cybersecurity

Summary

The 8th meeting of the 11th Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Security of and in the Use of ICTs concluded with the consensus adoption of a draft final report establishing a permanent global mechanism for cybersecurity discussions. Chair Ambassador Gafoor of Singapore emphasized that the Conference Room Paper (CRP) represented a “finely balanced package” requiring surgical rather than extensive changes, and urged delegates to avoid seeking perfection at the expense of achieving consensus. He warned that any attempts to reopen negotiations could upset the delicate balance and derail the transition to a single-track permanent mechanism.

Multiple delegations expressed support for the final report while noting areas of disappointment. India praised the establishment of the Global ICT Security Cooperation and Capacity Building Portal as a milestone for developing countries. The Arab Group, represented by Tunisia, expressed concerns about the removal of dedicated sections on international law and insufficient provisions for capacity building, but joined the consensus. Several Pacific Island nations, including Tonga and Vanuatu, highlighted how the process had been transformative for small island developing states and emphasized the importance of inclusive participation.

The United States expressed dissociation from certain paragraphs related to gender references and Sustainable Development Goals, while Russia and other like-minded countries voiced disappointment about the balance of implementation versus development of new norms. Many delegations specifically thanked the Women in International Security and Cyberspace Fellowship for enabling greater female participation, with Australia noting that women now make approximately 53% of interventions compared to one-third at the process’s beginning.

The Chair concluded by emphasizing that this represents a victory for multilateralism and the United Nations, establishing the foundation for a Global Mechanism that will begin operations with an organizational session by March 2026. He urged delegations to support a simple enabling resolution in the First Committee and to maintain the single-track approach moving forward.

Keypoints

## Major Discussion Points:

– **Adoption of the Final Report and Transition to Permanent Mechanism**: The primary focus was adopting the Conference Room Paper (CRP) containing the draft final report by consensus, establishing a single-track permanent mechanism for ongoing institutional dialogue on responsible state behavior in cyberspace under UN auspices.

– **Balancing Act and Compromise**: The Chair emphasized that the CRP represented a “very finely balanced package” requiring surgical amendments rather than extensive changes, with delegations needing to show flexibility and avoid letting “the search for perfection be the enemy of the good.”

– **Capacity Building and Inclusion**: Strong emphasis on capacity building for developing countries, particularly small island developing states, including the establishment of thematic groups and recognition of programs like the Women in International Security and Cyberspace Fellowship that enhanced participation.

– **International Law Concerns**: Several delegations, particularly from the Arab Group and others, expressed disappointment about the removal of dedicated sections on international law application in cyberspace, especially regarding international humanitarian law, while acknowledging the need for consensus.

– **Stakeholder Participation and Governance**: Discussion of modalities for non-governmental stakeholder participation in the future mechanism, with emphasis on maintaining the intergovernmental nature while allowing consultative participation under specific procedures.

## Overall Purpose:

The discussion aimed to conclude a five-year Open-Ended Working Group process by adopting a final report that would establish a permanent UN mechanism for ongoing dialogue on cybersecurity and responsible state behavior in cyberspace, ensuring a smooth transition from the current working group to a single-track future mechanism.

## Overall Tone:

The tone began formal and cautious, with the Chair setting expectations about the delicate balance required for consensus. As delegations expressed support for the document despite individual reservations, the atmosphere became increasingly positive and celebratory. The discussion concluded on a highly appreciative and emotional note, with extensive gratitude expressed toward the Chair and his team, reflecting relief at achieving consensus and pride in the multilateral accomplishment. The final portions were marked by warmth, humor, and genuine camaraderie among the participants.

Speakers

**Speakers from the provided list:**

– **Chair** – Ambassador Burhan Gafoor of Singapore, Chair of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICTs

– **India** – Delegation representative

– **Vanuatu** – Delegation representative

– **Tunisia** – Speaking on behalf of the Arab group

– **Tonga** – Speaking on behalf of the Pacific Island Forum member states with a presence in the United Nations

– **Venezuela** – Delegation representative, aligning with Nicaragua’s statement on behalf of like-minded countries

– **El Salvador** – Delegation representative

– **Islamic Republic of Iran** – Delegation representative, aligning with the LMG Group statement

– **Mauritius** – Delegation representative

– **Israel** – Delegation representative

– **Cuba** – Delegation representative

– **Republic of Korea** – Delegation representative

– **Egypt** – Delegation representative, aligning with Arab group and African group statements

– **China** – Delegation representative

– **Argentina** – Delegation representative

– **European Union** – Speaking on behalf of EU member states

– **Mozambique** – Delegation representative

– **Brazil** – Delegation representative

– **United Kingdom** – Delegation representative

– **Portugal** – Delegation representative

– **Russian Federation** – Delegation representative

– **United States** – Delegation representative

– **Switzerland** – Delegation representative

– **Canada** – Delegation representative

– **Nicaragua** – Speaking on behalf of like-minded states (Belarus, Venezuela, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Iran, Niger, Russian Federation, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Nicaragua)

– **Malaysia** – Speaking on behalf of ASEAN

– **Australia** – Delegation representative, aligning with Pacific Islands Forum Statement

– **Malawi** – Delegation representative

– **Ghana** – Delegation representative

– **Colombia** – Delegation representative

– **Fiji** – Speaking on behalf of a cross-regional group and in national capacity

– **France** – Delegation representative, aligning with EU statement

– **Pakistan** – Delegation representative

– **Algeria** – Delegation representative, aligning with Arab group and African group statements

– **New Zealand** – Delegation representative

– **Ireland** – Delegation representative, aligning with EU statement

– **Germany** – Delegation representative, aligning with EU statement

– **Greece** – Delegation representative, aligning with EU statement

– **Albania** – Delegation representative

– **Papua New Guinea** – Delegation representative, aligning with Pacific Island Forum statement

– **Sierra Leone** – Delegation representative

**Additional speakers:**

– **Philippines** – Delegation representative, aligning with ASEAN statement (spoke under Malaysia nameplate but identified as Philippines)

# Comprehensive Report: 8th Meeting of the 11th Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICTs

## Executive Summary

The 8th meeting of the 11th Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Security of and in the Use of ICTs concluded with the consensus adoption of a draft final report (document A.AC.292.2025.CRP.1), establishing a permanent global mechanism for cybersecurity discussions under United Nations auspices. Chair Ambassador Burhan Gafoor of Singapore emphasized that the Conference Room Paper (CRP) represented a “finely balanced package” requiring only surgical amendments rather than extensive changes, warning that further amendments could create “the risk of not being able to cross the finish line.”

All delegations ultimately joined consensus despite expressing various reservations about specific provisions. The outcome consolidates work dating back to 1998 and establishes the foundation for ongoing institutional dialogue on responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, with an organizational session to be held no later than March 2026.

## Opening Framework and Chair’s Guidance

Ambassador Gafoor opened the session by establishing clear parameters for the discussion, describing the CRP as walking “a very fine line, almost a tight rope” that required delegates to show flexibility and avoid “making the search for perfection the enemy of the good.” He noted that in multilateral negotiations, there would inevitably be “disappointment, displeasure, dissatisfaction, and even possibly frustration.”

The Chair contextualized the document as “a crystallisation of efforts not just this week, not just this past few months, not just these past few years, but a consolidation of decades of work starting with previous OEWGs and GGE processes.” He emphasized that any further amendments could “upset the apple cart” and derail the transition to a single-track permanent mechanism.

The Chair explained the evolution of regular institutional dialogue discussions from 2022 to 2025, noting that the first annual progress report in 2022 made an “in-principle decision to establish a global POC directory,” which was subsequently launched in May 2024.

## Universal Consensus Despite Reservations

### Delegation Positions

Tunisia, speaking on behalf of the Arab Group, established the pattern by expressing “certain reservations on the final form of the report” whilst choosing to “join the consensus on the CRP paper.” This approach was followed by numerous other delegations.

India praised the establishment of the Global ICT Security Cooperation and Capacity Building Portal as “a milestone for developing countries” whilst acknowledging that “many additional elements could have been incorporated.” China described the CRP as a “finely balanced package” despite noting areas where improvements could have been made.

The European Union welcomed the “balanced approach and consensus achievement” whilst noting they “would have preferred more ambitious language in certain areas.” Brazil expressed that whilst they “would have liked a higher level of ambition in some sections,” they recognized “a fair and balanced document.”

Several Pacific Island nations, including Tonga speaking on behalf of the Pacific Island Forum member states, highlighted the transformative nature of the process for small island developing states. Vanuatu emphasized the importance of inclusive participation, thanking the Chair for showing “respect to small island developing states” regardless of their size or resources.

## Major Areas of Disagreement

### International Law Provisions

The most significant area of contention centered on international law provisions and their application to cyberspace. Tunisia, representing the Arab Group, expressed particular concern about “the fact that the section reserved for international law and cyberspace was removed,” describing this as exacerbating “concerns by certain states regarding the use of ICTs.” The delegation noted “clear violations of IHL in the Middle East with the use of ICTs” and requested that “the Chair of the Mechanism hold a conference on the application of international law.”

Egypt, aligning with both Arab Group and African Group statements, expressed disappointment about “how international law compliance will be approached” under the new mechanism. Algeria voiced concern about “the removal of dedicated space for international law discussion,” whilst Canada “profoundly regretted that the final report fails to capture the substantive convergence on international law that became clear in the room.”

Australia noted disappointment that “the international law chapter does not capture all the progress made and emerging convergence reached over almost five years,” whilst Ireland regretted the “insufficient reflection of international law discussions.”

In contrast, the Russian Federation explicitly rejected “automatic and unconditional application of international law to the digital sphere,” arguing instead for “development of universal convention on international information security.”

### Gender References and Terminology

A notable disagreement emerged regarding gender-related language in the document. The United States expressed disappointment that “the report retains references to gender and the Sustainable Development Goals,” with the delegation formally dissociating from specific paragraphs containing these references.

Argentina provided a restrictive interpretation, stating that they “understand the word gender in the framework of international law as referring to two sexes, male and female, in accordance with the Rome Statute 7.3.” This contrasted with Fiji’s position, which “welcomed the references to gender included in the final report” and highlighted “the valuable role of the Women in International Security and Cyberspace Fellowship.”

### Capacity Building Mechanisms

Developing countries expressed significant disappointment with capacity building provisions. Tunisia noted “the weakness of the section on capacity building,” particularly the inability “to set up a voluntary fund or a fellowship programme.” Algeria maintained that “the content and recommendations regarding capacity building are significantly lower than expectations,” arguing that “without concrete steps to establish a UN-led capacity building vehicle with adequate resources, the discussions will not realise their desired potential.”

The Russian Federation, however, welcomed “the consensus decision of the OEWG to create a thematic group on capacity building under the Global Mechanism” and noted the launch of the Global POC directory in May 2024.

## Stakeholder Participation and Governance

Portugal expressed disappointment that “Member States were not able to agree on more equitable and transparent future modalities for selection of non-governmental interested parties.” This contrasted with Nicaragua’s position, speaking on behalf of like-minded states, which welcomed that “accredited stakeholders will participate on a non-objection basis with solely consultative status, maintaining the strictly intergovernmental nature.”

The Russian Federation viewed “the participation of non-state actors in the activities of the OEWG as of limited utility when it comes to conflict settlement and building up technical capacity.”

## Women’s Participation and Gender Inclusion

Despite disagreements over gender language, there was broad appreciation for the Women in International Security and Cyberspace Fellowship. Tonga expressed “appreciation for Women in International Security and Cyber Fellowship,” whilst Ghana thanked the programme for “enabling meaningful participation.” Mozambique noted how the fellowship had enabled “meaningful participation” from women delegates.

Australia provided empirical evidence of the programme’s impact, noting that “when the OEWG began… about one third of interventions were made by women. And since then, we’ve been tracking a very encouraging trend… it is 55%. It was 55% in February, and it’s 53% at this session.”

Colombia celebrated “the leadership and meaningful participation of women in the working group,” whilst Fiji highlighted how the fellowship had helped build “a global community of cyber practitioners.”

## Multilateralism and UN Framework

Multiple delegations emphasized that the successful consensus outcome represented a victory for multilateralism. China noted that “given the current geopolitical landscape, which is filled with challenges, hot-spot conflicts in regions are ongoing, and in countries we see that some countries are not so keen on the concept of multilateralism… The success of our meeting is of a special, great significance.”

India recognized the “achievement as testament to multilateral dialogue value,” whilst Brazil appreciated the “success demonstrating multilateralism effectiveness.” Pakistan welcomed the “consensus outcome as historic milestone,” and Albania viewed the “consensus as victory for multilateralism.”

## Specific National Positions and Additional Reservations

The United States not only dissociated from gender references but also opposed Sustainable Development Goals references, arguing that “the Sustainable Development Goals advance a programme of soft global governance that is inconsistent with U.S. sovereignty.”

Argentina recalled that “Agenda 2030 is not legally binding and that each state in exercise of their sovereignty has the right to interpret and pursue freely.”

Cuba expressed concern about “the neutrality of technologies notion in paragraph 26,” whilst the Islamic Republic of Iran remained concerned that “the final report does not fully reflect the entire range of the threat landscape,” particularly regarding “private sector responsibilities and platforms with extraterritorial impact.”

Nicaragua, speaking on behalf of like-minded states including Belarus, Venezuela, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Iran, Niger, Russian Federation, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, emphasized “commitment to peaceful use of ICTs and prevention of arms race” whilst supporting “development of universal convention on international information security.”

## Future Mechanism Structure and Transition

Despite substantive disagreements, there was consensus on the structural aspects of the future global mechanism. The Islamic Republic of Iran emphasized “consensus-based decision-making in global mechanism,” whilst Nicaragua supported the “single-track, state-led, consensus-based global mechanism.”

France expressed “readiness to support operationalisation through First Committee resolution,” and Brazil committed to “constructive engagement in future mechanism.”

The Chair appealed for “just one single resolution on ICT security in the First Committee, not multiple resolutions,” seeking to maintain the single-track approach. He suggested that the Global Mechanism could be nicknamed “GMAC” and emphasized that the organizational session must be held “no later than March next year” (2026).

## Procedural Outcomes and Next Steps

The session concluded with the formal adoption of the final report contained in document A.AC.292.2025.CRP.1 by consensus, along with adoption of the procedural report (A-AC-292-2025-L1) authorizing the Chair to finalize it. The establishment of the Global Mechanism as a permanent single-track process was confirmed.

Singapore committed to presenting a simple enabling resolution in the First Committee to endorse the final report. The future mechanism will include dedicated thematic groups on capacity building and cross-cutting working groups, along with the establishment of the Global ICT Security Cooperation and Capacity Building Portal.

Delegations were given the option to submit written statements within three weeks to be compiled by the Secretariat.

## Acknowledgments and Closing

The Chair expressed gratitude to his team members by name: Dr. Gillian Goh, Matthew Wong, Clarice Lim, Dennis Scott, and intern Denise Chan. He also thanked UNODA staff including Catherine Priceman, Virginia Browning, Alexander Lomia, Natalia Uliana, and others for their support throughout the process.

The session concluded with arrangements for a family photo at 1 p.m. with the UN photographer, marking the end of this phase of the OEWG process and the beginning of preparations for the permanent Global Mechanism.

## Assessment

The consensus adoption represents a significant diplomatic outcome that demonstrates the possibility of multilateral cooperation in cybersecurity governance. While substantial disagreements remain on international law application, capacity building mechanisms, and stakeholder participation, the establishment of a permanent mechanism provides a foundation for continued dialogue on responsible state behaviour in cyberspace.

The successful transition from expert group discussions to inclusive multilateral processes, combined with measurable improvements in women’s participation, indicates positive evolution in international security diplomacy. The future Global Mechanism will inherit both the achievements and challenges of the OEWG process as it begins operations in 2026.

Chair: Distinguished Delegates, the 8th meeting of the 11th Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICTs is now called to order. Distinguished Delegates, dear friends, we will continue our discussion under Agenda Item 5 to consider the Draft Final Report, which was issued overnight as Document A.AC.292.2025.CRP.1. Before I open the floor for comments on the document that was issued last night, please allow me to make some general remarks to set the context for our discussions today. First, I want to apologize for the fact that the CRP was made available much later than I had anticipated. My apologies for that. Secondly, the CRP is a very finely balanced package of elements that have been put together to create the balance necessary for us to cross the finish line. In preparing the conference room paper, I have walked a very fine line, almost a tight rope. I have not made extensive changes to the CRP, and indeed I had said yesterday that in looking at Ref. 2, we will not be able to make extensive changes but surgical amendments. and tweaks. That indeed has been my approach to looking at the CRP. But the few changes I have made in my assessment were needed to make us cross the finish line. I know that there were a range of requests for additional changes, amendments, additions as well as deletions yesterday. But I thought about them very carefully and decided to take a very surgical and strategic approach to preparing the CRP. Fundamentally, because the more we add, the more we lose the balance. And therefore, my approach had been very, very surgical and very, very strategic. And I hope that you will be able to appreciate the balance and the adjustments I have made in the context of the need to maintain the overall balance. I have often said before that balance like beauty lies in the eyes of the beholder. So it is my hope that you will be able to see the balance in the text. From your point of view, it is very clear that for each one of you, there will be a degree of disappointment, displeasure, dissatisfaction, and even possibly frustration that your views have not been accommodated. But in creating that overall balance, it is necessary to focus on what will get us across the finish line. So that is the reason why I have… been very, very surgical and strategic in making these amendments. Secondly, I want to say that it is not my intention to open the text in CRP for further changes or further negotiations, because my concern is that if we entertain the idea of additional adjustments, there will be requests for a range of adjustments which is bound to lead to upsetting the apple cart, so to speak. And because it’s a very finely balanced package, any requests for amendments will be met with a counter request for further amendments, whether they are additions, deletions, modifications. I’m certain of that. So I’d like to appeal to each one of you to resist the temptation to make further proposals or to make requests for further adjustments. I’d also like to urge each one of you to avoid making the search for perfection the enemy of the good. In my assessment, the package that is before us is a crystallization of efforts not just this week, not just this past few months, not just these past few years, but a consolidation of decades of work starting with previous OEWGs and GGE processes. But in this process, the report that we have is a crystallization of work that has been done over the years. And therefore, once again, I appeal to each one of you to look at the final report in the context of all previous annual progress reports that have been achieved. The first annual progress report, and some of you have been involved in the process, in this process from the beginning, in the first annual progress report, we made an in-principle decision to establish a global POC directory. That was in 2022. In the second annual progress report, we worked on elements and the framework for a global POC directory. And we also began the discussions on some guiding principles for regular institutional dialogue in 2023. So the discussions on regular institutional dialogue, annex one that we are focusing on today, has its roots from the beginning of this process. So in 2023, we started with guiding principles for regular institutional dialogue. And last year, we adopted annex C on modalities. And this year, annex one builds on the additional modalities needed. So this has been a three-year process as far as regular institutional dialogue is concerned. And these processes or discussions over the last few years has been, in my view, very inclusive because every one of you have had the opportunity to put your views across. And we are at a stage where we have to agree on some final additional elements. And therefore, we are very close to finalizing the architecture that will enable us to make a smooth and seamless transition to a single-track permanent mechanism. So I wanted to say that the final progress report, which now contains a CRP document, is not something that has just happened over the last few days. It is a distillation, crystallization of different points of view built over the last few years and put together in a very, very finely balanced package, which is why I believe that at this very final moment, any effort to put in additional elements has the risk of derailing the process that began many years ago, the process of building a smooth and seamless transition to a single-track future permanent mechanism. And I’m explaining the context so as to urge you to reflect on how far we have traversed as a group, as a community, and how far we have come in terms of building layers of understanding, building a degree of convergence on a set of issues that are reflected in the annual progress report and potentially in this final progress report. And that is why any further amendments or requests is going to create the risk of not being able to cross the finish line. So I’d like each one of you to reflect on that as well. The final thing I would say is that the CRP will open the door into the future for this process. I think we are on the threshold of crossing from one mechanism into the new one. But that step forward is not something that I can take. That step forward to cross the threshold from this mechanism to the next is your decision to make. And as to whether there will be consensus on the CRP is also in your hands now. I’ve done my utmost as chair of this process to listen to each one of you, to create a conducive environment where different viewpoints are expressed, and also to be always transparent and to be faithful to the mandate of this process. But the ultimate decision as to whether there is consensus lies in your hands. And I wanted you to be aware of this moment as we begin the discussions this morning. So my friends, with these comments, I’d like to open the floor now to see if there are any views or whether any delegations wish to express their views on the conference room paper which contains the draft final report. Thank you very much. I have a few speakers with us for the floor, so we’ll start with India, to be followed by Portugal.

India: Thank you, Chair. India wishes to place on record its deep appreciation for your exemplary leadership and the meticulous efforts of your team throughout the OEWG process. It is commendable that this long journey of more than five years of this OEWG and other previous mechanisms also, marked by consensus and cooperation, is now at the dawn of a new phase with the establishment of a permanent mechanism. The OEWG’s work in discussing the many crucial elements of the continuously evolving landscape of cyberspace stands as a testament to the value of multilateral dialogue and consensus. While noting that many additional elements could have been incorporated in the conference room paper, India recognises that, in the spirit of consensus, it is essential to agree on the common grounds at this stage. Further, the global mechanism will provide a permanent platform to deliberate on further elements as and when required. We underscore the importance of continuing the discussions on existing and potential threats, since several new and emerging threats like AI power tools will need closer coordination and discussions. if we are to stay ahead of the malicious actors. In a similar vein, we recognize the merit in continuing discussions and facilitating common understandings on the application of international law in cyberspace, as well as in exploring the possibilities of requirement of additional norms, should it be warranted in future. We are very pleased to note that capacity building has been accorded the prominence it deserves. The establishment of the Global ICT Security Cooperation and Capacity Building Portal is a milestone and a concrete outcome of this crucial OEWG process. It is an important step in bridging the digital divide and has been an important ask, particularly of the Global South countries. We reiterate that India stands ready to provide any support necessary to ensure its success. India aligns itself with the positive sentiments expressed by many delegations regarding dedication of a separate dedicated thematic group focused on ICT security capacity building. With these points in mind and in the interest of consensus, India has shown flexibility and is extending its support to the conference room paper, as we view it as a balanced and pragmatic document that advances international cooperation and strengthens trust among States. We emphasize that all decisions in the future permanent mechanism should continue to be based on consensus as articulated in the Third Annual Progress Report. India remains committed to constructive engagement and international cooperation in the evolving landscape of ICT security. We look forward to a positive conclusion of this process and a swift realization of the future permanent mechanism. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, India, for your statement and for your support for the conference room paper. I give the floor now to Vanuatu, to be followed by Tunisia.

Vanuatu: Mr. Chair, good morning. On behalf of the Vanuatu delegation, I wish to extend to you, your team, and the Secretariat Our sincere thanks. Your respect for the views of small island-developing states like Vanuatu has been evident to us throughout these almost five years. Chair, on the other hand, we were saddened to see some references to cross-regional papers that we were supportive of were taken out in the latest draft. Those were important pieces of work where small island-developing states were contributing to the development of the framework for responsible state behaviour. On the other hand, we were pleased to see several of our comments on capacity building reflected in REF 2 and now in this CRP. And to us, this is the nature of diplomacy. None of us get everything we want. Mr. Chair, when you spoke about a fine balance, please rest assured that the Vanuatu delegation was listening. Mr. Chair, we are ready to adopt the CRP as presented. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Vanuatu, for your very important statement. It is indeed in the nature of diplomacy that each one of us need to show flexibility to give and take and to move forward. I appreciate your comments and your support for the CRP. Tunisia, you have the floor, please.

Tunisia: Mr. Chair, Mr. Bouran Dafur, the Republic of Tunisia is making this statement on behalf of the Arab group to explain its position on this document. document within the OEWG under Resolution 75240. At the outset, we thank you for your outstanding leadership of our work over the past five years, five years of serious work. We pay tribute to Singapore, a member of the Non-Aligned Group, which we are also members of, and we thank Singapore for its support within the OEWG in helping us arrive at the desired results. The Arab Group reiterates here its commitment to a transition toward a permanent mechanism, a comprehensive mechanism based on consensus within the UN. For us, this is a crucial goal that we are addressing in our meeting here, and it will lead us toward a global level of cybersecurity to tackle challenges, address risks, the risks that countries are increasingly facing in cyberspace, as well as in the use of ICTs. We commend these successes and your efforts, but would also like to make the following remarks. First of all, the fact that the section reserved for international law and cyberspace was removed exacerbates concerns by certain states regarding the use of ICTs. At a time when a common understanding is still far from certain with regard to the application of international law and its principles in cyberspace, we’re thinking about a particular international humanitarian law. We’ve seen clear violations of IHL in the Middle East with the use of ICTs. The Arab Group believes that the first working group and its extremely broad mandate does not allow for an in-depth discussion of this very important issue. That is the first thematic group. With regard to paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Annex, we will present proposals for amendments and we ask the Chair of the Mechanism to hold a conference on the application of international law. Secondly, the weakness of the section on capacity building, at a time when we are hoping that a thematic group dedicated to this issue, it was not possible to set up a voluntary fund or a fellowship program. We also note the lack of a mechanism that could support capacity building that would be adequately funded and predictable. For this to be possible, or at least part of it to be possible, we ought to support developing states. and help close the digital divide, but this remains only on paper. Thirdly, the Arab group is concerned about the significant changes to the international law section, which concerns very important principles supported by the Arab group, especially national sovereignty, as well as non-interference in domestic affairs of states, as well as non-use of force, respect for international humanitarian law, and the Orthomatic Group on International Law has been removed, and this exacerbates our concerns when it comes to international law being upheld under the permanent mechanism. Fourthly, the Arab group welcomes the fact that the intergovernmental nature of the mechanism has been maintained. If maintained, this mechanism would be led by states. The participation of stakeholders is also guaranteed, that is, stakeholders that have consultative status with ECOSOC under the no-objection procedure. In conclusion, the Arab group remains committed to constructive discussions within this forum to protect ourselves from pressing threats and challenges, we join the consensus on the CRP paper that contains the draft report, but we do express certain reservations on the final form of the report as well as complementary measures of the global mechanism. This might lead to the creation of a new process without taking into account the concerns that we have around strengthening peace and security.

Chair: Thank you very much Tunisia. Speaking on behalf of the Arab group, the statement is well noted and thank you very much also for indicating that your group is in a position to join consensus. Excellencies, dear friends, I am very heartened by the fact that you have taken into heed my message on the need to maintain the capital balance in the CRP. I see no further requests for the floor and it is my intention now to proceed to the adoption of the report as contained in document CRP 1, but I would like to assure you that you will all have an opportunity to make your statements after the adoption. May I take it that it is the wish of the Working Group to adopt the draft final report of the Open-Ended Working Group as contained in document AAC.292.2025.CRP 1 and to include it in the report of the Working Group. I see no objection. It is so decided. Thank you. Thank you very much for the applause. I think it was an applause of collective relief. Needless to say of collective joy and satisfaction, I hope, that with this adoption, ladies and gentlemen, we have taken a step into the future. Congratulations to you. So we will continue now with any delegation wishing to make statements. And after we have heard those who wish to make statements, we will move to the consideration of the draft procedural report because, as you know, there is a procedural report that is containing document L1. And then we’ll close the meeting. So I’d like to now open the floor for those delegations or groups of delegations wishing to make any statements. And once again, please be brief. we can be efficient in the use of our time. And I also wanted to highlight at this point that, yes, yeah, I also wish to highlight that you also have the option of sending in statements and explanation of position on the adoption of the final report. And these statements will be circulated in an information note by the Secretariat in the original language in which it has been submitted. And so you have the option of submitting any written statement, individually or as a group, three weeks after the meeting today, and the Secretariat will compile all statements in explanations of position on the adoption of the final report. And that is another option too, but I will not stop delegations from taking the floor at this point. The floor is now open. Tonga to be followed by Venezuela. Thank you.

Tonga: Thank you, Chair, and thank you for giving me the floor to speak first after this adoption, which is indeed an honor. On behalf of the Pacific Island Forum member states with a presence in the United Nations, I wish to express our deepest appreciation to you, Ambassador Gafoor, and to your entire team for your tireless work, unwavering commitment to multilateralism, and genuine passion you have brought to this process. The framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace has been to this process, strengthened under your stewardship, and we thank you for guiding this group in such dedication, patience, and inclusivity. We also wish to acknowledge the tireless efforts of Matthew Wong in supporting your leadership. We also extend our sincere thanks to the Secretariat, and in particular to Ms. Catherine Priseman, whose steady support and wise advice and diligent work has been instrumental throughout these four years. The Secretariat’s professionalism has ensured that all states, regardless of size or resource, have had the opportunity to meaningfully participate in shaping this process. Chair, one of the most meaningful achievements of this OEWG has been the inclusion of small island developing states. For our region, this has not been a symbolic gesture, it has been practical and transformative. We thank all our development partners who have made this participation possible. In particular, we highlight the Women in International Security and Cyber Fellowship, which has not only expanded SIDS and women’s participation, but also built a global community of cyber practitioners. That community, diverse, capable and connected, is one of the enduring legacies of this group, and we look forward to seeing it continue to grow. The OEWG has not been just a venue for discussion, it has been a catalyst for action. In our region, this process has driven national and regional change in strengthening our cyber resilience. Together, we have articulated common regional positions on many core issues. The unity shaped through dialogue, grounded in shared values, will outlast this working group and guide us into the next phase. Thank you Chair, and thank you all colleagues in this room. In the Pacific, we are voyaging peoples. We understand that to cross great oceans, we must travel together, each person with a role to play, each voice guiding the course. As we move forward, we hope the future mechanism will be built in the same spirit, steady, collective, inclusive, and with all states aboard. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Tonga, for your statement. Venezuela, to be followed by El Salvador.

Venezuela: Chair, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela aligns itself with a statement that is to be delivered by the delegation of Nicaragua on behalf of a group of like-minded countries. Chair, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela wishes to take this opportunity to express our profound thanks for the work that, without a doubt, can be described as excellent and spectacular. Over the course of the last five years, the work of the chair of this OEWG has been exemplary. However, over the last two years, you have shown how the curve of learning of the chair’s team has been even more impressive. Mechanisms for decisions such as voting are easy to implement, but understanding and applying a genuine sense of consensus across more than 100 countries to produce a document that reflects some of the opinions of all of the participants, who themselves have very diverging and sometimes even contradictory views, is a truly impressive achievement. All delegations here have a great debt of gratitude to the efforts, patience, and the temperance of the chair of this group. Chair, you stand as an example of how the member states of this organization should truly promote multilateralism internationally. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela naturally does not see that all of our considerations are included in the final report. But at the same time, Venezuela, together with the chair of this group, both of us, I think, understand the nature of consensus and that this is about multiple voices and ideas, all with the same right to be expressed and to be a part of international affairs. And for this reason, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has joined the consensus in ratifying the latest version of the draft final report of the OEWG. We take this opportunity once again to congratulate you, Ambassador Gaffer, on your excellent work. Thank you very much.

Chair: Thank you very much, Venezuela. El Salvador, please, to be followed by Islamic Republic of Iran.

El Salvador: Thank you, Chair. El Salvador wishes to express our sincere thanks to you for your tireless efforts, Ambassador Buhanga, for. And we thank you for the commitment of your team in this process. We extend special recognition to Madam Clarice Ling, Mr. Matthew Wong, and Ms. Jinyang Goh, with whom we have worked very closely. We also extend our thanks to those, perhaps invisible people, who are part of this core team. We would like to extend special thanks to Catherine Preisman and Virginia Browning from the Science and Technology Unit of the Office of Disarmament Affairs for their valuable dedication throughout this whole process. As the women in cyber and the privately funded fund has allowed us to participate, and we are deeply grateful. for these opportunities. Chair, El Salvador has firmly supported this process from its very beginning. We know that this is not a perfect document. We had aspired to a more progressive vision as to how to progress to implementation of the framework on responsible behavior. Nevertheless, from the perspective of a small state, we have gained a great deal. In an area that historically has been dominated by actors with greatest technological power and greater political influence, small states such as El Salvador have actually been able to position critical priorities. And we have done so by driving the strengthening of cybernetic capabilities and the development of national resilience, as well as raising awareness about emerging threats and highlighting the debate as to how international law can be applied to cyberspace. We consider that we have contributed to balancing these deliberations and to guaranteeing that the framework reflects a broader range of perspectives and development realities. El Salvador will continue promoting inclusive dialogue, greater trust, and digital solidarity. We do this because, for us, these are not mere abstract principles. These are concrete necessities in order to achieve effective governance for the protection of critical infrastructure and in order to ensure that technologies contribute to international peace and security. I thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, El Salvador. Islamic Republic of Iran, to be followed by Mauritius.

Islamic Republic of Iran: Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation would like to express its sincere appreciation to you, your team, and the Secretariat for your dedicated, tireless, and professional efforts throughout the OEWG process. Your commitment to fostering an inclusive, transparent, and constructive dialogue has been instrumental in guiding our collective work and advancing progress on this complex and vital agenda. We commend your leadership in building consensus among member states and in facilitating a smooth transition to the global mechanism. My delegation aligns itself with the joint statement of the LMG Group, which will be delivered later today. Mr. Chair, while we welcome and appreciate the positive improvements introduced throughout the various parts of the final report and acknowledge the progress made, my delegation remains concerned that it does not fully reflect the breadth of the Threat Landscape. My delegation remains concerned that it does not fully reflect the entire range of the Threat Landscape, as it overlooks several threats identified by a number of states during the OEWG deliberations, particularly those related to the responsibilities of the private sector and platforms with extraterritorial impact. To address this significant gap and ensure a more balanced and comprehensive representation of the OEWG mandate, my delegation put forward a compromise proposal to compile a list of threats identified by states throughout the OEWG process to serve as a valuable reference for the work of the global mechanism. We continue to strongly believe that our proposal offers a constructive way to address this substantive shortcoming in the threat section. In line with the final sentence of paragraph 14 of the final report, which acknowledges the need to continue addressing the diverse landscape of ICT threats in a manner that reflects the realities of all countries and regions, my delegation will remain engaged in advancing the consideration of critical threats identified by a number of states including my own, within the framework of global mechanism. Mr. Chair, the consensus-based decision-making modality of the global mechanism is clearly articulated in Annex C of the third APR, which states the future permanent mechanism would take all decision based on the principle of consensus. This language leaves no ambiguity regarding the intended approach. Decision within the future mechanism are to be made by consensus. Any interpretation that diverge from this agreed and fundamental principle would compromise the very foundation of the global mechanism and is therefore not acceptable. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you, Iran, for your statement. Mauritius, to be followed by Israel.

Mauritius: Thank you, Chair. The Mauritian delegation wishes to express our strong support for the adoption of the CRP as presented. The text reflects a balanced and constructive outcome of our collective efforts, and we commend the Chair, his team, and the Secretariat for their inclusive approach and diligent facilitation throughout the process. The CRP captures the key priorities and perspectives shared by delegations over the course of our discussions and represents a meaningful step forward. Furthermore, the CRP reflects the needs of small island developing states like Mauritius, offering concrete avenues for inclusion and capacity building support. We believe its adoption will contribute significantly to advancing our common objectives and reinforcing international cooperation in this important area. Before ending, and on a personal note, allow me, Chair, to extend my heartfelt thanks to everyone who has been part of. this journey. Yourself, Ambassador Goufour, Catherine, Virginia, Matthew, and everyone else. It has been a privilege to work alongside such dedicated and thoughtful colleagues right from the beginning. Your support, collaboration, and shared commitment over these past years have been deeply meaningful. Thank you for the trust, the conversations, and the many moments of shared purpose. I look forward to what we can continue to achieve together in the spirit of partnership and mutual respect. Thank you very much.

Chair: Thank you very much, Mauritius, for your statement and for your kind words. Israel, to be followed by Cuba.

Israel: Thank you, Chair, for giving us the floor. Dear Chair, Israel wishes to express its sincere and deep appreciation to you and your very, very able team for your dedicated leadership throughout this process, culminating today in the successful adoption of this consensual report. This achievement underscores the importance of the principle of consensus as a cornerstone of our work. It is this spirit of inclusivity and shared ownership that has enabled all of us to advance a common understanding of responsible state behavior in cyberspace. Some of our reservations still remain unanswered, and unfortunately not all our concerns were fully addressed in the final version of the CRP. However, in the spirit of consensus, wishing to express positive will and in the light of all the constructive cooperation presented through the last few days here in New York by so many delegations, we understand the need for a certain degree of flexibility. Israel joined all delegations and is pleased to support this CRP. We can assure you that the Israeli delegation remains committed to work with all other states and to continue to present a constructive approach to further advance the dialogue on cybersecurity in the UN framework. As the mandate of the Open-Ended Working Group ends today, and we look ahead to the establishment of a global mechanism, Israel has constantly maintained that consensus must continue to guide us in all our decision-making, whether on procedural or substantive matters. Only by preserving this principle and decision-making modality can we assure that the interests and perspectives of all Member States are duly respected and that our collective efforts remain credible, balanced, and effective. We are encouraged by the fact that our discussions have time and again proven that this notion is universally shared by Member States, and we welcome the agreement on this matter, as it clearly reflects in the third APR and in the current final report as well. On a personal note, I have been personally deeply honored to take part in this process from its inception. As Israel has been an active and contributing member of several GGEs and both Open-Ended Working Groups, including as a member of the 2015 GGE which led the foundation of the framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, we can assure you, Mr. Chair, that Israel will continue to work to build global cyber resilience and to promote the security and stability of cyberspace. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Israel, for your statement and also for your expressions of support. Cuba to be followed by Republic of Korea, please.

Cuba: Thank you, Chair. We are grateful to you for your intense efforts in achieving the final report of the OEWG on security of and in the use of ICTs following five years of RGF’s work. We also appreciate the professionalism of your team and the support from the Secretariat. The agreement for the establishment of an intergovernmental mechanism that will be maintained through consensus and will allow regular institutional dialogue under the auspices of the United Nations is truly a meaningful achievement. The Cuban delegation has been working actively towards this end as part of our commitment to the OEWG, a forum created under the proposal of the Russian Federation together with a group of countries, and this is especially important for developing countries. We’re also grateful to delegations for their cooperation that allowed this result despite such divergent positions and intense days of deliberations. Chair, with a view to discussions under the future mechanism, we wish to place on the record that there is not currently a common understanding on the supposed neutralities of technologies, a notion that is mentioned in paragraph 26 of the final report. At the same time, we should not force the notion of the applicability of IHL onto cyberspace in light of concerns because some countries are developing offensive capacities in relation to the use of ICTs, and so we think that rather than tacitly agreeing to the possibility of a scenario of armed conflict in cyberspace, rather we should be focused on the essential purpose which is preserving ICTs for exclusively peaceful purposes aimed at furthering development. We hope that this new chapter that is being opened Now, we’ll make progress in legally binding obligations in the area of ICT security and their use. This would facilitate common understanding as to how international law applies to this area. It will address legal gaps, and we hope establish clear obligations for all states. Cuba maintains its commitment to actively contribute to this end. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Cuba, for your statement and also for your expressions of support for the outcome document. Republic of Korea, to be followed by Egypt.

Republic of Korea: Thank you, Chair. You and your team’s excellent leadership and dedication to this OEWG process and multilateralism. As you rightly pointed out, it is a rare thing to enjoy 100% satisfaction about the outcome of multilateral negotiation. Nevertheless, we’re hopeful because you said that this outcome of our work is not final. This is only part of a long journey where we can achieve more in the end. So I believe we have still a long way to go, but under your leadership, I think we can continue to constructively engage with other distinguished colleagues here and achieve meaningful outcome in the end. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Republic of Korea, for your statement and also for your support and kind statement. Just a slight clarification to your statement. It will no longer be me under my leadership. You are right that we have a long journey ahead. I am confident that all of you with the spirit of goodwill. that you have built over the years will be able to make that long journey, but it will not be under my leadership. Thank you very much for that. Egypt to be followed by China.

Egypt: Thank you, Chair. And the first thing that we say that we invite you to reconsider. Chairperson, we align with the statement delivered earlier by Tunisia on behalf of the Arab group as well as the statement delivered yesterday by Nigeria on behalf of the African group. In the first intervention by the Egyptian delegation during this 11th meeting, we underscored that our main and key priority would be to ensure a seamless transition to a future permit mechanism that can enable the continuation of a single-track, action-oriented, and consensus-based UN-led process on security of and in the use of ICT and not to open the space for a vacuum or competitive initiatives. From this prism, Egypt joins consensus today around the draft report. We based our decision on a number of considerations, including the fact that this report complements the three annual progress reports previously adopted by consensus, and that the normative framework of responsible state behavior continues to be cumulative and evolving. We welcome also the steps taken at this report to reflect a more diverse and representative landscape of threats that captures the reality in different regions. Nevertheless, and as explained on previous occasions, we continue to be deeply disappointed with some crucial points with this report and its annex. The omission of a dedicated DTG on the application of international law in the context of cyberspace is very alarming, and along with the significant reduction in the content of Section D on international law, Egypt, like many others, is concerned with how the application of and compliance with respective international law obligations, including international humanitarian law, will be approached under the new global mechanism. It is important to indicate once again that our interest and commitment to discussion supporting respect to international law and the UN Charter does not in any meaner way indicate conclusive preference or pre-empting a discussion on a legally binding instrument as an indispensable pathway. As mentioned by the Arab Group, we will continue to advance this avenue at the upcoming review meeting and request the Chairperson of the Global Mechanism to convene a focused roundtable on application of international law. In addition, we maintain our view that the content and recommendations in relation to capacity building is significantly lower than our expectations. Without concrete and meaningful steps to establish a UN-led capacity building vehicle, including through the Voluntary Fund and Sponsorship Program, and availing adequate, sufficient and predictable resources for this purpose, the discussion at DTG 2 will not realize its desired potential. Making meaningful and prompt progress on this front will be crucial for the level of confidence and the credibility of the newly born mechanism. Mr. Chairperson, having said that, we won’t miss on paying tribute to your exemplary leadership. Chairperson, we have mentioned before, and we are saying it once again, you were consistently the most serious and diligent participant in this process. From its inception until its conclusion, without your strong and impactful leadership, this process would have been in a very different place, which is way less effective and ambitious. I want also to extend our gratitude to my two dear colleagues and friends from your team, Matthew Wong and Clarice Lim, and the very dedicated team at the Secretariat, Ms. Preissman and Ms. Browning. Chairperson, thank you for taking us forward at a time when consensus around progress at the UN is becoming the exception rather than the norm. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Egypt, for your statement and for your very kind words. address to me and members of my team. China to be followed by Argentina.

China: Thank you, Chair. This morning’s meeting, obviously, which leaves me with the most impression is the round of very loud applauses. I believe that everybody has different interpretation of that round of applauses. But in the past week, the delegates who had the least sleep would have the most feelings about that round of applauses. What I mean is the most of the people that I was talking about are on the podium right now. And that is why I would like to take this opportunity to thank you, the Chair. Thank you, you and your able team, as well as colleagues from the Secretariat. I would like to thank you for your hard work. Obviously, undoubtedly, today is a very special, successful day with far-reaching consequences. I would like to make the first point, that is, the outcome of today’s meeting shows that our mechanism has passed a very important stress test. Given the current geopolitical landscape, which is filled with challenges, hot-spot conflicts in regions are ongoing, and in countries we see that some countries are not so keen on the concept of multilateralism. Given this context and background, I would like to ask you to give us some examples of how you would like us to respond. The success of our meeting is of a special, great significance. As the multilateral system is faced with such difficulties, today’s meeting and success increases our confidence in multilateralism. The second point I would like to make is, in terms of multilateral process on ICT security, we are seeing a new milestone today. The topic became a topic under the consideration of the UN as early as 1998, and in the past 27 years, if we look back, we have achieved two most important milestones, the first one being framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, the other being the draft report on the creation of a future permanent mechanism. As technology evolves, there are new emerging topics and subject matters, and cyberspace, in fact, is one of the more mature topics. In the past 27 years, the success we have achieved would be a very good example that we could learn when we deal with other governance issues in emerging areas. And when we look at new emerging topics, and if we look forward for another 27 years, they may not see as good an outcome as what we have today. I may be the delegate with the longest working history in the area of cyberspace, and I would like to say that I am proud of that experience. The third point I’d like to make is that China has always been an advocate for multilateralism, as well as a strong supporter of the United Nations’ international rules, among others. And we know that the current multilateral system is far from being perfect. The rules are far from being complete. The current reality of abiding by these rules are not satisfactory either. But China believes that, through multilateral efforts, we need to improve and strengthen current mechanisms, instead of just walking away or abandoning them. Because we believe that without a multilateral mechanism, the international community will turn into a place where it is more – it more resembles a jungle world, where everybody speaks from strength. I would like to say that only a very small number of countries will be able to sit by the table of the international community while the majority of the countries will become what’s put on the table, put on the menu. That is why multilateralism or the multilateral system for all member states, in particular for small and medium countries, has special and significant importance. The third point I would like to make is that the achievement we have seen today is the result of the collective efforts of all member states. But I would like to be very objective in saying that our success is because we have an exceptional chair. Thanks to your abundant diplomatic experience and excellent diplomatic skills, as well as your deep understanding of different positions of all countries, as well as the cyberspace itself in the past five years, given such a context that is filled with challenges. Thanks to your leadership, our sessions have reached today’s outcome, which is really hard work. Compared with other excellent diplomats, you, the chair, has a unique strong suit. At the critical moment of a negotiation, through changing the color of your outfit, you would send sensitive but important messages to all delegates. From yesterday, I actually was looking forward to enjoying today’s success. In closing, I would like to say that this document, or this new milestone, is a success of multilateralism. It is also a success of all delegations. This is also the success of all the diplomats sitting here in this conference room, working in the area of cyberspace. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, China, for your very, very kind remarks addressed to me and my team, and also for your support for the outcome document and for this process. And as you say, as one of the longest-serving representatives in the room at this point now, who has been involved in this process for such a long period, I think your role has been very helpful. And I would also say, for those who have not served as long, or even if this is your very first meeting, I think each one of you who has contributed to the outcome of this process and the outcome of this meeting today, you have the responsibility to play that role of being a catalyst for consensus, as a facilitator for convergence, as a trust-builder and a bridge-builder. Because multilateralism is not just a process that is mechanical. It is a process where people have views. People have agency, people can make a difference, and people need to build trust. And so while quite a number of you have said very kind words about me and my team, I think ultimately this is your success. I wasn’t going to respond to all these comments. I was going to make some closing remarks, which I’d like to do. But we do have a long list of speakers. I’d like to hear as many of you as possible. But keep in mind that ultimately this is your success, it is your process, it is your outcome, and it is you who will have to take this and continue this journey of 1,000 miles. So thank you very much. But it is correct that I have a colorful handkerchief today. And I thought I should cheer myself up because it’s Friday. But ultimately it’s all of you who have cheered me up. So I thank you very much for all your friendship. Long list of speakers, but let me add at this point that it’s my intention to conclude our meeting at 1 p.m. So that you can have the afternoon free to do what you need to do. So I’d like to hear as many of you as possible, then we have to adopt the procedural report, and then I’ll make some concluding comments in terms of what we need to do moving forward, including the first committee resolution that needs to be adopted as well to complete the passage of this report. But we’ll continue with the speakers list. Argentina to be followed by the European Union.

Argentina: Senor President. Chair, I’m taking the floor to express an explanation of position in relation to the final report of the OEWG on the security of and in the use of ICTs. We welcome the report, and we thank everyone for its adoption. On the word gender, Argentina understands in the framework of international law which refers to two sexes. male and female in accordance with the Rome Statute 7.3. The commitment of Argentina to women’s rights has been sustained over time and is reflected in international practices that actually goes beyond international standards. As regards to Agenda 2030, Argentina recalls that it is not legally binding that each state in exercise of their sovereignty has the right to interpret and pursue freely. Chair, we wish to express our gratitude to you for the effective, transparent, and inclusive manner in which you have led the work of this group over the past five years of its mandate. We especially value the momentum from all delegations as well as the professionalism of the Secretary of the ODA and also the work of the interpreters whose technical support has been essential throughout this process. We highlight that the contributions made by states are reflected in a balanced way in the final document as the exercise of a genuine negotiation process. This confirms the collective commitment to maintaining an open, interoperable, stable, secure, and peaceful cyberspace. We are especially gratified to see the incorporation of a thematic group dedicated to capacity building, a proposal that had firm support from my delegation and many other countries in our region throughout the process. We consider that the final report represents a meaningful contribution to strengthening the multilateral framework in the area of cyber security and cyber resilience and builds on more than two decades of multilateral work made up of principles, capacity building measures, and understandings that will continue to guide progress in an international framework on security in the use of ICTs. Thank you. you, your team, and the Secretariat will build on achievements to date, preserving the spirit of consensus, transparency, and representativeness that has characterized this process. The present explanation of position has been submitted to the Secretariat for publication. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Argentina, for your statement. European Union, to be followed by Mozambique.

European Union: Thank you, Chair. I know that all of EU member states would want to take the floor to thank you, and some will certainly do that. But at the same time, saying for the last time this week that I have the honor to speak on behalf of the EU member states, I also know that we likely run the risk to go into the afternoon with all our thank yous. So therefore, please note, indeed, I speak on behalf of all of the EU member states. If you don’t hear them all, this is certainly from them all. Not only this week, but over the past years, we’ve shown commitment. We’ve shown flexibility and dedication with the aim to advance responsible state behavior in cyberspace and conclude this process with a smooth and seamless transition to a single-track future permanent mechanism. Our ambitions in the report might have been different, as our intervention over the past days has shown. This week and this morning has also proven that the ambition to establish a permanent mechanism has been at the core of what unites us all. While we all have our additional wish list for the report, all well known, we applaud our collective achievement to agree on a global mechanism that will allow us to walk the talk, to take real action, using the tools that the UN framework and all its pillars offer us against the real challenges that we are all facing in cyberspace, challenges that affect our security, our economy, and our democracies. And we look forward to take this next step together, working together to advance responsible state behavior in cyberspace, building upon our collective achievements since the first UN group of governmental experts. and including this final Open-Ended Working Group report. The EU and its Member States want to wholeheartedly thank you, you and your team, for your efforts and the good cooperation. Matthew, Clarice, Gillian, as well as the UNODA, Catherine and Virginia, as well as UN Secretary General Nakamitsu, it has been a real pleasure to work with you all. Chair, your wise leadership has allowed us to make history. It has collectively moved us forward to advance responsible state behaviour in cyberspace and will serve to demonstrate the value of multilateralism. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, European Union, for your kind statement. Mozambique, to be followed by Brazil.

Mozambique: Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving us the floor. My delegation commend you and your team for your hard work. We especially congratulate you on your outstanding leadership and the successful conclusion of the Open-Ended Working Group mandate. The adoption of the final report is a major milestone in international cyber diplomacy and a testament to your commitment to transparency, inclusivity and consensus. We also wish to acknowledge the Women in International Security and Cyberspace Fellowship, which has significantly empowered women delegates, including Mozambicans, in a meaningful way. It stands as a model for inclusive and impactful capacity building. As we close this chapter, Mozambique looks ahead with optimism to the operationalisation of the future global mechanism. We remain committed to working constructively with all Member States and stakeholders. to ensure it becomes an effective and action-oriented platform that reflects the priorities of all state special developing countries. Technology will continue to evolve, just as trade will. Undoubtedly, we will face new challenges, but today we leave behind a meaningful legacy. This is not the end, but a beginning, and we will surely have further opportunities to come together, united to shape our common future in the digital world. Parabéns, congratulations, and I will say it in my mother tongue language, Makorokot, Mr. Chair, and all of us, I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Mozambique, for your support and very kind statements. Brazil, to be followed by the UK.

Brazil: Mr. Chair, I would like to express my delegation’s deepest appreciation to you and your team for the outstanding work throughout the past five years, which culminated in the adoption of our final report this morning. One of multilateralism’s greatest clichés is that a fair and balanced document is one that no delegation finds perfect, but with which everyone is equally unhappy. It is true that we would have liked a higher level of ambition in some sections, particularly international law. Nevertheless, we still have a fair and balanced document, which is a meaningful addition to our acquis, and an important contribution to the promotion of an open, safe, secure, stable, accessible, peaceful, and interoperable ICT environment, and which lays the groundwork for a seamless transition to a single-track permanent mechanism to address ICT security. Achieving this by consensus in such challenging geopolitical circumstances is a testament to the crucial importance and effectiveness of multilateralism. Brazil has been an active participant throughout this process, and you can count on us to continue our constructive engagement the future mechanism. On a final note, Brazil joins other delegations in thanking you for your extremely able leadership and unwavering commitment to a fair and balanced, to fair and balanced since the beginning of this process. We must also acknowledge Clarice Lim, Matthew Wong and Gillian Goh from your team and Catherine Priesman and Virginia Browning from the Secretariat for their exceptional work throughout this process. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much Brazil for your support and kind words. UK to be followed by Portugal. Thank you chair.

United Kingdom: We would like to offer our sincere and heartfelt congratulations to you, to your team and to the Secretariat. I won’t repeat their names again but they know who they are, for delivering this critically important outcome on behalf of UN member states today. The UK welcomes the adoption of the CRP by consensus, which marks a meaningful and important step towards advancing a free, open, peaceful, secure international order in cyberspace. The UK has contributed to international cybersecurity discussions at the UN for over 25 years. We remain as committed as always to these consensus discussions at the UN and the importance of the UN framework on responsible state behavior in cyberspace and its role in strengthening and safeguarding stability in cyberspace. We look forward to the global mechanism building on and deepening the many successes of this OEWG in March 2026. Thank you chair.

Chair: Thank you very much UK. Portugal to be followed by the Russian Federation.

Portugal: Mr. Chairman, Portugal aligns with your statement but would like to add some comments on the meaning of the adoption of the final report of this open-ended working group, including the mandate for the next and permanent mechanism. for Institutional Dialogue on Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace eventually agreed by consensus to a great extent thanks to your superior diplomatic talents and engagement. As we all required, the mandate provides for regular institutional dialogue focused on the implementation of the consensually agreed normative framework of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, repeatedly endorsed by the UN General Assembly since 2015. The future dialogue, focused on implementation of the normative framework, is meant to contribute decisively to upgrade national cyber capabilities across divides and to enable us to move on to a formal system of mutual accountability that levels up all Member States’ contributions to peace and security in the digital space, so that all of them can peacefully and securely benefit from the digital transition. The future cross-cutting working group designed to address specific security challenges to an open, stable, accessible, peaceful and interoperable cyberspace, and the cross-cutting working group designed to accelerate cyber security capacity building in tandem with the global roundtable, have the potential to lead us towards action-oriented results and towards further layers of understanding of the applicability in cyberspace of existing international law, including the UN Charter, human rights law and international humanitarian law. It goes without saying that the Member States should have been able to agree on more equitable and transparent future modalities for the selection of non-governmental interested parties, especially from the industry, given the private nature of the gatekeeping tech companies and of the vast majority of the critical infrastructures of our countries. But as you, Mr. Chairman, very well reminded us yesterday, there are no perfect UN documents. After all, at the review conferences of the next mechanism, Member States will, of course, remain free to, according to their evaluation of the results achieved, not only revisit the initial cross-cutting working group structure, but also improve the modalities of stakeholder participation. What we have achieved in three and a half years will be crucial to the contribution of the next mechanism of institutional dialogue to what I see as a desirable long-term voluntary universal system of periodic compliance reporting, which would involve all of us in monitoring and assisting one another to achieve a higher degree of accountability in ensuring peace and security all along the digital development of our nations. Therefore, I would like, on behalf of my government, to once again thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your outstanding dedication and wish you all the best going forward in your career. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Portugal, for your very kind words. Russian Federation, to be followed by the United States.

Russian Federation: Mr. Chair, distinguished colleagues, the Russian delegation, thanks you, Mr. Chair, and your team for all the work you’ve done over the past five years, very difficult work as the chair of this working group. Under your wise leadership, the group became a truly effective mechanism and reaffirmed its status as the essential UN platform for issues relating to security in the use of ICTs. Over the past five years, besides adopting full consensus reports, the group was also able to achieve concrete and practical results, including, first and foremost, the Global Intergovernmental Directory of Points of Contact, which was launched on Russia’s initiative in May 2024, and became the first universal confidence-building measure. And this all is to your credit, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, Russia welcomes the consensus-based agreement to establish a single permanent mechanism on security in the use of ICTs. This mechanism further augments the role of the UN in overseeing this important topic and makes her body to the OEWG a central universal format to discuss issues of security in the use of ICTs. Mr. Chair, Russia joined the consensus on the final report of the OEWG. In the report, what was important for us in many states was reflected, however, to our deep disappointment, a number of our ideas, initiatives, and proposals that had been supported by other delegations over the past five years of the OEWG’s work and which are objective reflections of our discussions were not taken into account. And so there was a balance on a number of important topics that was not adhered to. We tried to reflect fairly the views of many states within the future mechanism and other relevant UN platforms in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality of states. It’s unacceptable for a group of states to impede the expression of views of other states, placing their interests over those of others. That runs counter to the fundamental principles of the UN Charter. Mr. Chair, I’d like to make the following clarifying statement. Russia holds, as agreed by the OEWG, its reports and relevant geo-resolutions that this mechanism is useful and ought to develop new norms of international law for digital security. And we support the continuation of relevant discussions in the future mechanism. Mr. Chair. An automatic and unconditional application of international law to the digital sphere is unacceptable. Reference to alleged sufficiency of certain norms of international law do not hold water. And this is against the discussions of the OEWG and its work on the first universal agreement on information security, the UN Convention Against Cybercrime. We call on all states to join this convention and to allow for it to enter into effect as soon as possible. The future global mechanism ought to work on issues of security in the use of ICTs as well as ICTs themselves. The mechanism ought to work to strengthen confidence between states, to prevent conflict between states, and will facilitate decisions by consensus in the information sphere. The basis for this is the unanimous adoption of the Russian initiative to create this intergovernmental global directory of points of contact. The participation of non-state actors in the activities of the OEWG were of limited utility when it comes to conflict settlement and building up technical capacity. In addition, certain NGOs and private ICT actors abused their status, undermining diplomatic efforts by leveling accusations against states. We believe it’s unacceptable to undermine the intergovernmental nature of discussions on security in the use of ICTs within the future mechanism, and we welcome the maintenance of the sovereign right of states to remove themselves from the work of the – that is, to remove from the work of the future mechanism NGOs that display inappropriate behavior. We see continued attempts to focus attention on certain topics, for example, AI, quantum computing, Internet of Things, ransomware and underwater cameras, and other such issues. We believe that these actions are not constructive and do not facilitate – and they increase the digital inequality between states. We welcome the consensus decision of the OEWG to create a thematic group on capacity building under the Global Mechanisms, this important step toward overcoming the digital divide between countries. We hope for the occupation of all member states of the UN in implementing these tenets. We support capacity building in developing countries in the field of information security, including by signing legally binding agreements with these countries to strengthen their digital sovereignty. We support the development of a universal convention on international information security, the concept of which was presented by Russia together with likeminded states at the UN in April 2023. Mr. Chair, I ask you to include this statement in the Compendium of National Statements, which is an integral part of the final report of the OEWG. In closing, I’d like to thank Scott Harriot and the interpreters for their immense contributions to the success of this event.

Chair: Thank you very much, Russian Federation, for your statement and also for your… very kind words. One day I’ll sit back and reflect on what these applauses actually mean, because obviously there could be varying interpretations of the applauses, and also possibly statements in the explanation of applauses. But thank you very much, Russian Federation. Before I give the floor to the next speaker, it’s 12 o’clock. I would really like to conclude our meeting at 1 p.m., so that all of us can take the afternoon off to do the many things we need to do. Secondly, I kindly ask you to be as succinct in your comments as possible, knowing that you have the possibility of submitting your statements over the next few weeks, all of which will be compiled in a compendium of statements and explanations of position on the adoption of the final report of the OEWG, which in turn will be circulated as an information note by the UN Secretariat. Thirdly, at 1 p.m. sharp, I’ve arranged for the UN photographer to be here so that we can take a family photo. So those of you who wish to be associated with this photo, you are welcome to be present here at 1 p.m., and we will all be seated or gather around in this room to take one picture that we can hopefully keep for ourselves. So that is the family photo at 1 p.m. before we close and adjourn. So we’ll go through the list of speakers, and then we’ll go through the other remaining issues on the agenda. United States, to be followed by Switzerland.

United States: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I would like to start by recognizing the work that you, your team, and the Secretariat have undertaken this week to get to the final report today. We appreciate your efforts to produce a document that is a better reflection of the work this OAWG has undertaken over the course of its mandate. In particular, the report sets the stage for a smooth transition to a single-track, global mechanism that will continue important discussions on cyber stability and responsible state behavior while making meaningful progress on implementation of the framework through its dedicated thematic groups. We recognize the significance of capacity-building to states’ ability to implement the framework, and we are pleased to have found a path to retaining the capacity-building thematic group. We also appreciate that the report more accurately conveys the progress made in discussions on the application of existing international law to cyberspace, in particular by referencing discussion on international humanitarian law. Mr. Chair, the United States would like to express its disassociation with paragraphs 9, 12, 28, and 53A of the report. The United States remains deeply disappointed that the report retains references to gender and the Sustainable Development Goals. The United States strongly supports protecting women and girls, defending their rights, and promoting women’s empowerment, and promotes the ability of women and girls to engage in all aspects of social, civic, political, and economic life. However, the United States does not support references in the final report to gender. Additionally, the Sustainable Development Goals advance a program of soft global governance that is inconsistent with U.S. sovereignty and adverse to the rights and interests of Americans, and the United States does not support references in the final report to SDGs. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, United States, for your statement. Your statement is well noted. I thank the United States for joining consensus on the document. your statements with regard to dissociating your delegation from certain paragraphs is also noted. Switzerland, to be followed by Canada.

Switzerland: Thank you, Mr. Chair. As you said, the final report is a very balanced overall package. It’s not a perfect document. We would have liked to see a much more ambitious report, particularly regarding international law, with a focus also on international humanitarian law. While the Open-Ended Working Group hasn’t achieved breakthrough results on the most contentious issues, it has succeeded in maintaining multilateral dialogue, building capacity, contributing to confidence, and creating practical results. We must measure its success against the complex nature of cybersecurity and the political divisions that exist among states on these issues. The broad participation by all member states and stakeholders ensured that a wide range of perspectives and concerns were considered, making the discussions more comprehensive and representative of divergent interests. This Open-Ended Working Group and the final report are very important but incremental steps in our common ambition to building an open, safe, secure, stable, accessible, peaceful, and interoperable ICT environment. To achieve this, our work will continue in and outside the global mechanism. Mr. Chair, this morning I asked an AI model whether the chair of the Open-Ended Working Group has done a good job. The answer was, and I quote, the chair of the Open-Ended Working Group, Ambassador Burhan Kapur of Singapore, has widely been regarded as having done a commendable and effective job, especially given the highly polarized and sensitive nature of the subject. We know that AI models sometimes hallucinate, but in this case it was right. Under your leadership, we have adopted a final report that crowns a five-year process. You and your team have done a great job. We would like to thank you, Mr. Chair, as well as Catherine, Virginia, Clarice, Matthew and of course Jillian. She is the one with the historical memory of the GGE 2021, the first open-ended working group and this open-ended working group. Finally, we would like to thank all delegations for their flexibility and the stakeholders for their participation and valuable contributions. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Switzerland, for your statement and for your very kind remarks. I will not ask you to put on record which particular AI program was making those comments, but your comments are very much appreciated. Thank you. I will give the floor now to Canada to be followed by Nicaragua.

Canada: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I debated taking the floor, but I am told this process cannot end without one more reference to our shared birchbark canoe. You and your team have showed exemplary dedication in consulting all states and also towards giving stakeholders informal opportunities to be heard over the last years. We commend your effort and we thank you sincerely for your defence of multilateralism as a pillar of peace and security. You have guided our canoe over the rapids, moved us forward without tipping over and without too much going in circles, and we have landed safely at a harbour where we are ready for our next journey. You will not be surprised that Canada has some final comments on international law. We are glad to see the report reflects to a considerable extent the significant progress and achievements made by our OEWG. We have fostered common understandings and converging views, built capacities, and we are proud to be a part of the OEWG. Thank you.

Chair:

Canada: strengthened cross-regional dialogue, and concluded with solid, action-oriented recommendations. That said, we profoundly regret that the final report fails to capture the substantive convergence on international law that has become clear in the room. We regret the report leaves an incomplete record of our years of work on international law. But this does not alter the reality that real progress and momentum was achieved under your guidance during this OEWG. My delegation is committed to pursuing these fruitful discussions on how international law applies in the global mechanism. The future mechanism represents a solid stepping stone to elevate the practical nature of our discussions. As we move forward, we call on all states to offer ultimate flexibility in allowing stakeholders to engage in our global mechanism. I wish to take this opportunity not only to thank you, your team, and the Secretariat for their dedicated work, but also thank our stakeholders. Their input, side events, and dedicated engagement has also helped us get this far. Many thanks again, Mr. Chair. It has been a journey. The next one awaits us, and Canada is enthusiastic to work with all member states as we work to further responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, while also working to come up with a new, but still Canadian metaphor for a future process. Perhaps something about snowshoes and avoiding polar bears.

Chair: Thank you very much, Canada, for your statement and for your expressions of support. Nicaragua, to be followed by Malaysia.

Nicaragua: Thank you, Chair. I speak on behalf of a group of like-minded states, the Republic of Belarus, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Cuba, the State of Eritrea, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Republic of Niger, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Sudan. the Republic of Zimbabwe, and my own country, the Republic of Nicaragua. We appreciate the efforts made by you and your team in preparing the final report of the OEWG and joint consensus over this document. Due to your long-standing commitment to the OEWG process, the decision to establish a single-track, state-led, consensus-based global mechanism on developments on the field of ICTs in the context of international security and advancing responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs to deal comprehensively with a wide range of issues related to security of and in the use of ICTs has become possible. We admit that a number of improvements have been made in the final report with the proposals of the LMG Group taken into account. At the same time, we are disappointed with an overall misbalance between the implementation of the existing voluntary, non-binding rules of state behavior and the development of new norms, including the elaboration of legally binding obligations in the use of ICTs. As for the modalities for NGOs’ participation, we welcome that accredited stakeholders will participate on a non-objection basis and obtain a solely consultative status, as the future permanent mechanism is strictly an intergovernmental process. It is of utmost importance to ensure that all five pillars of the mandate of the mechanism would be treated equally during the discussions with respect to the state’s sovereignty and decision-making by consensus, which may not be challenged or conditioned according to modalities adopted by Consensus UNGA Resolution 79-237. Our group remains committed to working constructively within the mechanism to contribute to enhancing security of and in the use of ICTs. Chair, in our national capacity, please allow us to make a few brief additional remarks. We wish to express our heartfelt appreciation for how you have conducted the process of the OEWG on security of and in the use of ICTs. We value the open and inclusive approach that allowed for the full participation of all Member States on an equal footing, regardless of their size, their level of development or technological capacity, reflecting the true spirit of multilateralism and democracy that should guide our deliberations on an issue that is so critical to the peace and security of all nations. We extend our gratitude to you, Chair, and to your team for your dedication, impartiality and tireless efforts to guide our complex deliberations towards a consensus document. We are also grateful for the critical technical and substantive support provided by the Secretary at the Interpreters and the support staff, whose work has been indispensable to the effective functioning of this process. The utmost priority of this session was to achieve a smooth transition from the OEWG to the future mechanism, under the auspices of the United Nations, to be guided by the same spirit and consensus decision-making. In this regard, we wish to highlight that in our forthcoming discussions, special attention should be paid to implementation of mechanisms that effectively promote international cooperation, with the aim of ensuring that developing countries can participate in future meetings of the mechanisms on an equal footing and strengthen the capacities of developing countries. We reiterate our position on the peaceful use of ICTs, on the prevention of an arms race in cyberspace, and our condemnation of the use of these technologies for hostile or aggressive purposes. We therefore reject any attempt to forcibly impose the applicability of international humanitarian law to cyberspace. The international community should focus its efforts on promoting the use of ICTs for the development of our peoples and in preventing conflicts created by cyberattacks. We hope that discussions for a legally binding instrument in the field of ICT security and their use will continue in the future mechanism. Such an instrument will allow us to address legal gaps in cybersecurity and establish obligations for all states. Chair Nicaragua reaffirms its commitment to this multilateral process. We will continue to participate actively and constructively in the future stages of the mechanism, as always advocating for cyberspace that is a space of peace, cooperation, development and respect for the sovereign rights of all nations. It’s essential for the outcomes of this group to find expression in concrete actions that benefit all of humanity and prevent the use of ICTs as instruments of war or domination. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Nicaragua, for your statement. Australia, sorry, Malaysia, to be followed by Australia, please.

Malaysia: Mr Chair, allow me to speak on behalf of ASEAN. ASEAN would like to express its high appreciation for your efficient leadership and the dedicated efforts of your team throughout this OEWG. ASEAN is also proud that an esteemed ASEAN member state has been chairing this process. We are pleased to see the successful adoptions of the final report under your capable guidance, which marks an important step towards ensuring a smooth transition to the global mechanism on ICT security in the context of international security. ASEAN has remained steadfast in its commitment to this process and has consistently sought to contribute to our shared efforts to uphold peace and security and stability, while fostering an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful and interoperable ICT environment. We also recognise the importance of continuing discussion and reaffirm our intention to actively engage in the global mechanism. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Malaysia, for your very kind statement on behalf of ASEAN, and thank you very much for ASEAN’s support for this process. Now before I go to Australia, friends, the list is growing, and it seems that you are reluctant to let go of this process. I think you need to be ready to release yourself from this process, and I’m very keen to release you from this process. But the list of speakers is long, so can I please suggest that you try and make your statements in about two minutes so that we give everyone a chance. We have some procedural reports to adopt, and I think it’s important that we do that. And I want to close with some comments as well about next steps. So Australia, over to you to start with two minutes.

Australia: Thank you, Chair. Australia aligns with the Pacific Islands Forum Statement and wishes to make the following remarks in our national capacity. Australia wishes to express its sincere appreciation to you and your dedicated team for your leadership throughout this process. The adoption of the final report and the establishment of the new… new permanent mechanism by consensus represents a significant milestone in our collective efforts to uphold the rules-based international order and the framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. The outcome underscores the enduring value of multilateralism and reaffirms the central role of the United Nations in facilitating dialogue, fostering understanding, and enabling member states to navigate new and complex challenges together. It reflects the determination of our chair, the importance that all governments place on this issue, and the collective commitment demonstrated by every delegation throughout these negotiations. While certain elements of the final report do not fully align with Australia’s national positions, we acknowledge the finely balanced package to achieve consensus. In the spirit of cooperation and flexibility, we accept the outcome that has been reached. Australia believes the final report provides a strong foundation for our work ahead. It consolidates decades of work since the first GGE and set the clear direction for the new permanent mechanism to advance the framework for responsible state behavior. As we take stock of our progress, Australia notes two major disappointments on the final report. Firstly, on international law, Australia is disappointed that the chapter does not capture all the progress made, and the emerging convergence has reached over almost five years. We would have liked references to the application of international human rights law, the law of state responsibility, and international humanitarian law as reflected in the cross-regional paper on international law. We’re also disappointed that references to the ICT resolution of the 34th Conference of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent, an important consensus document, was deleted, as were the two OEWG cross-regional working papers, which remain important pieces of work. On stakeholders, we regret that we were not able to make more progress on improving inclusiveness and transparency. However. Australia welcomes the final report’s recognition of the high level of participation by women delegates and the integration of gender perspectives in our discussions. We would particularly like to acknowledge the valuable contributions of the Women in International Security and Cyberspace Fellows, which has enriched our deliberations and strengthened the collective outcome. Australia encourages all member states to support and increase the meaningful participation of women, both within the new permanent mechanism and across the landscape of cybersecurity and international security. In closing, Australia extends its sincere appreciation to all delegations, to our Chair and to his exceptional team for their tireless efforts in achieving a consensus outcome. We look forward to continuing our work under the new permanent mechanism and advancing our shared goal to protect and promote a peaceful, stable and interoperable cyberspace for all. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Australia. Malawi to be followed by Ghana.

Malawi: Chair, the Republic of Malawi takes the floor, not only to express its final views, but to extend our sincere appreciation and gratitude. We came to this process not just to share our national concerns and views, but also to thank you for your tireless leadership throughout this complex but rewarding journey. Chair, you have demonstrated patience, balance and unwavering commitment to inclusivity. You gave every delegation, regardless of size or resources, an equal platform to be heard. For countries like Malawi, this has meant the world. My delegation is further grateful for the WIC Fellowship and all sponsoring countries for allowing the wonderful ladies from across the world to participate in these discussions. We are particularly encouraged that consensus has been reached. This outcome is not just a document, it is a testament to what is possible when the international community engages in good faith, listens to one another and works towards shared goals. The concerns and priorities of developing countries, including capacity building, protection of critical infrastructure, and the applicability of international law, have found meaningful expression in the final report. As we transition into the global mechanism, we carry forward a spirit of unity, responsibility, and cooperation. The Republic of Malawi stands ready to continue contributing constructively, ensuring that the framework we’ve built here endures and grows stronger. Once again, congratulations on bringing us across the finish line. From the warm heart of Africa, to you, Chair, we say, Zigo Mwambili. Thank you very much, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Malawi, for your statement, and thank you very much, Africa, for your support. Ghana, you have the floor, please.

Ghana: Thank you, Chair. Although my delegation, like others, would have liked to see progress in certain areas of the text, for us this would have been elaboration on how the DTGs will be discussed in the future permanent mechanism, we welcome all the efforts that have been made to present a delicately balanced conference paper. This, indeed, has been no small feat. Ambassador Kofor, your exemplary leadership, wealth of experience and wisdom, delivered with a touch of humor, has been evident from the very beginning. On a personal note, I leave this process with a reminder to approach life and work in bilateral and multilateral processes with cautious, hopeful optimism, a term you have so often used. I would have definitely liked to see you in a brighter outfit this week. However, we take it as it is. I trust this will be sent to your holidays, which you’ve been looking forward to. We acknowledge that this OEWG has been a consensus-building measure and led to tangible outcomes. My delegation joins others in expressing sincerest appreciation to your entire team, as echoed by others. Matthew, Catherine, Virginia, and all the unsung heroes working diligently behind the scenes. Thank you very much. To this end, Gardan would like to join other colleagues in thanking the Women in Cyber Fellowship for the support provided to women to have an opportunity to be part of the process. To all those who conceptualized the program and put in tireless effort to build capacity, we say thank you. Thank you for ensuring that women did not just take up space in this room, but we contributed meaningfully to this process. This process that has been extremely transformative. It has turned technocrats into diplomats and turned diplomats and policy makers into technocrats. As we continue to strengthen our capacity to engage in meaningful dialogue and navigate future processes to address existing and potential threats, we will reference this moment as proof that with patience and collaboration, we are able to work together. Mr. Chair, to conclude, Ghana will continue to work in a spirit of flexibility in the future permanent mechanism. And as such, we look forward to a safe and secure digital future. I thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Ghana, for your very kind statement. I think I’ll need to go to Accra to refresh my wardrobe, to look for some colorful floats. But thank you very much. Friends, we still have about 15 speakers. This is how I intend to proceed. At this point, we will proceed to the next agenda item, which is the consideration of the draft procedural report. I think it’s important that we have that report adopted. Then after that, I’ll return to the speaker’s list. So distinguished delegates, with your permission, we shall now move to the consideration of the draft procedural report of the Open-Ended Working Group as contained in document A-AC-292-2025-L1. And let me, by way of background, explain that. The procedural report has a section on introduction, attendance, it describes the offices of the meeting, which is namely the chair, the organization of work, the documentation, proceedings of the working group, and the final section, which says that the working group adopted its final report. It’s a procedural report. It is not substantive. And in keeping with the practice of the working group, we will now proceed to have it adopted. I see no objections. It is so decided. I also take it that it is the wish of the working group to authorize the chair to finalize the report. It is so decided. Thank you. We return to the speakers list. At this point, I think we do need to stick to two minutes, and I kindly invite you to please do your best to be as succinct as possible, and do send us your final statements, if that is a good way to capture your positions. Colombia, to be followed by Fiji.

Colombia: Thank you, Chair. My delegation wishes to congratulate you and to recognize your leadership of this OEWG in the last four years. We are gratified to see the outcome of your efforts taking concrete form today through the adoption by consensus of the final report of this group and the creation of the permanent mechanism that will guide discussions on the use and security of ICTs under the UN framework. Thank you. The most important achievement has been to achieve an overall balance across the different elements making up the report, which means that we can take it as a whole, even though it doesn’t really represent an end point in itself, but rather accumulation of processes, previous APRs, and all of your efforts are part of this important package of results. I’d also like to thank you for the importance that you gave to the Capacity Building Group, whose work is going to be essential in strengthening the capacity of developing states in a practical way to ensure the functioning of the Future Permanent Mechanism. This group was a concrete example of how to be more inclusive and results-oriented. As reiterated by you, Chair, on many occasions, consensus cannot be taken for granted. It is fragile, especially in the current circumstances, and this is why we extend thanks to Member States who are present here, who have together shown flexibility in the spirit of compromise, adjusting to current circumstances, and we have shown how multilateralism can prevail over differences to achieve a joint result. Today we can all be certain that we have made a contribution to international peace and security, as demonstrated by all of the statements that went before me. I wish to highlight, recognize, and celebrate, as the Delegation of Colombia, the leadership, meaningful participation of women in this working group. Their contributions were crucial to building trust, finding innovative solutions, and reflecting the priorities of their delegations in the work of our group. And here we highlight the creation of the Women in Cyber Fellowship that actively promoted a gender balance in this space devoted to security of and in the needs of ICT. We thank regional organisations and civil society for their contributions to this and over the past years that have allowed us to go deeper in our understanding on many topics. I thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you, Columbia, for your statement. Fiji to be followed by France.

Fiji: Thank you, Chair. Chair, I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of a cross-regional group comprising Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Kiribati, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Moldova, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, the United Nations and Vietnam. Chair, as outlined in the working paper, our group submitted to this working group in February. We reaffirmed the critical importance of the full, meaningful and equitable participation and leadership of women in all decision-making processes related to the use of ICTs. In this respect, our group welcomes the references to gender included in the final report. We also wish to highlight the valuable role of the Women in International Security and Cyberspace Fellowship, which has enabled more women to engage meaningfully in the work of this OEWG. We believe the text presents a balanced and accurate reflection of the significant role that women have played in this OEWG and will continue to play in all future ICT-related discussions, including with the permanent mechanism. Chair, inclusive and gender-responsive approaches are not only a matter of equity, they are essential to building a secure, resilient and representative international cyber governance framework. We look forward to continued collaboration to ensure these principles are embedded in the foundation of our collective work. Thank you, Chair. Chair, I also seek your indulgence if I could please give remarks, a few remarks in our national capacity. Chair, Fiji fully aligns with the statement delivered by Tonga on behalf of the Pacific Island Forums and also wishes to deliver brief remarks in our national capacity. We also echo other delegations in our sincere appreciation to you, Chair, for your thoughtful leadership in navigating us through these challenging times, a massive vinaka wakalewu. For the Pacific and indeed for Fiji, this forum has been a key priority in voicing our lived realities, addressing our compounded crises, informing and synergizing our domestic and regional efforts such as Fiji’s National Digital Strategy and the Regional Lakatoi Declaration and continuing to build trust and confidence amongst member states. Our final report is an excellent document for the work that must be done to ensure that the United Nations maintains its place as the beating heart of global security in the face of unprecedented technological changes. And our heartfelt thanks also goes to the A-Team, to Clarice, Matthew, Jillian, Catherine, Virginia and the Secretariat for their meticulous efforts in providing support to all of us during our journey together. Chair, we reemphasize the Pacific Islands Forum Capacity Building Paper that was submitted in May and as mentioned by Vanuatu earlier, we look forward to working with all member states and stakeholders in this regard. Chair, Fiji sees substantive value coming out of our incremental steps and especially now with our final report and we’ve communicated this consistently during our journey. At the beginning of our journey, Fiji was represented by one delegate. Today I’m proud to say that we’re a delegation of four that have traveled from Fiji and we’d like to record our thanks for our partners. But this also demonstrates the trust and the confidence amongst states that have been building in our journey and the increased dedication and commitment amongst states. And so Fiji continues to remain steadfast in our commitment that we must advance our work and implement the action items and our consensus final report and ensuring a seamless transition into our next phase. Chair, Fiji reiterates that our final report serves as a unifying force much like the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean. bringing together collective aspirations, and we remain committed in our next phase of work together, the global mechanism. On a personal note, Chair, and having been part of this OEWG journey, it has been an absolute honor to work with you, your team, and the delegations here today who have turned into friends. On a final note, wishing everyone safe journeys back home. Vinaka Vakilevu, Chair. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Fiji, for your statement. France, to be followed by Pakistan.

France: Mr. President. Mr. Chair, my delegation aligns itself with the statement of the European Union and I would like to make the following remarks in its national capacity. Allow me at the outset to thank you most sincerely, you and your entire team, as well as the Secretariat and, of course, the interpreters, for your commitment and your efforts throughout the last five years. The successful conclusion of the work of this group is all to your credit and the constructive way in which you’ve always led our work. This consensus-based result is historic for work on the cyber issues and the first commission. And after more than 25 years of discussion and gradual consolidation of the normative framework for responsible behavior of states in cyberspace will allow us to establish a global, a single global mechanism that is action-oriented. This report is not perfect, but as others have underscored, this is the very nature of diplomacy. In accordance with the constructive spirit that my delegation has shown from the first to the last moments of this OEWG, France welcomes the adoption of this final report, which will become part of our collective heritage. The transregional proposal of the program of action, France and its partners wanted to see – ensure that all states were able to implement this normative framework because it is our first line of collective defense against cyber threats. We are pleased that this report, especially the section on capacity building, and how it interacts with the modalities of the global mechanism create the conditions needed for significant progress in this regard. Mr. Chair, you can count on France to support the operationalization of this report through the resolution that you will be submitting to the First Commission this fall. This resolution will allow for the establishment of the global mechanism and a seamless transition toward 2026 and beyond. In closing, I would like to cite a very wise man that many of you know, Ambassador Henri Verdier, who said to me one day, you know, our goal is not to create a new mechanism at the UN. Our real goal is to strengthen our collective cybersecurity. Mr. Chair, distinguished colleagues, I hope that collectively we will not lose sight of this goal. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, France, for your statement. Pakistan to be followed by Algeria. And dear friends, I have to do the unpleasant task of cutting off microphones. And I apologize for this, my humble, humble and sincere apologies, because I do want us to be able to complete by 1 p.m. And it’s doable, but it is important that we give everyone a chance. So, Pakistan, over to you. My apologies in advance, and please let us have your full statement if you think that you need to put on record other points of view as well. You have the floor, please.

Pakistan: Thank you, Mr. Chair. We commend dedication and tireless efforts of you and your team in this OEWG, as we have done in the past. We duly recognize your contribution to this process. Chair, the adoption of OEWG’s final report is indeed a historic milestone. a hard-won achievement and a victory for multilateralism. Today’s success is a relief amidst geopolitical environment which has been less conducive to multilateralism. All of us have our share of disappointments, regrets and reservations. However, as we said in our first intervention on Monday, for us and indeed for a large majority of countries, the foremost priority was to make a seamless transition to global mechanism. We hope that our decision today is a right step in this direction.

Chair: I apologize Pakistan to you, sincere apologies. Algeria to be followed by New Zealand.

Algeria: Thank you Mr. Chair. Algeria aligns itself with the statement delivered by Tunisia and Nigeria on behalf of the African group. While Algeria shares the concerns expressed by the Arab group and the African group regarding the removal of dedicated space for discussing international law applicability in cyberspace and insufficient provision for capacity building, we have joined the consensus in the spirit of multilateral cooperation and our commitment to maintaining constructive dialogue within the UN framework. Having said that, my delegation wishes to express its profound gratitude for your outstanding leadership demonstrated throughout the five-year mandate of the OEWG. We commend your efforts in ensuring that the OEWG has successfully fulfilled its mandate, culminating with the adoption of a consensus outcome which, despite the stumbling blocks and shortfalls, reflects our collective commitment to diplomacy and multilateralism. We reiterate our sincere appreciation to you, your team, the Secretariat, and the translation team, all of whom have worked tirelessly to achieve this outcome. And indeed, the pocket square indicated a successful conclusion. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Algeria. New Zealand to be followed by Ireland.

New Zealand: Thank you, Chair. You started this week stating that you thought a narrow pathway to consensus was visible. At that time, perhaps not everyone shared your optimistic foresight. So today we’re very pleased that your vision has become a reality. And even more so, we’re pleased to see the strong support in the room for that vision. Of course, that doesn’t mean we see perfection, but as you noted, the cause of multilateralism is not perfection. Today’s consensus outcome is an important demonstration of our collective commitment to ongoing dialogue on our differences and to advance responsible state behavior in cyberspace. Thank you very much for your leadership and the excellent work of your team.

Chair: Thank you very much, New Zealand, for your vision. Ireland to be followed by Germany.

Ireland: Thank you very much, dear Chair. Ireland aligns with the EU statement, but wanted to come in to thank you, your team, the Secretariat, and the translators for your extraordinary efforts both this week and over past years. Your careful, thoughtful, and effective chairmanship has led to this consensus outcome, threading the narrow pathway, as you said, to success through the many conflicting opinions reflected here. This is a success for you, for us all, but also more broadly for the UN and for multilateralism. Of course, there were points we would have liked to see in the text, in particular on international law, IHL and IHRL, where we consider our many discussions in this process were not fully reflected in the text. in the text, but there is also much that is good in the text and which we strongly support. What you have achieved here provides the base and tools from which we can build the new global mechanism. We look forward to the challenging but vitally important work to come in the new mechanism, drawing on the work done over the past five years, and we also look forward to working with all here in that regard. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Ireland, for your brevity as well. Germany to be followed by Greece.

Germany: Chair, yesterday you alluded to the Open-Ended Working Group being the first step on a 1,000-mile journey. We believe with the decision today, we have made a major, important, and yes, historic step forward, ensuring a seamless transition to a single-track, inclusive, consensus-based, and action-oriented permanent mechanism. And we thank you and commend you and your team for your tireless efforts and leadership steering us towards convergence and to consensus today. Even if it is a major step forward, more steps will need to follow on this journey, and we have to remain ambitious to advance and implement a framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. And we look forward to take this on in the new single-track global mechanism. In addition to that, and for reasons of brevity, we would just like to align with the statement of the European Union and support the statement made by Fiji on behalf of a cross-regional group. To conclude, I want to again join others in wholeheartedly thanking you and congratulating you and your team and the Secretariat for your outstanding work. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Germany, for your brevity. Greece, to be followed by Albania.

Greece: Thank you, sir, for giving me the floor. Greece aligns with the statement delivered by the European Union. I would like to take this opportunity and extend our deepest gratitude to you and your team for all your efforts and commitment driving this group from the beginning all the way through the finish line. I am certain one of the first challenges that the future mechanism will face is finding a chair of the same caliber. For our delegation, it has been a privilege and an honor being part of this process, a process we see… as a milestone, not only to the subject at hand, but to multilateralism as a general. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Chris, for your brevity. Albania, to be followed by Papua New Guinea.

Albania: Honourable Chair, distinguished colleagues, on behalf of Albania, I am honoured to take the floor at this historic moment. After five years of dedicated work and five intensive days of negotiation, the Open-Ended Working Group has achieved consensus on a meaningful and action-oriented final report. This is a remarkable success for multilateralism and for the United Nations, especially as we mark the 80th anniversary. Albania strongly welcomes this outcome. We believe that despite the challenges, geopolitical context and the complexity of issues at stake, our collective efforts have delivered a report which consolidates the progress made throughout the years, reaffirms the importance of international law on cyberspace and strengthens the framework of responsible state behaviour. We are particularly pleased that the report emphasised capacity-building, confidence-building measures and the importance of inclusive participation. These are essential to building trust, resilience and security in the digital environment. The concrete actions and cooperative measures contained in this report will help all states, regardless of their level of development, to address the evolving security challenges in the use of ICT. This is a foundation upon which the future permanent mechanism can build, ensuring continuity and progress in our shared work. Albania is proud to have contributed to this progress and remains committed to an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful ICT environment. Let us continue to uphold the spirit of consensus and cooperation as we move working together. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Albania, for a kind statement. Papua New Guinea?

Papua New Guinea: Mr. Chair, Papua New Guinea aligns itself with the statement made earlier by the Pacific Island Forum and makes the following remarks in our national capacity. We echo the sentiments expressed of your stellar leadership and commitment to the framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace, leading to today’s successful adoption of the final report. We thank you for guiding this process with dedication and inclusivity. We also commend the excellent efforts of your able and professional team. We recognize the work that has gone into finding a balance. We can see where compromises have been struck. We also acknowledge the generous support of donors to the Women in International Security and Cyberspace Fellowships for enabling more women, including from small island developing states like mine, to meaningfully engage in the work of the OEWG. I thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Papua New Guinea. Philippines, to be followed by Sierra Leone.

Malaysia: Thank you, Mr. Chair. The Philippine delegation aligns itself with the ASEAN statement, and in my national capacity I wish to extend our sincere congratulations to you, Mr. Chair, for your exceptional leadership and to your dedicated team and the Secretary for the tireless work, professionalism, and inclusive spirit throughout the years. The Philippines particularly appreciates the inclusion of initiatives such as the ICT Security Capacity Building Catalog in the final report, adopted final report. This reflects the maturing of our collective understanding of capacity building and provides a stronger foundation for operationalizing targeted needs-based support in the global mechanism, particularly for member states with limited ICT security capabilities. Philippines also expresses its appreciation to all member states for the flexibility and the constructive engagement demonstrated in the final stages of this process. The willingness to compromise and build consensus has allowed the group to grow. to deliver a credible and forward-looking outcome. Mr. Chair, the Philippines stands ready to support the continued strengthening of this process for delivering a result that reflects balance, inclusion, and future-oriented cooperation. Terima kasih. Maraming salamat.

Chair: Thank you very much, Philippines, for your kind statement. Sierra Leone, please.

Sierra Leone: Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving us the floor. We will stay brief. We want to thank you and your outstanding team for steering the ship over the years. We thank the Women in Cyber Fellowship and their partners for their support as well. Mr. Chair, I would like to say that if patience was a protocol, yours would be end-to-end encrypted. We thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Sierra Leone, for your very, very kind words. Pakistan, for a brief intervention, do you want to come back? Okay, thank you very much, Pakistan. Thank you so much for your kind consideration, all of you, and your brevity. There is one other agenda item that remains on our work, which is other matters, and it is my understanding that there are really no other matters that need to be discussed. May I take it that it is the case? Australia, for a very brief remarks.

Australia: It’s a really important gender marker for measuring the degree of gender equality in the interventions made in this forum. And for context, when the OEWG began, similarly to other processes in the international security pillar, about one third of interventions were made by women. And since then, we’ve been tracking a very encouraging trend. And I want to confirm this figure, but I think it is 55%. It was 55% in February, and it’s 53% at this session. And it is very encouraging that we are now really getting gender balance into our interventions. And we’d like to commend all delegations for their efforts in promoting inclusive representation. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very, very much, Australia, for the public service announcement, and for tracking the data, and most of all, for thanking for your work in this particular domain of encouraging and facilitating the participation of women delegates in our process. Not just Australia, but I think there’s a cross-regional group. And I take this opportunity to really commend all the women in cyber fellows who have been involved in this process. But not only that, but all the women delegates who have been involved in this process. Your role has been really critical in getting us to where we are in this process now. Thank you. So distinguished delegates, we have now completed all the agenda items. And therefore, our deliberations for the final session. So with your indulgence, I’d like to make a few closing remarks as chair of. the working group. It would be remiss on my part if I do not, at this point, as chair of this process, thank my own very, very excellent team of colleagues who have been with me. So before you give them a round of applause, I’d like to invite them to rise, Dr. Gillian Goh, Matthew Wong, Clarice Lim, and Dennis Scott. I must say that I’m very, very proud and so, so lucky to have them on my team. Gillian is an institution in the UN system, and the fact that she is from Singapore and has now moved back to Singapore is a source of great pride for me, and thank you for joining us. Gillian and Matthew and Clarice are really cyber Matthew and cyber Clarice, and I really could not have done this without them, but our secret weapon this week was our intern from the foreign ministry, Denise Chan, who is the young lady at the back. So she will be in some ways or other be involved in the future mechanism, which now has a name, Global Mechanism. Perhaps we could call it by a nickname, GMAC perhaps. UN Global Mechanism, GMAC for short perhaps. Second, I also want to thank the excellent, wonderful people on the podium. A lot of you have mentioned it, but it would be remiss on my part if I, as chair of the process, do not recognize the incredible work that they have done over the last a few years, and the patience they have shown to me, the support they have given, the very late nights, including yesterday, very late in the evening, going through the documents before the emails were sent out. So Catherine Priceman, please, please rise, Catherine. Also thank you, thank you very much, Catherine, and of course Secretary Alexander Lomia, Natalia Uliana, Natalia is behind, please rise, Alexander. And of course Virginia Browning, Gina, where are you? And also Orio Del Basto and Catherine, who are there at the secretariat table. And the excellent conference officers who are in the room by the side, over there, and also the wonderful, wonderful interpreters. They have been consistently giving us extra minutes, so thank you very much, thank you very much. I always start the meeting by wanting to finish at one, but it always exceeds the time allocated, as it is likely to do today, so very grateful to the wonderful work that they do, the interpreters, because without the interpreters, you’re not going to have multilingualism, and without multilingualism, you’re not going to have multilateralism. So I think it’s a very important part of the work of the UN. Another person, Under-Secretary General Izumi Nakamitsu of UNODA, has been a stalwart of support. I just texted her to say that we have adopted the report. She is very pleased and I think I wanted to take this opportunity to place on record my deep appreciation to UNODA and Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament, Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu. Friends, a lot has been said and of course you know me, I can go on and on, but you know I want to be as brief as possible, but I think there are some things that need to be said. The outcome today is a win for multilateralism. It is a win for the United Nations. It is of course a win for our own process, the OEWG, and it is a step into the future of creating the global mechanism. So I think this is something that all of us can be incredibly satisfied with, and this is the result of your work. I have also been saying that at the UN, success is not guaranteed, but failure is not an option. And I think like any process at the UN, we have to work for success, we have to work for consensus, which is never granted, and I think this process has demonstrated that when there is a commitment and willingness to listen to each other, and when there is a spirit of flexibility, it is possible to take small steps forward. The UN is an exercise in incrementalism, and the UN is a very bold experiment started 80 years ago. And in a variety of domains, it is important that we give life to the spirit of the UN Charter by making things work. And I also wanted to share with you that looking back at this process, which started in 1998, as some of you pointed out, and some of you have been involved for more than a few months or years, but decades, we have done some incredible work. The GGE process laid some foundation stones. But looking back, I think there was a wisdom in beginning the OEWG process. I know the OEWG process was contested when it was first initiated and launched, but there is a certain wisdom in the process in the sense that it made things inclusive. It was no longer a limited circle of representatives, experts, 25, 30 people discussing issues. Those are important, but multilateralism means making things inclusive, making things transparent. And that is helpful to build trust, and that is helpful and needed to build confidence. So we made that transition from the GGE to the OEWG, and the two OEWGs now have produced consensus reports. And that has laid a very strong foundation for a single-track process leading into the future, the UN Global Mechanism. But mechanisms and institutions are only there as they are designed, but they will not fulfill their potential if there is no commitment, there is no patient cultivation of ideas and relationships to give the institutions the potential that they have. So my friends, the Global Mechanism. is very promising, filled with great potential, but the success of the global mechanism depends on all of you. This leads me to the next point, which is that I am so incredibly grateful that so many of you have contributed to the consensus that we have in this process, especially today. Each one of you have made it possible. In spite of the statements you have made to register the position of your delegation, and I know that behind the nameplates there are individuals who were committed to this process, and that, I think, is the reason for the consensus outcome we have today. So I’m incredibly grateful for that, and I thank each one of you for making this consensus outcome possible. Now, there are a lot of things that I wanted to say and scribbled, but I really want to look forward in terms of what we do in the First Committee. My intention is to present a very simple draft resolution in the First Committee, and my only plea to you is that that resolution should be kept simple. Please do not look at that resolution as a means to reopen or re-litigate issues. The First Committee resolution that will endorse the final report of this working group is intended to formalize and have things approved by the General Assembly, and then in the Fifth Committee, and for the mechanism to come into force starting from here. So the First Committee resolution that Singapore will table once again, as we did in previous years. please look at it as a procedural enabling resolution to endorse the outcome. So it is not my intention to see that as a re-opening of discussions on the outcome document. The other thing that I would kindly request is that in the first committee, I’d like to appeal to all delegations to just have one single resolution on ICT security, not multiple resolutions, because we now have made the decision to have a single-track process. And we can’t have a single-track process and then have multiple resolutions. So let’s have just one single, simple enabling resolution to endorse the outcome, and that will then open the door for the beginning of the global mechanism to start its work, starting with the organizational session, which needs to be convened no later than March next year. So that’s the other point that I wanted to make as well. And the final point is about stakeholders. I know that this has been a debate, but leaving aside the question of modalities, if the modalities are what they are, it will enable to some degree the participation of stakeholders, not to a perfect degree, but it will nevertheless enable them to participate. But my advice to you as a friend of this process, but also as your friend, is to keep an open mind to the participation of stakeholders. If you want to make the potential of the global mechanism great, and if you want everyone in the world… to understand what the global mechanism can do and what we have done is to really also find ways to engage stakeholders in the process. So that is my humble advice to you as your friend. Of course, there will be differences in points of view. There are also differences in points of view between governments. But I would also appeal to you that it is important to some extent that we continue to have a strong degree of mutual trust, mutual respect. Even if there is not so much trust, I think we need to start from the premise of respect. I think that’s what multilateralism is about. Even if there is deep distrust, I think we need to start from the point of view of respect. And that means listening to people. And I know that in this process it has been very difficult for some of you to even talk to someone else or be seen to be talking to someone else. These are the consequences of geopolitics. And it is my hope that at some point in the future, at a place like the United Nations, in a process that is run from the United Nations, that people will be able to talk to each other with respect in spite of whatever differences there might be. Because it is this talking to each other with respect and listening to each other with respect that is so much needed. That is so much needed, not only for the UN, but I think to make the world a better place. I see that I’m nearing 1.10, two minutes left. And I think I also need a microphone cut off. Otherwise it’s an occupational hazard of diplomats that they don’t know what to do. when to stop. But just to say that it’s been an incredible journey. Thank you very much. I wish you all a safe journey back home. Please stay in touch. I will no longer be on the podium, but I will be perhaps on the other side, on the seat when the next, when the global mechanism meets. And do not forget the family photo. I think we have the photographer in town. And so please remain here for a very quick family photo. In the meantime, thank you very much, the meeting is adjourned.

Agreement points

Appreciation for Chair’s Leadership and Process Management

Speakers

– India
– Vanuatu
– Tunisia
– China
– European Union
– Brazil
– Egypt
– Mauritius
– Israel
– Cuba
– Algeria
– New Zealand
– Pakistan
– Albania
– Tonga
– Venezuela
– El Salvador
– Islamic Republic of Iran
– Malawi
– Ghana
– Mozambique
– Fiji
– Papua New Guinea
– Ireland
– Philippines
– Switzerland
– Malaysia
– France
– Colombia
– Republic of Korea
– Greece
– Germany

Arguments

Deep appreciation for exemplary leadership over five years

Thanks for respect shown to small island developing states

Commendation for outstanding leadership and serious participation

Recognition of Chair’s exceptional diplomatic skills and leadership

Recognition of Chair’s wise leadership allowing historic achievement

Heartfelt thanks for thoughtful leadership and effective chairmanship

Gratitude for stellar leadership and commitment to framework

Thanks for patient, balanced and inclusive leadership

Appreciation for exceptional leadership and inclusive approach

Recognition of Chair’s commendable and effective job performance

Summary

Universal appreciation and gratitude expressed by all speakers for the Chair’s exceptional leadership, diplomatic skills, patience, inclusivity, and commitment throughout the five-year OEWG process, with many noting the Chair’s ability to navigate complex negotiations and build consensus among diverse viewpoints.

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Support for Conference Room Paper (CRP) Adoption

Speakers

– India
– Vanuatu
– Tunisia
– China
– European Union
– United Kingdom
– Brazil
– Egypt
– Mauritius
– Israel
– Cuba
– Algeria
– New Zealand
– Pakistan
– Albania
– Australia
– Switzerland
– Canada
– Nicaragua
– Malaysia
– France
– Colombia
– Venezuela
– El Salvador
– Islamic Republic of Iran
– Malawi
– Ghana
– Mozambique
– Fiji
– Papua New Guinea
– Ireland
– Philippines
– Russian Federation
– Argentina
– Portugal
– Greece
– Germany

Arguments

Support for CRP as balanced document despite imperfections

Willingness to adopt CRP recognizing diplomatic compromises

Joining consensus while expressing reservations on international law sections

Support for CRP as finely balanced package

Appreciation for balanced approach and consensus achievement

Welcome of CRP adoption by consensus

Support for consensus outcome as meaningful step forward

Joining consensus despite disappointments with certain sections

Support for final report as balanced and pragmatic document

Flexibility shown in spirit of consensus

Summary

All speakers ultimately supported the adoption of the Conference Room Paper despite various reservations and disappointments, recognizing it as a balanced compromise that enables consensus and represents a meaningful step forward in establishing the global mechanism.

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Recognition of Multilateralism and UN Framework Success

Speakers

– India
– China
– European Union
– Brazil
– Pakistan
– Albania
– Chair
– Greece
– Germany

Arguments

Recognition of achievement as testament to multilateral dialogue value

View of success as important for multilateral system confidence

Appreciation for success demonstrating multilateralism effectiveness

Welcome of consensus outcome as historic milestone

Alignment with consensus as victory for multilateralism

Recognition of outcome as win for multilateralism and United Nations

Recognition of process as milestone for multilateralism

Recognition of major historic step forward ensuring seamless transition

Summary

Multiple speakers emphasized that the successful consensus outcome represents a victory for multilateralism and demonstrates the effectiveness of the UN framework, particularly significant given current challenging geopolitical circumstances.

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Support for Women in Cyber Fellowship and Gender Inclusion

Speakers

– Tonga
– Ghana
– Mozambique
– Fiji
– Australia
– Colombia

Arguments

Appreciation for Women in International Security and Cyber Fellowship

Thanks for Women in Cyber Fellowship enabling meaningful participation

Welcome of references to gender included in final report

Recognition of valuable role of Women in Cyber Fellowship

Recognition of meaningful participation and leadership of women

Summary

Strong consensus among speakers about the value and importance of the Women in International Security and Cyberspace Fellowship, with recognition that it has been transformative in enabling meaningful participation of women from small island developing states and building a global community of cyber practitioners.

Topics

Human rights | Development

Capacity Building and Development Priorities

Speakers

– India
– Tunisia
– Algeria
– Russian Federation
– Argentina
– Philippines

Arguments

Pleasure with establishment of Global ICT Security Cooperation Portal

Support for dedicated thematic group on ICT security capacity building

Disappointment with weakness of capacity building section

Concern about insufficient provision for capacity building

Welcome of consensus decision to create capacity building thematic group

Gratification with incorporation of capacity building thematic group

Appreciation for inclusion of ICT Security Capacity Building Catalog

Summary

Speakers agreed on the importance of capacity building, with appreciation for the establishment of capacity building mechanisms and thematic groups, though some expressed disappointment that more ambitious funding mechanisms were not included.

Topics

Development | Cybersecurity

Similar viewpoints

These speakers shared significant disappointment about the reduction or removal of international law content from the final report, particularly regarding international humanitarian law and the lack of a dedicated thematic group on international law application in cyberspace.

Speakers

– Tunisia
– Egypt
– Algeria
– Canada
– Ireland
– Australia

Arguments

Disappointment with removal of international law section and thematic group

Concern about how international law compliance will be approached

Disappointment with removal of dedicated space for international law discussion

Regret that final report fails to capture substantive convergence on international law

Disappointment that international law chapter doesn’t reflect progress made

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Human rights

These speakers shared a position rejecting the automatic application of international law to cyberspace, emphasizing state sovereignty and supporting the development of new legally binding instruments rather than applying existing international law frameworks.

Speakers

– Russian Federation
– Nicaragua
– Cuba

Arguments

Rejection of automatic application of international law to digital sphere

Emphasis on sovereign rights and non-interference principles

Support for development of universal convention on international information security

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Both speakers expressed specific reservations about gender-related language in the document, with the US dissociating from gender references entirely and Argentina clarifying their interpretation of gender as referring only to two biological sexes.

Speakers

– United States
– Argentina

Arguments

Dissociation with specific paragraphs on gender and SDGs

Explanation of position on gender terminology referring to two sexes

Topics

Human rights

Small island developing states and smaller countries expressed particular gratitude for the inclusive approach that gave them equal voice regardless of size or resources, and specifically appreciated support mechanisms like the Women in Cyber Fellowship.

Speakers

– Vanuatu
– Tonga
– Fiji
– Papua New Guinea
– Mauritius
– Malawi
– El Salvador

Arguments

Thanks for respect shown to small island developing states

Appreciation for Women in International Security and Cyber Fellowship

Gratitude for stellar leadership and commitment to framework

Topics

Development | Legal and regulatory

Unexpected consensus

Universal Support Despite Significant Reservations

Speakers

– Tunisia
– Egypt
– Algeria
– Russian Federation
– United States
– Iran
– Cuba
– Nicaragua

Arguments

Joining consensus while expressing reservations on international law sections

Joining consensus despite disappointments with certain sections

Concern that report doesn’t fully reflect breadth of threat landscape

Dissociation with specific paragraphs on gender and SDGs

Explanation

Despite expressing significant concerns and reservations about key aspects of the final report (international law provisions, threat landscape coverage, gender references), all speakers ultimately joined the consensus. This demonstrates remarkable diplomatic flexibility and commitment to the multilateral process over perfect outcomes.

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Consensus on Future Mechanism Structure Despite Procedural Concerns

Speakers

– Islamic Republic of Iran
– Nicaragua
– Russian Federation
– Portugal
– France
– Germany

Arguments

Emphasis on consensus-based decision-making in global mechanism

Support for single-track, state-led, consensus-based global mechanism

Support for mandate providing regular institutional dialogue on responsible state behavior

Readiness to support operationalization through First Committee resolution

Commitment to continued work in new single-track global mechanism

Explanation

Despite having different views on substantive issues, there was unexpected consensus on the structural and procedural aspects of the future global mechanism, with all speakers agreeing on consensus-based decision-making and the single-track approach.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Overall assessment

Summary

The discussion demonstrated remarkable consensus on procedural and structural issues, with universal appreciation for the Chair’s leadership, support for the CRP adoption, recognition of the process as a victory for multilateralism, and agreement on the importance of capacity building and women’s participation. However, significant substantive disagreements remained on international law application, threat landscape coverage, and gender-related language.

Consensus level

High procedural consensus with moderate substantive consensus. The ability to achieve unanimous adoption despite significant reservations demonstrates the strength of multilateral diplomacy and commitment to the UN framework. The consensus enables the transition to a permanent global mechanism while preserving space for continued dialogue on contentious issues. This suggests a mature diplomatic process where participants prioritized collective progress over individual preferences, setting a positive foundation for future work in the global mechanism.

Different viewpoints

International Law Provisions and Thematic Groups

Speakers

– Tunisia
– Egypt
– Algeria
– Australia
– Canada
– Ireland
– Russian Federation

Arguments

The fact that the section reserved for international law and cyberspace was removed exacerbates concerns by certain states regarding the use of ICTs

The omission of a dedicated DTG on the application of international law in the context of cyberspace is very alarming

Australia is disappointed that the international law chapter does not capture all the progress made and emerging convergence reached over almost five years

Canada profoundly regrets that the final report fails to capture the substantive convergence on international law that became clear in the room

An automatic and unconditional application of international law to the digital sphere is unacceptable

Summary

Arab states, African states, and Western countries disagreed on international law provisions. Arab/African states were concerned about removal of dedicated international law sections and thematic groups, while Western countries regretted that convergence on international law wasn’t fully captured. Russia opposed automatic application of international law to cyberspace.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Human rights

Gender References and Terminology

Speakers

– United States
– Argentina
– Fiji

Arguments

The United States remains deeply disappointed that the report retains references to gender and the Sustainable Development Goals

Argentina understands the word gender in the framework of international law as referring to two sexes, male and female, in accordance with the Rome Statute 7.3

Fiji welcomes the references to gender included in the final report and highlights the valuable role of the Women in International Security and Cyberspace Fellowship

Summary

The US opposed gender references entirely, Argentina provided a restrictive interpretation limiting gender to two sexes, while Fiji and cross-regional groups welcomed gender references and women’s participation initiatives.

Topics

Human rights

Stakeholder Participation Modalities

Speakers

– Portugal
– Russian Federation
– Nicaragua

Arguments

Portugal expresses disappointment that Member States were not able to agree on more equitable and transparent future modalities for selection of non-governmental interested parties

The participation of non-state actors in the activities of the OEWG were of limited utility when it comes to conflict settlement and building up technical capacity

Nicaragua welcomes that accredited stakeholders will participate on a non-objection basis with solely consultative status, maintaining the strictly intergovernmental nature

Summary

Portugal wanted more inclusive stakeholder participation, Russia viewed non-state actors as having limited utility and potentially undermining diplomatic efforts, while Nicaragua and like-minded states supported restrictive consultative-only status to maintain intergovernmental nature.

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Capacity Building Mechanisms and Funding

Speakers

– Tunisia
– Algeria
– Russian Federation

Arguments

The weakness of the section on capacity building, at a time when we are hoping that a thematic group dedicated to this issue, it was not possible to set up a voluntary fund or a fellowship program

Algeria maintains that the content and recommendations regarding capacity building are significantly lower than expectations. Without concrete steps to establish a UN-led capacity building vehicle with adequate resources, the discussions will not realize their desired potential

Russia welcomes the consensus decision of the OEWG to create a thematic group on capacity building under the Global Mechanism, viewing this as an important step toward overcoming the digital divide between countries

Summary

Arab and African states expressed disappointment with insufficient capacity building provisions and lack of concrete funding mechanisms, while Russia welcomed the capacity building thematic group as sufficient progress toward addressing digital divides.

Topics

Development

Unexpected differences

Sustainable Development Goals References

Speakers

– United States
– Argentina

Arguments

The United States remains deeply disappointed that the report retains references to gender and the Sustainable Development Goals. The Sustainable Development Goals advance a program of soft global governance that is inconsistent with U.S. sovereignty

Argentina recalls that Agenda 2030 is not legally binding that each state in exercise of their sovereignty has the right to interpret and pursue freely

Explanation

The disagreement over SDG references was unexpected as these are widely accepted UN frameworks. The US opposition based on sovereignty concerns and Argentina’s emphasis on non-binding interpretation revealed deeper tensions about global governance frameworks that weren’t anticipated in a cybersecurity context.

Topics

Development | Legal and regulatory

Threat Landscape Comprehensiveness

Speakers

– Islamic Republic of Iran

Arguments

Iran remains concerned that the final report does not fully reflect the entire range of the threat landscape, as it overlooks several threats identified by states during OEWG deliberations, particularly those related to private sector responsibilities and platforms with extraterritorial impact

Explanation

Iran’s specific concern about private sector responsibilities and platforms with extraterritorial impact was unexpected, as most other speakers focused on state-to-state issues. This highlighted a different perspective on cybersecurity threats that emphasized private sector accountability rather than just state behavior.

Topics

Cybersecurity

Overall assessment

Summary

The main areas of disagreement centered on international law provisions, gender references, stakeholder participation, and capacity building mechanisms. Despite these disagreements, all speakers ultimately joined consensus.

Disagreement level

Moderate disagreement level with significant implications. While all parties achieved consensus, the disagreements reveal fundamental differences in approach to cybersecurity governance – particularly between Western emphasis on international law convergence versus developing country concerns about capacity building and sovereignty, and between inclusive versus restrictive approaches to stakeholder participation. These underlying tensions will likely continue in the future global mechanism.

Partial agreements

Similar viewpoints

These speakers shared significant disappointment about the reduction or removal of international law content from the final report, particularly regarding international humanitarian law and the lack of a dedicated thematic group on international law application in cyberspace.

Speakers

– Tunisia
– Egypt
– Algeria
– Canada
– Ireland
– Australia

Arguments

Disappointment with removal of international law section and thematic group

Concern about how international law compliance will be approached

Disappointment with removal of dedicated space for international law discussion

Regret that final report fails to capture substantive convergence on international law

Disappointment that international law chapter doesn’t reflect progress made

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Human rights

These speakers shared a position rejecting the automatic application of international law to cyberspace, emphasizing state sovereignty and supporting the development of new legally binding instruments rather than applying existing international law frameworks.

Speakers

– Russian Federation
– Nicaragua
– Cuba

Arguments

Rejection of automatic application of international law to digital sphere

Emphasis on sovereign rights and non-interference principles

Support for development of universal convention on international information security

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Both speakers expressed specific reservations about gender-related language in the document, with the US dissociating from gender references entirely and Argentina clarifying their interpretation of gender as referring only to two biological sexes.

Speakers

– United States
– Argentina

Arguments

Dissociation with specific paragraphs on gender and SDGs

Explanation of position on gender terminology referring to two sexes

Topics

Human rights

Small island developing states and smaller countries expressed particular gratitude for the inclusive approach that gave them equal voice regardless of size or resources, and specifically appreciated support mechanisms like the Women in Cyber Fellowship.

Speakers

– Vanuatu
– Tonga
– Fiji
– Papua New Guinea
– Mauritius
– Malawi
– El Salvador

Arguments

Thanks for respect shown to small island developing states

Appreciation for Women in International Security and Cyber Fellowship

Gratitude for stellar leadership and commitment to framework

Topics

Development | Legal and regulatory

Key takeaways

The Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) successfully adopted its final report by consensus, establishing a single-track permanent mechanism called the ‘Global Mechanism’ for responsible state behavior in cyberspace

The consensus represents a significant achievement for multilateralism and the UN framework, despite challenging geopolitical circumstances

All delegations expressed some level of dissatisfaction with aspects of the final report, but showed flexibility in the spirit of consensus and diplomatic compromise

The report consolidates decades of work since 1998 and builds upon previous GGE and OEWG processes to create a framework for the future permanent mechanism

Strong appreciation was expressed for the Chair’s leadership over five years and the inclusive, transparent process that enabled meaningful participation by all member states

The Women in International Security and Cyberspace Fellowship was widely praised for enabling greater gender balance and meaningful participation of women delegates

The process demonstrated that multilateral consensus is possible even in difficult geopolitical times when there is commitment to listening and flexibility

Resolutions and action items

Adoption of the final report of the OEWG as contained in document A.AC.292.2025.CRP.1 by consensus

Adoption of the procedural report authorizing the Chair to finalize it

Establishment of the Global Mechanism (UN Global Mechanism) as a permanent single-track process starting with an organizational session no later than March 2026

Singapore to present a simple enabling resolution in the First Committee to endorse the final report and formalize the outcome

Chair’s appeal for only one single resolution on ICT security in the First Committee, not multiple resolutions

Future mechanism to include dedicated thematic groups on capacity building and cross-cutting working groups

Establishment of the Global ICT Security Cooperation and Capacity Building Portal as a concrete outcome

Delegations given option to submit written statements within three weeks to be compiled by the Secretariat

Unresolved issues

Concerns about insufficient provisions for international law discussions in the future mechanism, particularly regarding international humanitarian law

Disagreement over the automatic applicability of international law to cyberspace, with some states rejecting this approach

Insufficient capacity building mechanisms and funding, including lack of voluntary fund or fellowship program

Concerns about stakeholder participation modalities and transparency in the future mechanism

Debate over the neutrality of technologies concept mentioned in the report

Disagreement over references to gender and Sustainable Development Goals in the report

Concerns about the threat landscape not fully reflecting all identified threats, particularly those related to private sector responsibilities

Questions about how compliance with international law obligations will be approached under the new mechanism

Suggested compromises

Chair’s ‘surgical and strategic’ approach to amendments, making minimal changes to maintain overall balance

Acceptance of imperfect document in the spirit of consensus, with delegations showing flexibility despite reservations

Maintaining intergovernmental nature while allowing stakeholder participation under specific modalities

Inclusion of capacity building thematic group as compromise for developing countries’ priorities

Consensus-based decision making to be maintained in the future mechanism to respect all member states’ interests

Iran’s proposal to compile a list of threats identified by states throughout the OEWG process as reference for future work

Arab Group’s request for the future mechanism Chair to convene focused roundtables on international law application

Balance between different priorities across the five pillars of the mandate while respecting state sovereignty

The Chair’s opening statement about the CRP being ‘a very finely balanced package’ and walking ‘a very fine line, almost a tight rope’ while making only ‘surgical amendments and tweaks’ rather than extensive changes.

Speaker

Chair (Ambassador Gafoor)

Reason

This comment is insightful because it frames the entire discussion around the delicate nature of diplomatic consensus-building. The Chair explicitly acknowledges that achieving balance means everyone will experience ‘disappointment, displeasure, dissatisfaction, and even possibly frustration’ – a rare moment of diplomatic candor about the inherent compromises in multilateral negotiations.

Impact

This comment set the tone for the entire session by establishing realistic expectations and discouraging further amendments. It created a framework where delegates understood that requesting changes could ‘upset the apple cart’ and derail five years of work. This strategic framing helped secure consensus by making delegates reluctant to reopen negotiations.

The Chair’s philosophical observation: ‘avoid making the search for perfection the enemy of the good’ and describing the report as ‘a crystallization of efforts not just this week, not just this past few months, not just these past few years, but a consolidation of decades of work starting with previous OEWGs and GGE processes.’

Speaker

Chair (Ambassador Gafoor)

Reason

This comment provides crucial historical context and philosophical grounding for the negotiations. It reframes the current document not as an isolated product but as part of a decades-long evolution in international cyber governance, making it harder for delegates to dismiss the current compromise.

Impact

This historical perspective helped delegates view their current dissatisfactions within a longer arc of progress. It shifted the discussion from focusing on immediate shortcomings to appreciating incremental advancement, contributing significantly to the consensus-building atmosphere.

Tunisia’s statement on behalf of the Arab Group expressing ‘concerns regarding the use of ICTs’ and noting ‘clear violations of IHL in the Middle East with the use of ICTs’ while requesting ‘the Chair of the Mechanism to hold a conference on the application of international law.’

Speaker

Tunisia (on behalf of Arab Group)

Reason

This comment is thought-provoking because it connects abstract cyber governance discussions to concrete geopolitical realities. It demonstrates how current conflicts directly influence multilateral cyber negotiations and reveals the tension between consensus-building and addressing urgent security concerns.

Impact

Despite expressing significant reservations, Tunisia’s decision to ‘join the consensus’ while maintaining these concerns established a pattern for other delegations. It showed that strong disagreement with specific elements didn’t preclude overall support, encouraging other hesitant delegations to follow suit.

China’s observation about the ‘stress test’ of multilateralism: ‘Given the current geopolitical landscape, which is filled with challenges, hot-spot conflicts in regions are ongoing, and in countries we see that some countries are not so keen on the concept of multilateralism… The success of our meeting is of a special, great significance.’

Speaker

China

Reason

This comment provides a meta-analysis of the achievement, contextualizing the consensus within broader challenges to multilateral cooperation. It’s insightful because it recognizes that technical cyber governance discussions cannot be separated from larger geopolitical tensions.

Impact

China’s framing of the consensus as a victory for multilateralism itself elevated the significance of the achievement beyond cyber governance, encouraging other delegates to view their participation as supporting the broader multilateral system during a period of global tension.

The Chair’s closing reflection on the evolution from GGE to OEWG: ‘there was a wisdom in beginning the OEWG process… it made things inclusive. It was no longer a limited circle of representatives, experts, 25, 30 people discussing issues… multilateralism means making things inclusive, making things transparent.’

Speaker

Chair (Ambassador Gafoor)

Reason

This comment provides important institutional analysis about the democratization of cyber governance discussions. It’s insightful because it explains how procedural changes (moving from expert groups to open-ended working groups) can fundamentally alter the nature and legitimacy of international negotiations.

Impact

This observation helped frame the entire five-year process as a successful experiment in inclusive multilateralism, providing intellectual justification for the consensus approach and reinforcing the value of the process itself, regardless of specific textual outcomes.

Australia’s data point about gender representation: ‘when the OEWG began… about one third of interventions were made by women. And since then, we’ve been tracking a very encouraging trend… it is 55%. It was 55% in February, and it’s 53% at this session.’

Speaker

Australia

Reason

This empirical observation is thought-provoking because it provides concrete evidence of changing participation patterns in international security discussions, traditionally male-dominated fields. It demonstrates how intentional efforts (like the Women in Cyber Fellowship) can measurably impact diplomatic representation.

Impact

While brief, this data point validated the process’s commitment to inclusivity and provided tangible evidence of progress beyond the substantive negotiations, reinforcing the broader theme of the OEWG as an evolution in diplomatic practice.

Overall assessment

The key comments shaped this discussion by establishing a framework of managed expectations and historical perspective that facilitated consensus despite significant substantive disagreements. The Chair’s strategic framing of the document as a ‘finely balanced package’ that shouldn’t be reopened, combined with the historical contextualization of the work as part of decades-long progress, created psychological pressure for consensus while allowing delegates to express reservations. The pattern established by Tunisia – expressing strong concerns while still joining consensus – provided a template for other delegations to follow. China’s meta-commentary about multilateralism under stress elevated the stakes beyond cyber governance to the credibility of multilateral cooperation itself. Together, these comments created a narrative arc where consensus became not just desirable but necessary for the legitimacy of both the process and multilateralism more broadly. The discussion’s success lay not in resolving substantive disagreements but in creating a framework where those disagreements could coexist with procedural consensus.

How will the application of international law, particularly international humanitarian law, be approached under the new global mechanism given the removal of the dedicated thematic group on international law?

Speaker

Tunisia (on behalf of Arab Group), Egypt, Iran

Explanation

Multiple delegations expressed concern about the significant reduction in international law content and removal of the dedicated thematic group, particularly regarding IHL application in cyberspace

How will adequate, sufficient and predictable funding be established for capacity building initiatives, including a voluntary fund and fellowship program?

Speaker

Tunisia (on behalf of Arab Group), Egypt

Explanation

Delegations noted the weakness of capacity building provisions and lack of concrete funding mechanisms to support developing states

How will the global mechanism address the diverse landscape of ICT threats that reflects the realities of all countries and regions?

Speaker

Iran

Explanation

Iran expressed concern that the threat section doesn’t fully reflect the breadth of threats identified by states, particularly those related to private sector responsibilities

How will discussions on legally binding obligations in ICT security continue under the future mechanism?

Speaker

Cuba, Nicaragua (on behalf of like-minded states)

Explanation

Several delegations emphasized the need to continue work toward legally binding instruments to address legal gaps in cybersecurity

How will the modalities for stakeholder participation be improved to ensure more equitable and transparent selection processes?

Speaker

Portugal, Chair

Explanation

Portugal noted disappointment with stakeholder participation modalities, and the Chair encouraged keeping an open mind to stakeholder engagement

How will the future mechanism ensure that all five pillars of the mandate are treated equally during discussions?

Speaker

Nicaragua (on behalf of like-minded states)

Explanation

The group emphasized the importance of balanced treatment of all mandate pillars in future discussions

How will the review conferences of the mechanism evaluate results and potentially improve the initial structure and stakeholder participation modalities?

Speaker

Portugal

Explanation

Portugal noted that member states will remain free to revisit the working group structure and improve stakeholder participation at review conferences

How will the global mechanism work toward a voluntary universal system of periodic compliance reporting for responsible state behavior?

Speaker

Portugal

Explanation

Portugal envisioned the mechanism contributing to a long-term system of mutual accountability and compliance monitoring

Summary

This transcript documents the Seventh Meeting of the Eleventh Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICTs, focusing on the second reading of a draft final report for establishing a future permanent mechanism. The Chair opened by noting 22 speakers were scheduled to provide feedback on the revised document (REV2) that was circulated the previous evening, emphasizing the need for focused, surgical comments at this critical stage of the five-year process.

Multiple delegations expressed appreciation for the Chair’s efforts while raising specific concerns about various sections of the draft. A significant point of contention emerged around the international law chapter, with many countries including the EU, Switzerland, Canada, and others expressing disappointment that substantive discussions on international humanitarian law, state responsibility, and due diligence were not adequately reflected in the text. Several delegations called for reinstating language from cross-regional working papers, particularly those presented by Vietnam on behalf of multiple regions.

The structure of dedicated thematic groups (DTGs) generated considerable debate, with some delegations supporting the proposed two-group structure while others, including a like-minded group led by Nicaragua, opposed certain aspects and called for maintaining current NGO participation modalities. France proposed a compromise title for the future mechanism: “Global Mechanism to Advance Responsible State Behavior in the Use of ICTs,” which gained support from multiple delegations.

Capacity building remained a priority for many developing nations, with several African and Latin American countries emphasizing the importance of technical assistance and the need for inclusive participation mechanisms. The removal of the voluntary checklist from the main report disappointed numerous delegations who viewed it as a practical implementation tool.

Throughout the session, the Chair emphasized the collective commitment to reaching consensus and achieving a smooth transition to a single-track permanent mechanism. Despite various concerns and proposed amendments, most delegations expressed flexibility and willingness to compromise to achieve a consensus outcome. The Chair concluded by promising to prepare a conference room paper by 9 PM that evening, incorporating surgical fixes based on the feedback received, with final adoption scheduled for the following morning.

Keypoints

## Major Discussion Points:

– **International Law Application in Cyberspace**: Significant debate over how to reflect discussions on international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights law, and state responsibility in the final report. Many delegations expressed disappointment that substantive discussions from the past five years were not adequately captured, with particular concern about references to IHL being removed while minority proposals for new legally binding conventions remained.

– **Future Permanent Mechanism Structure**: Extensive discussion about the proposed dedicated thematic groups (DTGs), with disagreement over whether there should be separate groups for international law versus the proposed cross-cutting approach. Concerns were raised about DTG1 being too broad and potentially duplicating plenary sessions, while DTG2 on capacity building received broader support.

– **Stakeholder Participation Modalities**: Ongoing tension between delegations wanting more inclusive and transparent participation for non-governmental organizations versus those insisting on maintaining current restrictive modalities. Several delegations opposed the “no-objection procedure” that allows single states to block stakeholder participation without explanation.

– **Voluntary Norms Implementation Checklist**: Disappointment from many delegations about the removal of the voluntary checklist from the final report, which they viewed as an important practical tool for helping states implement the framework of responsible behavior in cyberspace.

– **Capacity Building Mechanisms**: Discussion of various capacity building initiatives, including support for a UN Cyber Resilience Academy, global roundtables, and concerns about ensuring adequate technical and financial assistance for developing countries.

## Overall Purpose:

The discussion aimed to finalize the report of the Open-Ended Working Group on ICT security and establish modalities for transitioning to a permanent mechanism. The goal was to reach consensus on a framework that would continue multilateral dialogue on responsible state behavior in cyberspace while addressing cybersecurity threats, international law application, norms implementation, confidence-building measures, and capacity building.

## Overall Tone:

The tone began constructively but became increasingly tense as delegations expressed significant concerns about the revised draft. While many speakers emphasized their commitment to reaching consensus and demonstrated flexibility, there was notable frustration about key elements being removed or inadequately addressed. The Chair maintained an encouraging tone throughout, acknowledging concerns while emphasizing the need for compromise. By the end, the tone shifted back toward cautious optimism, with the Chair expressing confidence that consensus was achievable despite the challenges, and delegations generally reaffirming their commitment to finding a path forward.

Speakers

**Speakers from the provided list:**

– Chair – Chairperson of the Seventh Meeting of the Eleventh Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICTs

– Burkina Faso – National delegation representative

– Argentina – National delegation representative

– Nicaragua – Speaking on behalf of a group of like-minded states (Republic of Belarus, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, People’s Republic of China, Republic of Cuba, State of Eritrea, Islamic Republic of Iran, Republic of the Niger, Russian Federation, and Republic of Nicaragua)

– Morocco – National delegation representative

– El Salvador – National delegation representative

– Switzerland – National delegation representative

– European Union – EU delegation representative

– France – National delegation representative

– Japan – National delegation representative

– Russian Federation – National delegation representative

– Cuba – National delegation representative

– South Africa – National delegation representative, aligned with African group statement

– Mexico – National delegation representative

– United States – National delegation representative

– Latvia – National delegation representative

– Brazil – National delegation representative

– Canada – National delegation representative

– Ukraine – National delegation representative, aligned with European Union statement

– Australia – National delegation representative

– Kingdom of the Netherlands – National delegation representative, aligned with European Union statement

– Israel – National delegation representative

– Ireland – National delegation representative, aligned with European Union statement

– Finland – National delegation representative, aligned with European Union statement

– United Kingdom – National delegation representative

– Mauritius – National delegation representative

– Philippines – National delegation representative

– Germany – National delegation representative

– Saudi Arabia – National delegation representative, aligned with Arab Group statement

– Poland – National delegation representative, aligned with European Union statement

– Malawi – National delegation representative

– New Zealand – National delegation representative

– Estonia – National delegation representative, aligned with European Union statement

– Pakistan – National delegation representative

– Costa Rica – National delegation representative

– Chile – National delegation representative

– Papua New Guinea – National delegation representative

– Islamic Republic of Iran – National delegation representative

**Additional speakers:**

None – all speakers mentioned in the transcript are included in the provided speakers names list.

# Report: Seventh Meeting of the Eleventh Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICTs

## Executive Summary

The Seventh Meeting of the Eleventh Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICTs focused on the second reading of the revised draft final report (REV2). The Chair opened the session noting 22 speakers on the list to provide feedback on REV2, which had been circulated the previous evening. The meeting revealed significant disagreements on key issues including the application of international law in cyberspace, the structure of the future permanent mechanism, stakeholder participation procedures, and implementation tools. Despite these disagreements, most delegations expressed willingness to compromise to achieve consensus. The Chair committed to preparing a conference room paper by 9 PM that evening incorporating feedback, with final adoption scheduled for 10 AM the following morning.

## Opening Remarks and Process Context

The Chair began by noting that delegations were continuing the second reading of the revised draft final report (REV2), which had been circulated the previous evening. The Chair emphasized that this represented the final stage of the five-year process to establish a permanent mechanism for international cyber security cooperation. With 22 speakers on the list, the Chair requested focused, surgical comments rather than comprehensive reviews given the advanced stage of negotiations.

The Chair stressed the goal of achieving a “smooth and seamless transition to the new mechanism” and maintaining a “single-track state-led process.” The Chair noted that the following day would provide the opportunity to begin this transition and emphasized the need for consensus within the remaining time.

## International Law Application in Cyberspace

The application of international law to cyberspace, particularly international humanitarian law (IHL), generated the most contentious debate, revealing sharp disagreements between different groups of countries.

### Concerns About Inadequate Reflection of Discussions

The European Union expressed strong disappointment that the revised draft failed to adequately reflect the extensive discussions on international law that had occurred over the five-year process. The EU representative stated that “four years of work cannot be lost with this,” emphasizing that discussions on international humanitarian law, state responsibility, and due diligence represented significant multilateral achievements that should be factually reflected in the final report.

Switzerland proposed specific language to address what it saw as an imbalance, suggesting that the document should include factual statements about the discussions that had taken place, even without consensus on all points. Switzerland argued for reinstating language on ICT operations constituting use of force when comparable to non-ICT operations, and proposed replacing “attacks” with “operations” for greater legal accuracy.

Germany, Poland, Finland, Estonia, and New Zealand echoed these concerns. Germany noted disappointment that “rich discussions on international law are not reflected in the final draft.” The United States expressed concern about the “imbalanced treatment giving equal footing to minority proposals versus consensus documents,” referring to the treatment of the ICRC consensus resolution alongside minority proposals for new legally binding conventions.

### Opposition to International Humanitarian Law References

Nicaragua, speaking on behalf of ten like-minded countries including Russia, China, Cuba, and others, took a different position, arguing for “ensuring a stable balance between voluntary and legally binding norms” and demanding “equal emphasis on both implementing existing voluntary non-binding norms and developing new legally binding instruments.”

Cuba explicitly requested “to delete references to international humanitarian law applicability due to lack of consensus.” The Russian Federation similarly insisted on “the exclusion of any hints or references to the non-consensus controversial ideas about the applicability of international humanitarian law to ICTs.”

This disagreement extended beyond IHL to broader questions about the nature of international law in cyberspace, with the like-minded states advocating for new legally binding instruments while other countries emphasized the application of existing international law frameworks.

## Future Permanent Mechanism Structure

The structure of the future permanent mechanism, particularly the proposed dedicated thematic groups (DTGs), generated considerable debate.

### Dedicated Thematic Groups Controversy

The revised draft proposed two dedicated thematic groups with a cross-cutting approach, but this structure faced criticism from multiple directions. Nicaragua, speaking for the like-minded group, expressed concern that “DTG1 scope is overstretched and unclear, risking duplication of plenary sessions.” They argued that the broad mandate covering multiple pillars could lead to ineffective discussions.

The Russian Federation supported a more limited approach, advocating for “establishing only DTG on capacity building and deferring other DTGs to organizational session.” However, other delegations had different preferences. Mauritius expressed a “preference for dedicated thematic group on international law to provide focused discussions,” while El Salvador voiced “concern over elimination of dedicated thematic group on international law.”

The United States stated they “cannot agree to a report that contains such a DTG [dedicated thematic group on international law]” because “certain states would seek to exploit conversations… to advance new, legally binding obligations.”

### Support for Capacity Building Focus

Despite disagreements about other aspects of the mechanism’s structure, there was broad consensus on the importance of capacity building. Morocco provided “strong support for dedicated thematic group on capacity building as cross-cutting lever,” a position echoed by South Africa, Papua New Guinea, and Argentina.

## Stakeholder Participation Procedures

The question of how non-governmental stakeholders should participate in the future mechanism revealed another area of disagreement.

### Calls for Transparency in Participation

Canada supported a “transparent objection process where decisions reflect majority will if objections persist,” challenging the existing “no-objection procedure” that allowed single states to block stakeholder participation. Australia expressed concern that “single state veto undermines participation of other stakeholders.” Chile called for “meaningful stakeholder participation with transparency and certainty in accreditation,” while the European Union supported “balanced stakeholder participation modalities covering various concerns.”

### Resistance to Changes in Participation

The like-minded states took a different approach, with Nicaragua expressing “strong opposition to restrictions on no-objection procedure and NGO participation in thematic groups.” The Russian Federation opposed “consultations on NGO participation being imposed on states,” while Cuba emphasized “maintaining intergovernmental nature and current OEWG modalities.”

## Capacity Building Initiatives

Capacity building emerged as an area of substantial agreement across different groups of countries.

### Support for Specific Programs

Multiple delegations called for reinstating references to the UN Cyber Resilience Academy within UNIDIR. Latvia made this call explicitly, supported by the Philippines and Pakistan. Brazil, Mexico, and Costa Rica expressed regret over the removal of the mapping exercise for capacity building programmes. Switzerland supported moving ICT tools and products access from confidence-building measures to the capacity building section.

### Developing Country Priorities

Burkina Faso raised specific concerns about mobile money vulnerabilities and the need for international assistance during major cyber attacks. South Africa, speaking in alignment with the African group, emphasized the importance of needs-based, inclusive capacity building. Mauritius called for “needs-based, inclusive capacity building especially for developing countries,” while Mexico supported a “UN-administered sponsorship program to ensure impartiality and transparency.”

## Implementation Tools and Norms

The removal of the voluntary checklist from the final report generated widespread disappointment.

### Regret Over Checklist Removal

The United States expressed “disappointment over removal of voluntary checklist as important implementation guidance,” a position supported by the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Chile, Malawi, and the Philippines. Chile called for “reincorporation of operational aspects and voluntary checklist for real-world implementation,” while Malawi supported the “checklist as tool to help operationalise norms and bridge implementation gap.”

## Emerging Threats and Technical Issues

Several delegations raised concerns about emerging threats and technical challenges.

### Specific Threat Concerns

Burkina Faso called for explicitly including “threats from terrorist groups using encrypted platforms for propaganda and recruitment” and raised concerns about “mobile money and financial services vulnerabilities in developing countries.” Pakistan requested adding “references to disinformation and fake news as emerging threats,” while Japan supported “maintaining language on cryptocurrency theft and its impact on international peace and security.”

### Technical Distinctions

Argentina raised specific technical concerns, emphasizing “technology neutrality and responsibility lying with users, not vulnerability identifiers” and noting that “IoT vs AI distinctions matter” and that “firewall references are becoming obsolete.” Cuba expressed “concern about technology neutrality language being included without proper discussion.”

## Compromise Efforts and Flexibility

Despite significant disagreements, several delegations demonstrated flexibility and offered compromise solutions.

### France’s Naming Proposal

France proposed a compromise name for the future mechanism: “Global Mechanism to Advance Responsible State Behavior in the Use of ICTs.” The French representative stated that “in the spirit of compromise necessary for consensus, my delegation… could consider accepting the following name,” abandoning their preferred “Programme of Action” terminology. This proposal gained immediate support from Latvia, Estonia, the Netherlands, Israel, and Switzerland.

### Other Compromise Suggestions

Canada suggested compromise language for promoting ICT use “in accordance with international law” rather than for “peaceful purposes.” Several delegations emphasized their willingness to be flexible on various issues to achieve consensus.

## Chair’s Concluding Remarks and Next Steps

The Chair concluded the session by acknowledging the feedback received and committing to preparing a conference room paper by 9 PM that evening, incorporating “surgical fixes” based on the comments. The Chair emphasized making changes that would make the consensus “workable through future work programs rather than perfect structure now.”

The Chair noted that the final adoption meeting was scheduled for 10 AM the following morning and that delegations would have the opportunity to make statements for the record to provide context for joining consensus. The Chair observed that “at the UN, there’s no such thing as a perfect document that is to be adopted by consensus,” emphasizing the need for compromise while maintaining functionality.

The Chair’s approach focused on addressing specific concerns through targeted revisions rather than comprehensive rewrites, recognizing the delicate balance required to maintain the possibility of consensus while addressing legitimate concerns raised by delegations.

## Conclusion

The Seventh Meeting highlighted both the challenges and possibilities of achieving consensus on international cybersecurity governance. While significant disagreements remained on fundamental issues such as international law application, stakeholder participation, and implementation tools, most delegations expressed willingness to compromise. The Chair’s commitment to incorporating feedback through surgical fixes, combined with expressions of flexibility from various delegations, maintained the possibility of consensus despite the challenges. The final outcome would depend on the ability to craft a document that acknowledged different perspectives while providing a workable foundation for the permanent mechanism.

Chair: The Seventh Meeting of the Eleventh Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICTs is now called to order. Members, we will continue our discussions under agenda item 5 and we will continue our second reading of the draft final report, looking at the document that was made available late yesterday evening. We began the discussions this morning with some opening general remarks on my part as Chair to provide some context and general overview of the document that was circulated. And I also addressed some comments and questions that were raised towards the end of our morning session after having heard a list of speakers. I’d like to inform you that I have a list of about 22 speakers and I’d like to, of course, give everyone the chance to intervene. And we are at a stage in our process where we need to focus on the essentials and to be very, very surgical in our comments. So with these remarks, I continue with the speakers list where we left off this afternoon, starting with Burkina Faso, to be followed by Argentina. Burkina Faso, you have the floor.

Burkina Faso: Mr. Chair, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen. Burkina Faso is taking the floor for the first time, and thus I would like to thank you and your team for your skilled leadership of our work in this OEWG on security and in the use of ICTs, as well as the proposed draft report. Chair, we align ourselves with the statement of the African group at the same time. We reaffirm our commitment to a peaceful, secure, stable, and open cyberspace in line with the goals of the UN Charter and international law. Burkina Faso commends the efforts of the group from 2021-2025, which took place in a complex international context marked by multiplication of cybernetic threats, and we greatly appreciate the inclusiveness, transparency, and multilateral approach that our discussions were based on. We would like to make the following comments. In terms of threats, we would like to add threats such as the use of encrypted platforms by terrorist groups for propaganda and recruitment purposes. This should not simply be implied in other paragraphs, but should be made explicit. The adoption of mobile money and financial services on mobile platforms is very widespread in our country. There are inadequate partnerships that lead to difficulties when it comes to mobile wallets. We also support having the Future Permanent Mechanism establishing – having it establish a oversight carried out by all states that would help to map the risks and provide targeted technical assistance where it is most needed. When it comes to international – law, Burkina Faso reaffirms its commitment to the fundamental principles of international law and cyberspace, and we affirm that digital sovereignty is an extension of national sovereignty. Burkina Faso is open to discussions on potential changes to international law and believes that topics such as law for international assistance in the event of a major cyber attack ought to be further explored to strengthen solidarity between states when they are faced with serious incidents. In addition, the question of reparations due to victims of transborder cyberattacks ought to be addressed to protect states. When it comes to confidence-building measures between states, Burkina Faso fully supports the promotion of confidence-building measures in cybersecurity, especially with regard to transparency and international cooperation. We support the Directory of Global Points of Contact, which lets us test our national measures, and our experience with this directory has revealed, however, practical challenges such as language and technical barriers. With regard to capacity-building, we are aware that the implementation of standards depends on available capacity. Burkina Faso therefore calls for the adoption of support measures. We support the voluntary checklist and supports its distribution. We commend the initiatives that have been proposed for capacity-building on the state level, and we align ourselves with the African Union’s position on the recent decisions made in this regard. We strongly encourage the operationalization of the national portals for cooperation and capacity-building in digital security, which will contribute. to better opportunities within member states and developing countries. Mr. Chair, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, in closing, Burkina Faso remains fully committed to the constructive work of this OEWG and calls on all states to demonstrate flexibility and a willingness to compromise in order to arrive at consensus-based results that strengthen digital security for all of us while strictly abiding by international law and the principle of sovereign equality. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Burkina Faso, for your contribution. Argentina, to be followed by Nicaragua.

Argentina: Mr. President, Chair, we value your efforts and those of the Secretariat in producing a rev to move closer to consensus. We wish to highlight a few technical considerations that we hope will contribute to strengthening the document. As regards the new wording of Section B, existing and emerging threats, on paragraph 25, it’s important to avoid a negative presentation of capacity-building and identifying vulnerabilities. Technologies themselves are neutral. The potentially negative aspect is the potential use of them. This is a technical reality that must be recognized in order to strengthen digital security systems. Responsibility does not lie on those who identify the faults, but on those using them. On paragraph 27, there could be a conceptual confusion that arises between the IoT and AI. These are different problems. In the case of the Internet of Things, the debate should be around the cycle of development and implementation of confidentiality, whereas in AI… the issues relate to training and consultation, so we should introduce language on this. On paragraph 18, the confusion between CI and CII could affect public information, whether they are state institutions or otherwise, and so it’s important to distinguish between the two. On paragraph 20, we wish to indicate that a few technical references in this paragraph could quickly become obsolete. So, for instance, firewalls have already almost been replaced, and so we suggest more general wording that would better resist the passage of time. We will submit suggestions in writing. As regards the future permanent mechanism, now called global mechanism, my delegation wishes to express our recognition for the efforts deployed in producing this revised text, which reflects clear will to find convergent positions across the different positions expressed by delegations. Specifically, we value the fact that there has been a thematic group dedicated to capacity building in the area of ICT security. This has now been formulated cross-cuttingly and integrated into the five pillars. While we would have preferred the previous wording that was more focused on the needs that my delegation has been expressing over these five years of the OEWG’s mandate, we hope that the creation of this group will continue to reflect the draft because without sufficient capacity, states will not have the tools to implement the existing framework or to maintain open, peaceful, secure, and interoperable cyberspace. We continue to support the modalities for participation proposed by the stakeholders. We believe that this is balanced and this covers the concerns expressed by various delegations in the room. And at the same time, it guarantees inclusion. of voices that continue to be relevant from civil society, academia, and the private sector. Chair, we are going to submit this proposal in writing together with suggested language. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Argentina. Nicaragua, to be followed by Morocco. Nicaragua, I believe, is speaking on behalf of a like-minded group.

Nicaragua: Thank you, Chair. I am honored to speak on behalf of a group of like-minded states, the Republic of Belarus, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Cuba, the State of Eritrea, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Republic of the Niger, the Russian Federation, and my own country, the Republic of Nicaragua. We appreciate the efforts made by you and your team in preparing the Rev. 2 of the draft final report of the OEWG, which might serve as the basis for further discussions. We recognize some positive changes in the text, including the removal of the Annex 1 on the Voluntary Checklist. At the same time, certain elements of the document remain concerning to our group of states. With a view to contributing to achieving consensus, we propose the following adjustments. It is essential to align the terminology throughout the entire text with the mandate of the Future Permanent Mechanism, as agreed in July 2024, security of and in the use of ICTs. We insist on including this language in the title of the Future Permanent Mechanism. As for modalities for NGOs’ participation, we insist on adhering to those approved in April 2022. We urge to delete any conditions or unnecessary ambiguity with regard to the non-objection procedure. NGOs’ participation in DTGs remains unacceptable. The thematic groups should serve as a platform for in-depth and detailed discussions among government experts only. We cannot support the creation of DTG 1 since its scope is overstretched and unclear in its focus and functionality. Furthermore, DTG 1 bears risks of duplication of the plenary sessions. At this stage, it seems reasonable to establish the DTG on capacity building and defer the decision on other possible DTGs to the organizational session of the future permitting mechanism in March 2026. We advocate for ensuring a stable balance between voluntary and legally binding norms. In particular, the document must reflect an equal emphasis on both implementing existing voluntary non-binding norms and developing new legally binding instruments in the use of ICTs. References to the perspectives of elaboration of new legally binding agreements in this regard should be included in the text, building on previous reports. To avoid undermining consensus, topics where significant disagreement persists should be removed, for example, the applicability of IHL and references to related documents that have not been submitted for the consideration within the OEWG and do not enjoy universal acceptance. Mr. Chair, our group remains committed to working constructively with you, your team, and all national delegations to achieve a balanced and consensus-based outcome. We believe that addressing the above-mentioned concerns will strengthen the report and pave the way to finding and reaching consensus. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Nicaragua, speaking on behalf of the like-minded group, and I thank you and members of your group for your commitment to maintaining your constructive approach and to looking for a consensus outcome tomorrow. Morocco to be followed by El Salvador.

Morocco: Extending our prior intervention, we wish to express our appreciation for your efforts in updating the final draft report which reflects your desire to make progress with our discussion. We wish to take note of the following priorities. As regards the structure of the Future Permanent Mechanism, we reiterate our attachment and we support the creation of a dedicated thematic group on capacity building. This we believe is a cross-cutting lever essential to the effective implementation of commitments, especially for developing countries. My delegation remains firmly convinced that capacity building must be at the heart of our future action. Secondly, we note that the first thematic group proposed covers several topics and could be a simple extension of the plenary, and so we do not understand the extension of the number of thematic groups, whereas their relevance has already been established. Thirdly, on the legal section, we would have appreciated a deeper approach on international law. It still remains to be clarified exactly how international law can be applied, especially in the context of growing threats. Over five years, we have seen our discussions get deeper on international law, but this progress risks being diluted if we do not give international law the place that it deserves at the heart of the Future Mechanism. Fourthly, as we recognize all of the threats and risks identified, we particularly welcome the emphasis placed on critical infrastructure. This is the heart of our digital ecosystems, and also the emphasis on the vulnerabilities to which these are exposed. This aligns perfectly with the concerns expressed by a number of delegations, including my own. Finally, on cyber security in the future depends on our ability to build a robust framework where every state can contribute fully. It is therefore down to us to work together to ensure that this shared ambition is realized. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Morocco, for your contribution. El Salvador to be followed by Switzerland.

El Salvador: Thank you, Chair. El Salvador thanks you for your efforts to bring us to this final stage of the process. We have a few remarks that we would like to share with you for consideration. On the section on threats, in paragraph 17 we are concerned that the specific reference to critical infrastructure and others that have been eliminated, health, maritime, aeronautic, financial and other sectors, this was previously agreed language in the APRs and represents an important step towards identifying vulnerable sectors. In paragraph 24, the human-centered approach has been removed, whereas we need to recognize there is a real impact on people, especially in the area of health, and we regret this. On the question of international law, we are concerned by the reformulation of paragraph 42, specifically how international law may apply to cyberspace, including state responsibility, right to life, international humanitarian law, and we regret the removal of the reference to international law, and especially the Charter of the United Nations, and how this should apply and is essential to maintaining. peace and security in cyberspace. This is the framework of responsible behaviour and should be reincorporated. On the section on capacity building, we note with concern the removal of the reference to essential mechanisms for the operationalisation of this area. While we understand that not all proposals could be discussed in detail and that it was necessary to reduce the scale of some initiatives, we believe that this edit undermines the future permanent mechanism. On annex 1, El Salvador expressed its concern regarding the elimination of the thematic group dedicated to continuing discussions on the applicability of international law in cyberspace. We furthermore consider that a single thematic group covering all of the pillars may lead to excessive generalisation. One of the reasons why we have made such progress is because we have clearly eliminated thematics. The absence of a clearly defined thematic structure could prevent future discussions from being effective. Chairperson, we reiterate El Salvador’s commitment to building a consensual solution for the establishment of a single track permanent mechanism under the auspices of the United Nations. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, El Salvador, for your contribution. Switzerland to be followed by the European Union.

Switzerland: Thank you, Mr Chair. I will right go into the topics. On paragraph 15, we welcome the deletion of exclusively in this paragraph as it does not reflect today’s reality. However, we would like to add at the end of the sentence consistent with international law. In paragraph 16, we are disappointed that the sentence mentioning the blurring of the lines has not been reintroduced as we asked for. In our view, it is negligent of this group to turn a blind eye to this worrying development. We’d like to see this reflected in the report. This could be done by introducing, as well as the blurring of the line between criminal activities and malicious ICT incidents. In paragraph 17, we would like to replace the last sentence, in the last sentence, attack with operation, given the legal implications of the word attack. Also in paragraph 17, we note that the delegation has asked for the deletion of the sectors mentioned but we’d like to see them reintroduced because this is mostly consensus language taken from paragraph 14 of the Third Annual Progress Report. We just would have to replace water by energy. Paragraph 23, we would like to propose the following change in line with our understanding of secure development practices and language in paragraph 34G. Start quote. States highlighted the critical importance of security by design as a key principle applied at the early stages of development by also recognizing the need to maintain security throughout the life cycle of ICT products and services as a fundamental measure to mitigate such risks, end quote. Paragraph 27, we would like to add at the end of the paragraph and also keeping in mind respect for human rights. International law. We have two points. First, in our view, it is regrettable that the rich discussions on international law are not reflected in the final draft. Specifically, the final draft no longer includes any topics that have been discussed in depth over the past five years. This we find incomprehensible and not acceptable. Specifically, we would like to suggest adding the following subparagraph to paragraph 42 which reflects the individual issues in a factual manner. Quote, states discussed and debated how international law applies to the use of ICTs including issues such as state responsibility, due diligence, international humanitarian law and international human rights law. The second point, in paragraph 41C, the sentence, an ICT operation may constitute the use of force when its scale and effects are comparable to non-ICT operations rising in the level of a use of force, end quote, that has been deleted in REV1, is still missing, and we would strongly recommend its reinstation. On CBMs, paragraph 47K, access to ICT products and tools do not belong under this section, is our view. We think we would like to propose to delete it, or if it remains in the report, it should be moved to the capacity building section, where states can voluntarily provide other states with ICT tools to build capacity. On capacity building, in paragraph 55, there is stated that global roundtables could include technical-level discussions. We’d like to replace this with practical-oriented discussions to not eliminate other dimensions than just technical ones to be discussed. In paragraph 58, a phrase should be added stating that existing tools or measures should be used and not duplicated. Coming back to paragraph 52H, we also, like Columbia, wonder why the MAC exercise has been deleted and think it could be reinstated there. Waiting for further instructions, I will come back later on the regular institutional dialogue and the Annex I. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: European Union, to be followed by France.

European Union: Chair, let me, considering the limited time we have, dive right into our assessment and the comments by the EU and its member states to the REF II, acknowledging the hard work by you and your team in a run-up to this version. We recognize elements into the draft, such as the rebalancing of the norms section, as well as the DTGs being cross-cutting and drawing upon all the five pillars. We would like to see the language from the French proposal to further detail the cross-cutting nature of the discussions. included, which also details how the DTG would create space for all the pillars, including international law. We regret that the document still lacks the reference to the POA resolutions adopted by a large majority in 2022 and 2023. And in addition, we regret that the checklist is no longer included, considering the value for building capacities of states in the implementation of the UN framework. We are, however, particularly concerned about the international law chapter that has suffered significantly from the change to REF1 to REF2. While there is a clear call in the room throughout the open-ended working group, including during the last three days, for appropriately reflecting the substantial discussions on international law, particularly on IHL, into the final report, we note that the REF2 does not include the additional language on international law, particularly noting the bodies of law as also outlined in the cross-regional working paper that includes proposed text for the final open-ended working group report 2025, presented also by Vietnam yesterday. It, secondly, does also not reinstall the language that was deleted from the zero draft and the REF1, as requested by many. Moreover, with serious concern, we have to further note that the language on how international law applies has even further deleted in the REF2, particularly when it comes to 43b and parts of 42. Yet, at the same time, the reference to the draft convention remains and is even put at an equal footing to the consensus resolution by the ICRC. This balance does not work for us, and it also does not reflect a significant contribution by member states in the open-ended working group. We therefore oppose to these changes in the REF2 as they walk back to consensus and international law and do not acknowledge the work by cross-regional groups delivering multiple working papers on this issue since 2022. Four years of work cannot be lost with this. Work that is also needed for the global mechanism to advance responsible state behavior and the use of ICTs to continue on a solid ground, ground created by this open-ended working group, ground that is used both in the plenary discussion as well as cross-cutting TTG discussions. And we request for the factual statement of the open-ended working group discussion in the final report. Finally, while we understand that you’ve made no changes to the modality for the multi-stakeholder participations, this does not mean that our position has changed. The EU and its member states reiterate our call to allow for firm transparency. Any objectives should be subject to open discussions, and if they persist, decisions should ultimately be guided by the will of the majority. We look forward, Chair, to work with you and other delegations today and tomorrow in view of a final open-ended working group report. Thank you very much.

Chair: Thank you very much, European Union, for your statement and contribution. France, to be followed by Japan.

France: Mr. President, Mr. Chair, the delegation aligns itself with the statement of the European Union. At the national level, we believe that this draft report provides a basis for structuring our future action-oriented work under the global mechanism. For example, we are satisfied with the substance of the section on threats, which highlights in a relevant manner the worrying trends that will need to continue to be discussed. Nevertheless, it is precisely because this final report will guide our future discussions that it is important to point out the persistent and emerging issues that it contains. I will make three remarks in this regard. First of all, we regret that in paragraph 31 of Rev. 1, there is the deletion of the affirmation that non-compliance with the framework of responsible behavior of states undermines international peace and security, trust between states, as well as stability. This is likely to permanently weaken the normative framework. We are also concerned about the significant imbalance in the section on international law because of, on one hand, a lack of recognition of discussions on international humanitarian law, and on the other hand, due to the inclusion of a proposal raised by a very small number of states. Secondly, I’d like to focus on the RID section and the future mechanism. Mr. Chair, we welcome the fact that the proposal contained in Rev. 2 for dedicated thematic groups creates a complementarity between, on one hand, pillar-by-pillar plenary discussions, and, on the other hand, thematic discussions that are policy-oriented to solve specific challenges of common interest. This may help to bridge the implementation gap. For DTG 1, however, it is regrettable that the agreed language on specific challenges of cooperation, resilience, and stability that we had proposed and which has been broadly supported was not retained. We consider that three broad categories are relevant to guide discussions without prejudice to the national priorities of each and every state. We also believe that the activities of DTG 2 could contribute to bringing about a capacity building that is more effective and efficient. To further improve it, we suggest that this thematic group be responsible for organizing the global roundtable on capacity building as well as its follow-up. To ensure that all parts of the future mechanism work in complementarity to bridge the digital divide and the capacity building gap. Third, as you know, for the past five years we have together with cross-regional partners in putting forward the proposal of the Program of Action, or POA. This name, although it is common in the UN system and is absolutely fit for the purpose of our work, has generated a strong resistance, which I still don’t quite understand, on the part of a small number of delegations. This controversy, Mr. Chair, is something that my delegation has chosen not to feed because we are fighting for ideas aiming to make multilateralism stronger and more effective, that we fight not for labels. For France, the objective of the POA has always been substance. As I recall during my presentation on Tuesday, the international community needs a single-track multilateral mechanism for peace and security in cyberspace. This mechanism must continue to host discussions on our normative framework while promoting action for its implementation. Supporting the capacities of all states to implement the framework is indeed our first line of defense, collectively speaking, against cyber threats. In this regard, we regret the deletion of the voluntary checklist, which would have been a concrete contribution to help guide states in the implementation of this framework. Mr. Chair, in the spirit of compromise necessary for consensus, my delegation, based on the title of the Consensus Resolution 76-19 of the General Assembly of 2021, could consider accepting the following name for our future framework for our work, Global Mechanism to Advance Responsible State Behavior in the Use of ICTs. We hope that this neutral proposal will contribute to achieving consensus by tomorrow, and my delegation remains available to exchange views with all delegations in this spirit. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, France, for your contribution and for your very constructive approach and your proposals as well. I give the floor now to Japan to be followed by the Russian Federation.

Japan: Thank you, Mr. Chair. First, Japan would like to thank you and your team again for your efforts and the draft final report, and we continue to agree with you about the importance of reaching consensus this week. Mr. Chair, Japan appreciates the latest draft incorporates, if not all, but some of our comments or the spirit of our comments. Nevertheless, allow me to stress a few points. Using the threat section, Japan values the maintaining of the text on cryptocurrency theft and financing of malicious ICT activity using cryptocurrency in Para 24. However, Japan continues to support the previous language on the REV-1, which clearly referred to the impact on the international peace and security, rather than limiting it only to a possibility of potential impact, as it is proposed in the REV-2. Concerns on malicious activities involving cryptocurrency, similar to ransomware, and commercially available ICT intrusion capabilities is a common issue for the entire international community. This issue should continue to be addressed to promote further collective efforts, and Japan strongly requests this sentence to go back to the previous version in the REV-1, just like our ROK colleague did this morning. Regarding the DTGs, Japan recognizes improvements in language. We believe the content of the DTGs should be cross-cutting and action-oriented, including scenario-based approach as well as avoiding duplication. And the further inclusion of words from French proposal would be pertinent. What you proposed in the annex of the REV2 would also allow us to consider an effective combination of various tools, including capacity-building assistance. Finally, regarding the modalities of multistakeholder participation, there’s no change from the previous version. Further languages to secure their participation to the future permanent mechanism would be appreciated from my delegation’s point of view. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much. Japan, Russian Federation, to be followed by Cuba.

Russian Federation: Distinguished Chair, my delegation links itself with the joint statement delivered on behalf of the like-minded states by Nicaragua in our national capacity. We’d like to say the following. We thank you, Mr. Chair, for your efforts to prepare the new version of the final report. Some of our proposals were taken into account. However, many were still not reflected. I will focus on the most important ones. Starting with the future mechanism, we are pleased that the position of Russia and like-minded states as well as many other countries had been, they had not fully been reflected. We don’t see the point in the so-called consultations on launching NGOs in the work of the future mechanism. In addition, we believe that these consultations are not able to be imposed on states, should not be imposed on states. We categorically oppose any restrictions to the no-objection procedure, and we cannot support allowing NGOs to take part in the work of the thematic groups or giving them the floor after national delegations during plenary sessions. In the context of the modalities for NGO participation, we fully support our Chinese colleague as well as the African group, the Arab group, and Chair – I’m not going to go into the list of all the states that supported maintaining the current modalities of the OEWG when it comes to NGO participation. As for the working group, we cannot support the establishment of a thematic group number one in the current format. In our view, while it’s not clear to us what exactly it will work on, we’re seeing obvious duplication of the plenary sessions from the point of view of its functioning. We continue to support the establishment of a separate group on international law norms and confidence-building measures. In addition, we believe that the working group ought to work not on political issues but rather legal and technical issues. Lastly, we continue to insist on correcting the terminology. Here in the OEWG and in the future mechanism, we are considering a broad range of issues related to security of and in the use of ICTs. This phrase has long been used in the UN and many other international organizations. But in the text, we see many references to ICT security, which we believe undermines and distorts the mandate of the OEWG and the future mechanism. Our absolute priority is to enshrine this term not only throughout the text, but in the name of the future mechanism in Annex 1. We hope this will not be a problem for other delegations because we’re talking not about a continuation of political approaches of a certain number of countries, but rather ensuring clarity and precision on what is being examined by the future mechanism. Overall, in the report, we’ll send our proposals by text, but I’d like to comment on some of these points in particular. We insist on the exclusion of any hints or references to the non-consensus controversial ideas about the applicability of international humanitarian law to ICTs. Therefore, we propose deleting from paragraph 22 the mention of armed conflict, or leave only the last sentence in paragraph 22. We also propose deleting paragraph 19, which wrongly distinguishes certain concrete technologies to the detriment of others. We insist on the correct reflection of the position of a number of states regarding the importance of discussing a legally binding agreement, first and foremost in the recommendation section for the section on international law. We also cannot support the excessive focus on critical information infrastructure. The risks of this kind of approach was explained by Russia in its position statement distributed on the website of the OEWG. The excessive focus in the text is also maintained on the issue of gender balance. Mr. Chair, we assure you that we are willing to work constructively in the interests of a consensus-based decision tomorrow, as long as our principal concerns are taken into account. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Russian Federation, for your contribution. Cuba to be followed by South Africa.

Cuba: Thank you, Mr. Chair. We are also grateful to you for your hard work and that of your team in moving us closer to the necessary consensus outcome for the OEWG, with a view to guaranteeing a smooth transition to the future mechanism, which will continue the regular institutional dialogue in the area of security of and in the use of ICT. We support the statement by Nicaragua on behalf of a group of countries, a group of like-minded countries. Furthermore, we wish to emphasize the following three points. Firstly, in the section on international law, we appreciate the inclusion of efforts to address the concerns of all delegations. However, we still insist on the deletion, in paragraph 42, of the international law. of the references linked in some way to the notion of the applicability of international humanitarian law to cyberspace, there is still clear disagreement about this matter. In this regard, we request the deletion of references to documents that have been formulated outside the framework of the OEWG, which were not submitted for consideration by the group and therefore do not enjoy universal acceptance. In paragraph 40, section B2, there is the inclusion of language in this regard for group of delegations. My delegation cannot accept that new language be added to the final report of the OEWG. In no way can we accept cyberattacks to be set on an equivalent basis with armed attacks. Similarly, we also cannot accept Switzerland’s proposal. It is precisely because we believe in multilateralism that we do not favour the imposition of specific questions without taking into account the concerns of each and every one of the delegations, regardless of their size or independently of the size of groups of delegations. We constructively request that all take into account our sensitivities with regards to the spirit of consensus. If this were to apply to other bodies in the First Committee, instance, for the elimination of nuclear weapons, whereas the vast majority of the international community was calling for the total elimination of these weapons, other considerations would no doubt prevail. Secondly, with a view to the future mechanism, we firmly advocate for the maintenance of the principle of intervention. We highlight that the participation of NGOs in this OEWG reflects a delicate balance that was the outcome of a compromise in and of itself. And finally, in paragraph 25 on the section on threats, in reference to the question of neutrality of technologies, it should be made clear that there are varying approaches across the delegations in relation to this. This is a notion that we do not share, and this reflects consultations that have not actually taken place. We feel that this reference was included for the first time in the third APR of the OEWG in 2024 without prior discussion, and this is why it was rejected by our delegation at that time in our explanation of vote. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you, Cuba, for your statement. South Africa, to be followed by Mexico.

South Africa: Thank you, Chair. South Africa aligns with the statement delivered by Nigeria on behalf of the African group. We express our appreciation to you, Chair, your team, and the Secretariat for your tireless efforts in preparing REF2. of the draft final report of the OEWG. We would like to emphasize that failing to reach a consensus on the permanent mechanism in the final report would undermine the progress we have made thus far. We are disappointed that we could not find consensus on the operationalization of the voluntary checklist. However, we agree with the proposal that this can be subject to further discussion in the future permanent mechanism. We also regret that we could not reach an agreement on the common template for requesting assistance. The South African delegation would like to join those who have expressed their flexibility on the establishment of the two dedicated thematic groups with the understanding that ad hoc dedicated thematic groups will be established with a fixed duration to engage in focused discussions without prejudging the discussions and outcomes of plenary meetings. We believe that enough has been said on the importance of maintaining the dedicated thematic group on capacity building, which this delegation supports. We also support retention of the women in international security and cyberspace fellowship. We have overcome grave circumstances over the last five years and reached this point where we can achieve consensus on the outcome of this OEWG by addressing important challenges facing the international community towards the building of an open, safe, secure, stable, accessible, peaceful, and interoperable ICT environment. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: flexibility. Mexico, to be followed by the United States.

Mexico: Thank you, Chair. Mexico, thanks to you and your team for presenting a revised draft of the final report in such a short space of time. We recognize your efforts in trying to reconcile the divergent positions that we have heard this week. While we will continue to review the changes that have been introduced, we would like to share the following preliminary remarks. We note with concern that agreed language on commitments and previously agreed wording has been either watered down or eliminated, which could undermine the progress that has been made in recent years or lead to a misinterpretation of the annual progress report. The lack of a reference in paragraph 43 to the applicability of international law and to the Charter of the United Nations is to us perplexing. We consider it essential that the final report maintain consistency in terms of terminology. For instance, global mechanism and permanent mechanism are used interchangeably, which may give rise to inaccurate interpretations about the nature and objectives of this new body. Given that our discussions have been focused on establishing a permanent mechanism, we suggest that this term be used both in the report and in the annexes. We are also concerned about the reinsertion of language that had previously been identified as problematic, such as references to non-state actors on the same level as states and the illegitimate malicious use of ICTs. This generates confusion regarding the obligations and responsibilities of states, especially we regret the deletion of the reference in paragraph 57 to the UN-administered sponsorship programme. We reiterate that Impartiality, transparency, and the scope of these programs hinges specifically on their being managed by a neutral entity subject to criteria that guarantees the inclusion of all delegates from all countries without discrimination arising from possible national policies of third states. Regarding Annex I, we express our deep dismay, as was expressed in a statement delivered by us on behalf of a group of countries of Latin America. We express our profound consternation in the elimination of a thematic group on international law. Discussions on this topic have been repeatedly highlighted as being priorities by various states, including Mexico, and there should be a dedicated structure within the mechanism for this. We can support Egypt’s proposal to move to a more informal setting that would allow us to have a more interactive discussion, if this can help us bring together our positions with a view to achieving agreement before circulation of the conference room paper. I thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Mexico, for your statement. United States, to be followed by Latvia.

United States: Chair, thank you to you and your team for the effort you have undertaken to further revise the draft final report. We appreciate this revised version attempts to find areas of convergence and does so in some ways, for instance, by removing a dedicated thematic group on international law. But the United States has significant outstanding concerns with this revised draft. We remain focused on achieving consensus in this process, however, work remains in order to arrive at that outcome. That calls from a wide range of cross-regional states to streamline the report. The body of the report itself remains quite long and detailed. The United States continues to be of the view that it would be more effective to remove details unnecessary to the priority item of establishing the future mechanism. Additionally, as a general matter, while the United States strongly supports protecting women and girls, defending their rights, and promoting women’s empowerment, and promotes the ability of women and girls to engage in all aspects of social, civic, political, and economic life, we are displeased by references in the final report to gender. Similarly, we remain displeased by the references to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals, or SDGs, which advance a program of soft global governance that is inconsistent with U.N. sovereignty and adverse to the rights and interests of Americans. Chair, on threats, we appreciate the improvements made in paragraph 15, including the additional language on civilian objects. The removal exclusively from the last sentence of that paragraph is important, and this deletion must be maintained. We also welcome the additional text in paragraph 17, recognizing that the United States has highlighted this as a highly concerning threat in several sessions. At the same time, we see the additional language in paragraph 26 related to artificial intelligence and deep fakes as unnecessary and out of scope for this process, and request its removal. On norms, we appreciate the removal of text throughout the section that referenced proposals for new norms. The deleted text did not reflect the consensus in the OEWG, and its removal was an important step in the right direction that must not be reversed. On the other hand, we regret the removal. of the norms implementation checklist. This is an important tool to assist states in implementing the framework, which is one of the action-oriented objectives the mechanism is being stood up to achieve. We would like to see the voluntary checklist reinserted to reflect states’ recognition of the need to implement the existing norms and the progress made during the OEWG in this regard. The checklist was also the only reference in the report to the full list of 11 consensus norms. Earlier this week, the United States supported a request to add a reference to Consensus Resolution 70-237, in which the General Assembly called upon member states to be guided in their use of ICTs by the 2015 report of the GGE, which included 11 voluntary nonbinding norms of responsible state behavior. We reiterate our support for this language. If the checklist is not restored, we also strongly support a footnote referencing the norms section of the 2021 GGE report, which contains useful language for implementing the 11 consensus norms. Regarding international law, we appreciate the Chair’s efforts to improve the international law section. We echo the comments from the EU and others that this section remains unbalanced and does not accurately reflect the robust conversations, including on international humanitarian law that we have had in the OEWG. We remain concerned that paragraph 42 puts documents of varying status on equal footing and highlights one minority proposal over others that have more widespread support. For example, the ICRC resolution on IHL and the use of ICTs was adopted by consensus at the 34th International Conference of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent. It was endorsed. enthusiastically by states across all regions. Similarly, the multiple papers on international law have garnered extensive cross-regional support in the Open-Ended Working Group and have continued to gain traction with new states over time. These documents represent real achievements in reaching common understandings on how international law applies in cyberspace, the development of which is a core element of the mandate of this group set forth in Resolution 75-240. By contrast, the proposal for a convention in Paragraph 42 has never garnered the level of support from states that the cross-regional papers mentioned have, despite frequent mentions by the same small group of states, and it should be removed. The proposal for new legally binding obligations in Paragraph 43E should be deleted, as it selectively elevates language in the third APR, upsetting the careful balance that is achieved in the original document. As you said this morning, Chair, that language is already part of the package that is being transmitted to the future mechanism and should not be repeated out of context. On CBMs, we regret that the references in Paragraph 47F to the UNIDIR assimilation exercise have been weakened. The report should reflect the value of this exercise to states’ efforts to build confidence. While we acknowledge edits to attempt to address the problematic language on the facilitation of access proposal in Paragraph 47K, we regret that this proposal remains at all. Elevating this single proposal above others is unnecessary and does not accurately reflect the OEWG’s decisions, and accordingly, this single example should be deleted. Thank you. The United States strongly supports capacity-building discussions, and we see this section as significantly improved. We also hear calls from many states for additional capacity-building in their efforts toward implementation. implementation of the framework, and we support those calls, including through our own funding. We see a focused and scoped section as this report as setting the future mechanism up for success in its efforts to advance capacity building in the future. We appreciate the Chair’s efforts to better focus the scope of the global ICT security cooperation and capacity building portal. We think taking a step-by-step approach will ensure that it does not duplicate existing tools. We also appreciate the revisions intended to recognize existing capacity building work and avoid duplicative processes and unnecessary overhead, for instance, in paragraph 57. We urge the Chair to retain these changes that help ensure that capacity building discussions and efforts are scoped and organized to deliver meaningful results. Chair, on the topic of institutional dialogue and Annex I, we very much appreciate your work to simplify the description of the DTGs in pursuit of consensus and, in particular, your deletion of the International Law Working Group. As we have made clear, the United States cannot agree to a report that contains such a DTG. As we explained earlier in the week, we are fully in support of continued discussion of international law in the plenary and the cross-cutting DTG. However, we have heard both in prior sessions and this week that certain states would seek to exploit conversations in any dedicated group on international law to advance new, legally binding obligations that could potentially undermine existing international law. This could have negative ramifications even outside the cyber context. We are deeply disappointed that the language for DTG 1 has lost its focus on the challenges of resilience, stability, and cooperation as proposed by the French delegation and supported by so many states in this room. However, we are encouraged that the cross-cutting policy-oriented model has been preserved in DTG 1 and would like to ensure that it is retained and implemented as intended. As you observed yesterday, the five pillars are foundational and mutually reinforcing. They were never intended to be hermetically sealed silos. With respect to DTG 2, we think it is essential to include language scoping the discussion to the implementation of the framework. As laid out in Annex C, the foundation of the future mechanism is the framework of responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs. That framework, and particularly implementation of the 11 norms, already allows for a wide range of potential capacity-building efforts. To ensure that capacity-building discussion and recommendations in the future mechanism remain true to the mandate, including the international security context, we suggest adding a scoping reference to, quote, implementing the framework, unquote, after the phrase, quote, ICT security capacity-building, end quote. The United States very much supports capacity-building in this space, but the OEWG is not a venue to address cyber-assistance matters writ large. With regard to the title of the future mechanism, we strongly support the French proposal, heard just now, to include, to advance responsible state behavior in the title of the mechanism. Finally, we continue to regret that the modalities for stakeholder participation in the future mechanism have not been improved. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you, United States, for your statement. Latvia, to be followed by Brazil.

Latvia: Thank you, Chair. I was asking the floor to support the intervention of the Vietnamese delegation at the beginning of this debate. We appreciate, Chair, your efforts in searching for balance. in the text when it comes to recommendations of the Open-Ended Working Group on the modalities of work of the UN Future Permanent Mechanism. But we were somehow surprised to see that part of Para 51-I in Rev. 1 of Capacity Building Section, which was devoted to the joint initiative of our countries to establish the UN Cyber Resilience Academy within UNIDIR was deleted. After deletion of the 51-I sub-point B of Rev. 1, the report no longer represents accurate reflection of a wealth of ideas presented during the liberation of the Working Group. The idea of UN Cyber Resilience Academy was launched in December 2024, discussed further in two subsequent Open-Ended Working Group sessions. The non-paper was circulated to all member states earlier this year, and the proposal gathers support from a considerable number of states from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and only one state voiced opposition to the idea. Based on the above, and in order to improve accuracy of the report, we encourage you to reinstate the deleted text from 51-I sub-point B of Rev. 1 to the CPR document for final adoption by consensus. On other topics, Mr. Chair, my delegation supports the remarks of the EU delegation as well as French delegation specifically about the title of the Future Permanent Mechanism that should put emphasis on advancement of responsible state behavior in cyberspace. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Latvia, for your statement. Brazil to be followed by Canada.

Brazil: Mr. Chair, we thank you and your team for your tireless efforts in the elaboration of Rev. 2 in your quest to bring us closer to consensus. We recognize the complexity of the task of bridging positions which are in some areas diametrically opposed, and value your determination in finding a fair balance among them. We acknowledge the streamlining of Ref 2 as a necessary byproduct of that attempt. It is, overall, a text which we could support, though it falls short of our ambitions in some sections, and we do have some tweaks to propose still. On threats, we support Switzerland’s proposal on paragraph 17 to replace attacks with operations, which is more legally accurate. On international law, we regret that the report does not capture the breadth and depth of our discussions. We support Switzerland’s proposal of a short factual reference of issues debated as a compromise. On the issue of capacity building, we would first like to express our appreciation for the flexibility incorporated to the level of representation at the Global Roundtable. Nevertheless, we join Colombia and Switzerland in regretting the deletion of the reference to the mapping exercise, and would like to see it reinstated. We also regret the weakening of paragraphs 56 and 57 of Ref 1 on the Sponsorship Programme and the Capacity Building Fund, which would constitute important tools to enable the UN to play a larger role in capacity building efforts, thus rendering those initiatives more accessible, transparent, and politically neutral. Turning to the future mechanism on Annex 1 of Ref 2, we welcome the change in paragraph 14 to meetings twice a year. One for plenary and one for DTGs. In the interest of brevity, I will not repeat the proposals made by Mexico on behalf of a group of Latin American countries on DTG 2 on capacity building, which we fully align with. My delegation must also register its disappointment at the elimination of the DTG on international law. While we of course recognize the cross-cutting nature of the issue for countries with limited resources and personnel, it will be difficult to ensure the meaningful participation of legal experts when the issue is so diluted in DTG 1’s overly broad mandate, which will have a negative impact in the quality of our discussions. In this regard, we could support Egypt’s latest proposal if that can bring us to a consensus while still preserving a space to discuss the subject. Finally, we reiterate our request to see the third APR’s Annex C and REF2’s Annex I integrated for clearer understanding of all elements of the future mechanism. It is our sincere belief that consensus is within reach, though it will require significant flexibility and goodwill from us all. You can count on Brazil to continue to engage constructively to get us across the finish line tomorrow. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Brazil, for your statement and for your expressions of constructive engagement. Canada to be followed by Ukraine.

Canada: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Canada sincerely thanks you and your team for your tireless efforts towards identifying outcomes in this multilateral process to promote responsible state behavior in cyberspace. We have long felt that there is a clear spectrum of consensus amongst the vast majority of states in this room. This draft brings us closer to a balance that reflects this space of consensus, but it is not quite there yet. First on threats. The current wording on paragraph 15 fails to recognize the reality, including that ICTs are used in ways that facilitate compliance with international humanitarian law. We suggest the following compromise language. States highlighted the need to promote the responsible use of ICTs by states in accordance with international law. We support paragraphs 16 and 17, but regret the change to the language on cryptocurrency theft in paragraph 24. On norms, we are disappointed that the voluntary checklist has been removed. Your checklist should be adopted. We welcome the change on para 34F. We deeply regret the removal of reference in the chapeau of now paragraph 42 to the topics we discussed pertaining how international law applies. to the use of ICTs, namely state responsibility, due diligence, and international humanitarian law. This is important language to show our progress in fulfilling our mandate. We also deeply regret the important substantive language proposals showing convergence on international law are not integrated. I refer here to language of para 44C from draft zero on the use of force, and different proposals made during this session by Brazil, Vietnam, Canada, and others on international humanitarian law. Still on international law, we have concerns with the reference to the document on a convention. On CBMs, we call for increased focus on consensus priority, which is to implement and operationalize existing CBMs before beginning new ones. We oppose the recommendation to work on standardized terminology. We welcome incapacity building the recognition of the important programs that are in place by states, including the Women in Cyber Fellowship. On the permanent mechanism, we support France’s proposal on the name. We suggest that the language describing the cross-cutting dedicated thematic groups should be clearer, and highlight the need to address the protection of critical infrastructure. We can accept your proposed compromise on capacity building. We call for a clear link and no duplication between the round table on capacity building and that DTG. We oppose the idea of additional round tables at the discretion of the chair, and request that in line with the NXC, such decisions be made by consensus. Lastly, with regard to stakeholder involvement, we continue to maintain that the proposal we have put forward, and that is co-sponsored by 42 states, is not maximalist. It is a sovereign right of states to express concerns about a stakeholder, but this must be transparent. Additionally, maintaining the one state veto, ruling over all member states, is fundamentally unfair to all other states. Further, we recall the UN practices for informal groups to be more inclusive than formal meetings. and include all stakeholders, providing them more meaningful opportunities to contribute. This needs to be recorded explicitly, for instance, by way of a For Greater Clarity footnote under paragraph 10 of Annex 1. Finally, Mr. Chair, we must be clear that the future mechanism will be single-track. This should be explicitly reflected in Annex 1 to support seamless transition. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Canada, for your statement. Ukraine, to be followed by Australia.

Ukraine: Thank you, Chair. We acknowledge the efforts of you and your team that resulted in compiling the ref2 of the final report of this OEWG, and thank you for that. Ukraine aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union, particularly on the issues of stakeholder participation modalities, the use of the ICTs in accordance with the existing provisions of international law, paragraph 15 and others, and excluding the Annex with the Voluntary Checklist of Practical Actions for the Implementation of Voluntary Non-Binding Norms of Responsible State Behavior in the Use of the ICTs. Referring to the latter, in our view, the very fact of unreadiness of the states to give support to the possibility of a voluntary self-check can serve as a practical illustration of the level of global readiness to implement a legally binding document within the scope of the use of ICTs. And on top of that, we observe the ongoing unjustified and unprovoked aggression against Ukraine by one of the current UN Security Council members in full disrespect of the already existing international law provisions, which proves that the existence of a convention does not at all guarantee its implementation. Having said that, we consider as premature the mention of some kind of convention in the list of the documents, the reference to which is given in paragraph 42, and suggest deleting the currently third bullet point from the final draft. In terms of the modalities of the future permanent mechanism, We see that now the DTGs are organized in a different logic, which relates to political DTG1 and technical DTG2 dimensions of the regular institutional dialogue and mentions the relevant development goals. In a way, this aligns with the logic of the POC directory and creates a structure that practically enables the states, particularly to consider how international law applies to the use of information and communication technologies within both these dimensions, which is a way to address the concerns of the proponents of the separate DTG on international law. We see that some progress in reaching the consensus has been made in these past days of discussion, and we would like to underline again the importance of the adoption of the report that would not be detrimental to our work in this OEWG. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Ukraine, for your statement. Australia to be followed by the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Australia: Thank you, Chair, for your continued leadership and for the hard work that has gone into this current draft, which is a more balanced reflection of our discussions. However, we still hold some serious concerns with key elements of the text. In relation to threats, we support Canada’s textual proposal for paragraph 15. On international law, we continue to be concerned about including a minority proposal in paragraph 42, placing it on an equal footing with other documents that have attracted far greater levels of support. We do not support the inclusion of this document. By contrast, the resolution of the 34th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent ICT was adopted by consensus. We would therefore prefer it to be placed in a standalone paragraph. However, in the spirit of compromise and at a minimum, we call for the report to be explicitly reflected with the consensus status of the 34 IC resolution in the body of the text. We join Brazil, El Salvador, Switzerland and others in expressing disappointment that after more than than four years of discussions, international law language is not reflected in the text. References in former paragraph 41 to topics that have been discussed, including IHL and state responsibility, have been omitted, and language appearing in the zero draft on the use of force has not been reinstated. The application of international law is an integral element of our framework. We cannot have nothing to show for our efforts within this OEWG, and reiterate the call made yesterday by the cross-regional group for language on international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and the law of state responsibility to be added in paragraph 41. In relation to norms, we continue to support the adoption of the voluntary checklist of practical actions, and regret its deletion in paragraph 37. On confidence-building measures, we continue to consider it inappropriate to include a reference in paragraph 45K to a proposal made by a single state without broad support. On the future permanent mechanism, we support the proposal made by France to include a reference to advancing responsible state behaviour in the title of the mechanism. In relation to paragraph 12, we continue to strongly recommend that recommendations of dedicated thematic groups are agreed by consensus, and to make this reference explicit in the document. We note reporting is missing from the draft, and will need to be discussed at the organisational session. Otherwise, a simple solution would be to draw on the UNGA resolution 75-240, calling for the mechanism to produce a progress report at the three-year mark, and a final report after five years. The proposed DTG on capacity building would be the most appropriate place to host the global roundtable on ICT security capacity building. On stakeholders, Australia remains deeply concerned by the lack of inclusiveness and transparency in the modalities, including allowing a single state to veto without explanation. Finally, Australia is a long-standing advocate for gender and STGs. supports the retention of references to them in the final report. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you Australia for your statement. Netherlands to be followed by Israel.

Kingdom of the Netherlands: Thank you Chair. The Kingdom of the Netherlands aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union and would like to make some additional remarks in a national capacity. At the outset we would like to thank you and your team for your work on this draft final report and we commend your efforts in guiding us towards a consensus outcome. Chair allow me to share some of our reflections on the report. On threats we recognized the threats included in this final report however the Netherlands regrets the lesion in paragraph 24 to a human centric approach to ransomware as we believe this is crucial to understand and mitigate the impact of ransomware attacks for different groups and individuals in society. In paragraph 15 we welcome the reference to civilian objects but propose to replace peaceful purposes with states highlighted the need to promote the use of ICTs in a manner consistent with the framework. Lastly we echo the remarks of El Salvador and Switzerland on paragraph 17 that the specific sectors now deleted were based on consensus language. Moving to the norm section we welcome the paragraphs 31 to 33 as well as 34 that are now accurately captured as introductory and substantive paragraphs rather than proposals with varying levels of support. My delegation further supports the lesion of the proposal for the UN Secretary to compile a list of norms proposals which was not sufficiently discussed. However concerning the norms implementation checklist in paragraph 36a we regret that a reference to the adoption of checklist has been deleted including the annex. We heard some delegations mention that adoption of a checklist would be premature, but we believe that the recommendation should at least reflect our willingness to work towards a consensual adoption of a checklist in a future permanent mechanism. Turning to international law, the Netherlands is disappointed that the clear convergence on how international law applies remains unaffected in the report. And in particular, we regret the references to discussions on international humanitarian law, due diligence and state responsibility that have been deleted. Without clear language on these topics, the reference to the letter proposing a convention in paragraph 42 creates a clear imbalance, and we therefore join Australia, Switzerland, El Salvador, Canada, Brazil and others in urging the inclusion of references to factual discussions on international humanitarian law, international human rights law and the law of state responsibility, as presented yesterday by Vietnam on behalf of a cross-regional group of states. We further propose to move the reference to the ICRC resolution into the chapeau of paragraph 42 to clearly reflect its status as a consensus document, as also just mentioned by Australia. Then on regular institutional dialogue, on the title of the future mechanism, we support Malaysia to use one title throughout the report, and in that regard we want to state our support for the title that France just proposed. On the modalities of stakeholders, we continue to support the proposal made by Canada and Chile. Then we support the inclusion of the new paragraph 14 in Annex 1, that the future mechanism would meet twice per year, with one week of dedicated thematic group meetings and one week of plenary sessions, allowing for flexibility on when they are specifically organised. Lastly, Chair, for the Kingdom of the Netherlands it is essential that this open-ended working group enables the smooth transition to a single track process after we conclude. Therefore, although we are supportive of the three policy-oriented dedicated working groups as proposed by France, we note the need of having a flexible approach in the spirit of consensus. I thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you, Kingdom of the Netherlands, for your statement. Israel to be followed by Ireland.

Israel: Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving Israel the floor once again. We would like to commend you and your team once again on the tireless efforts and trusting stewardship. REV2 is a significant step in the right direction, and we are committed to take the next steps necessary to cross the finish line of adopting a final report of our working group by consensus. In this spirit, I will limit my intervention to three outstanding issues in the text. First, we note with great appreciation the improvement of the language of paragraph 15. However, as many have noted in the discussion this week, it would be much more precise and consistent with reality to replace the language of promote the use of ICTs for peaceful purposes with promote the use of ICTs in accordance with international law, as suggested by Canada. This is not the exact wording that we have suggested, but in the spirit of compromise, we are willing to accept this good suggestion made by other delegations as well. Second, paragraph 42 mentions in the same breath different texts that are simply incomparable. For example, mentioning the ICT resolution adopted by consensus at the 2024 ICRC International Conference together with a letter dated 15th of May 2023, which was supported by a small number of states. and has time and again proven polarizing in our discussions, creates a misleading impression which we believe should be avoided. We therefore request the deletion of the dash point that makes reference to this letter. Third, Mr. Chair, it is Israel’s view that paragraph 42E must be revised in order to avoid prejudging future discussions in the permanent mechanism. Although the consistent view of many states has been that international law generally applies to cyberspace, we recognize that other states still wish to discuss the possibility of identifying gaps, if there are any, yet we cannot note the need to have this discussion and at the same time allude to a result, let alone to the conclusion of developing new obligations, which clearly is not shared by a large number of states. We therefore suggest revising paragraph 42E to read as follows, and I quote, noting the need to consider whether any gaps exist in how existing international law applies to the use of ICTs. And finally, Mr. Chair, like many others, I wish to add Israel’s support for the French suggestion on the title of the future permanent mechanism. Mr. Chair, we remain committed to work constructively with all Member States and wish to assure you our availability and willingness to work towards a consensual final report. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you, Israel, for your statement. Ireland, to be followed by Finland.

Ireland: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Firstly, as others, we want to thank you and your team for the enormous amount of hard work that has gone into preparing this version of the text and your efforts to take account of the many interventions that have been made this week. We align with the EU intervention, but would also like to make A few points in our national capacity. As others, we recognize some improved elements in the draft, but have some suggestions to improve the balance of the text and move closer to our common goal of consensus. We support the proposals from Switzerland on paragraphs 15 and 17, and the point made by El Salvador on reversing the deletion of details on critical infrastructure on paragraph 17. We also regret the deletion of the human-centric approach to ransomware in paragraph 24, particularly given the widespread support for stronger language on this topic during our debates earlier in the week. As with others, we are concerned about the international law chapter. It has suffered significantly from the change from Rev. 1 to Rev. 2, and had significant issues previously. While there has been a clear call in the room throughout the OEWG, including during the last three days, for appropriately reflecting the discussions on international law, particularly IHL and IHRL, into the final report, we note that Rev. 2 does not include the additional language on international law, particularly noting the bodies of law as outlined in the cross-regional working paper which was presented by Vietnam yesterday, which we strongly support. Unfortunately, Rev. 2 has seen further reductions in the text on international law, particularly 43b and parts of 42, yet at the same time the reference to the draft Convention remains and is put at an equal footing to the consensus resolution by the ICRC, as many others have mentioned previously. We do not feel this reflects the contributions by Member States in the OEWG. These changes walk back the consensus on international law, and do not acknowledge the work by cross-regional groups delivering multiple working parties on this issue since 2021. On Annex 1, we welcome that the DTGs will be cross-cutting and draw upon all of the five pillars, and would also support the proposal made by France on the future title for our new future mechanism to include to advance responsible state behaviour. On stakeholders, we continue to look for a more positive outcome, drawing on the paper of Chile and Canada. We look forward, Chair, to working with you and other delegations today to reaching consensus and ensuring the smooth transition to the future permanent mechanism we all hope and look for. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Ireland, for your statement. Finland, followed by United Kingdom.

Finland: Thank you, Chair. Finland aligns itself with the statement of the European Union and wishes to make some additional remarks in its national capacity. We appreciate all your efforts and hard work for the newly revised draft. In our view, the international law chapter as it now stands does not properly reflect the discussions on international law during the OEWG and the progress made. In particular, we have called for a clear reference to IHL’s applicability in cyberspace, as well as a standalone reference to the landmark ICT resolution adopted at the 34th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, which was adopted by consensus. Paragraph 42 as it now stands does not answer this call. There have also been repeated calls for the language of OP4 of said resolution to be included to explicitly acknowledge that in situations of armed conflict, IHL rules and principles serve to protect civilian populations and other protected persons and objects, including against the risks arising from ICT activities. Cyber capabilities have changed the way in which armed conflicts are conducted, and there is reason to expect that cyber means and methods will continue to be used also in the future. It is pertinent that there remains no ambiguity in the final report on this. IHL fully applies to cyberspace. Regarding the chapter on norms, we particularly regret the deletion of paragraph 31. We have, however, taken note of the constructive proposal by Colombia earlier today on including language recalling that the use of ICTs by states in a manner consistent with the framework of responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs, which includes voluntary norms, obligations under international law, and CBMs, fosters international peace and security, trust, and stability between states. On modalities for the multistakeholder participation, we regret that no changes have been made to the revised draft. The paper on practical modalities to enable meaningful stakeholder participation by Canada and Chile and co-sponsored by several states, including Finland, received wide support also in the room these past days, and this should be reflected in the final report. Lastly, we support comments made by France regarding the name of the new permanent mechanism. I thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Finland, for your statement. UK, to be followed by Mauritius.

United Kingdom: Chair, we’d like to begin by recognizing your considerable efforts to achieve consensus this week. On threats, we are grateful for your amendments to paragraph 15, but the UK shares the continuing concerns already expressed this afternoon. On norms, whilst we consider this section has a better balance, we are disappointed that the voluntary norms checklist has been deleted. This is an important piece of guidance for states. We’re also surprised that the consensus reference to CII has been removed. CII has been a natural part of our consensus discussions for many years. Having noted this, in the spirit of consensus, we would be in a position to accept this section if the existing balance is retained. On international law, the UK continues to be deeply disappointed that we have failed to include any new substantive content. despite the convergence that exists. The UK echoes and supports the statement made by Vietnam on behalf of a cross-regional group of states yesterday, which identified modest text proposals on the discussions that we have had in this OEWG on important international law topics. The UK joins others in reiterating our continued profound concern with paragraph 42. The UK cannot support the inclusion of the proposal for new legally binding obligations in this way. Existing international law applies in cyberspace, as it does to all other aspects of states’ international relations. The UK cannot support referring to a proposal that would risk undermining the application of core, foundational rules of international law, including the UN Charter. On regular institutional dialogue and the associated annex, the UK acknowledges the Chair’s efforts to identify an integrated, policy-oriented and cross-cutting approach to the dedicated thematic groups. Regarding the revised DTG1, we regret the removal of the content on resilience and threats, which we feel provided a valuable focus for cross-cutting discussions. To ensure a consistent approach, we urge that recommendations from the DTGs, referenced in paragraph 12, be agreed by consensus and that this be explicitly reflected in the text. On stakeholder modalities, our position remains unchanged. We deeply regret that the current text fails to reflect the demands of at least 42 states. This is in contrast to the prominence given to proposals supported by just a handful of delegations elsewhere in the report. We reiterate firmly the UK position that a single state veto is detrimental to our discussions. Finally, regarding the title of the future mechanism, we find ICT security to be a much simpler and easier to understand term, which does not discriminate against the various priorities of states. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you, UK, for your statement. Mauritius to be followed by the Philippines.

Mauritius: Thank you, Chair. Chair, distinguished delegates, good afternoon. The Mauritian delegation would like to express our deep appreciation to you, Chair, your team and the Secretariat for their tireless efforts to produce the REV2 report. We approach the report with a spirit of flexibility and constructive engagement. We are encouraged by the progress made across the full scope of the OEWG’s agenda and wish to highlight the following areas in particular. Number one, recognition of the evolving threat landscape, including malicious ICT activities targeting critical infrastructure and the need for cooperative risk-based responses. Number two, continued advancement of the framework of voluntary non-binding norms with space for both implementation and further development under the future permanent mechanism. Number three, operational progress on confidence-building measures, including the global POC directory and practical simulation exercises that build trust and readiness. Number four, strong emphasis on inclusive and needs-based capacity building, including support for developing countries, gender-responsive approaches and regional cooperation. Following the successful transition to the future permanent mechanism, we support the idea that the substantive plenary sessions will be organised in accordance with the five pillars of the Framework of Responsible State Behaviour, as stated in Annex 1 in paragraph 5. Furthermore, the DTGs are aimed at building on and complementing the discussions in the substantive plenary sessions by paving the way for more in-depth and action-oriented discussions. However, echoing the views expressed by many other delegations, we support the re-inclusion of a dedicated thematic group on international law. We believe this will provide a valuable platform to advance discussions on this important pillar and will be beneficial to states that are still developing their national expertise and involvement in this area. In conclusion, we reiterate our support for the consensus adoption of the final report and reaffirm our commitment to continued co-operation in the formalisation of the new mechanism. We also commend the dedication of all delegations and recognise the significant progress made over the past five years in this process. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Mauritius, for your statement. Philippines to be followed by Germany.

Philippines: Chair, the Philippines expresses its sincere appreciation to you and your team for your tireless efforts in guiding this process and your commitment to reconciling the views, preferences and positions of all delegations. Mr. Chair, we take note of the key refinements introduced in this final draft. However, we observe with some concern the removal of Annex I, Annex I rather, and the associated language in Rev. I, referring to the voluntary checklist. While we understand the sensitivities around prescriptive instruments at this stage, we believe these practical tools, if appropriately managed, could have supported a more tangible and structured implementation track. We welcome, however, the continued references to the checklist as a living document and urge its further refinement. under the incoming mechanism. On the matter of the dedicated thematic groups, the Philippines notes that the final draft continues to reflect the strong interest expressed by many delegations in exploring the utility such groups under the future mechanism. While we regret that the more detailed framework could not be established at this stage, welcome recognition of the two DTGs’ potential to improve focus, deepen technical exchanges, and contribute to more substantive discussions of issues within the five pillars. In particular, we support future exploration of thematic work streams and capacity building, responsible state behavior, international law, and emerging technologies. These areas offer opportunities to build consensus and bridge divergent positions through sustained inclusive engagement. We also emphasize the importance of ensuring that these DTGs are conducted in a manner that is inclusive, transparent, and guided by the principle of state sovereignty with meaningful contributions from technical experts, regional organizations, and other stakeholders as appropriate. In this regard, the Philippines believes that the structured thematic work under a formal or hybrid intergovernmental mechanism could significantly enhance the effectiveness of future deliberations and allow for the integration of the growing body of national and regional experiences in capacity building efforts. Mr. Chair, the Philippines joins Vietnam and Indonesia in welcoming the strengthened language in capacity building in the final draft, particularly its reaffirmation of the principle of inclusivity, demand drivenness, and sustainability. We support the recognition of practical tools such as the needs-based ICT security capacity building catalog. And at the same time, we echo the call made by Vietnam and Latvia for the reinstatement of language in paragraph 53G on the establishment of a UN Cyber Resilience Academy within UNIDIR. We believe such an academy would provide a dedicated, impartial, and solution-focused platform to conduct research and implement capacity building activities, particularly for member states with limited ICT security capabilities. We also encourage the continued development of tailored regionally relevant. training, and knowledge-sharing platforms, as they support the needs of countries with limited institutional and technical resources. Mr. Chair, the Philippines underscores the importance of ensuring the meaningful and structured participation of non-governmental stakeholders, including civil society, academia, and technical experts. The insights and practical knowledge are critical to enriching and complementing state-led processes, the rapidly-evolving challenges of emerging technologies and capacity-building. The inclusion will help ensure that the mechanism remains responsive, transparent, and grounded in diverse realities. In this context, the Philippines supports the Chair’s call and urges all delegations to exercise flexibility and constructive engagement during this 11th and final session. In order to reach consensus in the final report, we recognize that convergence will require compromise, mutual respect, and a spirit of collaboration. Our delegation remains committed to working with all delegations in this final stage to deliver a forward-looking, inclusive, and balanced outcome. Mr. Chair, lastly, we recognize the complexity of the task and once again commend your efforts to reflect an overall balance of perspectives in this final draft of the report. We appreciate the inclusive and transparent manner in which the process has been conducted, which has contributed to a text that, while not capturing every national position in full, lays a constructive and credible foundation for consensus. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Philippines, for your statement. And I underline the point you made about the need for flexibility on the part of everyone. Germany, to be followed by Saudi Arabia.

Germany: consensus and non-consensus elements throughout the text. However, we still have some substantial remaining concerns. The suppression of the norms checklist deprives us of the well-worn action-oriented implementation guidance to move us collectively forward on the implementation of the framework. Furthermore, and this I want to stress, yesterday we heard from a large number of member states that already REF1 did not accurately reflect the richness of our discussion over the last five years on how international law applies. We believe that one modest option to improve the current text in this regard would be to incorporate the modest and descriptive elements of the statement made by Vietnam on behalf of the cross-regional group, also in line with the proposal made by Switzerland. Finally, we note that the stakeholder modalities remained unchanged, which would mean that we will not be able to truly benefit from the depth and richness of their knowledge, and refer to both the statement made yesterday by Chile, as well as the joint paper of over 20 stakeholders delivered yesterday. Some states also have asked for more clarity on the DTGs. We believe the proposal made by France would provide additional guidance on the working of the first DTG, clarifying that by allowing states to bring their respective topics of importance to the CTG, by discussing them in an integrated policy-oriented and cross-cutting manner, and by applying the framework to them, we’re actually allowing more time and could dive deeper on the crucial subjects of capacity building, confidence building, norms, and international law. In this sense, we are ready to work constructively with your compromise proposal and DTGs in REV2. To conclude, Germany wants to reiterate our central points that are, first, the future permanent mechanism must implement, strengthen, and promote a framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace with all its five pillars. We support the proposal made by France with regard to the title, focusing on advancing responsible state behavior. And we deplore the deletion of paragraph 31 that reiterates that any behavior inconsistent with the framework undermines international peace

Chair: and security.

Germany: trust and stability between states, and call for a stronger reaffirmation of the framework. Equally important, there seems to be very strong support for a single-track consensus-based mechanism. As Inter-A expressed in a joint statement of Tunisia on behalf of the Group of Arab States this morning, Germany believes, like Canada, that Annex I should contain an explicit reiteration of the single-track principle in order to ensure a smooth transition. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Germany, for your statement. Saudi Arabia, to be followed by Poland.

Saudi Arabia: Thank you, Chair. Given that this is the first time we are taking the floor at this meeting, allow us to take this opportunity to thank you, Chair. We thank you for your efforts and also your team for their efforts to allow us to make progress and also in preparing this draft final report, this REV2. We hope to make progress on the basis of the hard-won gains of this group to achieve a future mechanism from next year. Chair, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia aligns itself with the statement delivered by the Republic of Tunisia on behalf of the Arab Group, and I wish to make the following remarks in our national capacity. Firstly, we affirm the applicability of international law to cyberspace as stated by the Arab Group. We also highlight the need to respect the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states in matters relating to cyberspace. We highlight the importance of strengthening action, regional and collective international action to deal with cyber threats, especially in the area of capacity building. In this context and following on from paragraph 59, we are attached to the idea of achieving regional forums and global fora that will discuss matters of cybersecurity in a general sense. We do so through our support to the work of the Arab Cybersecurity Ministers Council and through our commitment as the hosts of this council based in Riyadh. We support their work and we will ensure that they make progress. We also annually host the Global Cybersecurity Forum. More than 120 states participate in this forum. The aim is to root the principles of dialogue in discussing matters. We thank you once again for your work and we stand ready to continue contributing to this group and to discussions as part of the Arab group to achieve a consensus. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Saudi Arabia, for your statement and also for your commitment to working with others to reach consensus. It’s much appreciated. Poland to be followed by Malawi.

Poland: Mr. Chair, Poland aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union. We thank you for the revised draft and appreciate the visible efforts made to move us closer to consensus. Now we would like to offer some preliminary remarks in our national capacity. From our perspective, there is one section that requires significant improvement, the part addressing international law. The language concerning international humanitarian law and international human rights law should be notably strengthened. We must underline our concern that references to human rights included previously in the Voluntary Checklist were removed without any compensatory language included elsewhere in the report. While we would prefer the more ambitious approach to international human rights law and IHL throughout the text, we believe that the language proposed earlier by Vietnam on behalf of the cross-regional group offers a factual and balanced basis for addressing the current shortcomings in this section. Regarding the paragraph 42, we regret that the consensual ICRC resolution continues to be listed alongside national and regional initiatives. In our view, it warrants a stand-alone paragraph reflecting its unique and universally agreed-upon character. Furthermore, we suggest the removal of General Assembly document A-77-984 from the list as it does not address the issue of application of international law to ICT activities. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Malawi: Our states express regret over the removal of the Voluntary Checklist of practical actions from the body of the report. We fear this may make it less prioritized in our future discussions, which dilutes its current weight and visibility. Chair, throughout this process, Malawi has consistently supported practical and inclusive mechanisms that enhance the implementation of norms. The Voluntary Checklist was one such tool, non-prescriptive. adaptable to national context, and valuable, particularly for developing countries seeking to operationalize the framework for responsible state behavior. If we are to adapt going forward the norms for responsible state behavior, it is important to understand that the voluntary checklist will help us operationalize the norms, bridge the implementation gap, as well as foster consistency and accountability. Intermission from the main report risks diminishing the utility of the outcome for capacity-constrained states. While we welcome the reference to continue discussions on checklists under the future permitting mechanism, its absence from this milestone report is a missed opportunity to mainstream practical guidance at this critical juncture. Chair, on the matter of international law, Malawi reiterates that international law, including the UN Charter, remains applicable and essential in the ICT environment. We emphasize the importance of continued, focused discussions on how existing international law applies, and where necessary, identifying potential gaps. We also strongly support further voluntary sharing of national positions to foster convergence and understanding. Finally, Malawi remains flexible and committed to consensus. We urge the progress made be preserved and not diluted, and that practical tools, such as the voluntary checklist, be carried forward with strong institutional support in the next phase. I thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Malawi, for your statement and for your commitment to working towards consensus. New Zealand, to be followed by Estonia.

New Zealand: Thank you, Chair. We’ve heard a range of views about the best way to discuss international law in the future permitting mechanism. I can assure you that New Zealand is deeply committed to international law, and we think continuing to discuss how it applies in the use of ICTs is vital to international peace and security. We have regularly spoken about international law in the OEWG. We will want to continue to have this dialogue and the new permanent mechanism, recognizing that international law will continue to be one of its pillars. We will continue to share our perspectives and will listen with interest to the perspectives of all others. As in the past, we will continue to want to discuss how international humanitarian law applies to cyber activities during armed conflict. We will want to continue to talk about how international human rights law applies to cyber activities. We will want to continue to reflect on the context in which state cyber activity may amount to the use of force for the purposes of international law. We’re disappointed that our previous discussions on these and other questions of how international law applies to the use of ICTs have not been appropriately reflected in the annual report. We’re unable to reconcile the apparently widespread desire to promote discussions on the application of international law and permanent mechanism with the report’s silence on key aspects of the subject. It is not unreasonable to expect that robust discussions on these subjects are reflected accordingly. We encourage you to reconsider the balance of this section. In a similar vein, we’re troubled by the report’s treatment of the existing normative framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace, and even more so, why there would be any resistance to strong references to this fundamental framework and to the principle of advancing responsible state behavior. We encourage you to reflect on this further. On stakeholder modalities, for New Zealand, as a smaller and geographically isolated country, we do not always have the ready access to the expertise and insights of international representatives from academia, civil society, and industry. It can therefore be frustrating and disappointing when we deny the ability to benefit from their participation when they are blocked, with no transparency, let alone recourse. We support the approach put forward by Chile and Canada, not because we want to somehow change the intergovernmental nature of this process. We support stakeholder involvement because, in our view, it supports a state-led process by levelling the information playing field for states like mine. Their inputs support us in developing practical, human rights-respecting and technically viable solutions to global cybersecurity challenges. Chair, we know you will continue to listen carefully to the feedback you hear today, and we strongly support your careful leadership in finding a path towards consensus. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, New Zealand, for your statement and also for your expression of support for the Chair. I’m looking for every ounce of support I can get, so I’m listening very attentively to all the statements. I give the floor now to Estonia, to be followed by Nicaragua.

Estonia: Thank you, Mr Chair. Estonia aligns itself with the statement by the European Union, and that’s the following on its national capacity. We would like the Chair and its team for putting together REV2. We have noted some improvement compared to REV1. However, we regret that the IHL language in the international law chapter has regressed compared to the previous version. We believe that there have been deepening discussions on international law, particularly IHL, throughout Open-Ended Working Group, but we note that there is no additional language on IHL in this current proposal. The final report reaffirms the prohibition of the threat of use of force, a well-known fundamental rule formulated in the UN Charter. However, unlike the Zero Draft, REV2 does not highlight that an ICT operation may constitute use of force when its scale and effects are comparable to use of force. by a non-ICT operation. To add value, a link to ICT is necessary. We remain concerned about the reference to a convention. We believe that there were no substantial discussions and support on that proposal to add it to paragraph 42 of the core text. We believe that reference should be deleted. Moreover, on stakeholder modalities, we noted that no amendments were made. We are still in a position that any objections should be openly discussed and if they remain unresolved, decisions should reflect the will of the majority. Last but not least, we support French proposal advancing responsible state behavior in the title of the mechanism. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Nicaragua: Our responsibility is to guarantee an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful environment for ICT. We support capacity building in the sphere of ICT, supporting the obligation of developed countries to increase technological and financial support and capacity for developing states. It’s important to recognize the historic responsibility of developed countries in the provision of resources, including technological and scientific resources, in light of the low level of production. preparedness and capacity in developing countries in relation to undue use of ICTs against our countries. We highlight that this cooperation should take the form of the establishment and promotion of mechanisms for participation of developing countries in the meetings of the future permanent mechanism. Also, by promoting sponsorships and other forms of exchanges of views. We hope that this will not be excluded from the final report. Chair, we reiterate our call for maintaining current modalities in relation to participation of interested non-governmental actors in the future permanent mechanism in order to maintain the intergovernmental nature both of the United Nations and the process itself. It’s necessary to recall, and this is known to all, that the vast majority of the interested NGOs are funded by or have their origins in developed countries. There is no need to say that obviously the interest of such organizations is to promote, project, and justify the agendas of Western countries rather than promoting cooperation with developing countries. Finally, we reiterate the request from a group of delegations that the terminology of this process be in line with the OEWG security of and in the use of ICTs. So we request that in the future permanent mechanism this be reflected according to the same rationale. Once again, please be assured of the availability of our country in helping to achieve a successful outcome. this process. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Nicaragua, for your statement and also expression of support. Pakistan, to be followed by Costa Rica.

Pakistan: Mr. Chair, I am taking the floor to share a few points. First, of course, we would like to convey our appreciation to you and your team for hard work and stewardship of the OEWG. Chair, although we wished interested delegations were better involved in informal consultations to bridge gaps and support shared objectives, we offer our flexibility on CHAIRS REV2 to be a basis to achieve our shared objectives. Without reiterating our proposals made earlier, I would like to highlight that our suggestions in Para 15 have not been taken on board. We also regret that despite our repeated requests in this and earlier sessions, a reference to disinformation and fake news has not been reflected in the final report. The threat and implications of disinformation and fake news are emerging as a major area of international concern, and we did not hear any views contrary to it. Therefore, we would urge appropriate reflection in Para 16 of the final report. In Para 25 on intrusion capabilities, we had requested the addition of an I-code within the United Nations after appropriate safeguards and oversight efforts. It is important that such work is done under the UN auspices for the sake of legitimacy, universality, and inclusivity. Chair, on capacity building, we reiterate our support to various initiatives and proposals, including discussions or in a dedicated thematic group. We also echo comments made in support of UNIDIR Cyber Resilience Academy. Lastly, there are certain questions around the one dedicated thematic group that has now been asked to consider everything. From the process perspective, we are not sure how this will work practically. But having said this, we would look forward to continuing our detailed discussions on five pillars in the future forum. And I thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Pakistan, for your statement. Costa Rica to be followed by Chile.

Costa Rica: Senor Presidente. Chairman, we are grateful for your efforts in introducing a new version of the text that seeks to reflect a balance of the substantive discussions we have had and the political will in this final stretch of the process. We appreciate your commitment to bringing positions closer together and in listening to all delegations. For Costa Rica, achieving a consensus report to facilitate our work in the subsequent process continues to be a priority. This consensus should reflect what we have built together collectively, an ambitious, cooperative, and inclusive vision of international security and cyberspace rooted in international law and equity. We regret that in the quest for consensus, some language that had been incorporated into previous versions on international law, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law has been discarded. On the other hand, we welcome the fact that important elements have been maintained, such as the enabling role of capacity building. We reiterate the call of other delegations to reincorporate some elements that have been removed, including the mapping exercise of capacity building programmes. As regards the thematic group on this topic, which was including the annex, we consider that it is necessary to add some details that have been expressed by other delegations from the region, for instance incorporating the identification, planning and operationalisation of capacity building, and also the connection between providers and those in need of capacity building. This mobilises expertise and the available resources, and this better fits national and regional contexts. Still on the annex, we support the creation of a more inclusive stakeholder participation mechanism in line with what has been highlighted by other delegations. We also would call for the thematic groups to have interpretation in the six official languages in order to guarantee effective participation by our delegations and experts. Finally, we reiterate that the success of this process hinges on our collective will to defend what is essential, to adjust what needs to be adjusted, and to project a process that is inclusive and ambitious. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Costa Rica, for your statement. Chile, to be followed by Papua New Guinea.

Chile: draft. We recognise the substantive efforts towards a consensus text and we wish to assure you of our full support as we advance to this goal. We wish to make some constructive remarks to ensure that the text reflects in a balanced way the discussions that we’ve had in the last five years in the area of human rights. We welcome the fact that the text reaffirms that human rights should be respected online and offline. However, the current wording omits agreed language in this area. We suggest inclusion of references to the resolutions as in the first version and in line with the mandate of the OEWG and existing framework. In the same vein and as regards the norms of responsible behaviour in relation to the voluntary norms, we see that there is more detailed development of required actions in the previous version. We suggest that these operation aspects on norms be reincorporated including the voluntary checklist. Chile considers that these actions would contribute to adding real actions to the voluntary norms and ensure that this can be implemented in the real world. IHL and international law, respect for international law and the Charter of the United Nations is essential for stability and peace in cyberspace. In this regard, we consider that there is a significant omission, namely the withdrawal of the reference to international humanitarian law. We suggest going back to the earlier formulation in the one, that addresses respect for IHL. Also, incorporating references to the efforts of a group with substantive support from a significant group of countries, this would more accurately reflect the discussions that have been held. Incorporating the language suggested by Vietnam yesterday in their statement on behalf of all regions would be a good idea, and we support this. Also, references in the area of IHL by Brazil, Switzerland, and others. As regards participation of stakeholders, a multi-actor approach is, in our view, necessary to address digital security. Civil society, technical experts, and others contribute with legitimacy and capacity and will enrich this process. We suggest recovering language from the first version that encourages meaningful participation by other interested parties seeking to ensure transparency and certainty in the accreditation process. We’re also especially grateful to you, Chair, for the inclusion of references to other interested parties in the work of the thematic groups. Given the practical nature of this group and action-oriented nature of this, the involvement of other interested parties will certainly be fundamental. On the digital divide and the gender gap, we suggest incorporating language on the gender gap in the digital divide and an intersectional approach. Finally, on capacity building, the strengthening of capacity building is a key pillar of responsible behaviour. The earlier version of text had… key practical suggestions, including mapping and others, and so we see value in the convening of a global roundtable being based on the work of the group on capacity building, as suggested by France, and this should be considered as a suggestion in this regard. We align with the statement delivered by Mexico on behalf of a group of countries in Latin America. Thank you.

Chair: Papua New Guinea, to be followed by Switzerland.

Papua New Guinea: Mr. Chair, Papua New Guinea wishes to express its support for the ongoing process towards the successful adoption of a fourth annual progress report that would bring us closer to transitioning from the current open-ended working group to the future permanent mechanism. We highlight the focus of DTG2 on the subject of capacity building. We emphasize the importance of capacity building, including for small island developing states, as an enabler across all areas of this framework. We also support Malaysia’s proposal on Annex I, paragraph eight, for the chair of the permanent mechanism to prepare guiding questions to foster a more focused DTG dialogue. At this juncture, Papua New Guinea remains committed to engaging constructively with all delegations towards our shared goal of a single-track permanent mechanism. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Papua New Guinea, for your statement, as well as your expression of support. Switzerland, please.

Switzerland: Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor again. As I mentioned earlier, I will come back to two topics, norms and regular institutional dialogue. On the norms section, we would like to echo the statement made by the United Kingdom. We regret that the Annex I containing the voluntary checklist has been deleted. However, we can support this section if it is retained in its current form. On Irregular Institutional Dialogue and Annex I, we welcome that the dedicated thematic working groups proposed shall be cross-cutting in their nature. Like other delegations, we regret that there is no dedicated space for focused, in-depth discussions on the application of existing international law. But in the spirit of compromise, we acknowledge the need for flexibility. Throughout this open-ended working group, Switzerland has consistently advocated in-depth, scenario-based and focused discussions on the application of existing international law, particularly IHL, to the use of ICTs, submitted relevant proposals and, together with other delegations, drafted and presented working papers. Switzerland will continue this work within the Future Permanent Mechanism in the framework to be agreed jointly by consensus. On the name of the Future Mechanism, we support the proposal by the French delegation. On modalities, we continue to believe that the proposed modalities do not reflect what the overwhelming majorities of states here in this room expect from them – transparency. In our view, all states must be able to discuss and decide on the participation of stakeholders. We cannot accept that a single state can reject their participation to the detriment of all others. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Switzerland, for your statement and also for your expressions of flexibility. Islamic Republic of Iran, please.

Islamic Republic of Iran: Thank you, Mr. Chair, and sorry for taking the floor again. I would like to briefly respond to one of the proposals made by some delegations regarding the title of Future Permanent Mechanism as a global mechanism to advance responsible state behavior. I would like to underscore that my delegation cannot support this proposal, and we wish to reiterate the earlier suggestion made by LMG Group to retain the terminology used by the open-ended working group, namely security of and in the use of ICT as the foundation for the title of the future permanent mechanism. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Islamic Republic of Iran, for your statement. Friends, I have no more speakers at this point, and it’s close to 6 or 5.30, and we need to wrap up. And first of all, I want to thank all of you. I have been encouraged by the statements and the tone of the discussions throughout today, starting this morning and this afternoon as well. I want to thank you for that. In essence, this series of statements was a conversation, not with me, but between yourselves. And this conversation between yourselves is an important exercise for each one of you to understand where you stand and where you’re coming from. From where I am on the podium, I am encouraged by the discussions. And this discussion throughout the day reinforces my view that there is a pathway forward to have an outcome tomorrow. And I wanted to thank you for that. Second, throughout the day, the reactions to the final draft that I put forward yesterday evening, I sense… that there was considerable expressions of a commitment to reach consensus. Many of you said this. Many of you also said that you are flexible. Some of you said that you want to cross the finish line. But overall, whatever the vocabulary of your statements, I sense a very strong collective commitment to reach an outcome tomorrow and to have it adopted by consensus. This too, I think, is encouraging for me and I hope is also encouraging to all of you. Tomorrow is when we will have the opportunity to begin the smooth and seamless transition to the new mechanism. And tomorrow is when we will be able to demonstrate that we are committed to a single-track process. So the smooth and seamless transition and a single-track state-led process requires that we adopt an outcome tomorrow. Many of you said you are committed to a single-track process and you want to see a smooth and seamless transition. And if we are to achieve that, we need a consensus outcome tomorrow for which, as I said, I sense considerable, considerable commitment together with expressions of flexibility. Now I also heard throughout the day expressions of disappointment, expressions of regret, expressions of consternation, as some of you put it. expressions of concern as to why the final draft had omitted references or adjusted formulations which does not satisfy your point of view or which does not satisfy your instructions. Now these expressions of regret are also in my view important to hear, for me to hear certainly as the chair of the process. But these expressions of disappointment are also important for each one of you to listen and understand because in a UN process we need to understand what others are seeking, what others are happy or not happy about. And it is that intersection of all the different requirements, concerns, consternations, satisfaction that we have to find and chart a narrow path forward. I’m still of the view that it’s eminently doable. And this discussion has encouraged me. I’ve listened very carefully to all your statements. And it seems that there are some issues we will need to address. But we also need to keep in mind that we are at a stage of a very lengthy process which has lasted nearly five years and which is now coming to its final 24 hours. And so what we need to be looking at is surgical fixes and tweaks, not an attempt to rewrite or make extensive changes. So, having listened to your comments, I will give some very careful thought as to what are the sort of surgical fixes or tweaks or adjustments that will help all of us cross the finish line and leave tomorrow with a consensus document. But it is also clear that whatever we do, or whatever I do, that tomorrow we will not be in a position where people can say this is a perfect document. In fact, even after 80 years, there is continuing debate about the UN Charter, about some of the missing elements, and some of the elements that were put in there. So the point I’m making is that at the UN, there’s no such thing as a perfect document that is to be adopted by consensus. So we will minimize the imperfections. We need to do that. We need to make some adjustments to this final draft. But I also want to tell you that when you look at the conference room paper, keep in mind that this is a process that is going to continue. Keep in mind all the previous agreements that have been adopted. And therefore, look at it in its totality. And if you still think that there are issues that have been left out and you need to register them, you would have the option, of course, as in any UN process, to make your own statements, to put on record statements that provide the context for you to join consensus. And I also want to say that in keeping with the tradition of this working group, we do compile these statements, and these statements are circulated in an informal document, sorry, information document, as a UN information document. So I just wanted to say that I’ve listened carefully to both your expressions of satisfaction as well as deep dissatisfaction, but if you wish to register them, you will also have that possibility in a more formal way. Now, the other point I wanted to make is, of course, the question of flexibility. I mean, it is very clear that many of you were not happy with what has been taken out, so there are calls for, there were calls to bring back elements that were removed or deleted. There are also calls to add additional elements, even at this stage of the process. So I would urge all of you to look at it also from the point of view of showing flexibility. And in that context, please also help us to explain to your capitals as to why flexibility will be needed in order to attain consensus. I think it’s incumbent upon all of us. to explain the stakes to our capitals so that our capitals are in a position to join consensus and it need be with appropriate statements to be placed on record. Now the other thing that I wanted to say was that with regard to Annex I, there was a comment about the future permanent mechanism and of course if all goes well, tomorrow we may well be able to take the first step into the future if we are able to adopt it by consensus. So the reference to the word future would become redundant if we have a mechanism and a consensus outcome. I think some of you made the point that the name needs to be streamlined, references to global mechanism and permanent mechanism, I have taken note of that. There was also a discussion about the name of the mechanism, there are some proposals put forward, you heard the views, let me reflect on that. I think at this stage of the process we should not allow a discussion on the title to open another avenue for negotiations or renegotiations. So I think we need something simple and neutral because we have the modalities in Annex C of last year and we are discussing additional modalities to be adopted by consensus this year. Those are the constitutional documents. if you like. So the title would be important, the name of the mechanism, but we need a solution that is simple and neutral. I think the comment was also made that with the two dedicated thematic groups in the structure as it is, there’s a lack of clarity as to what the first dedicated thematic group would do because it is all a combination of various issues. And I think this is where, you know, I asked my team to look at the evolution of the discussion on the RID question. So when we started the discussion on RID, we started with three dedicated thematic groups. Then it became four. That was last year. Then it became five. Then in April, it went to four. The zero draft was three, REV1 was three, and now we are in two. So this debate is something that we have had for nearly two years. And you can cut and slice it and dice it in many different ways. And it’s very difficult to say what would be the best way to do it. And so my advice would be to work with the consensus that is attainable and then make that consensus workable. So, first, we need a consensus on the elements. And then we need to make the best of it. So, for example, with the DTGs, there’s no doubt that the chair of the global mechanism will have to put forward a work program at the organizational session. You will need an agenda. And those of you who have been in this process would remember the bitter battles on agenda and work programs. And by the way, for those of you who have not been involved, the work program of this working group has been blocked from time to time. So we have spent days discussing the work program. But my point is that we should avoid these kinds of things. But at the same time, we need to do what we can now and leave some of the discussions on work program as a way to organize the discussions of the dedicated thematic groups to the global mechanism and the chair of the global mechanism to consult and discuss with members. So, my friends, if we have a consensus outcome tomorrow, it is going to be the beginning of a new chapter of intense conversations and dialogue leading to cooperation, leading to greater confidence, and leading to greater trust among countries, which is precisely the idea of creating this mechanism, the global mechanism for ICT security. So, these are some of my reflections. And I want to end by saying that I will go back and review all the notes, will discuss with my team. And as I said earlier this morning, it’s my intention to… Prepare the conference room paper and make it available this evening around 9 p.m. It seems like you have a keen sense of humor about my sense of timing. Yes, ish. 9 p.m. ish. But I wanted to explain to you, for those who may be new to the process, the reason why we need this conference room paper. This is the final document that will be put forward for adoption. And it is important that the document be made available the day prior to adoption. So that’s why it’s my goal to make it available today, so that each one of you can take it back to capitals and their time zones and differences involved. So we want to give people adequate time. It’s going to be limited time, but adequate time, so that you can, tomorrow morning, come back with instructions on the positions that you would take on the adoption of the conference room paper tomorrow. I’m very clear in my mind that it’s my intention to put forward the adoption of the conference room paper tomorrow morning. And that is what we have done over the last three years. We’ve always started the very last day, Friday morning, with the chair putting forward the conference room paper for adoption. And that is what I intend to do tomorrow. And then we’ll take it from there. The best scenario is that we are done by 11am, and that gives you the whole day free. And that I hope will incentivize you to cross the finish line. But we’re not going to rush this. We are going to do it in a way that all of you can say, this is ours. The collective sense of ownership must be there as we adopt the document. Because ultimately, that is the way to ensure that the outcome document will be operationalized and implemented in a meaningful way. So friends, please do look out for the conference room paper this evening. Look out for an email. And tomorrow morning, we will meet at 10am here in the same room. The meeting is adjourned. I wish you a pleasant evening.

Agreement points

Support for dedicated thematic group on capacity building

Speakers

– Morocco
– Russian Federation
– South Africa
– Papua New Guinea
– Argentina

Arguments

Strong support for dedicated thematic group on capacity building as cross-cutting lever

Support for establishing only DTG on capacity building and deferring other DTGs to organizational session

Support for ad hoc dedicated thematic groups with fixed duration

Support for DTG2 focus on capacity building as enabler across all framework areas

Support for cross-cutting integration of capacity building across five pillars

Summary

Multiple speakers from different regions strongly supported establishing a dedicated thematic group focused on capacity building, viewing it as essential for developing countries and as a cross-cutting enabler across all framework areas

Topics

Capacity development | Cybersecurity | Development

Opposition to single state veto in stakeholder participation

Speakers

– Canada
– Australia
– Switzerland
– New Zealand

Arguments

Support for transparent objection process where decisions reflect majority will if objections persist

Concern that single state veto undermines participation of other stakeholders

Opposition to convention reference due to lack of substantial discussions and support

Support for stakeholder involvement to level information playing field for smaller states

Summary

Several developed countries opposed the single state veto mechanism for stakeholder participation, arguing it undermines transparency and fairness while disadvantaging states that rely on external expertise

Topics

Human rights principles | Legal and regulatory

Regret over removal of voluntary checklist

Speakers

– United States
– United Kingdom
– Switzerland
– Chile
– Malawi
– Philippines

Arguments

Disappointment over removal of voluntary checklist as important implementation guidance

Support for maintaining current balance in norms section if existing framework is retained

Regret that the Annex I containing the voluntary checklist has been deleted

Call for reincorporation of operational aspects and voluntary checklist for real-world implementation

Support for checklist as tool to help operationalize norms and bridge implementation gap

Regret over removal of voluntary checklist but support for continued refinement

Summary

A diverse group of countries expressed disappointment over the removal of the voluntary checklist, viewing it as an important practical tool for implementing cybersecurity norms, particularly valuable for developing countries

Topics

Cybersecurity | Cyber norms | Capacity development

Call for reinstatement of UN Cyber Resilience Academy within UNIDIR

Speakers

– Latvia
– Philippines
– Pakistan

Arguments

Call for reinstatement of UN Cyber Resilience Academy within UNIDIR reference

Call for reinstatement of UN Cyber Resilience Academy within UNIDIR

Echo comments made in support of UNIDIR Cyber Resilience Academy

Summary

Multiple countries supported reinstating references to establishing a UN Cyber Resilience Academy within UNIDIR, viewing it as an important capacity building initiative with broad international support

Topics

Capacity development | Online education | Cybersecurity

Support for stronger international humanitarian law language

Speakers

– European Union
– Germany
– Poland
– Finland
– Estonia
– New Zealand

Arguments

Strong support for factual reflection of discussions on international humanitarian law, state responsibility, and due diligence

Disappointment that rich discussions on international law are not reflected in the final draft

Call for stronger references to international humanitarian law and human rights law

Call for clear reference to IHL applicability and standalone ICRC resolution reference

Concern about regression in international humanitarian law language

Disappointment that robust international law discussions are not appropriately reflected

Summary

European and allied countries consistently called for stronger language on international humanitarian law, expressing disappointment that extensive discussions on IHL application to cyberspace were not adequately reflected in the final report

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cyberconflict and warfare | Human rights principles

Similar viewpoints

Like-minded states consistently opposed expanded stakeholder participation, restrictions on the no-objection procedure, and certain terminology changes, preferring to maintain existing modalities and traditional intergovernmental approaches

Speakers

– Nicaragua
– Russian Federation
– Cuba
– Islamic Republic of Iran

Arguments

Strong opposition to restrictions on no-objection procedure and NGO participation in thematic groups

Opposition to consultations on NGO participation being imposed on states

Concern about technology neutrality language being included without proper discussion

Opposition to ‘advance responsible state behavior’ in mechanism title

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Human rights principles | Cybersecurity

Latin American countries shared concerns about the removal of specific capacity building tools and mechanisms, particularly the mapping exercise and UN-administered programs that would ensure neutral and inclusive participation

Speakers

– Brazil
– Mexico
– Costa Rica

Arguments

Regret over removal of mapping exercise for capacity building programs

Support for UN-administered sponsorship program to ensure impartiality and transparency

Regret over deletion of mapping exercise for capacity building programmes

Topics

Capacity development | Cybersecurity | Legal and regulatory

These countries shared concern about the deletion of specific critical infrastructure sectors from the document, arguing that this represented previously agreed consensus language that should be maintained

Speakers

– El Salvador
– Ireland
– Kingdom of the Netherlands

Arguments

Concern over removal of specific critical infrastructure sectors from agreed language

Support for proposals to improve balance and reverse deletions on critical infrastructure

Support for reinstating consensus language on specific critical infrastructure sectors

Topics

Cybersecurity | Critical infrastructure

These countries advocated for more inclusive and transparent stakeholder participation mechanisms, supporting proposals that would reduce barriers to civil society and private sector engagement

Speakers

– Chile
– Canada
– Finland

Arguments

Call for meaningful stakeholder participation with transparency and certainty in accreditation

Support for transparent objection process where decisions reflect majority will if objections persist

Support for practical modalities to enable meaningful stakeholder participation

Topics

Human rights principles | Legal and regulatory

Unexpected consensus

Support for French proposal on mechanism naming

Speakers

– France
– Latvia
– Estonia
– Kingdom of the Netherlands
– Israel
– Switzerland

Arguments

Support for French proposal to name mechanism ‘Global Mechanism to Advance Responsible State Behavior’

Support for French proposal advancing responsible state behavior in the title of the mechanism

Support French proposal advancing responsible state behavior in the title of the mechanism

Support for Malaysia to use one title throughout the report, and support for the title that France proposed

Support for the French suggestion on the title of the future permanent mechanism

Support for the proposal by the French delegation

Explanation

Despite significant disagreements on many issues, there was unexpected broad support for France’s compromise proposal on the mechanism’s name, suggesting willingness to find middle ground on procedural matters even when substantive disagreements persist

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Concern about imbalanced treatment of consensus vs minority proposals

Speakers

– United States
– Israel
– Australia
– Estonia

Arguments

Concern about imbalanced treatment giving equal footing to minority proposals versus consensus documents

Opposition to equal treatment of consensus documents with minority proposals

Concern that single state veto undermines participation of other stakeholders

Opposition to convention reference due to lack of substantial discussions and support

Explanation

Countries from different regions shared concerns about giving equal weight to documents with varying levels of support, particularly regarding the ICRC consensus resolution versus minority proposals for new conventions

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cyberconflict and warfare

Overall assessment

Summary

The discussion revealed significant consensus on capacity building as a priority, broad agreement on the importance of practical implementation tools like the voluntary checklist, and shared concerns about stakeholder participation modalities. However, deep divisions remain on international law language, particularly regarding international humanitarian law, and on the balance between intergovernmental control and multi-stakeholder participation.

Consensus level

Moderate consensus exists on technical and capacity building issues, but fundamental disagreements persist on governance structures and legal frameworks. The Chair’s assessment that consensus is achievable appears optimistic given the procedural flexibility shown by many delegations, though substantive compromises will be necessary on contentious issues like stakeholder participation and international law language.

Different viewpoints

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) applicability in cyberspace

Speakers

– European Union
– United States
– Switzerland
– Finland
– Estonia
– Germany
– Poland
– Cuba
– Russian Federation
– Nicaragua

Arguments

Strong support for factual reflection of discussions on international humanitarian law, state responsibility, and due diligence

Concern about imbalanced treatment giving equal footing to minority proposals versus consensus documents

Support for reinstating language on ICT operations constituting use of force when comparable to non-ICT operations

Call for clear reference to IHL applicability and standalone ICRC resolution reference

Concern about regression in international humanitarian law language

Disappointment that rich discussions on international law are not reflected in the final draft

Call for stronger references to international humanitarian law and human rights law

Request to delete references to international humanitarian law applicability due to lack of consensus

Insistence on the exclusion of any hints or references to the non-consensus controversial ideas about the applicability of international humanitarian law to ICTs

Support for establishing only DTG on capacity building and deferring other DTGs to organizational session

Summary

Western countries and allies strongly support explicit recognition of IHL applicability in cyberspace and factual reflection of discussions, while Russia, Cuba, Nicaragua and like-minded states oppose any references to IHL applicability, arguing there is no consensus and such references should be deleted entirely.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cyberconflict and warfare | Human rights principles

Stakeholder participation modalities and transparency

Speakers

– Canada
– Chile
– Australia
– European Union
– Nicaragua
– Russian Federation
– Cuba
– Argentina

Arguments

Support for transparent objection process where decisions reflect majority will if objections persist

Call for meaningful stakeholder participation with transparency and certainty in accreditation

Concern that single state veto undermines participation of other stakeholders

Strong opposition to restrictions on no-objection procedure and NGO participation in thematic groups

Opposition to consultations on NGO participation being imposed on states

Concern about technology neutrality language being included without proper discussion

Support for balanced stakeholder participation modalities covering various concerns

Summary

Western countries advocate for transparent stakeholder participation with majority decision-making when objections persist, while Russia, Cuba, Nicaragua and like-minded states insist on maintaining current restrictive modalities with single-state veto power and oppose NGO participation in thematic groups.

Topics

Human rights principles | Legal and regulatory

Future mechanism structure and dedicated thematic groups

Speakers

– Nicaragua
– Russian Federation
– Mauritius
– El Salvador
– Brazil
– United States
– Morocco

Arguments

Concern that DTG1 scope is overstretched and unclear, risking duplication of plenary sessions

Support for establishing only DTG on capacity building and deferring other DTGs to organizational session

Preference for dedicated thematic group on international law to provide focused discussions

Concern over elimination of dedicated thematic group on international law

Strong support for dedicated thematic group on capacity building as cross-cutting lever

Summary

There is disagreement on the number and focus of dedicated thematic groups, with some countries preferring separate groups for international law and capacity building, while others support only a capacity building group or oppose DTG1’s broad mandate.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity | Capacity development

Voluntary checklist inclusion and implementation guidance

Speakers

– United States
– United Kingdom
– Malawi
– Chile
– Philippines
– South Africa
– Switzerland

Arguments

Disappointment over removal of voluntary checklist as important implementation guidance

Support for maintaining current balance in norms section if existing framework is retained

Support for checklist as tool to help operationalize norms and bridge implementation gap

Call for reincorporation of operational aspects and voluntary checklist for real-world implementation

Regret over removal of voluntary checklist but support for continued refinement

Disappointment over lack of consensus on voluntary checklist operationalization

Summary

Multiple countries express disappointment over the removal of the voluntary checklist, viewing it as an important practical tool for implementation, while the Chair’s decision to remove it suggests lack of consensus among all parties.

Topics

Cybersecurity | Cyber norms | Capacity development

Mechanism naming and terminology

Speakers

– France
– Russian Federation
– Islamic Republic of Iran
– Nicaragua
– Chair

Arguments

Support for French proposal to name mechanism ‘Global Mechanism to Advance Responsible State Behavior’

Insistence on using ‘security of and in the use of ICTs’ terminology throughout

Opposition to ‘advance responsible state behavior’ in mechanism title

Need for simple and neutral mechanism name to avoid opening new negotiations

Summary

France proposes including ‘advance responsible state behavior’ in the mechanism name, while Russia, Iran and like-minded states insist on maintaining ‘security of and in the use of ICTs’ terminology, with the Chair seeking a simple, neutral solution.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Unexpected differences

Technology neutrality principle

Speakers

– Argentina
– Cuba

Arguments

Emphasis on technology neutrality and responsibility lying with users, not vulnerability identifiers

Concern about technology neutrality language being included without proper discussion

Explanation

This disagreement is unexpected because both countries are from the Global South and might be expected to have similar positions, yet Argentina strongly supports technology neutrality while Cuba opposes the inclusion of this language, arguing it was added without proper consultation.

Topics

Cybersecurity | Digital standards | Legal and regulatory

Human-centric approach to ransomware

Speakers

– Kingdom of the Netherlands
– Ireland
– El Salvador

Arguments

Regret over deletion of human-centric approach to ransomware

Regret over deletion of human-centric approach to ransomware despite widespread support

Regret over removal of human-centered approach recognizing real impact on people

Explanation

It’s unexpected that there would be resistance to including human-centric language for ransomware, as this seems like a non-controversial humanitarian concern that should have broad support across different political blocs.

Topics

Human rights principles | Cybersecurity

Convention proposal treatment versus consensus documents

Speakers

– United States
– Israel
– Estonia
– Ukraine

Arguments

Concern about imbalanced treatment giving equal footing to minority proposals versus consensus documents

Opposition to equal treatment of consensus documents with minority proposals

Opposition to convention reference due to lack of substantial discussions and support

Opposition to convention reference as premature given current implementation challenges

Explanation

The strong opposition to treating a minority convention proposal equally with consensus documents is unexpected given the UN’s typical approach of acknowledging all member state proposals, suggesting deeper concerns about the substance and implications of the convention proposal.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cyberconflict and warfare

Overall assessment

Summary

The main areas of disagreement center on: (1) International humanitarian law applicability in cyberspace, with Western countries supporting explicit recognition while Russia and allies oppose any references; (2) Stakeholder participation modalities, with Western countries advocating transparency and majority decision-making while Russia/China bloc insists on restrictive single-state veto; (3) Future mechanism structure regarding dedicated thematic groups; (4) Inclusion of practical implementation tools like voluntary checklists; and (5) Mechanism naming and terminology preferences.

Disagreement level

High level of disagreement along geopolitical lines, particularly between Western countries and the Russia/China-led bloc, with fundamental differences on international law application, stakeholder participation, and governance approaches. These disagreements reflect broader tensions about multilateral governance, sovereignty, and the role of non-state actors in international processes. The Chair’s emphasis on ‘surgical fixes’ and the need for consensus suggests these disagreements pose significant challenges to reaching a final agreement, requiring substantial compromise from all parties.

Partial agreements

Similar viewpoints

Like-minded states consistently opposed expanded stakeholder participation, restrictions on the no-objection procedure, and certain terminology changes, preferring to maintain existing modalities and traditional intergovernmental approaches

Speakers

– Nicaragua
– Russian Federation
– Cuba
– Islamic Republic of Iran

Arguments

Strong opposition to restrictions on no-objection procedure and NGO participation in thematic groups

Opposition to consultations on NGO participation being imposed on states

Concern about technology neutrality language being included without proper discussion

Opposition to ‘advance responsible state behavior’ in mechanism title

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Human rights principles | Cybersecurity

Latin American countries shared concerns about the removal of specific capacity building tools and mechanisms, particularly the mapping exercise and UN-administered programs that would ensure neutral and inclusive participation

Speakers

– Brazil
– Mexico
– Costa Rica

Arguments

Regret over removal of mapping exercise for capacity building programs

Support for UN-administered sponsorship program to ensure impartiality and transparency

Regret over deletion of mapping exercise for capacity building programmes

Topics

Capacity development | Cybersecurity | Legal and regulatory

These countries shared concern about the deletion of specific critical infrastructure sectors from the document, arguing that this represented previously agreed consensus language that should be maintained

Speakers

– El Salvador
– Ireland
– Kingdom of the Netherlands

Arguments

Concern over removal of specific critical infrastructure sectors from agreed language

Support for proposals to improve balance and reverse deletions on critical infrastructure

Support for reinstating consensus language on specific critical infrastructure sectors

Topics

Cybersecurity | Critical infrastructure

These countries advocated for more inclusive and transparent stakeholder participation mechanisms, supporting proposals that would reduce barriers to civil society and private sector engagement

Speakers

– Chile
– Canada
– Finland

Arguments

Call for meaningful stakeholder participation with transparency and certainty in accreditation

Support for transparent objection process where decisions reflect majority will if objections persist

Support for practical modalities to enable meaningful stakeholder participation

Topics

Human rights principles | Legal and regulatory

Key takeaways

Strong collective commitment from delegations to reach consensus on the final report by the next day, with many expressing flexibility and willingness to compromise

Chair expressed encouragement about finding a pathway forward despite various expressions of disappointment and concern from delegations

Need for surgical fixes and tweaks rather than extensive rewrites, given the process is in its final 24 hours after nearly five years

Recognition that no UN consensus document is perfect, and delegations will have opportunity to make statements for the record to provide context for joining consensus

Future permanent mechanism structure will include two dedicated thematic groups (DTGs) with cross-cutting approach, though concerns remain about DTG1’s broad scope

Significant disagreement on international law section, with many calling for better reflection of discussions on IHL, state responsibility, and due diligence

Widespread regret over removal of voluntary checklist for norms implementation, seen as important practical guidance tool

Ongoing tensions over stakeholder participation modalities, particularly regarding transparency and single-state veto power

Strong support for capacity building initiatives, especially for developing countries, with calls to reinstate various programs and mechanisms

Resolutions and action items

Chair committed to preparing and circulating a conference room paper by 9 PM that evening for final adoption consideration

Final adoption meeting scheduled for 10 AM the following morning in the same room

Chair will review all statements and notes to make surgical adjustments to address key concerns while maintaining consensus viability

Delegations instructed to consult with capitals overnight on the conference room paper to come with final positions

Chair emphasized the document will be put forward for adoption the next morning, following the tradition of previous years

Future mechanism chair will need to develop work program and agenda at organizational session to clarify DTG operations

Unresolved issues

Title/name of the future permanent mechanism – multiple proposals on the table including French suggestion to ‘advance responsible state behavior’

International law section balance – widespread calls to better reflect discussions on IHL, state responsibility, and due diligence versus minority proposals

Stakeholder participation modalities – fundamental disagreement between transparency advocates and those supporting current restrictive approach

Scope and clarity of DTG1 operations – concerns about overly broad mandate that could duplicate plenary sessions

Whether to reinstate voluntary checklist for norms implementation – strong support from many but resistance from others

Terminology consistency throughout document – calls to standardize references to ‘security of and in the use of ICTs’

Specific language on threats section – various proposals for additions and modifications not yet resolved

References to capacity building initiatives like UN Cyber Resilience Academy and mapping exercises

Suggested compromises

Chair suggested using simple and neutral title for mechanism to avoid opening new negotiation avenues

France proposed ‘Global Mechanism to Advance Responsible State Behavior in the Use of ICTs’ as compromise title

Switzerland proposed factual statement approach for international law discussions as middle ground

Canada suggested compromise language for paragraph 15 on promoting ICT use ‘in accordance with international law’

Chair emphasized making consensus workable through future work programs rather than perfect structure now

Various delegations suggested moving certain elements between sections (e.g., ICT tools from CBMs to capacity building)

Proposal to defer some DTG decisions to organizational session of future mechanism rather than resolving all now

Chair noted delegations can make statements for the record to provide context while still joining consensus

Several delegations expressed willingness to accept current structure if certain balance elements are maintained

We advocate for ensuring a stable balance between voluntary and legally binding norms. In particular, the document must reflect an equal emphasis on both implementing existing voluntary non-binding norms and developing new legally binding instruments in the use of ICTs.

Speaker

Nicaragua (on behalf of like-minded group)

Reason

This comment crystallized one of the fundamental tensions in the entire process – the divide between those favoring voluntary frameworks versus legally binding obligations. It directly challenged the prevailing emphasis on voluntary norms and demanded equal treatment for binding instruments.

Impact

This statement set the tone for much of the subsequent discussion, with multiple delegations either supporting or opposing this balance. It forced other speakers to clarify their positions on the voluntary vs. binding framework debate, making this a central thread throughout the session.

Four years of work cannot be lost with this. Work that is also needed for the global mechanism to advance responsible state behavior and the use of ICTs to continue on a solid ground, ground created by this open-ended working group.

Speaker

European Union

Reason

This comment powerfully framed the stakes of the discussion – that years of multilateral work and consensus-building were at risk of being lost. It elevated the conversation from technical details to the broader question of preserving multilateral achievements.

Impact

This framing was picked up by numerous subsequent speakers who echoed concerns about ‘walking back consensus’ and losing progress. It shifted the discussion from individual country positions to a collective responsibility to preserve multilateral achievements.

This controversy, Mr. Chair, is something that my delegation has chosen not to feed because we are fighting for ideas aiming to make multilateralism stronger and more effective, that we fight not for labels… In the spirit of compromise necessary for consensus, my delegation… could consider accepting the following name for our future framework… Global Mechanism to Advance Responsible State Behavior in the Use of ICTs.

Speaker

France

Reason

This was a pivotal moment of diplomatic flexibility where France offered to abandon their preferred ‘Program of Action’ terminology in favor of compromise language. It demonstrated how substantive concessions could be made while preserving core objectives.

Impact

This proposal was immediately picked up by multiple delegations and became a focal point for consensus-building. It showed other delegations that significant compromises were possible and encouraged similar flexibility from others. The Chair specifically noted this as a ‘constructive approach.’

The United States cannot agree to a report that contains such a DTG [dedicated thematic group on international law]… we have heard both in prior sessions and this week that certain states would seek to exploit conversations in any dedicated group on international law to advance new, legally binding obligations that could potentially undermine existing international law.

Speaker

United States

Reason

This comment revealed the deep strategic concerns behind seemingly technical organizational decisions. It exposed how institutional design choices were actually about preventing certain types of legal developments, adding a layer of complexity to the discussion.

Impact

This stark position forced other delegations to respond to the underlying concern about legal obligations, not just the organizational structure. It clarified why the international law working group had been removed and prompted several delegations to propose alternative solutions.

Tomorrow is when we will have the opportunity to begin the smooth and seamless transition to the new mechanism… So the smooth and seamless transition and a single-track state-led process requires that we adopt an outcome tomorrow.

Speaker

Chair

Reason

This comment reframed the entire discussion by emphasizing the temporal urgency and the binary nature of the choice facing delegations – consensus tomorrow or no mechanism at all. It shifted focus from perfect solutions to workable compromises.

Impact

This intervention fundamentally changed the dynamic of the discussion. After this point, more delegations began emphasizing flexibility and compromise rather than specific demands. It created a sense of collective responsibility for the success of the process.

At the UN, there’s no such thing as a perfect document that is to be adopted by consensus. So we will minimize the imperfections… But I also want to tell you that when you look at the conference room paper, keep in mind that this is a process that is going to continue.

Speaker

Chair

Reason

This philosophical observation about the nature of multilateral consensus-building provided crucial perspective on the limitations and expectations of the process. It acknowledged imperfection while emphasizing continuity.

Impact

This comment helped delegations recalibrate their expectations and approach the final negotiations with more realistic goals. It provided intellectual framework for accepting an imperfect but workable outcome.

Overall assessment

These key comments fundamentally shaped the discussion by establishing the major fault lines (voluntary vs. binding norms), raising the stakes (preserving multilateral achievements), demonstrating the possibility of compromise (France’s proposal), revealing underlying strategic concerns (US on international law), and providing crucial perspective on the nature of consensus-building. The Chair’s interventions were particularly impactful in shifting the discussion from position-taking to problem-solving, creating urgency around reaching consensus, and providing a philosophical framework for accepting imperfection. The combination of these comments created a dynamic where delegations moved from stating positions to seeking workable compromises, ultimately setting the stage for the final negotiations.

How can international law for international assistance in the event of a major cyber attack be further explored to strengthen solidarity between states when they are faced with serious incidents?

Speaker

Burkina Faso

Explanation

This is important for developing frameworks for mutual support and cooperation during major cyber incidents that could overwhelm individual state capabilities

How should the question of reparations due to victims of transborder cyberattacks be addressed to protect states?

Speaker

Burkina Faso

Explanation

This addresses accountability and compensation mechanisms for cross-border cyber incidents, which is crucial for establishing legal frameworks for cyber harm

How can practical challenges such as language and technical barriers in the Directory of Global Points of Contact be addressed?

Speaker

Burkina Faso

Explanation

This is important for improving the effectiveness of international cyber incident response coordination mechanisms

How can the confusion between IoT and AI issues be clarified, particularly regarding development cycles, confidentiality for IoT versus training and consultation issues for AI?

Speaker

Argentina

Explanation

This is important for developing appropriate technical standards and security measures for different types of emerging technologies

How can the distinction between CI (Critical Infrastructure) and CII (Critical Information Infrastructure) be better clarified to avoid affecting public information?

Speaker

Argentina

Explanation

This is important for developing appropriate protection measures and avoiding confusion in policy implementation

How can more general wording be developed for technical references that would better resist the passage of time, given that specific technologies like firewalls become obsolete?

Speaker

Argentina

Explanation

This is important for creating durable policy frameworks that don’t become outdated as technology evolves

How can international law be applied more clearly, especially in the context of growing threats, and what specific mechanisms are needed?

Speaker

Morocco

Explanation

This is important for operationalizing international law in cyberspace and addressing the implementation gap between legal principles and practical application

How can the blurring of lines between criminal activities and malicious ICT incidents be better addressed and reflected in policy frameworks?

Speaker

Switzerland

Explanation

This is important for developing appropriate response mechanisms and legal frameworks that can address the hybrid nature of modern cyber threats

How can standardized terminology for confidence-building measures be developed, and is this approach appropriate?

Speaker

Canada (opposing this approach)

Explanation

This raises questions about whether standardization might limit flexibility in international cooperation or create barriers to participation

How can the mapping exercise for capacity building programs be effectively reinstated and operationalized?

Speaker

Colombia, Switzerland, Brazil

Explanation

This is important for avoiding duplication of efforts and ensuring efficient allocation of capacity building resources globally

How can the UN Cyber Resilience Academy within UNIDIR be established and operationalized effectively?

Speaker

Latvia, Vietnam, Philippines

Explanation

This is important for creating a dedicated, impartial platform for cyber capacity building research and implementation, particularly for states with limited capabilities

How can the practical operationalization of dedicated thematic groups be clarified, particularly for DTG1 which covers multiple broad topics?

Speaker

Pakistan, Morocco, Russian Federation

Explanation

This is important for ensuring the future mechanism can function effectively without duplicating plenary discussions or becoming too diffuse in focus

How can disinformation and fake news threats be appropriately reflected and addressed in international cyber security frameworks?

Speaker

Pakistan

Explanation

This is important as disinformation represents an emerging area of international concern that intersects with cyber security and information integrity

How can intrusion capabilities be developed within the United Nations framework with appropriate safeguards and oversight?

Speaker

Pakistan

Explanation

This is important for ensuring legitimacy, universality, and inclusivity in developing cyber capabilities while maintaining appropriate controls

Summary

This transcript captures the sixth meeting of the 11th Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICT Technologies, focused on the second reading of negotiations for a Draft Final Report. The Chair opened by apologizing for the late circulation of the revised draft report (REV-2), which was streamlined from 45 to 28 pages to address delegates’ requests for a more concise document. He emphasized that this final report should be viewed as part of a package including three previously adopted annual progress reports, and stressed that it represents the beginning of a new process rather than an end.

Multiple delegations provided preliminary reactions to REV-2, with several common themes emerging. Many countries, including the African Group and Arab Group, expressed disappointment over the removal of a dedicated thematic group on international law from the proposed future permanent mechanism structure. They argued this deletion undermines years of discussion on critical issues like sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. Several delegations also raised concerns about the threat section, arguing it overemphasizes critical infrastructure threats while neglecting other security concerns identified during the OEWG process.

Capacity building emerged as a widely supported priority, with many delegations welcoming the dedicated thematic group on this topic. However, concerns were raised about the lack of concrete steps to operationalize the UN voluntary trust fund for capacity building initiatives. Regarding stakeholder participation modalities, several countries expressed caution about proposed changes to the current non-objection procedure, preferring to maintain existing mechanisms.

The Chair acknowledged the various concerns raised, taking responsibility for deletions and additions made to achieve overall balance. He emphasized the need for pragmatism and prioritization to reach consensus by Friday’s deadline, noting that some organizational details could be addressed by the future permanent mechanism itself. The Chair concluded by appealing for constructive solutions and flexibility from all delegations to ensure a successful transition to the permanent mechanism.

Keypoints

## Major Discussion Points:

– **Streamlining and Balance of the Draft Final Report**: The Chair explained significant cuts from 45 to 28 pages while attempting to balance diverse viewpoints and expectations from member states, acknowledging that not all delegations’ priorities could be fully addressed.

– **Structure of the Future Permanent Mechanism**: Extensive debate over the number and focus of dedicated thematic groups, with particular concern about reducing from three to two groups and the removal of a dedicated group on international law, which disappointed African and Arab groups.

– **Capacity Building Priorities**: Strong support from multiple delegations for enhanced capacity building mechanisms, including calls for operationalizing a UN voluntary trust fund and ensuring adequate resources for developing countries’ ICT security capabilities.

– **Stakeholder Participation Modalities**: Significant disagreement over NGO participation procedures, with some delegations (like China) expressing concerns about politicized NGOs, while others sought more inclusive participation mechanisms beyond the current non-objection basis.

– **International Law Application in Cyberspace**: Multiple delegations, particularly from African and Arab groups, expressed disappointment over the removal of dedicated discussions on international law application, citing ongoing regional conflicts and the need for clarity on sovereignty and non-interference principles.

## Overall Purpose:

The discussion aimed to review and negotiate the second revision of a draft final report for transitioning from the current Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on ICT security to a future permanent mechanism under the UN framework, with the goal of achieving consensus adoption by the end of the week.

## Overall Tone:

The discussion maintained a diplomatic and constructive tone throughout, despite underlying tensions. The Chair set an optimistic yet pragmatic tone, acknowledging disappointments while emphasizing the need for consensus and compromise. Delegations expressed appreciation for the Chair’s efforts while firmly stating their positions and concerns. The tone remained professional and collaborative, with delegates showing flexibility and willingness to engage constructively, even when expressing significant reservations about specific elements of the draft.

Speakers

**Speakers from the provided list:**

– **Chair** – Chairperson of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICT Technologies

– **China** – Country representative/delegate

– **Viet Nam** – Country representative/delegate

– **Indonesia** – Country representative/delegate

– **Turkey** – Country representative/delegate

– **Thailand** – Country representative/delegate

– **Nigeria** – Country representative/delegate, speaking on behalf of the African group

– **Egypt** – Country representative/delegate

– **Mexico** – Country representative/delegate, speaking on behalf of a group of Latin American countries

– **Malaysia** – Country representative/delegate

– **Colombia** – Country representative/delegate

– **Islamic Republic of Iran** – Country representative/delegate

– **Tunisia** – Country representative/delegate, speaking on behalf of the Arab group

– **Ghana** – Country representative/delegate

– **Republic of Korea** – Country representative/delegate

**Additional speakers:**

None – all speakers who participated in the discussion were included in the provided speakers names list.

# Comprehensive Summary: Sixth Meeting of the 11th Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICT Technologies

## Introduction and Context

The sixth meeting of the 11th Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICT Technologies convened to conduct a second reading of negotiations for the Draft Final Report, marking a critical juncture in the transition from the current OEWG framework to a future permanent mechanism under the United Nations umbrella. The session was characterised by intensive diplomatic negotiations aimed at achieving consensus adoption by the end of the week, with significant time constraints and financial austerity measures preventing any extensions beyond Friday at 6 PM.

The Chair opened the proceedings with an apology for the late circulation of the revised draft report (REV-2), which had been substantially streamlined from 45 to 28 pages in response to delegates’ requests for a more concise document. This dramatic reduction represented a strategic attempt to balance diverse viewpoints and expectations from member states whilst maintaining the essential elements necessary for consensus-building.

## Chair’s Strategic Approach and Philosophical Framework

The Chair’s opening remarks established both the practical constraints and philosophical context for the negotiations. In a particularly thought-provoking reflection, the Chair positioned the current discussions within the broader historical trajectory of international cooperation, describing the process as part of “a journey of 1,000 miles, which began in San Francisco in 1945, when representatives of 50 countries gathered to sign a document called the U.N. Charter.”

The Chair acknowledged the inherent challenges in achieving perfect balance, stating candidly that “not all aspirations can be met” and emphasising the need for pragmatism and prioritisation. The Chair explained that the document had evolved from five to four to three to two dedicated thematic groups due to “red line objections” from various delegations, and that certain elements were deleted due to “very specific objections.” The Chair stressed that the final report should be viewed as part of a comprehensive package including three previously adopted annual progress reports, representing the beginning of a new process rather than an endpoint.

## Structure of the Future Permanent Mechanism: Core Disagreements

### Reduction of Dedicated Thematic Groups

The most contentious issue emerged around the structural organisation of the future permanent mechanism, particularly the reduction from three to two dedicated thematic groups and the removal of a dedicated group on international law. This decision prompted strong opposition from multiple regional groups.

Nigeria, representing the African Group, expressed regret over the removal of the international law group, characterising it as a loss of four years of substantive discussions. The delegation argued that this change undermines the interests and national priorities of African states, particularly given their trajectory of digitalisation in support of sustainable development aspirations.

Tunisia, speaking for the Arab Group, called for the restoration of three thematic groups including international law, expressing firm support for an independent thematic group on international law applicability. The delegation emphasised that this represented a fundamental principle that could not be compromised.

Egypt articulated concerns about the reduction from three to two dedicated thematic groups, particularly emphasising the removal of the international law group. The delegation argued that this deletion undermines years of substantive discussions on critical issues including sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs, and proposed an alternative formulation for the dropped international law group to read “follow up to matters related to section C and D of the fourth report.”

### Alternative Structural Proposals and Clarifications

Several delegations sought clarification on operational aspects of the proposed structure. Malaysia requested clarity on the scope of specific challenges for DTG1 and the role of facilitators, seeking to understand how states would prepare substantively for dedicated thematic group meetings. The delegation also questioned whether the preparation of guiding questions should be done by the Chair of the Global or Permanent Mechanism to avoid ambiguity regarding facilitators’ roles.

Ghana suggested the need for a clearer framework for time distribution among focus areas or restoration of previous groupings, expressing concern about insufficient clarity on how various focus areas would be discussed within the allocated timeframe.

Colombia demonstrated flexibility whilst expressing regret over the removal of certain elements including the checklist as an important outcome, suggesting a pragmatic approach to achieving consensus whilst preserving essential elements for future consideration.

## Capacity Building: Broad Consensus with Implementation Concerns

### Strong Support Across Regional Groups

Capacity building emerged as an area of remarkable consensus across diverse regional groups. Multiple delegations expressed strong support for establishing a dedicated thematic group focused on capacity building, viewing it as a cross-cutting foundational element essential for effective implementation of the cybersecurity framework.

Malaysia supported the dedicated thematic group on capacity building as a cross-cutting element, whilst Indonesia welcomed both the dedicated thematic group and the retention of the global ICT security cooperation portal. Mexico supported a comprehensive approach encompassing identification, planning, delivery, and operationalisation of capacity building initiatives.

Nigeria, representing the African Group, emphasised support for UN voluntary fund operationalisation and concrete steps for implementation, viewing this as crucial for addressing capacity gaps faced by developing countries. Colombia welcomed the roundtable on capacity building whilst calling for reincorporation of mapping exercises.

### Operationalisation and Implementation Details

Despite broad support for capacity building principles, significant concerns emerged regarding implementation mechanisms. Tunisia, speaking for the Arab Group, expressed worry about the lack of clear procedures to operationalise the trust fund, viewing this absence as potentially impactful for effective implementation.

Egypt called for a UN-led capacity building vehicle with sufficient resources, emphasising the need for concrete mechanisms rather than aspirational language. Vietnam requested reinstatement of the Latvia-Vietnam-Philippines initiative on a dedicated platform, demonstrating the importance of specific regional initiatives within the broader framework.

Ghana supported the inclusion of scenario-based exercises in capacity building activities and emphasised the need for recognition of women in cyber fellowship programmes, whilst Mexico requested simultaneous interpretation in all UN official languages for thematic group meetings to ensure linguistic accessibility.

## Stakeholder Participation: Fundamental Disagreements on Modalities

### China’s Geopolitical Critique

The discussion on stakeholder participation revealed fundamental disagreements about the role of non-governmental actors in international cyber governance. China introduced a particularly provocative dimension by challenging the assumed legitimacy of civil society participation, arguing that “some NGOs actually have become tools for governments in spreading disinformation so as to achieve their geopolitical objectives.”

China’s intervention went further, stating that “some multi-stakeholder groups even have been receiving direct funding from foreign governments,” and concluding that “treating NGO participation as a matter of political correctness is a baseless bubble. Now it is time for us to burst this bubble.” This stark warning fundamentally reframed NGO participation from a capacity-building tool to a potential security threat.

### Preference for Existing Modalities

In response to these concerns, several delegations expressed preference for maintaining existing stakeholder participation modalities. Tunisia, representing the Arab Group, supported maintaining current no-objection modalities rather than adopting new proceedings, arguing that established mechanisms had proven effective.

Nigeria, speaking for the African Group, expressed caution against new proposals that might be counterproductive to the intergovernmental nature of the process. Indonesia supported stakeholder participation in conformity with established mechanisms, whilst Turkey emphasised voluntary, non-binding participation without compromising intergovernmental decision-making.

### Chair’s Proposed Solutions

The Chair acknowledged the complexity of stakeholder participation issues and explained three different First Committee precedents for NGO participation: the UK outer space working group approach, the Russian outer space working group approach, and the Egyptian working group approach. The Chair suggested that Egypt, the UK, Russia, Canada, and Chile could collaborate on creative proposals for NGO modalities based on these precedents.

The Chair proposed a middle-of-the-road approach on NGO modalities that would retain objection rights whilst adding a consultation step, attempting to address both inclusivity and sovereignty concerns.

## International Law Application: Regional Perspectives and Development Concerns

### Developing Country Priorities

The removal of the dedicated international law thematic group prompted particularly strong reactions from developing countries who viewed this change as undermining their core interests. Egypt’s critique was particularly pointed, arguing that “developing countries, without reservoirs of guidance, consultants, advisors, partnerships, and working papers, might be being drawn into a track where they are inherently disadvantaged and lagging behind.”

This intervention exposed structural inequalities in international negotiations, revealing how technical decisions about working group structures can perpetuate existing power dynamics. Egypt connected procedural choices to substantive outcomes, highlighting how “questioning any unfavourable aspects of the status quo or application of some of the most basic principles could be very challenging” for developing countries.

### Regional Security Experiences

Tunisia’s position on behalf of the Arab Group was influenced by regional security experiences, with the delegation arguing for equitable consideration of different regional threats including misinformation. The emphasis on international law reflected concerns about sovereignty and non-interference principles.

Indonesia supported further deliberations on international law including legally binding instruments, demonstrating that the issue extended beyond immediate regional concerns to broader questions about the legal framework governing cyberspace.

Malaysia demonstrated flexibility on international law group placement in the spirit of consensus whilst maintaining that the topic merits focused discussion, suggesting potential pathways for compromise.

## Threat Assessment and Security Concerns

### Scope and Balance Issues

The threat assessment section generated significant debate regarding scope and emphasis. The Islamic Republic of Iran, aligning with the Like-Minded Group, expressed concern that the threat section failed to capture the full range of the threat landscape, particularly regarding “security in use of ICTs” rather than focusing primarily on “security of ICT” infrastructure.

Iran argued that the current approach was incomplete and biased toward critical infrastructure protection whilst neglecting other security concerns identified during the OEWG process. The delegation called for a comprehensive list of threats identified by states during the OEWG process to serve as a useful reference for the future permanent mechanism, and raised concerns about safeguards and oversight language.

Nigeria, representing the African Group, requested balanced treatment of threats beyond just critical infrastructure, arguing that the current focus did not adequately reflect the diverse security challenges faced by different regions.

### Language and Technical Concerns

The Republic of Korea requested deletion of “could potentially” language from paragraph 16 on threats, seeking stronger and more definitive language regarding threat impacts. China made a specific reference to paragraph 17, last sentence, expressing concerns about particular formulations.

Tunisia, speaking for the Arab Group, emphasised the need for equitable consideration of different regional threats including misinformation, demonstrating how regional experiences shape threat perceptions and priorities.

### Positive Developments

Despite concerns about scope and balance, several delegations welcomed specific elements of the threat assessment approach. Ghana supported the inclusion of the security by design concept, viewing this as an important proactive approach to cybersecurity. Colombia supported the incorporation of security by design principles and welcomed references to AI security systems.

## Technical and Procedural Considerations

### Implementation and Operational Details

Several delegations sought clarity on operational aspects of the future permanent mechanism. The Islamic Republic of Iran questioned how decision-making processes in the future permanent mechanism should be explicitly specified to avoid undermining effectiveness, arguing that vague procedures could compromise functionality.

Malaysia questioned whether the terms “Global Mechanism” and “Permanent Mechanism” should be standardised throughout the document, seeking consistency in terminology. Vietnam made a specific request regarding paragraph 35G, seeking reinstatement of certain language.

### Timeline and Next Steps

The Chair outlined the immediate next steps, indicating that the draft final report would be transformed into a Conference Room Paper (CRP) that evening, with the intention of putting it forward for adoption the following morning. This timeline reflected the significant time pressure facing the negotiations, with financial austerity measures and interpreter availability constraining the schedule.

Delegations were requested to provide specific language proposals for consideration by the Chair’s team, with any alternative language proposals needed by the afternoon for inclusion in the conference room paper.

## Chair’s Response and Strategic Considerations

### Acknowledgement of Difficult Choices

The Chair responded to the various concerns with a candid admission of responsibility, stating “mea maxima culpa. But I did that… in order for us collectively to achieve an overall balance that will get us to consensus tomorrow. We need to be focused. We need to be pragmatic. We need to prioritise.”

This acknowledgment of the strategic calculations behind seemingly technical choices revealed the inherent trade-offs in consensus-building and shifted the discussion toward collaborative problem-solving.

### Pragmatic Approach to Unresolved Issues

The Chair emphasised that some organisational details could be addressed by the future permanent mechanism itself rather than requiring resolution in the current negotiations. The Chair suggested that the organisational session of the new mechanism could address sequencing, specific challenges, and operational details, providing a pathway for addressing concerns that could not be fully resolved within current timeframes.

## Regional Group Positions and Dynamics

### African Group Perspectives

Nigeria’s intervention on behalf of the African Group connected cyber governance to broader development goals, arguing for “securing a safe cyber space, bearing in mind the trajectory of digitalisation that several African states are pursuing in support of their sustainable development aspiration.” This framing broadened the discussion beyond traditional security concerns to encompass economic and social dimensions.

### Arab Group Concerns

Tunisia’s representation of the Arab Group consistently emphasised sovereignty and legal framework issues, reflecting regional experiences with conflict and external interference. The group’s positions on international law, stakeholder participation, and threat assessment all reflected concerns about maintaining state control over cyber governance processes.

### Flexibility and Compromise Efforts

Several delegations demonstrated willingness to be flexible for consensus achievement. Thailand expressed appreciation for the Chair’s efforts whilst indicating flexibility for consensus-based outcomes. Indonesia supported the proposed structure guided by the spirit of consensus, whilst Colombia offered specific language proposals whilst maintaining substantive priorities.

## Assessment and Conclusion

The sixth meeting revealed both the possibilities and limitations of multilateral cyber governance negotiations. Whilst significant progress was achieved in identifying areas of consensus, particularly around capacity building and the basic structure of a permanent mechanism, fundamental disagreements on international law, stakeholder participation, and threat assessment approaches remained unresolved.

The discussion demonstrated the complex interplay between technical governance questions and broader geopolitical considerations, with regional security experiences, development priorities, and sovereignty concerns all influencing positions on seemingly procedural issues. The Chair’s philosophical framing of the negotiations as part of a longer journey toward international cooperation provided important context for understanding both the achievements and limitations of the current process.

The intensive negotiations scheduled for the following day would determine whether the flexibility demonstrated by several delegations could overcome the fundamental disagreements expressed by key regional groups. The success or failure of achieving consensus would have significant implications not only for cyber governance but for broader questions about the effectiveness of multilateral diplomacy in addressing complex global challenges.

The meeting ultimately highlighted both the necessity and difficulty of achieving inclusive global governance frameworks that can accommodate diverse national interests, regional experiences, and development priorities whilst maintaining effectiveness in addressing shared security challenges in cyberspace.

Chair: Good morning, Distinguished Delegates. The sixth meeting of the 11th Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICT Technologies is now called to order. Distinguished Delegates, dear friends, we’ll continue our discussion under Agenda Item 5, and in accordance with our program of work, we will begin the second reading of Negotiations on the Draft Final Report. Now, before we proceed, I wanted to make some comments of a general nature. First of all, I want to extend my sincere apologies to all of you for having circulated the Draft Final Report much later than I had anticipated and hoped. I know that the email with my letter and the Draft Final Report went out quite late, and I hope that this has not disrupted your normal sleep patterns. And I hope also that you’ve had some time to look at it, albeit very quickly, given that we are meeting this morning. I don’t intend to present to you or explain to you in detail the Draft Final Report by explaining each and every revision that has been made. But I do want to make some general comments. First of all, having listened to all of you, many of you have said that it is important to streamline the report. And so that is what I’ve tried to do. We’ve cut… down the draft final report from about 45 pages to 28 pages, which is a streamlining of more than one-third of the original Web 1 document, not only in terms of pages but also in terms of words and text. Second, the streamlining is just one aspect of this draft final report. The most important aspect is striking and overall balance of elements. This has been one of the most challenging reports to prepare, much more challenging than the previous annual progress reports because of, first of all, the differences of views but also the differences in the levels of expectations of what each one of you wanted to see in the draft final report. I’ve done my best to capture as many different ideas as possible in a most factual way possible without prejudice to the position of any state. I’ve also tried to include all the elements needed in my view to achieve an overall text that is balanced. Over the last few days, I’ve listened very carefully to the statements that have been made here, the inputs that have been submitted to me in writing and to the Secretariat. I’ve also spoken to many of you. formally in the corridors, over coffee, over sandwiches, informal consultations. And I’ve done my best to reflect as many elements as possible that you have given me while attempting to maintain an overall balance of elements. The third thing I wanted to say is that in looking at this final report, I would urge you to look at it in totality in the sense that this final report is not the ultimate outcome of this OEWG. This report builds on three annual progress reports which were adopted by consensus. So the three annual progress reports that we have adopted in the past three years also represent outcomes, captured in different ways. And it’s there, it’s there for posterity, it’s there as a package. So as we seek to make this smooth and seamless transition to the future permanent mechanism, we are not just moving forward with one final report, but we are moving forward with a package of reports. So that is my plea to you to also look at this final report in the totality of all the outcomes that has been achieved in this process. Now, having said that, this is my next point. I know that quite a number of you will be disappointed that we have not gone far enough in certain areas. Let me say that I share your disappointment as someone who has been involved in this process for some time. I, too, had hopes and aspirations for this process to go as far as possible. I did my best to push and encourage each one of you to push each other, but to collectively push forward. But we have to push in a balanced way. So I, too, have some disappointment that we could not go far in every aspect where I thought it was possible and feasible. But for the sake of balance and producing a balanced outcome, we have to streamline the text, and we have to prioritize, and we have to be pragmatic, knowing that this process will continue, and knowing, most importantly, that the final outcome document will lay the foundation for a smooth and seamless transition that opens the pathway ahead for all of us to continue this incredibly important process of conversation, building trust, building confidence. So this final report should not be seen as the end of a process, but rather as the beginning of a whole new process. And in order to begin a whole new process, we need this draft final report. So much as you may be disappointed, take heart in the fact that we have a long pathway ahead, but in order to walk that long pathway ahead, we need to take a single step forward. We had our first meeting, I think it was the district representative of China who said that a journey of 1,000 miles begins with a single step. I’m not suggesting by any means that we have made a journey of 1,000 miles, but what we have done is thicken several steps, and each step takes us forward to that destination which we aspire to go to. And incidentally, I would say, this journey of 1,000 miles, which began in San Francisco in 1945, when representatives of 50 countries gathered to sign a document called the U.N. Charter, is a journey that still goes on after 80 years. So the OEWG’s process over the last five years is a very, very small journey. It’s part of a larger journey that we make as nations, as we, the people, to go to a better future, to a better place for our people and for our countries. So the point that I’m trying to make is that we have made some important steps. We may not have gone as far as we would like collectively, or we may not have gone as far as each of you would have liked to see, but we are making a step forward. And I think we will make a step forward if we are able to adopt a report this week. So look at this report as laying the foundation to continue this journey of 1,000 miles. for which many more steps remain. The other important point that I think is we need to keep in mind, as you look at the report, and as you look at whether the report accords with your national positions, your instructions from capital, what your bosses have told you must be there. Otherwise, you cannot return to capital, for example. I mean, all those are important. But keep also in mind that everyone needs to go back to their capitals. Have empathy for your neighbors and friends in this process, because they, too, have concerns. They, too, have aspirations. And everyone needs to have a sense of ownership, a sense of collective ownership of the text. So if there are some things that you see that you do not like, perhaps what you do not like is possibly the element that is very critical for another delegation or group of delegation. So through these mosaic of paragraphs and text, we are trying to give everyone a sense of ownership, a collective sense of ownership in the text and in the outcome document. Because ultimately, this outcome document, draft final report, is something that has come out of this process, that needs to be owned by this process, and that needs to be taken forward by all of you. The next point I’ll make is that this draft final report that I’ve prepared, in my assessment, offers us a pathway towards consensus adoption. And I think a consensus adoption of the draft. final report is not only visible, it is possible, it is feasible, it is eminently achievable. My intention is to listen to you today, hear your reactions to this draft final report, hear your views. I know you may not have had the time to have thorough internal discussions or cross-regional discussions or group coordinations, so I concede that. So any views expressed at this stage is probably preliminary in nature, that is entirely reasonable, but I will open the floor after my general remarks to hear any reactions there might be, even if it is of a preliminary nature. But if your views are more than preliminary and you love the text and you would like to proceed to adoption, let me know too. Don’t conceal your affection for what you see. And of course, if you don’t like what you see, then say so as well. Don’t suppress your feelings either, because we are looking for something that is collectively owned, collectively understood, understood in terms of its imperfections, but also understood in terms of what gives each one of you the sense that perhaps you can live with this. Now, after having heard from you this morning, we will of course resume. this afternoon at 3 p.m. to continue hearing views, but we need to keep in mind the fact that our schedule of work will have to be completed tomorrow. That is not in doubt. And because of the financial austerity measures taken by the UN, there will be no possibility to meet beyond 6 p.m. So the curtain will have to come down tomorrow. In fact, this week we had to cut down meeting times. One session had to be given up because of financial austerity measures. So I wanted to make that also clear that the reality of not just the microphone being cut off, but also the meeting as a whole being cut off by Friday 6 p.m. is a very real one. But my own sense is that we don’t need to go to the wire, I hope, but that depends on you. And so my intention is to put forward a CRP conference room paper. That’s the UN terminology for a document that is circulated for the purposes of a specific meeting. So what I have circulated yesterday evening is a draft final report issued by me in my capacity as chair with a cover letter from me. But this evening, it is my intention to transform that document, that revised draft, into a conference room paper this evening. And then tomorrow morning, it’s my intention to intention to put forward the CRP for adoption at the meeting of the Open-Ended Working Group. And then we’ll take it from there. So my friends, thank you very much for your time. I wanted to make these general remarks at this stage. If delegations are ready to speak at this point, fine, but I don’t want to coerce anyone into making statements. If you think you’re not ready to speak yet, fine. We can adjourn and we can meet again this afternoon. I give the floor to Egypt.

Egypt: Thank you, Chairperson. We’re not taking the floor yet to comment on the report. We will do that later this morning or in the afternoon. It’s rather a point of clarification than a point of order. We know that you had a busier and more eventful night than anyone in this room. We commend you for the efforts you do. Our trust in your leadership continues to be unwavering, and for these reasons we never took the liberty to discuss any aspects related to the organization of work. However, since we are at the beginning of the final stretch, and particularly due to the austerity considerations that Your Excellency spoke about at 6 p.m. tomorrow, the microphone will be cut off on both the Chair and the Member States. We are wondering whether the Chair has the intention or the openness to shift into a more informal and or closed mood of discussion. In our view, we believe that would be very useful at this stage while we continue to have trust in your wise discretion. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Egypt. The comments are pertinent but premature. It’s premature in the sense that we have more than a day ahead of us. And this working group has, over the last three years, adopted a report within the allocated time. In the first year, we adopted the annual progress report in the morning at 11 a.m. on a Friday. The afternoon was free for delegations to experience the joys of New York City. So, it’s entirely possible and feasible. My intention is very clear. I intend to put forward the document for adoption tomorrow morning. And we’ll take it from there. We have the time needed to complete our work, in my view. Thank you, Egypt. I give the floor to Egypt. I give the floor to Malaysia to be followed by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Malaysia: Mr. Chair, Malaysia’s statement will focus on the revised version of Annex I. We are grateful for the Chair’s tireless efforts to ensure a permanent mechanism that is fit for purpose, seeking to reconcile divergent views on particular issues. While we are still reviewing the draft, allow us to share some preliminary views. With regard to the new proposed dedicated thematic group, DTG 1, we would like to better understand the scope of the specific challenges referred to, and how such challenges would be determined. by states ahead of the DTG’s meetings. This will be important in facilitating states’ substantive preparations, including the designation of relevant officials and experts. As to DTG 2, we appreciate the focus of this group on the important subject of capacity building, which many delegations have stressed as a cross-cutting element in ensuring the effective implementation of the framework of responsible state behavior, as well as appropriate balance in the overall structure of the Permanent Mechanism. We welcome the retention of language on the preparation of guiding questions for the DTG’s in paragraph 8. It may, however, be helpful to state that this would be done by the Chair of the Global or Permanent Mechanism, so as to avoid ambiguity vis-à-vis the facilitators of the DTG’s. Further, we recognize the value of the earlier paragraph 9, which has now been deleted, in our view the previous formulation provided a useful measure of clarity with regard to the selection and role of the facilitators of the DTG’s. In addition, as the terms Global Mechanism and Permanent Mechanism are used interchangeably in different sections of the Annex, we would recommend standardization in this regard. Mr. Chair, at this critical phase in our process, rest assured that Malaysia will continue to engage constructively with all delegations to achieve our shared goal of a single-track Permanent Mechanism. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Malaysia, for your statement. I won’t respond to the very specific questions addressed by each of the speakers. Perhaps I’ll listen to a few and then respond at a later stage. I give the floor now to the Islamic Republic of Iran, to be followed by China.

Islamic Republic of Iran: Thank you, Mr. Chair. We would like to express our sincere appreciation to you, your team, and the Secretariat for your efforts in preparing REV-2 of the final… report. We welcome the positive improvements introduced in various parts of the draft and recognize the progress made. In the interest of time, I will not elaborate on the positive points for now and concentrate on the main concerns of my delegation, which we believe should be reflected in the final report. The document is under consideration in my capital, and these are our preliminary comments on REV2. And Mr. Chair, I would like to mention that my delegation aligns itself with the statement that will be delivered later in the session on behalf of LMG. On the threat section, we are concerned that the current threat section does not fully capture the entire range of the threat landscape. As it overlooks a number of threats identified by a group of countries during the OEWG deliberations, the threat currently reflect relate primarily to one aspect of the group mandate, namely the security of ICT, while largely omitting the equally important dimension of security in the use of ICTs. In order to address this significant gap and to ensure a more balanced and comprehensive reflection of the OEWG mandate, our delegation has put forward a specific proposal, which is, I quote, to compile a list of threats identified by states during the OEWG process, which could serve as a useful reference for the work of the future permanent mechanism, end of quote. We strongly encourage that this proposal and the broader concern it seeks to address be appropriately reflected in the final report. With regard to paragraph 25 and 34F, we recommend the deletion of the reference to safeguards and oversight related to ICT intrusion capabilities. These specific measures have not been the subject of focused or inclusive discussion within the OEWG, and their inclusion. at this stage may therefore be considered premature. We believe that any such references should be based on thorough deliberation and broad consensus. On norm section, the development of new norms was explicitly identified as a priority in the mandate of the open-ended working group and set up in the resolution establishing the OEWG. In this context, the deletion of paragraphs 34R and 36 represents in our view a departure from the group’s agreed mandate. This is a matter of serious concern for our delegation. We therefore strongly urge that these two paragraphs be retained in the final report to ensure alignment with the OEWG mandate. On international law, since the outset of the open-ended working group, a group of countries and stakeholders have consistently advocated for the broad participation of stakeholders in both the OEWG and the future permanent mechanism, often underscoring that stakeholders are the owners and operators of the ICT environment. If stakeholders are to play such a central role in this space, it is important that their responsibilities also match the role. In this regard, our delegation has over the years repeatedly highlighted the lack of clarity regarding a stakeholder’s responsibility and has called for consideration for their role. The zero draft contained language addressing this point and we strongly encourage its inclusion once again in the final report. On capacity building, Mr. Chair, we are concerned about the revision to the capacity building section and request the retention of the language used in REV1 regarding the sponsorship program and UN voluntary fund. On future permanent mechanism, you rightly emphasized this week that the elements of the future mechanism should be determined by consensus within the OEWG by the end of this week. And the deferring these decisions to the future permanent mechanism. mechanism itself is not an option. We share this view and therefore believe that the decision-making process being the most critical element of the future mechanism should not be left vague as this could significantly undermine its effectiveness. In this regard, we strongly encourage that Annex I explicitly specify that decision within the future mechanism will be taken by consensus. The principle is especially important concerning the establishment of the ad hoc thematic groups referenced in Paragraph 11. Accordingly, we urge that the final report as reflected in Ramp 1 clearly state that such groups will be established by consensus. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you, Islamic Republic of Iran. China to be followed by Vietnam.

China: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you and your team for the hard work for preparing the latest version of the text. To be honest, we received the text way earlier than I expected. So, Mr. Chair, your work is hard, but also your work has been very efficient. I have noticed that your team are wearing very nice traditional costume. You know, in China, the color of red represents party elements, happiness. I thought probably you would be in such costume tomorrow, but you are wearing this costume today. That shows to me your confidence about the prospect of the process. in the future. I hope that optimism manifested on the podium can also be reflected and also encouraging all the participants in the meeting room. Our negotiation is in the last stretch. Right now, I only want to focus on the most critical topics to China. First of all, paragraph 17 of the current text, the last sentence. China recommends to delete this sentence. If you took part in the meeting in February this year and if you listened to the conversation, very intensive conversation between me and the representative from the U.S., then you would understand how much this matter matters to China. As you said that if this sentence exists in the text, then it’s very difficult for me to go back and report to my capital. So my recommendation is to delete this sentence. And the second topic, which is my priority for today, is about the modalities for the participation of NGOs. When we discuss, or rather before that, before we discuss about that, we have to clarify some very basic but very important facts. First of all, NGO participation to us is an important supplement, but it is not something necessary or it is not a must. History has proven that even without NGO participation, we can still achieve important results. Previous GGE sessions did not have the participation of NGOs, but because of the collective efforts of the member states, we achieved the well-known 11 norms and they have shaped the current framework for responsible behavior. Secondly, besides the OEWG, NGOs have many platforms to discuss cyber and digital issues, such as the UN IGF. However, for member states, we only have OEWG. Having the issue of multi-stakeholder participation to hijack or even obstruct OEWG discussions is extremely unfair to member states. Thirdly, we believe that the vast majority of NGOs or multi-stakeholder groups are non-political professional organizations. However, it is regrettable that we have noticed that some NGOs actually have become tools for governments in spreading disinformation so as to achieve their geopolitical objectives. This year, news reports shown that some multi-stakeholder groups even have been receiving direct funding from foreign governments. And helping serve their political interests. And some of these NGOs have also applied to participate in OEWG discussions. So as a principle, China welcomes the participation of multi-stakeholder groups. However, such participation is not unconditional. It must be premised on not undermining the rights of member states and must adhere to the rules jointly agreed upon by member states. Treating NGO participation as a matter of political correctness is a baseless bubble. Now it is time for us to burst this bubble. Mr. Chair, I want to make it clear that China cannot support the procedure in the current text. The essence is that after expressing objection, member states are not obliged to participate in the subsequent informal consultations. At the same time, I want to reiterate that China is willing to discuss with all parties in good faith and on the basis of safeguarding the rights and interests of member states so as to make appropriate revisions to the text in order to have a fairer resolution or rather solution. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, China, for your statement. Let me hear the views from others before I respond to any particular comment. But thank you for noticing that I’m wearing something bright. I thought no one might notice. Yeah, I’ll have to look for something brighter to wear tomorrow then. But yes, I do firmly believe that there’s no reason to be pessimistic about an outcome. But we cannot be naively optimistic either. At the UN, and I say this from experience and pardon the digression, we are all cautiously hopeful optimist, because if we are not cautiously hopeful optimists, we have no business to be here at the UN, which is an enterprise in bringing together 193 countries with very divergent viewpoints and instructions, not to mention officials in capital sometimes not entirely understanding what we do here. So we deal with capitals, we deal with our colleagues, and we deal with other delegations. One has to be optimistic, but the deep Singapore DNA in me also has trained me to be pragmatic, to be realistic, to focus on priorities. So not everything can be done in a single leap, and that probably is the reason for some of the streamlining, but we’ll come to that at the end after hearing all the comments. Let’s move to Vietnam to be followed by Thailand. Vietnam, please.

Viet Nam: Thank you, Mr. Chair. We would like to express our deep appreciation for the tireless efforts of you and your team in producing RAP2. The current draft, in our view, does try to reflect the discussion we have had so far. We would like to reiterate that Vietnam supports the adoption of the final report by consensus. While we reserve the right to have further comments on other parts of the report, at this stage, we would like to focus on one of the priorities of the future permanent mechanisms, that is capacity building. Mr. Chair, as highlighted in the intervention by member states, capacity building is a fundamental pillar for achieving an open, safe, secure, stable, accessible, peaceful, and interoperable ICT environment. This priority has received broad support from all member states. In this context, We believe the report should continue to reference all proposals and initiatives put forward by Member States on ICT capacity building. In particular, Vietnam would like to see the initiative co-sponsored by Latvia, Vietnam and the Philippines on establishing a dedicated, impartial and solution-oriented platform to conduct research and capacity building activities on ICT security and resilience, especially in support of UN members with limited ICT security capabilities, reintroduced in paragraph 35, subparagraph G of the report. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you, Vietnam. I was just looking at the paragraph that you referred to, 35 G. Are you suggesting a modification by including an addition to your proposal? Is that correct?

Viet Nam: Yes, Mr. Chair. Basically, we just reinstated this paragraph from the language that we have from the RAP1.

Chair: Thank you, Vietnam. Thailand to be followed by Nigeria speaking on behalf of the African group. Thailand, please.

Thailand: Thank you, Mr. Chair. The Thai delegation wishes to express our sincere appreciation to you and your team for the preparation of RAP2 and for your continued dedication throughout the OEWG process. Thailand has consistently underscored the importance of establishing a new permanent mechanism. that serves to foster trust and confidence among states, strengthen resilience against evolving cyber threats, and provide needs-based capacity building, particularly on the effective implementation of norms and facilitate common understandings on how international law applies in cyberspace. We also believe that it is important to have dedicated thematic groups that will address our key priorities that require in-depth and inclusive dialogue. While we are pleased to see a focus on accelerating the delivery of ICT security capacity building, the issue of international law, given its technical and specialized nature, clearly merits such focused discussion. Throughout the whole EWG process, states have significantly deepened and developed their positions on the application of international law in cyberspace. We should continue our momentum to build common understandings in this area, which is essential for fostering trust and confidence and for upholding international peace and security. Having said that, we recognize the complexity of achieving consensus on a text that reflects the diverse views held by member states. While we wish to include certain elements, such as the areas of convergence of views on international law in paragraph 41 and threats from advanced persistent threats in paragraph 24, in the spirit of consensus, Chair, Thailand can exercise flexibility and is prepared to support the current draft. We hope that other member states will also exercise utmost flexibility for us to transition smoothly into the future permanent mechanism. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Thailand, for your statement. And thank you very much for demonstrating flexibility as well. I appreciate your contribution. I give the floor now to Nigeria, speaking for the African group, to be followed by Tunisia, speaking for the Arab group. Nigeria, please.

Nigeria: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I wish to deliver this statement on behalf of the African group. The African group wishes to express its continued support for the ongoing process and keen interest to conclude with the successful adoption of a fourth annual progress report that brings us closer to a seamless transition for the current open-ended working group to the future permanent mechanism. As for the review of the report, the African group wishes to share the following observations. First, the group underscores the importance of addressing the risk and threat associated with the malicious use of ICT in a manner that equally treats the interests and national priority of all involved states with the aim of securing a safe interperambular cyber space, bearing in mind the trajectory of digitalization that several African states are pursuing in support of their sustainable development aspiration. We are concerned with the overemphasis of threats to critical infrastructure and CII throughout the report and would like to reiterate that the discussion on threats should be balanced to take into consideration other threats to ICT security as expressed by various delegations. Second, the group supports the proposed dedicated thematic group on capacity building. We wish to also express our support to paragraph 15. 68 for the future permanent mechanism to continue discussions on the initial report prepared by the UN Secretariat, outline a proposal for the development and operationalization of a UN voluntary fund to support capacity building, and we request concrete steps to be taken for its operationalization. Third, the position of the African group has been steadfast and clear on the priority it directs to the issue related to the application of international law on cyberspace. Accordingly, the group is truly disappointed from the removal of the dedicated thematic group on international law and the proposed structure of the future permanent mechanism. This not only risks the loss of more than four years of discussion on issues of such importance, but it also risks tampering with elements and pillars of utmost importance for the African state as sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs. Accordingly, the African group steadfastly calls for the restitution of the dedicated thematic group of international law for the future permanent mechanism to be faithfully reflective of the voices in this open-ended working group over the past years. Fourth, the African group believes that inputs from various stakeholders, including civil society, academia, and the private sector, will know that had value to the discussion. As such, their engagement with the work of future permanent mechanism will not only enhance the discussion, but provide additional impetus. That said, the African group reiterates the intergovernmental and state-led nature of the current process as well. well as a prospective permanent mechanism, and thus cautious against the new proposal on BREF II, which might be counterproductive and have a detrimental impetus on the proceedings of such an important mechanism. In conclusion, and accordingly, it is most advisable to continue applying the current modality based on the non-objection basis solely that I’ve been successfully working on the open-ended working group process, while continuing discussion on possible options to enhance the participation of stakeholders in our proceedings, as well as on the satellite of the formal convening and during the intersessional periods. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Nigeria, for your statement on behalf of the African group. And please do share with me the text of your very important statement. Tunisia, to be followed by Indonesia.

Tunisia: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the floor. At the outset, the Arab group, who expresses its appreciation for your efforts and the efforts of your team during the previous years, and specifically during the current session, we look forward to a successful conclusion with the consensus and the seamless transformation to the permanent future mechanism. This is because the Arab group attaches high importance to ICT security, and especially to achieve SDGs. In this context, we would like to mention the establishment of the ministerial council for security. for cyber security in the Arab League and the current work to operationalize this council in full. With regards to REV2, the Arab group would like to mention the following points. First, the group supports the fact that the future mechanism would be a single track under the umbrella of the United Nations, with the importance that the decision-making would be consensus-based and would be built on the work of the current OEWG. Second, the Arab group appreciates the value of the participation of stakeholders in the discussions on ICT security because of their expertise in the realm of multilateralism. However, we find that it is appropriate to maintain the current modalities based on the no-objection procedure. And we are cautious about the new proceedings proposed. And we should provide the space for the future chair of the mechanism to allow stakeholders to participate in this connection. We reiterate the need to commit to only the no-objection rule for the participation of stakeholders and to guarantee the participation of parties that enjoy consultative status with the ECOSOC. Next, we believe we should address the threats in a balanced manner, taking into consideration the different threats that face different regions. be equitable in this manner and give due consideration to threats facing critical infrastructure and address issues such as ransomware and the attacks that target institutions and national bodies as well as misinformation and targeting of individuals, et cetera. The group dedicated to this topic must be inclusive and must guarantee respect of states and their sovereignty and non-interference. Fourth, the priority of capacity building enjoys our endorsement and it must continue and must be cross-cutting with all other dedicated thematic groups and discuss knowledge transfer as well and here we welcome the dedicated group for this manner within the future mechanism. However, we find it strange that there are no clear procedures to operationalize the trust fund and we warn of the impact of this and we call here to add specific text on this topic. Fifth and finally, the issue of the applicability of international law in cyberspace enjoys importance and agreement in the Arab group, especially in light of the developments in our region which add an additional important dimension to the issue of the applicability of law in cyberspace, especially as regards to sovereignty and the applicability of the issue of the use of force and the non-interference in state domain. domestic affairs, and states’ right to defend their territory against cyber attacks. In this connection, the Arab Group position is firm in this regard, that an independent thematic group must be dedicated to the applicability of international law in cyberspace without committing to a specific product or predetermined results. and to base such a group on the framework for state responsibility. Accordingly, the Rev. 2, as it currently has deleted this part, does not give due consideration to our group’s position, and therefore we call for a return to the original text which has provided for three thematic groups. Thank you very much.

Chair: Thank you very much Tunisia, speaking on behalf of the Arab Group. Thank you for your statement and I hope you can also share with me the English text if you have one with my delegation. Indonesia to be followed by Mexico.

Indonesia: Thank you, Mr. Chair. First and foremost, Mr. Chair, Indonesia would like to extend our highest appreciation to you and your team for your hard work in producing the Rev. 2 within a very brief time frame. For our delegation, the Rev. 2 represents a constructive middle ground, one that serves as a solid basis for moving forward. Mr. Chair, in this regard, allow us to offer our brief reflections on Rev. 2. First, Indonesia appreciates the retention of key elements that reinforce capacity building as a foundational pillar of our cooperation, including but not limited to the recommendation to establish a dedicated global ICT security cooperation and capacity building portal, as outlined in paragraph 56. The stand-alone dedicated thematic group, too, on the five pillars of the framework to accelerate the delivery of ICT security capacity building will pave the way for fostering more tailored, demand-driven, and result-oriented capacity building efforts, which in turn will bridge existing digital divides. Second, Indonesia welcomes further deliberations on international law, including the possibility of developing a legally binding instrument. We appreciate the Chair’s wisdom in navigating various proposals to produce a balanced outcome, including on this matter. Guided by the spirit of consensus, our delegation is willing to exercise our flexibility to the proposed dedicated thematic groups, as outlined in URF 2. Third, the last one, Indonesia values stakeholders’ participation in the future permanent mechanism. Their perspective can provide better insights on the current cyber landscape. In this regard, we are of the view that the participation of any stakeholders in the future permanent mechanism should be in conformity with existing established mechanism and the spirit, purposes, and the principles of the UN Charter. Mr. Chair, we view that the URF 2.0 is not an overnight work, but as a culmination of our collective dedication. dialogue, and hard work over the past five years. Therefore, rest assured of Indonesia’s continued commitment towards a consensus-based outcome that reflects our shared principles and aspiration. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Indonesia, for your statement and also your willingness to look at the document in a constructive way. I give the floor to Mexico, to be followed by Ghana.

Mexico: Thank you, Chair. This statement is being delivered on behalf of a group of countries of Latin America who are committed to a constructive outcome from this OEWG. We appreciate this opportunity to present our considerations and reflections on the draft final report, and we reiterate our willingness to continue contributing to the negotiating process with a view to achieving a mechanism that reflects the interests and concerns of all member states. We are pleased to see the maintenance of Cluster 2 regarding accelerating the delivery of ICT security capacity building. We believe that this approach should not be limited solely to delivery of capacity. Rather, it is essential that the approach be complete and comprehensive, encompassing the stages of identification, planning, delivery, and operationalization of capacities. In this way, it will be possible to ensure that the assistance provided is sustainable and effective over the long term, tailored to the specific needs of the countries, and associated with continuous monitoring to ensure its real impact. In paragraph 8, section B. We consider it relevant not to limit the discussions focused on building capacities only to needs. The exercise must be broader than this and allow for a real process of much matchmaking, which loops in not only the needs of the countries, but also involves the country’s available capacity and available resources. This will ensure that assistance is better aligned with national and regional contexts, enabling more effective and sustainable cooperation. As regards the modalities of the dedicated thematic groups that are mentioned in paragraph 10, and considering also the need to ensure the full inclusion of delegations not only to attend the deliberations, but to actively participate in them, we reiterate that it should be specified that all meetings should have simultaneous interpretation services in all of the official languages of the United Nations. This is essential to ensure that all delegations can participate equitably regardless of their proficiency in the official languages of the United Nations. At the end of the paragraph it states that hybrid meetings shall be considered informal meetings and this actually could lead to a misinterpretation, namely the notion that the Secretariat does not need to include this requirement in programme planning, but actually this would impact the inclusivity of the process. And we reiterate our commitment to continue contributing to the process constructively. In this regard, we will send a concrete language proposal to you shortly for consideration by your team chair. We thank you for your attention and we look forward to continuing to work together. towards a truly effective and inclusive mechanism. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much Mexico for your comments and your willingness to look at the text constructively. Ghana to be followed by Egypt.

Ghana: Thank you Mr Chair. We would first like to express our sincere appreciation to you and your team for your tireless efforts in preparing the second revised draft. Ghana aligns itself with the statements delivered on behalf of the African group and we wish to make the following remarks in our national capacity. Mr Chair, we welcome and truly appreciate the inclusion of the concept of security by design as highlighted in paragraph 23. We also take note of its further reinforcement in paragraph 34G which we view as a positive step in mainstreaming this approach. In addition, we commend the emphasis placed on strengthening cooperation between computer emergency response teams and computer security incidents response teams as reflected in paragraph 29. With respect to section D on international law, my delegation has observed that paragraph 43 does not include scenario-based discussions. We wish to reiterate the value of such exercises which foster practical learning and promote the effective application of legal and normative frameworks and in this regard, we propose the inclusion of scenario-based exercises as a core element in capacity building activities and encourage its reflection in paragraph 43 subparagraph DI. In paragraph 53, we also see merit in recognizing the women in cyber fellowship as a meaningful initiative for capacity building and we would support its integration into the text to highlight the importance of inclusivity and gender responsive approaches in our work. Mr Chair, regarding the section on regular institutional dialogue, my delegation has noted with some concern the reduction in the number of dedicated thematic groupings. The current draft does not appear to provide sufficient clarity on how the various focus areas will be discussed and effectively distributed within the allocated time frame, nor does it clearly outline how each thematic pillar would be given adequate attention and priority. As a possible way forward and in the spirit of constructing engagement, we would propose considering either a clearer framework for the internal distribution of time among the focus areas or the restoration of the previously proposed groupings in the earlier drafts in order to ensure that all substantive pillars receive the depth of discussion they require. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much. Before we go to the next speakers, I was just looking at the time, yeah, but thank you very much Gana for your statement. We have a few more speakers and of course I intend to wrap up at one o’clock so that you can go back and continue your internal discussions, but I’m very happy to take preliminary views as they come. Egypt to be followed by Turkey. Egypt, please.

Egypt: Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. Egypt is taking the floor to share its reaction to RAF 2 of the draft final report as circulated last night, and we align with the African and Arab group statements delivered earlier by Tunisia, by Nigeria and Tunisia. We recognize your efforts in producing the revised version, and we maintain our commitment of your constantly diligent and serious leadership. This delegation, similar to numerous other developing countries, has consistently been vocal in supporting your efforts and reiterating confidence in your leadership, and consequently has lent its broad support to your zero draft as well as the RAF 1. On this basis, and with a spirit of mutual respect and candor, we will not shy away from expressing our serious disappointment with the number of alterations that were introduced to the version at hand. Egypt deeply regrets the omission of a dedicated thematic group for discussions on the application of international law. We were disconcerted by the proposal to block this avenue and disappointed by the favorable response to it. The removal of a dedicated space for international law application deepens our fears of the mindset with which some states and groups approach the future permit mechanism with. And the interest to maintain and reinforce ambiguities and uncertainties that may make the cyber arena even less safe. Our experience with the systematic and repeated violations of international law, including international humanitarian law, in the Middle East, including through the use of ICT capabilities, naturally informs our views in this domain. The group on international law, along with the group on alleviating capacity building, were the source of balance vis-a-vis DTG1 and its everything, everywhere, all at once approach. With the balance tilted, we are deeply concerned that developing countries, without reservoirs of guidance, consultants, advisors, partnerships, and working papers, might be being drawn into a track where they are inherently disadvantaged and lagging behind. A situation where questioning any unfavorable aspects of the status quo or application of some of the most basic principles could be very challenging. The initial configuration adopted by the chair, and to which we contributed significantly, provided a balanced comfort zone and allowed us to deprioritize support to a pillars approach that mirrors the agenda items of the plenary. We urge you, Mr. Chairperson, to continue your efforts to address this gap. We are open to a free formulation of the dropped group to read, follow up to matters related to section C and D of the fourth report of the 2021-2025 open-ended working group as a possible compromise. Finally, on the modalities of stakeholders engagement, we maintain our conviction of the sufficiency of the existing modalities under the current OEWG and we do not see merits in the additional consultative layers that will overload the chairperson of the future payment mechanism without necessarily resolving any potential divergence of views. Chairperson, moving to the report itself, this delegation had minimal observations on REV.1 and thanks you for partially accommodating the few suggestions we put forward, particularly in paragraphs 14 and 22. We welcome the useful clarification at paragraph 33 under section C on the relationship between the respective obligations and existing or future norms. On the other hand, there are a number of revisions in this version that we are not in a position to support. The pervasive deletions in paragraph 38, which dismiss the simplest step of circulation of a non-exhaustive list of proposals comprised of four categories of proposals. The deletions in the chapel of paragraph 42 as they suppress factual capturing of actual discussions that took place on matters including state responsibility, due diligence, international humanitarian law and the possibility of additional legally binding obligations. The deletion of the former paragraph 43B that suggested how international law applies in the use of ICTs as it’s related to the specificities of the ICT environment could be discussed in the future payment mechanism. Finally, under the recommendations portion of section F on capacity building, we regret that the draft report is not taking concrete steps to operationalize the Voluntary Trust Fund. Without the UN Trust Fund and with their portal… Only confined to a modular approach that supports the FPM, developing countries are entering the post-OEWG era without meaningful and specific commitments to usher in transformative change in capacity building. The report needs, as a bare minimum, to recognize the need for a UN-led capacity building vehicle which is supported with sufficient, adequate, and predictable resources. In conclusion, we remain committed to constructively engage with a view of arriving at a reasonable, fair, and balanced landing zone, a future pyramid mechanism that does not lean again as the less advantaged and inherently more vulnerable. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Egypt, for your important statement and also for your very constructive approach. Please do share your statement not only with me but with all the delegations. Turkey to be followed by Republic of Korea.

Turkey: Thank you for your tireless and dedicated work for the preparation of the revised text. I would like to briefly express our views on the new version. Chair, Turkey supports the establishment of dedicated thematic groups as outlined in the final draft. We recognize the value of such cross-cutting, multi-actor mechanisms in advancing structured cooperation across the five established pillars, namely international law, norms, confidence building measures, capacity building, and regular institutional dialogue. However, Turkey underlines that the leadership and primacy of states must be preserved throughout these processes. Participation of non-governmental stakeholders should remain as appropriate on a voluntary and non-binding basis. and guided by principles of transparency and inclusivity, without compromising intergovernmental decision-making. We further stress that the thematic areas of focus for DTGs must remain aligned with the existing OEWG pillars. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you. Thank you very much, Turkey, for your statement and important contribution. Republic of Korea to be followed by Colombia.

Republic of Korea: Thank you, Chair. I would like to join other speakers in thanking you for your dedication. Chair, I mean, I understand your job is very difficult. No one, I think, in this room would envy your position right now. Chair, but regarding Paragraph 16 of Dress Section, you know, we note that you added could potentially to revise one. Chair, we’ve been very consistent in explaining the argument why we need, you know, the revised Version 1 language at least. I am compelled to request that could potentially should be deleted. Chair, I must say that this Dress Section is a very important part. In fact, this is the substance of our negotiation and this is the very reason why we are here and discussing the report. So, you know, as I said, we’ve been so consistent about rationale and I don’t see you and other member states want to hear the rationale again here. We’re such a, I mean, we do not have plenty of time for that. So I am just simply asking you to, you and other members to think about this part again because just one more thing, this part reads, you know, without could potentially, it only reads impact international peace and security. If I want the best for this part, it shouldn’t be just impact. It’s not just the impacting. It is a threat to international security and peace. So I think impact has already a various level, various degree of influence in it. So I think impact should at least, you know, reflect our government’s position and other members that I remember argument as well. So I would like to politely request again that could potentially should be deleted and at least we should go back to revised version one. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Republic of Korea. Your comments are well noted. Let’s continue to hear the views of other delegations as well, especially with regard to this specific point. Colombia, please.

Colombia: Thank you, Chair. In relation to the revised version of the final draft, we have the following remarks to share in relation to this section B, existing and potential threats. We welcome the incorporation of security by design paragraph three. We note the elimination. of the paragraph on AI security systems and on the importance of using ICTs in accordance with the framework of responsible behavior. These are important references, and so we suggest the following constructed language. Use of ICTs by states in a matter consistent with the framework of responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs, which includes voluntary norms, obligations under international law, and CBMs, fosters international peace and security, trust, and stability between states. In relation to norms, rules, and principles, we regret the removal of the checklist. This was an important outcome of this working group. However, we can be flexible with your proposal of considering it under a future mechanism. On the section on international law, we welcome paragraph 42 and the working group documents from the interregional working groups and their inclusion. On the section on capacity building, we note the removal of the paragraph on the mapping exercise on capacity building. We felt that this was fundamental and would contribute to the work of the future mechanism. We call for it to be reincorporated. In line with the proposal made yesterday by Brazil, we welcome the inclusion of the roundtable on capacity building. And finally, on the section on RID, regular institution dialogue, we note the elimination of the paragraph on the future mechanism and how this would facilitate operationalization and future development of all existing processes and previous processes. This reincorporating this is essential to ensure the sustainability and an adequate and smooth transition between the OEWG and the future mechanism. We call for it to be reincorporated as well. Chair, as regards the annex on the future mechanism, we wish to make the following brief remarks. On the thematic groups, we especially highlight and welcome the group on capacity building. As we have said numerous times, this is a priority for us and a future mechanism. Like the African and Arab groups and other delegations, we regret the removal of the group on international law. As we have stated, the applicability of international law to cyberspace considers to be a matter where we need to make progress in terms of common understanding. Including a group on this would help us apply the UN structure to these issues. As indicated by the delegation of Mexico on behalf of a group of countries, it’s fundamental for the thematic groups’ meetings to have simultaneous interpretation to facilitate an inclusive service, and so we view this inclusion favorably. Also, the changes to the periodicity of the meetings and the plenaries is understanding, but we should also include the fact that the regional group meetings can also add additional meetings as necessary. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Colombia, for your contribution and also for your very constructive approach. Friends, it’s almost 12.50 and I intend to adjourn at one o’clock so that we do not impose on the interpreters again. We might need their flexibility much later and the speakers list has grown to about more than 10 speakers, which is a good sign that people are ready to take the floor. But before we adjourn for this morning, I wanted to share some comments and also give some comments by way of reaction. First of all, thank you all very much for your very constructive tone, and your very constructive approach. As Chair, I would say mea culpa. All the errors of sins of commission and omission are entirely mine. Everything that you have seen in the text that has been deleted, but you wanted to retain it, those are errors of my omission. I’ve added elements in order to attain a balance. Those are errors of my commission. So mea maxima culpa. But I did that, as I explained, in order for us collectively to achieve an overall balance that will get us to consensus tomorrow. We need to be focused. We need to be pragmatic. We need to prioritize. That’s point number one. Number two, I think the series of comments that have been made so far relate to different specific paragraphs in the text. If it’s a question of a minor tweak that we can make as a way to adjust the balance and maintain consensus, I think that’s the kind of solutions we need to be looking at. In the context of the text, some of you have also asked for reinstating what has been deleted. And the reasons for the deletion of some of these proposals or wordings or errors of omission on my part are the result of very specific objections that have been conveyed to me. me. So in my judgment, and I’m willing to explain these to the delegations concerned, as to why a reinstatement of some of these very specific elements in the main part of the final report will meet with objection and may hinder consensus. But if there are fixes and improvements we can make, I’m open to it. I am not fixated with any particular crafting or wording. What I’m fixated is a consensus outcome tomorrow. That’s my single-minded focus at this point. So if you have solutions to suggest or fixes to suggest, better still, if you’re able to work out fixes that you think will not meet any objection, then please share them with me. Then cluster of comments relate to the annex, which is regular institution dialogue. And here the question of dedicated thematic groups has been mentioned by many of you. And of course, there’s no perfect solution. We started with five dedicated thematic groups. Then we went to four. Then we went to three. But there were so many different proposals and requests in terms of how we should slice and dice the dedicated thematic groups. The three that I put forward in the Rev. 1, not last night but before that, out of the three there were very strong red line objections to one of them. What am I to do with that? So we ended up with two, and for me too that has been a source of disappointment. And so I hear Egypt very well, I think they articulated their points very well, African group as well made this point. But the fact that we now have two dedicated thematic groups in the context of Annex C of the Future Permanent Mechanism, which would allow for a discussion on the different issues, gives us hope that all issues in the five pillars will be covered. I think there was a question from Malaysia right at the outset with regard to the first dedicated thematic group. And I wanted to explain first that the two dedicated thematic groups are crafted to make sure that they are cross-cutting and policy-oriented. That idea of cross-cutting and policy-oriented comes from Annex C of the last report. And Malaysia’s question was to address specific challenges, but what are these specific challenges? That’s a very good question and a fair question. But I would humbly submit that this opens the door to another conversation for you, all members. And each one of you and groups within this process can say that, for me, this is my specific challenge. But the question is, is that something that we need to address now before Friday, or is this something that the new mechanism can take up, maybe at the organizational session? And so I would humbly submit that the idea of a specific challenge has a focusing element so that we are differentiating the dedicated thematic group from the substantive plenary sessions, which will be of a general nature. And the idea of the dedicated thematic group is to go deeper, focusing on specific issues and specific challenges. So I see this as an opportunity for delegations to come before the new mechanism at the organizational session and to say, look, these are specific challenges for my group. It needs to be addressed. So it doesn’t prejudice anyone’s position, but it opens the door to a conversation. I welcome your desire for me to resolve all your problems, but I’m incapable of addressing all the issues that have been identified, let alone the issues that need to be identified for us to attain consensus. So I’m trying to disentangle the issues such that we focus on what we need to do now this week on Friday to attain consensus. Issues of sequencing, the number of meetings, all of that can be taken up in the new mechanism at the organizational session. And that will require some robust discussions as to how you sequence the discussions and what are the different issues or what might be the specific challenges, et cetera. So I wanted you to keep that in mind. And there were also quite a number of comments about the integrated policy and cross-cutting dedicated thematic group on capacity building. Again, this is an overarching title. And my understanding would be that every aspect of capacity building can be discussed in that dedicated thematic group. So if delegations feel that aspect A versus aspect X has not been addressed in this report, my sense is that the door is not closed to any issue. Likewise, for sequencing, whether it’s held which time of the year, when, et cetera, these are organizational issues for the global mechanism to address. And then finally, the cluster of issues relating to capacity building. I think quite a number of you are African group, Arab group. Again, I share the disappointment. There were a range of capacity building proposals. But also, many have said that we need to proceed in an incremental and step-by-step manner. And for those of you who have followed this process, you know that from day one, I’ve been the biggest advocate of capacity building. And I remain so. But we need to move in a way that brings everyone together. So from the main section. Several aspects were deleted, errors of omission on my part, but again with the aim to attain consensus. The last thing I wanted to address was NGO modalities. And perhaps at this point I’d like to ask the Secretary to plead with the interpreters to give me five more minutes, even though I hadn’t intended to do this. The NGO modalities is up to us to decide here in this working group. And I wanted to share with you that in the First Committee there are precedents where there are working groups with a range of modalities. There’s an open-ended working group on outer space put forward by the United Kingdom, Resolution 7820, which calls for a final decision to be made by the open-ended working group on participation. There was a Russian-proposed open-ended working group on outer space, which was silent on the question of modalities, thereby adhering to existing mechanisms in the UN system. And then there was also a decision put forward by Egypt, which convened a new open-ended working group, in which the decision was made, consideration on a non-objection basis, and to bring the list to the attention of the working group for a final decision. So we have three different options for a working group. that was set up by the first committee. And in some instances in the past, delegations, but these decisions were adopted by a vote. So I share with you the frustrations that have been expressed by you. I think China mentioned this, African group, Egypt, and a few others. I’m ready for anything that you can agree by consensus. And perhaps the delegations of Egypt, UK, and Russia could come together and think of some creative proposals on these modalities, learning from the experience of the previous example. But the modalities in this final report, I wanted to say, was the middle-of-the-road attempt on my part, given the views expressed by two very different viewpoints. On the one hand, Canada and Chile had put forward a proposal essentially calling for a decision by majority voting and rules of procedure of the General Assembly. This, too, has been adopted in different committees and by the General Assembly. On the other hand, we have the existing practice of the NGO committee that takes its decisions. But the proposal that I had put forward in the draft final report retains the right of countries to express an objection. It retains that. It is a modification of the modalities we adopted in April 2022. But it provides for that additional step of consultations by the chair. But the chair is obliged to do so. to bring it back if there is no consensus, but then it comes back to the working group for to the future permanent mechanism for a decision and we have decided on the decision-making modalities of the future permanent mechanism. In NXC, decision-making in the future permanent mechanism has been agreed as a modality. How that modality is going to be operationalized is something that has to be dealt with in the future permanent mechanism. So my dear friends, I appeal to you. The NGO issue or stakeholder issue has been on my shoulders for five years and for five years I’ve been cracking my head. If there’s a possibility to vote in this working group, let’s do it. Let’s vote on it. That has been the UN practice. But all of you and all of us have decided that we will work on a consensus basis. That’s the mandate of this working group 75-240, of this working group, of which I’m the chair. So I have to abide by consensus basis. And precisely because we are trying to establish consensus around modalities for stakeholder participation, we have to accept a modality that everyone can accept. So for some of you, what I have proposed in the draft final report is not adequate because other working groups in the first committee have gone further. So I’ll just leave you with this thought. Think about it over lunch and if you can reach out to each other and maybe Canada and Chile can also contribute to the discussion by talking to Egypt as well as the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom. And if you’re able to… suggest some very specific language. I’m happy to look at it, but I will need it this afternoon for the conference room paper. So thank you very much, my friends, for your patience. We have a list of speakers. We will continue with that. I wish you a pleasant lunch. The meeting is adjourned. Thank you.