cybersecurity

Summary

This transcript captures the final substantive session of the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on cybersecurity, featuring both a dedicated stakeholder session and member state discussions on establishing a future permanent mechanism for international ICT security. The session began with stakeholder presentations from 24 organizations, including civil society groups, think tanks, and private sector representatives, who emphasized the critical importance of meaningful multi-stakeholder participation in cybersecurity governance. Key stakeholder concerns included the need for stronger human rights protections in cyberspace, better implementation of existing norms rather than creating new ones, and avoiding duplication of existing capacity-building initiatives.

Member states then engaged in discussions covering norms of responsible state behavior, international law application in cyberspace, confidence-building measures, and capacity building. There was notable convergence on the importance of capacity building for developing countries, with many delegations supporting proposals for global portals, sponsorship programs, and technical assistance initiatives. However, significant divergences emerged regarding the structure of the future permanent mechanism, particularly around the establishment of dedicated thematic groups and stakeholder participation modalities. Some delegations favored cross-cutting, action-oriented thematic groups as proposed by France, while others preferred pillar-based approaches or expressed concerns about resource implications.

The Chair acknowledged both the strong commitment from all delegations to reach consensus and the challenging matrix of competing proposals and counter-proposals. Despite time constraints due to UN budget cuts affecting meeting services, the Chair expressed optimism about finding a “narrow path” toward consensus. The session concluded with plans to produce a revised draft (REV2) by evening, followed by further negotiations leading to a final conference room paper for adoption on Friday, representing a critical test for multilateral cooperation in cybersecurity governance.

Keypoints

## Major Discussion Points:

– **Stakeholder Participation and Modalities**: Extensive debate over how civil society, NGOs, academia, and other stakeholders should participate in the future permanent mechanism, with strong support for meaningful inclusion but disagreements over accreditation processes and the extent of participation

– **Structure of Future Permanent Mechanism**: Significant discussion about establishing dedicated thematic groups (DTGs) with debate between cross-cutting action-oriented groups versus pillar-specific groups, particularly around international law, capacity building, and confidence-building measures

– **International Law Application in Cyberspace**: Ongoing tensions over how to reflect discussions on international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law in the final report, with some delegations wanting stronger language while others prefer more cautious approaches

– **Capacity Building as Cross-Cutting Priority**: Strong consensus that capacity building is fundamental and should be treated as a cross-cutting issue rather than siloed, with particular emphasis on supporting developing countries and avoiding duplication of existing initiatives

– **Financial Constraints and UN Crisis**: The Chair’s revelation that the OEWG faces unprecedented 10% cuts in meeting time due to UN financial crisis caused by non-payment of dues, highlighting broader challenges facing multilateral cooperation

## Overall Purpose:

The discussion aimed to finalize the Open-Ended Working Group’s report and establish a framework for transitioning to a future permanent mechanism on ICT security. The session focused on reaching consensus on outstanding issues across all pillars of responsible state behavior in cyberspace while ensuring continuity and avoiding regression from previous achievements.

## Overall Tone:

The discussion began with a constructive and collaborative tone, with stakeholders and member states expressing strong commitment to reaching consensus. However, the tone became more urgent and somewhat strained as time constraints became apparent, culminating in the Chair’s emotional explanation of the financial pressures facing the UN. Despite these challenges, the Chair maintained an encouraging tone, emphasizing the “narrow path” toward consensus while acknowledging the difficult compromises required. The session ended on a cautiously optimistic note, with the Chair expressing confidence that an outcome was achievable through flexibility and pragmatism.

Speakers

**Speakers from the provided list:**

– **Chair** – Session moderator and leader of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG)

– **Access Now** – International civil society organization focusing on digital security and defending digital rights of vulnerable individuals and communities (represented by Ramanjit Singh Cheema)

– **German Council on Foreign Relations** – Research organization (represented by Valentin Weber, senior research fellow)

– **Safe PC Solutions** – Organization focused on cybersecurity awareness training

– **Academia Mexicana de Ciberseguridad y Derecho Digital** – Mexican Academy of Cybersecurity and Digital Law

– **Crest International** – Non-profit organization building trust in the digital world by raising standards in the cyber security industry

– **Center for Humanitarian Dialogue** – Organization focused on humanitarian dialogue and conflict resolution

– **Red on Defensa de los Derechos Digital** – Mexican organization defending digital rights (represented by Francia Preta-Santa Baldassa)

– **Alliance of NGOs on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice** – Umbrella organization coordinating civil engagement with crime and justice mandates

– **European Union Institute for Security Studies** – Research institute focused on security studies

– **Wright pilot** – Jordanian organization (represented by Abdullah bin Hussain)

– **Hitachi America** – Private company providing critical infrastructure solutions

– **Arab Association of Cybersecurity** – Regional cybersecurity organization

– **Center of Excellence for National Security** – Think tank organization

– **Nuclear Age Peace Foundation** – Youth initiative organization (represented by Lydia Peavy, youth activist)

– **Youth for Privacy** – Youth organization (represented by J1 Choi, 16-year-old representative)

– **Fundación Karisma** – Colombian organization working for digital rights promotion

– **First ORG. INC** – Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams with over 800 members from 113 economies

– **Global Cyber Alliance** – Not-for-profit organization working to improve internet security (represented by Chris Painter, Strategic Advisor)

– **Women in cybersecurity Middle East** – Regional movement uniting over 3,000 women across 22 Arab countries

– **Global Partners Digital** – Human rights organization focusing on governance of digital technologies

– **Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik** – German Institute for International and Security Affairs (think-tank)

– **ICRC** – International Committee of the Red Cross

– **Interpol** – International police organization

– **El Salvador** – Country delegation

– **Switzerland** – Country delegation

– **Paraguay** – Country delegation

– **Mauritius** – Country delegation

– **South Africa** – Country delegation

– **Australia** – Country delegation

– **Republic of Korea** – Country delegation

– **Latvia** – Country delegation

– **Cuba** – Country delegation

– **Tunisia** – Country delegation

– **Kingdom of the Netherlands** – Country delegation

– **Dominican Republic** – Country delegation

– **Italy** – Country delegation

– **Sweden** – Country delegation

– **Zimbabwe** – Country delegation

– **United Kingdom** – Country delegation

– **Colombia** – Country delegation

– **Ghana** – Country delegation

– **Uruguay** – Country delegation

– **Ukraine** – Country delegation

– **Cameroon** – Country delegation

– **Viet Nam** – Country delegation representing a cross-regional group of states

– **Russian Federation** – Country delegation

– **Czechia** – Country delegation

– **Guatemala** – Country delegation

– **Belarus** – Country delegation

– **Costa Rica** – Country delegation

– **New Zealand** – Country delegation

– **India** – Country delegation

– **Nigeria** – Country delegation

– **Albania** – Country delegation

– **Djibouti** – Country delegation

**Additional speakers:**

None – all speakers mentioned in the transcript were included in the provided speakers names list.

# Report: Final Substantive Session of the UN Open-Ended Working Group on Cybersecurity

## Executive Summary

This report documents the final substantive session of the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on cybersecurity, which featured a stakeholder session followed by member state discussions on establishing a future permanent mechanism for international ICT security. The session highlighted both areas of consensus and significant disagreements on implementation approaches.

The stakeholder session included presentations from civil society groups, think tanks, and private sector representatives who emphasized the importance of multi-stakeholder participation, human rights protections in cyberspace, and implementation of existing norms rather than creating new ones. Youth representatives made particularly assertive interventions calling for systematic embedding as valid stakeholders.

Member state discussions covered norms of responsible state behavior, international law application in cyberspace, confidence-building measures, and capacity building. While notable agreement emerged on the importance of capacity building for developing countries and the applicability of international law to cyberspace, significant disagreements persisted regarding stakeholder participation modalities and the structure of thematic groups in the future permanent mechanism.

The Chair acknowledged the UN’s financial crisis, which resulted in 10% cuts in meeting time due to non-payment of dues by some member states. Despite what the Chair described as a “matrix of divergences,” the session concluded with the Chair expressing confidence that consensus could be reached through flexibility and pragmatism.

## Stakeholder Session

### Human Rights and Digital Rights Organizations

Access Now, represented by Ramanjit Singh Cheema, opened by challenging delegates to see themselves “not only as diplomats, but as stewards” with a duty to “leave things better than how you found it.” The organization called for addressing commercial spyware targeting civilians and emphasized that stakeholder modalities should be improved to avoid “locking into politics.” They requested that international human rights law be explicitly referenced in the main body text of the final report.

The Red on Defensa de los Derechos Digital, represented by Francia Preta-Santa Baldassa, emphasized incorporating regional perspectives, particularly Latin American human rights interpretations, arguing that regional perspectives must be integrated into global frameworks.

Global Partners Digital stated that human rights impacts of cyber incidents require multi-stakeholder collaboration frameworks, arguing that the interconnected nature of cyber threats necessitates inclusive approaches.

### Youth Representatives

The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, represented by youth activist Lydia Peavy, argued that “youth engagement is crucial as digital natives who understand technology impacts on society,” emphasizing that young people should be recognized as co-creators given their lived experience with digital technologies.

Youth for Privacy, represented by 16-year-old J1 Choi, declared that “children and youth must be systematically embedded as valid stakeholders with fundamental rights,” arguing that youth participation should be understood as an inalienable right rather than optional consultation.

### Technical Expertise and Private Sector

The German Council on Foreign Relations, represented by Valentin Weber, highlighted the quantum computing threat, noting that “quantum computing presents a foreseeable threat requiring urgent post-quantum cryptographic solutions.” Weber quoted Elvis Presley: “As Elvis Presley said, a little less conversation, a little more action. A little more bite, and a little less bark. A little less fight, and a little more spark.” The Chair noted that this comment brought “music into our lives” and a “positive tone.”

Safe PC Solutions emphasized that “generative AI and quantum computing need specific governance frameworks,” highlighting how emerging technologies introduce new vectors for disinformation and automated cyber attacks.

Crest International argued that “international standards are preferable to variable national standards for supply chain security.” Hitachi America noted that “the private sector can contribute to updating threats and applying norm checklists across sectors.”

The Global Cyber Alliance, represented by Chris Painter, emphasized that “existing effective mechanisms should be scaled rather than duplicated.”

### Regional and Other Perspectives

The Arab Association of Cybersecurity emphasized that “women’s meaningful participation must be promoted in capacity building initiatives.” Women in Cybersecurity Middle East noted their success in uniting “over 3,000 women across 22 Arab countries.”

Interpol emphasized that “criminal misuse of ICTs poses significant threats to essential services requiring collective action” and that “sophisticated criminal networks using advanced techniques like deepfakes target global infrastructure.”

## Member State Discussions

### Norms of Responsible State Behaviour

El Salvador emphasized that “the voluntary nature of norms and complementarity with international law must be recognised.” Mauritius noted that “whole-of-government approaches are essential for effective norm implementation” and that “critical infrastructure designation remains a sovereign prerogative requiring national frameworks.”

The Dominican Republic emphasized that “practical measures and good practices are needed for norm operationalisation,” while South Africa noted that “norm implementation requires specific capacity building to address gaps.”

Australia suggested that “templates for assistance requests should be voluntary and clearly titled,” while Sweden emphasized that “the framework for responsible state behaviour must be strengthened rather than weakened.”

### International Law Application in Cyberspace

Switzerland provided detailed legal analysis, noting that “ICT operations comparable to traditional means can constitute use of force” and that “due diligence obligations and state responsibility principles apply to cyber operations.” The delegation emphasized that “national positions on international law provide invaluable clarification that cyberspace is not lawless.”

Paraguay emphasized that “UN Charter principles of sovereign equality and peaceful relations apply to cyberspace.” The ICRC noted that “international humanitarian law prohibits attacks on civilian objects and hospitals in cyberspace” and that “a humanitarian red line exists prohibiting attacks on civilian infrastructure through ICTs.”

Vietnam, representing a cross-regional group, noted that “cross-regional working papers represent areas of emerging convergence on international law.”

### Capacity Building

Australia argued that “capacity building is a foundational and cross-cutting element requiring concrete implementation mechanisms.” Zimbabwe proposed a “global ICT security cooperation portal as a neutral member state-driven resource platform” and emphasized that “South-South and triangular cooperation is important to complement traditional partnerships.”

Latvia supported establishing a “UN Cyber Resilience Academy within UNIDIR for implementation.” Mauritius emphasized that “needs-based and tailored approaches are essential for effective capacity building programmes” and that “regional organisations serve as vital implementation partners and capacity building hubs.”

Ghana emphasized that “technical and hands-on training is critical for developing national cyber capabilities” and called for “voluntary fund establishment essential for supporting developing country participation.” Nigeria noted that “integration of modern technology with indigenous knowledge ensures sustainability” and that “gender inclusiveness and youth engagement are vital for maximising human capacity.”

Cuba argued that “UN budgetary constraints cannot be a pretext for limiting developing country needs” and that “capacity building is essential for eliminating the digital divide affecting developing countries.”

### Confidence-Building Measures

The Republic of Korea emphasized that “global point of contact directories require broad participation and flexible implementation” and that “CBMs serve to reduce misunderstanding and prevent conflict escalation.”

Ukraine argued that “existing eight CBMs should be operationalised before developing new proposals.” Cameroon emphasized that “regional POC networks should be integrated to enhance incident response capabilities.”

The Netherlands argued that “focus is needed on effective operationalisation before further development” and that “regional organisations and technical community roles should be explicitly recognised.”

### Future Permanent Mechanism Structure

Czechia proposed “three umbrella themes of stability, resilience, and cooperation” as an optimal framework and supported “cross-cutting action-oriented thematic groups preferred over pillar-based structures.” Latvia strongly supported “cross-cutting, action-oriented thematic groups.”

New Zealand argued for a “single-track format with concrete meaningful exchanges needed for success.” Albania emphasized that “action-oriented structures are needed to deliver real-world cybersecurity solutions.”

Belarus proposed “creating separate thematic groups on standards and on confidence building measures” and emphasized that “consensus-based decision making must be maintained in the future mechanism” with “seamless transition from OEWG to permanent mechanism without undermining the mandate.”

Guatemala sought middle ground, arguing for a “moderate number of thematic groups with specific focus on capacity building.” India emphasized that “the inclusive and democratic characteristics of OEWG must be preserved” and that “regular institutional dialogue should be representative, inclusive, and democratic.”

### Stakeholder Participation Modalities

Belarus stated: “We support the current format of work. We are aware of the important contributions made to the work of the OEWG by non-state entities, but we believe that all decisions on NGO participation in sessions ought to be based on no objection from member states.”

The Alliance of NGOs on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice warned that “should the final report maintain weak language on stakeholder modalities and the future permanent mechanism, it will further hinder their engagement.”

Italy emphasized that “multi-stakeholder engagement is indispensable for effective capacity building.”

## Chair’s Assessment and Procedural Matters

### UN Financial Crisis

The Chair provided a candid assessment of the UN’s financial constraints: “The UN is in financial crisis… Because some members do not pay in full and on time… multilateralism is in crisis… on your shoulders lies also the burden to show to your capitals, to each other, and to the world that the spirit of multilateral cooperation is alive and well.”

The Chair noted that the OEWG faced unprecedented 10% cuts in meeting time, directly impacting the ability to conduct comprehensive discussions with full interpretation services. The Chair acknowledged implementing microphone cutoffs for the first time in five years due to time constraints.

### Technical Issues

The Russian Federation experienced recurring difficulties accessing UN Web TV, which the delegation argued “violates transparency and participation principles.” The Chair acknowledged these problems and tasked the Secretariat with addressing technical issues.

### Path Forward

The Chair acknowledged a “matrix of divergences” while expressing determination to find a “narrow path” toward consensus, noting that reaching agreement would require “flexibility, pragmatism, and willingness to compromise from all parties.”

The Chair outlined a specific timeline: REV2 would be available around 9 p.m., with a meeting scheduled for Thursday at 11 a.m., a conference room paper by the end of Thursday, and adoption planned for Friday at 10 a.m.

The Chair requested delegations to send written statements and technical proposals to the Secretariat and asked them to prioritize their demands and show flexibility in the negotiations.

## Key Areas of Agreement and Disagreement

### Areas of Broad Agreement

Multiple speakers supported the principle of multi-stakeholder participation, though they disagreed on specific modalities. There was strong consensus on capacity building as a foundational element, with virtually all speakers emphasizing its importance for developing countries.

Broad agreement emerged that existing international law applies to cyberspace, including UN Charter principles and international humanitarian law, though disagreements persisted on specific formulations.

Many speakers supported leveraging existing mechanisms rather than creating duplicative structures, reflecting concerns about resource constraints and proven effectiveness.

### Fundamental Disagreements

The most significant disagreement concerned stakeholder participation modalities, with civil society advocating for improved meaningful participation while some states insisted on maintaining current restrictive formats requiring consensus for NGO participation.

Disagreement persisted on institutional structure, with some favoring cross-cutting thematic groups while others preferred pillar-specific or dedicated groups for particular areas.

While agreeing on international law applicability, states disagreed on specific formulations regarding use of force thresholds, explicit human rights law references, and the balance between different legal frameworks.

## Conclusion

The final substantive session demonstrated both the potential for multilateral cooperation in cybersecurity and the significant challenges facing such efforts. The strong stakeholder participation provided diverse perspectives and expertise, while member state discussions revealed both areas of consensus and fundamental disagreements that will need to be resolved in establishing an effective permanent mechanism.

The Chair’s acknowledgment of the UN’s financial crisis highlighted broader challenges facing multilateral cooperation, while the compressed timeline and procedural constraints added urgency to the negotiations. Despite these challenges, the Chair expressed confidence that consensus could be achieved through flexibility and pragmatism, setting the stage for final negotiations on the future permanent mechanism.

Chair: Good morning, distinguished delegates. As indicated in the program of work, this morning we will start with the dedicated stakeholder session. And in keeping with the practice of the working group, we will go through each of the stakeholders who are registered to speak. And as I indicated yesterday, before we wrapped up, we are operating under intense time pressure. So I’d like to appeal to the stakeholders for their understanding and support. We will have to turn off the microphone at the three-minute point. It’s not something that I enjoy doing, but I’d like to seek your kind understanding. Do circulate the statements to me and to all delegations. We will put that on the website. But I also want to say that this session today is not a one-off session. We have, throughout the five years, been talking to the stakeholder community. And each of the formal sessions, we have given them an opportunity to speak. I also make it a point to convene informal sessions with the stakeholders on a range of topics. They have contributed a lot of ideas. Not all the ideas make it to the formal progress reports, or might even make it to the final report. But the point is that they are engaging, participating, contributing ideas. And this enriches our collective conversation here. I think that is the spirit of the United Nations. So let’s get on with the speakers list. So the first speaker is AXS Now, to be followed by the German Council on Foreign Affairs. relations. Access Now, you have the floor, please.

Access Now: Thank you, Chair. I am Ramanjit Singh Cheema, addressing you on behalf of Access Now, the international civil society organization which focuses on digital security and defending the digital rights of vulnerable individuals and communities. We thank you for the opportunity to address you all today, and in particular, appreciate the comments you made yesterday, Chair. We hope all delegations are here, listening to us and seeking to understand the views of stakeholders. We speak to you from positions of expertise and frontline experience. Our digital security helpline, a proud member of the Forum for Incident Response, and a participant in the Common Good Cyber Initiative, has seen over 1,000 cases each quarter so far this year, showing us just the tip of the cybersecurity crisis we face. Today, we ask you to see yourselves not only as diplomats, but as stewards. The main duty of stewardship is simple, to leave things better than how you found it. Today, we are therefore asking this OEWG to consider the fact that the first OEWG and the group of governmental experts left us with milestone consensus achieved across the UN’s membership on responsible state behavior, despite the odds they faced, a foundation that we could all work with and build on. Right now, we believe you have partly progressed on this foundation, but you still run the risk of jeopardizing the acquis that states here have achieved through tremendous work. An instance of progress in the current draft is the references to state efforts against the growing market for commercially available ICT intrusion capabilities. We believe international efforts on responsible ICT behavior must recognize the reality that commercial spyware is regularly used to target civilian populations, diplomats, and other stakeholders. In that regard, we believe the REV.1 text must be further bolstered by adding specific references. In PARA 25, that cyber intrusion capabilities must be used in ways consistent with international law, including the standard of necessity, legality, and proportionality as outlined in international human rights law. We welcome the efforts to further implement the norms on human rights and a human-centric approach. to cybersecurity through the voluntary norms E and J in the text. OEWG members must promote human rights on the internet and encourage responsible reporting of ICT vulnerabilities, including the critical role of security researchers. But the current text leads us to the less secure foundation in the past OEWG by failing to incorporate explicit references to international human rights law in the main body. This body should also be proud of the increasing number of states who have outlined their position international on cyber operations. In that regard, we believe that more needs to be done again to specifically refer to international human rights law and humanitarian law. We urge you lastly to reconsider your approach to the modalities of stakeholders. We’ve joined 24 organizations and experts this week in supporting a joint letter asking for improved stakeholder modalities. Do not lock yourself into politics, be pragmatic and give yourself all the tools you can achieve. We therefore wish you a success in establishing a permanent mechanism that advances the challenges of meaningful rights respecting cyber dialogue.

Chair: Thank you very much Access Now for your contribution. German Council on Foreign Relations, you’re the next speaker.

German Council on Foreign Relations: My name is Valentin Weber and I’m a senior research fellow with DGP, the German Council on Foreign Relations. And in this capacity, I’ll also sign the joint civil society letter on multi-stakeholder modalities. Thank you so much for giving me the floor and for your admirable effort to find consensus in a world where it is increasingly rare. For the German Council on Foreign Relations, also known as DGP, this OEWG has been the first time to engage in a UN cyber dialogue. During the last five years, we thankfully had the opportunity to closely follow how member states have started operationalizing their key of the past 20 plus years. We’re very happy to see that the current version of this report puts an emphasis on critical infrastructures. At DGP, we have actively supported your and member states efforts. to strengthen their protection. But our research shows that words alone do not suffice. There is a huge gap in the implementation of the norms on the protection of critical infrastructure. In the policy brief, we have highlighted that half of the countries, that means half of the room here, represented in this room have not yet designated critical infrastructure sectors within their territories. This makes it difficult to implement norms 13F, G, and H, and in my opinion, requires further attention. My team at DGIP has also taken notice of member states’ concern over the misuse of quantum technology. In this context, we are happy to see that for the first time, the current version of the final OEWG report contains a reference to states’ intention to deploy post-quantum cryptographic solutions. We don’t think that this is premature. Chair, it is really high time to do so. DGIP research shows that all of us are profoundly vulnerable to quantum computing. Our analysis found that no UN member state has yet accomplished the transition to quantum security. No country in this room. In short, all UN member states are vulnerable for the day when quantum computers reach the capability to break conventional encryption. Some estimate that this might even occur by 2030. This leaves us only four years to get this job done. In short, there has been progress, also due to your efforts, Mr. Chair, but the world, and in particular its critical infrastructure, remains profoundly vulnerable. As Elvis Presley said, a little less conversation, a little more action. A little more bite, and a little less bark. A little less fight, and a little more spark. In this spirit, we appeal to you and the member states. Thank you for your attention.

Chair: Thank you very much. German Council for Foreign Relations and also for introducing some music into our lives. I think we need to have a positive tone and a positive tune in our heads at this point. I give the floor now to Safe PC Solutions.

Safe PC Solutions: Thank you, Chair, for the opportunity for Safe PC Solutions to speak today to make a statement for intervention. We welcome zero-draft recognition of the transformative potential and the dual-use nature of emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence and quantum computing. As I stated last week in the informal dialogue, we need to include generative AI, a rapidly advancing subset of AI capable of producing synthetic content such as text, images, code, and audio. It has introduced new vectors for disinformation, social engineering, and automated cyber attacks. And also, we encourage the OEWG to consider referencing the governance of generative AI as a distinct area of concern within the broader AI landscape. We also suggest that quantum computing be separated and be defined in the document. Quantum computing presents a foreseeable threat to current cryptographic systems. We urge the OEWG to emphasize the urgent need for the development, standardization, and the global adoption of post-quantum cryptographic solutions. We further emphasize the importance of inclusive cross-sectoral cooperation, engaging governments, industry, academia, and the public. and civil society to address the complex risks arising from convergence of AI, quantum computing, and other advanced technologies. And I do thank you for putting the stakeholders at the forefront of this meeting. We also, Safe Peace Solutions, we also support the joint stakeholder statement on the zero draft and REV1 Annex 3 section on stakeholder modalities. Also, concerning capacity building for resilience and sustainable development. Safe Peace Solutions, last month, in May, we had the opportunity to present at the global conference on cyber capacity building in Geneva. And I met with a lot of the member states from Africa, Latin America, and Pacific Islands. And they were not aware, first of all, that we were a stakeholder, no EWG, let alone that we had built a cybersecurity awareness training on a generative AI platform focusing on people of color. So, thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Safe Peace Solutions. Next speaker is Academia Mexicana de Ciberseguridad y Derecho Digital.

Academia Mexicana de Ciberseguridad y Derecho Digital: Gracias, Senor Presidente. Thank you very much, sir. The Mexican Academy of Cybersecurity and Digital Law welcomes this opportunity to speak, and we pay tribute to what has been done by states in this entire process. We welcome the advances in principles such as making a better, broader, and more peaceful cyberspace. However, things are still lacking to ensure a robust person-centered cybersecurity panorama. So, we would like to see more data, clear data looking- at the future so that we can include emerging technologies and new technologies, generative AI, so that we can be vigilant also in independent decision-making systems, although the draft does recognize quantum computing and generative AI. We feel that we need a specialized thematic group that can bring forward recommendations and look at technicalities based on evidence. Then we need a cross-cutting approach when it comes to human rights in the digital sphere. In the document, we have to respect human rights, that’s mentioned, but however, there’s a lack of practical measures to fulfill this. We have voluntary measures, as suggested over the last two weeks, applicable to AI and cyber technologies by states. Then when we look at the larger scale, we need governance, traceability, accountability, when it comes to decision-making operations for public decisions. This is linked also to products and services. Then fourthly, when we come to IHL in context of armed conflict in cyber space, we would suggest that the section here be strengthened with reference to possibility of enforcement, particularly in sensitive areas. We also underline how important it is to strengthen accountability mechanisms. When it comes here to a voluntary basis, it would be a good idea to provide basic behavioral indices per region and have voluntary national reports to increase confidence. And lastly, when it comes to the participation of stakeholders, stakeholders can make relevant contributions only if it’s possible to actually work in the field. The large support expressed in this group for capacity building cannot… forward without contributions from all sectors. Therefore, we support the joint cyber security paper submitted last week. Then lastly, when it comes to innovation and human dignity under legal provisions, we feel the speaker has been cut off.

Chair: Thank you very much, Academia Mexicana. Crest International, we have the next speaker.

Crest International: For your commitment to ensuring that stakeholders are heard by the OEWG, I speak for Crest International, a non-profit which builds trust in the digital world by raising standards in the cyber security industry. The recent Common Good Cyber and EU-ISS paper highlights multiple non-profit-led programs that are relevant to the zero draft initiatives. The practical experience and real-world results of such work uniquely position stakeholders to work with states. Crest therefore supports the joint civil society statement in calling for meaningful stakeholder engagement and the Canada-Chile-led paper’s proposal to overcome the single state veto and enable stakeholders to contribute to each agenda item. You invited us, Mr. Chair, to identify where we can work with states on the zero draft initiatives. Crest is specifically well-placed to contribute to global standards for supply chain security and the standardized curriculum for technical cyber capacity building. These are set out in paragraphs 34G and 51C. Crest brings 18 years of experience driving cyber resilience through the supply chain, developing standards for technical cyber security services and assessing providers against them. Crest also brings experience as a licensing and certifying body, setting standards for the cyber security workforce and developing and assessing professionals on behalf of governments and regulators. Crest’s syllabus defines the knowledge professionals require. Crest’s courses material is underpinned by a commercial model that supports capacity building. Crest’s certifications can be taken in 3,500 exam centers in 158 countries. Our standards enable capacity building. Australia, EBRD, and UK-sponsored Crest Camp programs have built service provider maturity in 14 countries, including Indonesia, Ghana, Kenya, Malaysia, Morocco, Thailand, and Vietnam, and supported training centers with trained a training course material. As we work together to build a safer digital world, internationally recognized and agreed upon standards must be preferable to variable national standards in guiding states due diligence, measuring verifying compliance and the norms upheld by the international community and in identifying gaps and measuring progress for capacity building. Together we can identify and recommend relevant tested standards as the basis for future international standards for future iterations of the checklist and as a confidence building measure. In conclusion, CREST supports the OEWG’s aspirations to drive international standards. We bring practical experience and capability to work with states and others to agree, negotiate and evolve standards and to develop standardized curriculum. We look forward to your continued collaboration with states and stakeholders within the future permanent mechanism. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much for your contribution. I give the floor now to Center for Humanitarian Dialogue.

Center for Humanitarian Dialogue: Thank you for giving me the floor, Mr. Chairman. The Center for Humanitarian Dialogue welcomes the opportunity to speak. It is among the numerous stakeholders who have issued a joint statement on stakeholder participation in the future permanent mechanism. On 11 January 2011, the UN General Assembly welcomed the work of a group of governmental experts on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security. In their report, the experts, chaired by Russian Ambassador Andrei Krutsky, warned that existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security are among the most serious challenges of the 21st century. They developed a conceptual triangle to address these challenges. The corners of this triangle are agreeing the rules that govern state use of ICT, both binding international law and non-binding norms of responsible state behavior, building confidence that states will respect these rules and developing and capacities so that all states can behave in a rule-abiding and confidence-inspiring manner. For 15 years, these elements have been guiding the United Nations work on the issue, building a cumulative and evolving framework for responsible state behavior. Now, I am worried that the final OEWG report may depart from this successful approach. The draft before delegates and the proposed setup of the dedicated working groups represents a shift of focus away from the evolving nature of the threats, and it relegates to second rank the discussions on norms as well as on confidence-building. UN efforts have resulted in a substantial progress on the rules of state use of ICT. As the Secretary General wrote in 2023, the rule of law exists in the digital space The rule of law exists in the digital sphere just as it does in the physical world. This progress has been hard won, and it must serve as a baseline for all future multilateral work in this area. Many argue that the problem is not an absence of rules, but a lack of confidence that states will respect them. Rules are a manifestation of power. They are worth very little without confidence that the rules will enjoy respect. In the words of Russian Tsarina Catherine the Great, power without confidence is nothing. To escape the risk of reducing hard-won progress to nothing, an appropriate emphasis in the future permanent mechanism on confidence-building seems advisable. In support of such efforts, including in the dedicated thematic working groups, the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue would be happy to offer insights based on its concrete activities dedicated to ICT confidence-building.

Chair: Thank you very much for your contribution. The next speaker is Red on Defensa de los Derechos Digital.

Red on Defensa de los Derechos Digital: Gracias, Senor President. Thank you very much, sir. I’m Francia Preta-Santa Baldassa, and I represent R3D, the Network to Defend Digital Rights. We’re a Mexican organization to defend rights in the digital. scenario and we welcome the opportunity to speak here. In a world where states are constantly expanding the use of technologies in some local context such as ours, there are also more and more attributions going to authorities to exceed to gain and share data without any effective limits. All this gives rise to serious concern when it comes to real capacities of infrastructure to ensure the security of computer systems. We can think of the millions of people that are affected when there are cyber attacks or undue use of information obtained. The development, acquisition and use of digital systems by states in areas such as intelligence, public security, implementation of law, control of migrants and the provision of service, this can only deepen structural gaps, facilitate mass vigilance, exploitation of data, discrimination when it comes to the provision of public services. As is indicated in paragraph 17, 27 and others, the protection of critical information structures has to be addressed very seriously. Here, the standing mechanism from this working group and its thematic groups needs to incorporate a perspective of the global majority, in particular Latin America, when it comes to the inter-American system of human rights and the differing interpretations when it comes to freedom of expression and privacy. There are effects here when it comes to these on human rights in accordance with A and what is considered in the voluntary measures for taking steps here. It is important to ensure that the results of these discussions be taken to a regional and national context to ensure real, fair and effective implementation. So, we from R3D have subscribed to the joint statement on the modalities of participation of stakeholders in order, as is stated in paragraph 17a of annex 3, in order to ensure a systematic and sustained and substantive involvement of all interested stakeholders when it comes to the use and abuse of technologies. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much for your contribution. Alliance of NGOs on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. You have the floor, please.

Alliance of NGOs on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice: Thank you, Chair. It’s a privilege to address you today on behalf of the Alliance of NGOs on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, an umbrella organization coordinating civil engagement with the crime and justice mandates of the United Nations. The Alliance has a leading role in supporting civil society participation in multilateral discussions. It has actively engaged in the negotiations of the United Nations Cybercrime Convention and the subsequent discussion on stakeholder participation in the Conference of States Parties. As delegations work towards the consensus adoption of the final report, it’s a critical time to show strong support for stakeholder participation to ensure that civil society, the private sector, and academia can meaningfully contribute to the future permanent mechanism on cybersecurity. Stakeholders have consistently demonstrated the value of their contributions over the two years of the first open-ended working group and more than four years of the second open-ended working group. We have seen more joint organization of side events on the margins on the substantive sessions, as well as state stakeholder cooperation and initiatives outside of the plenary. These actions show a strong commitment to responsible state behavior in cyber. cyber space. However, concerns remain about the openness and inclusiveness of the open and working group discussions. Many organizations have been vetoed and face concerns to participate in the substantive sessions. Should the final report maintain weak language on stakeholder modalities and the future permanent mechanism, it will further hinder their engagement. The advancement of responsible state behavior in cyber space will fall short of effectiveness, transparency, and inclusivity if done without the support of civil society. The plenary discussions also show a strong cross-regional support for stakeholders to have a voice in the regular institutional dialogue. We support a proposal led by Canada and Chile and a joint stakeholder position that states can object to specific applicants, but a vote will be requested in plenary to decide on the final accreditation. The future permanent mechanism is a unique opportunity to set the stage for long-term progress on international peace and security. To achieve its full potential, the agreement must not come at the expense of stakeholder participation. We remain committed to engaging throughout the session and supporting an outcome that ensures constructive stakeholder engagement. Thank you for your attention.

Chair: Thank you very much for your contribution. European Union Institute for Security Studies,

European Union Institute for Security Studies: please. Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor. As the Open-Ended Working Group concludes its mandate, we must acknowledge that the decision taken in this final session will not only shape the final report, but determine whether a decade of international consensus building anchors its achievements or risks diluting them. One of the most decisive tests will be whether we treat capacity building as a silo or as a strategic lever across all pillars of responsible state behavior. In this regard, the language of capacity building in REV.1 remains too siloed. We believe that cyber capacity building should be stronger recognized as a cross-cutting enabler for norm implementation, confidence building and the operationalization of international law, and this should be more clearly reflected in the report Across Pillars. Chair, we urge that the final report emphasizes the cross-cutting foundation of capacity building by considering the following proposals. Reiterate explicitly the link between norm implementation and capacity building, embed capacity building in the language on CBMs as an enabler for responsible but also accountable state behavior. And finally, on international law, we should emphasize that capacity building has played a foundational role in advancing states’ understanding of how international law applies in cyberspace within the respective jurisdictions. Capacity building efforts must uphold human rights, promote equity and include a wide range of actors to ensure meaningful and inclusive participation. These principles must shape program design, monitoring and evaluation, not serve as a post hoc consideration. Chair, there is a second cross-cutting observation we must acknowledge in the context of this process in cyberspace, the essential value that stakeholders contribute. Their contribution is grounded in their diversity and complementary expertise, qualities that are often described as welcome, yet not always treated as such in practice. Stakeholder inclusion is not optional. Excluding stakeholders from future coordination efforts will weaken the legitimacy of the process, but also its outcomes. In these regards, we also express our full support for the working paper on practical modalities for stakeholders’ participation and accreditation of future UN mechanisms on cybersecurity, coordinated by Canada and Chile, and the joint stakeholder statement on the ZERO draft and the REV1 Annex III section on stakeholders’ modality in the future permanent mechanism. Chair, the open-ended working group cannot conclude. a report that treats the cross-cutting contribution of capacity building and stakeholder engagement in isolation. Both are essential to reflect the reality of the cyber domain’s multi-layered nature and shared ownership. I thank you for your attention.

Chair: Thank you very much for your contribution. Wright pilot, you have the floor please.

Wright pilot: Honorable Chair, distinguished delegates and stakeholders, my name is Abdullah bin Hussain and noting your recent exhortation to stakeholders to find partners so that voices from vulnerable areas and underrepresented communities are heard, I am pleased to deliver this statement on behalf of Right Pilot so a young Jordanian voice is heard in this august chamber. Mr. Chair, allow me to express our appreciation for your exceptional leadership and guidance throughout this process. Your patience and understanding have been instrumental in fostering an environment that accommodates diverse perspectives and inclusion. In keeping with your guidance and focusing discussions on ways in which the multi-stakeholder community can work together with states, Right Pilot is prepared to serve as a co-facilitator in support of civil society’s efforts to structure, organize, and report back to states in the future permanent mechanism. We welcome the statement made by Crest International that internationally recognized standards must be preferred over to varied international standards and hence of the need to recognize the harmonization of standards as a confidence building measure. The multi-dimensional use of standards in the zero draft report warrants greater understanding of the diverse frequencies in which standards intend to play as either a technology security issue or a matter of governance or a matter of capacity building enabler even as a component of international law with states being obliged to comply under the principle of due diligence. Following your guidance to engage as a network of advocates, RightPilot is pleased to align itself with Crest International in committing to work with others to reach understanding on how standards in cyberspace can enable and operate under international law. We welcome and support the Canada-Chile-led proposal to support the engagement of multi-stakeholder community, the joint civil society statement and its call for meaningful stakeholder engagement. The Women in Cybersecurity Middle East Group, WICSME, we urge the international community to recognize them as a common good cyber initiative and to continue to support the major achievements of women in cybersecurity fellowship programs as a crucial way to enable an underrepresented voices to speak and be listened to by states. We stand ready to support you in building a resilient cyberspace. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much for your contribution. Next speaker is Hitachi America.

Hitachi America: Thank you, Mr. Chair, for this dedicated stakeholder session towards the final stage of OEWG consensus. As a private company, we make efforts providing safe, secure, reliable civilian critical infrastructure, including energy, transportation, digital water, and data for people globally while applying positive innovations in AI, quantum and nuclear fusion. Today, let me touch upon REV1 draft final report. First, working together with the states, we can contribute updating threats such as negative use of AI and quantum and start applying norm checklist, including FGHIJ in different designated sectors by state and regions. As a provider of hardware, software, IOT for global supply chain in digitized CI, we can work with inclusive stakeholders, NGO, academia, states, under the auspices of UN, sharing the best practices, analyzing gaps for improvements under trust. These are the example of plenary or designated thematic group one. Second, we can contribute active participation in technical and legal in simulation scenario and gap analysis with country advisors. Lessons learned can be reflected to policy improvements while applying international laws such as charter, human rights, IHL. These are examples of DTG2. Third, capacity building is most we can contribute as a CICII provider including global round table, best practices such as security by design, zero trust, AI security and ethics, and quantum safe securities. These are related with also DTG3 and relevant to digital compacts and SDGs, indeed. Capacity building is CBM. In conclusion, we can participate practically working together with the states in permanent mechanism continuously, improving global CICII for peace, safety, security, resilience, addressing cross-cutting nature and gaps in data integrity of physical virtual in each.

Chair: Thank you very much for your contribution. Association for Cybersecurity. You have the floor, please.

Arab Association of Cybersecurity: Honorable Chair, distinguished delegates, esteemed colleagues and stakeholders, it’s a privilege to address this distinguished group today on behalf of the Arab Association of Cybersecurity. Allow me first to express our sincere appreciation to you, Mr. Chair, for your unwavering leadership and dedication to ensuring this process remains inclusive, transparent, and loose in dialogue. Your efforts continue to inspire confidence and trust amongst all participants. We welcome the Zero Draft 100 report as a thoughtful and well-balanced basis for further negotiation. We particularly commend the inclusiveness of this process, embodied in the seasonal meetings and consultations over the past four years. The road to consensus requires patience, openness, and a willingness to listen. Remain committed to contributing to this process in that spirit, seeking outcomes that reflect the collective wisdom of the entire international community. We fully support the global points of the current directory, which holds great promise of building cross-border trust cooperation. To raise its full potential, we encourage targeted capacity-building efforts, including language-based training and regional exchange, so that all states, regardless of maturity, can benefit equally. Regional institutions, such as the OIC CERT, offers valuable experience and insights. Indeed, we see great potential in strengthening linkages between such bodies and the UNL process. To foster greater cohesion and a more effective implementation of global norms. Mr. Chair, allow me to turn to my colleague. Thank you, Mr. Chair. We welcome the reaffirmation in the zero draft that existing international law applies to cyberspace, and we support continued dialogue in this area. Recognizing that dialogue alone is not enough, we must take practical steps to strengthen understanding and importantly, compliance. That is why we urge states to commit to the formalization of expert briefings that draw on the legal expertise, as well as technical knowledge of international and regional organizations and regional and national cybersecurity agencies. We also welcome the reference to women’s meaningful participation in international law. We welcome the reference to women’s meaningful participation. Here too, we see an opportunity to lead by example. by promoting gender parity in national delegations and ensuring that women cybersecurity leaders are actively involved in OEWG discussions and consultations. The Arab Association for Cybersecurity stands ready to contribute to regional capacity building efforts in close collaboration with international partners. Our initiatives include delivering cyber diplomacy trainings aligned with UN frameworks, fostering trilateral partnerships between the UN, Arab cybersecurity centers, and academia, and promoting hands-on workshops tailored to the needs of developing states in our region. We believe that capacity building is not only a technical role, but a powerful enabler for mutual trust and understanding. In closing, as the working group moves forward towards finalizing its final report, we reaffirm our commitment towards active and constructive participation. We stand ready to support a smooth transition toward the future permanent mechanism, which will carry forward the inclusive spirit that has defined this process. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much for your contribution. S. Roger Redlam, School of International Studies, Center of Excellence for National Security, on the floor, please.

Center of Excellence for National Security: Thank you, Chair, for the floor, and for all of your hard work in including stakeholders. We appreciate the references in the draft to the contributions that all interested parties and stakeholders can make to the future permanent mechanism. Now, building on paragraph 17K of NX3, we propose the following process to organize hybrid consultative meetings with all interested parties and stakeholders during the intersessional period, building on the practice of the previous OEWG and our regional experience in capacity building and confidence building measures as a think tank. I invite everyone to view our written statement, which is posted on the UN OEWG website, which also includes a graphical representation of our proposal. Point one, the chair of the future permanent mechanism or the thematic study groups can appoint a corresponding non-governmental track two counterpart to organize stakeholder study groups of all interested parties and stakeholders to support the respective dedicated thematic groups of states. Point two, each corresponding stakeholder study group can convene regional or cross-regional. or global meetings in hybrid modalities over the course of the year to enable wider participation, sustainability, equitable geographic representation, regardless of accreditation, visa status, time zone, or funding. These stakeholder study groups can gather relevant expert analysis, generate actionable ideas, foster dialogue, and develop non-political recommendations to the respective thematic groups. States or other interested organizations can fund the conduct of these study groups as a means of capacity building. States participating at the thematic groups can interact on track 1.5 level with the stakeholder study groups so that both technical experts and policy experts can have interactive dialogue as the combined contributions of both are essential. The outcomes of the stakeholder study groups can be presented as memoranda to the respective dedicated thematic groups of states. States can identify experts to brief them on the findings of the study groups following the precedent of the Global Roundtable on Capacity Building. Chair, this proposal does not contradict or detract from the existing modalities for the inclusion of all interested parties and stakeholders into the future permanent mechanism or for any proposals to amend the modalities. This is instead a proposal to complement the modalities to ensure stakeholder contributions remain meaningful, relevant, consultative, and non-political in nature. We draw on the precedent of CSCAP or Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific, which is a non-governmental track 2 counterpart that carries out the same function in assisting the ASEAN Regional Forum, ARF, which is the official governmental forum for security dialogue. This multinational entity has experts participating from all ASEAN member states, Australia, Canada, China, Europe, India, Japan, Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Russia, the U.S., and the Pacific states. Our center stands ready to support, host, or organize.

Chair: I give the floor now to Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

Nuclear Age Peace Foundation: Chair, excellencies, distinguished colleagues, ladies and gentlemen. My name is Lydia Peavy and I am a youth activist with the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and Reverse the Trend, NAPF’s youth initiative. I grew up in Singapore and proud to be a Singapore permanent resident and appreciate Singapore’s efforts in guiding the OEWG’s process. I would like to recognize that the OEWG has strengthened global norms and open space for more inclusive dialogue. Chair, I will focus my remarks on the importance of civil society and youth engagement in the OEWG’s process and particularly on the critical role that youth can and must play as we transition to a future permanent mechanism. The draft final report acknowledges that engagement with civil society, NGOs, academia, and youth has strengthened legitimacy, transparency, and effectiveness in the OEWG’s work. But we must go further. In paragraph 52M, the report encourages states to engage other interested parties, stakeholders, and youth in capacity building and training. This is critical. But we urge member states to treat youth not just as recipients of training but as co-creators of policy. Youth engagement brings community insight and an understanding of how technologies are used, abused, and experienced firsthand. Civil society is not just a supporting actor in global cybersecurity governance but comprises implementers, technical experts, educators, and especially in the case of youth, digital natives who understand how these technologies function and how they affect our societies. The report’s recognition of the need for diverse and sustained engagement must be backed by practical steps, including regular consultations, technical cooperation, inclusive cyber capacity building, and clear pathways for stakeholder input in norm development. We are highly concerned about attempts to backtrack and limit the role of stakeholders. Chair, our generation will live with the consequences of today’s decisions on digital security and governance, whether it’s AI-enabled conflict, the misuse of cyber tools. civilians or governmental actors or attacks on critical infrastructure. The risks are real and youth engagement is crucial in shaping responses. The OEWG has laid a strong foundation, but the future permanent mechanism must go farther in embedding civil society, especially youth, as partners in this space. Finally, as someone who grew up in Singapore and now works with young peacebuilders from around the world, I’ve seen what happens when youth are given the tools and the trust to lead. The future of ICTs depends on us. Let’s build that future together. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much for your contribution. I give the floor now to Youth for Privacy.

Youth for Privacy: Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor. My name is J1 Choi and I am speaking on behalf of Youth for Privacy and the DMUN Foundation. I’m also a 16 year old young person representing the marginalized voices of children in this process. Chair, as we go through the final session of the Working Group, we commend the recognition of several cross-cutting issues and would like to offer our three reflections. First, we demand an open and inclusive future mechanism. As the draft report highlights, the Working Group engaged stakeholders in a systemic and sustained and substantive manner. We believe that this model of inclusive dialogue must continue further. In particular, the sustained interest of civil society organizations and other stakeholders throughout the sessions is the living evidence for the value of our contributions. Meaningful progress requires diverse voices. Second, we call for semantic flexibility in the works of the permanent mechanism. We strongly support the idea that the future mechanism should be integrated, policy oriented and cross-cutting. We also stress that semantic structures must remain adaptable to quickly address emerging risks and new technologies. Finally, and most importantly, use engagement is never optional, it’s inalienable and is part of our fundamental rights. While the final report affirms the importance of the participation of certain stakeholders, we note a concerning and relative silence regarding the role of children and youth. As previously stated, children and youth possess relevant lived experience that brings valuable contributions to the working group and the permanent mechanism. Hence, we urgently demand that children and youth become systemically embedded into the permanent mechanism as valid stakeholders. Distinguished colleagues, Mr. Chair, the success of the permanent mechanism will rely on the openness, agility, and commitment to inclusive stakeholder participation. We, as children and youth of the world, will not allow ourselves to be pushed out to the sidelines in this process. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Youth for Privacy, for your contribution. I give the floor now to Fundación Karisma. Señor Presidente.

Fundación Karisma: Mr. Chairman, I should like to thank you for your work at the head of this working group and also for giving us the opportunity to take part in today’s discussion. I belong to Fundación Carisma, it’s a Colombian organization working for the promotion of digital rights. We have a digital security laboratory and we look at privacy for civil society. We would like to emphasize the need to redouble endeavors when it comes to discussions and capacities from the OEWG so that they be implemented at a local level too by participating states. We know that some governments, such as the Colombian government, are making real steps forward to improve their policies and protocols and capacities regarding cyber security. An example is the attempt to update national legislation to create new… cyber security bodies, the effective inclusion of human rights in new legislation and strengthening human and technical capacity to respond to cyber attacks. However, from a charisma’s point of view, we believe that we need to take our discussions further with this. Yet, there’s been no consensus when it comes to the regulation of technology for military use identification of vulnerability and capacity building in cyber security in a non-centralized fashion. There are still very important barriers here at a national level. We believe that this process is a complex one and requires multisectoral work, time and resources. And therefore, we would like to emphasize the call that states continue with regard to local implementation. We believe that a standing dialogue mechanism should provide an opportunity for states to present regular reviews on progress in cyber security so that the many stakeholders can also make recommendations and reports in the thematic groups and plenaries. The alienation nationally from the purposes of this or the alignment rather from the purposes of this group nationally will include transparency and contribute to the construction of confidence amongst the various parties. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much for that charisma for contribution. I give the floor now to First Incorporated.

First ORG. INC: Thank you, Chair. And good morning, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, fellow stakeholders. First, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams is just that, a forum, a platform and community of incident response practitioners and teams from around the world. We have over 800 members from 113 economies, including national teams, some of whom are here today, as well as teams from government, the private sector, academia, civil society and more. We are practitioner and practice driven. Together with the wider community, we come together to build trust, share information and find ways to do incident response better. Nearly every aspect of the OEWG discussions involve or impact incident response, and we have direct operational experience on many of the matters discussed throughout the process. We hope to share what works in our community to help improve outcomes for everyone. CERTs are central in responding to existing and potential threats, actioning norms, and acting as key actors in competence-building measures. Driven by peer-to-peer sharing and community building, we also have practical experience in capacity building. This includes supporting the establishment of new teams, facilitating CERT-to-CERT cooperation, and delivering formal and informal mentorship—measures highlighted in paragraphs 32, 52D, Annex 1, and elsewhere in the draft report. FIRST welcomes the recognition of the importance of capacity building and echo the need to deliver efforts in a way that is tailored to local context in Section F of the draft. In our experience, the most effective efforts take an ecosystem-wide approach, leverage proactive engagement with stakeholders, are operationally driven, and focus on long-term formal and informal collaboration and community building. With this in mind, we encourage any efforts to action Recommendations 54 to 57 to not duplicate what already exists. Many of the most impactful capacity-building initiatives are driven by operational communities that work behind the scenes and are, unfortunately, under-resourced. Duplication diverts resources further away from delivering action and collectively dilutes utility. Supporting communities and platforms that already exist, like the GFCE, CBLPORTAL, FIRST, and others, as highlighted in the Common Good Cyber Nonprofit Contributions to Cybersecurity Report, build on what already works, expanding rather than replicating impact, and allowing further investment to be directed toward efforts that deliver concrete action. FIRST is here as a resource with expertise to share from the incident response community. This includes developing collaborative, bottom-up standards, like the Traffic Light Protocol, the Non-Vulnerability Scoring System, and the First Point of Contact Directory. These technical standards could offer a starting point to help put OEWG discussions, like on the POC Directory, into action. We are also proud to have worked with the Women in International Security and Cyberspace WIC Fellowship to deliver a series of Toastville tabletop exercises to build awareness of how instant response works in practice and bridge technical and diplomatic perspectives. These type of meaningful contributions require more robust stakeholder modalities than captured in the current draft. We endorse the joint stakeholder statement signed by 24 partners.

Chair: Thank you very much for your contribution. Global Cyber Alliance, you’re next.

Global Cyber Alliance: Chair, Excellencies, Distinguished Delegates, I’m Chris Painter, Strategic Advisor for the Global Cyber Alliance. GCA is a not-for-profit which works internationally to improve the internet and help people and organizations be more secure online. We thank the Chair for his inclusive approach, and we welcome the emphasis on practical capacity building as a core element of cyber stability. However, we’re still concerned that several proposed initiatives in the draft risk duplicating existing and ineffective mechanisms. Here are four examples. The draft calls for a new global ICT security cooperation and capacity building portal risk duplicating existing platforms such as the GFC’s civil portal and the UNIDIR’s cyber policy portal, both of which already catalog projects and connect donors with implementers. The creation of a UN-managed sponsorship program would divert from successful initiatives such as the Women in Cyber Fellowship Program or the France-Irish Sponsorship Program for small islands and developing states. Member states should consider the UN’s additional overhead and costs and decide whether they want less beneficiaries for more money. The proposal for standardized training and curriculum at a UN Cyber Resilience Academy risk duplicating the UNIDIR Academy and decades of work by civil society organizations such as FIRST, which has trained national CSIRTs with technical hands-on training, tailored, unprecedented, and deployed in more than 70 countries, or CREST, working with regulators in building standards and certifications for critical infrastructure protection. Future discussions on the new UN Voluntary Fund should consider the serious risk of the reverting funds from existing funding streams, like the World Bank Cybersecurity Multi-Dollar Trust Fund, and public-private partnerships, like Common Good Cyber Fund, which was recently launched to support non-profit work protecting vulnerable civil society and digital infrastructure. If established, and a UN voluntary fund, should be limited to helping states participate in UN meetings and activity. These existing efforts are not theoretical. They are functioning, field-tested, and responsive to national priorities, creating new structures in a state-only context, and without integrating stakeholders, risk duplication, confusion, and inefficiency. The recent Common Good Cyber report, Nonprofit Contributions to Cybersecurity, commissioned by the EU Institute for Security Studies and funded by Global Gateway, documents 334 non-profit-led initiatives, but it also highlights ongoing challenges, such as lack of funding, limited policy access, and weak coordination with multilateral bodies. We need to scale what works, not replace it. For this reason, we very much support the statement, the joint civil society statement, our meaningful involvement by stakeholders, which still is not reflected in the current draft. And we make a couple of recommendations in that regard. One, assess before you build. Include a commitment for annual mapping exercises in the first report to identify partnerships and existing stakeholders and how they can be integrated. And two, enhance the stakeholder accreditation and participation. To be fully inclusive and participant, it has to be better than a single state veto, which is.

Chair: Thank you very much for your contribution. I give the floor now to women in cybersecurity Middle East.

Women in cybersecurity Middle East: Chair, esteemed members, states, and colleagues. I speak today as the chairperson of Women’s Cybersecurity Middle East, Wixmi, a movement born from our region’s legacy of resilience, collective will, and they believe that cybersecurity is not merely a technical domain. It is a human responsibility. Starting with a verse from our holy Quran that reflects the spirit of our OEWG journey. Indeed, Allah will not change the condition of people until they change what’s within themselves. This reminds us that the transformation begins from within. And today, as we all share the higher purpose of guarding our digital realm, it is our collective resolve that can take this OIWG from experience to activation. Women are nation builders, and our Islamic and Arabic culture has proudly empowered women over the 1,400 years, cultivating a supporting environment that continues to produce impactive female role models across the various fields. A powerful recent example of resilience was demonstrated by the Palestinian women in Gaza. Their remarkable strength and iron grit resonated globally, reminding everyone of the enduring spirit of our region. Today, Wixmi continues that legacy, uniting over 3,000 women across 22 Arab countries to strengthen cyber capacity, elevate women’s voices, and deliver sustainable impact. Wixmi is not just a network. It is a global strategic blueprint for building inclusive digital future. Examples of that are launching CyberShe, the regional capacity building program with national KPIs alignment, aiming to train up to 1,500 skilled female cyber talents across the region in three years, with the first cohort launched from Kuwait. In partnership with ITU, Wixmi participants from one-third of the global cohort in the Women’s Cyber Mentorship Program, Arabic content and collage support were introduced for the first time, serving as a global hub by connecting more than 18 women’s cyber groups worldwide to support and amplify impact. These are not just milestones of representation. They are models of regional ownership, strategic execution, and sustained impact. As we approach the finalization of our OWGE work, we respectfully propose acknowledging Wixmi and CyberShe as global blueprints for gender-responsive capacity building, utilizing civil society as force multipliers and operational partners, and establishing inclusive payment mechanisms for their stakeholders. Wixmi’s journey is a story of our region’s culture-guided resilience-built and impact-driven. Let us carry this spirit forward, not as parallel voices. but as partners in progress and be keen to cooperate in righteousness and pity as widely advised in our Holy Quran. It is when empowerment needs righteousness, guided by a shared higher purpose, we build not only safer digital ecosystem but stronger more compassionate nations. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much for your contribution. Global Partners Digital, you have the floor, please.

Global Partners Digital: Thank you, Chair, for the opportunity to speak on behalf of Global Partners Digital. We’re a human rights organization focusing on the governance of digital technologies and thank you for your efforts to substantively engage stakeholders over the past years and to all of the states who listened to your encouragement to be here for this stakeholder session. Discussions around major cyber incidents often revolve around the technical, financial, legal and intergovernmental consequences. However, this group has also unpacked the human impacts of cyber incidents, including at a breakfast meeting hosted by Global Partners Digital alongside the Freedom Online Coalition, Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of Ghana at the group’s tenth session. This event explored how major incidents, and specifically ransomware, have cascading impacts, including on human rights and gender equality. This requires balancing technical measures with a rights-respecting, human-centric framework fostered by multi-stakeholder collaboration. Discussions on the human impact of cyber incidents could be better reflected in the group’s final APR to provide a clearer starting point for the future mechanism to build on progress made during the OEWG. In addition, greater detail on international humanitarian law would be useful. While recent APRs reaffirmed that IHL applies to cyber operations during armed conflict, they stopped short of reflecting obligations such as feasible precautions in hostilities. We appreciate Mexico’s intervention yesterday on the need for the APR to include more concrete measures related to IHL. We were also glad to hear so many delegations mention the updated paper on practical modalities for stakeholders participation supported by 42 states. This paper encourages NGOs to foster the diversity of stakeholder participation. This is something that GPD has been doing over the years at the OEWG. Through the support of our funders we have consistently funded and supported civil society from the global majority to engage in international cyber discussions and supported their work to translate the global norms to their regional and local contexts through rights respecting approaches. Without including these voices discussions in the future mechanism risk missing on-the-ground realities and proposals risk being impractical or inappropriate for many contexts. We fully support and endorse the joint statement by a group of 24 stakeholders. A few printed copies are available by the door as well as online. We need modalities that allow stakeholder participation to go beyond symbolic consultation for us to be able to effectively support the work of states in the permanent mechanism. Thank you for this opportunity to share our views.

Chair: Thank you very much for contribution. The last speaker is Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. You have the floor please.

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik: Mr. Chair, I’m affiliated with the German Institute for International and Security Affairs or Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in German. We’re a think-tank. I strongly support the joint stakeholder statement on stakeholder modalities in the future permanent mechanism. The statement is an example of cross-regional coordination among stakeholders as encouraged by you Mr. Chair. It provides action oriented proposals for ensuring meaningful stakeholder contributions to the future permanent mechanism. To quote from the statement, ensuring meaningful stakeholder participation is primarily for the benefit of UN member states. Also against the backdrop of limited resources and expertise. Researchers like me have continuously provided evidence-based scientific expertise that is directly relevant to the OUWG discussions. I encourage states to make use of this opportunity by elaborating modalities that allow for substantive stakeholder participation. Finally, as an affiliate of an organization with ECOSOC consultative status, I wish to acknowledge the longstanding practice that the participation of such organizations which have undergone a rigorous application process is a cornerstone of stakeholder participation in UN processes. Mr. Chair, I would also like to address the issue of action-oriented, dedicated thematic groups of the Future Permanent Mechanism. Faced with the question of how to design these groups, I advocate for a cross-cutting approach that addresses specific issues across all pillars of the framework. One concrete example showcasing the benefit of this cross-cutting approach is the issue of software supply chain security, which several delegations have raised during the sessions. I suggest that one of the dedicated thematic groups to be established tackle this cross-cutting issue as one of its agenda items. Software supply chain security remains a difficult problem as insecure software products and components and lacking security practices of suppliers and service providers are the root cause of many cybersecurity incidents around the world. It is also a matter for norms implementation, as norm I spells out an obligation for states to take action to strengthen software supply chain security. While this norm to date lacks broad implementation, stakeholders have made meaningful action-oriented suggestions on which policy actions such implementation could entail. Finally, the topic also has implications for international law and capacity building. In such discussions, stakeholders hold crucial expertise and can support states in advancing the debate towards concrete results. This example underscores that stakeholders need to have a voice, particularly in the dedicated thematic groups. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much for your contribution. Dear friends, that was the last speaker on the list of stakeholders, and I want to take this opportunity to thank all of them, all the stakeholders who spoke this morning, for their very well-prepared, thoughtful contributions. We heard several suggestions and ideas, and I hope that member states have listened carefully and taken note of these ideas and suggestions. My thanks also to the stakeholders for having been engaged in this process over the last few years. Some of you have been in this process from the beginning, others have joined recently. Your organizations have been engaged consistently, and I thank you for that. I’d like to suggest and request that the stakeholder community who are represented here in this room become advocates for this process, become ambassadors for this process, as we make the smooth and seamless transition to the Future Permanent Mechanism. You are familiar with the work and discussions here, you are familiar also with the challenges that we are dealing with, the diversity of views, the deep differences also in positions, but also you are familiar with the progress we have made, the convergence that has emerged on a range of issues, and the work that remains to be done. So be empowered to become advocates and ambassadors as we make the transition to the Future Permanent Mechanism. The other thing that I want to say is that the group here is, of course, a diverse group, and the group here present in the room is a function of the modalities that we have. That has been the decision, but it is my hope that we can, in the Future Permanent Mechanism, continue to grow this group, expand the circle of participants, but at the same time expand the diversity of representatives, so that we have representatives from different parts of the world, so that we have representatives from different sectors. segments of the population. The youth, for example, it’s very heartening to see youth representatives who have taken their time away from their studies to be engaged in this process. I find that very heartening and hopeful for the future permanent mechanism. So we need to do better in terms of expanding the circle of participation and also improving the diversity of representatives who will be able to participate in the future permanent mechanism. Now I have also taken note of the joint stakeholder statement on modalities. This of course, as all of you know, is one of the most challenging issues that we have faced in this process right from the beginning and it is with us even as we near the end of our work. We’ll need to find an equilibrium that is possible within this process, but my message to the stakeholders and also to member states is this. The modalities are important and it is important to have as inclusive a modality as possible. But if we are not able to arrive at perfect modalities, then we have to find other ways to continue to widen the circle of participation and enhance the diversity of representatives. For example, the modalities that we have for stakeholder participation does not prevent any member state or anyone else from convening side events. or Track 1.5 or Track 2 events, and I think there have been some ideas in that regard. So I’d like all of you to think about it. We have, within this process, under the previous OEWG, we have been able to convene stakeholders for a dialogue here at the UN. So that option and those kinds of possibilities are still open to us, regardless of what modalities we arrive at. So I’d like all of you to think very creatively in terms of how we can continue to expand and widen the circle of stakeholder participation. So these are some thoughts that I have, and my thanks once again to the stakeholders. Please stay engaged, please stay in touch, please also wish us luck as we continue our work over the next few days to cross the finish line. And of course, please share your statements in writing with us and with my office, so that we’ll put it on the website. I think the views of the stakeholders are an important record and a checking mechanism to what Member States are saying. It’s an alternative point of view, and it’s really important that we hear them and reflect on them. So thank you very much once again to everyone. Now Distinguished Delegates, we’ll now, as I said earlier, or rather yesterday, we have about one hour and 40 minutes. I have about 30 delegations, in fact 30. five delegations which have asked to speak. So I have to do what I wasn’t planning to do, which is to put a three-minute time limit and a microphone cutoff. Don’t look at this as the chair being nasty and mean, trying to muzzle you, but look at it as us collectively sharing a limited resource, which is time. And I encourage delegations to stay within the time limit, and I will, well, we’ll have to be fair to all delegations. One option is to let you speak, and then we’ll have to adjourn at 1 p.m., but that will not be fair to delegations which are not able to speak. There’s no easy way out, but I think I’d like to give everyone an equal opportunity, so that we collectively share the limited resource of an available time, and that collective sense of sharing that limited resource in itself is what this exercise has always been about, about creating a community, creating understanding, and listening to each other as well, listening to everyone, so that we give everyone a chance. So with those remarks, I will now open the floor, not open the floor, I mean, rather I will go to the list of speakers that we had left from yesterday morning, which starts with El Salvador and Switzerland. Now, as your name is announced, some of you have also indicated to the Secretary that you would like to withdraw your request for the floor. That is appreciated as a way of saving time. As you are given the floor, if you would like to withdraw your request for the floor, that will also be noted, but if you would like to make your intervention, then we will allocate three minutes to your delegation and to all delegations. So, El Salvador to be followed by Switzerland, and the speakers list yesterday was from sections A to F, but if you choose to address also the section on RID by all means. And then I also have some remaining speakers from yesterday afternoon on the RID section, about six speakers. So all in all, we have about 30 speakers, about 35 speakers. So let’s listen to everyone this morning. El Salvador to be followed by Switzerland.

El Salvador: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Looking at the remaining sections of the panel report, our comments will be very brief. Regarding norms, rules and principles of responsible behavior, we welcome the redrafting of paragraph 34C by eliminating the reference to non-state actors, which we believe consistent with the applicability of the framework for responsible behavior. We also welcome the rewording of paragraph 34E and the addition of 34N, which recognize the voluntary nature of these norms and how they are complementary with international law. When it comes to international law, as many delegations have stated when they took the floor before me, we believe that this section does not fully reflect the tenor of the discussions over the last few years and would be better if there were more progressive language. In particular, we regret the deletion in new paragraph of 46 of an important reference as to how these references by operations using ICT can mean use of force when comparable with traditional means. Indeed, the previous language of 42B was more accurate, particularly regarding future areas for discussion, such as obligations on territorial integrity, the importance of life and the protection of critical infrastructure and data under international law. Lastly, we regret that there is no inclusion of any significant reference to the implementation of IHL in cyberspace, in particular here regarding the limitation of cyber operations in context of armed conflict, the protection of critical infrastructure against cyber attacks, and also the implementation of IHL doesn’t legitimate cyberspace as an area for conflict. When it comes to confidence, CBM, we like the new wording in the new paragraph 46F when it comes to implementation of J, the provision on responsibilities, and also recommendation 58, looking at the capacity building aligned with the needs of developing countries and their priorities, respecting their national sovereignty and approval there. As many countries have said, it is vital to retain focus on a national capacity in this final report. This is not just a priority for developing countries. It is essential for the digital ecosystem. We would like to say that we support this capacity building initiative as suggested and the sponsorship program looking at experts being used in capitals. The speaker is interrupted.

Chair: Thank you very much, El Salvador, for your contribution to send us your statement. Switzerland has asked for the floor to be followed by Paraguay.

Switzerland: Thank you, Chair, for giving us the floor again. We initially wanted to comment on Chapter C, D, E, and F. However, in the interest of time, I will focus on international law and we will send our full statement to the Secretariat. However, we strongly regret this unequal treatment and the cutoff. On international law, we would first of all like to congratulate Thailand and the Republic of Korea on the publication of their national positions. on the application of international law in cyberspace and New Zealand on their updated position. Over the last five years, many states and regional organizations published their national positions on how international law applies. They are an invaluable source of clarifying the law, and they draw a clear picture. Cyberspace is not a lawless space, neither in peacetime nor during armed conflicts. Indeed, discussions on international law, particularly IHL, have developed substantially over the past five years. As numerous previous speakers have mentioned, this is particularly evident in the many contributions to the debate, especially across regional working papers, but also in the publication of many national and regional positions on the application of international law. However, this progress is not yet adequately reflected. Chair, we think that you have a unique opportunity to reflect the rich discussions that took place, and we trust you that you will try to do so in REV2 and give the text the necessary balance, as this is not the case yet. Therefore, now in detail to chapter D. In PARA 40C, the sentence, start quote, an ICT operation may constitute the use of force when its scale and effects are comparable to non-ICT operations, rising to the level of a use of force, end quote, has been deleted at the end. It needs to be reinstated as requested by Brazil, the UK, and many others. With regards to PARA 41, we welcome the mention of state responsibility, due diligence, and international humanitarian law in the list of topics. However, international human rights law should also be included here, as this was discussed and raised by numerous delegations, as well as the cross-regional paper on areas of convergence. We support the good proposition by Poland. We welcome the mentioning of the two cross-regional working papers on IHL and on areas of convergence. What we can’t understand is why PARA 41 refers to the document A-77-984, as this is not a contribution to the substantive discussions of the concrete application of international law in cyberspace, but a proposal on a convention. This reference needs to be deleted. The phrase and the possibility of. additionally legally binding obligations has nothing to do with the application of existing international law in cyberspace, we propose to delete it. We welcome the positions of the AU and the European Union that are mentioned. The same applies to the resolution of the 34th International Conference. However, since the resolution represents a consensus outcome, we believe it merits a separate paragraph. We support the proposal made by the Netherlands, propose adding substantive language on IHL from OP4 of the resolution. More generally on IHL, I would like to refer to the joint statement by the co-chairs of the ICT work stream on.

Chair: Thank you very much, Switzerland, and thank you for your understanding as well. Paraguay to be followed by Mauritius.

Paraguay: See, the law went up. Yes, thank you. Good morning, sir. I think looking at what was said yesterday, we still have outstanding the applicability of international law to cyberspace, and in particular, the charter of the UN, which has clear principles and purposes when it comes to sovereign equality of states and when it comes to maintaining peace and security in the international arena and supporting friendly relations amongst nations. This is especially referred to in the preamble to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Paraguay. Mauritius to be followed by South Africa.

Mauritius: Thank you for giving me the floor, Chair. The Mauritian delegation would like to reflect on agenda items C, D, E, and F. In the interest of time and taking into consideration the Chair’s guidance, we will limit our intervention to the most salient points. In line with paragraph 34B on rules, norms, and principles of responsible state behavior, we emphasize the importance of a whole-of-government approach. implementation of norms. We also wish to highlight that regional organizations can play a critical role in supporting and complementing national implementation efforts. Therefore we propose that the language be strengthened to read states emphasize the importance of whole of government coordination in the national implementation of voluntary non-binding norms of responsible state behavior and in raising awareness of these norms across all relevant sectors. In this context states recognize that regional organizations can serve as vital partners in facilitating the implementation process particularly by supporting capacity building efforts promoting regional cooperation and addressing shared challenges stemming from technical gaps diverse legal systems and regional specificities. We further believe that since paragraph 34 B and K are interrelated it could be beneficial to integrate the content of the two paragraphs into a single cohesive paragraph keeping the essence of global regional and national aspects. Moving on to paragraph 34 F we affirm that the designation of CI and CII remains a sovereign prerogative and we support the development of national risk assessments training programs and frameworks to ensure their protection and we believe that for an effective CI or CII framework implementation the first step is the identification of critical services and owners and this is often a challenging task for many developing states. We therefore recommend that the comprehensive guideline on the identification of CII be developed as part of the activities of the future permanent mechanism. Now with regards to confidence building measures we express our full support for the global POC directory and to ensure meaningful and inclusive participation we encourage efforts to support POCs from developing countries to participate in in person and call for comprehensive capacity building support to empower all states to actively engage with the directory. Now coming to capacity building, we express support for new initiatives such as the proposed digital tool for norms implementation and the UN Cyber Resilience Academy under UNIDEA. We believe that these tools can provide practical support and long-term resources for states, especially those with limited capacities. I thank you,

Chair: Chair. Thank you, Mauritius. South Africa to be followed by Australia.

South Africa: Thank you, Chair. The South African delegation agrees with the sections on norms and international law as drafted and we wish to make a brief remark on the norms section. Paragraph 34E in the norms section clearly outlines the purpose of common templates for requesting assistance and responding to requests. Therefore, we propose renaming annexure 2 to better reflect this purpose. Specifically, we suggest changing the title to templates for requests for assistance instead of template for communication. We consider this the common template an essential tool for both requesting assistance and responding to requests which can be implemented on a voluntary basis. We appreciate the recognition in subparagraph 34M of the value of developing targeted ICT security capacity building programs to address implementation challenges and capacity gaps. Paragraph 34P and Q accurately reflect the group’s discussions over the past four and a half years and we support their attention. South Africa also support the inclusion of annex 1, the voluntary checklist of implementation. Turning to section E and F, South Africa supports the sections on confidence building measures and capacity building as drafted with a minor proposal on paragraph 46B to delete part of the sentence after footnote. 67. That is the sentence starting with noting also that the principles of the POC directory as encapsulated in annex A of the second APR should be retained until the POC is fully operational without burdening the directory with additional responsibilities. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you, South Africa. Australia to be followed by Republic of Korea.

Australia: Thank you, Chair. I’m taking the floor on items E and F. Australia aligns itself with the Pacific Islands Forum Statement and makes the following remarks in its national capacity. On confidence building measures, we welcome many of the amendments that have been made in Rev 1. On paragraph 46E and 50, we suggest the template for communications be retitled voluntary template for communications to underscore this point and be consistent with the voluntary checklist of practical actions. On paragraph 45L, we do not consider it appropriate to include a reference to one CBM proposal made by a single state which has not been thoroughly discussed or widely supported and strongly recommend deleting it. On capacity building which is foundational to developing the capabilities necessary to increase state cyber security and resilience and implementing the framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. We must also be conscious of the context of UN80 and we need capacity building that is cost efficient, leverages existing resources and avoids duplication. On paragraph 54, while Australia supports the objectives of the global roundtable, it is unclear how they would interact with capacity building discussions in the plenary or dedicated thematic groups, when they would be scheduled or how they would be funded. We therefore support France’s updated proposal to convene the global roundtable under DTG1 on resilience. We also support Brazil’s suggestion to delete high level to give more flexibility on the format and level of participation. On paragraph 56, in principle Australia supports a sponsorship program funded by voluntary contributions to assist LDC’s, LLDC’s and SIDS participation and to encourage the full equal and meaningful participation of women in future permanent mechanism meetings. In practice Australia is a proud sponsor of the Women in International Security and Cyberspace Fellowship which has supported over 120 women from 55 countries to participate in the OEWG and is considered best practiced and cost-efficient. We strongly support retaining reference to it in paragraph 52 M. We also note the French, Irish and Singaporean sponsorship programs. On paragraph 57 agreeing to continue discussions on a UN voluntary fund is already covered under paragraph 53. It is premature to prescribe the direction of discussions especially in the context of major fiscal constraints and many alternative funding instruments available. Thank you chair.

Chair: Thank you Australia. Republic of Korea to be followed by Latvia.

Republic of Korea: Thank you chair I’m taking the floor to speak on CBM and capacity building. Chair on CBM we align ourselves with the statement by the representative of Ghana yesterday and we believe that the purpose of CBM is to reduce misunderstanding, enhance predictability and prevent the escalation of conflicts. In this regard we would like to underscore the critical role of information sharing through the global point of contact network. For the POC network to function effectively as a CBM it is crucial to ensure a broad participation by member states. In this regard we welcome paragraph 46 E which encourages the flexible and voluntary use of the POC template developed by the secretariat. Chair in line with the CBM 5 and 6 Republic of Korea has been hosting the world emerging security forum since 2021. At the fourth forum held last December, we brought together a wide range of stakeholders including government officials, private sector experts, academia, and civil society to discuss key issues including AI governance, the risks associated with the AIWMD nexus, and international cooperation in response to cyber threats. This year we’re pleased to announce that the fifth world emerging security forum will be held on September 8th in Seoul under the theme the evolution of a hybrid threats and international security. We sincerely hope to see active participation and interest from fellow member states. On capacity building, chair, while we welcome international support for a capacity building, we believe that the most important factor for its success is establishing a structure that’s both realistic and implementable. In this regard, we are somewhat concerned that the current draft report proposes rather excessive number of new initiatives. While well-intentioned, this may actually reduce the effectiveness and efficiency of implementation. Creating a new fund or a program does not automatically result in funding or a follow-through. It is essential to assess overlaps with existing system and explore ways to align and streamline to ensure concrete implementation. In this regard, we do not see the necessity of paragraph 52J. I’ll stop here. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you, ROK. Latvia to be followed by Cuba.

Latvia: Thank you, chair. I will make two short statements, national and joint. Nationally, Latvia aligns itself with the statement by the European Union, and I would like to stress that my delegation fully supports establishment of cross-cutting, action-oriented thematic groups. We share your view that decisions on the group should not be postponed. We believe that compromise proposal by France to establish groups drawing on existing formulations from Revision 1 is the right way to go. In line with the proposal, the groups to, A, increase the resilience and ICT security of states. Second, to enhance concrete actions and cooperative measures to address threats and to promote an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful ICTs, and third, to promote maintaining peace, security, and stability in ICT environment would provide the future mechanism with the action-oriented tools it requires. It would enable issue-based approach drawing on all pillars of the framework. Chair, now I would like to switch to a joint statement on behalf of Vietnam and Latvia concerning the specific element in the capacity building section. We welcome the PARA 52I which refers to establishment of a UN Cyber Resilience Academy within UNIDIR as proposed by Latvia together with Vietnam and supported by many other member states including today. That said, we regret that the proposal has not found a place in the recommendation part of the report which would envisage a clear way forward to its implementation. There is a clear demand for capacity building in the future permanent mechanism. The report in its current form has identified the issues and proposed a roadmap for the way forward. However, we believe that the implementation modality is still missing. The UN Cyber Resilience Academy within UNIDIR is meant exactly to be this implementation mechanism. Therefore, we would still call on you for adding a sentence in the recommendation part of the capacity building section that reads, decides to establish a Cyber Resilience Academy hosted within UNIDIR supported by voluntary contributions to conduct the research and capacity building activities on cyber security and resilience issues under the auspices of the Academy. With this, I thank you, Ms. Chair, and wish you all the luck you need to conclude these negotiations in a positive manner.

Cuba: on confidence building measures, we would like to emphasize our support for retaining the reference in paragraph 46L to the new measure proposed in the OEWG on the facilitation of access of all states to the market of security goods and services for ICTs. When it comes to the section on capacity building, we want once again to say how important this is in order to eliminate the deep and increasingly growing digital divide affecting developing countries. We support that language remain robust here with the specific proposals that are reflected in the current section F. Diluting, rendering conditional or limiting capacity building would only be against a global response that could really counter the threats looming in security and the use of ICTs. Budgetary constraints and the UN, essentially because of the denial of the major contributor, cannot be used as a pretext when it comes to addressing the needs of developing countries. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you. Tunisia to be followed by the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Tunisia: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the floor. The Arab group would like to refer to the intervention that called for deleting 52A and I, which relates to supporting the implementation of rules and norms under the pretext that this initiative was not addressed in previous discussions, Mr. Chairman, in this context. The Arab Group reiterates that this initiative was formally proposed during the 9th session and it was supported through a visual presentation that was uploaded to the OAEWG website by Kuwait in order to make it accessible to all delegations. The initiative enjoyed the support of a number of states during the 9th and 10th sessions and the Arab Group reiterated its full support of the initiative in a formal statement during the 10th session and this is also available on the website. Therefore we emphasize that we should maintain this paragraph. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chair: Thank you very much, Tunisia. Kingdom of the Netherlands to be followed by the Dominican Republic.

Kingdom of the Netherlands: Thank you, Chair. We align ourselves with the statements of the EU as well as the statement delivered by Ghana on behalf of the cross-regional group of the Open Ended Working Group Confidence Builders and we would like to add the additional remarks in our national capacity. Being grateful for all the work this Open Ended Working Group has put into the development of the eight CBMs, we believe that now is the time to focus on their operationalization and therefore we join others that the report should not list new proposals that were barely discussed and we echo the call by others to delete paragraph 46L and annex 2. Moreover, while we agree that the implementation of norm J is important, we are cautious to single out this norm on reporting of ICT vulnerabilities in paragraph 46F under this CBMs chapter and not the other norms. In paragraph 46J, we ask to explicitly recognize the role of regional organizations and the technical community alongside other stakeholders as they play a critical role in the implementation of CBMs. Lastly, on paragraph 47. As we have encountered obstacles with the practice of the POC directory, we are in favor of first focusing on the effective, inclusive and constructive operationalization before developing it further. Therefore, we wish to include the language, quote, in a step-by-step manner, end quote, as also mentioned in paragraph 46C. Chair, allow me to turn now to capacity building. Underlying that capacity building should be an essential element in the future mechanism, we have highlighted the proposal on functions on capacity building in the future mechanism under regular institutional dialogue. So now I will only focus on some additional text proposals. We took note of paragraph 52B on the need to enhance availability of capacity building and leadership programs, and we would be keen to see other active fellowships with a similar objective reflected. For example, the Women in Cyber Fellowship. Regarding paragraph 52E and F on the ICT security corporation and capacity building portal, we see merit of the portal serving as an official website in the future permanent mechanism. We do have concerns regarding the other functions and the complementarity with existing initiatives. And then finally, with respect to paragraph 58, we propose replacing while respecting national ownership and sovereignty with while respecting the principles of capacity building. The capacity principles adopted in 2021, the Open Ended Working Group Consensus Report, also already encompass national ownership and sovereignty, but also other elements. I thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you. Netherlands, Dominican Republic to be followed by Italy.

Dominican Republic: Gracias, President. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I shall just provide you with a very summary version of our full paper, which has been provided both in Spanish and English electronically. We didn’t have the opportunity to speak in any previous session because it doesn’t appear fair to us. It would give us only three minutes this morning. Section C, our delegation once again want to express its support for voluntary norms for responsible behaviour in cyberspace. We like the inclusion of practical measures and we support the existing norms and the good practices referred to here, particularly when it comes to critical infrastructure and supply chains. We think it’s appropriate to have references to regional provisions such as those adopted in some South American states in line with the AWG and also reference to cyber defenders. We recall that recently there’s been adoption of the practices on critical infrastructure, looking at all possible dangers there. And we support national capacity building in order really to look at the threats from ICTs. Looking at the international law, particularly the UN Charter is fully applicable to cyberspace. We welcome the reference to regional positions and we support the future mechanism continue to be discussed in the practical implementation of international law in the future. We welcome the reference to voluntary national positions and we shall be publishing our recommendations shortly. When it comes to critical mechanisms, we would say that we want to consider international law, UNIDIR in particular, in connection with South America, when it comes to E and confidence building measures of the OAS and cyberspace. We support CBNs in order to avoid misunderstanding and to strengthen interstate cooperation. We welcome the establishment of the global POC and we urge all states to… a POC and improve interoperability with existing mechanisms. We hope that it will be possible to connect regional directories so that we will be able to improve notification in the case of serious incidents. We support the development of a cyber incident global scale for, or common scale for requirements here. Then F, we believe that we should cover all pillars of the OEWG looking at cybernetics and digital rights. And we are proud to note a particular initiative such as that for particularly appreciated by our states. We support the global capacitation or confidence building portal. We want to see a redoubling of forces, but not duplication when it comes to cooperation here with developing countries. And the speaker is Guillotine.

Chair: Thank you very much, Dominican Republic. And thank you also for your understanding. Please do share with us your full statement. I give the floor now to Italy to be followed by Sweden.

Italy: Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor. Italy fully aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union. And we’d like to add the following element on section F from a national perspective. Italy considers cyber capacity building to be a central and cross-cutting component of the work of the OEWG, as well as of the future permanent mechanism. CCB is also at the core of our national cyber diplomacy. That’s why we sincerely attach a great deal of importance to it. We believe that the draft final report allows for some improvements. In fact, the inclusion of several proposals, some of which not properly discussed, risk undermining the overall coherence of. the section, see for example paragraph 52i. Furthermore, there seems to be an overemphasis on financial instruments at paragraphs 52j, 56 and 57, at the expense of a more integrated policy vision on what CCB is and how it can be carried out in a sustainable and inclusive way. At the same time, we must strive to avoid duplication and fragmentation. Existing tools and mechanisms, including the ongoing efforts of UNODA, UNIDIR, ITU and the work of multi-stakeholder platforms such as the GFC, should be leveraged more systematically. Italy also touched particular importance to promoting multi-stakeholder engagement. Effective capacity building cannot happen in silos. That’s why we strongly support an approach that actively involves governments, the private sector, academia, NGOs and civil society. Governments alone cannot always deliver what is needed. Technical and informed voices are indispensable for a successful and effective CCB. That’s why we believe that the language of paragraph 52m is too weak in this respect. In conclusion, Italy reaffirms its commitment to promoting a constructive and results-oriented dialogue on CCB. The latter is cross-cutting by nature and therefore we strongly support the structure of DTGs in the future permanent mechanism, as proposed by France with the cyber POA, in order to bridge the various gaps states are confronted with. We trust in your leadership, Mr. Chair, to shape a chapter on CCB that is realistic and implementable. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you. Thank you, Italy. Sweden, to be followed by Zimbabwe. Thank you, Chair.

Sweden: As previously mentioned, Sweden fully aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union, as well as the Nordic statement delivered by Finland. Sweden regrets that the new language in paragraph 15, that is reading exclusively peaceful. purposes. This diverts from previously agreed language and denies both the obligations and the rights given to states under international law, as elaborated on by multiple states, among others by Ukraine. Sweden therefore supports the language proposal put forward by Australia. Sweden also supports Italy’s remark on paragraph 15 regarding the potential hybrid use of ICTs. Sweden regrets that in paragraph 40c the reference to when an ICT operation may constitute a use of force has been deleted. Sweden requests its reinsertion. Chair, the UN framework of responsible state behavior and the UN key is what give us stability and security in the ICT domain. We cannot risk weakening the framework at this stage. Considering this, in paragraph 33, the UN framework must be given equal weight as the development of cooperative measures to counter threats facing states. And the overall balance in the report must be strengthened to reaffirm the UN framework and the UN key. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you, Sweden. Zimbabwe to be followed by UK.

Zimbabwe: Thank you, Chair. In the interest of time, Zimbabwe would like to focus on agenda item 5, section F of your draft report, and would like to underscore the following in our national capacity. First, Chair, my delegation finds merit in needs-based and sustainable approaches to capacity building. In this regard, we support the UN framework and the UN key. Second, Chair, I would like to underscore the importance of needs-based and sustainable approaches to capacity building. In this regard, we support the call for tailored, gender-responsive capacity building initiatives referenced in paragraphs 52A and 52B that address national gaps in ICT security, institutional strengthening, technical skills transfer, and leadership development. to proceed and include the points that were raised regarding institutional capacity building, which is important. We stress the importance of a South-South and triangular cooperation, as highlighted in paragraph 52C, to complement traditional North-South partnerships leveraging on shared regional experiences in Africa and beyond. Second, my delegation welcomes the proposal under paragraph 52E to 55 on the global ICT security cooperation portal, which is defined as a neutral member state-driven one-stop shop for capacity building resources. This portal must prioritize accessibility for developing countries and integrate with existing mechanisms to avoid duplication. Third, my delegation recognizes the value of strengthening computer emergency response teams, including computer security incident response teams through a structured mentorship program, joint training initiatives, and robust information sharing mechanisms. As highlighted in paragraph 52D of the report, such efforts are critical for enhancing Africa’s cyber resilience in the face of evolving threats. Zimbabwe, therefore, calls for increased international cooperation and targeted technical assistance aimed at developing and reinforcing regional set capabilities, particularly within the African context. This would bridge the digital divide while contributing meaningfully to building a secure, stable, and resilient cyberspace for all. Chair, we also welcome the inclusion of a regular high-level global roundtable as a means to sustain political momentum on capacity building initiatives. In particular, we support inclusive participation, as outlined in paragraph 52M, notably the involvement of the youth, academia, and the private sector in these dialogues. Such engagement under agreed modalities of participation is essential to ensuring that capacity building efforts are responsive. forward-looking and reflective of the diverse stakeholder shaping the global digital landscape. Chair, Zimbabwe emphasizes that the future permanent mechanism should prioritize concrete

Chair: Thank you very much, Zimbabwe. UK, to be followed by Colombia.

United Kingdom: Thank you, Chair. On confidence-building measures, we would like to add two additional sentences to 46B, which draws on consensus text of the second annual progress report, highlighting the voluntary, practical, and neutral nature of the POC, as well as taking into account the work of computer emergency response teams and computer security incident response teams, who will send our full proposal in writing. We also support paragraph 46D. Regarding paragraph 46E and 50, we appreciate the improvements in Rev. 1, but note the points raised by others, namely Australia, US, and France. In the final sentence in paragraph 46G and 49, we would like to add, in accordance with the state’s national policies and legislations, end quote, at the end of the last sentence. This language is from Annex A of the second APR. Regarding paragraph 46L, we are not comfortable with the elevation of a proposal by a single state in this way. We therefore agree with comments made by many others that this language should be removed. On capacity building, as stated yesterday, we continue to hear the broad consensus that capacity building should be at the heart of the future mechanism. Rev. 2, and particularly Annex 3, could draw more on the proposals that we’ve heard, including the 11 key functions by a group of Latin American states. In this regard, we continue to support further consideration of the proposals put forward by France and the Netherlands. We also agree with a large number of states that have said we should recognize the very difficult fiscal circumstances of the UN, and we therefore caution against initiatives that will increase financial burdens during the ongoing UNAT reforms. In this regard, the first sentence of Paragraph 55 should read States agree to establish a dedicated global ICT security, cooperation and capacity building portal within existing resources, taking into account Paragraphs 51E, F and G. In 52B, we welcome the addition of the words mutually agreed, but they should also be included in the first and penultimate sentences of 52D. We will send this amendment in writing. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, UK. Before I give the floor to Colombia, I have received a request from the Russian Federation to make a procedural point. Russia, you have the floor, please.

Russian Federation: Distinguished Chair, our delegation would like to once again point out to the Secretariat that there is a continuing problem with interruption in the webcast of this OEWG meeting in Russia through the UN Web TV website. Our experts have not been able to take part in person in today’s meeting, therefore are essentially being excluded from following our discussions at this very important session of the group. I’d like to once again underscore that this runs counter to the principles of transparency and participation of states in the activities of OEWG. We ask you to provide support and to take measures to rectify the situation immediately. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you, Russian Federation. I was not aware of this technical problem with regard to UN Web TV. I think it happened once before during this week, so I kindly ask the Secretariat to look into this. I think the point made by the Russian Federation is a fair one. Ultimately, if we have UN Web TV, it should be accessible to all around the world, and this recurring problem does create an issue, a reasonable grounds that Russia has. So can I request that the Secretary address this, and hopefully we’ll get an update at a later stage. Thank you, Russian Federation. We’ll continue with the list of speakers. Colombia, to be followed by Ghana. Colombia, please.

Colombia: Thank you, sir. This is a summarized version of what we have to say. Looking at the paragraph on norms and principles, we support the list of practical actions for the implementation of the norms, including the recommendation, including paragraph 37 on international law. We welcome the inclusion and the reference to the working documents on international law and IHL, as submitted by the regional group of countries, Colombia included therein. However, in order to move towards a more broader consensus, we think that this could be dealt with thematically in connection with the content of these documents. We also support the proposal from other delegations on this paragraph on C and D, on the importance of developing national positions. I’d like to say that in Colombia’s case, it was a determining experience working with other countries in outlining our national position. And here we would like to make the following suggestion on paragraph 42D, as a reaction there to our positions. We’d like to add practices in the process of their elaboration. On capacity building, for various sessions now, a group of countries from my region and others have submitted working documents and statements on capacity building. These are intended to provide practical considerations here. My delegation believes it’s important to include the reference to these documents and therefore we propose this in paragraph 52 after chair’s national experience that as views of groups of the states on international cooperation and capacity building. Finalmente, then lastly on paragraph 55 we support the proposal made recently by the UK. Thank you very much.

Chair: Thank you very much Columbia. Ghana to be followed by Uruguay.

Ghana: Thank you chair. Ghana aligns itself with a statement delivered yesterday by the African group on capacity building. We welcome and support paragraph 52B which underscores the importance of tailoring capacity building initiatives to the specific context and priorities of member states. My delegation also joins others in expressing strong support for the UN Voluntary Fund. In this regard Ghana welcomes paragraphs 52J and 57 and we are of the view that these should be retained in the final report. We also support paragraph 56 on the establishment of a sponsorship program administered by the UN Secretariat. Ghana supports the proposal to establish a dedicated global portal for ICT security cooperation and capacity building and looks forward to its timely operationalization. We also recognize the importance of existing initiatives such as the high-level global roundtable on ICT security as well as fellowships like the Women in International Security and Cyberspace Fellowship and the UN Singapore Cyber Fellowship. In this regard we express support for the creation of an additional fellowship program under the auspices of the United Nations. Finally we support the views expressed regarding the vital role of regional organizations in capacity building and the importance of showcasing the impactful initiatives already underway. We likewise welcome the proposal to establish a cyber resilience academy hosted by UNIDIR as a further step towards strengthening global capacity in this area. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much Ghana. Uruguay, to be followed by Ukraine.

Uruguay: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Uruguay has participated in the Group on Confidence-Building Measures together with Germany, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile and Colombia, Ghana, inter alia, and this is in line with our working document submitted by our country, believing that this is fundamental for the peaceful use of cyberspace and strengthening capacities here and minimizing conflict. We also appreciate the list of voluntary measures, including implementation of the PACE directory and looking at CBMs under the future standing mechanism. And lastly, we emphasize the work done regionally and sub-regionally to build confidence, such as in the OAS. And we wish to look at specific priorities and context here. We wish to see these organizations connected with the future standing body. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much. Uruguay, Ukraine, to be followed by Cameroon.

Ukraine: Thank you, Chair. As we advance in the discussions, Ukraine fully aligns itself with the statements previously delivered by the European Union and our delegation would like to make some additional remarks in its national capacity on CBMs. At the outset, we cannot but recognize the progress that UAWG has achieved on this issue, which includes the adoption of eight CBMs and the establishment of the POC directory. Turning to the revised draft final report, Ukraine does not support the development of additional CBMs at this stage. We observe that the potential of the CBMs already in place has not been explored to its fullest yet. The example illustrating how CBMs used, particularly CBM-3, can already add to the functioning of the future permanent mechanism was given during yesterday’s intervention by Ukraine. We would also suggest refraining from the inclusion of such proposals as the development of technical ICT terms and terminologies, since such proposals have not been discussed in depth. In general, we emphasize the need to focus on the further development and implementation of the eight agreed CBMs and further effective functioning of the POC directory. Therefore, at this stage, we should ensure that the POC directory is fully functionable. for moving to the further development of this mechanism. On capacity building, Ukraine supports the convening of regular global roundtables on ICT security capacity building under the auspices of the Future Permanent Mechanism. However, we would suggest that such roundtables are held at the expert level rather than at the high level. We believe that such meetings could include capacity building practitioners, representatives of states, and other interested parties and stakeholders, including businesses, non-governmental organizations, and others. We also support the establishment of a dedicated global ICT security cooperation capacity building portal, paragraph 55. However, we consider it is important to avoid the duplication with the existing initiatives, such as cyber policy portal of UNIDIR and civil portal of the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise. We remain committed to working constructively towards achieving a positive outcome at this session. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much. Ukraine, Cameroon, to be followed by Vietnam.

Cameroon: Thank you, Chair, for giving my delegation the floor once more. My delegation would like to make the following remarks on section E and section F. On section E, which focuses on capacity building measures, and paragraph 48, which focuses on global POC directory, Cameroon supports the functioning of the POC directory, but proposes amending paragraph 48 to include the director shall integrate regional POC networks to enhance incident response, leveraging the template in annex 2. This addition reinforces paragraph 46b on the POC’s contact directory’s purpose, and paragraph 11 on regional organization. On paragraph 49, which focuses on the simulation exercises, we propose the addition of this statement. Exercises should prioritize scenarios affecting least developing countries, with post-exercise reports shared via the global ICT security cooperation portal. On capacity building in section F, my delegation emphasizes the critical importance of section F. particularly Paragraph 57 on the proposed UN Voluntary Fund. To transform this concept into actionable progress, my delegation proposes the following amendment. In Paragraph 57, the current text should be replaced with, the future permanent mechanism shall operationalize a UN Voluntary Fund by 2026 with resources prioritized for least developing countries and African states in accordance with the ICT security capacity and building principles in the 2021 OEWG report in Paragraph 56. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Cameron, for your statement. Give the floor now to Vietnam, please.

Viet Nam: Thank you, Chair. I’m delivering this statement on behalf of a cross-regional group of states. That includes Australia, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Germany, Kiribati, Moldova, the Netherlands, Papua New Guinea, Romania, Thailand, Uruguay, Vanuatu, and Vietnam. We have come a long way. Over the years of this OEWG, states from all regions have engaged in increasingly detained and substantive discussion on international law. These discussions have helped reinforce capacity, bring confidence, and deepen our common understanding on how international law applies in cyberspace. These common understandings on international law are key output of this OEWG. Our cross-regional group has presented proposals in our paper that represent areas of emerging convergence on international law, based on our discussions, and has also reflected in state’s national positions. Regrettably, the current iteration of the report does not reflect these important understandings that we have reached. We are prepared to be flexible. We are open to compromise. In this period, we would therefore like to propose the following streamlined and qualified language for inclusion in the report under new sub-paragraphs in this Paragraph 40. The language reads as follows, Paragraph 40, at the OEWG’s focused discussion on how the national law applies to the use of ICTs states in the earlier new Paragraph F, sub-discussed the need to respect and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms both online and offline in accordance with their respective obligations, G, discussed how there can be an internationally wrongful act of a state when its use of ICTs is attributable to it and constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the state, H, discussed how international humanitarian law applies to activities using ICTs within an armed conflict including where applicable the established international legal principles of humanity, necessity, proportionality, and distinction. We hope that the report can, at a minimum, faithfully capture a factual record of our discussion within the OEWG. We look forward to working with all states to ensure that our hard work, rich discussion, and progress are appropriately reflected. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Vietnam, for the statement. India had asked for the floor. Are you able to take the floor now? Okay. So we’ll come back to India. I give the floor now to the ICRC and Interpol, two intergovernmental organizations which had asked for the floor since Monday, and I apologize to them as well for, first of all, making them wait and, of course, for the limited time that is available to them but also to others. So ICRC followed by Interpol.

ICRC: Excellent season. Ambassador Gafoor, the International Committee of the Red Cross is grateful for the opportunity to participate in this final substantive session of the Open-Ended Working Group. Today there are over 130 armed conflicts around the world. ICT activities are an integral part of many of these conflicts. You, the delegations in this room, have the important task of building common understandings on the international legal rules that limit malicious ICT activities, prevent escalation in new wars, and protect civilian populations against harm if conflict erupts. This Open-Ended Working Group has done an unprecedented job in setting out today’s ICT threats. The ICRC can attest that many of these exact threats materialize in today’s armed conflicts. Our colleagues in countries affected by armed conflicts have documented cyber operations aimed at disrupting or destroying essential services for civilian populations. These operations put the lives and well-being of civilian populations in danger. Excellencies, in light of these acute threats, the ICRC sees great value in paragraphs 38 to 41 of the draft report, which referenced the multiple agreements that states have reached on the application of international law, including international humanitarian law, to the use of ICTs. This Open-Ended Working Group has provided a central platform for such discussions, building on the work of several GGEs and the last Open-Ended Working Group, as well as other important processes such as the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. Through global, regional, and cross-regional cooperation, we today have overwhelming agreement to a humanitarian red line in the use of ICTs. IHL prohibits to attack civilian objects, to target hospitals, to launch indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks, including in the use of ICTs. During this final week of intergovernmental negotiations, the ICRC calls on all delegations to reflect this humanitarian red line in the final report. As said by many delegations in this working group, additional discussions are needed to ensure that IHL is effectively applied to the use of ICTs in armed conflicts. Whether this is done by building common understandings on existing law or through an additional legally binding instrument, such negotiations must not cast doubt or undermine the existing legal protection for civilian populations affected by armed conflicts. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, ICRC, for your contribution. Interpol, please.

Interpol: Mr. Chair, Excellencies and colleagues, thank you for this opportunity. Today, ICT security is not just a technical concern. It is a defining issue for global stability, peace, and sustainable development. In this context, Interpol welcomes Member States’ recognition in paragraph 16 of Rev. 1 of the threats posed by the criminal misuse of ICTs, given its significant potential to disrupt essential services and cause serious harm. And the threat is growing. Interpol’s latest Africa Cyber Threat Assessment reported an alarming increase in cybercrime incidents across the continent. One country saw over 17,000 ransomware detections, while another faced a 3,000 percent rise in scam alerts. These threats are not limited to one region. Across the globe, we’re seeing sophisticated criminal networks using techniques like phishing, malware, and deepfakes to target citizens, governments, and businesses. These threats mirror many of those recognized in Section B of Rev. 1 and underscore the need for collective action. Faced with this rapidly evolving challenge, Interpol encourages member states to continue leveraging our global capabilities and network to address the criminal and terrorist use of ICTs in line with Norm D of the Framework on Responsible State Behavior. In support of this, we continue to strengthen trust and confidence building between our 196 member countries for practical law enforcement cooperation. Our relaunched Cybercrime Expert Group brings together over 170 experts from around the world to examine the evolving cyber threat landscape, including the implications of emerging technologies like AI. Interpol is also embarking on new initiatives to better support member states in countering current and emerging cyber threats. These include efforts to respond to cyber attacks targeting critical infrastructure and developing global strategies to combat the misuse of residential proxies, the expansion of IoT malware, and phishing attacks. We welcome interested partners to contribute to these efforts. As states have repeatedly emphasized throughout this OEWG, capacity building is both foundational and cross-cutting. With the support of partners like the European Union, the Council of Europe, and the United Kingdom, Interpol delivers capacity building tailored to the needs of frontline officers across different regions. These efforts are aimed at producing operational outcomes against specific cyber threats, a model that has enabled the dismantling of hundreds of thousands of malicious infrastructures and the arrest of thousands of suspects just over the last year. In closing, these results show what is possible when we work together. In this regard, Interpol is convinced that a future permanent mechanism, like the OEWG, can play a vital role in strengthening trust and confidence between states, the foundation on which effective international cooperation is built. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Interpol. Friends, we have completed the list of speakers that was outstanding from yesterday morning. And it’s now my intention to move to the other list of outstanding speakers, and there are six of them, with regard to the debate yesterday on regular institutional The list is as follows, Czechia, Guatemala, Mauritius, Belarus, Costa Rica, and New Zealand, plus India, which had asked for the floor earlier, but I think they are not yet ready to speak. We’ll give them a chance. So we have seven speakers left. I’m planning to take the list remaining as of yesterday. So we’ll start with Czechia, to be followed by Guatemala.

Czechia: Thank you, Mr. Chair. On the RID, we align ourselves with the statement delivered by the EU and add the following in our national capacity. The Czech Republic supports a structure of a future mechanism which will be inclusive, efficient, and action-oriented. That is why we reaffirm our support for the creation of thematic groups, and we stress that they should be cross-cutting, as it was very well described by our French colleague yesterday. A cross-cutting structure will best reflect the interconnected nature of cyber issues and ensure coherence across the mechanism’s work. Within one group, we will be able to discuss all aspects of a specific cyber issue, with the related threats, our potential reactions to them, and also the capacity-building needs which such threats are linked to. From our experience as a country providing cyber capacity-building, we can clearly see that especially such capacity-building, which derives from specifically articulated needs, is the most effective. And the cross-cutting thematic groups, which will focus on specific topics under three umbrella themes – stability, resilience, and cooperation – define specific threats and identify specific gaps that need to be addressed, would provide a perfect basis for a tailor-made approach to capacity-building. The discussions in the cross-cutting groups would be able to cover also all other related issues, including international law, implementation of norms, or anything else that may arise in the specific context. We strongly do not agree with the creation of a specific group on international law, as the discussions on law should not stay alone without being related to specific issues that the law addresses. We consider the format of cross-cutting thematic groups to be the most convenient. We also support the idea of a global roundtable on capacity building, and we would like to see a global roundtable that would be convenient for efficient and to-the-point discussions, which should aim at tackling the specific challenges that we are facing in cyberspace. We would still have the pillar discussions in the plenary, and we would be able to benefit in the plenary from the practical discussions held in the cross-cutting thematic groups and from their potential recommendations under a separate agenda item in the plenary, as suggested, for example, by the UN and the UNESCO, and we would be able to support the idea of a global roundtable on capacity building, and we would like to see a global roundtable on capacity building, and we would be able to support the idea of a global roundtable on capacity building, and we agree with Brazil to strike out the high level. Concerning the indicative timeline in Annex 3, while we see merit in having the plenary taking place back-to-back with the thematic groups, at the same time, we are a bit concerned about the possible loss of momentum of the discussions, with having all the meetings taking place over the course of the year, and we would like to see a more balanced manner throughout the year. Finally, we also underline the importance of a meaningful multistakeholder participation. Multistakeholders play an important role in identifying threats, in tackling them, and, very importantly, also in capacity building. We are truly convinced that, while this being an intergovernmental process, the future permanent mechanism must be inclusive in all possible aspects, and that is why we cannot agree with the word

Guatemala: mechanism to help us to continue with progress in the AWG. We believe that the transition should be a fluid one and in accordance with the principles upon which we agreed. We emphasize the need to avoid duplication of efforts and processes, particularly in a context where both technical and financial resources are limited. A new sole mechanism should consolidate the existing one, strengthen what’s already worked and harmonize rather than to fragment initiatives. We also support the creation of a moderate number of technical working groups and thematic ones. And we believe it is vital that one of these should focus specifically on the capacity building pillar. This is a priority for developing countries and must be addressed in a structural fashion, looking for specific and sustainable results. We highlight the working documents submitted by a group of countries from my region, seeking to include the various dimensions of capacity building and looking at the various needs there. A specific thematic group will ensure a systematic integrated approach, able to coordinate what is already being done. Guatemala also resoundingly supports the participation of relevant stakeholders, their technical, operational and political contribution is vital to ensure that we have a transparent and inclusive participation, strengthening the future mechanism. So, here we support Canada and Chile’s proposal. Lastly, Guatemala once again says that we are committed constructively to the process whereby a permanent mechanism will be established and we wish to offer our full support to the chair. We are sure that after the fruitful discussions in the OEWG, we will be able to have an effective and inclusive mechanism. one that is action oriented. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you Guatemala for your statement and for your support.

Mauritius: Mauritius to be followed by Belarus. Thank you Chair for giving us the floor. We take this opportunity to reaffirm our strong commitment to the establishment of a regular institutional dialogue on international ICT security through the operationalization of the future permit mechanism. We support the operationalization of the permit mechanism through thematic working groups as a practical and flexible modality to carry forward discussions and implementation. We believe that such a structure will promote targeted sustained engagement and provide an opportunity for state and stakeholders to exchange experiences, propose new ideas and address gaps based on their evolving needs. We believe the following elements must be addressed in the future mechanism. Within DTG1 we recommend the following a non-attributive threat information exchange platform supported by a technical partners. Both public and private should be set up at the level of UN. Moreover the existing guidance toolkits and repositories should be leveraged by states for the adoption of existing norms. At the same time the modalities for the creation of a new norms could be considered as stated by many other delegations. As regards to CBMH we also underscore the importance of ensuring that initiative developed under the OEWG such as global POC simulation exercises and capacity building roundtables are sustained and further developed under the future permit mechanism. Their integration into the mechanism future work schemes will be critical to operationalizing the framework and building trust. We also emphasize the partnerships with regional organizations that could serve as an implementation bridge for policy alignment and regional implementation as well as for supporting region specific CBMs. Coming to DTG2 we propose the following an inclusive legal forum including technical and legal experts legal advisors and other stakeholders to discuss the applicability of international law to state behavior in this hybrid space. A voluntary compilation of the state’s national positions on international law could be made available on existing repositories. For the DTG3 on capacity building we suggest the needs-based catalog is transition to the future permit mechanism. We also support the idea of convening the global roundtable on IEA. to security capacity building on a regular basis. We believe the participation of inter-area capacity building experts, practitioners, and other stakeholders, such as regional organizations, technical community, and NGOs is critical to accelerate the delivery of the capacity building. Regional organizations could act as implementation hubs to coordinate technical assistance, training, and knowledge exchange. They could also serve as the liaison bodies for the future payment mechanism. Furthermore, they could play an important role in facilitating regional dialogues and submit regional reports or positions to the UN. We also propose setting up a monitoring and evaluation framework for voluntary state reporting on implementation progress at national, regional, and global level. Dashboards, as well as regular reviews, forums, could facilitate the monitoring of the progress. In conclusion, Chair, we reaffirm our commitment to the early and effective establishment of the future payment mechanism. Thank you very much.

Chair: Thank you, Mauricio. Belarus, to be followed by Costa Rica.

Belarus: Distinguished Chair, at the outset, allow me to thank you and your team for your hard work over the past five years to ensure the continuation of the negotiation process as part of this working group, which is now in its final phase, as well as for preparing the draft final report on the work of the OEWG. We align ourselves with the state of Nicaragua on behalf of the like-minded states with regard to the draft final report. We believe that the basic principle underlying decision-making in the future mechanism must be consensus. Taking into account the views of all states is crucially important in decision-making for both substantive and procedural issues. In discussing the details of the thematic groups, as we mentioned before, it’s important to find an optimal balance between, on one hand, efforts to cover a large number of issues, and on the other hand, to maintain their unique specialized nature. At the same time, it’s important to note that the establishment of thematic groups is not a prerequisite. is it for the success of this concluding session. The main priority should be having a seamless transition between the current OEWG and the future mechanism without undermining its mandate and taking into account all five pillars. Therefore, we do not support at the current stage the first thematic group in its current proposed format, taking into account the need for a balance between norms and international law, as well as the importance of efforts for confidence building measures and capacity building. We propose creating a separate thematic group on standards and on confidence building measures. Given the rapid development of technology, the mandate of the future mechanism should include the possibility of developing the standards on important issues such as supply chains and data security. We support the consensus-based approach toward appointing co-chairs of the thematic groups. With regard to persuasion of stakeholders in the work of the future mechanism, we believe that priority should be given to the principles of national sovereignty. We support the current format of work. We are aware of the important contributions made to the work of the OEWG by non-state entities, but we believe that all decisions on NGO participation in sessions ought to be based on no objection from member states. And this is an intergovernmental process, first and foremost. In addition, participation of accredited, ECOSOC-accredited NGOs could be helpful for the future permanent mechanism. We believe the terminology of the report ought to be in line with the mandate of the group and previously agreed reports. And we also believe we should separate out the concepts of criminal activities in the area of ICT and harmful cyber activity. We also support including language on potentially developing legally binding norms that would reflect positions of the member states from the outset of the OEWG. We believe that… norms of IHL that are applicable in times of armed conflicts are not sufficient for regulating ICT issues.

Chair: Thank you very much, Belarus, for your statement. Costa Rica, to be followed by New Zealand.

Costa Rica: Mr. Chairman, Costa Rica supports a regular institutional dialogue with broad participation of states and stakeholders on security and the use of ICTs. Not just looking at one of the mandates bringing us here, but also we view this as a need in order to achieve global understandings based on consensus on this important matter which is constantly in development. We wish to respect the principles of inclusivity and transparency and therefore support the document submitted by Canada and Chile. We also recognize the value of the structure being proposed to us in Annex III on the thematic working groups. For Costa Rica, looking at capacity building, we are of particular interest to the proposal which is aimed at action with clearly identified objectives to facilitate the exchange of experiences, including their experts to promote international cooperation, to provide a platform for implementing the agreed framework, and also to ensure that it be flexible to deal with new threats. So we strongly urge in the final report that there be the inclusion of the working documents submitted by the group of countries from Latin America and the Caribbean entitled Strengthening of the Strategic Dialogue on Capacity Building and its Inclusion in the Future Permanent Mechanism. Thank you.

New Zealand: Thank you, Chair. On regular institutional dialogue, and with your plea for brevity in mind, we will simply note that, like a great many other delegations, we support the very constructive French compromise proposal for crosscutting action-oriented thematic groups, and we support the important proposal put forward by Chile and Canada on stakeholder modalities. We’ve explained our reasoning for supporting these initiatives previously, so given time constraints, I won’t repeat that now. We also want to endorse the helpful reminder from Germany yesterday to take a step back and recall what we’re trying to achieve through establishing the permanent mechanism. We want to promote, protect, and implement the normative framework for responsible state behavior and continue to build common understanding of how international law applies in cyberspace. We want crosscutting issue-oriented discussions to allow for concrete and meaningful exchanges, including to support effective capacity building. And we want to move forward in a single-track format. The measure of success for our work this week will be to reach consensus on establishing, for the first time, a permanent UN forum focused on ICT security in the context of international security. This will be a significant achievement and is the most important signal we can send about our shared commitment to promoting an open, secure, stable, accessible, peaceful, and interoperable cyberspace. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, New Zealand, for your contribution. India, please, to be followed by Nigeria.

India: Thank you, Chair. India is speaking for the first time. We appreciate Chair’s leadership in guiding us towards consensus. We by and large agree with the Rev. 1 draft, which reflects the consensus we have achieved over the years. We have several technical solutions related to AI-powered attacks, ransomware as a service, etc., which we are sending to you by email. We would like to highlight some important broad principles, many of which have been highlighted in interventions of many of our Global South partners, like Brazil, South Africa, Thailand, Indonesia, Malawi, and the African Group. Mr. Chair, today a significant portion of global Internet users live in developing countries, and the governments of Global South are also heavily invested into the ICT domain and digital governance. The Global South today stands at a transformative juncture, where technology and digital innovation are not merely tools, but have become powerful levers and catalysts for economic advancement and the realization of our developmental aspirations. In this regard, India’s own journey with digital public infrastructure, exemplified by the open architecture of India’s TAC, demonstrates the profound potential of accessible, secure, and interoperable digital systems to uplift societies and accelerate progress at population scale. Let me add that the India’s TAC, from its inception, itself endeavours to implement secure by design, by default, and in deployment. It is in this spirit that we underscore the paramount importance of safeguarding cyberspace, particularly for developing nations, and that is why capacity building is of utmost importance for the Global South. Let me reiterate here that the sentiments of a majority of states on this topic, particularly the Global Capacity Building Portal, have been aptly captured by the REV.1 text. It is in this context of our developmental needs that the OEWG becomes important for us. One of the most important characteristics of OEWG that we want to preserve and pass on to the RID is that the OEWG is representative, inclusive, and democratic. These also abbreviate as RID. Therefore, we want the RID to be also RID. We believe that the strength of the OEWG platform lies not in the platform, but in our own ability to build consensus, which was very beautifully articulated by Egypt. ICT domain is a borderless domain where coexistence is not an option, but an inherent feature of the domain. It goes without saying that harmonious coexistence requires consensus as an essential. On the importance of consensus for coexistence, I am reminded of an ancient Sanskrit verse from Rig Veda, which I will translate. It says, meaning, let your intentions be united, let your hearts be in harmony, let your minds be in congruence so that you may coexist in harmony. We therefore would like to highlight that we all need to come together and focus on ensuring a seamless transition to a future permanent mechanism rather than focusing on procedural specificities. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, India, for your statement and your harmonious – your message of harmony, which is what I think we need as we closed – as we come close to the finish line. Nigeria, please.

Nigeria: Chair, Nigeria aligns itself with the African group, and I would like to make the following remarks in our national capacity. Nigeria views capacity building as a fundamental pillar of trust to bridge gaps among divergent capacities in the field of human endeavor. In our opinion, it’s a harbinger of inclusivity to reduce inequality of requisite knowledge among states. It gives states equal footing in relevant discussion, obliterating a sense of marginalization while holding up ownership in ensuring documents or outcomes of meetings. It’s a cross-cutting topic embedded in all pillars of the open-ended working group in the security of and in the use of information and communication technologies as asserted in paragraph nine of the report on that reference. Nigeria acknowledges the elaborate consensus stem of capacity building in the report on the view. I would like to make further suggestions on pragmatic mechanism to consolidate it as a pillar in the future permanent mechanism. My delegation advocates practical context with an actionable support for cyber security infrastructure and relevant staff. The transfer of knowledge should be need-based, inclusive, transparent, tailored to us, integrating it with indigenous knowledge for sustainability. The integration of modern technology with indigenous knowledge in recipient countries will facilitate the ability to nurture a diverse and skilled cyber security workforce. This enables such states to easily defend their critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure against cyber threats and contribute to the nation’s digital resilience as well as create cyber solutions for the future. It will also create a spiral effect on employment in emerging technological fields, improving economic and human developmental indices of developing countries. The gender inclusiveness in cyber security is vital to maximize human capacity. Women are famous for their multitasking ability which is crucial in inculcating relevant knowledge to safeguard the cyberspace. Technology as we know it today has become an indispensable element of human subsistence. It is therefore imperative to prepare the younger generation beyond the use of social media to the complexity of cyber security. Teaching them from a young age increases the digital skills of any nation and it further reduces future digital gaps between the high and low income countries. Nigeria acknowledges the framework of international law as a second pillar in the future of permanent mechanism due to its complexity within the cyberspace. The guiding principle of international law is a product of multilateral efforts in ensuring responsible state behavior and this should be applicable in the cyberspace. Let me conclude by reiterating the importance of inclusivity in global discourse. It should be championed through mutual respect, meaningful engagement and transparency.

Chair: Thank you very much, Nigeria, for your contribution. Friends, we’ve exhausted the speaker’s list and it’s almost 12.50 and I wanted to have some time to also share my views on how we move forward from here. So I will need some time as well for that purpose. But I wanted to also explain why we had to do the microphone cutoff. This is the first time I’ve done this in five years and I did not do it with an easy heart. But perhaps it was not clear to you, I wanted to explain that this is also the very first time that the work of the OEWG. has been subjected to cuts in meeting time allocated by the UN Secretariat. These cuts in meeting and conference services are applied across the board to all meetings of the UN, all processes, all chairs and facilitators of UN processes have been asked to make a 10% cut. So this afternoon, this meeting room is not available and there are no interpretation services available. I’m ready to meet you anywhere and to listen to you. But if you want to have an open-ended meeting of this nature with interpretation, which is what the UN is all about, multilingualism, multilateral cooperation, this meeting room is not available. And why do we have to cut conference services? Because the UN is in financial crisis. And why are we in a state of financial crisis? Because some members do not pay in full and on time. It’s not a secret. And why do some members not pay in full and on time? Because of a variety of reasons that’s known to them. And a related point, which provides the context for our work, is that multilateralism is in crisis. I don’t need to belabor that point. But before I elaborate on that, let me come back to why we had to cut the microphone. So I apologize sincerely to those who feel that you were not allowed to express your points of view, that you did not get the time you deserved. There are some, I believe, who have not even spoken. There are some who have only spoken once. There were some who were subjected to the microphone cutoff. So I apologize for that. These were circumstances beyond my control. At the same time, this process has evolved in such a way that there is so much to say. That is a good thing. And it seems to me that we will need a two-week meeting for the future permanent mechanism. Actually one week is not enough for everything that needs to be said. But that is another issue. But I once again want to say that, you know, my apologies for cutting you off if you feel that you have been muzzled. Second, I want to ask in the remaining time that we have, I still have a request for a floor that has just come in. Is there anyone else who feel that you have not been heard and you need to put your views on the table? I can only go until 1 p.m. I see Albania, you have asked for the floor.

Albania: Thank you, Chair. First, Albania fully aligns with the statement of the European Union on regular institutional dialogue and multi-stakeholder modalities. We also reaffirm our strong commitment to responsible state behavior in cyberspace and welcome continued progress towards a permanent and effective mechanism in line with the General Assembly’s decision on the program of actions. We believe this future mechanism must be inclusive, action-oriented, and structured to deliver real-world solutions towards cybersecurity challenges. It should build on existing UN framework while adapting to evolving threats and technological developments. To effectively secure cyberspace, we must focus on concrete real-world challenges and avoid duplicating efforts. This requires adding a practical dimension to UN discussions so that we can focus on open-ended working group-style negotiations in the plenary, including on international law, along with dedicated thematic group discussions focused on implementation and capacity building. Cyber threats are rarely confined to a single area. They are interlinked and complex. Therefore, we support a framework where expert-level groups focus on concrete challenges, sharing best practices, and identifying solutions. certifying capacity-building needs, while the plenary continues to play its critical role in discussing the essentials. Clear and distinct role for each format plenary, DGTs and capacity-building platforms will ensure that efforts are streamlined, complementary and effective. The complexity of cybersecurity demands that we leverage the full breadth of expertise available. The private sector, the civil society, academia and technical experts offer critical insight that states alone cannot provide. Transparency and open dialogue must guide our work and we support decision-making processes that reflect the will of the majority where necessary. An inclusive mechanism is not only more effective but also legitimate. Albania believes we must move past the system in which the objection of a single state can prevent the broader community from benefiting from the expertise of diverse stakeholders. Albania has prepared its position for each of the issues discussed and will send them to the Secretariat. Albania fully committed to working constructively with all partners to establish a mechanism that reflects our shared goals. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you Albania. Is there anyone else who has not spoken and you feel that it’s important for you to speak and you need to speak now? Djibouti please.

Djibouti: Thank you, Chair. My delegation commences on the declaration of the African Union at the following its national capacity. At the outset, I would like on behalf of my delegation taking the floor for the first time to congratulate you on your leadership throughout the process. We commend your considerable efforts throughout the past five years to arrive at this document that reflects concerns on these very important issues. We also are pleased with the other reports on progress made on – toward a common understanding of ICT security and its challenges. We are pleased with the strengthening of confidence-building measures despite a difficult situation geopolitically. We welcome the entirety of this report. Establishment of a permanent mechanism represents a natural evolution that is necessary to continue our combined efforts, and we welcome in particular the focus on capacity-building. That’s an absolute priority for developing countries. The Global POC Directory is also a promising innovation that we support. The inclusive approach allowing participation of non-state actors corresponds to modern realities in the field of cybersecurity, where the borders between public and private are blurred. We recognize the link between cybersecurity and sustainable development, which is often overlooked but is very important for developing countries. For in the interest of time, Mr. Chair, we will send you our contributions in writing, and we hope the work of this 11th and last session will be successful. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Djibouti. Is there anyone else who would like to make a statement? Good, I see no further requests for the floor. Thank you very much for your cooperation. But friends, you still have the opportunity to send me your inputs and statements in writing. I’d like this process to have the collective sense that you have been heard, and I want to assure you that I and my team have listened very carefully to everything that has been said this week. I’ve taken careful notes myself, and so has my team. I’ve also received many, many of your statements and suggestions and proposals, and I thank you for them. And I will also need to go through them, and for that, I will need some time. Thirdly, I want to say that I have been very encouraged by the discussions so far. We are midway in the week. It’s Wednesday morning and I am very gratified by the very constructive tone and the manner in which all of you have taken the floor, put forward your ideas. I’m also very encouraged and gratified by the strong commitment you have demonstrated to this process, and more importantly, the commitment that you have demonstrated to reach an outcome this week. That is my strong sense from listening to all the statements, but also that is my strong sense from my various informal meetings and consultations. Everyone I have spoken to informally, but also in the context of your statements here, everyone is committed to reaching a consensus outcome. I think that should give all of us encouragement and hope that an outcome is possible. Second, I want to say that, as I said earlier, the UN is going through a very challenging period. And therefore, what we do here will send a very strong signal. Positive or negative, a signal will be sent on Friday. And if we are able to reach a consensus outcome on Friday, then I think that will be good, not just for this process and for our ability to make the transition to the next mechanism, but also for… for the very idea of multilateral cooperation, for the very idea and vision of the United Nations. So in that sense, my dear friends, on your shoulders lies also the burden to show to your capitals, to each other, and to the world that the spirit of multilateral cooperation is alive and well. And that additional burden arises because of the specific context in which we are doing our work. This additional burden would not normally be on your shoulders, but it is precisely because we are traversing a very difficult period geopolitically, internationally, and in the international security landscape, that each one of us have that additional responsibility to look at the larger picture and do whatever we can to reach that outcome. And as I said, what gives me hope and encouragement is the fact that all of you are committed, all of you have said to me you want an outcome, all of you have said to me you are determined to go back home with a consensus outcome on Friday. So that, I think, is the positive and the plus point. The other point that I would make is that we cannot conceal or hide the fact that there are divergences. You have heard it throughout the week. And often these divergences are expressed with regard to proposals put forward by another group of delegation or another delegation. And that works both ways. If a proposal is put forward by a delegation or a group of delegation, then there is also a counterpoint or a counter proposal or a counter proposal or a counter request from another group of delegation. So if we look at all the proposals, there’s usually a counterpoint or a counter proposal. And that makes finding consensus very challenging. Sometimes the proposals are in terms of additional language, sometimes the proposals are in terms of deletion. So for every proposal, for additional language, there is additional proposals for deletion of the additional proposals. Sometimes the proposal is for deletion, the counterpoint is a proposal to retain. So it’s a matrix of divergences. And that is why I think the task for us is challenging. But at the same time, there are also elements of convergence. First, as I said, there is the strong commitment to reach an outcome and make that seamless and smooth transition to a future permanent mechanism. I think that there is a very strong commitment to that. Second, a strong convergence and commitment to build on all that we have achieved over the last three years as a working group and then consolidate the outcomes, build on it, and then take it to the next process. And then there are many other details in terms of how we reflect the discussions, factually, objectively, even that is challenging because that could also come back to the points and counterpoints. Having said all of that, I want to give you another positive aspect. And that is the fact that I do see a narrow path visible and possible that will take us forward. And that is what I will try and do in preparing REV2. But it is important to keep in mind that the narrow path that is possible and visible to take a step forward is not a path that will go automatically in the direction of your capital’s views. and instructions that you have. There’s a narrow path possible, but that narrow path has to be in the middle. In the middle, because we are seeking to put together an outcome that is balanced for everyone, because we are in a consensus process. If it was a question of putting things to a vote, it will be much, much easier. But we are not in that exercise, which is why we have that additional burden also of looking for and walking a tightrope, almost a tightrope, towards consensus. And that tightrope is going to be right in the middle. And therefore, I appeal to each one of you, first of all, to be very clear about your prioritization. Because if you want so many things in REV2, it may not be possible to have everything that you hope to see in REV2. You need to be pragmatic, but most of all, you need to be flexible. My intention is to look for solutions that will work for everyone. I will do my best. But in the nature of the UN processes, we may not be able to satisfy everyone. And therefore, you need to be very clear about your own priority issues. And then, of course, at the same time, you also need to not just take and take and take, but you also need to give and give and give. That is in the nature of seeking consensus. That is in the nature of what we do at the UN. There has to be give and take. There has to be an open-mindedness. There has to be flexibility. And we need to be pragmatic because we can’t solve all the issues. Some of the issues will have to be left for the future mechanism. But we need to do what is necessary to ensure a smooth and seamless transition. transition, so that we do not put at risk what we have achieved, so that we do not take a step backwards, we need to take a step forward. So friends, these are some thoughts I have. In terms of the process, this is what I intend to do. I will, together with my team, we will be working on REV2, and it’s my intention to make that available around 9 p.m. this evening. I’ve said 9 p.m. in the past, and it came much later. Some of you will remember this, so give me some flexibility on the 9 p.m. So we will say 9 p.m.-ish. Thank you for your understanding. Second, tomorrow we will meet at 11 a.m., so as to give some time for you and your groups to meet, have a quick meeting in the morning. But at 11 a.m. we will reconvene, and I will present the REV2, and after that we can have some initial remarks, and you probably will need more time to go through. But we need to look at a conference room paper by the end of Thursday, because delegations will have to seek instructions. So we need a formal document by the end of Thursday. So the REV2 is a step that will lead us to a conference room paper at the end of Thursday, which by the way is what we have done for the last few years. So what I’m describing to you is not a novel methodology, but what we have been doing in the group. So REV2 tonight. Tomorrow morning, we meet at 11 a.m. and to allow for me to present the REF-2 and to hear initial remarks, and then we can reconvene at 3 and CRP to be put forward tomorrow, the formal document, so that you can send it back to capitals and their time zone differences. And then Friday morning, at 10 a.m., we meet to adopt the conference room paper by consensus. It’s possible, it’s achievable, but we need to go to REF-2 first. So on that note, I want to thank you once again, and I also want to thank our excellent, excellent, excellent bunch of interpreters who are unseen, underappreciated. So they are the unsung heroes and the backbone of multilateralism because they’ve given us another 10 minutes extra for that. So thank you, dear interpreters, for that. So friends, the meeting is adjourned. I wish you a pleasant lunch and see you tomorrow morning. Thank you. Thank you.

Agreement points

Stakeholder participation essential for effective cybersecurity governance

Speakers

– Access Now
– German Council on Foreign Relations
– Alliance of NGOs on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
– European Union Institute for Security Studies
– First ORG. INC
– Global Partners Digital
– Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
– Italy

Arguments

Stakeholder modalities should be improved to avoid locking into politics

Multi-stakeholder engagement essential for effective cybersecurity governance

Civil society engagement essential for transparency and effectiveness in cybersecurity governance

Capacity building requires cross-cutting approach with stakeholder inclusion as strategic enabler

Incident response community brings practical experience that requires robust stakeholder modalities

Human rights impacts of cyber incidents need multi-stakeholder collaboration framework

Cross-regional coordination among stakeholders provides action-oriented proposals for meaningful participation

Multi-stakeholder engagement indispensable for effective capacity building

Summary

Multiple stakeholders agree that meaningful participation of civil society, private sector, academia, and other non-state actors is essential for effective cybersecurity governance, requiring improved modalities that go beyond symbolic consultation

Topics

Cybersecurity | Legal and regulatory | Human rights

Capacity building is foundational and cross-cutting element

Speakers

– Australia
– European Union Institute for Security Studies
– Ghana
– Zimbabwe
– Nigeria
– Mauritius
– Italy
– Cuba

Arguments

Capacity building is foundational and cross-cutting element requiring concrete implementation mechanisms

Capacity building requires cross-cutting approach with stakeholder inclusion as strategic enabler

Technical and hands-on training critical for developing national cyber capabilities

Global ICT security cooperation portal needed as neutral member state-driven resource platform

Integration of modern technology with indigenous knowledge ensures sustainability

Needs-based and tailored approaches essential for effective capacity building programs

Cyber capacity building should be central and cross-cutting component with integrated policy vision

Capacity building essential for eliminating digital divide affecting developing countries

Summary

Strong consensus that capacity building should be treated as a foundational, cross-cutting element rather than a separate pillar, with emphasis on needs-based, tailored approaches that leverage existing resources and avoid duplication

Topics

Development | Cybersecurity

International law applies to cyberspace with need for clearer implementation

Speakers

– Switzerland
– Paraguay
– ICRC
– Viet Nam
– Colombia
– El Salvador

Arguments

National positions on international law provide invaluable clarification that cyberspace is not lawless

UN Charter principles of sovereign equality and peaceful relations apply to cyberspace

International humanitarian law prohibits attacks on civilian objects and hospitals in cyberspace

Cross-regional working papers represent areas of emerging convergence on international law

National positions on international law should include development processes

Voluntary nature of norms and complementarity with international law must be recognized

Summary

Broad agreement that existing international law, including the UN Charter and IHL, applies to cyberspace, with growing convergence on specific applications and the value of national positions in clarifying legal frameworks

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity | Human rights

Cross-cutting thematic groups preferred over pillar-based structure

Speakers

– Czechia
– New Zealand
– Albania
– Latvia
– Guatemala

Arguments

Cross-cutting action-oriented thematic groups preferred over pillar-based structure

Single-track format with concrete meaningful exchanges needed for success

Action-oriented structure needed to deliver real-world cybersecurity solutions

Cross-cutting, action-oriented thematic groups should be established

Moderate number of thematic groups with specific focus on capacity building required

Summary

Strong support for establishing cross-cutting, action-oriented thematic groups that can address interconnected cyber issues holistically rather than maintaining separate pillar-based discussions

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Existing successful programs should be leveraged rather than duplicated

Speakers

– Australia
– Global Cyber Alliance
– Ukraine
– Italy
– Republic of Korea

Arguments

Existing successful programs should be supported rather than duplicated

Existing effective mechanisms should be scaled rather than duplicated

Existing eight CBMs should be operationalized before developing new proposals

Cyber capacity building should be central and cross-cutting component with integrated policy vision

CBMs serve to reduce misunderstanding and prevent conflict escalation

Summary

Consensus on the importance of building upon and scaling existing successful initiatives rather than creating new duplicative structures, particularly given resource constraints and proven effectiveness of current programs

Topics

Development | Cybersecurity

Similar viewpoints

Human rights organizations emphasize the need for explicit integration of human rights law and perspectives in cybersecurity governance, with particular attention to regional interpretations and the human impacts of cyber incidents

Speakers

– Access Now
– Red on Defensa de los Derechos Digital
– Global Partners Digital

Arguments

International human rights law must be explicitly referenced in main body text

Regional perspectives must be incorporated, particularly Latin American human rights interpretations

Human rights impacts of cyber incidents need multi-stakeholder collaboration framework

Topics

Human rights | Legal and regulatory

Technical experts agree that emerging technologies, particularly quantum computing and generative AI, present urgent threats requiring immediate attention and specialized governance frameworks

Speakers

– German Council on Foreign Relations
– Safe PC Solutions
– Academia Mexicana de Ciberseguridad y Derecho Digital

Arguments

Quantum computing presents foreseeable threat requiring urgent post-quantum cryptographic solutions

Generative AI and quantum computing need specific governance frameworks

AI governance and quantum computing risks require specialized thematic group attention

Topics

Cybersecurity | Infrastructure

Youth organizations argue for meaningful inclusion of young people as stakeholders based on their lived experience as digital natives and their fundamental rights to participate in decisions affecting their future

Speakers

– Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
– Youth for Privacy

Arguments

Youth engagement crucial as digital natives who understand technology impacts on society

Children and youth must be systematically embedded as valid stakeholders with fundamental rights

Topics

Human rights | Sociocultural

Technical standards organizations emphasize the importance of internationally harmonized standards over variable national approaches, viewing standardization as both a technical necessity and confidence-building measure

Speakers

– Crest International
– Wright pilot

Arguments

International standards preferable to variable national standards for supply chain security

Standards harmonization needed as confidence building measure with multi-stakeholder support

Topics

Cybersecurity | Infrastructure

Unexpected consensus

Private sector as essential partner in cybersecurity governance

Speakers

– Hitachi America
– Interpol
– Crest International
– Global Cyber Alliance

Arguments

Private sector can contribute to updating threats and applying norm checklists across sectors

International law enforcement cooperation essential for countering cyber threats

International standards preferable to variable national standards for supply chain security

Existing effective mechanisms should be scaled rather than duplicated

Explanation

Unexpected alignment between private sector companies and international organizations on the essential role of business in cybersecurity governance, moving beyond traditional state-centric approaches to recognize private sector expertise and capabilities

Topics

Cybersecurity | Infrastructure

Regional organizations as vital implementation partners

Speakers

– Mauritius
– Kingdom of the Netherlands
– Uruguay
– Arab Association of Cybersecurity

Arguments

Regional organizations serve as vital implementation partners and capacity building hubs

Regional organizations and technical community roles should be explicitly recognized

Regional and sub-regional confidence building measures should connect with future mechanism

Women’s meaningful participation must be promoted in capacity building initiatives

Explanation

Surprising convergence across different regions on the importance of regional organizations as implementation bridges, suggesting a shift toward more decentralized, regionally-adapted approaches to global cybersecurity governance

Topics

Development | Legal and regulatory

UN financial constraints as shared concern affecting all stakeholders

Speakers

– Chair
– Cuba
– Australia
– United Kingdom

Arguments

UN financial crisis forces meeting time cuts affecting multilateral cooperation

UN budgetary constraints cannot be pretext for limiting developing country needs

Capacity building is foundational and cross-cutting element requiring concrete implementation mechanisms

Templates for assistance requests should be voluntary and clearly titled

Explanation

Unexpected acknowledgment across different political perspectives that UN financial constraints are a real limitation requiring pragmatic solutions, with both developed and developing countries recognizing the need to work within resource limitations

Topics

Economic | Legal and regulatory

Overall assessment

Summary

Strong consensus emerged on several key areas: the essential role of stakeholder participation in cybersecurity governance, the foundational importance of capacity building as a cross-cutting element, the applicability of international law to cyberspace, preference for cross-cutting thematic groups over pillar-based structures, and the need to leverage existing successful programs rather than create duplicative mechanisms

Consensus level

High level of consensus on structural and procedural issues, with broad agreement on the need for inclusive, action-oriented approaches that build on existing frameworks. The consensus suggests a mature understanding of cybersecurity governance as requiring multi-stakeholder, cross-cutting approaches rather than traditional state-centric, siloed methods. This has significant implications for the future permanent mechanism, indicating strong support for innovative governance structures that can adapt to the interconnected nature of cyber threats while maintaining legitimacy through inclusive participation

Different viewpoints

Stakeholder participation modalities and accreditation processes

Speakers

– Access Now
– Belarus
– Alliance of NGOs on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
– Global Partners Digital

Arguments

Stakeholder modalities should be improved to avoid locking into politics

We support the current format of work. We are aware of the important contributions made to the work of the OEWG by non-state entities, but we believe that all decisions on NGO participation in sessions ought to be based on no objection from member states

Should the final report maintain weak language on stakeholder modalities and the future permanent mechanism, it will further hinder their engagement

We need modalities that allow stakeholder participation to go beyond symbolic consultation for us to be able to effectively support the work of states in the permanent mechanism

Summary

There is fundamental disagreement on stakeholder participation, with civil society organizations advocating for improved, meaningful participation beyond single-state vetoes, while some states like Belarus insist on maintaining current restrictive formats requiring no objection from member states

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Human rights

Structure of future permanent mechanism – cross-cutting vs pillar-based thematic groups

Speakers

– Czechia
– Belarus
– Guatemala
– Latvia

Arguments

Cross-cutting action-oriented thematic groups preferred over pillar-based structure

We propose creating a separate thematic group on standards and on confidence building measures

Moderate number of thematic groups with specific focus on capacity building required

Cross-cutting, action-oriented thematic groups

Summary

Disagreement exists on whether thematic groups should be cross-cutting (addressing issues across all pillars) or pillar-specific, with some favoring integrated approaches while others prefer dedicated groups for specific areas like capacity building or confidence building measures

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

International law references and use of force thresholds in cyberspace

Speakers

– Switzerland
– Access Now
– ICRC
– Sweden

Arguments

ICT operations comparable to traditional means can constitute use of force

International human rights law must be explicitly referenced in main body text

International humanitarian law prohibits attacks on civilian objects and hospitals in cyberspace

Framework for responsible state behavior must be strengthened rather than weakened

Summary

While there’s general agreement on international law applicability, there are disagreements on specific formulations, particularly regarding use of force thresholds, explicit human rights law references, and the balance between different legal frameworks

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Human rights

Capacity building funding mechanisms and duplication concerns

Speakers

– Australia
– Cuba
– Global Cyber Alliance
– Italy

Arguments

Existing successful programs should be supported rather than duplicated

UN budgetary constraints cannot be pretext for limiting developing country needs

Existing effective mechanisms should be scaled rather than duplicated

Cyber capacity building should be central and cross-cutting component with integrated policy vision

Summary

Disagreement on whether to create new UN funding mechanisms or leverage existing programs, with developed countries concerned about duplication and costs while developing countries emphasize the need for robust new funding despite UN budget constraints

Topics

Development | Economic

Confidence building measures – new proposals vs existing implementation

Speakers

– Ukraine
– Cuba
– Kingdom of the Netherlands
– Republic of Korea

Arguments

Existing eight CBMs should be operationalized before developing new proposals

Capacity building essential for eliminating digital divide affecting developing countries

Focus needed on effective operationalization before further development

CBMs serve to reduce misunderstanding and prevent conflict escalation

Summary

Disagreement on whether to focus on implementing existing confidence building measures or developing new ones, with some states preferring consolidation while others push for additional measures to address specific needs

Topics

Cybersecurity | Legal and regulatory

Unexpected differences

UN financial constraints impact on multilateral processes

Speakers

– Chair
– Cuba
– Russian Federation

Arguments

UN financial crisis forces meeting time cuts affecting multilateral cooperation

UN budgetary constraints cannot be pretext for limiting developing country needs

Webcast interruptions violate transparency and participation principles

Explanation

Unexpected disagreement emerged over how UN budget constraints should affect the working group’s operations, with the Chair explaining practical limitations while Cuba and Russia viewing these as unacceptable barriers to participation and developing country needs

Topics

Economic | Legal and regulatory

Role of private sector in cybersecurity governance

Speakers

– Hitachi America
– Belarus
– Crest International

Arguments

Private sector can contribute to updating threats and applying norm checklists across sectors

We support the current format of work. We are aware of the important contributions made to the work of the OEWG by non-state entities, but we believe that all decisions on NGO participation in sessions ought to be based on no objection from member states

International standards preferable to variable national standards for supply chain security

Explanation

Unexpected tension between private sector organizations offering specific technical contributions and state preferences for maintaining restrictive participation modalities, revealing disagreement on the appropriate level of private sector involvement in intergovernmental processes

Topics

Cybersecurity | Infrastructure

Youth and children’s rights in cybersecurity governance

Speakers

– Youth for Privacy
– Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
– Nigeria

Arguments

Children and youth must be systematically embedded as valid stakeholders with fundamental rights

Youth engagement crucial as digital natives who understand technology impacts on society

Gender inclusiveness and youth engagement vital for maximizing human capacity

Explanation

Unexpected emphasis on youth rights as a fundamental aspect of cybersecurity governance, with young speakers asserting their participation as inalienable rights rather than optional consultation, challenging traditional stakeholder categorizations

Topics

Human rights | Sociocultural

Overall assessment

Summary

The transcript reveals significant disagreements across multiple dimensions: stakeholder participation modalities (restrictive vs. inclusive), institutional structure (cross-cutting vs. pillar-based), international law formulations (specific vs. general references), and capacity building approaches (new mechanisms vs. existing programs). The most fundamental divide appears between developed and developing countries on funding and participation, and between states favoring restrictive vs. inclusive stakeholder engagement.

Disagreement level

High level of disagreement with significant implications for the future permanent mechanism. The Chair’s acknowledgment of a ‘matrix of divergences’ and the need for a ‘narrow path’ to consensus indicates that disagreements are substantial and could jeopardize the establishment of an effective permanent mechanism. The disagreements span both substantive policy issues and procedural questions about participation and governance, suggesting that even if consensus is reached, implementation may face ongoing challenges due to fundamentally different visions of how the mechanism should operate.

Partial agreements

Similar viewpoints

Human rights organizations emphasize the need for explicit integration of human rights law and perspectives in cybersecurity governance, with particular attention to regional interpretations and the human impacts of cyber incidents

Speakers

– Access Now
– Red on Defensa de los Derechos Digital
– Global Partners Digital

Arguments

International human rights law must be explicitly referenced in main body text

Regional perspectives must be incorporated, particularly Latin American human rights interpretations

Human rights impacts of cyber incidents need multi-stakeholder collaboration framework

Topics

Human rights | Legal and regulatory

Technical experts agree that emerging technologies, particularly quantum computing and generative AI, present urgent threats requiring immediate attention and specialized governance frameworks

Speakers

– German Council on Foreign Relations
– Safe PC Solutions
– Academia Mexicana de Ciberseguridad y Derecho Digital

Arguments

Quantum computing presents foreseeable threat requiring urgent post-quantum cryptographic solutions

Generative AI and quantum computing need specific governance frameworks

AI governance and quantum computing risks require specialized thematic group attention

Topics

Cybersecurity | Infrastructure

Youth organizations argue for meaningful inclusion of young people as stakeholders based on their lived experience as digital natives and their fundamental rights to participate in decisions affecting their future

Speakers

– Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
– Youth for Privacy

Arguments

Youth engagement crucial as digital natives who understand technology impacts on society

Children and youth must be systematically embedded as valid stakeholders with fundamental rights

Topics

Human rights | Sociocultural

Technical standards organizations emphasize the importance of internationally harmonized standards over variable national approaches, viewing standardization as both a technical necessity and confidence-building measure

Speakers

– Crest International
– Wright pilot

Arguments

International standards preferable to variable national standards for supply chain security

Standards harmonization needed as confidence building measure with multi-stakeholder support

Topics

Cybersecurity | Infrastructure

Key takeaways

Strong consensus exists among all delegations for establishing a future permanent mechanism to replace the current Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), with commitment to a seamless transition

Stakeholder participation is recognized as essential for effective cybersecurity governance, with 24 organizations supporting joint statements for meaningful multi-stakeholder engagement

Capacity building emerges as a foundational and cross-cutting element that must be prioritized, particularly for developing countries and the Global South

International law applies to cyberspace with growing convergence on key principles, though more concrete implementation guidance is needed

Cross-cutting, action-oriented thematic groups are preferred over traditional pillar-based structures for the future mechanism

Emerging technologies like AI and quantum computing require urgent attention and specialized governance frameworks

The UN faces significant financial constraints affecting meeting time and resources, reflecting broader challenges to multilateralism

Chair emphasizes that consensus requires flexibility, pragmatism, and willingness to compromise from all parties

Resolutions and action items

Chair will produce REV2 draft by 9 PM Wednesday evening incorporating feedback from all delegations

Meeting scheduled for Thursday 11 AM to review REV2 and provide initial remarks

Conference Room Paper (CRP) to be finalized by end of Thursday for delegation review and capital consultations

Final adoption meeting scheduled for Friday 10 AM to reach consensus on the conference room paper

Delegations requested to send written statements and technical proposals to the Secretariat

Secretariat tasked with addressing technical problems affecting Russian Federation’s access to UN Web TV

Future permanent mechanism to be established with dedicated thematic working groups structure

Global point of contact (POC) directory to be operationalized with broad state participation

Unresolved issues

Specific modalities for stakeholder participation remain contentious, with single-state veto concerns unresolved

Structure and number of dedicated thematic groups still under negotiation between different proposals

Balance between existing international law framework and potential new legally binding obligations

Funding mechanisms for proposed initiatives including UN Voluntary Fund and various capacity building programs

Integration versus duplication concerns regarding new initiatives and existing mechanisms

Specific language on international humanitarian law application in cyberspace

Decision-making procedures for the future permanent mechanism (consensus vs. majority voting)

Timeline and implementation details for transitioning from OEWG to permanent mechanism

Scope and mandate of proposed UN Cyber Resilience Academy within UNIDIR

Regional organization roles and integration with global mechanisms

Suggested compromises

French proposal for cross-cutting thematic groups under three umbrella themes: stability, resilience, and cooperation

Canada-Chile proposal allowing single state objections to specific stakeholder applicants but requiring plenary vote for final accreditation decisions

Establishment of global ICT security cooperation portal ‘within existing resources’ to address budget constraints

Voluntary nature of templates and mechanisms to accommodate different state preferences

Step-by-step approach to POC directory development before expanding functionality

Integration of existing successful programs rather than creating entirely new duplicative mechanisms

Flexible meeting formats including hybrid consultations during intersessional periods

Recognition of both global frameworks and regional specificities in implementation approaches

Today, we ask you to see yourselves not only as diplomats, but as stewards. The main duty of stewardship is simple, to leave things better than how you found it.

Speaker

Access Now

Reason

This reframes the entire discussion from a procedural diplomatic exercise to a moral imperative about legacy and responsibility. It challenges delegates to think beyond immediate national interests to long-term global impact.

Impact

This comment set a tone of responsibility and urgency that influenced subsequent stakeholder statements, with many emphasizing the need for concrete action and implementation rather than just discussion.

As Elvis Presley said, a little less conversation, a little more action. A little more bite, and a little less bark. A little less fight, and a little more spark.

Speaker

German Council on Foreign Relations

Reason

This unexpected cultural reference effectively highlighted the gap between discussion and implementation in cybersecurity, particularly regarding quantum computing threats. It made a serious technical point memorable and accessible.

Impact

The Chair specifically noted this comment brought ‘music into our lives’ and a ‘positive tone,’ showing how it shifted the atmosphere from technical density to more engaging discourse. It reinforced the theme of moving from talk to action.

Rules are a manifestation of power. They are worth very little without confidence that the rules will enjoy respect. In the words of Russian Tsarina Catherine the Great, power without confidence is nothing.

Speaker

Center for Humanitarian Dialogue

Reason

This philosophical observation cuts to the heart of international law and governance – that rules without enforcement mechanisms or confidence in compliance are meaningless. The historical reference adds gravitas to a fundamental challenge in cyber governance.

Impact

This comment deepened the discussion about confidence-building measures by highlighting that the problem isn’t lack of rules but lack of trust in their implementation, influencing how subsequent speakers addressed CBMs.

ICT domain is a borderless domain where coexistence is not an option, but an inherent feature of the domain. It goes without saying that harmonious coexistence requires consensus as an essential.

Speaker

India

Reason

This insight reframes cyber governance from a choice about cooperation to an inevitable necessity due to the nature of cyberspace itself. The Sanskrit verse that followed reinforced this with cultural wisdom about unity.

Impact

This comment provided philosophical grounding for why consensus-building is not just procedural preference but technical necessity in cyberspace, influencing the Chair’s final remarks about the importance of multilateral cooperation.

We cannot but recognize the progress that UAWG has achieved on this issue, which includes the adoption of eight CBMs and the establishment of the POC directory… We observe that the potential of the CBMs already in place has not been explored to its fullest yet.

Speaker

Ukraine

Reason

Despite being directly affected by cyber warfare, Ukraine’s measured assessment focused on building upon existing frameworks rather than demanding new ones. This showed pragmatic restraint and institutional thinking.

Impact

This comment influenced the discussion toward consolidation and implementation of existing measures rather than proliferation of new initiatives, with several subsequent speakers echoing the theme of avoiding duplication.

The future of ICTs depends on us. Let’s build that future together… We, as children and youth of the world, will not allow ourselves to be pushed out to the sidelines in this process.

Speaker

Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (youth representative)

Reason

This assertion of youth agency in cyber governance challenged the traditional diplomatic paradigm by positioning young people not as beneficiaries but as co-creators of policy, given their status as digital natives.

Impact

This comment, along with other youth interventions, prompted the Chair to specifically highlight the importance of youth participation and diversity in the future mechanism, showing how it influenced his thinking about inclusivity.

The UN is in financial crisis… Because some members do not pay in full and on time… multilateralism is in crisis… on your shoulders lies also the burden to show to your capitals, to each other, and to the world that the spirit of multilateral cooperation is alive and well.

Speaker

Chair

Reason

This candid acknowledgment of systemic challenges facing the UN elevated the stakes of the negotiation beyond cyber governance to the credibility of multilateralism itself. It was unusually direct for diplomatic discourse.

Impact

This comment recontextualized the entire negotiation as a test case for multilateral cooperation, adding moral weight to reaching consensus and explaining the procedural constraints (time limits, microphone cutoffs) that had frustrated delegates.

Overall assessment

These key comments fundamentally shaped the discussion by elevating it beyond technical and procedural matters to questions of stewardship, legacy, and the future of multilateral cooperation. The stakeholder interventions, particularly from civil society and youth, consistently pushed for concrete action over continued discussion, while state interventions revealed tensions between ambition and pragmatism. The Chair’s final remarks synthesized these themes by acknowledging both the constraints of the current system and the moral imperative to demonstrate that consensus-building remains possible. The discussion evolved from technical presentations to philosophical reflections on governance, power, and responsibility in cyberspace, with the most impactful comments being those that connected immediate procedural decisions to larger questions about international cooperation and intergenerational responsibility.

How to effectively implement post-quantum cryptographic solutions given the urgent timeline (potentially by 2030)

Speaker

German Council on Foreign Relations (Valentin Weber)

Explanation

Research shows all UN member states are vulnerable to quantum computing threats, with no country having accomplished the transition to quantum security yet, leaving only 4-6 years to complete this critical transition

How to develop comprehensive guidelines for identification of critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure

Speaker

Mauritius

Explanation

Many developing states find it challenging to identify critical services and owners, which is the first step for effective CI/CII framework implementation

How to establish specialized thematic groups for emerging technologies with evidence-based recommendations

Speaker

Academia Mexicana de Ciberseguridad y Derecho Digital

Explanation

There’s a need for technical expertise to address generative AI, independent decision-making systems, and other emerging technologies that require specialized knowledge

How to develop governance, traceability, and accountability mechanisms for AI decision-making in public operations

Speaker

Academia Mexicana de Ciberseguridad y Derecho Digital

Explanation

As AI systems are increasingly used for public decisions, there’s a need for frameworks to ensure responsible implementation and oversight

How to strengthen accountability mechanisms and develop behavioral indices for voluntary norms implementation

Speaker

Academia Mexicana de Ciberseguridad y Derecho Digital

Explanation

Current voluntary measures lack practical enforcement mechanisms, and regional behavioral indices could help track implementation progress

How to avoid duplication of existing capacity building initiatives while creating new UN mechanisms

Speaker

Global Cyber Alliance (Chris Painter)

Explanation

Multiple speakers raised concerns about proposed new initiatives duplicating existing successful programs, risking inefficiency and resource diversion from proven approaches

How to conduct annual mapping exercises to identify partnerships and existing stakeholder capabilities

Speaker

Global Cyber Alliance

Explanation

Before creating new structures, there’s a need to systematically assess what already exists and how it can be integrated rather than replaced

How to establish hybrid consultative meetings with stakeholder study groups during intersessional periods

Speaker

Center of Excellence for National Security

Explanation

There’s a proposal for a structured process to organize stakeholder contributions through regional/global hybrid meetings to support thematic groups, but implementation details need to be worked out

How to operationalize cross-cutting thematic groups that address specific issues across all pillars of the framework

Speaker

Multiple speakers including France, Czechia, Latvia

Explanation

Many delegations support cross-cutting groups but the specific structure, mandate, and operational details need further development

How to resolve technical problems with UN Web TV accessibility in certain regions

Speaker

Russian Federation and Chair

Explanation

Recurring technical issues are preventing some member states from following discussions, which undermines transparency and participation principles

How to transition from one-week to potentially two-week meetings for the future permanent mechanism

Speaker

Chair

Explanation

The Chair noted that one week appears insufficient for all the substantive discussions needed, suggesting a need to reassess meeting duration and structure

How to address the UN’s financial crisis affecting meeting time and conference services

Speaker

Chair

Explanation

Budget cuts are impacting the ability to conduct full meetings with interpretation services, which affects multilateral cooperation and needs systemic solutions

Summary

This discussion focused on establishing a Regular Institutional Dialogue (RID) and future permanent mechanism for cybersecurity governance under the UN Open-Ended Working Group on ICTs. The Chair opened the session by emphasizing the limited time available and the need for delegations to be brief while discussing Section G and Annex III of the draft report. France presented a comprehensive visual proposal identifying three key gaps: the capacity building divide, implementation gaps, and inclusivity challenges, proposing dedicated thematic groups to address these issues through cross-cutting discussions.

A central debate emerged around the structure of dedicated thematic groups (DTGs), with divergent views on their organization. Many delegations, including the EU and supporters of the French proposal, advocated for cross-cutting, action-oriented groups that would integrate all five pillars of the cybersecurity framework rather than creating separate groups for individual pillars. However, other delegations, particularly from the African Group, supported having distinct thematic groups focused on international law, capacity building, and resilience/threats.

Capacity building emerged as a priority area with broad consensus, with numerous developing countries emphasizing its critical importance for bridging the digital divide and ensuring meaningful participation in global cybersecurity governance. There was strong support for maintaining a dedicated capacity building group, with proposals for enhanced coordination mechanisms including a global roundtable.

Stakeholder participation generated significant disagreement, with 42 countries supporting a Canada-Chile proposal for more inclusive modalities that would allow majority decision-making when single states object to stakeholder participation. However, other delegations insisted on maintaining the current non-objection mechanism to preserve the intergovernmental nature of the process.

The Chair concluded by noting positive momentum toward consensus while acknowledging the need to find middle ground on contentious issues, particularly regarding DTG structure and stakeholder modalities, emphasizing that decisions cannot be postponed to avoid disrupting the transition to the permanent mechanism.

Keypoints

## Overall Purpose/Goal

This discussion focused on establishing a future permanent mechanism to replace the current Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on cybersecurity, specifically addressing the Regular Institutional Dialogue (RID) and operational modalities outlined in Annex III of the draft final report.

## Major Discussion Points

– **Structure of Dedicated Thematic Groups (DTGs)**: Significant debate over whether to have three DTGs as proposed (cross-cutting issues, international law, and capacity building) versus alternative configurations. France presented a compromise proposal for action-oriented, cross-cutting groups, while some delegations preferred pillar-based approaches or different groupings.

– **Stakeholder Participation Modalities**: Sharp divisions between delegations supporting more inclusive stakeholder engagement (backed by a 42-country paper led by Canada and Chile) versus those favoring current restrictive modalities with non-objection procedures. Key tension over whether single states should be able to veto stakeholder participation.

– **Capacity Building Emphasis**: Strong convergence on the critical importance of capacity building, with broad support for a dedicated thematic group and global roundtable. Many developing countries emphasized this as essential for bridging the digital divide and ensuring meaningful participation.

– **Decision-Making Procedures**: Debate over consensus requirements, with some delegations distinguishing between “decisions by consensus” (unanimity) and “principle of consensus” (broader agreement), and concerns about empowering co-facilitators to transmit recommendations without full consensus.

– **Meeting Logistics and Timeline**: Discussions on hybrid formats, interpretation services, meeting sequencing (whether DTGs should precede or follow plenary sessions), and resource constraints affecting smaller delegations’ participation.

## Overall Tone

The discussion began with a sense of urgency and time pressure, as the Chair emphasized the limited time available and requested brevity from speakers. The tone was generally constructive and diplomatic, with delegations expressing flexibility and willingness to compromise while defending their core positions. Toward the end, there was a palpable sense of commitment to reaching consensus, with the Chair noting the “enormous amount of commitment to conclude the work.” However, underlying tensions remained evident on key issues like stakeholder participation and DTG structure, requiring continued negotiation to bridge differences.

Speakers

**Speakers from the provided list:**

– Chair – Meeting chairperson, leading the fourth meeting of the 11th Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICTs

– France – Delegation representative, delivered visual presentation on bridging consensus gaps

– Chile – Delegation representative, co-coordinator (with Canada) of proposal on stakeholder participation and accreditation

– South Africa – Delegation representative

– Argentina – Delegation representative

– European Union – Group representative, speaking on behalf of EU member states

– Paraguay – Delegation representative

– Thailand – Delegation representative

– Australia – Delegation representative

– Malaysia – Delegation representative

– Islamic Republic of Iran – Delegation representative

– Morocco – Delegation representative

– United States – Delegation representative

– Colombia – Delegation representative

– Finland – Delegation representative, also delivered Nordic statement on international law

– Ireland – Delegation representative

– Cote d’Ivoire – Delegation representative

– Egypt – Delegation representative

– Fiji – Delegation representative

– Italy – Delegation representative

– Russian Federation – Delegation representative

– Ukraine – Delegation representative

– Mexico – Delegation representative

– Switzerland – Delegation representative

– China – Delegation representative

– Cuba – Delegation representative

– Kenya – Delegation representative

– Republic of Korea – Delegation representative

– Indonesia – Delegation representative

– Brazil – Delegation representative

– Lao PDR – Delegation representative

– Kiribati – Delegation representative

– Denmark – Delegation representative

– Japan – Delegation representative

– Canada – Delegation representative, co-coordinator (with Chile) of proposal on stakeholder participation

– Sweden – Delegation representative

– Romania – Delegation representative

– Viet Nam – Delegation representative

– Estonia – Delegation representative

– Portugal – Delegation representative

– United Kingdom – Delegation representative

– Kingdom of the Netherlands – Delegation representative

– Ghana – Delegation representative

– El Salvador – Delegation representative

– Senegal – Delegation representative

– Zimbabwe – Delegation representative

– Uruguay – Delegation representative

– Nicaragua – Delegation representative

– Germany – Delegation representative

– Botswana – Delegation representative

– Nigeria – Delegation representative, speaking on behalf of the African group

**Additional speakers:**

None – all speakers mentioned in the transcript are included in the provided speakers names list.

# Comprehensive Summary: Fourth Meeting of the 11th Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICTs

## Executive Overview

The fourth meeting of the 11th Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICTs focused on establishing a Regular Institutional Dialogue (RID) and future permanent mechanism for cybersecurity governance. The Chair opened the session emphasising critical time constraints and the urgent need for delegations to reach consensus on Section G and Annex III of the draft report. The discussion revealed significant convergence on fundamental principles, particularly the five pillars framework and capacity building priorities, alongside persistent divisions on implementation modalities, especially regarding dedicated thematic group structure and stakeholder participation mechanisms.

## Opening Context and Procedural Framework

The Chair began by acknowledging limited time available and requesting brevity from speakers whilst maintaining quality of interventions. The meeting was structured to conclude at 1 PM the following day to allow the Chair sufficient time to prepare Revision 2 of the draft report. The Chair announced that stakeholder presentations would occur the following morning at 10 AM with 3-minute time limits, and explicitly stated that Annex C would not be reopened or revisited during these discussions.

## France’s Diagnostic Framework

France delivered a visual presentation identifying three key gaps requiring attention in the future permanent mechanism:

**The Capacity Building Gap**: Representing the digital divide between developed and developing countries, encompassing disparities in technical capabilities, resources, and expertise.

**The Implementation Gap**: The challenge of moving from agreed frameworks and principles to concrete, actionable measures addressing real-world cybersecurity threats.

**The Inclusivity Gap**: The need to involve diverse stakeholders including cyber agencies, legal experts, and non-governmental actors whilst maintaining the intergovernmental nature of the process.

France proposed addressing these gaps through dedicated thematic groups adopting a cross-cutting approach, drawing from all five pillars of the cybersecurity framework rather than creating separate, siloed discussions.

## Areas of Convergence

### Universal Support for the Five Pillars Framework

The most significant achievement highlighted was universal acceptance of the five pillars framework developed over five years. As the Chair noted, “after five years, everyone’s defending the five pillars.” The five pillars encompass:

1. Threats and vulnerabilities

2. Norms of responsible state behaviour

3. International law application in cyberspace

4. Confidence-building measures

5. Capacity building

### Strong Consensus on Capacity Building Priority

Delegations from across regional groups emphasised capacity building’s critical importance. Countries including Argentina, Paraguay, Thailand, Malaysia, Nigeria, Morocco, Colombia, Brazil, Lao PDR, El Salvador, Chile, Uruguay, Botswana, Nicaragua, Kenya, Indonesia, and Fiji voiced strong support for a dedicated capacity building thematic group.

The Netherlands proposed a comprehensive three-step capacity building structure linking DTGs, a global roundtable, and plenary discussions. Colombia supported combining a dedicated capacity building DTG with a global roundtable providing coordination and implementation mechanisms. Brazil proposed UNIDIR involvement and emphasised spacing between DTG and plenary meetings for proper processing of capacity building initiatives.

### Agreement on Three Dedicated Thematic Groups Structure

Despite disagreements about specific organisation and mandate, strong consensus emerged on establishing three dedicated thematic groups as the basic structure. Countries including France, South Africa, Thailand, Nigeria, Indonesia, Ghana, El Salvador, Botswana, Egypt, and Côte d’Ivoire supported this framework.

### Commitment to Consensus-Based Decision Making

Multiple delegations, including Argentina, Islamic Republic of Iran, Mexico, Vietnam, Kiribati, and Botswana, emphasised consensus-based decision making’s importance. However, this masked nuanced differences in interpretation, with some advocating strict unanimity requirements whilst others supported more flexible consensus-building approaches.

## Major Areas of Disagreement

### Structure and Organisation of Dedicated Thematic Groups

The most significant structural disagreement centred on whether dedicated thematic groups should follow a cross-cutting or pillar-based approach.

**Cross-Cutting Approach Supporters**: France, the European Union, Australia, the United States, Ukraine, Germany, and the United Kingdom advocated for action-oriented thematic groups integrating all five pillars. The US specifically supported the French proposal for cross-cutting groups to avoid creating silos and prevent duplication.

**Pillar-Based Approach Supporters**: The Russian Federation, Thailand, and other delegations supported distinct thematic groups focused on specific pillars, particularly advocating for a dedicated international law group.

This disagreement was particularly acute regarding DTG1, which lacked clear definition and mandate in the Chair’s proposal. Multiple delegations, including Indonesia and Egypt, called for clarification of DTG1’s scope and activities.

### Stakeholder Participation Modalities

A fundamental schism emerged on stakeholder participation mechanisms, representing one of the most contentious issues.

**Majority Decision Supporters**: A coalition of 42 countries, led by Canada and Chile, supported eliminating single-state veto power over stakeholder participation. Chile, speaking both on behalf of the Canada-Chile proposal and later in national capacity, argued for transparent and inclusive stakeholder participation. This group proposed that when consensus could not be reached, decisions should be made by majority vote.

**Non-Objection Principle Defenders**: The Islamic Republic of Iran, Russian Federation, China, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe insisted on maintaining current non-objection procedures where any single state could block stakeholder participation, arguing this preserved the intergovernmental nature and respected state sovereignty.

### International Law Application in Cyberspace

Sharp divisions emerged on whether international law should have its own dedicated thematic group or be integrated into cross-cutting discussions.

**Dedicated International Law Group Supporters**: Switzerland, Thailand, Ghana, Zimbabwe argued for focused legal discussions to build capacity and provide clarity on international law application to cyberspace.

**Cross-Cutting Integration Advocates**: The European Union, Australia, and the United States opposed a standalone international law DTG, preferring legal frameworks discussed in cross-cutting manner within other groups to avoid creating silos.

## Regional and Developing Country Perspectives

Paraguay spoke for landlocked developing countries, emphasising limited participation due to resource constraints and geographical challenges. Morocco highlighted regional cooperation importance and African mechanisms for addressing cybersecurity challenges. Kenya proposed innovative solutions including regional resource hubs for pooled expertise and peer review mechanisms with dashboards to track progress.

Kiribati, representing Pacific Island states, emphasised unique challenges faced by small island developing states and the importance of hybrid meeting formats to enable participation despite resource constraints.

## Meeting Modalities and Practical Considerations

Brazil raised concerns about meeting costs, noting accommodation expenses often exceed airfare costs and suggesting December meetings should be avoided due to “notoriously high” accommodation costs in New York. Vietnam proposed considering alternative meeting locations outside New York to reduce costs and improve accessibility.

Multiple delegations supported hybrid meeting formats to balance participation needs with resource constraints. Colombia emphasised the need for appropriate hybrid platforms facilitating meaningful dialogue between experts, whilst Thailand supported hybrid formats with in-person participation encouraged.

## Specific Technical Proposals and Amendments

Several delegations proposed specific amendments to paragraph language and technical modifications to the draft report. Brazil raised concerns about consolidating Annex C with Annex 3, highlighting the need for better integration of existing frameworks with new institutional elements.

Multiple delegations mentioned specific paragraph numbers requiring amendments, though detailed discussion of these technical changes was deferred to allow focus on broader structural issues.

## The Chair’s Synthesis and Procedural Guidance

Throughout the discussion, the Chair played a crucial role in synthesising different positions and identifying potential paths forward. The Chair noted the “palpable commitment to bring this to closure” and the “enormous amount of commitment to conclude the work and reach consensus,” whilst acknowledging “divergent views” on key issues.

The Chair’s flexibility comments, made specifically in response to Thailand’s statement about being flexible on modalities, helped frame the discussion around accommodation and compromise. The Chair emphasised that decisions on the future mechanism’s structure could not be postponed without risking the entire transition process.

In closing remarks, the Chair echoed insights that political will, rather than perfect institutional architecture, would determine the mechanism’s success. The Chair announced that attendance would be taken for the following morning’s stakeholder presentations and reiterated the tight timeline for completing Revision 2 of the draft report.

## Unresolved Issues Requiring Continued Negotiation

Several critical issues remained unresolved:

**DTG Structure and Mandate**: The fundamental disagreement between cross-cutting and pillar-based approaches remained unresolved, with particular uncertainty about DTG1’s mandate and activities.

**Stakeholder Participation Modalities**: The divide between majority decision and non-objection approaches appeared irreconcilable, with both sides maintaining firm positions based on different philosophical approaches to multilateral governance.

**Decision-Making Procedures**: Tension between consensus principles and practical implementation remained unresolved, with different interpretations of what consensus requires in practice.

**Meeting Scheduling and Resource Allocation**: Practical questions about meeting timing, format, and resource requirements remained contentious, particularly regarding burden on smaller delegations.

## Conclusion

The fourth meeting demonstrated both significant progress made over five years of negotiations and persistent challenges in establishing an effective permanent mechanism for cybersecurity governance. Universal acceptance of the five pillars framework and strong convergence on capacity building priorities provided solid foundations for moving forward.

However, fundamental disagreements on DTG structure and stakeholder participation modalities reflected deeper philosophical differences about multilateral governance that could not be easily resolved through technical adjustments. The Chair’s emphasis on political will over institutional architecture suggested that success would depend more on participating states’ commitment and flexibility than on perfect structural design.

The meeting concluded with stakeholder presentations scheduled for the following morning, followed by the Chair’s preparation of Revision 2 of the draft report, reflecting the urgency of reaching consensus whilst ensuring all voices could be heard in the final stages of this negotiation on the future of global cybersecurity governance.

Chair: The fourth meeting of the 11th Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICTs is now called to order. Distinguished Delegates, we will continue our discussion under Agenda Item 5. As I indicated just before we broke for lunch, we will this afternoon begin with a discussion on Section G relating to Regular Institutional Dialogue and Annex III of Rev. 1, which is related to Regular Institutional Dialogue and has additional draft modalities to be discussed. Now please do not press the buttons yet to request for the floor. We are going to erase the previous list and we will start afresh. So please hold on while we start afresh. And I wanted to say at this point, I wanted to at this point apologize for those who were not able to speak this afternoon on Sections A to F. I want to assure you that after we consider Regular Institutional Dialogue, we will find some time together. other delegations who wish to go back to sections A to F and who have not yet spoken. So at this point I’m only inviting comments on section relating to regular institutional dialogue. If your comments relate to section A to F I kindly ask you to hold down. The discussions relating to regular institutional dialogue are in some ways interconnected with the other sections and therefore I think it’s important that we start a discussion on RID and then come back to some of the other issues if needed. But the overarching point is that we do not have a lot of time and even on regular institutional dialogue I’d like everyone to be as brief as possible because we only have this three-hour session to get through this topic and it is an important topic that we need to address. So I’d like to hear as many of you as possible and please be very brief. So let me now invite you to press the button if you wish to speak on RID. Thank you very much. I think we have quite a number of people who wish to speak on RID and I’d like to invite you to press the button if you wish to speak on RID. Thank you very much. I think we have quite a number of delegations, maybe around 40 or more. So, you do the math, we have three hours this afternoon and I’d like you to speak within three minutes. All right. We’ll start with France to be followed by Chile. The French delegation, you have the floor.

France: Thank you, Chairman. My delegation would like to use a visual presentation to try to summarize from our perspective the challenges related to the historic opportunity to establish a permanent action-oriented mechanism related to cyber security at the UN. I’d like to thank you and the Secretariat for your flexibility here. Since our visual presentation is in English, I will now unfortunately move into English. Those of you who are watching on the UN web TV, please don’t get mad at me. We thought it was important to take a few steps back to look at what is at stake this week. We should indeed look at the situation from a higher standpoint. And from there, observe that there are more agreements than disagreements, more common goals than diverging interests. Our goal is to bridge the gaps, as we’ve always done with our work around the POA proposal. Next slide, please. digital divide, which results from the capacity building divide and capacity building gap. The previous processes have given a prominent place to this issue in the discussions, that’s true. But in the next process, we need to walk the talk and create the conditions for better capacity building. This is what a group of states from the LAC region has made clear in their paper on strengthening strategic dialogue on capacity building and its inclusion in the future permanent mechanism. Next slide, please. Therefore, we want to make a constructive proposal for the final report for better capacity building with three dimensions. The first dimension would be cyber capacity building discussions in the plenary. The second dimension would be discussions on concrete needs and solutions in the dedicated thematic groups. And finally, the third dimension would be a roundtable to be a dedicated space to capacity building. Next slide, please. The second gap to fill is the implementation gap. The previous processes have allowed negotiations to establish the framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. But in order to face rising threats in cyberspace, we need here again to walk the talk. We need to start from the reality on the ground, and from there, understand how to best implement this framework through action-oriented recommendations. Next slide, please. Therefore, we suggest to add an agenda item for the future plenary. This item would allow the decision-making process in the plenary to benefit from the outcomes of action-oriented discussions in the dedicated thematic groups. More broadly, this will connect regional needs and best practices to the global conversation, as the working paper from the Pacific Island Forum Member States invited us to do. Next slide, please. And, finally, we need to fill the inclusivity gap. The previous processes have seen a broad participation of cyber diplomats, which is a very good thing. But the next mechanism needs to give a voice to expertise by having cyber agencies, legal experts and stakeholders around the table as well, being able to contribute when necessary. Let me be clear on one point, though. The decisions will remain the prerogative of states. Next slide, please. To accommodate experts’ inputs while depoliticizing these discussions, we propose three items as the agenda of each dedicated thematic group. They would start with briefings by experts, and then discussion on needs, and finally recommendations on solutions, drawing from all the pillars of the framework to address cyber threats. Dear colleagues, international cooperation is not a zero-sum game. Discussing about concrete challenges in cyberspace should not be seen as a national security risk. On the contrary, by sharing best practices, we can learn from each other and improve our collective resilience. This is the spirit of this proposal. Next slide, please. To try to bridge the consensus gap, France has uploaded a paper on the OEWG website proposing language for the three dedicated thematic groups. We hope this could be acceptable to all. This approach draws on all the pillars of the framework in a comprehensive and balanced way. The proposal online takes stock of agreed language as well as member state statements, especially the calls for a reasonable number of groups to avoid burdening delegations. Delegations may also observe that this approach is compatible with focusing on their various respective national priorities, as raised by many delegations. since Monday. Dear colleagues, my delegation is willing to keep this constructive dialogue going with a view to bridge the consensus gap by Friday. Thank you very much.

Chair: Thank you very much, France, for that presentation. Thank you also for your statement in English. I see that as a sign of flexibility on the part of the French delegation. That is to be welcomed. I think, apart from all the gaps that we have, the consensus gap, we also have a time gap. And I think that’s what we are trying to address as well, to give everyone a chance to give us their contributions before we look at REF2. So I’ll go down the list of speakers. Chile, to be followed by South Africa.

Chile: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Allow me to start by thanking France for their presentation. We will review it in detail. Also to say that we look forward to a very constructive dialogue on this agenda item as the outcomes of the regular institutional dialogue sets us forward towards our future permanent mechanism. I will deliver this statement on behalf of Canada and Chile, also in English, as co-coordinators of the proposal on practical modalities for stakeholder participation and accreditation in the future permanent mechanism, one of the core elements of the REIT. Mr. Chair, we are encouraged to note that our proposal is now co-sponsored by 42 member states from across regions. In previous sessions, we also had many other states express views that aligned with the spirit and intent of this initiative. We recall that in 2024, a number of delegations conveyed a clear interest in strengthening stakeholder engagement. There was broad convergence on the need to develop more transparent structure and practical modalities for their accreditation and to guide their participation in the future mechanism. We believe that this is not just a procedural matter, but one of real operational relevance. In many instances, stakeholders are at the forefront of capacity-building efforts, especially when responding to evolving threats, such as ransomware. They often serve as trusted interlocutors between donors and recipients and are well-positioned to distill lessons learned and good practices that can enrich our shared understandings. Our intent in presenting this proposal is not to create division, but to offer a practical balanced and implementable framework. We fully recognize that states may have legitimate concerns regarding certain stakeholder actors. That is why our proposal explicitly provides the opportunity for states to raise objections and present their reasoning to the broader group. At the same time, the proposal seeks to ensure that the decision-making process reflects our collective responsibility. In cases where there is no consensus to exclude a stakeholder and the concern raised is not broadly shared, we believe that the majority vote is an appropriate mechanism. This approach is not only consistent with the establishment of the UN practice, including the rules and procedures of the General Assembly, but also with our commitment to transparency and accountability. We reaffirm our understanding that the future mechanism must be state-led. This means led by all states collectively and guided by dialogue and compromise from all sides. Within such a framework, states stakeholders should have opportunities to contribute meaningfully on the issues that states identify as priorities. Their input is most effective when they are invited to speak in connection with each specific agenda item, ensuring their contributions are both relevant and timely. Finally, we wish to recall that informal meetings by UN practice and tradition are naturally more open to the participation of all stakeholders. They provide important opportunities for even more inclusive dialogue while preserving the intergovernmental nature of our process. Mr. Chair, we recognize that the issue of stakeholder modalities is of high priority to a significant number of delegations. We believe it’s also essential to our collective aim of ensuring a seamless, inclusive and adequate transition towards the future mechanism. We remain committed to working constructively with all delegations to achieve a solution that reflects our shared values and strengths and strengthens this process going forward. I will deliver my intervention on the RID in a national capacity later. Thank you so much, Chair.

Chair: Thank you. Thank you, Chile, for your statement. South Africa to be followed by Argentina.

South Africa: Thank you, Chair. The South African delegation recognizes that member states have varying views on the nature of the framework for the future mechanism. However, we must emphasize that failing to reach a consensus on this matter for inclusion in the final report would undermine the progress we have made in advancing our discussion with concrete actions. We fully support paragraph 63 of REV. 1. Regarding annex 3, additional elements for the future permanent mechanism, we agree with the proposal. to establish three dedicated thematic groups based on the motivations presented in previous sessions. While we appreciate the chair’s efforts to integrate the five pillars of the framework in DTG1, as currently drafted, the focus of DTG1 is not clear. Having had proposals made during the town hall meetings, we are persuaded to have a dedicated thematic group on international law and norms, without assuming that the two are of the same legal status. Thus, we propose deletion of cooperative measures such as rules, norms, and principles in DTG1 to allow for discussions on these matters to be discussed in DTG2 on IL and norms. Consideration should also be given to placing a discussion on confidence building measures under DTG on capacity building instead of DTG1 if member states would be agreeable to such a placement. South Africa looks forward to exchanging views on proposals by member states in this regard. In line with paragraph 53 of REV1, we accept a standalone DTG3 on capacity building, notwithstanding the need to discuss capacity building as a cross-cutting issue in the other two dedicated thematic groups. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, South Africa, for your statement within the time limit. Argentina, to be followed by European Union.

Argentina: Gracias. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The delegation of Argentina would like to take the floor on some aspects related to Annex 3 to the draft final report relating to the future permanent mechanism. Firstly, on the rules of procedure for the adoption of decisions by the. mechanism, Argentina supports those delegations that are requesting that substantive issues are to be adopted by consensus so as to preserve the intergovernmental nature and the constructive spirit of the mechanism. Secondly, turning to the participation of interested parties, we express our support for the chair’s proposal contained in paragraph 17, because we believe it is a balanced option that brings us closer to consensus. We understand that this text is a middle way between the different positions expressed by delegations in the room and does appropriately value the need to take into account the meaningful participation of interested parties, including civil society, the academic sector, and the private sector. The approach proposed includes substantive elements and a mechanism that in our view favors transparency, promotes technical and constructive participation, and at the same time preserves the intergovernmental nature of the permanent mechanism. Finally, Argentina supports the creation of a small number of DTGs, particularly the group on capacity building that is able to make recommendations for consideration by the plenary as set out in the revised version of the draft under consideration. My delegation, together with another 14 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, has been supporting over the last five years the approach for the DTGA, both within currently and the future mechanism. This has been shown not only through joint interventions but also the presentation of working documents in which we highlight the importance of capacity building for cyber resilience and so as to maintain cyber security in safe cyberspace that is interoperable and peaceful. These are all key elements to establish. ensuring stability in the digital environment and, in the last instance, maintaining international peace and security. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Argentina, for your statement within the time. EU followed by Paraguay.

European Union: Thank you, Chair. In the essence of time, I just say that I speak on behalf of the same States as before, and I have, with the indulgence of those States, I represent, shortened my text significantly, but the full text will be published online and shared with you, of course. First of all, Chair, we need to conclude this week with a report that establishes a future permanent mechanism with its plenary, its DTGs, the Capacity Building Roundtable, a review conference, and a portal that will help us and support us to further our work to advance security and stability in cyberspace. In line with our proposals for a UN Cyber Programme of Action, we want the discussions to become more concrete and more action-oriented, tackling real-life cybersecurity challenges. Therefore, in addition to the open-ended working group-like plenary discussions, the DTGs are to discuss these challenges, drawing upon all the five pillars of the framework. Challenges in cyberspace rarely occur in isolation and are not solved by just one pillar of the framework. Each pillar represents a distinct but independent dimension to tackling cyber threats. Isolating one pillar from the rest risks creating a silo and producing narrow and incoherent solutions. We therefore cannot accept a DTG solely on international law, as it goes against this very purpose. Let me make an example of a challenge that affects us all in a cross-cutting DTG. For instance, protecting our essential services against the use of malicious software, ransomware specifically. The cross-cutting DTG would allow to dive into understanding this threat, into the norms both related to the protection of essential services as well as also to prevent those malicious acts. The implications for international security… and stability and the role of international law in this context, such as the law of state responsibility, the CBMs we could use for international cooperation, as well as and moreover, the capacity building needs and gaps that would need to be addressed in the context of this threat. Putting all of the pillars in place to address cybersecurity challenges will enable us to exchange on best practices and address needs and gaps, notably as regards implementation and capacity building. Stakeholders could be invited to share their experience and measures contributing to our knowledge. Building on these DTG discussions, the plenary can then discuss and decide upon recommendations and we therefore suggest to replace the item of the regular institutional dialogue in our plenaries with the outcome of the DTGs. Chair, we need to build a mechanism of which the different elements work together smoothly without the risk of duplicating our discussions. Plenary discussions discuss the pillars and decide. The DTGs discuss the challenges and define actionable solutions, including on capacity building. And the capacity building round table at expert level allows us to advance capacity building opportunities and where necessary, recommendations on how to improve cyber capacity building. It is the combination of the formats where the strength of the future permanent mechanism will lie and which will allow us to make most progress. As for the participation of stakeholders, I can be very short as we have a clear stance and fully supported paper by Chile and Canada. Our support for stakeholder engagement is not a political point, but rather a pragmatic one. Why would we not tap into their expertise to help us advance security and stability in cyberspace? Thank you very much, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, European Union, for your brevity and also for speaking on behalf of your group. Paraguay followed by Thailand, please. And I encourage the same level of focus and brevity. Thank you very much.

Paraguay: Thank you, Chairman. Paraguay, I would like to reiterate that one of the fundamental pillars of the discussions of this group is capacity building, because this not only means institutional growth but also the development of capacities which, when applied to ICTs, allows for the protection and prevention against cyber threats. It guarantees data security and allows us to be at the vanguard with regard to the constant evolution of this topic and to move forward quickly. Seeking an open, free, global, interoperable, reliable and safe internet is important, and hence why it’s important to ensure that no one is left behind. Like other delegations, therefore, we believe that fundamental of the future mechanism should include a specialised working group looking at capacity building, because it would enable continued discussions on crucial topics so as to facilitate the consolidation of national efforts as they develop policies, exchange and exchange information, improving cyber security policies and other areas. In this sense, we join the working group on capacity building and its incorporation in the future permanent mechanism, and we encourage other countries to join this. Chair, Paraguay would like to express its thanks for the efforts made by the chair, and we’d like to refer to the following ad hoc matters. Firstly, we’d like to highlight something that may have gone unnoticed by the majority of countries, that is, during these discussions, the participation of landlocked developing countries has been limited. Chairman, we’d like to take this opportunity also to thank other organisations, international organisations and the academic world for their efforts which has contributed. to reducing the digital divide in our country. One example of this is the presidential decree that was adopted on cybersecurity that was crafted with the support of the OAS. Further, we’d like to express our sincere thanks to organizations and countries that have supported our national efforts to build our capacities, both diplomatic and technical. We have a policy supported by the OAS, Canada, and the Forum of Cyber Expertise and Unity on Cyberspace and Related Norms. We have the Cyber Diplomacy Winter School and the Summer School that were organized by the Estonian government and other initiatives. Finally, we’d also like to note that we’ve received support to combat cyber threats, which have been particularly active against Paraguay this year. We highlight the invaluable support of the United States and Taiwan here following the latest attacks that we suffered, many of which were directly or indirectly related to our foreign policy. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you, Paraguay, for your statement. Thailand to be followed by Australia.

Thailand: Mr. Chair, as we are approaching the conclusion of the OEWG’s mandate, it is essential to make a seamless transition to the future permanent mechanism. As encouraged by the Chair, I’ll be brief on my statement. First, we are, in general, supportive of the Chair’s proposal, as outlined in annex 3. Thailand can be supportive of the establishment of three dedicated thematic groups, as proposed by the Chair. A group on cross-cutting issues, which would provide space for discussion on receipt. resilience and effective responses, a group on capacity building, which is essential to ensure the mechanism’s practical and action-oriented character, and lastly, a group on international law, which we particularly welcome. This group will enable focused and sustained discussion, including on related capacity building, aimed at bridging legal and technical gaps and promote more inclusive participation by states on this specialized topic. These thematic areas reflect key priorities that merge in that continuous dialogue among states. Second, Thailand strongly supports inclusion of a provision allowing for the establishment of additional ad hoc dedicated thematic groups as necessary. This would enable us to – this would enable the new permanent mechanism to remain responsive to emerging challenges and evolving priorities. Third, Thailand strongly supports the Chair’s proposal to convene all three dedicated thematic groups in the same week, as this would optimize resource use, particularly for developing countries. However, we believe that the proposed requirements for the groups to meet at least one day per year may be insufficient, given the complexity of the issues. While we remain flexible on the modalities, we encourage extending this period to allow for deeper and more meaningful conversation, particularly on international law. Fourth, while Thailand maintains a preference for in-person meetings, given their value in trust-building, engagement, and addressing time-zone challenges, we can support a hybrid format with in-person participation strongly encouraged. Mr. Chair, Thailand supports engagement of multi-stakeholders in future permanent mechanisms. The involvement will enrich discussions and promote transparent cross-sector collaboration in addressing cybersecurity challenges. We remain flexible regarding the modalities proposed by you, Mr. Chair, and sincerely hope that consensus can be reached on this important matter. Mr. Chair, we hope that Member States can reach an agreement on these outstanding issues, enabling operationalization of the mechanism that fosters continual, substantive and inclusive dialogue on ICT security. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Thailand, for being on time, but most importantly for saying that you are flexible on the modalities put forward. I’d like to hear those words more often, flexibility in all its languages, in the true spirit of multilingualism and multilateral cooperation. So I call on the next speaker, Australia, to be followed by Malaysia.

Australia: Thank you, Chair. We align with the earlier Pacific Islands Forum statement and would like to make the additional remarks in our national capacity. On paragraph 63, Australia agrees with this approach for establishing the future action-oriented permanent mechanism and notes the importance of additional elements such as dedicated thematic groups and stakeholder modalities. Under annex 3 paragraph 7, we propose replacing a rotating agenda of issues with sharing lessons learned and best practices and identifying capacity-building needs. On paragraph 8, we support the updated French-led proposal for the action-oriented thematic groups based on resilience, cooperation and stability. We continue to emphasize the importance of dedicated thematic groups which will facilitate discussions of an integrated, policy-oriented and cross-cutting nature, where the framework’s toolkit of international law, norms, confidence-building measures and capacity-building can be applied to real-world cyber policy challenges. The French-updated proposal explicitly draws on the five pillars of the framework in each dedicated thematic group. In addition, we have heard from many states that capacity building is essential to building cyber resilience. The updated proposal also strengthens the linkages between the resilience group and capacity building, including by convening the global roundtable on ICT security capacity building. We support continued in-depth discussions on international law. However, a dedicated thematic group on international law is not the answer. We have a space in the plenary for broad discussions on international law. In addition, it is through discussing how international law applies to specific cyber policy challenges in cross-cutting dedicated thematic groups that we will be able to move from abstract statements on international law to concrete and responsive discussions on what international law means in practice. Ensuring that international law is cross-cutting across the dedicated thematic groups is essential to building capacity and promoting further convergences on how international law applies in cyberspace and understanding how all the tools in our framework work together to promote international peace and security. On paragraph 11, we support the opportunity to review the number and scope of dedicated thematic groups at the review conference and therefore consider it redundant to also review them at the third substantive session and request this reference be removed. On paragraph 12 and the indicative timeline, while Australia supports the streamlining of in-person meetings from three weeks to two weeks, we do not think it makes sense for the DTGs to be held immediately after the plenary. After all, the DTGs are meant to report to the plenary and it wouldn’t make sense to do this 11 and a half months later. There is also no time to digest the discussions from the plenary and the DTGs if they’re immediately together. We think there is benefit in meeting twice a year given the rapidly evolving cyber security environment and in order to deliver capacibility training in the margins. We would like to propose the plenary meets for one week in July and the DTGs meet for one week in December. This would strike the right balance between ensuring meetings are regular and the outcomes are useful with capacity and financial constraints also taken into consideration. We also request that any additional meetings be agreed by consensus given the constraints and challenges that not only smaller delegations have but all of us have when and we don’t want the meeting schedule to become overly burdensome. On paragraph 14 on additional ad hoc dedicated thematic groups we suggest deleting this paragraph. As we’ve heard many smaller delegations have already expressed concern about too many DTGs given their limited capacities. The potential for additional ad hoc groups creates additional uncertainties and potential burdens and there is already an opportunity to review DTGs at the review conference. On paragraph 15 we would like to emphasise that action oriented draft recommendations should be agreed by consensus in line with the consensus principle. On paragraph 17 on stakeholder modalities Australia emphasises the importance of a multi-stakeholder approach which enriches our discussions by drawing on the expertise, research and resources of academia, civil society, the private sector and the technical community to improve our collective cybersecurity and resilience. We strongly support the Canada and Chile led paper on practical modalities for stakeholders participation and accreditation to improve inclusiveness and transparency and would like to see these elements reflected in the next draft. In particular a state opposing a stakeholders accreditation should be required to share its objection and rationale with the OEWG and where there is no consensus on its accreditation status it should be decided by a majority. Finally Australia has meticulously recorded women’s participation in the OEWG formal meetings as a measure to reflect the level of gender equality and cybersecurity. Further, to the cross-regional paper on mainstreaming gender equality and the future permanent mechanism, re-request the Secretary to assume this role. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you, Australia, for your statement. Malaysia, to be followed by Islamic Republic of Iran.

Malaysia: Thank you, Mr Chair. My delegation commends your continued efforts relating to the future permanent mechanism, including through the latest iteration of Annex 3. Australia notes that there remain divergent views on inter alia, the dedicated thematic groups or DTGs. On the whole, we believe that Annex 3 sets out a helpful overall structure for detailed consideration of specific issue areas at the technical level, with periodic reporting to the plenary for decision-making at the political level. Whilst we believe there is scope for improvement in delineating the DTGs, we greatly appreciate the Chair’s efforts to provide a pathway towards consensus guided by our overarching goal of a seamless transition from the OEWG to its successor mechanism. In principle, we recognise the value of cross-cutting discourse on ICT security, given the dynamic nature of the ICT environment, which necessitates a degree of agility and adaptability in responding to evolving threats and challenges. Over the past five years, we have seen this OEWG make tangible contributions in advancing the implementation of the Framework of Responsible State Behaviour, deepening collective understandings and also providing a space for discussions on possible gaps and solutions thereto. At the same time, we appreciate the emphasis which delegations have placed on the value of further focused examination of particular aspects of the Framework so as to support and reinforce discussions at the plenary level. In this respect, We remain open to bridging proposals, noting that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive. We thank delegations which have made specific language proposals, which we are presently reviewing together with suggestions relating to the important issue of non-governmental stakeholder participation. Mr. Chair, as many have highlighted, we must guard against the real risk of fragmentation both of our substantive work at the UN on ICT security and of the attendant practical modalities if we are unable to agree on the key elements of the future mechanism this week. Rest assured that Malaysia will continue working intensively with all States in the spirit of constructive dialogue, conscious of what we collectively stand to gain from a single-track permanent UN mechanism on ICT security and what we stand to lose in its absence. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Malaysia, for your statement. Islamic Republic of Iran to be followed by Morocco.

Islamic Republic of Iran: Thank you, Mr. Chair. On Annex 3, we have the following comments. During the previous informal consultations, we noted some uncertainty and differing interpretations regarding the consensus-based nature of decision-making within the future permanent mechanism. In this regard, we propose the inclusion of a new paragraph before Paragraph 4 of Annex 3 to read as follows, the future permanent mechanism shall take all decisions by consensus. While we remain flexible regarding the number of dedicated thematic groups within the future permanent mechanism, we firmly believe that the pillars of the current OEWG should be reflected in these groups. Comments from other relevant mechanisms suggest that the concern raised by some States that structuring the thematic groups around the OEWG pillars might lead to repetitive statements in both plenary sessions and thematic discussions may be overstated. While the mandate of the thematic group 1 has been improved, it remains vague and overly complex and therefore requires further strengthening and clarification in line with the pillars of the open-ended working group. Additionally, the phrase maintaining peace and security appears in the mandate, however this falls within the responsibility of another body and its use in the context of the thematic group is not acceptable. Mr. Chair, regarding the mandate of the first thematic group, we will provide a specific language later in this session. The authority granted to the co-facilitators of the dedicated thematic groups in paragraph 15 to transmit action-oriented draft recommendations to the permanent mechanism is unacceptable. We strongly urge that the modalities outlined in the zero draft be retained. This includes the requirement that dedicated thematic groups agree by consensus to submit any action-oriented draft recommendations to the permanent mechanism and that such draft recommendations may be provisionally agreed upon through a silence procedure for transmission to the substantive plenary session for consideration by states. Regarding the modalities for the participation of stakeholders, we prefer to maintain the current modality, which has demonstrated its effectiveness. This is affirmed in paragraph 10 of the zero draft, which notes that the OEWG engages stakeholders in a systematic, sustained, and substantive manner. However, we emphasize that preserving the principle of non-objection in any stakeholder participation modalities remains our highest priority. We cannot accept any proposal that would weaken this fundamental principle. Given that technical experts from states will participate in the thematic groups and will engage in technical rather than political or diplomatic discussions, we believe that the expert briefings referenced in Paragraph 7a, as well as the participation of other stakeholders outlined in Paragraph 8, don’t offer additional value and could therefore be deleted. We support the proposal made by the Russian Federation during the town hall consultations to empower the chair and the secretariat of the future permanent mechanism to assess the relevance of ECOSOC-accredited NGOs that have applied to participate in the mechanism and to inform the state of the outcome of such assessment. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you, Iran, for your statement. Before I give the floor to Morocco, and I hope Morocco will accept this, that I invite Nigeria, which is making a statement on behalf of the African group. Thank you, Morocco. Nigeria, you have the floor, please.

Nigeria: Thank you, Chair. On the structure of future permanent mechanism, we wish to state that while the African group would like to reaffirm the relevance and equal importance of the fifth pillars of the framework, it welcomes the proposal to have three dedicated thematic groups on resilience, international law, and capacity building within the future permanent mechanism. We believe that a focus on three dedicated thematic groups will assist with greater efficiency and for obvious reasons, inclusiveness. The discussion of threats under the dedicated thematic group on resilience should provide a platform for formulating a continuously updated list of concurrent and emerging threats and seeking the best means and ways of preventing and responding to these threats from taking technical and operational perspectives. It is important that this thematic group also consider discussing cooperation in ICT incident management. We take note of the proposal on the revised first draft of the final report of Mr. Chair to have confidence building measure discussed under the thematic group. Given the dedicated thematic group on the application of international law in cyberspace, we understand that this would enhance deep and meaningful discussion on the effectiveness of and the existing landscape of obligation and norms. This will also give an insight into whether we need to enact a means of both binding and non-binding measure to deal with the increasing and rapid development of threat as well as address the gaps. The African group would like to reiterate that discussion on existing and future norms of responsible state behavior should be addressed in this thematic group. On the dedicated thematic group on capacity building, the group believe that this will provide a veritable platform for a more focused discussion on capacity building effort and on the best option to strengthen developing countries and bridge the digital gap that impede resilience and effective response. Nonetheless, we acknowledge that both capacity building and international law matters would naturally feature in a cross-cutting manner in the discussion of the other two thematic working groups. On the participation of stakeholders, the African group believe that input from various stakeholders including civil society, academia, and the private sector we know that had value to the discussion. As such, their engagement with the work of the future permanent mechanism would not only enhance the discussion but provide additional impetus. That said, the African group reiterates the intergovernmental and state-led nature of the current process as well as the prospective permanent mechanism and thus cautions against introducing new ideas that might be counterproductive and have a detrimental impact on the proceeding of such an important mechanism. Accordingly, it is most advisable to continue applying the current modalities that have been successfully working on the open-ended working group process while continuing discussions on possible options to enhance the participation of stakeholders in our proceeding as well as on the sidelines of the formal convening and during the intersessional periods. In conclusion, Mr. Chair, the group welcomes the Chair’s ongoing proposal regarding the organizational arrangement for the future mechanism and take note of those put forward by certain states. Finally, the group reiterates its readiness and commitment to continue consultation in order to finalize arrangements that will guarantee the effectiveness and inclusiveness of the future mechanism. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you, Nigeria, on behalf of the African group for your statement. Morocco to be followed by the United States.

Morocco: as well as the efforts that have been undertaken, which has – have allowed us over the past four years to maintain open, rich dialogue on a matter of tremendous importance. The Kingdom of Morocco is already looking towards the permanent mechanism. We attribute significance to the continuation of dialogue among states to achieve tangible results, and we stand ready also to work to ensure a smooth transition towards the new cooperation framework. We believe that the section of the report that deals with institutional regular dialogue and Annex III offers a foundation to build a sustainable mechanism based on shared principles. For the Kingdom of Morocco, we prioritize the need for the mechanism to reflect two major objectives to ensure collective security in the digital sphere and to ensure that this be accessible to all in an equitable way, in a manner that respects the sovereignty of all. Digital security needs to be viewed as a shared good, and on the basis of this conviction we call for capacity building to – for this to be prioritized. There’s a need to build solutions that are tailored to meet the needs of each country and to build targeted information programs and to ensure equitable access to resources specifically through the specific support mechanism. Trust is key, and this hinges on a common, applicable, measurable language. We support such practices as checklists as well as the reporting models, which allow states to make progress while contributing to the collective effort. Furthermore, responsible conduct is, of course, important, but there’s a need to continue discussions on the application of international law and cyberspace in a constructive spirit in order to ensure a legally clear and unified interpretation of the existing rules. Trust for the sovereignty of states in the digital sphere needs to be the core principle. This issue is of paramount importance. And because cyberattacks and malicious attacks serve as a reminder of the crucial need to make progress towards a clear multilateral framework that is rooted in international law that brings together responsible conduct in space, security also hinges on better protection of critical infrastructure given the growing digital – number of digital attacks with a broader scope. This is – there’s a need to prioritize these issues in terms of resilience. Issues need to be focused as a matter of priority on the sensitive systems which support our vital infrastructure. Morocco also wishes to stress the importance of regional cooperation, particularly in Africa, and we advocate having the future mechanism place value on regional mechanisms while at the same time establishing bridges among them, a follow-up mechanism based as exchange of knowledge is key to assess progress, and this assessment needs to be envisaged as a real tool for learning and not as a burden. And lastly, to support each country on the basis of its priorities and capacity. To conclude, Chairman, we welcome the fact that a number of these priorities for the forthcoming permanent mechanism are reflected in Annex III, and we think that there’s an important need to recall the following. States need to demonstrate flexibility vis-a-vis the functioning modalities and the composition of the proposed thematic group. This flexibility – and this is all the more necessary given that the report incorporates mechanisms to assess, to adjust, or to review the group over the course of time based on needs and priorities as well as lessons drawn from their implementation. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Morocco. United States to be followed by Colombia.

United States: Thank you, Chair. A report that accurately reflects states’ positions on regular institutional dialogue is – critical to the successful conclusion of this Working Group’s mandate. States have reached a significant degree of alignment on elements of the future permanent mechanism. Specifically, as noted in last year’s Annex C, the future permanent mechanism must be integrated, policy-oriented, and cross-cutting in nature. The future mechanism should be action-oriented and challenge-focused, with cross-cutting discussions that will allow us to progress in our implementation of the framework, including capacity building to that end. First I will discuss the RID portion in the main body of the draft report. Generally, we support this section’s brevity, leaving the detail to Annex 3 at the end allows us to focus our discussion there. We do want to highlight that in paragraph 62 of the RID section, we are concerned that if language changed from states proposed to states agreed, that the future mechanism will facilitate the continued operationalization of all initiatives from the OEWG. Our preference would be to revert to the original language. If agreed is retained, those initiatives which are being agreed to by consensus must be named so that states have clarity. Chair, moving to Annex 3, we appreciate your ongoing efforts to help this group find consensus on the topic of RID. The 2024 APR, particularly Annex C, represents an important step in defining a clear path for the single-track, permanent, action-oriented mechanism with implementation of the consensus framework as its foundation and mandate. Given that, Annex 3 must remain concise and focused on the fundamental parameters of the future permanent mechanism without delving into specific details that can be sorted in a future organizational conference for that mechanism. States have already agreed by consensus that the future permanent mechanism would be integrated, policy-oriented, and cross-cutting in nature, 2024 APR, paragraph 5, and Annex C, paragraph 9. We do not believe the dedicated thematic working groups as drafted in Rev. 1 fulfill that mandate. We continue to strongly support the French proposal that is action-oriented and includes challenge-focused groups that will allow us to progress in our implementation of the framework. The proposal for dedicated thematic groups on selective pillars of the framework, such as international law and capacity-building, necessarily duplicates the work of the plenary, where these topics already have dedicated discussion space. Such an approach could waste time and keeps our conversation on this critical topic stagnant. It also unhelpfully elevates certain pillars of the framework at the expense of others. In particular, some States have already affirmed this week that they will seek to exploit conversations in the international law DTG to advance new legally binding obligations contrary to the consensus spirit of the OEWG. We have exhibited extreme flexibility over the course of this OEWG in allowing for the future possibility of elaborating on additional binding obligations, but we cannot agree to a group that States openly affirm will be hijacked for such a purpose. The OEWG is not the appropriate body to be developing new law, nor is the time for that work ripe. The best use of the future mechanism in this respect is to continue to build States’ capacity to implement the consensus framework, including by formulating views on how existing legal obligations apply to States’ use of ICTs. Plenary and cross-cutting discussions, as well as the scenario-based workshops, like the successful event run by UNIDIR, further the development of common understanding, which is a prerequisite to identifying any gaps in the current legal framework. On stakeholders, we continue to hear calls from the vast majority of states that we need meaningful engagement with stakeholders in the future mechanism. The process outlined in this annex is not fit for purpose, and almost certainly allows single states with radical positions to veto valuable stakeholders from providing their expertise to our discussions. American businesses have deep expertise on a range of topics that are extremely relevant to this group, but are consistently excluded by one or two states who want to rob all states of such expertise for petty political reasons. We are disappointed that minor edits to this topic in Rev. 1 still create stakeholder modalities that would not facilitate the meaningful dialogue that so many states are calling for. Meaningful engagement with industry and other nongovernmental experts is critical to the utility of the future mechanism. The process outlined in this annex is not fit for purpose and will continue to allow a single state to prevent any number of expert stakeholders from attending. Chair, the United States seeks to achieve consensus in negotiations on this final report. To accomplish that, the report must accurately reflect the discussions that have taken place in this OEWG, jettison mention of topics that do not enjoy consensus and details that are not essential to solidifying the next process, and focus on the OEWG’s core concern of laying the groundwork for the future permanent mechanism based on implementation of the framework. We will submit additional comments in writing. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you, United States, for your statement. Colombia, to be followed by Finland.

Colombia: Thank you, Chairman. On the future permanent mechanism, we’re grateful for the efforts under your leadership to advance towards consensus in this area, and on national capacity, we’d like to make the following comments. On the thematic groups, we reiterate our willingness to seek agreement and advance in practical and pragmatic commitments to lay the foundations for a comprehensive, action-oriented cross-cutting mechanism. In this sense, we support the creation of the three groups that are currently proposed, particularly the importance of the international law group and on capacity building. On the future structure for capacity building, we believe that the global roundtable would be complementary to the thematic group on capacity building, which would develop the updates on this matter, as well as the discussions in the plenary, which would see the adoption of reports and where progress would be assessed. Therefore, the global roundtable on ICT could be the scenario where we would have the exchange of experience and good practice on this matter. As we’ve previously highlighted, methodologically and in order to grant the mechanism the appropriate flexibility to make progress on ICTs, we support the creation of an ad hoc group, the thematic of which would be chosen by the states and set out in its working document. In light of the – for the functioning of the thematic groups, we have the following comments. Firstly, we’d like to thank you for taking into account Colombia’s proposal in paragraph 7. Secondly, as you’re aware, for our delegation, it’s fundamental to to ensure the inclusive participation of national experts in these working groups. That means that to ensure meaningful participation, the thematic sessions should have interpretation services. In addition, in order to facilitate dialogue and exchange of opinions between experts, it’s important for hybrid sessions to consider the most appropriate hybrid platform to facilitate this type of dialogue. Thirdly, I’d like to refer to paragraph 16 and the proposal for a calendar for the future mechanism. We agree with Australia here on the importance for states to have sufficient time to review the updates from the thematic groups. Therefore, we suggest that we grant two months between the holding of each session, and in addition, we should take into account the calendar of sessions of the first committee. Finally, while we understand that the first session of the group should be organizational in nature, we believe that the next should be focused on the thematic groups and then subsequently the plenary session. The previous one should be focused on making recommendations, and then we would consider those within the plenary. On modalities, finally, my delegation believe that as proposed recently, the proposal put forward by Chile and Canada lays the foundation for a transparent and inclusive system. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Columbia, for your statement. Finland to be followed by Ireland.

Finland: Thank you, Chair, for giving us the floor. Finland aligns itself with the statement of the European Union and wishes to make some additional remarks in its national capacity. When it comes to the dedicated thematic groups, a multidimensional approach is needed, not the least for ensuring that the action-oriented measures proposed are in line with the full UN framework of responsible state behavior. behavior in cyberspace. Finland believes that the DDGs should complement the pillar approach of the plenaries by offering the possibility to share challenges and best practices in order to recognize any gaps in implementation and capacity building. Finland supports the next proposal of the DDGs made by France. Moreover, we need to close the inclusivity gap. Finland recognizes the chair’s efforts to make improvements on the modalities for stakeholder participation in the future permanent mechanism. However, the non-objection mechanism regarding stakeholder participation should be reconsidered. Open discussions on any objection are needed, but if unresolved, the majority should decide in accordance with the rules of procedure of the United Nations General Assembly. This has been suggested in the non-paper by Canada and Chile and co-sponsored by several states, including Finland. Dear Chair, please allow me to thank you and your team once again for your efforts throughout this process. Finland believes that at the end of this week, a consensus can be reached. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Finland, for the vote of confidence. I’ll give now the floor to Ireland, followed by Cote d’Ivoire.

Ireland: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Ireland would align itself with the intervention of the EU and also with the French presentation and proposal that was made, but we would like to make a few points in our national capacity as well. As we approach the end of this mandate of the OEWG, the establishment of a single track permanent future mechanism under UN auspices that is inclusive, action-oriented, and based on the UN normative framework must be our priority. Securing cyberspace comes down to addressing real-life concrete challenges. That is why the discussions in the DTG. DTDs need to be cross-cutting. This has been the call of the overwhelming majority of delegations as we have grown to understand together that our considerations are necessarily interrelated. The DTDs are there to discuss actual challenges we face and leveraging all of the different elements of the UN framework we have to address these. We recall with appreciation, Chair, that you have also been a champion of highlighting this essentially cross-cutting nature. We cannot afford to discuss issues in a way that no longer reflects the cross-cutting nature of contemporary concerns. Like others, we do not consider that a dedicated thematic group on international law is beneficial for the future mechanism and, as currently proposed, does not reflect the mandate we have been asked to fulfill in furthering understandings of how international law applies in cyberspace. As currently proposed, there is a risk that this group would duplicate efforts and divert resources and attention from more dynamic engagement on legal issues within the context of the work of the other thematic groups. We believe that stakeholders are particularly well placed to enhance situational awareness and also to input their learnings and insights into this process. Their input is particularly valuable on threats where they enhance our understanding, knowledge and information of the cybersecurity challenges related to critical infrastructure and new and emerging technologies such as quantum and artificial intelligence. For this reason, Ireland has joined 42 countries in supporting the cross-regional paper prepared by Canada and Chile, which ambitiously reimagines how we can best utilise the expertise and insight of stakeholders in our future deliberations. And finally, just in regards to timing, as was mentioned, I think, by Australia and Colombia, we would query the proposal to have the DTGs take place after the plenary session. Logically, we consider they should be placed so as to prepare the plenary session’s work and there are very good precedents for this. across a number of other UN processes. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you, Arlene. Côte d’Ivoire, to be followed by Egypt.

Cote d Ivoire: Chairman, Côte d’Ivoire has been a long-standing supporter of the establishment of a permanent mechanism for regular institutional dialogue to take over from the current working group in order to guarantee the continuity and stability of our work towards digital security and safety. Indeed, we very quickly supported the idea of a program of action to promote responsible state behavior in the digital sphere. Today we welcome the considerable headway that we have made that led to a shared adoption of this draft and the various elements of consensus that we’ve reached, particularly the need for a single mechanism and the need to smoothly, without delay, establish it. Its definitive establishment is the great challenge that we have in our current process, so it’s essential that we take the last decisive step, particularly to agree on the supplementary elements in annex 3 of the final report. In this regard, in paragraph 5, we’d like to specify the pillars of the responsible behavior framework for plenary sessions. Even if we are supposed to understand and know about these pillars, including these details, we wouldn’t necessarily be going too far. Further, my delegation supports the establishment of three thematic groups and the possibility of creating ad hoc supplementary groups. We welcome the principle of a coherent, co-ordinated approach. coordinated operation of the various components of the structure of the future mechanism in order to avoid any duplication. We think that this should involve clear delimitations between the scope of DTG 1, which should be focused on all of the pillars of the framework, and DTGs 2 and 3 related to two of these pillars. On the calendar for meetings, Côte d’Ivoire would welcome the holding of thematic group meetings either before or after the plenary sessions. However, we would allow the DTGs to report to these plenary sessions and understanding the dates of these meetings upstream would be helpful. In order to ensure more inclusivity, Côte d’Ivoire has always been in favour of ensuring the broadest possible participation of stakeholders and other concerned parties in the future permanent mechanism through a consultative mode and without necessarily their involvement in decision-making to preserve the intergovernmental nature of the mechanism. We therefore welcome the accreditation modalities that are set out in the supplementary elements. We encourage Member States to carefully use the non-objection mechanism in order to harness this participation as best as possible. We are also in favour of diverse participation based on equitable geographic representation of stakeholders and other concerned parties, and in this regard we support the establishment of a fellowship programme. To conclude, Côte d’Ivoire calls on us to demonstrate in this last step flexibility and a spirit of compromise that we will need to ensure the establishment of the future permanent mechanism. Thank you.

Chair: Egypt, to be followed by Fiji.

Egypt: Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor, and I wish to align myself with the statement of the African group. I would like to start my intervention with one observation, which is that over the past four years, I guess we have had separate discussions on international law, on norms, on threats, and yet we managed to agree on three consensual reports. If that proves anything, that proves that neither the structure nor the discussions are the problem. Rather, it’s the flexibility and the willingness to compromise. My second point is that we all agree that we convene here in order to bridge the digital divide and the gaps between the developed and developing countries. We have varying degrees of understanding of cyber threats and the actions to be taken. Accordingly, adopting a scenario-based discussion for our convening, while necessary, it’s not sufficient. We risk that we convert our discussions into a discussion between developed countries while alienating developing countries. That’s our main fear. That said, Chair, we support your current proposal of having three thematic groupings. The first one will be convened in a scenario-based approach, where we discuss the threats from all different aspects. And then the other two groupings, one on international law, which might be complemented by norms, and the other one on capacity building, will cater for the differences we have in priorities and needs, will provide a platform that combines both the interests and needs of developed and developing countries. I wish to say as well that we do not preempt the discussions in those two groups. No one said it will reach somewhere or that we have to reach a certain outcome. We just entertain a discussion, like we have been doing for the past four years. And at the end, and according to Paragraph 15 of the report, all we’re going to produce use our draft recommendations. They are draft. They are subject to a decision-taking procedure which is by consensus. So I propose, Chair, instead of focusing on how to reformulate your structure, the three three-matter groupings, that we focus rather on language and caveats that will better serve our interests and that will make us feel more comfortable with the current structure you propose. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Egypt, for your contribution. Fiji, to be followed by Italy.

Fiji: Thank you, Chair. Chair, Fiji fully aligns itself with the Pacific Islands Forum statement delivered this morning in relation to Section G on RID. Fiji now delivers in its national capacity. Chair, Fiji supports the proposal by a cross-regional group of states mentioned by Chile relating to the practical modalities for stakeholders’ participation and multi-stakeholder accreditation in the future mechanism. Further, Fiji thanks France for its visual presentation of its proposal on bridging the consensus gap. Fiji supports the text proposal for paragraph 8 from France and proposes a further minor but important amendment to include critical information infrastructure after critical information. Chair, we welcome the dedicated focus on capacity building, the protection of critical infrastructure and the continuation of the global points of contact directory under the future permanent mechanism. Finally, Fiji supports other delegations that have called for capacity building to be a standing priority across the thematic groups to ensure small island developing states are able to fully engage and implement the framework for responsible state behavior in the use of ICT. Thank you, Chair.

Italy: law, Italy fully aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union and wishes to add a few considerations from the national perspective. As we are now at the conclusion of the UAWG, we believe that a significant change of pace is needed. The UN membership is called on to identify a new permanent mechanism that allows us to build on this experience and deepen our long-lasting exchanges on cybersecurity in a more action-oriented way. Indeed, it is evident to us that the rapidity by which the threat landscape is evolving and the challenges related to it, and challenges affecting every country, require a permanent single track and flexible mechanism that is grounded in the UN acquis. This ought to be an action-oriented platform that can support all of us in increasing resilience and ICT security, fostering cooperation to address ICT threats, and promoting peace, security, and stability in cyberspace. That is the structure of the DTGs as proposed by France, which we fully support. Also, regarding the DTGs review process, we believe that paragraph 11 of Annex 3 could benefit from additional clarity. Last but not least, we are convinced that it is important to recognize the valuable contribution the multi-stakeholder community has provided to the discussions of this UAWG and to CCB projects worldwide. Governments alone cannot always deliver what is needed. Technical and informed voices are indispensable for successful and effective discussions and for CCB. That is why Italy supports the non-paper proposed by Canada and Chile. Therefore, we encourage all delegations to positively consider such proposals. We believe that it is the best possible way for the new mechanism to be really inclusive to the benefit of its action-oriented character. VETOs are not a synonym for inclusiveness. Mr. Chair, we believe that the above-mentioned points should be reflected in the final report. The future permanent mechanism will define our common ability to concretely act towards a cyberspace that is open, free, secure and interoperable. As always, we trust in your leadership to identify the appropriate balance in the report for an actionable way forward. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much. Italy, Russian Federation, to be followed by Ukraine.

Russian Federation: Mr. Chairman, distinguished colleagues, we proceed from the understanding that defining the modalities of the future permanent mechanism for the OEWG is our key task. The current version of Annex 3 for the draft report provides us a good basis for discussion. However, a number of the key elements of the Annex need further improvement. First and foremost, there is a need to adjust the terminology in accordance with the mandate of the OEWG as approved by General Assembly Resolution 75-240. We should talk about security of and in the use of ICTs, a topic that is the subject of consideration by the OEWG and the future permanent mechanism, and not ICT security, which is one of the narrow aspects of this. Therefore, there is a need to change the title of the future mechanism. What is of key significance is clarifying the functionality of the new body. the specific pillars of the Mandate for the Future Permanent Mechanism, including threats, norms, international law, confidence-building measures, as well as capacity-building. In order to avoid misinterpretation in paragraph 7, we also propose an adjustment from action-oriented measures to replace that language with result-oriented measures. We believe that the results are more important than actions for the future mechanism insofar as actions may not have any result at all. The establishment of thematic groups in paragraph 8 needs to be carried out strictly in accordance with the Mandate for the Future Permanent Mechanism, which was agreed upon during the 8th OEWG session. Distorting or going beyond its scope can undermine or even cancel out the results achieved within the OEWG and inherited by the successor body. We welcome the attempt by the Chairman to align the groups with the pillars, so we have no objections to the international law and capacity-building groups. At the same time, there are serious questions about the first DTG. We think there’s a need to clean up, so to speak, the description of the latter, removing terms which are unusual for the OEWG and not fully understood by all participants, such as the term resilience, as well as to delete footnotes to previous reports, which is not the case in other DTGs. We also believe that the discussion of the three pillars of the mandate within the same group may be challenging. When it comes to norms and confidence-building measures, we believe that these topics deserve separate groups. Turning to the concerns of those delegations who talk about the possible duplication of the work between the plenary meetings and the dedicated thematic groups, they, on the contrary, should complement one another. The groups will examine individual pillars of the mandate in a more detailed and expert manner in order to submit their findings to the plenary meetings. For example, if we’re talking about such a specific subject matter as a discussion of templates for the contact point registry. We cannot imagine how it is possible to organize a substantive discussion about this during a plenary session. This is precisely why we need to have the relevant thematic groups. We think it is excessive to hold expert briefings in thematic groups, paragraph 7A, as well as to involve experts and other stakeholders in the work of DTGs, paragraph 8. The DTGs are to provide a platform for dialogue specifically to government experts. The decision on the appointment of co-facilitators, paragraph 9, should remain with the states insofar as this has political significance. Following the same logic, we think it is risky to empower the co-facilitators to transmit recommendations to substantive plenary sessions without first reaching consensus within the groups, that’s paragraph 15. We think it is important to maintain the current modalities for NGO participation approved in April 2022 in the OEWG in the work of the future permanence mechanism. These are a delicate balance that includes both inclusivity and ensures the intergovernmental nature of the process, so paragraph 17L and 17I concerning the leading role of states in the consultative status of NGOs should be moved to the beginning of paragraph 17. We do not see added value in giving non-state actors the floor after states during plenary sessions and review conferences, subparagraph D. This would steal precious time allocated to intergovernmental dialogue. We continue to insist on the inclusion of the mechanism on consultations on blocked NGOs, these are subparagraphs F and G, insofar as they undermine the non-objection procedure. Moreover, we believe that granting the chair authority to make a final decision on the admission of certain organizations contrary to the position of a member state, this goes against the principle of consensus. We think it is justified to make a small clarification to sub-paragraph B concerning ECOSAC accredited organizations. According to this provision of the participation in the work of the Future Permanent Mechanism, relevant organizations are allowed. Organizations relevant to the scope. So the question arises as to who determines their competence in the field of international information security because the range of structures having consultative status within ECOSAC is indeed wide. Therefore, we propose to empower the Chair and the Secretary of the Future Permanent Mechanism to empower them to assess the relevance of NGOs accredited to the ECOSAC who have applied for participation in the Future Mechanism to inform states on the results of this assessment. In addition, the invitation to states and NGOs to sponsor the participation of NGOs in the activities of the Future Permanent Mechanism should be deleted, sub-paragraph J. The impartiality of the relevant aid recipients when participating in discussions is indeed questionable. Furthermore, in our view, there should be priority given to facilitating the participation in the Future Mechanism of governmental experts from developing countries. Thank you for your attention.

Chair: Thank you, Russian Federation. Ukraine, to be followed by Mexico.

Ukraine: Thank you, Chair. As we advance in the discussions, I would like to say that Ukraine fully aligns itself with the statements delivered by the European Union and now our delegation would like to make some additional remarks in its national capacity. I will shortly touch upon the CBMs in relation to the Section G. At the outset, we cannot… Ukraine, sorry to interrupt you. We are dealing with… from regular institutional dialogue. Is that the section you’re addressing? I would like to give an example how the CBMs can be used for the practical, how CBMs could be used in a different way. In relation to creating a separate thematic group on the international law, we would like to underline that international law in the first place is a tool, just one of the tools for setting the rules and determining the rights and obligations, a tool for maintaining peace, security and stability in the ICT environment. Any tool can be viewed as a piece of art in its frozen integrity or it can be used for a purpose. In our view, studying the international law and discussing it as a piece of art should be left to scholars and think tanks who will then present their views and recommendations for the common benefit during the focus-oriented events in the course of the dedicated thematic groups within the Future Permanent Mechanism. Also, states within the scope of the CBM-3 are always welcome to publish their positions or doctrines on the application of the international law in cyberspace or in the use of ICT. As the state-led Future Permanent Mechanism, in our view, should concentrate on the subject-focused application of the existing provisions of the international law. In similar logic that capacity building should be goal-oriented in the first place, we consider the dedicated thematic group on capacity building in the use of ICT in the context of international security, that’s DTG 3 in Para 8 of the Annex 3, as the one whose work will be fully within the scope of the tasks and the goals of increasing the resilience and ICT security of states and enhancing the concrete actions and cooperative measures to address ICT threats and to promote an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful ICT environment. Having said that, we support the relevant compromise wording for Para 8 of the Annex 3 suggested in the updated proposal for action-oriented thematic groups presented and circulated by France. We remain committed to work constructively towards achieving a positive outcome at this session. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Ukraine, for your statement. Mexico to be followed by Switzerland.

Mexico: Thank you, Chairman. Regarding Annex 3 on elements for the permanent institutional mechanism, for Mexico it’s important to include a specific item in the agenda dedicated to reviewing the reports of the thematic groups. This would ensure that the results of these discussions are effectively considered in the plenary meetings of the mechanism. Likewise, we support the calls mainly from delegations that have expressed the relevance of maintaining a thematic group dedicated to capacity building. While we recognize that this issue can and should be addressed in a cross-cutting manner in other groups across the other two groups, this does not replace the need for a specific space where experts can review this pillar comprehensively. We believe that this thematic group would allow us to advance in developing action-oriented recommendations, mapping specific needs and available resources, following up on the implementation of recommendations. ensuring coordination with the global roundtable and looking at the way in which stakeholders are involved so as to ensure diversity and inclusion. Similarly, we believe that it’s relevant for the permanent mechanism to have a thematic group on international law. Given the fast pace at which technologies are evolving, states need to have a permanent space in which to review, when appropriate, their compatibility with the existing legal framework. On the decision-making process, the Third Progress Report agreed that the future permanent mechanism will take all decisions based on the principle of consensus. The semantics here are clear. The principle of consensus does not equate to decisions by consensus, understood as unanimity. For Mexico, consensus is an aspiration that should lead us to building general understandings constructively. We recall that this working group is subsidiary to the General Assembly, whose rules of procedure are clear and are not governed by 193 vetoes. On the hybrid modalities for the DTGs, we reiterate our concern about the possibility that they end up being a space where a small group of delegations is able to dominate the conversation due to possible limitations on interpretation and technical services that they might have. If, in the end, we decide to keep this format, and bearing in mind that technical discussions are planned, it’s essential to guarantee at least simultaneous interpretation services, as has already been flagged by Colombia. Without this, it wouldn’t be an inclusive mechanism, as it would disadvantage delegations whose experts do not speak one of the six official UN languages. Finally, on the participation of stakeholders, we believe that our exchanges with these stakeholders, including intercessionally, should be integrated into the general discussions of the permanent mechanism, avoiding parallel or fragmented processes. Therefore, we join the voices that have already called for us to promote meaningful exchanges with stakeholders through modalities that are closer to the proposal presented by Canada and Chile. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Mexico. Switzerland, to be followed by China.

Switzerland: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I will keep this short because I hope we will have time later to make our statement on the section C to F, in particular on international law. Switzerland is of the view that the focus of the future permanent mechanism should be on the implementation of the existing framework in an action-oriented and cross-cutting manner, including by strengthening capacity. Therefore, Switzerland supports the proposal presented by France for a set of action-oriented thematic working groups. We welcome that in the proposed DTG, to promote maintaining peace, security, and stability in the ICT environment, we would have the possibility to discuss, with the participation of experts and legal advisors, on how international law applies to cyberspace. But we also think that we should have a place in the future mechanism to delve even deeper into the topic on how existing international law applies in cyberspace. In that spirit, Switzerland welcomes your proposal, Mr. Chair, for a dedicated thematic working group on international law, but we object to the addition made in Ref 1, referring to paragraphs 8 to 11 of Annex C of the third APR. We object to any attempt to use such a group for any other purpose than discussing on how existing international law applies. Having said that, we are flexible about a concrete format for such discussions. In that regard, Switzerland made a concrete proposal on a subgroup or committee during the sessions in December and February. On modalities, Switzerland is a co-sponsor of the working paper presented by Chile. Switzerland is of the firm view that we must overcome the very unsatisfactory situation in which one single state can object to the participation of one or several stakeholders to the detriment of all other participants. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Switzerland, for your statement and for your brevity.

China: On the discussion of DTG, this can be left to be decided by the future mechanism. Therefore, whether we reach consensus on DTG at this session, I would rather say this is not a must for this session. It supports the idea that an outcome will be generated from the current session, so that OEWG can have a smooth transition to the future mechanism. The President The President The President The President The President The President The President The President The President The President decide which NGOs cannot participate in our meeting. That is the procedure that we will follow, and no other consultation or discussion is needed. This is a process for Member States. This is also the right for Member States. So far, any newly added procedure will be weakening the rights of Member States. In our discussions in the past, I have mentioned that some delegates of Member States cannot participate in our meetings because of the acts of the host country. If the concerns of a Member State or Member States cannot be resolved, how can we push the participation of NGOs to an inappropriate, improper high level? I also have heard with regret that the remarks by a Member State, which is not in line with GA Resolution 2758, those remarks are inappropriate. If a Member State can make inappropriate remarks, then how can we ensure that NGOs can make proper statements? Therefore, on this question, The President The President

Cuba: The President The President The President We welcome the efforts to try to bring us closer to this aim. We do not support the current language on DTG1. At the same time, the reference to maintaining peace and security could be confused with the mandate of other UN bodies. We support the establishment of a specific group on norms. This cannot, however, take up the focus of discussion on certain matters over others. We also support having a dedicated thematic group on capacity building, which is a recurrent claim from many developing countries. This means that we should be addressing this matter in relation to other mandates under the mechanism. Having a specific group on this would contribute significantly to granting the paramount importance to this issue and would only have positive impacts, particularly for developing countries. But ultimately, this would have a collective benefit as well. Finally, we insist that it is essential to guarantee that future mechanism meetings, be they in thematic groups or the plenary, should not be held in parallel. We are not in favour of these meetings being virtual, as is mentioned in the table to Annex 3. This format would not enable the participation of all delegations on an equal footing. Our delegation will evaluate the proposals that are made on this topic with the firm determination to contribute to the best possible outcome.

Kenya: Thank you. opportunity. Kenya welcomes the draft final report as a constructive step towards a more secure, stable cyberspace and therefore makes the following additions and supports the sentiments made by the African group. Kenya endorses the establishment of a permanent inclusive mechanism to ensure sustained engagement and implementation under the auspices of the General Assembly, while the broad goals of the future permanent mechanism are well-intentioned and transparent, certain aspects need to be considered and we give the following recommendations. Kenya recommends for the introduction of a peer review mechanism complete with a dashboard to review progress under the future permanent mechanism. We also advocate for the implementation of a regional equitable leadership rotation for chairmanship and bureau roles for the future permanent mechanism ensuring all geographical regions periodically lead. Equally, we encourage the establishment of regional resource hubs where smaller states can access pooled expertise as part of capacity building. Further, we recommend alliances of smaller nations to designate rapporteurs who will offer impartial insights on agenda formulation. The language on peace cooperation is central to the POA, however, terms such as these like sovereignty, responsible behavior, capacity building can carry diverse geopolitical interpretations. These differing interpretations, such as concerning state control versus open internet, may persist despite diplomatic freezing. We therefore advocate for the development and regular update of a consensus-based glossary. to clarify core terms and definitions. The provision of modern legislative language illustrating balanced interpretation is welcome. Lastly, slow institution processes may lag behind fast-moving threats, such as ransomware and AI-generated threats. Kenya proposes for continued discussion on cyber threats arising from emerging technologies with a view to moving beyond dialogue to action. Chair, I submit, and asante sana.

Chair: Thank you very much, Kenya, for your contribution. Republic of Korea to be followed by Indonesia.

Republic of Korea: Thank you, Chair. I have three simple comments to make. First, regarding the proposed thematic groups, we recall that many delegations, including ours, have emphasized the need for cross-cutting discussions throughout the OEWG process. From this perspective, we welcome the updated French proposal, which would allow for more practical and integrated discussion. Second, on stakeholders, we would like to reaffirm our support for the inclusive and meaningful participation of multistakeholders in the OEWG process. In our view, there is no clear reason to unnecessarily limit the multistakeholders from sharing their expertise. At the same time, we recognize that views differ among member states on the level of their participation. In this regard, we align ourselves with the approach proposed by Canada and Chile. Lastly, we welcome the language in the final report encouraging the hybrid format for thematic group meetings. I’ll stop here. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Korea, for your statement and also for your brevity. Indonesia to be followed by Brazil.

Indonesia: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Allow us to share Indonesia’s reflections on Section G of the final report. First, Indonesia supports Paragraph 62, which sets the foundation for the future permanent mechanism in accordance with Annex C of the Third Annual Progress Report, along with additional elements outlined in Annex III of the final report. We hope that Paragraph 62 will be retained in the final report and garner broad consensus among Member States. Second, Indonesia sees merits in the establishment of the three dedicated automatic groups within the FPM, as outlined in Paragraph 8. We are of the view that the dedicated automatic group 1 can be streamlined to resilience and ICT security of States, with a particular focus on cybersecurity threats, protection of critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure, and other cross-cutting issues. It is important that discussions under the threats pillar be continued under this group, including those related to emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing. Third, Indonesia welcomes the Chair’s proposal on the DTG2 that builds upon Paragraphs 8 to 11 of the Annex C of the Third APR. Indonesia is open to continuing discussions on voluntary non-binding norms under this group. At the same time, we underscore that discussions on the development of new norms and the possibility of a legally binding instrument must proceed concurrently. This will help ensure coherence, avoid duplication, and promote greater synergy. Indonesia remains flexible to exploring both new norms and potential legal frameworks in the area of cybersecurity. Fourth, while recognizing the cross-cutting nature of capacity building, Indonesia strongly believes it must indeed be its own DTG. The last subparagraph of Paragraph 8 on DTG3 must therefore be reflected in the final report. Its discussions will focus on CBM, strengthening technical training and states’ capacities, and identifying needs, particularly from developing states, to strengthen capacity and responding to cyber threats, as well as narrow the digital divide. This DTG can also serve as a forum to strengthen existing initiatives, including the Global POC Directory and the newly established Global ICT Security Cooperation and Capacity Building Portal. Furthermore, broader cross-cutting issues such as strategies to bridge the digital divide must also be incorporated into the three dedicated thematic groups. Lastly, Indonesia supports Paragraph 17, particularly Paragraph 17A, that acknowledges the value of stakeholder participation in the future permanent mechanism, as their perspective can further enrich our deliberations and provide better insights on the current cyber landscape. Indonesia is of the view that related stakeholders, including the private sector, play a significant role in advancing cyber technologies. Nevertheless, we also affirm that their role must remain consultative with the aim of assisting and informing member states, as reflected on Paragraph 17I of the Annex. We believe member states must be the ones that set the direction, lead the decision-making, and oversee the implementation of the process. In closing, Mr. Chair, allow me to reiterate Indonesia’s commitment to engage constructively and support consensus towards a smooth and seamless transition to a single-track and state-led future permanent mechanism. I thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Indonesia. Brazil, to be followed by Dilawo PDR.

Brazil: Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation reiterates its appreciation to you and your team for your work on RID to guide us in establishing a single permanent future mechanism. Brazil was one of the sponsors of a working paper submitted on capacity building in the future mechanism, in which we further detail our arguments for a dedicated group and how we see its relationship to the plenary. As previously stated, this does not negate the cross-cutting nature of the issue. However, we need a space within this mechanism to discuss, evaluate, and make recommendations on how to conduct capacity building initiatives. In this regard, we reiterate our support to the current dedicated thematic group structure as reflected in Rev. 1, especially to the capacity building DTG. Based on the DTGs, we can also support South Africa’s proposal to integrate the discussion on norms under a separate agenda item to the DTG on international law, highlighting that this does not mean granting them equivalent legal status. In discharging their work, we believe the DTGs could also benefit from the expertise of UNIDIR on specific topics under discussion. In this regard, we would propose the following additional paragraph, possibly after nine, To foster diverse and substantive discussions, dedicated thematic groups may request UNIDIR to produce neutral and objective research reports or to organize other capacity building activities supported by voluntary contributions. These materials could be used to inform the discussions of subsequent dedicated thematic group sessions. Brazil also supports Australia’s proposal on spacing the meetings of the DTGs and the plenary. We value the chair’s idea to reduce costs of in-person participation. But for meetings in New York, accommodation comprises a much higher portion as compared to airfare. And we do see the benefit of having more time for our deliberations to percolate between meetings. However, we would propose avoiding meetings in December, a time when accommodation costs are notoriously high in New York, and suggest perhaps early February. We also support Colombia’s proposal on having interpretation for the thematic group meetings, even if hybrid, and also support Mexico proposals on having a clear agenda item at the plenary on the report of the groups. In this regard, we reiterate our proposal. proposal that dedicated thematic groups have a short formal segment to make the formal decision to elevate those reports to the plenary. We can support your text on modalities which strike a good balance between diverging positions on this issue. We particularly welcome paragraph 17J on facilitating participation of stakeholders from developing countries. At the same time we thank Chile and Canada for their work on this issue and remain flexible to incorporate elements from their working paper. Mr. Chair, as a final point my delegation has some concerns on how we will integrate the third APR’s NXC to the current NX3. We would like to see both documents consolidated in a single one at the next review of the draft report for greater clarity. We have been happy to see since late 2003 discussions on a future permanent mechanism take place within this group in order to avoid fragmentation. We remain ready to engage in further negotiations throughout the week to ensure the adoption of a single consensus outcome on Friday. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much Brazil for your statement and suggestions. Lao PDR to be followed by Kiribati.

Lao PDR: Thank you Mr. Chair. Lao PDR supports the establishment of a low-budget inclusive and transparent future mechanism that will address the growing risk and vulnerability in the ICT ecosystem. Our delegations underline the importance of a decision-making process within the future mechanism. This is guided by the principles of consensus. In the same swing we would like to underscore the critical importance of capacity building. in narrowing the digital gap. In this regard, we support the establishment of a dedicated thematic group on capacity building for many states. Capacity building is essential for meaningful participation in global ICT security governments. We recognize that the latest piece of technological development demands that the permanent mechanism mandate be sufficiently flexible to address emerging challenges. The mechanism should be equipped to address this evolving technological reality through appropriate process and discussions. The permanent mechanism should anticipate and prepare for future developments. In these connections, we support retaining in the final report the process for regular review and development of new norms and potential legally binding instruments as the continued mandate for future permanent mechanism. In conclusion, we believe that an inclusive consensus basis permanent mechanism with strong capacity building foundations and equipped with adaptive capability will best serve our collectively security interests in cyberspace. Process and approach will enable all states to contribute meaningful to global ICT security governance while ensuring the mechanism remain relevant and effective as technology continue to evolve. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Lao PDR for your contribution. Kiribati to be followed by Denmark.

Kiribati: Thank you, Chair. Excellencies and delegates, Kiribati welcomes the proposals under Section G of the report and expresses strong support for the establishment of a regular institutional dialogue on the security of and in the use of ICTs. We commend the Chair for leading the working group toward a structured, inclusive, and forward-looking conclusion, including the vision for a future permanent mechanism. Cybersecurity remains a multidimensional and evolving issue, intersecting with legal, technical, diplomatic, economical, and societal concerns. Kiribati believes that sustaining dialogue, particularly one that involves all stakeholders, including governments, civil society, technical experts, and the private sector, is essential to reducing miscalculation, strengthening trust, and ensuring accountability. We align with the Pacific Islands Forum call for a fit-for-purpose mechanism that is accessible, inclusive, and practical, especially for small island developing states like ours. In this regard, we highlight the importance of hybrid modalities, regional representation, and sensitivity to time zones, which are critical to ensuring meaningful participation from the Pacific. Kiribati supports the establishment of the future mechanism in accordance with Annex C of the third APR and Annex III of the final report. We appreciate that this platform will provide continuity and action-oriented follow-up across all thematic areas and must remain grounded in consensus. We look forward to working in partnership with all delegations to ensure that this mechanism is not only established but also responsive inclusive and effective for all. I thank you for your kind attention.

Chair: Thank you very much for your contribution. Denmark please.

Denmark: Thank you chair. As we work together towards a consensus outcome by the end of this week I wish to thank you and your team for all your efforts throughout the five years of the OEWG. Denmark fully aligns itself with the statements made by the EU during the past days as well as the joint Nordic statement on international law presented by my colleague from Finland yesterday. I would like to briefly elaborate in a national capacity on the important topic of regional institutional dialogue and stakeholder engagement. Along with the EU we continue to support the consensus reflected in the annex C of the 2024 annual progress report that the working group should be cross-cutting and action oriented. We share the view of the EU and others that we should be able to draw on all five pillars of the framework for responsible state behavior in each of the dedicated thematic groups and we support the French updated proposal for the content and focus of each of the groups. We need to ensure that we build a permanent mechanism that is firmly grounded in the UN a key. As for the participation of stakeholders we strongly support an inclusive approach to working with stakeholders and experts from industry academia and civil society. Denmark supports the letter from Canada and Chile on stakeholder modalities which is now co-sponsored by 42 states including the 27 EU member states. We also share the view as highlighted by many other delegations that cyber capacity building is crucial for our collective security and resilience. But if we all pause for a moment and think about how capacity building is actually implemented these efforts are are simply not possible without the insightful, experienced, and valuable input from stakeholders. Private companies are often first responders in the event of a cyber attack. Capacity building is delivered on the ground by industry experts, companies, civil society organizations, and other stakeholders. And we need to listen and learn from them. If we’re serious about prioritizing our joint cyber capacity building, we should not decouple our work from the stakeholders. We will gain more meaningful and effective discussions in return. Stakeholder contributions should be guided by the principle of a voice, not a vote, ensuring that while decision-making remains state-led, discussions benefit from the expertise and insights of relevant stakeholders, including those who’ve been affected by cyber incidents, academia, and those who implement and secure cyberspace in practice. By extension, we see a clear need to move beyond a situation where the veto of a single state limits our collective ability to benefit from the valuable contributions of a diverse set of stakeholders. Any objections should be subject to open discussions. And if they persist, decisions should ultimately be guided by the will of the majority. In closing, as other delegations have mentioned, let’s not lose sight of the progress we’ve made throughout the five years of the OEWG. And let’s ensure that the report reflects this progress as we embark on the next chapter of a permanent, inclusive, and action-oriented mechanism for the international cyber community. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Denmark, for your statement. Japan, to be followed by Canada.

Japan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just make two points. Japan, please. The future mechanism should center and function on conducting practical, concrete, and effective discussions or exercises in order to upgrade UN members, countries’ cyber security resilience in light of increasing and persistent cyber attacks against facilities and infrastructure, which all our modern societies heavily depend on. We have engaged in many constructive discussions through the OEWG and GGE, and Japan believes that we can move on to the next stage based on these achievements in the UN framework. In this regard, the content of the DTGs should be cross-cutting and action-oriented, including a scenario-based approach as well as avoiding duplication. As such, the proposal by the French delegation about how we should frame the DTGs seems more pertinent to my eyes rather than what is now proposed in the Annex III with the single-issue DTG on international law. The future mechanism should be based on the nature that five pillars of the framework are closely interrelated with each other when we need to find and offer practical solutions through pragmatic deliberations on how we prepare against threats and risks under normal circumstances and how we quickly respond to incidents in case of emergencies. My second point is about MATA stakeholders. In Japan’s view, we need to move on to the practical and effective stage, and this could only be done fully with appropriate participation of private sector and experts. I believe this is quite obvious because cyber attacks are done through tools, facilities, and infrastructure developed by the private sector. and market, and at the same time, in case of cyber attacks, it is often them who become the first victims. Many risks and damages which state actors have to manage, in fact, lie within the private sector. Japan, therefore, suggests to enable a variety of multistakeholders participate in the discussions of the DTGs. In this regard, Japan aligns itself with a proposal made by Canada and Chile and other significant number of countries which joined their paper on the modality of multistakeholders participation. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you. Japan. Canada, to be followed by Sweden.

Canada: Thank you, Mr. Chair. As you mentioned some time ago, the creation of a permanent mechanism at the UN is a unique opportunity and it is not without consequence. In my last statement, I spoke to our birchbark canoe. Mr. Chair, in any canoe, everyone must paddle. Some paddle fast to move forward and may need to slow down for others that are learning to paddle. Multiple compromises made over the last year by the supporters of the POA demonstrate our commitment to do just that. Yet, if some in the canoe start paddling backwards, the canoe will only go in circles. I wish to stress that Canada will not accept renegotiation of the existing agreements on the shape of our future mechanism, and I will quote four, that the future mechanism will take as its foundation of its work the consensus agreements on the framework, that it will be action-oriented in nature, that it will be open, inclusive, transparent, sustainable and flexible, and that it will be integrated, policy-oriented and cross-cutting in nature. We do not believe that we can delay decisions on how the future mechanism will operate, including the role of DTGs. Doing so would only result in delaying the start of the future process as we continue to negotiate but with no pressure to reach consensus. Canada strongly supports the DTG proposal eloquently presented by France today, and we underline the compromise they put forward, once again, on how to approach our work in the mechanism. We also support the inclusion of an agenda item for the plenaries to engage on cross-cutting discussions on recommendations of the DTGs. We oppose the duplication of pillars or groups of pillars in the DTGs. This is not integrated, and it is not cross-cutting. It is important to remember the DTGs are subsidiary bodies to the plenary. The plenary is the dominant and decision-making body. In the spirit of compromise, we have agreed that the plenary meetings could continue to address, like we do today, each pillar in turn. Discussions on capacity-building, international law, non-binding norms, and CBMs will therefore remain central to our discussions. Not having pillar DTGs does not decrease the importance of any pillar. Rather, the DTGs allow us to consider in an action-oriented, cross-cutting measure how the pillars come together when the issues we are discussing are applied in practice. Not only do practical pillar discussions risk creating silos, as outlined by the EU, they risk creating duplication. We believe that cross-cutting groups can place a solid focus on assessing capacity-building and how it meets identified gaps with the intent of prioritizing and recommending improvements to its delivery. We support those proposing holding DTGs ahead of the plenary and ideally separating these two meetings through the year, allowing time for states to take the outcomes of DTGs, consider them with sufficient time, and return to move our discussions forward in plenary. Mr. Chair, I will not speak extensively on stakeholders, given that a statement was already taken. delivered on our behalf. However, in my national capacity, I note that the veto counters the right of states, and robs hundreds of states from the expertise and capacity-building potential of stakeholders’ input based solely on the consideration of one state. Our future mechanism cannot operate on the basis of one veto to rule them all. An open, inclusive, and transparent mechanism will allow for open debate on objections, but the majority should decide in the end. Finally, in keeping with the goals of UN80, any future mechanism must not duplicate existing structures and processes, and must be developed in a manner that ensures it can operate within existing resources. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Canada, for your statement, and once again for reminding us that we are all on the same boat. We all need to paddle forward and move faster. We have very little time left. That much I agree with you. Sweden, to be followed by Romania.

Sweden: Thank you, Chair. As this is the first time Sweden takes the floor, please allow me to express Sweden’s gratitude towards the work done by you and your team. Sweden fully aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union and the Nordic Statement on International Law delivered by Finland. Chair, respecting your request, we will limit the statement to the aspects connected to the RID and Annex 3, yet we have a few additional remarks on the previous chapters that we hope to get the opportunity to put forward. Chair, as you said in the opening of this meeting, the RID and the Annex relates to the report’s overall substance. Let me therefore make a point by starting in paragraph 32. Sweden welcomes the recognition of the vital role of the public-private partnerships play in addressing the threats facing states and the importance of dialogue between different sectors. At the same time, we question how we, as states, will be able to efficiently develop such partnerships and dialogues if the modalities of the future permanent mechanism do not enable effective stakeholder participation. Sweden therefore invites the Chair to draw from the Canada-Chile-led paper. We believe that the paper, in fact, constitutes a bridging proposal, enabling states which have an objection to a certain stakeholder to clearly express and argue for its objection. Yet at the very end, the majority of states, in line with the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, make the decision adhering to the principle of a voice and a vote. Regarding the recommendation of the future permanent mechanism discussion, Sweden echoes multiple states’ requests to put a full stop after, quote, ICTs in Recommendation 43. And on the structure of the thematic groups, Sweden fully supports the French proposal, which in its revised form has drawn upon the views of many states and which constitutes an honest bridging proposal. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you, Sweden. Romania, to be followed by Vietnam.

Romania: Thank you, Chair. As it is the first time I’m taking the floor, let me start by expressing Romania’s appreciation for your tremendous work and that of your team in support of this process. Romania aligns to the position expressed by the EU and makes the following comments on the regular institutional dialogue in its national capacity. Given the time constraints, I will keep my intervention short and be providing in writing the extended position, including our views, on the A to F chapters of the report. As for the future mechanism, I would like to stress that for us it is very important to preserve the results of the last five years of intense and good work, and I’m convinced that we can all agree on a final version of the report that will be acceptable for all parties. Establishing a permanent mechanism is essential. in this respect. Let me underline the importance to have an action-oriented, cross-cutting approach. This is of essence in order to ensure a comprehensive and inclusive perspective addressing different elements of the UN Framework. In this regard, Romania considers that a specific DTG on international law is incompatible with this practical and cross-cutting view, and we propose the deletion of the references from Para 8 of Annex 3. We strongly support the constructive proposals put forward by France that provide a coherent structure and a clear delineation between different strands of work, putting an emphasis on capacity building in a transversal and cross-cutting manner. Last but not least, we share the position expressed by previous speakers about the importance of stakeholders. They are essential for a broader cybersecurity, and we don’t think we can spare their valuable inputs. Romania supports and has co-signed the paper that Canada and Chile presented on this topic. All this being said, we will continue to constructively participate in these negotiations. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Romania, for your statement. Vietnam, to be followed by Estonia.

Viet Nam: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Regarding the future mechanism, we support Paragraph 63 of the draft report, particularly the structure of the future permanent mechanism, as well as the modality on the participation of stakeholders, as proposed by the Chair in Annex 3. We believe modalities for the establishment of a future permanent mechanism should adhere to the following principles. First, the mechanism must operate on the basis of consensus, ensuring that all member states have equal voice in shaping international cooperation on ICT security. Secondly, It must be state-led, with member states taking the primary role in the development, implementation and oversight of the mechanism. Thirdly, it should encourage the participation of relevant stakeholders, including private sector entities, research institutes and other non-state actors, whose expertise and practical experience can enrich the discussion. At the same time, the involvement of non-governmental stakeholders must ensure the integrity and focus of the future mechanisms and comply with the first two principles. And finally, the mechanism must uphold the central role of the United Nations. In this regard, we believe that the future mechanisms need adjustments to enhance the efficiency, effectiveness and delivery of discussions. This may include shortening the duration and frequency of meetings, organising regional or inter-regional meetings, considering alternative meetings’ locations outside of New York, and allowing other countries to host inter-sectional meetings. The establishment of the mechanisms needs to be allied with ongoing UN reforms efforts, including the proposed UN80 Framework in order to promote a streamlined, resource-efficient system. Vietnam supports reducing fragmentation, focusing resources and prioritising mechanisms that demonstrate clear, concrete and achievable outcomes with defined timeframes. Vietnam reaffirms our commitment to participating actively in the OEWC process, as well as the future mechanisms and working constructively with all Member States to find common grounds in building an open, safe, secure, stable, accessible, peaceful and inter-operable ICT environment. I thank you for your attention.

Chair: Thank you very much, Vietnam, for your statement. Friends, I wanted to give you an update. We have about 20 speakers left on this agenda item. We have about 40 minutes left. And I wanted to also make some remarks as we wrap up this discussion. So if each one of you took two minutes, then I think it’s doable that we give everyone a chance. And part of being a community to discuss these important issues is also to share the limited resources we have. In this case, that is time. So I would urge each one of you to jump to the essentials and then look at the option of sending your statements to me and to also all members, we’ll put that on the website. I still do not intend to muzzle any of you, because I really think it’s important to give everyone a chance to speak, not just on this issue, but on every issue. But time is limited. So with these caveats, let’s see how far we can go in the speakers list. And I’m counting on you for your help and support. So Estonia to be followed by Portugal.

Estonia: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Estonia aligns itself with the statement of the European Union, and that’s the following in its national capacity. We express our full support to the French compromise proposal on the dedicated thematic groups presented today. We believe that this proposal is transparent, clear, logical, forward-looking, and provides action-oriented basis for the future cyber discussions. It states clearly that at plenary, we continue discussing the pillars of the responsible state behavior and the action-oriented dedicated thematic groups will complement it, as well as offer also an opportunity for concrete discussions. While taking into account also our own experience in capacity building activities, we believe that capacity building is essential pillar of the future. permanent mechanism, and it is essential to engage with it in a cross-cutting and action-oriented manner. We welcome the Pacific Islands Forum proposal, which provides small developing countries perspectives on making capacity-building cross-cutting item of DTGs. Mr. Chair, international law remains one of the most important topics for us. We believe that it should not be addressed in isolation, but rather in a cross-cutting manner with the other topics. Therefore, we are not in favor of a separate DTG on this. On stakeholder modalities, we believe that the non-objection mechanism allowing the single state to block participation has to be reconsidered. It has negative consequences for the effectiveness, transparency, and inclusivity of our work. We would like to see the cross-regional paper on stakeholder modalities submitted by Canada and Chile as a basis to draft the final report. And finally, I do apologize for abusing the word cross-cutting, but it seems to be the word of the day and a key to our future work. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Estonia, and well done, under two minutes as well. By the way, you don’t need to speak in full sentences. You can just say… Keywords. Keywords. I mean, I love good grammar. But as they say, the days of good English has gone. Well, my English is not my mother tongue, but please, I mean, the point I’m making is if you’re agreeing with delegation X, just say we agree with X, we don’t agree with Y, we don’t like this, or you love that. I think we are telegraphing and communicating with each other where we are and where we stand. I think that’s useful for all of us and certainly for me. So Portugal, followed by the United Kingdom, which I’m sure will speak with good grammar.

Portugal: This week, more than usually, Portugal relied on the EAS to convey the collective views and positions of EU member states. Therefore, I take the floor with the sole purpose of calling our attention that last year, according to cybersecurity ventures, the cost of cybercrime reached 9.5 trillion dollars – more than half the combined nominal GDP of the EU member states. That is the staggering dimension of the price we pay for the insecurity we are confronted with in cyberspace. And the figure does not even include the damage caused by state-sponsored espionage intrusions, which is understandably difficult to quantify. The main task of the Future Permanent Mechanism, which will come after this very successful Open-Ended Working Group, will therefore be undoubtedly the leveling up of the resilience of the systems and networks of the critical infrastructure in all UN member states, without exceptions, so that all of them can benefit from the general compliance of the normative framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace, which the UN General Assembly endorsed in 2015, and since then, we have patiently considered with a view to render it universally implementable, including the eight confidence-building measures, the eleven voluntary norms, and the relevant international law, i.e. the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the principles of international human law. Judging from what we heard yesterday and today, and as the French delegate underlined this afternoon, there is among us a strong degree of agreement that without the universal implementation of the UN framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace, we will not be able to tackle the growing challenge of digital insecurity. However, We are all also aware that if the most inflexible positions, those which have not yet managed to attract enough support from the membership, continue to be pushed regardless, a consensus mandate for the future permanent mechanism will not be possible. It is true that the mandates of the fifth group of government experts and the previous and current open-ended working groups were all voted, and that is precisely why resolutions on the mandate of a future program of action to promote responsible state behavior in cyberspace after 2025 were submitted to the General Assembly in 2022 and 2023. However, in spite of overwhelming votes, the sponsors of those resolutions accepted to bring the discussions of the mandate of the future permanent mechanism to within this open-ended working group, expecting that it could be finessed consensually in the highly constructive climate which your superlative stewardship, Mr. Chairman, fostered among us. It would therefore be highly unfair if, after five years of steadfast work, we were unable to achieve a consensus progress report that includes a structure for the future mechanism allowing for the cross-cutting, action-oriented and integrated discussions called for by the third annual progress report. We therefore trust that, in a spirit of generous responsibility, the membership will eventually enable you, Mr. Chairman, to submit a revised draft in accordance with the ambition of the vast majority of all of us. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Portugal, for your contribution and for your kind words. United Kingdom, to be followed by the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

United Kingdom: in writing. In paragraph 7.a we would like to add including but not limited to, so it reads briefings from relevant experts including but not limited to those drawn from a pool of experts nominated by states. We support a provision for states to recommend experts but as the process for such nominations would still need to be developed our amendment is essential to ensure the future chair can act flexibly and with agility to invite relevant experts to brief states. We would like to delete the last sentence of paragraph 11 for the reasons outlined by a number of states. In paragraph 12 we support the proposal made by Australia regarding meeting timings. We should retain all of paragraphs 13 and 14 as currently drafted. It’s particularly important to my delegation that any decision to establish additional thematic groups will be made by consensus. Regarding paragraph 15 as a number of states have requested we would like to add agreed by consensus after action oriented draft recommendations and would support further amendments to bring this in line with France’s proposal for a sixth plenary item which we think is a good one. In paragraph 17.f we should delete the words on a voluntary basis. We have a number of amendments to paragraph 17.g but in the interest of time we’ll send these to you in writing. Overall this paragraph does not sufficiently bridge the requests of the 42 states co-sponsoring the Canada Chile inclusive modalities paper. The operationalization of paragraph 17.i potentially conflicts with the consensus recommendation of annex c paragraph 11.b. We request that 17.i points back to this paragraph or is modified for consistency with the third APR. Turning to paragraph 8 in relation to two dedicated thematic working groups. Any configuration of DTGs should be consistent with the consensus agreement in Annex C of the third APR that we will have action-oriented and cross-cutting discussions in the future mechanism. If we are following a pillar-based approach in plenary, as Paragraph 5 proposes, such discussions surely occur in the thematic groups. Unfortunately, this is only the case in one out of the three groups in Rev. 1. In this context, my delegation emphasises, in particular, that we do not believe a DTG on international law will achieve consensus this week. Listening to statements today, we do hear a continuing and broad consensus that capacity building should be at the heart of the future mechanism. Rev. 2 of Annex 3 could draw further on the proposals that have been made in this regard, and we welcome the bridging compromise outlined by France. We also support the Global Roundtable’s scope and purpose being expanded in a separate paragraph in Annex 3, and the suggestions for the Roundtable put forward by Brazil and Vanuatu to ensure flexibility and the inclusion of experts. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you. UK, Netherlands, to be followed by Ghana.

Kingdom of the Netherlands: Thank you very much, Chair. The Kingdom of the Netherlands aligns itself with the statements of the European Union, and I would like to make the following complementary remarks in a national capacity. Building on Annex C of last year’s APR, we hope to channel the results achieved in the OEWG into the future permanent mechanism to be mandated by the final consensus report. We fully support the updated proposal by France on dedicated thematic working groups. Focusing on capacity building, we welcome the proposal of France to put capacity building central in the future. the cross-cutting group on increasing the resilience and ICT security of states. We also took note of the statements shared by others and joined papers by groups of states, including the Latin American states, on the functions within the structure of the future mechanism on capacity building. Taking these views into account and complementary to the French proposal, we would like to propose a structure for the facilitation of capacity building within the new mechanism. It would consist of the following three steps, which we would like to see reflected in a separate paragraph after paragraph 8 in Annex 3. First, dedicated thematic working groups could be aimed at sharing experiences, identifying specific needs, proposing actionable recommendations to the plenary, and providing information to convene the roundtable. Second, the global roundtable, which functions could be to, one, facilitate exchanging information on programs and opportunities, two, facilitate connecting needs of those requesting to resources of those providing assistance, three, and sharing capacity building best practices. Such a roundtable would bring together a range of cyber capacity building experts, also allowing to foster coordination among different states, regional organizations, and capacity building stakeholders, and provide ideas and practices that can be further reflected on in the plenary. And then third, the plenary could focus on the adoption of the recommendations from the working groups and the monitoring of previous recommendations. Based on this, states can also further reflect on existing and potential tools on capacity building and the need to strengthen initiatives in this regard. This would not preclude discussions on other capacity building topics in the plenary. We will also share some specific writing on these ideas with you, Chair. And then lastly, I’d like to share three very quick expressions of support. First, we support the proposal of Brazil to keep a flexible approach to the level of participation to the global roundtable and therefore to strike out high level. On stakeholder modalities we join other states in supporting the paper from Canada and Chile and the proposals in this regard and then lastly on the sequencing of the meeting we support the proposal made by Australia to have enough time between the meetings of the DTGs and the plenaries. Thank you very much.

Chair: Thank you Netherlands. Ghana to be followed by El Salvador.

Ghana: Thank you Mr. Chair. My delegation aligns itself with the statement delivered by the Africa Group and would like to reiterate its desire to witness a seamless transition from the UN OEWG to the future permanence mechanism. This is essential to ensure continuity in states discussions on such important issues. Mr. Chair regarding the dedicated thematic group DTG 1 my delegation appreciates your efforts to combine three focus areas into DTG 1 and the significant allocation of three days within the illustrative framework illustrative timeline for the work of the group. We understand the intent to comprehensively address the three substantive focus areas within this time frame. However to further enhance clarity and support the functioning of this thematic group my delegation is of the view that explicitly and clearly outlining within the illustrative timeline how the allocated time will be distributed among the group’s distinctive work streams would be highly beneficial. This would help ensure that each focus area receives equitable consideration and fosters a balanced structured approach to the group’s deliberations. Such specificity would greatly assist delegations in planning the engagement and contributing meaningfully to the process. Furthermore my delegation wishes to underscore the importance of having a dedicated discussion on international law as a topic that requires comprehensive discussions. However my delegation sees merit in South Africa’s proposal to merge international law and international law in the context of international law. international law and norms, as both have some similarities in that they govern state’s behavior. Furthermore, we have witnessed in the past how some norms have been codified into international law. As such, we can remain flexible on this proposal as long as both thematic areas are given sufficient time to have discussions in depth. Finally, my delegation welcomes a reference to hybrid formats for all dedicated thematic meetings in paragraph 13 of annex 3. This is especially important, noting that some countries may not have the resources to always participate in person. However, having an option to participate virtually provides the opportunity to contribute meaningfully to the process. As mentioned by my colleagues from Thailand and other countries, Ghana supports the proposal for the need to have in-person participation strongly encouraged. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Ghana. El Salvador, to be followed by Senegal.

El Salvador: Thank you, Mr. President. Thank you, Mr. President. On annex 3, we are grateful for the revised proposal. El Salvador advocated for the establishment of limited thematic groups, and we believe that the structure presented, including the topics proposed, respond to our national and regional needs. Particularly, we highlight the importance of the group dedicated to capacity building, because this is of the utmost relevance for the global use. We would also like to focus briefly on the capacity building group, which is a priority for my country and other countries in Central America. We do not see capacity building only as a space for discussing financing. We see it as a space to connect requests with providers, where we can look at technical assistance, exchange of knowledge, and discuss possible alternatives in light of the realities of limited financial resources that we face in our countries. This discussion can only happen in a space dedicated to that end. On the modalities for the participation of other stakeholders, we welcome the progress reflected in the hybrid participation option and the limited use of this option. We recommend that these modalities could be consistent in order to have a uniform level of participation for stakeholders throughout the process. Thank you very much.

Chair: Thank you very much, El Salvador. Senegal to be followed by Chile.

Senegal: Mr. Chairman, given that this is the first time I’m taking the floor, I wish to applaud you and the Secretariat for the efforts. We align ourselves with the statement delivered by Nigeria on behalf of the African group on threats and capacity building on the future mechanism, and in our national capacity, we wish to deliver the following statement. On the norms, we wish to recall our steadfast position on the matter. The implementation of the current norms could include the drafting of new norms. If there’s a consensus-based agreement about the necessity of this, we believe that additional norms may not be necessary. Turning to the implementation of international law, we know to the satisfaction that there’s a reference to the framework for responsible conduct of the use of ICT and the applicability of the core principles of international law in space. We also recognize the merits of presenting national positions and regional positions on the matter. Yesterday, the EU delegate quite rightly noted that individually, collectively, more than 100 states presented their national positions. In this regard, my delegation, and in light of the substantive discussions of the future mechanism, we propose the following addition to paragraph 42 for the Secretary to present to the thematic group 2 a report on the views already available in order to identify general trends in the perception of the matter by states on IHL. We applaud the reference to the resolution of the ICRC on the protection of civilians as well as the work which we represented here, the transnational group of friends on this matter, where our shared understanding has evolved about the way that this law is implemented. This needs to be reflected. We also support what has been proposed to incorporate paragraph 4 of the ICRC resolution, capacity building. We support the relevant non-exhaustive positions in the document. We also support the Vietnamese proposal on academic resilience and on UNIDIR. As a contribution, we wish to propose in 52C that we think it would be relevant to add a technological divide in capacity building efforts. For 53, propose addition of the need to organize regional preparatory meetings for the Round Table on 451B in the same paragraph, also to add at least one over the review conference. Now I briefly wish to turn to the future mechanism. We fully align ourselves with the position of the African group, the group of 54 countries on the structure of the mechanism, specifically the three thematic groups vis-a-vis international law and the other on capacity building support, the concerns of Egypt about the future mechanism with a dedicated space for discussions on application of international law. And the same applies to capacity building. Like Morocco, we think that modifications can be carried out if necessary during – throughout the future cycle and subsequent cycles. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Senegal, for your statement. Chile, to be followed by Zimbabwe.

Chile: Thank you, Chair. Chile is grateful for your proposal to present the additional elements for the operationalization of the future permanent mechanism. We value the efforts to ensure a structured, consistent basis which will allow for a fluid transition of our work from the OECD towards a sustainable, inclusive, and action-oriented mechanism. The predicted cycles with co-facilitators, particularly the relevance to the gender balance and geographic representation, are also to be welcomed. We’d like to express our support briefly for the proposal by Brazil on setting dates for meetings, particularly given the cost of accommodation along similar lines. My delegation has the same issues. As we also support the proposal of Colombia to have the interpretation in the hybrid groups in terms of decision-making, we agree with Mexico on the fact that Mexico should be adopted on the basis of the principle of consensus, which is not the same as decisions by consensus. We would like to in particular express our firm support for the inclusion of a thematic group for capacity building, which is a faithful reflection of the permanent strategic nature of this within our interests. We also value the proposal of periodically convening a global roundtable on capacity building as a space to raise the profile of needs and to mobilize collective efforts. The functional articulation of both spaces should be revised on a timely basis. We also believe that the mandate of this group could be further strengthened in Colombia incorporating functions such as, for instance, clearly establishing the needs in capacity building, systematic assessment of results from capacity building initiatives so as to guarantee their sustainability and inclusion. Also, as was suggested by Mexico, we should have specific work agendas that are circulated ahead of time. We hope that these will be considered as a part of thematic group 3 so as to strengthen its structure and to work within the mechanism. Within the structure, this should not represent a duplication of the discussions in the plenary. Turning to the participation of other stakeholders, we welcome the reference to the participation of experts and other interested parties in each DTG. We also think that we welcome the reference to states exercising the power here. However, we believe that this should follow a procedure that should at least ensure full transparency and we should also look at the final outcome decided by the member states efficiently. Finally, we reiterate its commitment to inclusive action-oriented multilateral forum. We believe that the success of the permanent mechanism will, to a large extent, depend on its ability to bridge gaps and ensure the voices of everyone in this area. Thank you very much.

Chair: Thank you very much. Chile, Zimbabwe, to be followed by Uruguay.

Zimbabwe: Thank you, Chair. As the first time we are taking the floor, Zimbabwe would like to commend you, Chair, for continued commitment to an inclusive, transparent, and consensus-driven process. Over the past four years, under your able leadership, the Open-Ended Working Group has addressed complex and sensitive issues concerning the security of and in the use of ICTs. We are confident that this momentum will be sustained as we move towards the establishment and up realization of a future permanent mechanism. Chair, we are particularly supportive of the inclusion of a dedicated thematic group on capacity building and the intention to convene a regular global roundtable on ICT security capacity building. This aligns with Zimbabwe’s national view that capacity building must be embedded in the permanent mechanism and treated as an enabler of both security and development objectives to bridge the digital divide. Furthermore, Chair, Zimbabwe welcomes the inclusion of a dedicated thematic group on the application of international law to the use of ICTs in the context of international security. We regard this as essential to fostering legal clarity, ensuring accountability, and preserving stability in cyberspace. In line with the common African position adopted by the African Union Peace and Security Council, Zimbabwe reaffirms that existing international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, fully applies in cyberspace. We are further of the view that this thematic group could facilitate the long-term objective of elaborating a comprehensive legal instrument negotiated multilaterally and grounded in customary and treaty based international law to codify the applicable rules and principles governing state conduct in cyberspace. Such an instrument would reinforce the rules-based international order and provide states, particularly developing countries, with the predictable legal framework to address complex cyber threats while safeguarding sovereignty and international peace and security. Chair, on stakeholder participation, Zimbabwe recognizes the valuable role that stakeholder participation plays in the development of international law. stakeholders, including the private sector, civil society, and academia, can play in shaping cybersecurity policy. However, we reaffirm the intergovernmental and state-led nature of both the current process and the envisaged permanent mechanism, and my delegation is mindful of the introduction of new elements that may prove counterproductive or risk undermining the integrity and effectiveness of this critical mechanism. In this regard, we support the modalities that have thus far guided the open-ended working group process continue to be applied given their proven efficacy. To conclude, Chair, Zimbabwe recognizes the growing importance of moving from conceptual debates to operational structures, and we appreciate the clarity and specificity that the current paper also brings to the institutional design of the future mechanism. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Zimbabwe. Uruguay, please.

Uruguay: Thank you very much, Chairman. This is the first time that Uruguay is taking the floor, so briefly our country would like to express its thanks for your work and the constructive spirit demonstrated throughout the negotiations, which is reflected in this robust document that we’re discussing. We advocate for the creation of a single permanent mechanism which has the trust of the members, which is a space for the discussion on the application of international law and the use of ICTs, and which has a thematic group to look at capacity building, as is set out in Annex III of the document. On Section F, as we have said several times, technical capacities and specialized bodies knowledge of countries is valuable not only between countries but also within them. The appearance of the digital divide underscores the need to ensure technology transfer and to foster international cooperation. Therefore we’re convinced that the creation of a DTG dedicated to capacity building, which as established in Annex 3 and in line with the working groups put forward by the Latin American region would allow us to go beyond the simple organization of training programs. This would allow us to have a comprehensive view to identify specific needs and ensure specific support. The full intervention has been sent and will be available for publication. Thank you very much.

Chair: Thank you very much, Uruguay, for your statement and brevity. Botswana, please.

Botswana: Thank you, Chair. The Botswana delegation takes the floor for the first time in this session and would like to express our gratitude to you and your Secretariat for having led this process to its completion. With regards to Section 1, Chair, relating – Section 1 of Rev. 1 relating to regular institutional dialogue, Botswana wishes to note that it fully aligns itself – herself with the statement delivered by Nigeria on behalf of the African group. Botswana remains fully committed to an inclusive process for maintaining international peace and security in the cyberspace and supports the establishment of a robust and permanent mechanism that builds upon the OEWG’s work over the past three cycles and its delivery on the expectations of all states, particularly those from the developing states. We therefore welcome the recognition of the importance of continuing regular institutional dialogue under the auspices of the UN under Paragraph 59 of Rev. 1, and we believe it appropriately reflects the consistent call made by participants of this OEWG to remain inclusive, action-oriented and consensus-driven. Botswana welcomes the inclusion within the Chair’s proposal in Annex 3, the proposed multi-stakeholder participation, including that of regional and sub-regional organizations, the private sector, academia and civil society, as this will ensure a balanced regional representation and will be guided by the principles of consensus. consensus, transparency, and inclusivity. We do understand that the expertise provided by the stakeholders will be crucial for insight and provide informed guidance on the work of the future mechanism and will not necessarily translate to decision making, which will be left to the states to retain, as Cote d’Ivoire has highlighted, the intergovernmental nature of the process. The report reflects the aspirational consensus on the need for continuity, and we believe at this point that Annex III should be sufficient in prescribing the operational modalities and institutional design of a future mechanism. As has already been indicated by other states, we are not particularly strict on this aspect and choose to be flexible in this regard, Chair. It is in this spirit that we agree with the Chair’s proposal, our client, in Annex III for the plenary sessions that will be supplemented by the work of the three dedicated thematic working groups in the future mechanism. We particularly support the establishment of a thematic group on capacity building that will assist states in the organization of their national cybersecurity efforts in developing policy frameworks, protecting their CI and CIIs against cyber threats, and in the implementation of existing voluntary norms and to develop national positions on the applicability of international law in the cyberspace. We wish to align ourselves with Brazil’s position, supported by the UK and the Netherlands, which call for the exercise of flexibility regarding participation in the global roundtable on ICT security capacity building, as opposed to high-level participation. This would ensure that deliberations take a more engaging approach. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Botswana. Nicaragua, please.

Nicaragua: Mr. President, Chair, our thanks to you and your team for all of your efforts to reach a successful outcome in this exhaustive process. The future permanent mechanism should fully implement all of the decisions adopted by consensus within our group, particularly respecting the principles of the UN Charter. It will also be vital to establish the appropriate mechanism to implement capacity-building programs for developing countries and to ensure interstate international cooperation to address the threats of the undue use of ICTs identified in the OEWG. The highest priority for this meeting is to achieve a fluid transition from the current OEWG to the future permanent mechanism through a concise report. In the meantime, the DTGs of the future permanent mechanism should be aligned with the five pillars of its mandate. We recognise the efforts of the Chair here. However, as has already been raised by other delegations, the scope and approach of thematic group one is not clear. We believe that we need greater discussion here. It has been shown that existing non-binding voluntary behaviour norms, despite being a positive step for the effective regulation of the use of ICTs, are insufficient. Being guided by this, as well as by the spirit of striking a balance between norms and international law, we suggest the establishment of a specific thematic group on norms. We also support the establishment of a specific group on capacity-building. Chair, in order to preserve the intergovernmental nature both of the UN and of this very process, we advocate for us to keep the current modalities for the participation of stakeholders in the future permanent mechanism. The issue of the participation of non-governmental stakeholders is not procedural, rather a substantive issue. Guided by this reasoning, we are not in favour of the participation of non-governmental stakeholders in specific thematic groups. groups, which should provide a forum for discussion solely between governmental experts. Finally, we support the terminology for this process to be aligned with the mandate of the OEWG. In this sense, ICT security should be replaced by security of and in the use of ICTs throughout the text. We also propose editing the title of Annex 3, replacing ICT security with security of and in the use of ICTs, following the same thinking. Nicaragua stands ready to continue to support constructively throughout this process. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Nicaragua. Germany, please.

Germany: Thank you, Chair. Germany aligns with the EU Statement, the presentation by the French delegation, and on stakeholder modality is the paper led by Chile and Canada. I will not repeat specific points that have been submitted in writing, but rather would like to share Germany’s view on the key goals that we want to achieve with the Future Permanent Transition, and I will focus on the question of the DTGs. First, we want to protect, promote, and implement the normative framework of responsible state behavior that we have built over the years and strengthen it. We cannot accept putting in question the implementation of that framework. Second, we want to have a space for policy-oriented, cross-cutting discussions in the DTGs. This has already been agreed in the 2024 APR. These cross-cutting, issue-oriented discussions allow for concrete and meaningful exchanges on many issues that also have been highlighted by colleagues like – and these are just examples – ransomware threats to essential public services. Third, we all want to move forward in a single-track format. We believe that the renewed compromise proposal made by France on how to pitch the different views on working groups would be appropriate to address the objective of strengthening the existing framework, breaking up silos, and also address policy challenges holistically and also the concerns raised by other delegations, including on assessing needs for and improving delivery of capacity building. We welcome and continue studying the perspectives of the LAC region and the Pacific Island Forum region. In a very concrete way, we could flexibly discuss challenges we all share, for example, ransomware that was raised by many during the course of our discussions. The considerations or potentially the consensus recommendations flowing from the dedicated thematic working groups would then again inform the plenary discussions. We support the essence of the proposals made by Mexico and France to have a dedicated plenary agenda item for such discussions. Such recommendations will enable us to move our discussion forward in the sole decision-making body of the Future Permanent Mechanism and then strengthen the framework with its five pillars. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Germany. It’s six o’clock exactly. First of all, I want to express my thanks to the interpreters who have kindly given us another ten minutes, and I’m grateful for their support for our process here. Second, I want to say that we have about six speakers who wanted to speak on this item of RIT, but we will not be able to cover them today. Third, we have 30 outstanding speakers from the morning list, and I had said that we will find a way to give them a chance. But I have the sense that out of the 30 speakers who had registered to speak in the morning, some might have already spoken already in this debate because it was not clear when they pressed the button whether they were wishing to address RIT. So the number may well be less than 30. So this is how we’ll proceed. First, tomorrow we will meet at 10 a.m. sharp. We will hear the stakeholders, as is indicated. in the work program and as approved in the work program. And it is fair that we hear them. And they have been a part of this process. The voices and views of the stakeholders are important. And in this process, I’ve always said that I’m committed to engaging them in a systematic, sustained, and substantive way. And so we will hear them tomorrow morning. But I would also like to seek the kind indulgence of the stakeholders in seeking their understanding and patience. So we will have to impose a time limit of three minutes for them tomorrow. We have about 20 stakeholders who are registered to speak. So if we allow for three minute statements, we should be able to complete it in about an hour. And then after that, I will take up the remaining speakers from this morning. And I would also like each one of you to come to the secretariat to see where you are in the speakers list left off from yesterday morning and whether you wish to take away, take yourself away from the speakers list. Of course, the idea is not to open it up to have another 50 speakers. Then we will not be able to give everyone a chance. This afternoon, some of you took the floor and said, this is the first time you were speaking. And that’s very gratifying because it’s important that we hear the voices of those who have not spoken. But at the same time, it’s not for me to say that delegations should not speak more than once or twice. So. responsible state behavior. We have a normative framework. So I leave it to you to exercise your judgment and for you to decide whether there are burning things that you need to say that hasn’t already been said in one way or another by your partners or groups. So the speaker’s list from this morning is going to be left with the Secretariat here in the podium and if you wish to take yourself away, I would encourage you to do that and if so, then we will have a shorter speaker’s list. So we will go through the speaker’s list tomorrow morning after the stakeholders have spoken and then finally, for those who have not been able to speak today, we will combine the remainder of the six speakers today and we have to do it tomorrow morning. We will have to have a cutoff of concluding the meeting at 1 p.m. tomorrow. After that, I will need to sit down and go through the discussions, my notes, and to prepare a ref too. And I will need time to do that. This is not to be generated through an AI program. We are not there yet. But it will require me and my team to go through all the interventions, proposals, paragraph, 56 pages of it, and it will require me to make some judgments. My judgment as Chair, as your friend, from the podium, I am a friend to all of you, but I also have a responsibility as Chair. Now, in that capacity, let me say a few words about the discussion today. I found the talk very, very positive. I sensed a palpable commitment to bring this to a closure. I sense that there is an enormous amount of commitment to conclude the work and reach consensus. So this discussion, in that sense, has been very encouraging for me. And I thank you for that. Second, a range of issues with regard to regular institutional dialogue. The whole question of NXC is there. It’s the foundational framework for the future permanent mechanism. And we’re looking at additional elements. And some of the discussions also relates back to NXC, which we have already agreed. And that’s a good thing. We have a very strong framework. And we are not revisiting or reopening NXC in any way. That much I want to make clear. But we need to build on that with some additional elements. And that’s what we are trying to do. And I think we need to find a way as to perhaps how we can connect NXC to the additional elements that we are doing. Of course, there are many different views. But I think there are some really converging elements. We all recognize the need for dedicated thematic groups to allow us to go out deeper, to have focused discussions, and to look at the interconnections, and to have a cross-cutting discussion, which is part of what we agreed to in NXC as the mandate of the future permanent mechanism, that we will have policy-oriented, cross-cutting discussions. And everyone agrees that we are not trying to replicate the and the dedicated thematic groups. So the question is, how do we differentiate the discussions? How do we go deeper? What do we need to do? How do we organize our discussions? Now, the idea of dedicated thematic groups was a means to go deeper and to look at the discussions in a policy-oriented way, to look at the interconnections, the cross-cutting nature, and within the context of the five pillar. That’s the other point that I think we are all converging on. No one’s questioning the five pillars. And look at it. After five years, everyone’s defending the five pillars. Look how far we have come. That is one of the many, many akis of this process. Everyone’s committed to and committed to defending the five pillars. And that’s a very convergent element. So the idea of the DTGs is not to displace, diminish the five pillars, but to actually complement it. And being committed to the five pillars does not mean that we can’t go deeper and look at the interconnections between the five pillars. We did agree on five pillars, but we did not agree to five silos. How do we connect the dots between the different pillars? I think that’s the challenge. I’ve got two more minutes, and I should be fair to the interpreters, but I do want to say that the proposals that I’ve put forward for the three dedicated thematic groups, very divergent views on dedicated thematic group one, divergent views, dedicated thematic group two, divergent views, dedicated thematic group three, more convergent views. as far as the importance of capacity building goes. So how do we organize this? Let me give some thought to that, but it seems clear to me that we do need dedicated thematic groups. It is not an option to postpone the decision to the future permanent mechanism. I urge you to reflect on that. We cannot postpone it. If we do, the transition will not be smooth and seamless. You will spend the next two years debating dedicated thematic groups. So you might as well call it the global mechanism to discuss dedicated thematic groups. It will not, so I’m being serious. I think that I’m making this as a friend of yours, that we do need to make a decision, but we need a decision that doesn’t lock us in. It must have sufficient flexibility. It must be general enough. It must respect the five pillars, but it must be able to organize our work. And as our friend from Egypt said this morning, it’s not the structure or the architecture that is going to make this process work. It’s the political will. It’s the reservoir of trust that is going to make this process work. This OEWG has come thus far, not because of the structure or anything architectural that we have designed. It’s because of your commitment, the process, the people, and the political will has all helped. So I think those things are important. So don’t be fixated on the structure or the architecture. It’s about how we organize the discussions and we need to have dedicated thematic groups. The number and scope is something that we need to reflect on. Finally, on stakeholders, I’ll just say, very divergent views on one side and the other. And it seems very clear to me that if we are to attain consensus, we need to. go towards the middle and the Rev. 1 elements that I have put forward in the Rev. 1 draft was an attempt to chart out a middle path. And I have not heard any new solutions today, so we need to go back to the middle. So that’s all I will say. Let me reflect on Rev. 2 and all the different elements, but most of all my gratitude to all of you for your very constructive and positive tone this afternoon. The meeting is adjourned. See you tomorrow at 10 a.m. And one last thing. I would like everyone to be here at 10 a.m. to listen to the stakeholders, especially those who have defended and advocated for stakeholder participation. You should be here. I’m going to be taking attendance. Because it’s not fair to the stakeholders that they come here at 10 o’clock and there’s no one in the room and they’re talking to me. No, they need to talk to you. And for those of you who also have different views on stakeholders, I’d like you to be here because I’ll be taking attendance and I’m asking you as a friend, please come and listen to the stakeholders. The meeting is adjourned. Thank you.

Agreement points

Support for dedicated capacity building thematic group

Speakers

– Argentina
– Paraguay
– Thailand
– Malaysia
– Nigeria
– Morocco
– Colombia
– Brazil
– Lao PDR
– El Salvador
– Chile
– Uruguay
– Botswana
– Nicaragua
– Kenya
– Indonesia
– Fiji

Arguments

Support for dedicated capacity building DTG as essential

Emphasis on capacity building as fundamental pillar

Support for three DTGs including international law group

Support for dedicated capacity building DTG

Support for three DTGs with focus on capacity building

Strong support for capacity building focus in future mechanism

Support for capacity building DTG and global roundtable

Support for capacity building DTG and global roundtable

Support for capacity building DTG as essential for developing countries

Support for limited thematic groups including capacity building

Support for capacity building DTG and global roundtable

Support for comprehensive capacity building approach

Support for three DTGs structure as proposed

Support for capacity building programs for developing countries

Support for developing country needs in capacity building

Support for DTG structure but concerns about DTG1 clarity

Support for capacity building as cross-cutting priority

Summary

Overwhelming consensus that capacity building should have a dedicated thematic group in the future permanent mechanism, with particular emphasis on its importance for developing countries and bridging the digital divide

Topics

Development | Cybersecurity

Need for three dedicated thematic groups structure

Speakers

– France
– South Africa
– Thailand
– Nigeria
– Indonesia
– Ghana
– El Salvador
– Botswana
– Egypt
– Cote d Ivoire

Arguments

Support for three DTGs with cross-cutting approach

Support for DTG on international law and norms combined

Support for three DTGs including international law group

Support for three DTGs with focus on capacity building

Support for DTG structure but concerns about DTG1 clarity

Support for international law and norms combined discussion

Support for limited thematic groups including capacity building

Support for three DTGs structure as proposed

Support for three thematic groups with scenario-based approach for DTG1

Support for three thematic groups with clear delimitations

Summary

Strong consensus on establishing three dedicated thematic groups as the basic structure for the future permanent mechanism, though with varying views on their specific focus and organization

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Importance of consensus-based decision making

Speakers

– Argentina
– Islamic Republic of Iran
– Mexico
– Viet Nam
– Kiribati
– Botswana

Arguments

Emphasis on consensus-based decision making for substantive issues

Proposal for explicit consensus requirement in future mechanism

Support for consensus principle while noting it differs from unanimity

Support for consensus-based decision making

Support for consensus-based approach

Support for consensus-based approach

Summary

Agreement on the fundamental importance of consensus-based decision making in the future permanent mechanism, though with some nuanced differences on interpretation and implementation

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Support for Canada-Chile stakeholder participation proposal

Speakers

– Australia
– Finland
– Denmark
– Japan
– Sweden
– Romania
– United Kingdom
– Italy
– Canada

Arguments

Support for Canada-Chile proposal on stakeholder modalities

Support for Canada-Chile paper on stakeholder inclusion

Support for Canada-Chile approach on stakeholder participation

Support for multistakeholder participation in DTGs

Support for Canada-Chile stakeholder participation paper

Support for Canada-Chile stakeholder participation paper

Support for Canada-Chile stakeholder participation proposal

Support for Canada-Chile stakeholder participation proposal

Opposition to majority vote mechanism for stakeholder participation

Summary

Strong support from multiple delegations for the Canada-Chile proposal on stakeholder participation modalities, emphasizing the need for more inclusive and transparent stakeholder engagement with majority decision-making when consensus cannot be reached

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Development

Similar viewpoints

Strong preference for cross-cutting, action-oriented discussions rather than pillar-based thematic groups, particularly opposing a standalone international law DTG in favor of integrated approaches that address real-world challenges using all five pillars of the framework

Speakers

– European Union
– Australia
– United States
– Ireland
– Ukraine
– Germany
– United Kingdom

Arguments

Opposition to standalone international law DTG, preference for cross-cutting discussions

Preference for cross-cutting DTGs over pillar-based approach

Opposition to international law DTG, support for cross-cutting approach

Support for single-track permanent mechanism under UN auspices

Support for French proposal on action-oriented thematic groups

Support for French compromise proposal on DTGs

Support for French proposal and opposition to international law DTG

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Preference for maintaining current stakeholder participation modalities with non-objection principles, supporting pillar-based DTG structure aligned with original OEWG mandate, and emphasizing state-led nature of the process

Speakers

– Russian Federation
– Islamic Republic of Iran
– China
– Cuba
– Nicaragua
– Zimbabwe

Arguments

Support for pillar-based DTGs aligned with OEWG mandate

Opposition to weakening non-objection principle for stakeholders

Support for majority vote mechanism for stakeholder participation

Support for current modalities, opposition to new consultation procedures

Opposition to non-governmental stakeholder participation in DTGs

Support for preserving current stakeholder modalities

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Strong emphasis on addressing developing country needs, regional cooperation, and ensuring meaningful participation of smaller and developing states in the future mechanism through various support structures and regional approaches

Speakers

– Paraguay
– Morocco
– Kenya
– Senegal

Arguments

Emphasis on landlocked developing countries’ limited participation

Support for regional cooperation and African mechanisms

Support for peer review mechanism and regional leadership rotation

Support for regional preparatory meetings and technological divide focus

Topics

Development

Unexpected consensus

Universal support for five pillars framework

Speakers

– Chair
– France
– European Union
– Russian Federation
– United States
– Nigeria
– Egypt

Arguments

Recognition of convergence on five pillars and need for cross-cutting approach

Support for three DTGs with cross-cutting approach

Opposition to standalone international law DTG, preference for cross-cutting discussions

Support for pillar-based DTGs aligned with OEWG mandate

Opposition to international law DTG, support for cross-cutting approach

Support for three DTGs with focus on capacity building

Support for three thematic groups with scenario-based approach for DTG1

Explanation

Despite significant disagreements on structure and modalities, there was unexpected universal acceptance and defense of the five pillars framework that has been developed over the past five years. As the Chair noted, ‘after five years, everyone’s defending the five pillars’ – this represents a major achievement given the initial skepticism and divergent views when the process began

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Agreement on need for immediate DTG decision

Speakers

– Chair
– Malaysia
– Ireland
– Canada
– United States

Arguments

Emphasis on need for dedicated thematic groups decision now

Emphasis on seamless transition from OEWG to permanent mechanism

Support for single-track permanent mechanism under UN auspices

Opposition to majority vote mechanism for stakeholder participation

Opposition to international law DTG, support for cross-cutting approach

Explanation

Despite disagreements on DTG structure, there was unexpected consensus that the decision on DTGs cannot be postponed to the future mechanism. Even delegations with different structural preferences agreed that delaying this decision would undermine the transition and effectiveness of the future mechanism

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Overall assessment

Summary

The discussion revealed strong consensus on several foundational elements: the need for three dedicated thematic groups, universal support for capacity building as a priority, commitment to the five pillars framework, and the importance of consensus-based decision making. However, significant divisions remain on the specific structure of DTGs (cross-cutting vs. pillar-based) and stakeholder participation modalities (current non-objection vs. majority decision approaches).

Consensus level

Moderate to high consensus on fundamental principles and structures, but deep divisions on implementation modalities. The level of agreement on core issues like capacity building and the five pillars framework suggests a strong foundation for compromise, but the polarized positions on stakeholder participation and DTG structure indicate that significant diplomatic work remains to bridge these gaps before the final report can be adopted.

Different viewpoints

Structure and Organization of Dedicated Thematic Groups (DTGs)

Speakers

– France
– European Union
– Australia
– United States
– Russian Federation
– South Africa
– Thailand
– Indonesia
– Egypt
– United Kingdom
– Germany

Arguments

Support for three DTGs with cross-cutting approach

Opposition to standalone international law DTG, preference for cross-cutting discussions

Preference for cross-cutting DTGs over pillar-based approach

Opposition to international law DTG, support for cross-cutting approach

Support for pillar-based DTGs aligned with OEWG mandate

Support for DTG on international law and norms combined

Support for three DTGs including international law group

Support for DTG structure but concerns about DTG1 clarity

Support for three thematic groups with scenario-based approach for DTG1

Support for French proposal and opposition to international law DTG

Support for French compromise proposal on DTGs

Summary

Major disagreement on whether DTGs should follow a cross-cutting approach (supported by France, EU, Australia, US, UK, Germany) that integrates all five pillars, or a pillar-based approach (supported by Russia, South Africa, Thailand, parts of African group) with dedicated groups for specific pillars like international law. The cross-cutting camp argues this avoids silos and duplication, while the pillar-based camp wants focused discussions on specific areas like international law and norms.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Stakeholder Participation Modalities

Speakers

– European Union
– Australia
– Islamic Republic of Iran
– United States
– Russian Federation
– China
– Cuba
– Finland
– Denmark
– Canada
– Sweden
– Romania
– Zimbabwe

Arguments

Support for meaningful stakeholder engagement with majority decision

Support for Canada-Chile proposal on stakeholder modalities

Opposition to weakening non-objection principle for stakeholders

Opposition to single state veto power over stakeholders

Support for current OEWG stakeholder modalities

Support for majority vote mechanism for stakeholder participation

Support for current modalities, opposition to new consultation procedures

Support for Canada-Chile paper on stakeholder inclusion

Support for Canada-Chile approach on stakeholder participation

Opposition to majority vote mechanism for stakeholder participation

Support for Canada-Chile stakeholder participation paper

Support for Canada-Chile stakeholder participation paper

Support for preserving current stakeholder modalities

Summary

Fundamental disagreement on stakeholder participation mechanisms. One group (EU, Australia, US, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Romania, supported by 42 countries via Canada-Chile paper) wants to eliminate single-state veto power and allow majority decisions on stakeholder participation. The opposing group (Iran, Russia, China, Cuba, Zimbabwe) insists on maintaining current non-objection procedures where any single state can block stakeholder participation.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Development

Decision-Making and Consensus Principles

Speakers

– Argentina
– Islamic Republic of Iran
– Mexico
– Viet Nam
– Kiribati
– Botswana

Arguments

Emphasis on consensus-based decision making for substantive issues

Proposal for explicit consensus requirement in future mechanism

Support for consensus principle while noting it differs from unanimity

Support for consensus-based decision making

Support for consensus-based approach

Support for consensus-based approach

Summary

Disagreement on interpretation of consensus decision-making. Some delegations (Iran, Argentina) want explicit consensus requirements interpreted as unanimity, while others (Mexico) argue that consensus principle doesn’t equate to unanimity and reference GA rules that don’t operate on ‘193 vetoes’. This reflects broader tension between strict unanimity requirements versus more flexible consensus-building approaches.

Topics

Legal and regulatory

International Law Application in Cyberspace

Speakers

– Switzerland
– Thailand
– Ghana
– Zimbabwe
– European Union
– Australia
– United States

Arguments

Support for deeper international law discussions in dedicated group

Support for three DTGs including international law group

Support for international law and norms combined discussion

Support for international law DTG for legal clarity and accountability

Opposition to standalone international law DTG, preference for cross-cutting discussions

Preference for cross-cutting DTGs over pillar-based approach

Opposition to international law DTG, support for cross-cutting approach

Summary

Sharp divide on whether international law should have its own dedicated thematic group. Supporters (Switzerland, Thailand, Ghana, Zimbabwe, parts of African group) argue for focused legal discussions to build capacity and clarity. Opponents (EU, Australia, US) contend that international law should be discussed in cross-cutting manner within other groups to avoid silos and show practical application to real-world challenges.

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Unexpected differences

Terminology and Mandate Alignment

Speakers

– Russian Federation
– Nicaragua

Arguments

Support for pillar-based DTGs aligned with OEWG mandate

Support for DTGs aligned with five pillars mandate

Explanation

Unexpected focus on technical terminology, with Russia and Nicaragua insisting on ‘security of and in the use of ICTs’ rather than ‘ICT security’ throughout the text, and objecting to terms like ‘resilience’ as unusual for the OEWG. This seemingly minor terminological dispute reflects deeper concerns about mandate interpretation and scope creep beyond agreed parameters.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Meeting Location and Cost Considerations

Speakers

– Brazil
– Viet Nam
– Australia

Arguments

Support for spacing between DTG and plenary meetings

Support for flexible meeting arrangements and UN reform alignment

Proposal for plenary in July, DTGs in December

Explanation

Unexpected detailed focus on practical meeting logistics, with Brazil specifically noting that accommodation costs are much higher than airfare in New York and suggesting avoiding December due to ‘notoriously high’ accommodation costs. Vietnam proposed alternative meeting locations outside New York. This practical concern about meeting costs became a significant point of discussion, reflecting resource constraints faced by many delegations.

Topics

Development | Legal and regulatory

Overall assessment

Summary

The discussion reveals three major areas of disagreement: DTG structure (cross-cutting vs. pillar-based), stakeholder participation modalities (majority decision vs. single-state veto), and decision-making principles (flexible consensus vs. strict unanimity). Despite these disagreements, there is strong convergence on the importance of capacity building and the need for a permanent mechanism.

Disagreement level

Moderate to high disagreement on structural and procedural issues, but with underlying consensus on core objectives. The Chair noted ‘palpable commitment to bring this to closure’ and ‘enormous amount of commitment to conclude the work and reach consensus,’ suggesting disagreements are bridgeable through compromise. The fundamental challenge is balancing inclusivity with efficiency, and state sovereignty with multistakeholder engagement. The disagreements reflect deeper tensions between different governance philosophies rather than opposition to the overall goals.

Partial agreements

Similar viewpoints

Strong preference for cross-cutting, action-oriented discussions rather than pillar-based thematic groups, particularly opposing a standalone international law DTG in favor of integrated approaches that address real-world challenges using all five pillars of the framework

Speakers

– European Union
– Australia
– United States
– Ireland
– Ukraine
– Germany
– United Kingdom

Arguments

Opposition to standalone international law DTG, preference for cross-cutting discussions

Preference for cross-cutting DTGs over pillar-based approach

Opposition to international law DTG, support for cross-cutting approach

Support for single-track permanent mechanism under UN auspices

Support for French proposal on action-oriented thematic groups

Support for French compromise proposal on DTGs

Support for French proposal and opposition to international law DTG

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Preference for maintaining current stakeholder participation modalities with non-objection principles, supporting pillar-based DTG structure aligned with original OEWG mandate, and emphasizing state-led nature of the process

Speakers

– Russian Federation
– Islamic Republic of Iran
– China
– Cuba
– Nicaragua
– Zimbabwe

Arguments

Support for pillar-based DTGs aligned with OEWG mandate

Opposition to weakening non-objection principle for stakeholders

Support for majority vote mechanism for stakeholder participation

Support for current modalities, opposition to new consultation procedures

Opposition to non-governmental stakeholder participation in DTGs

Support for preserving current stakeholder modalities

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Strong emphasis on addressing developing country needs, regional cooperation, and ensuring meaningful participation of smaller and developing states in the future mechanism through various support structures and regional approaches

Speakers

– Paraguay
– Morocco
– Kenya
– Senegal

Arguments

Emphasis on landlocked developing countries’ limited participation

Support for regional cooperation and African mechanisms

Support for peer review mechanism and regional leadership rotation

Support for regional preparatory meetings and technological divide focus

Topics

Development

Key takeaways

Strong consensus exists on the need for a single-track permanent mechanism to replace the OEWG with dedicated thematic groups (DTGs) for deeper, cross-cutting discussions

Universal agreement on maintaining the five pillars of the framework (threats, norms, international law, confidence-building measures, capacity building) without creating silos

Capacity building emerged as the most convergent priority, with broad support for a dedicated DTG on this topic

Significant divergence exists on DTG structure – some favor cross-cutting approach (France/EU), others prefer pillar-based groups (Russia/developing countries)

Stakeholder participation remains highly contentious, with fundamental disagreement between those supporting majority vote mechanisms vs. maintaining non-objection procedures

Time pressure is critical – decisions on DTG structure cannot be postponed to future mechanism without risking prolonged negotiations

Chair emphasized that political will and trust, not architectural structure, will determine the mechanism’s success

Resolutions and action items

Stakeholders will speak tomorrow morning at 10 AM with 3-minute time limits

Remaining speakers from morning session will be heard after stakeholder presentations

Meeting will conclude at 1 PM tomorrow to allow Chair time to prepare Rev. 2 of the draft report

Delegations encouraged to review morning speakers list and remove themselves if no longer needed

Chair will prepare Rev. 2 incorporating all discussions and proposals from the session

Unresolved issues

Structure and mandate of DTG 1 remains unclear and contentious, with calls for clarification

Fundamental disagreement on whether to have standalone international law DTG or integrate it cross-cutting approach

Stakeholder participation modalities – irreconcilable positions between non-objection principle vs. majority vote mechanism

Meeting scheduling and sequencing – whether DTGs should precede or follow plenary sessions

Decision-making procedures – tension between consensus principle and practical implementation

Integration of Annex C (existing framework) with new Annex 3 (additional elements) needs consolidation

Terminology alignment throughout document (ICT security vs. security of and in use of ICTs)

Resource allocation and burden on smaller delegations for multiple meetings and groups

Suggested compromises

France proposed updated action-oriented thematic groups drawing on all five pillars in cross-cutting manner

Chair’s Rev. 1 stakeholder modalities attempted middle path between divergent positions

South Africa suggested merging international law and norms discussions in single DTG

Brazil proposed formal segment for DTGs to elevate reports to plenary

Australia suggested plenary in July, DTGs in December to allow processing time

Netherlands proposed three-step capacity building structure linking DTGs, roundtable, and plenary

Mexico emphasized consensus as aspiration vs. unanimity requirement

Egypt suggested focusing on language and caveats rather than restructuring DTG framework

Multiple delegations supported hybrid meeting formats to balance participation and costs

France’s visual presentation identifying three key gaps: the capacity building gap (digital divide), the implementation gap (moving from framework to action), and the inclusivity gap (involving cyber agencies, legal experts and stakeholders). France proposed bridging these through cross-cutting dedicated thematic groups that draw from all pillars of the framework.

Speaker

France

Reason

This was insightful because it reframed the entire discussion around concrete problems rather than abstract structural debates. By identifying specific ‘gaps’ that needed filling, France provided a diagnostic framework that many subsequent speakers referenced and built upon.

Impact

This presentation fundamentally shifted the discussion from procedural arguments about group structures to substantive conversations about what the mechanism needed to achieve. Multiple delegations (EU, Australia, Germany, etc.) explicitly referenced France’s framework and proposal, making it a central reference point for the remainder of the debate.

Egypt’s observation: ‘over the past four years, I guess we have had separate discussions on international law, on norms, on threats, and yet we managed to agree on three consensual reports. If that proves anything, that proves that neither the structure nor the discussions are the problem. Rather, it’s the flexibility and the willingness to compromise.’

Speaker

Egypt

Reason

This comment was profoundly insightful because it cut through the technical debates about organizational structure to identify the real issue: political will and flexibility, not architecture, determine success in multilateral negotiations.

Impact

This comment provided a reality check that influenced the Chair’s closing remarks, where he echoed Egypt’s point: ‘it’s not the structure or the architecture that is going to make this process work. It’s the political will.’ It helped refocus the discussion on finding compromise rather than perfect structures.

Canada’s metaphor: ‘in any canoe, everyone must paddle. Some paddle fast to move forward and may need to slow down for others that are learning to paddle… Yet, if some in the canoe start paddling backwards, the canoe will only go in circles.’

Speaker

Canada

Reason

This metaphor was thought-provoking because it elegantly captured the tension between accommodation and progress in consensus-building, while also serving as a subtle warning about obstructionism.

Impact

The metaphor resonated with the Chair, who referenced it in his closing remarks about everyone being ‘on the same boat’ and needing to ‘paddle forward.’ It helped frame the discussion in terms of collective responsibility rather than individual positions.

Portugal’s stark economic framing: ‘last year, according to cybersecurity ventures, the cost of cybercrime reached 9.5 trillion dollars – more than half the combined nominal GDP of the EU member states. That is the staggering dimension of the price we pay for the insecurity we are confronted with in cyberspace.’

Speaker

Portugal

Reason

This comment was insightful because it grounded the abstract institutional discussions in concrete economic reality, demonstrating the urgent practical stakes of their negotiations.

Impact

While not extensively referenced by other speakers, this intervention served as a powerful reminder of why the mechanism matters beyond diplomatic process, adding urgency to the discussions about making the future mechanism action-oriented and effective.

The Chair’s closing observation: ‘After five years, everyone’s defending the five pillars. Look how far we have come. That is one of the many, many achievements of this process… We did agree on five pillars, but we did not agree to five silos. How do we connect the dots between the different pillars?’

Speaker

Chair

Reason

This was insightful because it reframed apparent disagreements as actually reflecting shared commitment to the framework, while identifying the real challenge as integration rather than protection of individual pillars.

Impact

This observation helped synthesize the day’s discussions and provided a constructive framing for moving forward, suggesting that the apparent conflicts were actually about implementation methodology rather than fundamental disagreements about substance.

United States’ warning about exploitation: ‘some States have already affirmed this week that they will seek to exploit conversations in the international law DTG to advance new legally binding obligations contrary to the consensus spirit of the OEWG.’

Speaker

United States

Reason

This comment was thought-provoking because it explicitly identified the political subtext underlying technical discussions about group structures, revealing how institutional design choices could enable or constrain different policy agendas.

Impact

This comment heightened tensions around the international law DTG proposal and contributed to the Chair’s assessment that there were ‘divergent views’ on this group, influencing the overall trajectory toward seeking middle-ground solutions.

Overall assessment

These key comments fundamentally shaped the discussion by moving it from technical institutional design debates toward substantive conversations about purpose, political will, and practical outcomes. France’s gap analysis provided a diagnostic framework that many delegations adopted, while Egypt’s insight about political will over structure influenced the Chair’s final synthesis. Canada’s canoe metaphor and Portugal’s economic data added urgency and collective responsibility framing. The Chair’s observation about defending pillars versus creating silos helped reframe apparent disagreements as implementation challenges rather than fundamental conflicts. Together, these interventions elevated the discussion from procedural arguments to strategic thinking about how to build an effective, action-oriented mechanism that could address real-world cybersecurity challenges while maintaining consensus among diverse stakeholders.