A coalition of civil society organisations has raised concerns about the European Commission’s proposed Digital Networks Act, warning that it could weaken existing net neutrality protections. The signatories argue that the legislation could weaken net neutrality protections and alter the existing framework governing the open internet.
According to the coalition, the proposal would incorporate the Open Internet Regulation into the broader Digital Networks Act while removing many of its explanatory provisions. The groups argue that this could reduce legal certainty and make net neutrality protections more vulnerable to reinterpretation.
The signatories also oppose proposed provisions on IP interconnection, arguing that there is insufficient evidence of market failure to justify regulatory intervention. They warn that proposed cooperation and conciliation mechanisms could formalise commercial negotiations between network operators and content providers, potentially paving the way for network fees.
The coalition is urging EU lawmakers to remove Articles 191 to 193 from the proposal and keep the Open Internet Regulation as a separate legal instrument. The coalition argues that doing so would help preserve consumer protections, competition and the principle of an open internet across the EU.
Why does it matter?
Net neutrality has been a cornerstone of EU internet policy, requiring internet service providers to treat online traffic equally rather than favouring or disadvantaging particular services, platforms or content. Supporters argue that these rules help protect competition, innovation and consumer choice online.
The debate over the Digital Networks Act highlights broader tensions between telecom operators, digital platforms and civil society groups over the future governance of internet infrastructure. Proposed changes to interconnection rules and the legal framework for net neutrality could have implications for how internet services are delivered, regulated and financed across Europe.
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The European Commission has carried out Cyber Europe 2026, a large-scale cybersecurity exercise testing how Europe would respond to attacks on rail and maritime transport networks.
Organised by the EU Agency for Cybersecurity, the exercise took place on 10 and 11 June and involved around 5,000 experts from across the EU, industry and partner countries. Participants included cybersecurity specialists from the public and private sectors, policymakers, the EU institutions and representatives from the UK, Norway, Switzerland and Ukraine.
The scenario simulated cyberattacks on Europe’s rail and maritime networks, causing severe operational disruption and escalating into a wider cybersecurity crisis. The exercise was designed to test coordination between authorities, industry and institutions during a major cross-border incident affecting critical transport infrastructure.
Cyber Europe 2026 was also the first EU-wide test of the 2025 EU Cyber Blueprint, which clarifies roles and responsibilities during a cyber crisis. The exercise also tested the Cybersecurity Reserve, created under the Cyber Solidarity Act to provide support during significant cybersecurity incidents.
The Commission said lessons from the exercise will help consolidate the Cyber Blueprint and embed cyber crisis management more firmly into the EU’s wider emergency preparedness and response frameworks.
Why does it matter?
Transport networks are critical infrastructure, and cyber incidents affecting ports, railways or logistics systems can disrupt trade, supply chains, military mobility and emergency response across borders. Cyber Europe 2026 is important because it tests not only technical response, but also EU-level coordination, crisis decision-making and support mechanisms under newer cyber resilience tools such as the Cyber Blueprint and Cybersecurity Reserve.
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The code is voluntary, but the underlying transparency obligations in Article 50 of the AI Act will apply from 2 August 2026. The Commission said the code is intended to help organisations implement those obligations in a consistent, practical and proportionate way.
The framework covers two main areas. Providers of generative AI systems are guided on marking and detecting AI-generated or manipulated audio, image, video and text content, including through machine-readable solutions where technically feasible. Deployers are guided on labelling deepfakes and AI-generated or manipulated text published to inform the public on matters of public interest.
Under the AI Act, users must also be informed when they are interacting with interactive AI systems, such as chatbots. The transparency requirements are intended to help people recognise when content has been generated or altered by AI and to reduce the risk of deception and manipulation.
The Commission has also published a set of the EU icons that deployers may use to label certain AI-generated content. The code does not replace the AI Act or future Commission guidelines on Article 50, which are expected before the transparency obligations begin to apply.
The Commission and the AI Board will now assess the code’s adequacy. If assessed positively, providers and deployers who sign the code may use its measures to help demonstrate compliance with the AI Act’s transparency rules.
Why does it matter?
The code is an important step in turning the AI Act’s transparency provisions into operational practice. Labelling and machine-readable marking rules could shape how platforms, AI providers, media organisations and other deployers handle synthetic text, images, audio and video. The measures are especially relevant for public-interest information, where undisclosed AI-generated or manipulated content can affect trust, elections, journalism and public debate.
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According to the Polish Press Agency, negotiations between the European Commission and EU member states on the development of AI gigafactories could conclude in June. The planned facilities are expected to be financed through the EU’s €20 billion InvestAI fund.
The initiative aims to establish five AI gigafactories across the EU to support the development of large-scale AI models and applications. Discussions intensified after revisions to the funding model required member states to commit financial support before the launch of a tender process limited to private companies and consortia.
Polish Deputy Minister of Digitisation Dariusz Standerski said Poland led a coalition of seven member states that opposed the revised framework and pushed for changes. He said negotiations are now close to a compromise that could strengthen the EU’s digital sovereignty and AI infrastructure ambitions.
Separately, Standerski said the Ministry of Digitisation is finalising proposals for a digital services tax of up to 3% on revenues generated by large technology companies operating in Poland. The draft legislation is expected to be published by early July in Poland.
Why does it matter?
The AI gigafactory initiative is a central component of the EU’s broader effort to strengthen its AI infrastructure and reduce dependence on non-European providers of computing capacity. Access to large-scale computing resources is increasingly viewed as a prerequisite for developing advanced AI models and competing in the global AI ecosystem.
The negotiations also highlight the governance challenges associated with large industrial policy initiatives. Questions around funding, public-private participation and member state involvement will shape how effectively the EU can translate its AI ambitions into operational infrastructure.
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The Commission framed the initiative as a fundamental shift in the EU’s approach to technology, underpinned by the recognition that digital dependence is no longer a market inefficiency to be tolerated, but a strategic vulnerability to be corrected through legislation.
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that Europe cannot afford to depend on others for the technologies that keep its hospitals running, its energy grids stable, and its services secure, calling on the EU to convert its research excellence, industrial base and single market into technological sovereignty.
The package is designed to broaden choice in core technologies for EU businesses, citizens and public administrations, and to position Europe to capture a larger share of a global semiconductor market projected to reach EUR 1.37 trillion by 2030, with AI-related components accounting for roughly 70% of that growth.
The timing reflects a specific convergence of pressures. The rapid spread of AI applications is driving a sharp increase in demand for data centre and cloud capacity that EU infrastructure cannot currently meet at scale. At the same time, longstanding dependence on non-EU suppliers for advanced semiconductor manufacturing, chip design and cloud services has become increasingly difficult to ignore as geopolitical tensions have demonstrated the economic risk of concentrated supply chains.
The 2022 US CHIPS and Science Act, generous subsidy regimes in Asia and tightening export controls on advanced semiconductor equipment have accelerated the global race for technological self-sufficiency, prompting Europe to adopt a more active industrial policy response.
Chips Act 2.0
The Chips Act 2.0 revises and expands the 2023 European Chips Act, which has mobilised more than EUR 52 billion in public and private investment, created an estimated 46,000 direct and indirect jobs and strengthened Europe’s research and innovation capacity in semiconductors. Despite this progress, the EU remains dependent on third countries for advanced chip manufacturing and semiconductor design.
The revised regulation is designed to accelerate Europe’s position across the entire semiconductor value chain, from raw materials and design to manufacturing and packaging, and to ensure that Europe captures a greater share of the growth in AI-related chip demand.
The proposal is structured around four objectives. On investment and competitiveness, the Act would cap permitting approvals at 12 months, introduce ‘Grand Challenges’ to support the development of strategically important chip types such as AI processors, and formalise Strategic Partnerships on Semiconductors with international allies.
To stimulate demand, it establishes Demand Accelerators to align new products with industry needs, expands innovation procurement, notably for European start-ups and scale-ups, and creates structural synergies with CADA to benefit from the data centre and AI Gigafactory buildout planned under that regulation.
On the supply side, the Act enables state aid for ‘First-of-a-Kind’ facilities not yet present in the Union, covering the full semiconductor value chain, designates strategic projects to unlock EU and member state co-investment, and creates a ‘Semiconductor Regions of Excellence’ label to attract investment at the regional level. To strengthen resilience, it establishes a business-to-business semiconductor supply chain platform and provides sector-specific guidance on risk assessment and mitigation.
The explicit linkage between Chips Act 2.0 and CADA reflects a deliberate industrial logic: European-made chips powering European cloud infrastructure, with demand from that infrastructure in turn supporting European chipmakers.
Cloud and AI Development Act
The Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA) forms a central part of the Commission’s AI Continent Action Plan and simultaneously addresses two structural problems: insufficient EU cloud and data centre capacity to meet AI-driven demand, and strategic dependence on a small number of non-EU cloud providers.
The Act is designed to facilitate and accelerate the deployment of sustainable cloud and data centre infrastructure, while ensuring the EU accelerates the rollout of cloud and AI in critical sectors and retains meaningful control over the infrastructure on which that rollout depends.
The Act focuses on three main areas. On research, development and innovation, it supports next-generation cloud and AI technologies, including frontier AI, industrial AI, and physical AI, introduces grand challenges to drive R&D efforts, and promotes adoption in strategic sectors through national cloud and AI strategies and new Experience and Acceleration Centres for AI in member states.
On capacity, it targets at least a tripling of EU data centre capacity within five to seven years, simplifies and accelerates permitting, and improves access to energy, land, water and financing. On sovereignty and autonomy, it establishes a single EU-wide sovereignty classification framework, promotes open source solutions as a tool for resilience, and introduces a common EU-level procurement framework for public administrations.
The sovereignty classification system merits particular attention. It introduces four assurance levels for cloud and AI services, to be applied by public sector bodies based on their own risk assessments. Level 1 requires data to be processed and stored within the EU. Level 2 requires providers to demonstrate independence from third countries and transparency over their software supply chain.
Level 3 requires providers to be owned and controlled from within the EU and to meet additional criteria including personnel citizenship, although the Commission retains the ability to recognise third-country providers at this level. Level 4 requires full transparency and control over the software supply chain with no third-country interference.
Cloud service providers seeking recognition under this framework must undergo an independent audit conducted by member state authorities. The framework is significant because it creates, for the first time, a legally grounded and progressive definition of what it means for a cloud service to be sovereign, moving the concept from political rhetoric to a procurement-relevant standard.
EU Open Source Strategy
The EU Open Source Strategy is the non-legislative pillar of the package most directly aimed at reducing dependence on proprietary, non-EU software. It places open source at the centre of the EU’s technological sovereignty approach, arguing that open ecosystems reduce supplier lock-in, increase transparency and give European developers and public administrations greater control over their digital infrastructure.
The strategy addresses a persistent structural weakness: the economic value generated by open source projects has historically been captured outside Europe, limiting the ability of European developers and companies to benefit fully from their own contributions.
The strategy is organised around four objectives. The first, Open Source for Tech Sovereignty, focuses on scaling the Open Internet Stack, a Commission-curated catalogue of EU-aligned open source solutions, and promoting alternatives to dominant proprietary products in areas such as cloud platforms, workplace tools, secure e-mail and decentralised social media.
The work will be carried out in cooperation with member states through the European Digital Infrastructure Consortium for Digital Commons. The second objective, Vibrant Open Source Ecosystem, targets start-up support through accelerators and procurement access, alongside a stewardship toolkit for critical open source assets and investment in digital skills across schools, universities, and civil services.
The third objective, Open Source in Public Administration, sets out procurement guidelines that favour open standards, reinforces the Commission’s Open Source Programme Office (OSPO) and the EU Public Sector OSPO Network, and seeks to embed openness and sovereignty-by-design in digital investment decisions across EU institutions and member states.
The fourth objective, Reinforced Standards and International Outreach, promotes EU open source developers and solutions internationally through the EU Tech Business Offer, supports uptake in partner countries and integrates open source communities into standardisation processes, including through a forthcoming revision of the EU Standardisation Regulation.
The strategy also intersects directly with the other package components. On semiconductors, it targets open hardware development through the Chips Joint Undertaking’s RISC-V programme. On AI, it supports the GenAI4EU initiative and promotes open source tooling for public sector AI adoption through the Apply AI Strategy.
On digital identity, it prioritises open source implementation of the European Digital Identity Wallet (EUDI Wallet) and the European Business Wallet. The strategy also interacts with the recently enacted Cyber Resilience Act (CRA), which imposes new security obligations on open source projects that have generated concern in the developer community. The Open Source Maintenance Instrument and critical dependency mapping exercises set out in the strategy are designed in part to address those obligations, though reconciling the CRA’s security requirements with the growth objectives of the strategy will be a key implementation challenge.
Strategic Roadmap for Digitalisation and AI in Energy
The Strategic Roadmap for Digitalisation and AI in Energy is the least legally binding element of the package but arguably the one that determines whether its ambitions are physically realisable. The targets set by CADA, particularly the goal of at least tripling EU data centre capacity within five to seven years, cannot be achieved without a corresponding expansion in reliable, affordable power supply.
Data centres are energy-intensive by nature, and the AI workloads they are increasingly required to process are even more demanding. The roadmap addresses this constraint by setting out how AI and digital technologies can improve the efficiency and flexibility of Europe’s energy systems while also enabling the energy infrastructure that these systems need.
The roadmap connects the package’s digital ambitions to the EU’s energy transition objectives, creating a mutually reinforcing relationship: cleaner, smarter energy systems create more viable conditions for data centre expansion, while AI-enabled demand management and grid optimisation tools reduce the cost and environmental impact of that expansion. The roadmap is also relevant as a governance document, since the deployment of AI in critical energy infrastructure raises its own questions about cybersecurity, data sovereignty and the concentration of control over systems on which entire economies depend.
Governance and policy implications
The Tech Sovereignty Package raises several governance issues that extend beyond its immediate legislative content. The most significant concerns the model it establishes for EU industrial policy. The package marks a clear departure from the long-standing assumption in EU competition policy that market mechanisms and trade openness are the primary tools for achieving efficient and innovative technology markets.
The explicit use of state aid for strategic semiconductor projects, the joint procurement frameworks in CADA and the deliberate promotion of EU-origin suppliers both in public procurement and sovereign cloud classification illustrate a greater role for public intervention in the technology sector. Whether the EU’s trading partners, particularly the United States and major Asian semiconductor producers, will treat these provisions as proportionate industrial policy or as market-distorting intervention is likely to become a significant diplomatic issue.
The package also has important implications for the governance of AI in Europe. It operates in parallel to the EU AI Act and the work of the EU AI Office, but addresses a different layer of the AI ecosystem. While the AI Act focuses on the risk profile and compliance obligations of AI systems once deployed, the Tech Sovereignty Package governs the infrastructure and supply chains that enable AI development in the first place.
The relationship between the two frameworks matters as decisions taken at the infrastructure layer, such as the cloud sovereignty level applied to a given public sector AI deployment, can have downstream consequences for compliance with AI Act requirements. The relationship between these frameworks will be an important area to monitor as implementation progresses.
A further coordination challenge arises internally. The package spans multiple policy domains and directorates-general within the Commission, including DG CONNECT for semiconductors, cloud and open source, and DG ENERGY for the energy roadmap.
It also interacts with DG COMP on State aid approvals and with DG TRADE on the trade implications of sovereignty-oriented procurement rules. Ensuring coherence across these areas during the legislative process, and subsequently during implementation, will require stronger-than-usual inter-institutional coordination.
Legislative process and upcoming milestones
The two legislative proposals, the Chips Act 2.0 and CADA, need to enter the ordinary legislative procedure, meaning they will be negotiated separately by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union before trilogue negotiations between the two institutions and the Commission can begin.
Given the political and economic stakes involved, and the number of member states with competing interests in semiconductor investment locations and cloud market access, the negotiations are likely to be protracted. The original European Chips Act took approximately two years from proposal to final adoption, and CADA, which touches on the politically sensitive question of digital sovereignty vis-à-vis key trading partners, may encounter comparable friction.
Several near-term milestones are already in view. The Commission is expected to launch a call for AI Gigafactories in July 2026, following the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking (EuroHPC JU) Governing Board’s agreement in principle on 1 June 2026. AI Gigafactories are large-scale, purpose-built AI training facilities and represent one of the most concrete and immediately actionable elements of the broader AI infrastructure agenda.
Their deployment is intended to provide European researchers, start-ups and industry with access to the kind of computing capacity currently concentrated in the United States, and the July call will be an early test of the Commission’s ability to move from legislative ambition to operational delivery.
The Commission will also launch a consultation with member states, the European Investment Bank Group and other key stakeholders to design a European equity capacity at scale for financing tech sovereignty ambitions. This implies that the Commission does not believe grant funding and state aid alone will be sufficient to mobilise the investment required, and that a blended finance model, combining public equity with private capital, will be needed.
The EIB Group’s involvement points towards the kind of risk-sharing instruments it has used in other strategic sectors, although the specific structures and governance arrangements have yet to be designed through the consultation process.
Broader context
The package does not emerge in isolation. It sits within a cluster of interconnected EU strategic frameworks that have, over the past two to three years, progressively shifted the EU’s economic policy stance from market liberalisation towards what the Commission calls ‘open strategic autonomy’: the maintenance of trade openness where possible, combined with targeted interventionism to reduce strategic dependencies where necessary.
The Competitiveness Compass, adopted earlier in 2025 and drawing heavily on the 2024 Draghi report on European competitiveness, identifies reducing strategic dependencies as one of three pillars for restoring European economic dynamism. The Tech Sovereignty Package is the most operationally specific expression of that pillar to date.
The Economic Security Strategy, adopted in 2023, provided the risk-assessment framework within which the package sits, identifying advanced semiconductors, AI, quantum computing and biotechnology as the technological areas posing the most significant dual-use and strategic dependency risks for the EU. The Tech Sovereignty Package translates that risk assessment into concrete legislative and policy instruments, with semiconductors and AI infrastructure receiving the most direct regulatory attention.
The Commission’s AI Continent Action Plan, which positions Europe to become a global AI leader by focusing on computing infrastructure, data, skills, and adoption, provides the most direct policy antecedent for CADA in particular. The Tech Sovereignty Package fast-tracks the infrastructure ambitions of the Action Plan and adds the supply chain governance dimension that the Action Plan did not fully address.
Taken together, these documents represent a sustained and internally consistent shift in EU digital and industrial policy, one in which technological leadership is treated not merely as an economic aspiration but as a precondition for political and regulatory autonomy in an increasingly contested global technological order.
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The European Commission has welcomed a new G7 Cybersecurity Working Group Declaration aimed at strengthening international cooperation in response to growing cyber threats.
Adopted under France’s G7 Presidency, the declaration calls for coordinated action to address cybersecurity challenges associated with quantum computing, AI, telecommunications infrastructure, and the protection of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
One of the declaration’s central priorities is accelerating the transition to post-quantum cryptography. As quantum computing capabilities continue to advance, governments and industry are being urged to accelerate preparations for new encryption standards capable of resisting future quantum attacks. The declaration describes migration to quantum-resistant encryption as an urgent cybersecurity priority that organisations should begin addressing now.
AI is another major focus of the declaration. The G7 declaration recognises that AI can both strengthen and threaten cybersecurity. Concerns include AI-enabled cyberattacks, model manipulation, data breaches, and software vulnerabilities.
The European Commission noted that it is preparing an action plan on AI and cybersecurity to help Member States and businesses address emerging risks while strengthening Europe’s cyber resilience.
The declaration also emphasises the importance of resilient telecommunications infrastructure and stronger protection for SMEs. Building on initiatives such as the NIS2 Directive and the Cyber Resilience Act, the EU said it will continue working with international partners to strengthen cybersecurity standards, protect critical infrastructure and support organisations facing increasingly sophisticated cyber threats.
Why does it matter?
The declaration reflects growing international recognition that cybersecurity challenges are increasingly transnational and require coordinated responses. Emerging technologies such as AI and quantum computing are creating new opportunities for innovation, but also introducing new vulnerabilities that could affect governments, businesses and critical infrastructure.
The emphasis on post-quantum cryptography is particularly significant, as organisations worldwide face the long-term challenge of protecting sensitive data against future quantum-enabled attacks. The declaration also highlights the growing importance of international cooperation in building cyber resilience and securing digital ecosystems.
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The commitments were set out in Brussels, where European Commission Executive Vice-President for Tech Sovereignty, Security and Democracy Henna Virkkunen welcomed Kenyan President William Ruto.
The Commission said the reinforced cooperation reflects Kenya’s role as a key EU partner in Africa and at the multilateral level.
Under the Global Gateway initiative, the EU and Kenya will support clean transport and trade facilitation along the Northern Corridor, a strategic route for East African trade.
Digital development is also central to the partnership. The two sides will support the rollout of high-speed connectivity to more than 3,000 public offices, schools, health centres, and digital hubs across Kenya.
The discussions also advanced cooperation under the EU-Kenya Strategic Dialogue and welcomed progress in the EU-Kenya data adequacy process. If completed, the adequacy process would facilitate safe data flows between the partners and support digital trade and innovation.
The EU said the assessment so far has been positive and that it intends to conclude the process as soon as possible.
Why does it matter?
The EU-Kenya partnership shows how digital infrastructure, connectivity, data flows, and trade facilitation are becoming central to international economic cooperation. The data adequacy process is especially important because it could create a trusted framework for cross-border data transfers, supporting digital trade, innovation, public services, and closer economic links between Kenya and the EU.
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The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has published a report on regulatory simplification, warning that excessive and fragmented rules can undermine competitiveness, investment, and innovation. The report, titled ‘Smart Regulations, Strong Business’, was approved and declassified by the OECD Regulatory Policy Committee on 18 May.
The report draws on the OECD’s Simplifying for Success surveys, conducted between July and September 2025 among governments and business organisations across OECD Members, accession countries, and the European Union. Responses were received from 34 jurisdictions, with the analysis also drawing on OECD regulatory governance data and discussions from a 2025 high-level symposium.
The OECD emphasises that regulation remains essential for market functioning, public health and safety, and transparent government processes. However, the report argues that the accumulation of rules and administrative requirements has created increasingly complex systems that are more difficult for businesses to navigate, comply with and adapt to.
Survey findings show that government respondents in 72% of participating countries and business organisations in 90% of countries consider current levels of regulation and bureaucracy to be excessive. More than three-quarters of business organisations also said full compliance is too costly, while many linked the regulatory environment to negative effects on competitiveness, investment, and innovation.
The report says regulatory burdens often stem from reporting, record-keeping, permitting, inspections, and fragmented rules, rather than solely from substantive policy goals. The OECD recommends targeting areas where regulatory burdens are greatest, streamlining administrative procedures through risk-based and digital approaches, and making rulemaking more future-ready through evidence-based policymaking, stakeholder engagement and stronger coordination.
Why does it matter?
Governments around the world are seeking ways to improve competitiveness and stimulate innovation while maintaining high standards of consumer protection, safety and market oversight. As regulatory frameworks expand, concerns have grown about the cumulative costs of compliance and administrative complexity for businesses.
The OECD’s findings contribute to broader debates on regulatory reform, highlighting the importance of balancing effective regulation with efficiency. The report also reflects growing interest in digital tools, risk-based approaches and evidence-driven policymaking as ways to reduce unnecessary burdens without weakening regulatory objectives.
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The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), Germany’s Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information, and the Bavarian Data Protection Commissioner will host a high-level debate on the European Commission’s Omnibus proposals. The event, titled ‘From Omnibus to Opportunity: Driving Data Protection and Innovation’, will take place in Brussels on 8 June.
The debate will examine the Omnibus proposals and their potential implications for the GDPR and the wider EU digital regulatory framework. The event is hosted by the Representation of the Free State of Bavaria to the European Union.
According to the EDPS, the proposals introduce targeted adjustments affecting elements of the EU digital acquis, including aspects of the GDPR and the AI Act. Their stated objective is to simplify compliance requirements and reduce administrative burdens while maintaining a high level of protection for fundamental rights.
Discussions will focus on legal certainty, regulatory coherence, preserving the GDPR’s level of protection, and identifying ways to strengthen fundamental rights, innovation and competitiveness across the EU.
The Omnibus proposals have become a focal point in wider debates about how the European Union can strengthen competitiveness and innovation while preserving high standards of data protection and fundamental rights.
The discussion highlights growing efforts to balance regulatory simplification with legal certainty and effective safeguards, particularly as the EU seeks to implement complex frameworks such as the GDPR and AI Act while supporting digital innovation and economic growth.
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The EU policymakers and high-level industry representatives have launched two flagship initiatives to prepare the EU energy system for a more digitalised future.
The first initiative brings together data centre operators, the energy sector, and public authorities to support the sustainable integration of data centres into the EU energy system. In the presence of Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen, 14 European associations signed a Declaration of Intent, while six companies signed a Declaration of Support indicating readiness to begin implementation.
The event also marked the launch of the AI.grids project, which will develop the EU sovereign AI models for energy grids. The project brings together 48 partners, including grid operators and research institutes, to improve grid management and planning.
Both initiatives coincide with the Commission’s Tech Sovereignty Package, published on the same day. The package includes a Strategic Roadmap for Digitalisation and AI in the energy sector, aimed at preparing the future energy system and supporting the deployment of AI solutions across the energy value chain.
Why does it matter?
The initiatives show how AI infrastructure and energy policy are becoming increasingly interconnected. Data centres are expanding rapidly as demand for AI computing grows, while electricity grids need more advanced digital tools to manage decentralised generation, demand, and resilience. By linking data centre sustainability with the EU sovereign AI models for grid management, the Commission is treating digitalisation as both a pressure on the energy system and a tool for managing it.
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