cybersecurity

Summary

This discussion represents the continuation of the first reading of the final report from the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on cybersecurity, focusing on sections A through F covering norms, international law, confidence-building measures, and capacity building. The Chair opened by announcing they would hear comments from multiple countries on these critical sections before moving to regular institutional dialogue later.

France began by emphasizing the need to strengthen implementation of existing 11 cybersecurity norms rather than developing new ones, requesting deletion of certain paragraphs that overemphasize new norm development. The United States strongly supported this position, arguing the report doesn’t reflect good faith efforts and places undue emphasis on elaborating additional norms when no consensus exists for such development. Multiple countries including Estonia, New Zealand, and Canada echoed concerns about premature focus on new norms before properly implementing existing frameworks.

On international law, several delegations stressed that existing international law, including the UN Charter and International Humanitarian Law, applies to cyberspace. There was significant discussion about whether to include references to IHL application in armed conflicts, with countries like Mexico, Switzerland, and Luxembourg advocating for stronger humanitarian protections in cyber operations. However, some delegations objected to automatic IHL applicability, creating tension around this issue.

Regarding confidence-building measures, countries generally supported the Global Points of Contact Directory but emphasized focusing on implementing existing eight measures rather than developing new ones. The capacity building section generated extensive discussion, with developing countries strongly supporting UN-sponsored fellowship programs and voluntary funds, while some developed nations expressed concerns about duplication and fiscal constraints under UN budget limitations.

The Chair repeatedly urged brevity due to time constraints, noting 40 speakers were registered and emphasizing the need to reach regular institutional dialogue discussions to inform the next revision of the report for achieving consensus.

Keypoints

**Overall Purpose/Goal:**

This is a formal UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) session focused on reviewing and reaching consensus on the final report regarding ICT security in international contexts. The Chair is guiding delegations through sections A-F of REV.1 of the final report, with the goal of gathering feedback to produce REV.2 and ultimately achieve consensus before transitioning to a future permanent mechanism.

**Major Discussion Points:**

– **Norms Implementation vs. New Norms Development**: Significant debate over whether to prioritize implementing the existing 11 consensus norms of responsible state behavior or to develop additional new norms. Many delegations (France, US, Estonia, New Zealand) called for deletion of paragraphs 34R and 36 that emphasize new norm development, arguing it’s premature without consensus and would burden states.

– **International Law Application in Cyberspace**: Extensive discussion on how existing international law, particularly International Humanitarian Law (IHL), applies to cyber activities. Key tensions around paragraph 41’s reference to legally binding obligations and whether IHL automatically applies in cyberspace, with some delegations supporting explicit IHL language while others resist.

– **Capacity Building Structure and Funding**: Debate over proposed UN capacity building initiatives including a Global ICT Security Portal, UN Voluntary Fund, and Cyber Resilience Academy. Concerns raised about duplication of existing programs, fiscal constraints under UN80, and whether the UN should play an operational vs. coordinating role.

– **Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) Implementation**: Focus on operationalizing the Global Points of Contact Directory and conducting simulation exercises, with discussions about templates, hybrid formats, and whether to develop new CBMs or concentrate on implementing the existing eight agreed measures.

– **Procedural Concerns and Time Management**: The Chair repeatedly urged delegations to be more concise and telegraphic in their statements, expressing concern about covering all agenda items including the crucial Regular Institutional Dialogue section scheduled for the afternoon.

**Overall Tone:**

The discussion maintained a diplomatic and professional tone throughout, though there was underlying tension regarding substantive disagreements on key issues. The Chair showed increasing urgency and mild frustration about time management, repeatedly asking for brevity while remaining respectful. Delegations generally showed flexibility and willingness to compromise, with many expressing alignment with group positions while adding specific national concerns. The tone became more focused and efficient toward the end as the Chair’s time warnings took effect.

Speakers

Based on the transcript, here are the speakers who participated in the discussion:

**Speakers from the provided list:**

– Chair – Role: Chair of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), from Singapore

– France – Representative/delegation speaking on behalf of France, aligns with European Union positions

– United States – Representative/delegation speaking on behalf of the United States

– Singapore – Representative/delegation speaking on behalf of Singapore

– Sierra Leone – Representative/delegation speaking on behalf of Sierra Leone

– Estonia – Representative/delegation speaking on behalf of Estonia, aligns with European Union

– New Zealand – Representative/delegation speaking on behalf of New Zealand

– Brazil – Representative/delegation speaking on behalf of Brazil

– Venezuela – Representative/delegation speaking on behalf of Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela), aligns with like-minded countries group

– European Union – Representative speaking on behalf of the European Union and its 27 member states plus additional aligned countries (37 states total)

– Malaysia – Representative speaking on behalf of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

– Nigeria – Representative speaking on behalf of the African Group

– Ghana – Representative speaking on behalf of the Open Informal Cross-Regional Group of the OEWG Confidence Builders

– Canada – Representative/delegation speaking on behalf of Canada

– Algeria – Representative/delegation speaking on behalf of Algeria, aligns with African Group

– Poland – Representative/delegation speaking on behalf of Poland, aligns with European Union

– Egypt – Representative/delegation speaking on behalf of Egypt

– Israel – Representative/delegation speaking on behalf of Israel

– Thailand – Representative/delegation speaking on behalf of Thailand

– China – Representative/delegation speaking on behalf of China

– Papua New Guinea – Representative/delegation speaking on behalf of Papua New Guinea

– Fiji – Representative speaking on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum

– Japan – Representative/delegation speaking on behalf of Japan

– Vanuatu – Representative/delegation speaking on behalf of Vanuatu, aligns with Pacific Islands Forum

– Malawi – Representative/delegation speaking on behalf of Malawi (Republic of Malawi)

– Islamic Republic of Iran – Representative/delegation speaking on behalf of Islamic Republic of Iran

– Mozambique – Representative/delegation speaking on behalf of Mozambique, aligns with African Group

– Indonesia – Representative/delegation speaking on behalf of Indonesia, aligns with ASEAN

– Russian Federation – Representative/delegation speaking on behalf of Russian Federation

**Additional speakers:**

– Mexico – Representative speaking on behalf of Mexico as co-chair of the ICT workstream (along with Luxembourg and Switzerland) under the Global Initiative to Galvanize Political Commitment for International Humanitarian Law

# Comprehensive Report: Open-Ended Working Group on Cybersecurity – First Reading of Final Report (Sections A-F)

## Executive Summary

This report documents a session of the United Nations Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on cybersecurity, focusing on the first reading of REV.1 of the final report covering sections A through F, which address norms, international law, confidence-building measures, and capacity building. The session, chaired by Singapore, featured interventions from numerous countries and regional groups reviewing the draft text with the goal of achieving consensus before transitioning to a future permanent mechanism.

The discussion revealed significant divisions between states emphasizing implementation of existing cybersecurity frameworks versus those supporting parallel development of new norms and mechanisms. Key areas of disagreement included the scope of future norms development, the application of international humanitarian law in cyberspace, and the appropriate role of the United Nations in capacity building initiatives.

## Opening and Procedural Framework

The Chair opened the session by announcing that delegations would provide comments on sections A through F of REV.1 of the final report before proceeding to discussions on Section G (Regular Institutional Dialogue) at 3 PM. With 40 speakers registered, the Chair repeatedly emphasized the need for brevity and focused comments on specific textual issues rather than general statements, expressing concern about covering all agenda items within the allocated timeframe.

The Chair’s interventions became increasingly direct throughout the session, at one point noting that delegates seemed to “love the OEWG so much” that they were making general statements rather than focusing on specific amendments to the text.

## Norms Development and Implementation: Competing Approaches

### Focus on Implementation of Existing Norms

France led countries arguing for prioritizing implementation of the existing 11 consensus norms of responsible state behaviour over developing new ones. France, aligning with EU statements, specifically requested deletion of paragraphs 34R and 36, which emphasize the development of additional norms, arguing that the focus should be on strengthening implementation rather than expanding the normative framework.

The United States provided strong support for this position, stating that “the norms section of the report does not reflect a good faith effort to accurately reflect the conversation of the OEWG over the past four years” and “places undue emphasis on the elaboration of new norms in the future at the expense of the fulsome discussions that took place on the implementation of the existing consensus norms.”

Estonia, Canada, New Zealand, and Israel echoed these concerns, with Estonia noting that “the existing norms constitute a comprehensive framework” and that priority should be given to implementation with capacity building support. Canada specifically suggested that discussions should be “action-oriented” rather than focused on theoretical expansion of normative frameworks.

### Support for Parallel Development

Singapore and Indonesia represented a different perspective, arguing that implementation of existing norms and discussion of new norms should not be mutually exclusive. Singapore advocated for an “incremental approach” that would allow for both implementation and parallel consideration of additional norms where necessary to address evolving cyber threats.

Indonesia emphasized the role of regional mechanisms in advancing norms discussions, suggesting that regional organizations could serve as platforms for developing and testing new normative approaches.

### Convergence on Implementation Tools

Despite disagreements about new norms development, there was strong consensus on the value of practical implementation tools. Multiple speakers, including France, Thailand, Singapore, and Estonia, supported the voluntary checklist of practical actions for implementing existing norms as an important step forward in operationalizing consensus agreements.

## International Law Application in Cyberspace

### Support for International Humanitarian Law Application

The application of international law, particularly International Humanitarian Law (IHL), in cyberspace generated extensive discussion. Poland, Mexico (speaking on behalf of Luxembourg, Mexico, and Switzerland), and Canada strongly advocated for explicit confirmation that IHL applies to cyberspace.

Mexico stated that “cyberspace is not a lawless space, whether in peace or in war” and emphasized that “the long-standing rules of international humanitarian law protect civilian populations and other protected persons and objects against all forms of warfare and against all kinds of weapons, be they old or new, kinetic or cybernetic.”

Multiple countries congratulated Thailand and the Republic of Korea for publishing national positions on international law application in cyberspace. Estonia mentioned the handbook “Developing a National Position on International Law and Cyber Activities” developed by Estonia, Japan, NATO CCDCOE, and the University of Exeter.

### Resistance to Automatic IHL Application

Venezuela explicitly rejected what they characterized as false consensus on IHL application, stating there was “insistence on the existence of consensus, which in our view does not exist, as regards the automatic applicability of international humanitarian law to the cyber sphere.”

The Islamic Republic of Iran similarly resisted automatic IHL application, instead advocating for the principle of “exclusively peaceful purposes” of ICTs and supporting strengthening this language in the report.

### Concerns About Non-Consensus References

The United States and Japan raised concerns about paragraph 41 inappropriately mixing documents of varying legal status, specifically objecting to references to non-consensus documents like the 2021 Chair’s summary. They argued that such references should be removed to maintain the integrity of a consensus-based report.

## Confidence-Building Measures: Building on Success

### Global Points of Contact Directory

There was remarkable consensus that the Global Points of Contact Directory represents one of the most important practical outcomes of the OEWG process. Singapore, the Russian Federation, Fiji, and Indonesia all emphasized the directory’s practical value and the need for smooth transition to the future permanent mechanism.

The Russian Federation noted that the directory requires “smooth transition” and suggested that simulation exercises could help identify problems and improve effectiveness. China provided specific technical suggestions, including changing “manager” to “facilitator” in simulation exercises and ensuring “more open and transparent modalities with member state consultation.”

### Cross-Regional Confidence Building Initiative

Ghana, speaking for the Cross-Regional Group of Confidence Builders (comprising Ghana, Estonia, Uruguay, Philippines, and Kenya), presented a working paper on confidence-building measures and announced plans for a side event to discuss practical implementation approaches.

### Implementation Focus

Canada argued for focusing on implementing the existing eight confidence-building measures rather than developing new ones, stating that “focus should be on implementing existing 8 CBMs rather than developing new ones.” This aligned with the broader theme of prioritizing implementation over expansion.

## Capacity Building Approaches

### Coordination Versus Operational Roles

The European Union, France, Japan, and Canada advocated for the UN playing primarily a coordinating role in capacity building rather than taking on operational responsibilities. France argued that “the UN should play its coordinating role without uselessly duplicating existing initiatives, but rather by adapting to the real needs of countries and providing concrete solutions.”

Canada expressed fiscal concerns, stating they “cannot accept the creation of a sponsorship program before having understood all of the costs entailed by this proposal,” noting that preliminary estimates were much higher than what states could manage independently.

### Support for UN-Led Initiatives

Nigeria, speaking for the African Group, Brazil, and Iran strongly supported establishing new UN-led capacity building mechanisms, including voluntary funds and fellowship programs. Nigeria argued that “establishment of UN Voluntary Fund for capacity building is important proposal,” emphasizing developing country needs.

Brazil supported retaining references to “equitable access to ICT security goods and services” as a way to bridge the digital divide. Iran welcomed the UN Singapore Cyber Fellowship as a “valuable initiative” and supported expanding such programs.

### Cross-Cutting Nature of Capacity Building

Sierra Leone argued that “bridging the digital divide must be treated as a security imperative, not just a development objective.” Fiji emphasized that “capacity building should be cross-cutting issue and standing item in all discussions,” arguing for integration across all aspects of the future permanent mechanism.

### Women in Cyber Fellowship

An area of consensus emerged around the Women in Cyber Fellowship program. Vanuatu, Malawi, and Mozambique specifically highlighted this as a “best practice model” that should be acknowledged and potentially expanded.

## Regional Perspectives

### ASEAN Coordination

Malaysia, speaking for ASEAN, emphasized the importance of international cooperation for developing countries and affirmed the practical value of regional mechanisms in supporting cybersecurity cooperation. Indonesia noted that regional mechanisms play a crucial role in advancing norms discussions.

### African Group Priorities

Nigeria, representing the African Group, emphasized the need for “robust international cooperation against cyber threats” and strongly supported UN-led capacity building initiatives. Algeria highlighted the “growing market for commercially available ICT intrusion capabilities” as posing a “destabilizing threat.”

### Pacific Islands Forum Challenges

Fiji, speaking for the Pacific Islands Forum, raised unique concerns about practical challenges facing small island developing states, including time zone issues where “10 a.m. meeting in New York occurs in the middle of the night across the Pacific.” Fiji emphasized the need for “hybrid and virtual options” while noting these “must not substitute for in-person diplomacy.”

## Emerging Threats and Technologies

Several speakers addressed evolving cyber threats. Mozambique advocated for including “artificial intelligence in the list of emerging digital technologies” and provided detailed analysis of critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, noting that “undersea cables and data centers are strategically important for national survival.”

Papua New Guinea emphasized that “ransomware attacks cause significant harm and disruption to essential public services,” highlighting the real-world impact of cyber threats on essential services in developing countries.

## Future Permanent Mechanism Considerations

Venezuela emphasized the need to “maintain governmental nature of mechanism and existing modalities for non-state actor participation,” while Fiji advocated for a “multi-stakeholder approach essential for incorporating diverse expertise.”

Fiji suggested a “manageable number of dedicated thematic groups with clear objectives,” expressing concern about creating an overly complex structure. Canada suggested streamlining the proposed structure “while focusing on discussions on capacity building that are action-oriented.”

## Key Areas of Consensus

Despite significant disagreements, several areas of strong agreement emerged:

– **Implementation Priority**: Broad agreement on the importance of implementing existing norms, with widespread support for the voluntary implementation checklist

– **Global POC Directory Value**: Universal recognition of the directory as a key practical achievement requiring smooth transition

– **Capacity Building as Cross-Cutting**: Agreement that capacity building should be foundational across all discussions

– **IHL Application**: Strong majority support for confirming that international humanitarian law applies to cyberspace

## Persistent Disagreements

Several fundamental disagreements remained unresolved:

– **Scope of Future Norms Development**: Division between implementation-focused and parallel development approaches

– **UN Role in Capacity Building**: Tension between coordination and operational involvement

– **Legal Framework References**: Disagreements about including non-consensus documents

– **Exclusively Peaceful Purposes**: Debate over characterizing ICTs as exclusively peaceful

## Conclusion

This session revealed both progress and challenges in achieving global consensus on cybersecurity governance. While significant agreement exists on practical measures like the Global POC Directory and implementation tools, fundamental disagreements persist about the scope of future norm development and institutional arrangements.

The Chair announced that feedback from this session would be incorporated into a revised version of the final report, followed by afternoon discussions on the Regular Institutional Dialogue. The depth of disagreements on fundamental issues suggests that achieving consensus will require significant compromise and creative solutions as the OEWG works toward establishing the future permanent mechanism.

The discussion demonstrated the complex intersection of technical expertise, legal frameworks, and political sovereignty that characterizes cybersecurity governance, highlighting the continued need for diplomatic engagement and practical cooperation to navigate these challenges effectively.

Chair: at item five, we will continue our first reading of ref one of the final report, and we will take comments on sections A, B, C, and D, as well as E and F this morning. I will start with the speaker’s list. Based on the remaining list from yesterday, we’ll start with the first speaker, France, to be followed by U.S., Singapore, Sierra Leone, Estonia, New Zealand, and then the list goes on. So, France, you have the floor, please.

France: Thank you, Mr. Chair. In the interest of time, as you mentioned, I will limit my comments to the most problematic points and will refer to the statements of the European Union, which my delegation aligns itself with, for the entirety of the paragraphs that are to be amended in sections C, D, E, and F of the report. For the section on norms, France notes that there is still a strong emphasis on the development of new norms, even though those are not at the core of our work in paragraphs 34 and O to Q. The priority of the future mechanism must be to strengthen the capacities of states, in particular to implement the 11 standards already approved, and that would entail deleting paragraph 34R and paragraph 36. On the other hand, we do not think paragraph 34N to be a new standard, but rather an important and useful clarification for norm 13I of the report of 2015, the OEWG. Lastly, Mr. Chair, and this is to your credit and that of your team, the adoption of a checklist on practical and voluntary actions for implementing these standards seems to us to be an important step forward. On international law, I will limit myself to pointing out two major difficulties in addition to the changes requested by the EU on behalf of more than 30 states in paragraph 39, 40C, 42F, and 43. First of all, my delegation would like to point out that the final report must reflect all of the discussions held by member states during the OEWG process over the past five years. In particular, we support taking into full consideration the work on international humanitarian law. of Resolution on Protection of Civilians of the 34th Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. I was surprised to hear the Russian delegation mention yesterday that the work on protection of civilians was not consensus-based. On the contrary, we commend the fact that this work was carried out under the Global Initiative of the ICRC, the progress made under which could inform the work of the future mechanism over the next few years. Secondly, the section on international law, we believe, lacks clarity because it combines different elements that ought to be reorganized or deleted in order not to erode the framework of responsible behavior of states. Here’s just one example. In paragraph 39B and I, paragraph 80 of the final report of the OEWG, which was referred to, presents concluding observations, not recommendations. So the text here introduces confusion. Paragraph 41 is even more troubling when it comes to its clarity because it ought to be severely edited. We believe that here it also introduces confusion. A letter supported by a very small number of states should not, we believe, be referred to in a report that is supposed to be held by consensus in order to reflect five years of discussions on the important issue of the way in which international law ought to apply in practice to cyberspace. As for the proposal contained in this letter, my delegation fully supports the eloquent arguments put forth by the Ukrainian delegation yesterday. On confidence-building measures, we support the progress made by the OEWG. However, we underscore that having too many proposals runs the risk of diluting progress and might prejudge discussions on the future mechanism, and that is the case of the Global Points of Contact Directory, for example, in paragraph 46B. We support the principle of this, but we would like the development of this to take place in a gradual way to prevent certain states from using it irresponsibly. We believe that the final report ought, first and foremost, to concentrate on the implementation of the eight already adopted confidence-building measures, and therefore we suggest not including in the report proposals that have not been adequately discussed in paragraphs 46, 50, and 46I. final section on capacity building, we’d like to raise a question to help guide our discussions. How can this report help lay the groundwork for improved capacity building that would be more efficient and effective? Capacity building, as you know, is of crucial importance in our proposed program of action to make cyberspace safer. Coming to this end, we must ensure that the UN plays its coordinating role without uselessly duplicating existing initiatives, but rather by adapting to the real needs of countries and providing concrete solutions. This requires, we believe, two different pillars. The first pillar is to focus on mature initiatives and take the time that we need to produce really viable solutions in the long term. For example, the idea of creating a UN-level sponsorship in paragraph 56. We are currently financing a sponsorship together with Ireland in our national capacity, which is further proof of our commitment to participation of all in UN discussions. However, given that there are other sponsorships that also exist and work quite well – for example, women in cyber – we should not assume the outcome of discussions under the Future Mechanism discussions that are based on a feedback that we need to still carry out. Secondly, improved capacity building requires an action-oriented structure for the Future Mechanism. In this regard, we thank the group states of the LAC region and the Pacific Island Forum for their feedback, which helped inform the proposal that we will develop on the RID section later today, especially with regard to a thematic group on resilience, which will be based on a roundtable on capacity building in order to foster exchanges between experts. This proposal, dear colleagues, has already been published online in the form of a working paper on the OEWG site, which was published a few days ago. And during our statement on RID, we will provide more detail on that. Thank you very much, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, France. Please do share your statement with all delegations, including with me. Thank you very much. The United States, followed by Singapore.

United States: Good morning, Chair and all colleagues. I will take the direction to address the various sections today, beginning with norms, I think. If I can do it. Okay. Here, let me trade with you. There we go. Chair, we believe that the norms section of the report does not reflect a good faith effort to accurately reflect the conversation of the OEWG over the past four years. It places undue emphasis on the elaboration of new norms in the future at the expense of the fulsome discussions that took place on the implementation of the existing consensus norms. As we have heard from several delegates over the past day, no consensus exists on the need to elaborate additional norms. For this reason, we require the deletion of paragraphs 34R and 36, as requested by the Netherlands and, as you have heard from other states. And in addition, as also raised by other states, 34Q should also be deleted. given its reliance on the non-consensus 2021 Chair’s summary. Paragraphs 34.0 and P already discuss the potential for elaborating new norms. And the addition of paragraphs Q and R unacceptably tilts this balance of this section toward the development of new norms. And along those lines, we support others who have called for paragraphs 34.0 and P to be combined. As observed by the Republic of Korea yesterday, we still have much work to do to implement the 11 consensus norms. We should not overburden states by prioritizing the development of new norms when there is no consensus that there are gaps that need to be filled. With respect to paragraph 34.N, we support others who have requested that it be incorporated into the chapeau portion of paragraph 34, as the text in N itself is not appropriately characterized as a proposal, quote unquote. We also support the proposal put forward by the UK yesterday for the addition of to the chapeau of consensus language from the 2021 GGE report, referencing the 11 norms. In lieu of the current paragraph 36, we propose the following text. States agree to continue supporting and furthering efforts to implement the 11 consensus norms, including through the incorporation of relevant stakeholders in future discussions and the exchange of best practices, end quote. Finally, paragraph 35 will require adjustment to reflect the deletion of paragraphs 34.Q and R. Moving now to the topic of international law, the report should reflect the progress made in discussions of how existing international legal obligations apply. to state behavior in cyberspace, including our robust discussions of international humanitarian law. We also think it would be appropriate for the report to acknowledge the consensus resolution on IHL and the use of ICTs adopted at the 34th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, just as we heard from the French just now. Contrary to some assertions we heard yesterday, the UN is not the only, or even the primary place where discussion of international law and ICTs can or should occur. Indeed, the Red Cross movement has long played an important role in promoting IHL and its implementation. Its efforts to do so with respect to new technology should be commended, not silenced. Discussions in this group have also demonstrated that states do not agree that there is a need for new binding obligations. The United States cannot accept any language calling for the creation of new binding international legal obligations, including within the mandate of the Future Mechanism. Furthermore, draft text in the report conflating documents of varying legal status is unhelpful and unacceptable. Specifically, in paragraph 38, we request the removal of the reference to the 2021 OEWG report summary, which was, as we’ve stated before, not a consensus document. That reference is repeated throughout this section, and we object to those repeated references to a non-consensus document from a previous working group. Paragraph 39bii is about norms and has no place in the international law section. We realize this error was made in a previous report, but we do not see the need to confuse future generations of it with its repetition here. We regret that language in paragraph 40c that stated an ICT operation may constitute a use of force when its effects are comparable to a non-ICT incident meeting, that threshold was deleted. We request the reinsertion of that language reflecting this. We cannot accept paragraph 41 as currently drafted. This paragraph includes a long list of documents with varying legal status, not all of which pertain to how international law applies to the use of ICTs in the context of international security, and not all of which have been submitted to the OEWG for discussion. We regret that the report continues to elevate more extreme proposals by a small group of states over those that have enjoyed widespread and cross-regional support. We request deletion of paragraph 42F. That text is already included in Annex C of the 2024 APR, and repeating only that text as violence to the carefully constructed compromise that paragraph represents. In paragraph 43, we request the removal of all of the text after, quote, in the use of ICTs, end quote, to include the non-exhausted list in paragraphs 39 to 42 above. And once again, the 2021 OEWG Chair Summary for the reasons we’ve already noted. Moving on to addressing confidence-building measures. As I mentioned in my remarks yesterday, the United Nations must focus on its core mission, promoting peace and security, and in this regard, we encourage continued confidence-building measures as we look to establish the future permanent mechanism. We appreciate the draft report’s reference to the simulation exercise carried out by UNIDIR in March, as well as its recommendations for future ping tests and simulation exercises. It is inappropriate for the final report to prematurely commit the future future mechanism to devoting time to specific measures, for instance, through the references to the template in paragraph 46E. In this regard, we appreciate that paragraph 50 has been edited to remove adoption. With respect to the points of contact network, we appreciate the work the Chair and the Secretariat team have put into its development. We also note the importance of ensuring that it is used for its intended purpose and does not duplicate other mechanisms. And finally, for the section in paragraph 46L, we do not support the inclusion of the text saying, quote, including relating to the facilitation of access for all states to the market for ICT security goods and services, end quote. There is no need to highlight one specific CBM proposal in this context, particularly when others are not mentioned and when it does not enjoy consensus. Moving now to capacity building, the OEWG’s focus on capacity building is for a specific purpose, implementing the framework and drawing attention to the specific needs that states have in their efforts to implement the framework’s recommendations. Capacity building discussions within the OEWG have served as a powerful demonstration of all the work happening around the world in this regard, and the report should reflect that fact. At the same time, the OEWG is not principally a venue to address cyber assistance matters writ large. In the context of UN80 and the UN’s financial crisis, we cannot support an operational role for the UN in capacity building measures or initiatives that would require additional resources. We also do not think that the topic should overwhelm our other priorities in these final negotiations. Instead, the report’s capacity building discussions should demonstrate the depth of and progress in our discussions, but should not at this stage in the OEWG create new processes or mechanisms for capacity building, particularly those that have not been adequately discussed in the group. For example, the function of the proposed global ICT security cooperation and capacity building portal, as outlined in paragraph 52F, seems to be much broader than anticipated and it remains unclear how it would avoid duplication with existing portals like the UNIDIR cyber policy portal and the GFC civil portal. We would support a more incremental approach to establishing the GSTCP, particularly with a view toward its role as a platform for the future permanent mechanism. Proposals such as the Cyber Resilience Academy in paragraph 52IB, which have not been discussed at length within the OEWG, should not be elevated to the same level as those in the GSTCP, which states have discussed for over a year. We do not support the development of the UN fund mentioned in paragraph 52J. Many similar sponsorships programs already exist, as so elegantly articulated by our French colleagues just now, and involving the UN in an operational role in this regard, particularly in a time of increasing fiscal constraints, will only serve to create additional overhead with minimal value added. States affirmed in the third annual progress report, as well as in statements throughout the last year, that capacity building will be a key cross-cutting discussion topic in the future permanent mechanism. However, it is not appropriate to overburden the future mechanism with capacity building items at this stage, and for all of these reasons, we do not support the operationalization of proposals in paragraph 55 to 57. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you. United States, Singapore, to be followed by Sierra Leone.

Singapore: Thank you, Mr. Chair. and Principles section, Singapore supports Paragraph 34.0, which recalls the mandate of the OEWG on the further development of the rules, norms and principles of responsible State behaviour, including the ways for their implementation and, if necessary, to introduce changes to them or elaborate additional rules of behaviour. We also support Paragraph 34.p, which states that additional norms could continue to develop over time, and the implementation of existing norms were not mutually exclusive but could take place in parallel. Chair, given the rapidly evolving and dynamic cyber-threat landscape, we need to carefully consider if and what new norms, in addition to the existing ones, are needed to respond to these new and emerging threats. The effective implementation of existing norms is necessary to better understand what new norms are needed, especially for small and developing countries, which have to decide on how best to implement norms based on their national priorities and resources. In our view, the implementation of existing norms and the discussion of new norms, where necessary, do not need to be mutually exclusive. This should be done through an incremental approach that first builds on implementing the existing norms we have today, identifying the gaps which exist, and tying the development of new norms to clear guidance that can help States understand and implement these norms, taking into account their own national priorities and resources, together with capacity-building activities needed for such implementation to be effective. The Voluntary Checklist of Practical Actions for the Implementation of Voluntary Non-Binding Norms of Responsible State Behaviour in the Use of ICTs at NX1 is also a useful guide towards this outcome. Singapore further supports a recommendation in Paragraph 36 for the UN Secretariat to compile and circulate a non-exhaustive list of proposals from States on rules, norms and principles of responsible behaviour of States for discussion purposes in this context. This non-exhaustive list will provide a concrete and comprehensive base for discussions for the future permanent mechanism, particularly in the areas of norms implementation, norms elaboration. International law. Singapore views international law as a key component of the OEWG’s work. The fostering of common understanding among states in the application of international law to the ICT context will help contribute to greater peace, security and trust among states. Singapore sees considerable value in states issuing national statements or regional statements which contribute to the aki of states understanding on how international law applies in cyberspace. We agree with the observation in paragraphs 42C and D as well as the recommendation at paragraph 44. There have been robust discussions in the OEWG on the application of international law to ICTs. The key principles set out in paragraph 40 of the draft report form an important foundation upon which deeper understanding can be built. Singapore remains willing and open to engaging in future discussions on the application of international law in the ICT environment. We believe the scenarios-based exercises would be a useful avenue for such discussions. Chair, capacity-building, as reflected by many delegations in international law, is an essential part of fostering common understanding on how international law applies in the use of ICTs. We agree with the urgent need to continue capacity-building efforts with the aim of ensuring that every state has access to the necessary expertise and is able to participate in such discussions on an equal footing. In this regard, Singapore welcomes and supports the inclusion of paragraph 42E as well as the recommendation in paragraph 45. Conference building measures on this section we agree with paragraphs 46B and C, which outline the need to take a step-by-step approach for the smooth transition of the global POC directory to the future permanent mechanism. On capacity-building, the draft report captures our extensive discussion over the course of the OEWG. In this regard, Singapore supports the draft text and recommendations in the capacity-building section, including the call for states to support and sponsor the participation of developing countries in the meetings of future permanent mechanism and other capacity-building programs on a voluntary basis where feasible. Singapore continues to support action-oriented capacity-building and ICT security, as it is key in supporting states across all pillars of the OEWG’s work and future mechanisms, and welcomes the recommendations in paragraph 45. 53. Singapore also welcomes the inclusion of the need for multidisciplinary, needs-based capacity building and capacity at the leadership level in REF 1 of the draft. Finally, Chair, coordination of global capacity building efforts is important so as to reduce duplication and ensure that our resources are maximised. To this end, we look forward to the establishment of the Global ICT Security Cooperation and Capacity Building Portal and to the update from the UN Secretariat, as mentioned in PARA 55. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Singapore, for your statement. Sierra Leone, to be followed by the European Union.

Sierra Leone: Thank you, Mr Chair. As this is the first time Sierra Leone is taking the floor, the delegation of Sierra Leone expresses its thanks and appreciation to you for your continued able stewardship of the OEWG since 2021. We also commend the Secretariat for its tireless efforts in facilitating this important process. We believe that the current draft report represents a balance towards building consensus for Member States. We align ourselves fully with the statement delivered by the Distinguished Representative of Nigeria on behalf of the African Group and wish to add the following in our national capacity. Sierra Leone welcomes recognition in paragraph 9 of the draft report regarding the importance of capacity building as both a cross-cutting element and a foundational pillar for strengthening international ICT security and advancing responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. We particularly support emphasis on sustainable, effective solutions and the call for a needs-based, inclusive approach that reflects the realities of all Member States. As a developing country, we underscore that bridging the digital divide is not only a matter of development, but also a matter of peace, security and digital stability. sovereignty. We must stress that the current levels of ICT infrastructure, skilled human resources and institutional capacity of developing countries remain significantly below those of more digitally advanced states. Therefore, for capacity building to be truly effective and equitable, it must be tailored long-term and responsive to national context. We also particularly support proposals in paragraphs 55 to 58 in this regard. We would like to recommend the inclusion of the text. Quote, targeted support for developing countries with limited ICT infrastructure and expertise is essential to enable their effective participation in the international ICT security framework and to avoid deepening existing digital inequalities. This includes the option of technology transfer as appropriate. End quote. We therefore reiterate a core that the future permanent mechanism must prioritize the needs of developing countries and build on capacity building principles already agreed in the 2021 OEWG report and subsequent annual progress reports. Chair, we further express serious concern about the increasing frequency and sophistication of malicious ICT activities that target critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure. We welcome the emphasis in paragraph 17 of the report on the cross-border and cascading effects of such attacks, particularly those targeting healthcare, energy, and financial sectors. In many developing countries, the digital divide amplifies our vulnerability to such threats. Limited national capacity to prevent detect or respond to attacks on CI and CII puts essential services, economic stability and public trust at grave risk. We therefore call for the draft report to reflect increased focus on protecting the CI and CII of developing countries through strengthened international cooperation, information sharing, capacity building and technology transfer as applicable. We also stress the need for greater accountability for actors engaged in malicious cyber activity targeting essential public systems. We emphasize that building the digital divide must be treated as a security imperative, not just a development objective. Finally, we urge that the future permanent mechanism also includes provisions for equitable access to threat intelligence, early warning systems and technical assistance, ensuring that no state is left behind in the pursuit of a safe, secure, stable and inclusive cyberspace. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Ghana, for your statement. I give the floor now to the European Union, to be followed by Malaysia.

European Union: Good morning, Chair. Let me deliver my statement, indeed, on cyber capacity building. I have the honor for this statement to speak on behalf of the European Union and its 27 member states, as well as the candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Georgia, the EFTA country Norway, member of the European Economic Area, as well as San Marino, align themselves with this statement, 37 states. Chair, over the past five years, delegations, including our own, have voiced the importance of capacity building for security and stability in cyberspace, and also for the need for our new mechanism’s core function to be, as also agreed in Annex C last year, as supporting states in building cyber resilience and secure our growing digital economies. We need to add a more practical dimension to the United Nations’ work through capacity building that is effective and sustainable, and supports states that are adhering to their international obligations. It is therefore important that the report outlines a solid global framework and eco-friendly ecosystem on capacity building that addresses the needs of UN member states and enables those that provide and receive capacity building to understand, design, and implement these efforts together. As ICT-related capacity building is an issue that extends beyond the context of the United Nations, many UN organizations as well as individual UN member states and regional organizations are already conducting ICT capacity building. Therefore we need to make sure that we do not duplicate our efforts at an additional cost, but rather make the best use of all the existing initiatives. The EU and its member states have been at the forefront of building capacities of partners all around the globe, and today the EU is running a portfolio of an estimated volume of €135 million throughout 26 projects with new programs being implemented in all regions. Other regional organizations are also active contributors to cyber capacity building efforts in their regions, and we would therefore suggest to add a paragraph on the role of regional organizations in delivering and coordinating capacity building efforts, as well as a paragraph on all the existing fellowships and sponsorship programs, acknowledging these efforts already taking place in line also with the non-paper on interregional cooperation, as well as the Pacific Island foreign paper on connecting regional priorities to the UN framework. While we certainly recognize the UN’s role as an inclusive convening platform to continue exchanging views, ideas and best practices related to capacity building, we also need to be mindful of the position that the UN is currently in. We must carefully consider the approach to any new financial structures at a time when there is a request to reflect on efficiency and effectiveness of even existing mandates, in particular as the activities envisioned are in some cases implemented already by actors outside of the UN. We therefore need to ensure that the report is realistic and puts an emphasis on an ecosystem that is needs-based, action-oriented. as well as implementable. In the EU’s vision, also laid down since 2020 in our proposal for a UN Cyber Program of Action, the permanent mechanism will place a capacity building at the heart of its work. In addition to continued discussions on capacity building in the plenary sessions, the permanent mechanism would include cyber capacity building as a standing item of each of the programs of work of each of the dedicated thematic groups, enabling states to identify and match their needs based on the cross-cutting discussions taking into account all of the dimensions of the UN framework, ensuring with that a holistic approach to capacity building in the context of ICT security. This space could also be used to share experiences, lessons learned, and best practices on capacity building relevant to the topic of discussion of that thematic working group. Furthermore, an action-oriented round table on cyber capacity building could complement these efforts by providing a dedicated capacity building structure as called upon. This dedicated structure would bring together experts on capacity building to discuss, to identify, and to open up opportunities for further international, regional, bilateral, and multi-stakeholder cooperation, exchange information on capacity building programs and initiatives, and to make action-oriented recommendations to the plenary on how to further coordinate and improve capacity building practices, including on the UN tools we have at hand. Finally, the global ICT security cooperation and capacity building portal could function as a central hub for information, expertise, and input, including from non-governmental entities, such as businesses, non-governmental organizations, and academia, noting their efforts in the delivery of capacity building as well, while avoiding duplication. With this ecosystem outlined, we aim to integrate capacity building into all of the different elements of the Permanent Mechanism as a key pillar of the framework of responsible state behavior. With action-oriented discussions, with map-making and network opportunities, information resources that would systematically discuss and address needs, we can create solutions and allow for the exchange of best practices and strong international cooperation. in building and the actual delivery of capacities. It is important that the final report there represents an ecosystem that provides such coherence among the various components of the permanent mechanism, how they function as a unified whole, and how they address the needs of the international community concretely. This approach will ensure that the UN continues to strengthen its role in galvanizing capacity-building ecosystem while minimizing the risk of duplication, existing delivery mechanisms. Thank you very much, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, European Union. And my apologies to Sierra Leone, which had made the statement earlier, and I had thanked Ghana instead of Sierra Leone. So keeping up with the long list here, and the electronic list has multiple names here, which is difficult to keep track. My apologies once again. Thank you also to Sierra Leone. I give the floor now to Malaysia, to be followed by Nigeria.

Malaysia: Mr. Chair, I have the honor to deliver this statement on behalf of Association of Southeast Asian Nations on capacity-building. ASEAN values the robust and constructive engagement demonstrated throughout the work of this open-ended working group. With regards to capacity-building, ASEAN stresses the importance of international cooperation and capacity-building in the field of ICTs in enabling states, especially developing countries, to effectively address evolving threat in cyberspace. The inclusive nature of the OEWG has been particularly valuable in underscoring capacity-building as a fundamental pillar of cyber resilience and in bridging the global digital divide. digital divide. Over the years, ASEAN has proudly played its part and contributed to this topic by highlighting our efforts to enhance regional capacity. By sharing what works for us, we hope others can learn from our experiences too, so that all digital economies, big and small, can grow safely and securely together. Mr Chair, we must not only preserve this momentum of capacity-building discussions, but also elevate it by translating them into concrete, result-driven actions. Equally important is retaining the prominence of the element of capacity-building in the future permanent mechanism. Therefore, ASEAN supports the development of practical capacity-building tools, as well as institutionalising cyber capacity-building within the UN framework. We hope these critical elements will be maintained in the final report. Overall, Mr Chair, ASEAN is fully committed to engaging constructively with all partners within the OEWG, as we work towards reaching consensus on the final report, and to advance our shared vision of an open, safe, secure, stable, accessible, interoperable, peaceful and resilient cyberspace. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Malaysia, speaking for ASEAN. And I give the floor now to Nigeria, to be followed by Ghana.

Nigeria: Thank you, Mr Chair. I’m pleased to deliver this statement on behalf of the African group. Thank you, Mr Chair. I’m pleased to deliver this statement on behalf of the African group. The statement is as follows on capacity building. The African group wishes to highlight the extraterritorial nature of cyber attack and malicious ICT activities as well as the increase in targeting of critical information infrastructure and ransomware attack through territories of member states by third parties. Therefore we reiterate the importance of ensuring that the use of ICT is fully in accordance with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and especially the principle of sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and the well-established principle of peaceful coexistence among states. We also wish to note the involvement of non-state actor and criminal group in such activities which entail a specific emphasis on the importance of national sovereignty, equality and security which by extension require robust and effective international cooperation. This will ensure that all states regardless of their level of development have the necessary capacity and capability to enable them to protect and defend themselves against threats on the basis of national ownership irrespective of degree of economic development. It is imperative to state that one useful tool in this regard is the operationalization of the global intergovernmental POC directory to improve the level of information sharing and transparency between states in a way that enhances our collective ability to mitigate threats and develop tools to protect the security of ICT network and applications. The African group supports the establishment of a dedicated ICT security cooperation and capacity building portal and further underlines the need to develop and improve the ICT security a separate fellowship program under the auspices of the United Nations, similar to that of Small Arms and Light Weapons. We also align with the joint fellowship by Singapore and the UN, both with extended scope and coverage to provide the necessary tools for diplomats and other official practitioners. We equally believe that the establishment of a UN Voluntary Final dedicated to capacity building is a proposal that should be advanced and given adequate attention. Finally, Mr Chair, the African Group wishes to stress that capacity building is an issue that should be dealt with in a pragmatic manner rather than a theoretical approach and should be part and parcel of discussion on a common understanding of the threats, the tools to prevent them, and the ability to provide – an ability to respond norm and CBM implementation and how international law applies in the use of ICT. Thank you, Mr Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Nigeria, speaking for the African Group. Please do share your statement with everyone and also with the Chair’s office. Ghana to be followed by Estonia.

Ghana: Thank you, Mr Chair. It’s an honour to deliver the statement on behalf of the Open Informal Cross-Regional Group of the OEWG Confidence Builders. Over the years, we’ve grown into one of the biggest cross-regional groups now comprising the following states – Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Ghana, Germany, Israel, Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, and Singapore. We have published a final working paper titled Confidence Building Measures, a Recap, and a Vision for the Future Permanent Mechanism. The paper recalls how the group took a step-by-step approach to support the development, the move towards consensus, and subsequent launch and operationalization of the initial list of voluntary confidence-building measures, including the Global Points of Contact Directory. The Confidence Builders Group intends to continue contributing in the future permanent mechanism to guide the inclusive operationalization and implementation of the eight global confidence-building measures. We seek to advance the understanding of how cyber confidence-building measures contribute to addressing policy challenges together with other pillars of the framework of responsible states’ behavior in the use of ICTs. The paper suggests which specific CBMs could be used to address specific policy challenges, such as the protection of critical infrastructure or the management of ICT-related incidents. Finally, the final report should focus on capturing the significance achievements under your leadership, Mr. Chair, and strengthen our commitment to the implementation of the eight consensus confidence-building measures. As a group, we look forward to building on that legacy and carrying it forward. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Ghana, for your statement on behalf of the Cross-Regional Group of Confidence Builders, and also for the submission of a joint working paper, which is very useful and very constructive. Thank you to you and to all members of your group. Friends, we have about 37 delegations with us to speak on Sections A to F, essentially. I would like to give all of you a chance to speak, so once again I urge you to be telegraphic in your points, and highlight the key points that you would like everyone to know about. And if your positions have been covered by group statements already made in the discussions, you can just align with the statement and make any points not already made. I think we are at a stage where we need to know where delegations stand and what their expectations are, and so this discussion is important. I do not intend to muzzle you, but time is a constraint, because I would like to get to RID this afternoon. I mean, that is the plan. So we’ll continue with the speakers list, now starting with Estonia, to be followed by New Zealand.

Estonia: Let me begin by thanking the Chair and his team for their efforts and steady leadership throughout this important process. Estonia aligns itself with the statements by the European Union, and that’s the following in its national capacity, focusing only on the most essential points. Firstly, we would like to support under the threats section those who have argued for amending paragraph 15, that in Rev 1 refers to exclusively peaceful purposes of ICTs. Current wording does simply not correspond to the reality, nor to the previous discussions within the different OEWG sessions. We would support the Australian amendment in this regard, or any other similar compromise solution like the one voiced by Ukraine. We would like to briefly address the chapter on norms. We believe that the existing norms constitute a comprehensive framework to govern the responsible state, behavior, and cyberspace. It is imperative to prioritize the effective implementation of these established norms, accompanied with targeted capacity building initiatives, to ensure their practical application. We welcome the voluntary norms implementation checklist, as it provides a clear roadmap for states in that process. So far, the deliberations within the OEWG concerning the formulation of new norms have remained predominantly theoretical and have not gathered consensus. Therefore, at this stage, we do not support the calls for new norms, and we think that such calls in the final report are unwarranted and should be deleted. We support those who have suggested to merge paragraphs 34-O and 34-P, and to delete paragraphs 34-Q and 34-R. Estonia highly appreciates the opportunity to engage in discussions about the applicability of international law in cyberspace. We reiterate that the existing international law, including the UN Charter, International Humanitarian Law, and International Human Rights Law, is applicable also in cyberspace. The current rules are technologically neutral, and they underline that the state behavior and the development of new transformative technologies do not change the applicability of international law. The draft report reaffirms the prohibition of the threat or use of force, a well-known fundamental rule enshrined in the UN Charter. However, unlike the zero draft, the current revision does not highlight that. that an ICT operation may constitute a use of force when its scale and effects are comparable to a use of force by a non-ICT operation. We request that the text of paragraph 40C is reverted back to its previous form. We welcome that the draft final report refers to international humanitarian law, but it could address the subject matter more substantially. It is not enough to acknowledge that international humanitarian law, including the principles of military necessity, humanitarian distinction, and proportionality apply in armed conflicts. We need to link the discussion to state behavior in cyberspace. We would refer here to the wording suggestions presented by the EU. In paragraph 41, we cannot support the reference to a convention on ensuring international information security as it moves too far from the UN framework, and we think that there were no substantial discussions in the Open and Working Group on that proposal for additional legally binding obligations. We believe that reference should be deleted. We welcome the active participation of an increasing number of states in the deliberations about the application of international law in cyberspace. Over time, we have witnessed that states have become more aware about the legal aspects of the use of ICTs, and a significant convergence has happened among states regarding their perspectives. To enable all states to meaningfully participate in these critical conversations, states have reiterated the importance of developing national positions about international law in cyberspace, and have endorsed the continued voluntary sharing of national views on related issues. So far, 33 states have prepared individual national positions. Sorry, with yesterday’s statements by Thailand and the Republic of Korea, the number is now 35. Recently, an important resource was published to guide states through the process of developing their national position. It’s called a Handbook on Developing a National Position on International Law and Cyber Activities, a Practical Guide for States, which was. was the result of a project co-sponsored by Estonia, Japan, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence, and the University of Exeter. The handbook offers concrete guidance on key motivations, procedural steps, legal issues, and presentation strategies for states developing or reviewing their national positions. On capacity building, Estonia has been very active in various capacity building activities throughout the years, and we remain committed to it. We acknowledge the valuable role of the UN as a platform for sharing experiences and good practices on capacity building. At the same time, we should be very mindful of UN’s limitations and creating of new financial structures without considering budgetary implications, especially when similar activities are already being carried out by other actors. Capacity building will clearly be an important pillar of the future permanent mechanism, and it is essential to engage with it in a practical, action-oriented, and substantive manner, while also strengthening international cooperation in this era. When it comes to the Global ICT Security Cooperation and Capacity Building Portal, we believe it could function as a central information hub for the future permanent mechanism. It should include information, expertise, and information on ongoing capacity building initiatives, as well as lessons learned, including the Global Roundtable on Capacity Building, future players, academia, and non-governmental entities. This would help to further coordinate and improve capacity building activities. However, the portal needs to make sure not to duplicate already existing mappings, such as the GFC’s civil portal or the EU Cybernetics mapping of EU member states’ capacity building projects. Finally, one of the examples of how Estonia, together with the European Union, is contributing to advancing free, open, safe, and secure cyberspace is the Italian Cyber Diplomacy Summer School. The latest iteration of the summer school took place in Tallinn from 20th to 26th of June this year, and welcomed 60 diplomats from 54 countries across the globe for a five-day program of cyber diplomacy. We are grateful also for the insightful introductory address of the chair of the Open Ended Working Group at our school. The summer school is now complemented also by a three-day winter school. and webinars for the alumni of the summer school as well as two-week fellowship program designed to foster a gender-balanced network of cyber diplomacy experts across the globe. This is not just training experts, but also building a community. Thank you very much.

Chair: Thank you very much, Estonia, for your contribution. New Zealand to be followed by Brazil.

New Zealand: Thank you, Chair. We align ourselves with the statements delivered by Fiji on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum and offer the following in our national capacity. As this is our first intervention, we’ll take up your suggestion that we speak to our key concerns across sections A to F of the report altogether. On threats, we agree with the concerns raised by a number of delegations around the last sentence of paragraph 15. As others have noted, the new proposed language on exclusively peaceful purposes is inconsistent with previous language and does not reflect current reality. It also fails to reflect the fundamental relevance of international humanitarian law, which in situations of armed conflict applies to cyber activities. On norms, the existing framework for responsible state behavior, if fully implemented, provides a solid foundation for states to collaborate in maintaining a stable and peaceful cyberspace. The report should more clearly acknowledge this fact. The possibility of new norms, if necessary, logically flows from identification of gaps, if any, that are found when implementing the framework. As the UK has noted, we have not seen any discernible progress on this issue over the past 12 months. We’ve also heard that for many states, their priority is implementing existing norms rather than diverting resources to consider new norms. The statement yesterday from the Pacific Islands Forums speaks directly to this perspective. We therefore do not support the proposal that secretariat resources should be invested in preparing the list. outlined in paragraphs 34R and 36. We acknowledge that there is a desire among some to explore new norms. We don’t dismiss that desire, nor is our mind closed to the possibility. Indeed, this is recognised in Annex C from last year’s annual report. We simply think it makes more sense to take a deliberate, step-by-step approach. In this respect, the proposed list exercise is premature and would be better left for the permanent mechanism to consider in due course. On international law, we are unsure of the intention of paragraph 43. This paragraph seems to articulate the permanent mechanism’s function and scope when it comes to discussions on how international law applies in the use of ICTs. But Annex C from last year’s annual report already outlines the permanent mechanism’s function and scope, including on the question of how international law applies. We are therefore unsure how to reconcile Annex C with what is proposed in paragraph 43. On such an important issue, this uncertainty is not helpful, and we’re concerned that it risks disrupting the delicate consensus reached in Annex C. We therefore support the suggestion that paragraph 43 be streamlined by deleting everything that comes after the phrase, quote, how international law applies in the use of ICTs, end quote. On paragraph 41, we have reservations about an approach which highlights a, quote, variety of perspectives, end quote, on the topic of how international law applies. This variety approach necessarily involves highlighting some perspectives and not others, which introduces a challenging dynamic to this discussion. We encourage a rethink of the approach of this paragraph. If the report is going to list a variety of perspectives on how international law applies, then at a minimum, those perspectives should actually relate to the issue of how international law applies. For this reason, the reference to additional legally binding obligations and reference to a letter submitted by a small number of states regarding a convention do not warrant inclusion in the report. this paragraph. Finally on international law, I take this opportunity to note that two weeks ago New Zealand issued an updated position statement on the application of international law to state activity in cyberspace. This is available as a working paper of the OEWG. On confidence building measures, we think that the permanent mechanism’s priority should be to support the implementation of CBMs that have already been agreed, rather than trying to develop specific new CBMs as proposed in paragraph 46L. A longer list of CBMs which are not implemented risks diminishing confidence rather than building it. Of course, in due course the permanent mechanism could decide for itself when the time is right to develop new CBMs. Finally on capacity building, we highlight the important regional contribution made by the Pacific Islands Forum in its recent working paper. This contains a range of principles and priorities from a Pacific perspective, including the importance of treating capacity building as a cross-cutting issue. While there’s strong agreement on the importance of capacity building, the report seems to be struggling to deliver on this aspiration in practice. New Zealand can be flexible on this, but is looking for an outcome that is coherent, calibrated and constructive. It should be coherent by responding to identified needs and avoiding duplication. It should be calibrated to the UN’s current fiscal context. And most importantly, it should be constructive by actually delivering practical support and improved outcomes. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you, New Zealand. Fiji to be followed by Mexico.

Fiji: Thank you, Chair Bulavanaka and good morning, dear colleagues. I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum with a presence in the United Nations, namely Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Palau. Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. Chair, on confidence-building measures, we commend the successful operationalization of the Global Points of Contact Directory. It is important that this mechanism is maintained and strengthened in the future permanent mechanism. CBMs play a critical role in building trust, especially in regions with limited capacity. We would welcome greater support for regional-level CBMs, including set-to-set cooperation and national exercises. Similarly to norms, at this stage, we are focused on implementing the existing CBMs as a region. Chair, if I may, we’d also like to give our comments on the regular institutional dialogue. And we support the establishment of a future permanent mechanism that is consensus-based, inclusive, transparent, and technically robust. We underline the need for practical participation measures. Hybrid and virtual options must be available, but they are no substitute for in-person diplomacy. The challenge of time zones for Pacific delegations must be taken seriously. A 10 a.m. meeting in New York occurs in the middle of the night across the Pacific. And to ensure equal footing, we welcome efforts to support the participation of developing country delegations with due regard for geographical representation and gender balance. We also call for a manageable number of dedicated thematic groups with clear and coherent objectives and with strong support from the U.N. Secretariat and regional organizations. This structure must enable smaller delegations to participate meaningfully, not overload them. Above all, the mechanism must have a mandate to support practical implementation of commitments, and all recommendations should be based on consensus. Our view remains that capacity building is a cross-cutting issue that should be a standing item on any discussion under the future permanent mechanism. And we are pleased to hear similar calls from other delegations, including at the chair’s informal town halls. Capacity building is crucial. to sustain our collective digital developments. Siloing those important discussions does not help us move closer to our goal of an action-oriented and practical permanent mechanism, and the same applies to discussions on international law. Chair, the Pacific emphasizes the importance of a multi-stakeholder approach which enriches our discussions by incorporating the diverse expertise, research and resources of academia, civil society, the private sector, and the technical community to improve our collective cybersecurity and resilience. For the future permanent mechanism to meaningfully include stakeholders, we need to improve accreditation and participation modalities. Stakeholders’ input will be essential both in formal and informal meetings. Chair, in conclusion, we stand ready to work with you and all delegations in a spirit of partnership to bring this OEWG to a successful close and ensure a strong and practical foundation for the future. We remain committed to a secure, stable, open and peaceful ICT environment and to ensuring that all countries, regardless of geography or capacity, can help shape their future. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Fiji, for your statement. I give the floor now to Mexico to be followed by Brazil.

Mexico: Ambassador Gaffour. Ambassador Gaffour, Excellencies, in September 2024, Brazil, China, France, Jordan, Kazakhstan and South Africa, together with the ICRC, launched the Global Initiative to Galvanize Political Commitment for International Humanitarian Law. They called on all high-contracting parties to the Geneva Conventions to reaffirm sustained political will to respect, implement and strengthen international humanitarian law, IHL. As co-chairs of the ICT workstream, Luxembourg, Mexico, and Switzerland, we have answered this call, and we are heartened that many others have joined us in the work of the Global Initiative. This statement is delivered on our behalf as co-chairs of the ICT workstream. Excellencies, the malicious use of ICTs is a reality in today’s armed conflicts. While cyber operations disrupt essential services such as electricity, water, communications, banking, hospitals, and humanitarian operations, they endanger civilian lives, and they exacerbate the hardships suffered by civilian populations. When civilian infrastructure is disabled, essential services cannot be delivered, and we, as states, cannot fulfill our fundamental responsibility to protect our populations. For five years, this OEWG has provided a central intergovernmental forum for the examination of the security of and in the use of ICTs. By adopting a consensus report, we will take an important step towards safeguarding civilian populations, economies, and governments against malicious ICT activities. Excellencies, we share the commitment to maintain international peace and security. We have all committed to protect the civilian population and other protected persons and objects in situations of armed conflict, including against the risks arising from malicious ICT-related activities. Today, we are painfully aware of the strong tensions that exist in the geopolitical environment. If these tensions were to escalate, death and destruction will follow, as we have seen in the unprecedentedly high number of armed conflicts around the world today. Warfare is changing. State and non-state actors are using ICTs to harm their enemies. They target civilian infrastructure, potentially encouraged by the assumption that the legal lines are blurred and they can avoid responsibility. It is, therefore, our collective responsibility to stand together and to send a clear signal. Cyberspace is not a lawless space, whether in peace or in war. The long-standing rules of international humanitarian law protect civilian populations and other protected persons and objects against all forms of warfare and against all kinds of weapons, be they old or new, kinetic or cybernetic. In other words, civilians and civilian objects must not be attacked or targeted. The principles of proportionality and precaution should be respected and medical facilities must be protected. The final report that we are seeking to adopt this week must reflect this basic common understanding. Excellencies, drawing a clear humanitarian red line in the ICT environment is only the first step. We remain committed to carrying this work forward through whatever future mechanism may be established and to carrying over humanitarian principles and translating them into concrete measures. The OEWG and the work of the ICT Workstream under the Global Initiative are two complementary processes. The OEWG charts the broader security landscape, while the Global Initiative develops humanitarian-driven guidance. To this end, we also invite all delegations to join us in the work of the ICT Workstream under the Global Initiative, building on the significant progress achieved in the OEWG and on the ICT resolution of the 34th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. This work stream fosters focus, solution-oriented dialogue with the aim of building shared understandings as to how international humanitarian law sets limits on ICT activities during armed conflict in order to protect civilians from the evolving threats of digitalized warfare. Let us seize this moment by adopting a robust consensus report here. We will be reinforcing protections for civilian populations against the harms caused by malicious ICT activities in current and future armed conflicts. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Mexico. Brazil, to be followed by Venezuela.

Brazil: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. My delegation on the issue of CBMs aligns itself with the statement made by the Group of Confidence Builders. We are overall supportive of the CBM section of EUREV1, particularly the references to the implementation of the POC directory and the measures for further implementation within the future permanent mechanism. And we are also supportive of the reference in 46L related to access to technology, as bridging digital divide is a key element to enhancing our collective security in the ICT domain. Moving on to capacity building, we would like to, of course, highlight that we, along with a number of Latin American countries, presented a joint working paper on the issue of capacity building and how we see that in the future mechanism, though we won’t get into that here as my statement will stick to E and F. We are also overall very happy with the text, happy to see the emphasis that has been duly given to the issue of capacity building within our OEWG deliberations. And on to some specific paragraphs. On paragraph 54, Brazil was very supportive of the Global Roundtable, and we were represented at the vice ministerial level at the time. However, we would recommend striking high level from the paragraph just to keep a more a more flexible approach to the participation, also acknowledging that while, of course, higher level participation always gives a higher profile to our discussions, having expert participation on a more technical level can allow for deeper discussions. So maybe having a mix of those could be good and just not having a specific reference to the level could give us more flexibility in designing it. On paragraphs 56 and 57, our delegation would very much like to express our support for both proposals, both for establishing a fund that will promote in-person participation and a voluntary fund on capacity building. As my distinguished colleague from Fiji just highlighted, hybrid events cannot be our main solution to ensure inclusivity and meaningful participation of developing countries in these discussions. While when it comes to New York meetings, Brazil does not have the same issue with time differences we have had in others. And the truth is for issues that can be as sensitive as the ones that we discussed here, in-person contact is essential to establishing the needed confidence and the relationships to really ensure consensus in our negotiations. And of course, while we recognize that many other countries and organizations have been promoting sponsorship programs in this regard, we do believe that the UN should play a higher role, a larger role in this to ensure access to all delegations on equal footing and with clear eligibility criteria for those funds. For similar reasons, we are also very supportive of the establishment of the Voluntary Fund on Capacity Building. We see that the UN should continue to play an even larger role in this issue, while of course we welcome and recognize all initiatives being promoted by a number of stakeholders. I would like to highlight that we have had always very positive experiences as beneficiaries and contributors of capacitability initiatives that have been made through multilateral organizations, whether the UN itself or the ITU or regional organizations such as the OAS, which have always been very collaborative in nature and very demand driven. And so, of course, while it would be important to ensure that there is a synergy between the initiatives promoted by these different organizations and particularly within the UN system, we very much support the proposal and would like to see it retained in the text. We will speak on the later session on RID. Thank you very much.

Chair: Thank you very much, Brazil, for your contribution. Venezuela to be followed by Algeria. Thank you.

Venezuela: Thank you, Chairman. I shall try to be brief. Presidente, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela aligns itself with the statement delivered by Nicaragua on behalf of the group of like-minded countries. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela wishes to take this opportunity to thank the chair of the OEWG for his efforts together with those of his team over these last five years. We consider that the town hall meetings were extremely successful and very useful. We underscore our aim of achieving consensus in the context of the current deliberations with a view to achieving a successful transition from the OEWG, the current working group, to the potential permanent mechanism for security in and the use of ICTs. To this end, we propose maintaining containing the use of the original name given to this group, which was security of and in the use of ICT technologies. Now, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela considers that the following points in the proposal for the latest draft of the final report should not be too far distant from these points if we are to achieve consensus. Firstly, thematic groups, dedicated thematic groups that do not fit the five pillars in the original mandate of the OEWG, loss of balance between norms and international law, abandonment of the existing consensus on the modalities for participation of non-state actors, the so-called stakeholders, that were adopted in April 2022, underscoring Venezuela’s interest in maintaining the governmental nature of this action and the future permanent mechanism, insistence on the existence of consensus, which in our view does not exist, as regards the automatic applicability of international humanitarian law to the cyber sphere, and finally, rejecting the necessary development of new legally binding norms or considering those that do not receive the same support in consideration of other actions such as implementation. In this regard, Venezuela, with a view to achieving consensus, stands ready to be flexible on those aspects that do not contravene the interests and principles of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, provided that we can count on this same flexibility from our counterparts. However, we are of the view that, in the interest of advancing and achieving consensus in the limited time available, we should avoid the inclusion of elements that, over the course of the past five years, have shown themselves to be problematic and lacking consensus. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Venezuela, for your contribution. Algeria, to be followed by Poland.

Algeria: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, since it’s the first time my delegation takes the floor, allow me to express our deep appreciation for your efforts and skillful stewardship of this critical process. We also thank your team and the Secretariat for their dedication and valuable efforts. Algeria remains fully committed to supporting your leadership in achieving consensus and ensuring a smooth and seamless transition to the future permanent mechanism. To this end, my delegation approaches our deliberation with the spirit of flexibility and constructive cooperation, recognizing that the adoption of the final report of the OEWG by consensus will be reached only through our collective commitment to refine the text through dialogue and a great sense of compromise. Before proceeding, Algeria aligns itself with the statements delivered by Nigeria on behalf of the African group. Accordingly, and as recommended by the Chair, my delegation will not reiterate the same elements expressed by the African group and will focus its intervention on practical improvements of the text only when needed. Mr. Chair, since we continue to consider Sections A and B, I would like to briefly outline the following points. At the outset, Algeria welcomes the revised draft final report circulated on June 25th. As a solid foundation for the future for a balanced outcome. The draft effectively captures how our discussions have evolved over the past five years. We particularly acknowledge that the draft has incorporated different perspectives, concerns, and proposals expressed by member states during the last 10 sessions. Specifically, my delegation has constantly expressed concerns regarding the growing and destabilizing threat posed by intrusion capabilities. Therefore, we welcome the inclusion of paragraph 25 that highlights and identifies how these capabilities could lead to escalation and threaten international peace and security. However, we would like to see in this paragraph references about specific categories of intrusion capabilities publicly known and discussed in our working group. In the same way expressed in paragraph 24 about malicious software, we propose the following reading for the first part of the paragraph 25. States noted growing market for commercially available ICT intrusion capabilities such as spyware, remote access trojans, and network penetration tools, as well as hardware and software vulnerabilities including on the dark web. Nevertheless, in the same paragraph, we have serious concerns about the sentence emphasizing that such capabilities could be used in a manner consistent with international law. The reason is that such language contradicts the main message conveyed by the paragraph and weakens the emphasis on the dangers of ICT intrusion capabilities. Furthermore, it could be seen as endorsing the use of such capabilities. Therefore, we suggest the deletion of this sentence. This complex issue deserves further discussion and offers a topic for the dedicated thematic group on how international law applies to cyberspace as proposed in annex three of the draft final report. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Algeria, for your statement. Poland to be followed by Egypt.

Poland: Mr. Chair, as this is the first time Poland takes the floor, we want to thank you and your team for preparing rev one of the report. We appreciate your efforts in seeking a consensual way forward, a task that is, to say the least, complex. Poland wishes to align itself with the statements delivered by the European Union while providing additional remarks in national capacity regarding international law. The discussion regarding international law we have held under your capable stewardship have been rich and deep. However, we must observe that the current draft of the report does not give justice to the richness and depth of these exchanges. To our mind, the report, in some aspects, lacks balance and misses an opportunity to address several crucial points. We offer the following suggestions in the hopes they will be reflected in the final text. The report should explicitly confirm that international humanitarian law applies to cyberspace. This position has been expressed by the vast majority of states and affirmed beyond the OEWG context, as has been noted by some other colleagues. The issue of application of IHL in the cyberspace is one of the topics where the deepening of our discussions has been particularly visible. Opposition from a small minority should not prevent the group from taking a clear stance on this matter. we want to stress that the first APR stated that discussions, I quote, should focus on identifying areas of convergence and consensus. While some could argue that consensus has not yet been reached at OEWG, there is a clear and growing convergence toward the view that IHL applies to cyberspace. This development deserves to be properly recognized in the text. We emphasize that the arguments against applying IHL to cyberspace remain unconvincing. To suggest that regulating online activities under IHL leads to militarization of the cyberspace is akin to blaming the existence of traffic signs for car accidents. Sadly, seldom in human history a lack of legal norms has led to a more restrained and civilized conduct in any field, let alone a battlefield. Whether we like it or not, cyberwarfare is an integral part of modern warfare with significant implications for civilians. Regarding IHR, we appreciate that it is mentioned in the context of non-binding norms in the Annex I, but we would like to see it properly reflected in the International Section II. After all, these are legally binding obligations. Hence, it is only appropriate to affirm that IHR applies both online and offline. The language we could use is already in the report. In Annex I, in the part regarding the norm E, the text says that states should respect and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms both online and offline. We should build on this language in the section on international law, while adding that rights such as freedom of expression and opinion, the right to privacy and the principle of discrimination apply online as well. We also support calls to include language on states’ responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. In paragraph 40C, you would like to see the deleted sentence on scale and effects back in the text. It was an important addition to our delegation. Like others, we oppose the listing of documents in paragraph 41 as currently presented. The list mixes instruments of varying legal standing and support among states. In particular, we do not believe that positions of individual states or groups of states should be listed alongside the consensus resolution adopted by the 34th ICRC. Moreover, since General Assembly document A-77-984 does not even address how international law applies in cyberspace, we would like to see it deleted from the report. To our mind, more fitting to the list would be references to the Constitutional Human Rights Council or UNGA resolutions regarding digital or cyber matters. Finally, we have a small linguistic suggestion in paragraphs 40A, B and C. While we acknowledge that this is an agreed language from the 3rd APR, we would nevertheless suggest to add the phrase, after the word reaffirmed. With this addition, it would be clear that the OEWG does not reaffirm the well-established principles of international law or articles of the UN Charter, but rather reaffirm the commitment of states to uphold them. As for other sections, we support the Australian suggestion in paragraph 15 and the French one in paragraph 25. In the section C, we support moving paragraph 34N to the Chapeau. Mr. Chair, we conclude by stressing that you can count on our continued support and constructive engagement in the final phase of the negotiations. I thank you.

Egypt: Egypt is taking the floor to react to Sections C and D. International law is indispensable to ensuring that cyberspace remains open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful. International law is essential to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms online and to upholding humanitarian law during armed conflicts so as to prevent turning cyberspace into a lawless battle space. International law is also necessary to ensure that conduct in cyberspace respects general principles and foundational rules on international law, including state sovereignty, the rules relating to the exercise of jurisdiction by states, due diligence, the prohibition on the threat or use of force, nonintervention, and the obligation to settle disputes peacefully, in addition to secondary rules relating to attribution, countermeasures, and the plea of necessity. In short, international law is one of the core components of our collective normative toolbox to protect the rule of law in cyberspace and to promote the common interest of humankind. Over the past years, as recognized by paragraph 41 of the draft final report, the OEWG has been a principal platform for the exchange of views among states and other stakeholders such as the ICRC and UNIDIR on the application of international law in cyberspace. The OEWG has provided space for states to express views on the scope and content of many rules of international law. This forum has also become a catalyst for developing common understandings on how international law applies in cyberspace, including by encouraging states to issue national and regional position papers on the application of international law in cyberspace. Of course, we do not have complete consensus on each and every question of law. That is natural. There are numerous areas of uncertainty that remain regarding how specific rules of law apply to certain forms of conduct by states and non-state actors in cyberspace. And that is precisely why Egypt enthusiastically supports the view expressed in annex 3.8 bullet 2 of the draft final report, which expresses the view that the future permanent mechanism should include a thematic group that is dedicated to continuing exchanges of views on the application of international law in cyberspace. We firmly believe that international law is a vehicle to ensure that cyberspace remains an indispensable locomotive of prosperity. And it is a topic that requires both a dedicated theoretical discussion and a cross-cutting discussion among other pillars of the future permanent mechanism. This thematic group should not irrevocably commit us to any particular outcome, nor should it prematurely foreclose any particular proposal on the conclusion of this discussion. Rather, this thematic group should be viewed as a space for regular, in-depth, and doctrinally robust debates on the application of international law, and that are also informed by a greater appreciation of technical aspects of the operation of cyberspace. This thematic group would also complement other components of the permanent mechanism. Discussions on norms of responsible state behavior and debates on international law would be mutually reinforcing. Scenario-based discussions would benefit and would be informed by discussions on the application of international law. Furthermore, discussions on the application of international law would benefit from continuing capacity-building efforts at the national and regional levels that deepen understandings of many of the outstanding doctrinal questions that remain. And let me ask you, colleagues, consider the message that we would send if after five years of discussions on international law and the OEWG, the future permanent mechanism is established without a dedicated thematic group on international law? The message, in our view, would not be in favor of promoting the rule of law in cyberspace and beyond. Our view is also without prejudice to our agreement with the need to follow up on the effective implementation of existing norms. Moreover, we believe that proponents of different approaches, including the proposal to proceed towards a legally binding instrument, and those advocating continued discussions on voluntary measures and norms, both sides, need to recognize that there are dozens of other states who approach this conversation with an open mind and do not see a contradiction between focusing on implementation and identifying possible gaps and finding ways to address them. At the end, and reflecting on some of the interventions made yesterday on different sides of the aisle, we want to… register an observation on paragraph 34 under the norms section, which is self-explanatory in introducing itself as a non-exhaustive list of proposals with varying levels of support without endorsing or issuing concluding views on them. The same applies to paragraphs 40, 41, and 42 under the international law section, which factually reflect questions and issues that were raised during the meetings, as well as additional proposals that were made. We are keen to maintain a consistently factual approach in reflecting the discussions and proposals. Disagreeing with a proposal does not negate the fact that a proposal was made. As long as it is not subject for consideration and endorsement, the only party that can amend, edit, or withdraw a proposal is a member state or the group of states that submitted such proposal. Otherwise, all matters discussed and proposals made should be captured factually in an equitable and inclusive manner. To further reinforce the factual character of the relevant subparagraphs, they can base themselves on the idea or the proposal included therein without attribution to states at the beginning of each subparagraph, and possibly with a disclaimer that whatever is mentioned is without prejudice to the current and future positions of member states. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Egypt, for your contribution. Israel, to be followed by Malawi.

Israel: Thank you, Chair, for giving us the floor. In the interest of time and the spirit of compromise, I intend to focus my comments to the most important aspects for Israel, mainly in Sections D and F. Before making comments on specific paragraphs, allow me to say three broader points. The first is that Israel supports the interventions voiced up until this point on the need to focus on the implementation of the norms we have. before developing new norms, be it legally binding obligations or norms of responsible state behavior. For this reason, Israel finds merit in the view voiced yesterday that it might be premature to compile proposals for new norms. Secondly, Mr. Chair, from the comments yesterday and from our discussions throughout the Open-Ended Working Group, there clearly is a lack of consensus on developing legally binding obligations. Thirdly, and on the issue of IHL, Israel generally supports the suggestions to add acknowledging the applicability of IHL in the context of armed conflict. But in seeking compromise, we could also suggest doing so without completely duplicating the language of the ICT resolution from the 34th ICRC. Although we have supported this document, we recognize that at the time of its adoption, certain states felt it necessary to disassociate from it. And now, Mr. Chair, moving on some specific paragraphs. Israel welcomes the new version of paragraph 40C in Rev. 1 and the deletion of language specifying when an ICT operation may amount to use of force under international law. The zero-draft language was inconsistent with Israel’s published national position on how the law of the use of force applies to ICT operations, and we are therefore not in a position to accept it. Yet, being cognizant of the views of other delegations and in the spirit of compromise, we would accept a formulation that is based on the former language subject to the following revision, and I quote, an ICT operation may constitute a use of force if it is expected to cause physical damage, injury, or death, which would establish the use of force if caused by kinetic means. On paragraph 41, we support comments made by other colleagues to remove the reference to the letter dated 15th of May, 2023, for the same reasons mentioned previously. For paragraph 42B, we request that the words, as well as data, in the fifth line be omitted. The protection of data may relate to a large number of branches of international law, creating ambiguity as to what protection we are envisaging. It is also a topic we have considered far less than the protection of critical infrastructure, and coupling them together gives the protection of data, as such, undue weight in our discussions. As for paragraph 42D, we suggest adding language that will acknowledge the rich variety of perspectives shared in the group’s discussion that can serve as an important reminder of the current state of diverging views on how international law applies to ICT activities. For example, this could be achieved by adding, at the end of the second line, a comma, reflecting a wide range of perspectives on the issue. As for paragraph 42F, it is clear from yesterday’s discussion that it does not reflect consensus, and it is our view that it should be deleted. Moving on to section F, we suggest inserting, where appropriate, in the second part of paragraph 52D, so it reads, in this regard, states also proposed strengthening cooperation between CERTs and CSERTs, including where appropriate. Recalling our previous comment on the myriad of considerations that affect the ability of states to share information, as well as comments made from the floor, we believe that this surgical addition can accommodate the concerns of many states. Finally, Mr. Chair, Israel also wishes to support the intervention made by Ghana on behalf of the Confidence Buildings Cross-Regional Group, and in our national capacity on this issue of CBMs, we wish to emphasize that the notion of viewing vulnerability disclosure as a CBM mischaracterizes our discussions. We have not deliberated this matter sufficiently, and we certainly have not reached any meaningful consensus on this matter. Accordingly, we join others in requesting that all references to vulnerability disclosures be removed from this section of the draft. I thank you, Chair, and we will also present to the Secretariat with a written version of our suggestions.

Chair: Thank you, Israel, for your statement. Thailand, to be followed by Canada.

Thailand: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation will now address Section C, D, E, and F. On Section C, Thailand welcomes the draft final report of the OEWG that reflects the constructive discussion in the areas of norms, rules, and principle of responsible state behavior. In this section, we would like to make the following points. First, as we are facing common security challenges regarding the malicious use of ICTs, we need an even closer cooperation for solutions that go beyond national borders. It is important to include a reflection on the needs for states to fully observe these norms, to reduce risk to international peace, security, and stability, and build mutual trust and confidence among states. Second, Thailand welcomes the voluntary checklist of practical action contained in Annex I of the draft report as a comprehensive and adaptable roadmap to guide states in advancing the implementation of norms in line with national priorities and specific needs. This is in line with the efforts in ASEAN in developing its norm implementation checklist. Lastly, Thailand support the state that state continue to exchange views and best practices on the implementation of norms and its relevant capacity-building effort in new permanent action-oriented mechanism to deepen practical cooperation and sustain momentum on this issue. On section D, international law, Thailand reaffirms the long-standing consensus that international law, particularly the UN Charter, applies to the use of ICT. On paragraph 40C, we join other member states who wish to see reinstatement of the last sentence in the serial draft on the use of force. On paragraph 41, we are pleased that the draft report acknowledges the growing engagement of states on this very important topic. We also welcome that the REF 1 draft reflects the deepened discussion that took place at the OEWG on various principles and areas of international law, such as sovereignty, non-intervention, peaceful settlement of disputes, state responsibility, due diligence, and international humanitarian law, among others. As Thailand gradually builds our own understanding on how international law applies in cyberspace, we have benefited immensely from the deepened discussions at the OEWG, as well as from the various capacitive programs that have taken place precisely because we have had such deepened discussion here. In this regard, the report should capture the progress we have made. Therefore, we support the proposal made by Vietnam and Australia to make additional substantive references from the cross-regional groups’ working paper on application of international law in the use of ICT areas of convergence into paragraph 40 of the draft. report. Finally, I’m pleased to announce that after an 18-month process involving over 20 agencies, Thailand has just published its national position on application of international law in cyberspace. We will host a side event to launch our national position today during the lunch break in Conference Room 12. It is our hope that this national position will further contribute to the development of common understanding on this issue. We also congratulate the Republic of Korea for releasing its national position this week. On CBMs, first, Thailand recognizes the essential and constructive roles of CBMs. We express our support to the implementation of the Global Points of Contact Directory and its relevant capacity-building activities. On the standardized template for communication, we suggest incorporating elements such as urgency and confidentiality to help states identify operational needs in sensitive situations. Second, regarding CERT, we would like to include the importance of establishment of regional CERTs as well as the possible establishment of the Global CERT to CERT Cooperation to promote cross-regional cooperation and serve as a vital CBM. On capacity building, first, we welcome proposals outlined in the draft, including the dedicated Global ICT Security Cooperation and Capacity Building Portal as a one-stop shop platform and the integration of the need-based ICT Security Capacity Building Catalog into the platform. We further welcome regular high-level roundtables and the sponsorship program to be funded by voluntary contribution. We also support the initiative to explore the potential establishment of a UN Cyber Resilience Academy under UNIDIR. Second, in the final report of the previous OEWG, which includes a sustainable, neutral, inclusive, gender-responsive, and need-based approach to capacity building, these principles have been fully observed in Thailand’s continued engagement with a variety of partners in the past few years. Mr. Chair, lastly, we would like to note that it is important to continue our dialogue on all these issues in the future permanent mechanism to enhance mutual trust and build necessary capabilities to address emerging cyber threats. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Thailand. Congratulations on publishing your national position and also to ROK, which has also published its national position. I’m not sure who else has published their national positions recently, especially these past few weeks, but I think this is a very good indication of the value of this process that has encouraged countries to come forward, to think deeply about their own national positions and to share it with the international community. I mean, that’s a very significant step forward by these countries, and this is what I think we need to encourage in this process for all countries to share their national position. But that in turn requires support, partnership, capacity building, which in turn contributes to confidence building, which is a virtuous cycle of interactions that strengthens the entire system that we have here at the UN. So I thought I should mention that before we move on to the next few speakers. Canada to be followed by Malawi, China, and the list goes on. But before I give the floor to Canada, it’s midday, 12, we have 40 speakers registered, so the list has grown. This is a good sign. but it’s going to be impossible to manage the time. I’m having the feeling that you love the OEWG so much that you’re getting into the mode of making general statements, and it seems to me that you’re going to miss the OEWG when it doesn’t exist any longer. But I assure you there’s a future permanent mechanism waiting for all your general statements in the future. So you don’t need to compel yourself to unburden all your thoughts in this mechanism or in this process. I may have to resort to limiting your statements, but I’m reluctant to do that because this is what we do at the UN, to share our views. But if each of you go on like this, we will not be able to get to regular institutional dialogue. And if you’re not able to share your views on that matter, then I will not be able to have a sense of how I should revise REV.1 to produce REV.2. And you need REV.2, we need REV.2 in order to get to consensus, so that everyone can see what’s going to be in REV.2. And I can’t give you REV.2 on Friday morning. So I plead with you. For those of you who, of course, who have not made a statement, and some of you have made your first statement this morning, and I think that’s important, we should hear them. Some of you have made several statements, and that’s also important. But I do ask you to jump to the essentials, because otherwise we will not be able to cover all the issues. And the option is that we’ll have to cut off the debate at the end of the day, depending on wherever we are on the speaker’s list, and then I take all your remaining statements in writing, and then I have to start working on on REVTU, but of course, I’d like to hear all of you before I produce REVTU. So hence the need to be very succinct and telegraphic. So I’ve said this a few times, but obviously, your love of the OEWG process is encouraging you to make great substantive statements. But we need telegraphic statements that focuses on REVTU 1, the essential amendments or modifications that you need from your point of view, and the key points that you think we need to address to get to consensus. So that’s where we are, friends. We go to Canada for a telegraphic statement. And everyone, please watch the timer, henceforth. To be followed by Malawi.

Canada: Thank you, Mr. Chair. And I will do my best to be brief, albeit in both official languages. Canada regrets that the norms in international law sections of REVTU 1 do not fully reflect the balance of interest expressed by states over the last four years and do not sufficiently highlight the importance of the existing framework. We recognize our framework is not static and that a future mechanism will look not only at norms implementation, but examine over time whether new norms are needed. However, asking the Secretariat to compile a list of new norms that do not command consensus and have not been fully discussed as premature. Thus, we join the call of multiple states for the deletion of Para 34R and Para 36, a reference to the future mechanism addressing implementation of the 11 agreed norms and the possibility of developing additional voluntary norms as a chapeau would suffice. In keeping with the focus on highlighting the achievements of this group, we welcome Para 37 to adopt a voluntary checklist. We support Paras 34B, F and H. We agree that consensus. language under para 34n should be placed in the chapeau. Turning to international law, our OEWG can claim success in fulfilling its mandate. Our mandate, to be clear, was to study with a view to promote common understandings on how international law applies in the use of information and communications technologies by states. Through many initiatives, discussions, and capacity building activities, we have successfully advanced common understandings, fostered trust, built confidence, and greater clarity on how international law applies to cyberspace. Any proposals to seek to water down this achievement by changing the scope of our mandate would be unacceptable. Chair, under your continued leadership, we have maintained strong cross-regional momentum on international law, which must now be captured in the final report. We share the concerns expressed by many that the text of paragraph 41 should not include reference to the possibility of additional legally binding obligations under a paragraph referring to how international law applies. We request its removal here. We welcome the references in paragraph 41 to the AU and EU regional positions and the two cross-regional working papers. Also in paragraph 41, echoing Vietnam, Fiji, and others, we consider that international humanitarian law as a key area of convergence and support the joint statement made by Mexico, Switzerland, and Luxembourg. We make two proposals. The final report should welcome the adoption of the consensus resolution of the 34th International Conference, and as proposed by Brazil and supported by many others, the text should incorporation of the text of OP4 of the resolution on the protection of civilian populations and other protected persons and objects in the final report. This text would build on consensus language found notably in paragraph 71F of the 2021 GGE report. A key achievement would be fully reflected in the final report, the wealth of capacity-building activities that you just pointed out on international law. The scope and variety of these activities have answered concrete needs of member states. Canada has trained over 70,000 people in international law. 600 foreign officials from 87 member states since 2022. Other successful initiatives include those from UNIDIR, the ICRC, University of Exeter, CCD, COE, Japan and Estonia and others. All of these have complimented the OEWG’s work and deserve mention in our report. We also support the EU proposal in relation to Para 43. We wish to congratulate Thailand and the Republic of Korea on the publication of their national positions. This helps further our understandings, including on IHL and reinforces the call for language in the report. Turning to the future, we strongly believe that continuing dialogue and capacity building on international law and cyberspace are essential in a future mechanism. Monsieur the President. Mr. Chair, we support your efforts to breathe life into the eight agreed CBMs, including simulation exercises and ping tests for the global points of contact directory. There are seven other CBMs. Our experience within various regional organizations confirms that it will be important for the permanent mechanism to focus on the implementation of these CBMs in a step-by-step manner before developing further ones. Therefore, we call on the Chair to delete references to new CBMs or to further developing the global points of contact directory in paragraphs 46B, L47, and 48. On capacity building, we support paragraphs 52A, H, L, and M, and 58. We remain concerned by the large number of fora for discussing capacity building under the future mechanism. For now, there are plenaries. The DTG number one, the thematic group. on capacity building, the TG3, as well as roundtables. In light of the fiscal context of optimizing resources under UN80, we suggest that these four be streamlined while focusing on discussions on capacity building that are action-oriented. The role and mandate of the different groups must be clearly defined to guarantee the development of a future mechanism that addresses capacity gaps and problems with concrete implementation. The current text risks duplicating the many bodies that discuss the importance of capacity building without creating any real capacity. We suggest that a possible roundtable could be modified to address the needs of recipient countries by being more focused on practical discussions, including with stakeholders that often implement capacity building activities. We underscore the importance of the text, which clearly states that the portal will only use existing resources and thus prevents duplication of existing portals. We cannot accept the creation of a sponsorship program before having understood all of the costs entailed by this proposal, especially in light of the preliminary estimates. These estimates are much higher than what the states could carry out themselves, for example, through the Women in Cyber program. In light of UN80, it is crucial for every penny to be used as effectively as possible. Therefore, we call for caution when it comes to replicating what has already been delivered. Mr. Chair, during our last session in February, our canoe had almost been finished, and now summer has come. Together we have been able to build this canoe, and it is now prepared to handle the challenges put by cyberspace in the future. To guarantee the stability of our canoe, it is essential for us to all be on board. Thanks to a consensus, we will be able to navigate the waters of dialogue, trust, and common understanding. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you, Canada. Malawi, to be followed by China.

Malawi: Mr. Chairman, Excellencies, and Delegates, The Republic of Malawi thanks you for giving us the floor and would like to share in its national capacity its statement and views on Section C, D, and F of the report. With first, Section C on Rules, Norms, and Principles of Responsible State Behavior. The Republic of Malawi supports, just like other states that previously shared their statements, the voluntary, non-binding norms outlined in the report and stresses the importance of their implementation at national and regional levels. We just, like Ghana, particularly highlight the relevance of Norms F, G, and H on the protection of critical infrastructure, and Norm C, emphasizing that states should not allow their territory to be used for wrongful cyber acts. We support the adoption of the Voluntary Checklist of Practical Actions as a valuable tool for developing nations. In our national context, the Data Protection Act of 2024 and the Electronic Transactions and Cybersecurity Act 2016, our soon-to-be-finalized cybersecurity policy and revised strategy, demonstrate our commitment to implementing norms through legislation, institutional frameworks, and national coordination. My delegation has also integrated norm implementation in its Child Online Protection Strategy and Women in Cyber initiatives. We stress that implementation of these norms must reflect inclusivity, particularly gender considerations. Promoting gender equity in digital policy and cybersecurity practices is not only just, but essential for building holistic and resilient cyber governance structures. In regards to Section D on international law, the Republic of Malawi reaffirms its alignment with the position of the African Group, which underscores the need for such discussions to enhance our collective understanding and ensure that the use of ICTs remains a priority. remains in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, especially in reinforcing sovereignty and peaceful coexistence among states. We note the growing consensus that ICT operations with impacts equivalent to conventional uses of force must be addressed under Article 2, Section 4 of the UN Charter. My delegation also supports the integration of international humanitarian and human rights obligations, including the rights to privacy and freedom of expression in the application of international law to cyberspace. Importantly, my delegation is currently in the process of drafting its national position on the applicability of international law in cyberspace, which will serve as a basis for harmonizing international practice with international norms and ensuring clarity for implementation. In this regard, we welcome initiatives to build capacity on international law and encourage the continued sharing of national views to advance legal clarity and convergence. Finally, on Section F on capacity building. Chair, I would like to remind all member states present the overarching mission of the United Nations, start of court, to maintain international peace and security, promote human rights, deliver humanitarian aid, support sustainable development, and uphold international law, end of court. Capacity building remains foundational to cybersecurity resilience. My delegation, just like Sierra Leone, calls for capacity building initiatives that are sustainable, needs-based, gender-responsive, and locally led. Chair, we can all attest to the great impact capacity building initiatives, such as the WIC Fellowship has brought to the UN. Malawi, therefore, strongly supports the establishment. of a voluntary global capacity-building fund and the proposed global ICT security cooperation and capacity-building portal. We believe that promotion of gender inclusion should be a priority and the future permanent mechanism and can be reflected in inclusive and targeted outreach, scholarship opportunities, and promotion of female engagements in digital policy. We believe capacity-building should not only address governance, leadership, and policy development, but also technical training for the responders, which will in turn directly and indirectly support our efforts in setting up of the POC directory. I thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Malawi, for your contribution. China, to be followed by Papua New Guinea.

China: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, China will be very brief about Section ENF. In terms of simulation exercise, China has emailed and expressed our opinions on the simulation exercise conducted in March 2025 in terms of the modality and content. We’ve expressed our concern to the Secretary in this email. We hope that the Secretary can, in a more open and transparent manner, improve its follow-up in simulation exercises in terms of the content and modalities so that POC can focus on the realities on what is happening around us and play an active part to effectively improve collaborative responses across the world in response to cyberspace incidents. As a result, China suggests deleting 46G. And in Paragraph 49. After convening working exercises in simulation exercises, in hybrid format, I think the following. In consultation with member states on modalities of such exercises in advance. In addition, in terms of the role of the secretariat in the simulation exercises, China suggests that we change manager in the first line of paragraph 49 to facilitator. In addition, China suggests – China supports retaining 46L. As for other proposals, China has already submitted in written forms. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you, China, for your contribution and also for being within the time limit. Papua New Guinea, to be followed by Vanuatu.

Papua New Guinea: Mr. Chair, excellencies and distinguished delegates, on behalf of my delegation, I would like to firstly extend our sincere gratitude to you, Mr. Chair, and your distinguished delegation of Singapore for your sterling leadership, commitment, and for the manner in which you have carried out your mandate impressively since your election as chair. Let me also thank the secretariat for their valued support to you, Mr. Chair, and the process. Papua New Guinea has taken careful note of your instructive guidance in our final session this week. My delegation welcomes the draft report of the OEWG on security and is of the view that this is a good basis for our work going forward. We will constructively – we will work constructively with you, Mr. Chair, and all other delegations and stakeholders. In this spirit, Papua New Guinea aligns itself with the statement delivered by Fiji on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum. We wish to make the following points in our national capacity. On Part B, Existing and Potential Threats, Papua New Guinea highlights the following feedback to the proposed text in Rev. 1. My delegation agrees with the Chair’s comments on the increasingly complex and an evolving ICT threat landscape. This includes the text in Paris 17 on critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure. Cybersecurity issues have become a central part of national security concerns in view of our national digital transformation efforts. Strengthening the resilience of critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure, therefore, is integral to safeguarding ICT systems against cyberattacks, enabling uninterrupted delivery of essential services during cyber incidents. Papua New Guinea also agrees with the text in Para 24 in reference to the increasing frequency, scale, and severity of ransomware attacks as a cause of harm and disruption to essential services to the public. A recent example of this includes the ransomware attack which took place in February of 2025 on Papua New Guinea’s Internal Revenue Commission. On Part F, capacity building, we are also in support of the text in Para 52, subsection B, emphasizing tailored capacity building according to states’ needs. This underscores the importance of designing and implementing cybercapacity building initiatives that tackle both existing and emerging gaps across policy, technology, legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks with activities customized to states’ unique context and absorption capacity. Cybercapacity building investments and programs must also take into account the prevalent cybersecurity skills gap and its gender dimension and adapt as necessary to include relevant and context-based education, skilling, reskilling, and upskilling activities, components, or standalone initiatives that are sensitive to the needs of women and girls, the youth, persons with disabilities, rural and remote communities, vulnerable and marginalized groups. Finally, Mr. Chair, be rest assured of my delegation’s constructive support to your leadership of this process and to also work with all delegations and other stakeholders for a consensus outcome that facilitates this process. facilitates a safer and secure cyber world. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Papua New Guinea. Vanuatu, to be followed by Japan.

Vanuatu: Thank you, Chair. Vanuatu aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum and appreciates the inclusive efforts made to reach consensus on this final stage of the OEWG’s mandate. We are going to intervene on norms, but in the interest of time, we’ll refer you to the joint page statement on the matter. To capacity building, Chair, we were pleased to see the Women in Cyber Fellowship acknowledged in paragraph 52M. This is a positive step, and we believe WIC is a best practice for the type of sponsorship modality envisioned in paragraph 56. Not only has the program supported women’s participation in OEWG sessions, but its structure should also encourage further state support for sponsorship in future meetings. We are conscious that creating a new sponsorship program will not automatically bring new funding and would support the extension of women in cyber, a program that has already proven itself. We also note that some capacity building programs can present high entry barriers for resource-constrained states. Vanuatu encourages all capacity building providers to ensure that their offerings are accessible and tailored to the realities of smaller developing states, especially those with limited personnel and infrastructure. We also note with interest the proposal for a Cyber Resilience Academy hosted in UNIDIR. We are appreciative of the work that UNIDIR is doing, and they would be a natural and successful host. for such an academy. We would stress, however, that developing states, particularly small island developing states, should be consulted throughout the lifecycle of the academy to ensure that its program is serving the interests of some of the most remote and vulnerable nations. We would also need to ensure that there is no duplication with other existing training programs. Additionally, we are hopeful that any interest in further training, both in part of donor states, but also in recipient states, is matched with investment in the actual implementation of the training programs. The goal, after all, is not the training, but stronger cybersecurity on the ground. With respect to paragraph 52K, we are conscious about the characterization of ICT capacity building as a, quote, high-level policy issue. While we understand the intent, our view is that awareness and implementation in this area benefit most from focused technical engagement. For example, the proposed global roundtable could be more impactful if designed for senior-level or technical-level participants. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you. Thank you, Vanuatu. Japan, to be followed by Islamic Republic of Iran.

Japan: Thank you, Mr. Chair. So for the Section C and D, the OEWG has stressed importance of accumulated discussions on the application of existing international law and norms. And a lot of states advocated for further exploring that issue in a scenario-based and cross-cutting manner to be practical and effective in responding to threats and risks in the cyberspace. In this context, there are some points Japan considers. necessary to be amended in the referendum. For example, in paragraph 36 of the norms section, references are made to documents which have not reached consensus such as the 2021 Chair’s Summary, and items which have not been sufficiently discussed to reach maturity, such as about the new norms. Japan does not rule out the possibility of discussing such issues in future, but we consider it is premature at this stage to include them as it is in the draft report, and suggest therefore striking them out this paragraph. As for the voluntary checklist for the implementation of norms in paragraph 37, where it is mentioned, we support attaching it to the final report for the reasons already laid out by many delegations. About paragraph 41 in the international law section, Japan shares the spirit of elaborating further discussions based on the documents prepared by various groups of countries, but the criteria for selecting those to be cited in the report is not clear to our eyes, and we are not very supportive of it. Japan does not support inclusion of documents and references regarding a new legally binding instrument in a way reflected in actual version, when the issue has not gained wide support during past discussions. The same spirit applies to paragraph 42, and we hope to see amendments in the next version. For section E and F, especially the capacity building, Japan puts a lot of importance in capacity building, since building resilience to cyber security cannot be achieved alone. In fact, Japan has been offering and conducting tangible and practical efforts for many countries, and is willing to continue exploring what can be done at the UN level too. In this context, we should be mindful of the fact that there are already so many existing and ongoing capacity-building efforts in the globe, bilaterally and regionally, and resources are limited as well. We should therefore avoid duplication of efforts to be both effective and efficient as a whole. We believe such voices have been expressed in the past discussion in the OEWG and Japan wishes some text to be added telling the necessity of UN and other actors being complementary in the role, as well as being mindful of limitation of resources leading naturally to the necessity to the efficiency of the UN. Before I end, I would like to join those who have congratulated the publication of national positions on international law, such as by Republic of Korea and Thailand. In this duration, like the Estonian and Canadian colleagues did, I would like to invite you all also, regardless of publication of national positions on the IAO, to have a look on the handbook on developing a national position on international law and cyber activities, which has just been published as a fruit of a collaboration among Estonia, Japan, NATO CCDCOE, and the University of Exeter. It’s not too long, but it is practical and useful. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chair: Thank you, Japan. Islamic Republic of Iran, to be followed by Mozambique.

Islamic Republic of Iran: Thank you, Mr. Chair. On CBMs, in paragraph 46L, we welcome the reference to facilitating equitable access for all states to the market for ICT security goods and services. We urge that this reference be retained in the final report, as it plays a vital role in addressing the technological gap between developed and developing countries. The important issue of technical ICT terms and terminologies need to continue to be addressed within the future permanent mechanism. Therefore, we propose adding a sentence at the end of paragraph 51 to reflect the ongoing consideration and further development of this matter in the future mechanism. On capacity building section we welcome and appreciate the comprehensive reflection of the extensive discussions on capacity building within the OEWG. At the same time, we would like to offer a few comments aimed at further strengthening this section, which is of utmost importance, particularly for developing countries. Like other delegations that spoke before me, including Brazil, we welcome the inclusion of paragraphs 56 and 57, which respectively address the Sponsorship Program and UN Voluntary Fund. We underscore the importance of these provisions and strongly encourage their retention in the final report. The later part of paragraph 52B appropriately reflects the views expressed by many delegations regarding the importance of the Fellowship Program. It rightly notes that states underline the need to enhance the availability of capacity building and leadership programs on ICT security aimed at senior officials and decision makers at the national level. The paragraph also accurately highlights the recognition by states of the UN Singapore Cyber Fellowship Program as a valuable initiative contributing to this objective. In this regard, we propose the addition of a new paragraph 57B in the recommendation section as follows. States agree to establish a standing dedicated Fellowship Training Program to support the capacity building of states on the security of and in the use of ICTs, and request the Secretariat to prepare options, including funding and administrative arrangements for consideration by states within the framework of the future permanent mechanism. Mr. Chair, if we accept the perspective expressed by some countries that current uninclusive capacity building initiatives are sufficient and that the UN should only take a coordinating rule, then a critical question arises for the international community, what has been the tangible outcome of seven years of extensive discussions within the first and second OEWG on capacity building under the auspices of the United Nations. This long-standing dialogue was intended to develop truly inclusive, multilateral capacity building initiatives that address the diverse needs of all member states, particularly those of developing countries. To overlook these efforts risks undermining the progress made and disregards the unique role of the United Nations in promoting equitable and comprehensive capacity building initiatives globally. Mr. Chair, yesterday and today we heard calls to delete the later part of paragraph 15, which refers to the exclusively peaceful use of ICT. In this connection, we would like to express our support for the comments made by our distinguished colleague from China.

China: Given the paramount importance of upholding the principle of exclusively peaceful use of ICTs, we would like to offer the following points. While it is true that the paragraph acknowledged the development and use of ICT for military purposes, this acknowledgement is descriptive, not normative. It reflects the reality of current trends and risks in the international security landscape. However, the reference at the end of the paragraph to promoting the exclusively peaceful use of ICTs serves a different and complementary function. It reflects the normative aspiration of the international community to reverse or mitigate these concerning trends. Recognizing a problematic reality does not equate to endorsing it. On the contrary, it is precisely because such military developments and uses exist that there is an urgent need to reaffirm and promote the principle that ICTs should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The later part of paragraph 15 articulates a shared commitment to a more stable and peaceful ICT. environment. Accordingly, my delegation not only does not support its deletion or any alternative proposals that we can eat, but like Cuba, we would also welcome efforts to further strengthen its language. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Iran, for your contribution. Mozambique, to be followed by Indonesia.

Mozambique: Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving us the floor. At the outset, allow me to express our profound appreciation for your outstanding leadership in guiding us into this final and defining stage of open-ended working group. Mozambique aligns itself with the statement delivered by Nigeria on behalf of African group, and in our national capacity, we would like to highlight the following points. On existing and potential threats, Mozambique strongly supports your proposed language and joins others in emphasizing that malicious ICT activities targeting critical infrastructure, including undersea cables and data centers, constitute a gross violation of international law. And we also emphasize that as a coastal state, we are culturally aware that the strategic importance of undersea cable and digital infrastructures for our nation’s survival and regional connectivity, they are very important. Their protection must be clearly and unequivocally reflected in our commitment. Furthermore, we take note of paragraph 20 of the draft report, which highlights increasing vulnerability in industrial system operational technology. 5G network, Internet of Things, cloud computing and edge technology such as VPN and firewalls. These technologies are becoming integral to critical services, yet they remain highly exposed to cyber threat. We also joined Ghana and other member states in emphasizing the need to adopt secure by design approach across all digital infrastructures. On the list of emerging digital technologies in paragraph 20, we would like to propose the inclusion of artificial intelligence. These technologies are now being used to expose the vulnerability of networks and IT infrastructure such as data centers. The deep fake threats associated to artificial intelligence application in fake news, misinformation, hate speech and targeted social campaign are today major risk for democracy, peace and stability in many countries. On the rules, norms and principles of responsive state behavior, we reaffirm our strong support to volunteer non-binding norms of responsive state behavior in cyberspace. As outlined in paragraph 34P of REF1 draft report, we hold the view that continued development of norms must go hand to hand with their practical implementation. It is against this backdrop that we welcome the volunteer checklist of practical action state on paragraph 33 and use member states to use it as a tool to turn political consensus in measurable impact. On international law, Mozambique welcomed reaffirmation of international law in particular to the UN Charter. that applies in the use of ICT. We commend the OEWG continued effort to deepen discussion on core principles, such as sovereignty, non-intervention, and due diligence. We particularly note with appreciation the reference to national and regional position, including the common African position on the application of international law in cyberspace, as well as AU declaration and other working papers. This contribution enriched the dialogue and offer foundation and progressive convergence on these key issues. Mozambique encouraged the future permanent mechanism to build on this discussion through structured, inclusive format that move beyond reaffirmation towards shared understanding on complex areas, such as attribution, state responsibility, and legal thresholds. We also highlight the importance of dedicated capacity building international law, particularly in developing countries to ensure equal participation in shaping legal norms and digital domain. And also the tailored program delivered in partnership with our regional legal institution in multiple language will be greatly enhanced impacts. On confidence building measure, Mozambique welcomed the Open-Ended Working Group continuous emphasis on confidence building measure as means of enhanced trust, reducing tension, and promoting cooperation in cyberspace. We support the development of operationalization of global points of contact, and also comment the simulation exercise that have helped and tested effectiveness. On capacity building. Capacity building lays at the core of our national and regional effort to enhance cyber security and digital resilience. As reaffirmed on paragraph 9.52, sustainable capacity building is a key enabler for digital transformation, special for developing countries such as Mozambique. We strongly support inclusive and high-impact initiatives such as Women in International Security and Cyberspace Fellowship, which has proven to be a powerful platform for building leadership and institutional capacity. Likewise, acknowledge to value initiatives such as UN Singapore Cyber Fellowship and Italian Summer and Winter School, which many of us have benefited from first-hand. These are not merely training programs, they are practical confidence-building measures. We therefore advocate for their consolidation and expansion under the Future Permanent Mechanism. In this context, paragraph 12 holds particular importance, and we emphasize that gender perspective must be systematically embedded in the design and operation of the Future Mechanism. Meaningful participation of women in cyber governance is not optional, it is essential. Mr. Chair, as I conclude, I would like to reiterate Mozambique delegation commitment to a forward-looking, inclusive and action-oriented outcome. We stand ready to work constructively with all delegations to ensure that the final report serves as a launchpad for meaningful implementation and that the Future Mechanism is equipped to respond to the evolving digital landscape. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you, Mozambique, for your statement. Indonesia, followed by Russian Federation.

Indonesia: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Indonesia would like to share our reflections on Section C through F, which we view as central to building a secure and inclusive cyberspace. On Section C, our position is fully guided by our commitment to the 11 norms of responsible We are committed to the implementation of the 11 norms and to the implementation of the 11 norms in the digital and cyberspace, while remaining open to the development of additional norms. There are several points that our delegations would like to share. First, we support paragraph 34B, which recognizes the uniqueness of each member state’s technical capacity, diverse national system, and regional specificity in the implementation of the 11 norms. Second, we support the inclusion of paragraph 34N, which recognizes the importance of the implementation of the 11 norms, therefore, we support the retention of paragraph 34M on the value of developing targeted ICT security capacity building programs. In line with that spirit, Indonesia also welcomes the inclusion of paragraph 34N that further clarifies the linkage between states’ obligation under international law and the implementation of the 11 norms in cyberspace. Third, we support the inclusion of paragraph 34N to enhance transparency and accountability among member states. Indonesia can support the adoption of the voluntary checklist at annex 1 of this report, as has been discussed and agreed in the third APR. Third, on regional mechanism could also play a crucial role in advancing discussions on norms in cyberspace. In addition, we support the inclusion of paragraph 34K, which recognizes the importance of regional efforts in supporting the implementation of voluntary norms in fostering regional cooperation and trust. Moving to section D, Indonesia believes that cyberspace must not be limited to the implementation of the 11 norms in cyberspace. Therefore, we support the inclusion of paragraph 34K, as it acknowledges the important role of regional efforts in supporting the implementation of voluntary norms in fostering regional cooperation and trust. Next, we report on the current text which reflects Indonesia’s stance towards lasting transparency and transparency on international law. Indonesia has unaccepting of the firstly from Indonesia. We reaffirm our support to equality of international law and UN charter. Indonesia is open to fertilizations on international law, included in the UN Charter. Indonesia is open to international law and UN charter. Mr. Chair, now allow me to turn to section E and F. On section E, Indonesia supports the continued development of practical initiatives to enhance transparency, trust, and cooperation in the cyber domain. In this regard, we affirm the global point of contact directories’ practical value in facilitating timely cooperation in the cyber domain, and we affirm the continued development of practical initiatives to enhance transparency, trust, and cooperation in the cyber domain. as a part of broader CBM efforts, including through ensuring the smooth transition of the global POC directory from under the auspice of the OEWG to the future permanent mechanism as outlined in paragraph 46B. On section F, Indonesia aligns itself with ASEAN statement as delivered by Malaysia. In our national capacity, Indonesia would like to reiterate our beliefs that capacity building is foundational to narrowing capability gaps in digital divide and state’s capacity in addressing cyber threats. Our comments on this section as follow. First, to ensure sustainability, Indonesia supports the establishment of a dedicated thematic group on capacity building as reflected on paragraph 52M and also sponsorship through voluntary contribution as outlined in paragraph 56. Second, in line with the spirit of effectiveness, Indonesia believes the importance of need assessment prior to capacity building initiative to ensure such programs are demand-driven and adaptive to present challenges, including but not limited to the development of guidelines to ensure such initiatives are tailored and effective to the needs of states. We also support paragraph 55 as the proposed establishment of a dedicated global ICT security cooperation and capacity building portal that will provide a trusted global platform to share timely and accurate information on ICT threats, foster transparency, and enhance coordinated responses. That also incorporates a specific section for stakeholders to share best practices. Third, Indonesia also underlines the value of collaborative approaches, particularly with private sectors and regional partners. Therefore, we would like to see paragraph 52C to be retained. In closing, Mr. Chair, we hope that the spirit of cooperation that has guided our discussion will continue to lead us towards consensus on the final report. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Russian Federation: 24 of the Global Intergovernmental Points of Contact Directory for exchange of information on computer attacks and incidents is one of the most important practical outcomes of the OEWG’s work. At the same time, we are convinced that the final report should provide objective information about the current status of the directory. In particular, it’s important to further develop it and to eliminate existing problems related to states’ interaction within its framework. In paragraph 46C, we consider it appropriate in the context of its capacity-building to add a mention of the UNIDIR workshop that took place on the margins of the 10th OEWG session, a workshop on the POC directory. This workshop helped raise awareness among developing countries about the directory and the procedure of admitting the national POCs. In addition, it is important to use the exact name of this instrument supplementing the phrase Global POC Directory with the term Intergovernmental. We believe that it would be very useful, as mentioned in paragraph 46C, to hold POC meetings within the framework of the Future Mechanism. We believe that it deserves a separate and detailed reflection in the context of the modalities of the Future Permanent Mechanism, NX3. To guarantee convenience and inclusive participation, such informal meetings could be held in a hybrid format. We also support our colleague that suggested adding in paragraph 46C a reference to equitable access of all member states to the market of goods and services in the area of ICT. As for paragraph 46E, we note that the use of templates and exchange of messages should certainly be of a voluntary nature, but their format should be fixed. This kind of scheme could undermine… effective interaction within the directory as it contradicts the very logic of having a single template if the format is flexible. When it comes to paragraph 46G, we believe that the positions of states are not correctly reflected with regard to the simulation exercises that took place. It is worth adding in this paragraph language stating that the exercises made it possible to identify problems in the functioning of the POC directory and identify ways to eliminate them, as well as point out any imperfections in past exercises and the need to improve and refine scenarios in order to increase the effectiveness of the exercises by consulting on the matter with states. In the recommendations section, paragraph 49, we believe that the involvement of relevant UN entities in the organization of simulation exercises ought to be optional, adding the words where appropriate. In the same paragraph, it is important to consolidate the assertion about the readiness of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs to take into account the recommendations of states to conduct further simulation exercises. To ensure a clearer structure in the report, we recommend that the wording of the threats section related to confidence-building measures be moved to this section. This refers in particular to provisions of paragraph 32 on strengthening cooperation between CERTs and CSERTs. As the initiator of the launch of the POC directory, Russia has consistently advocated for the unification of information exchange mechanisms, including first and foremost the development of a template with the goal of improving the effectiveness of the directory. Exercises conducted by UNODA only confirm the need to develop a single template here. We support the relevant efforts of UNODA. to Annex 2 requires serious revision. Even if this template can be used by diplomatic POCs, it does not meet the needs of technical POCs. They need a form for transmitting specific technical data related to computer incidents. Since the template was distributed shortly before the final OEWG sessions, states had the opportunity to discuss it. It’s also obvious that we will not have time to properly consider this template this week. In this regard, without questioning the priority of developing a single template for exchanging information, we suggest moving its more detailed discussion to the future permanent mechanism. As for capacity building, this is one of the most important issues within the framework of the OEWG and the future permanent mechanism. We are convinced that this topic should be given special attention in the final report. We welcome the assertion in the text that capacity building programs should address the special needs and priorities of developing countries while respecting national sovereignty, as laid out in paragraph 58. At the same time, we consider it important to adhere to a balanced approach and to avoid including concepts and initiatives that were not properly discussed within the OEWG. In this regard, we propose deleting the following provisions that were not previously discussed at substantive sessions of the group on standardization of curriculum or capacity building programs, paragraph 52C, on digital tools to support states’ implementation of the voluntary and nonbinding norms of responsible state behavior, paragraph 52I, and on the establishment of a UN Cyber Resilience Academy within UNIDIR. With regard to this academy, I’d like to emphasize that the future permanent mechanism is being established as a central platform for all aspects of security of and in the use of ICTs, including capacity building. We will be able to further elaborate on the need for additional efforts in this field only after the launch of the future mechanism. The implementation of initiatives such as the above-mentioned academy at the current stage would only lead to duplication of efforts within the future permanent mechanism. We cannot agree with the statement that capacity-building needs of states can be best met by individual states and stakeholders, as stated in paragraph 52M. This wording unduly diminishes the role of the UN. In the same paragraph, we consider it excessive to single out distinct initiatives such as women in international security and cyberspace, not to mention that this topic is already covered by paragraph 12. In order to optimize the text, we also propose to combine and shorten subparagraphs E and F of paragraph 52 as related to the same topic. In paragraph 52 recommendations, we suggest replacing the term action-oriented with practical. Another proposal is to transfer the provisions related to the topic of capacity-building from paragraph 42E – subparagraphs, remunerals 1 to 4 – of the section international law to the capacity-building section. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Russian Federation. A few comments we need to break soon. First, my thanks and deep appreciation to the interpreters. I am very grateful for the extra time that they have given us. Second, we will meet at 3 p.m. sharp this afternoon. Third, at 3 p.m. this afternoon, we will shift our discussion to section G, regular institutional dialogue and the related Annex III of the REP 1, which is additional elements for the open-ended action-oriented permanent mechanism on ICT security in the context of international security. So, section G and Annex III. Fourth point, there are still about 20 speakers who have pressed the buttons, and there was some degree of pressing the buttons soon after one speaks as a way to line up for the future. So what I would like to do this afternoon is set aside this current list of speakers. At 3 p.m., I will only be inviting comments on RID, and I’ll invite everyone to press the buttons afresh at 3 p.m. sharp, which is another incentive for all of you to be on time. Not that that was ever in question, because I have partly been the cause of starting the meetings late as a result of other meetings and informal consultations. And 3 p.m. interventions focus entirely on Section G and Annex III. Again, my appeal for brevity, and I have the sense also that some of you have coordinated your interventions such as – with an aim to persuade others that there is a wave of momentum for your particular position. I mean, this is to be understood. And there are group positions as well. But I would urge you to repeat positions, especially if they have been covered by your group positions, unless you have a particular element with which you disagree with the group that you are aligned with. And that will be interesting to hear. Or if you have a new element that your group has not been able to, for one reason or another, have a common position on. So I think we really need to be efficient in the use of time. And after we have exhausted the list of speakers for RID, Regular Institutional Dialogue and Annex III, we will come back to the remaining speakers in one way or another. We’ll need to find a way to do that. But much depends on how we progress this afternoon. So on that note, I wish you a pleasant afternoon. See you exactly at 3 p.m. this afternoon. The meeting is adjourned. Thank you. Yeah.

Agreement points

Priority on implementing existing 11 consensus norms rather than developing new ones

Speakers

– France
– United States
– Estonia
– Canada
– New Zealand
– Israel

Arguments

Priority should be on implementing existing 11 consensus norms rather than developing new ones

Delete paragraphs 34R and 36 calling for new norms development as they lack consensus

Existing norms constitute comprehensive framework, prioritize implementation with capacity building

Focus should be on implementing existing 8 CBMs rather than developing new ones

Existing norms framework provides solid foundation, new norms discussion is premature

Support implementation of existing norms before developing new legally binding obligations

Summary

Multiple speakers agree that the focus should be on implementing the existing 11 consensus norms rather than developing new ones, with several calling for deletion of specific paragraphs that emphasize new norms development

Topics

Cybersecurity

Support for voluntary checklist of practical actions for norms implementation

Speakers

– France
– Thailand
– Singapore
– Estonia

Arguments

The adoption of a checklist on practical and voluntary actions for implementing these standards seems to us to be an important step forward

Support for voluntary checklist of practical actions as valuable implementation tool

Implementation and discussion of new norms should not be mutually exclusive but done incrementally

We welcome the voluntary norms implementation checklist, as it provides a clear roadmap for states in that process

Summary

Speakers consistently support the voluntary checklist as a practical tool for implementing existing norms, viewing it as an important step forward in operationalizing consensus agreements

Topics

Cybersecurity

International humanitarian law applies to cyberspace and should be reflected in the report

Speakers

– Poland
– Mexico
– Canada

Arguments

International humanitarian law applies to cyberspace and should be explicitly confirmed in report

Malicious ICT use in armed conflicts endangers civilian lives and violates IHL

We share the concerns expressed by many that the text of paragraph 41 should not include reference to the possibility of additional legally binding obligations

Summary

There is strong agreement that international humanitarian law applies to cyberspace and should be explicitly acknowledged in the final report, with emphasis on protecting civilians in armed conflicts

Topics

Cybersecurity

Need for capacity building to be cross-cutting and foundational pillar

Speakers

– Sierra Leone
– Fiji
– European Union
– Nigeria
– Malaysia

Arguments

Capacity building is foundational pillar requiring sustainable, needs-based approach

Capacity building should be cross-cutting issue and standing item in all discussions

Support for Global ICT Security Cooperation and Capacity Building Portal as central hub

Establishment of UN Voluntary Fund for capacity building is important proposal

ASEAN stresses importance of international cooperation for developing countries

Summary

Speakers agree that capacity building should be treated as a cross-cutting, foundational element rather than a siloed discussion, with emphasis on supporting developing countries

Topics

Development

Global Points of Contact Directory is important practical achievement requiring smooth transition

Speakers

– Singapore
– Russian Federation
– Fiji
– Indonesia

Arguments

Support step-by-step approach for POC directory transition to future mechanism

Global Points of Contact Directory is important practical outcome requiring smooth transition

CBMs play critical role in building trust, especially for regions with limited capacity

We affirm the global point of contact directories’ practical value in facilitating timely cooperation in the cyber domain

Summary

There is consensus that the Global Points of Contact Directory represents a significant practical achievement that should be maintained and smoothly transitioned to the future permanent mechanism

Topics

Cybersecurity

Similar viewpoints

These speakers share concern about including non-consensus documents and references to proposals by small groups of states in the final report, emphasizing the need for balanced representation of views

Speakers

– United States
– New Zealand
– Israel

Arguments

Remove references to non-consensus documents like 2021 Chair’s summary

Language on exclusively peaceful purposes of ICTs is inconsistent and fails to reflect reality

Remove reference to letter on convention from small number of states

Topics

Cybersecurity

These speakers support maintaining language about equitable access to ICT security goods and services as a way to bridge the digital divide and ensure fair access to cybersecurity resources

Speakers

– Brazil
– China
– Islamic Republic of Iran

Arguments

Support for retaining reference to equitable access to ICT security goods and services

Support for retaining language on equitable access to ICT security goods and services

We welcome the reference to facilitating equitable access for all states to the market for ICT security goods and services

Topics

Development

These speakers emphasize the need to avoid duplication of existing capacity building efforts and be mindful of resource constraints, advocating for coordination rather than creation of new overlapping programs

Speakers

– European Union
– Japan
– Canada

Arguments

UN should play coordinating role without duplicating existing initiatives

Need to avoid duplication with existing capacity building efforts and be mindful of resource limitations

We cannot accept the creation of a sponsorship program before having understood all of the costs entailed by this proposal

Topics

Development

Both speakers emphasize the serious threats posed by malicious ICT activities, particularly targeting critical infrastructure, and view these as violations of international law requiring strong responses

Speakers

– Algeria
– Mozambique

Arguments

Growing market for commercially available ICT intrusion capabilities poses destabilizing threat

Malicious ICT activities targeting critical infrastructure constitute gross violation of international law

Topics

Cybersecurity

Unexpected consensus

Support for Women in Cyber Fellowship as best practice model

Speakers

– Vanuatu
– Malawi
– Mozambique

Arguments

Women in Cyber Fellowship should be acknowledged as best practice model

Strong support for voluntary global capacity-building fund and portal

We therefore advocate for their consolidation and expansion under the Future Permanent Mechanism

Explanation

Despite different regional backgrounds, these speakers specifically highlighted the Women in Cyber Fellowship as a successful model, showing unexpected consensus on gender-focused capacity building initiatives across Pacific and African regions

Topics

Human rights | Development

Need for manageable structure in future permanent mechanism

Speakers

– Fiji
– Venezuela
– Canada

Arguments

Need manageable number of dedicated thematic groups with clear objectives

Maintain governmental nature of mechanism and existing modalities for non-state actor participation

We suggest that these four be streamlined while focusing on discussions on capacity building that are action-oriented

Explanation

Despite different political orientations, these speakers share concern about creating an overly complex future mechanism structure, emphasizing the need for manageable, clear arrangements

Topics

Cybersecurity

Overall assessment

Summary

There is strong consensus on prioritizing implementation of existing norms over developing new ones, supporting practical tools like the voluntary checklist, maintaining the Global POC Directory, and treating capacity building as cross-cutting. Agreement also exists on IHL applicability to cyberspace and avoiding duplication in capacity building efforts.

Consensus level

High level of consensus on core operational issues, with main disagreements centered on the scope of new norms development and the balance between coordination versus creation of new UN capacity building mechanisms. The consensus suggests a pragmatic approach focused on implementation and practical cooperation rather than expanding normative frameworks.

Different viewpoints

Development of new norms versus implementation of existing norms

Speakers

– France
– United States
– Estonia
– Canada
– New Zealand
– Israel
– Singapore
– Indonesia

Arguments

Priority should be on implementing existing 11 consensus norms rather than developing new ones

Delete paragraphs 34R and 36 calling for new norms development as they lack consensus

Existing norms constitute comprehensive framework, prioritize implementation with capacity building

Support for both implementation of existing norms and parallel development of new norms where necessary

Regional mechanisms play crucial role in advancing norms discussions

Summary

Major divide between countries wanting to focus exclusively on implementing the 11 existing consensus norms (France, US, Estonia, Canada, New Zealand, Israel) versus those supporting parallel development of new norms alongside implementation (Singapore, Indonesia). The first group argues there’s no consensus for new norms and resources should focus on implementation, while the second group believes the evolving cyber threat landscape requires consideration of additional norms.

Topics

Cybersecurity

Application of International Humanitarian Law in cyberspace

Speakers

– United States
– Poland
– Mexico
– Venezuela
– Islamic Republic of Iran

Arguments

Support for reinserting language on ICT operations constituting use of force when scale and effects are comparable

International humanitarian law applies to cyberspace and should be explicitly confirmed in report

Malicious ICT use in armed conflicts endangers civilian lives and violates IHL

Insistence on the existence of consensus, which in our view does not exist, as regards the automatic applicability of international humanitarian law to the cyber sphere

Summary

Clear disagreement on whether international humanitarian law automatically applies to cyberspace. Poland, Mexico, and the US strongly support explicit confirmation of IHL application, while Venezuela explicitly rejects what they see as false consensus on automatic IHL applicability. This represents a fundamental legal disagreement about the scope of international law in cyber operations.

Topics

Cybersecurity

Exclusively peaceful use of ICTs

Speakers

– New Zealand
– Estonia
– Islamic Republic of Iran
– China

Arguments

Language on exclusively peaceful purposes of ICTs is inconsistent and fails to reflect reality

Support for exclusively peaceful use of ICT principle and strengthening its language

Summary

Fundamental disagreement about whether ICTs should be characterized as exclusively for peaceful purposes. New Zealand and Estonia argue this language is inconsistent with reality and fails to acknowledge IHL relevance in armed conflict, while Iran and China strongly support maintaining and even strengthening language promoting exclusively peaceful use of ICTs.

Topics

Cybersecurity

Role of UN in capacity building versus existing initiatives

Speakers

– European Union
– Japan
– Canada
– Nigeria
– Brazil
– Islamic Republic of Iran

Arguments

UN should play coordinating role without duplicating existing initiatives

Need to avoid duplication with existing capacity building efforts and be mindful of resource limitations

Establishment of UN Voluntary Fund for capacity building is important proposal

Support for UN Singapore Cyber Fellowship as valuable initiative

Summary

Disagreement over whether the UN should take a more operational role in capacity building or primarily coordinate existing efforts. EU, Japan, and Canada emphasize avoiding duplication and being mindful of fiscal constraints, while Nigeria, Brazil, and Iran support establishing new UN-led capacity building mechanisms including voluntary funds and fellowship programs.

Topics

Development

References to non-consensus documents in the report

Speakers

– United States
– Japan
– Egypt

Arguments

Remove references to non-consensus documents like 2021 Chair’s summary

Paragraph 41 inappropriately mixes documents of varying legal status and support

Disagreeing with a proposal does not negate the fact that a proposal was made

Summary

Disagreement over whether the report should reference documents that lack consensus. The US and Japan want to remove references to non-consensus documents like the 2021 Chair’s summary, arguing they shouldn’t be elevated in a consensus report. Egypt argues that all proposals made should be captured factually regardless of support level, as long as they’re not endorsed.

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Unexpected differences

Governmental nature of the mechanism versus multi-stakeholder approach

Speakers

– Venezuela
– Fiji

Arguments

Maintain governmental nature of mechanism and existing modalities for non-state actor participation

Multi-stakeholder approach essential for incorporating diverse expertise

Explanation

Unexpected disagreement on stakeholder participation, with Venezuela strongly emphasizing maintaining governmental nature while Fiji advocates for enhanced multi-stakeholder approach. This represents a fundamental disagreement about the nature of cyber governance that wasn’t prominently featured in earlier discussions.

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Artificial intelligence as emerging threat requiring specific attention

Speakers

– Mozambique

Arguments

Artificial intelligence should be included in list of emerging digital technologies

Explanation

Mozambique’s specific focus on AI as a cyber threat requiring inclusion in the emerging technologies list represents an unexpected area of concern not widely discussed by other speakers, highlighting emerging technological threats beyond traditional cyber security concerns.

Topics

Cybersecurity

Time zone challenges for meaningful participation

Speakers

– Fiji

Arguments

Hybrid and virtual options must be available but not substitute for in-person diplomacy

Explanation

Fiji’s specific concern about time zone challenges for Pacific delegations (10 a.m. New York meetings occurring in middle of night across Pacific) represents an unexpected practical barrier to participation that other speakers didn’t address, highlighting geographic inequities in global governance processes.

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Overall assessment

Summary

The discussion reveals significant disagreements on fundamental issues including the scope of international law application in cyberspace, the balance between implementing existing norms versus developing new ones, the role of the UN in capacity building, and the nature of stakeholder participation. There are also procedural disagreements about referencing non-consensus documents and the characterization of ICTs as exclusively peaceful.

Disagreement level

High level of disagreement with major implications for the future permanent mechanism. The disagreements are not merely technical but represent fundamental differences in legal interpretation, institutional roles, and governance approaches. These disagreements could significantly impact the consensus-building process and the effectiveness of any future permanent mechanism, as they touch on core issues of international law, institutional design, and resource allocation.

Partial agreements

Similar viewpoints

These speakers share concern about including non-consensus documents and references to proposals by small groups of states in the final report, emphasizing the need for balanced representation of views

Speakers

– United States
– New Zealand
– Israel

Arguments

Remove references to non-consensus documents like 2021 Chair’s summary

Language on exclusively peaceful purposes of ICTs is inconsistent and fails to reflect reality

Remove reference to letter on convention from small number of states

Topics

Cybersecurity

These speakers support maintaining language about equitable access to ICT security goods and services as a way to bridge the digital divide and ensure fair access to cybersecurity resources

Speakers

– Brazil
– China
– Islamic Republic of Iran

Arguments

Support for retaining reference to equitable access to ICT security goods and services

Support for retaining language on equitable access to ICT security goods and services

We welcome the reference to facilitating equitable access for all states to the market for ICT security goods and services

Topics

Development

These speakers emphasize the need to avoid duplication of existing capacity building efforts and be mindful of resource constraints, advocating for coordination rather than creation of new overlapping programs

Speakers

– European Union
– Japan
– Canada

Arguments

UN should play coordinating role without duplicating existing initiatives

Need to avoid duplication with existing capacity building efforts and be mindful of resource limitations

We cannot accept the creation of a sponsorship program before having understood all of the costs entailed by this proposal

Topics

Development

Both speakers emphasize the serious threats posed by malicious ICT activities, particularly targeting critical infrastructure, and view these as violations of international law requiring strong responses

Speakers

– Algeria
– Mozambique

Arguments

Growing market for commercially available ICT intrusion capabilities poses destabilizing threat

Malicious ICT activities targeting critical infrastructure constitute gross violation of international law

Topics

Cybersecurity

Key takeaways

There is a fundamental divide between states prioritizing implementation of existing 11 consensus norms versus those supporting parallel development of new norms

Strong consensus exists that international humanitarian law applies to cyberspace, despite opposition from a small minority of states

Capacity building is recognized as a foundational, cross-cutting pillar that should be integrated into all aspects of the future permanent mechanism

The Global Points of Contact Directory is viewed as one of the most important practical outcomes of the OEWG process

There is broad agreement on the need for a future permanent mechanism that is consensus-based, inclusive, and action-oriented

Regional and cross-regional cooperation is essential for effective cybersecurity governance

Time constraints and the need for consensus are creating pressure to focus on essential amendments rather than comprehensive revisions

Resolutions and action items

Chair to produce REV.2 of the final report incorporating feedback from delegations

Afternoon session at 3 PM to focus specifically on Section G (Regular Institutional Dialogue) and Annex III

Fresh speaker list to be established for the afternoon session on RID discussions

Delegations requested to share written statements with Chair’s office and other delegations

Thailand announced publication of national position on international law application in cyberspace

Republic of Korea congratulated for publishing its national position on international law

Side event scheduled during lunch break to launch Thailand’s national position

Unresolved issues

Disagreement over deletion of paragraphs 34R and 36 regarding new norms development

Dispute over inclusion of references to non-consensus documents like 2021 Chair’s summary

Lack of consensus on establishing new UN financial structures for capacity building

Disagreement over language regarding ‘exclusively peaceful purposes’ of ICTs in paragraph 15

Unresolved questions about the scope and mandate of dedicated thematic groups

Ongoing debate over appropriate level of detail for international humanitarian law references

Uncertainty about resource allocation and duplication concerns for capacity building initiatives

Disagreement over inclusion of references to legally binding obligations in paragraph 41

Suggested compromises

Combine paragraphs 34.O and 34.P on norms development rather than deleting them entirely

Move paragraph 34.N to chapeau section instead of treating it as a new proposal

Use Australian amendment or similar compromise solution for paragraph 15 on peaceful purposes

Streamline paragraph 43 by deleting text after ‘how international law applies in the use of ICTs’

Extend existing Women in Cyber Fellowship program rather than creating new sponsorship mechanisms

Focus on incremental approach for Global ICT Security Cooperation and Capacity Building Portal

Replace ‘high-level’ with more flexible language for roundtable participation levels

Add ‘where appropriate’ qualifier to strengthen cooperation between CERTs and CSERTs

Combine and shorten related subparagraphs in capacity building section to optimize text

How can this report help lay the groundwork for improved capacity building that would be more efficient and effective? Capacity building, as you know, is of crucial importance in our proposed program of action to make cyberspace safer. Coming to this end, we must ensure that the UN plays its coordinating role without uselessly duplicating existing initiatives, but rather by adapting to the real needs of countries and providing concrete solutions.

Speaker

France

Reason

This comment reframes the entire capacity building discussion from a theoretical exercise to a practical implementation challenge. It introduces the critical tension between UN coordination versus duplication of existing efforts, forcing delegates to think beyond just agreeing on principles to actually considering operational effectiveness.

Impact

This comment established a recurring theme throughout the discussion where multiple delegations (EU, Canada, New Zealand, Estonia) began explicitly addressing the duplication concern and fiscal constraints. It shifted the conversation from ‘what should we do’ to ‘how can we do it efficiently without wasting resources.’

The report should not reflect a good faith effort to accurately reflect the conversation of the OEWG over the past four years. It places undue emphasis on the elaboration of new norms in the future at the expense of the fulsome discussions that took place on the implementation of the existing consensus norms.

Speaker

United States

Reason

This comment challenges the fundamental balance and accuracy of the report itself, questioning whether it truly represents four years of multilateral negotiations. It introduces a meta-critique about how consensus processes should be documented and what constitutes fair representation of diverse views.

Impact

This critique prompted multiple delegations (France, Estonia, Canada, New Zealand) to echo similar concerns about premature norm development, creating a clear divide in the room between those favoring implementation of existing norms versus those supporting new norm elaboration. It fundamentally shifted the debate from content to process legitimacy.

Bridging the digital divide must be treated as a security imperative, not just a development objective.

Speaker

Sierra Leone

Reason

This comment reframes the traditional development-security divide by arguing that digital inequality itself creates security vulnerabilities. It challenges the conventional separation between development assistance and security cooperation, suggesting they are inseparable in cyberspace.

Impact

This perspective influenced subsequent speakers to view capacity building through a security lens rather than just a development assistance framework. It helped justify stronger UN involvement in capacity building by linking it directly to international peace and security mandates.

If we accept the perspective expressed by some countries that current uninclusive capacity building initiatives are sufficient and that the UN should only take a coordinating rule, then a critical question arises for the international community, what has been the tangible outcome of seven years of extensive discussions within the first and second OEWG on capacity building under the auspices of the United Nations.

Speaker

Iran

Reason

This comment forces delegates to confront the potential futility of their seven-year process if it doesn’t result in concrete UN-led initiatives. It challenges the legitimacy of limiting UN involvement and questions whether the entire multilateral process has been worthwhile if it only results in coordination rather than action.

Impact

This intervention created a defensive response from several delegations who had to justify why coordination rather than operational involvement might still be valuable. It highlighted the fundamental tension between those wanting an active UN role versus those preferring existing bilateral/regional mechanisms.

Cyberspace is not a lawless space, whether in peace or in war. The long-standing rules of international humanitarian law protect civilian populations and other protected persons and objects against all forms of warfare and against all kinds of weapons, be they old or new, kinetic or cybernetic.

Speaker

Mexico (on behalf of Luxembourg, Mexico, and Switzerland as co-chairs of the ICT workstream)

Reason

This comment directly confronts the notion that cyberspace exists in a legal gray area, particularly during armed conflict. It bridges the gap between traditional warfare law and emerging cyber capabilities, making a clear humanitarian argument for legal clarity in cyberspace.

Impact

This intervention strengthened the position of those advocating for explicit recognition of international humanitarian law in cyberspace, influencing subsequent speakers to reference civilian protection and the need for clear legal boundaries in cyber operations during conflicts.

Chair’s intervention about time management and the need for telegraphic statements: ‘I’m having the feeling that you love the OEWG so much that you’re getting into the mode of making general statements, and it seems to me that you’re going to miss the OEWG when it doesn’t exist any longer. But I assure you there’s a future permanent mechanism waiting for all your general statements in the future.’

Speaker

Chair

Reason

This humorous but pointed intervention reveals the emotional attachment delegates have developed to this process while simultaneously managing the practical challenge of time constraints. It demonstrates sophisticated diplomatic leadership by using humor to redirect behavior while acknowledging the underlying sentiment.

Impact

This intervention immediately changed the tone and pace of subsequent interventions, with speakers becoming noticeably more concise and focused. It also revealed the psychological dimension of multilateral negotiations – that delegates can become attached to processes themselves, not just outcomes.

Overall assessment

These key comments fundamentally shaped the discussion by introducing three critical tensions that ran throughout the session: (1) the balance between norm implementation versus new norm development, (2) the appropriate role of the UN in capacity building (coordination versus operational involvement), and (3) the challenge of translating years of multilateral dialogue into concrete, efficient action. The Chair’s time management intervention also revealed how process dynamics can become as important as substantive content in multilateral negotiations. Together, these comments moved the discussion from abstract policy positions toward practical implementation challenges, forcing delegates to confront the gap between diplomatic consensus and operational reality.

How can this report help lay the groundwork for improved capacity building that would be more efficient and effective?

Speaker

France

Explanation

This question was raised to guide discussions on capacity building, emphasizing the need for the UN to play a coordinating role without duplicating existing initiatives while adapting to real needs of countries

How would the proposed global ICT security cooperation and capacity building portal avoid duplication with existing portals like the UNIDIR cyber policy portal and the GFC civil portal?

Speaker

United States

Explanation

This question addresses concerns about the function and scope of the proposed portal being much broader than anticipated and the need to prevent duplication of existing resources

What are the costs entailed by the sponsorship program proposal?

Speaker

Canada

Explanation

Canada expressed concern about accepting the creation of a sponsorship program before understanding all costs, especially given preliminary estimates being much higher than what states could carry out themselves

How to reconcile Annex C from last year’s annual report with what is proposed in paragraph 43 regarding the permanent mechanism’s function and scope on international law?

Speaker

New Zealand

Explanation

New Zealand expressed uncertainty about the intention of paragraph 43 and how it relates to the already established framework in Annex C, noting this uncertainty is not helpful for such an important issue

What has been the tangible outcome of seven years of extensive discussions within the first and second OEWG on capacity building under the auspices of the United Nations?

Speaker

Islamic Republic of Iran

Explanation

This question challenges the perspective that current capacity building initiatives are sufficient and questions what concrete results have emerged from extensive UN discussions on this topic

How to improve simulation exercises in terms of modalities and content to make them more effective?

Speaker

China

Explanation

China expressed concerns about simulation exercises and suggested improvements to make POCs focus on realities and play active roles in collaborative responses to cyberspace incidents

How to develop a single template for exchanging information through the POC directory that meets the needs of both diplomatic and technical POCs?

Speaker

Russian Federation

Explanation

Russia noted that the current template may work for diplomatic POCs but doesn’t meet the needs of technical POCs who need forms for transmitting specific technical data related to computer incidents

What specific categories of intrusion capabilities should be referenced in paragraph 25?

Speaker

Algeria

Explanation

Algeria proposed adding references to specific categories of intrusion capabilities that are publicly known and discussed, similar to how malicious software is addressed in paragraph 24

Summary

This transcript captures the second meeting of the 11th Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security and Use of ICTs, where delegates discussed sections A through D of the revised final report (Rev. 1). The Chair opened by emphasizing the need for constructive solutions and bridging proposals rather than restating preferred positions, as this represents the final week of negotiations for the working group’s mandate.

Multiple delegations, including those from Africa, Europe, and the Pacific, expressed support for maintaining focus on implementing the existing 11 voluntary non-binding norms of responsible state behavior rather than developing new norms. There was particular emphasis on ransomware as a significant threat, with many countries calling for a dedicated paragraph on this issue and supporting references to attacks on critical infrastructure and healthcare facilities. Several delegations proposed specific amendments to strengthen language around capacity building, particularly for developing countries and least developed nations.

Significant debate emerged around paragraph 15’s reference to “exclusively peaceful purposes” for ICT use, with many countries requesting its deletion or modification to reflect that ICTs are already being used in conflicts. On international law, numerous delegations called for better reflection of progress made on international humanitarian law, human rights law, and state responsibility, citing the need to include substantive language from the 34th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent resolution.

The European Union and many member states expressed concern about the report’s balance, arguing it gives disproportionate weight to non-consensus proposals while inadequately reflecting the established UN framework for responsible state behavior. Russia and some allies pushed back, advocating for legally binding obligations and opposing certain implementation-focused language. The Chair concluded by urging flexibility and compromise, noting that simply advocating for one’s preferred positions while requesting deletion of others would not achieve consensus in this final negotiation week.

Keypoints

## Overall Purpose/Goal

This is the 11th and final substantive session of the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Security and Use of ICTs, focused on reviewing and finalizing the group’s final report (Rev. 1) before transitioning to a future permanent mechanism. The session aims to achieve consensus on the report’s content across multiple sections covering threats, norms, international law, and other cybersecurity governance issues.

## Major Discussion Points

– **Balance between existing consensus and new proposals**: Multiple delegations emphasized the need to clearly distinguish between established UN framework elements (like the 11 voluntary norms from 2015) that have consensus support versus new proposals that lack broad agreement. Many called for stronger emphasis on implementing existing norms rather than developing new ones.

– **Ransomware and critical infrastructure threats**: Widespread support emerged for dedicating separate paragraphs to ransomware attacks and strengthening language on protecting critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure, with many delegations sharing experiences of being targeted by such attacks.

– **International law application in cyberspace**: Significant debate over how to reflect progress made on international law discussions, particularly regarding international humanitarian law (IHL), state responsibility, and human rights law. Many delegations wanted more substantive content reflecting convergence achieved, while others opposed references to legally binding instruments.

– **Contentious language on “exclusively peaceful purposes”**: Strong opposition from multiple delegations to new language in paragraph 15 stating ICTs should be used “for exclusively peaceful purposes,” with many calling for deletion or alternative formulations recognizing legitimate defensive uses under international law.

– **Future mechanism mandate and priorities**: Discussions on what topics and approaches the future permanent mechanism should prioritize, with tensions between those wanting to focus on implementation of existing frameworks versus those seeking to develop new norms or legally binding obligations.

## Overall Tone

The discussion began constructively with delegations thanking the Chair and expressing commitment to consensus. However, the tone became increasingly tense and positional as the day progressed, with many delegations making firm demands for deletions of opposing viewpoints while insisting on retention of their preferred language. The Chair noted this dynamic in closing remarks, cautioning that simply demanding deletion of all non-aligned positions while preserving only preferred positions would not lead to convergence, and appealed for more flexibility and compromise in future discussions.

Speakers

Based on the transcript, here are the speakers who participated in the discussion:

**Speakers from the provided list:**

– Chair – Session moderator/chairperson leading the 11th Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and the Use of ICTs

– Cameroon – National delegation representative

– Republic of Korea – National delegation representative

– Malaysia – National delegation representative

– Kingdom of Netherlands – National delegation representative

– United Kingdom – National delegation representative

– Germany – National delegation representative

– Albania – National delegation representative (part of Women in Cyber Fellowship)

– Fiji – National delegation representative (also speaking on behalf of Pacific Islands Forum)

– Israel – National delegation representative

– Pakistan – National delegation representative

– Ukraine – National delegation representative

– Ireland – National delegation representative

– Czechia – National delegation representative

– Costa Rica – National delegation representative

– Brazil – National delegation representative

– Cuba – National delegation representative

– Viet Nam – National delegation representative

– European Union – Regional organization representative (speaking on behalf of 37 states)

– Cote d’Ivoire – National delegation representative

– Islamic Republic of Iran – National delegation representative

– Australia – National delegation representative

– China – National delegation representative

– Finland – National delegation representative (speaking on behalf of Nordic countries)

– Ghana – National delegation representative

– Russian Federation – National delegation representative

– Italy – National delegation representative

**Additional speakers:**

None – all speakers mentioned in the transcript are included in the provided speakers names list.

# Comprehensive Report: 11th Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security and Use of ICTs – Second Meeting

## Executive Summary

The second meeting of the 11th Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security and Use of ICTs focused on sections A through D of the revised final report (Rev. 1), with delegates engaging in substantive discussions on key cybersecurity governance issues. The Chair opened proceedings with an appeal for constructive solutions, noting a delay due to informal consultations and setting expectations for productive negotiations.

The session revealed both areas of convergence and disagreement that will shape the working group’s final report. Key areas of consensus emerged around addressing ransomware threats, the importance of capacity building for developing countries, and maintaining the voluntary nature of existing norms. Significant discussions centered on the implementation of existing frameworks versus developing new norms, the application of international law in cyberspace, and specific language regarding “exclusively peaceful purposes.”

The Chair provided guidance that sections E and F would be added to tomorrow’s agenda and extended an invitation to a reception at the Singapore Mission, emphasizing the importance of continued dialogue in achieving consensus.

## Key Areas of Discussion and Debate

### Implementation Focus: Strengthening Existing Norms

A central theme throughout the discussion was the preference for implementing existing cybersecurity norms rather than developing new ones. The Republic of Korea articulated this position clearly: “What’s needed now is not more norms, but rather a focus on how to implement and operationalise the ones we already have.” This perspective found support from the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Germany, Australia, and the European Union.

The 11 voluntary non-binding norms of responsible state behaviour, established in 2015, were consistently referenced as the foundation that most delegations wished to preserve and strengthen. Multiple speakers called for the deletion of paragraphs 34R and 36, which would mandate the development of new norms, arguing that such proposals lacked consensus.

However, this position faced different perspectives from Iran, China, and Russia. Iran argued that removing references to new norm development would “undermine the balance” of the report, while China advocated for “balance between implementing existing norms and developing new ones.” Russia called for legally binding status for the voluntary norms and objected to the voluntary checklist, preferring that states “observe” rather than “implement” existing norms.

### Ransomware: Achieving Consensus on Concrete Threats

Ransomware emerged as an issue commanding broad support across regional and political divides. The Republic of Korea’s call for a dedicated paragraph on ransomware attacks targeting critical infrastructure found widespread backing. Malaysia emphasized protecting critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure, while Ireland highlighted concerns about malicious ICT activities targeting healthcare and maritime sectors.

Germany proposed ransomware as a possible example for future cross-cutting, action-oriented discussions, noting how it intersects with norms, international law, and capacity building. This practical approach to addressing specific threats represented one of the clearest areas of convergence, suggesting that future cooperation might be most effective when focused on concrete challenges.

### The “Exclusively Peaceful Purposes” Discussion

The reference to “exclusively peaceful purposes” in paragraph 15 generated significant discussion among delegates. China and Pakistan defended the language, with China arguing it demonstrated “foresightedness” and “firm commitment to peaceful ICT use.” Pakistan similarly supported maintaining this language as an important principle.

Several countries expressed concerns about this formulation. The Netherlands called the language “problematic,” while the Republic of Korea, Australia, Israel, Ukraine, and Czechia called for its deletion or modification. Australia proposed alternative language suggesting “in compliance with international law” as a potential compromise.

The discussion reflected different approaches to conceptualizing state behavior in cyberspace and the relationship between cybersecurity and broader security frameworks.

### International Law Applications in Cyberspace

The application of international law in cyberspace generated substantial discussion, with particular focus on international humanitarian law (IHL). The European Union, Finland (speaking for Nordic countries), Republic of Korea, and Netherlands supported including clear references to IHL applicability in cyberspace and incorporating language from the International Committee of the Red Cross resolution.

Multiple delegations called for reinstating use of force language in paragraph 40C, arguing it represented concrete progress widely reflected in national and regional positions. Australia proposed specific amendments to include references to state responsibility and human rights law, while Brazil suggested additional language based on the ICRC humanitarian resolution.

Vietnam emphasized the importance of progressive codification of international cyber law, while Fiji, speaking on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum representing 15 countries, supported strengthening references to international law and norms.

Cuba and Iran expressed different perspectives on IHL references. Cuba argued that such references could legitimize cyberspace as “another sphere of war,” while Iran sought deletion of IHL references and argued for “balanced reflection of different approaches to international law.”

### Capacity Building: A Shared Priority

Capacity building emerged as an area of significant convergence among delegates. Cameroon made specific proposals for paragraph 24 amendments regarding capacity building for least developed countries, emphasizing the need for targeted support. Côte d’Ivoire similarly called for capacity building focused on developing countries’ needs.

Vietnam supported global ICT cooperation portal development, while Ghana highlighted the need for technical assistance and training programmes, specifically supporting standardized templates and voluntary checklists. The discussion revealed broad recognition that effective cybersecurity requires comprehensive technical capabilities and inclusive participation.

Ukraine’s emphasis on women’s participation in cybersecurity discussions found support from Albania, which mentioned women in cyber fellowship programs, and Costa Rica, suggesting growing recognition of gender dimensions in cybersecurity governance.

### Attribution and Accountability Discussions

The discussion of attribution practices revealed specific concerns about accountability mechanisms. Albania provided a detailed account of cyber attacks “assessed to have originated from Iranian state-linked actors,” while offering technical cooperation to help Iran address these issues.

Iran categorically rejected these claims, arguing that “attribution is challenging” and that “unsubstantiated claims violate responsible behaviour principles.” Iran emphasized that such accusations were not conducive to the working group’s objectives.

Cameroon supported accountability mechanisms for egregious acts, while Cuba emphasized the importance of responsible attribution practices, suggesting potential approaches for addressing these challenges constructively.

### Future Mechanism and Transition Planning

Discussions about the future permanent mechanism revealed shared commitment to continuity alongside different priorities. The Republic of Korea emphasized the importance of a smooth transition, while the European Union called for a clear mandate grounded in the UN framework. Czechia supported action-oriented discussions, and Pakistan emphasized preserving consensus achievements.

The Points of Contact directory found support among the European Union, Côte d’Ivoire, and Fiji, despite their different regional perspectives, suggesting practical areas where cooperation could advance.

## Technical Proposals and Amendments

Delegates offered numerous specific technical proposals for improving the report structure and content. The Netherlands suggested adding references to GGE reports in paragraph 3 for better foundation, while multiple delegations proposed merging paragraphs 20 and 29 on technology vulnerabilities.

Malaysia made detailed technical proposals for paragraph 20 language realignment, while the United Kingdom proposed moving paragraph 34N consensus language to the chapeau of paragraph 34. Various delegations suggested deletion of duplicative paragraphs to improve document coherence.

These technical proposals demonstrated shared interest in producing a well-structured final document, with delegates working constructively on specific language improvements even where broader political disagreements existed.

## Regional and Cross-Regional Perspectives

The discussion revealed various patterns of alignment on different issues. Western countries, including EU member states, the United Kingdom, Australia, and others, generally favored implementation of existing frameworks and supported stronger references to international humanitarian law.

Countries including China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba often supported maintaining references to peaceful purposes and ensuring balanced representation of different approaches to international law. However, these patterns were not absolute, with some issues generating support across regional divides.

Finland’s statement on behalf of Nordic countries and Fiji’s intervention representing Pacific Islands Forum demonstrated the role of regional coordination in multilateral negotiations, while also showing how regional groups could contribute to consensus-building.

## Process Observations and Chair’s Guidance

The Chair’s interventions provided important guidance for the negotiation process. The opening call for “solutions, not necessarily in the mode of restating and reiterating your preferred positions” established a framework for constructive engagement that influenced subsequent discussions.

The Chair’s closing reflection highlighted the need for flexibility: “If we put together everyone’s preferences, then that is not going to bring us to convergence. I think we will need some expressions of flexibility, and that will mean that everyone, accepting the fact that other delegations who have a different point of view also need to have their points of view reflected.”

This guidance emphasized the importance of compromise and mutual accommodation in achieving consensus, while the Chair’s procedural announcements about tomorrow’s agenda and the evening reception demonstrated attention to both substantive progress and relationship-building.

## Areas of Convergence and Continuing Discussions

Despite disagreements on some issues, several areas showed clear convergence. Ransomware threats, capacity building for developing countries, the importance of the Points of Contact directory, and women’s participation in cybersecurity all generated broad support across different regional and political perspectives.

The voluntary nature of existing norms found widespread support, even as delegates held different views about developing new norms. Similarly, while approaches to international law varied, most delegates recognized its relevance to cybersecurity governance.

Technical improvements to the document structure and language also showed areas where delegates could work constructively together, suggesting that detailed negotiations could produce mutually acceptable outcomes even where initial positions differed.

## Implications for Cybersecurity Governance

The discussion demonstrated both the potential for multilateral cybersecurity cooperation and the challenges of building consensus across different approaches to governance. Areas of convergence, particularly around specific threats like ransomware and practical cooperation through capacity building, suggested pathways for effective future collaboration.

The emphasis on implementing existing frameworks rather than developing new norms indicated a potential approach focused on operationalizing established agreements while addressing concrete cybersecurity challenges. This implementation focus might offer greater prospects for consensus while still advancing practical cybersecurity objectives.

The discussion also highlighted the importance of inclusive participation, with multiple references to supporting developing countries and ensuring women’s participation in cybersecurity governance, suggesting recognition that effective cybersecurity requires broad-based engagement.

## Conclusion

The second meeting demonstrated delegates’ commitment to finding constructive solutions while navigating different perspectives on key cybersecurity governance issues. The Chair’s appeal for flexibility and compromise provided a framework for moving forward, emphasizing that achieving consensus would require mutual accommodation rather than rigid adherence to preferred positions.

The session revealed that while perfect alignment might not be achievable on all issues, practical cooperation on specific challenges like ransomware, capacity building, and technical assistance remained highly feasible. The constructive tone of discussions, despite substantive disagreements, suggested that diplomatic engagement could bridge different approaches to cybersecurity governance.

As the working group continued its negotiations, the challenge would be building on areas of convergence while finding acceptable compromises on more contentious issues. The outcome would have significant implications for the final report and for establishing foundations for the future permanent mechanism for international cybersecurity cooperation.

The session ultimately highlighted that effective cybersecurity governance requires not only technical expertise and political commitment, but also diplomatic skill in building bridges across different perspectives and interests. The working group’s ability to achieve this balance would determine its success in advancing international cooperation in cyberspace.

Chair: Friends, welcome back. The second meeting of the 11th Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and the Use of ICTs is now called to order. I apologize for the delay in beginning this session, I was engaged in some informal consultations which took a little longer than expected. The group will now continue its discussion under Agenda Item 5. We will continue our reading of Rev. 1 of the final report. This morning we began with Sections A and B, and this afternoon we will also start with Sections C and D, and therefore Sections A, B, C, and D are now open for comments. We will begin with the speakers who remain on the list from this morning, and the first speaker on my list is Cameroon to be followed by Republic of Korea. I would once again urge all delegations to be as brief as possible. If your points have already been addressed by groups in which you are a member, you could simply align yourself with that statement and make any additional specific points that have not been previously already been mentioned. If you have any very specific proposals, bridging proposals, compromise solutions, or better still, if you have a draft of Rev. 2, make that available to all of us. I think that is the spirit of the discussions, that we are looking for solutions, not necessarily in the mode of restating and reiterating your preferred positions. So thank you very much for your understanding. be followed by Republic of Korea.

Cameroon: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, my delegation aligns itself with a statement delivered by Nigeria on behalf of the African group and commends your leadership in steering this session towards consensus. My dedication welcomes REF 1 drafted and published on the 25th of June 2025. I would like to make the following remarks in its national capacity to breach the remaining divergences. Under threats to ICT security in section B, my delegation supports section B’s focus on ransomware, undersea cables and critical infrastructure in paragraph 17 to 19. To strengthen this, my delegation proposes the following amendment. In paragraph 24, we propose the insertion of the following. The future permanent mechanism shall prioritize capacity building programs for least developed countries to enhance their resilience against ransomware attacks, including through dedicated technical assistance via the global ICT cooperation portal, referenced in paragraph 55. Regional cooperation frameworks such as African Union’s mechanism for police cooperation, AFRIPOL, and finally, specialized training for national CSETs, building on paragraph 52D of this report. This addition provides concrete implementation pathways for ransomware mitigation directly responding to the trade landscape described in paragraph 17 to 19 on critical infrastructure protection. On sovereignty and norms in section D, paragraph 40A, my delegation suggests reaffirming sovereignty as foundational while recognizing voluntary norms as complementary. The permanent mechanism should facilitate dialogue on harmonizing sovereign rights with cooperative implementation, particularly for developing countries. developing states. For norm accountability in Section C, paragraph 34P, my delegation proposes establishing a working group to study gaps in accountability, including feasibility of binding measures for egregious acts, for example, attacks on healthcare infrastructure, with findings reported to the 2030 Review Conference. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Cameroon, for your contribution. Republic of Korea to be followed by Malaysia.

Republic of Korea: Thank you, Chair. I would like to thank you and your team for leadership and efforts in guiding us throughout the process. Regarding threat section, first, we welcome the revision made to paragraph 24 of the report, which reflects more clearly the risks and seriousness of cryptocurrency heist and ransomware. We strongly urge that this language be maintained in the final report. In this vein, I would like to thank Japan for making these points very clear in the morning session. We also welcome the more concrete reference in paragraph 25 to the use of commercially available ICT intrusion capabilities, which aligns with the developments reflected in the third annual progress report. And third, throughout our discussions, we have recognized the usefulness of AI, but we have also stressed that its malicious use can significantly increase cyber threats. In this regard, we welcome paragraph 27 of the final report, which points out that large language models can lower the barriers to internet access. engage in malicious cyber activities such as malware development and defakes. And lastly, regarding the third section, we have concern regarding the specific phrase, which is exclusively peaceful purposes in paragraph 15. This phrase has not been part of our discussions and it is ambiguous. We suggest reverting to the original language or revising the wording for clarity and consistency. For rules section, Chair, among the voluntary and non-binding norms currently being discussed, we believe that the 11 existing norms as outlined in the 2015 GG report and endorsed by the General Assembly already enjoy broad consensus and provide a relevant and effective framework for addressing emerging threats. In this context, we would like to express our concerns regarding paragraphs 34 and 36 of the current draft, which leave open the possibility of proposing or creating new norms. What’s needed now is not more norms, but rather a focus on how to implement and operationalize the ones we already have. In this regard, the Voluntary Checklist of Practical Action included in Annex 1 is a valuable tool to facilitate practical and ongoing discussions among states on norm implementation. Regarding international law, first of all, I’m pleased to share that the government of the Republic of Korea released its official position paper on this matter today. You can find our position paper in the OEWG website or our ministry website. As many other states have already stated, our position also. confirms the core principles of the UN Charter, such as state sovereignty and the prohibition on the use of force, along with the obligations under international human rights law and international humanitarian law, apply equally in cyberspace. Chair, we believe with the rapid pace of technological advancement and the constantly evolving nature of the cyber environment, it is simply not feasible to create a completely new legal system tailored to cyberspace. Instead, we should base our approach on the application of existing international law and not allow specific practices related to the cyber domain to develop progressively through implementation tools, such as the Voluntary Checklist of Practical Actions, as well as through the accumulation of national position papers. Regarding IHL, we would like to emphasize the need for clearer and more detailed language in the final report on the application of international humanitarian law. Given that IHL has been a recurring topic of discussion within the OEWG and is reflected in the position papers of a significant number of member states, we believe it is important for the final report to reflect this explicitly. Lastly, we believe some revisions are needed in paragraph 41. Among the six currently listed, some are outcomes of a formal international meeting, while others are just joint statements from groups of states. It’s unclear what criteria were used for their inclusion, so maybe possible listing of documents can be deleted as well. I’ll stop here. Thank you for your attention, Chair.

Malaysia: We join others in expressing our appreciation for your continued leadership and tireless efforts, bringing us to this 11th and final substantive session of the OEWG. Malaysia is committed to working together with all member states in ensuring smooth transition to the future permanent mechanism in the spirit of constructive dialogue and consensus. We are pleased that the overall structure of the REF-1 draft that have been drawn from agreed language found in the first, second APR and third APR and the activities carry up prior to this substantive session. Recognizing these points we agree with the proposed text in section A of the REF-1 draft. Moving to section B on existing and potential threats, Malaysia appreciates the comprehensive overview of threats in this section reflecting the depth of discussion we have had on this section. Like Mauritius and Malawi, Malaysia supports paragraph 17 on critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure. Malaysia further joins Qatar, Japan and Australia in supporting paragraph 24 which highlights concern on malicious software as well as cryptocurrency, currency theft and the abuse of cryptocurrency to finance malicious activity which could potentially impact international peace and security. Malaysia joins Indonesia in supporting paragraph 20 and would like to propose realignment of the language in this paragraph, taking into account technical and policy-oriented audiences. We propose the formulation, I quote, states express concern that industrial control systems I see ITS, operational technology, OT, 5G networks, the Internet of Things, IOT, cloud computing services and technologies at the network parameter, such as virtual private networks, VPNs, firewalls and routers are increasingly vulnerable to malicious ICT activities, which could compromise them and have widespread consequences. Malaysia is also of the view that paragraphs 20 and 29 may be combined, as both paragraphs touch upon vulnerabilities that can be exploited for malicious activities. Malaysia further welcomes paragraph 26 and 27 on the new and emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence and the need to better understand the associated risks. Further, Malaysia joins Mauritius, Ghana and Singapore in supporting language on the strengthening of cooperation between CERTs or CSERTs, including capacity building and public-private partnership in paragraph 32. Malaysia also recognises the importance of enhancing dialogue on ICT security between different sectors at the national level, including the technical, diplomatic and legal sector. Finally, Malaysia looks forward to continued exchange of view under future permanent mechanism on existing and potential threat to security of and in the use of ICT in the context of international security, as recommended in paragraph 33. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Malaysia, for your contribution. Kingdom of Netherlands to be followed by United Kingdom. Thank you, Chair, for giving my delegation the floor.

Kingdom of Netherlands: The Kingdom of the Netherlands fully aligns itself with the statements of the European Union and I would like to make the following complimentary remarks in a national capacity. At the outset, I want to start by thanking you, Mr. Chair, your team and UNODA. for the preparation of the REF1 report, and we continue to constructively work with you and other delegations towards a consensus outcome at the end of this week. As raised by others, we see a strong need to better reflect the balance between implementing existing consensus agreements on the one hand, and new proposals that did not achieve consensus on the other. The content and value of the existing normative framework should be acknowledged in full in the final report. Chair, on the overview section, as this report will be the basis for future discussion, it is essential it is based on consensus agreements. In that regard, we propose to add in the last sentence of paragraph three, a reference to the GGE reports and the 2021 OEWG report endorsed by the General Assembly. In a similar vein, we agree with other states to remove the language on the chair summary and the proposals in the annex, for example, in paragraph four, as this was explicitly not a consensus agreement. Chair, turning to threats. In the past reports, we have made clear progress in identifying and articulating the range of threats in the use of ICTs. Specifically, we welcome the references regarding malicious ICT activity targeting international organizations and humanitarian organizations in paragraph 21, and the reflection of the in-depth discussion we had in paragraphs 18 and 19. However, we also see room for further improvement, and we will limit ourselves to three paragraphs. First on paragraph 15, on the notion that ICTs have already been used in conflicts in different regions, we join other UN member states in the call for deletion of exclusively peaceful purposes and support the proposal for alternative language raised by Australia. Lastly, as was raised by Colombia, the Republic of Korea and others, we welcome the references in paragraph 24 to the risks of ransomware, and the notion for a human-centric approach. Paragraph 24 lists several examples of malicious software and cyber attack techniques. techniques. As ransomware was specifically raised by many delegations in past years, we asked to dedicate a separate paragraph to it, starting with, quote, states express particular concern over ransomware attacks targeting CI and CII, end of quote. The other examples of malicious software and techniques could be included in the following paragraph. We also support the new proposal for a recommendation as was done by the EU in a statement on ransomware. And turning to norms, in line with what the Republic of Korea just said, we welcome the recommendation in paragraph 37 on the voluntary checklist of practical action for the implementation of the 11 norms, as this provides states with clear guidance on implementation while also remaining flexibility to tailor implementation to specific needs and realities. Second, while we welcome the addition of paragraph 34n, we propose moving the first two sentences to the chapeau of paragraph 34. The first two sentences of 34n reflect consensus language rather than one of the proposals with varying levels of support. The same argument goes for paragraph 34a. In our view, the subparagraphs contain too many references to the chair summary of 2021 OEWG report, which is not a consensus document, as well as proposals that were supported by only a very limited number of states. In that regard, we specifically propose deleting paragraph 34q. As stated throughout this OEWG, my delegation considers that we still have a lot of work to do on norms implementation, including through capacity building. While this does not exclude the possibility of future discussions on additional norms that could be developed over time, as agreed in NXC of the third APR, some of the proposals in this ref1 have hardly been discussed, were proposed by a very limited number of states, or are already captured by existing norms. We therefore strongly urge the deletion of paragraph 34r. and paragraph 36 in its entirety. Then, lastly, turning to international law, Chair. Throughout this OEWG, we have seen a rise in the number of substantive statements on international law. Moreover, in national and regional positions, in cross-regional papers, and inside events, as well as in scenario-based workshops, we have clearly moved from the question of whether international law applies to the question of how it applies. And while my delegation recognizes that we do not yet have all the answers, we believe that the substantial progress made should be reflected in the final report. We therefore urge the inclusion of substantive language on the law of state responsibility, international human rights law, and international humanitarian law, as proposed in the cross-regional paper on convergence language. Then, lastly, turning to a few concrete proposals. First, we regret the deletion of the final sentence of paragraph 40C on the question of when an ICT operation may constitute a use of force. This additional layer of understanding is widely reflected in national and regional positions and shows concrete progress. We therefore propose reinstating this final sentence. Second, as underlined in the second sentence of paragraph 41, this paragraph focuses on how international law applies to the use of ICTs. In that context, we propose a reference to discussions on international human rights law. In addition, we ask for the deletion of the references to the possibility of additional binding obligations and the latter supported by a very small number of states on a convention, as they do not relate to the question of how international law applies. Since the resolution of the 34th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent represents a consensus outcome, we believe it merits a separate paragraph. We also propose adding substantive language on IHL from OP4 of this resolution. In particular that, quote, states reiterated that in situations of armed conflict, IHL rules and principles serve to protect civilian populations and other protected persons and objects, including against the risks arising from ICT activities.” Furthermore, in paragraph 42e on capacity building, we propose adding scenario-based discussions after conferences. And then, that’s my final point, lastly, with regards to paragraph 43, we support states that have proposed placing a full stop after the phrase in the use of ICTs. Thank you very much, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Netherlands, UK followed by Germany.

United Kingdom: Thank you, Chair. As this is the first time we’ve taken the floor, we’d like to begin by thanking you and your team for your work over the last five years. The UK reiterates its commitment to working with you and other delegations here constructively to achieve consensus this week and deliver a seamless transition to a future mechanism in March 2026. At present, however, we believe the current draft requires further refinement to achieve the balance necessary for consensus. In particular, the report should more clearly focus on the constituent parts of the consensus framework on responsible state behavior in cyberspace that we have built collectively over many years. At present, the draft gives disproportionate weight to proposals that remain far from broadly supported. If we do not clearly preserve and highlight this shared foundation, we risk setting the future mechanism on an unstable footing, potentially undermining the hard-won consensus that international law applies to state conduct in cyberspace. This leads my delegation to our first point on the threats section. The last sentence of paragraph 15 should be removed for the reasons outlined by a number of states, including South Korea, just now. It introduces novel criteria, in paragraph 16 we support the edit made in REV1 with regard to cryptocurrency. The UK also supports the acknowledgement in this paragraph that serious ICT criminal activity could impact international peace and security, thereby bringing such activity in scope for our discussions. This OEWG recognised this by consensus with respect to ransomware in the third APR. In paragraph 20 we would like to add data centres and managed service providers to the list of technology infrastructures, so the sentence would read states expressed concern that industrial systems, operational technology, 5G networks, the internet of things, cloud computing services, data centres and managed service providers and then continue as currently drafted. This would make the list more consistent with the scope of CII regulation in many states. We’d also support merging this paragraph with paragraph 29 as Malaysia has suggested. We support the addition to paragraph 23 made by Ghana regarding security by design. In paragraph 24 we would like to insert the words including those to the third sentence so it reads states expressed a particular concern over ransomware attacks including those targeting CI and CII. We also support the proposal from the EU to make ransomware a standalone paragraph. We support maintaining the last sentence of paragraph 24. We see paragraph 25 as a reasonable reflection of our discussions that also balances a range of positions. Use of commercially available cyber intrusion capabilities by states is subject to the consensus UN framework including the voluntary non-binding norms and international law, so we should retain these references. we also support the, uh, improvement recommended by France to this paragraph. We support the REV1 change to paragraph 26, but this could be further improved by adding, and prepare for the migration to post-quantum cryptography at the end of the last sentence. In the middle of paragraph 27, we would like to replace large language models with simply AI. This is because generative models, reinforcement learning agents and other AI systems beyond LLMs are relevant in this context. In paragraph 28, we support the additional technologies listed in REV1 and their relevance to the security and protection of data. The UK does not support amendments to paragraph 12, and we emphasize that this paragraph is consensus language from the third APR. On norms, we were pleased to see the use of, uh, footnotes to cite the wording of the relevant norms throughout this report. However, in the view of my delegation, the norms section does not sufficiently anchor the final report of this OEWG in the existing consensus framework. With respect to paragraph 34N, we would like this paragraph to be incorporated into the chapeau portion of paragraph, uh, 34, as, uh, a few other delegations have mentioned. This is because the text in 34N is not simply a proposal, but is consensus language. Consensus language from the 2021 GG report referencing the 11 norms should also be added to the chapeau. The combined text added to 34 would read as follows. The consensus resolution 70237, in which the General Assembly called upon member states to be guided in their use of ICTs by the 2015 report of the GGE, which included 11 voluntary non-binding norms of responsible state behaviour, and further recalled that norms do not seek to limit or prohibit action that is otherwise consistent with international law. They reflect the expectations of the international community and set standards for responsible state behaviour. States also acknowledge that the work of the OEWG has contributed to strengthening the cumulative and evolving framework of responsible state behaviour, which provides a foundation for the future mechanism. Moving on, the UK supports the existing text in 34b, 34c, 34e and 34f. In paragraph 34h, we would like to replace lawful purposes with legitimate and necessary purposes and is consistent with international law. In 34l, we regret that our proposals for the Voluntary Checklist of Practical Actions have not been incorporated. We nonetheless welcome the adoption of the checklist as a valuable output of the final report of this OEWG. Chair, we now wish to address paragraph 34r and the recommendation in paragraph 36. Through your guiding questions, you provided opportunities for states to present their proposals for possible new norms at the 4th, 6th, 9th substantive sessions and the intercessional meetings of December 2022, May 2023 and May 2024. There have been at least six meetings of this OEWG in which the states advocating for new norms have been invited to build support among UN members for specific proposals. Despite the substantial time this OEWG has dedicated to studying new norms, we find it hard to see that any convincing complementary addition to the 11 2015 norms has emerged. As the Netherlands has just noted, Annex C of the third APR and the recommendation in paragraph 35 already recognise that new norms could be developed over time, including under the future mechanism. This is existing consensus and delegations, including my own, have already demonstrated flexibility in this regard. However, the UK strongly objects to the use of the Secretariat’s time and resources to further an exercise that has failed to generate convincing proposals over the 10-year period since 2015, as is proposed in 34R and 36. Current UN80 reforms are a further argument against this. 34R and 36 should be deleted in order to provide more emphasis on implementing the more practical measures emerging from this OEWG, including those in Annex 1. On international law, the UK is disappointed that REV1 does not include new substantive content on the additional areas of convergence in our common understanding of international law that have become apparent over the past year. For example, there is a consensus text on the application of international humanitarian law thanks to the ICRC’s 34th International Conference Resolution that could have readily been included in this year’s report. Similarly, we are disappointed that the language in the Zero Draft regarding the use of force at paragraph 40C has been deleted for reasons that are not clear to us. We would like this to be added back into the report. The UK is also deeply concerned with paragraph 41. This paragraph should reflect the rich and deep discussions that we have had in the OEWG on how existing international law applies to the use of ICTs. Instead, paragraph 41 conflates existing law with proposals for new law in a deeply problematic way. The UK considers that new legally binding obligations should not be listed alongside topics such as state responsibility and IHL. This is not an accurate reflection of our discussions. Moreover, the UK cannot accept the inclusion of a controversial proposal for new obligations, which is supported by only five states. We welcome the changes made to Paragraph 42B, which we considered prejudged our discussions on international law at the Future Mechanism. Finally, Chair, on Paragraph 43, the UK does not support the prejudging of international law topics that we will discuss at the Future Permanent Mechanism. Paragraph 43 should simply recognize that we will continue to engage in focused discussions on how international law applies. We’d also like to agree with the points made by a number of delegations in relation to the 2021 Chair Summary and the importance of recognizing GGE reports throughout this report. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you. UK, Germany, to be followed by Albania.

Germany: Mr. Chair, first we would like to thank you for your and your team’s efforts to move us toward consensus. We align with the statements of the European Union and would like to address in a national capacity a few points on the four sections that have been raised already by colleagues. On the first two sections, first in line with the EU and also highlighted inter-area by Canada, El Salvador and Moldova, we see a need to recall and reaffirm the normative framework and the consensus achieved so far in the overview section. Also as a solid foundation for our future discussion, the suggestion by one state to delete the commitment to implement the UN framework is not an option for us. Second, the threat section should include key issues we are faced with today, like ransomware or the protection of critical infrastructure. structures, as highlighted, for example, by Nigeria on behalf of the African group, Mauritius, but also Cameroon and Korea this afternoon. Like Canada and the Netherlands, we believe ransomware would warrant an extra paragraph. We are all affected by its consequences, and we believe it might also be a possible example for a topic for a future cross-cutting, action-oriented discussion, question how norms in international law relates to it, what cyber capacity building needs and tools are there or need to be developed to better address this threat, also acknowledging the role of the private sector in this regard. Third, like a number of other states, the new last part of paragraph 15 is problematic for us, and we suggest to delete it, but would also be ready to support a proposal made by Australia. More generally, also on Section C and D, Germany, like expressed by many others, believes that a clear distinction between the acquis of the normative framework that we have built collectively over the years and the areas of consensus that we already agreed on during this open-ended working group on the one side, and additional proposals that have been made but not have received universal support on the other side, is necessary, also to move us toward consensus. We would be in favor of mainstreaming and organizing the whole Section C and D following this logic, also with regard to the recommendations. Mindful of time, just a few examples that have already been raised by colleagues, and there can be brief. First, on paragraph 34N, we believe it’s under wrong chapeau. For us, it’s clear that the first sentences are not a proposal of varying levels of support, but they are consensus language. Second, the chair summary annexed to the 2021 open-ended working group report that has been mentioned by colleagues, and which is not a consensus document. Third, we believe it is up to the future mechanism to decide on whether to take on the potential development of new voluntary, non-binding norms, considering the comprehensive set of expectations already in place, and therefore ask for a deletion of 35%. for Q and R, as well as para 36. Finally, paragraph 41 is a mix of very different papers that was just explained by the UK colleague. National positions and non-consensual proposals for future formats for discussion. We therefore suggest dividing it and take out from recommendation para 43, references to non-consensual proposals. A last point on one area where progress has been made and where we also had extensive discussions here with a number of cross-regional working papers. We would very much welcome a clear reference to the applicability of international humanitarian law and an inclusion of relevant language, which would be OP4 of the ICRC consensus resolution adopted last year. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you, Germany, for your statement. Albania to be followed by Fiji.

Albania: Thank you. Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor. As this is the Albanian’s first intervention, I wish to commend you and your team for your excellent leadership in advancing the work of this open-ended working group. I am happy to be here as part of the Women in Cyber Fellowship, thanks to the Netherlands. I am happy to be part of a group of women of this fellowship who have a strong voice and give a tremendous contribution to the UN discussions on cybersecurity. Albania supports the EU statement presented at the open-ended working group and presents this statement in its national capacity. Albania has reviewed the APR1 draft and considers it a good foundation for constructive discussions, keeping in consideration that we should conclude on a report that recognizes the work done by the international community so far. Our aim is to contribute actively to the open-ended working group mission and advance global peace in cyberspace. We believe that we can do this. this forum is uniquely equipped to reconcile different views and chart a path forward. Albania stands firmly behind efforts to foster a cooperative framework in the cybersecurity dialogue, recognizing that such progress depends on the collective state commitment. It supports every effort which leads toward a report that would allow a future permanent mechanism which would face real challenges of cybersecurity in today’s world. We welcome the true reflection of the threat landscape, acknowledging this is the basis of our discussions on responsible state behavior in cyberspace and the implementation of the UN framework in this regard. The threat of misuse of cyber operation, whether by state or non-state actors, is growing more urgent. We would like to highlight a matter of paramount importance as Albania reiterates its deep concern over the continued pattern of malicious cyber activities attributed to state-sponsored actors which have systematically targeted democratic institutions and the civilian infrastructure. A notable escalation occurred in Albania in July 2022 when a destructive cyber attack, assessed to have originated from Iranian state-linked actors, severely distributed a wide range of government digital services. This incident was the first of a broader and ongoing campaign followed by subsequent cyber operations, including multiple intrusions throughout this period. The most recent attack happened on June 20, 2025 when the IT systems of the municipality of our capital city were breached and the normal functioning of public services was disrupted. The attackers publicly claimed the responsibility. Such coordinated action Operations, whether conducted by or on behalf of a state, reflect a deliberate strategy to challenge sovereignty, weaken institutional integrity, interfere with the normal functioning of democratic societies, and reflect a persistent and involving threat landscape. We urge member states to reaffirm their commitment to the principle that no state should itself or should only allow its territory to be used for malicious cyber operations. Member states should support the development of a framework that ensures appropriate consequences for those responsible. Albania therefore calls upon the Open-Ended Working Group to allow for a future mechanism which would explicitly recognize the cyber attacks directed at democratic system and civilian infrastructure to be incompatible with international law and require the establishment of effective accountability mechanisms. In closing, Albania reiterates its strong support to the OEWG’s mandate and underscores its commitment to work constructively to ensure a smooth transition for the future permanent mechanism to advance transparency, stability, and trust in cyberspace, and to strengthen the resilience of democratic institutions against evolving cyber threats. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Albania. Fiji, to be followed by Israel.

Fiji: Mbulevunaka, Chair, dear colleagues and dear friends. Fiji aligns itself with the Pacific Islands Forum statement and provides the following in our national capacity regarding sections A and B of Rev. 1. Firstly, Chair, Fiji thanks you for your leadership in our OEWG journey and we’d like to reaffirm our commitment as we lead to the conclusion of this week. With regards to section 8, Chair, Fiji welcomes paragraphs 9 and 12 regarding the need for more to be done to bridge the digital divides and the gender digital divide, and echoes the statements by Australia, Mauritius, Moldova, and a number of other states, and also refers to the working paper on gender and the permanent mechanism which Fiji has co-drafted and which is supported by a large number of states. Fiji also welcomes text recognizing the many cyber threats already impacting member states, especially impacting our critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure, and the text on the discretion of states to designate their critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure, which is an area of priority for Fiji, and we welcome collaboration in that regard. With regards to section B, Chair, Fiji welcomes text on new and emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and 5G and quantum computing, as there is an urgent need to enhance common understanding amongst all states on the opportunities and the risks of these new and emerging technologies, and this has also been referenced by a number of delegations. Chair, data shows that in our region, in the first four months of this year, threat actors have publicly claimed almost one cyber extortion attack per month, compared with an average of one every four months over the previous two years, and we note that in reality, this number may be higher. Therefore, we support the calls for a dedicated paragraph on ransomware and welcome the text of the human-centric approach in paragraph 24, as has been echoed by delegations. Fiji also supports proposals by the European Union and the African Union and supported by other delegations regarding subsea cable infrastructure, the text amendment proposed by Malaysia and the UK on paragraph 20, the proposal by Ghana regarding paragraph 23 on incorporating security by design, the text proposal by France for paragraph 25. Finally, Chair, Fiji welcomes the reference to the need for strengthened cooperation between CERTs. and private-public partnerships in paragraph 32 to combat these cyber threats that we’re facing, and this has also been echoed by a number of delegations. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Fiji. Israel, to be followed by Pakistan.

Israel: Thank you, Chair, for the floor. As this is the first time a delegation takes the floor during the 11th round of the open-ended working group discussions, Israel wishes to congratulate and thank you and your team for the commendable efforts up to this point, which, if we all do our part during this week, could bring us to a report that will hopefully be adopted by consensus and pave the road for a seamless and smooth transition into the future mechanism and our institutional dialogue. Mr. Chair, in line with your guidance in our agenda, allow me to briefly share a few suggestions we have for the sections B and C of Rev. 1. There are, however, other very important issues that we intend to address later on in our deliberations. Mr. Chair, in paragraph 15, we would like to support the comments of the EU, made by the EU and the US, Australia, and others, that the language of, for exclusively peaceful purposes, should be omitted. In the spirit of compromise, we suggest replacing the language, for purposes exclusively in line with the principle of the UN Charter. This amendment better reflect, in our view, the appropriate scope of purposes that ICD capabilities should be employed for. We could also support the language proposed by Australia to amend this paragraph. In paragraph 16, keeping in line with the new language added at the end of paragraph 16, which refers to the possibility that criminal activities may impact international peace and security, it is important to add identical language to the threat. posed by terrorist groups, which undoubtedly reflects an equal, if not greater, risk to global peace and security. In response to comments by other delegations and in the spirit of constructive dialogue, we suggest adding may or potential before making reference to threats to international peace and security where appropriate. As for paragraph 17, in order to keep consistent with agreed language, we suggested adding the word malicious before the words ICT attacks. In paragraph 25, the word particularly suggests that the use of ICT capabilities in a manner that is consistent with the framework for responsible state behavior could nonetheless contribute to a threat to the international peace and security. This surely isn’t the notion we are suggesting, and this could be easily amended by deleting the word particularly. Additionally, we request that the word illegitimate be added before dissemination in order to keep the language of this paragraph consistent with the paragraph 34H in section C. On a final and more general note, as other delegations have commented, the reference made in section B to emerging technologies such as AI and quantum computing is overly detailed and overemphasizes the risks, rather the opportunities that these technologies may provide. It also gives an incorrect impression that we have thoroughly discussed these issues, an impression we would not carry on to our work in the permanent mechanism. Therefore, we find it appropriate that these areas of text be shortened and recalibrated to respond to the needs of the international community. reflect the promises these technologies may hold. We will provide these comments in writing to the Chair and his team as well. As for Section C, Mr. Chair, in the Zero Draft Paragraph 34C included an explicit reference to non-state actors. This reflects the reality that often it is these actors that conduct malicious ICT activities from the territory of one state against a third party. This acknowledgement is important, reflects our discussions previously, and is consistent with other paragraphs that explicitly reference to non-state actors. Therefore, we suggest adding the words, including by non-state actors, between two commas after the words, internationally wrongful acts using ICTs, in paragraph 34C. In paragraph 34H, a reference to lawful purposes has been added. This new language may create ambiguity, as the law does not always spell out what purposes are lawful, but rather prescribes rules of conduct. It is true that the former language referred only to international law, yet this could be remended in the clearer and preferable way by replacing these words with consistent with domestic and international law. As for paragraph 24J that deals with, inter alia, the sharing of information between the public and private sector, as well as between states, although we fully support the sharing of information between stakeholders, we would also acknowledge the challenges that the states may face in this regard due to a myriad of reasons ranging from domestic law to the lack of technical capacity. Therefore, we suggest adding the words as deemed appropriate after the words, as well as with the involvement of relevant stakeholders. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Pakistan, to be followed by Ukraine.

Pakistan: Thank you, Chair. I have asked for the floor to make a few brief points. First, to express our profound appreciation for your dedication and professionalism, which I believe is recognized by everyone. Second, geopolitical environment in the past five years has discernibly worsened, impacting the ICT landscape and its implications for the global peace and security. Despite a shared comprehension of our collective work, global cyberspace continues to evolve as an emerging, rather, an established arena of conflict. We would have wished these concerns better reflected in the draft report. Third, the Chase revised draft report provides, in our view, a good basis to achieve shared objectives. We, like other delegations, have several proposed amendments in the draft report for it to better reflect our concerns and priorities. However, while doing so, we should remain cognizant of our overarching goal to arrive at a consensus report, which is already the least common denominator of our international understanding. In this spirit, we would strive to make as minimal interventions as possible and allow your efforts to forge consensus and contribute wherever required. Chair, I would like to briefly outline some feedback on the revised text. In Para 15, we support the reference to exclusively peaceful purposes. In the same Para, we’ll request for bringing back the language of zero draft on ICTs in conflict situations. In Para 16, we support impact international peace and security reference. In Para 25, we support the addition of appropriate safeguards and oversight efforts, but would propose to add within the United Nations at the end of it. We also support the reference to cryptocurrency in Para 24 and post-quantum cryptographic solutions in Para 26. We need to maintain a balance between applications of international law and norms, particularly on the possible new norms. The binding instrument or a combination of these approaches. Lastly, we believe that the progress achieved in the OEWG should be preserved and must not be allowed to relapse. Therefore, the only acceptable way forward is to continue in future discussions on security of and in the use of ICTs under the UN auspices. I thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Pakistan, for your contribution. Ukraine to be followed by Ireland.

Ukraine: Thank you, Chair, and thank you for all the efforts of you personally and your team throughout the process and with compiling a comprehensive final document. As a starting comment on the draft final report, Ukraine stresses the importance of adoption of the report that would not be detrimental to our work in this open-ended working group. In relation to the sections A and B, Ukraine fully aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union. Now our delegation would like to make some additional remarks in our national capacity. In relation to 12, we welcome the mention of the increasing level of meaningful participation of women in the work of the OEWG and the related decision-making processes, as we believe it makes the process itself a better balanced one. Our delegation positively notes the inclusion of the UN framework in Para 13, but we would like – we would recommend further emphasis on this issue throughout the document, primarily in paragraphs 7 and 8. We welcome the comprehensive reflection of current cyber threats, which provides an essential basis for advancing responsible behavior in cyberspace. In Para 15, we note that the nature of the ICT determines the possibility of its use for the self-defense purposes in accordance with the Article 51 of the UN Charter, which does not lift the obligation of the states to protect civilians from the consequences of malicious cyber operations. In this respect, we believe that the compromise line here could be a mention of using the ICT in compliance with international law. In relation to Para 34R, in line with what was already mentioned by some other countries, Ukraine considers as premature the discussion over the new proposals for norms on top of the 11 voluntary non-binding norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace that are already in place. We suggest continuing and succeeding with the implementation of the existing 11 norms, and we suggest to put no pressure on the Secretariat regarding the circulation of the list of proposals that is to exclude Para 36. In this respect, we also note that the effective implementation of these norms by the states within the already existing international legal framework should and must precede a possible new international legally binding document in that regard. It is the issue of the will to implement and the responsibility in the first place. A binding document is not the magic pill. We all currently observe the unjustified military aggression against Ukraine lasting for over three years, which was was conducted by a UN Security Council member against another UN member state with full disrespect of the provisions of the already existing legally binding multilateral documents. Therefore, in relation to PARA 41, we cannot accept any language tasking any kind of group or structure within this final report or the future permanent mechanism for developing a binding multilateral document prior to a successful implementation by the states of the already existing UN framework. Having said that, we suggest revising the language to ensure that discussions should not only focus on cooperation, but also on implementing the UN framework. We remain committed to working constructively towards achieving a positive outcome at this session. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Ukraine, for your contribution. Thank you very much. Ireland, to be followed by Czechia.

Ireland: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As this is the first time that I have intervened at this session, I would like to, as many others have, thank you for all of your hard work and that of your team over the course of the years of this process. We would align with the intervention of the EU. I thought that your own summary at the start of this meeting was very helpful, particularly your highlighting of the UN normative framework and the need to focus on what has been agreed by consensus over the course of the OEWG. In this regard, the UN framework of responsible state behavior must be at the core of our work in moving forward this process and indeed underpin our future permanent mechanism. As with Argentina, we recognize the importance of enduring and supporting the independence of American citizens. And that is the key to the of capacity building in this process and in the future perpanent mechanism. Turning to threats, Ireland welcomes the progress that states have made under the threats pillar, particularly in recognizing the devastating impact of ransomware and spyware on a global level. In this regard, we feel that ransomware can be further strengthened in the text as has been proposed by the EU and a number of other states already. Regrettably, over the course of the OEWG, we have seen a deteriorating security environment, increasing use of ICTs in armed conflicts and the breach of the consensus agreed UN norms of responsible state behavior. We must acknowledge the proliferation of state and non-state actors using cyber capabilities for disruptive and offensive means. In this regard in paragraph 15, we would oppose the reference to exclusively peaceful uses, which does not reflect the reality that ICTs are being used in conflicts already. In this regard, we can support the Australian proposal on paragraph 15. Today’s cyber criminals are better organized, have more developed capabilities and are more sophisticated in their approach than ever before and we must recognize this. We welcome the language on critical infrastructure and support the mentions in the AU statement and many others, most recently I think Fiji on the importance of CI and CII in this text. Ireland strongly condemns cyber activities that target healthcare facilities, which is a breach of the UN norms. In paragraph 17, in that regard, we support the highlighting of vulnerable sectors, particularly healthcare and maritime. Turning to the norms of responsible state behavior, we support it and we’re encouraged by the consensus development of the UN normative framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. This agreement was a major achievement. in our collective path towards a global, open, secure cyberspace. We strongly support the Voluntary Checklist that has been developed as an effective capacity-building tool for states, demonstrating the value of sustainable capacity-building initiatives. We also welcome in Section C, Paragraph N, the clarification on the appropriate role that norms play in the UN framework, and the important reiteration that norms do not replace or alter states’ obligations or rights under international law, which are binding. We have, in regards to many of the new norms that have been proposed, as others have previously mentioned, we feel that there has not as yet been sufficient substantive discussion on these, and therefore we would suggest that the emphasis of the four paragraphs on new norms seems out of step with the discussion of the OEWG. We would therefore propose to merge 3402P and delete 34Q and OR, as all of these paragraphs articulate the same point. This would also help to streamline the document. We would also mention that the recommendation in Paragraph 36 on the same lines perhaps might be premature, and so we’d suggest a deletion of that paragraph. On the capacity-building, we feel – sorry, apologies. Turning to legal, I think that many very good points have already been made. We could agree with the proposals that were made, particularly by the Dutch, but also some of the ones that were proposed by the Germans and the UK on legal matters. We think that there’s – at the moment, the balance here is not right, as many others have mentioned. You know, we have had a great deal of discussion on international humanitarian law over the course of the OEWG. We feel that this is not, as yet, reflected in the text, and we would feel that there is a good deal of change to be made in this section. But in the interest of brevity and the fact that many of these points have already been made as mentioned by other states previously, I will leave it at that for the moment. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Ireland, for your contribution. Czechia to be followed by Costa Rica.

Czechia: Thank you, Mr. Chair. The Czech Republic fully aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union and wishes to add the following remarks in its national capacity. First of all, let me commend all yours and your team’s tireless efforts throughout the entire OEWG process, and now particularly on the final report, driven by a vision to reflect as much as possible the wide range of views expressed by member states and to find an acceptable balance between them. And that is not easy. As we approach the conclusion of the OEWG’s mandate, the Czech Republic believes that consensus must remain the foundation of our collective work while preserving the fundamental elements of what the UN is based on, and also while preserving what we have already achieved, as you rightly mentioned, Mr. Chair, in your opening remarks, and we have already achieved a lot. Now let me make a few remarks to the specific parts of the report which we are now discussing, that means the first four parts. On the overview, we welcome how it covers our previous discussions, mentioning not only the OEWG reports, but also the GGE reports, because all of those discussions provided grounds for where we are now, as was mentioned, for example, by Japan and other delegations, and it is important to include that in the report. In the same vein… We would like to support the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and others who propose to add links to other important GGE documents which are still missing from the report. On chapter B on threats, we appreciate the inclusion of key concerns, such as cyber operations targeting health care in Para 17, or the growing impact of ransomware in Para 24, as highlighted also by Columbia and many other states, and including the emphasis on a human-centric approach to it in Para 24, as mentioned, for example, by Fiji, and also the risks posed by emerging technologies in Para 27. This inclusion is crucial, as we are all struggling with these threats. And that is why we should also focus on capacity building in this respect, as mentioned, for example, in Para 32, which we welcome. And that is also why we should direct our cross-cutting discussions that way in the future permanent mechanism, and why we see a high merit in involving private sector in such discussions, while not disputing, of course, the intergovernmental character of this process. But the private sector has the expertise which we, as the governments, do not have, obviously, and therefore is irreplaceable and very valuable for us. On the specific wording on this section, we would like to propose just two minor adjustments for clarification purposes in Paragraph 15 and 25. The last sentence of Para 15, in that sentence, we propose to delete the words for exclusively peaceful purposes and replace them in compliance with international law, as mentioned just a while ago, for example, by Ukraine. And we could also support the proposal by Australia, voiced earlier this morning, which goes in a similar direction. And likewise, in the last sentence of Paragraph 25, we propose replacing the words for lawful purposes in compliance with international law. On Chapter C, norms, the Czech Republic has consistently emphasized that priority must be placed on the implementation of norms which have already been agreed by consensus and we would strongly caution against introducing new norms especially those that have not been thoroughly discussed within the OEWG as this risks undermining the focus on practical application which is crucial. In this regard we note with concern para 34 P of the draft report which suggests that norm development and implementation can proceed in parallel and it is precisely because we place such emphasis on emphasis on implementation we welcome the inclusion of the voluntary checklist of practical actions just as it was mentioned by the Republic of Korea and some other states. We fully support this tool as a practical means to guide national efforts and promote shared understanding. While we generally welcome all suggestions for improvements we do not see the suggestion contained in para 36 to compile and circulate to delegations and non-exhaustive list of proposals to be based on previous discussions. For this reason we join numerous other delegations and request its deletion. And in the last sentence of para 34 H for the same reasons explained for example by Israel we propose replacing the words for lawful purposes with in compliance with international law. And finally on section D on international law we would like to thank you for taking into account some of our comments including in paragraph 39 B double I which in our view has improved. However the broad substantive discussion on this topic has not yet been adequately reflected and we would like to see further elaboration on this matter in particular in relation to international humanitarian law. Similarly we appreciate the inclusion of additional important documents and initiatives in para 41. However due to these additions the paragraph now appears somewhat difficult to navigate and we therefore propose splitting it into sub paragraphs in line what was suggested by Germany, and grouping the references according to their origin. And speaking about paragraph 41, we also request the deletion of the notion possibility of additional legally binding obligations, as we do not see there has been consensus on this topic. And for the same reasons, we would also request deleting the reference to the General Assembly document A-77-984. And just like many others, we also regret that the last sentence of paragraph 40C from the Zero Draft has been removed, as we believe it constitutes an essential substantive addition, and we therefore request its reinstatement. Mr. Chair, the Czech Republic is fully committed to listening to other states and to reaching consensus by the end of this week. And we would like to conclude with the belief that we are all here to work toward an agreement on a practical, action-oriented, and inclusive future mechanism, with a high focus on capacity building and on putting the existing normative framework into practice, also through international cooperation. And we should all do our best to reach that goal. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much. Czechia. Costa Rica, to be followed by Brazil.

Costa Rica: Thank you, sir. Costa Rica appreciates your leadership in this final stage of the process. We appreciate the inclusiveness and transparency with which you have guided the work of the working group, and we recognize the effort reflected in the revised version of the report. Regarding section A, we highlight the way in which the text recognizes the key role of international cooperation in building an open, secure, stable, accessible, peaceful, and interoperable ICG environment. Capacity building not only complements, but also enables the effective implementation of standards, confidence-building measures, and international cooperation. law and is a priority for countries facing structural challenges in developing their national capacities. Regarding Section B, we believe it is right that the text identify ransomware as a significant and expanding threat, in line with the concrete experience of countries such as Costa Rica, where this type of attack has seriously affected essential public services. We also welcome the fact that the text recognizes the new risk factors associated with emerging technologies, such as generative artificial intelligence and quantum computing. Mr. Chair, we echo, as was mentioned by the delegation of Mauritius in support of El Salvador, Moldova, Colombia and others, on the equal and meaningful participation of women in decision-making processes related to the use of ICTs in the context of international security. Finally, we join the call expressed in the room to work with flexibility and constructive spirit, with the objective of adopting a consensus report that reflects the collective progress achieved. Multilateralism, as this group has demonstrated, remains the indispensable framework for addressing the global challenges of cyberspace. Thank you very much.

Chair: Thank you very much, Costa Rica, for your contribution. Brazil, to be followed by Cuba.

Brazil: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. My delegation would like to express its appreciation to you and your team for your work throughout this process, in particular for this REV1, which we believe is a very good basis for our continued discussions and, though, of course, with some room for improvement, makes a very good, very successful in balancing. some diverging and sometimes conflicting positions on this issue. Turning to the overview, my delegation appreciates the due recognition given to cooperation and capacity building, and would like to see that remain. We also would like to see the retention of paragraph 12, Language on Gender and Women, which we highlight is the same wording as the one adopted by consensus in the third APR, so we would like to see that remain. On paragraph 13, we also join other delegations in asking to have the reference to the GGE reports, which are part of the UN AQI on the security of and in the use of ICTs, and as others have mentioned, we highlight that these reports were endorsed by consensus General Assembly resolutions. Our future work should build upon what we have already achieved, and that includes the GGE reports. On threats, we agree with El Salvador on reverting the language on paragraphs 15 and 16 to that of the Zero Draft, which we believe better reflects the delicate relationship between ICT criminal activities and ICT activities that amount to threats to international peace and security. We support, however, the Swiss proposal to add, at the end of paragraph 15, a sentence on the protection of civilian populations in situations of conflict. Furthermore, on paragraph 24, we align with the proposals made to have a separate paragraph specifically on the issue of ransomware, given the prominence of this threat currently, and can support the language that has been put forward by other delegations. We also appreciate the changes made to paragraph 25, particularly regarding the use of the adjective irresponsible. which we believe is better defined in the current wording. We are, of course, willing to work with delegations on further refining the language, as long as we are mindful to keep any references to it within the mandate of this group and what was actually discussed on the issues. Moving on to norms on paragraph 34, we can support the UK’s proposal on adding more, a stronger, clearer reference to the 11 norms and responsible state behaviour on the chapeau of that paragraph, lifted from the previous OEWG’s final report. And moving on to international law on 40C, we would also support reinserting the last phrase from the zero draft on definitions of use of force and also would like to reiterate a proposal we made in previous Town Halls to have an additional subparagraph under 40 that is based on the ICRC humanitarian resolution, which would then read, States further recalled that in situations of armed conflict, IHL rules and principles serve to protect civilian populations and other protected persons and objects, including against the risks arising from ICT activities. These are our remarks for now. As you and others have stated, our final week of negotiations take place in a challenging geopolitical environment. We, however, have succeeded in reaching consensus in other challenging circumstances before and remain confident that, guided by your able leadership and our collective goodwill and flexibility, we can reach a consensus outcome once again. Thank you.

Cuba: And here, in addition to what was stated by the Delegation of Nicaragua on behalf of the group of countries sharing ideas related to our common view on international norms and law, I should like to propose the following. We support maintaining P, Q, and R of Paris 34 of Section C on norms. In Section D on international law, we like deleting the reference to unacceptable use of force, which was in the zero draft of the report, as there were controversial documents which were not discussed within the context of the OEWG. However, looking at paragraph 41, we still see references to questions where there is no consensus in the OEWG, such as the references to international law, IHL, international humanitarian law, be that directly or indirectly, by means of the reference to documents that were drawn up beyond the framework of the OEWG and which are not universally accepted. We would like to stress that we want to see the dilution of any reference which could be kindred with the notion defending the applicability of IHL to cyberspace, and therefore this could lead to unacceptable interpretations seeking to legitimise this sphere as another one of war. We suggest re-wording the second paragraph of paragraph 42, sub-paragraph D, so that it should exactly reflect what happened in the OAWG, taking into account that not all the national or regional positions distributed to the working group were discussed in this framework. Thank you very much, sir.

Chair: Thank you very much, Cuba. Viet Nam to be followed by European Union.

Viet Nam: Mr. Chair, at the outset, Vietnam would like to extend our appreciation for the continued leadership and great efforts of you and your team in preparing the draft of the final report. We also commend the initiative to convene the Tahoe meetings, which have served as an inclusive platform to exchange views and promote greater understanding among members and stakeholders. Vietnam supports the adoption of the final report by consensus. Despite ongoing differences in perspectives among member states, the OAWG process has seen meaningful progress across various thematic topics. We believe the final report should reflect all these achievements. It should avoid overly detained and divisive elements that risk undermining consensus and instead aim to address shared concerns and priorities. The report must clearly outline areas of convergence and consensus, while also comprehensively reflecting the wide range of views expressed during the group’s discussions. In this vein, we would like to make the following comments on the first two sections in the draft 1 of the final draft. Regarding section A, we echo the emphasis by previous speakers on capacity building. which is essential for countries, especially developing ones. We stress the pressing need to put capacity-building initiatives proposed during the OEWG into operation, even as pilot programs, to address the growing needs of developing countries in strengthening resilience and ensuring ICT security. Delaying action until a fully completed framework is in place risks missing critical opportunities to respond to emerging ICT threats. To reflect this view, we would like to make two small amendments to paragraph 8 and paragraph 9, which will be provided to you in writing later. On section B, we support the current revised draft, which has identified existing and potential ICT threats. We believe this section provides good basis for discussion in the future permanent mechanism. Mr. Chair, our delegation would now like to turn briefly to on section D on international law. The group discussion on this topic has been significantly enriched by a wide range of national and regional positions on how international applies in cyberspace. We believe the final report should reflect the areas of convergence among these positions. We would also like to see clearer reference to the application of some areas of international law, particularly state responsibility, human rights, and international humanitarian law in the final report. In this regard, we thank you and your team for updating draft 1 with the working paper entitled application of international law in the use of ICTs, areas of convergence by a cross-regional group of states to which Vietnam is a member. We support the recommendation in the final report to continue the discussion on international law in the future permanent mechanism where states and encourage to share their national views and position. We believe that the mechanism should capitalize upon the convergence among national position by promoting progressive codification of international cyber law. This could result in a concrete outcome such as a guideline, declaration, or set of understandings on the application of international law in cyberspace, which will certainly contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security and promotion of an open, secure, stable, accessible, and peaceful ICT environment. I thank you for your attention.

Chair: Thank you very much, Vietnam, for your statement. European Union, to be followed by Cote d’Ivoire.

European Union: Thank you, Chair. I have the honor to speak on behalf of the EU and its member states. The Canada countries, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Georgia, and the EFTA country, Norway, member of the European Economic Area, as well as San Marino, align themselves with this statement. That means 37 states, as said before. Please allow me to come back to what I said earlier today. We should not allow this report to lose the progress we made on the UN framework, including the 11 voluntary non-binding norms of responsible state behavior. We should not lose it by putting an emphasis on new proposals, which have not been properly discussed, rather than focusing on the further implementation of existing norms. Moreover, the Russian intervention earlier today shows that we actually are even at risk losing our work on the framework altogether, with Russia wanting to just observe it rather than express its commitment to it. And again, I really ask everyone in this room to think about what that would mean if states would not feel themselves restrained by the UN framework of responsible state behavior. cyberspace. Particularly on norms, to date, the open-ended working group discussions on new voluntary non-binding norms have been limited in scope. And the proposals made could be covered by existing norms, or would fall outside of the scope of the open-ended working group mandate. Also, we have not had sufficient substantive discussions on new norms. And therefore, the emphasis of four paragraphs on new norms seems out of step with the discussion of the open-ended working group. We therefore propose to merge 34O to P, and delete Q and R, as all of these paragraphs are duplicatory, and as these articulate actually the same point. We also call for the deletion of the repeated references to the chair summary annexed in the 2021 open-ended working group reports, as just this chair summary is not a consensus document. Further, to compile a list of new norms is premature. Not only are most states, including EU member states, still focused on implementing existing norms, which we consider to be a comprehensive set of expectation for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. The discussion on potential development of new voluntary non-binding norms is something for the future permanent mechanism to decide whether to potentially take on, considering the current level of discussions in this open-ended working group. The already existing consensus language on these issues, which you can use for the final report, and as we are negotiating this final report right now. We therefore request the deletion of paragraph 36. We stress that reflecting the overwhelming appetite of states in this process, we need to keep our focus on the implementation of the existing set of norms, and provide capacity building to effectively do so, as well as identify on that basis any gaps before considering whether new norms are actually necessary. Regarding the implementation of norms, we welcome the recognition of the value of the whole of government coordination in paragraph 34b. Further, with regard to. implementation, we welcome the paragraph 37 of the Adoption of the Voluntary Checklist of Practical Actions for the Implementation of Norms. It functions as a reference for states working to implement the norms, and we would further support the identification of related cybercapacity-building needs in this context. We also look forward to using it ourselves. Let me turn to international law. Over recent years, the international community, repeatedly in the Open Ended Working Group as well as in the UNGA, has affirmed that international law applies in cyberspace. This affirmation has allowed us to make progress, detailing how international law applies and furthering international security and stability. The Open Ended Working Group has taken important steps to clarify how international law applies and to ensure that states uphold their legal obligations in this context. Many working papers have been put forward, including on the application of IHL, such as the cross-regional working paper submitted by Switzerland and 12 other states, presented by Senegal in March 2024 on IHL, and the cross-regional working paper on the application of international law and the use of ICTs, areas of convergence, submitted on behalf of a number of countries across regions from 21st of May 25, also referred just now by Vietnam. Also with the declaration of the EU and its member states in 24 on a common understanding of the application of international law to cyberspace, as well as the common position of the African Union in this context, over 100 member states have now individually or collectively published their position and views on the application of international law. We see this as significant progress by the current Open Ended Working Group and a milestone, because it has brought not only further clarity on how international law applies, but also enabled us to identify common ground. Common ground that we feel needs to be reflected in the final Open Ended Working Group report. It simply cannot be that all the efforts to further and implement UN consensus on international law is placed at the same level as non-consensual proposals by individual states advocating for a new legally binding instrument, which is not the sole solution to addressing cyber threats, and we all know this. We do not think it’s appropriate to move away from the UN Framework for Responsible State Behavior and therefore do not see room for the reference to the letter with the Russian proposal in paragraph 41. Particularly since this paragraph relates to how international law applies and even more so as this has not been debated in the Open-Ended Working Group. We therefore ask for deletion of the reference to this letter in its entirety. The possibility of future elaboration of additional legally binding obligations could be discussed, if appropriate, and once gaps may have been identified following our further discussions on how international law applies. We already acknowledged that and we already made a compromise on this, of which everyone is aware. We have language on this in the consensus reports of last year that can help us to achieve consensus this week. Also paragraph 41, as it stands, is in general quite heavy and it contains documents that are not of the same nature or value. We would suggest dividing the paragraph into parts and in particular having the landmark ICT resolution adopted at the 34th International Conference of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent recognized on its own. Particularly in this section on international law, we reiterate our strong preference for a structure that shows a clear separation between paragraph that concerns the re-information of the applicability of international law and the consensus interpretations of how it applies gained through this open-end working group from new proposals that have not garnered consensus but could be part of future discussions if gaps are found to exist. We should continue to discuss how international law applies to cyberspace and could should continue the implementation of rules, norms, and principles supported by cross-cutting discussions in dedicated working groups and by capacity building. Through this, we can see how to best strengthen the UN framework. This can also be done through scenario-based discussions. In order to identify the gaps, the report needs to actually reflect the progress made on the application of international law. And given that all that we have achieved, and in the understanding to need to find consensus by the end of this week, the EU requests for the final report to simply acknowledge the progress the Open End Working Group has achieved regarding the application of international law, including on the Charter, on peaceful settlement of disputes, international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and the law of state responsibility. We have language proposals on each of these items that could be reflected to this end, and we will share this with you in writing. But please allow me to highlight just one now, which I know other states have and will continue to address as well. We suggest to include a clear reference to the applicability of IHL in cyberspace and the progress made to this end, building on the various cross-regional working papers mentioned, including also the reference to principles of humanity, necessity, proportionality, and distinctions in situations of armed conflict. As others have suggested, we would also welcome the inclusion of language of OP4 of the consensus resolution adopted by the 34th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. And this could be included in the new subparagraph 40H. Achieving consensus on language on state responsibility, human rights law, and IHL have proved to be challenging over the lifetime of the Open End Working Group due to the objections by a small number of states. If the final

Chair: report does not allow us to identify these areas of consensus, at a minimum they should be acknowledged as areas of convergence, as it is not acceptable that the view of the vast majority of Member States were ignored in the final report. on these crucial issues. Furthermore, as regard our discussions on international law, we agree that discussions on how international law applies between legal experts is useful and necessary and this should continue in the plenary discussions as well as dedicated as one of the pillars on the cross-cutting DTGs. We reiterate that discussions on international law between states should be placed in the context of challenges we face and should not be treated in just a silo. How international law applies is not just a theoretical debate nor should the outcome of this debate be predetermined by some states. The debate on international law should most importantly allow states to exchange on practices, seek mutual understanding and common ground as well as build capacity of states on how specific rules and principles of international law apply. In this regard, recommendation 43 is pre-empting the discussions under the future permitting mechanism by adding references to specific draft proposal on a convention. Annex C of last year notes the possibility of future elaboration of additional binding obligations if appropriate and should not be reinterpreted or rewritten. As said, we have accepted this language as a compromise under the pretext that we continue to work on the implementation and if any gaps are identified we could enter in such discussions. We therefore do not consider it necessary or appropriate to mandate the future permitting mechanism to specifically continue the discussions on this specific proposal. We must continue to work on our understanding how international law applies in line with the fragile consensus achieved in Annex C of last year and not stretch this fragile consensus by adding references to a draft convention. We therefore request to put a full stop in the recommendation 43 after ICTs. For a smooth transition to ensure a clear mandate for the permanent mechanism, one that is grounded in the UN Framework of Responsible State Behavior, one that enables the implementation of the UN Framework through action-oriented discussions, one that facilitates capacity building, and one that, if appropriate, and once gaps have been identified, could look into measures of further discussions. This effort towards a smooth transition becomes challenging if other states continue to insist of adding a detailed proposal to an already fragile compromise we have made over recent years. It is all of the pillars of the UN Framework, including, but not just only, international law and their effective implementation that will ensure stability and security in cyberspace. And the effort of implementation will also lead to further discussion on gaps, if they exist, and further measures, if appropriate.

European Union: We should therefore continue to work on the implementation and not dismiss or rewrite it. Let me also continue with CBMs now, if you indulge me, which is another important tool, in addition and in connection to the other pillars I just discussed, that can help us to advance security and stability in cyberspace. Let me thank you for all your efforts, and we are very supportive of the work that you have done in this open-ended working group. We have established eight CBMs, of which we have been able to operationalize one significantly, the POC Directory. While we support these efforts, we also caution against adding too many new elements in the final report. Our collective aim should be to build trust and confidence, which is something that takes time, as we all know, and it requires a strong buy-in and consensus from all UN member states. We therefore suggest to be modest in the final report with new commitments, including in general terms, such as stressing the development of additional CBMs twice in paragraph 47, and refrain from proposals that are unlikely to find consensus, such as the development of technical ICT terms and terminologies, as well as a template that was actually developed as an example by the Secretariat. We have not discussed it, and adopting it would also go beyond what is common practice on the POC networks, such as in the OSCE and in the CERT networks. Their voluntary nature also reflects the need for operational flexibility to adapt to the different organizations and address the dynamic environments in which they are used. We also caution against including the norm and reporting of ICT vulnerabilities in 46F and present it as a CBM, and we caution against putting in obligations as regards to facilitation of access to ICT security goods and services in 46L. Not only have these proposals not been discussed in detail, including regarding their potential nature as a CBM, they have not garnered broad support, and it’s difficult to see a pathway to consensus with these proposals. Placing them into the final report without an exchange during the open-end working group could only undermine the idea that the report will reflect consensus, and in addition is preempting discussions under the future permanent mechanism, while also hampering progress on the implementation of your actual achievements on CBMs today. In this vein, we stress the need to focus on the further development and the implementation of the eight CBMs we already agreed upon, and to just improve the POC directory at this stage. We recognize the value of the directory in enabling communication between states during situations that may threaten international peace and security, but we have also raised our concern about instances of misuse of the directory, an issue that was publicly noted by France and Germany during the February 25 session. We support the Secretariat’s efforts to operationalize and maintain the directory, but we believe that the directory as such needs to first function well, and that existing challenges must be addressed before we can consider an expansion. We believe the priority should be to increase participation and enhance states’ capacity to use the directory in accordance with its agreed purposes. Further development should be informed by the practical experience gained through its use. To summarize, while we are very grateful for your effort in developing the CBMs that we have to date, we suggest it should be left to the future permanent mechanism to guide further discussions and to, moreover, focus on concrete action to implement the actual achievements of this open-ended working group. Thank you very much, Chair.

Chair: Thank you, European Union. Cote d’Ivoire, to be followed by Fiji.

Cote d Ivoire: Mr. Chairman, my delegation aligns itself with the statement delivered by Niger on behalf of the African group, and we wish to duly pay tribute to you for your excellent stewardship of the work over the past five years. We recognize the key role of confidence-building measures in easing tensions as well as improving shared understanding of the framework for responsible conduct of states. We have always supported the various significant measures that we have gradually undertaken over these past few years. These include the initial list of confidence-building measures as well as technical and technological terms for ICT, including the global directory for points of contacts. We recently joined the directory through the nomination of the national focal point, and we are also supportive of continuing and deepening the implementation of this framework as part of the standing future mechanism. We believe that biannual ping tests and exercises and mock simulations are key for its smooth operations and should be fine-tuned. We also support the communications model that was proposed by the Secretariat, as reflected in Annex 2 of the draft report. key tool for facilitating communication, transparency, and confidence among the points of contact. Furthermore, when it comes to extending the open-ended working group, we believe it is wise to stress that the future mechanism should explore to a greater degree the means of encouraging more significant participation in this directory through targeted capacity-building modalities. Moreover, there is an important need to specify for future consideration the priority that needs to be granted for strategies to ensure universal accession to the directory. I now turn to capacity-building. Due to the significance of this, as reflected in the report, we support a regular convening of these meetings, preferably on an annual basis. We also welcome the updating requested by the Secretary for the Establishment and Operationalization of the Global Portal before the first substantive session of the future standing mechanism. We hope that this updating exercise will duly reflect the exchanges on the subject during the 10th substantive session of the OEWG, specifically with more information about the modalities for management of the portal. As a beneficiary, we have appreciated the scholarship program for women in international security and cyberspace. We also reiterate our gratitude to the various donors to this program, specifically Germany. We call for sustaining this initiative and strengthening it through adequate and sufficient financing. To conclude, we fully support the OEWG as well as the successful conclusion of the mandate. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Côte d’Ivoire, Fiji, to be followed by Islamic Republic of Iran.

Fiji: Thank you, Chair. I have the honor to deliver this statement on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum with a presence in the United Nations. Namely, Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Salmon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. On norms, we reiterate our position that the focus must remain on the implementation of existing voluntary non-binding norms. Our members are at varying stages of operationalizing these norms, including identifying national critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure, developing cyber incident response capacity, and applying whole-of-government approaches. Discussions on new norms, particularly without consensus or a clear gap analysis, are premature. We are not opposed to new norms of responsible state behavior, however, given our constrained resources, we need time to implement the 11 agreed norms. The voluntary track list is a helpful step towards mainstreaming norms implementation, but we also need consolidated guidance, capacity support, and peer exchanges to fully realize their potential, which is crucial. On international law, we continue to support a principled approach grounded in the UN Charter and other relevant international legal obligations. We endorse the applicability of international humanitarian law in situations of armed conflict and reaffirm that human rights apply online just as they do offline. While the REV. 1 text reflects many perspectives, the Pacific shares concerns, also shared by others, that it fails to reflect the depth of legal discussions that have taken place within the OEWG, including the high degree of convergence on areas such as international humanitarian law and human rights. We are of the view that a better balance needs to be struck between acknowledging a diversity of views and faithfully reflecting the views of an overwhelmingly majority of states. We would like to see our final annual report demonstrate the progress that has been made in the OEWG. We call attention to the need to further references to state responsibility and further detail on the peaceful settlement of disputes, both important to our understanding of responsible behavior. We are concerned by the lack of balance demonstrated by reference to the possibility of developing additional legally binding obligations, noting that many states have expressed a need to build legal capacities first and that this is a necessary step to enable states to engage in discussions on how existing international law already applies before considering whether there are any gaps. Legal capacity building, including scenario-based training and regional workshops, will be essential to ensuring all states can meaningfully engage in these discussions. Chair Fiji will also be taking the floor later on Sections B and C in our national capacity. Thank you.

Chair: Islamic Republic of Iran, followed by Australia.

Islamic Republic of Iran: Thank you, Mr. Chair. We have the following specific comments on norm section. As noted in our comments on paragraph 25, states have identified commercially available ICT intrusion capabilities as a threat, but specific measures to address it have not yet been discussed in the open-ended working group. Therefore, we cannot support the inclusion of paragraph 34H in the final report at this stage. Paragraph 33 of the third annual progress report explicitly underscores that the voluntary checklist is to be discussed and updated at the forthcoming OEWG session. However, it is a fact that states have not discussed the checklist in any of the meetings held after the eight substantive sessions of the OEWG. Therefore, we request the deletion of paragraphs 34L and 37, as well as annex 1. We further propose that consideration of the checklist be deferred to the future permanent mechanism. In this regard, we propose the following language as the recommended next step on the checklist. I quote, states to discuss and update the voluntary checklist within the framework of the future permanent mechanism, with a view to its development and finalization, while recognizing that it is the prerogative of each state to structure its implementation efforts in accordance with national policies and circumstances. We appreciate the inclusion of paragraphs 34P, Q, and R, and 36 regarding the development of new norms, and we strongly support their retention in the final version of the report. Any attempt to remove these paragraphs would seriously undermine the overall balance of the section on norms, which would be unacceptable for us. In this context, we are concerned about the reference in paragraph 36 to the inclusion of new norms proposed by stakeholders in a list to be compiled by the Secretariat. This approach is not acceptable, as such proposals have not been subject to intergovernmental discussions. We express our support for the specific language proposal put forward by China during the previous meetings on data security. Mr. Chair, we are surprised by the request from some delegations to remove the reference to the Chair’s summary, given that this document has been referenced repeatedly in previous annual progress reports adopted by consensus. For instance, the Chair’s summary is mentioned seven times. in the third annual progress report alone. Therefore, we cannot support the request for deleting references to the chair’s summary throughout the final report. On international law, we believe that section on international law lacks overall balance as it reflects only one existing approach, namely the sufficiency of existing international law and its application to the ICT domain. To ensure a more balanced treatment, the report should also reflect discussions on the potential development of additional legally binding obligations, particularly in paragraphs 38, 41B, and 42. To accurately reflect the discussions held over the past years, we also propose adding the following sentence at the end of paragraph 42F. I quote, in this regard, a proposal was made concerning the update concept of the United Nations Convention on ensuring international information security. End of quote. We welcome the removal of the reference to the use of force in paragraph 40C, which is a positive development. However, we remain concerned about the reference to article 33, paragraph one of the UN Charter in paragraph 40B, which lacks consensus and reflects significant divergence among the state and therefore should be deleted. A new paragraph 42D has been introduced referring to national and regional views on the application of international law. It states that these views were discussed within the OEWG, which does not accurately reflect the proceedings. Given the current lack of clarity regarding the responsibility of the private sector and platforms with extraterritorial impact in the ICT environment, we underscore the importance of in-depth discussions on their obligations within the framework of the future payment mechanism. We therefore request that the reference to this important issue be retained in. Paragraph 42B. Mr. Chair, concerning the unsubstantiated political accusation made by the representative of Albania, I would like to bring the following to your attention. First, the Islamic Republic of Iran categorically rejects and denounces any kind of unwarranted attribution for the alleged cyber attack on Albania’s infrastructure. This accusation is completely unfounded and is hereby rejected and condemned. Second, given the nature and technical characteristics of cyberspace and the challenges of attribution in the information, communication, technologies, environment, Iran warns of the negative consequences of falsified and forged attribution to the state. We need to observe the principle enshrined in the UNGA Resolution 73-27, which states that all accusation brought against a state in organizing or committing wrongful acts should be substantiated. Paradoxically, this principle has been ignored by those states that advocate implementing the norms of responsible state behavior in ICT environment, and at the same time make groundless accusations that contradict these norms. Publicly attributing responsibility for incidents in the information space to a specific state without any technical evidence is unacceptable and constitutes irresponsible behavior in the ICT environment. Such behavior clearly underscores the validity of certain states’ concerns that existing norms are insufficient and that new norms must be developed. Third and finally, I would like to underscore that Iran, as the primary target and main victim of cyber attacks against its vital infrastructure, has expressed its readiness for technical cooperation since the very first day these baseless claims were made by Albania. Yet, to date, we have received no response. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Republic of Iran for your statement. Australia to be followed by China.

Australia: Australia aligns itself with the Pacific Islands Forum statement delivered by Fiji and we will now make some additional remarks in our national capacity. Chair, on norms and international law, we appreciate that there have been some positive additions but we suggest that these sections could be improved considerably to strike a better balance in the text and to more accurately reflect the discussions that have taken place in the OEWG. First, turning to norms, on paragraph 34n we agree with many others that the new additions should be moved to the chapeau of paragraph 34 and additional consensus language on the 11 voluntary non-binding norms of responsible state behavior should be recalled. On paragraph 34h we propose the same change here as in paragraph 25 since these paragraphs are linked amending for lawful purposes to consistent with international law. On the new paragraph 34r and the recommendation in paragraph 36 we echo others that there is no consensus among states to compile and circulate a list of proposals on norms. Only a small number of states have advocated for new norms while many more states have pointed out that such proposals may already be addressed by existing norms. We have also heard from many developing states that have raised the need to focus first on building capacity in order to implement existing norms. We therefore request that these paragraphs be deleted. On paragraph 37 we support the adoption of the voluntary checklist of practical actions and note it could be further enhanced by mainstreaming gender equality actions under relevant norms as detailed in the cross-regional paper on gender and the future permanent mechanism. Turning now to international law, on paragraph 40C Australia supports retaining the last sentence from the zero draft on the use of force which has been omitted in Rev 1. The supplementary detail was a very positive addition that added granularity on common understandings reached. Australia also joins Vietnam in calling for insertion of additional language in line with the cross-regional paper co-sponsored by Australia and a group of 16 other states on the topics of international human rights law, the law of state responsibility and international humanitarian law. This text could be included in paragraph 40. The proposed language in the paper reflects progress made and emerged common understandings reached on international law in the OEWG. The language draws from agreed language adopted by all states including the 2021 GGE report and is supported broadly by states across different regions. On paragraph 41 Australia welcomes the inclusion of references to the two OEWG cross-regional papers on international law as well as references to the discussions that have taken place on IHL and state responsibility. We consider that a reference to international human rights law should also be included to accurately reflect our discussions. In paragraph 41 we are however concerned with the reference to possible additional legally binding obligations which is a topic that has received very little support and does not fall within the scope of the topic of how international law applies to the use of ICTs. It duplicates content already elsewhere in the report including at paragraph 42 F giving it undue prominence in the international law chapter. The letter referring to a convention is also not relevant to the topic of how existing international law applies. These references in paragraph 41 should therefore be deleted. We further suggest placing the reference to the 34 ICT resolution in a separate paragraph to reflect its special status as a consensus document. Noting that we have heard many in the room today call for more substantive content on IHL, including from Brazil and the Republic of Korea, we consider that this paragraph would present a good opportunity to insert a grade 34 IC language on IHL. In paragraph 43 we echo the EU and others in calling for the recommendation to end with the words applies on the use of ICTs as we should not prejudge the topics to be discussed in the future permanent mechanism. Thank you Chair.

Chair: Thank You Australia. China to be followed by Finland.

China: I would like to thank you your team and the Secretariat for your efforts to promote consensus. We would like to align ourselves with Niagara for their statement. On behalf of our delegation, I would like to make the following additions. On section A and B, I would like to make three points considering time constraint. We would like to provide our written recommendations on edits. First, considering the fact that China is not only a target of cyber attack by malicious actors in the cyberspace, by state actors in the cyberspace, China is also the victims of these state actors in spreading misinformation, disinformation on attribution. Given the power of China, I would like to ask that we add 17 bits after paragraph 17. I would like to read the addition. States expressed serious concerns regarding the spread of disinformation on attributions of malicious ICT activities. In the norms section, I would like to add relevant wording as well. Point number two. On paragraph 16 and paragraph 24, China believes that cyber criminal activities are different from malicious cyber activities that impact international peace and security. We believe that under the UN framework, there is a specific mechanism that is dealing with the issue. So we should not equal these two things. At the same time, ransomware, in essence, is a cyber criminal activity, and it should not be linked to any impact on international peace and security. China would like to propose deletion of relevant wordings. On paragraph 15, the use of ICTs for exclusively peaceful purposes has long been a consensus among us. When ICT is being widely used in conflicts in the current landscape, This shows that we are advocating for the use of ICTs for exclusive peaceful purposes. This shows our foresightedness and the significance of the use of ICTs for peaceful purposes. Because of this, we do need to keep the reference here so that we could send a signal to the international community that we are firmly committed to promoting the use of ICTs for exclusively peaceful purposes. Section C and Section D, China has three points to make. First, there should be a balance between norms and international law. Creating existing rules and creating new rules should also strike a balance. This is why we were able to reach consensus in previous sessions. This is not only included in summaries of our previous discussions. This also is reflected in the wording and the organization or structure of recommendation parts. On the summaries of our discussions, in this OEWG session, many countries, including China, in terms of supplier security, data security, cross-border data sharing, attribution cooperation mechanism, gap disclosure, vulnerability disclosure. have made many suggestions and have conducted discussions in these areas. Throughout the whole process, China has always proposed this global security – a data security initiative. Considering PARA 41 has made a detailed summary of our discussions on international law, we would like to put these suggestions and recommendations into the discussions on norms. On PARA 41, I would like to remind us that under international law, we also talked about UN Charter and the principle of sovereignty as well as other major important topics. We would like to ask that those things could be reflected here in our discussions part. At the same time, we should change our topic directly to international law in order to reflect our discussions in a more accurate manner. Now when it comes to recommendation part, recommendations on norms should be consistent with the part under international law. We would like to ask in terms of PARA 35, we need to change states to continue exchanging views to – states to continue to engage in focused Paragraph 36 On commercially available intrusion capacities, China has always made it clear that the transfer of cyber weapons between governments and the spread of aggressive weapon technologies are something that are more concerning. The current text is far from being balanced. In particular, when it comes to Para 34H, it does not consider the major source of threat, which is state actor. It only focuses on commercially available ICT intrusion capacities. It is China’s belief that this is in fact not focusing on what matters and this is not an approach that we should adopt. We would like to suggest deleting H. At the same time, I’ve noted that countries that support the retention of Para H are countries that are opposing the creation of new norms. We hope that these countries should maintain consistency in implementing their own standards. Point number three. On the new Para 34H…

Chair: Thank you, China, for your statement. And could you please share your statement in English with the chair’s office? Thank you. Finland, to be followed by Ghana.

Finland: Thank you, Chair. I have the honor to deliver this statement on international law on behalf of the Nordic countries – Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and my own country, Finland. The Nordic countries fully align themselves with the EU statement. This final year of the OEWG, we also mark the 80th anniversary of the signing of the UN Charter. What better time to reaffirm our steadfast commitment to the rules-based international order, with the UN at its core, and to upholding international law. As affirmed by the previous OEWG and endorsed by the General Assembly, international law, including the UN Charter, applies in cyberspace. We consistently emphasize that the applicability of international law does not depend on the technological means employed, but applies across domains. More than a half of the UN member states have now elaborated positions and understandings on how international law applies in cyberspace. These have paved the way towards a truly common understanding. This broad support should be reflected in the OEWG final report. In the course of the OEWG, many of the charter-based obligations have been discussed and references in the annual progress reports. We would wish to reiterate that the prohibition of the threat or use of force apply to any use of force, regardless of the weapons or means employed. Depending on the scale and effects of the cyber operation in question, it may violate this prohibition. And depending on its gravity, a cyber operation may also constitute an armed attack under international law. Regarding peaceful settlement of disputes, the commitment made by states in the GGE report from 2021 continues to be valid. We also wish to emphasize that the rule of state sovereignty is applicable in cyberspace and that a breach of the rule may amount to an international wrongful act and give rise to state responsibility. We are pleased with the further discussions regarding IHL and ICTs both in the OEWG and in other fora, and the final report should clearly refer to IHL’s applicability in cyberspace. The report should also explicitly acknowledge that in situations of armed conflict, IHL rules and principles serve to protect civilian populations and other protected persons and objects, including against the risks arising from ICT activities. The landmark ICT resolution adopted at the 34th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent merits to be taken into consideration by the OEWG. not merely as a reference, but also regarding its substance and the progress made. The Nordic countries affirmed the need for states to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights and fundamental freedoms, both online and offline, in accordance with their respective obligations. This should also be reflected in the final report. How international law applies in cyberspace will continue to be discussed in the future permanent mechanism. The starting point is the established acquis of the successive GGEs and OEWGs that international law applies in cyberspace. Building on the three annual progress reports, the final report should clearly reflect and acknowledge the significantly deepened discussions during the OEWG on how international law applies in cyberspace. We need to look ahead while holding on to the common understanding already developed. We consider that international law is relevant to all thematic discussions, and the suggested dedicated thematic groups should reflect this. International law is also included in the plenary session. In the future mechanism, the focus should be on addressing practical, concrete challenges. Finally, we wish to thank the Chair for all the work and effort in seeking to take into account divergent views and to continue to steer us in the process of making the future permanent mechanism a reality. The longer version of this statement will be shared in writing. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you Finland for your statement. Ghana to be followed by Russian Federation.

Ghana: My delegation would like to now share our views on sections C and D. Mr. Chair, my delegation welcomes paragraph 34C regarding further discussions to build common understanding on norm C, which highlights that states should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs. In support of the comments delivered by Fiji on behalf of the Pacific Island Forum, my delegation is not opposed to conversations around new norms either. However, we see merit in the need to ensure that member states focus on implementing existing norms nationally and regionally. In line with this, my delegation is in support of Paragraph 34B, which advocates for a whole of government coordination on the implementation of the voluntary non-binding norms and the need to raise awareness of these norms at the national level. Ghana during previous sections highlighted the importance of standardized templates and as such welcomes a reference to a common template in Paragraph 34E for requesting assistance and responding to such requests, which is essential to facilitating effective and timely cooperation. Finally, Ghana supports the adoption of the Voluntary Checklist of Practical Actions for the Implementation of Voluntary Non-Binding Norms of Responsible States Behavior in the Use of ICTs, as contained in the next of the Rev. 1 draft of the final report. Now on international law. On Sections D, Mr. Chair, Ghana welcomes Paragraph 42E of the Rev. 1 draft of the final report and sees merit in the retention of this paragraph, particularly the reference to principles that should underpin capacity building efforts to develop a common understanding on how international law applies in the use of ICTs, as well as the proposals for such capacity building initiatives, including workshops, conferences and best practices exchanges at the international, inter-regional and sub-regional levels. To further build on this, Ghana supports the inclusion of scenario-based discussions in this paragraph after conferences, as highlighted by Netherlands. In prioritizing capacity building, Ghana recently joined the ICT work stream of the ICRC’s Global Initiative to Galvanize Political Commitment to International Humanitarian Law to join other like-minded States and build a shared understanding on the topic. Ghana will be co-chairing this work stream with colleagues from Luxembourg, Mexico, and Switzerland. Additionally, the development of online and in-person training courses, as well as the online resource libraries, will serve as a useful tool for developing countries. To conclude, Ghana supports earlier references that have been made to include previous GGE reports in the existing reports to clearly outline the progress that has been made over the years, as highlighted by Netherlands and re-echoed by the UK. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you, Ghana, for your contribution. Russian Federation, to be followed by Italy.

Russian Federation: Mr. Chairman, distinguished colleagues. According to the mandate for the OEWG, in resolution 75-240, states as a priority need to continue to formulate rules, norms, and principles for responsible conduct of states in the information space. We cannot but note in the current version of the final report of the group, this key premise has been violated. As a whole, the document, and specifically in the rules of conduct, has unjustified distortion in favor merely of implementation of the existing list of voluntary norms. I refer to paragraphs 30B, 30C, 32, and 36. There is a blatant biased reflection of the course of discussions about this aspect of the mandate. Specifically, there is an absence of something that has been repeatedly voiced by a number of delegations, including the Russian delegation. I refer to the premise about the importance of attributing voluntary, non-binding rules of conduct and making this a legally binding status. I refer to paragraph 34. 34, we stress that there’s a need to incorporate this language in the section on norms. Furthermore, we propose that paragraph 34N, which stresses a difference in the status and rules of conduct and norms of international law, to be brought to the beginning of that paragraph and to be moved there. We cannot agree with the proposal to approve the control list of practical actions to implement rules of conduct, paragraphs 34L and 37. This initiative was not thoroughly considered during the final negotiations round of OEWG, including – and this – we – Russia has a number of – and a number of delegations have principled objections to this, and we propose a continuation of this under the future permanent standing mechanism. We propose that it remain provisional in nature, given that the draft list has already been incorporated in Annex A to the third annual report of the OEWG and has not yet been changed. We stress that it be deleted from the list of proposals for the final report and for the relevant adjustment in paragraph 34L and 37 to be made. In order to ensure progress in terms of rules, norms, and principles for the future standing mechanism, we recommend the deletion from the commendation of paragraph 36B, provisions on the final fine-tuning of existing norms, and to use the two-term observation instead of implementation vis-a-vis the voluntary rules of conduct for states. I also wish to react in this context to the statement that was delivered by the EU representative. In my language, observe is to adhere to, to abide by, or to comply with, and this presupposes a high level of obligation. So far as my language – my knowledge of English allows me to understand English, these are also clear synonyms to the verb observe. Now turning to implementation, this is a matter of domestic policy of states. This is a part of their sovereignty. We cannot dictate to states how they are to implement the norms at the national level. This is only possible in the event of the adoption of a legally binding agreement and the relevant ratification thereof by the relevant states. I now turn to paragraph 34E. We believe there’s an important need to focus on the development through the OEWG to focus on universal templates for data exchange through the UN’s Establishment Global Intergovernmental Register for Contact Points, and not the templates for the delivery of assistance on matters related to malicious impact on critical infrastructure. I am confident that states will be able to deal with this matter bilaterally. We note the unjustified emphasis on something which is not widely supported. I refer to the idea of internal domestic measures for the implementation of voluntary norms, paragraph 34B, and the establishment of some kind of a culture of constant improvement vis-a-vis critical information infrastructure, paragraph 34F. We think it is wise to delete this language in the above-mentioned paragraphs. On the whole, the section on norms could be shortened specifically through paragraph 34F and 34J, as well as for certain provisions of 34M to be brought to the – or moved to the capacity-building section. I’ll turn to the section on the applicability of international law. In principle, in our view, it is important to incorporate recommendation – paragraph 43 on the possibility of developing – developing a legally binding agreement, an information space, in accordance with the OEWG report, which was approved last year for the standing mechanism. We also firmly believe that the fact that the question is being set out in and of itself by certain delegations about the necessity for legally binding norms is simply not relevant. The international community has already taken a concrete step in that direction, having reached agreement last year on the UN Convention Against Cybercrime. This became the first international treaty in the area of safety and security in the use of ICT. For this reason, in paragraph 41 on the relevant national initiatives, we propose that there be a reference with an up-to-date note of state sponsors of the concept of the OEWG on providing for international information security. We also insist on the deletion of mention to the non-consensual resolution of the 34th International Red Crescent and Red Cross Conference on the Protection of Civilians in the Context of the Use of ICT in the light of the centrality of the role of the UN and the OEWG on the question of the applicability of international law vis-a-vis the use of ICT. What is also not feasible, in our view, is to single out certain aspects such as protection of critical infrastructure and data as priorities for the discussion on the matter of the applicability of international law and information space under the future mechanism of paragraph 42B. We believe it is wise to include in the list the relevant proposals on the development of a legally binding – of legally binding agreements and taking into account the specific features of ICT paragraph 42B in order to ensure balanced reflection of the position of states parties of the OEWG. Turning to the section on international law, the idea of briefings of experts, including the International Law Commission, paragraph 42A, is premature for states. What is optimal, in our view, is to have paragraphs shortened on the capacity-building of states on the matter of international law, paragraph 42E and 45 in the section on capacity-building. Mr. Chairman, I also wish to note in response to the statements made by a number of delegations who have been proposing that we revert back – in paragraph 40C to include a highly contentious notion which places cyber operations on equal footing with the use of force in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. This is an approach which is neither consensus-based nor is it supported by the majority of states. And our objective during this final session is to enshrine in the final report specifically those elements which constitute the fruit of consensus. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you, Russian Federation, for your statement. Italy, please.

Italy: Thank you, Mr. Chair. First of all, I’d like to express our sincere appreciation for your leadership and for preparing the final report. Let me also extend my gratitude to the Secretariat for its invaluable support. Mr. Chair, as you pointed out earlier today, we have almost reached the final goal of the OIWG. We now need to make sure that everyone’s concerns are taken into due consideration for a more balanced consensus-based report that is firmly anchored to the framework of responsible state behavior. behavior. Italy fully aligns itself with the statements delivered by the European Union. I would like just to share a few additional reflections on Sections B, C, and D in our national capacity. On Section B, we welcome the thorough analysis of the threat landscape, acknowledging this is the basis for the implementation of the UN framework. In this context, we note that ICTs are increasingly being employed in ways that combine different non-conventional instruments of influence, including activities below the threshold of armed conflict. We are thus confident that the final report for Concerns Paragraph 15 will reflect this understanding about the potential hybrid use of ICTs with which the international community is daily confronted. We also welcome the inclusion of a dedicated paragraph on AI. Italy highlights the importance to continue to better understand the risks associated with emerging technologies, including AI, quantum computing, IoT, and cloud computing, and to dedicate appropriate space in the report to each of them as they do have a direct impact on international security, and we are called to address the risks they pose. As for Section C, we strongly believe that states should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs, as is rightfully mentioned in Paragraph 34C. However, building on that, we underline that all the actors present within a state’s territory so state and non-state ones should fall under the application of this rule. As for Section D, we would like to see the progress made on international humanitarian law reflected into the final report. In particular, we once again underline the importance of upholding the core principles reaffirmed in the resolution adopted at the 34th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, as also recalled a while ago by the Netherlands, the UK, the EU, Finland, and others. In addition, we stress that human rights have to be protected in the digital space inasmuch as they are offline. This is much more evident and undeniable now than it was at the beginning of the OEWG. Furthermore, we share many delegations’ conviction that we should continue to debate on how international law applies to cyberspace and continue to implement existing rules, norms, and principles supported by cross-cutting discussions and by capacity building before introducing new norms or legally binding instruments for which consensus has not been reached. Finally, we regret the omission of previously agreed language on the threshold for an ICT operation to constitute a use of force, and we support its reinsertion in paragraph 40C. Mr. Chair, to conclude, let us not lose sight of the considerable progress already achieved in this OEWG. We encourage a final report that duly reflects this progress and reinforces our collective, shared commitment to implement the UN Framework on Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much. Now, friends, I think we have about another maybe 15 delegations, so certainly we’ll need to tick up the list of speakers and continue our work tomorrow morning. But second, I just want to share that tomorrow morning we will shift to, in addition to A, B, C and D, also to sections E and F tomorrow morning. And I’ll give an opportunity to delegations who are waiting on the list to speak to also make comments on these two additional sections. So we’ll keep for the moment regular institutional dialogue apart and I intend to take that up tomorrow afternoon or hopefully earlier in the morning if we can exhaust the speaker’s list. Thirdly, now there has been some interventions which are fairly long and some of you have been speaking for groups. I respect that. I acknowledge that these are very important inputs and I’m hoping also that the statements that we have heard today will help to frame the discussions and that those who are speaking tomorrow do not find the need to repeat statements that were already made today, especially if they were part of these groups to which they had been, to which they are aligned. So I seek your indulgence in that. The last comment I wanted to make was that today, or rather this afternoon, we went deeper into the discussions because we were trying to cover four additional or two additional sections, so covering a chunk of REV1. And so we’ve continued our work. The tone has been constructive. The contributions have been detailed and specific. But there’s also a degree of expressing strong preferences for your own positions while expressing objections and requests for deletions of proposals that are not your positions. And this has been the dynamic to some extent this afternoon. And that is not surprising because this is a negotiation, you obviously are not ready to part with your national positions and your preferred positions. But that too is understandable. But what you need to keep in mind, as we reflect on the day’s work, is that if we put together everyone’s preferences, then that is not going to bring us to convergence. I think we will need some expressions of flexibility, and that will mean that everyone, accepting the fact that other delegations who have a different point of view also need to have their points of view reflected. And that is where the balance needs to be struck. So I appeal to each one of you to keep that in mind, because it’s in some ways easy to take a position that I want the document to be reflected the way it is aligned with my own national position. But anything that is not aligned with my national position, I would like to have it deleted. I mean, that kind of reasoning is not going to get us very far. So please keep this in mind when you come back for your statements tomorrow. Tomorrow we’ll start with France, to be followed by the United States. And to be fair to them, I don’t want to give them the floor at this point, partly because we are running out of time, partly because the interpreters have worked hard. They’ve also passed me the message that… Delegations have to speak a bit slower. Obviously, projecting the clock on the screen is stressing quite a number of you and accelerating your statements. But if you slow down, we don’t have all the time either. So I really think you need to, this evening, those who are planning to speak tomorrow, to focus on the essential points, so that you are communicating your position in terms of what you can live with, what you can accept, what the compromises could be, and of course any bridging proposals, if you have any to put forward. The final thing is that since you worked very hard today, I’d like to invite all of you for a drink at the Singapore Mission. This is the traditional start of the meeting reception that I would like to host for all of you this evening at 6.15 p.m. at the Singapore Mission. So please come and have a drink, meet and mingle, get to know people, and if you can also negotiate bridging proposals at the reception over a drink in a neutral territory like the Mission of Singapore, that is also very much welcome. So friends, thank you very much for a productive day. My thanks to the interpreters for keeping up with the rapid speeches. The meeting is adjourned. We resume tomorrow morning at 10 a.m. Thank you for your attention. you

Agreement points

Opposition to ‘exclusively peaceful purposes’ language in paragraph 15

Speakers

– Kingdom of Netherlands
– Republic of Korea
– Israel
– Germany
– United Kingdom
– Ireland
– Czechia

Arguments

Opposition to “exclusively peaceful purposes” language in paragraph 15

Need for clearer language on international humanitarian law application

Support for replacing ‘exclusively peaceful purposes’ with UN Charter compliance language

Concerns about document giving undue weight to non-consensus proposals

Support for voluntary checklist of practical actions for norm implementation

Concerns about malicious ICT activities targeting healthcare and maritime sectors

Summary

Multiple speakers from different regions agreed that the ‘exclusively peaceful purposes’ language in paragraph 15 should be deleted or replaced with language referring to compliance with international law or UN Charter principles, arguing this language was problematic and not based on consensus

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Focus on implementing existing 11 norms rather than developing new ones

Speakers

– Republic of Korea
– Kingdom of Netherlands
– United Kingdom
– Ukraine
– Germany
– Australia
– European Union
– Fiji

Arguments

Focus should be on implementing existing 11 norms rather than developing new ones

Opposition to paragraphs 34R and 36 on developing new norms

Opposition to references to new legally binding obligations

Premature to discuss new norms without proper consensus

Concerns about document giving undue weight to non-consensus proposals

Request for inclusion of state responsibility and human rights law references

Need to reflect progress made on IHL through ICRC resolution

Opposition to prejudging future mechanism discussions on binding instruments

Summary

A significant number of speakers agreed that the priority should be on implementing the existing 11 voluntary non-binding norms rather than developing new ones, with many calling for deletion of paragraphs 34R and 36 that would mandate development of new norms

Topics

Cybersecurity | Legal and regulatory

Support for dedicated paragraph on ransomware attacks

Speakers

– Republic of Korea
– Malaysia
– Kingdom of Netherlands
– Germany
– United Kingdom
– Costa Rica
– Ireland
– Fiji

Arguments

Support for dedicated paragraph on ransomware attacks targeting critical infrastructure

Emphasis on protecting critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure

Opposition to “exclusively peaceful purposes” language in paragraph 15

Concerns about document giving undue weight to non-consensus proposals

Support for voluntary checklist of practical actions for norm implementation

Need for inclusive and transparent future mechanism

Concerns about malicious ICT activities targeting healthcare and maritime sectors

Opposition to prejudging future mechanism discussions on binding instruments

Summary

Multiple speakers supported having a dedicated paragraph specifically addressing ransomware attacks, recognizing it as a significant and expanding threat that warrants special attention in the final report

Topics

Cybersecurity | Infrastructure

Need to reinstate use of force language in paragraph 40C

Speakers

– Kingdom of Netherlands
– United Kingdom
– Brazil
– Australia
– Italy

Arguments

Support for reinstating use of force language in paragraph 40C

Opposition to references to new legally binding obligations

Request to strengthen references to GGE reports in overview section

Support for scenario-based discussions and capacity building on international law

Importance of preserving UN framework as foundation

Summary

Several speakers regretted the deletion of language on use of force from paragraph 40C and called for its reinstatement, arguing it represented concrete progress and was widely reflected in national and regional positions

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Support for capacity building programs for developing countries

Speakers

– Cameroon
– Cote d Ivoire
– Viet Nam
– Ghana
– Ukraine
– Costa Rica
– Czechia

Arguments

Emphasis on capacity building for least developed countries

Need for targeted capacity building for developing countries

Support for global ICT cooperation portal development

Need for technical assistance and training programs

Importance of women’s participation in cybersecurity discussions

Need for inclusive and transparent future mechanism

Support for action-oriented discussions in future mechanism

Summary

Multiple speakers, particularly from developing countries, emphasized the critical importance of capacity building programs and technical assistance for developing nations to enhance their cybersecurity resilience and meaningful participation in the process

Topics

Capacity development | Cybersecurity

Similar viewpoints

These speakers generally supported maintaining references to peaceful purposes, developing new norms alongside existing ones, and ensuring balanced representation of different approaches to international law including potential legally binding instruments

Speakers

– China
– Pakistan
– Islamic Republic of Iran
– Russian Federation
– Cuba

Arguments

Support for maintaining “exclusively peaceful purposes” language

Emphasis on preserving consensus achievements in transition

Support for retaining paragraphs on new norm development

Call for flexibility and compromise in final negotiations

Importance of responsible attribution practices

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

These Western/European speakers consistently emphasized the need to focus on implementing existing consensus frameworks, reflect progress made on international humanitarian law, and avoid giving undue weight to proposals that lack broad consensus

Speakers

– European Union
– Kingdom of Netherlands
– United Kingdom
– Germany
– Australia

Arguments

Need to reflect progress made on IHL through ICRC resolution

Opposition to paragraphs 34R and 36 on developing new norms

Opposition to references to new legally binding obligations

Concerns about document giving undue weight to non-consensus proposals

Request for inclusion of state responsibility and human rights law references

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Human rights | Cybersecurity

These speakers emphasized the importance of legal capacity building and scenario-based training before considering new binding instruments, and supported strengthening references to international humanitarian law and human rights

Speakers

– Fiji
– Australia
– Finland
– Ghana

Arguments

Opposition to prejudging future mechanism discussions on binding instruments

Request for inclusion of state responsibility and human rights law references

Support for scenario-based discussions and capacity building on international law

Need for technical assistance and training programs

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Capacity development

Unexpected consensus

Support for POC directory with concerns about expansion

Speakers

– European Union
– Cote d Ivoire
– Fiji

Arguments

Support for operationalizing POC directory with proper safeguards

Support for biannual ping tests and mock simulations

Caution against expanding directory before addressing existing challenges

Explanation

Despite different regional perspectives, there was unexpected consensus that the POC directory should be maintained and improved, but with caution about expansion until existing challenges are addressed – showing pragmatic agreement across different blocs

Topics

Cybersecurity | Capacity development

Importance of women’s participation in cybersecurity

Speakers

– Ukraine
– Albania
– Costa Rica

Arguments

Importance of women’s participation in cybersecurity discussions

Concerns about state-sponsored cyber attacks on democratic institutions

Need for inclusive and transparent future mechanism

Explanation

Speakers from different regions and political alignments unexpectedly converged on emphasizing the importance of women’s meaningful participation in cybersecurity discussions, suggesting this has become a broadly accepted principle

Topics

Gender rights online | Human rights | Cybersecurity

Overall assessment

Summary

The discussion revealed clear regional and ideological divisions, with Western/European countries generally favoring implementation of existing frameworks and opposing new norm development, while some developing countries and non-Western states supported balanced approaches including new norm development. However, there was broad consensus on practical issues like ransomware threats, capacity building needs, and the importance of the POC directory.

Consensus level

Moderate consensus exists on technical and practical cybersecurity issues, but significant divisions remain on fundamental questions about the balance between existing and new norms, the role of international law, and the structure of future mechanisms. The Chair’s appeal for flexibility suggests these divisions may be bridgeable through compromise, but will require significant diplomatic effort to achieve consensus on the final report.

Different viewpoints

Use of ‘exclusively peaceful purposes’ language in paragraph 15

Speakers

– China
– Pakistan
– Kingdom of Netherlands
– Republic of Korea
– Australia
– Israel
– Ukraine
– Czechia

Arguments

Support for maintaining ‘exclusively peaceful purposes’ language

Opposition to ‘exclusively peaceful purposes’ language in paragraph 15

Support for replacing ‘exclusively peaceful purposes’ with UN Charter compliance language

Summary

China and Pakistan strongly support maintaining the ‘exclusively peaceful purposes’ language, arguing it shows foresightedness and firm commitment to peaceful ICT use. However, multiple Western countries (Netherlands, Republic of Korea, Australia, Israel, Ukraine, Czechia) oppose this language, calling it problematic, ambiguous, and not based on consensus agreements. They propose alternative language or deletion.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Development of new norms versus implementation of existing 11 norms

Speakers

– Republic of Korea
– Kingdom of Netherlands
– United Kingdom
– Ukraine
– Ireland
– Islamic Republic of Iran
– China
– Russian Federation

Arguments

Focus should be on implementing existing 11 norms rather than developing new ones

Opposition to paragraphs 34R and 36 on developing new norms

Support for retaining paragraphs on new norm development

Need for balance between implementing existing norms and developing new ones

Summary

Western countries (Republic of Korea, Netherlands, UK, Ukraine, Ireland) strongly oppose developing new norms, arguing focus should be on implementing existing 11 norms and that new proposals lack consensus. Iran, China, and Russia support retaining language on new norm development, with Iran arguing removal would undermine balance and Russia calling for legally binding status for norms.

Topics

Cybersecurity | Legal and regulatory

References to international humanitarian law (IHL) in cyberspace

Speakers

– European Union
– Finland
– Republic of Korea
– Kingdom of Netherlands
– Cuba
– Islamic Republic of Iran

Arguments

Need for clearer language on international humanitarian law application

Need to reflect progress made on IHL through ICRC resolution

Importance of responsible attribution practices

Summary

EU, Finland, Republic of Korea, and Netherlands strongly support including clear references to IHL applicability in cyberspace and incorporating language from the ICRC resolution. Cuba and Iran oppose IHL references, with Cuba arguing this could legitimize cyberspace as ‘another sphere of war’ and Iran wanting deletion of IHL references.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Human rights

References to additional legally binding obligations

Speakers

– United Kingdom
– Australia
– European Union
– Islamic Republic of Iran
– Russian Federation

Arguments

Opposition to references to new legally binding obligations

Concerns about balanced reflection of different approaches to international law

Call for flexibility and compromise in final negotiations

Summary

UK, Australia, and EU strongly oppose references to new legally binding obligations, arguing they conflate existing law with non-consensual proposals and are supported by only five states. Iran and Russia support including references to additional binding obligations, with Iran arguing the current text lacks balance and Russia calling for legally binding status for voluntary norms.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Attribution practices and accountability mechanisms

Speakers

– Albania
– Islamic Republic of Iran
– Cameroon
– Cuba

Arguments

Concerns about state-sponsored cyber attacks on democratic institutions

Concerns about unsubstantiated attribution claims

Support for accountability mechanisms for egregious cyber attacks

Importance of responsible attribution practices

Summary

Albania strongly condemned state-sponsored attacks and called for accountability mechanisms, specifically citing Iranian attacks. Iran categorically rejected these accusations, arguing attribution is challenging and unsubstantiated claims violate responsible behavior principles. Cameroon supported accountability mechanisms for egregious acts, while Cuba emphasized responsible attribution practices.

Topics

Cybersecurity | Legal and regulatory

Unexpected differences

Chair summary references from 2021 OEWG report

Speakers

– Kingdom of Netherlands
– United Kingdom
– Germany
– Islamic Republic of Iran

Arguments

Opposition to paragraphs 34R and 36 on developing new norms

Support for retaining paragraphs on new norm development

Explanation

An unexpected technical disagreement emerged over whether to reference the 2021 chair summary, with Western countries arguing it’s not a consensus document while Iran pointed out it was referenced seven times in the third annual progress report adopted by consensus.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Voluntary checklist adoption timing

Speakers

– United Kingdom
– Islamic Republic of Iran
– Russian Federation

Arguments

Support for voluntary checklist of practical actions for norm implementation

Support for retaining paragraphs on new norm development

Call for flexibility and compromise in final negotiations

Explanation

Unexpected disagreement over whether the voluntary checklist should be adopted now or deferred to the future mechanism, with Iran and Russia arguing it hasn’t been properly discussed while UK supports its adoption as valuable output.

Topics

Cybersecurity | Capacity development

Overall assessment

Summary

The discussion reveals fundamental disagreements between Western countries and countries like China, Iran, and Russia on key issues including peaceful use language, new norm development, IHL applicability, and legally binding obligations. There are also specific bilateral tensions around attribution practices.

Disagreement level

High level of disagreement with significant implications for consensus-building. The disagreements reflect deeper geopolitical divisions and different approaches to international law and cybersecurity governance. The Chair’s appeal for flexibility suggests these disagreements pose serious challenges to achieving consensus on the final report.

Partial agreements

Similar viewpoints

These speakers generally supported maintaining references to peaceful purposes, developing new norms alongside existing ones, and ensuring balanced representation of different approaches to international law including potential legally binding instruments

Speakers

– China
– Pakistan
– Islamic Republic of Iran
– Russian Federation
– Cuba

Arguments

Support for maintaining “exclusively peaceful purposes” language

Emphasis on preserving consensus achievements in transition

Support for retaining paragraphs on new norm development

Call for flexibility and compromise in final negotiations

Importance of responsible attribution practices

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

These Western/European speakers consistently emphasized the need to focus on implementing existing consensus frameworks, reflect progress made on international humanitarian law, and avoid giving undue weight to proposals that lack broad consensus

Speakers

– European Union
– Kingdom of Netherlands
– United Kingdom
– Germany
– Australia

Arguments

Need to reflect progress made on IHL through ICRC resolution

Opposition to paragraphs 34R and 36 on developing new norms

Opposition to references to new legally binding obligations

Concerns about document giving undue weight to non-consensus proposals

Request for inclusion of state responsibility and human rights law references

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Human rights | Cybersecurity

These speakers emphasized the importance of legal capacity building and scenario-based training before considering new binding instruments, and supported strengthening references to international humanitarian law and human rights

Speakers

– Fiji
– Australia
– Finland
– Ghana

Arguments

Opposition to prejudging future mechanism discussions on binding instruments

Request for inclusion of state responsibility and human rights law references

Support for scenario-based discussions and capacity building on international law

Need for technical assistance and training programs

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Capacity development

Key takeaways

Strong consensus on need to focus on implementing existing 11 voluntary norms rather than developing new ones, with many delegations opposing paragraphs 34R and 36 on new norm development

Significant support for dedicated paragraph on ransomware attacks targeting critical infrastructure, reflecting growing threat landscape

Major disagreement on ‘exclusively peaceful purposes’ language in paragraph 15, with some supporting deletion and others (like China) strongly supporting retention

Widespread call for better balance in report between consensus achievements and non-consensus proposals, with concerns about giving undue weight to minority positions

Strong support for reinstating use of force language in paragraph 40C and including more substantive content on international humanitarian law application

Emphasis on capacity building for developing countries and need for smooth transition to future permanent mechanism

Chair’s warning that current approach of demanding deletions of opposing views while preserving own positions will not lead to convergence

Resolutions and action items

Chair invited all delegations to reception at Singapore Mission at 6:15 PM for informal consultations

Tomorrow’s session will expand discussion to include sections E and F in addition to A, B, C, and D

Delegations requested to provide written proposals and amendments to Chair’s office

Chair urged delegations to focus on essential points, bridging proposals, and compromise solutions in future statements

Multiple delegations committed to sharing detailed written recommendations on specific paragraph edits

Unresolved issues

Fundamental disagreement on whether to retain ‘exclusively peaceful purposes’ language in paragraph 15

Dispute over inclusion of new norm development paragraphs (34R and 36) versus focus on existing norm implementation

Disagreement on references to chair summary from 2021 OEWG report as non-consensus document

Unresolved balance between reflecting consensus achievements versus accommodating diverse viewpoints on international law

Ongoing debate over inclusion of references to new legally binding obligations in international law section

Dispute over voluntary checklist adoption (paragraphs 34L and 37) with some delegations having principled objections

Disagreement on attribution language and accountability mechanisms for cyber attacks

Unresolved structure and mandate details for future permanent mechanism

Suggested compromises

Australia’s proposal to replace ‘exclusively peaceful purposes’ with ‘in compliance with international law’ in paragraph 15

Multiple delegations suggesting merger of paragraphs 20 and 29 on technology vulnerabilities

UK proposal to move paragraph 34N consensus language to chapeau of paragraph 34

Suggestion to create separate paragraph for ransomware while maintaining other malicious software references

Proposal to split paragraph 41 into subparagraphs grouping references by origin and nature

Netherlands suggestion to add GGE reports reference in paragraph 3 for better foundation

Brazil’s proposal for additional subparagraph under 40 based on ICRC humanitarian resolution

Various delegations suggesting deletion of duplicative paragraphs (34O-P merger, 34Q-R deletion)

Chair’s appeal for flexibility where delegations accept that opposing viewpoints also need reflection in final document

Chair’s opening guidance: ‘I think that is the spirit of the discussions, that we are looking for solutions, not necessarily in the mode of restating and reiterating your preferred positions. So thank you very much for your understanding.’

Speaker

Chair

Reason

This comment was insightful because it directly addressed the fundamental challenge of multilateral negotiations – the tendency to simply restate positions rather than seek compromise. It set a constructive tone by explicitly calling for bridging proposals and solutions.

Impact

This guidance influenced the entire discussion flow by establishing expectations for constructive engagement. Many subsequent speakers referenced this call for flexibility, and it created a framework against which participants could measure their contributions.

Republic of Korea’s position on norms: ‘What’s needed now is not more norms, but rather a focus on how to implement and operationalize the ones we already have.’

Speaker

Republic of Korea

Reason

This comment crystallized a key philosophical divide in the discussion between those wanting to develop new norms versus those prioritizing implementation of existing frameworks. It challenged the assumption that more rules necessarily lead to better outcomes.

Impact

This perspective became a recurring theme throughout the discussion, with multiple delegations (UK, Netherlands, Germany, Australia) echoing this implementation-first approach. It helped frame the debate around paragraphs 34R and 36, leading to widespread calls for their deletion.

European Union’s warning: ‘We should not allow this report to lose the progress we made on the UN framework… we actually are even at risk losing our work on the framework altogether, with Russia wanting to just observe it rather than express its commitment to it.’

Speaker

European Union

Reason

This comment was particularly thought-provoking because it highlighted the fragility of existing consensus and the risk of regression. It reframed the discussion from one about adding new elements to one about preserving hard-won agreements.

Impact

This warning shifted the tone of the discussion toward preservation of existing achievements. It influenced subsequent speakers to emphasize the importance of maintaining the UN framework and led to increased resistance to proposals that might undermine established consensus.

Chair’s closing reflection: ‘But what you need to keep in mind, as we reflect on the day’s work, is that if we put together everyone’s preferences, then that is not going to bring us to convergence. I think we will need some expressions of flexibility, and that will mean that everyone, accepting the fact that other delegations who have a different point of view also need to have their points of view reflected.’

Speaker

Chair

Reason

This meta-commentary on the negotiation process itself was deeply insightful because it diagnosed the core challenge: the mathematical impossibility of satisfying all preferences simultaneously. It called for a fundamental shift in approach from position-taking to compromise-seeking.

Impact

This comment served as a reality check that reframed the entire negotiation dynamic. It challenged delegates to move beyond their comfort zones and consider what compromises they could accept, setting the stage for more constructive engagement in subsequent sessions.

Albania’s specific attribution example: ‘A notable escalation occurred in Albania in July 2022 when a destructive cyber attack, assessed to have originated from Iranian state-linked actors, severely distributed a wide range of government digital services… The most recent attack happened on June 20, 2025 when the IT systems of the municipality of our capital city were breached.’

Speaker

Albania

Reason

This comment was significant because it moved the discussion from abstract policy debates to concrete real-world consequences of cyber attacks. It personalized the stakes and demonstrated the urgent need for effective frameworks.

Impact

This specific example prompted Iran to respond with a detailed rebuttal, highlighting the contentious nature of attribution in cyberspace. It demonstrated how attribution disputes can derail constructive dialogue and reinforced arguments for focusing on implementation rather than new norms.

Russian Federation’s semantic challenge: ‘In my language, observe is to adhere to, to abide by, or to comply with, and this presupposes a high level of obligation. So far as my language – my knowledge of English allows me to understand English, these are also clear synonyms to the verb observe.’

Speaker

Russian Federation

Reason

This linguistic intervention was thought-provoking because it revealed how semantic differences can mask deeper philosophical disagreements about the nature of international commitments. It showed how language choices carry significant political implications.

Impact

This comment exposed the underlying tension between voluntary and binding obligations, influencing how other delegations approached discussions about implementation versus observation of norms. It highlighted the importance of precise language in international agreements.

Overall assessment

These key comments fundamentally shaped the discussion by establishing three critical dynamics: (1) the Chair’s interventions created a framework for constructive negotiation that emphasized compromise over position-taking; (2) the substantive debate crystallized around implementation of existing frameworks versus development of new norms, with most delegations favoring the former; and (3) specific examples and semantic challenges revealed the practical difficulties of achieving consensus in a politically charged environment. The discussion evolved from initial position statements toward a more nuanced understanding of the trade-offs required for consensus, though significant divisions remained. The Chair’s process observations were particularly influential in encouraging delegates to think beyond their preferred positions toward what might be collectively acceptable.

How to implement and operationalize the existing 11 voluntary non-binding norms of responsible state behavior

Speaker

Republic of Korea

Explanation

Korea emphasized that what’s needed now is not more norms, but rather a focus on how to implement and operationalize the ones already established

How to better understand the associated risks of new and emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence

Speaker

Malaysia

Explanation

Malaysia welcomed discussion on AI and emphasized the need to better understand the risks associated with emerging technologies

How to enhance dialogue on ICT security between different sectors at the national level, including the technical, diplomatic and legal sector

Speaker

Malaysia

Explanation

Malaysia recognized the importance of cross-sectoral dialogue for comprehensive ICT security approaches

How norms and international law relates to ransomware, what cyber capacity building needs and tools are there or need to be developed to better address this threat

Speaker

Germany

Explanation

Germany suggested ransomware as a possible example for future cross-cutting, action-oriented discussions examining multiple aspects of the threat

How to establish effective accountability mechanisms for cyber attacks directed at democratic systems and civilian infrastructure

Speaker

Albania

Explanation

Albania called for the development of frameworks that ensure appropriate consequences for those responsible for malicious cyber operations

How to enhance common understanding amongst all states on the opportunities and risks of new and emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, 5G and quantum computing

Speaker

Fiji

Explanation

Fiji emphasized the urgent need to develop shared understanding of emerging technologies across all member states

How to encourage more significant participation in the POC directory through targeted capacity-building modalities

Speaker

Cote d’Ivoire

Explanation

Cote d’Ivoire highlighted the need to explore means of increasing participation in the global directory for points of contact

How to ensure universal accession to the POC directory

Speaker

Cote d’Ivoire

Explanation

There is a need to specify strategies for achieving universal participation in the points of contact directory

How to address the responsibilities and obligations of the private sector and platforms with extraterritorial impact in the ICT environment

Speaker

Islamic Republic of Iran

Explanation

Iran emphasized the current lack of clarity regarding private sector responsibilities and the need for in-depth discussions on their obligations

How to address practical, concrete challenges in the application of international law in cyberspace

Speaker

Finland (on behalf of Nordic countries)

Explanation

The Nordic countries emphasized that future mechanism discussions should focus on addressing practical challenges rather than theoretical debates

How to develop a common understanding on how international law applies in the use of ICTs through capacity building initiatives

Speaker

Ghana

Explanation

Ghana supported capacity building efforts including workshops, conferences and scenario-based discussions to build shared understanding

How to develop universal templates for data exchange through the UN’s Global Intergovernmental Register for Contact Points

Speaker

Russian Federation

Explanation

Russia proposed focusing on the development of universal templates for data exchange rather than assistance delivery templates

Summary

This transcript captures the opening session of the 11th and final substantive meeting of the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Security of and in the Use of ICTs, chaired by Ambassador Gafoor. The session began with a video message from UN Under-Secretary-General Izumi Nakamitsu, who praised the working group’s achievements over five years, including establishing a global intergovernmental directory with 115+ states, eight global confidence-building measures, and common understandings on ICT security threats. She emphasized the critical importance of finalizing the future permanent mechanism to ensure seamless transition from the current OEWG.

Chair Gafoor reflected on the working group’s progress since 2021, highlighting three consensus annual progress reports achieved despite challenging international circumstances. He outlined key accomplishments including reinforcing the normative framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace, raising ICT security awareness, widening participation especially among developing countries, and building confidence among member states. The chair stressed that success requires incremental progress and flexibility from all delegations.

The main discussion focused on sections A (Overview) and B (Existing and Potential Threats) of the draft final report. Multiple regional groups and individual countries provided detailed feedback on the revised draft. The European Union emphasized preserving the UN framework for responsible state behavior and avoiding language that could weaken existing commitments. The African Group highlighted threats particularly relevant to African states, including attacks on critical infrastructure, supply chains, and misinformation campaigns targeting governance during political transitions.

Several delegations raised concerns about specific language in the threat section, particularly regarding “exclusively peaceful purposes” of ICTs and the relationship between criminal cyber activities and international peace and security. Countries like the United States, Canada, and Australia opposed the “exclusively peaceful purposes” language, arguing it contradicts the reality that ICTs are already used in armed conflicts and should be regulated by international humanitarian law. A like-minded group led by Nicaragua advocated for legally binding agreements and expressed concerns about stakeholder participation modalities in the future permanent mechanism.

The session demonstrated both convergence and divergence among member states, with broad agreement on the need for consensus while revealing substantive disagreements on key issues that will require intensive negotiations throughout the week to achieve the seamless transition to a permanent mechanism.

Keypoints

## Major Discussion Points:

– **Transition to Future Permanent Mechanism**: The primary focus is finalizing the 11th and final session of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) and ensuring a seamless transition to a future permanent mechanism for ICT security discussions, with emphasis on reaching consensus on the final report by the end of the week.

– **ICT Threat Landscape Assessment**: Extensive discussion of evolving cyber threats including ransomware attacks, critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, commercially available intrusion capabilities, emerging technologies (AI, quantum computing), cryptocurrency theft, and threats to undersea cables and cross-border infrastructure.

– **Framework for Responsible State Behavior**: Debate over maintaining and strengthening the existing UN framework of norms, rules, and principles for responsible state behavior in cyberspace, with some delegations emphasizing implementation over creating new obligations, while others seek additional legally binding agreements.

– **Stakeholder Participation and Institutional Design**: Disagreement over modalities for non-governmental stakeholder participation in the future mechanism, with some supporting expanded inclusion and others insisting on maintaining the intergovernmental nature of the process.

– **Capacity Building and Regional Cooperation**: Strong emphasis on capacity building as a foundational pillar, particularly for developing countries, and recognition of the important role of regional organizations in implementing cybersecurity frameworks and fostering cooperation.

## Overall Purpose:

The discussion aims to finalize the OEWG’s four-year mandate by adopting a consensus final report that consolidates achievements in international cybersecurity cooperation and establishes the framework for a future permanent mechanism to continue this work under UN auspices.

## Overall Tone:

The tone began very positively and constructively, with the Chair commending delegations for focused, specific interventions rather than general statements. Speakers expressed appreciation for the Chair’s leadership and demonstrated commitment to reaching consensus. However, some tension emerged with the like-minded group statement highlighting significant concerns about various aspects of the draft report, though even this maintained a constructive commitment to finding consensus. The Chair emphasized the collaborative nature of the process and the need for all delegations to feel ownership of the final outcome.

Speakers

**Speakers from the provided list:**

– Chair – Ambassador Gafoor, Chair of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICTs

– Izumi Nakamitsu – Undersecretary General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

– European Union – Speaking on behalf of the European Union and its member states, as well as candidate countries and aligned states (37 states total, representing 20% of UN membership)

– Nigeria – Speaking on behalf of the African Group

– Fiji – Speaking on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum

– Islamic Republic of Iran –

– Russian Federation –

– Mauritius –

– Canada –

– United States –

– Indonesia –

– El Salvador –

– Qatar –

– Egypt – Aligning with the African Group statement

– Ghana – Aligning with the African Group statement, also speaking in national capacity

– Singapore –

– Republic of Moldova – Aligning with the European Union statement

– Malawi – Aligning with the African Group statement

– France –

– South Africa – Aligning with the African Group statement

– Thailand –

– Japan –

– Turkey –

– Cuba – Aligning with the like-minded group statement

– Croatia – Aligning with the European Union statement

– Switzerland –

– Colombia –

– Australia – Aligning with the Pacific Islands Forum statement

– Argentina –

– Rwanda – Aligning with the African Group statement

– Nicaragua – Speaking on behalf of a group of like-minded states including Belarus, Venezuela, Burkina Faso, Cuba, Eritrea, Iran, China, and Russia

**Additional speakers:**

None identified beyond those in the provided speakers names list.

# Report: 11th Session of the UN Open-Ended Working Group on ICT Security

## Executive Summary

The 11th session of the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Security of and in the Use of ICTs convened under the chairmanship of Ambassador Gafoor to advance negotiations on the draft final report and discuss the framework for a future permanent mechanism. The session demonstrated broad consensus on preserving the UN Framework for Responsible State Behaviour in cyberspace while revealing persistent disagreements on key issues including the use of ICTs in armed conflict, stakeholder participation, and institutional design of future mechanisms.

## Opening Remarks and Procedural Matters

### UN Leadership Perspective

Under-Secretary-General Izumi Nakamitsu delivered a video message highlighting the OEWG’s achievements over its mandate, including the establishment of a global intergovernmental directory with over 115 participating states, development of eight global confidence-building measures, and creation of common understandings on ICT security threats. She emphasized the critical importance of finalizing the future permanent mechanism to ensure seamless transition from the current OEWG.

### Chair’s Framework

Ambassador Gafoor reflected on the working group’s progress since his election as Chair in June 2021, noting the achievement of three consensus annual progress reports. He outlined four key accomplishments: reinforcing the normative framework for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, raising ICT security awareness globally, widening participation particularly among developing countries, and building confidence among member states through practical cooperation measures.

The Chair established expectations for constructive engagement, noting that while the distance to travel in negotiations was not large, it represented the most challenging part requiring flexibility from all delegations.

### Procedural Arrangements

The Chair announced the adoption of the provisional program of work and explained the fluid implementation approach based on the nature of discussions. He introduced time management measures, including the use of timers for interventions, and noted that technical issues with UN Web TV access had been resolved.

## Regional Group Positions

### European Union and Aligned States

The European Union, speaking on behalf of 37 states, emphasized preserving and building upon the UN Framework for Responsible State Behaviour in cyberspace. The EU stated: “We should not conclude on a report that makes us lose the work we have done so far. We should not conclude on a report that diminishes the value of the UN framework and prioritises new discussions on new norms and obligations over taking action and implementing those commitments we have made thus far.”

The EU advocated for dedicated attention to ransomware due to its severity and impact on international peace and security, particularly effects on healthcare systems and critical infrastructure. They also highlighted concerns about threats to cross-border critical infrastructure, including undersea cables and orbital communication networks.

### African Group

Nigeria, speaking for the African Group, emphasized growing threats to critical infrastructure in healthcare, energy, and financial sectors. The Group highlighted vulnerabilities relevant to African states, including supply chain attacks and misinformation campaigns targeting governance structures during political transitions.

Egypt called for more equitable representation of the global threat landscape, arguing that threat assessments should capture realities in all regions, not just developed nations.

### Pacific Islands Forum

Fiji, representing the Pacific Islands Forum, focused on capacity building as a foundational cross-cutting pillar enabling implementation across all framework areas. The Forum emphasized particular vulnerabilities of small island developing states to cyber threats and highlighted concerns about threats to undersea cables critical for island nations’ connectivity.

### Like-Minded Group

Nicaragua, speaking for like-minded states including Belarus, Venezuela, Burkina Faso, Cuba, Eritrea, Iran, China, and Russia, advocated for legally binding agreements as the most effective measure to counter challenges in the digital environment. This group raised concerns about stakeholder participation modalities, insisting on maintaining the intergovernmental nature of the process, and supported creating a dedicated thematic group on capacity building.

## Key Areas of Convergence

### Preservation of Existing Framework

Multiple speakers, including the European Union, France, Croatia, and Republic of Moldova, emphasized the need to preserve and build upon the existing UN Framework for Responsible State Behaviour in cyberspace as a foundational principle.

### Recognition of Evolving Threats

Delegations showed consensus on several key threat areas:

**Ransomware**: The European Union, Mauritius, Qatar, and Colombia recognized ransomware as a severe and growing threat requiring comprehensive treatment.

**Emerging Technologies**: Countries including Mauritius, Qatar, Indonesia, Rwanda, and El Salvador showed consensus on addressing risks from emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and quantum computing.

**Critical Infrastructure**: Multiple speakers highlighted concerns about attacks on critical infrastructure, particularly healthcare systems, energy networks, and financial services.

### Capacity Building

There was broad support across diverse political alignments for capacity building as a foundational pillar. Argentina, Mauritius, Indonesia, Fiji, and Rwanda emphasized capacity building as a cross-cutting enabler for cybersecurity.

### Gender Inclusion

Multiple speakers, including Mauritius, Republic of Moldova, Colombia, and Australia, supported promoting gender inclusion and ensuring meaningful participation of women in ICT-related decision-making processes.

## Major Areas of Disagreement

### Use of ICTs in Armed Conflict

The most significant disagreement centered on language regarding ICT use in armed conflict. The United States argued against “exclusively peaceful purposes” language, stating: “We cannot support the draft report’s reference to promoting the use of ICTs for ‘exclusively peaceful purposes’… states are already using ICTs in the context of armed conflict. It is all the more important, therefore, that states reaffirm their commitment to applying principles of international humanitarian law to their use of ICTs in armed conflict.”

This position was supported by Australia, Switzerland, and Canada, while Cuba and other like-minded states supported stronger peaceful use language.

### Stakeholder Participation

Western states, including Australia, Croatia, and Turkey, advocated for more inclusive stakeholder participation, citing the importance of stakeholder expertise. Conversely, the like-minded group insisted on maintaining current restrictive modalities to preserve the intergovernmental character of the process.

### Terminology and Scope

The like-minded group, through Iran and Russia, insisted on using “security of and in the use of ICTs” rather than “ICT security” throughout the text. Iran and other like-minded states also questioned including Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) reports as foundational documents while seeking removal of references to the 2021 chair’s summary.

## Specific Proposals and Amendments

### Threat Assessment Proposals

Iran suggested the UN Secretariat compile a non-exhaustive list of threats as proposed by states during OEWG deliberations to serve as reference for future mechanisms.

### Technical Issues

Several delegations proposed specific amendments:

France suggested language addressing commercially available ICT intrusion capabilities with appropriate safeguards and oversight.

Australia proposed alternative language for ICT use in armed conflict, suggesting states stress “the need to promote the responsible use of ICTs by states in accordance with international law.”

### Institutional Design

The like-minded group opposed the current thematic group structure and advocated for a separate norms group, while others supported the proposed three-group structure with a cross-cutting approach.

## Technical and Operational Discussions

### Specific Threats

**Supply Chain Security**: Ghana emphasized security by design throughout the ICT lifecycle.

**Commercial Intrusion Tools**: Australia and Iran raised concerns about proliferation of commercial cyber intrusion tools.

**Advanced Persistent Threats**: Thailand highlighted the importance of including APTs in threat assessments.

**Cryptocurrency Theft**: Mauritius and Japan advocated for including cryptocurrency theft in the international peace and security context.

### Regional Cooperation

Singapore emphasized enhanced Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) cooperation and public-private partnerships. Switzerland highlighted the role of regional organizations in implementing the responsible state behaviour framework.

## Side Events and Additional Matters

Qatar announced a side event on “Securing Cyberspace: Building Partnerships for a Safer Digital Future” scheduled for the following day, with details to be circulated via the Secretariat.

## Conclusion

The 11th session revealed both the significant progress achieved by the OEWG and the challenges remaining in reaching consensus on contentious issues. While there was broad agreement on preserving the UN Framework and addressing evolving cyber threats, fundamental disagreements on the use of ICTs in armed conflict, stakeholder participation, and institutional design require continued negotiation.

The Chair’s emphasis on focusing on specific amendments rather than general statements, and the need for flexibility from all delegations, will be critical for achieving consensus on the final report and establishing the future permanent mechanism. The success of these negotiations will determine the framework for international cybersecurity cooperation within the UN system for years to come.

Chair: Good morning, Excellencies, Distinguished Delegates. The first meeting of the 11th and final substantive session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICTs established pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 75 slash 240 is now called to order. I extend a very warm welcome to all Delegations attending this meeting. and to those watching the meeting on UN Web TV. I’d like to now invite delegations to hear a video message from Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, Undersecretary General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, to give us her message.

Izumi Nakamitsu: Mr. Chair, Distinguished Delegates, Dear Colleagues, I regret that I cannot address you in person, but I am grateful for the opportunity to deliver this video message. I thank you, Ambassador Gafoor, for your tremendous leadership of this process. We are all appreciative of the singular dedication you have shown over the last five years. From day one, this open-ended working group has been a demonstration of what is possible in multilateralism, not only progress but consensus. I have consistently commended this working group for proving its value over and over again. In doing so, I have highlighted its many achievements. A global intergovernmental directory with the participation of more than 115 states. Eight global confidence-building measures that enhance trust and predictability between states, reducing tensions and misunderstandings. Common understandings on the ICT security threat landscape, from critical infrastructure vulnerabilities to incidents involving malicious software. And a whole range of initiatives in the area of capacity building, including the convening of the first-ever Global Roundtable discussion. Achieving these outcomes would have been challenging in the best of circumstances, but we know the international security landscape has been anything but ideal. While conflicts rage and divisions deepen, this working group has managed to maintain a positive record of success. Throughout the life of this group, I have lamented that challenges to international peace and security arising from state use of ICTs are growing. My concern remains unabated. In particular, recent conflicts demonstrate the serious dangers posed to civilians by malicious ICT activity, particularly that targets infrastructure essential for public services. As the United Nations celebrates its 80th anniversary, we must assess the suitability of the organization. A critical part of this assessment will be answering the question, how will the organization respond to emerging dynamic challenges for which we do not have the luxury of time? Advances in technology are a case in point. Today’s cutting-edge technology is considered absolute just months later. On the other hand, inclusive deliberation among states takes time. But despite the difficulty of addressing these fast-moving issues, we know that states’ consistent, dedicated engagement makes a difference. ICT intergovernmental work on ICT security over more than two decades has proven just that. This brings me to the critical matter of the future permanent mechanism on ICT security, the final modalities of which will be considered. this week. I remarked in February that the groundwork has laid last year with agreement on the fundamentals of the mechanism, functions in scope, and decision-making. This is a strong starting point. But we know that delegations must still find consensus on several difficult issues, particularly stakeholder modalities and dedicated thematic working groups. I am keenly aware of ongoing divergences of views, but I am also confident that a balance can be struck. From my perspective, diverse stakeholders have much to contribute to any future process, and it is my sincere hope that modalities for their meaningful participation will be finalized. Regarding the thematic groups, having space for focused exchanges with a view to action-oriented recommendations is essential. Shaping the groups in a way that allows for a diversity of focused discussions is a task at hand. All that said, we must draw encouragement from the baseline understanding that states are firmly invested in a seamless transition from this OEWG to a single-track permanent mechanism. On that, there is no disagreement. The issue of ICT security is too important to allow any lag in consideration of it. I appeal to all delegations to continue in the spirit of constructive engagement, which has been a defining quality of this working group from the start. The OEWG’s past achievements must be met with shared commitment to the future. Rest assured that the Secretariat will be your dedicated partner and looks forward to working closely with delegations in the framework of a future mechanism. As we cross the finishing line of this mechanism, mechanism, let us ensure we are ready for the next race. I wish you great success in your negotiations in this week, and thank you very much for your attention.

Chair: I thank the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs for her statement. First Delegates, at this stage I would like to offer some remarks in my capacity as Chair of this process. And once again, I would like to warmly welcome all Delegations to this 11th and final substantive session of the OEWG. It is good to see so many familiar faces in this process. Some of you have been involved in this process for the last five years, some even prior to that, but also this process has regenerated itself by having so many new faces who have joined the process. I think over the years, we have built a community of practitioners who are deeply committed to continuing the exercise that we began not just five years ago, but I think decades ago. Ultimately, this is what diplomacy is truly about, building a community, building a base level of confidence and trust so that we can work together to find common ground and make progress in a manner that is mutually beneficial. I want to take a moment to step back and reflect on how far we have come. This Working Group was established by the General Assembly almost five years ago in December 2020. I was elected as Chair in June 2021. At the time, many Delegations were unsure about what this new open-ended Working Group could do or achieve. I want to take a moment to reflect on how far we have come. This Working Group was established by the General Assembly almost five years ago in December 2021. At the time, many Delegations were unsure about what this new open-ended Working Group could do or achieve. I want to take a moment to reflect on how far we have come. Since then, we have adopted three consensus annual progress reports, each building on the other, each taking a small step forward in an incremental manner. And we have done this even in the face of a very challenging and tense international security landscape and an increasingly tensed and polarized atmosphere here at the United Nations in New York. From the beginning of this process, I had emphasized the need to make concrete action-oriented progress in a step-by-step manner. That is what we must continue to do this week. In the past four years, we have made good progress and achieved some concrete outcomes. Under-Secretary-General Izumi Nakamitsu highlighted some of them. I would like to highlight what I regard to be some positive outcomes of this process. First, we have reinforced and mainstreamed the normative framework of norms, rules and principles of responsible state behavior in the field of ICTs. This framework was decades in the making, and this is a framework that has been reinforced as a result of this process. Make no mistake about that. Second, we have raised the level of awareness with regard to ICT security. And equally important, we have widened the circle of engagement and participation in this process. And it is particularly heartening to see that so many small countries and developing countries have now become actively engaged in this process, which previously was not always the case. This is an achievement that we must build on so that the process is not only open-ended and universal, but also inclusive with a sense of ownership felt by every single member of the United Nations. Thirdly, we have made out of this process an exercise in building confidence with each other. Many of you have said this again and again in this process, that the open-ended working group was itself a CBM. And if that is the case, we need to continue the CBM beyond this process into a future permanent mechanism so that the confidence building can continue, and so too the trust building among all countries. These are some intangible outcomes that are difficult to quantify, but the three positive outcomes that I have identified are nevertheless, in my view, important ones that require some serious reflection on the part of all UN members. In terms of specific outcomes, the open-ended working group took some concrete steps forward with regard to the POC directory. Undersecretary General Izumi Nakamitsu mentioned that. But the work is not done. We need to make it truly universal as a mechanism for countries to engage each other, build partnerships, and build confidence. We also adopted eight new global CBMs from ground zero, because prior to this process, there was no notion of a voluntary global CBM within the framework of the UN. So that is an outcome that is full of potential for the future. Thirdly, and again as Undersecretary General Nakamitsu mentioned, we convened the first ever global round table on ICT security capacity building, which was the first time that such a discussion was held here at the UN. Additionally, with regard to the various sections of the mandate, I think we have reached additional layers of understanding. We have reached common understanding with regard to some emerging issues. For example, we have identified a range of new ICT threats appearing in the rapidly evolving threat landscape and we have tried to capture them and record them in consensus UN documents for the first time. And our shared assessment of the evolving threat landscape provides the basis and foundation for continued collective discussion and collective action. And some of these threats include threats relating to ransomware, commercially available ICT intrusion capabilities, and new and emerging technologies such as AI and quantum computing, just to name a few. And of course, we have also agreed in principle to establish the Future Permanent Mechanism as a single-track universal process. We have agreed to establish this mechanism and we have some unfinished business that we need to address at this session. The good progress we have made over the past five years reflects the urgency that you have felt, the commitment that you have given to this process. Now it is true that there are many differences between delegations on the approach we should take, but it is also clear to me from the podium that there is an overwhelming sense of commitment to this process and that all delegations are united by their commitment to making progress and achieving concrete outcomes in a spirit of flexibility. That’s my sense. That’s what I hear when people talk to me. Looking back on all that we have achieved, I think there are some lessons we can draw. Firstly, it is important that as a collective we are united in making progress. concrete steps forward in an incremental, step-by-step way. And this applies to all processes. The challenge before us at the UN is an overwhelming one, not just with regard to this Committee but across the board. But in each of the UN processes, it is important that we focus on making small steps, taking small steps forward in an incremental way to strengthen and build on what we already have. The second lesson that I think we can draw from this process is that when states are ready to work together, talk to each other in a spirit of mutual cooperation, and when they are ready to exercise flexibility in order to achieve a compromise, consensus is possible, progress is possible. My sense is that these two factors remain very much in place for our process this week. In other words, there is an overwhelming sense of commitment to this process, which I sense. And second, states are ready to work together in a spirit of mutual cooperation. We will need every ounce of that in the next few days ahead in order to reach an agreement. The second point that I wanted to address is that it is important that we bring the work of this Working Group to a conclusion this week in order to ensure a smooth and seamless transition to the Future Permanent Mechanism. And we need to do this by Friday this week. The good news is that a successful outcome is within our grasp. From the podium, I can see… a pathway forward for us to reach consensus. The pathway is visible and consensus is entirely attainable, provided countries engage in this process over the next few days in a spirit of flexibility and in a spirit of open-mindedness. This opportunity to make progress is something that we cannot afford to miss. The other good news is that we have a foundation of three annual progress reports, which provides the framework of common understandings that we have reached over the years. So what we need to do this week is to take a few additional steps – a few additional small steps, if I may add – to reach a balanced outcome that every delegation can embrace and own, and that will lead to a strengthening of what we have already built as a foundation. There are quite a number of things that are on my remarks, but let me abbreviate my remarks in the interest of time. Even as we discuss our work this week, the ICT security threat landscape continues to evolve at an accelerating rate. And this just underlines the need for us to continue our work and make some progress. It’s also important that as we look at what we need to do, we have to think of continuing our efforts to broaden participation in the global POC directory and see how we can implement what we have already agreed, for example, the global CBMs. And capacity building is something that has become very cross-cutting in nature, and as many of you have also said, capacity building is also an exercise in building confidence. And this is an area where we need to be very careful. where we have to take another step forward. There is a considerable amount of expectations in this area, and here, too, we have to take a step forward. Finally, the permanent mechanism that we have agreed to establish will provide a permanent venue for us to continue the work that we need to do. And as we enter these final hours of our work, I hope that delegations will continue to channel the spirit of flexibility and understanding that has been built up in this process over the last few years. And in this process, I wanted to say that each one of you have a role to play. Each one of you have agency and autonomy to make a difference. So I ask each one of you to see how you can contribute to this process over the next few days in order for us to reach an outcome at the end of the week. I’m very confident that all of you are committed to doing your part. I want to let you know that I’m committed to doing everything that’s possible, but I cannot produce miracles. The UN process is such that, ultimately, what is agreed requires the support and consensus of every single member. In that sense, success is in your hands, and failure is not an option. So with those remarks, distinguished delegates, I thank you very much for your attention. We will now move to agenda item three, which is organization of work. And this is also listed in accordance with the provisional program of work. Delegations are reminded that the group will continue to conduct its work in accordance with the decisions taken at its organizational session held on the 1st of June, 2021. And these decisions include the adoption of the working group’s agenda as contained in document A/AC 292 2021/1, an agreement that the work of the group will be conducted in accordance with the rules of procedure of the main committees of the General Assembly, while acting on a consensus basis. Now I’d like to draw the attention of the working group to the provisional program of work of the 10th substantive session as contained in document A /AC 292/2025/4, which has been structured in accordance with the agenda of the working group. And this structure of the provisional program of work is in keeping with all the previous provisional programs of work that we have adopted. May I take it that the working group wishes to proceed in accordance with the provisional program of work. of the 10th substantive session as contained in document A-AC292-2025-4. I see no objections, it is decided. Let me say that the adoption of the Provisional Programme of Work must not be taken for granted. Remember the early days when we used to have very lively debates about the Provisional Programme of Work. So I think we are making good progress. Thanks to all of you, of course. And as all of you know, the process is going to be very fluid and in implementing the Provisional Programme of Work, which is now adopted as the Programme of Work, we will apply it in a very flexible way so that we can do everything that we need to do by the end of this week. I would now like to address the attendance or the question of the participation and attendance of stakeholders at this 11th substantive session. Delegates would recall that the Working Group adopted the modalities for the participation of stakeholders in the Working Group at its third substantive session. And following the latest round of accreditation conducted ahead of this session, in accordance with that decision, an updated list of non-governmental entities is contained in document A-AC.292-2025-INF-3. May I take it that the Open-Ended Working Group approves the attendance of the non-governmental entities as contained in document A-AC.292-2025-INF-3. I hear no objection. It is so decided. Thank you very much for that. Finally, I’d like to inform delegations that the draft final report of the group outlining all organizational matters relating to the working group has been circulated as document A slash AC.292 slash 2025 slash L1. And just to let you know, the draft final report is the procedural report, which is separate from the final report, which is the document that has been circulated as REV1 to you. So the draft final report that I’m referring to is the procedural report that has been circulated as document A slash AC.292 slash 2025 slash L1. And the working group will take up this draft document in L1 at our final meeting on Friday, the 11th of July. Now having completed agenda item 3, we will now move to agenda item 5, discussions on substantive issues contained in paragraph 1 of General Assembly Resolution 75 slash 240. We will now begin our consideration of agenda item 5 on the substantive issues. And in this regard, I wanted to recall that in my letter dated 23 May 2025, I circulated the zero draft of the final report. Subsequently, during virtual open-ended informal town halls held on the 2nd and 16th of June, delegations provided initial views on the zero draft. And following these informal virtual consultations, I circulated a revised version of the final progress report in a letter dated 25 June. And I’d also like to inform you that additionally, I convened an informal dialogue with stakeholders just last week on the 3rd of July. As I stated in my letter dated the 3rd of July, it is important that we finalize all outstanding issues within the limited time that we have, and this requires all of us to use the available time efficiently. I’ve therefore in my letter requested that all delegations refrain from delivering general statements. And in the event you have prepared general statements, I kindly request that you share these statements in advance with me and the Secretary. The intention is not to prevent you from making your statements, but the intention is to manage our time effectively and efficiently so that we can address the key issues that will be required to attain consensus. And as I also explained in my letter dated the 3rd of July, we will go through the document in Rev. 1, starting with Sections A and B, and then Sections C and D, and then Sections E and F. And I therefore invite all delegations to make a single statement on these Sections A and B to start with. And on Tuesday, tomorrow, it’s my intention to begin discussions on regular institutional dialogue, which, as all of you can understand, will require sufficient time to address the various issues. And it is important that we devote sufficient time for these issues as well. And it is therefore important for us to make progress through the various sections in a rapid way. Finally, as I said in my letter as well, I hope that delegations will look at Rev. 1 in a spirit of flexibility, compromise, and constructive cooperation, and use this meeting this morning and this afternoon and also tomorrow with regard to addressing the key issues from the point of view of your delegation. And I would also particularly welcome proposals for compromises, proposals for bridging text that can help all of us get to consensus. And it’s really important that we go beyond a restating of your preferred… positions and your national positions, because a restatement or reiteration of your preferred positions or issues is in itself not sufficient to get us to convergence and consensus. So my friends, my apologies for these lengthy opening remarks, but I wanted to situate the meeting as to where we are, the context in terms of how far we have come, and most importantly the challenge as to where we need to go. The distance to travel in the next few days is not large but it’s the hardest part that we need to traverse, but it can be done. A pathway to progress is visible, success is within reach, and I count on each one of you for your cooperation. So there’s no established list of speakers. Please press the buttons if you’d like to request for the floor, and we’ll ask for, we’ll ask, we’ll ask all delegations to be as succinct as possible, and I’ve also requested the Secretary to put a timer on the screen so that you can see for yourself how much time you’re taking. It’s not intended to pressure you in any way, but it’s to encourage every one of you to do your best in terms of being concise and brief in your interventions. So we’ll start with the European Union which is, which is asked for the floor, to be followed by Nigeria.

European Union: Good morning Chair, good morning colleagues. I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union and its member states, as well as the candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Georgia. The EFTA country Norway, member of the European Economic Area, as well as San Marino, aligned themselves with this statement. That means that I will be speaking on behalf of 37 states. I will do this for all of my statements this week. That means 20% of the UN membership. I promise I won’t take 20% of the time. But please allow me to maybe go a bit over the three minutes for some of the statements and some of the points that we want to make. Dear chairs, this is the first time I’m taking the floor this week. Please allow me to start by thanking you and your team for the continuous effort throughout this process. The UN’s member states continue to be committed to the open-ended working group discussions, as we have shown over the last years. And we will work this week constructively with you and all UN member states to ensure a smooth transition to the future permanent mechanism, a mechanism that will allow us to walk the talk, to take real action against the real challenges that we are facing in cyberspace, challenges that affect our security, affect our economies and democracies. And we look forward to concluding a report this week that will allow us to take the next step building on the framework for responsible, safe behavior in cyberspace. And this is an important principle, Mr. Chair. We should not conclude on a report that makes us lose the work we have done so far. We should not conclude on a report that diminishes the value of the UN framework and prioritizes new discussions on new norms and obligations over taking action and implementing those commitments we have made thus far. We cannot risk weakening the UN framework, as we cannot risk the international stability and security that those commitments offer us. And I invite every delegate in this room to just pause for a moment and think about what it would actually mean for our stability and security to not have those commitments strongly grounded in this final Open-Ended Working Group report. What raising doubts about the application of the UN framework would mean for your national security, for your economy and for your political system. In this light, we strongly suggest to ensure that the work by the international community done so far is well reflected in this report. And that we use this report to put in place the tools to effectively implement the UN framework, notably on capacity building. We therefore welcome the reference made in paragraph 13, but suggest to add the further references to the UN framework, its pillars and the work of the Open-Ended Working Group, as well as the UN GGEs in this context. And we welcome them to add them throughout the text, particularly for instance, in paragraph seven and eight. We also welcome in section C, paragraph N, the clarification on the appropriate role that norms play in the UN framework and the important reiteration that norms do not replace or alter states’ obligations and rights under international law, which are binding. We ask, however, to move this to the chapeau and to use agreed language in this context. We also suggest that all sections are clearly organized in a way that separates the paragraphs on the UN framework, its elements and its applicability, as well as the consensus interpretations of the Open-Ended Working Group from new proposals that have not garnered consensus, but could be potentially part of future discussions. By clearly making that separation, we leave no doubt that there are rules, norms and principles in place that states should abide by, and that additional proposals might build on them, but should never try to replace them. Let me then. and move to the threat section, Chair. We welcome the thorough reflection of the threat landscape, acknowledging that this is the basis for our discussion on responsible state behavior in cyberspace and the implementation of the UN framework in this regard. And I’m happy you referred to that as well. In this light, we clearly suggest to reflect the connection between the threat section and the other sections. For instance, linked to paragraph 15 in the threat chapter that recognizes the reality of the use of cyber capabilities in armed conflicts, the international law section should reflect the discussion on IHL. We would like to see the international law section clearly stating the elements of IHL as developed by a cross-regional group in a working paper. And we regret that in paragraph 15, the language has been changed for exclusively peaceful purposes, which diverts from agreed language and obligations and rights under international law. We therefore ask for its deletion. On paragraph 16, we regret the deletion of the blurred lines between state and non-state and criminal actors, as in particular, we see an increase of non-state actors engaging in light with state interest or engaging from the state’s territory with impunity. We strongly support the explicit recognition of ICT threats against international humanitarian organizations. And as well, we support the reference in paragraph 27 on the need to better understanding the risks associated with new and emerging technologies, including AI and quantum computing. We, however, suggest a caution in paragraph 27 for potential duplication of discussions under the future permanent mechanism on addressing threats stemming from new and emerging technologies, considering other ongoing processes, for instance, on AI addressing these type of threats. We also continue to be concerned about the use of malicious software, especially ransomware, and the expanding market for commercial intrusion capabilities, the increase of cryptocurrency as well as intellectual property theft, and welcome those references in the threat section. As regards ransomware, for instance, the healthcare section has over recent years become a prime target for ransomware actors due to the vast amount of sensitive patient data and the criticality of its operations. In this slide, we would welcome a separate paragraph on ransomware, as well as the recommendation to highlight the risk that ransomware poses to national security and the developments of state’s digital economy, and the need to further discuss and develop action-oriented measures under the cross-cutting dedicated thematic groups building on the commitments of the five pillars of the UN framework to address this threat appropriately. We see the UN framework of particular relevance here as criminal groups operating from the territory of certain states have increasingly sought to disrupt public entities and critical services in other states. Also, additional considerations of what might differentiate criminal and national security dimension of ransomware would require further attention under our discussions under the future permanent mechanism. We reaffirm also the need to include threats to cross-border critical infrastructure, including undersea cables. In the July APR of last year, states noted for the first time the need to secure undersea cables and orbital communication networks from malicious cyber activities, acknowledging that this could cause significant damage or disruption to telecommunications. and potentially affect the infrastructure essential to the availability and integrity of the Internet. Again, given the importance of these critical infrastructure and essential services for all states as the backbone of every country, we suggest to include a recommendation that highlights the need to secure cross-border critical infrastructures such as undersea cables and orbital communication networks and the need to develop action-oriented measures under the cross-cutting DTGs building on the commitments under the five pillars of the UN Framework to address this threat appropriately. We also welcome paragraph 18 that mentions cyber activities targeting critical infrastructure related to democratic institution and electoral processes as these significantly undermine trust and confidence between states and risk international stability. And finally, we welcome the language at the end of paragraph 32 setting out concrete tools to combat threats, including capacity building and public-private partnerships, as well as the multidisciplinary or cross-cutting dialogue among technical, diplomatic and legal experts which could be made effective under the cross-cutting DTGs. Let me please make one final remark as regards paragraph 33 as we would suggest to rephrase the language here, acknowledging that we should not only discuss cooperative measures but we should also discuss the application of the UN Framework in relation to threats as you mentioned yourself, taking into account paragraph 14 to 32. Here we reiterate that the UN Framework reflects the rules, norms and principles in place that should guide states’ behavior in cyberspace. Thank you very much, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, European Union. Could you kindly share the statement with us, please? Thank you very much. Nigeria for African Group to be followed by Fiji.

Nigeria: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I wish to deliver this statement on behalf of the African Group. The African Group wishes to express its deep appreciation to the Chair for his stewardship and thank him and his team for the progress made. made in this process since its inception in 2021. The group further wishes to highlight the successful adoption of the three annual progress reports of the Open Area Working Group by a concessor and the fruitful deliberation that took place during the past four and a half years. The group welcomes the annual progress report first reverse draft presented by the chair and the recommendation therein as we consider this initiative as a constructive contribution aimed at bringing us closer to a seamless transition from the current Open Area Working Group to the future permanent mechanism. The African group calls on all members to show a strong political will and a determination to promote compromise as a fundamental principle of negotiation to achieve a consensual adoption of the annual progress report for reaffirming the imperative for a single track. At this 11th and final session, the African group would like to highlight the following view in relation to different aspects of discussion. But first, let me go into the pillar on threat. Mr. Chair, the group underscored the importance of addressing the risk and the threat associated with malicious use of ICT, including attack on critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure, which is a form of threat increasingly relevant to African country, given the valuable investment put in such infrastructure, which are located from a limited pool of resources. I’m bearing in mind the trajectory of digitalization that several African states are pursuing in support of their sustainable development aspiration. Similarly, it is our view that there are other equally important and relevant ICT security threat and risk that target our nation, which should be addressed on an equal footing. This include, but is not limited to, targeting supply chain, undersage cable, Business may compromise the misuse of new and emerging technologies such as AI, IoT, cloud computing, and quantum computing, widespread misinformation and disinformation campaigns, including deepfakes, particularly targeting state institutions and designed to influence public opinion and destabilize governance during phases of post-conflict recovery and political crisis, ransomware attack, and cyber attack-destructing workflow in state institutions and or regional organizations. We wish to reiterate that this type and form of threat emanating from the cyber space are not only harmful by definition, but also impair the ability of African states to pursue their developmental path, compromising the credibility and functionality of state institutions, reducing the public confidence and trust, as well as general safety and societal harmony. We therefore reiterate our call for more in-depth discussion on this form of threat in our deliberation as well as in the future permanent mechanism. Thank you so much.

Chair: Thank you, Nigeria, for the African group, Fiji for the Pacific Islands Forum, to be followed by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Fiji: Thank you, Chair. Chair, I have the honor to speak on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum with a presence here in the United Nations, namely Australia, the Cook Islands, Kiribati, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and my island home, Fiji. Chair, as we reach the culmination of these open Ended Working Group’s mandate, the Pacific Islands Forum reaffirms its support for consensus outcomes and inclusive global cooperation on international cybersecurity. We commend your efforts, Chair, and the contributions of all of the delegations. Throughout this process, the Pacific has consistently advocated for a cumulative and evolving framework that addresses threats and builds resilience through the application of international law, voluntary and non-binding norms, confidence building measures, capacity building, and regular institutional dialogue. These pillars are not standalone silos. They must be advanced coherently and implemented effectively. We emphasize the adoption of the Pact of the Future that was adopted by our leaders last year and its annexes in relation to the Global Digital Compact, where international collaboration and cooperation are key, and request that the reference to this important multilateral process is captured in the final report. Chair, from the Pacific’s perspective, our greatest priority now is to ensure the future permanent mechanism is fit for purpose, accessible to all states, and capable of delivering practical outcomes. This mechanism must be inclusive and balanced, not only in participation, but in agenda setting, working modalities, and outcomes. And we appreciate the Chair’s effort to consolidate the structure of the proposed dedicated thematic groups. At the same time, we share the view that this approach may not allow us to meet these goals effectively. The OEWG has delivered meaningful dialogue. And moving forward, it is important that the future permanent mechanism be action-oriented and focused on delivering real results for all countries. We emphasize the importance of capacity building as an enabler across all areas of the framework. Cyber capacity building should not be siloed. It is foundational to implementing norms, to meaningfully engaging in international legal dialogue, and to sustaining confidence-building measures. The OEWG principles remain a strong foundation. But we regret that the Pacific Islands Forum’s regional capacity building paper, a major regional contribution, as well as other similar regional papers, are not meaningfully reflected in Rev. 1. And we look forward to working with you. forward to seeing this incorporated in the next iteration of the draft. The future mechanism must help identify national and regional needs and match them with appropriate support. And this includes supporting the technical implementation, the legislative development, workforce development and public awareness, and cyber hygiene education. And noting the role of these regional papers will set the appropriate foundation for the future permanent mechanism. On threats, Chair, our region continues to be impacted by malicious cyber activity. Ransomware remains a severe and growing concern as are threats against critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure. We welcome the paragraphs that reflect this in our Rev. 1 report. The integrity of our undersea cable infrastructure, which is vital to our economic and social resilience, is increasingly at risk from both natural hazards and malicious activity. And Chair, in closing, in line with the work program, we will provide our regional comments on the other sections when those comments are open for deliberation and also seek your indulgence that we will request for the floor at a later time to deliver remarks in our national capacity. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you, Fiji, Iran, to be followed by the Russian Federation.

Islamic Republic of Iran: Thank you, Mr. Chair. First, we would like to express our appreciation to you and your team for dedicated and tireless efforts in preparing the draft final report of the OEWG. The document provides an appropriate foundation for our deliberations this week. At the same time, we are of the view that further improvements are necessary to ensure the broadest possible support and to pave the way for consensus adoption. In this regard, our proposals on the first draft are guided by the overarching objective of enhancing the dedicated balance of the text, an important principle that you, Mr. Chair, have rightly emphasized as a key consideration in our deliberations. We remain committed to engaging constructively with all delegations under your leadership to ensure that the final report accurately reflects the views and concerns of all member states, enjoys the widest possible endorsement, and fosters a genuine sense of collective ownership. My delegations fully align itself with the joint statement of the LMG Group, which will be delivered later today. On the overview section, we have minor amendments to propose. With regard to paragraph 13, which refers to building the final report upon the first, second, and third annual progress report, we recommend retaining the language contained in the zero draft and omitting the reference to the GGE reports, as these reports were developed by a limited number of countries and don’t reflect the inclusive and consensus-based nature of the OEWG process. We also suggest that the term ICT security, which captures only a limited dimension of the OEWG comprehensive mandate, be replaced throughout the text, including in the overview section, with the more accurate and widely accepted formulation, which is security of and in the use of ICTs. This would better reflect the full scope and intent of the group’s work. On existing and potential threats, we are of the view that the section on threats in the first draft remains unbalanced. This is primarily due to the fact that certain threats highlighted by member states, including my own, over the course of the OEWG work in the past five years have not been adequately reflected in the current text. In order to help address this shortcoming, we would like to offer the following constructive and compromised proposal for consideration. To request the UN Secretariat to compile a non-exhaustive list of existing and emerging threats as proposed by states during the OEWG deliberations. Such a list could serve as a valuable reference to inform further discussion and study within the framework. of the future permanent mechanism. We welcome the reference in paragraph 15 to the use of ICTs exclusively for peaceful purposes and we underscore the importance of retaining this language in the final report. We would like to recall that OEWG’s mandate is to consider threats arising from the use of ICT, especially in the context of international peace and security. As such, the identification of existing and emerging threats should be approached through this specific lens. In this context, we are concerned that the final sentence of paragraph 16 appears to equate ICT-related criminal activity with issues of international peace and security. As this goes beyond the OEWG agreed scope, we would recommend that the sentence be deleted to maintain alignment with the group’s mandate. In the same vein, and based on the same rationale, we cannot support the change made to the agreed language of the third annual progress report in the last part of paragraph 24 regarding cyber, regarding cryptocurrency theft. We propose reverting the formulation in the zero draft, which reflected the agreed language of the third APR. Paragraph 25 has undergone significant changes compared to the zero draft. While we welcome the addition of the final sentence highlighting the importance of ensuring access to these tools by states, particularly developing countries, for lawful purposes, we would suggest a refinement of the last phrase to read, to access and utilize such capabilities for legitimate and lawful purposes. We believe this formulation provides greater clarity and precision. At the same time, we note with concerns the inclusion of newly added languages in this paragraph that we are unable to support. First, the reference to the use of such capabilities in a manner inconsistent with the framework for responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs appears to equate voluntary norms with binding obligations under international law. To preserve the integrity of this distinction, we would recommend the deletion of the newly added sentence. Second, the revised text introduced specific measures, such as establishment of safeguards and oversight related to the market of these capabilities as potential responses to the risk posed by intrusive ICT tools. We note that these measures. have not been subject of focused discussion within the OEWG, and we therefore suggest that these elements be reconsidered for possible future deliberation rather than incorporated at this stage. We would like to recall that the understanding reached at the time of the adoption of the third annual progress report concerning the content now reflected in paragraph 31 of the zero draft. It was explicitly stated at that time that this paragraph would remain open to further consideration. Our first and foremost preference is the deletion of paragraph 31 from the final report as it does not accurately reflect established hierarchy and nature of the international legal framework. Should deletion not possible, the paragraph must be substantially revised to address this fundamental legal issue. To this end, we propose the following alternative wording for paragraph 31. States recall that any use of ICTs by states that is gravely inconsistent with their obligations under international law undermines international peace and security. The use of ICTs in a manner inconsistent with voluntary commitments under the framework of responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs, including voluntary norms and confidence-building measures, undermines security, trust, and stability among states. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chair: Thank you very much, Islamic Republic of Iran. Russian Federation, to be followed by Mauritius.

Russian Federation: Distinguished Chair, distinguished colleagues. First of all, we would like to note the efforts of Ambassador Gafoor and his team to prepare the draft final report of the Open-Ended Working Group and to organize meetings to negotiate on it during the intersessional period. Currently, a great deal of work has been done, but much remains to be done during this week to ensure that this text can serve as a basis for consensus. We would like to emphasize that we are not talking about an imposed consensus, but rather about a result that will be achieved through a balanced consideration of the views of all parties and not at the expense of the interests of any of the states participating in the group. We agree with the structure of the draft report. At the same time, in terms of its content, Russia has a number of concrete, targeted proposals that are fundamentally important for our country. These guidelines are reflected, as well, in the joint statement of a group of like-minded states presented today that will be presented later today. Mr. Chair. In our view, the key task of agreeing on this – 50 pages of the report in a very short timeframe is overly ambitious. We call on the chair to consider shortening the text and preparing the next version of the report. This could be done by deleting or shortening paragraphs that duplicate agreements previously reached in the OEWG, as well as those containing issues that are not related to the mandate of the group – for example, cryptocurrency, information crime, gender issues, etc. I’d like to present the specific considerations of the Russian delegation on Sections A and B. First of all, we believe it’s important throughout the text to replace the term ICT security, which is narrow in its scope, with the phrase security of and in the use of ICTs. That includes the entire range of issues considered by the group. This same proposal applies to the title of the future permanent mechanism. The word stakeholders should also be replaced by other interested parties, as enshrined in the mandate of the group. The overview section, we believe, contains excessive commentary on the current geopolitical situation in paragraph 1, which we recommend removing in order to emphasize the depoliticized nature of the OEWG meetings. We insist on including in the text a call for the future mechanism to rely, in its work, upon the modalities of interaction between the OEWG and other stakeholders agreed upon in April 2022. That’s paragraph 10. In the section on threats, we believe it is necessary to reflect in the recommendations, first and foremost, the task of developing legally binding agreements as the most effective measure to counter challenges in the digital environment. It is reasonable to emphasize, as well, the role of the global intergovernmental points of contact directory for the exchange of information on computer attacks and incidents established for these purposes in the OEWG, which allows for the cooperation between the competent authorities of states to prevent conflicts in information space, taking into account the voluntary nature of the Framework for Responsible Behavior and Use of ICTs, we insist on the deletion of the wording on the commitment to their implementation by all states. That’s paragraph 33. We believe it’s sufficient to indicate the importance of observing this framework. In paragraph 25, in the context of commercially available ICT intrusion capabilities, it is more correct to refer to a violation of international law, especially the UN Charter, rather than the aforementioned framework of behavior. In paragraph 25, it is unclear what possibilities of using commercially available ICT intrusion capabilities for unauthorized access to ICTs in accordance with international law are being referred to. This language should be deleted. In addition, it would be more correct to replace the term illegitimate with illegal. Unreasonable emphasis is placed on the possible impact of ICT criminal activity, that is paragraph 16, hidden malicious functions, paragraph 23, and ransomware attacks, paragraph 24, on international peace and security. We assume that all issues discussed in the OEWG by default may have an impact on peace and security. Considering that the malicious use of ICTs poses a threat to all types of critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure, we see no reason to single out, in paragraph 17, individual vulnerable sectors such as health care, maritime transport, aviation, finance, and so on. The draft pays excessive attention, we believe, to issues of artificial intelligence, in paragraphs 26 to 27, ransomware, paragraph 24, quantum computing, and the Internet of Things, paragraph 28, which we believe should be combined and we should significantly shorten the relevant paragraphs. We propose deleting paragraph 20 altogether. We believe it is to remove vague provisions on a human-centric approach to ransomware, in paragraph 24, and effective risk management in relation to ICTs, that is paragraph 27, as well as premature conclusions on the importance of developing post-quantum cryptographic solutions, in paragraph 26. Thank you for your attention.

Chair: Thank you, Russian Federation. Please do give me an English version of your statement and also share it with all delegations. Thank you for that. Mauritius, to be followed by Canada.

Mauritius: Chair, distinguished delegates, good morning. The Mauritian delegation extends its sincere appreciation to you, Ambassador Gaffour, for your steadfast leadership throughout the OEWG’s mandate. We also express our gratitude to the Chair’s dedicated team and the UN Secretariat, in particular the ODA, whose combined efforts have been instrumental during the life cycle of the OEWG. We commend your initiative in convening two town hall meetings ahead of this final substantive session. These open and candid exchanges provided a valuable space for delegations to clarify positions, hear concerns from Member States, and collectively explore pathways towards convergence. We believe this contributed meaningfully to a shared sense of direction to building confidence at a critical moment in our work. As we convene for this concluding session, we reaffirm our commitment to a secure, stable, and peaceful ICT environment. We welcome the Chair’s final report, dated 25 June 2025, which encapsulates the progress achieved. and outlines a path forward. In this context, we offer the following reflections on agenda items A and B. Starting with agenda item A, we support paragraph three in its entirety, and we strongly believe that taken together, the three annual progress reports and the final report represent a carefully constructed foundation that will inform and support the continuation of dialogue on ICT security in the context of international security within the framework of the future permanent mechanism. Reflecting the language of paragraph seven, we express our support for the view that the FPM should be integrated, policy-oriented, and cross-cutting in its approach. Turning to paragraph nine, we strongly support the emphasis placed by states on capacity building as a foundational pillar for strengthening national resilience and ICT security. We conquer that building the necessary resources, skills, policies, and institutions is essential not only for addressing evolving cyber threats, but also for advancing digital transformation and supporting the implementation of the 2030 agenda for sustainable development. Coming to paragraph 12, we welcome the increasing participation of women delegates in the OEWG and commend the growing integration of agenda perspective in its deliberations. We share the view that narrowing the gender digital divide and promoting the full, equal, and meaningful participation and leadership of women in ICT-related decision-making, particularly in the context of international peace and security, is both essential and overdue. We reaffirm our commitment to advancing gender inclusion as a core element of effecting an equitable cyber diplomacy. We now wish to address the elements contained in section B, existing and potential threats, with a view to supporting consensus. My delegation aligns itself with the concerns expressed in the latest chair’s report regarding the increasingly complex and evolving ICT threat landscape. We fully support the emphasis placed by states in paragraph 17 on the growing risks posed to critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure from malicious ICT activities. In particular. Together we share the concern over incidents targeting vital sectors such as health, energy, financial services, maritime, aviation, and water, recognizing that disruption in these domains can result in cascading effects across borders and regions with serious implications for international peace and security. We also echo the alarm raised about the vulnerabilities of emerging digital ecosystems, including industrial systems, 5G networks, Internet of Things devices, cloud computing, virtual private networks, and firewalls, which are increasingly exposed to exploitation. The growing use of advanced cyber tools such as ransomware, wiper malware, trojans, phishing, and distributed denial-of-service attacks further exacerbates this threat environment. We also share the view that the growing incidence of cryptocurrency theft linked to ICT threats demands urgent and coordinated international attention. We further recognize that while technologies are inherently neutral, the rapid advancement and convergence of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing introduce new risks that may amplify the speed, scale, and targeting capabilities of malicious ICT activities. We support the emphasis in paragraph 27 on the need to strengthen AI and quantum governance, including through the development of post-quantum cryptographic solutions and by addressing safety and security concerns across the technology lifecycle. Particular attention must also be paid to the dual-use nature of these technologies, including the risks posed by large-language models, deepfakes, and other synthetic content, as well as AI-generated malware. As highlighted by states, the growth and aggregation of data, especially through AI, IoT, and cloud computing underscore the increasing importance of robust… data protection and cyber security practices. We therefore affirm the need for enhanced risk management frameworks and responsible innovation in the use of these technologies for preventing escalation of cyber threats. Finally, referring to paragraph 32, we support the continued call to address capacity gaps that make states more vulnerable to cyber threats. No state is immune. We underline the importance of raising awareness, strengthening national coordination among technical, diplomatic, and legal sectors, and fostering cooperation between CERTs and CSERTs. We also support deepening public-private partnerships and expanded targeted capacity-building initiatives to improve early detection, response, and resilience against evolving ICT threats. We also lay emphasis on the importance of cross-regional collaboration, which is key to address cyber threats at regional level. I thank you for your attention, Chair.

Chair: Thank you. Mauritius, Canada, to be followed by the United States.

Canada: Thank you, Chair. We thank you for your efforts in seeking to devote tomorrow to the discussions that are necessary to allow us to agree on a future permanent mechanism. Canada will therefore today focus on the improvements that we believe are needed in order to find consensus, and we will be brief. In general, we note that the report and Annex III are helping to shape the mandate and the work of our future mechanism. Our work in recent years and our future work under the future mechanism ought to recognize the foundations laid by the Framework for Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace. Our final report should clearly recall this solid foundation, upon which we have already agreed. Just like the EU, we are concerned by the fact that Annex I does not sufficiently recall the importance of this existing framework. As regards the text, in the overview section of the report, we particularly support paragraph 7, which refers to our consensus that the future mechanism will work in a cross-cutting and public policy-oriented manner. We consider that paragraph 2 should note the involvement of stakeholders when it refers to our platform as seeking to be inclusive. inclusive and transparent. Finally, and this is a point that we will reiterate in relation to several sections, Canada urges the Chair to remove references to the 2021 summary, given that this document does not, in fact, represent consensus. References to this 2021 document are confusing because they give the impression that this summary has a status that it has not, in fact, earned. Moving now to the section on threats. Canada supports paragraphs 20, 25, and 32. We share the concerns of the EU about paragraph 16, and Canada also has serious concerns about the last sentence of paragraph 15, and we would call for deletion of the last sentence of paragraph 15. We welcome the content of paragraph 24. Nevertheless, this list of threats does not do justice to the major trend that was echoed throughout our OEWG, which was specifically to deal with ransomware. In our view, this particular threat deserves its own paragraph. We support the reference to cryptocurrencies at the end of paragraph 24, and we suggest that we change the reference to post-quantum cryptography at the end of paragraph 26 to focus it more on cybersecurity with an emphasis on implementation of solutions related to these developments. Finally, together with the African group, we welcome the idea that we work more on threats to critical infrastructure under the future mechanism. And this concludes our brief remarks. Thank you very much, Chair.

Chair: Thank you, Canada. United States, to be followed by Indonesia.

United States: Thank you, Chair. The United States has been clear that the UN must return to its founding purpose to maintain international peace and security. The United States helped found the UN after World War II to prevent future global conflicts and promote international peace and security. But some of the UN’s agencies and bodies have drifted from this mission and instead act contrary to the interests of the United States. And it is in that context that we enter these negotiations. With the OEWG coming to a close, we have an opportunity to cement the good work we’ve done to promote common-sense cybersecurity approaches while ensuring that the discussions that follow continue on this productive path and do not get mired in UN bureaucracy or distracted by controversial or divisive issues. To that end, the United States has reviewed the chair’s draft final OEWG report and has significant concerns. The United States firmly believes that the final OEWG report should serve as a record of consensus achieved in this process and, as a priority, provide a roadmap for a seamless transition to the next discussion forum. Unnecessary details that do not serve that purpose and in the inclusion of a controversial or underdeveloped proposal should not distract from this overall intended purpose of the report. Further, Chair, we emphasize our concern about the draft’s reports over-referencing the 2021 chair’s summary in the 2021 OEWG report. We underscore to all states, as others have mentioned, that this is not a consensus document and should not be treated as such in this draft report. Chair, we ask you to review all references to that summary with this context in mind and remove them where they are inappropriate. In the overview section, we welcome the references to the GGE reports in paragraph 13. These reports represent the foundation of our work, were adopted by consensus by all U.N. member states, and should be referenced in the report. On the threat section of the draft report, we appreciate the draft’s continued acknowledgment that ICTs are already being used in conflict in paragraph 15. Its recognition of the severe threat to international peace and security posed by ransomware activity in paragraph 24, and its general focus on cyber threats to critical infrastructure. The United States has been the repeated victim of ransomware attacks and significant cyber intrusions into our critical infrastructure from foreign adversaries and criminal actors. And as you have heard, we are not alone in this regard. UN member states must do more to combat these threats. In that vein, we support the European Union’s text proposal highlighting the need to secure cross-border critical infrastructure. We are also pleased to see language added in paragraph 24 on concern about rising cryptocurrency theft and the threat to international peace and security posed by the illicit financing of malicious cyber activity. However, we cannot support the draft’s report’s reference to promoting the use of ICTs for quote, exclusively peaceful purposes, unquote, in paragraph 15. As every state in this room is aware, states are already using ICTs in the context of armed conflict. It is all the more important, therefore, that states reaffirm their commitment to applying principles of international humanitarian law to their use of ICTs in armed conflict. The robust discussions of IHL during this OEWG are not adequately reflected in this draft, and we should not compound that failure by including the confusing text in paragraph 15. Further, while we understand some states are eager to discuss emerging technologies, we believe discussion of those topics and their portrayal in the report need to be carefully kept within the OEWG’s existing mandate. In that vein, we see much of the language on this topic as unnecessarily detailed and as such overemphasizing risk over opportunity. Finally, the United States has raised in each session the serious threat that pre-positioning poses to critical infrastructure, and we are disappointed that that has not been included in REV-1. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you, United States, for your statement. Indonesia to be followed by El Salvador.

Indonesia: Thank you, Mr. Chair. At the outset, Indonesia wishes to express its sincere appreciation to you, Mr. Chair, for your continued leadership throughout the OEWG process. Indonesia comments you and your team for the hard work for producing the REV-1 of the final report, which in our view broadly reflects the progress achieved in promoting a common understanding of responsible state behavior in cyberspace. We are fully guided by your approach in discussing the final report, as mentioned in the letter dated 3 July 2025. In this regard, allow us to share with you our reflections on Section B, Existing and Potential Threats. First, Indonesia notes the concern on the continued intensification and evolution of cyber threats, as outlined in paragraph 14, as well as the vulnerabilities of ICT infrastructure on paragraph 20, an issue of relevance to Indonesia. Hence, we would like for the those two paragraphs to be retained. Second, Indonesia hopes further discussion on emerging technologies can be continued on the future permanent mechanism. We welcome the inclusion of peaceful uses of ICTs as reflected in paragraph 15 and 27, and elements on emerging technologies, such as AI and quantum computing in paragraph 26 and 27. Third, we believe that capacity building must remain central to our deliberations on this pillar. Paragraph 32 has emphasized this notion, and we are of the view that discussions on threats shall be followed on efforts to strengthen state’s capacity in preventing and mitigating such risks. Therefore, Indonesia believes this paragraph must be retained in the final report. Mr. Chair, in closing, Indonesia reiterates its full support for your leadership and the process ahead. We remain committed to exercise our utmost flexibility on this matter, and working constructively with all delegations towards consensus. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Indonesia, for your two-minute statement. I think you get the prize this morning. El Salvador, to be followed by Qatar.

El Salvador: Senor President, Chair, allow me to begin by expressing the thanks of El Salvador for the hard, preparatory work ahead of this final session of the OEWG. We have noted with appreciation your efforts, those of the team and the Secretariat, in producing a document that facilitates an effective transition towards a permanent mechanism on the basis of the work that we have done so far and that reaffirms the framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. My country looks forward to the adoption by consensus the final annual progress report. We hope that the revised version a solid basis for discussions today. Allow me now to deliver a few specific remarks based on the previous informal meeting on existing and potential threats. El Salvador feels that this is one of the most comprehensive sections of the report. We welcome the reference to the threat landscape in information security. Nevertheless, we consider that paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Zero Draft reflected more accurately the relationship between hybrid use of ICT and conventional weapons, and also the criminal activities related to ICT and how they can represent a threat to international peace and security. This is why we would request that you consider returning to the language of the Zero Draft in this area. On paragraph 27, we are grateful that you have included El Salvador’s suggestion on post-quantum cryptographic solutions, and we would ask you, therefore, to keep this language. We also echo what was said by Mauritius in relation to equal meaningful participation of women in decision-making processes related to the use of ICT in the context of international security. We will come back on future sections at a later time. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, El Salvador, for also keeping within time. No pressure on Qatar to be followed by Egypt.

Qatar: We will also express our appreciation to you and to the Secretariat and everyone who has prepared the draft final report, which captures the work of the OEWG. Mr. Chairman, we would like to mention Section B on existing and potential threats. The State of Qatar has previously reiterated the need to discuss the threats and security gaps as a result of the increased use of AI and modern technology. We emphasize paragraphs 20 and 26. This is an important measure to bridge views on the threats landscape. We also welcome paragraph 24 on the comprehensive treatment of increased threats from ransomware and malicious software. On Section C, we agree with paragraph 35 that includes a recommendation to continue exchanging views within a permanent mechanism. On paragraph 37, Qatar continues to share best practices, and we would like to invite you to a side event on the successful experience of Qatar in applying the norms of responsible state behavior in the use of ICT, and this will be today from 1.30 to 2.30 p.m. in Conference Room 12. With regards to Section E on CBMs and paragraph 46E on the template for communication, we emphasize the need to maintain the voluntary and flexible nature of the template, and we also emphasize paragraph 46H on the initial list of global CBMs, and here we would like to thank the organizing partners of the simulation exercise on the points of contacts directory as well as the ping test every six months because these are very useful for the preparedness of the points of contact. Mr. Chairman, on Section F on capacity building, we welcome paragraph 52F on the Global Security Cooperation. and capacity building portal. The portal is important to promote the cooperation between states, and we also welcome that it shall evolve over time to cater to the needs of states. We also emphasize the importance of the roundtables that provide a forum to exchange national, regional and international experiences. Mr. Chairman, the report highlights and reflects the work of our group, and the state of Qatar reiterates that it will continue to share best practices and will remain committed to achieving our shared objectives. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chair: Thank you very much, Qatar, for your statement and also for the announcement on your side event. Egypt, to be followed by Ghana, please.

Egypt: Thank you, Excellency Chairperson. Chairperson, we align with the statement delivered by the African group. Chairperson, we continue to resolutely stand behind your leadership and supportive of your appreciated and relentless endeavors. We acknowledge the wide sense of commitment and political will among member states to honor the hard work undertaken at this OEWG with a meaningful, balanced and impactful conclusion. Egypt is not planning to deliver a general statement, neither now nor during the course of the week. We reiterate that our utmost priority is to ensure a consensus that allows smooth and seamless transition towards a future permanent mechanism, and to ensure that the gains and milestones achieved through the course of the work of this open-ended working group and previous UN-relevant processes are safeguarded and built upon. This will be an instrumental step in reinforcing the role of the UN in itself as a mean of confidence building. As indicated by the African group, albeit potential room for enhancements and strengthening, REV.1 provides a very promising, balanced and constructive point of departure that delegations are are encouraged to engage with an open mind and sense of purpose. We acknowledge that the report, including its annexes, responded positively to a number of the priorities and concerns of our delegation and parameters suggested previously by both the African and Arab groups during previous sessions. Any divergence of views concerning the substantive content of the report under its five sections, particularly since it mostly does not endorse any new conclusions or recommendations, can be addressed in the most factual manner or through effective yet prudent streamlining. For these reasons, we will exercise self-restraint and keep our comments and suggestions on the report itself to the most minimal level. We encourage all delegations to consider to do the same, to allow ample room to consider Annex III on the additional elements of the open-ended, action-oriented permit mechanism on ICT security in the context of international security that supplements the agreements included in Annex C of the third APR, and further allow for the needed time to consider RF2 as early as possible during this week. We have three text-based suggestions on Section B with a view of further reinforcing the element of a more equitable, diverse, and representative threats landscape, as portrayed in previous statements and interventions. As a better informed and more precise understanding of the forms and types of threats contribute to building and maintaining more resilient digital ecosystems. First, to add in the end of paragraph 14 the following sentence, states recognize the need to continue to capture and address the widest and most diverse landscape and range of risks and threats in a manner that equitably represents realities in all countries and regions. In paragraph 15, and also to capture the present reality in a more precise and realistic manner, in the middle we suggest the editing that would read as follows. The use of ICT in current army conflicts is increasing and is becoming more and more likely in future conflicts. between states. Finally, in paragraph 22, we suggest an addition at the very end of this paragraph to read as follows. States recognize the disproportionate impact of such malicious activities, including through misinformation on states in transitional phases or emerging from armed conflicts, particularly in Africa and other developing countries, and may subject them to heightened risk of relapse and increase their fragility. I thank you, Chairperson.

Chair: Thank you very much, Egypt, for your statement, but also for your reference to the fact that you have exercised self-restraint. I think that’s a virtue that I would command to all of us, and I wanted to give you a stocktake as to where we are. I think we have about 20 delegations that have asked for the floor under this section, but first I want to say that it has been a very positive and very constructive beginning to our discussions, so thank you very much for that. Second, I like the fact that all of you are zeroing in on very specific amendments and suggestions. I like that as well, so let’s keep that in mind. Thirdly, if you agree with a statement that has been previously made by another delegation with regard to a particular proposal, say so very briefly. You don’t need to elaborate the reasons, so that the room has a sense of where everyone stands with regard to proposals made, and the proposals could be with reference to additions or deletions, so that everyone has a sense of how the proposals are being received. Again, you don’t need to elaborate your reasons if indicating that you are in line with a proposal previously made. I think that will be helpful to all of us. And of course, self-restraint is good. You can send us your full text, but if you’d like to particularly focus on proposals that you think are important, then please put it forward, and I would also encourage others to react to it. I mean, this process is not a collection or collation of statements. If it was, then at the end of the week I could ask, chat GPT, or deep seek. to prepare a summary and then you know put it to you but it is more than that it is more than a compilation you need to interact with each other by responding to the different proposals that have been made so so I would encourage of course brevity focus and I’m not intending to cut off any statement but that really depends on each one of you being focused so that we give everyone a chance to come in with very brief statements to indicate where they stand so I seek your cooperation with that but having said that my thanks to all of you for what I would consider to be a very good start to our discussions plus the fact that the tone has been positive and constructive I’m very very grateful for that so let’s keep moving before the lunch break I give the floor to Ghana to be followed by Singapore

Ghana: Mr. chair thank you for giving me the floor my delegation has actively participated in the work of this open-ended working group and appreciates the significance progress made since the beginning of its mandate in 2021 we welcome the ref one draft of the final report as a substantial milestone that reflects the collective efforts undertaking over the past five years to achieve our shared objectives in this final stretch mr. chair Ghana remains fully committed to supporting the successful conclusion of the group’s work we align with a statement delivered on behalf of the African group and wish to make the following remarks in our national capacity there’s a chair on this section B which addresses existed and potential threats we welcome the inclusion in paragraph 17 of language recognizing the sovereign prerogative of states to determine which infrastructure they consider critical as well as the importance of protecting critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure we also appreciate the reference in paragraph 23 to concern regarding the exploitation of ICT product vulnerabilities and the threats posed to the integrity of supply chains. However, Ghana believes this paragraph would benefit from the inclusion of a reference to security by design, a concept consistently emphasized by our delegation and others in previous sessions of the OEWG. We therefore propose that the following sentence be added to paragraph 23 immediately after the last sentence of that paragraph. So the last line in paragraph 23 reads, states also noted the significant ICT threats posed to the integrity of supply chains. And after this paragraph, we propose adding this line. In this context, states highlighted the critical importance of security by design throughout the life cycle of ICTs as a fundamental measure to mitigate such risks. Mr. Chair, this addition is important as it reflects the understanding that supply chain integrity cannot be fully ensured without the consistent application of security by design principles by all actors involved. Mr. Chair, with respect to paragraph 25, which notes the growing markets for commercially available ICT intrusion capabilities as well as the proliferation of hardware and software vulnerabilities, including those accessible via the dark web, my delegation supports the inclusion of this important issue. We believe it is vital to address the increasing risk posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of such commercial intrusive capabilities. In this regard, Ghana wishes to reiterate its support for the joint statement submitted by the Palmaul Group and aligns itself with the recommendations put forward therein. The Palmaul process, as we understand, represents an ongoing international and multi-stakeholder dialogue aimed at developing joint policy and technical solutions to address the challenges associated with commercial cyber intrusion capabilities. Mr. Chair, my delegation also welcomes the language in paragraph 32 concerning the need to strengthen cooperation between computer emergency response teams and computer security incidents response teams. We equally support the emphasis on enhancing public-private partnerships, which are essential for improving resilience and promoting timely, coordinated responses to ICT. related threats. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much. Ghana, Singapore please. Mr.

Singapore: Chair, my delegation would like to thank and express our appreciation to you and your team for the hard work in preparing this draft final progress report and in facilitating this week’s discussions. On existing and potential threats, given the transboundary nature of these threats, Singapore welcomes the draft report’s comprehensive focus on the diverse cyber threats faced by states as outlined in Paris 16 to 29. These threats provide an up-to-date and very useful snapshot of the cyber threats that the majority of states around the room today have to deal with and also in doing so provide a roadmap of concrete and meaningful for the concrete and meaningful implementation of the normative framework and the areas we need to further discuss in strengthening this framework as well as cooperation initiatives and capacity building we need to strengthen at the international, regional and sub-regional levels to build our collective resilience against them. We support the inclusion of Paris 26, 27 and 29 which acknowledge the risks of emerging tech especially on AI. We need to continue to build our understanding on the opportunities as well as risks posed by such technologies especially to small and developing states. It is vital that we continue our conversations on emerging threats in the future permanent mechanism. Mr. Chair, noting the evolving nature of the cyber threat landscape, we support Paris 32 on the importance of further encouraging cooperation dialogue particularly at the CERT level. To further enhance this we should ensure that CERT related information sharing and cooperation occurs in a timely manner to ensure that we can appropriately respond to cyber incidents. From our region the ASEAN regional CERT and information sharing mechanism we have recently established provide useful examples of how such information sharing and cooperation can help advance these efforts. Given above we support the recommendation in Paris 33 to continue exchanging views at the future permanent mechanism to identify cooperative measures to address these common challenges. It is more important than ever that we maintain dialogue on cyber issues and cyber security as cyber threats affect us all. It is in all our interests to continue our cooperation. Thank you Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much Singapore for your statement. Friends I’ve been told that the Russian Federation wishes to take a… floor to make a procedural point. So I’ll give them an opportunity to do so, but I request them to be as brief as possible. Russian Federation.

Russian Federation: Thank you, Chair. I’d like to touch on an organizational and procedural issue that’s very important. Unfortunately, my colleagues from Russia do not have access to the interpretation or the webcast of the session. So could you please address this issue with the technical service and rectify the situation and prevent it from being repeated? This could potentially be linked with the political activity of certain states and take part in the work of the OEWG. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you, Russian Federation. Just to clarify, are you saying that the UN web TV cannot be seen, or it can be seen, but there’s no access to interpretation? Can you clarify, please?

Russian Federation: Chair, the website UN web TV can be opened, but there’s no access to the webcast.

Chair: Well, thank you very much, Russian Federation. These sort of technical website issues are not uncommon, especially the UN website, which, by the way, requires a lot of funding for improvement, but that’s a separate issue. So it’s a pretty archaic system, and I think they’re doing their best. So let’s assume that these are technical issues. I don’t think we need to impute anything more sinister at this stage, but I will ask the secretariat to check with the technicians to see, and I hope that we can fix the problem, because the idea is that anyone can access it, and I’m very happy to hear that people around the world are watching our meeting. It is so exciting, very obviously. But it also is an instrument for transparency and inclusiveness. So it is a very important issue. So let’s hope that we can fix it. Secretary, can you take it up? Yeah, I will. All right, we’ll give you an update later, later in the afternoon. So Republic of Moldova to be followed by Malawi, please.

Republic of Moldova: Chair, Excellency, distinguished delegates, the Republic of Moldova aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union and its member states. In this regard, we reaffirm our strong support for the consensus-based work of the YWG and the foundational role it has played in reinforcing international peace and security in cyberspace. Chair, first, I would like to express my delegation’s appreciation for your leadership and for the sustained efforts of your team in guiding this process over the past years. We also acknowledge the valuable contributions of all delegations in navigating this complex, yes, vital agenda. As a smaller state committed to the multilateral rules-based order, Moldova places a high premium on the stability and predictability that the existing UN framework on responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs provides. This framework rooted in international law and voluntary norms, confidence building measures and capacity building remains essential to safeguarding our digital future. We echo the EU’s call that this final YWG report must not only preserve the progress achieved so far, but also act as a launchpad for implementation. Any attempt to dilute the consensus reached or to blur the applicability of international law in cyberspace risks undermining global stability for. Moldova and many countries in similar positions. Such uncertainty would pose serious challenges to national security, economic development and democratic governance. In this context, we support the clear differentiation in the report between agreed norms and proposals still under discussion. This distinction is critical to maintaining coherence and credibility in the UN framework. Chair, we would like to highlight three complementary points. First, capacity building must remain at the heart of international cooperation. The Republic of Moldova particularly values the recognition of its cross-cutting role in the OEWG work. We see capacity building not only as a technical priority, but as a strategic enabler of our national resilience, our cyber diplomacy and our ability to meaningfully engage in international processes. We welcome paragraph 9’s emphasis on the need for accelerated needs-based and sustainable approaches and call for the future permanent mechanism to operationalize these principles with inclusivity and transparency. Second, we underscore the importance of regional cooperation. In our region, cyber threats often transcend borders and institutional capacities. My delegation, therefore, supports stronger cooperation between the UN and regional or sub-regional organizations, including those not traditionally focused on ICT security. Enhanced cross-regional exchanges would help ensure that regional diversity is reflected in global norms and practices. Third, we appreciate the OEWG’s efforts to promote gender inclusion and the increasing participation of women in cyber diplomacy, and we remain committed. to reducing the gender digital divide and enabling the full and meaningful participation of women in ICT policies both domestically and internationally. Chair, in conclusion, the Republic of Moldova remains firmly committed to an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful ICT environment. We view the transition to a future permanent mechanism not as the end of a process but as a renewed commitment to responsible behavior, dialogue and practical cooperation. We thank you once again for your leadership and assure you of our continuing constructive engagement. Thank you very much.

Chair: Thank you very much, Moldova, for your statement. I give the floor now to Malawi to be followed by France.

Malawi: Mr. Chairman, Excellencies and Delegates, the Republic of Malawi aligns itself with the principles of consensus, cooperation and constructive dialogue as emphasized in your letters dated 23rd May, 4th June and 25th of June 2025. My delegation commends your leadership and guidance during this critical final stage of the OEWG final process and reiterates our unmervering commitment to the successful adoption of a consensus-based final report that ensures a seamless transition to the future permanent mechanism. The Republic of Malawi will structure its interventions in this session around the five key pillars of the OEWG as reflected in REV1, draft final report with first the existing and potential threats. The Republic of Malawi supports the statement by the African group and acknowledges the growing complexity and sophistication of ICT related threats including ransomware, data breaches and the malicious use of AI. My delegation reaffirms its concern regarding cyber incidents that target critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure. such as the 2024 breach of Malawi’s passport issuance system. We strongly support the report’s recognition of ransomware and cryptocurrency-related fraud as major threats. In line with the REV1 report, we stress that a human-centric and capacity-focused response to ransomware is essential. The Republic of Malawi has experienced an increase in mobile money fraud, SIM swaps scams, and phishing attacks, especially as we are approaching our general elections this September. Many of these threats leverage social engineering and undermine public trust in digital systems. In response, the Republic of Malawi is enhancing its national threat monitoring capacity through our national search and is in the process of finalizing its national cybersecurity policy to further address these threats. Just like Mauritius, Ghana, and Singapore, the Republic of Malawi echoes the call for enhanced cooperation between CERTs, improved public-private partnerships, and regional response frameworks. And we also underline the urgent need to address vulnerabilities in undersea cables and satellite communications. In conclusion, Chair, my delegation supports the OEWG’s efforts to identify and prioritize the most urgent threats to international ICT security. We commit to strengthening our threat landscape, mechanisms, and call on member states to continue sharing their threats, intelligence, tools, and best practices. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Malawi, for your contribution. France to be followed by South Africa.

France: Thank you, Mr. Chair, your team, and the Secretariat for your work throughout the OEWG process. We assure you of our support in reaching a consensus on all the sections of the report and its annexes, and in ensuring the transition toward a future permanent mechanism, a topic on which my delegation, as you know, has worked tirelessly and in a constructive manner since our initial proposal of a program of action five years ago. I’d like to – the discussions that we’ve been having on growing and multifaceted threats in cyberspace, whether this is ransomware, cyber threats linked to AI, or the commercial market for cyber intrusion capabilities, demonstrates one thing. It is urgent to implement the Framework for Responsible Behavior by States through an action-oriented mechanism. This is our best asset for dealing with these threats. However, Mr. Chair, we still have work to do to reach a consensus, as the revised draft report remains unbalanced. For each section, my delegation will focus on the main stumbling blocks and will send its detailed comments in writing for the sake of time. For the section on threats, we will limit ourselves to two points. I’d like, first and foremost, to support the delegations that have raised the issue of paragraph 15 containing problematic and nonconsensual language on uses of cyberspace by states. And secondly, I’d like to point out that paragraph 25 could be improved, in our view, and we will send a written proposal in this regard to replace the end of the last sentence by, quote, to access and utilize ICT tools for legitimate and necessary purposes consistent with international law. international law where appropriate safeguards and oversight are in place. So that’s the end of paragraph 25. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, France, for your statement and for your very focused proposals, and I look forward to receiving them in writing. South Africa, to be followed by Thailand.

South Africa: Thank you, Chair. South Africa aligns with the statement delivered by Nigeria on behalf of the African group. In our national capacity, we would like to express our appreciation to you, your team, and the Secretariat for your tireless efforts in preparing for the 11th and final session of the OEWG. We reaffirm our full support and commitment to working with all states to achieve consensus on the fourth and final report of the OEWG. We also support the Chair’s approach to discussions and negotiations as outlined in the letter dated 3 July 2025. Recognizing that time is of essence, we commend your efforts to encourage delegations to provide more specific interventions on the draft report rather than general statements as we work together to finalize the outstanding issues. We believe that the text of Ref 1 of the final report is balanced and provides a solid foundation for negotiation, reflecting the diverse viewpoints and discussions held over the past four and a half years. We are confident that consensus can be achieved on these elements, ensuring a seamless transition from the current OEWG to the future Permanent Mechanism. Turning to Sections A and B, we fully support the Chair’s proposed text in the Overview and Threat Sections, which are drawn from the consensus already achieved in the three OEWG APRs. We welcome the revisions made to paragraph 25. based on the discussions held during the two town hall meetings. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, South Africa, for your statement and also for your message of hope and optimism that we can get to consensus. I think this is what we need as we embark on this intense week. Thailand to be followed by Japan.

Thailand: Mr. Chair, since this is the first time Thailand is taking the floor, I would like to thank the Chair for the preparation of the draft final report and all the work leading up to it. On existing and potential threats section, Thailand would like to highlight the following points. First, we welcome the clear and thorough overview of the evolving threat landscape in the draft. We agree that growing threats in the use of ICTs, particularly in terms of conflict and political tension, present serious risk to international peace and security. Second, Thailand agrees with the inclusion of the concern over the rising number and growing sophistication of cyber attacks worldwide, particularly those targeting critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure. Among these, we would like the draft report to specifically include threats from advanced persistent threats or APTs, which are especially alarming due to their complex and sustained nature, and can disrupt essential services and threaten national security, economic stability, and public safety. These risks are even more serious for developing countries with limited cyber security capacity. Third, Thailand agrees with the inclusion of paragraph 16, which states the current trend that some non-states have demonstrated ICT capabilities previously only available to states. We would like to note our concerns about the challenge of determining whether such sophisticated cyber activities are carried out by state or non-state actors and the importance of relevant capacity building, which I will continue to address later in this meeting. Fourth, Thailand also agrees with the inclusion of the increasing importance of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and cloud-based systems. To fully benefit from these technologies while addressing their potential risks, we stress the need to strengthen cooperation at all levels. Lastly, Thailand believes that preventing and addressing cyber threats requires both strong domestic measures and enhanced regional and international cooperation. Recognizing that cyber threats can affect privately-owned infrastructure or systems that operate across borders, Thailand underscores the importance of both interstate and public-private sector cooperation. In this regard, Thailand supports continued engagement within the Future Permanent Mechanism to address existing and potential threats through focused discussions on cooperative measures and strengthen collaboration at the regional and international level. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Thailand. Japan, to be followed by Turkey.

Japan: Thank you, Mr. Chair. First of all, I’d like to thank you and your team for all the efforts already put into date for the draft final report. Although there still remains… issues which need to be addressed to achieve the right balance, Japan concurs with you about the importance of reaching consensus this week in this room. Regarding the overview section in paragraphs such as 8 and 13 for example, a reference to the work of GGE is necessary because our discussions at the UN are based on a series of discussions and efforts done both by the OEWG and GGE. Therefore it is necessary to mention not only the OEWG’s work but also the GGE’s work if not mentioned yet and retained if already mentioned in relevant paragraphs. My second point is that regarding the threat section, threats from cross-border cyber attacks and intrusions have unfortunately been on continuous upward trend and it is crucial that all member countries share the right landscape on the existing and potential threats and risks. In this regard we highly value the Red One mentions the issue of cryptocurrency theft in the context of international peace and security in paragraph 24 and despite what I heard today in this room, Japan requests that text be maintained as it stands in the Red One. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you Japan for your statement. Turkey to be followed by Cuba.

Turkey: Mr. Chair, distinguished delegates, let me begin by expressing Turkey’s appreciation for your dedicated leadership and the inclusive manner in which this process has been conducted. The draft final report before us marks a critical step in consolidating our collective efforts and shaping the contours of the failed future permanent mechanism. As we prepare to transition to this new phase Turkey would like to offer the following reflections. First, we attach great importance to the security and resilience of global ICT supply chains. As highlighted in paragraph 23 and 34G of the draft, the development of shared standards and best practices is essential. However, these must be complemented by practical implementation frameworks that respect the diversity of national capacities and foster trust across jurisdictions. Second, we wish to underscore the centrality of data governance in today’s digital environment. As noted in paragraph 28, the risks posed by data misuse and breaches of privacy are growing. We see merit in sustained dialogue on secure cross-border data flows, personal data protection, and mechanisms for preventing the exploitation of sensitive data. Chair, Turkey believes that the UN Technology Bank for Least Developed Countries plays a vital role in strengthening the science, technology, and innovation ecosystems of LDCs. In this context, we see significant value in expanding the Bank’s mandate and partnerships to include targeted support for capacity building in ICT security. As digital threats increasingly affect national development and stability, it’s essential that cybersecurity be mainstreamed into broader digital transformation strategies. The Technology Bank, through its established networks and expertise, is well positioned to facilitate the transfer of secure digital technologies, support cyber skills training, and promote regional cooperation in cyber resilience. Turkey stands ready to support initiatives that leverage the Bank’s convening power to build by cybersecurity capacities aligned with the needs and priorities of the LDCs. Third, we acknowledge the growing role of the private sector in securing the digital ecosystem. However, we note that responsibilities remain insufficiently defined. The future mechanism should support reflection on how private actors can cooperate with states in addressing systemic ICT vulnerabilities and mitigating the consequences of major incidents. Chair, on the application of international law, Turkey reiterates that the UN Charter and other relevant instruments apply in cyberspace. Yet, as reflected in paragraphs 38 to 42, ambiguity remains concerning thresholds such as the use of force, intervention, and state responsibility. We support the proposal to dedicate a thematic group under the future mechanism to this issue as outlined in Annex 3. We also believe that effective cooperation between sources and affected states in responding to cross-border ICT incidents should be prioritized. Developing operational modalities for such coordination will be key to preventing escalation and fostering mutual confidence. Finally, with respect to stakeholder engagement under the future permanent mechanism, Turkey reaffirms its support for transparency and inclusiveness. That said, this must not come at the expense of the intergovernmental character of the process, which Turkey views as red line. We urge clear affirmation that participation will be strictly based on accredited status in full accordance with established UN practice and the principle of non-objection. Chair, Turkey remains committed to the successful conclusion of this process and to the establishment of a future mechanism that builds on our shared achievements. We will continue to support efforts that ensure an open, secure, stable, accessible, and peaceful ICT environment rooted in international law, cooperation, and collective responsibility. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much. Turkey, Cuba, to be followed by Croatia.

Cuba: Gracias, Senor President. Thank you, Chair. Chair, we have reached the final meeting, the final session, rather, of this OEWG following four weeks of work, four years of work, and you have demonstrated the value of your stewardship. It is now time for us to achieve a final progress report that keeps all states united in the establishment of a new mechanism for periodic institutional dialogue. Our delegation stands ready to work arduously to achieve this outcome. The current version of the report needs some major modifications. We align ourselves with the statement to be delivered by the like-minded group. We support the call to be cautious in terms of the specific use of terminology throughout the final report in order to ensure coherence with the mandate handed down to the OEWG. Chair, my delegation wishes to refer to sections A and B of the draft report. We note that section A, overview, is largely based on previously agreed language, while there is still room for perfection. In section B, on existing and potential threats, we are pleased to note that paragraph 15 has been modified to refer to the need to promote the use of ICTs for exclusively peaceful purposes, even though we would have preferred the language to be even more explicit, to reflect an unequivocal commitment by all states. We could not accept some of the formulas proposed this morning in the meeting that could use to legitimising the use of force in this area. We note that in paragraph 16, reference is made to cybercrime, and we believe that this should be kept separate from questions under the work of this working group. The reference to cybercrime is covered in a different platform, specifically based on adoption of the International Convention in 2024. This should be separate. In paragraph 25, we would insist on the elimination of the reference to the supposed neutrality of technology. technologies. This is a notion that we do not share. Let us recall that a reference in this regard was included for the first time in the final version of the third annual progress report of the G3A without prior discussion, and that was rejected by our delegation. There is no common understanding in the OEWG on this notion. In paragraph 33 on recommendations, it concludes with a view to discussion to handle threats. The next line following this is not useful. It sort of undermines this proposal, and this is an idea that has been reflected numerous other times throughout the report. My delegation will deliver statements about the other sections of the report at the appropriate time. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you, Cuba, for your statement. Croatia, to be followed by Switzerland.

Croatia: Mr. Chair, Croatia aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union and wishes to add the following remarks in its national capacity. As we are entering in the last week of the OEWG, please allow me to express our appreciation for all the work and energy you and your team have invested throughout this process. We look forward to constructive and consensus-driven conclusion that reflects the collective efforts of all delegations and paves the way towards a future permanent mechanism. We believe this mechanism will help structure discussion, deliver concrete outcomes, and translate experience into its useful results. It will also strengthen trust and cooperation among diplomats and experts by highlighting both success and improvements. As the threat landscape continues to evolve, it is clear that we need to make use of all the expertise available to us. So far, unfortunately, we’ve been trying to respond to these threats with one hand tied behind our backs. It is strange that we have recognized, or at least we are discovering, the value of involving other stakeholders in our other fields of work, but we are still reluctant to involve them in this one. Last week’s town hall meeting showcased an abundance of interest by multi-stakeholders. While we would also like to see geographical diversity among them, we do not believe others should be punished for the lack of it. On the contrary, seeing the positives provided at the greatest stage can be the best inspiration for new and emerging actors in cybersecurity around the globe. Also, we hope to see more and more diversity within that community in terms of different areas of expertise. We are satisfied with the draft report recognizing that ransomware goes beyond criminal behavior, although a number of improvements can and should be made with it as well to properly reflect realities. Similarly, we hope that vulnerability of critical infrastructure can be reflected better. This is an indiscriminate threat that does not target only developed countries. In fact, non-state and criminal actors are being increasingly enticed to go after a proverbial low-hanging fruit, where the risk-reward ratio goes in their favor, and no one wants to be so-called easy-picking. There is really no reason to allow for another gap to develop between developed and developing states, especially since there is a resolute will to offer capacity-building services, including in terms of critical infrastructure protection, including ones of cross-boarding importance such as undersea cables. Chair, as we look to the future, we rely heavily on results achieved. Agreed consensus-based rules, norms, and principles are amongst our greatest results. We strongly value and support the established UN framework of responsible state behavior. This is our final step, the final OEWG, which needs to properly reflect this in its final report. Finally, as we understand your delicate position and your willingness to reflect various ideas, proposals, and suggestions given by delegations, and as far as possible to incorporate them in a draft final report, in order for us to reach consensus by the end of the week and achieve an overall balance, it will be vital to differentiate those ideas that have already reached consensus from those that have yet to reach that status, and at this time deserve to be listened in some sort of footnote or an annex at maximum, and be left for the future permanent mechanism discussion. I thank you.

Switzerland: Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you for your commitment and all the hard work of you and your team. Let me assure you of Switzerland’s full support in finding a way to adopt a strong final progress report at the end of this week that reflects the discussions and findings over the last five years and that paves the way for the future. Switzerland would like to thank you for the revised draft of the final annual progress, of the final report. We see many good elements in the draft one. However, we also see room for improvement. that the report needs to reflect what a significant number of states have said, discussed, or handed in as working papers, often with broad cross-regional support. However, this is not always the case. For example, in the section on international law, and in particular on international humanitarian law. On section A, or review, we propose to delete the words could continue to in the first sentence of paragraph 11. Regional and sub-regional organizations have demonstrated on many occasions, in our sessions and through their work, that they play an important role in implementing the framework for responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs, not least in the field of capacity building. In this context, I would like to refer to the non-paper on the role of regional organizations in implementing the framework, which was circulated to all delegations at the request of my delegation two weeks ago. Regional organizations act as an incubator, supporter, and facilitator for national implementation of the UN Framework for Responsible State Behavior in cyberspace. Moreover, regional organizations have developed their own innovative ideas on how to address some of the international cybersecurity policy challenges. The non-paper contains concrete examples of the work of regional organizations, namely ASEAN, African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, European Union, Pacific Island Forum, the OAS, and the OSCE. Furthermore, it also contains recommendations for the future mechanism, as, for example, recognize the regional efforts in implementing the UN Framework, have an opportunity for regional organizations to contribute to the discussions and share their experiences in the future for a mechanism, both in plenary sessions and the relevant dedicated thematic groups. The provision of a venue and modalities for regular inter-regional exchanges between regional organizations. Inter-regional exchanges on the margins of the plenary meetings could take place with the participation of interested representatives of the respective secretariats and member participating states of the regional organizations and could serve as a forum for interested representatives of UN member states not part of regional arrangements. Having annual meetings, preferably on the margins of the plenary meetings or as part of one of the dedicated thematic groups to be established as appropriate. Let me make now some comments on Section B of potential and existing threats. With regards to paragraph 15, we do not agree with the changes made in the last sentence. I mean exclusively. This should be deleted. And we would strongly recommend, however, that this paragraph not only notes that civilians might be affected, but also recall states shared commitment to safeguard civilians from harm. This could be done by adding the following half sentence of rigid language from the resolution protecting civilians and other protected persons and objects against potential human costs of ITC activities during armed conflict adopted by the 34th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent on the 31st October 2024 at the end of the paragraph. So this paragraph would read then of this sentence. In this regard, states stressed the need to promote the peaceful use of ICTs by states and reiterated their shared commitment to protect the civilian populations in situations of conflict, including against the risks arising from malicious ICT activities. In paragraph 16, we do not support the deletion of the sentence mentioning the blurring the lines. This blurring of lines is a reality and is unfortunately becoming increasingly widespread with corresponding risks for international peace and security. Recent developments show that state-backed groups are leveraging the expansion of the cyber-criminal ecosystem for their own benefit. State-backed activity can no longer be evaluated in isolation from financially motivated intrusions. The vast cyber-criminal ecosystem acts as an accelerant for state-sponsored operation, providing malware, vulnerabilities, and in some cases full-spectrum operations to states. In our view, it would be negligent of this group to turn a blind eye to this worrying development. Maybe just a final comment on a distinguished delegate from Cuba who mentioned that he cannot support the neutrality of technology, just to mention that this is an agreed language of APRs we adopted by consensus last time in 2024 to be found in paragraph 22 of the third APR. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Switzerland, for your statement. happy news to announce. I think the U.N. Web TV is working well around the world, including in Moscow. I think the issue has been resolved, so it’s accessible to everyone who wishes to follow the discussions. So the matter has been resolved. We move now to Colombia, to be followed by Australia.

Colombia: Thank you, Chair. As we have expressed repeatedly, we are grateful for your efforts in leading the work of this OEWG towards consensus. We should not take it for granted. It is fragile, and the current circumstances requires a commitment and flexibility from all here present. In this same spirit, my delegation wishes to express the following comments in relation to the Rev. 1 of the draft final report. In the overview section, we agree with the reference in paragraph 2 that the OEWG has made a positive contribution to common understanding and served as a vehicle for building trust and confidence. On paragraph 7, the three annual progress reports are complementary, and together with the final report will represent the foundation for future discussions on ICT in relation to international security under the Permanent Future Mechanism. We also welcome the reference in paragraph 13 to the governmental group of experts and their work. On paragraph 8, the swift development and the need for continuous building on this is important. It’s important for all states to be benefiting from digital technologies. As expressed by other states, we think it’s fundamental that we keep the references in paragraph 2 on the inclusion of women and a gender perspective in discussions on these topics, and also the reference in paragraph 11 on the role of regional regional organisations, taking into account the complementary work that they have been undertaking in the area of capacity building and regional efforts. In section B, existing potential threats, we highlight the reference in paragraph 24 on the need to comprehensively address all elements under ransomware, a human-centred approach. For us, this is what affects us most internationally. We also welcome the references in paragraph 26 on new and emerging technologies. These have expanding development opportunities and they could potentially have implications for the use of ICTs. We also highlight the inclusion of the gender perspective in paragraph 30, including these in addressing ICT threats and also the needs of persons in vulnerable situations. Also, paragraph 32, capacity building aimed at detecting threats. Finally, we’d like to point out that our delegation supports the reference by the Ghanaian delegation of security by design. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you, Columbia, for your statement. Australia to be followed by Argentina.

Australia: Good morning. Thank you to the Chair and Secretariat for your longstanding commitment to the OEWG process and for your efforts in drafting the Rev. 1 of the final report. It is great to be in New York with everyone in person rather than in my pyjamas after midnight in Canberra. Columbia looks forward to engaging constructively with all delegations to work towards consensus on the final report and seek a seamless transition to the future permanent mechanism. We align with the Pacific Islands Forum statement and underscore the importance of focusing on the consolidation and implementation of the framework for responsible state behaviour in the final report while continuing to exchange views on enhancing the framework in the future permanent mechanism. We wish to make some additional remarks in our national capacity. At the outset, Australia wishes to express its disappointment that a number of stakeholders have again been denied accreditation to the final session of the OEWG due to the exclusionary use of stakeholder modalities. This reduces the ability of member states to benefit from the indispensable expertise that stakeholders provide our discussions and we strongly support the Canada Chile paper to improve stakeholder modalities in the future permanent mechanism. On the final report, Australia was pleased to see some additions in Rev. 1 that provide a more accurate reflection of OEWG discussions and strike a better balance in the text. We would also like to suggest some areas for improvement for the final report. On the overview, we strongly support the comments from Columbia, Moldovia and Mauritius on the importance of the full, equal and meaningful engagement of women in the OEWG process as well as efforts to narrow the gender digital divide. We also welcome in paragraph 13, the reference to the consensus reports of the GGEs and agree with others that references to the OEWG 2021 chair’s summary should be reconsidered given it’s not consensus. On threats, together with Qatar and Japan, we support paragraph 24’s addition of cryptocurrency and we also support in 27, the reference to effective risk management of AI. In paragraph 15 we do not support the reference to exclusively peaceful purposes as just outlined by Switzerland. There is a serious disconnect between recognizing the reality that cyber is already being used in conflict situations and promoting the use of ICTs for exclusively peaceful purposes. This reference does not recognize that cyber has already been and can legitimately be used in conflict including in ways that would better allow parties to a conflict to distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives. It is important to recognize that the use of cyber in conflict is regulated by international humanitarian law. We propose deleting the last sentence of paragraph 15 and replacing it with the following. States highlighted with concern the potential for ICTs to be used in a manner that violates international humanitarian law. In this regard states stressed the need to promote the responsible use of ICTs by states in accordance with international law. On paragraph 25 and the growing market for commercially available ICT intrusion capabilities we appreciate the addition on the need to establish appropriate safeguards and oversight efforts. However we support France in making an amendment to the final line by replacing lawful purposes with consistent with international law. This would also make it consistent with the earlier reference in the same paragraph. Thank you chair.

Chair: Thank you very much Australia for your statement. Argentina to be followed by Rwanda.

Argentina: We are grateful to you for circulating the draft final report and we thank you for your efforts and those of the Secretariat in facilitating a transparent and constructive negotiation process. As regards paragraph 9 we reaffirm that capacity building represents an essential pillar for strengthening the resilience of states in the area of cyber security. We agree that these efforts should be adapted to the specific reality and vulnerabilities in each state and fully respect each state’s sovereignty, we welcome the fact that the text reaffirms the principles that were previously adopted in the progress reports. We believe that this represents a strong basis for future work in this area. As regards the proposals for language, in paragraph 12, for greater clarity, we suggest replacing the term gender for women and simplifying the terminology in the paragraph. We will submit this proposal in writing. Rather than the rights of women, we would prefer references to women specifically as opposed to gender. These sorts of terms make women invisible and actually prevent women from affirming their rights. And we have similar suggestions for other parts of the text where there are references to gender. In paragraph 30, we could end this with growing digital divide and remove the rest of the text. Every state is free and sovereign to implement agenda 2030. We prefer to avoid references to this to avoid divergences. The same logic applies to the rest of the document where similar references are found, especially in 42E2 and 52A. Chair, by way of conclusion, we wish to highlight that Argentina especially values the fact that this report has a central axis, the promotion of capacity building. In this regard, we wish to underscore that strengthening cyber resilience for states constitutes not only a technical tool but a substantial contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the creation of open, secure, peaceful and interoperable cyberspace. I thank you.

Chair: Argentina for your statement. Rwanda to be followed by Nicaragua.

Rwanda: Thank you, Chair, for this opportunity to speak. At the outset, allow me to express our deep appreciation to you, Chair, for your leadership and for the progress made in this process since 2021. We recognize these moments represent not just the culmination of the four years of negotiations but the foundation of more secure, inclusive and cooperative digital future for all member states. Mr. Chair, Rwanda supports and aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of African group and wish to highlight the flowing in our national capacity. We commend the comprehensive scope of the final report and acknowledge the significant milestone it represents. We appreciate the Chair’s efforts to steer this process in particular challenging context and underscore the importance of reaching consensus and preserving the validity of previous annual progress reports. We regard the APR4 as a constructive contribution that brings us closer to a smooth and effective transition towards the future permanent mechanism. Mr. Chair, cyber threats recognize no borders. They demand responses that transcend boundaries and unite us in a common purpose. As we navigate an increasingly interconnected digital world, the security of our information and communication technologies have become fundamental to international peace, stability and sustainable development. We gather here today, not merely as separate regions, but as partners united in recognizing that our digital destinies are Mr. Chair, I want to commend these three proposed dedicated thematic groups that creates a framework that balances focus with comprehensiveness. We acknowledge the interconnected nature of these peers, allowing each dedicated thematic group to meet jointly with others to facilitate holistic discussions on the linkages between issues. As we stand at the threshold of unprecedented technological advancement, we must acknowledge that innovation is a double-edged sword, bringing transformative opportunities while simultaneously introducing new vulnerabilities that we are only beginning to understand. This is why the international cooperation on emerging technologies standards is not merely desirable but essential. Mr. Chair, to conclude, the future of ICT’s security lies not in building digital worlds but in constructing bridges of cooperation, trust, and shared responsibility. And I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Rwanda, for your statement. Nicaragua, please.

Nicaragua: Thank you very much, Chair. I speak on behalf of a group of like-minded states, the Republic of Belarus, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Burkina Faso, the Republic of Cuba, the State of Eritrea, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and my own country, the Republic of Nicaragua. We also know that other countries will align themselves to this statement at a later stage. stage. We appreciate efforts made by the chair and his team in crafting the draft final OEWG report that will serve as a basis for upcoming discussions at the 11th session of the group. We consider, however, that further efforts are needed in order to reach the compromises that would allow us to adopt this document by consensus. We are convinced that terminology must be aligned with the mandate of the OEWG defined by UNGA Resolution 75-240. In this regard, ICT security, which reflects a narrow aspect of the OEWG’s scope, should be substituted with security of and in the use of ICTs throughout the entire text. We also propose to edit the title of Annex 3 by substituting ICT security with security of and in the use of ICTs following the same logic. Mr. Chair, on the future permanent mechanism, as the third annual progress report explicitly mentioned, the dedicated thematic groups are to be established by decisions of the future permanent mechanism as required. Dedicated thematic groups are not a must for achieving success of the final session. The top priority of this session is to achieve a smooth transition from the current OEWG to the future permanent mechanism by a concise report. Meanwhile, dedicated thematic groups of the future permanent mechanism must not undermine the five pillars of its mandate, namely threats, norms, international law, business building measures, capacity building. Going beyond the mandate or distorting it is unacceptable and has the potential to undermine concrete practical results already achieved by the OEWG. Therefore, we cannot support dedicated thematic group 1 in the current draft. Also, being guided by this, as well as by the spirit of maintaining balance between norms and international law, we propose to create a separate dedicated thematic groups on norms. We support the creation of a dedicated thematic group on capacity building, a consistent demand of developing countries. We advocate for sticking to the current modalities of stakeholders’ participation within the Future Permanent Mechanism adopted in April 2022, since they represent a delicate balance that ensures both inclusivity and intergovernmental nature of the process. It has included one dedicated segment for NGOs to present their views in each substantive session, a valuable practice that should be replicated in the Future Permanent Mechanism. With a view to preserve the intergovernmental nature of both the United Nations and this very process, we are not in a position to support giving floor to NGOs after States at the plenaries and review conferences, as well as the concept of so-called consultations. We also urge to facilitate verification of the relevance of the ECOSOC-accredited NGOs to the scope and functions of the Future Permanent Mechanism by its chair and the secretariat. Guided by the same rationale, we cannot support participation of stakeholders in dedicated thematic groups, which should provide venue for detailed discussions among governmental experts. With regard to the powers of the chair of the Future Permanent Mechanism, we consider that this should not be overstretched in terms of appointment of co-facilitators of dedicated thematic groups. Since this issue might have political implications, it is more appropriate, in our view, to follow the principle of consensus while appointing the co-facilitators. Authorities of co-facilitators should be clearly defined as well, leaving no space for submitting recommendations to plenaries without prior transparent and inclusive discussions. Mr. Chair, on the main body of the draft report, we insist on adding language on the of elaborating legally binding agreements which would reflect positions voiced by member states since the start of the OEWG’s work. We also insist on the balance between norms and international law, as well as between implementing existing rules and formulating new rules, which has always been the key to reaching consensus. This should be reflected not only in the design of the future permanent mechanism, but also in the agenda and arrangement for future discussions. Contentious topics, including the applicability of international humanitarian law on which there is a clear disagreement, should be removed altogether, precisely in the interest of building consensus. At this stage, we are in no position to support the adoption of voluntary checklists containing Annex I, since this was not thoroughly discussed during the final year cycle of the OEWG. Therefore, we call for the removal of Annex I from the report and recommend to continue discussions on the voluntary checklist within the future permanent mechanism. We believe that Annex II still needs further discussion and refinement, specifically to meet the needs of technical POCs, which could be discussed and adopted in the future permanent mechanism. We also urge to reflect that Member States, while welcoming the UNODA efforts to organize the POC directory simulation exercise, took note of the shortcomings of the mentioned exercise and highlighted the need to refine any future drills as well. We take note of an excessive focus on the issue of critical information infrastructure, including concepts that were not discussed within the OEWG, which should be removed, such as, and I quote, the culture of continuous improvement in order to adapt to evolving ICT threats to critical infrastructure and critical… information infrastructure.” End of quote. The reference to the supposed neutrality of technologies should also be removed as this has not been discussed within the OEWG and there is not a common understanding about it. We believe that ICT criminal activity is different from malicious cyber activity that impact international peace and security. There is a designated platform to discuss issues on cyber crime. The final report should not mix these two kinds of activities. Finally, Mr. Chair, we affirm our commitment to work in a constructive manner with the chair and his team as well as with all national delegations in order to produce consensus report based on a fair balance of interest. We proceed from the understanding that concerns of each and every member state should be treated equally. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Nicaragua, for your statement. I believe on behalf of the like-minded group. Friends, we are almost one o’clock. Just a few quick comments. First of all, it’s very heartening to see that there are different kinds of like-minded groups in our process. And so we have just had one statement. Nicaragua, I kindly request that you make available the statement to all of us and me a copy as well. We’ll put it on the website. And our exercise or our goal is to converge the different clusters and groups of like-minded members so that at the end of the week, we are all like-minded on a set of issues, recommendations, and outcomes. And that indeed is how we have worked over the last few years because the three annual progress reports reflects a certain like-mindedness in terms of the outcomes of the process. So that’s the first point I wanted to make. Second, yes, of course, it’s my intention to treat every single delegation. equally. And I’d like to give every single delegation that wishes to speak an opportunity to speak. This is the United Nations. And therefore, how we manage the time is going to be very critical. I would like to avoid cutting off microphones, because that’s a terrible practice, because I don’t want to muzzle you. And also because the final outcome must reflect all your views, inputs, aspirations. And the final outcome must be embraced and owned by all of you. It’s not the chair’s outcome. And it’s not going to be a consensus imposed from the podium. It must be owned from all of you. It must emanate and germinate from the floor. And that’s why it’s important to hear everyone. And this leads me to my last point, last two points, actually. I think this morning has been an excellent start. The statements have been very focused and specific. The tone is very positive and constructive, including from our very last speaker, Nicaragua, which has expressed its commitment to working with all member states to achieve consensus. I think everyone is committed to that. I think that sets a great tone and framework for our work for the rest of the day and week. But we have about 20 speakers left. And we are in the first section or clusters of section, section A and B. So this is how I would like to proceed in the afternoon. This afternoon, we will begin sections C and D. Already some of you have delved into regular institutional dialogue, which is a statement from a group that went into some detail on RID. So I think there is a certain eagerness to get into that challenging discussion. And I think it’s important that we get there. So this afternoon, I’ll take the rest of the speakers, but we will also begin. discussions on section C and D. So for the remaining speakers I urge them to collapse their statements to section not only A and B but also C and D and I will also take other comments from groups if they wish to speak on sections C and D and in keeping with UN practice I’ll let those who are speaking on behalf of a group to go first. This is the only way to proceed if we are going to get to sections E and F tomorrow and then to regular institutional dialogue. So I urge your patience and I seek your flexibility and but most of all I appeal for your brevity this afternoon as you make your statements. I wish you all a pleasant and productive lunch and the meeting is now adjourned. See you at 3 p.m.

Agreement points

Need to preserve and build upon existing UN Framework for Responsible State Behavior

Speakers

– European Union
– France
– Croatia
– Republic of Moldova

Arguments

Need to preserve and build upon the UN Framework for Responsible State Behavior in cyberspace

Urgent need to implement Framework for Responsible Behavior through action-oriented mechanism

Support for established UN framework of responsible state behavior

Strong support for consensus-based work and foundational role in reinforcing international peace and security

Summary

Multiple speakers emphasized the critical importance of maintaining and implementing the existing UN Framework for Responsible State Behavior in cyberspace rather than creating new frameworks or undermining existing consensus

Topics

Cybersecurity | Legal and regulatory

Rejection of ‘exclusively peaceful purposes’ language for ICT use

Speakers

– United States
– Australia
– Switzerland

Arguments

Cannot support ‘exclusively peaceful purposes’ language as ICTs are already used in conflicts

Need to recognize reality of ICT use in conflicts while promoting responsible use under international law

Problematic language on ICT uses by states needs revision for international law consistency

Summary

These speakers agreed that the ‘exclusively peaceful purposes’ language is problematic because it fails to recognize the reality that ICTs are already being used in armed conflicts and should be regulated by international humanitarian law

Topics

Cybersecurity | Legal and regulatory

Importance of including GGE reports as foundational consensus documents

Speakers

– United States
– Japan
– European Union

Arguments

Report should include references to GGE reports as foundational consensus documents

GGE work must be referenced alongside OEWG work as foundation for UN discussions

Need to preserve and build upon the UN Framework for Responsible State Behavior in cyberspace

Summary

These speakers agreed that the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) reports represent foundational consensus documents that should be properly referenced in the final report alongside OEWG work

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Need to remove references to 2021 chair’s summary as non-consensus document

Speakers

– Canada
– Australia
– United States

Arguments

References to 2021 chair’s summary should be removed as it’s not a consensus document

Disappointment over denied accreditation of stakeholders due to exclusionary modalities

Report should include references to GGE reports as foundational consensus documents

Summary

These speakers agreed that the 2021 chair’s summary should not be referenced in the final report because it does not represent consensus and gives a false impression of agreed status

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Recognition of ransomware as major threat requiring dedicated attention

Speakers

– European Union
– Mauritius
– Qatar
– Colombia

Arguments

Ransomware deserves dedicated paragraph due to its severity and impact on international peace and security

Cryptocurrency theft linked to ICT threats demands urgent international attention

Dual-use nature of technologies including AI-generated malware requires attention

Reference to comprehensive treatment of increased threats from ransomware

Summary

Multiple speakers recognized ransomware as a severe and growing threat that requires comprehensive treatment and dedicated attention in international cybersecurity discussions

Topics

Cybersecurity | Economic

Importance of gender inclusion and women’s participation in ICT decision-making

Speakers

– Mauritius
– Republic of Moldova
– Colombia
– Australia

Arguments

Importance of full, equal, and meaningful participation of women in ICT decision-making

Need to address gender digital divide and promote women’s leadership

Growing integration of gender perspective in OEWG deliberations should be maintained

Support for full, equal and meaningful engagement of women in the OEWG process

Summary

These speakers shared strong support for promoting gender inclusion, narrowing the gender digital divide, and ensuring meaningful participation of women in ICT-related decision-making processes

Topics

Gender rights online | Human rights principles

Similar viewpoints

These speakers, representing the like-minded group, shared concerns about maintaining the comprehensive mandate scope, streamlining the text, and ensuring the future mechanism doesn’t undermine established pillars

Speakers

– Islamic Republic of Iran
– Russian Federation
– Nicaragua

Arguments

Terminology should be ‘security of and in the use of ICTs’ rather than ‘ICT security’ throughout the text

Text needs to be shortened and streamlined to focus on essential elements

Dedicated thematic groups should not undermine the five pillars of the mandate

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

These speakers emphasized the particular vulnerabilities of developing countries to cyber threats and the need for more comprehensive, equitable representation of the global threat landscape

Speakers

– Nigeria
– Thailand
– Malawi
– Egypt

Arguments

Growing threats to critical infrastructure, especially healthcare, energy, and financial sectors

Importance of including Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) in threat assessment

Cross-regional collaboration essential for addressing cyber threats

Need for more equitable and diverse representation of threats landscape across all countries and regions

Topics

Cybersecurity | Development

These speakers supported meaningful stakeholder engagement while maintaining the intergovernmental nature of the process, though with different emphases on inclusivity versus control

Speakers

– Australia
– Croatia
– Turkey

Arguments

Disappointment over denied accreditation of stakeholders due to exclusionary modalities

Stakeholder expertise is indispensable for informed discussions

Clear affirmation needed that participation based on accredited status and non-objection principle

Topics

Legal and regulatory

These speakers emphasized the importance of technical cooperation, regional collaboration, and public-private partnerships in building cybersecurity resilience

Speakers

– Singapore
– Ghana
– Switzerland

Arguments

Need for enhanced CERT cooperation and public-private partnerships

Supply chain integrity requires security by design principles throughout ICT lifecycle

Regional organizations play important role in implementing responsible state behavior framework

Topics

Cybersecurity | Development

Unexpected consensus

Broad support for capacity building as foundational pillar

Speakers

– Argentina
– Mauritius
– Indonesia
– Fiji
– Rwanda

Arguments

Capacity building should be needs-based, sustainable, and respect state sovereignty

Support for emphasis on capacity building as foundational pillar for strengthening national resilience

Continued dialogue on emerging technologies needed in future permanent mechanism

Support for single-track permanent mechanism with cross-cutting approach

International cooperation on emerging technologies standards is essential not merely desirable

Explanation

Despite different regional and political alignments, there was unexpected broad consensus across diverse countries on the fundamental importance of capacity building as a cross-cutting enabler for cybersecurity

Topics

Development | Capacity development

Recognition of emerging technologies risks across political divides

Speakers

– Mauritius
– Qatar
– Indonesia
– Rwanda
– El Salvador

Arguments

AI and quantum computing introduce new risks that amplify speed and scale of malicious activities

Dual-use nature of technologies including AI-generated malware requires attention

Continued dialogue on emerging technologies needed in future permanent mechanism

International cooperation on emerging technologies standards is essential not merely desirable

Need for post-quantum cryptographic solutions to address quantum computing threats

Explanation

Countries from different regions and political alignments showed unexpected consensus on the need to address risks from emerging technologies like AI and quantum computing, suggesting this is seen as a universal challenge

Topics

Cybersecurity | Development

Overall assessment

Summary

The discussion revealed strong consensus on preserving existing frameworks, addressing ransomware threats, promoting gender inclusion, and building capacity. However, significant divisions emerged on the scope of ICT use in conflicts, stakeholder participation modalities, and the structure of future mechanisms.

Consensus level

Moderate to high consensus on technical and capacity-building issues, but lower consensus on political and governance questions. The broad agreement on foundational principles suggests potential for successful transition to a permanent mechanism, though key political disagreements about stakeholder roles and conflict-related ICT use remain unresolved.

Different viewpoints

Use of ICTs for ‘exclusively peaceful purposes’ vs. recognition of legitimate use in armed conflict

Speakers

– United States
– Australia
– Switzerland
– Cuba

Arguments

Cannot support “exclusively peaceful purposes” language as ICTs are already used in conflicts

Need to recognize reality of ICT use in conflicts while promoting responsible use under international law

International humanitarian law should be clearly reflected in discussions on ICT use in conflicts

Support for “exclusively peaceful purposes” language to prevent legitimizing use of force

Summary

Western states argue that ‘exclusively peaceful purposes’ language is unrealistic since ICTs are already used in conflicts and should be regulated by international humanitarian law, while Cuba supports stronger peaceful use language to prevent legitimizing force

Topics

Cybersecurity | Legal and regulatory

Terminology: ‘ICT security’ vs. ‘security of and in the use of ICTs’

Speakers

– Islamic Republic of Iran
– Russian Federation
– Nicaragua

Arguments

Terminology should be “security of and in the use of ICTs” rather than “ICT security” throughout the text

Text needs to be shortened and streamlined to focus on essential elements

Dedicated thematic groups should not undermine the five pillars of the mandate

Summary

Like-minded group insists on broader terminology to reflect comprehensive mandate, while others appear comfortable with ‘ICT security’ terminology

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Stakeholder participation modalities in future permanent mechanism

Speakers

– Australia
– Croatia
– Turkey
– Nicaragua

Arguments

Disappointment over denied accreditation of stakeholders due to exclusionary modalities

Stakeholder expertise is indispensable for informed discussions

Clear affirmation needed that participation based on accredited status and non-objection principle

Stakeholder participation should maintain intergovernmental nature of the process

Summary

Western states want more inclusive stakeholder participation citing expertise needs, while like-minded group wants to maintain current restrictive modalities to preserve intergovernmental character

Topics

Legal and regulatory

References to 2021 chair’s summary and GGE reports

Speakers

– Canada
– United States
– Japan
– Islamic Republic of Iran

Arguments

References to 2021 chair’s summary should be removed as it’s not a consensus document

Report should include references to GGE reports as foundational consensus documents

GGE work must be referenced alongside OEWG work as foundation for UN discussions

Need to preserve and build upon the UN Framework for Responsible State Behavior in cyberspace

Summary

Western states want GGE reports included as foundational but 2021 summary removed, while Iran questions GGE inclusion as not reflecting inclusive OEWG nature

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Structure and scope of dedicated thematic groups

Speakers

– Nicaragua
– Rwanda
– Fiji

Arguments

Dedicated thematic groups should not undermine the five pillars of the mandate

Support for three proposed dedicated thematic groups with interconnected approach

Support for single-track permanent mechanism with cross-cutting approach

Summary

Like-minded group opposes current thematic group structure and wants separate norms group, while others support proposed three-group structure with cross-cutting approach

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Inclusion of cybercrime and cryptocurrency theft in international peace and security context

Speakers

– Japan
– Cuba
– Russian Federation
– Mauritius

Arguments

Cryptocurrency theft in context of international peace and security should be maintained in report

Support for “exclusively peaceful purposes” language to prevent legitimizing use of force

Text needs to be shortened and streamlined to focus on essential elements

Cryptocurrency theft linked to ICT threats demands urgent international attention

Summary

Some states support including cryptocurrency theft as international security issue, while others view cybercrime as separate from OEWG mandate with designated platforms for discussion

Topics

Economic | Cybersecurity

Unexpected differences

Gender terminology preferences

Speakers

– Argentina
– Mauritius
– Colombia

Arguments

Prefer specific references to “women” rather than broader “gender” terminology

Importance of full, equal, and meaningful participation of women in ICT decision-making

Growing integration of gender perspective in OEWG deliberations should be maintained

Explanation

Unexpected disagreement on terminology within states supporting women’s participation – Argentina wants ‘women’ instead of ‘gender’ terms, while others support broader gender perspective language

Topics

Gender rights online | Human rights principles

Technology neutrality concept

Speakers

– Cuba
– Switzerland

Arguments

Support for “exclusively peaceful purposes” language to prevent legitimizing use of force

International humanitarian law should be clearly reflected in discussions on ICT use in conflicts

Explanation

Unexpected disagreement over technology neutrality – Cuba rejects the concept while Switzerland notes it’s agreed language from previous APRs, revealing different interpretations of past consensus

Topics

Cybersecurity | Legal and regulatory

Overall assessment

Summary

Main disagreements center on: 1) Use of ICTs in armed conflict vs. exclusively peaceful purposes, 2) Stakeholder participation levels, 3) Report structure and foundational references, 4) Thematic group organization, 5) Scope of cybercrime inclusion

Disagreement level

Moderate to significant disagreements that could impede consensus. The fundamental divide between Western states and like-minded group on stakeholder inclusion, terminology, and conflict-related ICT use represents structural challenges. However, broad agreement exists on threats landscape, capacity building importance, and need for future mechanism, suggesting consensus possible with compromise.

Partial agreements

Similar viewpoints

These speakers, representing the like-minded group, shared concerns about maintaining the comprehensive mandate scope, streamlining the text, and ensuring the future mechanism doesn’t undermine established pillars

Speakers

– Islamic Republic of Iran
– Russian Federation
– Nicaragua

Arguments

Terminology should be ‘security of and in the use of ICTs’ rather than ‘ICT security’ throughout the text

Text needs to be shortened and streamlined to focus on essential elements

Dedicated thematic groups should not undermine the five pillars of the mandate

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

These speakers emphasized the particular vulnerabilities of developing countries to cyber threats and the need for more comprehensive, equitable representation of the global threat landscape

Speakers

– Nigeria
– Thailand
– Malawi
– Egypt

Arguments

Growing threats to critical infrastructure, especially healthcare, energy, and financial sectors

Importance of including Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) in threat assessment

Cross-regional collaboration essential for addressing cyber threats

Need for more equitable and diverse representation of threats landscape across all countries and regions

Topics

Cybersecurity | Development

These speakers supported meaningful stakeholder engagement while maintaining the intergovernmental nature of the process, though with different emphases on inclusivity versus control

Speakers

– Australia
– Croatia
– Turkey

Arguments

Disappointment over denied accreditation of stakeholders due to exclusionary modalities

Stakeholder expertise is indispensable for informed discussions

Clear affirmation needed that participation based on accredited status and non-objection principle

Topics

Legal and regulatory

These speakers emphasized the importance of technical cooperation, regional collaboration, and public-private partnerships in building cybersecurity resilience

Speakers

– Singapore
– Ghana
– Switzerland

Arguments

Need for enhanced CERT cooperation and public-private partnerships

Supply chain integrity requires security by design principles throughout ICT lifecycle

Regional organizations play important role in implementing responsible state behavior framework

Topics

Cybersecurity | Development

Key takeaways

The 11th and final session of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on ICT security represents the culmination of 5 years of multilateral negotiations with significant achievements including three consensus annual progress reports, establishment of a global POC directory with 115+ states, and eight global confidence-building measures

There is broad consensus among member states on establishing a Future Permanent Mechanism as a single-track universal process, though key modalities remain to be finalized including stakeholder participation and dedicated thematic groups structure

The UN Framework for Responsible State Behavior in cyberspace must be preserved and strengthened as the foundation for future work, with clear distinction between consensus achievements and new proposals still under discussion

The cyber threat landscape continues to evolve rapidly with particular concerns about ransomware, threats to critical infrastructure (especially undersea cables), commercially available intrusion capabilities, and risks from emerging technologies like AI and quantum computing

Capacity building is recognized as a foundational cross-cutting pillar that enables implementation across all framework areas, with emphasis on needs-based, sustainable approaches that respect state sovereignty

There are fundamental disagreements on the use of ICTs in armed conflict, with some states supporting ‘exclusively peaceful purposes’ language while others argue this ignores the reality of ICT use in conflicts and the need for international humanitarian law application

Regional organizations and stakeholder engagement are viewed as important for implementation, though there are differing views on the extent and modalities of their participation in the future mechanism

Resolutions and action items

Chair requested all delegations to share written statements and specific textual proposals to facilitate consensus-building

Technical issues with UN Web TV access were identified and resolved during the session

Chair announced Qatar’s side event on responsible state behavior implementation scheduled for 1:30-2:30 PM in Conference Room 12

Chair outlined structured approach for remainder of week: afternoon session to cover sections C and D, Tuesday to focus on regular institutional dialogue discussions

Delegations agreed to proceed according to the provisional program of work and approved attendance of non-governmental entities as listed in document A-AC.292-2025-INF-3

Unresolved issues

Terminology dispute between ‘ICT security’ versus ‘security of and in the use of ICTs’ throughout the final report

Disagreement over inclusion of ‘exclusively peaceful purposes’ language regarding ICT use by states

Debate over references to 2021 chair’s summary which some view as non-consensus document

Unresolved modalities for stakeholder participation in the Future Permanent Mechanism

Structure and mandate of dedicated thematic groups under the future mechanism

Treatment of contentious topics like international humanitarian law applicability in cyberspace

Inclusion/exclusion of Annex I (voluntary checklists) which some argue was not thoroughly discussed

Balance between preserving intergovernmental nature while enabling meaningful stakeholder contributions

Specific language around commercially available ICT intrusion capabilities and appropriate safeguards

References to technology neutrality concept which some delegations dispute

Suggested compromises

Iran proposed UN Secretariat compile non-exhaustive list of threats as proposed by states during OEWG deliberations to serve as reference for future mechanism

Iran suggested alternative wording for paragraph 31 to address concerns about hierarchy between international law and voluntary norms

France proposed specific language for paragraph 25 ending: ‘to access and utilize ICT tools for legitimate and necessary purposes consistent with international law where appropriate safeguards and oversight are in place’

Australia proposed replacing problematic language in paragraph 15 with: ‘States highlighted with concern the potential for ICTs to be used in a manner that violates international humanitarian law. In this regard states stressed the need to promote the responsible use of ICTs by states in accordance with international law’

Egypt suggested adding language to paragraph 14 recognizing need to ‘capture and address the widest and most diverse landscape and range of risks and threats in a manner that equitably represents realities in all countries and regions’

Ghana proposed adding sentence on ‘security by design throughout the life cycle of ICTs’ to paragraph 23 on supply chain integrity

Switzerland proposed deleting ‘could continue to’ from paragraph 11 to better reflect the established role of regional organizations

Chair emphasized need for delegations to focus on specific amendments rather than general statements and to indicate support/opposition to proposals made by others to gauge consensus

We should not conclude on a report that makes us lose the work we have done so far. We should not conclude on a report that diminishes the value of the UN framework and prioritizes new discussions on new norms and obligations over taking action and implementing those commitments we have made thus far.

Speaker

European Union

Reason

This comment crystallized a fundamental tension in the negotiations between preserving existing consensus achievements versus pursuing new normative developments. It highlighted the risk of regression and established a clear red line for a major bloc of countries.

Impact

This framing influenced subsequent speakers to explicitly address the balance between existing frameworks and new proposals. Multiple delegations (Canada, France, Croatia) echoed this concern, making it a central theme that shaped how other participants positioned their statements regarding consensus language versus new initiatives.

We believe it is necessary to reflect in the recommendations, first and foremost, the task of developing legally binding agreements as the most effective measure to counter challenges in the digital environment.

Speaker

Russian Federation

Reason

This comment introduced a fundamentally different approach to cybersecurity governance, advocating for legally binding instruments rather than voluntary frameworks. It represented a significant departure from the consensus-based voluntary approach that had dominated the OEWG process.

Impact

This position was later reinforced by the like-minded group statement through Nicaragua, creating a clear divide in the room between those supporting voluntary frameworks and those pushing for legally binding agreements. It forced other delegations to either explicitly support or distance themselves from this approach.

The final report should not mix these two kinds of activities [ICT criminal activity versus malicious cyber activity that impact international peace and security]. There is a designated platform to discuss issues on cyber crime.

Speaker

Nicaragua (for like-minded group)

Reason

This comment challenged the scope and mandate of the OEWG by arguing for strict separation between cybercrime and cybersecurity issues. It raised fundamental questions about jurisdictional boundaries and the appropriate forums for different types of cyber threats.

Impact

This jurisdictional challenge created a new axis of debate, with several delegations having to clarify their positions on whether ransomware, cryptocurrency theft, and other criminal activities belonged in the OEWG’s purview. It forced a more precise definition of what constitutes threats to international peace and security.

We cannot support the draft’s report’s reference to promoting the use of ICTs for ‘exclusively peaceful purposes’… states are already using ICTs in the context of armed conflict. It is all the more important, therefore, that states reaffirm their commitment to applying principles of international humanitarian law to their use of ICTs in armed conflict.

Speaker

United States

Reason

This comment directly confronted idealistic language with operational reality, arguing that acknowledging current state practice in cyber warfare is essential for developing realistic governance frameworks. It highlighted the tension between aspirational goals and practical implementation.

Impact

This position was supported by multiple delegations (Switzerland, Australia, Canada) and created a clear divide with countries supporting ‘exclusively peaceful purposes’ language. It shifted the discussion toward the practical application of international humanitarian law in cyberspace rather than abstract peaceful use principles.

The distance to travel in the next few days is not large but it’s the hardest part that we need to traverse, but it can be done. A pathway to progress is visible, success is within reach, and I count on each one of you for your cooperation.

Speaker

Chair

Reason

This comment provided crucial leadership by acknowledging the difficulty of the remaining negotiations while maintaining optimism. It set realistic expectations while encouraging collaborative problem-solving rather than positional bargaining.

Impact

This framing influenced the tone of subsequent interventions, with many delegations explicitly referencing their commitment to flexibility and consensus-building. It established a constructive atmosphere that encouraged delegations to focus on bridging differences rather than hardening positions.

We propose to create a separate dedicated thematic groups on norms… We support the creation of a dedicated thematic group on capacity building, a consistent demand of developing countries.

Speaker

Nicaragua (for like-minded group)

Reason

This comment restructured the proposed institutional architecture by advocating for separate treatment of norms and capacity building, challenging the integrated approach proposed by the Chair. It reflected developing country priorities and concerns about balanced representation.

Impact

This institutional design challenge forced other delegations to consider alternative structures for the future permanent mechanism. It highlighted the tension between integrated cross-cutting approaches versus pillar-specific focused discussions, influencing how subsequent speakers addressed the institutional framework.

Overall assessment

These key comments fundamentally shaped the discussion by establishing three major fault lines: (1) the tension between preserving existing consensus versus pursuing new normative developments, (2) the divide between voluntary frameworks and legally binding approaches, and (3) the scope and institutional design of future cybersecurity governance. The European Union’s opening salvo about protecting existing achievements set a defensive tone that influenced many Western delegations, while the like-minded group’s comprehensive alternative vision created a clear negotiating dynamic. The Chair’s leadership comments were crucial in maintaining a constructive atmosphere despite these fundamental disagreements. The discussion evolved from initial position-stating to more nuanced engagement with specific textual issues, but the underlying structural tensions remained evident throughout, setting the stage for intensive negotiations on the future permanent mechanism.

How to effectively implement the UN framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace through action-oriented measures

Speaker

European Union

Explanation

The EU emphasized the need to move beyond discussing new norms to actually implementing existing commitments, highlighting this as crucial for international stability and security

How to develop action-oriented measures under cross-cutting dedicated thematic groups to address ransomware threats

Speaker

European Union

Explanation

Given ransomware’s impact on healthcare and critical services, the EU called for specific measures building on the five pillars of the UN framework

How to secure cross-border critical infrastructure such as undersea cables and orbital communication networks

Speaker

European Union

Explanation

These infrastructures are vital for all countries as the backbone of internet connectivity and economic resilience

How to differentiate between criminal and national security dimensions of ransomware

Speaker

European Union

Explanation

This distinction is important for developing appropriate responses and understanding when ransomware crosses from criminal activity into national security threats

How to address the widest and most diverse landscape of ICT threats in a manner that equitably represents realities in all countries and regions

Speaker

Egypt (African Group)

Explanation

This is needed to ensure threat assessments are comprehensive and representative of global experiences, not just developed countries

How to address the disproportionate impact of malicious ICT activities on states in transitional phases or emerging from armed conflicts

Speaker

Egypt (African Group)

Explanation

These states face heightened risks and increased fragility from cyber threats, requiring targeted attention and support

How to compile a non-exhaustive list of existing and emerging threats as proposed by states during OEWG deliberations

Speaker

Islamic Republic of Iran

Explanation

This would serve as a valuable reference for future discussions and ensure all member state concerns about threats are captured

How to establish appropriate safeguards and oversight related to the market of commercially available ICT intrusion capabilities

Speaker

Islamic Republic of Iran

Explanation

These measures were introduced in the text but have not been subject to focused discussion within the OEWG

How to develop legally binding agreements as the most effective measure to counter challenges in the digital environment

Speaker

Russian Federation

Explanation

Russia emphasized this as a priority for addressing cyber threats, suggesting current voluntary frameworks may be insufficient

How to ensure security by design throughout the lifecycle of ICTs as a fundamental measure to mitigate supply chain risks

Speaker

Ghana

Explanation

This concept was consistently emphasized but needs further development for practical implementation in supply chain security

How to address challenges associated with commercial cyber intrusion capabilities through joint policy and technical solutions

Speaker

Ghana (referencing Pall Mall Group)

Explanation

The Pall Mall process represents ongoing international dialogue that needs continued development

How to ensure CERT-related information sharing and cooperation occurs in a timely manner for appropriate incident response

Speaker

Singapore

Explanation

Timely information sharing is crucial for effective cyber incident response and building collective resilience

How to expand the UN Technology Bank for Least Developed Countries’ mandate to include targeted support for ICT security capacity building

Speaker

Turkey

Explanation

This would mainstream cybersecurity into broader digital transformation strategies for LDCs

How to develop operational modalities for coordination between source and affected states in responding to cross-border ICT incidents

Speaker

Turkey

Explanation

This is key to preventing escalation and fostering mutual confidence in international cyber incident response

How to better reflect the role of regional organizations in implementing the UN Framework for Responsible State Behavior in cyberspace

Speaker

Switzerland

Explanation

Regional organizations act as incubators and facilitators for national implementation and have developed innovative approaches

How to address the blurring lines between state-backed groups and the cyber-criminal ecosystem

Speaker

Switzerland

Explanation

State-backed activity can no longer be evaluated in isolation from financially motivated intrusions, creating new risks for international peace and security

How to ensure that cyber capacity building is not siloed but serves as a foundational enabler across all areas of the framework

Speaker

Fiji (Pacific Islands Forum)

Explanation

Capacity building should support implementation of norms, international legal dialogue, and confidence-building measures in an integrated manner

How to identify national and regional needs and match them with appropriate support through the future permanent mechanism

Speaker

Fiji (Pacific Islands Forum)

Explanation

This includes technical implementation, legislative development, workforce development, and public awareness programs