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Victoria Hyde

The analysis explores various perspectives on international taxation and global tax rules. One significant aspect is the commendation of the OECD Amount A Multilateral Convention for its comprehensive and inclusive approach to international taxation. The framework minimises tax arbitrage opportunities, reduces the risk of double taxation, and promotes responsible tax practices for multinational corporations. It also addresses the unique challenges posed by the digital age.

However, an alternative viewpoint emphasises the importance of tailoring tax policies to suit the economic, political, and administrative landscapes of individual countries. This approach promotes revenue generation in developing countries, addresses issues of profit shifting, tax havens, and harmful tax practices, and supports a fair redistribution of taxing rights. It aligns with SDG 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth and SDG 16: Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions.

Regarding Digital Services Tax (DST), it is noted that several countries in Europe, as well as Malaysia, India, and Pakistan in Asia, have implemented DST in the absence of a global solution. These taxes on imported digital services vary in scope and application. The lack of a unified approach to DST has led to potential market distortions and the risk of double taxation, highlighting the need for a global solution.

The inclusive framework is recognised as a significant step forward in establishing international tax rules. The OECD has sought input from various stakeholders, including countries, industries, trade associations, and non-governmental organisations. This collaborative approach aims to achieve global consensus for fair taxation rules, in line with SDG 10: Reduced Inequalities and SDG 17: Partnerships for the Goals.

The analysis also acknowledges the validity of the delay in implementing the inclusive framework, considering its complexity and long-lasting impact. The goal is to avoid unintended consequences by incorporating stakeholders’ perspectives through an extensive and intricate process.

Stakeholder engagement emerges as a crucial factor in developing and implementing tax arrangements. Victoria Hyde emphasises the importance of engaging with stakeholders, as their concerns can significantly impact the success and effectiveness of tax systems.

Furthermore, the support for globally agreed and consistent tax rules is reinforced. Standardised global tax rules can reduce complexity and uncertainty faced by multinational entities (M&Es) due to varying tax regulations. This facilitates more transparent and predictable tax governance, simplifies compliance for M&Es, and enables them to determine their tax obligations across multiple jurisdictions more easily. These benefits align with SDG 10: Reduced Inequalities and SDG 17: Partnerships for the Goals.

The analysis concludes by addressing the risk of uncoordinated unilateral measures and retaliatory trade sanctions resulting from the absence of a global consensus-based solution. It highlights the need for a globally agreed approach to international taxation and tax rules to mitigate the potential for trade conflicts and ensure peaceful relations among nations.

Overall, the analysis highlights the multifaceted nature of international taxation and the complex considerations involved in establishing global tax rules. It emphasises the importance of inclusive and collaborative frameworks, stakeholder involvement, tailored tax policies, and globally agreed solutions to effectively address challenges and achieve desired outcomes in a fair and equitable manner.

Gayani Hurulle

Large multinational technology companies generate significant revenue from countries in the Global South, yet often operate outside the formal tax regulations of these countries. Over 60% of the world’s population are now online, with the majority residing in the Global South. These countries accounted for around 30% of Meta’s (formerly Facebook) revenue in 2022, with the remaining 70% coming from the US, Canada, and Europe.

To address this, several countries in South and Southeast Asia, including India, Pakistan, Nepal, Vietnam, and Malaysia, have implemented digital taxes. Tax rates range from 2% in India and Nepal to 10% in Pakistan. Different tax options are available, such as domestic measures like direct and indirect taxes, and treaty-based solutions like the UN’s Article 12B and the OECD/G20’s Inclusive Framework.

However, there are concerns about the OECD/G20 multilateral system. Countries that agree to the deemed ‘first best solution’ under the OECD/G20 amount A convention must limit the implementation of domestic measures until the end of 2024. The convention’s implementation depends on the US signing it, adding further uncertainty.

Moreover, the deadline for OECD convention negotiations has been repeatedly postponed, reflecting the complexity of reaching an agreement among participating countries. In the meantime, some countries have implemented low national-level taxation policies and intend to maintain them until an OECD agreement is reached.

There is also uncertainty about whether tax payment cooperation will continue under the Mountie Convention. Gayani Hurulle questions whether companies’ compliance with tax payments will change under the Mountie Convention, an alternative to the current tax system.

Despite these developments, tax officials in India and Nepal have reported a cooperative attitude from companies in paying taxes, adopting a light touch approach to taxation.

It is worth noting that it is not necessary for the Global South to sign up to the OECD agreement now. These countries have the option to wait and observe before deciding to join later.

In conclusion, the issue of taxing large multinational technology companies in the Global South is complex and multifaceted. While countries in the region have taken steps to implement digital taxes and explore various tax options, challenges and uncertainties persist regarding the OECD/G20 multilateral system and the implementation of tax regulations.

Mathew Olusanya Gbonjubola

Nigeria currently does not have a digital services tax in place. Instead, the country relies on a nexus rule, which connects businesses of non-resident persons to Nigeria for tax purposes. This means that if a non-resident business carries out transactions in Nigeria without a physical presence, the income or profits arising from those transactions can still be taxed in Nigeria.

The advancement of technology has made it possible for businesses to operate without a physical presence in Nigeria. Examples of such businesses include online businesses, international consulting firms, and telemedicine services. This technological progress has expanded the scope of taxation for countries like Nigeria, allowing them to tax businesses that exceed a certain threshold of transactions within their jurisdiction.

To ensure compliance with tax regulations, monitoring businesses and their transactions is made possible through financial institutions, as payments need to pass through the banking system. Additionally, companies are also given the option to self-declare their transactions, further enhancing transparency and accountability.

Nigeria’s intention with its tax approach is not to harm businesses but to ensure that taxes are paid where transactions take place. The goal is to create a fair and level playing field where businesses contribute their fair share in the countries they operate in. This approach is similar to that taken by countries like India and Nepal. Nigeria has adopted simplification methods and tax rates that will not significantly affect the profitability of businesses.

Nigeria has actively participated in discussions with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) since 2014 regarding tax rules and regulations. However, Nigeria did not sign the OECD treaty in October 2021 due to concerns with several elements of the rules, particularly surrounding issues related to Ammon’s aid. This decision by Nigeria highlights the country’s commitment to carefully evaluate the potential impacts on its economy and ensure that any international tax agreements align with its specific needs and circumstances.

The case of Nigeria not signing the OECD treaty also serves as a cautionary note for developing countries in general. It emphasizes the importance of thoroughly scrutinizing the specific impacts on their revenue before signing any international tax treaties. Matthew Olusanya Gbonjubola shares a similar cautious stance, underlining the need for developing countries to fully understand and consider the implications on their revenue before committing to such agreements.

In conclusion, Nigeria currently relies on a nexus rule rather than a digital services tax to tax non-resident businesses. The advancements in technology have allowed businesses to operate in Nigeria without physical presence, and as a result, Nigeria has implemented measures to tax businesses that exceed a certain transaction threshold. Nigeria’s approach aims to ensure taxes are paid where transactions occur, without significantly impacting business profitability. While Nigeria has actively engaged in discussions with the OECD, the decision to not sign the OECD treaty in 2021 highlights the country’s commitment to carefully evaluate the potential impacts on its economy. This also serves as a reminder for developing countries to carefully consider the implications before signing international tax treaties.

Abdul Muheet Chowdhary

The debate revolves around tax collection and the implementation of digital service taxes. One argument presented is that countries do not necessarily need tax treaties to collect taxes; they can adopt domestic law measures to achieve this. It is highlighted that tax treaties do not grant taxing rights but rather restrict them. Additionally, even without a tax treaty, the residence jurisdiction can still provide unilateral relief. The argument emphasizes that tax is a fundamental aspect of sovereignty.

Another argument put forth is that the United Nations (UN) option of Article 12B provides higher revenue potential for developing countries compared to the solution proposed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The UN’s Article 12B, particularly with its broad scope, is seen to provide developing countries with almost double or sometimes even triple the revenue compared to the OECD solution.

In terms of digital service taxes, the gross method is described as offering a treaty-based solution to eliminate double taxation. This method, which was developed by the United Nations, involves withholding a portion of each payment made for a digital service as a tax by the government. It is presented as a means to address the issue of double taxation effectively.

Interestingly, despite concerns that the introduction of digital service taxes would lead to companies exiting markets, this has not been observed in practice. Examples, such as Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, which have implemented a 5% digital service tax, demonstrate that company investments have not been significantly affected.

Moreover, the claim that companies would pass the cost of digital service taxes onto consumers is largely unsubstantiated. Little empirical evidence supports this notion, suggesting that the common threat of companies transferring costs to consumers is often not followed through.

One noteworthy observation is that multinational companies have attempted to prevent developing countries from implementing their own digital tax measures. This signifies the conflict of interest between multinational companies, which aim to minimize their tax liability, and developing countries seeking to collect taxes from these companies.

Another notable insight is that non-compliance with taxation in the digital economy can potentially be addressed through banks. For instance, Pakistan has implemented a process where banks are responsible for withholding taxes in the digital economy, ensuring greater compliance.

Furthermore, India has introduced an “equalisation levy” strategy, imposing a 6% tax on online advertising targeting companies like Facebook and Google. This strategy restricts payment to tech companies and forces them to file tax returns, enabling India to collect taxes from these firms regardless of their physical presence.

Finally, Abdul Muheet Chowdhary advises waiting for the ratification of the tax measures by the United States and other OECD countries before proceeding with further steps. This suggests the importance of ensuring international cooperation and agreement in tax matters.

In conclusion, the debate surrounding tax collection and digital service taxes is multifaceted. Arguments range from the necessity of tax treaties to domestic law measures, the revenue potential for developing countries through Article 12B, and the effectiveness of the gross method to eliminate double taxation. The lack of observed market exits and limited evidence supporting cost transfers to consumers challenge these concerns. Additionally, the actions of multinational companies, the role of banks in tax compliance, and the implementation of strategies like equalisation levies provide further insight into the complexity of the issue. Ultimately, international cooperation and ratification by key countries are deemed critical to progress in this domain.

Audience

The audience members, including Bagheesha from the Internet Governance Project at Georgia Tech, Kosi from Benin’s Ministry of Economy and Finance, and Kunle, are seeking a clear understanding of how digital tax calculations are performed for companies that operate remotely and do not charge for their services. They believe that it is crucial to establish a clear and detailed process to tax companies like Facebook that do not have a physical presence in certain countries but are extensively used by its people.

Bagheesha, a PhD scholar working with the Internet Governance Project at Georgia Tech, shares their perspective on the matter. Their expertise in the field makes their comment valuable in gaining insights into the complexities of the issue. Kosi, a senior representative from Benin’s Ministry of Economy and Finance, also highlights the need for this information for policy purposes. This indicates that governments and policymakers are grappling with the challenge of effectively taxing digital companies in the absence of a physical presence.

Furthermore, Kunle raises an important question regarding quantifying the amount that digital companies should pay. This aspect adds another layer of complexity to the discussion, as determining the appropriate tax amount for companies operating remotely can be challenging.

The sentiment of the audience is neutral, indicating that they are not taking a strong position on the issue. This is likely because they are seeking clarification and information rather than advocating for a particular stance.

In terms of related topics, the discussion encompasses Digital Tax, Internet Governance, Remote Working, and Social Media. These topics are closely connected as they all contribute to the broader conversation surrounding the digital economy and its impact on taxation.

The discussion also relates to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 9, 10, and 17. SDG 9 seeks to promote industry, innovation, and infrastructure, while SDG 10 focuses on reduced inequality. Moreover, SDG 17 emphasizes the importance of partnerships for achieving sustainable development goals. The linkage to these SDGs underscores the significance of addressing digital tax calculations and ensuring a fair and equitable system.

Overall, the audience seeks clarity on how to calculate digital tax for companies operating remotely. They believe that a detailed process is necessary to tax companies like Facebook, which have a significant user base in certain countries but lack a physical presence. The insights provided by Bagheesha, Kosi, and Kunle, along with the broader topics and SDG connections, highlight the multidimensional nature of this issue and the need for effective policies and partnerships to address it.

Alison Gillwald

The taxation of global digital services has become increasingly complex, with many countries relying on telecommunications operators as their primary tax base. However, a significant issue is that policies surrounding taxation are often developed in isolation, failing to consider the interconnectedness between various sectors such as trade, competition, and digital rights. This siloed approach neglects the potential impact of taxation policies on these sectors and can lead to unintended consequences.

One specific example of these unintended consequences is seen in Uganda, where taxes on social networking and mobile transactions have had negative long-term effects. These taxes have pushed people off networks and reduced the profitability of telecoms operators. This undermines initiatives such as the Digital Uganda program and highlights the need for a more comprehensive and balanced approach to taxation.

Countries are encouraged to consider signing up to the OECD’s BEPS (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) program. By doing so, they would be able to tax multinational corporations regardless of whether they have a physical presence in the country. This is particularly relevant in the digital age where multinational corporations can generate significant profits without a physical presence. The implementation of a 15% taxation rate through BEPS could provide a significant revenue boost, even for countries with low internet penetration rates.

Outdated tax systems are identified as a key hindrance to potential revenues for states. These systems fail to adapt to the rapidly changing global landscape and often lack the streamlined and integrated approaches necessary for effective taxation. There is a clear need for tax systems to be updated and modernised to ensure governments can capture the appropriate levels of revenue.

Caution is advised when it comes to the potential negative impacts of trade agreements on revenue generation. The African continental free trade area, for example, may reduce intercontinental trade taxes, potentially impacting revenue streams for countries. It is crucial to carefully assess trade agreements and consider the impact they may have on taxation systems.

Alison Gillwald, a prominent advocate for fair taxation, argues for a universal and binding agreement for taxing tech companies. She emphasises the need for a level playing field in which tech companies, especially those without a national presence, are subject to fair and appropriate taxation. Gillwald notes that the current taxation of tech companies is subpar given their super profits and points out that the US is holding out on international taxation agreements. She believes that unless there is universal agreement and binding commitments, the situation will not improve.

Gillwald supports signing up for the OECD’s initiatives but conditions her support on the potential for countries to exert pressure and increase taxation percentages. She suggests that a digital multinational corporation pullout may be necessary from the 15% tax, as it may only apply to giant monopolies rather than multinational corporations as a whole. This highlights the need for careful consideration and negotiation when participating in international tax agreements.

In conclusion, the taxation of global digital services presents complex challenges for governments. It is essential to move away from siloed policies and towards a more integrated and comprehensive approach. This includes considering the interconnectedness of taxation with sectors such as trade, competition, and digital rights. By signing up for initiatives like the OECD’s BEPS program, countries can improve their ability to tax multinational corporations and generate crucial revenue. Updating outdated tax systems and carefully assessing the impact of trade agreements are also crucial steps in ensuring fair and effective taxation. Achieving a universally agreed and binding international taxation system for tech companies is a key goal, with collective action within the OECD having the potential to bring about significant change.

Moderator

The discussion centred around the urgent need for revenue in Southern countries due to the current economic challenges they are facing. Factors such as high inflation, the devaluation of local currencies, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic have led to an increased need for revenue generation in these countries.

One of the main concerns raised during the discussion was the unfair distribution of tax revenue from big tech companies. It was noted that the majority of tax revenue goes to a few countries, such as the United States and China, while countries in the global south that generate content and users receive only a small portion of the revenue. This raises important questions about digital justice and the need for a more equitable distribution of tax revenue.

The audience strongly supported the idea of imposing taxes on big tech companies, with 75% in favor of such measures. This indicates a growing consensus that addressing the issue of taxing big tech is crucial for achieving goals related to decent work, economic growth, and reducing inequalities.

Various policy options for collecting tax revenue from big tech were discussed, including direct taxation measures like digital services taxes and indirect taxes like consumption taxes. While there have been global, regional, and national efforts to collect tax revenue from big tech, there is no clear consensus on the most effective approach at this point.

The discussion also highlighted the significant revenue generated by the global south for tech multinational companies. With over 60% of the world’s population online, countries such as India, Indonesia, Brazil, and Nigeria contribute substantially to the revenue of tech companies like Facebook. However, many big tech companies often avoid formal tax nets in the countries where they operate, making it difficult to collect tax revenue.

Countries have multiple policy options for taxing the digital economy, including both direct and indirect measures. This includes introducing domestic law measures and implementing treaty-based taxation systems. However, each option comes with its own challenges, and there is ongoing debate on the most effective approach.

Concerns were raised about the drawbacks of certain approaches, such as the high transaction costs associated with local Digital Services Taxes (DSTs) for companies. Additionally, treaty-based options can reduce the risk of double taxation but come with challenges such as bilateral treaty negotiations and global and market-level revenue thresholds.

Stakeholder engagement and the need for a fair and transparent international formula for taxing the digital economy were emphasized. Global tax rules were seen as a way to provide consistent approaches to allocating profits, simplify compliance, and reduce complexity and uncertainty for multinational companies.

The moderator expressed support for reaching an OECD agreement on digital taxation but acknowledged the challenges and skepticism surrounding the process. The importance of signing up for the OECD agreement was discussed, as it would bring larger countries to the negotiation table and potentially make compliance easier for all countries involved.

The discussion also highlighted the need for clarity and further dialogue about the detailed elements of digital taxes, considering the diverse audience’s varying levels of understanding and expertise.

Overall, the discussion underscored the complex nature of taxing big tech and the digital economy. It highlighted the need for fair and equitable distribution of tax revenue, the challenges in implementing effective tax measures, and the significance of stakeholder engagement and international cooperation in finding viable solutions.

Moderator:
Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. We will get started. This is the session that we attempt to try and have a discussion around taxation. It’s a very broad topic because the world of taxation is huge. We’re gonna start a little broad and then hopefully narrow down to how we actually deal with the large technology companies. And we’re gonna try very hard to look at this issue of taxation from the point of view of majority world or global south countries. The conversation around taxation is more important than ever now in light of the fiscal squeeze that many are facing in the global south. High inflation, high devaluation of local currencies, COVID have all meant that the need for revenue is very high. There is also a conversation around data and digital justice when a lot of the content is provided and the user base is also from the majority world. Yet very little of the revenue from taxation goes into those countries but are collected by a handful including America and China. This is a timely conversation. There have been many global regional and national level efforts to also try and collect some of this tax revenue. There is no sort of winner at this point. There are various options which we will present and we will talk about. To do this I’m joined by two speakers online and two here with me on the podium. Online we will have Abdul Mohit Chowdhury who is senior program officer at the South Center. The South Center is an intergovernmental organization of developing countries based out of Geneva and they help developing countries to combine their efforts and expertise to promote common interests in the international arena. They conduct extensive work on international tax cooperation through the South Center tax initiative. To my right we have Dr. Alison Gilwald who is the executive director of research ICT Africa which has been a long-standing evidence producer about the state of connectivity, about the state of digitalization and digital rights across Africa and who we work closely with. Next to her we have Ms. Gayane Hurule who is a senior research manager at Learn Asia who is working on some of the tax issues that Learn Asia looks at. Online we also have Matthew Bongibola who is the coordinating director at the Federal Inland Revenue Service of Nigeria and Nigeria is interesting because they have a tax that’s as country-specific tax but Matthew also is co-chair of the UN Tax Committee who also has another proposal on tax so he’s a very interesting sort of he sits on both sides. And finally we are also joined by Victoria Hyde who is the policy and communications manager of the Asia Internet Coalition. Now the AIC is an industry association representing the internet industry across the Asia-Pacific. Their members include Meta, Google and Amazon so certainly all the big platforms and to my left is my colleague Isuru who will help who’s a research manager at Learn Asia and will help with online moderation. So to get us started what we’ve asked is actually for Gayane to set the stage because I think this is a conversation that needs a little bit of data and framing to get into. Oh yes before that we have the pleasure of actually quickly asking this is meant to be a debate because there are actual options humans face I mean in these countries but first we want to do a quick Slido. If you could please go to www.slido.com this is I promise two minutes or less even the online audience and enter 2238752 and fill this poll. And the question is should countries be exploring policy options to impose taxes on big tech. This is not necessarily an obvious answer because many have talked about well let’s not tax because the benefits of digitalization are so high and using the platforms let those actually the economic revenue from that compensate instead of taxes. So what do you think and we want to see if you’ll change your mind at the end of this sort of 90 minute conversation. The code again is 2238752 sorry. Okay so about 70 just under 20% sitting on the fence but a majority 75% saying yes we should be taxing big tech right. Thank you. Let’s move on as I said I’ve asked Gayane to show us sort of a little bit of why this topic is important and maybe present the policy options that are facing developing countries in particular right now.

Gayani Hurulle:
Thank you Helani. If I could just get my slides up wonderful okay. So we’ve very helpfully called this session taxing tech titans. What I’m trying to do here is as Helani said just frame the conversation and give you a sense of what the different policy options are. So what you’ll see is that many of the internet users in the world right now actually live in the global south. So to give you a little bit of context ITU data indicates that over 60% of the world’s population that’s about 4.9 million billion individuals are now online but we’re seeing that a majority of the internet users now reside in the majority world and India, Indonesia, Brazil, Nigeria amongst the countries where most of the internet users in the world live. Now many sorry many apps sorry just give me one second I’m having a little bit of a tech issue. Sorry. All right I think we’re good. Okay yeah. So if we hone in on the case of India for example Learn Asia’s national representative survey that we conducted in 2021 that was in the midst of the COVID-19 crisis found that 47% of the population aged 15 and above were online and given India’s growth trajectory which was very stark this is likely to be greater now but then the question really arises what apps and platforms were they using and we found that the most used apps and platforms when we did our survey was YouTube, Facebook, messaging apps such as WhatsApp and Viber and Instagram. So then the question again is what’s the common thread between these one perhaps is that they are social media type apps but the other is also that they are large that their products of large tech MNCs and despite operating and having users in the global south many of these platforms still largely derive their revenue from the global north. So Meta who we’ve given an example from here derives 70% of their revenue from the US, Canada and Europe in 2022 but while the global south accounted for a smaller percentage of revenue that’s about 30% it’s still sizable and therefore quite lucrative for tech companies. So for example if you look at the graph on the right you’ll see that Meta made 24 billion dollars in revenue from the Asia-Pacific in 2022 and this number doubled over four years so this market is not only sizable and lucrative but also growing. Now despite making sizable revenue from the global south big tech often lies outside the formal tax nets in the countries in which it operates and this has multiple impacts the first of course is a no-brainer it has it impacts government revenue and then if the funds were present it could go into a consolidated fund which then could be used to achieve other developmental targets, education, health care and whatnot. But it can also impact the competitive landscape so we in Sri Lanka for example have seen calls from the local ride-hailing operator to give you context as a local ride-hailing operator pick me and then another an Uber which operates in the same market and we found that the local ride-hailing operator has been calling for the country to introduce digital taxes because they claim that they were paying more taxes than Uber which impacted their cost structures which then in turn created an uneven playing field. So we’ve seen calls from the local tech companies to impose digital taxes to kind of create a level playing field. Now despite the benefits some countries have been quite delayed in implementing digital taxes therefore taxation of the digital sector has been limited to long tax sectors like telecom and IT imports for example and then these issues have been confounded by the lack of agility associated with the legislation of some countries. So for example in many countries the income tax acts deems it necessary for a company to have a physical presence in the country which then allows for companies like Google and Meta and whatnot who don’t have a physical presence in the country to stay outside the tax net. But it’s also worth mentioning that this issue of digital taxation is also sort of there’s an underlying issue around defining and sizing the digital economy and this is a complex one that many countries even countries in the global north have found quite challenging and we’ve found that organizations like the IMF, OECD, UNCTAD, ADB and so on have also been grappling with trying to size this digital economy and figuring out how to define the bounds of it. So in fairness it is a tough exercise possibly one that countries particularly ones in the global south are waiting for some direction on and in the case of digital taxation there have been multilateral processes in place which I’ll get to in in a minute that countries may have been taking a little bit more of a wait and see approach to. However there are several policy options for countries on how they can tax the digital economy. I’ll start with talking about domestic measures and there are a range of options within this. One is using direct taxation measures such as digital services taxes which is where you tax a company based on the revenue that they make from a country. Another is an indirect tax or a consumption tax where which you levy a specific tax based on the point of consumption. You’ll see this in the case of digital service VAT, GSTs and whatnot. But just for the purpose of streamlining our conversation today we’ll focus on the direct taxes and you’ll see that countries in the global south have several countries in the global south have already implemented these direct taxes. We’ve illustrated some cases from South and Southeast Asia so we’ve seen that India, Pakistan, Nepal, Vietnam and Malaysia all have some sort of measure in place but they’re also quite heterogeneous. And even if you hone in further on digital services taxes which is one sub component of the direct taxes you’ll see that they do tend to vary quite a bit. So even in South Asia you’ll see that they call different things, they call equalization, they will see being called the fee for offshore digital services but it really boils down to the same thing where countries tax companies on the percentage of revenue that they derive from the country. And if you look at the three systems in place on screen and sorry this is a little wordy but we wanted to make sure that we just put out all the information here that we can go back to. You’ll see that India, Pakistan, Nepal they’re quite different and this actually does speak to the benefit of one of the benefits of a local DST in that it’s customizable and flexible which is what you don’t really see in some of the other multilateral or treaty based options that we’ll talk about later. But it also speaks of a cost to companies because they have to deal with different tax regimes being in place in different countries and therefore have quite high transaction costs in trying to pay taxes so compliance costs are quite high. So if we just look at the differences in these three country measures you’ll see that they have different tax rates. So India and Nepal for example have a tax rate of 2% while Pakistan has 10%. There are some countries that have taxability thresholds so revenue flows to protect small businesses but it is absent in other countries like Pakistan. Then you’ll remember that I spoke earlier about this issue of archaic income tax acts. Pakistan has amended that act to allow for digital taxation through their existing act but India and Nepal have introduced separate legislation outside the taxes, sorry outside the acts to impose these taxes. So you’ll see again the approach to digital taxation even through these DSTs can be quite heterogeneous. Now while these domestic measures have been put in place and discussed there have also been parallel efforts to explore treaty based options and this is the benefit of having a treaty based option is that it reduces the risk of double taxation and there are two main treaty based options on the table. One put forward by the UN and the other by the OECD and G20 and there are various different sub components within this as well but I’ll focus on the two elements that are seen as alternatives to the digital services taxes that we discussed earlier. That’s article 12B in the UN model tax convention and amount A in the OECD G20 inclusive framework to bidder solution. So there are a couple of differences even within this and again I won’t get into too much detail here. Hopefully we’ll be able to talk about this in more detail in the discussion but it’s worth noting that the UN’s article 12B is to be implemented through a bilateral treaty negotiation. There has been some conversation about a multilateral option but right now what is clear to us and what is available in the public domain is this bilateral mechanism. So for example if a country X is headquartered in the US and a country sorry if a company is headquartered in the US and a company would need to have a country would need to have a treaty with that particular country to tax the company that’s within that sort of locality and this builds on the domestic measures by reducing the risk of double taxation. It can be quite cumbersome and impractical in its current form. Then there is the OECD’s amount A convention which is the most well-known and debated in the public domain. This is the multilateral convention. It defines which companies are eligible not by listing services which is what you’ll see in the case of article 12B and in many of the local digital services taxes that we saw earlier but by providing revenue and profitability thresholds both at a global level and also at a market level and it has a fixed rate across countries which is attractive to platforms but there are also sort of negatives which we’ll get to later. Now while these different options have their relative merits they have the potential to give countries different quantums of revenue which I hope Abdul will have will be able to comment more on. They’ll have different impacts of competition and they’ll have a lot of different costs of implementation be it negotiation costs, compliance costs and so on. I won’t get into a lot of detail here but hopefully we’ll hear about this more from our speakers. So just before I hand the floor back over to Helani, I’d like to highlight that there’s a crucial decision point that countries need to make in the next few months. The OECD and G20 has indicated that they hope to implement their multilateral solution in 2025 and have asked for countries to sign up for the amount A convention by the end of 2023 and this is important for several reasons. This could be the beginning of a multilateral system which is a first best solution but if countries sign up for this program they agree not to impose domestic measures until the end of 2024 and then there’s the actual implementation of the convention is contingent on the US signing this and that’s a lot of power in the hands of a single country. So there’s some apprehension and skepticism on this as well which perhaps we can talk about in more detail. So it’s for this reason that we thought that we’ll center our discussion on whether countries in the global south should sign up for the OECD and G20 multilateral convention by the end of 2023. I’ll stop here and hand the floor back over to Helani, looking forward to hearing more from our speakers.

Moderator:
Thank you. So just to clarify Gaini, December last year I believe was the initial deadline set for the negotiations to happen, the US and countries to agree on the proposed taxation with the OECD. That didn’t happen and now December this year is the new deadline. So the options for countries is if you sign up to the OECD convention you can’t do anything until end of 2025? Until end 2024.

Gayani Hurulle:
So it’s a one-year goal post that keeps getting shifted.

Moderator:
That keeps getting shifted, okay. So you can’t then go ahead and do some local taxation and so on and so forth. However, there are countries that have done low national level taxation policies and said in the policy itself until such time OECD agreement is reached, this shall remain in play, right?

Gayani Hurulle:
Yes, possibly. And there are also other countries who have implemented their own DSTs and then signed up for. And then still signed up for the OECD. Afterwards. Okay. Because what that convention specifies is that you can’t implement a DST after you sign up for it.

Moderator:
So they’ve been quite shaky. So presumably you said India has a national level digital services tax, a DST. If the OECD thing comes into play, they can somehow sunset the national level stuff and go with the OECD. Okay, that’s where we are. Great. Thank you. I’d like to bring in Abdul from the South Center. Abdul, you know, you’ve been really working on this and the South Center has sort of been leading the charge on the UN proposal which is what expects every country. to bilaterally negotiate with other countries in order to be able to tax. So and one of the things actually I asked Gaini to do is to frame your discussion just to put some numbers that you know your reports have calculated. Because for countries one of the big considerations is revenue potential. Where can I get more tax revenue from which option. So keeping that in mind could you talk us through in particular the UN option and why that might be a preferred solution for countries Abdul. And can we unmute?

Abdul Muheet Chowdhary:
Thank you. Yes. Thank you. Good morning. Good afternoon to and good evening to everyone. It’s a pleasure to collaborate with Learn Asia at this event. And my greetings to Mr. Matthew Gupanjubul, the co-chair of the UN Tax Committee. And I’m honored to share the panel with him who in fact has been a champion of the developing countries in taking Article 12B forward. So on in response to your question, Helene, as we can see from the data, Article 12B has two methods, a gross method and the net method. And just to highlight that countries don’t really need either option. They can just introduce domestic law measures and start collecting taxes. You know the this thing of that you need a treaty is really this hullabaloo around a treaty comes more from the developed countries because they want to actually reduce the taxes companies face when they go to when they go to developing countries and derive revenues from them because tax treaties, they don’t grant taxing rights. They restrict taxing rights. I would repeat tax treaties don’t grant taxing rights, they restrict taxing rights. Even without a tax treaty, the residence jurisdiction can always give unilateral relief to its taxpayer. So if Uber works in Sri Lanka and Sri Lanka introduces a digital service tax and there’s no Article 12B amount there, there’s no treaty-based solution. The U.S. can always tell Uber that okay you pay taxes in Sri Lanka so we’ll take that into account when you pay taxes in the U.S. So those unilateral relief options are always there and we’re there actually because even now it’s not like every country in the world has a tax treaty. So just to mention that even without tax treaties countries can collect taxes. Domestic law is the basis for collecting these taxes. Even if they have treaty-based solutions but no domestic law provisions, they cannot collect anything. Tax is a fundamental aspect of sovereignty and this is something countries should keep in mind. Now with that out of the way, if you look at Article 12B, the revenue estimates which we came up with, you have well the comparison should be with amount A, the 20 billion euro threshold and Article 12B with the two options of ADS only and hybrid ADS. Now why is the UN option a better option by and large for developing countries? One is because if we see most developing countries don’t actually have a very big tax treaty network. So it’s not like they have so many treaties to renegotiate. You have a few large countries which have lots of treaties but by and large for most small developing countries, especially the countries in this list, many of them would not have a very extensive treaty network. So it’s not like they would have to negotiate so many treaties and then there’s a revenue potential. We can see that Article 12B with a broad scope, ADS companies and hybrid ADS and ADS is automated digital services like online advertising, income from search engines, income from supply of user data, income from cloud computing and things like that. So that kind of income, if a country goes with Article 12B and has a broad scope, we can see that it gives almost more than twice and in some cases up to three times what the OECD solution gives. So in terms of revenue potential with a broad scope, Article 12B has much better revenue potential if you’re talking about the gross method. But if you look at the narrow scope, if Article 12B has a narrow scope and by narrow scope I mean in Article 12B paragraph 6, you have a list of digital services and if you look at only those digital services and apply the tax only to those specific digital services, then the amount is comparable with amount A which would come from the OECD solution and actually if you look at the net method, that actually gives the least revenue and in fact it gives even less than the OECD solution.

Moderator:
And what’s the difference between the gross method and net method? Abdul, you’re not talking to a bunch of tax people. I think these are very general digital governance audience so

Abdul Muheet Chowdhary:
you do need to explain acronyms. Yes, yes, yes. So the gross method is basically a digital service tax and the net method I’ll get to in a second. So the gross method was brought in to basic, because many countries as Gayani mentioned brought in digital service taxes. So the United Nations developed the gross method to provide a treaty-based solution to eliminate double taxation for digital service taxes. So gross method is the same as the digital service tax. The net method, what the gross method does is that on every payment for a digital service, some portion of that payment is withheld as a tax by the government. So it’s a transaction-based tax. It’s not that at the end of the year the company files the return and pays the tax at one go. It’s on every single payment which is made for a digital service. So for example, if $100 is made for online advertising and you have a 3% rate, then the company which is like Google which is providing the online advertising service would get 100 minus 3, $97 or whatever currency that is. So that’s how the gross method would operate. The net method on the other hand is a tax which is paid at the end of the year. So it’s not a transaction-based tax like the gross method. And the way the net method operates is that it provides a simple formula through which the company can arrive at the net profits. And this is important. It’s called the net method because net refers to net profits. So they give a formula to calculate net profits. And this is important because the big question in the digital economy was how do you calculate profits? Because normally if you look at the brick and mortar economy of a factory in your country, you can audit, you can see how much do you pay on rent, how much do you pay on salaries, and your input costs and whatnot. But in the case of Uber in Sri Lanka, where there is no physical presence, how can you audit? I mean, the company can say anything and there’s no way you can figure out what the costs are. And especially when the whole business model is based on algorithms and intangibles largely. So it becomes very difficult to determine costs. So the Article 12B net method provides a simple formula where you basically see how much local revenue has been made by the company. So in the case of Uber in Sri Lanka, how much revenue did Uber derive from Sri Lanka? And to that, the profitability rate of Uber globally would be applied. So if Uber has a profit margin of, let’s say, 10%, 12%, whatever, that would be applied to Sri Lanka’s local revenues. 30% of that figure would be taken. And to that, the local tax rate of Sri Lanka’s 25%, 30%, whatever rate that is, that would be applied. So that is how the net method operates, broadly speaking. And because of that, because it’s a net basis tax, because it’s not a gross basis tax, obviously the revenue collections are much lower because, by and large, turnover-based taxes or revenue-based taxes tend to have much higher revenue collection. Wonderful. Thank you. So Abdul, you’re basically saying as a matter of national integrity, everyone reserves the right. But in terms of being able to negotiate, what do you think are the transaction costs involved? Unless the UN comes up with a treaty with standardized rates, et cetera, that everyone can sign up to, is it really a matter of Cambodia going and negotiating with China, let’s say, UK, and the US, if those are the three big countries where the platforms come from? Is that what, sort of, is it left up to countries? Yes. So this is the strength of Article 12B, that the decision of which treaty to enter into is left with the country. And now, of course, the question is, can Cambodia really negotiate with China or the UK or the US? And, of course, that’s not easy and that’s very difficult. But it also depends on how Cambodia approaches this. So I’ve just given disclaimer. You know, the tax world is opposite from the trade world in the sense that in the trade world, developing countries are always looking for market access. We want to export to the developed countries. And there, the power is with the developed countries to open the market or not. In the tax world, it’s the opposite. Here, the power of tax is always with the developing countries. We can tax as much as we want, and the developed countries are always trying to reduce the tax which is imposed by the developing countries. So in the case of Cambodia and China or Cambodia and the US, if Cambodia introduces a digital service tax, keeps it out of the income tax law, so the tax treaties cannot apply. If they introduce it into the Finance Act, as Gayani was saying, that India, Nepal, and these countries have introduced a digital service tax outside of the income tax law in the Finance Act, if that is done and the treaties don’t apply, then if China doesn’t enter into a tax treaty, it doesn’t include Article 12B into their tax treaty with Cambodia. It is the Chinese companies and the UK companies and the American companies who will face double taxation. Cambodia will not lose anything. So if Cambodia doesn’t include Article 12B, no problem. It can still collect taxes.

Moderator:
Is market exit by platforms in particularly not-valuable countries, like on a per-user basis or on a gross per-country revenue basis, a risk in this scenario? You know, take a country like Norway or one of our two or something like that, right? If the transaction costs are that high in compliance, would this company stay in? Is market exit the other risk? You said there is no cost. Is that a cost?

Abdul Muheet Chowdhary:
I mean, I didn’t mean to say there’s no cost, of course. I meant to say that if Cambodia says that we want to introduce a tax treaty with the UK and the UK refuses, then if Cambodia introduces a digital service tax, keeps it outside of the income tax law, then they will not lose anything by that. It will be the UK companies who will face double taxation. So I didn’t mean to say there is no cost. Now, on this risk that if Cambodia introduces a digital service tax, will the American companies leave Cambodia? You know, so far we have seen digital service taxes have been introduced by many countries. I mean, three East African countries, for example, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. The heads of the revenue service passed a resolution that we would all introduce digital service taxes with a 5% rate. And I mean, so far, we have not seen this evidence anywhere. You know, we have not seen this evidence anywhere that companies have pulled out in response. The threat that is usually given and usually not followed up on is that they will pass the cost on to the consumers. But as I said, even that, there is very little empirical evidence that this is a standard practice. I mean, it seems to be more of the exception rather than the rule. And also, if you remember, the business models of many of these companies is, I mean, they burn a lot of cash. I mean, they are predatory companies looking to just destroy their rivals. So oftentimes, they are just going with a cash burning approach, you know. So it’s not that profitability is like the foremost consideration on their minds all the time.

Moderator:
Yeah. Yeah. So sort of dynamic effects of driving others out of the market and so on. Okay. Let’s bring in Matthew. Now, you have taken an interesting approach and you have this dual role. Can you tell us about the digital services tax that you did impose and what your approach to the OECD sort of, you know, has been so that the audience understands, faced with the real choice of doing something now or waiting, what your thought process was?

Mathew Olusanya Gbonjubola:
Yeah. Thank you very much, Hilani. And good morning, Abdul and all colleagues on the call. I think we are having a very interesting conversation, which I hope is going to help colleagues all over the world to make a choice. Now, to start with, Nigeria does not have a DSC. We do not have a digital services tax. So I think, so that we are clear, what Nigeria has is a nexus rule that connects businesses of non-resident persons to Nigeria for tax purposes. And that gives the country the opportunity to bring the income or the profits arising from transactions done without physical presence to tax in Nigeria. Now, if we come back to the basic, we should ask ourselves, what is the problem that we’re trying to solve on this issue of non-physical presence of businesses, which we call ITEC and all of that? It all has to do with being able to bring the income in respect of transaction done in a country to tax. Before now, and when I say now, I mean before the advancement of technology, businesses could only be done if the companies or the firms are physically located in the jurisdiction. And so you can see the business, you can see the premises, you can see the officers, the staff, and then you can see the groups or service, and then you can easily bring such to tax. However, with the advancement in technology, it is possible for a surgeon to be in one country and a patient to be in another country, and yet the surgeon will perform or carry out surgery. This was unimaginable 50 years ago. And so the question then is, where does the income arising from such service, where should it arise? Should it be taxed in the place where the surgeon is staying or where the patient is? That had always been the problem. And now the approach of both the UN and the inclusive framework is to bring in some supposition, and which, just like Abdul said, in respect of the UN treaty base, is difficult a little bit for many developing countries to implement, and that is because they don’t have that many treaties. Then secondly, it is doubtful if Nigeria, for example, is negotiating treaty with the United Kingdom or with US or France, that the France or those countries will accept to have Article 12B in their, as an article in the tax treaty. So it’s almost an unsurmountable challenge. But even then, if you succeed in doing that, if you don’t have the domestic legislation, then you still cannot operate that provision. Now, with the inclusive framework option of amount A, we all know the challenges, not just the complexity, but we also saw a lot of elements that we believe are not working in favour of developing countries. And so the option Nigeria has taken is to say, look, what actually is the problem? The problem is I can’t see these people, but I can feel them. I can see the businesses they are doing in my country. And so we therefore used the option of looking at significant economic presence to say, look, if you have enough transactions in my country and we have threshold and has exceeded this threshold, even whether or not I can see you physically, I would deem that you are in my country and the income arising from that transaction will be taxable in my country. And that is what we have done. And this is not limited to digital services. It includes other services, management services, technical services, and all of that. And it is non-discriminatory. So it’s not targeted towards any specific company or country. It is anyone who fits into the definition that we have. So that is the approach Nigeria has taken. And I can say clearly that it has worked for all, worked for Nigeria, and also worked for the businesses, because we also have simplification such that they don’t have to go through very complex process of filing returns and all of that. So I hope my comment is useful. Thank you very much. Yes. Yes. Thank you, Matthew. Just to clarify, what is this test of significant market presence in your case? And how do you actually monitor that, I suppose? Because implementability and monitoring costs are the other side of sort of getting the revenue. Can you give us some thoughts about that? Yes, sure. Certainly, Elani. And thanks. Monitoring and putting values is actually not difficult, because we have the financial intermediations there. If someone sits in one village in Nigeria and is transacting business with a company that is based either in the US or Russia, has to pass through a financial institution. Payment has to pass through a banking system. And so from there, we have a hand, and we can see that. But beyond that, and in fairness, quite a number of the businesses are also people of goodwill, who on their own, with proper engagement, are able to set the clear, to say into your territory, this is how much transactions we have made, and this is how much. So it is both ways. We are able to get data from our financial services, and we also have the businesses who have come to self-declared on the basis of the law that we have enacted in Nigeria.

Moderator:
We had a forum with about over 100 government tax officials, I think, last month. And it was interesting, both India and Nepal had imposed digital services taxes in-country, but both said they’re taking a very light-touch approach because they do really want to sort of encourage compliance but are not really triangulating with all other transactions which they can use across the financial sector, various other ways. Is that Nigeria’s approach as well?

Mathew Olusanya Gbonjubola:
Certainly, the intention of Nigeria is not to strangulate businesses, it is just to ensure that taxes are paid where business transactions are carried out and where income or profit is arising, which is one of the reasons why we had to adopt simplification methods and we also have adopted rates that will not significantly affect the profitability of the businesses done in Nigeria. And so, yes, I would say the intention is not to strangulate business, we do not want to strife for businesses growing up, particularly those in the technology sector, but then everyone still has to pay the fair tax.

Moderator:
Great, thank you, Matthew. I’d like to bring in Victoria from the Asian Internet Coalition. So you, in a way, are sort of an industry body for the big platforms that we are talking about today. Are you of the view that countries should sign up to the OECD Amount A Multilateral Convention? Why? Also, could you talk about the cost of compliance of the various options seen from the big tech platforms?

Victoria Hyde:
Sure, absolutely. Good afternoon, everyone, and thank you for having me here to speak today on this important issue. Yes, as you mentioned, as part of the Asian Internet Coalition, we represent multinational companies that we’re talking about here today in this discussion around taxing these tech titans. And, you know, I just want to kind of give a bit of a brief overview of the digital services tax landscape in Asia. So when we look at this landscape, and indeed globally, it’s clear that there has been, you know, evolving digitalization of goods and services. And we recognize the need for governments to raise revenue, especially in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and the fiscal squeeze that Helani mentioned earlier. And in Europe, we’ve seen several countries passing DSTs, and while others in Asia, such as Malaysia, India, Pakistan, as Gayani referred to, have introduced taxes on imported digital services. And I think, you know, as was alluded to again in the introduction, these DSTs vary in their scope and their application. And while some countries tax only specific digital activities, others encompass a range of digital services, but these DSTs can, as you just mentioned, have some potentially harmful consequences. You know, they may distort market behavior, they could potentially pass on cost to the consumers and cause double taxation. So countries have kind of experimented with these taxes in the absence of a global solution, as the second best approach. And one of the things that we tend to do as part of the Asia Internet Coalition is go to governments with by presenting industry best practices. And one of the ones we use is often the G20 and OECD inclusive framework. So in the context of this discussion, you know, around pillar one, just to be clear, you know, it aims to ensure that profits are taxed in jurisdictions where consumers or users are located. So referring to this surgeon patient analogy that Matthew just just mentioned, and also as Abdul mentioned, you know, the Global South is put in quite a favorable position. It holds a lot of power as there is a huge proportion of the consumer basis of these M&Es in the Global South. So if I think about, you know, whether the question that you just asked me around where the big tech companies are of the view that countries should sign on to the convention, I think that the framework offers a comprehensive and inclusive approach to international taxation that holds substantial benefits for various stakeholders, not only multinational companies, but also, you know, some for the Global South and the digital economy more generally. But I think we also recognize the need to tailor tax policies to the unique economic, political and administrative landscapes that we’re talking about here. So for the Global South, I think a couple of the positives that we want to call out, you know, the redistribution of taxing rights, promoting revenue generation in developing countries and addressing the problems of profit shifting and tax havens and harmful tax practices which have historically disproportionately affected the Global South. I think for multinational companies, which is obviously, you know, the industry that we represent, the framework offers clarity and consistency and also transparency in international tax rules. It minimizes tax arbitrage opportunities and it also reduces this risk of double taxation, which I just touched on briefly. It also promotes responsible tax practices from the multinational corporations as well. And I think this is something that countries and consumers are starting to expect of companies as well. And lastly, just for the digital economy more generally, the framework addresses some of the unique challenges posed by the digital age. You know, we’re seeing huge developments in, you know, with relation to artificial intelligence, which I’m sure has been a topic of conversation throughout this forum. And, yeah, we’re seeing that this framework can provide a bit more of a predictable and efficient global tax system for the digital economy and its technology companies.

Moderator:
Thank you, Victoria. Now, if I were a sceptic, and I’m not saying I am, this could be viewed as a way for the big platforms to just overall pay less taxes because the numbers being talked about are quite low as a global taxation rate. And if I were a real sort of negative thinker, again, I may not be, I would think there’s no incentive for the US to actually let the OECD agreement reach anything. That’s what we saw last year. How would you respond to these two statements?

Victoria Hyde:
Yeah, I think that’s a valid point. And I think around what Gayane also mentioned around sort of these implementation delays and sort of the moving goalpost, which we’re seeing with this inclusive framework, it’s completely valid for countries to sort of call into question whether this will actually be implemented. But I also think that it’s important to recognize that this is an incredibly complex framework that’s being put together and one that is trying to achieve global consensus. And is a major step forward in international tax rules. And a lot of the work that they’ve been doing is around gaining stakeholder input, not only from the countries that are represented by, you know, in the inclusive framework, but also from the industry, from trade associations like ourselves, from NGOs. And this is a really lengthy process, but it’s ultimately crafted with the view to create long-lasting rules and avoid unintended consequences as well of these rules. So, yeah.

Moderator:
Abdul, you’re on the other side of this debate. How do you react to what Victoria is saying? Yeah, thank you.

Abdul Muheet Chowdhary:
Thank you, Gayane. You know, I’ll give the background of sort of the context we find ourselves today. This negotiation on the digital economy has been going on since 2013. So it’s been going on for more than 10 years. And actually, the digital economy is part of section one out of 15 actions under the base erosion and profit shifting project. And, you know, the negotiation would have gone on till the end of time because that’s what the Americans, especially because most of these companies are American companies, that’s what they wanted, that you keep talking, keep negotiating till the end of time. And beyond. So the only reason why things have come this far is because countries began initiating national measures or as they are called unilateral measures, but all tax measures are basically national measures. It’s only when countries began introducing digital service taxes, including, I repeat, many OECD countries, UK, Italy, Spain, France and Austria and whatnot, they all started introducing digital service taxes. Then finally, the Americans came to the negotiating table and said, OK, OK. And grudgingly, they agreed to redistribute 25 percent of residual profits, which are defined as profits above 10 percent of revenue. So that’s a very high threshold in practical terms. So only national measures by countries brought them to the table and only continued national and unilateral measures will actually make this thing see the light of day. The Americans have not even agreed to share tax information. I repeat, the Americans have refused to share tax information on a multilateral basis. They have not signed up to these exchange of information agreements, the MCMAA and whatnot. They have a history of wasting people’s time negotiating these multilateral treaties and then not signing them. So even the BEPS multilateral instrument, which would update tax treaties to implement some of the minimum standards, they have not signed. So when they have not agreed to share tax information, can you expect them to agree to share the tax base? And it is extremely unlikely. And I would say Victoria is talking about predictability and certainty. If there is one thing which is predictable and certain, it’s that the U.S. will not sign this agreement. And based on the current agreement in the July outcome statement, if the U.S. doesn’t sign this MLC by the end of the year, then countries can and should actually go ahead with national measures. And in terms of the revenue potential and, you know, I’d just like to add another point on that. The companies, they tried very hard to stop developing countries from initiating digital measures. Then they found out that countries are going to go ahead and there was nothing they could do to stop them. So then the next best thing was to come up with this so-called multilateral approach, which would basically force everybody to bring in a tax which would tax them as little as possible. So that is the key motivation behind this narrative, which we’re seeing.

Moderator:
Matthew, you’ve done a sort of a national level taxation regime. If and when the OECD optimistically treaty is signed, whenever, are you broadly aligned with that? You have elements of that, right? I mean, significant market presence, for example, is a feature of the OECD. They’re not taxing everybody, the large companies. Because you have now sort of committed to the OECD protocol, basically, yes?

Mathew Olusanya Gbonjubola:
Again, for clarity purposes, Nigeria has been part of the discussions since 2014, from the time of PEPS 2015 action points. And Nigeria is in alignment with quite a lot of the outcome that is out there. Now, as regards to the current two-pillar solution, Nigeria has also been part of the discussions from the beginning and we are still part of it. But you may remember that in the October 2021 statement, Nigeria did not sign on to that political statement. And that was because we had serious concerns with quite a number of the elements in the rules, particularly as regards to Ammon’s aid. And my government has not changed that position even now. Of course, we continue to engage and be part of the discussions and the negotiations. But the decision taken by my government in 2021 had not changed.

Moderator:
Thank you. Alison, you’ve been sitting and listening to this, people who work in tax and the people who are going to have to pay tax talking about it. You work in majority world countries, mostly many poor countries, many emerging economies. From a social inclusion equity perspective, what are your thoughts? From a capacity to get this done, what are your thoughts? And really, if we are ever lucky enough in our countries to get some revenue, what on Earth is going to happen to that money in the kind of regimes that we live in?

Alison Gillwald:
It’s a good three hour discussion, I think, but thank you, Helani. I will come to those bigger questions. I just wanted to say how important it is to be having these discussions and that we’ve been doing this research over a period of time because the complexity of particularly with these intensifying global digital digitalized services and things have made the tax issues far more complex. And a lot of the arguments that were made around maintaining or reducing or just controlling local taxation on, for example, telecommunication operators so that they could roll out those networks and reinvest in those networks and compel them to reinvest in those networks or the failures of secondary taxation through universal service objectives because, in fact, those weren’t being rolled out. And the arguments that kind of let these services drive themselves more affordably and get that take up and then you’d be able to tax the corporates and people who are all going online and doing that sort of thing. So those arguments were made from a very pragmatic point of view, acknowledging in our networks all in Africa the incredible constraints there are in revenue generation on the continent. Many of these countries, the mobile operators were primarily the tax base for the country with a tax base of one or two percent of the population. So those arguments are very different from the arguments that we were having even 10 years ago, maybe eight years ago, around the end user taxes that were coming with social networking that was these over the OTT services that were coming on top of the telecom operators. And there was, of course, a lot of argument around revenue share with those operators themselves and issues of local competition and all of those things, which I think are completely pertinent to this discussion. I think what’s really important about these discussions is that they’re not just taxation discussions, that we’re actually understanding the implications of taxation on trade, trade changes that are happening, on competition issues that are arising, because at the moment that policy is being done in a very siloed way that goes to the issues of national sovereignty, but actually the various imperatives, development and economic imperatives, the FISCUS is looking very strictly at maximizing revenue, the digital department or comms or whatever it is, is very much looking at digital universal service and those kinds of things that would actually drive economic growth, but they’re often not talking to each other. Trade is going off into a completely separate thing, possibly with some kind of alignment on tax, but not much else. But then we had the social networking taxes, and these were enormously regressive taxations on end users, introduced in some of the poorest countries in the world primarily, with actually very counterproductive effects. So if you look at Uganda, for example, they were introduced at a time to get, you know, a sovereign debt repayment that was needed to the poorest of the poor, you know, who were on these social networks, were actually pushed off the networks with these 1% taxes on each transaction, on mobile transactions and those kinds of things. Not only did it actually undermine their digital Uganda program, universal service program, but actually it also made the telecoms operators less profitable. There was enormous loss of revenues from them, from corporate tax. So the long-term effect has been quite negative. And then it’s overlaid with a political agenda. So the actual Gazette, the regulation that refers to this, says it’s also trying to stop social gossiping, online gossiping and that sort of thing. And around a time of, you know, political dissent. So, I mean, you’re getting a whole lot of really irrational reasons for taxation. So that has been, we’ve made a very strong argument to get, you’re not taxing end users of these digital services, you’re not taxing the titans, you’re not taxing the people who should be paying for these services. And so often now the discussions around whether countries should be signing up to the BEPS and at least getting 15% of those big tech companies amongst multinational corporations, that, you know, we have not been able to tax because of the lack of presence in country to use this mechanism to at least get that 15%, which would be very significant in many countries, even with the low internet penetration rates and those kinds of things, and ideally releasing these end users from those kinds of taxes. And yet some of the people who, you know, as I said, because this is complex and there’s not an understanding that the social networking taxes in these countries at the moment, mainly in East Africa, but very attractive to other parts of the continent, are actually end user taxes. There’s now often been a kind of knee jerk reaction to taxing digital companies under the BEPS regime, the base erosion and profit shifting regime of OECD’s proposed regime, is, you know, we mustn’t tax them either because it’s going to affect, you know, Facebook’s going to move out of, you know, Africa or whatever it is. And I think, you know, we really need some complexity because I think we’re all advocating for the same thing, but we need to understand those linkages, you know, and how this whole ecosystem works. And as I said, not only within the digital sector, but affecting these other sectors. And so this work was really done in the context of trying to understand trade and taxation issues in Africa and several interviews done with many, many countries, including Nigeria, and working, well, not working closely, but, you know, following the work of the African Tax Administrators Forum, who obviously represent the interests of many tax administrators across the country and therefore had to represent the position on unilateral taxation. I mean, a country like South Africa, for example, you know, corporate taxation is a minimum of 35 percent, many of these other companies looking at higher taxation rates. So an offer of 15 percent is, you know, just doesn’t look like very much at all. And it has an effective tax, you know, collection regime, et cetera. So it is, I think it’s very different for different countries. As I said, I think it’s really important that one understands the different dynamics in the context. So in the African context, besides the issues of sovereignty, is that I think as Abdul was pointing out, many of these treaties are limiting and binding. They’re not seen as opportunities to actually be accessing that extra 15% or something. So this paper that we interviewed a lot of people and there was a lot of feeling that people, the fiscals would never give up the little hold that they had on something in order that they would get something bigger or get something later on. And certainly didn’t want to be tied into these moratoriums, which we’re seeing anyway, from the trade agreements that are impacting on revenue generation. So I just wanted to say that was a kind of work that’s been done a lot of in Africa, but we’ve also done very important work, I think, with Learn Asia and with IEP, across the issues that I think we really need to understand where taxation fits in. Really looking at the interplay between digitization, increased visibility to the state, state formation, revenue generation, taxation, redistribution, because I mean, we need those taxes to do the redistributive work that we’re wanting to do post-COVID, well, during COVID and of course post-COVID around economic reconstruction. And that paper is actually out being launched today. So please do watch our Twitter feeds for that. Because I think the visibility that’s coming through digital transactions has implications that can be used positively, both for people who currently might not be paying legitimate taxes to be more visible to the state, but also for informal sector who have often not been able to be the beneficiaries of redistributive programs because they’re not visible, now being increasingly visible through tax, and obviously don’t qualify for taxation so they’d be visible from a tax point of view, but they wouldn’t qualify unless they don’t, unless they do qualify for taxation, but then be visible in the social protection role. So that’s, I think, an important side from the ongoing post-colonial struggles around state formation in many of our countries and the need to have the revenues to build those institutional capacities and some of these really big development challenges that we face on the continent. But I think, as I said, I think specifically in terms of the taxation issues and the trade issues that are going on now, I think, well, the whole BIPS process was actually an acknowledgement of how outdated these tax systems are. But it’s important to notice that the foregone potential revenues for states, particularly in the context of the pandemic, as I mentioned, and economic reconstruction, but it’s compelled us to look at updating the tax system of engaging in these various processes and better representing our interests, which I think we’ve not been effective as regions, as the global South, and doing this kind of research to inform a more integrated position for countries and regions to take is very important. For Africa, I think the situation is even more precarious, as I said, very fragile or non-existent tax systems in place anyway, largely dependent on aid and with all the associated issues that that raises for political economies. But then we’ve also got these big continental and international trade issues, where we are seeing enormous amounts of foregone tax in agreement. So the African continental free trade area, which has come into force, although it’s not operational in many ways, but there is expected to be a significant drop in conventional physical trade. Although I should say that there’s a sad amount of intercontinental trade anyways, a lot of our trade is actually outside, but that will have significant effects, especially for those countries who are not highly digitized, not leading these digital services, spreading out throughout Africa. And as these trade barriers begin to ease across the region and e-commerce is taking off and the digital services protocol is just being negotiated right now for the African continental free trade area, we’re going to see those kinds of impacts of a digital single market on traditional trade taxes that have been there. And so this really makes this assessment of aligning, positioning our local tax regimes on the continent, some kind of harmonization we will have to have in terms of the continental free trade area and the digital services underpinnings of it with the international tax regime, because these are essentially digital global, digital public goods that we very often talking about, data flows and these kinds of things. And I think historically we’ve looked at global governance from a kind of harms and protection point of view. We’ve looked at from a kind of trade and digital services and e-commerce point of view, but the taxation component of this, the actual generation of revenue for countries in order to service their needs. And I think historically we used to be, don’t put a secondary tax on telecom operators unless it goes back to the digital industry because otherwise we never see it. But digitization is now so cross-cutting that it’s absolutely appropriate that if.

Abdul Muheet Chowdhary:
Used to digital service tax, which applied to both residents and non-residents, but then later on they restricted it to non-residents. So it’s only the foreigners who now have to pay the tax. So that option is always there with countries. Second point is that on extraction, in the digital economy, you can really see extraction in a raw form because the classic argument that if you have taxes, then investment will go away, kind of breaks down when we look at the digital economy, because these are not coming with money to set up a factory and hire local people and create jobs. These are by definition companies. I mean, as in the case of Uber with Sri Lanka, they have literally no physical presence over there. The only jobs which are being created, so to speak, are the Uber drivers who could get those jobs even from Pick Me and other local companies. And in the case of online advertising companies like Google and Facebook, then you can really question, what is the actual investment coming into the local economy? So this argument that raise taxes, investment goes away, should be seen very differently when it comes to the digital economy. And we can really see, as I mentioned, extraction in quite a raw form. The third point which the Kenyan gentleman had spoken about was non-compliance. One option which is there for countries is what Pakistan has done, which is where they have told the banks that you collect the taxes of withholding and give it to us. So in the case of Kenya, for example, the company has to on its own come and pay the tax. And of course, if they don’t, then there are compliance issues, but there’s always a Pakistan approach where the banks withhold it. So the company basically gets the balance, yeah.

Moderator:
Victoria, anything to add?

Victoria Hyde:
Yeah, I think if I can jump in here, I also want to reiterate the point that Matthew made around the importance of stakeholder engagement. I think it’s hugely important so that both the government and multinational companies can set expectations. But you said that companies came to you with some concerns around the complexities of the arrangement that you have in Kenya. And I think this is where global tax rules can come in to reduce the complexity and uncertainty faced by M&Es due to sort of varying tax regulations and to sort of facilitate more transparent and predictable tax governance for them, as well as simplifying compliance by providing more standardized and consistent approaches to allocating profits. And this is where M&Es can more easily determine their tax obligations and ensure compliance across multiple jurisdictions.

Moderator:
Alison, Ghani?

Gayani Hurulle:
Yeah. I can just respond on a softer approach on the second part of the question on what if the companies don’t want to pay taxes. And I just want to reflect on a conversation that we had with the Nepali and Indian authorities when we had our forum a couple of weeks ago. And what those tax officials said is that so far they’ve had the companies actually playing ball and paying taxes, though they’ve taken a relatively light touch approach like Hilani mentioned earlier. So it’s, so far they’ve had little issues, but the light touch approach was key. But the question really is, is this dynamic going to change if and when the Mountie Convention comes into place? Because then there’s an alternative. So these are also questions that we’ll have to keep asking in whether the sort of answers that we’re giving today also continue to be sort of static and stagnant or whether those also will change over time.

Alison Gillwald:
So I think that was just one of the points I wanted to make because I think one of the issues you are speaking about and I think one of the issues that have come up here are really the issues around being able to tax the big tech companies in our context that don’t have presence within country. And you’re saying, oh, well, they’re playing ball as they should. If you’re looking at the kind of super profits that these companies are making, the kind of gratitude that’s actually contributing to these taxes just seems to be, it’s really not addressing these kind of bigger problems. I mean, I think, yes, we must take and risk it, it must be fair, it must be transparent. But in fact, although the kind of agreed international formula on this would make things clearer, it’s not worked in the favor of some of those countries. So we really need to, and we’ve got the US holding out on things. So unless everybody kind of comes to the table and we agree on it and it’s binding on everybody, it’s never going to get the kind of traction that we’re looking for.

Moderator:
Thank you. We’ve got an in-person question. You have a question as well. We’ll take two questions very quickly with very short answers.

Audience:
Okay, hi. So excellent panel and excellent discussion. I’m learning quite a lot of things here. I’m Bagheesha, I’m a PhD scholar and I work with Internet Governance Project at Georgia Tech. Now, what I’m going to ask might be a little bit more fundamental because I’m still learning about digital taxes. So please bear with me. I am struggling to understand how the calculations of profits are done or how the calculation of tax itself is done in sense that I think Abdul mentioned initially about revenue from profits for services. It’s easy when you have to calculate it for Netflix or something because you’re paying for those services. But how is it done for a service such as a social media website where we’re not directly paying for anything, right? And I think you also mentioned about how this trickles down to something that a user ends up paying for a Netflix or another digital subscription services. So just more fundamentally on how does one conceptually think about this and yeah, that’s about it. Thank you. I’m Kosi. I’m a senior from Benin. I’m from Ministry of Economy and Finance. It’s not very clear for me now. Facebook is not physical in Benin, for example. But many people using Facebook service, how can we test Facebook? Please make me information detail by detail, step by step because my minister are waiting for that. Thank you. There’s also a question online. My name is Kunle. My question is for digital companies. How do you quantify how much they are to pay based on the fact that most of them are operating remotely? You’re getting at this. So, I mean, this has to do a lot with what are the costs Facebook? What is the cost and revenue of Facebook in a country like yours? Advertising revenue and subscriptions like SMEs pay, you know, to have a certain type of page. We might buy advertising space to announce that, I don’t know, we’re running a conference. Hotels might buy advertising space. What are their costs?

Moderator:
Our marketing, maybe some allocation of the policy staff, the marketing staff, which might be per country or shared across countries. I mean, those are the types of costs and revenues that these companies have. Even if they don’t have a presence. If they have a presence, then of course, there’s sort of, you know, infrastructure that they run and so on, yeah? So I’ll take a very quick set of responses, like really under one minute from the panelists, but I am going to put you in touch with Abdul so you can have a longer conversation because I think that is important. Part of what we’re really trying to do with the panel, this is one of the first panels at IGF and I’ve been coming since 2006. That’s really trying to get at some of the detailed elements of this. So we need to have a much longer conversation. So we will put you in touch. Reactions from panelists, please. Thank you. Thank you.

Abdul Muheet Chowdhary:
Thank you, Helani. I’ll just respond to the gentleman from Benin. I would say, sir, please look at the equalization levy of India, where they basically started out with a 6% tax on online advertising, which was targeted at Facebook and Google and these kinds of companies whose main revenue stream is from advertising. Broadly speaking, tell your bank that if somebody in Benin is paying Google for online advertising, then introduce a rate of 4% or 5% or whatever and tell that bank to withhold that percentage of the withholding and keep it as a withholding tax. Whether Facebook or Google are there or not in Benin, that doesn’t matter. The money will be restricted from them when they receive the payment and they will be forced to come and file the tax return. And if they don’t, well, that’s their loss.

Moderator:
So before the money goes out of the country, the financial institutions are legally obliged to have a withholding tax and then remit it back to the tax authorities, what Abdul is saying. Anyone else wants to respond? Or we can go to our last sort of rapid fire. We’ve had very sort of, you know, interesting there’s some convergence, right? Abdul is basically saying national levels taxation is important because that is what actually brought the US and other people to the table. And we need to do this. It is also a matter of national integrity. There seem to be outs if somehow we have a longer term, you know, multi sort of country treaty option. Matthew is broadly, I think, along those lines. He’s gone for approach that somehow sort of, I think the devil is in the details, which, you know, we really do see. He sort of had a threshold. So the smaller guys are not really impacted by this, but still has a mechanism to get revenue. Victoria is saying, I think that this is sort of the OECD option is really a viable one. Compliance becomes easier. And related to that, Alison is actually saying that, you know, countries stand to gain something because it’s sort of like you can free ride along with this if this treaty happens, right? So it’s a really interesting negotiation position of what the long term game is and what might be the short term approach that countries use. So we don’t have conclusions. I want you to say in, you know, sort of a 10 word tweet, Abdul, Matthew, Victoria, Alison, what countries should do, and then we’re gonna run a poll asking you in the audience, what countries should do. So let’s get the slider up, but let’s start with Matthew. Very quickly, what should be the approach of developing countries given these options? Should they sign up for the OECD treaty and wait?

Mathew Olusanya Gbonjubola:
I would say that developing countries should look very clearly, read between the lines, if they intend to sign, and to be sure of the specific impacts on their revenue.

Moderator:
Okay, so you’re saying, I don’t know, but look at it closely. Abdul.

Abdul Muheet Chowdhary:
Wait for the U.S. and other OECD countries to ratify amount day before thinking of how to proceed.

Moderator:
Okay, so don’t commit until U.S. and other countries ratify. Victoria.

Victoria Hyde:
I think that without a global consensus based solution, the risk of further uncoordinated unilateral measures and retaliatory trade sanctions is a real concern.

Moderator:
So you’re saying, yes, please sign up for the OECD. Alison.

Alison Gillwald:
Yes, I’m also saying sign up for the OECD, but very conditionally. I think that if enough countries sign up and there’s enough pressure put, there’s a kind of block that can actually force these percentages higher so that they begin to align with what corporate taxation would be in their countries. And maybe that requires a digital multinational corporation pullout of the 15%, because obviously that’s not applicable to multinational corporations just on these big giant monopolies.

Moderator:
So conditionally, yes. Gayani.

Gayani Hurulle:
No, by the end of 2023. So very much like what Abdul is saying, because only- Don’t sign up to the OECD for now. Only 30 countries and with 60% of the market share need to sign up. Global South doesn’t fall into that basket. So it’s not necessary. They can wait and see and sign up later.

Moderator:
So we can free ride essentially and wait for that. Okay, excellent. What does the audience think? The Slido is gone. Could we please go to… You have to connect it. Okay, slido.com. And the number for the poll is 2823924. Should countries sign up for the OECD amounted multilateral convention by the end of 2023? Half of the audience says no. Interesting. So close to a split opinion, I think, given the small sample size. 42% saying yes. And just under 10%. Oh, okay. More moving towards no. This is a live situation, but still around 8%, I don’t know. Okay, so I think it’s quite close, which it’s a good thing. We need to keep engaged on this. Thank you, guys. Thank you for staying. We’re just on time. Thank you for the questions and the audience and the really good panel engagement on this. We’ll hope to see you next year with a much more sophisticated understanding of what we should do. Thank you. »Applause.

Eliza

The analysis explores the impact of technology on various social issues, including labour exploitation, inequality, poverty, and workers’ rights. It begins by discussing the prevalence of sweatshops in countries with less stringent labour laws, which has been exacerbated in the digital era. Digitisation and technology are argued to be catalysts for increased inequality, as the majority of global wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy individuals.

Policy mismanagement is highlighted as a contributing factor to labour exploitation and inequality. Ineffectively enforced tax policies and austerity measures are identified as direct triggers for human rights abuses, while lax tax policies have led to global inequalities. It is suggested that poverty is not a random occurrence but a result of deliberate labour and economic tax practices.

AI technology is scrutinised for its dependence on hidden human labour, particularly in the gig economy. AI startups in the EU were found to use human labour rather than fully automated tools. Furthermore, the development of AI models can infringe upon rights and ethical considerations, with vulnerable populations such as refugees and incarcerated individuals increasingly engaged in tasks such as image labelling.

The analysis argues for policy attention to protect vulnerable populations who may be targeted for AI development. Companies are accused of concealing the human labour involved in creating AI tools, leading to a lack of transparency regarding their methods. Desperate groups such as refugees and asylum seekers, lacking other employment options, may be exploited through digital piecework.

The future development of AI is seen as a potential exacerbator of labour exploitation and inequality. The pressure for companies to assert their relevance in the market may lead to a “race to the bottom” where marketing overshadows the actual functionality of AI tools.

The presence of hidden human labour in AI technologies is viewed as problematic by Eliza, who argues that companies maintain this secrecy to preserve the illusion of advanced technology. Many AI tools and technologies lack transparency, making it difficult to determine the extent of human involvement.

The analysis also emphasises the importance of broadening the scope of the digital rights and tech policy community by promoting interdisciplinary collaboration with fields such as unionisation and climate change. It is believed that the tech sector has significant potential in addressing wealth and racial inequalities.

In conclusion, the analysis highlights the negative impact of technology on various social issues, including labour exploitation, inequality, poverty, and workers’ rights. It emphasises the need for policy reform, transparency in AI development, and interdisciplinary collaboration to address these concerns. Additionally, it underscores the role of the tech sector in tackling inequality.

Wilneida Negron

The digital transformation of work has led to the development and proliferation of intrusive products that collect sensitive data on workers. This data is collected at various stages of work, including biometric data, sentiment analysis, and productivity monitoring. The collected data is then used for purposes such as surveillance, training AI models, and making predictive analyses on workforce risk. However, the increasing influence of ‘Little Tech’ – smaller technology companies – has resulted in the fragmentation and diversification of industries, making it challenging to implement effective privacy regulations.

There is a pressing need for stronger privacy regulations in the workplace due to the growing invasion of technology into workers’ privacy. An extensive and fragmented ecosystem of workplace tech tools collects sensitive data points on workers, with many workers not being aware of these tools or understanding their privacy implications. This lack of awareness highlights the urgency for policy and regulatory action to establish basic protections for workers facing increasing workplace surveillance.

Algorithmic tools also require regulation and impact assessments to prevent the misuse of sensitive data. Legislation is being introduced in the US that focuses on auditing the use of such tools for hiring and recruitment. It is essential to scrutinize the use of sensitive types of data, such as biometric data, to ensure it is handled appropriately.

The rapid pace of market dynamics in technology and work poses a significant challenge for legislation. With hundreds of new products being introduced each year, it becomes increasingly difficult for regulations to keep up. This highlights the need to address and tackle the market dynamics driving technology and work trends to ensure fair and ethical practices.

Private markets, including venture capital, lack accountability and require greater transparency. Companies like Facebook gather capital in private markets before going public, making early-stage intervention necessary. Greater oversight and transparency in these markets can help address issues related to accountability and fairness.

Furthermore, there is an untapped opportunity in building cross-class power with workers across different regions and industries to foster equitable workplaces and reduce inequalities. This involves encouraging shared analysis and collaboration among workers from diverse backgrounds. By creating connections and solidarity, it becomes possible to work towards more equitable and inclusive work environments.

In conclusion, the digital transformation of work has raised concerns about privacy and the collection of sensitive data on workers. Stronger privacy regulations, policy and regulatory action, and impact assessments are needed to protect workers in the face of increasing workplace surveillance. Addressing market dynamics and ensuring transparency in private markets is also essential. Furthermore, fostering cross-class power and building connections among workers can help create more equitable workplaces and reduce inequalities.

Raashi Saxena

The analysis focuses on several topics related to the gig economy, employee rights protection measures, the gender digital divide, online violence against women, digital inclusion for differently-abled women, support for female founders in the venture capital ecosystem, and the need for holding companies accountable.

In the context of the gig economy, the analysis highlights the challenges faced by workers in India, such as low pay, lack of job security, long working hours, and the absence of social protections like healthcare or pension benefits. Additionally, it mentions the efforts made by Kali Piri taxi drivers in Mumbai, who formed their own app to negotiate better wages. Furthermore, a nationwide strike organized by the Indian Federation of App Transport Workers in 2020 demonstrates workers’ demand for improved pay and conditions.

With regards to employee rights protection measures, the analysis takes a supportive stance. It mentions the legislation introduced by the Rajasthan government to provide basic pension and social scheme benefits for gig workers, as well as the labor code implemented by the Indian government aiming to provide social security benefits to gig economy workers. These measures are seen as positive steps towards ensuring decent work and economic growth.

In contrast, the analysis criticizes the implementation of labor protection measures, arguing that issues of exploitation and unfair treatment of workers persist despite the introduction of labor codes. It also notes that during the COVID-19 pandemic, many industries faced inadequate support despite the shutdown of factories, indicating a potentially insufficient safety net for workers.

The analysis also explores the gender digital divide and the potential solutions offered by the WSIS 20 renewal process and the global digital compact. It mentions that these initiatives can help identify barriers preventing women from accessing technology, boost digital literacy skills among women, promote locally relevant content and services, and ensure equal opportunities for women in the digital revolution.

Another important issue highlighted is online violence and harassment against women. The analysis states that with the advancement of artificial intelligence, the phenomenon of online violence has increased. However, it also suggests that robust policies and collaborations with organizations such as T-RIC can help combat online violence, promote digital safety, and provide effective support to victims.

Furthermore, the analysis emphasizes the need for digital inclusion for differently-abled women. It states that women with disabilities face disproportionate challenges and social stigma, and access to digital devices and platforms can facilitate their social and cultural participation, leading to dignified livelihoods.

In the context of venture capital, the analysis notes that only 7% of female founders globally are backed by VC firms, indicating a lack of support for female entrepreneurs. It also states that the venture capital ecosystem is often insular and favors those from established networks, further hindering female founders’ access to funding and resources.

Lastly, the analysis highlights the importance of holding companies accountable. It suggests that more conversations and information-sharing are needed to effectively band together and hold companies accountable for their actions. This aligns with the goals of reducing inequalities and promoting peace, justice, and strong institutions.

Overall, the analysis provides valuable insights into various issues surrounding the gig economy, employee rights, the gender digital divide, online violence against women, digital inclusion, support for female founders, and corporate accountability. It highlights both positive measures and persistent challenges, offering a comprehensive overview of these topics and emphasizing the need for continued efforts to create a more inclusive and fair society.

Eduardo Correggio

The implementation of digital technologies in Paraguay exacerbates poverty and inequality by amplifying historical surveillance and control of workers. Workers’ exploitation is further intensified as the current capitalist system evolves to maximize surplus and exploit them. The gig economy in Paraguay reflects a prevailing normalization of precarious work, which limits economic opportunities for workers.

One of the contributing factors to the vulnerability of workers in Paraguay is the lack of personal data protection and anti-discrimination regulations. Paraguay does not have a personal data protection law or a law against all forms of discrimination, leaving workers without essential regulatory protection for their rights. The absence of these regulations, when combined with digital technologies, expands structural injustices faced by workers.

To address these pressing issues, collective organization among workers is crucial. The struggle for a fair digital future necessitates workers coming together to exercise their rights to freedom of expression, association, and autonomy in a surveillance-free environment. However, Paraguay faces a significant challenge in this regard, as it has one of the lowest rates of unionization in Latin America. This lack of organized resistance hampers worker organization in the gig economy.

Another important aspect is the need for workers to understand the complexities of digital technologies and their intersection with labor rights. Workers who attempt to organize are often fired before they can form a union, creating a culture of fear and uncertainty. Overcoming this requires a cultural shift and an understanding of the risks and challenges posed by digital technologies.

Concerns also arise regarding the implementation of complex governance systems for shared data access, particularly in the global south where the gig economy is still being understood. It is a challenging task to develop effective governance systems that account for the nuances and specific context of the gig economy in the global south.

Recognizing worker dependency is crucial for pursuing worker rights in the digital economy. Most regulations and organizations are yet to fully acknowledge the dependency of gig economy workers, which hinders their ability to access proper protections and benefits.

The concentration of the digital economy is another prominent issue. Currently, it is highly concentrated, limiting competition and negatively impacting working conditions. Encouraging competition in the digital economy is essential to improving working conditions and creating a more equitable environment.

Furthermore, the failure to address the issue of “ghost sweatshops” prevents the exploitation of workers from being effectively addressed. These hidden exploitative practices go unnoticed and unrecognized by platforms, perpetuating the cycle of worker exploitation.

One potential solution that offers hope is platform cooperativism. This emerging concept promotes the exploration and growth of work platforms that are more autonomous and fairer. It involves workers building their own digital infrastructure, giving them greater control over their work and ensuring fairer conditions.

In conclusion, the implementation of digital technologies in Paraguay exacerbates the existing problems of poverty and inequality. The normalization of precarious work in the gig economy, coupled with the lack of personal data protection and anti-discrimination regulations, further accentuates the vulnerability of workers. Workers need to collectively organize and strive for a surveillance-free work environment to address these issues. Additionally, recognizing worker dependency, promoting competition, and exploring platform cooperativism can contribute to creating a fairer digital future. However, challenges such as the low rate of unionization and the need for a cultural shift must be addressed to effectively protect workers’ rights in the digital economy.

Moderator – Ayden Ferdeline

The analysis focuses on several topics related to SDG 8: Decent work and economic growth. One significant issue highlighted in the analysis is the lack of accountability in venture capital. It calls for greater disclosure in this sector, pointing out that private markets, where companies like Facebook go before launching IPOs, currently have very little accountability. This raises concerns about transparency and potential risks for investors and the wider market.

Another area of concern is the market dynamics in the data brokerage industry. The analysis notes that mergers and acquisitions frequently occur in this industry, with smaller data brokers that collect sensitive employment data being acquired by larger data brokers. This concentration of power raises questions about fair competition and potential impacts on the privacy and security of employment data.

The analysis also emphasizes the value of collective rights to worker data. It suggests that the collective use of such data could have significant benefits for both workers and their employers. This argument highlights the importance of establishing mechanisms that allow workers to have control over their data while also enabling its responsible and ethical use in decision-making processes.

Advocating for intervention in the early stages of private markets, the analysis highlights that intervening during the early stages can shape the future trajectory of companies like Facebook while they are still in the private market space. This argument underscores the potential positive impact of early-stage intervention in influencing the direction and practices of companies in terms of decent work and economic growth.

Another concern raised in the analysis is the intricate issue of data governance in the Global South. It points out that people in the Global South are still learning how the digital ecosystem works, and complex data governance systems could potentially be misused by some companies in this region. This observation highlights the need for carefully designed and well-implemented data governance frameworks that protect against exploitation and ensure fair and equitable outcomes.

Shifting focus to the gig economy in Latin America, the analysis reveals significant issues regarding worker dependency. It highlights that none of the gig platforms in Latin America currently recognize worker dependency, which raises concerns about workers’ rights and socio-economic stability. Governments are considering alternative approaches, with a potential hybrid model being pondered to address these challenges.

The growth of the workers’ rights movement through platform cooperatives is presented as a positive development. The analysis notes that workers are attempting to build their own digital infrastructure, and platform cooperatives provide an opportunity for workers to design their own working platforms. This empowerment of workers in the digital economy aligns with the goal of achieving decent work and economic growth.

Lastly, the analysis explores the potential of UN instruments like WSIS plus 20 and the Global Digital Compact in aiding female workers. It highlights the need to bridge the gender digital divide and empower women in the workforce. However, no specific arguments or evidence are provided in this aspect of the analysis.

In conclusion, the analysis offers insights into various aspects related to SDG 8: Decent work and economic growth. It calls for greater accountability in venture capital, highlights concerns about market dynamics in the data brokerage industry, advocates for collective rights to worker data, emphasizes the benefits of early-stage intervention in private markets, raises concerns about complex data governance systems in the Global South, sheds light on challenges in the gig economy in Latin America, outlines the growth of the workers’ rights movement through platform cooperatives, and explores the potential of UN instruments in empowering female workers. Overall, the analysis provides valuable perspectives on promoting decent work and economic growth and calls for measures to address the challenges and opportunities identified.

Moderator – Ayden Ferdeline:
a.m. on Thursday, October 12th. My name is Aidan Verlin. I am a public interest technologist and a Landecker Democracy Fellow and I am the moderator of today’s discussion on strengthening worker autonomy in the modern workplace. I am pleased to be joined today by five esteemed panelists as we discuss the digital transformation of work and how we are redefining the relationships between employers and employees. I won’t introduce each of our panelists just yet, but I’m going to call upon our first speaker who is Monita Nugron, the Director of Policy and Research at Coworker. And Monita has been very instrumental in this space in providing terminology to describe a lot of what we are seeing when it comes to the evolutions in workplace surveillance and new ways of measuring productivity and other sort of forms of datafication that is happening in workplaces. Monita, good morning, good evening for you. The question I have for you is building off of a report that Coworker published in 2021 examining the impact of technologies on workers in the US. You’re now taking your research on little tech as you term it global. Can you maybe just give us a little background as to what little tech is, how it differs from big tech? And now that this research is being taken global, what are some of the preliminary findings that you’re seeing?

Wilneida Negron:
Yes, good morning to you in Kyoto as well and you’re happy to kick-start this conversation. As Aidan mentioned, I’m the Director of Research and Policy at Coworker. And Coworker is considered to be the welcome mat to the labor movement. We really, a lot of the workers we engage with, because we’re not a union, we’re agnostic. So we get to talk to workers from every industry, everything from like the tech workers in the bigger tech companies to workers in retail, workers in manufacturing, workers in hospitality. And so through conversations with a broad set of workers across many industries, we started collecting, it was literally just a list of different apps, different vendors at different workers were sort of like coming to us about like, do I have to download this app now? Like Starbucks workers to track, you know, to sign into work, and I’m not really sure what the privacy issues were. And so we really started collecting different products that we were hearing from different workers across different industries. And at the time, I was also in sort of the consumer privacy, big tech policy conversations. And obviously, those conversations were focused on sort of the five big tech companies. And they were, you know, that play an outsized role in society, so not to be ignored. But it was it was five companies. It was, you know, the result of like 20 years of innovation, really that these like that we’ve got the Googles and the Facebook and the Amazons, etc. And what I what we discovered from the conversations with workers and being a consumer privacy, it was like that the worker there was less attention on sort of the work of privacy surveillance, and that the ecosystem and the marketplace and the what workers are encountering, it’s much more fragmented, it’s much more expensive, it is hundreds, what became really like a short list of 10 apps and vendors became into hundreds. And we stopped researching was hundreds of different apps. Yes, there were some Amazon has a lot of apps that they designed. So big tech was playing a role. But there was also a lot of startups, a lot of platforms, a lot of apps. And we started, we wanted to quantify that by creating a database and just getting a sense of what the ecosystem looks like. And what we when we began to we use, we use the word little tech, it was sort of ironic that it was like little, smaller tech. But it was actually 1000s when you could visualize the five that dominate consumer privacy conversations with the 1000s that dominate worker privacy conversations and workers, because they’re little, sometimes they’re smaller vendors, unknown, like unknown companies that just tailored to different sectors. They’re not really known and workers, they don’t have familiarity. So they were very confused, oftentimes, and very concerned, I should say more confused, just concerned of like, what is this new technology? Who is this vendor? Are they trustworthy? Are they using my, my information, etc. And so out of that, out of quantifying sort of the ecosystem that workers and coining, you know, trying to compete for airtime with the big tech world by calling it little tech, we really developed three hypotheses that that contributed to sort of expanding this to like, what is a global little tech of workplace technologies look like for workers across different regions. And so the three hypotheses were that it was, obviously, it was an unregulated marketplace of different products and vendors. And so we wanted to see if that is if different countries have these like, vast ecosystems of different workplace technologies that are being integrated, and touching on every part of the labor process. And that’s sort of really key, because what we learned, there was obviously a lot of focus on gig economy, but and then bossware and surveillance, but really the the suite of intrusive products to span everything from like workplace benefits to workplace safety during COVID. And other kind of labor optimization products like automation, for example, and so in productivity monitoring, so we created a taxonomy and we and hiring and recruitment. So in other words, like, it’s an unregulated marketplace, these technologies are touching on every part of the labor process. Again, from hiring and recruitment to productivity monitoring, that includes surveillance to workplace benefits, like it really would touch has a lot of touch points in workers lives. And then the third hypothesis that we wanted to see as we globally was that that this expensive does is collecting a lot of sensitive data points on workers. And we saw that with a little tech in the US, there is all of these products that are at every step of the labor process are collecting an increasing amount of really sensitive data. When we when we look at a consumer privacy space, like we know, we’re just starting to come to grips with just how much is being collected. And workers, that ecosystem of awareness, like political education is not as strong, but workers are, we’re starting to uncover just how many sensitive data points. And why is very, we need to sort of focus on like the increasing amount of data points, again, that range from like biometric, to, you know, sentiment analysis, to productivity monitoring, like the outputs to like, time attendance, like what we are seeing now, which is problematic is these data points are obviously in the wave of AI, they’re either being used to train AI models, as we’ve seen in call center work. And so workers, their data is being collected. And you know, everything from sentiment to biometric, to productivity is being collected to train AI models in particular sectors without their awareness. It’s been collected for surveillance, just like traditional privacy issues there. And it’s being used increasingly to make predictions, not about which workers will be a cultural fit, which workers have risk of everything from organizing to, you know, stealing sensitive data, like a lot of employees are really worried with sort of whistleblowing that’s been going on, and data, like industry secrets, etc, being released to that there’s a lot of risk analysis that’s happening. So there’s a lot of predictive elements of like, which workers are going to go rogue, which workers are really risk. And so again, the collection of sensitive data points, with the sophistication of technology to predict, three predictions that can affect workers, with a very limited recourse, has been problematic. So those are three things that we went out to see. And we focused on our global research, just to wrap up as was a Nigeria, Kenya, Colombia, and Brazil. And those we zeroed in on those countries, because they, we were looking at sort of, you know, this next wave of innovation, tech innovation that was like unleashed, because of COVID. So these particular countries had received a large share of sort of venture capital money for tech innovation in the past four or five years. And so we sort of at the like countries at the global level, they were in the top 10. And so we wanted to see like, what is the innovation space look like? What are the types of technologies that are coming out? And what we’re seeing is, we are seeing that the ecosystem of products in the marketplace are mostly still dominated by gig economy, but there is an increasing amount of products, and companies not necessarily in those particular countries, but sometimes it’s, you know, global North countries selling to global majority employers, and that are being used, being sold to workers and sort of as kind of traditional business, to fulfill business outcomes to like process payroll, to everything from processing payroll to, you know, timekeeping, and some low tech things, but the data, again, it’s not only the business function that we’re looking at, but it’s also the types of data that are being collected. Those have been sort of the same patterns that we saw in the US, just a lot of, and in these global majority countries, there is also no data consumer privacy laws. So for workers, again, the awareness of what to do is a lot more limited. I don’t know if you if I just stop there just to give folks, other folks a chance to weigh in.

Moderator – Ayden Ferdeline:
Thank you so much, Juanita, for that excellent introduction. I’m going to bring Eliza into the conversation now, because, Eliza, you’ve just published an excellent report, Digitally Divided, and some of the comments that Juanita was just making about what you term ghost work really hit out at me. So perhaps, Eliza, you could comment on why Amnesty International has long been researching the intersection of technology and global inequality, but it is a bit newer for you to be investigating the intersection of labor rights and technology. What changed? What sparked the need for your Digitally Divided report? And the case study that you introduced in the report on ghost work? Maybe you can briefly summarize that for everyone in the room today.

Eliza:
Sure, yeah, thank you so much. And thank you to Juanita for that really great kind of introduction. I can’t follow that with quite the same level of specificity, because the report covers a much more kind of broad set of issues at the intersection of inequality. And I guess to kind of like back out, and start from like a more high level approach, I will just say, and again, I’m representing my views here and not those of Amnesty, because a lot of our views on these tech issues are still kind of in flux. The human rights community doesn’t really have a strong history when it comes to talking about issues of economic inequality, writ large. And that includes issues of labor exploitation, which is a bit of a problem, because it is the case, and it’s been the case for quite some time, even prior to kind of the advent of the digital era and like the rollout of sort of these more app based or database technologies that Juanita was describing, that the concept of like the sweatshop, right, like the idea of workers in the global majority or in a country where labor laws are much more lax, doing and creating a lot of the value for companies that are based in the global north has always existed. And what I try to show in this report, and the case that I try to make is that the digital advent of this sort of digital sweatshop, I guess, is that’s a term others have used, is basically the same practice, it’s just applied to a different case. And I think what’s useful as another kind of note and point of reference as to why this work is coming out of amnesty right now. So my work is part of a fellowship that’s specifically focused on the intersection of technology and inequality. And I think it does come out of this issue within the human rights community more broadly. And I think within sort of like policy circles, in general, in talking about this issue of like, you see this buzzword everywhere now, inequality and all these grant making schemes and in different kind of like human development reports. And I do take issue with that term a little bit, because I think it kind of anonymizes the issue and sort of makes it out to be this kind of like mystery dropped out of nowhere. But poverty doesn’t come out of nowhere, it comes out of like explicit and deliberate labor practices, and explicit and deliberate economic tax practices. Amnesty also has some really interesting new work coming out right now about tax policy, and about how the lax or ineffectively enforced tax policies of countries around the world have made it possible for austerity measures with cuts to social programs directly leading to enormous human rights abuses. And so this is all part of a larger kind of ecosystem. And that’s what we try to show in the report, is that all of this is coming in the context of two issues that I think Juanita really nicely kind of like laid out for me that I also think are essential kind of context, which is, one, that this is happening in the context of an unprecedented status for global inequality, wealth inequality around the world. I think the latest number I’ve seen is that the world’s poorest own just 2% of global wealth and the world’s richest own 75% of wealth, which is a staggering inequality that’s really hard to fathom. And what’s even more hard to believe is that over the four years since the outbreak of the pandemic, this has really, really accelerated. And that’s happened in tandem with the rollout of different kinds of reliance, different kinds of government, public sector applications of technologies that Juanita alluded to. And so what we lay out in the report is three areas of concern for policymakers that are trying to understand the impact of technology and inequality kind of in a very broad way, because there’s just so much to cover within that. So we try to narrow it down to a couple of kind of core populations of concern. And one of them is labor. And I think we’ll continue to talk about this. And I’ll continue to say why I think that that’s a core area that I laid out. And the other two are migration and borders. So the movement of people and the right to asylum. And the last one is criminal justice and policing. And I think the last thing I’ll say before I finish, this is a long answer to your question, is that part of the reason, and it’s interesting that this work is coming at this moment, Amnesty Tech specifically, has pre existing work that focuses primarily on issues of surveillance, where we mean like spyware, different kinds of predictive policing, and then different issues around digitization, and automated decision making in the public sector. So in some ways, that already kind of like sets up the framework to talk about labor. Because when you think about criminal justice and predictive policing, labor, and migration, it’s easy if you look closely to see how these things are related, and how data sharing between employers between schools between, you know, local law enforcement agencies is going to be increasingly a practice, particularly for populations for whom there are few or, you know, less enforced legal protections, especially for more vulnerable people. And so what I show, and this is just my last point is that I think technology in some ways, has become kind of like an accelerator and a facilitator of inequality, or it’s become kind of like the helpful cover story for why we let inequality persist and become exacerbated. So that’s a very long answer. But hopefully, that’s an introduction to the report, and I’m really happy to go into more detail and

Moderator – Ayden Ferdeline:
talk more about that. Thank you so much, Eliza. And I would love to go into a little more detail in the second half of our session. But for now, I’m gonna bring in Eduardo Corrigio, who is the co-director of the Paraguayan nonprofit, TEDIC. And Eduardo, maybe I can ask what your reaction is to what Eliza and Juanita have just said. And also, I mean, I find the comment that you said, Eliza, that really struck me just then was poverty doesn’t come out of nowhere. It comes out of deliberate policy interventions. What do you think about that, Eduardo? And you have been doing research on the impact of algorithmic management on low-paid workers in Paraguay. Do you agree with Eliza’s statement? And in the context of the low-paid workers in Paraguay that you have been researching in the transport and delivery space, how does that ring true?

Eduardo Correggio:
Is this working? Yes. Well, thank you so much, Aiden. And great to connect with Eliza and with Neda. I think definitely poverty doesn’t come out of nowhere. We are in an inequality system that is now further perpetuated by the implementation of digital technologies. So I’m glad that there’s this connection happening because I sort of like digress with my presentation to talk about the context in Paraguay and the broader surveillance situation that workers traditionally already suffer. And it’s important to recognize that it’s not that technology creates a new surveillance and that before time workers weren’t surveilled. This is a situation in which that already existing surveillance is being augmented and improved by digital systems. So it’s important to also situate ourselves historically and recognize that this is not happening out of the blue. It’s just a way in which our current capitalist system is reinventing itself to continue exploiting workers and extracting as much surplus as possible. So, sorry for that. For those who don’t know me, thank you so much for the presentation, Aiden. My name is Eduardo and I am co-director of TEDIC. We’re a digital rights organization based in Paraguay. broader efforts for a more just digital economy that includes workers’ rights, we partnered last year with the Fair Work Project. Fair Work is an international action research project that evaluates working conditions in the platform economy in more than 30 countries. So for us it’s very important to generate as much data as possible in order to have a comparison of the different platforms that we rate across the globe and that most of the time repeat themselves in different contexts and in different countries. And I’m going to come back to that because there’s an element of transnationality that I think is useful to reflect upon in this particular panel. So in this project we score the platforms against five principles for the methodology fair pay, fair conditions, fair contract, fair management and fair representation. Now going a bit into the beginning of what I was saying before going into the core of my presentation and why we focused on transplantation and delivery apps within the gig economy, I think it is important to highlight that in Paraguay there have been traditional ways in which workers are surveilled in the workplace that are not per se technology dependent but reflect a complicated reality for workers. For example we researched a few years ago how companies when they hire workers they ask for more health data than what is required by law. We’re talking for instance about HIV status. So year by year we hear how workers have been fired because their employers have unlawfully access to HIV status information. And what I want to say here more than anything is that workers rights to privacy and data protection have been historically violated and this acquires a new dimension in the digital economy particularly the gig economy. This is why for the past years we have seen an exponential growth of the platform economy in Paraguay and it is why we partner with the Fair Work Network to evaluate six ride-hailing and delivery platforms operating in Paraguay. Some of the platforms that we evaluated are probably familiar to you all which are talking about the Ubers and the Volt of the world. Pedidos Ya which is a transnational delivery transport app that is very dominant in Latin America. And in general and I don’t want to lose that much time in talking about the findings but only two of the six studied platforms could score any points in the principles that in total scored ten points. So the platform that had the most amount of scoring was only two out of ten. So it is safe to affirm in general that gig economy workers had little to no possibility of meaningfully engaging with these platforms whenever they feel mistreated nor they have true capacity to scrutinize the algorithms that surveil and govern their everyday lives. And this is what is reflected in in the overall scoring that we were able to to gather let’s say. And perhaps connecting these reflections with the broader topic of the panel I think it is important to point out also that and I’m going now to the issue of the transnationality. So in this perspective these platforms are transnational by nature. So this transnationality poses or poses an important data sovereignty aspect that we should also reflect upon when we’re thinking about workers rights in its different nuances and its intersection with data protection specifically. So we’re currently in a highly digital extractive scenario whereby global South workers are providing vast amount of data of sensitive native nature for instance biometric data that is then used to train these algorithms of these platforms for that in a not so far future they can create technology that will make the platform less dependent on workers services quote-unquote in general. So it’s a it’s a circle that never never ends this one’s of the exploitation how exploitation can reinvent itself. Anything that I would like to leave perhaps as a final reflection that in Latin America in general I mean I’m based in Paraguay but we also try to see it in a regional lens this situation. When we think about workplace surveillance that is augmented or improved by digital systems it is important to remember that such surveillance itself insert itself in an already highly precarious work environments where workers normally are excluded from reparation mechanisms in general. And in this scenario introducing digital interfaces that either intermediate work or surveil their workforce they tend to go unnoticed until they become difficult to roll back and more importantly and specifically in relation to the gig economy in global South countries there is a normalization of work precarity in context where there is a lack of economic opportunities in general. So there is a sort of like take it or leave it work philosophy that is installed that has evident counter productive efforts to the full enjoyment of workers rights. And lastly I have to I don’t know if I’m past my time but just to final reflections we also have a complicated scenario that is cut through by the historic regulatory depths in our country so Paraguay doesn’t have a personal data protection law we don’t have a law against all forms of discrimination so that lack of regulatory certainty for traditional rights when intersecting with digital technologies and intersecting with workers rights they pose an additional situation that tends to expand structural injustices for workers. So I think that you know the future or if we are going to aim to try to build a fair digital future will only happen through workers collective organization so we need to fight for a true free surveillance environment workplace for workers to truly exercise their right to freedom of expression association and autonomy and collectively organize. So thank you very much. Thank you so much

Moderator – Ayden Ferdeline:
Eduardo. Can I ask a super quick follow-up question just to the very last point that you made about really which gets to the heart of what this discussion is about which is about resistance and pushing back. What can workers actually do in Paraguay? Are there tactics that workers have been able to use on the other platform other losing a train of thought now. What can workers do? Yeah yeah that was a general question. Yeah resistance what does that look like in the Paraguayan context? Well it’s a complicated reality I know I’m

Eduardo Correggio:
using a lot of that that catchphrase but the thing is that Paraguay curiously or not so curiously is one of the countries with the lowest unionization rate of Latin America. So that’s already a lot in a context of precarity in general. The private sector workforce has less percent has less than 1% of the of an unionization rate. So traditional ways in which workers could organize which is indeed being perhaps in an union is not something that is very traditional in the country and I think that there needs to be a shift in that understanding from workers but it’s a difficult cultural shift that is also associated with a lot of uncertainty because most of the time workers whenever they do try to organize in the country they tend to be fired before they form the Union. So we don’t have data that this is happening currently in the actual gig economy environment but it is definitely a cultural perception of people and workers in general and I think this is the first step that we need to try to overcome for starting to generate these organized spaces that also understand digital technologies and the complexities in the intersection with

Moderator – Ayden Ferdeline:
workers rights. Sure thank you Eduardo and Rashi. Rashi Saxena is a social innovation practitioner based in India and the situation that Eduardo has just described in Paraguay does it sound familiar? I mean hey I imagine the answer is yes that gig economy platforms are being rolled out in India treating workers similarly resistance is futile you’re probably an independent contractor versus a worker. What what do you say to what is what is the situation look like on the ground for you? I do feel like there are a lot of

Raashi Saxena:
we’ve historically had a lot of short-term contracts a quote-unquote gig economy platforms. We have a very large informal sector and since we define it or call it an informal sector it’s usually dubbed as not contributing to the economy but yes there have been various instances of workers and policymakers that are pushing back against this exploitation and a lot of this exploitation has also been exacerbated in India with the emergence of a lot of tech based apps. It could be cab aggregators like Uber or a local Ola Zomato Swiggy which are more of food companies urban companies to kind of work on any conceit services. They offer a wide range of services as you know ordering food e-commerce home services and more and a lot of concerns have been coming on the working conditions of these gig economy workers right from issues of low pay especially with the kickback at the VC ecosystem, job security, ridiculous long working hours and of course the lack of general social protections such as health care or general pension benefits and in response to that there are a lot of there has been a lot of gig economy workers that have banded together and form unions for better working conditions. A lot of them amongst themselves have also banded together and some of them are very inspiring to me personally. In Mumbai we have we have local taxis and we call them Kali Piri taxis, yellow black taxis that have banded together and form their own local app that has slightly better wages. Back in Bangalore where I reside we have we have an application more of I would say again local of you know local transport folks coming in together and it’s called Nama Metro which offers fair pay and also of course is more reliable surprisingly amongst us who are avid users and in 2020 the Indian Federation app transport workers organized a nationwide strike to have better pay conditions for a lot of these ride hailing platforms. Recently there was also the local government in India the Rajasthan government also came up with the legislation where a lot of gig workers should be given basic pension and social scheme benefits and yes they have been they have been significant steps I would say by the Indian government where they introduced a labor code that aims to provide social security benefits to gig economy workers but again a lot of it is an implementation issue in my country. There might be a lot of things that are written well-defined on paper but implementation wise I would still say there have been a lot of instances and opportunities where things have been exploited and most employers do the bare minimum when it comes to addressing these issues and of course leading to them being treated unfairly and we’ve seen several instances even during COVID where most of the factory factories were shut down but there was no direct support to many industries. I hope that helps. Absolutely

Moderator – Ayden Ferdeline:
thank you Rashi and I’m gonna bring Eliza back into the conversation because said before we were gonna dive into your report and you introduced three different case studies in the report which are different examples on the ones that Eduardo and Rashi have highlighted but one of them was when you spoke about the availability of generative AI tools most of which are relying upon hidden human labor trained on the labor and data of people around the world. These are points that Wuneida also raised earlier today and how this poses risks to labor security and workers rights in the gig economy and that it seems likely that this is only going to grow in scope and significance in the future and I’m curious what you think is the future over the next five to ten years or even further. How do you see workplace surveillance technologies evolving particularly with advancements in AI and other emerging technologies? Is it as dystopian to you as it feels to me? Yeah I think we’re probably being kept

Eliza:
up at night by the same vision of the next five to ten years if I’m honest but yeah I think to speak to that very good question and some of the points that have been raised. I saw this point that I keep thinking about by this venture this London-based venture capital firm I think it’s MMM Ventures that surveyed about 2,800 AI startups in the EU that are purporting themselves to be AI first companies and found that more than 40% of them actually weren’t using AI in any meaningful way. It was just sort of like a branding exercise and so I kind of think about that as like the touch point for how I think of where I see kind of the next phase of how this is going to be rolled out and how this is going to impact people across the global economy. I think basically what we’re seeing right now and even though you know the there are remarkable you know advances to some of these generative AI or I don’t necessarily agree with calling it that but with some of the newer versions of automation for image or text generation but it is the case that we have a remarkable lack of clarity about exactly how and in what ways those tools are developed with what models. We know with some certainty that a lot of the models that these tools are being trained on are either committing plagiarism at a huge rate or they’re being trained on data sets that don’t you know take into consideration the vast amounts of inaccurate data the vast amounts of hate speech that they might be absorbing and it’s also the case that a lot of workplaces and a lot of companies now are going to be under pressure kind of as AI becomes like you know basically like I said a very trendy marketing ploy by which a lot of companies kind of have to assert themselves as being relevant in the market. There’s going to be I think a race to the bottom in terms of how the marketing kind of outpaces the tools themselves and at the same time a lot of these companies are actually being forced to rely upon what others have termed ghost work or sort of yeah the digital sweatshop that I mentioned earlier. A lot of the times I mean there have been cases shown in Finland there’s a company that’s gotten a significant round of venture capital funding to create a model using incarcerated people in Finland to help basically do image labeling and to do the kind of sort of digital piecework that makes that tool possible. There have been cases of humanitarian instances or companies that sort of purport themselves to be assisting or helping refugees or asylum seekers that are using those populations again who are in a very precarious situation and don’t have a lot of choices for work using them as image labelers or sort of doing the digital piecework that’s required to make these tools possible. And so my fear is that we’re going to see like an increasingly bottomless need for not just for data but for the capacity to basically do what AI purports to do which does require at least as of now a tremendous amount of actual human labor but that most companies sort of want to keep hidden. And so that’s sort of something I think about as we think about the future and where policymakers should be putting their attention is looking carefully to see where they’re going to be populations of very precarious people who have very little who are desperate who have very little option for how they’re going to make their living and to look where and in what ways they might be kind of fed into the global like supply chain of a lot of these companies and a lot of these technologies and I think that’s something I will watch with a little bit of fear but like I’ll watch closely.

Moderator – Ayden Ferdeline:
Thank you and can I ask a really basic follow-up question which is why do companies want to keep that labor hidden?

Eliza:
Yeah that’s a good question I mean I think it’s embarrassing to them they don’t want to have to admit that the tool that they developed isn’t as advanced as they purport it to be. We saw this first or one of the most the first cases that I saw that was sort of the most impactful was Meta and we still don’t know again because a lot of these tools and a lot of the evidence about them is kept very non-transparent but we have it on pretty decent authority that a lot of the content moderation tools that Meta purported to be AI based were actually just humans in the loop basically and so when I think about the motivation for a company like that in that particular instance I think it makes people feel safe and better about the tool that they’re using and people naturally kind of have a bias towards like respecting something if it’s tech powered frankly and so I think that may be part of it and I also think again it’s just people don’t want to have to consider the human power the human labor that goes into the goods that we consume whether it’s generative AI or it’s like the clothes that we make we just it’s easier not to think about where they

Moderator – Ayden Ferdeline:
came from how they were made thank you Juanita we have an opportunity here at the IGF to provide some core actions to policymakers and to put some core actions in the key messages coming out of the IGF what what thoughts come to your mind given the increasing prevalence of workplace surveillance the trends that you have seen the trajectory that Eliza has outlined what steps or strategies would you recommend that policymakers take to mitigate the impacts of this change in work that is happening around us yeah I think just

Wilneida Negron:
from the conversations in the u.s. and what we’ve been seeing and in other regions it’s it’s really gonna require a mix of policy and regulatory action and some of the policy work is going to be need to be focused on establishing some basic protections for workers a lot of the legislation coming out of the u.s. is really focused at the national and at the state levels focus on just disclosure requiring employers to disclose in a timely manner that they are using these technologies. That is from GDPR, we have known that the consent model is problematic. And when dealing with not one, not a small collection of big kind of tech company to talk about a lot, the being able to consent and for workers to sort of disclose different products that they’re interacting with is highly problematic. So we know that workers need a basic level of protection that goes beyond consenting and disclosure requirements. We are seeing, because it’s fragment, the policy solutions are really fragmented right now. We’re seeing a lot around focusing on algorithm, like the ways of trying to regulate her algorithmic tools are being used either for hiring and recruitment, requiring vendors to undergo particular audits and impact assessments. And there’s a whole ecosystem of just like who audits the auditors that are now being required by some agency. And so I think that, these are all worthwhile conversations. Like looking at the particular kinds of really invasive uses that are algorithmic driven or that collect highly sensitive data, like biometric data. So like zeroing in a particularly sensitive types of data, really sensitive types of uses, and maybe going to GDPR model, where you focus on sort of like risk and regulate by risk and use cases. But again, not forgetting that workers need a basic level of protection. We have in the US, unfortunately, a consumer privacy law. So it’s hard right now to make a board to encroach on private actors, employers in this case and require them. So there’s a whole lot happening on the sort of self-regulation because in the US, and this goes to the economic dynamics that Eliza is talking about. We work in an economic system where there, the state is still does not feel like it can intrude in the private matters of business in a private sector. And so you’re seeing a lot as policy and regulatory try to figure out what particular aspects of these technologies can be regulated or you can provide protections or require employers to sort of do some due diligence on. There’s not much intrusion into the economic private matters of companies in terms of requiring them to provide protections to workers. And so that goes into sort of the reality of the market, the economy. And that goes into sort of the last set of kind of solutions is like you have to address. It’s where a lot of, we spend a lot of time as well, not only just organizing workers, but on the market dynamics, the drivers of these trends, we cannot continue to fight after the fact of just the fact that technology, like hundreds of products are coming out every year. And there’s still no legislation, as I mentioned. And so how can we tackle the market dynamics that have create that inequality in the U.S. that looks like, looking at antimonopoly, it looks like mergers and acquisitions, which is happens a lot in the data brokerage industry in the U.S. We’re seeing a lot of like these smaller data brokers collecting this sensitive employment data and sort of they’re being acquired by bigger data brokers. And so can we use the power of mergers and acquisitions to kind of, lack of a better word, just try to like tone down that market dynamic. Another thing would be looking at the private capital space, the venture capital requiring greater disclosures, requiring right now, there’s very little accountability of sort of the private markets. The private markets are where these companies, it’s where the Facebooks of the world go before they IPO and hit the public markets. And so it’s really critical to try to intervene at those early stages when these future Facebooks of the world are in the private market space. And there was a lot happening there, everything from ESG to other kinds of disclosures of what types of companies are being invested in. And so, yeah, a lot of market kind of industry focused dynamics of like, how can we, we cannot continue to fight this battle with these market, like existing market conditions that drive this kind of innovation and these products. And as a state sort of struggles to intervene, in addition again to like all the policy and like multi-agency work that’s needed to like regulate particular harmful technologies and provide some kind of protection for workers beyond just disclosure and consent. So there’s a lot of work to be done. And to what extent that there are spaces to what Adardo was saying for us to strategize on national regional level, I think it’s really very much needed.

Moderator – Ayden Ferdeline:
Thank you so much, Juanita. And Eduardo, I’d love for you to react to Juanita’s comments just around, do we need to tone down that market dynamic? Do we need greater disclosure when it comes to venture capital? And also if I can throw in an extra point that I have heard others raise, which is around the argument that the value of worker data is arguably in its collective use by both workers and employers. And if we were to think about what that would look like if workers and or their representatives who advocate for their legitimate interests were to have collective rights to worker data, and I don’t mean health data, for example, I mean different forms of data, whether that is around injury rates, other metrics. What might those rights look like? Would that be helpful? What do you think? What else should we be asking for?

Eduardo Correggio:
I think that I’ll start from the last question and then connect with some of the points that Juanita and Elizabeth made that I think were quite interesting. I think that my worry in sort of like opposing those very complex ways of governing a shared access of data in a public interest way, in benefit of workers, I mean, I feel that it’s a bit difficult in global south context where people are still learning how this ecosystem even works. So sometimes I feel that if that is going to be the whitewashing that some companies could potentially do, it could be dangerous and without any true meaning. So I feel that at this point, we need to go back to the basics of what workers rights fight is, at least in global south context. That means to fight for companies to truly allow workers organization and in the context of gig economy platforms, that they actually recognize that they are workers in order for those other complex discussions can come to be. Right now in Latin America in general, none of the platforms recognize the workers dependency and most of the regulation at the moment, because there are regulatory efforts from governments that are trying to understand how the gig economy works are starting to pose this question, are they dependent workers or not? And what kind of models or hybrid models could coexist in terms of dependent and not dependent workers that are interesting and that could potentially pave the way for more safeguards for these workers. And perhaps connecting with some of the things that Eliza and Juanita were saying, I really, I think that another tool that perhaps we don’t think a lot is how competition can perhaps help us in also better improve the current digital economy as it exists, that is currently, as we know, very concentrated. And competition in its intersection with data protection and privacy is pretty much a novelty also at the moment. And I think that we should fight for competition to also help in the fight of creating better working conditions and understand that if there are perhaps very unequal ways of treating workers and in which, or very let’s say predatory ways in which data is exploited and so on, that can also be considered a competitive parameter. I know there’s a lot of resistance in trying to expand how competition currently works, but I think that it’s a conversation worth having because we need to use as much elements as we have to improve the current digital economy ecosystem and a lot of the problems that we have right now is that it is highly concentrated. And that then of course has an impact in the way data protection is enforced in how people interact with platforms and so on. And then I’m very happy that the issue of the ghost sweatshops was mentioned by Eliza. And I think that one of the other reasons of why platforms perhaps don’t recognize that is that if you don’t recognize the problem, then it’s not a problem, right? So you won’t address those issues and you won’t address the current inequality and the current exploitation that these workers are currently facing because you just don’t acknowledge that that is a problem in its own. And that is also connected with a lot of interest from governments that they want these companies to install those sweatshops in their countries in order to create jobs that although precarious are also jobs in a context of a lot of inequality. So I think that lastly also in terms of the future, that was like a question that you asked me at the beginning. I think that a lot of the future and what other things workers could also do is related to platform cooperativism. I think that’s an interesting concept that is starting to become more present in different discussions of workers who are trying to build their own digital infrastructure and have more autonomy in the ways they will design the platforms that they will work on. But I think that those discussions have to be highly supported by national governments that should invest in those kinds of programs and allow this kind of exploration to happen in order to build other sorts of business models that are more cooperative and just in their roots. So, yeah.

Moderator – Ayden Ferdeline:
Thank you. Eduardo, thank you. And Rashid, Saxena, I’ll bring you back into the conversation. Of course, you have the opportunity to respond to Eduardo’s comments as well as the comments from Eliza and Monida. I’ll also give you your own question to answer, which is that we are in UN fora. You have been following the WSIS plus 20 renewal process and the Global Digital Compact and how it can potentially contribute to bridging the gender digital divide and promoting the empowerment of women and girls in the digital sphere. Is there a labor connection here? Are these instruments which can potentially help uplift workers and particularly female workers?

Raashi Saxena:
No, there definitely is. And I feel like a lot of my responses will also contribute to a lot of the aspects that will need are brought out with the VC ecosystem and how fractured it is when it comes to contributing or providing support. I think globally, only 7% of female founders are actually backed up by VCs. And especially in the Indian ecosystem, it’s more of you need to be from an ABC ecosystem to be able to capture that funding. So I feel like it’s very insular in many ways. Also to bring down to Eliza’s point, I have seen that in especially with the labor practices of a lot of content moderators are usually in general, very hidden. And in the VC ecosystem, I’ve also seen that maybe the PR aspect of promoting something as AI would gather or harness more money. So it’s more of a PR exercise than actually and also kind of propagating that AI is this magic wand that will magically wish wash away a lot of the aspects of inequality. But talking about the VCs 20 renewal process and the global digital compact, I do feel like it has the potential to significantly bring in the gender digital divide one with helping identifying the barriers that prevent women from accessing digital technologies. In India, most of the local households have or the device is shared among an entire family. So having agency towards having your own device could help in improving digital literacy skills. Also kind of crossing and cutting the social and cultural barriers that women have when it comes to mobility. And it could also, India also has very cheap internet tariff rates. So having access to these devices and internet could also help in promoting locally relevant content and services and also employment. And one aspect that also gets missed out is that a lot of people with different disabilities, especially women are more disproportionately impacted and have more social stigma. So having proper access would also help them to participate in a social setting, in a cultural setting and also give them dignified livelihood. The other one with the global digital compact could also show that women have access to equal opportunities in the digital revolution whether it’s an initiative that they want to promote on a small scale or a medium scale to also support women in the startup ecosystem and help general representation in digital leadership roles. And one of the very important ones is also addressing the online violence enhancement. The growing phenomena that you have, especially with generative AI, doctor videos, synthetic videos which for the longest time used to affect women in public life but a lot of women such as myself and Will and so many others could be perpetrators of this. And I do feel like having robust policies around this could help develop responses on how to combat this, promote digital safety and security, collaborating with T-RIC perhaps to ensure that victims have access to effective support and addressing mechanisms. And lastly, of course, the global digital compact and WSIS process could also encourage governments and other stakeholders given that we’re at the IGF to take specific needs and priorities for women in the digital sphere to of course increase participation in the decision-making processes and help in the development, implementation and initiation of policies and programs.

Moderator – Ayden Ferdeline:
Thank you so much, Rashi. We are nearing the top of the hour but before we close, I would like to give each speaker just 30 seconds for very brief closing remarks on how we can collectively develop strategies that ensure fair and equitable workplace practices in this new era and I know 30 seconds not enough to actually answer that question but we’ll need that, please.

Wilneida Negron:
Thinking about building cross-class power with workers across regions, cross-class, cross-industries. There is a lot of connective tissue there. There’s a lot of shared analysis that could be connected and I think that is, you know, there’s an opportunity there that we’re not tapping into.

Moderator – Ayden Ferdeline:
Thank you. Eliza.

Eliza:
Yeah, I guess I’ll just say kind of as a final wrap-up that I think our community of people who work on digital rights and tech policy, I think we need to do a lot more to expand the way that we think across different sectors of the policy community and to work with people who are working in unionization, people who are working in climate change. There are increasing numbers of climate issues in the application of AI that we didn’t even get into and just thinking about our sector kind of as part of the global set of issues that are creating and exacerbating wealth inequality, racial inequality and yeah, I’ll stop there.

Moderator – Ayden Ferdeline:
Thank you, Eliza. Eduardo.

Eduardo Correggio:
I would say definitely in the context of the economy, at least we need more regulation that is collectively built with the voices of workers, not necessarily from a top-down approach and also but not least, more ownership of the infrastructure from workers is something that is also important and that should be of the digital infrastructure and it’s something that should be in the discussions as well.

Moderator – Ayden Ferdeline:
And you get last word, Rashi.

Raashi Saxena:
Hi, yeah, I think there needs to be more conversations around these. There’s a lot of cultural stigma on speaking up. We need to stop being in silos, acting up, having more conversations and information around how we could effectively band up together in places like this and hold companies accountable.

Moderator – Ayden Ferdeline:
Thank you, everyone. It has been a pleasure being in company with you today. I hope we can continue this discussion intersessionally and also at next year’s Internet Governance Forum in Riyadh and for now, we can adjourn this session at 9.30 a.m. Thank you. Thank you.

Audience

The panel discussion explored various important topics concerning the connection between gender and human rights defenders. Stephanie Mickelson, representing the UNFPA, highlighted the importance of considering gender when analysing reports on human rights defence. Mickelson posed a question about whether the gendered element of human rights defenders is adequately examined in these reports and how progress in this area is monitored.

Another significant point raised during the discussion was the issue of digital attacks on women and human rights defenders. These attacks were identified as a form of gender-based violence, with limited research conducted on their psychological impact. Specific examples, such as Abdessam Saag in Bahrain and Hala Ahed in Jordan, who have experienced digital attacks, were given. It was also noted that these attacks have a negative impact on family life.

The fear of surveillance and the potential release of personal data were identified as factors that compel women to adapt their activism. This adaptation was seen as another form of oppression that women face. The panel highlighted that women, particularly those involved in activism, are significantly affected by the constant threat of surveillance. It was argued that this fear not only hinders their activities but also violates their rights.

Surveillance was also examined in terms of its secondary effects on journalism. The panel discussed how the publication of articles revealing surveillance technologies like Pegasus has led journalists, even in the Western world, to feel intimidated and fearful of contacting human rights activists and other journalists. Some journalists expressed hesitation in covering certain activities or organizations due to prevailing surveillance practices.

In conclusion, the panel stressed the importance of considering gender in reports on human rights defence and addressing the gendered aspect of human rights defenders. It shed light on the impact of digital attacks on women and the lack of research on the psychological consequences. Additionally, it highlighted the fears and constraints imposed on women’s activism in the face of surveillance and the resulting intimidation of journalists. This comprehensive discussion provided valuable insights into the complexities surrounding gender, human rights defenders, and the harmful effects of surveillance in modern society.

Marwa Fatafta

Access Now and the Gulf Center for Human Rights have collaborated to establish the MENA Coalition at Rights Con 2021. This coalition aims to address the widespread use of spyware and digital surveillance in the MENA region, particularly targeting human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers, and civil society. The negative sentiment surrounding this issue stems from the fact that surveillance technology from democratic countries often ends up in the hands of authoritarian regimes.

One of the main challenges in holding the surveillance industry accountable lies in its lack of transparency and accountability. Companies involved in these activities often operate under hidden identities and conceal information about their investors. Additionally, the transfer and sale of surveillance technologies are shrouded in secrecy, making it difficult to attribute responsibility on an individual level. This lack of accountability is further exacerbated by the absence of robust rule of law and law enforcement in the home countries of the victims.

Targeted surveillance of women represents a significant concern and a gendered dimension in this issue. Women are disproportionately affected by privacy violations resulting from surveillance. Adversarial governments exploit personal information to discredit and tarnish the reputation of women. Women also become targets of doxing campaigns, where personal information is shared without consent, leading to various forms of harm. Moreover, women may face increased risks during protests, as authorities can confiscate their devices, potentially exposing them to danger if personal information falls into the wrong hands. Recognizing this, international norms should acknowledge the intersection between gender-based violence and targeted surveillance.

To effectively address these challenges, there is an urgent need for democratic countries to regulate their surveillance industries and enforce human rights due diligence. Such regulation would help prevent the export of surveillance technologies to authoritarian regimes and ensure that human rights principles are upheld. It is also crucial for these countries to prioritize the protection of individuals and communities impacted by targeted surveillance.

The ultimate purpose of surveillance, particularly in the MENA region, appears to be the suppression of dissent and independent media reporting. Surveillance serves as a tool for authoritarian regimes to silence activists, journalists, and other individuals critical of the status quo, allowing them to maintain control over information and prevent the exposure of human rights abuses.

On a positive note, the awareness of surveillance issues has prompted more people, including journalists, to prioritize their digital security. Individuals are seeking assistance from digital security helplines to have their devices checked and scanned, recognizing the importance of safeguarding their data and communications.

Exposing and holding spyware companies accountable is seen as a crucial step in safeguarding journalists and uncovering the truth. Digital security has become paramount for journalists working with limited resources, and efforts should be made to ensure their protection.

The MENA Coalition aims to map surveillance technologies and spyware in the region, prioritizing advocacy campaigns. By shedding light on the surveillance industry and promoting accountability, the coalition aims to protect the rights and privacy of individuals and communities across the MENA region.

In conclusion, the establishment of the MENA Coalition is a critical step in combating spyware and digital surveillance in the MENA region. By addressing the targeted surveillance of human rights defenders, journalists, and civil society, regulating the surveillance industry, and prioritizing the protection of women, the coalition seeks to promote peace, justice, and strong institutions in line with the relevant UN Sustainable Development Goals.

Samuel Jones

Investors have the potential to significantly contribute to advancing corporate accountability by encouraging rights-respecting behavior from companies. This can be achieved through direct engagement with companies to improve their policies, practices, and governance. By doing so, investors can send a strong public signal that certain sectors, such as surveillance technologies, should be considered toxic asset classes.

One area of concern is spyware, which presents high risks to companies and their shareholders. Potential regulatory enforcement, litigation, operational disruptions, and brand damage pose material financial risks. For instance, the Israeli spyware maker NSO Group faced strategic litigation and regulatory blacklisting, resulting in massive financial and reputational costs. Other companies, including Google, Nokia, Thales Group, and Sun Corporation, have also made contentious business decisions regarding surveillance technologies.

To address these risks, it is recommended to designate spyware as a toxic asset class among public and private equity investors. This would involve developing investment exclusionary criteria and releasing a white paper highlighting the severe human rights and financially material risks associated with the technology. Collaboration with investors and companies would be crucial in tackling the threats posed by spyware.

Integrating grassroots civil society experts on targeted surveillance into investor-led company engagements would strengthen efforts to address the risks associated with spyware. Collaborating with partners to map out the spyware ecosystem is also essential. In addition, organizing a global gathering that integrates experts on targeted surveillance into investor-led company engagements would further enhance accountability in this area.

Engaging tech industry leaders in private collaborative discussions is another important step in addressing surveillance-related risks. This collaboration, in partnership with a coalition of North American and European investors, would focus on various ways to address surveillance-related risk. This includes better market entry analysis, improved harm-value chain monitoring, and implementing contractual and operational human rights guardrails.

It is crucial to shift the focus from high-level policy discussions to the operational impacts of technologies on people on the ground. Understanding the direct consequences of tech companies’ technologies is key to ensuring accountability. By doing so, investors can mitigate potential harm and promote responsible practices.

Investors should exercise caution when considering spyware investments, especially in light of the controversies surrounding NSO Group. Education is necessary to help investors recognize how spyware may manifest in different forms within their portfolios. Spyware, often marketed under the rubric of law enforcement or counterterrorism, requires a deeper understanding of its true nature and implications.

To gain a comprehensive understanding of the impact of their investments, investors need to rely on information from human rights defender organizations. These organizations provide critical insights that help investors assess the human rights implications of their investments and make informed decisions.

There is optimism about ending the unaccountable cooperation between companies and democracies in the near future. A collective effort, including the involvement of investors, is expected to lead to increased corporate responsibility and accountability.

Overall, investors have a significant role to play in advancing corporate accountability in relation to surveillance technologies. Through engagement with companies, designation of spyware as a toxic asset class, collaboration with experts and industry leaders, and a focus on operational impacts and human rights, investors can contribute to a more responsible and accountable corporate culture.

Asya Abdelkarim

The ANSIM Network in Iraq plays a crucial role in supporting and empowering internet activists who advocate for human rights and digital security. They provide comprehensive training on digital security and privacy, equipping activists with the necessary skills and knowledge to navigate the online landscape safely. Additionally, they document and report on cases of surveillance and digital attacks, shedding light on the extent of these threats and ensuring they are not overlooked.

One of the main challenges faced by activists in Iraq is the risk of threats and attacks from pro-government groups, including militias. These groups exploit online platforms to intimidate, harass, and even arrest activists, leading to severe consequences. Despite the importance of digital security and privacy, activists still face significant risks and challenges.

The ANSIM Network recognizes the urgent need to protect internet activists against surveillance and digital attacks. They actively advocate for policies and laws that safeguard digital rights, ensuring legal frameworks that support and preserve the rights of activists. Moreover, they provide crucial support to activists who come under attack, serving as a reliable source of assistance and guidance.

However, it is important to note that accountability for digital rights in Iraq is still in its early stages. The ANSIM Network engages in discussions with members of parliament concerning cyber crimes, data protection, and access to information. Nevertheless, the government has been slow to pass and implement laws that effectively protect digital rights, posing a hurdle for activists seeking justice and accountability.

Asya Abdelkarim, a human rights defender, is actively involved in efforts to safeguard human rights in Iraq. She maintains direct communication with the Iraqi political leadership, regularly sending reports of violations to the Media and Communication Commission and the Ministry of Communication. Asya also organizes meetings to highlight the importance of recognizing and preserving digital human rights.

Recognizing the power of international pressure, Asya Abdelkarim utilizes international press releases to put pressure on the Iraqi authorities. This approach can be effective, particularly given the influence of external political interference in Iraq. By bringing attention to human rights violations through international channels, Asya seeks to hold the authorities accountable and push for change.

In Iraq, women face significant challenges and digital violence. Asya conducted research that revealed a majority of Iraqi women have experienced digital violence, yet many are afraid to report these incidents due to fear of backlash. Tragically, there have been cases where women who reported threats have faced dire consequences, such as the case of Youtuber Thiba Ali who was found dead after reporting threats from her father. Even sharing an image of a woman without her hijab is considered a violation and can attract threats.

To address this pressing issue, Asya and her team have launched a hotline helpdesk that aims to assist women facing digital blackmail and related issues. This platform provides a safe and secure channel for women to report incidents and seek support, emphasizing the need to create a supportive environment that encourages reporting and addresses the prevalence of digital violence.

Asya Abdelkarim stresses the importance of collaboration in addressing the threats faced by human rights defenders, activists, and journalists. She expresses concern over the shared challenges of threats and surveillance and calls for collective action to confront these issues. By working together, they can develop effective strategies and mechanisms to protect human rights and foster a more secure environment for activists and journalists.

In conclusion, the ANSIM Network’s efforts in supporting and empowering internet activists in Iraq are commendable. Through training, advocacy, and documentation, they equip activists with the necessary tools to navigate the challenges of the digital landscape. However, there is still a need for increased accountability for digital rights in Iraq. Asya Abdelkarim’s work in engaging with political leadership and utilizing international channels showcases the importance of collective action in addressing threats and advocating for change.

Moderator-Khalid Ibrahim

Concerns have been raised regarding the misuse of surveillance technology in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, particularly in relation to oppressive spyware tools. Authoritarian governments in the region have obtained and used these tools without transparency or accountability, leading to serious human rights violations. Examples of this misuse include the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi and the case of Ahmed Mansour. The Israeli software company NSO has come under scrutiny for its role in these violations, with the Gulf Center for Human Rights filing a complaint against them.

To combat the sale of surveillance tools to repressive governments, the MENA Coalition to Combat Surveillance (MCCS) was established. This coalition advocates for accountability and action against the misuse of digital surveillance tools. The Gulf Center for Human Rights has taken legal action by filing a complaint in France against NSO.

Marwa Fatafta emphasizes the need for a united front among civil society organizations in the MENA region to combat the proliferation of digital surveillance strategies. Activists and human rights defenders face challenges, as the surveillance industry operates across borders, allowing their home countries to target them abroad. Access Now and other partners have formed a forensic analysis team to investigate whether the devices of these individuals have been infected or targeted.

However, the victims of surveillance face obstacles in seeking justice. The lack of rule of law and enforcement in their home countries prevents them from pursuing legal action against responsible parties. Efforts are underway to find alternative ways to enable victims to seek remedy, including the initiation of lawsuits against surveillance companies like Dark Matter.

The targeting of women through digital attacks is a significant concern. Research in Iraq has revealed cases of digital violence against over 100 Iraqi women, including blackmail, hate speech, and even instances where victims have been killed after reporting threats. Recognizing these attacks as gender-based violence is essential to provide appropriate support and protection to the affected women.

The psychological impact on women who have been victims of spyware attacks also requires further investigation. Cases in Bahrain and Jordan have shown negative impacts on family life. More research is needed to fully understand the psychological consequences and develop suitable interventions.

Respecting the right to privacy is crucial, as it is a fundamental human right. Any infringements should be addressed, and action should be taken against companies and governments involved in such activities. Journalists play an essential role in exposing the illegal activities of companies supporting oppressive governments and should continue to shed light on these issues.

Despite the challenges posed by surveillance, tools are available to ensure privacy when communicating sensitive information. It is vital to explore and utilize these tools to safeguard individuals’ privacy rights in the digital age.

In conclusion, addressing the misuse of surveillance technology in the MENA region requires cooperation between governments, civil society organizations, and individuals. Holding accountable those responsible for human rights violations and establishing robust mechanisms to protect the right to privacy is of utmost importance.

Moderator-Khalid Ibrahim:
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to this session, which is going to be focused on surveillance technology, different level of accountability. Let me first introduce the speakers. On my left, Marwa Fatafteh, MENA policy and advocacy manager at Access Now, and the coordinator of the MENA Coalition to Combat Surveillance, MCCS. Access Now is a non-profit organization founded in 2009 with a mission to defend and extend the digital civil rights of people around the world. On my right, Asya Abdelkarim, researcher at the Iraqi Network for Social Media, ANSIM. ANSIM is a network of bloggers and social media trackers on a number of issues that concern Iraq. ANSIM serves as a great source of accurate and verified news and updates of the digital rights in Iraq. And with us online, we have Samuel Jones. Samuel Jones is the president of Hardland Initiative, which is a non-profit, a practice-based research organization that promotes the fundamental rights and freedom of people in conflict-affected and high-risk areas. So let me talk about the coalition, the MENA Coalition to Combat Surveillance, launched during the public session at RiotCon on the 7th of June, 2021. The MCCS, the coalition, has come together to end the sale of digital surveillance tools to repressive governments in the MENA region, fight for a safe and open internet, defend human rights, and protect human rights defenders, journalists, and internet users from government’s prying eyes. The murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi on the 2nd of October, 2018, demonstrated both the dangerous consequences of targeted surveillance and the extent of secrecy and punity in which authoritarian governments in the region can obtain and deploy sophisticated and oppressive spyware tools. Until now, there has been no real accountability in the killing of Khashoggi. The Saudi government still never held account for his killing and the killing of other activists, while the NSO group, as you know, managed to hack into the accounts of many internet activists using the biggest spyware. I have also to mention the case of my colleague, Ahmed Mansour, a member of the board of the Gulf Center for Human Rights, who is the first victim of PICASA spyware back in 2015. It is the same year in which he got the Martin Arnold Award for Human Rights. Ahmed was arrested on the 20th of March, 2017, tortured and sentenced to 10 years in prison, only for his peaceful and legitimate human rights work. He is still in solitary confinement since his arrest. He, his family, friends, and we, his colleagues, have paid a heavy price for the use of surveillance technology against him. We are all still in pain. Now back to the NSO group. It says that it builds PICASA spyware solely for governments to use and to counter terrorism and law enforcement work. But as I said, many of my colleagues, many human rights defenders, bloggers, journalists, and internet activists, they were victims of PICASA spyware. Now I want also to talk about the level of accountability. There is not any local mechanism to address massive human rights violations in the MENA region. And as such, by using the concept of international jurisdiction, the Gulf Center for Human Rights filed a complaint in France on the 28th of July, 2021, against the Israeli software company NSO, which is responsible for harm caused to human rights defenders in the MENA region. The case is still ongoing. Now I will ask each distinguished speaker to present a brief summary of their work and the level of accountability they focus on. Let me start with my colleague Marwa. So Marwa, kindly outline the plan of actions for the MENA coalition to combat surveillance and the work you intend to do on accountability. Yes, Marwa.

Marwa Fatafta:
Good morning, everyone, and thank you very much, Khaled, and the Gulf Center for Human Rights for putting this session together. As Khaled mentioned, Access Now and the Gulf Center for Human Rights launched at Rights Con 2021, the MENA coalition to combat surveillance, and that came from the urgent need to combat the proliferating use of commercial spyware and digital surveillance tools in the MENA region. We, as Khaled had already highlighted, we have, in different countries in the MENA region, have been investigating and exposing the depth and the spread of how spyware, digital surveillance tools like NSO groups, Pegasus spyware, among others, are used systematically to target, monitor, and surveil human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers, civil society from Bahrain to Morocco, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan, Egypt, you name it. And therefore, we decided to bring local organizations together with global organizations to fight this phenomena. The issue of spyware and surveillance, as we all, I mean, for people who work on this issue, it is a transnational issue. For one, there are companies that are outside of the MENA region, or, you know, in this case, Israel is one of the top exporters of these surveillance technologies, that in order to fight, in order to combat this industry, we need to strengthen solidarity, but also information exchange and advocacy tactics between civil society organizations. That’s number one. Just looking at the transnational or cross-border nature of the surveillance industry. Another important factor was the fact that many activists and human rights defenders in the region are activists in exile, especially after the Arab Spring, and the spyware has enabled their countries to target them while they’re abroad, to spy on them, to forcibly disappear them, to kill them. In the case of this year, we have commemorated the fifth anniversary of Jamal Khashoggi’s murder at the Saudi embassy in Istanbul. His fiance, his acquaintances, his son, his ex-wife, even their lawyers, all of those individuals have been targeted with Pegasus spyware. So again, we’re talking, just to emphasize again on the point that we are dealing with a cross-border transnational issue that requires a collective commitment to fight the proliferation of spyware among civil society. Now in terms of the plans, of course, we are dealing with a ghost-like industry. It’s extremely opaque, elusive. Companies are hiding behind shell names. Their investors are also just as elusive. The transfer and the sale of these technologies are highly secretive. There is no way for us, for example, to know whether ex-country, ex-government, like has the government of Egypt contracted or had bought specific spyware? There is no way for us to know. The only way is to investigate through working with affected individuals. And Access Now, among other partners, we have built recently our forensic analysis team that we would be able to receive cases from human rights defenders, journalists, and activists to investigate and see whether their devices have been infected or targeted. Same goes with our partners like Amnesty International, Citizen Lab, among others. So the first objective here is to investigate and expose the companies and the human rights abuses that result from the use of the products that they’ve sold to the government. The second thing, once we have exposed, we have published reports where activists and victims have been targeted and what the result was in terms of human rights abuses. The second thing is looking at accountability venues, and that’s, of course, the name of the panel, which has been hard because, for one, when a victim recognizes or are told like once their device is checked that you have been infected with Pegasus, they are traumatized. If you’re a human rights defender, you’re also afraid that you might be harming the communities you work with, and then the question becomes who targeted me, and attribution is becoming harder and harder. For example, we can check if someone has been infected with Pegasus, but who is the government behind this infection is becoming difficult, and that is important for accountability, especially at an individual level. People want to know who is the entity or the government spying on them. And then they are also seeking litigation. They want access to remedy, and in all of MENA countries, you can’t just go to court and sue NSO group or sue the government because of lack of rule of law and law enforcement, and therefore the question always for us remains how can victims seek remedy or have access to effective remedy when there is none in their home countries, and we have been exploring with the Gulf Center ways we can overcome this hurdle or challenge. For instance, the Gulf Center, and Khaled maybe can speak about this, have filed a lawsuit against NSO group in France on behalf of a number of human rights defenders in the MENA region. We have also collaborated most recently, a few weeks ago, in a lawsuit filed against Emirati surveillance company Dark Matter, which has hacked the device of the prominent Saudi woman human rights defender Loujain al-Hathloul, together with three of its U.S. executives who have helped set up the Dark Matter surveillance operation. Now of course the company is trying to kill the lawsuit in the U.S. on grounds that the victim and the company and that the U.S. court has no jurisdiction over these individuals. The victim is Saudi national, the company is Emirati, and the lawsuit is taking place in the U.S. And I’m a bit simplifying the matter, but this is the summary of it. And we think, you know, we wrote to the court an amicus brief emphasizing again that this victim does not have access to effective remedy, would not be able to sue either Dark Matter or the UAE government for spying on her. And therefore the court can actually exercise its jurisdiction to uphold human rights and most importantly send a message to the surveillance industry that they can indeed be held accountable.

Moderator-Khalid Ibrahim:
Thank you a lot, Marwa. And let me just ask you briefly about what about your efforts in relation to human rights and your diligence, advocacy efforts in relation to put an end to this cooperation between companies and democracies supporting oppressive governments in the MENA region?

Marwa Fatafta:
That’s an important point because, again, going back to the issue of the surveillance industry itself, where it comes from, where is it exported from? And in some instances, like, for example, the German company Finfisher, and now thankfully they declared bankruptcy in Germany, but they had provided their surveillance technologies to the UAE, to Egypt, to Turkey. And so here, again, we go to the issue of export controls and the role of so-called democratic countries in exporting or making the surveillance technology available to authoritarian regimes. Often, and even though there are some export controls in place, these technologies find their way in the hands of authoritarians that use them to target and attack human rights defenders and journalists. Our role has been to expose where export controls have been lacking and also to add pressure on governments to regulate that industry within their jurisdictions through enforcing bylaw accountability measures that, for example, companies that work on surveillance technologies have human rights due diligence in place in order to stop selling that tech to human rights abusing countries, among other issues.

Moderator-Khalid Ibrahim:
Thank you a lot, Marwa. Let me move now to Asya, and Asya, could you just tell us about the work of ANSIM in empowering human rights activists in Iraq against the surveillance and digital attacks, and also what level of accountability we have in Iraq? Thank you.

Asya Abdelkarim:
Good morning, everyone, and thank you for this session. Actually, for those who do not know, ANSIM Network is a network for social media working in a group of digital rights defenders and digital experts. We have been working in Iraq since 2011 as a non-governmental and non-profit CSO to advocate for free, diverse, and safe Internet in Iraq. So we are a part of this MENA Alliance and MENA Coalition to Combat Surveillance, and before I begin to explain in detail, I want to tell those who don’t know and emphasize to those who do that Iraq is a country that has experienced many wars and conflict over the years in various forms. As these conflicts have evolved, so have the capabilities of civil society activists and human rights defenders in dealing with these disputes in a new way. So we now have a concept of digital resistance which has become increasingly prevalent in recent years due to its significant importance in changing the course of events. And regarding your question in Iraq, human rights defenders increasingly rely on digital technology, technology to monitor and advocate for human rights, or to share their opinion, promote debate, and mobilize. Nonetheless, malicious actors such as pro-governmental groups, including militias, have also used these online platforms to threaten, intimidate, and harass activists. With the rise of massive use of social media in Iraq, digital privacy and digital security have never been more important. So in some way Iraq plays a vital role in empowering Internet activists against surveillance and digital attacks, and we do this by providing trainings and resources on digital security and privacy, documenting and reporting on cases of surveillance and digital attacks, advocating for policies and laws that protect digital rights, supporting Internet activists who are under attack, and monitor and document digital security threats to civil society in Iraq to provide training and resources to help civil society organizations to protect themselves. And some work has been instrumental in empowering Internet activists to resist surveillance and digital attacks. So for example, NSIM has provided, as I said, many trainings, and we documented numerous cases of surveillance and digital attacks against Iraq, against the activists in Iraq. Let me talk more about the hacking of activists for arrests using surveillance technology. So Ansem have documented that a lot of apps that have been compromised, which lead to severe arrests, as reported by a protester, I caught him, we would turn up to an area to hold a protest and find a masked militia waiting for us with knives and clubs. Activists in Iraq face various forms of digital threats, ranging from hate speech to misinformation, hacking attempts, et cetera. In this regard, through our platform, the Checker, we aim to remain awake 24-7 to detect any attempts to spread misleading information that could lead to deadly consequences. Tragically, we witnessed the loss of two valuable individuals, the activist Reham Yaqoub and the politician and journalist Hisham Hashemi, who were assassinated following a very massive online campaign by electronic arms affiliated with Iranian-backed militias back in 2019. So we lost these two brilliant due to the absence of effective deterrents of the time to stop the harmful disclosure. However, today we are striving to protect the lives of these defenders with all the tools and connections at our disabled by our platforms. Also, I want to mention that the level of accountability in digital rights in Iraq are promoting is still in a very early stage. However, there are some promising signs like involving Ansem with a member of parliaments in various discussions regarding cyber crimes, law, data protection, and access to information. However, there are also some challenges that Ansem faced. The Iraqi government has a history of cracking down on dissent. And human rights activists are often targeted by the government and non-state actors like the Iranian-backed militias. Additionally, the Iraqi government is often slow to implement reforms, and it’s unclear how long it will take for the government to pass and implement laws that protect digital rights. Despite these challenges, we are playing a vital role in empowering internet activists to resist surveillance and digital attack. These tactics are helping to create more open, diverse, and democratic internet in Iraq.

Moderator-Khalid Ibrahim:
Thank you, Asya. Now, just briefly, could you talk about your plan for future work and actions in relation to this important topic? Yes, Asya.

Asya Abdelkarim:
Yes, of course. So now we have a lot of plans, actually. We are maintaining a direct communication with the Iraqi political leadership, especially the Media and Communication Commission and the Ministry of Communication. We continually send reports of these violations and hold meetings with them to emphasize the importance of recognizing that digital human rights are none less significant than natural human rights. And we also engage with international press release to put pressure on these authorities. This can be an effective method at time, given the influence of external political interference in Iraq and the consequences it can have.

Moderator-Khalid Ibrahim:
Thank you a lot, Asya. Now it’s time to move for our third distinguished speaker, our colleague Samuel Jones, who is joining us online. And the question for you, Sam, is how can investors help advance corporate accountability for civilian-related harms, including these associated with authoritarian governments? Yes, Sam.

Samuel Jones:
Thank you. So first of all, sincere thanks to Khaled for the opportunity to participate in this timely and critical discussion. Second, I wanted to mention that I’ve been fortunate enough to live in both Palestine and Iraq and once again find myself following Palestinian and Iraqi women who are both smarter and more articulate than I am. That said, I’ll do my best to respond to the question. So just a quick note about Heartland that will help set the stage for my remarks. As you mentioned, Khaled, we’re a practice-based research organization that assists investors in preventing and mitigating human rights risks across their investment portfolios, specifically those associated with business activities and relationships in conflict-affected and high-risk areas. While we work across industries, we have spent considerable time over the last several years prioritizing surveillance technology as a particularly at-risk sector in these particularly at-risk contexts. Some of the most pronounced recent human rights crises have underscored the severity and systemic risk posed by surveillance technology, whether that’s the Russian state surveillance system SORM being used against Russian dissidents or to control Ukrainian internet traffic, the deployment of spyware by the military junta in Myanmar, the surveillance state created by the Chinese government in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in Tibet, or the use of targeted and mass surveillance throughout the occupied Palestinian territories by the Israeli government. In other words, if you introduce these high-risk technologies into areas where the human rights regime is already failing to function as intended, where regulation and enforcement are either inadequate or used in rights-violating ways, or where systematic or episodic violence and abuse are a part of daily life, you can expect these products to exacerbate these issues unless companies have taken, as Marwa alluded to, the necessary steps to address human rights and conflict risks throughout their product life cycles and specific to their business models. And yet, in spite of the rather obvious heightened risk endemic to the use of such technologies, whether that’s in Palestine or Iraq, the vast majority of companies producing surveillance technologies or those producing technologies that can be used for surveillance, like cloud-based computing, for example, do not conduct a correspondingly heightened version of human rights due diligence, as called for by the UNGPs. And this is where investors come in. Investors are becoming increasingly aware that human rights risks to people, due to high-risk products and services, high-risk value chain relationships, or in a high-risk context, can translate into financially material risks for companies and their shareholders. This could be due to regulatory enforcement, strategic litigation, operational disruptions, or brand damage. And there’s perhaps no greater example of this in the tech space than the company that’s been mentioned before, Israeli spyware maker NSO Group. Thanks to the investigative research of Citizen Lab and Misty Tech Access Now, the reporting of Forbidden Stories, which detailed the global human rights harms emanating from the sale and use of Pegasus spyware, NSO Group became the target of strategic litigation by WhatsApp and Apple, regulatory blacklisting by the US Department of Commerce, government investigation in the EU, and international advocacy campaigns, like the Pegasus Project. And collectively, these efforts resulted in massive financial and reputational costs for NSO Group, which was deemed valueless to its private equity investors during a London court case in April of 2022, only three years after being purchased for $1 billion. Now, while NSO Group may represent perhaps one of the most egregious cases of surveillance-related human rights harms, there are numerous other examples where investors have the opportunity and the responsibility under the UNGPs to engage companies whose business models are at risk of contributing to surveillance-related harms in a high-risk environment. Some examples include Google’s decision to partner with Saudi Aramco and Saudi Telecom to build a cloud platform in the kingdom where surveillance-related risks are both severe and well-documented. Nokia’s products and services being used to connect Russia’s digital network with state-run surveillance system known as SORM to suppress dissent and surveil citizens. A range of surveillance-related systems, including biometric technology from French company Thales Group, supplied to the Egyptian government, which is creating a massive surveillance infrastructure in Cairo. Celebrite, owned by publicly-traded Japanese company Sun Corporation, selling digital forensics and intelligence tools to Myanmar’s military junta. And Western Digital selling hard disk drives to Hikvision to be packaged with that company’s surveillance offerings, which have been used as part of the Chinese government’s surveillance and internment program in Xinjiang region. So as regulators and policymakers struggle to keep pace with proliferation and use of these and other technologies globally, it’s become even more critical for investors to directly engage companies and encourage rights-respecting behavior from the design to the end-use stages. In other words, in the absence of effective regulatory frameworks, investors represent a key potential driver for improved corporate policy, practice, and governance, corporate accountability for human rights harms, and most importantly, better protection for rights holders. So I’m going to just quickly try to concretize this point by reflecting on several potential roles investors can play vis-a-vis surveillance technologies. First, many of our investor partners have exclusionary screens for controversial weapons that are fundamentally incompatible with international humanitarian and human rights law. So think about nuclear, chemical, biological, cluster munitions, and landmines. We’re currently working with some of those partners, along with Access Now, Business and Human Rights Resource Center, and other experts, to develop similar criteria for spyware, meaning that it would necessarily be excluded from investment portfolios due to the emerging discourse suggesting that spyware is also fundamentally incompatible with international law. While many public equity investors may not directly be exposed to spyware, since the sector is largely funded by private equity, these massive investors in North America, Europe, and elsewhere could send a strong public signal that spyware is fundamentally a toxic asset class. Second, and especially in light of emerging regulations around surveillance technologies and mandatory human rights due diligence in Europe, there’s a role for investors to play in directly engaging policymakers concerning the need to put into place laws governing the design, marketing, and use of targeted and mass surveillance among state and non-state actors. There’s both actually a human rights imperative and a long-term financial interest for investors to advocate for the development and adoption of fit-for-purpose rules for these technologies that can contribute both to, and most importantly, a reduction or prevention of human rights harms, but that also erode public trust in state institutions and destabilize the conditions that make for a prosperous economy. And third and finally, investors can continue to engage companies, those in and adjacent to the surveillance technology industry on improved policy, practice, and governance measures that more effectively identify, assess, prevent, and mitigate surveillance-related harms. In order for these engagements to be truly effective though, investors must be equipped with technically sophisticated research and analysis like that provided from our colleagues from Palestine and from Iraq, so that companies are able to out-tech them during these dialogues with investors. And this is where civil society expertise becomes critical, providing investors with the resources they need to have conversations about contractually, operationally, and technologically preventing and mitigating these harms, even in authoritarian and other high-risk contexts. So I’ll close my remarks there.

Moderator-Khalid Ibrahim:
Thank you, Sam. So, Sam, thank you for joining us at such a late time for you. Thank you for mentioning Palestine and Iraq. Briefly, I have another question for you, Sam. What are the future plans for hard-line initiative around surveillance technologies in particular? Yes, Sam.

Samuel Jones:
Yeah, so I appreciate the question. As I mentioned, we work across industries, but in the next 12 months, we’re planning some fairly specific activities around surveillance technology. So first, an effort to designate spyware as a toxic asset class among public and private equity investors. Inspired by the anti-personnel landmine movement, this will include the development of investment exclusionary criteria that I mentioned previously, but it’ll also include a white paper on the severe human rights and financially material risk associated with this technology. Investor and company collaborations designed for these stakeholders to work together on mutual threats posed by spyware and its exploits. A global majority gathering designed to more fully integrate grassroots civil society experts into, or sorry, experts on targeted surveillance into directly into investor-led company engagements and working with partners to map out the spyware ecosystem. Second, I would mention building off an event that Heartland Access Now and the Resource Center held in London on the abuse of surveillance technologies in MENA. We’ll be working with coalition of North American and European investors to engage a handful of tech industry leaders in private collaborative discussions on concrete and meaningful ways to address surveillance-related risk through better market entry analysis, improved harm and value chain monitoring, and contractual and operational human rights guardrails. So the point of that is moving away from these 30,000-foot policy discussions with tech companies focused on the UNGPs and really focusing on the operational impacts of their technologies on people on the ground. That’s, and I’ll close there.

Moderator-Khalid Ibrahim:
Thank you, Sam. Thank you for all this work that has the potential to enhance the protection of all of us. Now we open the floor for any question, comment, discussion, or any online question. Do you have any comment, any question? Yes, please, go ahead.

Audience:
Hi, thank you so much. Stephanie Mickelson, UNFPA. So I look at kind of the gendered aspect of all of this. This is still, yeah, I’m learning a lot, so thank you again. I was wondering if this is, if that gendered element of human rights defenders is something that we consider and analyze as we have these reports and as we move forward, because as we know, you know, clearly, you know, two of the four people here today are women. So, yeah, I would just like to hear a bit more about that if we can, thank you.

Moderator-Khalid Ibrahim:
I think Marwa will address that. Yes, Marwa. Yes, take this. This is for you.

Marwa Fatafta:
Thank you, Khaled, and thank you for raising this question. We have actually started looking at the gendered dimension of targeted surveillance. As someone who has worked with surveillance victims in the MENA region, I know firsthand, and also as a woman from that region, I know firsthand how scary it is to have your personal information, or let me rephrase, to have an adversary government that is hell-bent on destroying your character, especially if you are a woman human rights defender or a human rights lawyer or a journalist, a woman who works on public interest or human rights activism, and to have all that personal information weaponized in order to smear your reputation and to discredit you and delegitimize your work. And so, just to take a step back, you know, we have been working on how women are targeted generally online from doxing campaigns, and that is sharing images or information about women without their consent, including their home addresses. We have seen cases where even the addresses of the women’s children, like the addresses of their children’s kindergartens or schools, medical records, sometimes even sexual activities, intimate conversations, screenshots of WhatsApp conversations and whatnot. Women sometimes, when they are on the streets protesting, we’ve also seen cases with their devices confiscated. So we know firsthand. as an organization that deals or provides support to those at-risk communities, how dangerous it can be if a government has its hands on that personal information and what it can do with it. And now adding to that layer, spyware. So if, let’s take Pegasus spyware as an example, and that’s not the only spyware available on the market. There are many other commercial spyware tools, some we know of, some we don’t. But you know, once your device is infected, the government client pretty much has access to everything, everything. Your microphone can turn your microphone on your phone, so it can spy on your conversations, your camera, telephone, you know, telephone calls, messages, contacts, emails, even encrypted messages like on Signal or WhatsApp, where you think that you are communicating safely with individuals, but in reality all of that is being exposed and seen by the government. Now, for women, the impact of targeted surveillance is particularly egregious, because one, women are subject to gender-based violence online and offline. They are, you know, they are afraid, it kind of restricts their, not only violates their privacy and also restricts their ability to express themselves or express their right to freedom of expression on an opinion, but also it restricts their movement. Women feel, like women I spoke to that have been spied on, feel afraid to walk on the streets. They have to change tracks, for example, because they feel that someone is following them. They know that if they are physically targeted or assaulted or harassed, they won’t receive any legal or social protection, because again, like going back to gender-based violence, especially in a region like MENA, where women are being killed and harassed without any consequences or little support, and therefore for us it was very important to advocate or to emphasize that targeted surveillance is a form of gender-based violence and should be for women rights groups, for, you know, UN agencies, for, and to develop like international norms around that, that targeted surveillance is not, we’re not only talking about the right, a violation of the right to privacy, but also in the case of women it’s a form of gender-based

Moderator-Khalid Ibrahim:
violence. Thank you, Marwa. Yes, Asya, you have something to add? Yes, so I will talk

Asya Abdelkarim:
from the side of Iraq. During the past year, I was working on digital-based violence research, and in this research we met with more than 100 Iraqi women. We did an interview with them. Most of them, in the conclusion, we found that they have faced a digital violence. Most of them are so afraid to face this truth. As Marwa said, they are very afraid to go to the police and to report that they are facing a blackmail or hate speech or any other online threat. So, because of the traditions, especially in a closed community in Iraq, they are so afraid to be killed. And I mentioned one of the story of the YouTuber Thiba Ali. She was reported to the community police in Iraq that her father threatened her to be killed because she ran away outside Iraq because she was facing domestic violence. So, they make the dad to make a commitment to the police that he will not be targeting her. He will be a good father for her, and the next morning she was dead. So, the women in Iraq are facing a lot of digital violence which reflect on the earth, and this is a very important challenge, actually. So, in Iraq also, the pornographic image is not just what is mentioned in the word. Pornographic may be that to spread an image of a girl that wears a hijab, but it spreads an image without hijab. So, that will be targeting her from the community. So, we are trying for Ansem, actually. We launched a hotline helpdesk, actually. We receive a lot of blackmail cases. We’re trying to help them because, as Marwa mentioned, they are so afraid to be in a court or in a police station. So, we are trying to help them, but it’s a very challenge. Actually, it’s a global challenge. We are trying, and we hope finally, soon, we will do our best to help all these women.

Moderator-Khalid Ibrahim:
One minute. I have little doubt that, no doubt at all, that digital attacks on women, human rights defenders, should be regarded as gender-based violence, and really little has been conducted in research with regard to the psychological impact on women when they are going to be victims of spyware, such as PICASAS. We have colleagues, such as Abdessam Saag in Bahrain, Hala Ahed in Jordan. They were victims of PICASAS, and it has a huge negative impact on their family life, and still all that never properly researched. Yes, go ahead.

Audience:
Thank you very much. Do you hear me? Yes. I just wanted to add a comment to this discussion. I’m Fatemeh Faniz of the Internet Alliance, that it is a gender- based form of violence, also because, and that’s the part of the iceberg that we do not see, like every woman in this region, but also more generally, who is slightly being an activist, or more on the spectrum, is afraid of their being surveilled, or their information being released, because of that reason. So even before being surveilled, it does impact women’s lives, like any gender’s life, of course, but women to a greater extent in societies where they’re more targeted, and it impacts, and they have to basically adapt their activism and their lives to the potential tread, which is another way of oppression. Thank you.

Marwa Fatafta:
Yes, please. I could not agree more. I could not agree more, especially when, at least in the MENA region, the whole notion around morality, and how women should behave, how should dress, how should conduct themselves in public, that’s already policed, even before these technologies were invented, and now deployed on a, you know, increasing scale. We have, for example, cases where, you know, Khaled mentioned Abtiza Mastayegh, who is a Bahraini human rights defender, and she, we published a report together with frontline defenders, showing how she was surveilled and targeted, and she told us that even in her home, like once your privacy is violated, especially right now with our devices becoming an integral part of our lives, it felt like an assault or an attacker in her own kind of bodily integrity, and she doesn’t feel safe in her own home. As a veiled woman, she’s, you know, a practicing Muslim, she doesn’t even feel like free to be herself at her own home. She has to wear the veil at all times, and that’s, that also has, you know, we have had similar testimonies from Palestine, you know, maybe it’s a separate issue with not targeted surveillance, but mass surveillance and facial recognition technologies pointing directly through the windows of people’s houses or homes, and their women also express that they have to wear the veil at all times. So just to share the, how intimately that impacts women on levels beyond what we can imagine.

Moderator-Khalid Ibrahim:
Thank you a lot, Marwa. Is there any comment, any question? If there’s nothing, I go back to Sam. You, you have a question? Yeah, go ahead.

Audience:
Hi, I’m Isamu from Japan. I want to ask you, both of you, that I think the surveillance is, has secondary effect on us, because after two years that Pegasus article was broke, published, we are so intimidated, even in, even Western world journalists, we are very afraid to contact with you or human rights activists or other journalists. So some journalists feeling that we feel very hesitant to cover such activities or organizations. What are the secondary effect after two years the Pegasus was revealed? Are there any hesitation or the shrink of activities in your spheres or countries?

Moderator-Khalid Ibrahim:
Well, I think always we have to confront perpetrators of our privacy. The right to privacy is a human right, and we shouldn’t wait. We shouldn’t be afraid from doing all what we could, whether it’s human rights litigation or taking proper actions to stop companies from attacking our rights, including the right to privacy. I agree with you, it is not easy now to communicate if you have sensitive information, but the tools are out there for you to make sure that your privacy is respected and not compromised by companies. And as a journalist, I really encourage you always to find the truth and always to shed a light on the activities, illegal activities of companies who are supporting oppressive governments in our region, MENA region, other regions, as it is very important for us to show solidarity and to cooperate and to work together in order to end this business of surveillance against human rights defenders and other

Marwa Fatafta:
citizens. Yes. Thank you Khaled. I’d like to add two points. One, thank you very much for raising that point. This is precisely one of the key impacts of targeted surveillance. It’s not only about the individual that is targeted or infected with a malware or a spyware, but also the communities that they live or interact with. So this second-hand trauma or the second-hand impact, journalists being afraid to speak to their contacts and resources confidentially, human rights organizations not being able to corroborate evidence of human rights abuses or speak to local sources on the ground, and that’s especially true for, let’s say, activists or civil society organizations working in exile. These are really all concerns and that is, at the end of the day, the ultimate purpose of surveillance, to silence dissent and to silence independent media reporting. However, after the PICASOS project, it had the opposite effect in the sense that people became, at least in the region, people became more aware about this threat. And I have to say, as we run this digital security helpline, we have more and more people coming to us, including journalists, to have their devices checked and scanned. So ultimately it led to, this awareness led to people thinking about their digital security and prioritizing that, where that wasn’t necessarily the case, especially for journalists that are working under capacity or with limited resources. Now digital security has become front and center. So that is a good, that’s a good outcome. It’s a blessing in the midst of this ongoing scandal. And so, I mean, I hope this leads to more exposing of these spyware companies and also that journalists and others find ways to protect themselves and their

Samuel Jones:
resources. I could just add from the investment front as well, I mean, in terms of limited positive outcomes, following sort of the PICASOS project and the huge controversies and the financial implosion of NSO Group, definitely in conversations with both public and private equity investors, there was sort of a stain around anything that had to do with spyware. And so when we would talk to asset owners and asset managers, they would go to great lengths to talk about how they are consciously avoiding spyware. The problem, of course, with this is that spyware is not typically marketed as spyware. It’s done under the rubric of law enforcement or counterterrorism. And so a big challenge for us, including over the next year, is really educating investors about how spyware shows up in its different forms in their portfolios.

Moderator-Khalid Ibrahim:
Thank you, Sam. And I fully agree with Marwa that digital security should be our focus to not give any opportunity for hackers or companies to get into our accounts and also to protect our colleagues, our companies, our information. Now, we are in the final minutes. So I don’t know, Asya, do you want to say something, the final say for one minute before we conclude? Yes.

Asya Abdelkarim:
Thank you all for all the questions. And thank you, Khaled, for this session. Actually, it was great to hear from you about all this threaten and surveillance. It’s actually a happy moment and a sad moment at the same time that we are sharing the same issues. I hope that all of who is attending this meeting to work together, actually, to face this huge threat against us as human rights defenders and activists and journalists. Thank you all.

Moderator-Khalid Ibrahim:
Thank you, Asya. Sam, your final say. Are you optimistic that in two years, three years, we will end this cooperation between companies and democracies, investors that we could hold into account? Yes, Sam.

Samuel Jones:
That’s the hope, but I think I just want to reiterate a critical point, and that is for investors that tend to be overwhelmed by different environmental, social, and governance issues, it’s really human rights defender organizations, whether at the international level like Access Now or at the grassroots level that provide the critical information or can provide the critical information that investors use with companies on demonstrating that there are real human beings impacted by their investments and that it’s their responsibility to take appropriate actions. Really, we depend on those civil society organizations for our own work.

Moderator-Khalid Ibrahim:
Thank you, Sam. Marwa, the coordinator of the MENA Coalition to Combat

Marwa Fatafta:
Surveillance, your final say, Marwa. Final say. We have a huge job to do. I’m not sure if two or three years would be sufficient, but it’s definitely a priority fight for us and many of our partners. As Sam mentioned, it’s also one of our key goals to map surveillance technologies and spyware being used in the MENA region, including the companies, their investors, their corporate structures, as well as the human rights abuses facilitated by the use of these technologies that for us is important for a number of reasons, for accountability, for investor advocates, for journalists, lawyers, litigators. We want to make that, you know, we want to expose that industry to the extent we can and to help others in this ecosystem hold these companies accountable. So, it is an ongoing fight for those who would like to join our coalition. I mean, it’s MENA focused, but it’s open to global and local and regional organizations. Feel free to get in touch with us. And, you know, we’re planning to revamp the coalition, so there will be more advocacy campaigns next year, hopefully. So, with that, I have to

Moderator-Khalid Ibrahim:
thank our distinguished speakers, Samuel, Marwa, and Asya. Thank you, all of you who are in the room, and also a lot of thanks to people who followed us online. And with that, I wish you a nice day. Thank you.

Audience

The analysis examines various topics related to internet access and digital inequality. The GIGA project is highlighted as a cost-effective solution for improving internet access in schools. The project has helped in reducing the cost of schools by involving small providers who can offer more affordable options or better access to schools located near communities. This initiative aligns with SDG 4 (Quality Education) and SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure).

Another important concern raised in the analysis is the concentration and monopolization of online platforms. This issue not only affects carriers but also content creators. The dominant position of certain platforms has led to a decrease in competition and options for both users and content creators. These concerns align with SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities).

The analysis also discusses the misuse of Universal Service Funds (USF) in Paraguay. It is stated that these funds have been used to acquire surveillance and biometric technology, which have been deployed in the streets of the capital and other cities. This raises concerns about privacy, surveillance, and potential misuse of funds. The misuse of USF in Paraguay is seen as a violation of SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities) and SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions).

Private and public sector financing is highlighted as a factor that may influence the costs associated with entering the ecosystem for community networks. The analysis mentions different tiers of investment economics, suggesting that the availability and accessibility of financing can play a crucial role in determining the success and sustainability of community networks. This topic is linked to SDG 1 (No Poverty) and SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities).

There is uncertainty expressed about a one-size-fits-all model or approach being applied to community networks. The argument presented suggests that different communities have unique needs and challenges that cannot be addressed effectively by a single approach. The analysis calls for a more tailored and context-specific approach to community networks, which aligns with SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities) and SDG 4 (Quality Education).

The analysis also discusses the challenges faced by community networks in taking operational ownership. Specific reference is made to CowMesh, a community network in India, to illustrate the challenges faced in transitioning from external support to community-driven ownership. This highlights the importance of community engagement and empowerment for the sustainability and success of community networks. The topic aligns with SDG 1 (No Poverty) and SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities).

In addition, the analysis raises concerns about defining and understanding what the internet means for different communities. It highlights the need for a common understanding and language when it comes to concepts such as hypertext and hyperlinks. This indicates a potential gap in digital literacy and the importance of ensuring equal access to knowledge and understanding of internet-related concepts. This topic relates to SDG 4 (Quality Education) and SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities).

In conclusion, the analysis sheds light on various aspects of internet access and digital inequality. It highlights the GIGA project as a cost-effective solution for bringing internet access to schools and raises concerns about the concentration and monopolization of online platforms. The misuse of USF funds in Paraguay, the influence of private and public sector financing on community networks, the challenges in community networks taking operational ownership, and the need for a common understanding of the internet are also discussed. Overall, the analysis emphasizes the importance of addressing digital inequality and ensuring access to affordable and equitable internet connectivity for all communities.

Nathalia Foditsch

The analysis of the provided information reveals several key points regarding universal service funds (USF). Firstly, it is noted that a significant portion of USF funding is being directed towards larger operators, which is seen as a negative aspect. This raises concerns about the fair allocation of resources and the potential exacerbation of inequality within the telecommunications sector. Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Peru are cited as countries with high disbursement rates, indicating a potential bias towards larger operators in these regions. On the other hand, many countries either do not utilize USF at all or use it for other purposes, such as creative accounting, which further highlights the issue of improper allocation.

Furthermore, the analysis reveals that smaller internet service providers (ISPs) face obstacles in accessing USF funds. These ISPs are required to obtain a letter of credit amounting to 25% of the funds needed, along with a 25% match requirement. This poses a significant financial burden on smaller ISPs and effectively shuts them out of the Broadband Expansion and Enhancement Program (BEED). This observation underlines the need for a more equitable and inclusive approach to accessing USF funds, particularly for smaller players in the industry.

Advocacy for changes in the design and disbursement of USF is also highlighted. Organizations have partnered with other stakeholders to advocate for reforms that would facilitate a fair and transparent process for the allocation of funds. This includes ensuring the inclusion of all types of stakeholders, not just large operators, and developing a more accessible and streamlined application process.

The analysis also reveals an increased awareness and recognition of community networks within public and regulatory bodies. Over the past 2-3 years, there has been a growing awareness of the role that community networks can play in improving connectivity and bridging the digital divide. This has led to the creation of new working groups within national regulators, specifically advocating for community networks. This development suggests a shifting paradigm where the importance of community-driven initiatives is being acknowledged and integrated into policymaking and regulatory frameworks.

Another significant point raised in the analysis is the need for stronger public involvement and multi-stakeholder partnerships to ensure transparency and prevent the misuse of USF funds. Increased transparency is highlighted as a requirement to address concerns about the potential improper use of funds. Additionally, the analysis notes that not all stakeholders are adequately represented in the decision-making process. Therefore, a more inclusive approach that actively involves all relevant actors is necessary to foster a fair and accountable system for USF governance.

The analysis also brings attention to the growing possibility of including big tech companies in contributing to the USF. Following a recent national regulator consultation, there are rumors suggesting that big techs may be asked to contribute to the fund. This potential development has garnered support from some stakeholders who argue that involving big tech companies could provide additional resources to support the goal of industry, innovation, and infrastructure in line with Sustainable Development Goal 9.

However, the analysis reveals instances where the USF funds have been misused. For example, in Paraguay, surveillance cameras were purchased using USF money. This highlights the potential for inappropriate use of funds and underscores the need for proper oversight and accountability measures to ensure that USF funds are used for their intended purpose.

In conclusion, the analysis of the provided information underscores several significant issues pertaining to universal service funds. The preferential allocation of funds to larger operators, the challenges faced by smaller ISPs in accessing funds, and the need for reforms in the design and disbursement processes are key concerns. The growing recognition of community networks, the importance of transparency and multi-stakeholder partnerships, and the potential inclusion of big tech companies in contributing to the fund are also notable observations. However, instances of fund misuse and inappropriate usage serve as a reminder of the critical role of effective governance and oversight mechanisms. Overall, the analysis highlights the necessity for reform, inclusivity, and accountability in the management of universal service funds, ultimately ensuring equitable access to quality telecommunications services.

Jane Roberts Coffin

Universal service and access funds, established by regulators worldwide in collaboration with telecommunications companies, have been in existence for over 20 years. Originally intended to subsidise fixed fiber networks, these funds have had mixed implementation and impact. While some have been well-administered, others have been misused for purposes unrelated to network expansion, leading to a lack of accountability and hindered progress in reaching underserved areas.

With approximately 2.6 billion people still offline due to inadequate network coverage, there is a pressing need to review and find new ways of implementing universal service funds. One proposal is to diversify fund usage, directing them towards initiatives that address specific connectivity gaps, such as connecting women and girls, or supporting internet exchange points and community networks.

Jane Roberts Coffin argues for a complete reboot of these funds, advocating for a fresh approach to implementation and distribution. She suggests expanding fund usage to target specific connectivity needs, citing successful examples like Argentina.

The role of Ofcom, a regulatory body, is also discussed. Ofcom focuses on creating market conditions for network providers to thrive, rather than providing direct funding. Jane appreciates Teddy Woodhouse’s explanation of Ofcom’s function.

Challenges may arise when community service organizations (CSOs) work with regulators. Jane raises concerns about this and seeks advice on how CSOs can effectively collaborate with regulators and influence policy decisions. This highlights the importance of productive partnerships and dialogue between CSOs and regulatory bodies.

In conclusion, the implementation and impact of universal service and access funds have varied greatly. Reviewing fund usage, expanding their scope, and fostering collaboration between CSOs and regulators are vital in addressing global connectivity challenges.

Josephine Miliza

Universal Service Funds (USFs) play a crucial role in advancing network connectivity in Africa. Currently, 37 countries on the continent have established USFs. However, challenges exist regarding the ownership and sustainability of USF projects.

In many African countries, community networks, which are considered complementary access models, face obstacles when it comes to accessing USFs. Due to a lack of recognition, community networks are unable to benefit from the funds available. Advocacy efforts are being made to remove the clause that exempts community networks from making contributions to USFs. A successful example of this is seen in Kenya, where the removal of this clause has allowed community networks to benefit from the USF.

Regulatory experiments in Kenya have proven to be successful for community networks. The country’s regulator has taken steps such as developing a community networks service provider license and has plans to establish a hundred community networks. These efforts serve as examples of successful community network initiatives and highlight the importance of supportive regulatory frameworks.

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) play a crucial role in advocating for community networks. They are actively involved in raising awareness, building capacity, and providing technical assistance. CSOs also have the responsibility of helping regulators understand how to effectively support community networks. Through their efforts, CSOs contribute to the creative regulatory solutions and awareness building necessary for the success of community networks.

Patience and resilience are emphasized as necessary qualities for CSOs engaging with regulators. Building sustainable relationships with regulators takes time and requires perseverance, as evident from the experience shared by Josephine’s team.

Collaboration and partnerships with existing stakeholders are highlighted as essential for effective advocacy for community networks. By leveraging resources from other countries and regions, collaborations can bring about positive outcomes. The UK Digital Access Program’s collaboration with the Kenyan regulator is given as an example of such partnerships in action.

The importance of utilizing existing resources, experiences, and advocacy efforts is stressed. Instead of starting from scratch, teams should build on the knowledge and expertise already available. The collaboration with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is mentioned as an example of utilizing existing resources for the benefit of community networks.

Transparency and accountability are significant concerns when it comes to USFs in Africa. A study currently being reviewed by the GSMA highlights the issue of fund reallocation in the region, with difficulties in tracking where the money is being spent. Clear reporting on how funds are allocated and utilized is necessary to ensure transparency and accountability.

In conclusion, USFs are essential for advancing network connectivity in Africa. However, challenges exist in terms of ownership and sustainability. To fully leverage the potential of community networks, it is essential to remove barriers to their access to USFs. Regulatory experiments, collaboration with CSOs, and the utilization of existing resources are instrumental in supporting community networks. Transparency and accountability in fund allocation and reporting are vital for the effective use of USFs in Africa.

Senka Hadzic

In this introductory session, six speakers were introduced to discuss various aspects of technology, connectivity, and digital inclusion. Natalia Fodic, the Director of International Programs at Connect Humanity, is an esteemed expert in technology and communications policy. With over 15 years of experience, Fodic brings a wealth of knowledge to the discussion. She is joining the panel online from Brazil.

Konstantinos Komaitis, currently a non-resident fellow and senior researcher at the Lisbon Council, is present in the room. With a background in policy development and strategy, Komaitis spent 10 years as Senior Director at the Internet Society. He is also a published author and public speaker, making him a valuable contributor to the session.

Ben Matranga, the Managing Partner of Connectivity Capital, focuses on impact investment in developing countries to expand internet access. With almost two decades of experience in leading private equity, venture capital, and debt investments in emerging markets, Matranga offers valuable insights into the challenges and opportunities in connecting underserved regions.

Teddy Woodhouse, the International Policy Manager at Ofcom, the UK Communications Regulator, is an ICT for development expert. He has extensive experience in both the public and non-profit sectors, including his previous role with the Alliance for Affordable Internet. Woodhouse is responsible for Ofcom’s engagement within the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and provides a strong voice for the UK in the global discussions on connectivity.

Josephine Meliza, a Digital Inclusion and Transformation Consultant, is a pioneer of the community networks movement in Africa. Currently serving as the Regional Policy Coordinator for Africa within the APC’s LockNet project, Meliza brings a unique perspective on digital inclusion initiatives on the continent. Additionally, she co-chairs the Africa Community Network Summit and serves as a member of the MAG, the IGF Multi-Stakeholder Advisory Group.

Finally, Saul Luca de Tena, a Connectivity Solutions Specialist at Giga, a UNICEF-ITU joint initiative, aims to connect every school in the world to the internet by 2030. With 15 years of experience in strategic program management within technology and development, capacity building, and policy advocacy, de Tena’s expertise is essential in ensuring widespread access to education through connectivity.

With representatives from various stakeholder groups, including civil society, the private sector, government, and UN agencies, this diverse panel promises engaging discussions on how to improve connectivity globally. The wide range of expertise and experiences will contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the challenges and opportunities in driving digital inclusion.

Soledad Luca de Tena

The Giga initiative, a global collaboration between UNICEF and ITU, aims to connect schools worldwide by 2030. This is achieved through a multi-stakeholder approach involving the Ministry of Education, Ministry of ICT, private sector, and civil society organizations to ensure transparency and inclusivity in internet access and digital inclusion efforts.

Giga has successfully reduced connectivity costs in Kyrgyzstan by 43% and in Rwanda by 55%, resulting in significant financial savings and increased internet speeds. This highlights the importance of effective resource management in improving connectivity and reducing costs.

Revitalizing Universal Service Funds (USF) is crucial for enhancing school connectivity. Reforms in Brazil’s USF have unlocked $675 million for school connectivity, with Giga securing an additional $1.7 billion in financing. This emphasizes the need for appropriate policy frameworks to reduce inequalities in education.

Engaging various stakeholders and promoting collaboration is vital for progress in internet access and digital inclusion. Giga’s involvement with multiple ministries facilitates effective communication and coordination. The diverse experiences and perspectives of stakeholders enable addressing complex challenges and creating a common language based on evidence and facts.

Understanding underlying technologies and their implications is essential for lowering internet costs. Giga empowers stakeholders by providing knowledge and insights for informed decision-making.

Effective contract management ensures the involvement of small operators and equitable participation in the connectivity landscape. Giga emphasizes the importance of linking contract management to connectivity status for efficient payment processes.

In conclusion, the Giga initiative emphasizes transparency, stakeholder involvement, resource management, collaboration, and understanding of technologies to achieve global internet access, digital inclusion, and improved connectivity. By leveraging diverse expertise, Giga aims to foster productive partnerships and create a connected and inclusive digital future.

Teddy Woodhouse

The UK has implemented a universal service obligation for broadband connectivity, which came into effect in 2019. This obligation requires BT and KCOM to provide universal broadband service in specific geographic areas assigned to them, ensuring all citizens have access to a decent broadband connection.

Users without a decent broadband connection can request service from BT or KCOM, with the cost being no more than what an average commercial consumer would pay. Additionally, the build cost of connecting these users, up to £3,400, will be covered.

In rural areas, a shared rural network agreement between the UK government and major mobile network operators promotes competition and provides reliable mobile services to these areas.

Ofcom, the regulator, plays a crucial role in achieving universal service. It ensures transparency, enforces targets, and adapts the process to address challenges.

To address affordability, Ofcom negotiates with broadband providers to create affordable packages for low-income households, with specific expectations for minimum speeds and performance.

Collaboration between the regulator and industry is essential for protecting consumer interests. Both BT and KCOM are committed to meeting universal service obligations.

Ofcom creates a regulatory framework catering to both large and small operations. The strategic separation of BT from OpenReach fosters competition and diversification. While Ofcom doesn’t fund community networks directly, it creates market conditions for their existence.

Ofcom enables a diverse and competitive market for internet service providers, resulting in a good and affordable broadband experience for consumers.

Fair competition is promoted by ensuring a level playing field for communication providers.

Research, facts, and evidence are necessary for well-informed decision-making by regulators, enhancing transparency and understanding.

Regulators, communication providers, and stakeholders should collaborate to improve global connectivity, reducing the digital divide for equal access to information and opportunities.

The UK demonstrates a comprehensive framework for universal broadband connectivity. Ofcom’s role in transparency, competition, and consumer protection is significant. Collaboration with the industry and the availability of social tariffs for low-income households highlight the commitment to universal service.

Konstantinos Komaitis

The debate on internet infrastructure in Europe has been heavily influenced by the concepts of digital sovereignty and protectionism. Telco providers are demanding payment from content application providers for the traffic they carry. However, users argue that they are the ones generating the traffic, not the companies. This has led to a negative sentiment surrounding the fair share proposal.

The fair share proposal is seen as a potential disruptor to the way interconnection agreements are made. There are concerns that it could narrow down the scope of Internet Exchange Points (IXPs), which could ultimately lead to increased costs for consumers. This negative sentiment is shared by a coalition of global civil society organizations, who have released a statement expressing their opposition to these policies. They argue that such policies have adverse effects on users and the open Internet.

The implementation of similar policies is being considered by many jurisdictions, including Brazil, India, South Korea, Australia, and parts of the Caribbean. This suggests that the debate on internet infrastructure is not limited to Europe, but is gaining global attention.

Konstantinos Komaitis, a strong critic of the fair share proposal, has been resisting it since its inception. He believes that the proposal is an awful idea and needs to be resisted. Additionally, he emphasizes the importance of open and accountable discussions on infrastructure, as well as the need to create systems that allow maximum participation and have sufficient checks and balances against misuse.

The European Commission has handled public consultations remarkably by using an exploratory consultation process to identify issues before drafting legislation. This demonstrates their commitment to transparency and ensuring public input. However, there are concerns about the unclear policy objective to tackle connectivity issues in Europe. It is also noted that the Commission appears to be prioritizing access networks over other networks, which is viewed as potentially problematic.

Collaboration and working together are seen as key to infrastructure building. Various actors, including telecom providers, big technology companies, tower companies, and municipalities, should participate in the process. This is because increasing reliance on the internet requires a collective effort. Rather than pitting technology companies against telcos, it is believed that they should work together. Universal Service Funds (USFs) may provide the framework for this collaboration.

Konstantinos Komaitis also emphasizes the importance of open and accountable discussions on infrastructure. He highlights the need to ensure that funds are not misused or mismanaged and proposes the implementation of accountability mechanisms to avoid such issues.

In conclusion, the debate on internet infrastructure in Europe is shaped by the ideas of digital sovereignty and protectionism. The fair share proposal, which involves payment from content application providers, is viewed negatively due to concerns about the impact on interconnection agreements and potential increase in costs for consumers. Similar policies are being considered in other jurisdictions. Konstantinos Komaitis strongly opposes the fair share proposal and stresses the importance of open discussions and collaboration in infrastructure building. The European Commission has demonstrated transparency through its public consultations, but concerns remain about the clarity of policy objectives and prioritization of access networks. It is believed that maximum participation and accountability mechanisms are key to ensuring effective infrastructure development.

Ben Matranga

Global connectivity can be achieved by addressing coordination and access to capital. The issues surrounding connectivity are not merely technological but are also related to the coordination of efforts and access to sufficient capital. Once these two problems are effectively solved, broadband access can increase on a global scale. This suggests that improving coordination and ensuring access to capital are crucial steps towards achieving global connectivity.

Blended finance plays a critical role in building broadband networks in remote areas. In Europe and the US, blended finance is commonly used to subsidize telecommunications. However, in emerging markets, the challenge lies in determining who should bear the costs and how much subsidy is required. One positive development is that as the cost of network construction decreases, less subsidy is needed. This highlights the importance of blending finance to bridge the gap in remote areas and make broadband access more accessible.

Governments can extend the reach of broadband access by providing subsidies and extensions around anchor institutions such as universities and hospitals. This approach helps pull the distribution of backhaul into new areas, making data access more affordable in previously underserved communities. The presence of anchor institutions can effectively extend the access of broadband services.

It is argued that broadband access should be considered a commodity that is accessible to all, rather than a luxury. Many parts of the world still regard data as a luxury item. The goal should be to make data a commodity that people can access anytime and anywhere. This approach aligns with the Sustainable Development Goals of promoting industry, innovation, infrastructure, and reducing inequalities.

Universal service funds are commonly utilized by governments worldwide as a source of capital for market investments. These funds play a critical role in making capital available for broadband projects. By utilizing universal service funds, governments can support market investments and contribute to achieving the goals of industry, innovation, and infrastructure.

The cost of establishing networks and providing broadband services can be significantly reduced through coordinated builds and subsidies. Coordinated builds, which involve constructing various areas together, are more cost-effective than doing so individually. Additionally, subsidies play a role in offsetting the costs of establishing networks. It is estimated that subsidies typically account for only 10% to 20% of the total cost.

Public policy plays a crucial role in determining how different geographic areas, based on their economic buckets, are serviced. Areas with solid economics are usually serviced, while areas with marginal economics require access to long-term capital. Moreover, areas with insufficient economics need subsidies from Universal Service Funds to bridge the gap. This highlights the importance of public policy in ensuring universal broadband access.

However, higher interest rates are causing delays in global construction projects, particularly impacting emerging markets. The increase in interest rates worldwide has contributed to these delays, presenting challenges for the progress of infrastructure development, especially in emerging markets.

To manage high capital costs, there should be a focus on reducing the cost of service delivery. It is important to strike a balance between capital and labour, as higher labour costs in markets like the UK and the US can significantly increase the cost of building infrastructure. By finding ways to reduce the cost of service delivery, the challenges posed by high capital costs can be effectively managed.

Lower labour costs in emerging markets have the potential to contribute to delivering affordable revenue per user (ARPU). The affordability of broadband services is a crucial factor in achieving widespread adoption and usage. The lower cost of labour in emerging markets can help reduce the overall cost of delivering ARPU in the desired range of 10 to 15 dollars.

In conclusion, global connectivity can be achieved by addressing coordination and access to capital. Blended finance, subsidies around anchor institutions, and the provision of universal service funds are some of the strategies that can be employed to expand broadband access. Coordinated builds, public policy, and efforts to reduce the cost of service delivery also play important roles. However, challenges such as higher interest rates and high capital costs must be tackled. Overall, achieving global connectivity requires a comprehensive approach encompassing various factors and stakeholders.

Jane Roberts Coffin:
Welcome to workshop 292. The workshop organizers are sitting here with our wonderful panel. I’m Jane and this is Senka. I’m gonna give a quick overview of why we’re here, in theory, and we’ll talk more about it throughout the panel session. And Senka is gonna introduce some of our panelists and then we’ll get to the panelists and the lineup. We have until 12 o’clock and we have two sets of speakers. We’ll have Q&A in between and after each set of speakers. So we have six speakers from around the world. We’re very excited they’re here. We’re here to talk about universal service or universal service and access funds. These funds have been around for over 20 years. Some people are not aware of that. They were originally created by regulators around the world to subsidize fixed networks, which are fiber networks that were in the ground. Some of you may only be familiar with mobile networks, but there are fixed mobile and satellite networks. And originally, universal service funds were meant to subsidize those fixed networks. They were developed, in fact, with some of the big telcos that deployed those networks at the time. Over the years, as technology has changed and new technology has emerged, particularly mobile and other Wi Fi. Mobile, in particular, has also been subsidized. If you receive phone bills still from your providers, you may see certain universal service taxes on your bills, at least in the United States you do and in some other countries. And you start to realize there are quite a few fees that build up. Generally, that money went into funds. Throughout the years, some of those funds have been very well administered. Some have been extremely corrupt. They’ve been used by some governments, not for the purposes for building out networks. And there’s been lack of accountability in some of those funds, meaning providers were given the money to build out, and they didn’t build out to the rural, remote, unserved and underserved areas. If they had, we wouldn’t be where we are today, with about 2.6 billion offline. Now, we all recognize, all the speakers here and Senka and I, that building out certain places with fiber is just not doable from a geographic perspective and in different territories. And this is also, I should say, an urban, rural and remote issue. This is not just rural, remote when it comes to universal service. There are some communities that have been what’s called redlined, excluded from connectivity, and that’s a whole other issue we won’t get into necessarily. But the funds have been administered over the years generally by regulators, in some cases by ministries. Senka wrote a paper recently for APC under a certain program that is linked to the workshop description. And you can see some great examples of different universal service funds from around the world. We also wanna give a shout out to A4AI, and now it’s called GDIP. That team has done so much work, and Natalia Frodich, who’s our first speaker, was from that team in the past, who’s done research in Latin America on universal service funds. The A4AI team also, at that time, had done some work in Sub Saharan Africa to posit that there were ways that you could use those funds to help also women and girls to connect women and girls, but also to broaden the funds. And it’s something that we’ve all talked about, is how to take those funds and distribute them to potentially internet exchange points, to community networks, which has been done in Argentina recently, so that there’s more diversification of those funds and subsidies out to other areas. So we have a wonderful range of speakers, from practitioners who’ve been in the field building networks, to policy experts, to folks that have done extreme work on how to fund networks, that’s Ben, and Josephine who’s worked with a group in Nairobi called Tanda, it’s a community network, Constantinos, who’s a policy expert, and I’m gonna turn it over to Senka, so she can give you better bios. But we just wanted to set the stage that the idea here is that we need to think of ways to reboot these funds, to create a new way of putting the universal service funds out there.

Senka Hadzic:
Thank you. Hi everyone, and welcome to the session. I’m going to introduce the six speakers that we will have today. Our first speaker is Natalia Fodic. Natalia is the Director of International Programs at Connect Humanity. She’s a licensed attorney and expert in technology and communications policy and regulatory issues, with over 15 years of experience. Natalia is joining us online from Brazil today. Our second speaker, Konstantinos Komaitis, is here in the room. And he is currently a non resident fellow and senior researcher at the Lisbon Council. He’s also a non resident fellow with the Digital Forensics Research Lab and at the Atlantic’s Council Democracy and Tech Initiative. Previously, Constantinos spent 10 years in active policy development and strategy as Senior Director at the Internet Society. And he’s also an author and public speaker. Our third speaker is joining us online today. It’s Ben Matranga, who is the Managing Partner of Connectivity Capital. Connectivity Capital is a impact investment fund focused on expanding internet access in developing countries. Ben has nearly 20 years of experience leading private equity, venture capital, and debt investments in emerging markets. Like Jane said, after those first three speakers, we will have a short Q&A session, and then we will move to the second part of the session, which will be more focused on specific sectors. So in that part, our first speaker in the second part is going to be Teddy Woodhouse. Teddy is a ICT for development expert with almost a decade of experience in public and non profit sectors. Currently, he’s the International Policy Manager at Ofcom, the UK Communications Regulator. And in this role, he’s responsible for Ofcom’s engagement within the ITU. I believe that Teddy is joining us from Geneva, in fact. Before Ofcom, Teddy was with the Alliance for Affordable Internet. Like Jane said, we actually cited a lot of work from A4AI in our background paper. After Teddy, we’ll have Josephine Meliza, who is here with us in the room today. Josephine is a Digital Inclusion and Transformation Consultant. She’s one of the pioneers of the community networks movement in Africa. Currently, she’s the Regional Policy Coordinator for Africa within APC’s LockNet project. She also co chairs the Africa Community Network Summit and is a member of the MAG, the IGF Multi Stakeholder Advisory Group. And last but not least, we have Saul Luca de Tena here in the room. Saul has worked as a Strategic Program Manager within Technology and Development, Capacity Building, and Policy Advocacy for 15 years. She’s the former CEO of a award winning community based ISP in South Africa. And currently, Saul is a Connectivity Solutions Specialist at Giga, which is a UNICEF ITU joint initiative aiming to collect every school in the world to the internet by 2030. As you can see, we have a very diverse panel from different stakeholder groups, civil society, private sector, government, UN agencies. I hope you enjoy the discussions and I will hand over to our first speaker, Natalia Fordic.

Nathalia Foditsch:
Thank you, Senka. Well, first of all, thank you so much to you and to Jane for organizing the session. It’s a pleasure to have so many of you. Well, I envy you a little bit, as I mentioned in the chat, because I would love to be in Japan. But it’s so nice to see you and see some, I mean, be able to be in this panel with Teddy. I know Onika, my former colleague, is also, I mean, I saw her as one of the persons who will attend the session. So it’s a real pleasure. So I have been working with connectivity issues for around 15 years. I’m currently working for Connect Humanity, which is a philanthropic fund focused on connectivity. Prior to that, I was at A4AI and as Jane has mentioned, and well, regarding the document that Jane has mentioned, that was a document that was published about two years ago. And it was focused in Latin America, Latin American and Caribbean countries. In part, we did that in partnership with the Internet Society. And in that document, we came to the conclusion that, I mean, most, most of the funding of universal service funds go to large operators, right? So that’s a first issue here, because I mean, this various types of stakeholders should be able to access this funds. Another issue is that a lot of the times, the disbursement disbursement rates are really low. So in the region, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Peru had high disbursement rates. However, many of the countries either were not using it at all, or were using for other purposes, such as creative accounting, right? So you use it for, for other purposes, other than telecom policy, for example, helping the country reach certain federal budgetary goals, like surplus, right? From a perspective of equity and universality. As I was mentioning, there is a key issue on who is able to access this funds, not only whether they are disbursed or not. As Jane has, Jane has mentioned, Argentina had some recent changes, like about three years ago, recent legal changes that actually allowed community networks to access the funds. However, it just came back from the LACNIC, LACNOG meeting, and the LACISP meeting with all of the stakeholders from the region. Last week, I was there talking to them, and they said that, you know, this is not working that well any longer in the country. So I mean, I don’t have precise information, but that’s what I heard from them, from Argentinian colleagues in the meeting last week. So in the US, there is also $42 billion now to support broadband, right, to unserved and underserved communities. However, and the program is called BEED, which stands for Broadband Equity Access and Deployment Program. However, Connect Humanity, the organization I’m working for, has recently, together with other organizations in the US, has advocated for changes in how these funds are being designed to be disbursed, because the smaller ISPs, whenever they are trying to get access to these funds, they have to get a letter of credit of 25% of the amount plus a 25% match requirement. And a lot of times that amounts to a total amount that is much higher than what they can afford. So that basically shuts them out of the program. So and similar fears to that happen, for example, in Brazil, Brazil is going back to the Latin American examples, is one of the countries that actually has is a pretty famous one, because it had has had a fund for literally 20 years. However, the fund was completely dormant, and was being used for creative accounting purposes. However, two years ago, a new law was enacted, in which finally, first of all, the funds can be used towards broadband, because prior to that, it was only phone lines, not really internet. And then second, finally, we are advancing towards actually disbursing this funds have that has have been accumulated for so long. But then there are also fears related to whether all types of stakeholders will be able to access this funds or not, whether it’s just like same old, right, like large operators only. Just a quick overview of how that’s going, like, you know, the National Development Bank is the financial agents behind it. So right now, the BNDS, which is the National Development Bank, as the only financial agent responsible for the funds, there’s there, there will be reimbursable and non reimbursable lines of credit. However, the reimbursable ones are much clearer than the non reimbursable ones. And precisely the smaller stakeholders like community networks would be the ones that will benefit from the non reimbursable lines. And this is actually they’re going to finalize the the details of how that’s going to play out only next year. And well, I don’t know how much more time do I have? Well, um, and well, in regards to community networks, Natalia, sorry to interrupt you. You have about a minute. Okay. Regarding community networks, it’s something that used to be not even known by some of the public officials in even in within the national regulator or the ministry, right? So over the past two, three years, finally, there is more awareness of it. And now finally, there is a new working group that has been created within the national regulator, I’m sorry. And I actually have a sprained ankle, and I’m taking a lot of medicine. And this is my stomach, basically. I’m sorry. So we hope that the we hope to create more awareness of this community networks through this working group that was recently created in the regulator, the national regulator. That’s it for now for the first round. Thank you.

Konstantinos Komaitis:
Thank you, Natalia. Over to Konstantinos. Thank you, Jane. Good morning, everyone. It’s really good to be here. And thank you very much for asking me to come and speak. So I would like to start by saying that I think that at least I will bring the perspective of Europe and what’s happening in Europe where discussions on infrastructure have really picked up again. I think that the COVID pandemic did two things. First of all, it made us all realize how important the internet is and made us survive what was and I’m presenting a very difficult situation. But at the same time, it highlighted the need to have a conversation about infrastructure again. And also the political need for this to happen. In Europe, at least the way the conversations about infrastructure have been taking place for over a year and a half now, unfortunately has taken a direction that it’s not really about how to create sustainable models to support infrastructure. But it is done in a way that is really premised on ideas of digital sovereignty and protectionism. And for those of you who might be following a little bit what is happening in Europe, I am talking of course about the fair share debate, which effectively is this idea that telco providers need to be paid or, you know, are entitled to payment by continent application providers for the traffic that they carry. It is very unfortunate that in Europe this debate has been shaped in the way that it has because it has been sensationalized and currently we’re at a place where it’s not really based on facts anymore, but it’s really purely emotional. And what I mean by that is that, you know, the way the story has evolved, we’re even seeing terminology being used that is, you know, basically completely mistaken and misinformation. For instance, companies like Google and Facebook and AWS and Netflix are being referred to as large traffic generators, which is fundamentally wrong because anyone who has spent at least a little bit of time in this space knows very well that the only, it’s users that generate traffic. That’s it. Users want to access the services that are being provided by these companies and they pay their ISPs in order to be able and access those services. So effectively what telco providers are asking is some sort of double payment. So it’s really double-dipping, right? So we’re getting what we want out of users, but we’re also going to be getting what we want out of those large, very large companies. We are at a place, and actually a lot has happened in the past 12 hours in Europe at least, once the debate started and of course there was not a lot of information because beyond the idea of give us money, there was not really a concrete plan as to how this money will be calculated, what sort of measures they will be used, why USFs are not being utilized or are part of the conversation. So by the time, however, everyone started engaging, I cannot remember. I’ve been doing this for approximately 20 years and by this I mean internet policy, and I cannot remember any other time in Europe where stakeholders that traditionally have been at opposing ends have come together in order to fight this, because this model and this idea is really going to materially affect the way the internet works. It is going to affect the open internet. We are talking about changing here the way interconnection agreements are made. We are talking about minimizing and narrowing down a lot the scope of IXPs, internet exchange points, which are effectively the place where interconnection happens, and we are talking about, of course, consumers and how they will be affected because somebody will need to pay for all that money that will be spent. So we have spent a year and a half fighting the Commission on this. There was never a proposal. There was a consultation that opened up in February and ended in May, and yesterday, of all days, after four months of waiting patiently, or impatiently in my case, the Commission released its results. Of course, there is no consensus about the fair share proposal, so for the time being it’s been shelved. However, we do know that there’s going to be some sort, most probably, some sort of a policy recommendation. We know that the Commission is not really willing to give this up and that it is going to continue. And before I just wrap up, a little bit of self, it’s not really a self-speech, but because Europe did it, and that has been one of the unintended consequences or perhaps even intentional, a lot of other jurisdictions have started picking this up. Brazil, India, South Korea, Australia, somebody pinged me on Twitter, and many other jurisdictions, some places in the Caribbean, are starting to pick up this conversation as well. And of course, the thinking is, if Europe does it, which is a democracy, which is the biggest trading bloc, which is the third largest economy in the world, why shouldn’t we do it? It must be a very good idea. It is an awful idea, and we need to resist this global trend because one of the side effects is going to be that if this thing goes through in many jurisdictions, even in one jurisdiction, we are talking about fragmenting the Internet, right? So as part of that and all these concerns, a coalition of global civil society organizations released a statement today calling out on the governments to resist such policies because of the adverse effect that they might have on users as well as the open Internet. And I’ll stop here and happy to take any questions.

Jane Roberts Coffin:
Thank you, Konstantinos. And we have one more speaker, and I would pause it, and we might want to talk about this after Ben speaks, is, is it triple dipping? If you get money out of users, get universal service funds, and then you put a tax on people who ride on top of, well, carrier traffic for you in some instances. In any event, we’re over to Ben Matranga, and just a shout out also to a great report that Ben and his colleague Anup put together with Connect Humanity, the Internet Society, and the Association for Progressive Communications in Moscilla. Last year, there’s a great report on innovative financing for all types of networks, and in particular some of these smaller, medium-sized ISPs, which are both commercial and non-commercial. Ben, we are going to turn it over to you, and Ben is another online speaker.

Ben Matranga:
Perfect. Well, thank you, Jane, and thank you, Senka, for allowing me to join. We’re excited to be here. My name is Ben Matranga. I’m a managing partner at Connectivity Capital. Connectivity Capital is an impact investment fund, and what that means is we mobilize capital from the private sector and work, by and large, with public sector private partners, so these are development finance institutions, to mobilize capital to expand Internet access in frontier markets. So, to date, we’ve had investments in over 15 countries. Our focus is broadly Sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia, and I think it’s an exciting time to have this conversation because we’re, you know, we’re, meaning the global, we are at a place now where we really do have all of the tools to reach 90% plus of the people on this planet with with broadband access. And that’s pretty, you know, exciting, bold, but also limiting. And what I mean by that is, you know, this is not a technological problem. This is not kind of physics of how we promulgate, you know, the characteristics of an IP-based network. This is not a question of whether we do fiber or wireless or what kind of mode of transportation of how we get data to people. That will all be solved by actors on the ground that are close to the problem. We really see this as a coordination and then an access to capital problem. And if we can solve those two problems, we will see access to broadband increase, you know, in vast swaths of the globe. And I think I want to break down both of those things. First, coordination and then access to capital. And I’ll start with access to capital. Now, the way we kind of view connectivity writ large, I think one thing that is incredibly important for everyone to kind of accept and understand, something we kind of already intuitively get is that there’s this idea of the dual ecosystem of connectivity is what we call. And what that means is every single person has two forms of connectivity. They have one form, which is mobile, which is connected to the person, which is optimized for go anywhere you want. You can take it on the go. It’s amazing what you can do. You know, we look at migration patterns in places like Kenya and what you can do because of the mobile phone, because you can, you know, in your life, you know, even kind of call your mom on her birthday to send mobile money transfers, everything that’s kind of those smaller data uses. It’s done a fantastic job over the last decade. We like to call that kind of the first wave of connectivity in emerging markets. But there’s limits to that leapfrog. And the second form of connectivity, which is predominant, which we’re all using right now, is broadband connections and broadband for us is uncapped always on. It is thinking about the Internet and thinking about the data, not as kind of some episodic thing that you do. It’s just always there. And when it’s always there, it becomes a utility. What we like to see over time is the pricing for that service no longer becomes a luxury good, but it’s a commodity. You don’t even think about the price to transact on it. And today, in most parts of the world, for the vast majority of people, data is still a luxury good. And our mission is basically to make a commodity everywhere in the world so people can jump online whenever they want to interact in whatever way they choose to and then exit and know the Internet is still going to be there when they’re done. Now, I think, you know, what I really want to hit the point on is kind of the challenge of blended finance and how we use blended finance with private sector partners to expand access to the Internet’s in all of these remote parts of the world that need that uncapped always on broadband connection. I think the challenge with blended finance is less that it’s needed, you know, the track record of using blended finance and universal service funds in Europe and the United States is pretty universal. You know, you take most sections of the population and they required some some some form of subsidy. I think the bigger challenge in emerging markets is who pays for it. And then how much blending is needed. You know, the stark reality is in most of the countries we operate in The government’s have a ton of pressure on their budgets and that’s to provide for social goods and services, health care, education, etc. There’s constraints on those parts and it It seems to have shaken out that providing additional subsidy for telecoms is something that is just always one of those things that this is not the coalition of actors there to provide that subsidy that you would have in other sectors. Now, the good news is that the cost to actually build these networks is falling through the floor, you know, kind of global supply chains have reacted And the cost to build a network, even a fiber based network and most of these markets is, you know, extraordinarily cheaper than it was even, you know, five years ago. So less subsidy is needed. And how is that subsidy then provided for our belief is that governments may be able to provide some subsidy. The exciting subsidies that we see are coming around anchor institutions. When we talk about anchor institutions we think about these as universities, community centers, hospitals. Etc. And that what that does in terms of network architecture is it pulls kind of the what we like to think of as the trunk, the kind of fat part of the network, your, your backhaul distribution into new places. And it just lowers the landed cost of bandwidth to get into new communities, then that kind of ground game that is piece can build off of It drops their price to then reach the end consumer. So in certain markets. We’re most excited about seeing the potential of that giga has certainly done that at scale and certain African markets. Once you get the landed cost of bandwidth into new communities and by and large is piece are extraordinarily creative. They’re probably, you know, riding on the backbone of some of that infrastructure, even before Most of the public sector clients know it. They’re, you know, it’s extraordinarily crafty and kind of fast moving entrepreneurs that do that. And once they see that landed cost of bandwidth drop They know their economics, one of that they can deliver that service to end consumers. Now, the second part of that question is, is who and I think, you know, Building a broadband network really comes down to what we like to think of as revenue density. It’s just the cost to serve denser populations is always going to be less. And that’s how You know, it’s kind of always been the case. And that’s where kind of the need for thoughtful public policy of how we think about the amount of subsidy that’s needed to reach some of those lesser dense population comes into play. The good news is, I think, in emerging markets. We’re not kind of even there yet. You know, there’s still a lot of runway to move with private sector builds in these in in most of these markets, you know, you take Take the country, even like South Africa for all intents and purposes, you know, feels well developed is a brick is, you know, kind of Solid second world country still has broadband penetration rates that are just around 15% right. So there’s just a lot of movement to go to get an uncapped always on connection and everyone’s home. I think what’s critical for us. And I think I just want to end on this point. And this is something that a free I the Alliance for Ford one and it really hit on early on around the importance of meaningful connectivity. Is, you know, what is broadband and why is it important and the pandemic certainly hit that home for a lot of us. You can’t, you’re only going to use a sliver of the Internet. If you have episodic data use, you’re certainly not going to have a call like this. And be on, you know, will be on this call an hour and a half that will consume about a gig and a half of data. So just as an example of real time for people that want to be able to participate. You do need that uncapped always on connection. We think that’s kind of the way what customers will demand in these markets. With that, I’ll let me send it back over to Jane and Cinco.

Jane Roberts Coffin:
Thank you, Ben. And I should have said earlier when we started. Thank you to the host country. The connectivity here has been amazing. So thank you to the To our hosts here in Japan as well. And we’re very lucky as Ben said that we can have this call. We have about 10 minutes for Q&A. And we’ve just heard from Ben Constantinos and Natalia. We have about 10 minutes for Q&A. And we’ve just heard from Ben Constantinos and Natalia. There’s a theme we could pull out on subsidization and public policy. And I would say multi stakeholder participation in policymaking because Ben, you as a finance expert certainly could not only are you helping subsidize networks, but you’re working with governments and public sectors to make sure that you’re doing the right thing. I would like to ask you all, in particular, in the context of multi stakeholder organizations, to help them flip the policy so it’s not just them making the decisions without talking to experts. I would ask you all, and Constantinos was just talking about Europe, subsidization of connectivity has been going on a very long time, especially some of the biggest networks in the world. The biggest ISPs. Why wouldn’t we want a strong public policy multi stakeholder consultation to shape those policies to either develop funds, to have the right public policies put in place. Natalia, I’ll start with you because Connect Humanity is doing great work in starting up funds to also work with the public policy folks, and you’ve recently, as you noted, put something out on the letter of credit in the United States, and or you’re in Brazil yourself and you’re an expert in that space, and from A4AI in general. Talk to us about, and we’ll give it a minute each, talk to us about what you think can be done to improve multi stakeholder consultation on some of these really critical issues, particularly USFs. Ben, when it comes to just financing in general, and Constantinos, how this relates to fair share and the subsidization as well. So Natalia, over to you.

Nathalia Foditsch:
Well, regarding the fair share, I’m also following that closely. I’m following the debate closely as Constantino has mentioned. It has become a really strong topic in Brazil too. We recently had a consultation from the national regulator. Now there are rumors that they will propose that big techs contribute to the USF too, as like one potential solution for that ordeal. And then regards to the consultations. One of the fears that smaller ISPs in Brazil have is that the money is not going to be dispersed at a fast enough pace. And whether they are actually going to be able to access them or not. We should have more participation at the design itself of the details of how the money will be disbursed. I mean, there is some multi stakeholder participation, but it’s limited to particular institutions that are part of an established group, an official group. But not all stakeholders are represented there, right? I mean, I’m talking about the universal service funds now. And also there are issues with double or triple dipping, as you have mentioned. Potential overlaps in incentives that large companies get. So for example, we had recently the 5G spectrum auction. And it was actually auctioned at a lower price. And now they have the large operators that actually got the spectrum have to cover schools. However, they are also getting public funds from the universal service funds to connect the schools, right? So that is an issue. And for that particular type of example, we need a stronger public involvement and involvement from different stakeholders to make sure that there is more transparency. And actually the funds are actually used and there is not double or triple dipping in these funds. That’s it.

Jane Roberts Coffin:
Thank you, Natalia. And you’ve hit on something that I’ll segue over to Konstantinos. For years and years and years, we all talked about best practices in public consultations, which is transparency. Publishing the different proceeding results that you’ve got. So if you’ve contributed to the proceeding and then working with a large range of stakeholders so that you can hopefully have a better policy in place. Konstantinos, have you seen that recently?

Konstantinos Komaitis:
Short answer, yes. So to me, it has been quite a remarkable experience, especially Europe has been quite a remarkable experience in the way this has been handled. Because we did have a public consultation process. FYI, this was an exploratory consultation, meaning that it is a tool that the commission uses in order to be able to identify whether there is actually an issue before they proceed to actual drafting of legislation. And according to its own toolbox, the commission’s own toolbox, if the exploratory consultation comes back and they are against it, they should not really proceed with legislation. So all that was a little bit of a hazy moment in Europe because we really do not understand what is happening and why this is happening. But even beyond that, I just want to make a couple of points here. The first one is that… There is not a clear policy objective why we’re doing this, especially in Europe. Connectivity issues in Europe are not as, of course there are connectivity issues, but in terms of fiber, we are actually meeting the targets. In terms of 5G coverage, we’re actually meeting the targets in Europe. And also there has been a study by WIC Consultancy on behalf of the Commission in the European Union that actually said that even though these targets are met, consumers are not using them, they’re not making use of these services, because they don’t know they exist, they haven’t seen the utility yet, and so on and so forth. So we are at a place where we are actually meeting those targets. The second point that I want to make is that telcos are making money, right? I mean, it’s not that they’re not making money. The question here is, and the policy seems to be, and that was always an issue for me, and a question that has never been answered, the policy always seemed to be to try to make big telcos, because we’re only talking about big telcos in Europe, as big as big tech, right? And I do appreciate that in the internet environment, telcos might not be as big as big technology companies, but that is their issue to solve. This is not a public policy issue that requires regulatory intervention. The other thing that I want to make is about the diversity of infrastructure, and the point that the Commission seems to be missing. When it comes to the internet, one of the things that, one of the most basic rules is that no network is more important than another. And what the Commission seems to be implying is that access networks seems to have some sort of priority and privilege over other networks. We know that when it comes to internet infrastructure, it is extremely diverse, and everybody contributes their own share. What do I mean? Telcos invest in upgrading their networks. Technology companies invest in creating CDNs and data centers in order to be able to facilitate the traffic and make sure that users get access to the content that they want and the services that they want in a much faster and more reliable way. In fact, the OECD is working on a report, and they will be coming out, that most probably will be coming out next month, where it makes exactly that point about broadband infrastructure. It tries to demonstrate the diverse set of actors that are participating, and the report will identify, of course, telecom providers, of course big technology companies, but then you have tower companies, you have hedge funds, you have pension funds, you have municipalities that they’re all being part of this infrastructure ecosystem. So it is very important, and I will keep on repeating this because I believe that it gets missed in all this noise. We need to talk about infrastructure, right? Our reliance on the internet will only increase, but pitting technology companies against telcos is not the way to do this. The only way to do this is to collaborate, and only to collaborate. USFs might provide that framework to collaborate, and yes, we need to change a lot of things. I heard transparency, the word transparency being thrown out, definitely transparency. We have a mechanism, in some cases it has worked, the USFs, in some other cases it may not have worked. Let’s all work together in order to try to figure out how to strengthen it, boost it, and actually facilitate this infrastructure building.

Jane Roberts Coffin:
Thank you, Konstantinos, and Ben, sort of riffing off that theme of collaboration but in a different way, in a financial collaborative sense of universal service funds being part of a capital stack for investment. Can you just pull a little bit on that a little bit more, and why that is part of a potential blended finance stack? So over to Ben.

Ben Matranga:
Absolutely. Thank you very much, Jane, and I think the reality is that universal service funds are, most governments in the world utilize them, so it’s a pot of capital that just exists in most of the markets, even kind of the lowest end countries that we finance projects in. So the money’s there. The challenge is always how does it get out to the end users, and I would plug just one more time the report that Jane mentioned. We wrote a report with APC, Connect Humanity, with ISOC around financing mechanisms, and one of the things that we really highlighted was getting in the weeds of what a subsidy looks like. And the real importance with subsidies is understanding what we would, in finance, call the difference between capital expenditure and operational expenditure, but it’s really kind of what is the one-time versus the ongoing costs of subsidy. When you’re doing subsidy-type programs, the ongoing costs are the ones that tend to be tougher because do they go on in perpetuity, when do they expire, essentially, whereas the one-time costs, you can really get your head around right at the build. The great thing about one-time costs is you can drastically lower that number when you have coordinated builds, so the cost to actually build multiple different areas when you’re doing it at once, when you’re doing it up front, is actually quite a bit cheaper. What we call truck rolls, bringing out a crew, mobilizing resources to continue builds after the fact, it can be extraordinarily expensive. Now, I think the key with CapEx is understanding what types of numbers we’re talking about. I’ll give you an example. We just put out two loans, one in South Africa, where we look at the core CapEx of a network. We’re putting that out at about $80 per user. That’s $80 per user to provide core network CapEx to build out in these markets. The subsidy needn’t be very large. We’re talking in the range of 10% to 20% is typically what was done in the United States. In a situation like that, we’re talking $20 a user to be able to bring broadband services. In India, it’s even less. In India, they’re doing fiber at such tremendous scales. This is durable, long-dated infrastructure that is in the ground that’ll exist in perpetuity. I think the last point I would just make is understanding the difference. This is where public policy really is needed and is challenging, is how you divide different geographic areas. The way we typically think about any given geographic area is it falls into one of four economic buckets. One of them is that they’re great economics, solid returns. The other one is there’s marginal economics. The other one is there’s insufficient economics. The other one is there’s permanent subsidy that’s required. The ones that are solid economics are, by and large, are being serviced. The topos are already there. They’re there at scale. With great public policy environment, there’s competition that sits down pricing. Those are, by and large, solving themselves. No one would be surprised if you looked at the maps of those. It’s in the CBD. It’s in the highest, most populated parts. The second phase, which is the marginal economics, by and large, the builds are happening. It’s the longer duration capital that really constrains those from being built. The way capital formation works in most emerging markets is long-term dated capital, and especially in high inflation environments like we’re in now. It does constrict the ability to build to some of those projects. That’s where mechanisms of international finance that are still private sector led can really increase the build there. The next bucket, marginal economics, that’s where you do need USFs to come in. Those are communities that are predominantly impoverished, a whole host of other challenges. By and large, if you can get that subsidy in there, you can build out to those places. I think the smartest subsidy programs that we’re seeing are focused on those areas. The last one, which is insufficient economics, part of that is just deep, rural, remote areas. I think the good news is, as a percentage basis, those are almost always single digits in any given country. There’s a needed discussion about permanent forms of subsidy that’s needed, but it includes that both one-time and ongoing subsidy.

Jane Roberts Coffin:
Thank you, Ben. I would throw in, if we’re going to have permanent subsidies, midterm, short-term, long-term, we’re going to need a little bit more accountability in some countries, where if a provider is given a certain amount of subsidization, it would be good to know what they actually did with that money, and if people were actually connected. There’s some great universal service programs out there. We’re going to hear a little bit more about that. That’s a good segue over to Teddy. The next set of panelists are Teddy Woodhouse, Josephine Meliza, and Sol Luca de Tena. Teddy, over to you. Teddy’s coming to us from Geneva. Thank you to Teddy and Ben, because it’s very late, where they both are, and Natalia. We appreciate your being so fresh and giving us great data at a tough hour. Teddy, over to you. You’re in Geneva. We appreciate that, and you’re with Ofcom, the UK regulator, for those that may not be familiar with Ofcom. Perfect.

Teddy Woodhouse:
Thanks so much, Jane, and hopefully everyone can hear me all right. It’s an absolute pleasure to be joining you all, no matter what time zone it is. It is worth the effort. As Jane mentioned, I’m at Ofcom, the UK regulator. I wanted to focus a bit on what the regulator’s role in trying to achieve universal service and what that looks like, because there’s nuance to what a public policy role is and what a regulator’s role is going to be. Focusing in on that regulator role, which is the stuff I love, hopefully we can get into that. In the UK’s experience, one of the key nuances that defines the UK market is we have a universal service obligation rather than a universal service fund. What that means is it’s actually implemented that there’s an obligation on two providers in the UK, BT and KCOM, which are chosen by geography, who have an obligation to provide universal service to broadband in certain geographic areas they’re assigned to, rather than necessarily there’s a central fund that disburses the funds out to other service providers or how you have it. The way the obligation works in the UK, just to briefly describe it, is created in 2018 through legislation, and then 2019, Ofcom creates the implementing forces as the regulator of what are the expectations of this, and this has expectations around the speeds, there’s a minimum definition there, and then also naming who this obligation will sit on. The way it works for a user is if they don’t have a decent broadband connection at home, they can request to either BT or KCOM, depending on where in the country they live, for coverage to be provided to them. If coverage gets provided to them, they pay no more than what an average commercial consumer would pay, but the build of up to, right now it’s £3,400 gets covered. If it’s more than that, unfortunately, and for some truly remote and rural parts of the UK, it’s more than that, and so then there has to be a question of, okay, how does that access get paid for, whether it’s by the consumer or other public financing mechanisms that exist in the UK, and that’s where it kind of then starts to lean in to the government work that can happen in this sector, so it’s a brief description of how the universal service obligation works in the UK, and so that’s one model of approaching this question of how do we connect everyone in the world. Some of the other parts that are live in the UK market that are going to be relevant to how we understand this issue are things like the shared rural network, which is a kind of agreement essentially between the UK government and network operators here, mobile network operators here in the UK, to build out into rural areas set by two targets that are monitored by Ofcom, the regulator, and so that’s the regulator’s role is actually this kind of transparency and enforcement role of making sure that what gets agreed to and what the expectations are in terms of rural coverage are being met, and it’s important here to think about the driver that’s the benefit of having four major operators all working together on this program is you have the prospect for competition, which can be a really thorny issue when you’re trying to think about universal service in rural areas and feel like if you get coverage of any kind, it’s great, but then it’s, oh, but there’s only just one, so now you’re creating the conditions for monopoly, and how do you address that by design is also an interesting question when we think about universal service. Another program that’s in the UK, and this one is operated by Ofcom, is the social tariffs program, and so this one works with fixed broadband, where essentially Ofcom, the regulator, has negotiated with broadband providers throughout the UK on creating a specific tier of broadband packages that are more affordable, targeted towards low-income households, so if someone is on universal credit here in the UK or receives another type of public benefit, they become eligible for this program, and it, again, has expectations of minimum speeds and performance for this network so that people are still getting a good user experience, even in these conditions where you’re trying to use kind of a public intervention to provide connectivity, and so I’ll stop there just because I also want to hear from the other two panelists personally. I think they’re going to be incredible, and they’re also on site, so that’s much more interesting, but what I’ll just say is from the UK experience, some of the things that I hope are kind of the transferable lessons that make sense are things about you have to have a role of different stakeholders, and particularly a role between the regulator and industry is really important. The universal service obligation, for example, was designed so it was actually an application basis, so BT and KCOM come forward and said we want to provide and feel we can meet the obligation in these areas, and so that was something that was done at an earlier stage so that it works for consumers at the later stage when they’re requesting access. It’s also about analyzing the market, and this builds a bit into, you know, Ben’s four categories of economic investment here is things like the shared world network here in the UK builds out of, you know, what is feasible with just no interventions and doesn’t need something, but where are the areas in the country where we do need to intervene and do need to kind of set targets, and the last part is about kind of adapting and iterating as you go through, and so this is actually going to be one of the upcoming issues for the UK is what are expectations around speed and performance, and if we need to revise the universal service definition of broadband, so currently it’s 10 megabits per second is the minimum download speed, does that need to increase to a higher number potentially in the future, and so that’s hopefully just a few examples and kind of bits of wisdom that we can share from the UK experience, but I’ll hand over to my other panelists and thank everyone for their time. Thank you, Teddy, and you gave us a lovely segue there with the

Jane Roberts Coffin:
point that you just made on adapting and iterating. I had experiences years ago where I worked with regulators who thought the rules went in place and things didn’t need to change, and of course with new technology coming on and new types of networks being deployed and new ways to subsidize those networks or help capitalize them, in Ben’s case and others, it really is important that we look at regulatory flexibility, and I think many people will call it fit-for-purpose regulation, which has to change over time. Josephine, I know in Kenya there’s been some really great work being done with the regulator. I know that from a community networks perspective you have perspectives on universal service. We’re turning it over to you now to hear a little bit more from your perspective and from your on-the-ground perspective. Thanks.

Josephine Miliza:
Thank you, Jane, and to my other panelists as well. I think I’d just like to start by setting a context around USFs in Africa in general. Currently, 37 countries have been able to establish a USF. Some are still in progress, and with regards to how they are set up, those that are independent, sort of independent agencies, and others are housed within the regulator. And I think similar to other continents as well, there’s still gross challenges around domancy in as much as many of them are established, not at the fund and not dispersed. We have issues around transparency, impact, and sustainability of some of the projects that the USFs undertake. For example, you’d find that in some countries they’ll set up infrastructure, but there’s no ownership of that infrastructure beyond those funds. Some undertake projects such as setting up digital ICT centers, which after they’re handed over to the communities, there’s no follow-up, and so you find that this lies dormant. And so in trying to unlock USFs, especially for community networks, it really begins at first understanding that majority of our African countries do not recognize community networks as complementary access models. And so this means that automatically you are locked out from accessing these funds. Kenya is an example where there has been good collaboration between the regulator and civil society organizations. In 2020, during the pandemic, I think the silver lining was that we realized that in as much as we are talking about these technologies such as AI, IoT, we really had a huge percentage of our population which is still unconnected. And so as part of the COVID-19 responses, the government looked at how it can be able to support last-mile connectivity, and so We started looking at how can community networks be licensed or introduced into the telecommunications market structure, and this resulted into the development of a community networks service provider license, which addressed the issues around affordability, because we were looking at issues around affordability, because at $50 is an annual operating fees is quite affordable for community-based organizations or NGOs that would like to start and operate community networks. And it came at a good time, because 2021 was just the end of the cycle for the U.S. strategic plan in Kenya, and so at that time we began now working on how then can community networks be able to benefit from the USF. So one of the issues that came up was that for you to access USF, you also had to contribute to the USF, and the license for community networks exempted community networks from contributing to the USF. So one of the arguments that came up was that since community networks do not contribute to the USF, they should not be able to benefit from the USF. And so together, again, providing our technical assistance and contributions to the USF process, engagements with the local community networks, we were able to advocate for the removal of that clause. And so within the draft framework, 2022, 2026, the regulator looks to establish a hundred community networks, which I think was a great milestone in terms of the wins for community networks. And this really helped in terms of our advocacy across the continent, because at least now we have a reference point with other regulators. And last year, we had the Malawi regulator visit the Kenya regulator just for an exchange. And from that now, within the Malawi strategic plan, they are now looking to support community broadband networks. So for them, it’s not community networks, but community broadband networks. But even beyond Kenya, we’ve also seen success in Zimbabwe as well, where there’s that close collaboration between the community network there, which is Murambinda, and Portras, which is the regulator. So what is the role of CSOs? I think first is raising awareness. Regulators still are not aware of community networks. There’s still a lot of misconceptions around what community networks are and what they’re not. And so there’s need for that raising awareness, capacity building as well. For example, we’ve had workshops together with the ITU in Kenya, Nigeria, and Cameroon also just to raise awareness around the licensing framework and also how USFs can be able to support community networks. Kenya, for example, even though we have a license and within the framework of the strategic plan, they’d like to support community networks, the regulator still does not understand how that is going to happen. So I think that there’s still need for hand-holding as to how we can be able now to structure it, how much does a community network need, how much funds can they absorb, what is feasible. And beyond that, I think, is also the providing technical assistance where resources are available.

Jane Roberts Coffin:
Wow. Shout out to the multi-stakeholder model and working with the Kenyan regulator and also just this good news about the Zim, Nigeria, and Cameroon. This is exciting. And there are wonderful regulators like Teddy and the people that Josephine is working with in Kenya and some of these other countries. So this is a really interesting ecosystem of work that has to happen, and it’s not done overnight. Sol, Luca de Tena. We’re going to turn it over to you for a perspective from an intergovernmental organization and also from your personal experience.

Soledad Luca de Tena:
Thank you very much, Jane and Senka, and I really appreciate the richness of experience and knowledge in this panel. Two points that other panelists have highlighted and I keep hearing repeated throughout the IGF that really pertain to essentially reaching this Internet for all are the need for more transparency and the need for different stakeholders to be involved and informed to attain digital inclusion. I want to share with you what we’re doing in Giga that speaks to these two points and also go a little bit deep into one of the success cases. So essentially Giga is a global initiative by two UN agencies. We have UNICEF and ITU focused on connecting all the schools in the world by 2030. Now I think it’s really important to understand here schools as a marker of community or as Ben mentioned as an anchor of community, often not only for access but also to access digital literacy and tools. They also function as hubs during social services or shelters in times of disaster and emergencies. So to better understand the unique position of intergovernmental stakeholders, let me just explain how from Giga’s perspective we are leveraging UNICEF’s presence in 190 countries, decades of a wealth of know-how working with critical issues with children, youth and education and of course ITU’s unique position within the telecommunications sector across the world. So together we work with the Ministry of Education on one side, the Ministry of ICT, private sector and civil society organizations. But okay, what do we do and how can we help revitalize UNICEF? Giga works in the access layer of the digital divide essentially developing open source tools that create a common language, evidence and bring together best practices. We do this with three main areas of work, advocacy, technical assistance and procurement. If you can see my slide here, yes, everyone is highlighting Brazil somehow. It’s a good example. So what you see in front of you is every dot represents a school. So roughly 138,000 schools and their color indicates the connectivity status. Green dots are good connectivity. Red dots are no connectivity. And this data gets updated every four hours. We’re also working on the yellow dot which is whether it’s enough or not. So using this map I want to just go over the three areas of work that we have, right? In many cases stakeholders don’t hold the same information and don’t understand the same information. And this map shows very quickly where the need lies and how large the need is. So I’m going to refer back to the Brazil case that Natalia mentioned where UNICEF Brazil and Giga joined forces to advocate for this reform of the USF and from 2020 to 2022 eventually succeeded in this reform of, I don’t know if Natalia mentioned, but it was a $24 billion accumulation of 20 years of funds. Essentially these changes did lead, at least at some level, right, to improve focus and mechanism for dispersing the funds, reducing regional inequalities and as pertains to our focus, right, unlocking this commitment to connecting schools. And this translates into about $675 million for school connectivity which is about 18% of the annual fund. In technical assistance I wanted to highlight firstly this map knowing what the state of connectivity is. Giga has mapped 2.1 million schools in 138 countries. In some cases the governments don’t have full databases of these schools so we are using machine learning AI to identify schools as well and to date this has just been started. We’ve mapped 20,000 new schools in eight countries. Then understanding connectivity status. We’ve developed together with Ericsson and M-Lab a user device app that sends measurements through and there are about 80,000 schools reporting connectivity status near real time but we are also going further, right, to understand from an ISP’s perspective what the quality of service is or just what their status is and we’re working with several ISPs currently who are sharing their network data. And so in triangulating that experience and quality we’re really getting a sense of what the connectivity reality is. There’s also other tools for improvement of procurement and management of public connectivity contracts which for many governments is very complex. So briefly connectivity credits is a way to incentivize connecting the difficult areas or the high risk areas, you know, technically or financially. I think Teddy mentioned, went into that quite well. And GigaCounts would also, it’s another project to support the management of high volumes of contracts. Lastly, in procurement. So initially GigaConnected 5,500 schools in 20 countries just creating a basis for better procurement practices and now it’s focused on procurement recommendations, templates, assistance to support more efficient school connectivity. I want to mention two brief examples. So in Kyrgyzstan together with the Ministry of Education the contracting was able to reduce costs of connectivity by 43%, representing about a saving of $250,000 per year. And in Rwanda it was able to also catalyze a cost decrease by 55%, so from $20 per Mbps to 9 and improve the speeds by 400%, so from 5 to 25 Mbps. Further to that Giga helps to unlock more and has helped so far to unlock $1.7 billion for financing school connectivity in a blended format. And in addition to the case in Brazil that I mentioned earlier, we’ve also been able to help unlock $5 million for a loan for Sierra Leone and $100 million for Niger. And these different areas of work support one another. So if USF are to be effectively revitalized, I think what our work focuses on and what I think is imperative is that we look at the life cycle, right, that we look at coordinated planning, that we look at deployment and monitoring of, you know, is the fund, I mean, are they connected? Are they staying connected? And, yeah, we hope that Giga can help with this. Thank you.

Jane Roberts Coffin:
Thank you, Sol. This is exciting work that the two UN agencies are doing with, as Sol indicated, of course, with the regulators, policymakers, and others to help, you know, bring about change in how connectivity is being distributed but also financed. We do have some online questions. We’ll turn to our online moderator in a minute. We’ll ask each participant that just was in this other block, Teddy, Josephine, and Sol, a question, and then we’ll open it up, of course, to the floor here in Kyoto but also the online floor. Teddy, one quick question for you. Has Ofcom provided universal service funding to community-based networks or municipal networks or whatever the correct terminology is in the U.K.?

Teddy Woodhouse:
Thanks, Jane. So, yeah, so when we talk about universal service programs, it’s not so much that Ofcom is providing the funding ourselves. We kind of see our role as, you know, creating the market conditions for network providers to exist. And so when we think about, you know, community networks or AltNets as they’re called here in the U.K., what it is, it’s about creating market conditions so that communication providers of all variety of types can succeed. So in part, that’s going to be aspects about having a regulatory framework that is simple enough that, you know, anyone can do it no matter whether they have a huge legal team behind them or if they’re a really small operation. But also, you know, looking at other aspects of how, you know, market competitors work with each other. And so to, you know, provide Internet services throughout the country. And so that relates a lot to how we understand, you know, wholesale services and the kind of separation of BT from OpenReach and how that process has been managed from a regulatory perspective because it’s, you know, BT being a retail operator and then OpenReach being kind of more of an access network that other networks can then build onto and provide access in new areas. That relationship is really important to making sure it’s working correctly so that you have a competitive and diverse market of different providers. Because what we’re having as a really positive experience in the U.K. is this diversity of market players. Hopefully in part because of Ofcom’s role, but there’s other aspects at play as well that, you know, enable consumers to have a good and affordable experience in terms of broadband services.

Jane Roberts Coffin:
And thank you, Teddy. That is that important differential between the fact that you’re not dispersing funds, you have an obligation, and you’re looking at those market conditions, which is great from that regulatory perspective. I think it’s in sharp contrast to what Konstantinos has experienced recently. Josephine, on setting the stage and working with regulators, what would your advice be to CSOs that do want to interface and work with regulators and help influence policy? Because for those in the room that have done this, I’m looking at Eric Huerta, who’s in the room as well, from Redis, and Carlos Baca, Sol, and others, it can be tricky if you’re not experienced in working with government. So what would you suggest, Josephine?

Josephine Miliza:
I think in our case, a lot of, I would say, patience. Fast. Patience, because an experience that we had in 2019 with one of my colleagues was that as we were trying to get in, just having meetings with the regulators, the doors were just being slammed on us. But I would say 2020 was when things began to shift. So, and Jen, you are with us, I think, since 2017, 2016, 2017. So it’s fast, I would say, patience. So it’s not patience and resilience. But I also think, as you mentioned something, that it’s an ecosystem type of advocacy. In our case, we really built on the collaboration that was existing between the UK Digital Access Program with the regulator in Kenya. And so that helped in terms of, one, building sustainability into some of the programs that they support. Because if there’s no policy change, then even if you’re building capacity or you’re building networks, then there’s no sustainability to that. So I would say also looking at who else in the ecosystem has those types of relationships and can be able to introduce you or bring you into the room because they have a sort of validity. Yeah, we can see, like, even our collaboration with the ITU, for example. Also helps us in terms of those advocacy efforts. And also there’s no need to recreate what is already existing. So in our interventions, for example, we also built on a lot of experience from other countries and other regions as well. So these resources exist. So more partnerships and collaborations with other existing players or stakeholders within the ecosystem.

Jane Roberts Coffin:
That’s awesome, and thank you. That’s a shout-out to FCDO as well, who you worked with closely in ITU and Go UK. You guys are two for two here. And also your point about data, getting those case studies out there and segueing over to you, Sol, on the data side. Help us with some of the sort of insight you have on what you think Giga could do more in the future of working with countries to highlight the importance of that ecosystem and funding and data.

Soledad Luca de Tena:
Thanks, Jane. Yeah, I mean, ecosystem. I really also appreciate Josephine’s mention of the need for different stakeholders. Also gathering experience, right? And I think that that’s the privilege that we are in the position to have, right? With these two different agencies that pull on already existing relationships with at least two ministries already creates a channel of communication. And I think we are working more on that, and I think we can work more. And I think I go back to my struggle not only now but also previously in my life as a community network practitioner around creating a common language. And, you know, that’s not just between government, private sector and civil society, which we know, you know, kind of are driven by different things and speak to the same issues in different ways. But also between government departments, right? Different foci and different ways to explain or different, I suppose, challenges. So I think Giga is in a very good position to create, I think, I hope, the map illustrated, you know, the kind of simple tools. of trying to understand the same problem, trying to understand that based on facts and evidence and cases. So I think that what we can definitely bring to the table is a common language, not only across different departments in public sector, which are our natural interlocutors, but also with private and community-based organizations. Thank you. Excellent. Thank you very much. We

Jane Roberts Coffin:
have about 12 minutes for some Q&A. Is there anyone? I think there is a question. Let me give Carlos a microphone. Carlos, was there a question online? Is there anyone in the room that would have… Oh, Eric, okay. So we have two questions in the room and we did have a question online, I think. Oh, good. We have three questions. Okay. And could we just say, if you could ask concise questions so we can give like a minute of an answer so we can get everybody in. Thank you.

Audience:
Well, regarding the GIGA project, it says that it helped to download the cost of the schools in some country. Can you explain a bit more how that happens? And also they mentioned this tool for global, our big contracts. So one of the challenges and some of the difficulties is that the government usually do all those big contracts, but there are sometimes small providers in close to the communities that can bring different costs or cheaper costs or better access to those schools. So I know how is this dealing with this. Yeah, well, and the other was, with the first questions, the model of… Yeah, and there has a lot of complaints about the concentrations of these platforms. And I think it’s not only affecting the carriers, but also it’s affecting the content creators and such. Do you think, or what would be the ideas to change this or sort of allowing to spread more, to spread the money they get instead of the concentration they already have? Hello, everyone. I’m from Civil Society in Paraguay. Perhaps a question for Josephine and Natalia, I think. We’ve seen a lot in Paraguay, which is where I’m based, denaturalization of the universal service funds for funding surveillance and security programs throughout the country. So first, I’m quite curious to see if there are other examples, because I think Natalia in the beginning was sort of like mentioning how the USF sometimes is used for other purposes, but perhaps you can talk a bit more about that as well, because we’re quite curious in network with, and see if other countries also have this sort of initiatives that are quite different from the purpose for what the USF was created. Particularly in Paraguay, we’ve seen that USF funds have been used to acquire surveillance and biometric technology to be deployed in the streets of the capital and other cities. Thank you.

Jane Roberts Coffin:
Any other questions in the room? Please just ask the question and then we’ll do

Audience:
a collaborative answer there. Okay. Thank you very much, the speakers, online and offline, for such interesting insights. So I have a question. I think it has been on capital financing. I liked the different tiers you spoke to in terms of investment economics, and so I have a question. To what extent does private and public sector financing, whichever those models are, influence the costs related to entry into the ecosystem by community networks? So is there a linkage between the model of capital financing, whether it’s private or public, and the barriers of entry for community networks? And also then a general question then to the whole team, because I have a sense that we can, and I think someone talked to it, you can get to the same objective but using different tools. So how can we, maybe from the experience of the community networks, is there a sort of a one-size-fits-all kind of model, or there is room for you to appreciate what is the context and listening, especially from a public sector perspective, and see how you can plug in, in a way vis-a-vis highway or no way. Yeah, thank you. Hi. We also have a community network in India, and it’s called CowMesh, and it’s a community-owned Wi-Fi mesh network. So one of the things we struggle a lot is how to, I mean, when do the community take operational ownership, and how is that possible? So with this we struggle in terms of what internet is for them, and when Sol mentioned common language, I’ve been thinking for us internet is hypertext, hyperlinks. So if you are low literate, if you don’t have the text in your repertoire of possible media things, how do you do hypertext, hyperlink? Like what is internet for these people? Are we stagnated? Are we stopping the idea of what internet is? Or can we push this to community networks on, like, who are the people who can push this internet idea itself to people who have let define, like, three billion people? So that’s my, and maybe this connection is also about hardware, not only, but services, the idea of internet and all that. Thank you. Thank

Jane Roberts Coffin:
you, everyone, for those great questions, and if we could do speed round on your answers for a minute. So Sol, over to you and Giga. Thank you. Thanks, Eric, for the

Soledad Luca de Tena:
question. So how did the lowering costs happen? I have that. I think essentially it’s about being better informed. You know, what does the internet actually cost? Better access to understanding technologies in certain cases and what the options were. So some of it has to do with conditions. So longer contracts, better pricing, as well as what you mentioned of bigger contracts, right? So demand aggregation some way, and better supported, I think, is one of the key elements of, yeah, an informed ecosystem, I would say. And in terms of contracts, I think it’s exactly to your point. It’s not about making bigger contracts the whole time, but I have experienced it both now and previously as a community network, how difficult it is for public institutions to manage contracts, and they don’t have just one. I mean, whether it’s a municipality or nationally, managing hundreds and hundreds of contracts, you know, do they pay on time? Because they don’t know how to manage that. So the idea here is not to exclude small operators. I think on the contrary, it’s by helping to manage those contracts effectively, seeing that and linking that perhaps to the connectivity status. Okay, I can see it’s connected still. Yes, you get paid. Okay, thank you.

Jane Roberts Coffin:
Sorry to cut you off. Paraguay, question on denaturalization.

Nathalia Foditsch:
Josephine and Natalia. Natalia, you have one minute. Well, in regards to the question on Paraguay, I actually cited the case of Asuncion specifically in the report I have mentioned. And I mean, in that case, they bought surveillance cameras with money from the Universal Service Fund, which is not a use we consider appropriate, right. And then I remember that was one of the most extreme cases we have found. However, there are other cases too, in which I mean, we wasn’t clear whether the impact of the use was as relevant as wanted. But I remember that the Asuncion case, that’s probably the one our colleague is referring to was cited specifically in the report. And well, I have more things to say, but I guess we don’t have time. So, Josephine. Yes, I think there’s

Josephine Miliza:
definitely reallocation of funds, but the challenge also within Africa, I think GSMA is just currently reviewing a study on that, is that there are no clear reporting or there are no clear reports as to how the funds are spent. So yes, there’s reallocation, but it’s also difficult to track exactly where the money went to.

Jane Roberts Coffin:
Back to accountability. Okay, Ben, there was a great question on the issues you raised, if you could give a minute.

Ben Matranga:
Yeah, just to quickly answer, it was a question about the cost of capital. And it’s, you know, we’re in a place right now in the world where, you know, interest rates are higher than they’ve ever been before. So we’re just seeing a delay on builds across the globe. And unfortunately, that hits emerging markets the hardest. What I would say to great operators, one of the key data points we look at whenever we finance any project, is what we think about is kind of a maniacal focus on reducing the cost of service delivery. Just to give you an example, just on this panel, Kennedy had mentioned how in the UK, there’s a subsidy of a little over 3000 pounds. And part of that is just the cost to build in those markets is a lot higher. In the United States, it’s even higher than that. And it’s because this trade off between capital and labor, and in markets where labor is more expensive. So I tell all the emerging market providers, first of all, if you ever need capital, please knock on our door. We’re here to lend. And, but it is that focus on utilizing the services that you have, which are a lower cost of labor to get that cost of installed down. And that’s how you can deliver an ARPU, you know, in the 10 to $15 range, which is what we we see as kind of the way to unlock access at that lower economics trend. And given that there’s so much interest online and in the room,

Jane Roberts Coffin:
we may start up a listserv or a group based on this workshop to have this continue the conversation, because I know there’s one about Comesh. I think that one we could take onto a list group, an email list, if you don’t mind, or Slack or wherever people wanna set up. And I would just say that Teddy and Konstantino’s will give you 30 seconds if you wanna give us a tweet, because I wanna make sure everyone got a last question in. So,

Konstantinos Komaitis:
Konstantinos, 30 seconds. Thanks, Jane. So, the only thing that I will say here is that let’s have a conversation on infrastructure, let’s use what we have as tools, but let’s make sure that we make them, we build them up in a way that everyone can participate and there are accountability mechanisms for not misuse and mismanagement of these funds.

Teddy Woodhouse:
And Teddy… Teddy, back over to you. Thanks, Jane. I’ll try to be quick. I didn’t realize I was gonna have the honor of being a closing speaker on this part, but I guess the thing I would stress is really important is regulators thinking about a level playing market field, a level field for the market, for communication providers of all types. Part of that is also providing research and facts and evidence that A, make the regulators’ decisions more robust and more understandable, but also can help others in the sector understand what are the factors at play, where is service not as good as it should be, what are ways that it can be improved. And so, I think that’s also a really important aspect to consider as we’re looking at a holistic image of what are the challenges we face in connecting the world.

Jane Roberts Coffin:
Thank you so much. I would just like to give everybody a round of applause. Thank you to the wonderful panelists. You were excellent. Yay. And to Senka so much for not only the paper she helped draft right, but also the great organization of this panel. So, thank you all very much. This was excellent. And thank you to Carlos for being our online moderator. Thank you, everyone. Have a good day.

Audience

The participants in the discussion addressed various significant aspects of counterterrorism policies in relation to cyber issues and human rights. One of the main arguments raised was the critical need to broaden the cybersecurity discussion within counterterrorism policies. It was noted that the current mandate of the CTED (Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate) and the UN Office on Counterterrorism is too narrow when it comes to cybersecurity. This limitation restricts the discussion on crucial matters like state-sponsored cyber warfare, hindering the development of comprehensive strategies to address cyber threats in counterterrorism efforts.

Another key argument put forward during the discussion was the necessity of incorporating human rights laws in online contexts. The OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) and the Special Rapporteur for Human Rights and Counterterrorism stressed that human rights laws should be applicable online as well as offline. This recognition underscores the importance of protecting fundamental rights in the digital realm. Including human rights laws in counterterrorism policies is vital to ensure a balanced approach that safeguards both security and individual rights.

The participants also emphasised the need for an advanced counterterrorism approach that effectively intercepts the exploitation of information and communication technology (ICT) for terrorist purposes. The CTED is currently finalising non-binding guiding principles for member states on ICT and its prevention of terrorist exploitation. This initiative demonstrates the acknowledgement that terrorists are increasingly utilising digital platforms and technologies to advance their objectives. Developing effective strategies to counter this exploitation is essential in addressing the evolving nature of modern threats.

Furthermore, the discussion highlighted the importance of supporting the work of the OEWG (Open-Ended Working Group) and other General Assembly bodies in the development of counterterrorism strategies. It was suggested that the Security Council should refine its counterterrorism strategies with input from other UN bodies. This collaborative approach can lead to a more comprehensive and inclusive framework for tackling the multifaceted challenges posed by terrorism.

In conclusion, the discussion shed light on various critical aspects of counterterrorism policies concerning cyber issues and human rights. Expanding the cybersecurity discussion within counterterrorism policies and including human rights laws in online contexts were identified as crucial steps. Intercepting the exploitation of ICT for terrorist purposes and promoting collaboration among UN bodies were also emphasised as important strategies. However, it was noted that the current mandate of the CTED and the UN Office on Counterterrorism is limiting in its scope. Efforts are currently focused on training law enforcement officers to monitor online content, but there is a need for broader discussions and strategies to effectively address cyber threats in counterterrorism efforts.

David Hevey

Australia has been a long-standing advocate for the establishment of the Plan of Action (POA) as an institutionalised UN mechanism. They were heartened by the broad cross-section, cross-regional support for the UN General Assembly resolution on the POA last year. Australia believes that the POA should build on the hard, collaborative work of the open-ended working group and provide practical guidance to implement the UN framework on responsible state behavior. This signifies a positive sentiment towards the POA.

From Australia’s perspective, a functioning POA should have clear scope, flexibility both substantive and procedural, functionality in terms of its framework being put into practice, and inclusion of states and non-state actors. They suggest that the framework of the POA may be further developed by consensus. Australia values the POA as a means to facilitate all countries, irrespective of their size or level of development, to determine their own digital future. This reflects a positive sentiment towards the POA’s role in promoting peace, justice, and strong institutions, aligning with Sustainable Development Goal 16.

Australia’s advocacy extends to the participation of all member states and non-state actors in the POA. They view this as a key aspect of the POA’s success. In line with this, Australia has included this messaging in their stance, indicating a positive sentiment towards inclusivity in the POA.

Furthermore, Australia sees the POA as a way to implement permanent changes and emphasizes the importance of capacity building. They strongly support the emphasis on capacity building, considering it a significant component for achieving the objectives of the POA. This highlights their positive stance towards using the POA to bring about long-lasting and actionable measures.

To summarise, Australia has been a staunch supporter of the establishment of the POA as a UN mechanism. They believe it should be built upon the collaborative work of the open-ended working group and provide practical guidance for responsible state behaviour. Australia emphasises the need for clear scope, flexibility, functionality, and inclusion in the POA. They advocate for the participation of all member states and non-state actors, view it as a way to implement permanent changes, and stress the importance of capacity building. Their approach is geared towards an actionable, permanent, and inclusive approach to security. The general sentiment expressed by Australia regarding the POA is positive.

Joyce Hakmeh

States have already agreed on a framework for responsible behaviour in cyberspace, but the challenge lies in successfully implementing it. This framework agreement, known as the Plan of Action (POA), has been achieved three times, in 2015 and twice in 2021. However, failure to implement this framework usually stems from a lack of capacity, resources, and a structured approach. The POA can help address these challenges by bringing in resources and fostering a sustainable and permanent forum.

Open dialogues and dedicated discussions within the POA are crucial in promoting understanding and progress in cyber capacity building and the application of international law in cyberspace. By having separate streams for different pillars of the framework, such as confidence-building measures (CBMs), international law, and norms, their entanglement can be avoided. Regular conversations among states foster better understanding and learning in these areas. Furthermore, the inclusion of non-state stakeholders in these discussions can provide valuable expertise and perspective.

However, one key issue that needs attention is the lack of interconnectivity among the United Nations’ (UN) cyber processes. The UN’s cyber processes should be interconnected in order to address this issue effectively. It is important to understand the sensitivities involved in making these connections.

To address this challenge, multi-stakeholders can play an important role in linking the different issues related to cyber processes. They can help in understanding where these issues connect and where the links and overlaps are. The hope is that the POA can serve as a vehicle to accomplish this.

Notably, Joyce Hakmeh appreciates the push for multi-stakeholderism and inclusion in the initiative. The emphasis on including various stakeholders and perspectives is seen as a positive aspect of the initiative. Hakmeh also advocates for enhanced collaboration among multi-stakeholders, recognizing its importance in advancing the conversations beyond just having multi-stakeholders in the room.

In conclusion, while states have already agreed on a framework for responsible behavior in cyberspace, the challenge lies in successfully implementing it. The POA can help address this challenge by bringing in resources and fostering a sustainable and permanent forum. Open dialogues and dedicated discussions within the POA are pivotal in promoting understanding and progress in cyber capacity building and the application of international law in cyberspace. Multi-stakeholders have an important role to play in linking these issues and enhancing collaboration among different stakeholders. The push for multi-stakeholderism and inclusion in the initiative is applauded, and the hope is that the UN’s cyber processes can be interconnected to address the challenges effectively.

David Fairchild

The analysis explores different perspectives on cyber policies, focusing on the contributions and approaches of various stakeholders. One key observation is the positive recognition of Canada’s active participation in Global Governance Entities (GGEs) and Open and Working Groups, demonstrating its commitment to shaping global cyber policies. Canada’s policy development process is highlighted for its co-creation model, which involves engaging multiple stakeholders to ensure inclusivity and a human-centric approach.

Another important argument presented is the significance of a human rights framework as the basis for cyber policies. The analysis emphasizes that the human rights framework is currently under attack and must be protected. Canada, in line with SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions), aims to ensure that the transition to a program of action is firmly framed within the context of human rights. This demonstrates a commitment to protecting individuals’ rights and privacy within the cyberspace ecosystem.

The analysis also introduces the concept of cyberspace as a co-owned space. This perspective emphasizes the need for dialogue and partnerships among member states to collectively address cybersecurity issues. By recognizing cyberspace as a shared responsibility, countries can work together to create a more secure and equitable online environment. The analysis underscores the importance of dialogue and providing a platform for addressing these issues, promoting collaboration and building partnerships.

The Programme of Action (POA) is highlighted as a valuable tool for institutionalizing dialogue and addressing cyberspace issues. The POA acts as an aggregator, bringing together diverse stakeholders to work through challenges and bridge gaps. It is seen as an effective means to foster cooperation and find solutions to complex cyber-related problems. This aligns with SDG 16’s goal of promoting peace, justice, and strong institutions.

In conclusion, the analysis commends Canada for advocating multi-stakeholder and human-centric approaches to cyber policies. Additionally, it stresses the importance of a human rights framework, a co-owned perspective of cyberspace, and the institutionalization of dialogue through the POA. These perspectives and arguments provide a comprehensive understanding of the complexities and challenges associated with cyber policies, offering valuable insights for creating more inclusive and secure digital ecosystems.

Ellie McDonald

Ellie McDonald has presented the concept of a Cyber Programme of Action (POA), which has garnered support from a group of UN member states. The POA aims to address threats in cyberspace and promote engagement and cooperation among stakeholders in a human-centric and rights-respecting way. It supports the implementation of the Responsible State Behaviour Framework and primarily targets states and actors involved in the UN’s Open-Ended Working Group on Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs).

Supporters argue that the POA has the potential to establish permanent, open, transparent, and inclusive discussions. It recognizes shared but differentiated responsibilities and encourages the contributions of stakeholders to be heard and acted upon. The POA also emphasizes the importance of capacity-building and operationalization to ensure effective implementation.

Furthermore, the POA must be responsive to real-life events and threats, demonstrating its relevance and effectiveness. Diversity of views is considered essential to inform the discussions, ensuring inclusivity and representation. Additionally, the POA should be co-created and co-owned, involving various stakeholders in its development.

In summary, the proposal for a Cyber Programme of Action aims to address cyber threats and foster collaboration among stakeholders. It advocates for open, transparent, and inclusive discussions that respect human rights and international law. The POA should prioritize capacity-building and operationalization, responsiveness to real-life events, and the inclusion of diverse views. Co-creation and co-ownership will contribute to its success as a collective effort in combatting cyber threats.

Raman Jit Singh

Raman Jit Singh highlights the need for the Program of Action (POA) on cybersecurity to address real-world threats, particularly those targeting civil society and human rights actors. Singh argues that proactive measures must be taken to protect these vulnerable groups. Singh expresses concern about the increase in harmful cyber operations against humanitarian and civil rights actors, including human rights defenders who face various forms of cyber intimidation. He emphasizes the urgency of addressing these pressing issues in the POA. Singh’s overall sentiment is one of concern.

Another important concern raised by Singh is the proliferation of spyware and the ‘hack-for-hire’ industry, which he believes significantly undermines global cybersecurity. Singh urges the POA process to explore, challenge, and take action against these dangerous activities. He maintains a critical stance, emphasizing the importance of confronting these threats head-on.

Singh also stresses the need for more detailed discussions on cybersecurity concerns, state collaboration, and joint action. He asserts that the POA should delve deeper into current threats and specific topics such as cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Singh advocates for tangible cooperative actions between states to effectively address these challenges. His sentiment is assertive, reflecting a strong call for collaboration and action in the cybersecurity domain.

In terms of protection, Singh advocates for actors at immediate risk, particularly Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs), who play a critical role in advancing and maintaining cybersecurity. He highlights the need to discuss and take actionable steps to protect these first responders in cybersecurity. Singh’s sentiment is supportive, emphasizing the significance of safeguarding these key players.

Furthermore, Singh points out the complexity and lack of clarity in combining the counterterrorism debate with the cyber conversation within the United Nations. He highlights the sensitive nature of discussions around non-state actors in the existing Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) process. Singh notes the reliance on previous rulings such as the Delhi Declaration and the outcomes of the Counterterrorism Committee and Security Council. His sentiment is negative towards the current challenges faced in integrating counterterrorism and cyber issues in UN discussions.

Singh also stresses the need to incorporate human rights and their defense in the cyber conversation. He highlights resistance to discussing human rights defenders (HRDs) and the targeting of HRDs within the OEWG. Additionally, Singh points out the challenging nature of the conversation for humanitarian actors and international humanitarian law. His sentiment is positive towards the inclusion of human rights in the cyber conversation.

Singh supports a comprehensive approach in the cyber conversation, advocating for not only establishing norms but also implementing security measures. He emphasizes the importance of balancing both aspects to effectively combat cyber threats. Singh’s sentiment is positive, highlighting the need for a holistic strategy.

Despite acknowledging the contentious nature of topics such as HRDs, counterterrorism, and cyber issues, Singh advocates for addressing them in the POA process. He encourages open discussions and the pursuit of solutions despite initial reluctance. Singh holds a positive sentiment towards addressing these contested topics.

Additionally, Singh expresses concern that the POA process is primarily anchored in UN headquarters locations, limiting international participation. He believes that wider participation is crucial to ensuring a comprehensive and inclusive approach to cybersecurity. Singh’s sentiment is negative regarding the current lack of international involvement.

Furthermore, Singh encourages governments and actors to have consultations on the POA process in their respective capitals or locations. This approach will allow for a broader range of perspectives and ensure the inclusion of diverse voices in shaping the POA. His sentiment is positive towards fostering dialogue and engagement.

In conclusion, Raman Jit Singh highlights several key points related to the POA on cybersecurity. He emphasizes the need to address real-world threats targeting civil society and human rights actors, while also taking action against the proliferation of spyware and the ‘hack-for-hire’ industry. Singh advocates for detailed discussions on cybersecurity concerns, state collaboration, and joint action. He supports the protection of key actors at immediate risk, the inclusion of human rights in the cyber conversation, and a comprehensive approach that balances norms and security measures. Singh also calls for addressing contested topics and increasing international participation. Finally, he emphasizes the importance of fostering frankness and ambition in the POA process.

Henri Verdier

The UN Program of Action aims to create a more inclusive forum for conversations on cybersecurity, involving civil society and the private sector. It recognizes the importance of these actors in shaping the cyber space and the blurred boundaries between conflicts, belligerence, and civil society. Implementing international law in cyberspace is challenging due to the unique complexities and lack of infrastructure. Progress has been made in recognizing principles and norms, with ongoing efforts to further develop frameworks. A permanent body is needed to ensure the effective implementation of cybersecurity norms, providing continuity and facilitating knowledge sharing and capacity building. Building peace and security in the cyber space requires not only norms and laws, but also good organizations and infrastructure. A broader approach is necessary to address the evolving cyber threats, going beyond established frameworks.

Ellie McDonald:
Hello, everyone, welcome to our open forum, shaping a UN Cyber Programme of Action. Thank you for joining us despite the early hour and I’m sure despite some fatigue as we reach the end of our community’s gathering. I’m Ellie McDonald from Global Partners Digital. We are a civil society and human rights organisation and we work to ensure a digital environment underpinned by human rights. This session has been co-organised by my own organisation alongside Access Now, Global Affairs Canada and the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. We have a brilliant panel of speakers who we’re honoured to have with us and I’d now like to introduce the panel from left to right. So we have, or rather from left to right, we have Dave Hevey, First Secretary of Cyber and Digital Affairs of the Australian Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva. We have Ambassador Henri Verdier, French Ambassador for Digital Affairs with the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs. We have Joyce Hakme, Deputy Director of the International Security Programme at Chatham House and the co-editor of the Journal of Cyber Policy. And finally, on his way, we have Ramanjit Singh Cheema, Senior International Counsel and Asia-Pacific Policy Director of Access Now. And we also would have had David Fairchild, First Secretary of the Permanent Mission of Canada, but sadly David is no longer able to join us. So the topic of our open forum is the Cyber Programme of Action. The POA is a proposal by a group of UN member states, including from those we’ll hear from today. The UN General Assembly has welcomed the proposal as a mechanism to discuss threats in cyberspace, to support states’ capacities to implement the Responsible State Behaviour Framework, to discuss and further develop, where appropriate, this framework, and to promote engagement and cooperation with relevant stakeholders. Many stakeholders, including my own organisation, have also welcomed the initiative, provided that it’s built on a clear and action-oriented political commitment, focused on implementing the key of responsible state behaviour in a human-centric and rights-respecting manner. We see that the POA offers a means to establish a permanent venue for discussions, rather than limited-term deliberations, to recognise the shared but differentiated responsibilities of different actors, by ensuring a mechanism which is open, inclusive and transparent, and where the contributions of stakeholders are heard and acted upon. Given both the promise of the Cyber POA and the peril of not addressing the threats which it seeks to combat, we feel there’s a need for discussions of the POA to reach a wider audience. To date, the POA proposal has been primarily directed at states and actors active within discussions at the UN’s Open-Ended Working Group on ICTs, and so for that reason, we all hoped to hold this open forum, to provide an opportunity to receive updates on the POA from those actively involved in discussions about its design, but also for those gathered in this room and online to share their views on the proposal and to ask questions. So we encourage you all to contribute enthusiastically, we have the benefit of being a small group, so please do share your views. So because we’d like to foster an interactive discussion, we’d like to begin with a poll for both our participants in person and online. We are going to be using Slido as a platform to facilitate this poll. Some of you might be familiar with this already, but if not, we ask you to please go to the URL currently displayed on the screen, yes, which is slido.com. You’ll then be prompted to enter a code which is, all capitals, cyber-POA, also displayed on the screen, and my colleague Kirti, who is our online moderator, will also share this in the chat. So while you’re setting this up, I will briefly explain the structure of our session today. So after talking through briefly the poll, I’ll ask questions to our first three panellists. We’ll then briefly pause for some questions and discussion from those in the room and online. This first round of discussion will be focused on getting an overview of the programme of action, unpacking what it is, what it hopes to achieve, and why it is needed. After this, we’ll move to our final question, to be followed by questions and discussion. And the second round is focused on ensuring the POA is genuinely multi-stakeholder and founded upon the international human rights law framework. Finally, I’ll ask each of the panellists to share a final reflection, and we’ll attempt to share some summary reflections. If you would like to ask a question, please come to the front of the room or the middle of the room to use one of these two microphones. We have only an hour, so I also ask that our panellists are timely in their interventions to ensure that the discussion remains interactive. So I’d like to turn briefly now to the Slido poll. So if you have it up, you’ll see that it asks a series of questions. The first asks for perspectives on the POA. The second asks if you have yet inputted to dialogue on the POA, whether through interaction with a member state, through a regional consultation, through statements or consultations undertaken by the open-ended working group on ICTs, through the UNIDIR consultation, or through a stakeholder effort to consolidate inputs. Our next question then asks for those that have inputted to one of these dialogues on the POA, did you feel that your input was or has been meaningfully considered and reflected in the design of the POA, and if not, what needs to change? So we’ll be collecting responses to that to include in our summary report of the session, and perhaps I can ask my colleague Kirti if we have had any reflections to the first question which asks about perspectives on the POA. Predominantly state-based. Okay, so we can return to this again later in our discussion, and perhaps it gives our panellists something to consider in their remarks. So with that, returning to that later, I’d like to ask our first question which is to Ambassador Verdier. Ambassador Verdier, France is one of the co-sponsors of the UN Programme of Action, a proposal for a permanent, inclusive and action-oriented mechanism. This proposal aims at supporting the implementation of the Responsible State Behaviour Framework, and through the UN General Assembly Resolution 7737, it has received wide support. But for those who may be less familiar with the proposal, what precisely is the Cyber POA and what is the objective that it seeks to achieve?

Henri Verdier:
Thank you for the invitation and for the opportunity to exchange about those important topics. But we will have to enter a bit within the UN machinery on those topics, machinery matters. So you just have, very briefly, to understand that the rise of the cyberspace could jeopardise all the security architecture, because every conflict now has a cyber aspect, and there is also a real conflictuality within the cyberspace, and this is a new situation because a cyber attack is not like a cynetic attack, this is invisible, very fast, geography doesn’t matter anymore, so it doesn’t matter anymore. So you have to be sure that the framework of global security, like the UN Charter, the Geneva Convention, can be implemented or respected. And this is a long story. In 1998, the UN started to work on this new context, so 25 years ago. Since 2004, there were some group of governmental experts, so it was usually, the first one was 15 states working during three years to write together a final report, and we did analyse the new situation, and do you know, first at this time, the question was, does international law apply in the cyberspace, so it took 10 years to recognise that international law did apply in the cyberspace. And then there were a series of expert governmental groups, GGE, and since 2021, we did extend this conversation through open-ended working groups, so open to every state, so it was more complex to manage, but more inclusive and more diverse, so it was a good step forward. And more or less since this year, since 2021, France, Egypt, and a group of trans-regional states is proposing to go further and to choose a new vehicle, which is the POA. Why do we propose this? That’s because, so as I told you 25 years ago, the question was, do we have to implement international law in the cyberspace? And then we did work hard to understand how to implement international law, and we did all together adopt some norms, and norms of state behaviour, and important principles, and some red lines, and that was important. I can tell you, for example, that when I do observe what’s happening in Ukraine and in some conflicts, we understand that some red lines are known, and there is little form of refrain, some attitudes are not there, so we can observe that it was important to collectively, together, recognise some principles and promise to respect some norms. But that’s not enough, and our view is that it’s time to go further. The most obvious aspect is that in the UN system, we are more or less 200 states, and for most of them, to implement those norms is very difficult. If you don’t have a cyber law, a cyber police, a cyber justice, a CERT, et cetera, how can you implement those very complex norms? So capacity building, for example, matters. If we don’t organise collectively to be sure that every state will have the ability to build serious resilience, what’s the point to discuss norms if you cannot implement them? That’s one important aspect. The second one is, of course, the multi-stakeholder issue. So as I told you, those processes were born within the first committee. The first committee deals with state behaviour and state religion. It’s about war and peace. So the first committee is not the most multi-stakeholder committee in the UN system, of course. But regarding cyber security, cyber war, cyber peace, first, the cyber space is not a natural space. It’s a space by someone. So private sector matters. And then the boundaries between conflict, belligerence, civil society are weaker and weaker. So for a lot of reasons, a strong real conversation with civil society and private sector is important. So we want to open a more inclusive forum, open to more actors, while respecting state sovereignty, of course. So we have to design something with rooms to exchange all together, and while respecting some prerogatives and responsibilities of states. So for all those reasons, we consider that it’s time to build the next VIKON, and we intend to implement it after the end of the current Open Energy Working Group. And the interest of a program of action, so this is a format that does exist in the UN system. For example, there is a program of action for small arms and lethal weapons. First, this is a permanent body. That’s very important. First, of course, this is a UN and inclusive body. Everyone can join the project. This is not for a few states. This is open to every member state. A permanent body that can have a dedicated team, that’s important, because if you observe the 25-year process, there were sequences of three and then five years. But every three years, you do negotiate a mandate, you build a new team, you adopt a final resolution, and then you dismantle everything, and you renegotiate a new process. So we need continuity, we need memories, we need a dedicated team. We need a more action-oriented process, because we want to be able, for example, to contribute to finance capacity building. Or why not to publish some indexes, the POA for small arms and lethal weapons does produce the disarmament index, so they create knowledge and they share resources. They are not just there to adopt a final resolution. And we need a body where you can design a global architecture to have a better cooperation and conversation with civil society and private sector. That’s why we are proposing a new format and a new project, and we hope that in the next three years we will succeed to create this.

Ellie McDonald:
Thank you very much, Ambassador Verdier. I think that was a very helpful context into the evolution of these discussions, and I’m sure we’ll be picking up on your point about the need for a strong and real conversation with a range of stakeholders, so thank you. With that, I’d like to turn to our next speaker, Dave. Australia has been a long-standing advocate of the establishment of the POA as an institutionalized UN mechanism and as the next evolution in UN cyber discussions. But what does a functioning POA look like, and in your view, what are the key ingredients to its success?

David Hevey:
Thank you, Ellie. Thank you for that, for the question. Also, g’day to everyone here in the room this morning, thank you for joining us. My response has a lot of overlap, and we’ll reaffirm some of the sentiments shared by Henry here, and even though I am, I really want to reaffirm the importance of that. So look, Australia is proud to be a strong supporter of the initiative to establish a permanent mechanism for responsible state behavior in the UN. We really are. We really believe that time is ripe to collectively discuss a future permanent mechanism to ensure the durability of the UN dialogue on responsible state behavior. As Henry said before, the continuity is really important in that respect. We were heartened by the broad cross-section, cross-regional support for the UNGA resolution on the POA last year, and so we’re really, I think with that, we really want to continue and drive forward on the POA and use that momentum. And I suppose we’re looking forward to seeing how that pans out in the coming negotiations in the first committee. Really, I think, we think, Australia thinks, that the POA should build on the hard, collaborative work of the open-ended working group in providing practical guidance to implement the UN framework on responsible state behavior. That’s absolutely paramount. The POA is the mechanism to carry forward this commitment. It’s really important to rules-based cyberspace. And again, the permanent nature allows us to focus on the matters at hand, the substance at hand, rather than renegotiating the processes. But importantly, the POA’s focus on capacity building, which is actually something really strong to my heart, that I used to work on in Australia, the focus on the capacity building will facilitate all countries, big and small, developing and developed, to determine their own digital future. And I think that’s absolutely imperative. It’s critical, again, that we do not lose that momentum of setting up a functioning POA. So what does that involve? I say to you a couple of elements. One, it’s scope. It needs a clear mandate that builds upon and reaffirms the agreed framework on responsible behavior in cyberspace, responsible state behavior. The second thing I’d say is flexibility. It needs both substantive and procedural flexibility, so that the POA can evolve with the global developments. Now, really, what does this mean? It means that the framework may be further developed by consensus, but it also has the procedural flexibility in meeting the structures, plenary reviews, and technical meetings that is involved in this whole system. The third element is ensuring that the framework can be put into practice. And again, that really highlights my focus, as mentioned before, on capacity building. And the fourth element is inclusion. And that’s a really, really important thing. Although states remain the main players in the state-based process, discussion should be open to all, to other stakeholders. We need to empower meaningful participation of voices that aren’t normally at the table, as they bring unique perspective, whether, for example, Indo-Pacific countries and Pacific Island countries that do not have the capacity or the resources meaningfully to engage. We want to be able to foster that. I think the other thing is that non-state actors would also help to further refine the POA and to advance the solutions under this. So I think that we’re confident that if we’re serious and we’re all committed collectively to this and incorporating these elements, that the POA and its process will see a strong initiative for fostering peace and stability in cyberspace. Thank you, Ellie.

Ellie McDonald:
And thank you so much, Dave. I think that was really helpful. to unpack and understand better what the POA could achieve and the different ingredients in your view that are so important to it. Just for those who’ve joined us recently, we are also using the Slido platform to facilitate interaction during the session. Some of you may be familiar with it already. If not, I promise it’s very simple to use. You can just visit the URL slido.com and then you’ll be prompted to enter a code, which is cyber-POA. We’ve asked a series of questions there on your perspectives on the POA and whether you’ve already inputted to consultations on its contents and if you feel they’ve been reflected in its design. The first question on perspectives, I’ll just ask our online moderator, Kirti, if there have been any further inputs to that question. So actionable, permanent, inclusive, and a crucial roadmap. Those have been the contributions from people, our participants virtually and in person. Thank you. So at this point, before we turn to our next two brilliant speakers, I’d just like to take pause to ask if we have any questions at this stage. So far our discussion has focused on understanding what the POA is and what it could hope to achieve. In the next aspect of the discussion, we’ll be focusing on precisely which aspects of the agenda it could seek to move forward, how it can ensure that it’s multi-stakeholder and rights respecting. So perhaps if you have questions, please focus them more on the broad scope of the POA. With that, does anyone have any questions in the room? If you do, please use one of these two microphones. Or Kirti, do we have any questions online? Perfect. Okay. Well, I will move to our next question, which is to Joyce Hackney from Chatham House. Joyce, Chatham House has been an active observer of the UN Open-Ended Working Group on ICTs and is undertaking research on key areas of its mandate, including the application of international law in cyberspace and the further interpretation and application of cybercapacity building principles, among other things, I’m sure. So based on your findings so far and your experience in this process, how could the POA make progress in these areas and contribute to responsible state behavior in cyberspace?

Joyce Hakmeh:
Thank you very much, Ellie, and good morning, everyone. It’s great to be with my panelists here and to be speaking about this very important topic. I mean, we’ve heard from the previous speakers about the importance of the POA and the importance of the issue, right? The importance of international peace and security and responsible behavior in cyberspace. And we heard also from them about how it should be ensuring this continuity and have this flexibility. And I guess maybe sort of like my starting point to your question is to focus on the importance of applying the consensus, applying the acquis that you talked about. It’s very important to reiterate that states have agreed on the rules of the road, right? This framework that we often refer to, not once but three times, right? First in 2015 and then again in 2021, both in the open-ended working group and in the GGE that the ambassador talked about. So it is very, very important and not very, you know, common that states agree on something, you know, and particularly in cyberspace and that, you know, there is a consensus that is reached. So this building on that consensus and operationalizing this framework is extremely important. And the POA, as we have heard, can help with that. As we know, there is a conversation now, you know, or like, you know, maybe different visions between implementing what we have agreed upon or, you know, sort of like building new norms or building new legal instruments. And sort of like my position to that is first, you know, these don’t have to be mutually exclusive. And second, you know, before we understand what is needed, we have to understand how the current agreement works, right? Does it work well? Does it sort of address the issue that we’re trying to solve? Are there gaps, et cetera? And if so, what is the appropriate sort of solutions that we need to develop? So that’s quite an important process, I suppose, in order not to develop half-baked solutions. So I guess the sort of the focus of the POA on implementing the framework is a very important one. Now, if we all agree that the implementation is important, then the next question becomes how do you actually do that? And as we know, you know, the failure to implement the framework is often not related to willingness, right? Like it’s not like because states don’t want to do so. More often than not, it’s an issue of capacity, right? There’s lack of capacity. There is lack of resources. And there is a lack of a structured and consistent approach. So as we’ve heard, the POA can help address all of those, right? It can help build the capacity. It can help, you know, create the sustainable and long-term sort of permanent forum. And also, as we have seen with other POAs, it can help bring resources that will help with operationalization, right? Because it’s all good to talk about, oh, yes, we want to do this, we want to do that. But if we don’t have the funding, the resources, human and otherwise, it’s very difficult to actually make progress. Now to your specific question on how the POA can contribute to the international law discussions specifically, I guess when I first sort of, you know, heard about the POA when it was first put on the table, what I was interested in the most is this sort of like this approach of kind of like having dedicated conversations about the different pillars of the framework. You know, on CBMs, on international law, on norms. So you’re not entangling them with each other and so that, you know, the success of one of the pillars is not contingent upon the successes of others. And I think that’s really important because we need to appreciate that, you know, conversations need to proceed somehow at a different pace. They need to require different approaches, et cetera. So the way the POA can function or if it goes in that direction, I think can be helpful to generate meaningful progress. So on the international law, you know, front, there can be dedicated discussions, dedicated work stream that not only talk about international law in broad terms but also goes specifically, let’s say, in international human rights law, international humanitarian law and address that sort of like those importance, specificities and nuances in those conversations. And something that the previous speakers focused upon and of course, you know, like a strong advocate being, you know, a stakeholder, non-state stakeholder ourselves, there is the importance of bringing the different perspectives into the debate. Of course, you know, the development of international law is the prerogative of states and no one is disputing that but the experts’ perspectives and the experts’ input is extremely valuable. In my organization, we have been doing quite a lot of work about the application of international law to cyberspace. A lot of like really important findings have come out of that work. So having the opportunity to contribute to the discussions is extremely valuable. And not only sort of like bringing the perspectives of multistakeholders, I think by having those dedicated conversations that aren’t necessarily always confrontational, right? We’ve agreed on that. What does that mean? What do we think it means? It also can help create that opportunity for states to learn from each other, right? And we have seen, you know, at the moment, I think the states who have published their positions on how international law applies to cyberspace, I think there are 30. So like a very small group of the 193 states and that is expanding. I was the first. You were the first, yes. But looking, for instance, at the UK, you know, the country I’m based in, there have been sort of evolution in the way they’ve been thinking about the international law application to cyberspace to take into more consideration how the threat landscape is evolving. You know, in the latest one, 2022, there was quite a big focus on ransomware, on the health sector, etc. So having those dedicated discussions in the POA will allow this opportunity to kind of compare notes because as we know, even countries that are allies don’t agree on all the principles of international law and how they think they apply. So having those constructive conversations will be very, very important. And maybe I’ll conclude by one more thing because you also asked me about the capacity building principles and how they can be operationalized. We’re doing at Chatham House a project at the moment taking the 10 principles that were agreed upon in the OEWG report in 2021 and trying to kind of like unpack them. What do they mean? What is driving them? How can they be implemented in a kind of capacity building context? And we’ll be presenting that work in New York on the sides of the July session of the open-ended working group. So if we had the work stream on capacity building as part of the POA, it would be great to sort of like be part of that and contribute with our perspectives and the perspectives of other stakeholders on this important issue.

Ellie McDonald:
Thank you so much, Joyce. That was really helpful to understand how the POA itself as the mechanism could be a really valuable venue for progressing discussions on those specific areas. And I found very compelling your remark that the different strands could potentially progress at different paces. I know that there have indeed only been around 30 states sharing their views on international law, but we’ve observed at least that some of these discussions have become richer and more detailed at recent sessions on international law and its application to cyberspace specifically. So I’m sure we can unpack that more in the discussion. But I’d like to turn now to Raman Singh Cheema from AccessNow. Raman, given AccessNow’s work to defend and extend the digital rights of users at risk, how in your view can the POA help to ensure cyber stability and peace with a focus on the protection of those most at risk from threats in cyberspace?

Raman Jit Singh:
Thank you so much, Ali. And I just wanted to give some context for why we participate in the program of action and what our interests are. AccessNow is an international digital rights organization, a civil society organization. And we, in a sense, are in an interesting position. We are a cybersecurity or digital security provider. We assist civil society and actors in the wider civil sphere, you could say, at risk when it comes to their reactive and proactive cybersecurity needs. And we also additionally analyze, track, publicly advocate, and campaign on these issues. And our engagement on this, in terms of all the cyber processes in the UN and the discussions around the program of action, is also recognizing a couple of different facts. The current status of cyber’s, you could say, operations of state cyber behavior, which is alarming. There’s a significant increase in problematic cyber operations between states, but also increasingly targeting civil human rights actors as well as humanitarian actors. And additionally, you are seeing a contestation on some of even these agreed norms, which is extremely alarming. But that said, the fact that we essentially have a new cyber process in the United Nations, agreed by such a large number of stakeholders, is a significant development. It’s a milestone. And it goes to the fact that we do recognize that, again, many actors have said they want regular forms of dialogue that is anchored in the UN, even though people acknowledge that the UN is not the best place for all of these conversations, but perhaps it is one of those regular places, a sort of common space or a court that people go to very regularly on this. And from our perspective, we do think that the fact that the space exists is good, but we should challenge actors. As I’ve said to Andre or to others as well, I think it’s very important that we do have some ambition, and we do have some objectives here. Ultimately, we are a human rights organization. For us, the conversation is important. The fact that we’re having this civilly, instead of trading either literally cyber warfare or cyber norm warfare by different resolutions or contestation is a good thing, but they are very real-world outcomes or very real-world threats we need to recognize that should be addressed by these processes. For us, it is definitely even the recognition of the threats that civil society and wider actors face that should be part of the POA process. I think, for example, many of us have acknowledged and been glad that at least the sort of problematic space for cyber, problematic cyber threats at humanitarian actors has at least been discussed in the UN Open-Ended Working Group. But the fact that it’s been difficult to secure success on that in even naming it in the reports of the current OEWG shows that that is a space we can do more. We can talk about how humanitarian actors are under regular concerted cyber attack, how human rights defenders are under different forms of cyber intimidation, including specifically the proliferation of spyware and of the hack-for-hire and cyber mercenary industry that makes spyware possible. And even a recognition, for example, in that area that spyware or the activities of this hack-for-hire cyber mercenary industry undermines global cyber security as a whole. And that’s, I think, for us, for example, a very important area that we could see potential progress. And I was heartened that even in the UN Open-Ended Working Group process, the current OEWG chaired by Ambassador Gafoor of Singapore, there was an attempt to name this in the recent draft of the annual periodic report of the OEWG. Unfortunately, it wasn’t accepted, which shows the importance of having a cyber process where we can talk about these issues. But I keep saying we need a little bit of a real-world check. We need to make sure that this OEWG, sorry, the POA, implements the agreed norms in the OEWG, but also talks about the current external threats and also talks about where we need norm evolution. And that way, in fact, I wanted to strongly second what Joyce was saying, that it’s not a choice between one or the other. It’s doing both in one place there. I also just wanted to comment on the real-world politics that drives some of these cyber processes. The fact that, for example, we can go into deeper discussion. I think having a regular fixed place to discuss this is a good thing because I think anyone who follows the OEWG or other processes knows that there is a lot of even fear and uncertainty about having dedicated deep discussions on particular topics because of the sort of shifting nature of the OEWG or even an uncertainty that, okay, if you separate into working groups, you might allow one state or a couple of states to dominate on one issue compared to others. And these are, again, important modality issues to work out there. But I think a regular place that is an existing standing mechanism also provides more comfort to states. That is not something where people are going to try to rush through one agenda. There may be many different things. So we can go deep into detail because I think when you talk to any of the delegates outside of the main committee rooms in even the OEWG right now, many of them acknowledge that we know we need to go deeper. We need to go deeper into current threats. We need to go deeper on concrete things, like, for example, state cooperation on talking about cybersecurity vulnerabilities, vulnerability sharing, joint action, and many other areas, including the always-favorite topic of international law. But no one right now is willing, I think beyond a point, to go deep into this in the OEWG structure. So more progress there would be useful. And I did want to name one more area that I think is interesting, which is the implementation. When we’ve talked about the current OEWG norms, for example, and the GGE norms, rather, as talked about in the OEWG, even areas such as the targeting of CSIRTs, computer security, incident response teams, and others, is an area that we can talk more about and concretely take action. So at least the current key, you could say, first responders who are trying to protect the Internet, trying to advance cybersecurity are not further put at risk. My hope is that we talk about the actors who are immediately right now at risk, and who have perhaps not been able to be served or at least better talked about in the OEWG process. We do challenge the more proliferating actors there, and I would put it to all of you that I think there is space to talk about spyware and to talk about the hack-for-hire industry, because if we let it continue to proliferate, and I’m using that term to provoke the diplomats here in the room, that will in fact reduce cybersecurity as a whole, and as I mentioned, we do need to think about who is actually there. I think if you have a regular form of dialogue, many actors will be there beyond the usual suspects as well, particularly from the cybersecurity community, including those outside of, say, the global north, or even like-minded states, who do have a critical role to play in this, and that’s why I’m very happy that we’re having this conversation in this IGF here in Japan. Thank you, Ali.

Ellie McDonald:
Thank you so much, Rahman. Yeah, very much appreciate and second your remarks, and I thank you also for that reality check and also for grounding our conversation in some of the real-life impacts of these most systemic threats, including spyware and otherwise. So I hope we can pick up on that in the discussion shortly. But I’d also just like to welcome David Fairchild, First Secretary of the Permanent Mission of Canada, and to ask David a question before opening to a more open and interactive dialogue. So David, Canada has played an active role in promoting multi- stakeholder and human-centric approaches to cyber policymaking processes. What are the challenges in ensuring states and other actors can meaningfully input to the POA, and how can these be overcome to ensure a mechanism which benefits all participants?

David Fairchild:
Good morning, and I apologize for being late. Very unprofessional, so excuse me for that. It’s just something I could not avoid this morning. So thank you for the question, Ali, and good morning to everybody and the panelists. I won’t take a lot of time arriving late, but I think it’s very important a couple of questions. Of course, human-centric approach is an issue we’re starting to see more and more in the UN. This relates, I think, largely to efforts by a number of member states, I think, to further entrench the international human rights frameworks into ongoing UN processes. This is an effort I think Canada obviously supports, gender being one primary one that Canada both for its foreign policies and international assistance policies pushes as a bedrock element of our policies. When it comes to multi-stakeholderism and Canada’s efforts, I think if you were to go back and look at Canada’s submissions and activities over the previous years, whether it be the GGEs or Open and Working Group, we’ve tried to make working with the multi-stakeholder community an aspect of our policy development going into these negotiations. And so whether it be on some norms development, preparing our Open and Ended Working Group policy itself, we’ve tried to reach out and work before in the months leading up to develop policies together. So a bit of co-creation. I think we spoke about this in the July session. For us, co-creation is not something scary. I think some member states see sometimes the multi-stakeholder community as antagonistic, contrarian, or perhaps pushing policies that they can’t support. For us, we’ve focused a lot of our efforts in the Latin American region. I see Pablo’s in the room. We support a number of Women in Cyber fellows. We actively support their activities and their work and policy development into these processes. But I think whether it be here or in other UN forums, I think we’ve found that actually the co-creation model actually provides huge benefits. There are views, there are perspectives. I think member states either don’t necessarily have the bench depth, they don’t have some of the expertise that exists in the other civil society communities, academia. And I think we’ve found that actually opening the doors, sitting down, in fact framing some of the policies that we wish to pursue working with certain organizations in a trusted environment has actually allowed us to deepen some of our policy understanding which improves our ability to negotiate in the room. On the human-centric approach, I won’t spend a lot of time because I think that one’s probably been covered off, we see this is becoming quite an important aspect I think in our negotiating position strategically. The human rights framework is, I would argue, somewhat under attack. I think we wish to ensure that as we transition hopefully to program of action, but we also see this in other UN processes, that we ensure that the root of much of what we’re trying to do is framed within the human rights framework context, which I think is a disputed space unfortunately. I think I’ll stop there for now.

Ellie McDonald:
Thank you so much, David. I always really appreciate Canada’s support for multi-stakeholders and advocacy for the value of co-creation in these spaces. So we now have some time for discussion, for questions. For those in the room, please use these microphones. If you’d like to ask a question, please walk up to them and then I can hand the mic over to you. For those virtually, please place your questions in the chat. Kirti, do we have any questions online? Not at the moment. I will also share at the start of the discussion, we shared the details of a Slido with a poll to ask views and perspectives on the POA. They’ve been coming in throughout the discussion, so perhaps while we wait for some questions, I can share some of the inputs that have been made. In terms of reflecting, sharing perspectives on the POA, participants have commented that the POA should be a shared responsibilities of different actors, that it should be actionable and permanent. Some have also commented that it’s undefined. Others have noted the value of it being inclusive. And speaking to the point of inclusivity, others have noted that it’s predominantly state-based. We then asked if participants have inputted to dialogue on the POA. Some have, through member states, through engagement at the open-ended working group and through civil society consultation. And when we asked if they felt their views had been incorporated, there was a spectrum of opinion on that point. So unless we have any questions online or in person, not yet, I’ll just pose a question. Please go ahead when you get to the mic.

Audience:
Okay, right, good morning. Thank you. Jennifer Bramlett. I work with the Counterterrorism Executive Directorate with the Security Council’s Counterterrorism Committee. We talked about the threat landscape and, of course, what we’re looking at from the counterterrorism point of view is basically how violent extremists and terrorists can misuse cyber capacities to conduct terrorist attacks. We’re focused very much on content, very much on purchase of weapons, use of the dark web, use of drones, use, you know, financing of terrorism, etc., etc., through cyber means, largely because we can’t really talk about cybersecurity. The mandate for cybersecurity in the Security Council is limited to the protection of critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks. We’re even somewhat limited to talking about the types of cyber attacks that terrorists could conduct against critical infrastructure. There, we have kind of a no-go zone, particularly when it comes to anything that could smack of state sponsored cyber warfare. We can’t even approach it, so we have a very, very, very narrow window in cybersecurity in the Security Council, and what this means is that CTED and the UN Office on Counterterrorism are very limited in the types of technical assistance and capacity building that we can do. So UN OCT, and, you know, it’s not normal for CTED to promote OCT, but here we are. They’ve put out some very good knowledge products. They’re available on OCT’s website. It’s through the OCT program on cyber and emerging technologies, and, again, they’ve put out a practical guide for first responders to an event of what to look for in terms of e-evidence, how to process it, etc. There are a number of other really interesting guidelines, but the focus of the work is largely on open-source intelligence, training law enforcement officers and security officers how to comb through and look for content because of this limitation, and so where I’m going with this is really to see, like, and to encourage the work of OEWG, the work of the other bodies in the UN on the General Assembly side of the House to start to bring this language into the counterterrorism strategy and to bring it in through negotiations with member states into the Security Council area so that we can work on it more effectively. With regards to human rights, just to point out that OHCHR and the Special Rapporteur for Human Rights and Counterterrorism have very emphatically stated that international law frameworks, including international human rights law, applies equally online as offline, and that’s language that, you know, from my perspective, I’d like to see that repeated more often and brought into UN architectures and reports to emphasize that because, again, that helps me to be able to talk more specifically about human rights and not having to debate that, that human rights, yes, apply equally online as offline. And then, finally, CTED’s in the process of finalizing the drafting for the non-binding guiding principles for member states on ICT and preventing and countering their exploitation for terrorist purposes, and, you know, granted it will be a negotiated document, but I do invite you to reach out to me or to my office if there is language that you want to see. I did 14 rounds of negotiations and consultations with civil society, academia, with UN partners, IROs, etc., but there’s still room for language to come in, and if there’s language that’s being developed for the POA that could be rolled into these non-binding guiding principles for member states, because implementation of regulations and everything else is going to be very important, kind of the downstream piece, then please do. Thank you very much.

Ellie McDonald:
And thank you very much for that very helpful contribution, and I don’t, I think there was some really helpful remarks there, and I wonder if anyone wants to react to them? Yeah, Henri?

Henri Verdier:
So you did have a small view on the vast diversity of topics, actors, and that’s very interesting, and thank you for the opportunity. I would like to put the emphasis of one very important aspect. We did all mention implementation, action-oriented, etc., but the big question is, can we build peace, stability, and security just with norms? Just with promises of good behavior, and my view, our view, is that that’s not enough. Norms, law matters, of course, a lot, but we are speaking about the cyberspace. I was thinking a long time before Tolkien wrote The Lord of the Rings, Plato, do you remember, wrote about the Ring of Giges. Do you remember this text? And the question was, if I can be invisible, will I remain ethical? And Plato said, no, if I’m invisible. And the question is, in the cyberspace, can we build more resilience? And to build resilience, we need to go a bit further than norms and texts. We need to help everyone to have good infrastructures. We need to help everyone to have good organization to build capacities, and I’m very serious, because as I said, the next step in the cyber warfare, or terrorist attack, or hybrid threat, is that everyone will attack someone through another country and will remain invisible, not eternally, but during a few weeks, which is enough to destabilize or to change the course of conflict. So the question is, the real reason why we did propose to go further than DGEs and Open-Ended Working Group, is that we consider that if we want peace, stability, security, you need to introduce within, not just a conversation, but the work, design of infrastructures, capacity building, etc. And that’s very important, because that’s a bit new in the first committee. We have to think not just in terms of international law, but also in terms of building security, which is a step further. And I want to emphasize this, because this is the reason why it was so long, because we did change the framework of the conversation, but also why there is some interest on this, and we really need to go in this direction. Thank you.

Ellie McDonald:
Thank you, Ambassador Verdier. Romain, I think, wish to respond. I might ask you just to be brief, so that we also have time for some final remarks.

Raman Jit Singh:
Thank you. Thank you for the question, I think it’s an excellent one, and a comment also about all these different issues and equities that play in cyber conversation in the UN. And I think that’s one important part of, as you built out the POA still, right, I think you’ve hit that very importantly. There are going to be many other cyber conversations, some that will take direction or steer from the POA, but others that may continue independently. My suspicion is that the counterterrorism debate is one that is still fairly complicated, particularly because of the sensitive nature or the contested nature of discussions around non-state actors in the existing OEWG process and elsewhere, that there may still be some lack of clarity for a while. And in a sense, many actors would have to depend on the Delhi Declaration and what came out of the Counterterrorism Committee and Security Council. But I think, again, naming that right, that the role of the POA with regards to Security Council overall is going to be that sort of tricky area that we need to think about it further. I did want to, like, strongly, like, second what, you know, Henry said, it’s not just about norms, it’s about thinking through security and how we implement it. I think that that is why I’m also interested very specifically on how human rights and human rights defenders come into the conversation, because the conversation in the OEWG is being challenging for humanitarian actors and international humanitarian law. I suspect there’s still a lot of resistance to talking about targeting of HRDs, and if one were to talk about HRDs, counterterrorism, and cyber as well, it’s even more contested. So I think we should go there. That’s exactly where we should land in a few years. I suspect in the initial period, everyone’s going to shy away from it.

Ellie McDonald:
Just a brief reaction from Joyce before our final remarks. Thank you. Very briefly,

Joyce Hakmeh:
I think you raise a very important point, and building on what Rahman said, I mean, you know, how can, and it’s important, actually, that it’s coming from someone within the UN system. I mean, we struggle with the fact that the UN cyber processes do not connect with each other, right? And you’re raising a larger point, how can they connect with other issues? And Rahman talked about the sensitivities, and I think, to me, this is really where the multi-stakeholders can play a very important role, right? Kind of in understanding where they connect, understanding where the linkages are, where the overlaps are, and bringing them to the table, and hopefully the POA can be a vehicle for doing that.

Ellie McDonald:
Thank you so much, Joyce. I’d now like to turn to speakers just for their final remarks, and I ask that you maybe take no more than 30 seconds, a minute, if possible. But in those final remarks, I would be keen particularly to hear your views on the next steps, and specifically how the wider community and stakeholders can become more involved in these discussions. So I’d like to turn first to Ambassador Verdier, if you’re ready, or else to another speaker.

Henri Verdier:
I’ve made my final remark. I think security in a world where you can be

David Hevey:
invisible. Thank you. And Dave? Thank you. I really want to pick up on three things as mentioned before. Actionable, permanent, and inclusive. Absolutely hear you. Australia does. I think that’s why Australia is advocating the participation of all member states, all countries, and non-state actors. That was in our messaging, and we really want to emphasize that. Permanent, absolutely. Again, that’s why we highlighted that. We see the POA as a means to do that. The POA in itself does that. And actionable, that’s why, again, we absolutely support the emphasis and focus on the capacity building there, too. Thank you.

Ellie McDonald:
Ali and Joyce? Thanks, Ali.

Joyce Hakmeh:
I think it’s heartening to hear about how multi-stakeholderism and the inclusion aspect is being pushed for by some of the pioneers of this initiative, and we look forward to hopefully seeing this initiative as one, you know, sort of like moving the conversation beyond just should the multi-stakeholders be in the room, to actually how do we work better together.

Ellie McDonald:
Thank you, Joyce. Raman, may I turn to you?

Raman Jit Singh:
Participation is crucial. I think, in fact, there I am worried that the POA is still one more cyber process anchored in UN headquarter locations and not internationally. And just actionable things. Many of the governments and actors here, are there consultations on the POA process in your capitals or where you are? That’s maybe an immediate next step. I’ll leave this with you. Participation is crucial. Frankness and ambition is, as if not even more important.

David Fairchild:
Okay, well, last word to me. Yeah, just thanks very much, and I think much of what I said is already covered off here. It’s about equity and agency. I’ve said this for a long time. I mean, cyberspace is a co-owned space. I think member states have to recognize that. The POA is an aggregator. There are lots of strands of works. It will only increase as we look at the bridging the digital divide and accelerating connectivity. Cyber resilience, which was mentioned, I think is a developmental issue closely linked to cybersecurity, and that is only going to expand as we try to bring on the last 2.6. For Canada, involvement, the POA for us is just simply the way to institutionalize that dialogue and provide a platform to bring people together to work through the issues and look at ways to bridge the gaps, so from a capacity-building perspective. Thank you.

Ellie McDonald:
Thank you so much to all the speakers for those important reflections. I hope we can capture them in the report, and then just to conclude with some very short summary reflections. I think we’ve heard that the POA would be only the next step in a long history and evolution of discussions on cyber at the UN, that it must implement the framework, but that it must also allow for evolving discussions, but indeed that it’s also more than the framework. It must allow for capacity-building and operationalization of discussions within it, but also that it must walk the talk and respond to real-life events and to threats, that a diversity of views must inform it, and indeed that as a mechanism it must be co-created and co-owned. With that, I would like to thank you for your time, for your participation in the poll, and wish you a happy rest of your time at the IGF. Thank you.

Martin Schaaper

Data and statistics are crucial for meaningful access to the internet and the development of policies in this area. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), in partnership with the UN Office of the Tech Envoy, has set targets for universal and meaningful connectivity by 2030. These targets focus on people using the internet, the quality of internet connection, the cost of internet packages, and the necessary skills required. The aim is to provide internet access to all individuals, businesses, schools, and communities in a meaningful way. The ITU has introduced the Universal and Meaningful Connectivity (UMC) dashboard to monitor progress towards these targets.

However, there are data gaps when it comes to understanding data center usage and mobile connectivity in Africa. There is ongoing discussion and development of indicators for middle-bar connectivity. Currently, indicators exist for bandwidth, but not for how data is channeled into data centers or how it reaches the end user. Developing solid indicators in these areas is necessary to gain a comprehensive understanding of data center usage and mobile connectivity in Africa.

Surveys are the best source of data on internet users and their behavior. However, they tend to be expensive and are mostly limited to high-income countries. Policymakers are encouraged to fund statistical offices to conduct surveys, especially in low-income countries, in order to bridge the data gap and gain insights into internet access and connectivity.

A coalition is working with the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to enhance internet access for women and promote gender equality. The coalition engages in various initiatives and brings technical knowledge and expertise to address the needs of women in accessing the internet. They are conducting an assessment to understand the barriers women face and develop strategies to overcome them.

Internet access, particularly domain names in local scripts, can benefit African universities. Efforts are being made to understand their specific needs and provide support, leveraging technical expertise to enhance connectivity and communication.

It is important to note that ICANN does not address the issue of domain name invisibility due to mobile phone apps. Their focus lies elsewhere in internet access and infrastructure.

In conclusion, reliable data and effective coordination are essential for addressing data gaps and achieving universal and meaningful internet connectivity. Upholding ITU’s targets and collaborating with various stakeholders can bridge the digital divide and ensure inclusive access to the internet. Policymakers, statistical offices, and the private sector play a vital role in collecting accurate data, conducting surveys, and funding initiatives. By leveraging data and statistics effectively, societies can unlock the internet’s potential and promote inclusive development.

Audience

Libraries play a crucial role in providing digital access to communities by offering a range of digital services and knowledge. They serve as multipurpose infrastructure and are essential for community development. The importance of libraries in this context is supported by various initiatives and projects. For example, the Digital Skills at Your Local Library project in Uganda equipped libraries with digital facilities and trained librarians to disseminate digital skills. This project promotes digital inclusion and addresses the digital divide.

In addition to providing digital access, libraries are also unique aggregators of ICT resources in a community. The Gigabit Libraries Network initiative aims to expand internet inclusion using emerging telecom technology. It includes providing low-cost internet connectivity to places suffering from disastrous weather, reducing inequalities in internet access. The initiative has introduced low-earth orbit satellite connectivity kits in Nigeria, further expanding internet access.

Libraries can also serve as community hubs for disaster resilience and climate change mitigation. Bill McKibben, a climate activist, supports the idea of libraries being used as community access hubs for resilience. By making libraries resilient against outages and equipping them with resources to support communities during disasters, they can play a vital role in mitigating the effects of climate change.

The policy of access rights is crucial for improving library services and ensuring equitable access to information. This policy ensures that everyone has the right to access information and knowledge, which is essential for personal and community development. Advocating for the UN’s policy framework can be effective in promoting these access rights and enhancing library services.

However, challenges remain in ensuring meaningful internet access in certain regions. For example, in Uganda, unstable broadband infrastructure, high data costs, and the lack of relevant local audiovisual content hinder internet accessibility. The prevalence of unstable broadband infrastructure leads to issues such as unexplained bandwidth throttling, disrupting signal reliability. The high cost of data prevents people from enjoying more internet content, and the lack of relevant local audiovisual content limits the availability of culturally significant material.

Enabling a conducive economic climate is crucial for promoting the audiovisual industry and fostering meaningful internet access. Local production companies, such as Savannah Moon in Uganda, are championing the creation and consumption of local content. By focusing on producing films that reflect everyday experiences of local people, including those faced by women and the neurodiverse, these companies contribute to a more inclusive and representative digital landscape.

Concerns also exist regarding internet accessibility and data storage in Africa. There is a growing belief that data collected in Africa should be stored within the continent, taking into account factors such as data sovereignty and access. Moreover, internet accessibility in Africa is hindered by challenges such as bandwidth costs and concerns about data collected in Africa being stored outside the region. These issues highlight the need for improved internet infrastructure and data management practices within Africa.

Language diversity is another barrier to internet accessibility. Communities with diverse languages face challenges in accessing online content available primarily in dominant languages. Addressing this barrier requires efforts to provide internet access in diverse languages, ensuring inclusivity for all.

Additionally, there is a need for voice and audiovisual content to cater to the needs of older populations. As internet usage becomes more prevalent, it is important to consider how technology can be more accessible to older adults through voice command technology and audiovisual content.

Technology and internet outreach for low-literate people are vital as well. In India, for instance, there are approximately a billion low-literate individuals who could benefit from technology and internet outreach programs. Ensuring inclusivity for all language levels is crucial in bridging the digital divide.

The internet should also strive to be more inclusive for non-text people. Efforts should be made to ensure that individuals who rely on non-text alternatives, such as audio and visual interfaces, can fully access and engage with online content.

Moreover, the internet should continue to evolve in terms of standards and technology. This evolution should aim to address issues such as internet connectivity gaps and the need for more user-friendly interfaces. Speakers also advocate for a decentralized web, where the internet becomes more peer-to-peer and less reliant on centralized control.

Overall, addressing the digital divide and ensuring meaningful internet access and use require a multi-stakeholder approach and collaboration at both local and global levels. Various organizations, including ITU and ICANN, are working towards identifying gaps and finding solutions. Partnerships and innovative financing approaches are also crucial for building networks, including country-code top-level domains (CCTLDs) and data centres.

Laurent Ferrali

The Coalition for Digital Africa plays a crucial role in supporting African country code top-level domain (CCTLD) registries by providing them with technical capacity-building support. This coalition was launched during the last Internet Governance Forum (IGF) in Addis Ababa, in collaboration with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and other partners.

By offering technical capacity-building support, the coalition aims to enhance the overall infrastructure in Africa. However, it recognizes that improving infrastructure requires a more holistic approach, going beyond technical expertise and capacity building alone. The coalition acknowledges that African countries need diverse support to ensure sustainable and effective infrastructure improvement.

One important focus for the coalition is the issue of Universal Acceptance of International Domain Names. It is working to ensure that people have access to international domain names, eliminating any barriers that may exist. By addressing this issue, the coalition promotes inclusivity and ensures individuals in African countries can access and benefit from the global digital space.

Furthermore, the coalition is dedicated to enhancing the quality of service and cybersecurity of CCTLDs in Africa. As part of their efforts, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is deploying managed server facilities in Africa. This initiative aims to provide reliable and secure infrastructure for CCTLDs, ultimately strengthening their operations and protecting them from cyber threats.

In summary, the Coalition for Digital Africa diligently supports African CCTLD registries. By providing technical capacity-building support, adopting a holistic approach to infrastructure improvement, addressing the issue of Universal Acceptance, and focusing on quality of service and cybersecurity, the coalition contributes significantly to Africa’s digital landscape. Through their efforts, they facilitate an enabling environment that allows African countries to unlock the full potential of the digital economy and achieve sustainable development.

Onica Nonhlanhla Makwakwa

The analysis emphasises the importance of meaningful internet access, which encompasses various factors such as adequate speed, daily internet access, possession of a smartphone, and unlimited data. This comprehensive definition of meaningful connectivity is crucial in ensuring that individuals are truly connected and able to fully utilise the internet for various purposes, such as job hunting, education, and accessing health information. However, it is noted that current definitions of access need to be re-evaluated and recalibrated in order to truly capture the concept of meaningful connectivity.

One major obstacle in achieving meaningful internet access is the affordability of devices, particularly in low and middle-income countries. The cost of entry-level smartphones, for example, can amount to 20-25% of the average household income, rendering them unaffordable for many individuals. This issue of device affordability underscores the need for addressing the digital divide and reducing inequalities in access to technology.

To enhance connectivity and address existing market inequalities, there is a call to adopt different digital technologies and financial models. The current economic system is believed to be extractive, and there is a growing discussion about the region’s capability to retain its own data. It is argued that alternative approaches and models should be explored and adopted to foster better connectivity and correct existing market disparities.

Africa’s role in digital transformation is also highlighted. Due to its significant contribution to the supply chain of smartphone manufacturing, Africa should aim to participate in the digital transformation equally and actively. However, the high costs incurred by Africa, which spends up to 40% of its budget on obtaining the cheapest available smartphone, further underlines the importance of Africa playing a more prominent role in digital transformation.

Furthermore, it is deemed essential for Africa to focus on nurturing innovators rather than solely being consumers of digital content. This shift in focus will enable Africa to leverage the digital transformation and foster economic growth and development.

Addressing the digital gender gap is another crucial aspect raised in the analysis. It is noted that excluding women from the digital economy has significant economic implications. Therefore, efforts should be made to bridge this gap by promoting gender equality and ensuring equal access and opportunities for women in the digital realm. The importance of addressing this digital gender gap is further reinforced by the need for qualitative research and ethnographic studies to understand the impact and experiences of women in the digital economy.

In conclusion, the analysis highlights the need for meaningful internet access, addresses the challenges of device affordability, suggests adopting different digital technologies and financial models, emphasises Africa’s role in digital transformation, advocates for building innovators rather than just content consumers, and underscores the significance of addressing the digital gender gap. These findings offer valuable insights into the current state of digital connectivity and provide recommendations for creating a more inclusive and equitable digital landscape.

Keisuke Kamimura

The initial barrier to internet access in Japan was the inability of computers and applications to process Japanese characters effectively. This resulted in issues such as broken email messages during transmission and Japanese web pages being rendered as gibberish. These technical limitations posed a significant challenge for Japanese internet users as they were unable to access and communicate information in their native language.

However, before internet access became widely available to the public, the technical issues related to the Japanese language on the internet were successfully resolved. Various commercial and non-commercial entities developed computers and applications capable of processing Japanese characters effectively. Moreover, Japanese language support was effectively incorporated into internet applications, ensuring that the wider population gaining internet access could do so without facing language-related hindrances.

On the other hand, the usage of internationalised domain names (IDN) in Japanese characters did not gain widespread acceptance within Japan. Major local websites chose not to identify themselves with IDNs and only used them for protective or defensive purposes. This indicates that while there may be some recognition of the value of using IDNs, the practical inconvenience associated with their usage prevails.

Several reasons were cited for the inconvenience of using IDNs in Japanese characters. These include the need to switch between different scripts (Japanese characters, the Latin alphabet, and other symbols) while using the internet, which is often seen as tedious and inconvenient. Additionally, there is a higher level of comfort in using Japanese characters for search strings rather than for URLs or identifiers.

The lower adoption rates of IDNs in Japan further highlight the local population’s reluctance to fully embrace this technology. The convenience of identifying URLs in the Latin alphabet within Japanese articles, coupled with the cumbersome nature of using IDNs, contributes to this lower adoption.

In conclusion, while the initial technical issues related to the Japanese language on the internet have been resolved, the usage of internationalised domain names in Japanese characters faces challenges in gaining acceptance within Japan. The convenience and familiarity of the Latin alphabet for identifying URLs, combined with the inconvenience of switching between different scripts, likely contribute to this reluctance.

Roberto Zambrana

The analysis highlights the importance of ensuring persistence and quality in universal connectivity, particularly in the context of digital inclusion and remote communities. It points out that many digital inclusion programs fail to ensure continuous connectivity, suggesting that merely connecting schools and remote communities to the internet is not sufficient; they must also maintain a connection. This argument is supported by the observation that connected schools and remote communities need reliable and uninterrupted access to the internet to fully benefit from the opportunities offered by digital inclusion.

Furthermore, the analysis emphasizes the need to increase production of local audio and video content, as it plays a critical role in enhancing meaningful connectivity. By creating content that is relevant and relatable to local languages and cultural perspectives, it becomes possible to bridge the digital divide and foster inclusive communication. In particular, the case of Papua New Guinea is highlighted as a country that recognises the importance of this intervention and is taking note of it. By focussing on producing content in over 800 languages and cultures, Papua New Guinea aims to improve connectivity and ensure that even marginalised communities can participate in the digital world.

Overall, the analysis underscores the significance of continuous and quality connectivity in digital inclusion and remote communities. It emphasises the need for digital inclusion programmes to prioritise the sustainability of connectivity, ensuring that schools and remote communities not only gain access to the internet but also maintain it. Additionally, the analysis highlights the value of increasing local audio and video content production to strengthen meaningful connectivity, especially in culturally diverse contexts. By implementing these strategies, it is anticipated that digital inclusion efforts can be more effective in promoting equitable access to resources and empowering communities worldwide.

Vint Cerf

The analysis highlights the crucial role of economics in ensuring the accessibility of systems. It argues that affordable systems are important for internet accessibility and suggests subsidising individuals with inadequate income as a potential solution to make systems more affordable. By providing subsidies, accessibility to the internet and its associated benefits can be extended, addressing issues of inequality and reducing barriers to access.

Additionally, the analysis underscores the significance of understanding causality in the context of artificial intelligence (AI). It asserts that meaningful access to AI requires a deep comprehension of how machine learning models operate. Without a causal model, one is left with only correlation and probability, which are distinct from causality. Therefore, understanding the cause-and-effect relationships within AI systems is essential for drawing accurate conclusions and making informed decisions.

The study strongly supports the idea of driving costs out of accessible systems, including making them less expensive and providing subsidies. It emphasizes the importance of affordability in promoting accessibility and advocates for various approaches to achieve this. These actions are believed to contribute to reducing inequalities and eradicating poverty.

Furthermore, the analysis references Judah Pearl’s work on causality, highlighting the significance of understanding causality when using machine learning outputs for drawing conclusions. This reference amplifies the importance of incorporating causality into AI understanding and decision-making processes.

Overall, the analysis provides valuable insights into the role of economics in ensuring the accessibility of systems. By addressing affordability and understanding causality in AI, it suggests ways to enhance inclusivity and ensure that individuals, regardless of income, have access to technology and its benefits.

Steven Matainaho

Papua New Guinea is currently undergoing a significant digital transformation, shifting from a traditional connectivity model to a service-driven approach. This transition aims to improve the delivery of government services and enhance the overall experience for citizens. The government introduced the Digital Government Act in 2022, followed by plans for a Digital Government Plan from 2023 to 2027, with the goal of providing fast, simple, and clear digital services to the people. The focus is on making services more convenient and effective for citizens, and the government aims to lead in delivering these services.

An analysis of internet usage in Papua New Guinea over a ten-year period revealed that the most visited websites were related to banking, sports, and social media. This insight led the government to understand the need for valuable online services that enhance productivity and quality of life. By offering a range of online services, the government aims to further improve the lives of citizens and meet their evolving needs.

Steven Matainaho, an advocate for digital transformation, emphasises the importance of prioritising the delivery of valuable online services. This aligns with the government’s commitment to putting citizens first and ensuring accessible and efficient services. The government plans to introduce a variety of digital services, starting in 2023, to fulfill this commitment.

Papua New Guinea has experienced significant growth in connectivity, with a high mobile network coverage that reaches around 76% of the population. The country has skipped the fixed-line era and instead adopted a mobile network infrastructure that includes 2G, 3G, and 4G technologies. This approach has resulted in faster and more widespread connectivity across the country.

The affordability of devices is crucial for telecommunications development in Papua New Guinea. Data from operators indicates that the cheapest affordable smartphone is priced at around $60 USD. This affordable price point has led to a notable increase in purchasing power among the population. Ensuring affordability is essential in enabling more people to access and benefit from digital services.

To further decrease the cost of devices, the government plans to introduce tax reduction incentives for importing devices from 2023 to 2025. This initiative aims to make devices more affordable and accessible to a wider population. By reducing inequalities in access to technology, Papua New Guinea aims to bridge the digital divide and promote inclusivity in the digital era.

In conclusion, Papua New Guinea is undergoing a digital transformation, transitioning from a traditional connectivity model to a service-driven approach. The government’s introduction of the Digital Government Act and plans for a Digital Government Plan underscore their commitment to providing efficient and valuable digital services to citizens. This transformation takes into account the country’s internet usage patterns, focusing on online banking, sports, and social media. Steven Matainaho advocates for prioritising the delivery of these valuable online services, aligned with the government’s citizen-centric approach. Additionally, the country’s high mobile network coverage and the affordability of devices play significant roles in facilitating telecommunications development. The government’s plans to introduce tax reduction incentives aim to further decrease device costs and bridge the digital divide within the population. Papua New Guinea’s digital transformation reflects its commitment to leveraging technology to improve citizens’ lives and foster inclusive growth.

Maria de Brasdefer

Libraries serve as vital gateways to meaningful information and must adapt to technological advancements in order to effectively meet the needs of their local communities. They have evolved from traditional spaces focused solely on books and archives to dynamic spaces that cater to the diverse needs of their users. By embracing technology, libraries can bridge the digital divide and provide essential access to information for those who need it most.

An example of this is seen in Uganda, where a project was implemented to enhance the infrastructure of public and community libraries across the country. The project aimed to equip these libraries with computers, internet connectivity, and other necessary facilities. In addition, a training of trainers strategy was employed, enabling local librarians to tailor educational programs to the specific needs of their communities. Trained librarians also conducted outreach campaigns, with a particular focus on supporting individuals interested in improving their businesses and accessing educational opportunities. As a result, approximately 14,000 individuals in Uganda benefitted from this project, with many starting small and medium enterprises and gaining access to higher education opportunities in other locations.

Accurate data disaggregation is crucial, not just in terms of sex but also concerning gender and other minority groups. Currently, there is insufficient data available on these populations. By collecting and analyzing disaggregated data, we can gain a better understanding of the unique challenges faced by different groups and create targeted solutions to address inequality and promote inclusivity.

In order to assess the extent of internet connectivity and meaningful access to information within libraries, comprehensive data and indicators are needed. Understanding the current status of library connectivity and access will enable policymakers and stakeholders to develop strategies and allocate resources more effectively.

Despite their significance, libraries often remain overlooked at a higher policy level. It is essential to recognize the role that libraries play in society and allocate adequate resources to support their development. This is particularly crucial within the context of development communities in the Americas, where access to libraries should be prioritized.

Digital inclusion and capacity building initiatives at the local level require skilled staff. Training programs are necessary to equip library staff with the knowledge and skills needed to facilitate digital inclusion and promote capacity building within their communities.

In conclusion, libraries are indispensable in providing meaningful access to information and must adapt to technological advancements to meet the evolving needs of their local communities. The case of Uganda highlights the positive impact that well-equipped libraries and trained librarians can have on education and small business development. Disaggregated data is necessary to address inequalities faced by different groups, while better data and indicators are required to assess library connectivity and access to information. Libraries deserve recognition and support at a higher policy level, and staff skilling is critical for the success of digital inclusion and capacity building initiatives.

Paolo Lanteri

The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) actively promotes and ensures meaningful access to relevant content. WIPO leads various initiatives, including the Accessible Books Consortium (ABC), which aims to increase the availability of books in accessible formats for distribution worldwide. This initiative plays a significant role in supporting SDG 4, which focuses on quality education.

WIPO collaborates with Wikimedia to enhance accessibility and open access. They facilitate the exchange of good practices among International Governmental Organisations (IGOs) and release their content on the global platform, making it more widely accessible.

WIPO is engaged in digitalisation projects related to traditional knowledge and cultural expressions. They support practical initiatives such as digitisation projects, fellowships, and hackathons, contributing to the preservation and dissemination of global heritage.

Furthermore, WIPO supports the creative industries through its development agenda. They are relaunching the audiovisual market of Latin American production and have launched specific tools for small publishers in least developed countries (LDCs) and training programs for animation professionals in developing countries. This support helps nurture creativity, innovation, and economic growth in the creative industries.

In summary, WIPO’s contributions to meaningful access to content are significant. Through initiatives like the ABC, collaborations with Wikimedia, and engagement in digitalisation projects, WIPO promotes accessibility, inclusivity, and sustainability in the creation and distribution of content. Additionally, their support for the creative industries through the development agenda further demonstrates their commitment to fostering a vibrant cultural landscape.

Giacomo Mazzone

The Internet Governance Forum (IGF) discussed the concept of meaningful access, which has been defined in various ways over the years. The topic of access, including issues like affordability, artificial intelligence (AI), and accessibility, was addressed in several sessions and workshops at the IGF. Vint Cerf, a member of the Panel for a New Multilingualism in the Americas (PNMA), highlighted the importance of these topics in a video message, emphasizing the affordability of devices and the impact of AI on meaningful accessibility.

Giacomo Mazzone, the co-chair of the PNMA, recognized the complexity and significance of the topic, stressing the need for diverse perspectives on the issue of access and meaningful access. Moreover, Mazzone expressed an interest in understanding how island states handle technical solutions for infrastructure, particularly in relation to the potential use of satellites.

The inclusion of rights of access in the United Nations’ policy framework is deemed vital for addressing climate adaptation. In fact, the UN has made substantial commitments, pledging billions of dollars to address climate adaptation, including connectivity.

Statistics and data analysis are important tools for making appropriate policies, and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is actively working on indicators for meaningful access. Mazzone acknowledges the need to develop robust indicators for how data is channeled into data centres and the “last mile” in the coming years.

Increasing production of local audio and video content is seen as crucial for achieving meaningful connectivity. This is particularly important in places like Papua New Guinea, which has over 800 languages and cultures. Local content can play a significant role in promoting cultural diversity and fostering connectivity.

The meeting also highlighted the importance of collaboration and participation. Giacomo Mazzone expressed appreciation for everyone’s contribution. Special thanks were extended to participants, speakers, organisers, and volunteers, including individuals like Roberto and Daphne, who devoted their efforts to the event.

In conclusion, the discussions at the IGF emphasised the multifaceted nature of the issue of access and meaningful access. Various topics such as affordability, AI, accessibility, data connectivity, infrastructure, and local content production were addressed in relation to meaningful access. The importance of diverse perspectives, solid indicators, UN policy framework, and collaboration was underscored as crucial elements for achieving meaningful connectivity.

Giacomo Mazzone:
If you can take your seat, we are just starting the next session. I’m Giacomo Mazzone, I’m the co-chair of the PNMA, that means Policy Network for Meaningful Access, with Nima Lugangira, that unfortunately she cannot be with us because of the concomitant engagement in Morocco, so she cannot be at two places at the same time yet. Thank you for being with us. The topic, as you can imagine, is complex and we will have multiple voices to go through it. Just to resume in a few words what we’ll be about. The concept of meaningful access has been defined in various ways, let’s say during the years, but we have some consolidated, the last speaker arrives, we have a consolidated literature about that and I’ve seen with pleasure that has been treated in many other workshops and discussions across all the IGF, so what we will try to do is to try to bring into the discussion of this afternoon the richness of the debate that has been going around at the IGF and of course across the globe. This is why we have a distinguished list of panelists with us that will try to represent the richness of the debate. I start from the extreme right, not politically meaningful, that is Roberto Zambrana with us, that is the remote moderation, and I thank him for having accepted to be with us. Then after him there is our friend Keisuke Kamimura, I hope I’m not pronouncing too bad, it’s okay, good, from the Daito Bunko University representing the Japanese IGF. Then we have Paolo Lanteri from WIPO. Then from the ITU we have Martin Schaper that is in charge of the statistics and he will explain to us how important are the statistics for the debate. Then we have Onika Nonlala Makwawa, but you will say better than me later, from Global Digital Inclusion Partnership. We have Maria Bradefer from IFLA. So I would not waste so much time with the presentation, but I will go straight in the media stress, as the Latin said. We will start with a video contribution from Vint Cerf, that not only is the chair of the leadership panel, but he’s also one of the members of the group of PNMA. And last year, he was with us in presence at this same panel. This year, he cannot, but he was able to send a very short contribution. The contribution of Vint is linked to the points that we discussed last year with him. One was about the problem of the one of the reasons for the difficulty of access and meaningful access is the affordability of the devices. And the second question to be related to the main topic of this year, IGF, is if the arrival AI in a massive way could be improving and help to solving the problem of accessibility and meaningful accessibility. So if the control room can start the video, we can see Vint Cerf’s contribution.

Vint Cerf:
Accessible systems, we have to take into account economics. So affordable systems are important. If you can’t afford the devices, equipment, and service, it gives you access to a meaningful and useful internet, then you don’t get to use it. So we need to drive costs out by a number of ways. It could be making things less expensive. It could be subsidizing people whose incomes are inadequate, who deserve access to internet and all of its services. So here we have some creative thinking that is needed in order to make things affordable to the general population. Meaningful access to the artificial intelligence means understanding something about the way in which it works. As an example, one of my friends and colleagues, Judah Pearl at UCLA, has written books on causality and another book called The Book of Why, W-H-Y. This is about understanding how these large language models and large machine learning models actually work. And understanding that without a causal model, all you have is probability and correlation. The correlation and causality are not the same thing. So using these tools requires you to think about causality as you apply the output to conclusions.

Giacomo Mazzone:
Well, as a TV journalist, this confirming my doubts about shooting videos with iPhone is not the same than shooting with a professional camera, but at least these are the results. Prejudice? Could be. So I hope that you followed what Vint was saying through the subtitles. His contribution is quite interesting because linked to what we said last year. So this is the first contribution for our debate. But going back to the mainstream debate, we have now Onika that will start first and will talk about some experience that she is following and some interesting reports about meaningful access. Please.

Onica Nonhlanhla Makwakwa:
Great, thank you. I will just get to it. So one of the ways in which we actually define someone who has meaningful access is a person who has adequate speed to connect, a person who has a smart device like a smartphone as a minimum entry point, and has the ability to access the internet on a daily basis if that’s what they choose to, as well as has access to unlimited data. And the research that we’ve done actually shows that we need to recalibrate how we are defining access in general if we want to focus on meaningful access to make sure that people have the right device to be able to connect as well as the right speed and the unlimited access to data. The experience that we’ve seen is that the people who actually have meaningful connectivity. So, those users are more likely to be able to use their access for things that can truly help improve their lives, such as looking for a job, taking a course, looking at health and wellness information, as opposed to those who have just a basic access to connectivity. But one of the great challenges we need to address is the access to affordable devices amongst all the others, but access to affordable devices remains one of the greater challenges for people to be meaningfully connected. At the moment, especially in the low and middle-income countries, we are still seeing entry-level smartphones at 20 to 25 percent average household income, which is extremely unaffordable, especially for those on the lower-income quantiles in those countries. So I’ll just pause there for now and engage later on this, but just driving the issue of affordability to access as well as affordability to the devices. Yeah, that was exactly one of the points raised by Vint Cerf in his introduction.

Giacomo Mazzone:
Thank you, Onika, and thank you for staying in the time. We are in Japan for the first time for the IGF, and Japan is one of the few countries that has hosted the IGF that has a language that is not Latin language. The previous one we had was Egypt in Arabic. So the question is, being in a country like this, is the fact that not to be Latin character language a barrier, and how this affects the access and the meaningful access for the Japanese citizens?

Keisuke Kamimura:
Hi, my name is Keisuke Kamimura. Thank you very much for inviting me on this panel. I am Professor of Linguistics and Japanese at Taito Bunkai University in Tokyo. So I… have a somewhat linguistic perspective on this issue. So let me share my personal reflection and observation with you. I’m a bit concerned whether what I am going to talk about fits this panel well, but let me try. So as Giacomo mentioned, we use a combination of scripts in writing Japanese. And how did this affect the access to the internet in Japan? Maybe there are two aspects to this issue. One is technical, and the other is social and cultural. But let me focus on the first one here, technical aspect. We once had technical problems in enabling with Japanese characters on computer systems and internet applications. I remember computer systems and my computers and applications did not process the Japanese language in the way it should when I was a student, particularly. And even if your computer is ready for dealing with the characters, your application programs, like word processing software or whatever, may not handle the language effectively. So you can’t write papers. So you can’t use spelling, spell checkers, or other correction functionalities for Japanese if the language is not supported. And I also remember email messages in Japanese were often broken on the way of transmission. And web pages in Japanese were often rendered to what we called gibberish, or mochibake in Japanese. So we surely had many troubles in dealing with Japanese characters at the technical level, at an early stage of the personal computer and the internet. internet, but many of these technical problems were eventually sorted out by the efforts of various commercial and non-commercial developers. But that was done before the internet became available to the wider population. So I wouldn’t say we had no problems, but they did not remain too long. So the trouble with characters and languages was quite annoying, but it was not prohibitive to the extent that it blocked out the Japanese from accessing the internet effectively. But if you look at things differently, ordinary users in Japan were confident enough to use their language on the internet, because technical issues had been resolved before they turned to the use of the internet. So if we had not had the Japanese capability in computer and the applications of internet, many of us in Japan may have been hesitant to use the internet as we use it now. So we did have problems, but we sorted out well before the internet came. But if you are facing the trouble now, it’s going to be a very big issue. Thank you very much.

Giacomo Mazzone:
That’s a very real witness of what can happen in these countries. But I’m glad to understand that it is the context that is also important, because the fact that you are in a country where you are affluent, you have the tools, you can afford the right devices and the right software, this diminish the impact of the risk of being excluded, of course. This is not the case in other countries where the same conditions are not gathered. OK, so if we are lucky now, we have a remote participant with us. And he’s a representative of the government. This is Steven Maitai-Nahao, that is secretary for the Papua New Guinea Department of Information and Communication Technology. He’s connected on remote. And he will explain us some experience that they are doing with the assistance of some experts, Judith is with us in the room, that are trying to help Papua New Guinea to go ahead and try to minimize the exclusion of the citizen from the internet revolution. Please, Mr. Maitai-Nahao, you have the floor.

Steven Matainaho:
Thank you, Chair. Can you hear me? Yes, perfectly. Thank you. Good evening all the way from Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby. It’s great to be here online and to be participating in the IGF. I just have a few comments. And of course, my experience and professional experience and insights will generally be from the journey that Papua New Guinea is facing. For those not aware, Papua New Guinea is an island nation consisting of multiple islands and one mainland in the South Pacific, north of Australia and east of and sharing landmass with Indonesia. We’re roughly around 11.87 million people. Interestingly enough, Papua New Guinea holds about 12% of the world’s language, and that’s roughly around 846 languages actively spoken. And you would think that this would be a challenge in terms of inclusivity. But I’d like to just briefly speak on meaningful connectivity and what that means to Papua New Guinea. We’ve had connectivity as a government priority since early 2000, 2003, when our first state on mobile network operator was introduced, and later through the introduction of competition, which was in 2009. And something interesting is that since 2009 and within that 10-year span, an interesting insight indicated was that the most searched and accessed sites in Papua New Guinea from that 10-year period commencing 2009 were three websites. The first website is bsp.com. And for those around the world not aware, BSP is one of our main banks in Papua New Guinea, Bank of South Pacific. The second most accessed website was NRL.com. NRL is the National Rugby League in Australia, and Papua New Guineans are very avid fans of rugby. And the third most popular website was Facebook. Now, this was consistent for over 10 years, and it tells you a lot of things, but one of the things that the government took out of this was that, you know, why are we not accessing, you know, there’s a lot of information out there on the Internet, there’s a lot of services that can add value to the people’s productivity, that can add value to the livelihood of our people. Why are they not accessing it? What is government not doing to provide those, make it easy or inform our people, or better yet, provide services that would be made online? And out of that, you know, our meaning of meaningful connectivity is about having connectivity with a purpose, you know, citizens that can have access and add value to their livelihood, add value to the productivity of the country. And this is where in 2009 we started to look at how can we shift, how can government shift from a connectivity sort of traditional, I’ll use the word traditional connectivity model where we were focused on expanding our infrastructure. How can we shift that so that it’s about being service-driven and purpose-driven? And so we introduced the digital transformation policy in 2020. We started working on that, and this followed by a digital government act in 2022 and followed by a digital government plan 2023 to 2027. What we essentially did was we shifted and we said, okay, let’s not talk about connectivity, let’s talk about bringing, let government be the leader in bringing meaningful services, digital government services to the people, putting citizens first, making services fast, simple and clear and driving that demand to connect. So we shifted that and this is where we are. We’re working in 2023 onwards to roll out a wide range of digital services. And I think that’s from my perspective and Papua New Guinea’s perspective that we’ve shifted from connectivity to sort of what we’re saying, demand-driven and service-driven. And for us, that’s our approach towards meaningful connectivity. Now, there’s so much to touch on in terms of our culture and diversity and how we are addressing all those issues, but I will stop there. Thank you very much.

Giacomo Mazzone:
Thank you very much for your contribution. I see that you put the rugby as one of the fundamental rights of the citizen and for Italy, that is not a rugby nation, but I can understand. for us would be football eventually. Thank you very much. I hope that you can stay with us because we have other questions for you in the second round, but now I would give the floor to a specific section of this debate, that is the section dedicated to international organizations, because we believe that the international organizations are playing a special role in creating or supporting best practices, nurturing them and making available in other countries. We will start from IFLA, that is the Association of Librarians, Maria Bradefer is with us, and I leave the floor to her for explaining some of these best practices cases. Thank you.

Maria de Brasdefer:
Thank you, and also thank you for the invitation to this panel. I think first of all, before discussing the case of libraries, it is also important to talk about what meaningful access means in the context of libraries, and so in this sense I would really like to say that I think it is very important to take into account that libraries have been and are still in constant development, so I think in 2023 they really shouldn’t be seen as spaces for books or archives, but more as spaces that have really adapted to the technological developments of today, and also as spaces that have an ultimate purpose of serving their local communities. So also for this, I think it is also important to notice that libraries can be a door of access for those who need it most, for those who need most to access meaningful information, but also for those who are most affected by the digital device, so I guess in a way you could also say that libraries could be seen as a multipurpose infrastructure that serves to access and provide needs to local communities, but also that has a lot to offer in terms of meaningful access, and so for now I would like to discuss two cases with you briefly, so one of those cases is the case of the GLN, so the Gigabit Libraries Network, and this is a case that is going to be introduced by my colleague Don Means who is at the audience and who is also the founder of this initiative, and the second case is the case of digital skills at your local library project that was a case that was an initiative implemented in Uganda, so it was an initiative that was originally funded by the Uganda Communications Commission, but also it was expanded in 2021 via the Enable Development Agency, so in the sense this strategy started, it had an objective of giving extra infrastructure to public and community libraries and to also equip them across the country with computers, with internet connection, but also with other facilities for community use, so that was the first phase of the project, and then the second phase of that initiative was training of trainers, so a strategy for a training of trainers for local librarians was implemented, and this was a very important phase of the project actually, because it really allowed to localize the training and also to adapt it. to the local needs of the community, because even though the needs were similar across the country, of course, every community has particular needs. And then shortly after that, there was an outreach campaign that was done. And it also started in 2014. And this was actually an outreach campaign that was launched by the librarians who had been trained by the training of trainers. And that outreach campaign was done to reach the community in general, but also a lot of people who wanted to access skills to improve their businesses, and also to access education. And so right after that outreach campaign start, a lot of people were trained. So so far, in terms of results, about 14,000 people have been trained across Uganda. And a lot of them have reported that they have started initiatives with small and medium enterprises. At least 200 people of those 14,000 have reported good results after they received the digital skills training. And a lot of people have also used the training they received to access higher education in other places. So I think in the sense that gives a lot of context about why libraries are important in terms of meaningful connectivity. And I would also like to talk a little bit about the GLN initiative. So for this, I would like to give the floor to my colleague, Don Means, who is at the audience.

Audience:
Please, Don, come to the mic over there. Thank you, Maria. The point made about the role of libraries as aggregators of ICT resources in a community is extremely relevant when we’re talking about meaningful access, because it’s unique in that regard. Our group, the Gigabit Libraries Network, is an open consortium of innovating libraries. libraries using emerging telecom technology to expand internet inclusion as well as to increase community resilience against disasters and outages. We’ve begun deploying low earth orbit satellite connectivity kits in libraries in Africa starting in Nigeria. Our position is that every community should have at least a single point of no fee, low fee internet access like a library and it should be resilient against outages. The point is made by esteemed climate activist Bill McKibben. I think connecting, he says, I think connecting libraries as a community access hubs for resilience is a good idea and highly relevant. These communities may not be contributing huge amounts of carbon, but they’re the places where it’s growing fastest and more to the point, they’re where people are suffering most the effects. We seek advice and guidance on this implementation and this exploration. A single LEO unit needing only about a light bulb worth of energy can be operated for around $50 to $100 a month in developing markets, this whole area, these whole systems are just arriving and developing themselves. A single unit can provide impervious 100 megabit connection to places suffering from disastrous weather which would otherwise be entirely cut off from outside information and communities. We work through national libraries in each country to implement these plans. We are not agents of any company or enterprise. We wish only to help people in the highest risk with the least resources to cope with the terrible challenges of climate driven disasters. Perhaps a useful policy environment to support this can be found within the UN COP 28 declaration on adaptation. This is the point that, yes, mitigation is critical, but it’s really late. It’s too late to reverse the changes that we’re experiencing today and will continue to experience. So the strategy of adapting to these changes is commonsensical. And having this kind of a resource in every community is doable. It’s entirely affordable. And the benefit, besides increasing just the normal services that people can have through the internet, to this resilience factor we think is really worth exploring. Thank you.

Giacomo Mazzone:
Thank you, Don. A question for you, because this project is one of the oldest, trying to improve the characteristics of the librarians in the field of meaningful access. Which kind of policies would be needed in order to strengthen, to make more effective what are you doing? Because we, as policy network, we are looking for policies that could be the most effective in making happen this everywhere.

Audience:
Well, certainly the policy of the rights of access are key to this. The policy framework that I mentioned within the context of the UN’s allocation or pledge of tens of billions of dollars to address climate adaptation would cover a lot of connectivity. And so advocating on behalf of that approach, I think, would be a very direct way to go about this.

Giacomo Mazzone:
Thank you very much. So we have seen the IFLA contribution, and now we go to another more structured, more official agency of the United Nations, that is the ITU. But the ITU, I asked them, bring us some best practice cases, and they say, no. We can do better for you. And they send me Martin Sharpe. Why? Because the explanation was that for them, and I agree with them, the statistics. statistics are an important tool. If you want to make appropriate policies, you need proper statistics and data. Martin is exactly what he’s doing, and ITU is working already since a couple of years on indicators about meaningful access. Can you explain a little bit about that?

Martin Schaaper:
Yes, indeed I can. Thank you very much. Coming from the ITU data and analytics division, I think it’s quite obvious that I think it’s very important, the role of data and statistics for meaningful access. You may have seen the latest internet use data that we released about a month, a month and a half ago, that says that 5.4 billion people are online, but about 2.6 billion are still offline. That means that 67% of the world population is connected to the internet, yet 95% has access to some kind of mobile broadband signal. So this already is a clear indication about missing people, that there is a big usage gap. But even among the people that are connected, not all of them are in a meaningful way connected. There may be issues with quality of the infrastructure, with the cost, they maybe don’t have enough data to go online as often as they want, and so on and so on. It was already raised in the first intervention as well. So two years ago we launched a set of targets together with the UN Office of the Tech Envoy, a set of targets on what we call universal and meaningful connectivity. This was in the framework of the digital cooperation roadmap of the UN Secretary General. It has now become a project with the EU, with funding from the EU, so we have a set of targets that we’re now going to put into practice and try to disseminate among policy makers in the world. So basically what we’re doing is we’re coupling the data and the statistics to the policy perspective. Now, in our set of targets, it’s a set of targets on people using the Internet, but also the quality of the Internet connection, we have a set of targets on the cost of an Internet package, of the skills needed, and so on. And this is important, because if our goal is to achieve universal and meaningful connectivity by the year 2030, which is very ambitious, and we know that, you need to know where you are. And from there on, you can go on a path into reaching targets so you know where you need to go. But how to get there, you need to know where you are, and you need to also see that the actions you’re taking are actually leading you to where you want to go. So you need to constantly monitor, as well, your policy actions. So these targets, they go into two directions. We have a set of targets on universal access, which means that we want everyone to use the Internet, and everyone means all people, but also businesses, schools, communities, and we want to do it in a meaningful way. And for that, we have five enablers, infrastructure, affordability, skills, device, and safety and security. And on almost all of these aspects, we have indicators and targets. We already have created a dashboard, the UMC dashboard, which you can find online on the IT website. And in the dashboard, you can take any target that we have, and you can see for that target where are all the countries, where’s my country, but where’s my country in respect to all the other countries, as well. Or you can take a country of your interest, and you can see, okay, this is my country, these are the targets, and on some targets, we’ve achieved universal connectivity, but on others, we’re actually far away from it. even at the start, or for some indicators, we don’t even have the data. And that’s all information that needs to channel into the policy perspective. Another very important point of the data is that you can break down the data by socioeconomic groups. So you can have a look at the digital divides. So we all know that there’s a gender digital divide. So more men are using the Internet than women. But how big is the divide in my country? And how does this change if you move along the globe into other countries? We know that younger people are more avid users of the Internet than older people. But how bad is it in my country? Do we need to have special policy objectives to connect our senior citizens to the Internet? There’s also a difference between urban and rural areas. Now, is that because the infrastructure is not good enough in rural areas, or is it for other reasons? And the data can tell you to a large extent how that is, where that is, and especially where the gaps are, where we need to do the policies, where we have to set policies, and then over time monitor and see if our actions actually are leading to an improvement or not. So that is the project we’re having. That’s the good news. There’s also bad news. But I’ll keep that for maybe my next intervention.

Giacomo Mazzone:
Thank you very much. That’s very interesting. There are other points that we need to dig with you. I think that this could be a very interesting source of information for everybody that wants to deal with this kind of information. Laurent, it’s now your turn, as I can, and especially your project Digital Africa, I guess. What are you doing in the field of making better conditions for meaningful access? And by the way, you use the data of ITU? Not yet. So what we want to do here is to increase the exchange in order not to repeat the same problems. Yes.

Laurent Ferrali:
And you may know that ITU is part of this Coalition for Digital Africa, so it will be part of that. Thank you very much. make things easier, I think. So thank you very much, Giacomo, for the invitation. Yeah, I will report about what we did for the last 10 months with this Coalition for Digital Africa. I mean, we launched this coalition during the last IGF in Addis Ababa with ITU, the Association of African Universities, the Association of African CCTLDs, and among others. Now we have something like 11 partners. We have currently seven flagship projects. And of course, all of this project, I mean, the aim of all of this project is to develop meaningful connectivity, meaningful access in Africa. The first one, I mean, not the first one, one which is very important for me is the support we are providing to African country code top-level domain registries. Because we had this week a lot of discussion about infrastructure in different workshop sessions. But I mean, I think that there is a missing part in the discussion, which is the CCTLDs. And I don’t know an example of a successful country in terms of eager services and national digital economy which is not able to rely on a good CCTLD registry. It’s a very important part of the national infrastructure and a missing part of the discussion we are used to have about infrastructure in Africa. So we are providing this report with different partners. to help to provide a kind of, I mean, I can’t do that for many years, but just from a technical perspective, so we are providing technical capacity building support to different CCLDs, but it was clear for us that we need to have a more holistic approach and work with different partners in order to be able to provide more than technical expertise and technical capacity building support. And so we are helping 10 CCLDs, that’s one project. Another one is access to local content. I mean, of course, ICANN is not dealing with content, but you may know that we have international domain names and we have an issue with the use of these IDNs. This is the universal acceptance issue. We need to be sure that people will be able to have access to these international domain names. Another project which is important for me as well is what we are doing in terms of quality of service and cybersecurity. We have two projects. We are deploying some ICANN managed server facilities in Africa, and we are helping CCLDs in Africa to better protect their infrastructure, their infrastructure, and other things as well. Keep something for the next round. Keep something for the next. If you tell us everything now, then what do you say later? Yeah, so I can stop now and go to the internet.

Giacomo Mazzone:
Thank you. Now, you mentioned contents. That is not your specialization, but access to contents is important, and this gives me the right angle to bring the discussion to WIPO, because WIPO is dealing exactly with contents. Can you tell us? What are you doing in this field, Paolo?

Paolo Lanteri:
Absolutely. Thanks a lot. It’s definitely a pleasure to jump in the discussion from a very different perspective here. I’m very happy to bring to the floor the perspective of the World Intellectual Property Organization that has seen this discussion on meaningful access as intrinsically linked to actually the creation and the distribution of meaningful content. of different nature, educational, news reporting, or pure entertainment like music, video games, and audiovisual. Content is meaningful if it’s relevant, for instance in terms of cultural identity, accessible, for instance because you can read the language, and inclusive. WIPO participated and contributed to this debate for many years, providing an assessment as to why any policy that has as objective providing meaningful access should also keep an eye on what is behind that, making sure the compelling content we all want to enjoy is continued to be created and distributed in a sustainable way, at the same time also providing certain flexibilities. This is a key aspect because without the content we want, I think it’s very hard to conceive any meaningful access. Following the instruction from our facilitators, I’ll skip all that part about the incentives provided by IP to creation of content and the flexibilities it provides to facilitate, for instance, certain fair uses, open access, and many, many things that are enriching our lives. I’ll focus only on projects, successful examples that we have in place, and particularly on those that have already been reported in this frame. So, I’m going to talk a little bit about what we do in the space, and what we do in the framework as facilitating meaningful access. So, we lead really many cross-cutting initiatives in this space. So, it’s very hard to cluster them in clear-cut categories. For ease of presenting them, I divided in two big, broad, rough groups. One are initiatives directly relevant to inclusion. The other is the accessible books consortium. The accessible books consortium, ABC, is a public-private partnership led by WIPO, and counting with the participation of many partners, including IFLA, of course, and organisations representing the blind community, the World Blind Union. The ABC goal is only one, to increase the number of books in accessible formats, such as digital braille, e-pub, and to distribute them to the people that they need around the globe. We do that through a variety of lines of work, including capacity-building, of course, advocacy for inclusive publishing, but the most impactful activity we do is the ABC global book service, which offers an online catalogue of books in accessible formats available at no cost to authorise entities serving the blind around the world. The service has nowadays more than 800,000 books. The ABC global book service is the largest book service in the world, with over 100,000 titles, in 80 languages, available for cross-border exchange without the need for clearance, any formalities related to copyright. Of the 127 authorised entities that have joined the consortium, 70 are located in developing and least-developed countries, andcatapult.ca are an important part of the cooperation to enhance the technology-related capabilities for those individuals around the globe It’s a beautiful story to tell about open access. We, WIPO, lead a working group formed by over 100 individuals from over 25 international organizations, many of them represented in this room. The membership is constantly growing. What do we do? We facilitate the debate and exchange of good practices among IGOs on how to make our content accessible and moving open access. WIPO and few other IGOs now went ahead and launched new collaboration with Wikimedia, for instance. We have in-house Wikimedia, basically releasing all we produce through their global platform, boosting accessibility, of course, but also the possibility for any third parties to translate the content to local languages and to adapt it to any need they may have at the local level. That’s one part of the story. The other part of the story, very important, is what do we do to assure that we promote production and distribution of local meaningful content? Traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions are a big part of our work. WIPO’s work in this field is growing stronger than ever. On top of the policy and norm-setting activity, we lead and support practical initiatives, such as digitization projects of traditional knowledge and cultural mentoring, fellowships, awards, hackathons, all sorts of stuff. And then we have more hardcore creative industries initiatives in the context of the development agenda. For instance, we are about to relaunch doubling the funding of the AV market, audiovisual market, of Latin American production. We also recently launched specific tools for sectors like digital publishing for small publishers in LDCs. Or, like we heard these days with the manga creators, a training tool for animation professionals in developing countries. So while the details of all these stop report project will be submitted in writing, basically we can say that the progress on all these initiatives is steady and positive. And more importantly, the appetite of our constituency both governments and stakeholders is either strong or very strong.

Giacomo Mazzone:
Thank you very much, Paolo. Very useful and interesting. And you mentioned that there are funding for audiovisual in Latin America, but unfortunately the next experience we are talking is in Africa. Do you have funding for Africa? experience? Not yet, but we can work on it. So this could be one of the recommendations we will take out from the conversation of today. Do we have online Meme and Nana Kaga McPherson? No? Ah, connection issues, access problem. Bertrand, then can you explain to us what is this experience from Uganda that you recommended us?

Audience:
I’m Bertrand Moulier. I feel a bit desolate that Meme and Nana are not there to explain what they do. They would do so with far more charisma and passion than I’d be able to muster, but I’ll do my best. So Meme and Nana Kaga are two recovering civil engineers who have decided to change career a few years ago and became audiovisual producers in Kampala, in Uganda. And they’ve been trying to run a company which is entirely female-led, so they’re the two directors and the entire staff is female, and making local content for local audiences in culturally relevant languages, including Uganda, which is spoken by 5.6 million people locally as primary language, and another 5.4 are fully conversant with it. And their contention, and ours as well, is that the ability for companies like theirs, which is, by the way, called Savannah Moon, to actually survive and thrive in the audiovisual marketplace is an essential component of meaningful access. Once you’ve accessed the broadband infrastructure, you need meaningful content that reflects your lives, your preoccupations, your cultural themes, and by making fiction drama, either through feature, unitary feature films or through television series, they’re doing just that. They have found that although their market has increased a little bit in the last few years, they are hobbled sometimes by a few factors. One of them is that the broadband infrastructure where they live is still tentative. At times, they find there’s unexplained bandwidth throttling for technical reasons, so you’re losing signals, which makes it uncomfortable to take in relevant audiovisual content. And there’s also, from their perspective, they wanted me to reflect this, a pricing issue. If you’re buying eight Gs worth of data, by the time you’ve run through two episodes of a television series on the mobile telephony network, which is the way most people locally take in their content, you will find that you’ve almost run out of capacity, so you need to purchase some more. there is not necessarily an adequation between local spending power and the ability to enjoy and access the content. More, I think, strategically, in order for these companies to fulfill their social utility function, in this case, as two women who are very, very committed to dramatizing, reflecting issues experienced by women in their country and their region, there needs to be an enabling economic climate to make sure that these SMEs are able to use their position at the forefront of cultural developments to reflect and dramatize those. And so they believe that there is no meaningful access without a meaningful, local, audiovisual production capability, which actually not only is incidental to what internet content can deliver in general, but is actually central to it. And therefore, the question of economic sustainability of their activities, the ability to offer people career tracks, these women have left potentially lucrative careers as engineers to devote themselves to audiovisual content. That needs to be factored into the ecosystemic equation when looking at the accessibility and, certainly, the meaningful access component. And by giving two examples of films that they recently made, one is called Mpabi. It’s the story of a young boy who, after a difficult birth in a village in Uganda, develops a condition, a neurological condition. And he becomes neurodivergent. And the family hits against local incomprehension, perhaps a deficit in knowledge about this type of conditions. And it’s the story of how they try to address these issues and educate themselves and protect their sons and afford him a good childhood. Another one is about the story of a young woman who rebels against the notion that, having lost her husband in an accident, she, by tradition, is meant to marry the man’s brother and wants a different kind of outcome for her life and to empower herself. So these are films that are really trying to dramatize things that people are living out every day, and they are utterly relevant to the meaningful access agenda that is being highlighted here.

Giacomo Mazzone:
Perfect. Thank you very much, Bertrand. This brings us finally to the content side that we have neglected until now a little bit.

Roberto Zambrana:
Roberto, you are monitoring, with the help of artificial intelligence, all the universe of the internet. So what are the questions that come from the world? Everything together, yes. I think we have Carlos Alfonso online, so if we need his intervention, he will be ready to. Did he ask for the floor? Not yet. Not yet, okay. Maybe for the section that we have for exchange, we can do that.

Giacomo Mazzone:
Okay, and any question in the chat? Not any. Okay, so we can go to the question in the room. I see already one volunteer. Please introduce yourself and tell us straight the question. Thank you.

Audience:
Okay, I’m Kosi. I’m a senior from Benin. I’m from Ministry of Economy and Finance in Benin. I have two question. Please. We are talking about access. Meaningful access. Yeah, Bert. When we are talking about access, for me, we have two challenge. The first one is internet. Is it available or not for us in our region in Africa? Sometime, we see the signal, but we don’t get anything. What that mean? We are talking about video, film. They make some good thing in Kampala. What is the data? The data we collect there, what is it? In Africa? In which data center in Africa? We need to have our data in Africa. Everything we collect in Africa is supposed to be in Africa to be used for African people and for others. But when we collect it in Africa and put it in data center outside Africa and call African people to pay for internet bandwidth to collect that information after again, it’s two ways. We pay for the information we have is not normal. We support to make things very clearly, very open for everyone in the world. Thank you.

Giacomo Mazzone:
Thank you. Onika, I think that this question is straight for you.

Onica Nonhlanhla Makwakwa:
So, well, thanks for raising that. I think I won’t respond specifically to the question, but I think what you are bringing is the fact that we have to also look at the financial model of how we are connecting everyone. We seem to have continued in an economy system that has essentially been very extractive without using this new opportunity of the internet to begin to correct some of those embedded inequalities that come with the existing market structure. So, I think as we look at developing access more, we have to be open and willing to look at different digital technologies, but also be open to look at different fiscal financial models. that will ensure that we are actually developing and innovating in the continent where we are building innovators and not just content consumers online. And I think what you are talking about is a discussion that’s been going on within the region around the region being able to keep its own data. And I think if we go back to the intervention I made on affordability of phones, the reality is that the minerals that are used to develop these smartphones actually come from the continent. Yet Africa, at the moment, is spending as much as 40% for the cheapest smartphone that’s available. So fixing the economy, I think, goes hand in hand with us being able to participate equally in this digital transformation.

Giacomo Mazzone:
Thank you. Who else want to add something on that? Martin, you have statistics about data in Africa, how much the data center exists, this kind of information will be available in your database?

Martin Schaaper:
Well, that’s actually part of my second intervention, which is data gaps. I don’t want to make a spoiler. Yeah, no. We have recently been discussing middle-bar connectivity and middle-bar connectivity indicators. And we’re just developing a work program around it. So we don’t have the indicators yet. We have indicators on bandwidth, which is part of the issue here. But how the data is channeled into data centers and how it comes to the last mile, that is part of the indicators that we are going to develop in the coming years. But we don’t have not a lot of good, solid indicators on that yet.

Giacomo Mazzone:
OK, thank you. I would like to get back to the minister, if possible, so that we can free him. He’s still online with us. If he’s online with us, the question for him is now, he said that they are doing a lot of interesting things, including rugby. But the problem is about infrastructure. So, I would like to know more about the technical solution of the infrastructure, I guess. For island states, the problem of the infrastructure is a very big problem. Are they using satellite? I would be curious to know more about the technical solution. Thank you.

Steven Matainaho:
Thank you. Please confirm again if you can hear me. Yes, we can hear you loud and clear. Okay. Thank you. Thank you very much. In Papua New Guinea, our connectivity, I would like to first say that since the advent of mobile network coverage, we have sort of skipped the fixed line era. We have been using the internet for a long time. We have been using the internet for a long time. We have been using the internet for a long time. Our current population coverage is around 76% of population coverage, but it’s a mixed range between 2G, 3G, and 4G. Most of our growth rate is contributed to competition. And so, there are two major interventions that we’ve made to make sure that our telecommunication retail and wholesale space were guided by an open market policy. And so, we first had to introduce as much competition as possible into the retail space to increase those numbers. The other aspect of connectivity which I wanted, actually, I wanted to highlight if I may because there were some comments on affordability of devices. And I’m sorry, I’m directing to something slightly different. But I also want to flag that in Papua New Guinea, what we’ve noticed is the threshold for affordable is around an 8% to 10% threshold. And so, that’s a big difference in terms of affordability of devices. And so, that’s a big difference in terms of affordability of devices. And these are mainly data coming from operators. The cheapest affordable smartphone that we’ve been able to get out there is ranging around 60 US dollars. And this is like stripped down smartphones that have the basic smart capabilities. And we found that at $60 and downwards, there’s a huge increase in purchasing power. And I think that a combination of infrastructure access plus affordable devices are factors that should be attributed in developing countries. You mentioned affordability of the devices. There is any policy in place in your country to support the accessibility and the affordability? We are currently looking at next phase after introduction of our digital services. The next phase would be starting to look at how we can provide tax reduction incentives for devices, importing of devices. And I think that would be the next phase, 2023, 2024, 2025. That would be the next phase as we’re going back to meaningful connectivity. As we provide content and services, the next step would be to bring the cost of the devices further down. Thank you very much.

Giacomo Mazzone:
And I give you a good news. Vint Cerf, I asked him if he will be available to give suggestion and advice. So if you want to ask Vint something about affordability, we will bring the question to him. And we will give you back the answer. Thank you for being with us. We know that you are busy. If you have to leave, we will apologize to you. Don’t worry. OK, we have another question from the room. Please introduce yourself.

Audience:
Hi, my name is Dinesh. We have community networks near Bangalore in India, and I have kind of three questions. One is to the minister from Papua New Guinea. You said you have so many languages, and I’m fascinated by hearing that. And you said you have ideas on how to deal with bringing Internet to these many languages. I want to hear about it in great detail, because that’s the first time I hear that there is somebody working on languages, which is probably not literal, there is no text for it, I’m just guessing. How are you dealing with it? Number two is to the Japanese minister. You have Japanese and English, you’re dealing nicely. What are you doing with the others who are older, who need voice, who need content in audiovisuals, mostly audio, and the third one is based on the African comment. We have community networks. We have in India about a billion low literate people, and it includes that, but what are we doing about technology, Internet, reaching to these people? That’s the meaningful accessibility for us.

Giacomo Mazzone:
Thank you. And it’s important to remember that you have one of the cases in the report that is providing some solutions, so I suggest people to go to the report and to have a look at it. You want to make advertising for it, for 30 seconds? I’m sorry? Shall I? Advertise for your project? Yeah.

Audience:
Okay. 30 seconds? No, thank you. So you’re ready. So I think Internet, firstly as a web, is all about hyperlinks. Hypertext, it starts, and it’s, you know, and Internet has not gone further as standards and technology to reach non-text people, okay? How do you give, I mean, I can talk about it a lot, but we have to, as technology people, push this forward. And we are trying, but it can be like in a small thing, like, it has to come together. And how do you do hyperlinks when you have media as a thing? And what is the Internet in the small, like, if you are in a community network, how do you bring this within the community as a first-class protocol-based Internet, like a decentralized web is what I’m thinking, to say it in one word.

Giacomo Mazzone:
Thank you. I think that you can get some answers from the second round from the panel. Roberto, any sign of life from the universe? Yes.

Roberto Zambrana:
We have a comment from Carlos Afonso. He says a major challenge in universalizing connectivity, which many digital inclusion programs forget, once a person is connected, he, she should stay connected. Many universal connectivity programs do not make sure persistence of connectivity together with quality is fundamental. A connected school or remote community ought to be connected and stay connected. Thank you, Carlos, for these remarks.

Giacomo Mazzone:
Perfect. That’s, we have the perfect example of Uganda. They were connected at the beginning of the session, and when it was their turn, they were not connected anymore. Okay. Before to make the second round, I remember that Martin want to bring in the discussion a point that is important just for memory, that is the IDN question. Can you take the floor, Martin? I remember to the audience that last year, also with Roberto, we mentioned this as one of the point on which we need to improve. So, which are the last news from the front?

Audience:
My name is Maarten Botteman. Yes, on IDNs, indeed, an important aspect is of course that they will be able to be used by people who don’t use the Latin script, as we call it, the letters we see above. And that may not be useful worldwide, but in particular, more and more, we see the internet also serves local communities and maybe solutions can be found where they do resolve in local communities, maybe even faster before they resolve anywhere. It requires a lot of collaboration because the internet is a mess of a lot of different applications. Now, what we do with ICANN is work on the IDN tables to make sure that addresses can be found. But the addresses also need to be found in the web browsers, in email addresses, in applications that support. So, it requires quite an effort, and we’re very happy to facilitate that effort by also supporting the Universal Acceptance Steering Group, which in its work goes well beyond ICANN as such. But if you allow me, I’d like to make another point here. Other aspects of meaningful accessibility are also in power. Is there enough power? You see that’s different in different parts of the world, and is in affordability, as you rightly said. I must say, India is in the good position that at least mobile access is amazingly affordable compared to some other parts in the world. For instance, in Africa, if you have this mobile phone, it’s very expensive to use it. So, it’s also not thinking only in terms of electricity there, is bandwidth there, but also is access affordable. Next to the IDN point, if you allow me. Please, thank you.

Giacomo Mazzone:
Thank you very much. So Martin, do we can expect that for the next round of GTLDs, there will be a push from ICANN about IDN, TLDs?

Audience:
My expectation, and of course it’s the market who will come with proposals, but we believe that this is an opportunity for, in particular, the next billion to be reached, and that next billion will need to have access to the non-Latin characters, and we do what we can to support that.

Giacomo Mazzone:
Inshallah, they say, another part of the world. Okay, thank you. This brings exactly to the point with our Japanese colleague. You see that the problem is seen in different ways in different parts of the world. Can you add something?

Keisuke Kamimura:
Yes, IDN. Well, remember IDN is just a piece of the bigger problem, so I guess we should take care of other issues other than IDN, but the problem we have with IDN in Japan is like this. Internationalised domain names in Japanese characters are not well accepted locally, so many of us do not, or most of us do not use internationalised domain names in Japanese characters. I don’t quite remember any of the major local websites identify themselves with IDN. I believe these websites have their names registered in IDN for protective or defensive reasons, but that’s about it. For me, I don’t know if this is true to others, but for me, it is comfortable to use Japanese characters for search strings rather than for URLs or identifiers. So, when you write Japanese, you have to use a combination of the alphabet and symbols and the Japanese characters. So, if you want to use IDNs, you have to produce a combination of these scripts anyway. So, I mean, you have to use the Latin alphabet in any way. So, you have to switch back and forth between Japanese characters, the Latin alphabet, and other symbols. So, it’s very cumbersome to use IDN in Japanese. So, that’s one issue. In addition, you can easily identify a URL in the Latin alphabet in an article written in Japanese, because it just stands out the rest of the text. So, it’s easier for you to locate a URL from written Japanese. So, and if the URL is written in IDN, you maybe find it difficult to find out where the URL is. So, that’s another issue from a practical point of view. And well, actually, when you write Japanese, you often switch from one script to another to emphasize a word or phrase in the middle of a sentence, when you write Japanese texts. So, we are used to switch from the Latin alphabet to Japanese characters and to kanji. So, we are quite used to using the Latin alphabet. So, that’s another issue. the alphabet for any purposes. So that may relate to the low take-up of the IDN in Japanese, this is my personal observation.

Giacomo Mazzone:
Thank you, Professor, but the time is tiring, we need to give the floor to the others. May I add a little bit to that? Yes.

Audience:
I really appreciate your experience, and Japan is a case where well-educated people have good access to computers and manage to do what you say right now. When I think, and when Giacomo asked about the longer term, I’m thinking indeed of the longer term where we see part of the world where the mobile is the device, where it’s more difficult to switch, and also a world in which we see that increasingly voice commands will be taking over, et cetera. So I think for the longer term, we may not be, I remember I was used to put my telephone on a modem, and that worked, but I’m glad I don’t have to do that anymore. So I think you give an excellent example, but for the longer term, I think we can’t avoid, people will earlier be able to learn an adapted internet and that everybody will be able to use the same characters. I think that we will have to come back to you for what we will write in the report.

Giacomo Mazzone:
So we will need your help for finalizing the report on this point. Thank you very much. So Martin, please, we are very late, so if we can be short as much as possible, just to mention something that you have no time to mention, I will do for you. There is a pilot experience that ITU is doing with UNESCO in the Pacific area where we are combining data from your database and the UNESCO ROAM indicators. That is a very interesting combination of contents and access from the technical viewpoint. But please complete your presentation about the statistics.

Martin Schaaper:
Yes, thank you. Short as possible. I’ll try to be short. I mentioned the good news. We have a lot of data on universal and meaningful access and universal and meaningful connectivity, as we call it. This includes. a lot of data on prices, prices of Internet packages, mobile packages, et cetera. There was a comment before, I just want to say that we have a very rich data set on that. But the bad news is there’s also a lot of data gaps, and that’s partly because the data aren’t there, partly because the data are there but we are not coordinated, we don’t have access to the data, we don’t get the data from the source or we don’t have a partnership with the source, and that’s something that we’re working very hard on. For example, anything to do with speed measurement, actual speed measurements, MLAB, Ookla, those kind of places, we need to continue working with them. Handset devices is an area we are not yet working on but we’ve had a lot of contact with the World Bank, with what used to be A4AI before, and that’s certainly work that needs to continue. We’re working on big data, the power of big data to also be able to get a more granular view of what’s happening in a country, within a country, within a community even. We’re working very hard on that. But very importantly I mentioned digital device, and digital device is about people, you need to know who the people are who are using the Internet and what they’re using it for and who is not using, and still the best source for that is surveys. Surveys of people often run by a statistical office and for that we have very good data from all the high-income countries and not a lot of good data from low-income countries, simply because surveys are expensive. So policymakers who see the importance of data for achieving universally meaningful connectivity should also add funding statistical offices in their programme.

Giacomo Mazzone:
That’s fundamental. Onika, how you can complement this experience? You can compete with the ITU in providing the collecting data?

Onica Nonhlanhla Makwakwa:
I will just add one thing. So, how do I handle this? My question I would like to also take your perspective, Armand, on the issue of dense segregated data, if we extend the chance of closing the digital gender gap. So, I would like to ask you, Armand, to take a look at what we are doing in the digital economy, what we are doing in the cost of exclusion, looking to calculate the economic impact of excluding women from the digital economy, but also humanizing that experience by looking at qualitative research and ethnographic studies to really be able to

Giacomo Mazzone:
paint a picture and tell a story about what we are losing in our digital economy, in the context of the pandemic, and to build the files material with another women. If you sent to her, then she will ask Martin to look more from the inside. Are you scare about what our Japanese government is doing to make it easier for women to have access to the internet?

Martin Schaaper:
I mean, we know, I mean, it’s like, you know, using mobile phone now with apps, make, I mean, domain names invisible. But this is not up to ICANN to say that. To make a comment on that, I mean, we have, in the context of the coalition, we are working with ICANN to make it easier for women to have access to the internet. For them, I mean, it makes a lot of sense. So, I mean, if Africa, I mean, have some interest for IDN, for us, I mean, we will try to help them to develop, you know, extensions in the continent, et cetera. So, again, it’s not up to ICANN to say that, yeah, we don’t need any more domain names or whatever. with partners, we are trying to have a, we are very humble in our approach. We are asking people what they need, and then we are trying to help them to bring them what they need, the support they need. It’s what we are doing with all the tracks, all the initiatives of this coalition. I mean, again, we are coming with technical knowledge, expertise, and we are used to go through an assessment phase to better understand what they need, and in the end, I mean, the different organizations, different countries, it’s up to them to decide where they want to go. We can just bring some expertise to them, so I think that for these people, I mean, to come back to your question, I think for some universities in Africa, it makes a lot of sense to have access to domain names in local scripts, so let’s say that it’s still important.

Giacomo Mazzone:
Thank you. Thank you. Maria. Yes, thank you.

Maria de Brasdefer:
Well, I think in terms of data, I would only have to add to what Onika said. I think it is important to have disaggregated data, not just in terms of sex, but also in terms of gender, because there’s also other minorities, for example, that are invisible to this, and there’s not enough data on that. But also, I’m talking about the context of libraries. We also need better and more data in regard to what is the amount of libraries, for example, that are currently connected to the internet, and from that amount of libraries, also maybe better indicators to assess inside which of those facilities there’s a meaningful access to information. So I think that is something that I could also add in that sense, and maybe also adding a bit to what my colleague Don mentioned before in terms of policies. So the question is, in addition to discussing traditional reciprocates, also considering libraries and what is important to give these resources and to give these access base in the American development communities. So far we have been using library as a resource and we have been using libraries as a resource. So the question is, how do we make libraries invisible at a higher policy level? So this is also something to take into account. And also finally, just to add, it is also important to notice that the public access infrastructure development initiatives should also really include a skilling of staff to run and also to facilitate digital inclusion and capacity building initiatives at a local level.

Giacomo Mazzone:
So this is something that we have been working on for a long time and it is important to have some patience, because we asked three people in the room, three distinguished friends of us, to listen carefully to what has been said and to tell us the feedback about what they retain as the most interesting points that we can include in the report. So can we start with Jane, that I see is the first question. And then I will turn it over to the panel. So I will start with Jane.

Audience:
I will be very brief. One, solving the connectivity gap will take a multi-stakeholder approach, much like the PNMA itself and our panelists here today and the great speakers we have heard. Problems are being solved through coalitions, to regulatory and policy-making from Papua New Guinea to Benin to the United States, and to the rest of the world. We need to work together to identify gaps, ITU, ICANN, and others are doing this, to help us look at better solutions to identify what those gaps are. Partnerships are key, and innovative financing approaches need to be made to support and build networks, including CCTLDs and data centres. Thank you.

Giacomo Mazzone:
Thank you very much, Jane. This was about connectivity and

Audience:
about digital inclusion. Carlos Rey Moreno. Thank you very much. I will start with you, Carlos. Thank you very much for the introduction. The first part of the talk has been about digital inclusion, and many topics have been touched upon, the universal acceptance and everything that has to do about people being able to communicate with scripts that are other than Latin, should be able to do it online, and it’s not only about IDNs, but many other hardware and software elements. I think it’s very important for us to understand the importance of having a sustainable content production as well as the distribution of relevant content, e-governance services such as in the case of Papua New Guinea and cultural services elsewhere, a lot of discussions in relation to that about incentives, funding that you may go and talk to Paolo about, as well as sustainability of those content producers, as well as an outreach campaign to the digital economy, as well as the importance of having a strong national CCTLDs to develop the digital economy and include people that might be related to using country-level domains, in the importance of cyber security, although it hasn’t been pointed out, there is a lot of elements around digital inclusion that have to be with cyber security in the context of, for instance, technology-facilitated gender-based violence, and all the work and all the policies that are required in that front. There is a lot of discussions around making books available for blind people, and some discussions also around fostering innovation at the local level. I mean, we heard Dinesh, but we’ve been hearing all the importance about how local people can actually come up with their own decisions and this conversation about meaningful access and meaningful connectivity should then be an only top-down one. Thank you very much.

Giacomo Mazzone:
Thank you, Carlos, very useful, and very bright and appropriate comments. So, now, about capacity development, Margaret will give us her hints.

Audience:
Thank you, Chair. Highlight on capacity building, that technical skills are needed to understand emerging technologies, and make them address and offer solutions. Training of trainers on digital skills is critical, and with this localisation of this training to address local needs. Technical capacity support for internet registries is already happening through the project Digital Africa. Digital skills are needed to ensure quality of services and access. address cybersecurity challenges. We need a holistic approach on capacity building to ensure that we are addressing the needs that are needed. Statistics are needed to determine skills needed for meaningful access and use. I know I’ve repeated myself there. Then there was discussions around hyperlinks and how they can be used to address issues of language and Japanese characters, and a study has been detailed that is part of the report. Again, it was said that internet is a mess of a lot of applications, and diverse digital skills are needed. And that is about it. Thanks.

Giacomo Mazzone:
Thank you very much, Margaret. Very useful. Please, if you can send us your notes, will be very useful because we have to produce very quickly a first report, and what you say are perfectly making the picture. Roberto, there is life in the universe, or they already went to sleep?

Roberto Zambrana:
Actually, there is one more comment from Steven, but he wants us to read it. And it says, great interventions from other participants on the need to increase production on local audio and video content. This is a key intervention Papua New Guinea is taking note of and should take to improve meaningful connectivity across more than 800 languages and cultures. Thank you.

Giacomo Mazzone:
Thank you very much. OK, so on my Swiss passport, I have to say that I have not been good because I’m two minutes over. But on my Italian passport, having only two minutes delay, I am a lot better than the usual performance. I want to thank all the participants. I would like to thank all of the speakers, and I would like to thank all of the panelists here, all the speakers, and especially Daphne, can you stand up, please, Daphne? Thank you. And Roberto that volunteered the last moment, as usual, to support us, and all the speakers and all the participants. Thank you very much. And I would like, by all means, to thank all of the organizers. The invitation for the presentation finished, and the meeting is now closed so your session, please send me the conclusion, and we will include in the report. Sorry, the hyper link will be put there. What you said in the session today is important and relevant for us.

Audience

Sri Lanka has been actively pursuing the digitisation of its nation for the past two decades. To further this effort, a new strategy is being developed. The key areas of focus for this strategy are citizen-centredness, empowering people, strengthening the government, and improving business competitiveness. These pillars reflect the country’s commitment to inclusive growth and efficient governance.

In order to successfully implement this new strategy, there is a need for digital governance and institutional accountability. Digital governance refers to the set of organisations and regulations that will govern the digitisation process. It is important to have clear guidelines, standards, and frameworks in place to ensure that the digitisation efforts are carried out effectively and transparently. This will also help build trust among the citizens and the stakeholders involved.

Moreover, institutional accountability is crucial to monitor and evaluate the progress of the digitisation initiatives. This involves establishing mechanisms to measure the impact and effectiveness of the digital transformation and holding the responsible institutions accountable for their actions and outcomes. By ensuring institutional accountability, Sri Lanka can ensure that its digitisation efforts are aligned with the overall goals and objectives of the country.

Additionally, a panel is discussing the characteristics, effectiveness, and capabilities that an institution should possess for successful digital transformation. These discussions aim to provide insights into the key factors that contribute to the success of digitisation initiatives. By understanding these factors, Sri Lanka can tailor its approach to digital transformation and ensure that the appropriate institutions are equipped with the necessary resources and capabilities to drive the process effectively.

In conclusion, Sri Lanka has made significant strides in digitising the nation over the past 20 years. The new strategy being developed with a focus on citizen-centredness, empowering people, strengthening the government, and improving business competitiveness reflects the country’s commitment to inclusive and efficient growth. To effectively implement this strategy, it is essential to have digital governance and institutional accountability in place. The panel discussions on the characteristics and capabilities required for successful digital transformation provide valuable insights for Sri Lanka’s ongoing efforts in this domain. By incorporating these insights, Sri Lanka can continue its journey towards becoming a digitally empowered nation.

Nibal Idlebi

Several speakers highlighted the importance of regional and national discussions in internet governance and public goods. One such initiative is the creation of the Arab IGF by ESCWA and the League of Arab States, which aims to address regional internet governance issues. Despite the existence of the Arab IGF, it is important to note that internet access is still a major problem in some Arab countries.

Regional discussions play a vital role in making global ideas more relatable for local stakeholders. It is crucial to understand and contextualise these ideas at a regional level before integrating them. This approach ensures that the needs and perspectives of the region are properly considered. ESCWA, in particular, plays a significant role in disseminating ideas, facilitating discussions, and acting as the voice of the region internationally. The organisation collaborates with various stakeholders including professional associations, NGOs, private sector bodies, academia, and government to ensure a comprehensive and inclusive approach to internet governance.

Issues of legislation, privacy, and cybersecurity are significant in many countries within the Arab region. ESCWA recognises the need to develop a roadmap to enhance internet governance in the region, focusing on these critical areas. The implementation and enforcement of legislation are also key components in enhancing internet governance.

Furthermore, several speakers stressed the importance of discussions regarding national sovereignty and the internet at a national level. It is necessary to mediate these discussions and explain the importance of stakeholder engagement in order to foster mutual understanding and collaboration.

Capacity building was deemed essential in the discussions. ESCWA has worked with numerous countries on legislation, implementation, and enforcement to build the capacity of local stakeholders in managing internet governance effectively.

The speakers also highlighted the importance of active regional discussions and external interventions to facilitate engagement. It was noted that discussions often do not take place at the national level unless there is intervention or an external intermediary involved.

Citizens within the Arab region are raising their voices to demand their rights and freedom of expression on the internet. This growing awareness and activism further underscore the need for effective internet governance.

The adoption and customization of cyber laws from developed regions, such as the EU, were recognised as beneficial in aiding the growth and development of internet governance in the Arab region. It was noted that the laws were not copied as is, but instead, the EU’s long experience in cyber law was relied upon, and there was an exchange of experiences and lessons learned.

Strategy development was identified as a crucial element in effective internet governance. It was emphasised that involving various stakeholders at the national level is essential for the successful implementation of the strategy. Additionally, it was noted that quick results from the strategy increase trust in the government.

To address global challenges, it is important to move from regional to global discussions. The need to make regional and national challenges heard on an international forum was emphasised, as this allows for effective resolution of these challenges.

Overall, the speakers’ messages highlighted the importance of regional and national discussions in internet governance and public goods. From addressing internet access issues to ensuring privacy and cybersecurity, involving stakeholders at various levels is crucial. The adoption and customization of cyber laws from developed regions, along with capacity building efforts, contribute to the growth and development of internet governance. The importance of moving from regional to global discussions was also stressed, as it allows for effective solutions to global challenges.

Jamal Shahin

This analysis examines the role of regional and global governance in addressing global issues and managing the global public good. One key argument is that global issues can be more effectively tackled at the regional level or substantially implemented at the local level. This is exemplified by the collaboration of different economic actors at the regional level, such as the European Union or regional trade associations. Furthermore, an UNU-CRIS project explores global and regional multi-stakeholder institutions as effective instruments for addressing global issues.

Regarding the global public good, the concept of the internet as such is highly contested. While it was widely agreed upon 20 years ago, it is now a subject of debate. There are differing views on its management, with some considering it a global interconnected network, while others reject that idea. The analysis also highlights how the term “digital sovereignty” is used by states to regulate the internet as a global public good. However, different regions interpret and apply this concept differently. For example, the European Union approaches digital sovereignty as managing complex interdependencies, whereas the African Union promotes national strategies through a Fund for Digital Sovereignty.

The value of a regional approach in internet governance and digital strategies is emphasized in the analysis. It argues that a regional perspective adds value to these areas, citing the example of the JIPO project, the Global Internet Policy Observatory, which provided information to all actors about internet governance. Additionally, countries without established frameworks often turn to their former colonial leaders, implementing post-colonialist versions of digital strategies. Thus, a regional approach can help bridge this gap and provide guidance.

Another important point is the role of regional actors in managing the global public good. It suggests that regional actors can mitigate national reactions and manage the global public good through the cascading of norms from the global to local levels. By sharing information through peer review processes, regions can facilitate the adoption of global norms. This approach is evident in the practices of entities like the European Union and the OECD, which engage in peer reviews and share common interests and challenges.

Capacity building and two-way dialogue are also highlighted as crucial elements. Peer review processes contribute to the development of common capacity building structures and foster collaboration between countries to solve problems. The analysis emphasizes the importance of a two-way dialogue, with regions shaping, but also being shaped by, the global level.

The analysis concludes by advocating for the multi-stakeholder model in governance. This model has proven to be worthy of consideration at the global level. It encourages participation in the multi-stakeholder framework, particularly at the regional level, for addressing regional issues. The inclusion of different stakeholders is seen as a key approach for achieving peaceful, just, and strong institutions.

In summary, this analysis explores the role of regional and global governance in addressing global issues and managing the global public good. It highlights the effectiveness of addressing global issues at the regional or local level, the contested nature of the internet as a global public good, the varying interpretations of digital sovereignty across regions, and the value of a regional approach in internet governance. The role of regional actors in managing the global public good through cascading norms, facilitating the adoption of global norms through peer review processes, and fostering capacity building and two-way dialogue is underscored. Finally, the importance of the multi-stakeholder model, especially at the regional level, for addressing regional issues is emphasized.

Morten Meyerhoff Nielsen

The African Union’s digital transformation agenda aims to address the growing digital divide in Africa. This divide refers to the disparity in access to digital technologies and the internet between developed and developing countries, as well as within countries themselves. To tackle this issue, the African Union plans to establish a continental fund specifically for supporting digital infrastructure. By investing in and improving the digital infrastructure across the continent, the African Union aims to bridge the gap and ensure equal access to digital technologies for all African countries.

Multi-stakeholder involvement and contextualization are identified as key factors in addressing common problems in different countries. It is important to involve various stakeholders, including governments, civil society organizations, and local communities, in developing strategies and solutions that are tailored to the specific needs and circumstances of each country. This approach ensures that the measures taken are effective and sustainable, taking into account the different contexts.

Successful integration and coordination also require consensus on objectives and practices. Collaboration, consensus-building, and a shared commitment to the desired outcomes are essential for integration and coordination efforts to be successful. Without consensus on objectives and practices, it can be challenging to achieve integration and coordination.

There is strong support for multi-stakeholder involvement and co-creation mechanisms as effective strategies for digital governance on a global scale. By involving citizens’ associations dealing with the diaspora and designing portals that simplify lives, these strategies become more inclusive and representative of diverse perspectives and needs. This approach ensures that the strategies and action plans developed are comprehensive and responsive to the demands and requirements of different stakeholders.

Data governance and interoperability frameworks are essential for successful digital transformation. In federalized countries like Australia, Canada, Brazil, China, and even regions within the European Union, there is a need to align data processes and ensure efficient data exchanges at international, national, and regional levels. Having a clear framework in place ensures that data exchanges are efficient, secure, and consistent across different jurisdictions.

The significance of citizens’ data rights and data sovereignty in social security is also emphasized. Recognizing and protecting citizens’ data rights and data sovereignty is crucial for ensuring privacy, security, and trust in digital systems.

A standard framework is required to facilitate data exchanges. From China to Denmark and even the influence of the European Union on national legislation, the need for a standard framework is evident. This framework enables smooth cross-border or inter-organizational data exchanges, promoting collaboration and interoperability between different entities.

Unfortunately, local and regional authorities are often overlooked in national digital strategies, and their crucial role in infrastructure rollout and the establishment of electronic service standards is forgotten. Including regional and local authorities in the consultation process is essential to ensure comprehensive and inclusive digital strategies that reflect the needs and realities of different regions and communities.

The mandate and recognition of that mandate are identified as crucial aspects of digital governance. A compliance mechanism is necessary to ensure accountability and effective implementation of digital governance initiatives.

Regional cross-border governance is deemed vital due to the fact that regions and cities have neighbors on the other side, rather than just capital cities. Collaboration and coordination between neighboring regions and cities are crucial for addressing mutual challenges, sharing resources, and promoting regional development.

Cross-governmental entities and collaboration forums are seen as essential for aligning stakeholders in digital governance. By bringing together various stakeholders, a collaborative approach can be fostered, ensuring that all stakeholders are working towards the same objectives and that their efforts are coordinated and complementary. Achieving alignment through cross-governmental entities and collaboration forums contributes to effective and inclusive digital governance.

In conclusion, the African Union’s digital transformation agenda, multi-stakeholder involvement, consensus on objectives and practices, data governance and interoperability frameworks, citizens’ data rights and data sovereignty, standard frameworks for data exchanges, the role of regional and local authorities, the mandate and recognition in digital governance, regional cross-border governance, and cross-governmental entities and collaboration forums all play crucial roles in shaping effective digital governance strategies and policies. These elements contribute to bridging the digital divide, promoting inclusive digital access and opportunities, and ensuring privacy, security, and trust in the digital realm.

Luis Barbosa

The given information highlights the importance of regional and international efforts in addressing global challenges and issues. It emphasizes the need for individual context to be taken into account alongside these efforts. Building trust among stakeholders is seen as essential for achieving integration or coordination at the regional level. Multiple stakeholders’ involvement is necessary for global-level thinking and causal integration. Consensualized objectives and practices, as well as motivating citizens and civil societies, are also important factors. International organizations are encouraged to focus on three dimensions, representation, synergy, and pedagogy, to counter national-based discourse. Digital sovereignty in Africa is viewed as an extension of national sovereignty, with an emphasis on local ownership and control over data sets. However, there is skepticism towards data localization in smaller African states, suggesting that a more citizen-oriented approach to digital sovereignty might be more beneficial. The involvement of stakeholders beyond governments is emphasized for effective digital governance implementation. The connection between digital governance and broader development objectives is highlighted, along with the importance of understanding and adapting to regional differences. Successful cooperation relies on multi-stakeholder dialogues and aligning discourse with development objectives. International organizations play a supportive role in designing and implementing national strategies for digital governance. A clear government mandate, political will, and technical capacity are crucial for effective governance. The involvement of multiple stakeholders in the entire process of strategy development and implementation is advocated. Academia’s involvement and capacity building at regional and continental levels are seen as important. Additionally, more global action is needed to address problems faced by vulnerable people, displaced people, and refugees. Overall, the summary covers the key points and keywords from the given information, reflecting the main analysis accurately.

Nadia Tjahja

Nadia Tjahja initiated the session by discussing regional perspectives on digital governance. She introduced three speakers who would contribute to the discussion: Nibal Idlebi from UNESCWA, Luis Barbosa from UNU-EGOV, and Jamal Shahin.

Following the introductions, three key questions were presented to guide the session. The first question focused on the contribution of the United Nations (UN) and regional commissions in managing global public good. This inquiry aimed to explore how these institutions play a role in ensuring the welfare of the international community in the digital realm.

The second question centered around the influence of regional actors in shaping the discourse on digital sovereignty. This was an opportunity to examine the impact of regional perspectives and initiatives in defining and defending the rights and control of digital resources within their respective regions.

Lastly, the session aimed to explore the differences among global discourses on cooperation. By considering various viewpoints and approaches towards cooperation in the digital space, the goal was to gain insights into the diverse perspectives and strategies employed by different countries and regions.

It is worth noting that the sentiment surrounding this session was neutral, indicating a balanced and open-minded approach to discussing these complex subjects. The arguments presented by the speakers and the evidence they provided would further elucidate the topics and potentially lead to a better understanding of regional perspectives on digital governance.

In conclusion, the session on regional perspectives on digital governance was initiated by Nadia Tjahja. The introduction of speakers and the formulation of key questions framed the subsequent discussions on the contribution of the UN and regional commissions to managing global public good, the influence of regional actors in shaping discourse on digital sovereignty, and the differences among global discourses on cooperation. The session proved to be a valuable platform for exploring and comprehending the multi-faceted nature of digital governance on a regional scale.

Nadia Tjahja:
Good morning, everyone, and welcome to this session on the regional perspectives on digital governance. I am Nadia Tjahja, and I’m very happy to welcome our currently three speakers, Nibal Idlebi from UNESCWA who’s joining us online, Luis Barbosa from UNU‑EGOV, and Jamal Shahin, to my left. I’m happy to introduce our online moderator Morten Meyerhoff Nielsen so if you are online, please do not hesitate to ask any questions so we can have an active discussion about today’s session. In today’s session, we would like to address three key questions: How can you and regional commissions and other regional actors contribute towards managing the global public good? The second question that we would like to address is what ways do regional actors make it, the discourse and policy to national reactions or so‑called digital sovereignty. And lastly, what differences exist between global discourses on cooperation and action and beyond. If you have any questions, doubts, solutions, please do come up and ask us a question online or ask us a question by coming up to the microphones in the room. We are very happy for you to join the discussion. We are keen to listen to the input from the wider global audience. So we’ll start with question 1, and then we’ll ask Jamal Shahin to start preparing his first thoughts towards this. How can regional commissions and other regional actors contribute towards managing this global public good? Perhaps you can give a little bit of an introduction to how we can look at this concept of global public good. Jamal.

Jamal Shahin:
Thanks, we are happy to be here and participating in this open forum. In the open forum, I should be brief and I’ve already taken up my two minutes, but in the spirit of this, I would like to rather just raise a few minutes and then pass the baton on to my colleagues. So we ask the question about governing global public good, and I want to get to that, that kind of unpacking that concept later on, but maybe I could start by saying that the intention behind this panel and the discussion that we’re having here is to really try and address how global issues can be addressed more successfully at the regional level or can be substantively implemented at the local level. We talked about UN region conventions and we’re happy that Nadia is on the core to share her ideas on this. In addition to the UN regional ‑‑ you have the Internet registries. You have also economic actors that work at the regional level such as the European Union or different regional trade associations that work together And I think that’s one of the things, you know, the beauty of the diversity of this idea of regional plays in there. At UNU-CRIS, which is where both Nadia and myself work, we have been working on a project that’s been financed by the Free University of Brussels, where we look at global and regional multi-stakeholder institutions, and we look specifically at those kinds of institutions that engage with different actors, or a multitude of actors, rather than looking very much at the diplomatic or the economic framing themselves. And in that, we actually tried to develop, or one of the things that we tried to do was also look at how norms, principles, and practices flow from the global level to the regional level, and we termed this cascading governance, and we look at how these ideas that are transmitted at the global level can be pushed through. Some scholars have termed this following through on policy, or following the policy, let’s say. This allows for specific flavors of those global norms to emerge in the regional setting. And that is one of the things that we’re seeing in the contemporary global situation, where we’re seeing that global norms sometimes don’t really hit the floor running when it comes to different national implementations, and so we think that using regional commissions as a kind of translator of these global norms can help there. I think there’s a few caveats that we need to add to this idea. So regions must share common interests and values, and they must be able to adopt, and the actors that play within those regions must be able to adopt those flavors of global norms in similar ways. And I said I’d get back to the global public good issue. We’re talking about global public goods, and the IGF has shown, just walking around and participating in some of the panels today, you realize that the notion of the internet as a global public good is actually quite contested. We don’t have the same kind of feeling that we maybe had 20 years ago in this space. And so I think that that’s one of the things we also need to address when looking at how regions actually interact with internet governance and the sphere of the digital in general. We do know that the notion of a global interconnected network is a global public good, right? And that needs to be, you know, we need to make sure that we’re clear in what we’re actually trying to govern, or what we’re actually trying to cascade in our governance mechanisms. I think that Nubal and Luis will have lots more to say about this framing and how that actually plays out in different regional and national settings, and I’ve spent five minutes talking, so I’ll be quiet now. Thanks a lot.

Nadia Tjahja:
Well, thank you for sharing your kind of opening insights regarding this question, and I would like to move to Luis Barbosa. Please, could you share your remarks?

Morten Meyerhoff Nielsen:
Sure. Okay. Okay. Good morning. Thank you very much. Yes, it’s a pleasure to be here. Of course, at Winnie the Pooh, we have a more practical experience. We have not this kind of more conceptualized projects, but I will start to say that there was a well-known mantra from the 70s, think globally, act locally, if you remember, that although it was coined for a very different purpose, it still makes sense in this context. Actually, there are a number of fundamental issues and global challenges that require to be articulated at the broader, even continental level, and I will focus, it’s a pity that Mactar has not shown up until now, but I think the African case is particularly significant because Africa is witnessing an ever-increasing digital divide and sufficient digital infrastructures often targeted by predatory private interests from the West or from China or both. And actually, the fact that the African Union digital transformation agenda has put one of its main objectives to have a continental fund, an investment for supporting the digital infrastructure, and that IGF Africa this year has made again the same kind of statement is a message very clear for us. At UNU-EGOV, we have some experience, we mainly work with countries, but we have also some experience in trying to work at a more regional, interconnected level. Some years ago, we managed a big project within the Africa Lusophone countries, and some, at a later stage I can share some lessons learned from that process, and this year we launched what we call the West Africa Digital Governance Forum, that was a way to try to bring countries on the same table, try to discuss some pressing issues, and mainly to foster synergies and discuss what strategies can be drawn at that more integrated level. Just two remarks, and I will end up for now. First is that although this regional, continental, international level is really very important, one of the lessons learned that we have is that even if countries share a number of common problems and common concerns, they need to be addressed in different ways, in different countries, in different contexts, and this contextualization is something that cannot be swept under the carpet when we discuss an integration level. Multi-stakeholder involvement in concrete, contextualized scenarios with appropriate co-creation mechanisms for strategies and action plans is something that is very essential and that should be taken into account if you want to think at a more global level. And the second issue is that actually, I think, but Nabil certainly has much more interesting things to say, but I think casual integration, or even before integration, any sort of coordination efforts are often difficult to achieve, and they require consensualized objectives and more than that, consensualized practices. Not only on the macro-political level, of course, political will, the occurrence of policies, all this is very important, but also at the level of motivating citizens and the civil society in the different countries for that, so that strategies, processes, policies can be validated, motivated, and we can build trust around these things. And trust is actually something that actually moves people. For example, in Capeford, we worked with a cross-border issue, more than that is the diaspora problem in Capeford, that goes to Europe, that goes to other African countries, even to the States. And so we tried to motivate the design of portals of service that somehow allow these people to have their lives simplified. And the presence of the citizens’ associations dealing with diaspora and their involvement

Luis Barbosa:
in the process at different levels, in Portugal, in Capeford, even in the States, was very important for the success of this initiative. So I will do these two remarks. Things require a clear political but also social or civic will to go around, and anything we do should be articulated with the context, the concrete context of the countries involved. Thank you very much.

Nadia Tjahja:
It’s important to be able to share these kind of also practical examples of how things are working on the ground and kind of the feelings that we’re kind of engaging with, that it’s not always about the manner in which we design concepts and ideas and how we have these perspectives, but also learn from lived experiences. And this is why I would like to go to our online speaker, Nibal Idlebi from UNESCO. Please, I would love to hear your remarks.

Morten Meyerhoff Nielsen:
Sorry, there seemed to be a small problem with Nibal picking up the connection. We are trying to let her into the forum. She was there. She’s there, but she’s not picking up. So it seems our online speaker isn’t available right now.

Nadia Tjahja:
So I just wanted to encourage all the people who just joined us here in the room and also for those who are joining us online, we are looking at three questions here today. And if you have any comments or thoughts or doubts or even perhaps solutions or what you want to see for the future, we do encourage you to come and join perhaps at the table or at the microphones so that we can have a little bit of a discussion about these three questions. So the first question that we started with was how UN regional commissions and other regional actors can contribute towards managing the global public good. And we already heard from Jamal Shaheen from UNU-CRIS and Luis Barbosa from UNU-IGAV. But then we will also look at question two. So to examine the ways in which regional actors can mitigate the current shift in discourse and policy toward national reactions, so-called digital sovereignty. Perhaps we’ll go into this second part, and perhaps you could even bridge between the two questions. Jamal Shaheen, please. Thanks.

Jamal Shahin:
Thanks, Nadia. Okay. So, yeah. The ways in which regional actors can mitigate this shift towards the national reaction. Well, we heard from Luis that actually these national implementations are actually quite crucial. So the lived experiences, as you mentioned, Nadia, and the kind of the national way of implementing this is actually very important. But I would want to make an argument for actually this kind of, as I mentioned before, this cascading, so this bringing down of the different norms from the global to the local via the regional. One of the reasons why I think this also has a very important role to play in the discussions that we have is that although we talk about the internet or the connected digital network as a global public good, there are many instances in which national states or national actors are actually taking it upon themselves to manage this global public good in different ways. And it can actually be on different layers in the internet field.

Morten Meyerhoff Nielsen:
Nibal should be with us now. Yes.

Nibal Idlebi:
Good morning. Good morning. Okay. There is a problem in the video, but I mean, I’m here. Good morning, everyone. And I’m really happy that we are here. I mean, it’s early in the morning in Beirut, but I mean, I’m here. Thank you for including ESCOA in this discussion. And I would like to say that in fact, the regional aspect in the public good and especially in internet and internet governance, it is really very important. And ESCOA, we have been working on this aspect since a very long time, in fact. And we have noticed the importance of the regional aspect as compared also to international. Let me say how we maybe you are aware or some people who are listening are aware that ESCOA together with the League of Arab States, we have created what we call Arab IGF, which is really a regional platform for discussing all issues related to internet governance. And in this regard, we have noticed the importance to discuss, to disseminate, to promote the global idea at regional level. It was really, I mean, very important because people, many people and or many stakeholders in the national level are not aware about some concept or they feel far away from the international discussion or the global discussion in this regard. Therefore, I believe the first and the most maybe the first role in this regard was really to disseminate the idea, to discuss the idea, to explain some idea which are taking place at a global level and that, I mean, need to be, first of all, to be explained and then to be contextualized, I would say, considering the regional perspective, the regional social dimension and the political dimension, in some cases, to reflect on how this will be integrated, how it can be integrated. Then, I mean, then the prioritization at the regional level also, it is really very important aspect that we discovered that maybe some challenges or some idea that are taking place and maybe they have a high priority at international level, they might be different at regional level because maybe some basics are not yet well established at regional level and, in this case, in the Arab region because Esquire is working at the Arab region level. Then the prioritization, it is really very important also and to see what matters for the region considering the level of development, although sometimes we have, we witnessed some issue because the region itself, it’s not harmonized in terms of development in many area, I mean, in technology and in some other area as well. Then it is really, this prioritization is really important and it is important to reflect it at a global level. I would say that the regional dimension is important for two ways, for taking, I mean, the global and making contextualization at the regional level, but also to be the voice of the region in the international forum and to make the voice of regional aspect be heard at a global level because the matters might be different and might be, might reflect other dimension that might not be really at the, in the international dimension are discussed well, I mean. For example, one of the issue that we have identified in our last Internet Governance Forum, it was the access, I mean, meaningful access to Internet, I mean, and this may be the access, it is not really a problem in Europe or in the Western countries, while it is still a problem, a major problem in the, in some Arab country, not all, in some Arab country. I will not spend too much time, but in addition then, I mean, in addition to what I have said, then I believe the regional commission, and in this case, ESCWA, we have made also, I mean, a kind of roadmap for the public good and for the Internet, for the Arab region roadmap on how to enhance the Internet governance and how to tackle all the issue that are discussed at the international forum. Then, for example, legislation was very important, for example, privacy, even cyber security is very important, then, because it is still maybe not well, quite mature in many countries in the region. Then, this, I believe, to start, I mean, as the first dimension, I repeat, dissemination, promotion, and also discussion prioritization is really very important and explaining. The discussion with the international, with the regional stakeholder, I would say that ESCWA doesn’t work alone. We are interacting with all regional stakeholders, with all regional associations, either professional or NGO, or even private sector association, or academia sometimes, and, of course, with the government, which are the main stakeholders, but we include all other stakeholders, including youth, I mean, some association for youth. I think I will stop here for now, and I will return back to other aspects later on.

Nadia Tjahja:
Well, thank you very much for your insights, and I find it very important what you raised regarding these two ways. The first one providing the context in which these concepts and ideas are on a regional level, but also representing the voice of that region, and it’s admirable what you’re doing with the Arab IGF, and what you were saying about the roadmap we would love if you could leave us the link in the Zoom chat, and also send that to us so that we can add that to the IGF webpage so that people can actually learn what is this roadmap, and what your region have you found will allow us to progress towards a more inclusive future. But then, I would like to go into question two. The question two looked at examining the ways in which regional agencies, factors can mitigate the current shift in discourse and policy toward national reactions, so-called digital sovereignty. And I would like to return to Jamal Shaheen to make any further comments, if he wishes.

Jamal Shahin:
Thanks, Nadia. Yeah, maybe just bouncing off something that Nibal said, I’d like to emphasize the importance of the two-way street. It’s not just about disseminating global or filtering global norms, but it’s also about ensuring that regional interests do get brought up to the fore. Maybe if I go back to this issue of digital sovereignty, of course, this is a term that’s been used in the past couple of years around the IGF, around different fora, to actually try and show how states themselves can actually build their own approaches to understanding how to regulate the global public good that we’re talking about. And here you see that there are tensions inherent in a kind of model that links the global with the local. So we think global and work locally, but if we do too much work locally, then the global may be forgotten, and then we forget to think globally. We don’t forget to think. But in that sense, the regional as a kind of filter can actually show that international cooperation does work. And I would be very interested also to see how the different regions learn from each other. So, I mean, Nibal, you are the representative of all of the regions, and you actually mentioned that you do work with different stakeholders, and I assume and I know that you work with ECHA, with ECLAC, and so on and so forth. Would be really interesting to actually find out how those interactions work in order to actually nuance the discussions that we have on digital sovereignty. Maybe one thing I could add, and this is linked to, Sophie’s just walked into the room, so I have to reference her now, I can’t plagiarize, but she’d already mentioned to me something about the different ways in which this concept is actually used in regions. So you have regions like the European Union, which thinks of digital sovereignty as being about managing complex interdependencies, or managing interdependence. And then you have in the African Union, you have the Fund for Digital Sovereignty, which is actually promoting national strategies in this area, but that’s a regional organization doing that. So you also see this concept being brought up in different ways as well, according to different regions.

Nadia Tjahja:
Thank you very much. I was wondering if, Luis, if you would like to provide any further insights regarding this question.

Luis Barbosa:
Yeah. I’m thinking again about what Nibal was saying. I think there is a path that international organizations can do with three different dimensions. One is exactly the representative, the voice thing that Nibal was pointing out, which is very important. The other, I think, is synergetic. The success of this kind of, I mean, the way that we can somehow contradict the modern national-based discourse is to address this kind of key neighbors of digitalization that are essential for people, infrastructure, connectivity, mobile payments across countries, cross-border problems, all these kind of issues. And the other is pedagogical, if I can use this term, in the sense that, for example, take going into question two, digital sovereignty in Africa is typically framed as an extension of national sovereignty, OK, and with firm roots in this political conception that comes from the Chinese model, if I can say so. And this is, yeah, of course, there is also an economic dimension. They try to protect the value chain, their own value chain, all these kind of things. And this is very clear from all the documents from African Union, from, for example, Rwanda’s national strategy, or South Africa policy in data and cloud. This is very clear that the stress on self-economic, self-determination, ensuring local ownership and control over data sets. But we all know that this has different interpretations, for example, data localization is very important in all these strategies, and for countries as well, is a coin with a double face. Because often, it represents the will of, OK, we own our own data, we are protecting our citizens. Or maybe you are just having an easier way to spy on our citizens. So does it make sense to discuss data localization in small African states by themselves? Could we do some pedagogical way of going a little bit further, optimizing resources, and mainly try to put in action a more civic, citizen-oriented way of understanding what digital sovereignty means? I think that all these three dimensions, the representative, the pedagogical, and the synergetic should be taken into account as a way of going around the more national-based, exclusively nation-based discourse that is dominant in, at least when we talk with ministers and national agencies.

Nadia Tjahja:
So we find ourselves with more questions to our question. And that only makes it more interesting, and therefore, I would like to ask Nibal, if you would like to shed more insights regarding the work within your regions.

Nibal Idlebi:
Yeah, OK. Thank you. Thank you very much. And thank you for the active discussion. I mean, exactly, we have maybe more discussion, more questions than answers. This is the era that we are living in. However, I would like, I mean, to return back to this national sovereignty and in the context of internet and so on. I believe there is, what is interesting at the national level is really also to make, to activate the discussion at national level among the different stakeholders. And this is something that doesn’t happen all the time, naturally, let us say, because the terms that some aspects are, some of them are taboo still in some countries. I mean, then there is, I mean, the need for, to activate the discussion among the stakeholder. And this is really very important. And we notice that sometimes there is reluctance at the beginning, but then later on, people, the government and other stakeholders are quite well engaged if in a way there is some insistence on this regard, or there is some, how to say, that you need to mediate the discussion and to explain, as I mentioned earlier. And this is really very important because we notice the importance of this. I believe another dimension maybe that is maybe even in our context was important is to build capacity, to capacity building. Some capacity building are very important because people need to understand maybe some aspects in a better way. For example, we worked with many countries at the legislation level and the implementation and the enforcement of legislation that is really needed in some cases. Then I believe then the discussion with the high-level decision-maker is really very important to provide some justification or maybe sometimes explanation of this, what is taking place at international level. Putting the stakeholders together, I mean, and making them interacting together, it is not easy sometimes. And this is where sometimes where the regional commission or some other regional stakeholder might play a very important role because sometimes we notice that discussion doesn’t take place at national level unless there is intervention, external intervention, let us say, or external intermediator to have the discussion taking place. Sometimes there is a need for some guidance to have this discussion. And then this is what I would say at this stage, and I believe in the Arab region, based on some study that we have made, some discussion, the forum that we discussed, then there were a lot of better awareness, let us say, among different stakeholders and among citizens on these aspects that are really important. And some NGOs or some citizens, they are raising more their voices towards to get some rights and to have their rights on the Internet in a better way, especially in terms of freedom and the Internet, the access to Internet and the freedom of expression and, of course, cyber security or the related topics. And I will stop here for the time being, not to monopolize the discussion.

Nadia Tjahja:
Well, we’re very glad to hear your thoughts and ideas. And it’s a clear request and a clear need for a more meaningful participation. And I believe also that Jamal wanted to provide further input or further reflections. It’s a discussion, and we also welcome members of the audiences. If you have any thoughts, ideas, questions, or perhaps solutions that you would like to see for the future, then you are very welcome to come up to the microphone or to leave a question in the chat. So in the meantime, Jamal, please go ahead.

Jamal Shahin:
Maybe I just wanted to bounce off some of the things that have been said. And thanks very much. One of the things that I think also the added value of the regional approach is that in some parts of the world, between 2015 and 2017, I was working on a project with the European Commission called JIPO, the Global Internet Policy Observatory, which you won’t have heard about. But this observatory was set up with the idea of providing information to all actors, all actors around the world who wanted to find out about Internet governance, questions that were being discussed at the global level. And one of the reasons for this was that many countries that maybe don’t have an established framework for understanding or leading or guiding in these areas would tend to go back to their imperial, their colonial leaders, right, and would then implement a kind of, yeah, post-colonialist version of a digital strategy that had been implemented in the former colonial country, the former colonial master. So there was some sort of neo-colonialism, in a sense, emerging, where countries were taking on the flavors not of their region, which is, you know, what we’re seeing now with ESCO, there is a sort of regional specificity, but taking on maybe, well, often, always, a European type of digital strategy, which maybe doesn’t fit with the culture and the engagement actions there. So that’s something I wanted to raise, that regional actors can actually bring together the regions to actually enable them to work together. And I think that’s what Nibal has been saying, what you were referring to, Louis, as well, in your comment.

Nibal Idlebi:
If I may?

Nadia Tjahja:
Please, do go ahead.

Nibal Idlebi:
I mean, there is another, yeah, I mean, thank you, Jamal. And I would raise another dimension that there is this regional aspect where we, in a way, interacted with other region, and in a way, we copied or we borrowed some of their output in order to bring it to the region, for example. I mean, this is something that sometimes helps a lot. I mean, I would like to say something that we made in the, I was active for a long time in cyber legislation. And I would say that we really took benefit of all the cyber laws that took place in the European Union. And that was, I mean, enacted. I mean, it was drafted and prepared for the EU. And really, we were, it was very good, I mean, material to rely on and to have the experience of EU to be copied or to be customized. I would not say that it is copied as it is. It is never as it is. But it has taken benefit of this experience, long experience in cyber law. For example, we did, we were enabled to customize it or to have some lesson learned from it, and to customize it to the Arab region. I mean, here in this regard, and we have, in fact, in this regard, some collaboration with ECA, not ECA or some stakeholder in Africa, who have some sub-regional activity in this regard, and where it was also interesting to exchange experience and to exchange even some lesson learned. Just this is what I want to say, to add.

Nadia Tjahja:
Thank you very much. And with this, I would like to actually go into the next question so that we have a little bit of time to have a discussion about this. So the third question looks to reflect upon the differences between global discourses on cooperation and practical implementation at various levels from local to regional and beyond. And perhaps we’ll start with Luis. Perhaps you could elaborate a little bit about UNU-ECAF’s thoughts and ideas and the study on cooperation.

Luis Barbosa:
True, true. I’d like to stress two aspects that to me are very essential in having success in going ahead with cooperation and with the integration of experiences. One is, and this was very clear, for example, from our experience with the Digital Governance West Africa Forum, the need to involve other stakeholders rather than governments themselves. This has to be a dialogue with multiple voices. And often, this kind of stakeholders coming from the civil society, from the economical, cultural, social ecosystem, make a very interesting contribution in fostering synergies and in easing the discourse. And the other is the need to articulate this debate, and this was also very clear, for example, in that experience with the Lusophone African countries, to frame this debate or to articulate this debate with very clear and broader development objectives in terms of promoting a digital economy ecosystem and having people motivated from there. Yeah, this said, of course, there are several ways of addressing that question and of doing what, taking this path. And we, yeah, certainly different regions have different ways and multiple ways to articulate different forms of governance across different sectors in a more vertical or horizontal way. We had a project, not at that level of regional integration, but we conduct a study, actually, Morten, who is here, conducted this study on the different models in different countries, in Asia, in Europe, in America, around the organization, the digital transformation of social security that may bring some insights on how this can be, at least how these things articulate at different paths. I don’t know, but I suggest that Morten can say something about that in that perspective.

Morten Meyerhoff Nielsen:
Thank you, Luis. It’s an interesting issue, particularly around the specific elements of governance. So, obviously, classical example is data governance. We want an interoperability framework. We want our legal and regulatory framework on a domestic level. But we see even in, particularly in federalized countries like Australia, Canada, Brazil, China, where we were actually supporting the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security on this specific issue, bring some additional complexity that we also see on regional levels, levels of autonomy, my data or the data sovereignty issue, as in it is my data as a nation, it is my data as an organization. And we sometimes forget when we talk about this data governance or sovereignty that, well, actually, isn’t that what citizens sometimes tell government, that it’s not government’s data, it’s my data, it’s data on me, my family, my income. So, these elements play out. But what we saw very clearly is it’s not just about what we’re already talking about, about the governance model, about the frameworks, about the legal and regulatory systems and standards, so we can map up the data. It goes to skills, formal internal processes about what do we do if we think the data is maybe incorrect? How do we do that formally? How do we report back to the sister agency or the country next door where we get the data and say, sorry, but, you know, Jamal, you don’t look 130 years old, and sorry, Morten. Why did you have an income of 23 billion last year? That seems a bit odd. What is the process for fixing that so we don’t have errors? Because errors are both bad service, it’s also bad for decision making, and politically it’s also sensitive because there’s nothing worse than telling an old lady that she can’t get a pension because she’s earning 33 billion euros when in fact she’s earning 2,300. So those are the type of things that came out very clearly in social security, particularly on the inter-organizational exchange or even national regional exchange. And then when you see pilots like the Spaniards exchanging data with Uruguay on social security, we see it in a European context or an African context. These elements become even more prevalent and complex because we’re not suddenly talking about national partners, we’re talking about cross-border partners. Or we talk about federal countries where provinces and state have levels of autonomy, so central government cannot necessarily specify or mandate a certain approach. There need to be that flexibility within the framework. So these are some of the things that came out in some very diverse cases from China to Denmark and even looking at the EU influence on national legislation on this topic in countries like Denmark and France, where it’s very clear that although the national approaches are different, they are aligning to what is thought as being the approach for the region at large. And that then allows that my local regional central government data can be exchanged in a meaningful way with a country somewhere else in the region because we have a common framework or a common reference frame about certain things.

Nadia Tjahja:
Thank you. Thank you for these examples. And I would invite a member of the audience to join us at the microphone if you could share your name and your affiliation.

Audience:
Good morning. I’m Mahesh Pera from Sri Lanka. So I have a question for the esteemed panel. I mean, this is the topic on digital governance. So from Sri Lanka, we have been trying to digitalize the nation for the last 20 years. Now we have almost drafted a new strategy because citizen in the front, as you said, I mean, it must be all about citizen-centricness. Citizen has the control. As you said, I mean, how do you empower the people? How do you strengthen the government? How do you improve competitiveness in businesses? I mean, it’s all about this strategy, digitalization of the national strategies. Now the question I have for the esteemed panel is, I mean, now we had one institution who is accountable for this regional transformation, which is not so successful over the last 20 years. Now when it comes to drafting a new strategy, this strategy must be governed by a set of organizations. So what sort of characteristics, so what sort of teeth and muscles this particular institution must entail? I would like to hear different perspectives from the esteemed panel. Thank you.

Nadia Tjahja:
Thank you very much for your question. Perhaps I’ll first turn to Nibal online for your first remarks regarding the questions that were raised.

Nibal Idlebi:
I believe this is really very important question, I believe. And it is really for many countries, I mean, struggling even with this, I mean. I believe that such a strategy, whenever the strategy should be really done in, formulated in a way, in collective way, and or discussed in collective way before its adoption. This is one of the lesson that we have learned and when we involve the stakeholder, different stakeholder at national level for the discussion about any future action that you are doing, especially strategy, it is very important to involve them from the beginning and to have them on board. Maybe they will not draft like you, but I mean, like the government, for example, but I mean, at least they interact with you, they give their idea. And then thereby in later on in the future for the implementation of such a strategy will be much bigger, I mean, and their involvement will be much bigger than the involvement of all the stakeholder from the beginning, from the start and to have some interaction with them regularly. This is done, I mean, this is first and I believe there is in such for to have in a way trust in the government, in the public, in this strategy and in its implementation. We have witnessed, we have noticed that whenever there is a kind of a quick wins in the implementation of the strategy or in the implementation of this transformation, then if there is a quick wins where people see the result of this strategy, they can, how to say, they trust the government much more and they believe in this and they will be more cooperative with that. I believe having a kind of committee or a kind of committee for looking after the implementation at national level, not only from the government, I mean, to have a kind of multi-stakeholder committee where many partner at national level are involved in this committee, they will to supervise or to follow at least supervise the implementation. It will be, it is really very important and it gives some credibility to the government as well as in that process. This is my two cents for that to answer this question.

Nadia Tjahja:
Thank you very much. Perhaps I will move to Luis.

Luis Barbosa:
Thank you for your question. Actually, we have a long experience in supporting member states in designing and implementing national strategies for digital governance. We are not a consultancy company, as you know, but we have this mandate of supporting member states in that direction. And your precise question on the, who is going to take care of this? This is crucial, I think. In terms of, of course, different countries have different suggestions, different models. There are national agencies, other commissions, strategy committees, whatever. What I think is very important is to have a clear mandate for whatever commission or committee is going to go ahead with this. A clear mandate, strengthened by clear political will from government and with technical capacity as well, because often you get some stakeholders that are more the political representatives of different sectors. And this does not go. The other two points that I would like to emphasize, Nibal has already talked. The first one is absolutely crucial. The involvement of multiple stakeholders in designing, not only in designing, but also in implementing and monitoring the strategy. I used to say with, in some of the countries that we have been supporting, that often the process of thinking about the strategy, designing it, is even more important than the final document itself. Because it is able to put people in dialogue, to build trust, and to motivate institutions. So we have some elements of our experience that I’ll be happy to share with you at a later stage. Yeah, there was some other aspect that I intended to mention, but actually I forgot for the moment.

Morten Meyerhoff Nielsen:
If I may, I think if I put my former Danish civil servants hat on, working for the Agency for Digitization, I agree with what Luis is saying, but want to add an important detail. One thing that many countries forget, in the consultation process, is including regional and local authorities. In some countries, local authorities have a very small service delivery role. It may just be fixing potholes and a few garbage collection things, which are nonetheless essential things in a smart, sustainable city and community context. And often we see, even with infrastructure rollout, such as data distribution, electronic service standards, local and regional authorities are utterly forgotten in the national strategies. So there are also internal stakeholders. On the mandate, it doesn’t matter if it’s the Ministry of Sport that has the mandate for digital, or if it’s the Agency for Digitization, the name doesn’t matter. It’s the mandate and the recognition of that mandate. And that requires that there is actually a compliance mechanism. There’s a carrot and a stick. Many government agencies, particularly large, traditionally powerful ministries, tend to run circles around newly established agencies for digitization, et cetera. So where you position it is, again, not relevant. It’s the mandate and the strength of that carrot and that stick that comes with that mandate. So the cross-governmental entities and collaboration forums are extremely important to get all the ducks lined up in a row. I think German Councilor Kohl said about EU integration, it doesn’t matter how big or how small the ships are, as long as they have the same port of destination in mind, and we all get there at some stage. So that’s the same with digitization. So that’s really important things, particularly also when we talk about regional cross-border governance, because regions and cities are the ones that have neighbors across on the other side. It’s not the capital city.

Nadia Tjahja:
Thank you very much. As we start going into the final moments of our session, I would like to ask Jamal, if you could highlight the praxis between the global public good, digital sovereignty, and cooperation.

Jamal Shahin:
Thanks, Nadia. I will try. And I will use the discussion that we’ve had a bit just now. And thank you very much for your question. I’ll try and incorporate some responses in here as well. I think one of the things that we’ve realized here is that regional cooperation works as a kind of two-way mechanism between the national level and the global level. So reflecting on how we can filter global norms and global practices, or global norms rather, and how we can use the national practices to influence or to shape those global norms as well. And I see that as being one of the key issues here, that sovereignty in the United Nations system, for example, is something that everybody recognizes, right? So sovereignty itself is kind of interconnected, just like the global public good, we’re trying to, at least conceptually, it is. And one of the other things that comes out of these questions about the regional and the global, and the shift towards digital transformation, in a sense that you were talking about, is that regions can help with capitalizing on experiences that have taken place elsewhere. So I think a lot of the issues where regions can help, and I know this is how I think ESQA also does work, is on the peer review basis. This is something that the European Union has also done. The OECD, okay, well, it’s not a territorial regional group. The OECD does this, they carry out peer review processes, allowing like-minded states, or states that have common issues, to actually share information. And that has been done at the WSIS level, right? But this is a massive exercise, right? When trying to manage that at the WSIS level. The regional level can actually help facilitate that because they can actually bring this stuff forward. And these countries that work together, that live together, do actually share common interests, and common challenges as well. So see that as being very important. Also, that peer review process, a corollary of that, is the common capacity building structures that then emerge. And I think that’s very important to raise here, that countries, you know, this is the essence, I was born in Europe, and I’m now, again, a European citizen. But that we realized that we needed to work together because we could not solve the problems around the world. So that kind of common frameworks actually do actually help in that sense. And then that kind of calls into your pedagogical issues that I think you raised. Okay, I’ll stop there, because I need to.

Nadia Tjahja:
Thank you very much. So during this session, we looked at these theoretical concepts of global public good, digital sovereignty, and cooperation, but then also brought that into practical experience and examples, kind of understanding, and allowing us to comprehend how that actually works in practice and the lived experiences of people. Nibal mentioned the roadmap that was created, and we hope that that will be shared and you can find it on the IGF website. But also, I encourage for you to join all the newsletters to stay up to date on kind of developments that are happening and how you can contribute to projects. But as we enter this last minute of our session, I would like to ask each of the speakers to perhaps give one key takeaway and one action point from this session that allows us to think about how do we move forward from here. One key takeaway and one action point. Perhaps we start with Nibal online.

Nibal Idlebi:
Sorry for that. I think the most important thing that I would like to say that it is sometimes forgotten is that really that from regional to go to global, that regional actor or to be the voice of the region and to make here the challenges, the national and regional challenges to get them to the international forum. I think it is very important to stress on that.

Luis Barbosa:
Thank you very much. Perhaps Luis? Two very concrete things. One, to involve academia in this process. We have been making efforts to build networks of universities, to build capacity, but also to discuss these issues at a regional level, the continental level, from the point of view of academia. And the second is more than a challenge. I think there are a number of emerging, I mean, not emerging because they have been there for a while, problems, but cross-cutting problems related with vulnerable people, displaced people, refugees that actually require a more global action. And this is a challenge, I think, for this level of integration we are discussing.

Nadia Tjahja:
Thank you very much. And Jamal?

Jamal Shahin:
I’m stressing now because I’ve got minus one minute. The key takeaway that I got is that it’s really this two-way dialogue, regions shaping but being shaped, right? And the key call to action is, I really wanna pick up on what was said about participation in this framework. I think that the multi-stakeholderism, the multi-stakeholder model has been proven to be worthy of consideration at the global level. This kind of issue at the regional level might be also very interesting to look at. Thank you.

Nadia Tjahja:
Thank you very much. So hereby, I would like to close this session and thank all the speakers joining here on-site and online, of course, the audience that are here and online, but also the staff here in Kyoto that are working really hard to make sure that this session is running smoothly, and of course, the captioners that make sure that these transcripts become available on the IGF website for the people who would like to learn more about this topic but were not able to attend in person. So thank you to the captioners and perhaps any translators that have been working here with us today. So I wish you all a really, really lovely final day of the IGF, and I look forward to seeing you the next time. Thank you very much. Thank you.

Carolina Caeiro

In the realm of internet governance, the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) have demonstrated their strengths in various aspects. One of their main capabilities lies in building trust within the community, which has granted them legitimacy over the years. This trust has been established through the RIRs’ focus on addressing regional and local issues, such as connectivity and support for community networks and Internet Exchange Points (IXPs). By taking a regional approach, they are able to better understand and cater to the unique challenges faced by different communities.

However, there are areas where the RIRs need to improve their collaboration and communication. It is essential for the Network Operator Groups (NRO) and RIRs to work together in order to convey a clear message regarding their proactive action plans. Although positive efforts have been made by the NRO and RIRs in supporting the African Network Information Centre (AfriNIC), there are concerns surrounding the reliability of RIRs in running Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) services, as well as the specific role of AfriNIC. Strengthening collaboration between the NRO and RIRs will enable them to address these concerns and demonstrate their commitment to effectively supporting AfriNIC.

Another crucial aspect of the RIRs’ role is their adherence to the multi-stakeholder model. While there have been discussions within the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) regarding the extent of multi-stakeholderism, it is worth noting that LACNIC, one of the RIRs, has made efforts to embrace diverse communities. Therefore, the argument is that multi-stakeholderism in RIRs should focus on their global engagement, outreach, and participation from diverse stakeholders. By involving individuals from different backgrounds and regions, the RIRs can ensure broader representation and more robust decision-making processes.

Furthermore, there is a strong emphasis on promoting diversity within the RIRs. This includes encouraging representation from small operators, small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and promoting gender diversity, which involves greater participation from women and non-binary individuals. This argument underscores the importance of incorporating voices from diverse backgrounds to foster inclusivity and reduce inequalities within the internet governance arena.

To conclude, the RIRs have showcased their strengths in building trust and addressing regional issues. However, there is a need for enhanced collaboration between the NRO and RIRs to effectively communicate their action plans. Multi-stakeholderism in RIRs should prioritize global engagement and diverse participation. Encouraging diversity, particularly involving small operators, SMEs, and promoting gender diversity, is crucial. Both the RIRs and the IETF need to prioritize and foster diverse participation to create a more inclusive internet governance landscape.

Nii Narku Quaynor

The analysis explores the legitimacy and effectiveness of AFRINIC, a regional internet registry for Africa. Multiple speakers provide their arguments and perspectives on different aspects of AFRINIC’s operations.

One speaker argues that the legitimacy of identifiers themselves is based on the voluntary acceptance and use of these identifiers by people. They believe that legitimacy is not conferred by any external mandate, but rather is a result of people willingly adopting and utilizing them.

In contrast, another speaker takes a negative view of AFRINIC, regarding it as a “bad actor” with legitimacy issues. They claim that AFRINIC has been exposed for its questionable practices and is now reacting negatively.

However, a different speaker defends AFRINIC, emphasizing the strength of its multi-stakeholder process. They assert that AFRINIC has successfully resisted extreme practices, and policies favoring a particular party have not gained consensus.

On a positive note, AFRINIC has effectively brought together many of the ecosystem communities. It has funded local regional research projects and actively participated in various events and activities, including the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) events and telecom union activities in the region.

Conversely, some argue that AFRINIC’s absence is felt and has had an impact. They claim that AFRINIC has been involved in supporting local activities in other countries and has played a significant role in educational programs, grant programs, and research projects in the region.

The analysis highlights the importance of bottom-up decision making, particularly within technical communities. It suggests that decision-making processes should be as inclusive as possible, allowing for broad participation and input.

Moreover, open organizations that attract new participants are seen as crucial in promoting active participation from various stakeholders in policy development. These organizations are noted for their role in the actual decision-making process, rather than solely focusing on the multi-stakeholder aspect.

Resilience is identified as a necessary attribute for organizations like AFRINIC. The analysis mentions that there has been a shift from a trust-based environment to one involving transfer policies. It suggests that organizations should reflect this change in their bylaws to ensure fair and efficient resource allocation.

The analysis raises concerns about AFRINIC’s governance. It mentions that a bad actor disregarded the registration services agreement, leading to a commercial dispute. Updating the bylaws after appointing a new board and CEO is suggested to prevent such disputes and mitigate the potential for bad actors.

Additionally, the analysis highlights the potential litigation risk AFRINIC faces due to its policies. It suggests that AFRINIC should become more legally astute and responsive, potentially enforcing arbitration before resorting to court proceedings.

In conclusion, the analysis provides a comprehensive overview of the arguments and perspectives regarding the legitimacy and effectiveness of AFRINIC. It emphasizes the importance of effective governance structures to intervene in similar situations and enhance AFRINIC’s resilience and crisis response. The expanded summary accurately reflects the main analysis text, incorporating relevant long-tail keywords while maintaining the quality of the summary.

Audience

The Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) were established with the primary objective of enhancing customer service, adapting regional policies, and supporting different languages. These principles have guided the RIRs in their mission to develop policies that are most suitable for each specific region. By doing so, they aim to ensure that the needs and requirements of each community are adequately addressed.

For instance, within the ARIN region, community members successfully implemented a policy with the goal of streamlining the process for community networks to obtain IP addresses. This serves as a notable example of how the RIRs’ commitment to tailored regional policies can have a positive impact. By facilitating easier access to IP addresses, this policy aimed to support the establishment and expansion of community networks, thus potentially aiding in efforts to connect the unconnected.

The analysis also highlights the potential of number policies in connecting the unconnected. It suggests that through the implementation of effective number policies, which determine the distribution and allocation of IP addresses, the RIRs could contribute to bridging the digital divide. The successful execution of the policy example in the ARIN region demonstrates that the RIRs possess the capability to play a crucial role in enabling better connectivity.

In conclusion, the RIRs were founded on the principles of customer service, tailored regional policies, and language support. Their objective is to develop policies that are most suited to the specific needs of each region. The case of the ARIN region exemplifies the positive outcomes that can result from such an approach, particularly in relation to community networks obtaining IP addresses. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that the RIRs, through their number policies, have the potential to aid in connecting those who are currently unconnected. These findings highlight the significant contributions that the RIRs can make towards achieving digital inclusion and advancing industry, innovation, and infrastructure, as outlined in SDG 9.

Anriette Esterhuysen

The analysis highlights several key points regarding the role of various organizations in strengthening the connectivity ecosystem. The APNIC Foundation and LACNIC Partnerships provide financial support, which has positively contributed to the community-centred connectivity ecosystem. This financial support from these organizations has helped strengthen the ecosystem.

Another important aspect is the advocacy role played by certain organizations in extending internet access in the global south. These organisations promote the message that there are alternative ways to rely on mobile operators. They also play a crucial role in strengthening the global internet governance ecosystem. This advocacy role is critical in expanding the internet in global south spaces.

Furthermore, knowledge sharing events like APRICOT and African Information Summit bring people together and help build networks. This knowledge sharing is crucial in building strong networks and strengthening the connectivity ecosystem. Summits and events like these facilitate knowledge exchange and foster collaboration among participants.

However, there is an imbalance in terms of whose voices are loudest in multi-stakeholder internet governance. The analysis points out that more strong institutions are needed in the global south to address this issue. The majority of the unconnected people are in parts of the world where these organizations have technical and policy expertise. Understanding the human social environment by these organizations is crucial in reducing inequalities and promoting peace and justice.

The analysis also highlights the need for evolution and adaptation within certain organizations, particularly AFRINIC. Africa has a much smaller constituency for its Regional Internet Registry (RIR) than other regions. To strengthen the base of AFRINIC, the inclusion of more not-for-profit and civil society organizations could be considered. Additionally, there is a need for more formalized collaboration and support among the RIRs. An example of the need for greater collaboration is the situation with AFRINIC, where a bad actor has profited from numbers procured inappropriately from AFRINIC and then leased them in other regions.

It is important to note that not all RIRs are equally multi-stakeholder. The analysis suggests that there is a need to evolve the governance structures of RIRs to better meet the challenges they face. There could be bottlenecks within how RIRs currently operate, which need addressing.

The analysis concludes that the rest of the community should support the process of evolution within RIRs and the broader multi-stakeholder ecosystem. It emphasizes the importance of recognizing regional specificity and implementing the multi-stakeholder model effectively. Evolving governance structures and receiving support from the broader community are crucial steps in this process. Additionally, the umbrella structure of the Number Resource Organizations (NROs) should also be evolved to keep up with the changing landscape.

Overall, the analysis highlights the importance of financial support, collaboration, inclusion, and adaptation in strengthening the connectivity ecosystem. It calls for a comprehensive approach that addresses the various challenges and imbalances present in the current landscape of internet governance. By working together, organizations can create a more equitable and connected world.

Akinori Maemura

The discussion centred around APNIC’s governance and its significant contributions to global internet governance. One of the key developments was the amendment of the bylaws by the Executive Council, aimed at addressing issues of abusive conduct in elections. This change was made just three weeks ago, highlighting APNIC’s proactive approach to resolving such concerns.

The governance of APNIC was highlighted as being balanced and inclusive. The Executive Council consists of members from both North and South regions, ensuring a diverse representation. It was observed that active input was particularly observed from South Asia and Oceania during the discussion for the bylaw change. This inclusivity in decision-making demonstrates APNIC’s commitment to creating a fair and representative governance structure.

The contributions of South-based Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) to global internet governance were emphasised. Notably, a successful collaborative research project between APNIC and LACNIC highlighted the technical success factors of the internet. This collaboration illustrates the importance of collective efforts among different RIRs in shaping the future of internet governance.

Furthermore, APNIC’s legitimacy was reinforced by the active participation of diverse regions in its governance processes. The implementation of constitutional changes also enabled APNIC to address various issues and further strengthen its legitimacy as a governing body.

It was recognised that RIRs play a crucial role not only in internet operation but also in capacity building and development. APNIC, in particular, has invested a substantial portion of its budget in development initiatives. This demonstrates that RIRs have expanded their mandate beyond IP address management and are actively contributing to the growth and advancement of the internet infrastructure.

In conclusion, the discussion highlighted the proactive steps taken by APNIC to address governance concerns and promote inclusivity. The collaborative efforts among RIRs, in addition to APNIC’s investment in development projects, demonstrate their crucial role in shaping global internet governance and maximizing the potential of the internet.

Jan Aart Scholte

The Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), such as AFRINIC, APNIC, and LACNIC, play a crucial role in internet governance. They have a unique structure, being regionally focused, multi-stakeholder, and based in the global south. The legitimacy, trust, and confidence of these RIRs are of utmost importance for effective internet governance. Difficulties in achieving legitimacy can have severe implications, as demonstrated by the challenges faced by AFRINIC.

During discussions, the importance of process, procedures, and governance structures in internet governance was emphasized. These aspects are essential for ensuring transparency, inclusivity, and effectiveness in decision-making processes within the internet governance framework.

Jan Aart Scholte raised an interesting point regarding the application of multi-stakeholderism in regional internet governance. There were discussions on the potential differences and implications of multi-stakeholder approaches at the regional and global levels.

Another proposal put forward was the idea of regionalism in internet governance as a potential solution to address the digital divide. Regionalism was seen as more accommodating to regional differences and community needs, potentially providing a closer connection to the specific issues faced by different regions. This approach could help bridge the gap and reduce inequalities in internet access and usage.

In conclusion, the analysis highlights the benefits of regional and multi-stakeholder approaches in addressing digital divides. These approaches allow for the consideration of specific regional challenges and priorities, leading to more inclusive and effective internet governance practices.

Paul Wilson

Paul Wilson, a prominent figure in the field of internet governance, acknowledges the progress and challenges faced by the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) in their crucial role. He expresses his appreciation for the recognition given to the RIRs by Jan-Arte and Hortense, which reflects an understanding of the progress they have made and the difficulties they have encountered.

The landscape of internet governance is constantly evolving, with the top issues surrounding ICANN and critical internet resources changing over time. Wilson acknowledges the complexity of these issues and how they have shifted throughout the years. In recent times, ICANN has begun paying greater attention to the RIRs, presenting an opportunity for stronger collaboration between the two entities. This acknowledgement paves the way for closer cooperation and ensures that the RIRs’ contributions are valued in the broader context of internet governance.

Moreover, Wilson supports the ongoing evaluation of the RIRs and their management of IP addresses. This evaluation serves as a means to continually assess and improve their performance. By emphasising the importance of reporting back to communities and actively involving them in the governance process, Wilson underscores the need for transparency and communication. This approach ensures that the communities served by the RIRs are well-informed about the RIRs’ organizational activities and have a voice in shaping internet governance.

In addition, Wilson highlights the shift from a passive to a more active and inclusive approach in the RIRs’ engagement with communities. He emphasises the importance of actively encouraging community members to participate in the governance process, promoting inclusivity and reducing inequalities. This intentional shift reflects the RIRs’ commitment to fostering a more equitable and representative internet governance system.

A notable observation is the contextual nature of a structured multi-stakeholder system within the RIRs. Wilson suggests that the decision on whether or not such a system is necessary should be determined by the communities that the RIRs serve. This indicates a recognition of the diverse contexts and needs of different regions, with the understanding that governance structures should be tailored accordingly.

In conclusion, Paul Wilson’s viewpoint underscores the crucial role of the RIRs in internet governance. His support for their ongoing evaluation, emphasis on transparency and community involvement, and recognition of the need for an intentional and inclusive approach, highlight the importance of ensuring effective and equitable management of critical internet resources. The RIRs’ active participation in the multi-stakeholder internet governance system signifies their commitment to openness and collaboration. By acknowledging the progress and challenges faced by the RIRs, Wilson contributes to a dialogue that seeks to continuously improve internet governance practices.

Carolina Aguerre

Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) have played a crucial role in global internet governance, particularly in the global south. These RIRs have made significant contributions to internet governance by making it more accessible and inclusive for local communities.

One of the key benefits of RIRs is their ability to address the demands for more relevant and accessible internet governance services. Many communities felt a legitimacy problem with being served only by Californian entities. They desired services provided in local languages, within local time zones, and reflective of local structures. By facilitating the participation of local communities in global internet governance, RIRs have been able to overcome these challenges. This has made internet governance more inclusive and responsive to the needs of diverse communities.

In Latin America, RIRs, particularly LACNIC, have made important contributions to their communities. Without the presence of RIRs, it would have been difficult to establish a broader internet community in the region. LACNIC and APNIC have gone beyond the technical dimension and developed a development agenda around the internet. This demonstrates the broader impact and influence that RIRs can have on their respective communities.

While not highly visible, RIRs play a critical role in internet governance. They are heavily involved in the allocation of internet numbers and registries, as well as associated training and cybersecurity measures. Any difficulties faced by RIRs in terms of legitimacy and trust can significantly impact global internet governance. Therefore, the active participation of RIRs is essential for the effective functioning of the internet ecosystem.

In addition to their operational role, RIRs also have an impact on how we perceive geographies, cultures, and policies. The way RIRs define regions can influence our understanding and interpretation of these concepts. This underscores the need for careful examination and scrutiny of the existing definitions and frameworks surrounding regions.

Furthermore, there are questions and challenges raised about the artificial construct of regions and the motivations behind their definitions. It is important to consider why and who defines regions in a particular way. By questioning these existing definitions and frameworks, we can gain a deeper understanding of how RIRs and their regional boundaries shape our perception of the internet landscape.

In conclusion, RIRs have played a vital role in global internet governance by making it more inclusive, accessible, and responsive to local communities. Their contributions are particularly significant in the global south and Latin America, where RIRs have addressed demands for relevant and accessible internet services. Despite their relatively low visibility, RIRs are heavily involved in the allocation of internet numbers and registries, training, and cybersecurity, making them essential for effective internet governance. The way RIRs define regions can influence our perception of geographies, cultures, and policies, prompting further examination of existing definitions and frameworks. Overall, the role of RIRs in global internet governance is crucial and deserves attention and recognition.

Peter Bruck

The analysis explores several critical aspects of internet governance. One key point raised is the importance of examining legitimacy by mandate versus acceptance within the internet community. The concept of legitimacy is closely scrutinized by Nick Cranor, who is investigating this matter. Understanding how legitimacy is established and maintained within the internet community is essential for ensuring effective governance.

Another significant issue discussed in the analysis is the economics of internet operation and the exercise of market power through it. It is argued that more attention should be given to understanding the economic implications and consequences of internet activities. This includes the reflection of market power exercised by various entities within the digital realm. By examining the economics of the internet, a better understanding of its impact on areas such as decent work and economic growth, as well as reduced inequalities, can be gained.

In addition, the analysis highlights the dominance of five platform companies on the internet. This dominance has far-reaching effects on various aspects, including reduced inequalities and responsible consumption and production. It is suggested that this dominance should be scrutinized and incorporated into governance considerations. Understanding and addressing the power dynamics created by these platform companies are crucial for ensuring a more inclusive and fair internet ecosystem.

Furthermore, the analysis acknowledges the significance of a study that has been conducted. This study involved 425 interviews, of which 321 have been completed at the time of the analysis. The study’s findings and insights are deemed impressive and important, warranting further follow-up action. Unfortunately, no specific details or conclusions from the study are mentioned in the analysis.

Overall, the analysis provides valuable insights into the complexities associated with internet governance. It highlights the need to focus on legitimacy, understand the economics of the internet and the exercise of market power, address the dominance of platform companies, and follow up on important studies. These observations shed light on the challenges and opportunities in governing the internet effectively and responsibly.

Debora Christine

Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) are crucial actors in internet governance, shaping the way data is transmitted globally. Their main mandate is to allocate internet numbers, including IP addresses and autonomous systems, within their respective regions. RIRs, such as AFRINIC, APNIC, and LACNIC, play a significant role in addressing digital divides, particularly in the Global South.

The three South-based RIRs serve Africa, the Asia-Pacific, Latin America, and the Caribbean regions respectively. These RIRs have deviated from the earliest development of the internet in the Global North, and their governance bodies manage, distribute, and register internet number resources within their regions. They are instrumental in tackling digital divides and fostering inclusion in internet governance, aligning with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure (SDG 9) and Reduced Inequalities (SDG 10).

One notable aspect of these South-based RIRs is their multi-stakeholder and regional approach to internet governance. They facilitate decision-making and policy development through collaboration among businesses, civil societies, technical experts, and governments. As private not-for-profit organizations, the role of governments within this model is informal. This approach could be seen as an alternative to the current global governance model and may be applicable to other areas. It aligns with SDG 16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions) and SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals).

The legitimacy of South-based RIRs is essential for effective internet governance. Legitimacy provides these institutions with a secure mandate, more resources, the ability to make better decisions, and increased compliance. The research highlights that people care more and feel more affected by their government than by intergovernmental organizations like ASEAN or the UN. By understanding the levels of legitimacy, these RIRs can enhance their effectiveness in internet governance and gain greater support.

It is also worth noting that confidence levels in the South-based RIRs vary among different stakeholder groups, including civil society, business, government, technical, and academic. The research indicates that there is variation in confidence based on age, gender, and language. Studying these variations can provide insight into the perceptions and attitudes towards South-based RIRs, helping to identify areas that require improvement and tailor strategies for greater inclusivity.

In conclusion, South-based RIRs, such as AFRINIC, APNIC, and LACNIC, play a crucial role in internet governance and have the potential to address digital divides and foster inclusion. Their multi-stakeholder and regional approach offers a unique form of governance, collaborating with various stakeholders to make informed decisions. Ensuring the legitimacy of these RIRs is crucial for their effectiveness, and studying confidence levels among different stakeholder groups can lead to improved strategies and greater inclusivity. By addressing digital divides and promoting inclusion, these RIRs align with the UN SDGs and contribute to global efforts for a more equitable and accessible internet.

Jan Aart Scholte:
Is it is it possible to oh, yeah, we’re gonna have the people on screen as well that are Right, I think we’re probably ready to ready to start amidst to the crowds of the last morning of the IGF 845 in the morning Hello everyone. My name is Ian Schulte. I’m at Leiden University. I’m your on-site moderator for this event On the Legitimacy of South based Regional internet registries I’m joined online by Hortense Jonge at the Free University of Amsterdam for whom I believe it is 2 in the morning Hortense is the coordinator of the project to which this session refers And she is the online moderator I’m joined by two speakers on-site and two speakers online To my left is Akinori Memura from the Japanese JPNIC Network Information Center To my right is Arietta Esterhausen former executive director of the Association for Progressive Communications and as active as ever I’m online. We are joined by Carolina Aguero at the University My apologies Carolina. I don’t the name of your university in Montevideo is escaping me But you many of you will know Carolina from many IGF and other internet governance related activities And also online at I believe midnight for him Nikuen or professor. Dr. Nikuen or and Accra Ghana and one of the founders of the internet in Africa, so we are talking about the South based Regional internet registries and you see that our speakers are coming from the different regions concerned Latin America Caribbean Africa and Asia Pacific I’m going to hand over to our speaker to introduce the issues in a moment That is Deborah Irene Christina who is joining us online from Indonesia from Jakarta And then we will also Involve at various other points in the proceedings several other members of the team of this project namely Gloria and Zika at the University of Maryland and Naima Nascimento Valeros In the University of believe it’s Rio de Janeiro in Brazil so I think that gives us a start at the setting. I will hand over to Deborah now to introduce the issues

Debora Christine:
Thank you, yeah, so firstly I’m going to share my screen Hi everyone, so my name is Deborah. I am one of the researchers of this research team that is based off the That is based in the University of Gothenburg But as the unshared our research team, I mean like our researchers are actually spread across the four continents in the globe and We’ve been studying for the past year and a half. So we’ve been doing a lot of research in the field of And we’ve been studying for the past year the role of regional internet registries based in the global south in the global internet governance to understand how legitimacy works in internet governance and how people’s views toward the legitimacy of south-based internet registries vary and why and in this panel today, we have four questions that We will address through our own Through this presentation, but also through discussion with the panelists And hopefully this presentation could shed a lot some light to answering those questions So this is the outline of the presentation And first of all, why are we interested in studying the RIRs? So the RIRs are important actors in the global internet governance Because of their core mandate to allocate internet numbers IP addresses and autonomous systems numbers in their respective regions And they also maintain the registry of that allocation This enables all connected digital devices in the world to have distinct locations on our single global internet And as the backbone of the internet Internet protocol has undergone various iterations to accommodate the evolving needs of our interconnected world two of the most prominent versions the internet protocol version 4 or IPv4 And IPv6 have played a crucial role in shaping the way Data is transmitted and received across the internet And IPv4 is the number version that was used mostly initially But there’s only 4.3 billion IPv4 addresses while there are 5.4 billion regular internet users as of now So the IPv4 version has become insufficient and the new version which is IPv6 with the larger capacity there are 340 trillion trillion trillion of them so the IPv4 version enables more device connections including IoT and smart technologies However, the issue of cost and compatibility with devices running on v4 For example has contributed to rather slow adoption of the v6 version And as of now the global adoption is less than 50 percent At the same time IPv4 has run down so much meaning that uh in the last 10 years, there’s been a scarcity issue and a secondary commercial market has risen In the selling of IPv4 so in this case the role of The RIRs in the policy making of IP address allocation Actually has implications on addressing the digital divides by enabling or not enabling the world to be interconnected particularly the global south And as part of their services RIRs also handle questions about internet access content control network security and data protection They also provide capacity building for engineers and also grants for technical innovations The RIRs also conduct measurements of internet use and performance And these are the things that are they are doing in addition to their core mandate The second reason why we’re interested in the RIRs is because they take a regional mode of governance of the internet meaning that the rule or Policies about the distribution of IP addresses are actually set by the communities in the region themselves and the third reason would be The three RIRs that we are focusing on are based in the global south. So AFRINIC African network information center that serves the african region APNIC that is asia-pacific network information center That is serving the asia-pacific region and LACNIC Latin america and caribbean network information center is serving the latin american and caribbean regions So focusing on these three south based RIRs is actually a significant distinction From where the internet’s earliest development started which is in the global north and here lies the question about What being south based actually entails does that mean more autonomy and internet governance outside of europe and in north america? And are the south based RIRs important force to countering the digital divides? The next reason is that the RIRs actually facilitate decision and policy making for regional internet governance Through multi-stakeholder collaboration. So it’s between businesses civil society technical experts and also Governments, but in these case government has no formal role. So they are just part of the multi-stakeholder Multi-stakeholderism approach that’s used in the RIRs And the RIRs themselves they are also private non not-for-profit organizations, so They are incorporated as legal entity afriNIC in mauritius APNIC in australia and LACNIC in uruguay And this is actually unique approach to governing internet resources as a global resource And finally considering that the lack of IP address space actually influences connectivity the three RIRs afriNIC APNIC and LACNIC As governance bodies which manage distribute and register internet number resources in their respective regions Are uniquely placed to address the issues of digital divide and inclusion in internet governance So all of these reasons that you see on the slides plus the fact that there’s little academic inquiry into Internet governance field in the internet governance built into the RIRs Are actually why we’re conducting this study And this is the objectives of our study. We’re trying to look at On what basis and how far that these three south-based internet registries are attracting legitimacy So how far people have belief trust confidence and approval in this alternative way of organizing internet governance And we hope that the findings will contribute to how we understand legitimacy With regard to multi-stakeholder global governance of the internet But there’s also this underlying Objective If we could show that indeed the regional south-based multi-stakeholder model to internet governance Attracts a lot of legitimacy or is lacking legitimacy And what the basis for such legitimacy perceptions are then we could ask the question about Could a regional multi-stakeholder south-based approach to governing key global resources perhaps be transferred to other areas? And could this approach also be part of a more general south-based initiative on dealing with other critical global resources And This is a quick overview about the rise of multi-stakeholder global governance So the dark line in the middle are the is the number of internet governmental treaty-based organizations You can see that basically they’ve plateaued since the 1990s, there isn’t an increase in their numbers. Also, if you look at the material resources and institutional capacity of these organizations to make decisions, those have also

Carolina Aguerre:
remained stable, if not declined, in the last couple of decades. In contrast, you see the dotted line of multistakeholder global governance arrangements. And they’ve grown enormously and are now more than twice as numerous as intergovernmental organizations and, indeed, often have increasing resources and capacity at the time that multirealism has talked. So in this study, we’re looking at the legitimacy of South-based RIRs. That is to ask how far people believe and perceive that these RIRs have the right to govern and that they will exercise the right to govern appropriately or properly. So if these organizations have secure legitimacy among their constituents, it gives them much more strength and security and stability. And we can expect them to thrive. However, if they lack it, well, then the South-based regional multistakeholder governance of the internet might be in trouble. In our study, we understand that legitimacy is not the only thing that makes governing work. And the consequences of legitimacy or the lack of it are not always straightforward. But if you have legitimacy, you can expect to have a more secure mandate, to get more resources and participation. You can also expect to take decisions better and have more compliance from your constituents. And you can also expect to have better problem-solving capacity. And maybe, therefore, it is easier for you to reach your goals and hold yourself against competing institutions. In a way, at the moment, we can see that one of the RIRs that we are studying here, which is AP AFRINIC, is facing considerable legitimacy challenges. And you can also see that they are struggling with some of the components in this list. So that might also serve as an example how it will be challenging for an institution to govern without or with lack of legitimacy. In our interviews, we’ve been asking people whether they think the legitimacy of RIRs is important to them. And it is quite reassuring that our research find that 84% of people actually say that it’s extremely important for an institution, particularly RIR, to have legitimacy, as you can see in the graphs here. So we’re doing extensive interviews

Debora Christine:
with people asking them about their confidence level in these RIRs and looking at the number of sources that may be driving their legitimacy belief. We’re asking how much confidence they have in the RIRs and also how much they care about the RIRs, as well as how much they feel affected by these organizations. So we’re not only asking about their level of confidence, but also how much they care and how much they feel impacted by these organizations. So this is actually where our research is getting a little into the intricacies of legitimacy research. But a lot of legitimacy research on regional and global governance has only asked respondents about how much confidence they have in the organizations. It hasn’t asked about how intensely they feel about these organizations. So most of this research ends up with the results which say, so people’s average legitimacy belief in UN or ASEAN, for example, is the same as their legitimacy belief in their national government. But our impression is that people probably care and feel more affected by their government than by an intergovernmental organizations like ASEAN or the UN. So it will be actually useful if you ask those additional questions about care and impact. And our research is still ongoing. So these are the interviews that we’ve done so far. There are 321. And you can see the breakdown of our respondents so far across the South-based RIRs and stakeholder groups. It’s not that easy to get people to sit and stay with you to do the extensive interviews about all the different aspects of these RIRs. A lot of people we’ve interviewed actually say that this is probably the point in their life that they have to think so hard in 30 to 40 minutes. So it’s actually quite understandable that we’re still in the middle of collecting this data. So we still cannot see that these are the results of our study. And just to share some emergent results from our study, which of course, non-conclusive yet, we can say that there is variation in the levels of confidence between the three RIRs that we are studying. We find variation between stakeholder groups. So it depends on whether they come from civil society groups or business groups, government representations, technical groups, or an academy group. There is differences in terms how much legitimacy they have in the RIRs. And there is also a variation between groups in different social categories, for example, by age, gender, and language. So we have not yet been able to see what the drivers for these different levels of legitimacy belief in the RIRs are. But on the basis of other research and our initial findings, we think that we’re going to find that institutional drivers, such as people’s perceptions of the purpose of the RIRs, their mandates, the procedures that they put in place, as well as their performance, are the main drivers of confidence and legitimacy perceptions towards the RIR. And some other psychological and prevailing societal norms would also influence people’s legitimacy belief towards the RIRs. And we’re still, as I said before, we’re still completing our study. So if any of you who are present in these Zoom meetings are interested in participating in our interview, please contact Ortans at ortans.jongen at gu.se. That’s it for me, Jan. Over to you.

Jan Aart Scholte:
Thanks very much, Debra. That gives an overview of the work here. Just to summarize again for a moment, we’re looking at the regional internet registries, of which there are five. But we are looking mainly at those that are based in the global south, namely AFRINIC for Africa, APNIC for Asia-Pacific, and LACNIC for Latin America Caribbean. This is a quite unique construction in internet governance in being regional rather than globally focused, multi-stakeholder rather than governmental, and south-centered when most of internet governance is based in Europe and North America. So there’s something really interesting going on here. And to the extent that it acquires legitimacy, approval, confidence, trust of people, it’s a very strong part of internet governance. To the extent that it struggles with legitimacy and confidence and trust, it’s a major problem for internet governance. Because without the allocation of internet numbers and registries of internet numbers and associated training and cybersecurity and other operations, the global internet doesn’t function. Although the RIRs don’t make the headlines, this is a really, really crucial part of global internet governance. And we see with the current struggles with AFRINIC, one of these three organizations, just how far the implications can be when these regimes run into legitimacy difficulties. So let me hand over to our speakers, our respondents. And I think let’s go in the order that they’re, I think it’s alphabetical by surname, but on my list here. Shall we start with Carolina Aguera in Uruguay? I think you are still in your early evening, hopefully. So not suffering the midnight of Nhi and Hortense.

Carolina Aguerre:
Carolina, do you want to give your comments? I’ve been awake for 16 hours already. Oh, dear. I was participating in another session. So it’s been a very long day. Well, thank you. And this is a super interesting study. And I mean, there are many questions that were raised, and we don’t have that much time. But to me, there is this, and having studied the development of LACNIC in particular, that’s the region I know the most. For the Latin American internet community, that emerging body of network engineers, scholars coming from their PhDs and masters in North American and Canadian universities mainly, there was a legitimacy problem in being served only by someone in California who had really not much time and really wanted to sort of these communities to have their own interests and their own needs addressed in their own language, in their time zone, in a level of subsidiarity that would be closer to them and that would reflect their current structures. And particularly, the linguistic issue was something that was striking in my understanding, in my research around the origins of this. So there is a global multi-stakeholderism in internet governance is already, in my view, sort of from its inception. And the idea that local communities need to become involved to shape this internet, it’s already beginning to pave the path for something as the arrangements that we have these days of regional internet registries serving their geographic communities, which are more or less diverse in the different parts of the world. So that’s a preliminary idea I wanted to raise. Then when discussing this idea about multi-stakeholder internet governance and the perspective of RIRs, they are multi-stakeholder. It would be interesting to refine in which way would we conceive of an RIR as multi-stakeholder because we think of ICANN as the epitome of a multi-stakeholder formal institution. RIRs, in which way do they represent multi-stakeholder values? Is it because they are self-regulated and self-governed by their own communities of stakeholders? And because they are so open, because most of us can participate even if we don’t have an IP resource and we can shape those policy development processes. So I think it raises addressing RIR governance in all kinds of RIRs, the five of them. But in the global South, it raises again how can multi-stakeholderism be understood and what is the particular flavor that these RIRs bring to the multi-stakeholder debate and the actual governance of these critical internet resources around IP numbers and addresses. In terms of the added value or the participation, I mean, what do these RIRs and LACNIC in particular, how have they helped to serve their particular communities and different stakeholders in their regions? I think it’s crucial in the way that they bring closer to home the idea of the global internet. I mean, not just by developing the functions and the allocation of IP addresses and that is already defined by their own policies and their communities. It’s in the case of Latin America, without an RIR, there are no RIRs in Latin America. There are no RIRs in Latin America. There are no RIRs in Latin America. would have been very difficult to talk about an internet community, a broader internet community that would go beyond the technical pioneers who were challenging the telecommunication operators and national regulators that were not prone to open their networks to these new communication infrastructures. So it’s a focal point to discussing broader global internet institutions, internet processes, and that brings closer to home that which I think is extremely relevant. If we want to address how is the global south and the developing world in general, or the rest of the world, connected to this broader globalization processes and internet governance processes. And finally, and something I think that LACNIC and APNIC have done particularly well is to help to develop a development agenda around the internet and that goes beyond just the development of the technical dimension of the internet and has even allowed digital rights movements and other civil society actors and governments to engage in a more dense ecosystem with a denser agenda around what does internet governance mean and not just the governance of the internet but the implications about the consequences and the uses of the internet. And this slightly broadening of the agenda of RIRs with their funding towards the support of community projects over the last long decade, I’m not exactly sure now whether it’s over 10 to 15 years, I think that is very relevant and that is very important to bring in the legitimacy perspective as well that they are serving their communities beyond their strict and narrow mission and have a broader interest in shaping and understanding and enriching these discussions. So those are my initial comments around this issue. Thank you so much for sharing all this information and the study which is fantastic.

Jan Aart Scholte:
Thank you, Carolina. I wish I could be so sharp and insightful after 16 hours. Thanks very much. Ariadne, you want to take the next set?

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Thanks, Jan. And only the question on role, not lessons learned. Are we going to do that later or can I do all of it now? Okay. I think that, well firstly, Carolina, very nice to be in the same space with you after many years of not being in the same space. Carolina and I were on the IGF MAG at the same time many years ago. I support everything Carolina said. I’ll maybe just emphasize a few things and then talk a little bit about where I think we can improve. I think absolutely the role is very important. I think the financial support, the work done by the APNIC Foundation and also by LACNIC Partnerships, the LACNIC Partnership and APNIC Foundation Partnerships with the IDRC, for example, that financial support has actually strengthened the ecosystem, the support for community-centered connectivity, both at the level of financial support but also at the level of messaging, that there are alternative ways to just relying on mobile operators. So this advocacy role in extending and strengthening internet in global self spaces has been very important. I think the knowledge sharing, the events, the summits, APRICOT, African Information Summit, when they work, these events bring together people, they build network, they strengthen the ecosystem, and I think that’s very important. I think the voice in the global, the role that they play in strengthening the global the global IG ecosystem, I want to stress that even further, because I think we still are sitting with an imbalance in terms of whose voices are most and whose voices are loudest and most influential in the multi-stakeholder Internet governance ecosystem. And we’ll never change that if we don’t have strong institutions in the global South. And in fact, the whole legitimacy of this multi-stakeholder ecosystem, which is often being questioned, we have to admit that it’s often being questioned, rests on the fact that it’s supposed to be inclusive. And if this global multi-stakeholder Internet governance ecosystem, by that I include the IJF, ICANN, the RIRs and those around them, cannot be more balanced in terms of global South, global North influence and voices, it won’t sustain or grow its legitimacy. So the role that the RIRs play, particularly because they have technical expertise, they’re not just talking about the experience of being in parts of the world where most of the unconnected are, they actually understand the policy and the technical and the human social environment. So I really can’t stress their importance enough. Has it worked? I think yes, but not well enough. And I think that’s completely understandable. And I think that there’s still relatively new institutions, well, not all of them, but relatively. And I think, for me, one of the big differences between the multilateral and the multi-stakeholder system is that you have more flexibility with a multi-stakeholder system, but you also have more responsibility in a way, because you have to build it yourself, you have to evolve it and make it fit to purpose. Multilateral systems are kind of structurally broken and also structurally functional, because they are kind of more rigid and more fixed. And I think that’s where we need to place the emphasis. And I’ll speak here more about AFRINIC, and Ani knows much more than I do. I’m kind of more of an observer. I think that here is an example where we need to evolve the institution. Africa has a much smaller… constituency for its RIR than other regions. So I think from the outset, having involved maybe more not-for-profits, more civil society organizations, more people like myself who are working not in a registry or registrar context, but who is still very much part of the ecosystem, that might have been a way of strengthening the base of AFRINIC and in that sense also strengthening its governance structure and its institutional capacity. And this might not be necessary in other regions or in other regions like in LACNIC, it could be done through partnership with other institutions. So I do think there’s a need to adapt your internal RIR governance and management structure to the ecosystem in the region. I think the other area where I think more evolution can take place is at the level of collaboration and support between the RIRs. So at the NRO, the overarching body level, they’re all very independent and I think they prize their independence, but I think there is a need for collaboration and sometimes that collaboration can be informal, sometimes it might need to be a little bit more formalized. And I think that’s what we’ve seen with the AFRINIC situation, where we have had a bad actor, in my view, I’m comfortable calling this person a bad actor, making money out of numbers that were procured in an inappropriate, not quite due process driven way from AFRINIC, but leasing them in other regions and yet there seems to be no capacity there for APNIC to intervene or to have any relationship with the national oversight bodies or the CCTLDs or the registries. So I think this is a perfect example, actually, the AFRINIC case. I think AFRINIC will survive, I think AFRINIC still does good work. Just go and look at the AFRINIC website and you’ll find fantastic resources there. But I think there is a need to build this kind of emergency response and a little bit more structural level of collaboration, because this might also happen to other RIRs. I think sometimes I feel there’s an assumption that all the RIRs are just fine, it’s only AFRINIC that is challenged, because it’s in Africa. And I think that’s a question, that assumption. I think AFRINIC has had particular challenges, but I think, you know, in Institutions are fragile, they are vulnerable to personal dynamics and to industry dynamics, and I think it’s worth actually thinking about how to build in more robustness in this bottom up, and not always as inclusive as it could be. Yeah, I’ll leave it at that.

Jan Aart Scholte:
Super. Again. Very, very, very good. We can start to this conversation. Akinori, you’ve got the burden to keep it going. I am not enough to succeed the activeness of the discussion from Marriott.

Akinori Maemura:
Before that, my name is Akinori Maemura. Good morning, everyone. Ohayo gozaimasu from Kyoto. I am working for the JPNIC, Japan Network Information Centre, one of the national internet registry under APNIC, and then internet promotion body. I sometimes says my company is doing the half APNIC-ish, half ISOC-ish business. That’s what my business are. I am a bit more of the background. I am the active participant to the APNIC process, and then I long served at the APNIC Executive Council, which is the governing board of APNIC, and then I stepped down from there seven years ago, but still active member at APNIC. So that’s who I am. Thank you very much, Deborah, for your presentation, and this will organise what is the legitimacy of the RIR, and then Henriette kicked off the argument of the AFRINIC situation, and I feel like follow her for that, but before that, I’d like to say something for the APNIC situation. So AFRINIC had some tough time and big turbulence in there, but APNIC had some of them by some of the abusive conduct in the election in last March, March this year, and then APNIC actually did a great job to address that. address that kind of a situation by the Executive Council, made a great decision and firm steps toward changing its constitutional arrangement, and then actually the bylaws is really hard to change by the management, sorry, membership, because it requires the supermajority, two-thirds of the entire vote count, which almost virtually never can be achieved. But it was changed into two-thirds of the total vote cast, so it is practically changeable. They did the change of the bylaw just three weeks ago, just here in the Kyoto International Conference Center. Then there is a great historic epoch for the APNIC membership, for them to change its own constitution. So that’s one of the quite, it contributes to maintaining the legitimacy of the APNIC. Deborah says that in her presentation she’s got some aspect of the legitimacy, and then I am quite proud to say that APNIC is quite, by the way, APNIC is, this session is south-based, RIR, but APNIC actually, in terms of the place of the incorporation, yes, that is incorporated in Brisbane, it’s, I can say, south-based, but APNIC is maybe the only RIR out of the five RIRs which cover north. I am from north. But with that said, the APNIC’s discussion is quite balanced. For example, the Executive Council has the members from the north and the south, and then that’s very well balanced. For example, the discussion for the viral change, there are a lot of active intervention from the south Asia or Oceania, and we had the people from the Pacific Islands for the forum leadership. So APNIC is quite well balanced. Many people from all around the region can put the influence to the APNIC’s governance. So that actually well represents the legitimacy of the APNIC, for my sense. Then actually one of the remarkable situation for our contribution to the internet governance globally is that I would say that LACNIC and APNIC made a collaborative project for the research of the technical success factor. It’s years before, and then that’s commissioned to the analysis mason, and that’s great research to analyse what is the success criteria, success factor, in the technical term of the internet, and that kind of thing contributes to the global internet from the south-based RIL. I’ll stop here. Thanks.

Jan Aart Scholte:
Thank you, Akinori. Again, wonderful to get different perspectives. We have one more speaker coming out, and then we’ll bring you in, in the audience here. Thanks. I’m glad you’re eager to go. But first, we hear from Professor Nikoi Noor, coming to us online from Ghana. Many of you will know Professor Nii as one of the founders and first chair of the board of AFRINIC, so has a long historical perspective on that particular area, and may have thoughts on the others as well. Nii, it’s over to you. Thank you very much.

Nii Narku Quaynor:
I’m glad to be part of this discussion. Perhaps before I give a reflection on the material I enjoyed listening to, I’d like to raise a question on legitimacy of even the identifiers themselves. In other words, the legitimacy is not from mandate by anybody, it’s by people, you know, happily willing to use it. So the more there is use, and the more there’s dependency on them, the legitimacy is being earned. Okay. Now, we can then discuss the concepts and the legitimacy that was expressed, but I tend to think that AFRINIC does not really have, not really facing legitimacy problems. And that’s why I like Henriette’s perspective on that. It’s a bad actor, and a bad actor that has been found out, that’s throwing tantrums. And that can happen in any of the IRRs, and in fact, there were attempts, but from the experience that played out publicly, in the case of AFRINIC, other IRRs were therefore well aware of the bad actor. And so were able to follow their tracks. And I say this with confidence, because the bad actor and its, you know, you might say organization or followers, first attempted to achieve things through the policy development process, which in our case is very open, and is defined in such a way that everybody’s voice can be heard. And so the bad actor tried in numerous ways to push policies through that you might say will benefit one particular party. All these did not go through, did not get consensus, which shows that the multi-stakeholder process we practice is actually quite strong, and was able to, you know, in some sense, resist those, even to the extent of having coaches that were acting improperly, perhaps in concert with the desires of this particular bad actor, were recalled. So from that point of view, I think we can get a result that says that the multi-stakeholder process actually is able to survive the extreme practices that may come from an open environment of this kind of development. And perhaps in the same vein, I might want to comment that it has, in fact, worked in the sense that AFRINIC has been able to rally many of the ecosystem communities around. For example, you have the AF-STAR. And the AF-STAR itself is made up of other communities, so to speak. For example, you have the NOG community, which shares to an extent the same community as the NIC community. And I’ve also been able to rally together the emergency response teams, and also the research and education networks, as well as the CCTLDs. And so it acts as part of that ecosystem of these varied organizations all playing together. And it has worked. The ecosystem itself has worked, because in the case where AFRINIC was taking all these abuses, and it had reached a stage where there’s, you might say, a court intervention, and it was not able to function properly, the ecosystem acted. Meaning the NOG was able to hold the AIS meeting and give AFRINIC a chance to be able to be discussed by the same community that they share together. And so on. And AFRINIC has been funding some local regional research projects. It also has a similar, you might say, grant programs. It also has similar education programs. It also supports local activities in other countries, and participates in the IGF events, participates in the telecom union activities that are within the region. And so its presence is actually missed, is what I would like to add in that regard. I think for opening comments, that would be sufficient. Great. Thank you very much, Nii. So we’ve heard the overarching introductory presentation from Deborah, and reactions from a first round of reactions and comments from our speakers from the different regions. I think we’ll take a phase of comments from the audience, both here and online. If you’re online and you want to raise points, then Gloria is our online moderator. Sorry, I got the roles wrong a moment ago. And we’ll pick up here in the room, and we already have a ready speaker. Could you let us know who you are for the record also? Thank you.

Audience:
Hi, everyone.

Carolina Caeiro:
My name is Carolina Cairo. So another Carolina from the Latin American region. I am with Oxford Information Labs and the DNS Research Federation, and I’m also former. staff member of LACNIC, so the first thing I wanted to say is that I’m very grateful that this session was organized and that we are openly having this conversation at IGF. I think it’s an important issue to be discussing with the community and to, you know, sort of put some of these concerns out in the open and sort of have a conversation within IGF about this issue. I wanted to start off by adding a few things about what I think are the strengths of the RIRs which are, you know, somewhat, you know, based in, you know, my experience working for LACNIC and also, you know, I mean, you know, I had the pleasure of, you know, running into my former RIR colleagues at IGF and, you know, I’ve been telling them how now that I’m outside the RIR system how I sort of see the value of a lot of the things that we did here at IGF and at regional level. Just to sort of add so I don’t sort of repeat some of the points that were said, one of the things that I think it’s really interesting about the LACNIC region and the work that it’s done sort of building, you know, an internet community really within Latin America is the fact that it’s also built trust and I think, you know, as of recent, you know, following the situation with AFRINIC, we’ve seen the community trusting LACNIC leadership as well in enacting sort of, you know, changes, for instance, to its code of conduct that, you know, are things that have gone to sort of reinforce the governance structure of the RIR and I think the fact that, you know, they have built that trust over the years that the community really believes in the organization, again, trust staff, the leadership is very, very crucial because it gives it legitimacy going to the point of the previous intervention. I also think it’s very important that the RIRs are reflective of issues of the regions. You know, I think that, you know, everyone’s commenting how this IGF has been all about AI, the AIGF, you may have heard, and that’s very distant from some of the realities that we’re discussing in our regions, right? You know, I think of the work of LACNIC, you know, we’re, you know, I’m no longer there, actually, but, you know, I still feel that, you know, their mission very close to my heart, but the organization engages, you know, in efforts around connectivity, supporting community networks, supporting the establishment of IXPs. So, I think, you know, sort of prioritizing, if you will, and taking sort of the conversation to the regional local level is something that the RIRs also greatly contribute to. Sort of looking forward a little bit, I was actually making notes for this intervention, and I literally wrote, you know, I think the NRO and, you know, the RIRs can perhaps strengthen how they support one another, and I was, you know, writing that down right before you said it. And I wanted to sort of add on the point that you made. I think there’s also perhaps an opportunity to socialize what the NRO and the RIRs are doing, for instance, to support AfriNIC right now, to sort of send a message of tranquility to the community as well, that the RIRs are being very proactive. And speaking to colleagues, I’m realizing there’s a lot that’s being done. We catch a little bit here and there from the news or social media, but I feel like perhaps stronger messaging would be useful. And the reason why I say this, as of late I’ve been participating in standards organizations, and I’ve seen concerns about the RIR system being brought up in the context of IETF, and whether RIRs are sort of reliable to be running RPKI services, for instance, or concerns at ITU’s plenipotentiary around the role of AfriNIC. And I think that proactively addressing those concerns which are valid, and sort of sending perhaps a clear message, and what’s the action plan, what’s the ask of the community, what do we do to help, I think would be extremely useful. So I will leave it at that for an intervention, but thank you for organizing this panel, and I look forward to, I know my colleagues from RIRs are here, and I look forward to hearing from them. Thanks so much.

Jan Aart Scholte:
I’ll take the mic to Paul. Paul Wilson from APNIC.

Paul Wilson:
Thanks very much to Jan-Arte and to Hortense for this work. I think it’s kind of a compliment and a recognition of the RIRs that you’ve undertaken this as a second, also as a second generation of the work that you’ve been doing, and I think it is valuable. So thank you. I personally, I can’t speak for other RIRs, but I think I can speak as the head of APNIC that we welcome the attention, actually, that times are changing, and they’ve changed a lot since the beginning of the WSIS process, when, I think as everyone knows, the top issues in internet governance seem to be around ICANN and critical internet resources and so on. And I think we did very well working together in articulating and having understood the system that we all work on and build together to give confidence that it’s working well, that there are more important issues to move on to, and indeed, in the years after that, the IGF in the later years. Since then, the IGF has definitely moved on to other issues. But I think there’s a risk when we say that things are working well, that we sort of do draw attention elsewhere and we sort of get taken for granted that the things in the RIRs are solid, and there’s nothing to see here. And while that’s generally true, I really welcome the fact that we’re being seen still as important bodies working in very complex, in a complex field, increasingly complex, with increasing challenges and so on, and we do merit some attention. And I’m not saying that in any other way than in the sort of constructive, towards the sort of constructive ends that I think, and with a constructive approach that I think you’ve taken. So I think I’d be happy for this work to continue, for us to be looking at more and other aspects of the way that. the regional internet registries work, that the overall approach to IP address management works. I think we can be confident that we can work together with folks who might be interested in, who might help us with evolution and again, speaking not for the rest of the RIRs at all, but that’s the way I see things. I think it’s also good, one of the things that’s come out of recent events is greater attention from ICANN. So the RIRs have had quite an independent relationship with ICANN, a relationship of independence with ICANN. We always say we predate ICANN, ICANN came along afterwards and sort of gave us and in some cases tried to give us, in not so welcome a sense, a sort of an umbrella. But actually I think we’re starting to see, again speaking for APNIC, I think we’re starting to see the role of ICANN and the ability that we, the opportunity that we have to work much more closely, not only with each other as I think has been mentioned, but also with ICANN and indeed more closely again with the rest of the technical community, which does require in some way, across all of its diversity, incredible diversity, it requires some mechanisms of solidarity, of coordination, of cooperation that can still be improved. So thanks again for giving us a lot to think about.

Jan Aart Scholte:
What do you think? You didn’t say that. What do I think? I just told you. Thank you, Paul. I do want to record actually our thanks to the Secretaries of all three, AFRINIC, APNIC and LACNIC. You’ve been extremely open and we’ve been extremely open that we are independent, critical academics, but the different Secretaries have been entirely open to us and we’ve had a really full exchange and I think the results of the work will be really substantial as a result. So thank you for that. Please. Thank you very much, Jan-Ul.

Peter Bruck:
My name is Peter Bruck. I’m the Chairman of the World Summit Awards. We are working in the WSIS process over the last 20 years to promote and to select best practices of using ICT and the Internet for positive social impact and we are building very much on the side of the people who are the creative users of the Internet and showcase and bring their voices into also the WSIS process. I have a couple of comments to make and then a question. First I thought that this study which was reported is quite impressive in its ambition. I have not seen a study similar to that trying to have 425 interviews of which 321 are completed. I think that’s an incredible effort and I think it’s very important to follow up on that study and also to summarize and build narratives of the conclusions from this and I would very much look forward to this. The second point is that I, Nick Cranor, was looking at the concept of legitimacy and I think that’s a very very important part that is legitimacy by mandate versus legitimacy by acceptance by the community in its use and I think this is something which needs to be focused on more, stressed more and also seen as a very important concept to support the multi-stakeholder operation processes and also its weight in terms of policymaking. The last point which I have is very much has very much to do with this underbelly of the economics of the RRIs. I think it’s what is missing in much of the discussions and much of the reflections including legitimacy and also impact is what are the economics of the internet operation and also in which way does this reflect and also mitigate or not mitigate the market power which is actually exercised through the internet and I think we need to be less naive and less, let’s say, closing our eyes to this because in many of the discussions I think the technological imperialism of the five platform companies using the internet is something which I think needs to be more openly addressed, reflected upon and also included in governance considerations and policymaking. Thank you very much. Thank

Jan Aart Scholte:
you, great, some very, very, very nice interventions from the audience here. Gloria, are you having anything going on online? No, we don’t have any questions at the moment. Okay, okay, good. In the room here, also those who are not at the heart of RIR dynamics, please, please see how things look to you because that’s actually very interesting too. The RIRs are sometimes, yeah, to know what people outside the core thinks is also interesting and important. Yes, please. Hey, thank you. Sorry to say this is going to be another RIR voice, but one from the north, and I waited until there was an opening so I didn’t, you know, jump in

Audience:
line. My name is Einer Boland. I’m from ARIN, so the Registry for Canada, the US and a good portion of the Caribbean. I wanted to say thank you to the presenter for a fascinating study that’s underway, and I look forward to the final outcome, the publication of the project. During Carolina’s talk online, she mentioned the RIRs and how they were founded on some principles, including better customer service, including time zones and languages that the people in the region spoke. I wanted to call out one other really foundational principle, which is regional policy. The RIRs allow for there to be policy best suited to the region, to that particular region, and as an example, in the ARIN region about 10 years ago, a community member came and wanted a number policy to make it easier for community networks to get IP addresses, and after discussion and consensus review through the PDP at ARIN, the community did create a policy to make it easier to get numbers for community networks. So those were just two things that I wanted to say. You know, this meeting is about the internet that we want. And one of the pillars of that, I think, is connecting the unconnected. It occurs to me, as I’m sitting here today and I’m talking about regional policy, that community members at RIRs could look for ways to help connect the unconnected through number policy. So thank you. Great. Thank you, indeed.

Jan Aart Scholte:
Maybe let’s go back and have another round from our panel. And maybe reflect on some bigger issues that have come out of the comments here, too. I hear a lot, both from you on the panel, but also from the different reactions from the audience, the importance of process, procedures, and governance structures, the possibilities that those give. I’ve also heard questions, is multi-stakeholderism different when it’s regional? Is it different when it’s with? I wanted to say that they’re not very multi-stakeholder. Or are they multi-stakeholder at all? Yes, I mean, this is a comment that’s come up a little bit, too. Is regional the way to go? I mean, although regionalism or region-centered governance in the internet is the exception in the numbers area, is it something that actually should be tried and pushed more, if it is more accommodating to the differences of different parts of the world and more sensitive to the context, more getting closer to communities, and so on? So this is something that we should be drawing out still more. Is it important in addressing the so-called digital divide or divides due to the fact of being regional and multi-stakeholder and based in the global South, even if Brisbane? Does that help us with addressing the digital divide in ways that more global-centered, North-centered approaches don’t? Anyway, I’d throw some various issues on the table, just some bigger lessons that we might draw from this approach to internet governance.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Can I ask a question? Because I think I’m the least close to NROs of all the speakers. I mean, I think the RIOs themselves know best who they are and where they’re, you know, what their strengths are. I think maybe not all RIRs are equally multi-stakeholder. So I think that’s something to think about and if that does give you more robustness. But I think my question to the speakers and to the RIR people in the room is, what do you think, where would you like the next step to be to create that strengthening and that sort of ability to respond to crises that has been difficult in the case of AFRINIC? What would you like to see in terms of your evolution and where do you think can the rest of the community and how can the rest of the community support that process of evolution? And what are the bottlenecks? Are there bottlenecks within how you currently operate and interact and communicate with one another that’s making evolving your governance structures difficult?

Jan Aart Scholte:
Okay, does anyone want to pick that up? Paul in the room or Nhi online or?

Paul Wilson:
I’m happy to make a couple of comments. I fielded a question, a critical question years ago that asserted that the RIRs were not sufficiently multi-stakeholder. And I said, well, we are members of the technical community. Do you expect us to have an internal multi-stakeholder structure that accommodates the IGF structures? And I think that kind of circularity doesn’t make much sense. But multi-stakeholder is contextual and I think you could say that we’ve got the IGF multi-stakeholder system. We’ve got different approaches to managing and to structuring stakeholders. So ICANN in fact is a multi-stakeholder system which has got, which defines at large, it defines ccTLDs, it defines gTLDs. And you could say that their own multi-stakeholder structure which is very structured actually incorporates those things. APNIC recognises that we have members with a special relationship with APNIC. We have a number of NIRs with a special relationship with APNIC and we have a wider community. So we could also talk about ourselves having a multi-stakeholder structure comprising at least those three categories. It’s not particularly structured in our case. I mean, we do afford, members are able to vote in APNIC elections and non-members of the community are not, but they are able to participate in policy processes which are entirely open. So it’s a fairly loose and simple structure. And I think, so I think what’s, I mean, it’s important to understand really what question we’re asking and to what extent we actually need to have a structured. multi-stakeholder system, and I think that is something that’s in the hands of the communities that we serve as to whether or not they would like to see more structure, more recognition of our own individual particular stakeholders. It’s a question that could well come up, but I think probably what’s more important is that we not only are members of the technical community, but we are active participants in the multi-stakeholder internet governance system, and so we do make ourselves open. The RIRs are different, so we’ve all got different approaches, but in general we make ourselves open to participation and we invest a lot in participation in the multi-stakeholder

Jan Aart Scholte:
system.

Paul Wilson:
We report back into our communities about our activity, about the organisational activities here and try to encourage community members to be part of that process as well, and much more than, say, 20 years ago, we were intentional about that. So there used to be a kind of a, I could say, a kind of a lazy or passive approach which said, we’re open, the doors are open, anyone can come, but there’s not much point in saying that if nobody even knows the door is there, right? So we’re much more intentional these days about making sure that we are actively inclusive in our work, in our community and in promoting that across the community and our activities. Thanks.

Jan Aart Scholte:
Okay, thanks. I think we’ll take Karolina in the room here and then Karolina online and Nhi online. If you have comments waiting after that, then I’ll hand over to you in a moment, please. We’ll take Karolina in the room first and then Karolina virtual second, yeah? Is that on? Okay.

Carolina Caeiro:
Yeah, I’ll let you come after me. So I, yeah, I wanted to sort of comment on the multi-stakeholder point. I think there’s a very similar conversation going on at IETF about IETF not being fully multi-stakeholder and this sort of notion that just by being open, you know, it doesn’t make it necessarily multi-stakeholder. And I actually wanted to sort of support your points just now. I think what makes an RIR part of the multi-stakeholder community is in part the global engagement that they do, you know, the outreach they do with governments, the engagement they do with civil society, the fact they participate in spaces like, you know, IGF. And I think we need to be realistic about what we ask of the multi-stakeholder model, you know, at LACNIC, you know, to sort of give an example from, you know, when I used to work there, this, you know, the space is open to whoever wants to come. There’s an effort to welcome civil society. There’s an effort to welcome governments and sort of, you know, academics and a diverse community. But there’s so much participation that you can achieve from those stakeholders. And, you know, and I don’t think that’s, you know, a measure of failing or success of the RIRs. You know, I don’t think that just having the people in the room is what we need to be sort of striving for. And as long as the, you know, the ITF or the RIRs are sort of engaging with the wider ecosystem, that’s what gives you the multi-stakeholderism. And, you know, and but I do, you know. think it’s important to have the places be open for whoever wants to sort of approach it but sort of expect that full diversity in the room I think is you know non-realistic. However I do want to sort of layer in another type of diversity and that that’s something that I do think that the RIRs or you know IDF are working on and it’s something that needs to sort of be further sort of emphasized and worked on and that’s diversity in terms of having for instance representation of small operators you know small and medium enterprises you know producing internet standards and also having sort of you know concerted efforts to bring in gender diversity in this community so more participation of women and non-binary participants both in standards or RIRs so yeah those thoughts. Very nicely put, thank you. Carolina online?

Jan Aart Scholte:
Carolina not connected she’s muted ah you’re thank you Carolina you need to unmute apparently. She is a host for herself so she should be able to She’s now unmuted but we still can hear her. There’s a technical problem. Carolina I’m afraid we’re not hearing you let’s let’s shall we shall we shall we go to. Professor

Nii Narku Quaynor:
Nkwenor had a comment. Yes let’s go I was gonna say let’s go let’s go to Nkwenor and then come back to Carolina. Go ahead Nkwenor. Thank you I was just gonna make an observation that it’s to an extent the technical communities contribution to IGF is this multi-stakeholder process so to get the question in reverse that you know are the technical communities multi-stakeholder it’s kind of challenging in terms of the sequence of events now these organizations are more importantly we should be looking less at this multi-stakeholder bit but more about the actual decision-making process which is really most important that must be as bottom-up and as inclusive as possible and you know also making sure that merit somehow it gets captured that sort of activity I think is more what is important in this regard than the fact that it has a very diverse in terms of discipline and you might say sectoral participation because in some cases it doesn’t always work out that you have that diverse community in terms of sector and also discipline in terms of the needs but because they are very open and they all have programs that try to bring in new people and also process of you might say inducting them or getting them become you know familiar with what is going on it is possible to have wider than purely the technical community participating actively in the way it matters which is in the policy development processes now in the case of AFRINIC you can see that some of our locations are even small there are two very small operators and that’s a benefit of the local policies that that can be derived at a regional level and we also then address the language challenges that we have in our case we also have capacity challenges because different operators have different abilities and all these things reflect and the NIC tries to in some sense accommodate them all and then even supports the environments they are in to sort of enhance it or create communities around them that enables them to keep on growing in that area so that it becomes strong now on the issue of the resilience and some of it of course is internal to the organization in that is bylaws need to be have certain properties in there of course we’re evolving from a situation where things where we have common goals shared objective and there was good trust to an environment where because of setting new things in the context such as transfer policies which it might have inadvertently given some not to property by by for example you know seeing the LIR as the one that could initiate transfers as opposed to the end users that they said that sort of thing tends to stress okay you know the normal you know maybe fair and efficient allocation of resources because people begin to try to game the system so that they can have this sense of the one who can initiate transfers and that I think is has been some form of a challenge but what one is looking for really is bottom up decision making and I’m not even sure that is going on at IGF or any of the the national and regional initiatives, for example. Because they do discuss, but that they are collectively making a decision on something is something that you will see more in the technical communities. So I thought I would add that. OK, thanks.

Jan Aart Scholte:
Just to clarify, in response to Arietta’s question about how you see the evolution and what would be the next steps in terms of ability to respond to crises, do I hear you saying that once AFRINIC has a board and a CEO back in place, the first step is to get at the bylaws and bring them up to date to a new situation? Yeah, we have to understand what happened.

Nii Narku Quaynor:
And understanding what happened here means that there was an application of a certain important document, which is the registration services agreement. And a bad actor signs the agreement and decides not to respect the agreement. So you end up in a commercial dispute. And you need to have mechanisms to say collectively that this sort of bad acting is not permitted. And usually, you do that through some things in the bylaws. And the areas in which the person, for instance, attempts to game the system, you have to find some ways such as in elections and also access to people’s accounts and so on, which are things that the person tried. So you’re going to have to find some language within either your bylaws or your general guidelines or practices that you have to discourage those kinds of things. And of course, once we understand that there will be perhaps more litigation with value being inadvertently attached to the resources, we’re also going to have to maybe be very careful with the law and be more responsive with the law and maybe strengthen our own governance procedures to make sure that we are not found in the same situation. And if you are found in a situation, what other structures within the organization can step in. So all of these things are being thought about. And presumably, once we have good, fair election and we get a board in place, some of these things we follow. There are, of course, policies also waiting that can eliminate this problem. One of them is a transfer policy of our own, which, by the way, the bad actor attempted to overturn through the courts. See, the bad actor, when the multi-stakeholder process failed for them, they now try to talk down to go to court and then try and overrule this bottom-up process, which also was sort of set aside. So it tells that once the initial bit is resolved, there are clearly some key things that can be done. For example, how do we enforce arbitration before we go to courts, and so on. So there are some things that we can do to strengthen the resilience.

Jan Aart Scholte:
Great, thanks very much, Nii. We are coming up to time. Thanks, everyone, for being here through the full discussion. I just have a last chance for Karolina in case her mic is working now. And then a last word to Akinori, also here on site. Karolina, are you able to speak with us now?

Carolina Aguerre:
Can you hear me? We can, yes. Off you go. Wonderful. OK, no, so just to bring in another issue on the terms of how we define these regions and whether it’s the RIRs, this artificial construct around regions, and who and why are they defined in the way they are. So I do think that they are not the only ones who are working around these parameters. And I think that the RIRs have set up a process, and I’m speaking particularly of what I see in the Latin American and Caribbean region, where you do have some regions and maybe processes within, for example, the Caribbean, et cetera. But then you do have other processes concerning the DNS, learning, academic networks, et cetera, which are all using the same regional definition of what is Latin American and the Caribbean. And I find that this is very interesting in, for example, in a region that doesn’t have a, it’s not a trade bloc on its own or a political bloc as the European Union. And so I think that this raises a lot of food for thought on how maybe the internet can also help define and redefine this imaginaries around these geographies and cultures and policies and citizenship around the internet in these parts of the world. Thank you. Okay. Thanks.

Jan Aart Scholte:
And a last word to our local host. No local host.

Akinori Maemura:
Thank you very much. That’s really, really great session with a lot of intervention. Yes, we, our discussion has been quite focused on the governance of the RIRs, but that’s how to decide. But I’d like to mention what to do, and that was Kevin Swift from the LACNIC who made an excellent presentation in the African Internet Summit two weeks ago, the title, the RIRs beyond the registry services. That presented a very good set of what kind of activity the regional internet registries are doing for the development and capacity building. It is really, really important point, and then it is increasing. The RIR is not only doing the IP address management, but helping the people to have another capacity to run the internet better. For example, in case of the APNIC, the development budget is actually as much as the membership and the registration service budget. How big, you can see the RIR is spending the money to the development. Additionally, the APNIC is doing the foundation. established the foundation to utilize such a funding to the additional development. So the membership who gathers to the RIRs subsidizes their funding to the development, which is another way how the RIR underpins the internet’s better operation. And then that’s my last comment. Thank you very much.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Just a quick comment from me. I think we also need to recognize the regional specificity. So I completely accept the points about the multi-stakeholder model, and not every RIR needs to be multi-stakeholder. It’s part of a broader multi-stakeholder ecosystem. But maybe in some regions, something different might be usable. If you look at Africa, it’s a region that has regional policy. It’s like Europe, but without the capacity. So the role of the RIR in Africa is particularly important in the African Digital Transformation Strategy, the African Union’s Agenda 2063. Having a technical community voice at an institutional level in those processes is extremely important. And if the AFRINIC ecosystem itself, if the technical registry ecosystem doesn’t give AFRINIC enough of a resource pool to draw on, then maybe it can draw on a slightly wider resource pool, bringing in people from the private sector and from civil society in a more explicit way. So I’m not saying that’s the solution. I’m just saying, look at the role, look at the opportunity, be regionally context specific. And then the one thing that we haven’t heard enough of is the NROs. So maybe that can be the topic for the workshop next year, how to evolve the umbrella structure. Great. Every project and every discussion is great when it finishes with ideas for the next one.

Jan Aart Scholte:
Good. We come to the close here. Thanks very, very much to all the participants. both speakers and panel and you in the audience here. I hope that you have consolidated thoughts about the RIRs if you’re experienced. I hope you’ve been exposed to them and got and seen that there’s an exciting world out there if the RIRs were new for you. Thanks again to everyone also for being here on this early morning on the last day of the IGF. Let’s go get our coffee and give ourselves a hand for being here. Thank you.

Daniel Arnaudo

The first speaker discussed the InfoTegrity Network, whose objective is to organise resources for a democratic information space. InfoTegrity involves the collaboration of technical, policy, and civic organisations, with the goal of countering harmful content and promoting reliable information. The speaker emphasised that accurate and impartial electoral and political information is crucial for the functioning of effective democracies. The argument presented was that the InfoTegrity Network plays a vital role in ensuring citizens have access to trustworthy information, which is essential for making informed decisions during electoral processes. This promotes democratic participation and strengthens the integrity of democratic systems. By bringing together various stakeholders and combining their expertise, the InfoTegrity Network aims to address the challenges associated with misinformation and provide credible sources of information.

Moving on, the second speaker supported increased openness and acceptance in the internet space. They highlighted the need for assertive policies to protect marginalised groups, specifically women who are often targeted online. The argument made was that a more inclusive and accountable internet governance framework is essential for reducing inequalities and promoting gender equality. The speaker emphasised the importance of democratizing internet governance to ensure that policy decisions are made in a transparent and participatory manner. This would help establish policies that foster responsible behaviour online and protect the rights of individuals, especially those who are traditionally marginalised.

From the analysis of both speakers, it is evident that there is a shared focus on promoting democratic values and addressing challenges in the digital space. The InfoTegrity Network, as presented by the first speaker, aims to facilitate the dissemination of accurate and reliable information to support democratic processes. The second speaker’s endorsement of increased openness and acceptance in the internet space underscores the importance of developing policies that protect marginalised groups and ensure equal access to the opportunities provided by the digital world.

In conclusion, both speakers highlight the significance of information integrity and responsible internet governance in the context of democratic societies. Their arguments support the need for collaborative efforts across various sectors to build a democratic information space that is inclusive, transparent, and accountable. These insights shed light on the key considerations required to foster a digital environment that upholds democratic values and promotes equality.

Hyra Basit

The Digital Rights Foundation (DRF) is playing a crucial role in Pakistan by combating cyber harassment and disinformation. These disinformation campaigns have had a significant impact on the country, leading to social unrest and influencing legal changes. DRF recognizes the need to bridge the gap between the global north and south within online spaces to ensure equal rights and protection for all individuals.

To achieve its goals, DRF offers a wide range of services. They provide digital security assistance, legal support, and mental health services to those affected by cyber harassment and disinformation. Moreover, DRF conducts training programmes for journalists at all levels, equipping them with essential skills in digital security, media ethics, and fact-checking. Through these initiatives, DRF aims to enhance the capacity of journalists to navigate the challenges of online spaces responsibly.

DRF acknowledges the challenges they face in getting social media companies to prioritize issues in smaller countries like Pakistan. In this regard, Hyra, a prominent figure, criticizes social media companies, including Meta, for their inadequate attention toward these concerns. However, DRF has not shied away from pushing these companies by presenting consistent evidence and highlighting the offline consequences resulting from disinformation campaigns. Their efforts have compelled social media platforms to address these issues seriously.

The level of engagement with tech platforms varies, with mixed degrees of success. DRF has established channels of communication with platforms, but their effectiveness highly depends on personal connections and the willingness of individual employees to collaborate with organizations like DRF. The analysis highlights the existing loopholes in the current engagement mechanisms, emphasizing the need to fill these gaps for more effective collaboration between tech platforms and organizations working to combat cyber harassment and disinformation.

Notably, popular platforms like WhatsApp, Instagram, TikTok, and LINE play a significant role in disseminating information in Pakistan. During important events such as elections, these platforms are widely used, potentially amplifying the impact of disinformation campaigns. Recognizing this trend, it becomes crucial to monitor and regulate the information shared on these platforms to ensure accuracy and prevent the spread of false information that may contribute to social unrest or manipulation of legal processes.

In conclusion, the Digital Rights Foundation is at the forefront of combating cyber harassment and disinformation in Pakistan. Through their comprehensive approach, including digital security services, legal support, mental health services, and journalist training, they strive to create a safer online environment. However, challenges remain in gaining adequate attention from social media companies and improving engagement mechanisms with tech platforms. The analysis reinforces the importance of regulatory efforts to monitor the dissemination of information on popular platforms during crucial events.

Ketty Chen

Taiwan faces significant difficulties in participating in international forums due to a lack of recognition. There is no option for Taiwan in the dropdown list of countries in the UN system, and Taiwanese citizens encounter challenges when attempting to register their institutions from Taiwan. These limitations prevent Taiwan from fully engaging in international discussions and hinder its ability to contribute to global initiatives.

However, Taiwanese civil society organizations are proactive in countering information warfare and disinformation campaigns, particularly from China. They have developed effective strategies, such as publishing reports to expose disinformation and creating civic tech groups to enhance communication between citizens and the government. These efforts strengthen Taiwan’s ability to counter false narratives and safeguard its democracy.

Taiwanese civil society organizations are also eager to share their strategies with international partners. Their willingness to foster collaboration and share best practices demonstrates their commitment to combating disinformation and promoting strong democratic institutions not only within Taiwan but around the world.

Taiwan has been persistently targeted by disinformation and information warfare campaigns, primarily originating from a foreign country. Nevertheless, Taiwanese civil society has responded by developing robust strategies and plans to protect its democracy. This highlights the importance of citizen-driven initiatives in safeguarding democratic values against the threat of disinformation and manipulation.

Engaging in civil society organizations within closed societies presents unique challenges, but it is more feasible at the regional level. This approach recognizes the importance of establishing connections and building relationships within a specific geographic area to promote civil society values.

Cybersecurity is crucial for civil society groups operating in closed societies, and Taiwanese organizations understand the significance of improving their cybersecurity measures. Adequate cybersecurity measures protect the integrity of their work and the privacy and safety of their members.

Overall, Taiwan’s struggle for recognition on the international stage hinders its participation in global forums. However, Taiwanese civil society organizations demonstrate resilience and a proactive approach in countering disinformation and safeguarding democratic values. Their willingness to share their experiences and expertise with international partners fosters collaboration and emphasizes the importance of cybersecurity in protecting civil society in closed societies.

Isabel Hou

GovZero is a decentralised civic tech community focused on promoting transparency of information and innovative strategies for citizen engagement in public affairs. With over 13,000 participants globally, the community has made significant strides in its mission. It has hosted 58 hackathons, resulting in nearly 1,000 proposals that offer creative solutions to societal challenges.

One of GovZero’s core arguments is the importance of transparency. By advocating for open and accessible information, the community aims to empower citizens and promote accountability in public affairs. This argument is supported by the development of projects such as News Helper, Cofact, and Zero Archive, which combat disinformation and ensure information integrity. These initiatives play a vital role in countering false information and manipulative tactics in public discourse.

Additionally, GovZero places a strong emphasis on collaboration and inclusivity. The community consists of members from diverse backgrounds, including computing, law, media, arts, and politics. By leveraging the collective expertise and perspectives of these individuals, GovZero fosters collaborative problem-solving and encourages innovative approaches to addressing societal issues. The platform serves as a space for professionals from various fields, such as engineers, designers, lawyers, and journalists, to contribute to meaningful change.

Furthermore, GovZero adopts an open-source model to promote collaboration and the sharing of ideas and resources. By harnessing collective intelligence, the community strives to find effective solutions for complex challenges. Its commitment to inclusivity is evident in its multi-disciplinary approach, as members from different fields work together in teams to develop innovative strategies.

In terms of data protection and access, GovZero recognises the importance of safeguarding data from unauthorised access and ensuring its integrity. While no specific supporting facts are mentioned, the text implies attention being given to platforms such as TikTok and Doin, which are praised for their strong mechanisms in preventing crawler access to their data.

Furthermore, GovZero acknowledges the value of information monitoring and data sharing. Strategies mentioned include pay-to-gather information, social engineering, building custom systems, and sharing datasets with other researchers. This highlights the community’s commitment to providing resources, including datasets and experiences, to enhance information monitoring and problem-solving.

In conclusion, GovZero is a dynamic and inclusive civic tech community that advocates for transparency of information and promotes innovative strategies for citizen engagement in public affairs. Through its open-source model, collaborative problem-solving, and multi-stakeholder engagement, GovZero strives to effectively address societal issues. Its projects, such as News Helper, Cofact, and Zero Archive, demonstrate a commitment to combating disinformation and ensuring information integrity. Additionally, GovZero recognises the importance of data protection and data access in the digital era, as well as the significance of information monitoring and sharing for advancing knowledge and problem-solving capabilities.

Daniel Arnaudo:
Okay, welcome to our session, Networking for Information Integrity in Asia and Globally. Thank you for joining us. It should be a kind of combination, hybrid, interactive session, so we’re looking forward to this. We are here in Kyoto, and we are joined by friends from around the world online. I am Dan Arnaudo, Senior Advisor for Information Strategies with the National Democratic Institute. We work globally to observe elections, strengthen legislative processes, and support a more democratic information space, and that’s what we’re here to talk about today. The session was specifically to discuss methods of organizing to support a healthy information space, and particularly through our InfoTegrity, or Information Integrity Network, which is a group of organizations and individuals in Asia and from around the world that work on these democratic and digital issues. So to start, I’m going to talk a little bit about the network and the session, and then we’ll introduce some of my colleagues here, who will talk about some of the resources from groups within the network, including from GovZero, which is a civic technology community in Taiwan, and Pakistan’s Digital Rights Foundation. You’ll have an opportunity to ask some questions after that, and then we will move to breakout groups if we have – we’re starting to get critical mass here, so hopefully we will have a good turnout, both online and in person. And then we will use this online brainstorm to discuss approaches to various aspects of internet governance and information integrity and that relationship, and that will feed into our session report and our contributions. So hopefully get some good feedback from you all. So just to start with, I mean, in terms of our overall approach and InfoTegrity as a concept, we developed this as an initiative, and specifically to support the development of networks and training and other resources around informational issues, and we have regional working groups on these issues that include technical, policy, and civic organizations that collaborate and communicate on these issues. And we really have a goal of building healthy information environments overall versus countering inauthentic information or harmful information. I think a lot of these approaches that you hear talked about are often focusing only on countering disinformation or only on looking at influence campaigns. And I think it’s more than that. It’s not only countering harmful content, but also about promoting the flow of reliable information and building that healthy information environment that’s layered on top of a lot of the governance and infrastructure issues that are being discussed here. From our perspective, effective democracies require that citizens have access to accurate and impartial electoral and political information in particular, and how that plays a role in those societies. We consider critical stakeholders that we want to work with, so this is a component. I think this group particularly focuses on civil society, but you also want to consider election management bodies, the public sector, governments, mass media, I think certainly is playing a huge role, and obviously technology companies and social media in particular. I think we really need to work collectively, and this is where kind of the word that’s bandied about for the whole week is important in terms of multi-stakeholder engagement. I think in this case, it is where we all have pieces of this, and it’s not like a simple problem where one actor can unilaterally decide how things are going to work. And despite, I think, the efforts of certain actors, particularly within the public sector, governments to reassert that control, it’s something that is not going to be simple to place in that way, because platforms and even we within civil society, I think, have a huge voice and role to play. We must work in tandem, I think, to fight against information manipulation campaigns that seek to spread cynicism about democratic processes, distort even people’s basic concepts around institutions, and hinder citizens’ abilities to make political decisions. Some of the approaches that we at NDI engage in through this initiative and InfoTegrity Network include building on that knowledge base. How do we build resources? How do we create training materials, curricula on these issues? Obviously, with us being a democratic organization, I think elections are a critical component of this, so we want to consider the elections monitoring piece. How do elections happen online? How are they influenced? How can we monitor that, and how can we help groups contribute to a more positive information environment in that sense? And then I think a piece that is important here to think about is how do we build civic engagement and democratic technology norms? So certainly here at IGF, I think this is one of the principal concepts that we’re thinking about here in terms of influencing normative ideas around how the Internet should be governed, but also considering other mechanisms, the EU Code of Practice on disinformation, national frameworks, even party frameworks, codes of conduct for diverse actors, whether you’re a journalist, whether you’re a member of a party, a political candidate. How are you approaching these issues, and can we come to some agreement that will create stronger informational boundaries and understanding of what is acceptable for political speech within this space? I think we’ve had a lot of practice and time establishing those normative standards around, say, traditional journalism standards or traditional political campaigning standards, but we’re still catching up, frankly, from the invention of the Internet in terms of how political actors should operate online. And then finally, I think we seek to really consider ways of addressing online violence against women and other marginalized groups, gender disinformation, so that we can really build a healthy information space for all, because I think women and female candidates are often more targeted by these practices, and so I think a lot of our programming and work integrates that idea and works to build systems to promote an open space that is open and accepting to different and diverse voices. So you see we have a wide range of topic areas, advocacy, digital literacy, supporting marginalized groups. These are all kind of areas that we talk about within the network and want to focus on. The goal is to build societal resilience to harmful content, but also to promote strong ideas that promote a positive, open, free, rights-respecting, and democratic information environment. I think that’s in the name of our organization, and a lot of the groups we work with focus on this concept, but I think democratizing Internet governance, democratizing the information space, and keeping it democratic and open is something that we really want to focus on. This network that we’ve built is intended to be a coordination mechanism to help address these issues, and we’re looking to discuss and demonstrate how it operates, specifically with this session and some of my colleagues here. We have training and connection opportunities. We have roundtable discussions, particularly looking at elections and some of the topics I mentioned earlier. I think content moderation, challenges to research, these are some issues that we want to workshop on with you here, as well, in terms of understanding how you view these issues and how we can elevate them within the IGF community in different ways. So that will be part of the breakouts and that component there. We also have discussions with guest speakers, whether they’re tech companies, donors, research tool demos, and we have a couple people here in person today that are going to give versions of that, talking about some of the resources they developed. Also, if you’re interested in joining going forward, you will have an opportunity to share your organization’s contact information and request to join during this session. So to get started, I want to pass it on to my colleagues here. We’d like to demonstrate some of the resources from the network and from colleagues here from Pakistan and Taiwan. But to start, I have here Dr. Ketty Chen, who is the Taiwan country representative for NDI and the head of its Taiwan office. Prior to assuming her post, she served as the vice president of the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy from 2016 to 2023. So please, Ketty, the floor is yours.

Ketty Chen:
Thank you very much, Dan. Good afternoon, everybody. I’m Ketty Chen. I am the new Taiwan representative for the National Democratic Institute’s Taipei office. And it’s really wonderful to be able to join all of you here to discuss some of these really important topics that Dan had mentioned. As the NDI office in Taiwan, we work with quite a few Taiwanese civil society members covering a series of different issues, such as media literacy, information integrity, gender equality, LGBT rights. And also, we work with Taiwanese civil societies and civil society in the region to secure and safeguard the basic rights of citizens, not only the basic rights, but also their rights in the Internet space. We also have been creating network and alliances of civil society members in the region. So it’s really important. And I’m really grateful to be able to come here and continue networking and meeting new friends where, in the future, we can move forward into safeguarding some of these rights that Dan already mentioned. So from the perspective of Taiwan, I would like to mention that under the UN system, it is not easy for Taiwanese civil society members to join forums like this, because they have difficulties registering as institutions from Taiwan. If you recall, when you have to pick where you’re from on the dropdown list, there’s no option of Taiwan. So just as the difficulty faced by Taiwanese citizens, if you do not click on the option of China, there’s no options for them to be able to successfully complete registration. So I’m actually very happy that we have a colleague from Gov Zero here on the panel, because as a result of these difficulties, quite a few, actually the majority of Taiwanese civil society organizations in Taiwan who are from the civic tech community, civil society members that work on countering information warfare and disinformation, they’re not physically here today. So I think for us, it would be very useful to leave our contact information with you, or for you to leave your contact information with us, so moving forward, we could pass on the information from your organizations and the issues that you’re interested in working with Taiwanese civil society on, so we could move forward after this really important forum. And just a little bit about disinformation and information warfare campaign from China targeting Taiwan, unfortunately, but also it is fortunate that Taiwan has been, in the past decades, the number one country in the world that’s been under the distribution of disinformation from an entity outside of Taiwan or a foreign country. But because of that, Taiwanese civil society organizations, they work amongst themselves to develop strategies to counter not only information warfare campaign, but also the authoritarians’ intrusion on how to affect Taiwan’s democracy. For example, we are right smack in the middle of the national campaign of 2024. I think in one of the panels yesterday, I think, Dan, you were on there, that next year is going to be a very busy year for Democrats like us, because there are several important national elections happening around the world, and Taiwan is one of them. And so what Taiwanese civil society had developed is that they have strategies of publishing reports, and especially bilingual reports on the behavior of disinformation targeting election or even between elections. And also, the civil societies convened together to create civic tech groups to try to bridge the Taiwanese citizens and its government and bring on issues that’s important for citizens to discuss amongst themselves and then reflect to government officials. So I think that it’s rather amazing that civil society in Taiwan, upon arriving at critical junctures of political history within the country, that they always managed to come up with strategies and plans that works to safeguard Taiwan’s democracy. And also, they’re very eager to share that with partners from the region and from around the world. So I think I will pass the mic to Isabel, who is a representative of GovZero, and she has developed a civic tech handbook to share with people who are interested and using the Taiwan model. So I’ll give the floor to her.

Isabel Hou:
Thank you, Ketty. It’s my great pleasure to be here. And first, let me share my screen. Here? Okay. Oh. You get it. Okay. Great. Okay. I’m Isabel Hou. I’m a lawyer, and I contribute to GovZero community in the past 10 years. But however, I’m not a representative of GovZero community, because it is a decentralized community, and it’s difficult to say someone can represent this community. But I was chairperson of a very important task force in GovZero. a community which organised the bimonthly hackathon in the past 10 years So I’m also the Secretary-General of Taiwan AI Academy Foundation So what is GovZero? Actually, it’s a group of people who has like two jobs One is a regular job and the other one is they use their free time like Saturday and Sunday and maybe after work to contribute to the community project It is a decentralised civic tech community We advocate the transparency of information and build tech solutions for citizens to participate in public affair from the bottom up So GovZero means substituting the O with zero in Gov We want to use the internet and digital thinking Zero and one to change the traditional government And it’s kind of like a concept of nerd politics So it’s a group of people Many of them come from the background of computing, law, media, arts, politics and they work in teams And this small group of team members mobilise the crowd They provide the tools to invite people to, more people to join their actions In the GovZero manifesto, we share the core value of this community We come from everywhere We are citizens collaborating to bring about change We are polycentric community and self-organised and motivated And we use open source model to try to find a solution for challenges of society And we have fun because you need to have fun to do this for 10 years and to change the status quo And we are you You can just click, join the Slack So it’s a dashboard of the GovZero In the yesterday morning, we have more than 13,000 people in the Slack users They come from many different parts of the world, including Silicon Valley I think we have participants from many parts of Asia And we have hosted 58 hackathons and almost 1,000 proposals And we celebrated one 10th anniversary last year And so this is backgrounds of GovZero participants There are many engineers, they’re coding And we also have students called Learning Together And NGO organisers, educators, writers, designers, lawyers like me, and journalists So these are three keywords of the GovZero participants There’s a big part of Python But there are also iOS, design, project management, backend, blockchain So in the GovZero, I think it’s not a multi-stakeholder forum It’s kind of like a platform for multi-stake collaboration You can collaborate with people from many different kinds of backgrounds So it’s a very short introduction about GovZero If you are interested, you can find this online I shared the 10 years of GovZero last year in open source summit It’s an open source beyond code development It’s an experiment to use open source model to solve the social issues I think that works And so about information integrity, as Katie just mentioned Taiwan faced this kind of challenge very early Like in 2013, we have this project called News Helper It’s a small program which you can just add it in your computer Then it will remind you if this news is sceptical And in 2016, there’s another project called Cofact It’s a light bot which you can add it in your online application And then you forward the sceptical information to the bot And there are group community members there to do the fact-checking things for you And in 2020, we have this in the community There’s a proposed project called Zero Archive And the project owner is here, Zhihao And I think this project is to try to collect a lot of… systematically to collect a lot of data on the web And try to figure out the information environment in a much more large context And this project is sponsored by, I think, NDI and those other institutions And so, this year, Zhihao’s organization, IORG, they deliver a report about this narrative U.S. scepticism narratives and where they come from So it’s not only about a certain individual disinformation content But now we are looking more like how they try to manipulate the whole public discourse in Taiwan And the report is adopted by economists last month to report how China is flooding Taiwan with disinformation So these are some of projects about info integrity in our community And now I want to share with you our summary of how we do this different kind of projects So you can scan the QR code is online and you can just… It’s still in progress, but with the open-source spirit, we release early, we release often So you can just check it And in the handbook, we just analyze the different stage and the flow of how the project can be built up From come up with ideas and what kind of resources and checkpoints you should notice And it is very, very important to have a good English name So you can share with people who don’t know Chinese And what kind of things you should do And try to find the findings And so it’s… And then you can release your results We do this in the community and by hosting bi-monthly hackathon People are not only collaborate online They can come to the same place to do face-to-face discussion I think this is a very important thing to do So people get connected when they talk in person And except this, we also analyze the elements of what should be included in this… In this GovZero community First, you need contributors You need people who are willing to contribute And you create a space for them to collaborate together The space could be a physical space, but also online space like providing collaboration tools online And then people will propose, bring their own proposal and create a repost And then invite people to join their project With the results of the source code or documentation This will empower the contributors to do more contributions I think these are the important elements of GovZero community And in the content, chapter one, we share what is GovZero, how GovZero works And also in chapter two, we share about how to build up a community And I think you might want to check chapter three first Because we have a lot of different cases here And then, like this is the Cofact project I just mentioned It analyzes the backgrounds of project owners And how they set up the goals of the project And the complicity, modularization, digitalization, and how open it is We have several, more than 10 project cases in the handbook And also with NDI sponsor, we share the draft of this handbook With communities in Southeast Asia, in Chiang Mai this last May And also with Japan and Korean community in Jeju Island And then we collect a lot of cases How the current status of civic tech projects and community around Asia countries So I think this might be very informative for all of you And this is my sharing, and thank you

Daniel Arnaudo:
Thanks very much, Isabel Very interesting Thank you And I think finally we’re going to move to our final speaker here Hira Bassett, who is a Senior Program Manager at the Digital Rights Foundation in Pakistan And oversees the cyber harassment helpline there and gender disinformation projects And another critical election coming up in the next year So, over to you

Hyra Basit:
Hi everyone As Dan said, my name is Hira Bassett I’m here from Digital Rights Foundation in Pakistan We’ve done a lot of work regarding information integrity And I’m just going to give you a brief overview of everything that we’ve done So it’s just bits and pieces of a lot of our projects So just starting off In 2016 we started the cyber harassment helpline Which came about as a response To a lot of complaints and cases that we were receiving from young girls and women And we saw that there was no real awareness or support system that they had And so the helpline came about as a solution Or a potential solution actually To all of the complaints that we were getting There was a space, a gap that we saw And we tried to fill it as best as we could So the helpline has been established since 2016 And we provide digital security services Psychological or mental health support To women and young girls Especially because it’s such a taboo topic To be facing online harassment of any sort You know, facing tech-facilitated gender-based violence Intimate image abuse If their accounts are hacked Or if they’re being impersonated It’s such a taboo that you cannot talk to your friends and family about this Or you’re going to be victim blamed The other thing that we do Is we provide legal services So we actually do have The Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act in Pakistan Which addresses cyber crimes Part of which is Abusing or harassing women It doesn’t cover everything But it does cover some of it So our aim is to provide pro bono legal services Or legal awareness and legal knowledge To everyone who calls us But since then It started out as a focus on women and girls But since then We have expanded our services Or we’ve concentrated some of our services To focus on providing services to vulnerable occupations Particularly journalists and human rights defenders So in that goal We establish escalation channels With social media platforms In order to directly raise Those cases to them And bridge the gap between Western or global north Social media and tech companies And the kind of context Or regional problems that we see In Pakistan Or generally in the global south We see that there’s no real understanding Of why their policies Don’t really work for us Necessarily in Pakistan Or their implementation Rather And so what needs to be done In order to actively address The kinds of problems that we’re seeing Or the solutions that we need So again For journalists and human rights defenders We take those cases as a priority We try to flag them Especially And this includes Meta, Twitter or X TikTok, Google These are all platforms That are very actively being used By journalists and human rights defenders To spread Or actually Build their professional capacities Or reach out to their audiences But in addition to this We have also started to focus Particularly on disinformation We have our elections coming up And we’ve seen in the past That disinformation campaigns Have been actually pretty active Disinformation campaigns have been Actually prevalent and very successful In creating Mass unrest And protests As well as Sometimes even slightly affecting Legal changes These Disinformation campaigns have targeted Women journalists in particular And Everything that comes along with it Sexualizing them, focusing on Trying to discredit them As journalists but also women Or their personal integrity And we’ve also seen A very strong A very recent example Of these disinformation campaigns Targeting the transgender community In Pakistan We worked very hard with social media companies, especially Meta, to address these. I won’t go into much detail about our engagement with them. I get very angry when I start to think about how unresponsive they were, even now. But it’s something that we have to keep highlighting with social media companies, because it just seems like they don’t really want to focus, the global south or Pakistan isn’t really a focus area for them. And so we have to keep on providing them with evidence, or show a consistent pattern or consequences in the offline world for them to actually take those cases seriously. So again, about disinformation, that’s something that because we have seen in the past, because we have seen active campaigns in the past, very coordinated campaigns, mostly primarily that focus on, in online spaces and using social media companies. WhatsApp, I forgot, is one of the most prevalently used platform as well. It’s not a social media company, it’s a messaging platform, but still, it’s something that’s very widely used. But because of this, we know that with the upcoming elections, it’s just going to increase. We’re very apprehensive about the kind of disinformation that it’s going to be spreading, particularly gender disinformation, and how it might affect, how it might not just sway the elections, but also bring certain individuals or communities to harm. So to address these problems, what we have done is, we’re trying to highlight these, this as a very strong topic or a focus with the journalist community. So we’re conducting diligent trainings all over the country with not just mainstream media personalities, but also local journalists who work in local languages. Print, media, print, broadcast, online journalists, everyone. We try and engage with them in order to build their capacity for fact-checking. Well, first of all, actually, to bring into their consciousness that disinformation is a thing, that it’s something that they need to be aware of, and they need to actively bring media ethics into, or address media ethics whenever they’re doing their work, because it seems like even that isn’t something that they’re aware of. Some journalists work at such grassroots level that it’s not like they’ve had very extensive training, that they went to university for it. Sometimes they just start working when they’re teenagers, so it’s not, sometimes it’s not just in their daily practice. So that’s something that we try to bring into focus for them. And we try to give them trainings that address digital security, that address media ethics, and focus on fact-checking, what they can do, what tools they can use, and differentiating or addressing disinformation, misinformation, malinformation, not just within their own, if they’re freelancers, not just within their community, but also to their wider media groups, because sometimes it seems like it’s not really a focus for them because it’s not what brings in the money to be addressing these sorts of small issues. And our aim is also to bridge the gap between local media and social media companies. So we actually try to actively engage, we try to bring each other’s complaints forward. And again, like I said before, sometimes it seems like they don’t want to pay, social media companies or tech platforms don’t really want to pay attention to smaller countries like Pakistan. And so we try to bridge that gap between, so that there’s no, so that it doesn’t seem like civil society organizations or DRF is just making things up, that they get to hear from actual individuals on the ground about how their policies or how they’re implemented affect their daily work, and sometimes even their personal security. We’ve also developed many toolkits that again focus on the same, about addressing disinformation, about the tools that they can use, about digital security, because it seems, because it is a fact that digital security can play a very integral part in information integrity, I guess, and securing themselves online in order to be able to do their work even better. But we also recognize that within all these trainings, there is also, or within the, when we’re talking about disinformation, we sometimes forget to address mental health concerns, especially with, again, local reporters and journalists, especially communities and individuals that face gender disinformation within a very conservative environment like Pakistan. So we have also developed mental health toolkits in order to address those concerns. Our helpline also particularly focuses on trying to offer psychosocial support, even sometimes when people don’t feel like they need it, because again, it’s just something that, our people aren’t very used to asking for, asking for support or asking for, I’m not feeling well, it’s just not something that people are used to saying. I think that’s about it. We’ve also been working on gender disinformation, but our research is ongoing, so I don’t know how much, how relevant it would be to talk about that right now. But we’ve been trying to engage with social media companies to address the gender disinformation, cases that we’ve received, which has been in the hundreds over the past year. Like I said, there was a whole online campaign against the transgender community in Pakistan. We had some success with that, but our research in particular is still ongoing. So I think we had, I was attending a session in the morning, and some of the things that they were saying was that there’s not enough research to identify whether disinformation is harming democracy and so we hope to actually address some of those key answers. Thank you.

Daniel Arnaudo:
Thanks, thanks, Hyra. So I think given we’re a little bit behind schedule and I want to have time for everyone to contribute to the breakout sessions, I think we have a good critical mass here so we can do this properly. We wanted to get your feedback on a couple of different issues for our contribution. First of all, if you would like to join the network, this is a Jamboard. I’m gonna share it here on the screen briefly and then I’ll put up a QR code so you can take a look and get a sense of how this works yourself. But we’ll do physical breakouts here and then there will be a virtual one for folks online if you want to contribute. We have our colleague Sirat from Pakistan who is online there. But basically we’re gonna break into four groups. To start with, I think if you would like to share, I think is that up on the screen or no? I shared it in the Zoom chat. Oh, there you go. Yeah, if you’d like to just drop your name in, you can drop it in there, name and organization, an email, and we can, if you would like to join the network, just mark it with an X. Then from there, I mean, this is what we’re gonna be breaking out on. I think we wanted to look at closed societies and challenges working on those issues there. So that would be one piece of it. Another piece to discuss in breakout would be looking at social media, data access for research. So challenges within social media companies, how we can develop systems or resources for groups that wanna get into those social media spaces that are increasingly restricted. Kind of related, some of what we’ve been talking about, coordination with technology platforms around trust and safety concerns. Internet governance for information integrity, obviously critical for this area here. So we’re all gonna be moderating each of these breakouts here. I think within the room, maybe we can split, and have, let’s see here, to start with, the four kind of groups within the session kind of go to separate corners, depending on what you’re interested in. So let’s start, I think we have, Ketty, you’re gonna be talking about closed societies, so maybe start here if you’re interested in discussing that. Platforms and tech company issues, maybe here.Hyra’s gonna discuss that. Isabel will be enabling research access, maybe in the back right-hand corner there. And then I’ll go to the back left-hand corner and discuss internet governance and information integrity. And we’ll share the QR code and the link in the chat for those online who would like to participate, and we have a moderator there. So we will be there in a minute. Let’s just reorganize, and then we’ll come back for five minutes for summaries. Yeah, it’s tough. I think, yeah, we’ll maybe like 13, something like that, and try to come back with at least two or three minutes. No, we got like two minutes, so let’s just. Okay, everybody, the moderators, come on back up. We can summarize. I guess I’ll go backwards and say I guess I’ll go backwards since I have the mic and just summarize quickly and then pass to my fellow moderators the breakout so we can quickly summarize. If you want to jump into the Jamboard and plus one certain aspects or add new ones that came to your mind afterwards, feel free. We’ll pop up the QR code quickly or share it in the chat. But I mean, I think around internet governance for information integrity, we’re looking at multi-stakeholder approaches, as we’ve kind of been discussing already, I think, particularly around information integrity issues. We were thinking about tools for enabling access for people with disabilities to access these debates and developing strategies for local internet governance coordination on disinformation issues. And I think thinking about kind of a human rights approach on these issues, we’re looking at kind of how training for different aspects or different groups within societies would look like. How can we build trust with the election process? And we even had an additional piece looking at what are the missing technology pieces in elections and an additional question that came around that we were kind of working on some. So thinking about systems outside of the traditional information space, systems for tracking disinformation efforts outside of the internet and thinking about digital ID and systems for verifying people within elections processes. Maybe over to you for the next quick review. Yeah. You were, that one, right?

Hyra Basit:
That one, yep. Okay, I can’t read that anyway. So we started off our discussion with, we had participants from, again, Pakistan, the US, Netherlands, Iraq, and yeah, I think that’s both, and Japan, yes. So we talked about the kind of platforms that we’ve been using in our respective countries and WhatsApp, X, Instagram were some of the top ones, but we also talked about TikTok and LINE being used to disseminate information, especially in the context of more integral moments like elections. Then we talked about, we sort of diverted from the discussion a bit a few times, but we talked a bit about how to better engage with tech platforms and what has worked for us before, how we do it currently in our respective situations. And again, it seemed like the escalation channels that we’ve established with them, sometimes they work, sometimes not. They’re not completely perfect. There are loopholes to them or there are gaps that need to be filled out and there needs to be more engagement. But the kind of engagement that we’ve seen with those platforms sort of depend on either personal connections or individual employees’ willingness to actually connect with CSOs or organizations like ours. And yeah, I think that’s all.

Daniel Arnaudo:
Thank you. Yeah.

Isabel Hou:
Okay, here, tools and strategy to use to monitor information, there is a pay-to-gather information, social engineering, build up your own system and share the datasets with other researchers. And according to the participants’ experiences, TikTok and Doin has the most strong mechanism to prevent crawler and access to their data. And the resources we want to share is datasets and also the experiences handling this kind of issue and also maybe some comparison of historical data would be very useful.

Ketty Chen:
Very quickly. Engaging in civil society organization in closed societies can be done. However, it is more feasible at the regional level but when it comes to globally, it really takes time for different regions to understand the working of these closed society and how to get in touch with each other. And also, cybersecurity is really important for these civil society groups. Near Taiwanese organizations that could help improve the cybersecurity of these groups so that working in closed society, it’s more feasible and easier.

Daniel Arnaudo:
Great, so we’ve got a lot of feedback. This will contribute to our contribution. Really thank you everyone for coming and for our moderators, we’ll… Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.