First substantive session of the UN Global Mechanism on cybersecurity
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1st meeting – Plenary Session, Global Mechanism on ICTs in the Context of International Security
The first substantive plenary session of the Global Mechanism on Developments in the Field of ICTs in the context of international security opened at UN Headquarters in New York, with Chair Egriselda López of El Salvador presiding . In a pre-recorded statement, Under-Secretary-General Izumi Nakamitsu highlighted the mechanism’s significance as a permanent, single-track, consensually agreed process, and called for meaningful stakeholder engagement in a systematic, sustained, and substantive manner . Chair López emphasised that the session marked a historic juncture, setting the foundation not only for the first biennium but for how the UN would address ICT security in coming years, and appealed to delegations for collaboration and political will to build consensus .
The most contentious issue of the session was stakeholder accreditation. Multiple delegations – including Canada, the EU, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Japan, Switzerland, and others – expressed grave concern that more than 50% of stakeholders who applied to participate in the plenary had been blocked, with Russia alone raising 43 objections . These delegations argued that such a wholesale approach contradicted the agreed spirit of inclusivity and deprived member states, particularly smaller ones, of essential technical expertise . Russia defended its objections by arguing that the blocked organisations engaged in politicised attribution of cyber attacks and failed to meet the criterion of impartiality . Iran and Cuba, aligning with a group of like-minded states, maintained that the agreed modalities applied equally to dedicated thematic groups (DTGs) and that only accredited stakeholders should participate in those forums .
A second major dispute concerned the Chair’s appointment of co-facilitators for the DTGs. A group of like-minded states, including Russia, China, Cuba, Iran, and Nicaragua, strongly objected, arguing that co-facilitators must be appointed by consensus of all member states and that the Chair’s unilateral approach contradicted the agreed modalities and set an unacceptable precedent . By contrast, the EU, Mexico, Japan, Canada, and others welcomed the appointments as consistent with UN practice and necessary to operationalise the DTGs in time for their December meetings .
The session concluded with the adoption of a provisional agenda for the 2026 and 2027 substantive plenary sessions and a provisional programme of work, both welcomed as important steps forward . Despite deep divisions on stakeholder participation and the appointment of co-facilitators, the Chair reaffirmed her commitment to inclusive, transparent, and consensus-based leadership, underscoring that the success of the mechanism would ultimately be a collective achievement of all member states .
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Overall Purpose
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The discussion marks the inaugural substantive plenary session of the Global Mechanism on Developments in the Field of ICTs in the Context of International Security. Its primary goals are to formally adopt the agenda and programme of work for 2026-2027, address outstanding organisational matters (including the structure of Dedicated Thematic Groups and the appointment of co-facilitators), and begin substantive dialogue on responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. A central preoccupation throughout is ensuring the mechanism is inclusive, consensus-based, and capable of delivering tangible results.
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Major Discussion Points
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Stakeholder Accreditation and the Non-Objection Mechanism: A dominant and contentious issue was the blocking of over 50% of stakeholder applicants from participating in the plenary, with Russia alone raising 43 objections. Many delegations – including Canada, the EU, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Japan, Switzerland, the United States, and others – expressed deep concern that this approach contradicted the agreed spirit of inclusivity and the requirement to use the non-objection mechanism “judiciously.” Canada noted that “more than 50% of stakeholders that applied to participate in plenaries have been blocked” and that “Russia alone raised 43 objections.” The United States characterised it as “a wholesale effort to strip this mechanism of independent expertise.” Russia defended its position by arguing that the blocked organisations engaged in “unfounded political attribution of computer attacks” or “politicised propaganda,” and that member states have every right to refuse accreditation under the agreed modalities. Estonia, by contrast, provided a written, publicly available justification for its own objection to one stakeholder, citing EU sanctions and FSB links. – Stakeholder Participation in Dedicated Thematic Groups (DTGs): A significant procedural dispute arose over whether the non-objection/accreditation rules applicable to formal plenary sessions also extend to the informal DTGs. Western delegations – including Canada, the UK, Chile, Italy, and Australia – argued that DTGs are informal meetings and therefore do not require prior accreditation, consistent with established UN practice. Conversely, Russia, Iran, Cuba, Nicaragua (on behalf of like-minded states), and China argued that the same modalities agreed by consensus for the global mechanism apply equally to DTGs, and that only accredited NGOs should be permitted to brief in that context. China further warned that applying different rules to DTGs risks reducing them to “nothing more than a workshop or even a side event.” – Appointment of Co-Facilitators for the DTGs: The Chair’s decision to appoint four co-facilitators (from Australia, Egypt, Malaysia, and the Netherlands) without achieving formal consensus among all member states generated sharp disagreement. A group of like-minded states – Belarus, Burkina Faso, China, Cuba, the DPRK, Iran, Russia, Venezuela, and Nicaragua – formally disassociated themselves from the procedure, arguing it violated the consensus-based decision-making principle enshrined in UNGA Resolutions 79-237 and 80-16, and should not serve as a precedent. Russia stated it “does not recognise this decision” as it was “made in circumvention of the consensus procedure.” Iran noted that the original OEWG draft had included Chair authority to appoint facilitators but that this provision was deliberately removed because it lacked consensus. In contrast, Mexico, Japan, Switzerland, Canada, the EU, and Italy welcomed the appointments as consistent with UN practice and appropriate in terms of geographic and gender balance.
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The Role and Working Methods of the DTGs: Beyond the dispute over co-facilitator appointments, delegations debated how the DTGs should function in practice. The EU, Canada, Switzerland, Mexico, and Japan advocated for focused, scenario-based discussions drawing on expert briefings, guiding questions prepared by the Chair, and hybrid participation to accommodate smaller delegations. Russia and Iran insisted that discussion topics and timetables must be agreed by consensus among all member states, that reports not unanimously approved cannot be considered legitimate, and that the DTGs must strictly reflect all five pillars of the framework without prioritising certain issues. Colombia additionally raised the practical concern of ensuring simultaneous interpretation in DTG meetings to enable full participation from diverse linguistic communities. – Consensus as the Foundational Principle and the Mechanism’s Historic Significance: Underpinning all organisational disputes was a broader debate about the meaning and application of consensus. The Chair and many Western delegations emphasised that consensus must be actively built through flexibility and political will, and is not a veto to be wielded unilaterally. The like-minded group, led by Nicaragua and Russia, insisted that consensus applies to all decisions – procedural and substantive – and that any departure from this principle “will endanger the future of the GM.” The Chair, in her opening statement, framed the session as a historic juncture: “For the first time, member states are meeting in the framework of a standing global mechanism,” and called on all delegations to write “the first chapter of this story” with conviction and openness.
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Overall Tone
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The tone of the discussion was formally diplomatic but increasingly tense and adversarial as the session progressed. The opening statements from the Chair and USG Nakamitsu were optimistic and aspirational, emphasising the historic nature of the mechanism and the promise of constructive multilateral engagement. This positive register was maintained by many delegations in their congratulatory remarks to the Chair.
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However, the tone shifted markedly once the floor opened for debate on stakeholder accreditation. Statements from Canada, the United States, the Netherlands, Poland, Estonia, and others became pointed and critical, directly naming Russia’s conduct as contrary to the spirit of the agreed modalities. The United States was particularly blunt, comparing the exclusion of technical experts to “holding an agricultural convention and not inviting farmers.” Russia’s response was defensive and firm, rejecting what it characterised as “unjustified attacks” and reaffirming its legal right to object. The debate over co-facilitator appointments introduced a second layer of tension, with the like-minded group formally disassociating from the Chair’s decision and Russia declaring it would “not recognise” the appointments. By the close of the morning session, the discussion had settled into entrenched positions, with a clear fault line between states prioritising inclusivity and practical implementation on one side, and those insisting on strict consensus-based proceduralism on the other. Despite this, the Chair consistently sought to de-escalate, reaffirming her commitment to transparency, continued consultations, and hearing all voices.
First Substantive Plenary Session of the Global Mechanism on ICTs in the Context of International Security
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Opening of the Session and Institutional Context
The first substantive plenary session of the Global Mechanism on Developments in the Field of ICTs in the Context of International Security convened on 20 July 2026 at UN Headquarters in New York, with Chair Egriselda López of El Salvador presiding . The session marked a genuinely historic milestone: for the first time, member states were meeting within the framework of a standing, permanent global mechanism dedicated to ICT security and responsible state behaviour in cyberspace . Chair López opened proceedings by extending a warm welcome to all delegations attending in person and those following via UN Web TV , and expressed deep gratitude for the trust placed in El Salvador to lead the first biennium . She emphasised that what transpired during the week would set the foundation not only for the first biennium but for how the United Nations would address ICT security issues in the years ahead .
In a pre-recorded video statement, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu described the mechanism as holding “tremendous promise” as a permanent, single-track, and consensually agreed process . Drawing on nine years of experience as High Representative, she noted that ICT security had consistently stood out as an area where states had “regularly sought and found consensus solutions, even when the broader international security environment has been anything but conducive” . She highlighted the achievements of the preceding Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), including the establishment of global intergovernmental points of contact, confidence-building measures, and capacity-building initiatives , and called for the atmosphere of constructive engagement that characterised the OEWG to be maintained in the new mechanism . She also underscored the importance of meaningful stakeholder engagement in a systematic, sustained, and substantive manner , and drew attention to the Dedicated Thematic Groups (DTGs) as a key innovation of the process . She described the DTGs as complementing plenary meetings through in-depth expert discussions and noted that they would benefit greatly from a broad array of expert briefings to inform states’ deliberations .
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Chair’s Opening Statement: Ambition, Responsibility, and the Challenge of Consensus
Chair López delivered a substantive opening statement that set both an aspirational and a realistic tone for the session. She acknowledged the complex geopolitical context in which the mechanism’s work was unfolding, characterised by the constant evolution of the threat landscape, the inappropriate use of ICTs in conflicts, and the growing interrelationship with emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence . She noted that delegations would likely hear during the week about attacks against critical infrastructures, disruptions in digital supply chains, and new challenges for international stability .
The Chair was candid about the demands of consensus-building, observing that “consensus is not automatic” but must be built through “commitment, flexibility, and political will” . She acknowledged that in a context of growing mistrust, building bridges was in itself an achievement , and appealed to delegations’ spirit of collaboration and willingness to find points of convergence . She framed the mechanism’s value as being measured by its capacity to create understanding, strengthen trust, and produce tangible results , and expressed her conviction that all the necessary elements for a successful first biennium were in place . In a notably philosophical observation, she remarked that “the history of multilateral processes is rarely written in great moments of unanimity” but is more frequently built through “small steps, difficult compromises, and the willingness to keep talking even when there are differences” . She expressed the hope that the first biennium would be remembered not as “just another meeting at the UN” but as the moment when member states decided to transform decades of work into permanent cooperation .
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Adoption of the Provisional Agenda and Programme of Work
Before turning to the most contentious issues of the session, the Chair addressed several organisational matters. She recalled that the March 2026 organisational session had been unable to adopt a formal agenda , and that she had subsequently conducted intensive consultations with delegations to resolve this impasse . She had circulated a revised agenda covering both the 2026 and 2027 plenary sessions, designed to provide future chairs with flexibility to make adjustments as necessary . An indicative programme of work (CRP.1) had been circulated on 29 June along with a letter from the chairmanship. The provisional agenda for the 2026 and 2027 substantive plenary sessions, contained in document A/AC.304/2026/CRP.2, was adopted by consensus without objection . The Chair expressed deep gratitude to delegations for their commitment and spirit of cooperation throughout the intensive consultations that preceded this decision, describing the consensus reached as “the result of good faith, a willingness to compromise, and dedication in order to reach the common objective of this mechanism” .
The Chair also drew attention to the provisional programme of work for the current plenary session (document A/AC.304/2026/CRP.3), which was taken note of by the Global Mechanism . Both documents were to be registered as official documents available in all official UN languages . Thailand welcomed the provisional agenda and expressed its intention to advance dialogue across the five pillars of the framework for responsible state behaviour, focusing on building trust and confidence, strengthening resilience against emerging technologies, clarifying the application of international law in cyberspace, effectively implementing existing norms, and delivering needs-based capacity building .
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Stakeholder Accreditation: The Non-Objection Mechanism and Its Contested Application
The most contentious and time-consuming issue of the morning session was the accreditation of non-governmental stakeholders to participate in the plenary. The Chair provided a detailed update on the accreditation process, explaining that the Secretariat had opened the annual window for applications on 7 April with a deadline of 30 April, and that requests were considered approved unless written objection was received by 12 p.m. EDT on 20 May 2026 . She noted that she had briefed delegations on the accreditation matter during the 23 June informal consultations and had committed to providing further information at the plenary session. She had conducted informal consultations with the eight concerned states over a period not exceeding three months, but concerned states had ultimately reaffirmed their objections . While she had been unable to facilitate additional accreditations, she committed to continuing to use her good offices to support states in addressing outstanding concerns .
Canada was the first delegation to address the issue directly, and its statement set the tone for the exchanges that followed. Canada noted that “more than 50% of stakeholders that applied to participate in plenaries have been blocked” and that “Russia alone raised 43 objections” . Canada argued that this approach was inconsistent with the agreed call in the OEWG final report for states to “utilise the non-objection mechanism judiciously, bearing in mind the spirit of inclusivity” [S118]. Canada characterised Russia’s approach as “particularly detrimental to the quality of the work of our body,” arguing that it deprived member states of expertise essential to meaningful cybersecurity discussions . Canada also drew attention to a joint statement issued by 35 stakeholders spanning every segment of the community and several regions .
The European Union, speaking on behalf of 37 states including candidate countries and EFTA members, reiterated strong regret that 50 stakeholders had been objected to, representing the majority of the 70 entities that applied . The EU argued that these objections demonstrated “a concerning lack of transparency, predictability, and consistency” with the OEWG consensus, under which member states had committed to engaging with stakeholders in a systematic, sustained, and substantive manner . The EU cited the specific example of the EU Institute for Security Studies – an organisation with which many delegations had worked for years in New York and on the ground – being objected to despite its significant contributions . The EU called on the Chair and co-facilitators to ensure that relevant stakeholders who add value to discussions are brought into the DTG process .
Delegations cited varying figures on the scale of the objections, with the EU noting that 50 of the 70 entities that applied had been objected to, the Netherlands stating that 50 of 92 multi-stakeholders that had indicated their interest to participate had been blocked, and Canada and Ireland noting that Russia alone had raised 43 objections . Portugal, Mexico, the Netherlands, Colombia, Switzerland, New Zealand, Japan, Chile, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Republic of Korea, Poland, Estonia, the United States, Ireland, Australia, Albania, and Ukraine all expressed similar concerns, reflecting a broadly shared concern among a large number of delegations about the scale and opacity of the objections . The Netherlands noted that 43 of the 50 blocked stakeholders had been objected to by a single member state without proper explanation, going against the spirit of what was agreed in the OEWG . Switzerland pointedly observed the irony that Russia, which had initiated the OEWG and thereby given stakeholders access to ICT discussions at the United Nations, was now preventing states from accessing the expertise required to fulfil the mandate . The United States was the most direct in its condemnation, describing Russia’s approach as “a wholesale effort to strip this mechanism of independent expertise” that “hollows out its substance” , and noting that it had not objected to a single stakeholder submitted by members in the room . The US offered a memorable analogy: “This is equivalent to holding an agricultural convention and not inviting farmers to participate – that is how silly” .
Nigeria, when invited to speak on behalf of the African Group, deferred its statement to a later time.
Kiribati’s intervention was among the most morally compelling of the session. As a small island developing state, Kiribati emphasised that its national cybersecurity posture had been built with the support of technical partners, regional bodies, and the wider community, and that stakeholders had sharpened the quality of its deliberations and helped move the mechanism from description toward delivery . Kiribati was careful to acknowledge that any member state may raise an objection under the agreed modalities and that this right was not in question, but argued that the same modalities ask states to use the non-objection mechanism judiciously and to share the general basis of their objection. Kiribati argued that objecting states should share the basis of their objections so that concerns could be understood and resolved, observing that “transparency here costs the objecting state little; silence costs the rest of us a great deal” . For a small island state without deep in-house expertise, the excluded stakeholders were “very often precisely the partners on whom states like ours are most dependent” . New Zealand similarly highlighted that as a smaller and geographically isolated country, it did not always have ready access to international expertise from academia, civil society, and industry, and that large-scale, non-transparent objections deprived it of the ability to benefit from stakeholder participation .
Poland gave a specific and pointed example, describing the Łódź Cyber Hub – a public academic institution operating within the Department of Public International Law and International Relations at the University of Łódź – which had been blocked by a single member state without substantive justification . Poland argued that raising objections en masse without justification “runs counter to this commitment and undermines the legitimacy of the process itself” , and challenged Russia’s general justification as clearly inapplicable to an academic institution, suggesting that Russia’s decision was itself driven by a politicised agenda .
Estonia’s intervention introduced an important nuance. While aligning with the majority position on the harm caused by mass objections, Estonia explained that, on behalf of the European Union and its member states, it had objected to the participation of JSC Positive Technologies, citing its links to the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB), EU sanctions – specifically as part of the EU’s 11th sanctions package adopted on 23 June 2023 – and documented malicious cyber activity . Crucially, Estonia emphasised that it had “not hide behind procedures” but had “set out our reasons in writing and made them publicly available,” arguing that “transparency matters, especially when objections are raised” . Estonia argued that inclusivity cannot come at the expense of integrity, trust, and security , but that the appropriate response to concerns about a specific stakeholder is transparent, substantiated objection – not mass, unexplained vetoes. Australia specifically commended Estonia’s transparency , and Germany noted that EU member states had provided a written explanation for their own veto as an example of the spirit of transparent dialogue .
Cuba reaffirmed that participation of other stakeholders should be based on the principle of non-objection as agreed in the OEWG, that modalities should be respected comprehensively to ensure non-politicised and impartial participation, and that these rules should also be applied to the dedicated thematic working groups .
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Russia’s Defence and the Like-Minded Group’s Position
Russia responded to what it characterised as “unjustified attacks” by invoking paragraph 15i of the agreed modalities, which requires NGOs to participate objectively and refrain from politicisation . Russia argued that all organisations it refused accreditation for had failed to meet this criterion, having practised “unfounded political attribution of computer attacks” or “politicised propaganda to tarnish the reputation of these countries” . Russia also expressed disappointment at the rejection of Russian NGOs and called for clarification on why they were blocked .
Nicaragua, Cuba, and Iran aligned with Russia’s position on the right to object. Nicaragua recalled that the modalities for stakeholder participation were negotiated and approved by consensus, fully recognising the right of states to present objections, and that organisations with political activities would have difficulty contributing impartially . Iran argued that the agreed modalities apply to the global mechanism as a whole, including DTGs, and that general UN practice cannot supersede specifically negotiated modalities [S100]. China supported NGO involvement in principle but emphasised that NGOs must respect agreed procedures and meet established criteria .
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The Dispute Over Stakeholder Participation in Dedicated Thematic Groups
A closely related but distinct dispute concerned whether the non-objection mechanism and accreditation requirements applicable to formal plenary sessions also extend to the informal DTGs. Canada noted that stakeholders facing plenary vetoes would be able to join and participate in the December informal thematic groups , and the United Kingdom reiterated “for the avoidance of doubt” that DTGs are informal working groups and that stakeholder participation does not require accreditation, citing both the agreed modalities and established UN practice including the May 2024 OEWG intersessional where unaccredited stakeholders attended and contributed . Italy cited paragraph 15 of Annex I to the OEWG final report as clearly affirming that accreditation is needed for plenary and review conferences only, and that DTGs have an informal nature not requiring prior accreditation . Portugal, Chile, Australia, the Netherlands, Germany, and Ukraine all concurred with this interpretation .
Russia, Iran, Cuba, and China took the opposing view. Russia argued that according to paragraph 8a of Annex 1 to the OEWG final report, no stakeholders other than briefers may participate in DTGs, that briefings are optional and require approval of all member states, and that speakers must be selected from accredited NGOs . In a separate intervention on DTG modalities, Iran argued that neither Annex C to the third annual progress report nor Annex A to the final report draws any distinction between plenary meetings and DTG meetings for the purposes of stakeholder participation . China warned that if DTGs use a totally different set of rules of procedure from the plenary, it would “dent the competence of member states in their discussions and the seriousness of the final outcome,” risking DTGs becoming “nothing more than a workshop or even a side event” .
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The Appointment of Co-Facilitators for the DTGs
The second major organisational dispute of the session concerned the Chair’s appointment of four co-facilitators for the DTGs from Australia, Egypt, Malaysia, and the Netherlands, reflecting geographic and gender balance . The Chair explained that she had identified, on the basis of broad understanding among a great majority of delegations, that the nomination of two co-facilitators per group bearing in mind geographic and gender balance and relevant experience constituted the most balanced and logical approach . She committed to working closely with the co-facilitators and all delegations to ensure that the thematic groups work in full respect of the agreed modalities, and emphasised that co-facilitators would act on a personal basis in strict observance of the principles of neutrality, impartiality, and inclusion .
Nicaragua, speaking on behalf of a Group of Like-Minded States comprising Belarus, Burkina Faso, China, Cuba, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, the Russian Federation, Venezuela, and Nicaragua itself, expressed “strong disappointment” with the Chair’s approach and formally disassociated the group from the procedure, stating that it would not consider it as a precedent for the future functioning of the global mechanism . The group called for co-facilitators to be elected or appointed on the basis of consensus among all member states , and urged the Chair to ensure strict adherence to agreed modalities, including the centrality of consensus .
Russia’s statement on this matter was the most forceful. Russia argued that consultations from April to June had shown that no consensus was reached on candidates, and that the Chair’s decision “contradicts the UNGA-approved parameters of the global mechanism” and “was made in circumvention of the consensus procedure and in violation of the principle of the guiding role of states” . Russia argued that on the matter of appointing co-facilitators, states were “basically presented with their fait accompli.” Russia stated explicitly that it “does not recognise this decision” and that it “cannot be seen to be legitimate, let alone serve as a precedent for the further functioning of the global mechanism” . Russia also argued that the list of topics for DTGs should be developed and approved transparently and unanimously, and that reports of co-facilitators not unanimously approved by states cannot be regarded as legitimate .
In a separate intervention on the co-facilitator appointments, Iran added a specific historical argument, recalling that during OEWG negotiations, the proposal to authorise the Chair to appoint facilitators had appeared in the initial draft but was “ultimately removed because it did not enjoy the consensus of member states,” meaning the agreed outcome reflected a deliberate decision not to confer such authority to the Chair . Iran also expressed reservations about co-facilitator summaries, arguing that experience in other UN processes had demonstrated it is impossible to ensure complete objectivity, and suggested that outcomes should instead be recorded from the outset as rolling text evolving into consensus recommendations . Venezuela added that a 50-50 split between developed and developing countries does not reflect a truly equitable distribution given that developing countries represent a considerably higher proportion of UN membership .
Cuba expressed deep concern that the procedure followed to name co-facilitators was incompatible with the member-states-led nature of the Global Mechanism and the principle of consensus, and should not constitute a precedent . Cuba urged strict compliance with agreed modalities, including the centrality of consensus, warning that any attempt to reinterpret or dilute this principle “creates the risk of undermining the necessary trust to ensure that it works adequately” .
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Support for the Co-Facilitator Appointments
In contrast, a broad coalition of delegations welcomed the Chair’s appointments as consistent with UN practice and necessary to operationalise the DTGs in time for their December meetings. The EU welcomed the timely appointment of co-facilitators in line with UN practice, viewing them as part of the Chair’s team serving in a personal capacity to help give shape and further operationalise the DTGs . Mexico expressed support for the Chair’s prerogative to name co-facilitators pursuant to established practice in other General Assembly processes, welcoming the four nominations as reflecting adequate geographical, gender, and technical balance . Canada invited states to refrain from significant departures from UN practice for informal cybersecurity meetings , referencing the precedent set by the OEWG for informal meetings, including the May 2024 intersessional where the Chair selected experts from a pool nominated by delegations and all stakeholders could participate as discussants or expert briefers . Japan supported the Chair’s appointment, believing the co-facilitators would contribute to fostering constructive discussions under the Chair’s leadership . Switzerland welcomed the appointment as an important step in preparing for the December DTG meetings . Italy affirmed that the appointment does not contravene any modality or rule and ensures appropriate balance in geographical, development, and gender terms . Colombia welcomed the selection on an individual basis, considering that reflecting geographic balance between developed and developing countries favours a more inclusive and representative dynamic . Thailand congratulated the newly appointed co-facilitators from Australia, Egypt, Malaysia, and the Netherlands, assuring them of full support in operationalising the DTGs on the basis of neutrality, impartiality, and geographical and gender balance .
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The Working Methods of the DTGs: Competing Visions
Beyond the dispute over co-facilitator appointments, delegations offered competing visions for how the DTGs should function in practice. The EU proposed focused, topic-based discussions drawing on expert briefings followed by states’ interventions exchanging best practices, with co-facilitators providing verbal updates to the plenary and potentially transmitting written recommendations agreed in the spirit of consensus . The EU also emphasised that the agendas of the plenary, the DTGs, and the Global Roundtable for Capacity Building are complementary, with the current plenary providing guidance for the December DTGs and the December DTGs in turn informing actionable recommendations for the 2027 plenary .
Canada proposed that DTG guiding questions should focus on priorities broadly shared across UN membership, with one or two questions or topics potentially linked to a case study, integrated interventions addressing all pillars of the framework, and dedicated time for stakeholder interventions and interactive discussion . Canada also emphasised that the success of the December DTGs would depend on the degree of predictability provided beforehand, with delegations and stakeholders needing to know the guiding questions and expert briefers sufficiently in advance . Mexico proposed that discussions be structured around scenarios allowing exchange of national experiences, identification of common challenges, and extraction of specific lessons on the application of the framework, avoiding duplication of conceptual debates already held in plenary . Japan emphasised that DTG1 should prioritise concrete discussions on pressing issues such as ransomware and attacks on critical infrastructure using specific scenarios, while DTG2 should ensure broad stakeholder participation and address capacity building efficiently . Thailand proposed that the DTGs discuss topics on capacity building addressing advanced cyber threats including AI security, quantum readiness, post-quantum cryptography, and operational technology security, as well as assistance with national legal and policy frameworks .
Colombia raised a practical but critical concern that received little attention from other delegations: the availability of simultaneous interpretation in DTG meetings, arguing that technical experts from different regions and linguistic contexts should be able to participate fully and meaningfully . Mexico echoed this concern about multilingualism . Mauritius called for clear and predictable rules of procedure for the DTGs covering objectives, scope, meeting formats, submission modalities, co-chair roles, timelines, and mechanisms for coordination among DTGs .
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Perspectives from Developing and Small States
Several developing and small state delegations made substantive contributions that added important equity dimensions to the discussion. Malawi underscored that meaningful stakeholder participation is indispensable to an implementation-oriented global mechanism, arguing that “if our objective is implementation, then we must ensure that those who contribute to implementation are meaningfully engaged throughout the process” . Malawi echoed the Chair’s aspiration that the mechanism not be remembered as just another meeting at the UN, expressing hope that it would instead be remembered as one where dialogue remained stronger than distrust and where cooperation translated into implementation . Morocco welcomed the appointment of the four co-facilitators and expressed the wish that they carry out their work in a spirit of neutrality, while calling for practical modalities for participation to be clarified as soon as possible to allow delegations with more limited capacity to prepare properly . Montenegro welcomed the establishment of the permanent, single-track forum as a significant step towards structured multilateral dialogue on ICT security, noting that for Montenegro and the wider Western Balkan region, cyber threats are not abstract but immediate and evolving . Montenegro cited ransomware attacks, state espionage, critical infrastructure disruption, and hybrid operations combining cyber intrusions with disinformation campaigns as examples of the threats it faces.
Mauritius, speaking for the first time under the global mechanism, expressed appreciation for the Women in International Security and Cyberspace Fellowship Programme, noting that such initiatives are instrumental in promoting inclusive and representative discussions on international cybersecurity . Mauritius also concurred with China’s observation that the meaningful contribution of member states should not be determined by their size, arguing that every member state, regardless of size, can make valuable and substantive contributions where there is commitment, expertise, and a willingness to engage constructively . The Philippines, as a country with developing cyber and technological maturity, emphasised its reliance on partnerships with the private sector, academia, civil society, and international partners, and noted that multi-stakeholder coordination plays a vital role in enriching cyber resilience . The Philippines noted that it considers whole-of-government coordination, multi-stakeholder engagement, and inclusive multilateralism as best practice for strengthening cyber resilience. Albania expressed concern that objections to well-established organisations risk depriving member states of valuable expertise precisely at a time when cyber threats are becoming increasingly complex . Albania appeared both among the states aligned with the EU statement and as a separate speaker in its national capacity later in the session.
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China’s Contribution and the Broader Governance Debate
China’s intervention was notable for its combination of support for the Chair’s leadership with a substantive governance argument about DTG procedures. China congratulated the Chair and expressed full confidence in her and her team, noting that the size of a country does not matter at the end of the day and that what matters is a deep understanding of the situation and an objective and balanced approach to finding compromise . China supported NGO involvement in principle but emphasised that NGOs must respect agreed procedures and meet established criteria, and argued that the same rules of NGO participation applying to the plenary should also apply to DTGs . China’s warning that applying different rules to DTGs risks reducing them to “nothing more than a workshop or even a side event” provided intellectual grounding for the like-minded group’s position on DTG modalities.
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The Chair’s Closing Remarks on Stakeholder Participation
After hearing from all delegations wishing to speak on the stakeholder accreditation issue, the Chair summarised the discussion and reaffirmed her commitments. She confirmed her intention to continue working hard to convene informal dialogues and maintain a systematic, substantive, and sustained continuous dialogue with stakeholders . She also drew attention to the list of accredited non-governmental entities (document A/AC.304/2026/INF.1), which includes entities accredited to participate in the work of the substantive plenary sessions and review conferences of the global mechanism for the current five-year cycle, and which was taken note of by the Global Mechanism . The Chair reiterated that co-facilitators would carry out their role under her guidance and general responsibility, acting on a personal basis with strict observance of the principles of neutrality, impartiality, and inclusion .
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Conclusion and Outlook
The morning session concluded with the Chair proposing that the meeting resume at 3 p.m. to hear remaining speakers – including Argentina and Chile – before moving to substantive agenda item 5 on current and potential threats . Despite the deep divisions that had emerged on stakeholder participation and the appointment of co-facilitators, the session had achieved the significant procedural milestone of adopting the provisional agenda for the 2026 and 2027 substantive plenary sessions by consensus .
The overall picture that emerged was one of a mechanism facing a structural tension between its consensus-based decision-making mandate and the practical need to make organisational decisions when consensus cannot be achieved [S100]. A clear fault line divided a large majority of states – spanning Western, Asia-Pacific, Latin American, and small island developing state delegations – who prioritised inclusivity, multi-stakeholder expertise, and pragmatic UN practice, from a Group of Like-Minded States led by Russia who insisted on strict consensus-based state control over all procedural and substantive decisions . The like-minded group’s formal disassociation from the co-facilitator appointment decision and Russia’s explicit non-recognition of that decision created a serious legitimacy challenge for the mechanism from its very first substantive session. Nevertheless, the universal commitment expressed by all delegations – including those in the like-minded group – to the success of the global mechanism and to delivering practical results provided a foundation for cautious optimism that substantive work could proceed even as procedural disputes continued to be navigated. The Chair’s framing throughout – emphasising realistic ambition, collective responsibility, and the value of incremental progress – provided a stabilising thread that prevented the confrontations from derailing the session entirely.
The knowledge base confirms that the first substantive session was scheduled for July 2026 [S114] and [S159], and that the opening session included statements from Izumi Nakamitsu and Chair López [S160], consistent with the report’s account.
The knowledge base confirms that Ambassador Egriselda López serves as Chair of the Global Mechanism, as referenced in both the organisational session summary [S2] and the 2nd meeting of the organisational session [S109], which notes Canada congratulating Ambassador López on her election as Chair.
The agenda for the 1st meeting of the plenary session explicitly lists a pre-recorded statement from Under-Secretary-General Izumi Nakamitsu as part of the opening statements [S160], confirming this detail.
The knowledge base confirms that states agreed for the first time to establish a permanent global mechanism at the United Nations to discuss ICT security [S113], corroborating the report’s characterisation of this as a historic milestone.
The knowledge base notes that the Global Mechanism will hold substantive plenary sessions once a year during each biennial cycle [S114] and [S159], providing additional structural context about the permanent and cyclical nature of the process, though the specific phrase ‘single-track’ is not explicitly confirmed in the sources.
The knowledge base references the OEWG 2021-2025 and its work on confidence-building measures and capacity-building [S161], and notes discussions on CBMs in substantive sessions [S167] and [S85], providing supporting context for the OEWG’s achievements as described in the report.
The knowledge base notes that the UN First Committee discussed cybersecurity and artificial intelligence in military applications [S163], and that the OEWG decision to establish a global mechanism represents an important milestone in addressing responsible state behaviour [S163], providing broader context for the thematic concerns raised by Chair López.
The knowledge base confirms that at the organisational session, Chair López outlined the Mechanism’s mandate and emphasised the principles of consensus, inclusivity, transparency and impartiality [S2].
The knowledge base does not explicitly describe the DTGs in detail, though it notes the Global Mechanism will convene in different formats [S114], which is consistent with the existence of complementary formats such as DTGs alongside plenary sessions.
Background and Research Context
Media Remuneration Policy Analysis Mitchell began by establishing her background and the context for CNTI’s work. Coming from 25 years at the Pew Research Center where she helped l…
The Global Mechanism represents a historic first permanent, single-track, consensually agreed forum for ICT security discussions, building on nine years of steady progress
Arg. 1
Nakamitsu highlighted that the new Global Mechanism holds tremendous promise as a permanent, single-track, and consensually agreed process. She expressed confidence rooted in the solid foundation built over nine years of steady progress in ICT security, during which states regularly found consensus solutions even in difficult geopolitical environments.
Nakamitsu noted that ICT security stood out as one of the areas where states regularly sought and found consensus solutions, even when the broader international security environment was not conducive . She highlighted achievements of the past Open-ended Working Group, including global intergovernmental points of contact, confidence-building measures, common understandings on the ICT threat landscape, and capacity building initiatives .
The DTGs represent a key innovation of the process, complementing plenary meetings through in-depth expert discussions, and should benefit from a broad array of expert briefings to inform states' deliberations
Arg. 2
Nakamitsu described the Dedicated Thematic Groups as a key innovation that complements plenary meetings through in-depth expert discussions. She emphasised that DTGs should remain action-oriented and focused, benefiting from a broad array of expert briefings to inform states' further deliberation, and that such contributions would enrich rather than detract from the state-led process.
Nakamitsu stated that the DTGs represent a key innovation of the process, completing and complementing plenary meetings through in-depth expert discussions . She noted that staying true to their action-oriented and focused nature, the DTGs would benefit greatly from a broad array of expert briefings to inform states’ further deliberation, and that such contributions would enrich and not detract from the state-led process .
on: The DTGs represent a key innovation of the process that should be action-oriented, practical, and focused on implementation of the framework for responsible state behaviour
El Salvador accepted the chairmanship with humility and conviction that small states can contribute significantly to consensus building and international peace and security
Arg. 1
The Chair emphasised that El Salvador accepted the honour of leading the Global Mechanism's first biennium with humility but also with firm conviction that small states can make significant contributions to consensus building and international peace and security. She stressed that the focus has been clear from the beginning: moving from agreements to implementation and from commitments to tangible results.
The Chair stated that El Salvador accepted the honour with humility but also with a firm conviction that small states can significantly contribute to consensus building and to strengthening international peace and security . She noted that the focus has been clear from the beginning, going from agreements to implementation and from commitments to tangible results .
The mechanism's value will be measured by its capacity to create understanding, strengthen trust, and produce tangible results, with consensus being built through commitment, flexibility, and political will
Arg. 2
The Chair articulated that the value of the Global Mechanism lies in its capacity to create understanding, strengthen trust, and produce tangible results. She emphasised that consensus is not automatic but must be built through commitment, flexibility, and political will, and that building bridges in a context of growing mistrust is itself an achievement.
The Chair stated that the value of the mechanism will be measured in its capacity to create understanding, strengthen trust, and produce tangible results . She noted that consensus is not automatic but requires commitment, flexibility, and political will to bring delegations closer to points of convergence, and that in a context of growing mistrust, building bridges is in and of itself an achievement .
on: The global mechanism is state-led and consensus-based, with decision-making remaining the exclusive prerogative of member states
The provisional agenda for 2026 and 2027 substantive plenary sessions was adopted by consensus, reflecting good faith and willingness to compromise
Arg. 3
The Chair announced the adoption of the provisional agenda for the 2026 and 2027 substantive plenary sessions, describing it as a good compromise that can effectively guide substantive discussions. She expressed deep gratitude to delegations for their commitment and spirit of cooperation throughout the intensive consultations that preceded this decision.
The Chair shared that she had worked on a proposal to present an agenda covering the 2026 and 2027 plenary sessions to allow future chairs flexibility to make adjustments as necessary . She described the adopted agenda as a good compromise that can effectively help guide substantive discussions , and expressed deep gratitude to delegations for their commitment and spirit of cooperation throughout the intensive consultations .
Thailand welcomed the provisional agenda and looks forward to advancing dialogue across the five pillars of the framework for responsible state behaviour in ICTs
Arg. 1
Thailand welcomed the provisional agenda for 2026 and 2027 and expressed its commitment to advancing dialogue across the five pillars of the framework for responsible state behaviour in ICTs. The delegation emphasised building trust, strengthening resilience against emerging technologies, clarifying international law in cyberspace, implementing existing norms, and delivering needs-based capacity building.
Thailand welcomed the provisional agenda for 2026 and 2027 substantive plenary sessions as well as the indicative proposals for the programme of work . The delegation expressed its intention to advance dialogue across the five pillars of the framework for responsible state behaviour, focusing on building trust and confidence, strengthening resilience against emerging technologies acting as threat multiplier, clarifying the application of international law in cyberspace, effectively implementing existing norms, and delivering needs-based capacity building .
Thailand proposed that the DTGs should discuss topics on capacity building on, first, addressing advanced cyber threats, including artificial intelligence security, quantum readiness, as well as post-quantum cryptography and operational technology security, and providing assistance with national legal and policy frameworks and the application of the DTGs
Arg. 2
Thailand proposed specific topics for the DTGs to discuss, focusing on capacity building related to advanced cyber threats including artificial intelligence security, quantum readiness, post-quantum cryptography, and operational technology security. The delegation also proposed that DTGs address providing assistance with national legal and policy frameworks.
Thailand proposed that the DTGs should discuss topics on capacity building on addressing advanced cyber threats, including artificial intelligence security, quantum readiness, as well as post-quantum cryptography and operational technology security, and providing assistance with national legal and policy frameworks . Thailand also reiterated that capacity building must remain the core of cooperation and deliberation in both the plenary and the DTGs .
on: The DTGs represent a key innovation of the process that should be action-oriented, practical, and focused on implementation of the framework for responsible state behaviour
Montenegro welcomed the establishment of this permanent, single-track forum as a significant step towards structured multilateral dialogue on ICT security
Arg. 1
Montenegro welcomed the establishment of the permanent, single-track Global Mechanism as a significant step towards structured multilateral dialogue on ICT security and responsible state behaviour. The delegation highlighted that cyber threats are not abstract for Montenegro and the wider Western Balkan region, as they face ransomware attacks, state espionage, critical infrastructure disruption, and hybrid operations.
Montenegro noted that it faces a range of ransomware attacks, state espionage, critical infrastructure disruption, and hybrid operations that combine cyber intrusions with disinformation campaigns, which undermine public trust, economic development, and stability for democratic institutions . As a small nation with growing digital infrastructure and EU accession ambitions, Montenegro acknowledged that even a single successful large-scale cyber incident can have disproportionate consequences .
Malawi underscored that the foundation laid through the Open-Ended Working Group remains instrumental, and the mechanism must build upon it with meaningful stakeholder participation
Arg. 1
Malawi emphasised that the work of the Global Mechanism builds upon years of dialogue and consensus achieved through the Open-Ended Working Group, and that this foundation remains instrumental to success. The delegation underscored that meaningful stakeholder participation is indispensable to an implementation-oriented global mechanism, as those who contribute to implementation must be meaningfully engaged throughout the process.
Malawi noted that as reflected in Annex 1 of the 2025 OEWG Final Report, member states agreed to establish an action-oriented permanent mechanism to advance the implementation of a cumulative and evolving framework for responsible state behaviour in the use of ICTs . The delegation stated that meaningful stakeholder participation is indispensable to an implementation-oriented global mechanism, and that if the objective is implementation, then those who contribute to implementation must be meaningfully engaged throughout the process .
Malawi underscored that meaningful stakeholder participation is indispensable to an implementation-oriented global mechanism, as those who contribute to implementation must be meaningfully engaged throughout the process
Arg. 2
Malawi underscored that meaningful stakeholder participation is indispensable to an implementation-oriented global mechanism, arguing that if the objective is implementation, then those who contribute to implementation must be meaningfully engaged throughout the process. The delegation noted that stakeholder participation has informed and strengthened its ongoing efforts to advance its national cybersecurity framework.
Malawi stated that meaningful stakeholder participation is indispensable to an implementation-oriented global mechanism, and that while the agreed modalities provide for stakeholder participation in the dedicated thematic groups, the broadest possible engagement of relevant stakeholders strengthens collective work by bringing technical expertise, operational experience, and practical perspectives . Malawi noted that stakeholder participation has informed and strengthened its ongoing efforts to advance its national cybersecurity framework, including through policy development, institutional strengthening, and enhanced cooperation .
on: The global mechanism is state-led and consensus-based, with decision-making remaining the exclusive prerogative of member states
Over 50% of stakeholders that applied to participate in plenaries have been blocked, with Russia alone raising 43 objections, which is inconsistent with the agreed spirit of inclusivity and the call to use the non-objection mechanism judiciously
Arg. 1
Canada expressed grave concern that more than 50% of stakeholders that applied to participate in plenaries have been blocked, with Russia alone raising 43 objections. Canada argued that this approach is not in line with the letter or spirit of the consensus provision encouraging states to utilise the non-objection mechanism judiciously, bearing in mind the spirit of inclusivity.
Canada noted that more than 50% of stakeholders that applied to participate in plenaries have been blocked, and Russia alone raised 43 objections . Canada quoted the agreed text stating that states are encouraged to utilise the non-objection mechanism judiciously, bearing in mind the spirit of inclusivity , and argued that Russia’s broad brush approach is particularly detrimental to the quality of the work of the body, depriving member states of expertise essential to meaningful cybersecurity discussions .
on: The non-objection mechanism should be used judiciously and in the spirit of inclusivity, and objections should be accompanied by transparent justification
on: Legitimacy and scale of Russia's use of the non-objection mechanism to block stakeholder accreditation
Stakeholders contribute expertise through training, simulations, research, public outreach, threat assessments, and raising awareness on human rights and gender matters related to cybersecurity, and their exclusion deprives member states of essential knowledge
Arg. 2
Canada highlighted the diverse and essential contributions that stakeholders make to cybersecurity discussions, including technical expertise, training, research, and awareness-raising on human rights and gender matters. The delegation argued that vetoes against stakeholders prevent states from fully benefiting from this expertise and make it harder to secure the broad buy-in needed to address malicious cyber activity.
Canada listed the contributions of stakeholders, including expertise through training, simulations, research, public outreach, disseminating cyber hygiene practices, building cheap or free cyber solutions, sharing threat assessments, and raising awareness on human rights and gender matters related to cybersecurity . Canada argued that these vetoes prevent states from fully benefiting from stakeholder expertise and make it harder to secure the broad buy-in needed to address malicious cyber activity .
on: Stakeholders bring essential expertise that governments alone cannot provide, and their participation strengthens the effectiveness of the global mechanism
Canada welcomed the appointment of co-facilitators for the informal DTGs and invited states to refrain from significant departures from UN practice for informal cybersecurity meetings
Arg. 3
Canada welcomed the Chair's appointment of co-facilitators for the informal DTGs, recognising the magnitude of efforts dedicated to ensuring all views were heard before asserting her authority in line with UN practice. Canada invited states to refrain from significant departures from UN practice for UN informal cybersecurity meetings, arguing that informal thematic groups provide value beyond formal plenary statements.
Canada referenced the precedent set by the OEWG for informal meetings, noting that before the May 2024 informal meetings, OEWG Chair Ambassador Ghaffour invited delegations to nominate experts, selected a number from this pool to provide briefings, and reflected states’ views through guiding questions . Canada noted that all stakeholders, whether accredited to the plenaries or not, could participate as discussants or expert briefers in those informal meetings .
on: Whether transparency and justification are required when states exercise the non-objection mechanism
Canada proposed that DTG guiding questions should focus on priorities broadly shared across UN membership, with one or two questions per session, integrated interventions addressing all pillars, and stakeholder participation with dedicated interactive time
Arg. 4
Canada proposed a specific working methodology for the DTGs, suggesting that guiding questions should focus on priorities broadly shared across UN membership, with one or two questions or topics potentially linked to a case study. The delegation recommended that delegations respond through integrated interventions addressing all pillars of the framework, with stakeholders also intervening and dedicated time for interactive discussions.
Canada proposed that to ensure focused and productive exchanges, there should be one or two guiding questions or topics potentially linked to a case study, with delegations responding through integrated interventions addressing all pillars of the framework . Canada stated that these working methods would mirror those of the most recent UN informal cybersecurity meetings and enable the move to substantive discussions as agreed in July 2025 through a week of dedicated thematic groups in December .
on: The DTGs represent a key innovation of the process that should be action-oriented, practical, and focused on implementation of the framework for responsible state behaviour
on: Whether DTG topics, timetables, and outcomes require unanimous consensus approval by all member states
The EU expressed strong regret that 50 stakeholders were objected to, representing a majority of the 70 entities that applied, demonstrating a concerning lack of transparency, predictability, and consistency with the OEWG consensus
Arg. 1
The EU, speaking on behalf of 37 states, expressed strong regret that the accreditation process led to objections against 50 stakeholders, representing a majority of the 70 entities that applied. The EU argued that these objections demonstrate a concerning lack of transparency, predictability, and consistency with the OEWG report consensus, where all agreed to engage with stakeholders in a systematic, sustained, and substantive manner.
The EU cited the example of the EU Institute for Security Studies, which many delegations had worked with over years in New York and on the ground, and which had contributed significantly to discussions by organising side events, publishing papers, and hosting training and capacity building projects, yet was objected to . The EU called on the Chair and co-facilitators to bring in relevant stakeholders who add value to discussions and support states in understanding the cyber threat landscape and implementing the UN Framework of Responsible State Behaviour .
on: Legitimacy and scale of Russia's use of the non-objection mechanism to block stakeholder accreditation
The European Union welcomed the timely appointment of co-facilitators in line with UN practice, viewing them as part of the Chair's team to help operationalise the DTGs over the coming two years
Arg. 2
The EU welcomed the Chair's timely appointment of co-facilitators in line with UN practice, viewing them as part of the Chair's team in their personal capacity to help give shape and further operationalise the DTGs over the coming two years. The EU expressed confidence that the paper circulated on the work of the DTGs sets out a clear way forward.
The EU stated that it welcomes the timely appointment of the co-facilitators in line with UN practice, as they will serve as part of the Chair’s team in their personal capacity to help give shape and further operationalise the DTGs in the coming two years . The EU noted that the paper circulated on the work of the DTGs sets out a clear way forward on how the DTGs should work and gives further elements on how they can become an effective tool for the international community to practically implement the UN Framework .
on: The global mechanism is state-led and consensus-based, with decision-making remaining the exclusive prerogative of member states
on: Whether the Chair had the authority to appoint co-facilitators for the DTGs without consensus
The European Union supported focused, topic-based DTG discussions drawing on expert briefings, with co-facilitators updating the plenary verbally and potentially transmitting written recommendations agreed in the spirit of consensus
Arg. 3
The EU outlined its vision for how the DTGs should function, supporting focused, topic-based discussions drawing on relevant expertise through expert briefings, followed by states' interventions exchanging best practices and developing practical know-how. The EU proposed that co-facilitators could update the plenary verbally and potentially transmit written recommendations agreed upon by states within the DTG context in the spirit of consensus.
The EU stated that the work of the DTGs should provide for focused and topic-based discussions, drawing on relevant expertise through expert briefings, followed by states’ interventions exchanging best practices and developing practical know-how for the implementation of the framework . The EU proposed that DTG co-facilitators could update the plenary next year in a verbal transmission of discussions, in addition to, where needed, a transmission of written recommendations to the plenary session in case they are agreed upon by states within the DTG context in the spirit of consensus .
on: The DTGs represent a key innovation of the process that should be action-oriented, practical, and focused on implementation of the framework for responsible state behaviour
on: Whether DTG topics, timetables, and outcomes require unanimous consensus approval by all member states
Portugal expressed concern that an unusually high number of stakeholder plenary accreditations were blocked, contrary to the agreed spirit of inclusivity, undermining access to essential expertise
Arg. 1
Portugal expressed concern that an unusually high number of stakeholder plenary accreditations have been blocked, contrary to the agreed spirit of inclusivity in the OEWG July 2025 final report. The delegation argued that broad and unexplained vetoes undermine the participation of stakeholders that provide essential expertise, research, training, threat analysis, cyber capacity building, and perspectives on human rights.
Portugal noted that broad and unexplained vetoes undermine the participation of stakeholders that provide access and essential expertise, research, training, threat analysis, cyber capacity building, and perspectives on human rights . Portugal stated that excluding stakeholders in plenaries makes it much more difficult to build the broad cooperation needed to address cybersecurity challenges effectively .
on: Stakeholders bring essential expertise that governments alone cannot provide, and their participation strengthens the effectiveness of the global mechanism
on: Legitimacy and scale of Russia's use of the non-objection mechanism to block stakeholder accreditation
Portugal concurred that the agreed objection mechanism applies only to formal meetings such as plenaries and review conferences, not to informal thematic groups where affected stakeholders will be able to participate
Arg. 2
Portugal concurred with the understanding that the agreed objection mechanism applies only to formal meetings such as plenaries and review conferences, not to informal thematic groups. The delegation noted that affected stakeholders will therefore be able to participate in the December informal thematic groups.
Portugal stated that it concurs that the agreed objection mechanism applies only to formal meetings such as plenaries and review conferences, not to informal thematic groups where affected stakeholders will be able to participate . Portugal welcomed the consultations and exchanges on objections as improvements in terms of both transparency and accountability in stakeholder plenary participation .
on: The agreed modalities for stakeholder participation apply to formal plenary sessions and review conferences, and the objection mechanism does not apply to the informal Dedicated Thematic Groups
on: Whether the non-objection mechanism and accreditation requirements apply to DTGs or only to formal plenary sessions and review conferences
Mexico reiterated that the non-objection mechanism should not be interpreted as giving a state the capacity to block stakeholders that contribute to implementing the mechanism's mandate, but should be used to seek the greatest level of support
Arg. 1
Mexico reiterated the importance of ensuring that the Global Mechanism promotes systematic, substantive, and meaningful participation of stakeholders, arguing that the consensus-based principle should not be interpreted as giving a state the capacity to block stakeholders that may contribute to implementing the mechanism's mandate. Instead, it should be interpreted as solution-seeking to find the greatest level of support amongst member states.
Mexico recalled that the final report of the working group 2021-2025, adopted without a vote, recognises the importance of stakeholder participation and incorporates a non-objection mechanism that should be applied properly and responsibly . Mexico argued that the so-called consensus-based principle should not be interpreted as giving a state the capacity to block the participation of stakeholders that may contribute to implementing the mechanism’s mandate, but should be interpreted as solution-seeking to find the greatest level of support amongst member states .
on: The non-objection mechanism should be used judiciously and in the spirit of inclusivity, and objections should be accompanied by transparent justification
on: Legitimacy and scale of Russia's use of the non-objection mechanism to block stakeholder accreditation
Mexico expressed support for the Chair's prerogative to name co-facilitators pursuant to established practice in other GA processes, welcoming the four nominations as reflecting adequate geographical, gender, and technical balance
Arg. 2
Mexico expressed support for the Chair's prerogative to name co-facilitators for the dedicated thematic groups pursuant to established practice in other General Assembly processes. The delegation welcomed the four nominations announced on 29 June as reflecting adequate geographical and gender balance, as well as the necessary technical expertise.
Mexico stated that it supports the Chair’s prerogative to name the co-facilitators of the dedicated thematic groups pursuant to the established practice in other GA processes, and welcomed the four nominations announced on 29 June, which reflect an adequate geographical and gender balance, as well as the necessary technical expertise . Mexico reiterated that the co-facilitators carry out a supporting role for the chairmanship, and any recommendation coming out of the thematic groups should be considered and, if warranted, adopted by member states in the plenary .
on: The global mechanism is state-led and consensus-based, with decision-making remaining the exclusive prerogative of member states
on: Whether the Chair had the authority to appoint co-facilitators for the DTGs without consensus
Mexico considered that DTG discussions should be structured around scenarios allowing exchange of national experiences, identification of common challenges, and extraction of specific lessons, avoiding duplication of conceptual debates already held in plenary
Arg. 3
Mexico considered that the thematic groups should prioritise practicality and an implementation-focused approach, with discussions structured around scenarios that allow for exchange of national experiences, identification of common challenges, and extraction of specific lessons on the application of the framework for responsible state behaviour. This approach would avoid duplicating conceptual debates that already happen in the plenary.
Mexico stated that DTG discussions should be structured around scenarios that allow for exchange of national experiences, identify common challenges, and extract specific lessons on the application of the framework for responsible state behaviour, thus avoiding duplicating conceptual debates that already happen in the plenary . Mexico also reiterated support for the fact that the thematic groups benefit from the participation of technical experts nominated by member states when this contributes to enriching discussions on highly specialised issues, on a technical basis without undermining the intergovernmental character of the mechanism .
on: The DTGs represent a key innovation of the process that should be action-oriented, practical, and focused on implementation of the framework for responsible state behaviour
on: Whether DTG topics, timetables, and outcomes require unanimous consensus approval by all member states
The Netherlands deeply regretted that 50 of 92 multi-stakeholders were objected to, with 43 blocked by one member state without proper explanation, going against the spirit of what was agreed in the OEWG
Arg. 1
The Netherlands deeply regretted that 50 of the 92 multi-stakeholders that indicated their interest to participate in the plenary session were objected to by member states, with 43 blocked by one member state without giving proper explanation. The delegation argued that this goes against the spirit of what was agreed during the Open-Ended Working Group and unnecessarily hinders the practical potential of the UN Global Mechanism.
The Netherlands noted that 50 of the 92 multi-stakeholders that indicated their interest to participate in the plenary were objected to by member states, with 43 blocked by one member state without giving proper explanation . The delegation stated that this goes against the spirit of what was agreed during the Open-Ended Working Group and unnecessarily hinders the practical potential of the UN global mechanism .
on: The non-objection mechanism should be used judiciously and in the spirit of inclusivity, and objections should be accompanied by transparent justification
on: Legitimacy and scale of Russia's use of the non-objection mechanism to block stakeholder accreditation
Netherlands stated that multi-stakeholders should be able to participate in a meaningful manner in the DTGs themselves and speak in their own capacity, given the informal nature of the DTGs
Arg. 2
The Netherlands argued that given the informal nature of the DTGs, multi-stakeholders should be able to participate in a meaningful manner in the DTGs themselves and speak in their own capacity. The delegation also noted that states should timely provide co-facilitators with their preferences on which experts should be considered for the pool of experts.
The Netherlands stated that given the informal nature of the DTGs, multi-stakeholders should be able to participate in a meaningful manner in the DTGs themselves and speak in their own capacity . The delegation also noted that states should timely provide co-facilitators with their preferences on which experts should be considered for the pool of experts, and that in line with the Open-Ended Working Group agreements, these experts will brief states on scenario-based topics in the DTGs .
on: The agreed modalities for stakeholder participation apply to formal plenary sessions and review conferences, and the objection mechanism does not apply to the informal Dedicated Thematic Groups
on: Whether the non-objection mechanism and accreditation requirements apply to DTGs or only to formal plenary sessions and review conferences
Colombia noted with concern the high number of blocked stakeholders and called for broad, representative, and meaningful participation of experts, academia, civil society, and the private sector
Arg. 1
Colombia noted with concern the high number of stakeholders whose participation was blocked in the framework of the plenary session. The delegation called for ensuring broad, representative, and meaningful participation of experts nominated by states as well as academia, civil society, and the private sector, arguing that the mechanism will only reach its goal if it reflects the multidimensional nature of the digital sphere.
Colombia recalled that the objection mechanism contemplated in the modalities for participation agreed by consensus in 2025 applies exclusively to formal plenary sessions and review conferences and not to thematic groups whose meetings are informal in nature . Colombia argued that the experience and technical knowledge of stakeholders enrich member states’ discussions and contribute to ensuring that adopted decisions effectively respond to the challenges and realities of the digital sphere .
Colombia supported and welcomed the selection of co-facilitators on an individual basis, considering that reflecting geographic balance between developed and developing countries favours a more inclusive and representative dynamic
Arg. 2
Colombia supported and welcomed the selection of co-facilitators on an individual basis, bearing in mind their technical experience and the principle of gender equality. The delegation considered that reflecting a geographic balance between developed and developing countries favours a more inclusive and representative dynamic by incorporating the perspectives, experiences, and strengths of both parties.
Colombia stated that it supports and welcomes the selection of co-facilitators on an individual basis, bearing in mind their technical experience and the principle of gender equality . The delegation considered that reflecting a geographic balance between developed and developing countries favours a more inclusive and representative dynamic by incorporating the perspectives, experiences, and strengths of both parties .
on: Whether the Chair had the authority to appoint co-facilitators for the DTGs without consensus
Colombia urged that simultaneous interpretation be ensured in DTG meetings to allow technical experts from different regions and linguistic contexts to participate fully and meaningfully
Arg. 3
Colombia urged that whenever possible, simultaneous interpretation be ensured in the meetings of the thematic groups, in keeping with the inclusive spirit of the mechanism. The delegation argued that technical experts from different regions and linguistic contexts should be able to participate fully and meaningfully in discussions.
Colombia stated that it wishes to reiterate a condition that is practical but critical for the effective functioning of thematic groups, namely the availability of simultaneous interpretation . The delegation urged that whenever possible, simultaneous interpretation be ensured in the meetings of the thematic groups, in keeping with the inclusive spirit of the mechanism, so that technical experts from different regions and linguistic contexts can participate fully and meaningfully .
Switzerland expressed deep regret that objections were raised against a large number of qualified stakeholders, noting that Russia, despite having initiated the OEWG, is now preventing states from accessing expertise required to fulfil the mandate
Arg. 1
Switzerland expressed deep regret that objections have been raised against a large number of qualified stakeholders, arguing that excluding them hinders the effective implementation of the mandate, particularly in capacity building. The delegation noted the irony that Russia, which initiated the Open-Ended Working Group and thereby gave various stakeholder groups access to ICT discussions at the UN, is now preventing states from accessing the expertise required to fulfil the mandate.
Switzerland noted that thanks to Russia’s initiative in establishing the Open-Ended Working Group, various stakeholder groups gained access to ICT discussions at the United Nations . However, by vetoing almost half of the stakeholders that applied to participate in the new mechanism, including some that were able to participate in the OEWG’s work, Russia is preventing states from accessing the expertise required to fulfil the mandate .
on: Legitimacy and scale of Russia's use of the non-objection mechanism to block stakeholder accreditation
Switzerland welcomed the appointment of co-facilitators in line with UN practice as an important step in preparing for the December DTG meetings
Arg. 2
Switzerland welcomed the Chair's appointment of co-facilitators in line with UN practice, describing it as an important step in preparing for the meetings of the dedicated thematic groups in December and in the implementation of the global mechanism. The delegation emphasised the need to start preparing for the work of the DTGs without delay.
Switzerland stated that it welcomes the Chair’s appointment of co-facilitators in line with UN practice as an important step in preparing for the meetings of the dedicated thematic groups in December, as well as in the implementation of the global mechanism . Switzerland emphasised that it is crucial to start preparing for the work of the DTGs without delay, noting the need to know which topics will be discussed, how discussions will be structured, and which experts states should send to the meetings in New York .
on: The DTGs represent a key innovation of the process that should be action-oriented, practical, and focused on implementation of the framework for responsible state behaviour
on: Whether DTG topics, timetables, and outcomes require unanimous consensus approval by all member states
Switzerland noted that the private sector owns and operates much of the world's digital infrastructure, the technical community develops and secures it, academia advances collective understanding, and civil society contributes on resilience and human rights
Arg. 3
Switzerland emphasised the importance of meaningful multi-stakeholder engagement, noting that governments cannot address today's complex cyber challenges alone. The delegation outlined the distinct contributions of different stakeholder groups: the private sector owns and operates much of the world's digital infrastructure, the technical community develops and secures it, academia advances collective understanding, and civil society contributes essential expertise on resilience, human rights, and capacity building.
Switzerland stated that the private sector owns and operates much of the world’s digital infrastructure, the technical community develops and secures it, and academia advances collective understanding . Switzerland noted that civil society contributes essential expertise on resilience, human rights, and capacity building, and that it is therefore regrettable that objections have been raised against such a large number of qualified stakeholders .
on: Stakeholders bring essential expertise that governments alone cannot provide, and their participation strengthens the effectiveness of the global mechanism
New Zealand highlighted that mass non-transparent objections deprive smaller, geographically isolated countries of access to international expertise, undermining the spirit of inclusivity and the practical purpose of the mechanism
Arg. 1
New Zealand expressed disappointment at the mass objection to dozens of stakeholders' participation with no meaningful attempt to transparently explain such an approach. The delegation highlighted that for smaller, geographically isolated countries like New Zealand, large-scale non-transparent objections deprive them of the ability to benefit from the participation of international representatives from academia, civil society, and industry.
New Zealand noted that for New Zealand, as a smaller and geographically isolated country, it does not always have ready access to the expertise and insights of international representatives from academia, civil society, and industry . The delegation argued that large-scale, non-transparent objections deprive it of the ability to benefit from stakeholder participation, and that their involvement would support the state-led process by levelling the information playing field for smaller states .
on: Legitimacy and scale of Russia's use of the non-objection mechanism to block stakeholder accreditation
Russia defended its objections, stating that all organisations refused accreditation did not meet the criterion of objectivity and non-politicisation, as they practised unfounded political attribution of cyber attacks or carried out politicised propaganda
Arg. 1
Russia responded to criticism by recalling that member states have every right to refuse accreditation of any NGO wishing to participate in the work of the Global Mechanism, as agreed in the modalities. Russia stated that all organisations it refused accreditation for did not meet the criterion of objectivity and non-politicisation, as they practised unfounded political attribution of computer attacks or carried out politicised propaganda to tarnish the reputation of countries.
Russia stated that when making decisions on allowing NGOs, it was guided by paragraph 15i of the agreed modalities, which says that NGOs should participate in activities of the negotiation objectively and refrain from politicisation . Russia argued that the analysis of the work of the refused organisations showed that these NGOs practised and still practise unfounded political attribution of computer attacks, or carry out politicised propaganda to tarnish the reputation of countries .
on: Whether transparency and justification are required when states exercise the non-objection mechanism
Russia stated it does not recognise the Chair's decision to appoint co-facilitators, arguing it contradicts UNGA-approved parameters and was made in circumvention of the consensus procedure and in violation of the principle of the guiding role of states
Arg. 2
Russia stated that it does not recognise the Chair's decision to appoint co-facilitators for the dedicated thematic groups, arguing that this decision contradicts the UNGA-approved parameters of the global mechanism. Russia argued that the decision was made in circumvention of the consensus procedure and in violation of the principle of the guiding role of states, and cannot be seen as legitimate or serve as a precedent.
Russia stated that given the results of consultations with member states held from April to June showing that no consensus was reached on candidates for these posts, the Chair’s decision to appoint co-facilitators contradicts the UNGA-approved parameters of the global mechanism . Russia argued that this decision was made in circumvention of the consensus procedure and in violation of the principle of the guiding role of states, and that such a measure cannot be seen as legitimate, let alone serve as a precedent for the further functioning of the global mechanism .
on: The global mechanism is state-led and consensus-based, with decision-making remaining the exclusive prerogative of member states
on: Whether the Chair had the authority to appoint co-facilitators for the DTGs without consensus
Russia argued that the list of topics for DTGs should be developed and approved transparently and unanimously, that reports not unanimously approved cannot be regarded as legitimate, and that only accredited NGOs may serve as briefers
Arg. 3
Russia argued that the list of topics for DTGs should be developed and approved transparently and unanimously, taking into account the priorities and concerns of all member states. The delegation stated that reports of co-facilitators not unanimously approved by states cannot be regarded as legitimate, and that only accredited NGOs may serve as briefers, with no other category of external participants permitted.
Russia stated that the list of topics should be developed and approved transparently and unanimously, taking into account the priorities and concerns of all member states, and that discussions should be structured in strict accordance with the five pillars of the mechanism’s mandate without singling out individual issues of interest to a narrow group of states . Russia argued that according to paragraph 8a of Annex 1 to the final report of the OEWG, no stakeholders other than briefers may participate in the work of the DTGs, and that speakers must be selected from accredited NGOs .
on: Whether DTG topics, timetables, and outcomes require unanimous consensus approval by all member states
Kiribati, as a small island state, emphasised that objecting states should share the basis of their objections so concerns can be understood and resolved, as transparency costs little but silence costs the rest a great deal
Arg. 1
Kiribati spoke candidly about the objections that have kept a number of stakeholders from the session, acknowledging the right of member states to raise objections but emphasising that the agreed modalities ask states to use the non-objection mechanism judicially and to make the general basis of their objection known. Kiribati argued that transparency costs the objecting state little, while silence costs the rest a great deal.
Kiribati noted that the agreed modalities ask states to use the non-objection mechanism judicially and call on an objecting state to make the general basis of its objection known so that the Chair may consult, address the concern, and facilitate accreditations wherever possible . Kiribati argued that transparency here costs the objecting state little, while silence costs the rest a great deal, and that for a small island state like Kiribati, the stakeholders excluded are very often precisely the partners on whom states like theirs are most dependent .
on: The non-objection mechanism should be used judiciously and in the spirit of inclusivity, and objections should be accompanied by transparent justification
on: Whether transparency and justification are required when states exercise the non-objection mechanism
For small island states like Kiribati, cybersecurity capacity was built with the support of technical partners and regional bodies, and stakeholders sharpened the quality of deliberations and helped move the mechanism from description toward delivery
Arg. 2
Kiribati shared its own experience as a small island state, noting that its cybersecurity posture was not built by government alone but with the support of technical partners, regional bodies, and the wider community. The delegation argued that stakeholders sharpened the quality of deliberations, grounded them in operational experience, and helped move the mechanism from description toward delivery.
Kiribati stated that its national strategy, maturity assessment, legal frameworks, and operational capabilities were shaped with the support of technical partners, regional bodies, and the wider community . The delegation noted that stakeholders sharpened the quality of deliberations, grounded them in operational experience, and helped move the mechanism from description toward delivery .
on: Stakeholders bring essential expertise that governments alone cannot provide, and their participation strengthens the effectiveness of the global mechanism
Italy expressed deep disappointment at the high number of objections, including against four Italian stakeholders, and noted the lack of transparency regarding the actual reasons for the Russian objections
Arg. 1
Italy expressed deep disappointment at the very high number of objections against the accreditation of stakeholders from many countries, including Italy. The delegation noted the lack of transparency related to the actual reasons for the Russian objections against four Italian stakeholders whose contributions to the plenary could have enriched discussions.
Italy expressed deep disappointment for the very high number of objections against the accreditation of stakeholders from many countries, including Italy . Italy noted concern about the lack of transparency related to the actual reasons for the Russian objections against four Italian stakeholders whose contributions to the plenary could have enriched the discussions .
Italy affirmed that the appointment of co-facilitators does not contravene any modality or rule and ensures appropriate balance in geographical, development, and gender terms
Arg. 2
Italy welcomed the appointment of the four co-facilitators and affirmed that such appointment does not contravene any modality or rule, and that it ensures an appropriate balance in geographical, development, and gender terms. Italy also reaffirmed the importance of making the DTGs operational as soon as possible, as they represent the real added value of the mechanism.
Italy stated that it believes the appointment of co-facilitators does not contravene any modality or rule, and that it ensures an appropriate balance in geographical, development, and gender terms . Italy also reaffirmed the importance of making the DTGs operational as soon as possible because they are the real added value of the mechanism, as also recalled by Undersecretary General Nakamitsu, thanks to their practical and action-oriented nature complementing the plenary .
on: Whether the Chair had the authority to appoint co-facilitators for the DTGs without consensus
Italy argued that paragraph 15 of Annex I to the OEWG final report clearly affirms that accreditation is needed for plenary and review conferences only, and that DTGs have an informal nature not requiring prior accreditation for stakeholders
Arg. 3
Italy argued that paragraph 15 of Annex I to the OEWG's final report clearly affirms that accreditation is needed for plenary and review conferences only, and that DTGs have an informal nature that does not require prior accreditation for stakeholders. The delegation also noted that classifying all stakeholders as NGOs is a clear attempt to politicise the participation of interested parties whose technical contribution can be key to collective work.
Italy noted that the stakeholder community includes a wide range of actors, not only NGOs, and that classifying all stakeholders as NGOs is a clear attempt to politicise the participation of interested parties whose technical contribution can be key to collective work . Italy stated that paragraph 15 of Annex I to the OEWG’s final report clearly affirms that accreditation is needed for plenary and review conferences only, and that DTGs have an informal nature and do not need prior accreditation for stakeholders .
on: The agreed modalities for stakeholder participation apply to formal plenary sessions and review conferences, and the objection mechanism does not apply to the informal Dedicated Thematic Groups
on: Whether the non-objection mechanism and accreditation requirements apply to DTGs or only to formal plenary sessions and review conferences
China supported NGO involvement in principle but emphasised that NGOs must respect agreed procedures and meet established criteria, and that the same rules applying to plenary participation should apply to DTGs
Arg. 1
China stated that it supports in principle the involvement of NGOs in the process, but emphasised that there is no position that NGOs can participate at will, as they must respect certain procedures and meet established criteria. China argued that the same rules of NGO participation that apply to the plenary should also apply to their participation in DTGs, to guarantee that DTG outcomes can become an integral part of plenary outcomes.
China stated that the matter being discussed is not a question of whether or not NGOs should participate, but rather whether they should respect the procedures that were agreed upon . China argued that if DTGs use a totally different set of rules of procedure, it will undermine the competence of member states in their discussions and the seriousness of the final outcome coming out of the DTG discussions, risking DTGs becoming nothing more than a workshop or even a side event .
on: The global mechanism is state-led and consensus-based, with decision-making remaining the exclusive prerogative of member states
China argued that if DTGs use a totally different set of rules of procedure from the plenary, it will undermine the competence of member states and the seriousness of final outcomes, risking DTGs becoming mere workshops or side events
Arg. 2
China argued that if the DTG mechanism uses a totally different set of rules of procedure from the plenary, it will undermine the competence of member states in their discussions and the seriousness of the final outcomes coming out of the DTG discussions. China warned that if things go on like this, DTGs will become nothing more than a workshop or even a side event, which is not what member states wish to see.
China argued that if the DTG mechanism uses a totally different set of rules of procedure, it will undermine the competence of member states in their discussions and also undermine the seriousness of the final outcome coming out of the DTG discussions . China warned that if things go on like this, DTGs will become nothing more than a workshop or even a side event, and stated that all member states are hoping for the success of this innovation .
on: Whether the non-objection mechanism and accreditation requirements apply to DTGs or only to formal plenary sessions and review conferences
Japan expressed concern that objections were raised in a non-judicious manner and stated that any objections should be accompanied by appropriate justification and explained transparently
Arg. 1
Japan expressed concern that objections were raised in a non-judicious manner with respect to the requests of numerous private sector organisations to participate in the global mechanism. The delegation stated that in light of the agreed provision requiring objections to be expressed judiciously, any objections should be accompanied by appropriate justification and explained transparently.
Japan noted that as communicated to all delegations in the Chair’s letter in June, it is concerned that objections were raised in a non-judicious manner with respect to the requests of numerous private sector organisations to participate in the global mechanism . Japan stated that in light of paragraph 15 of Annex 1 to the final report of the UNOEWG, which provides that objections need to be expressed judiciously, any objections should be accompanied by appropriate justification, and those countries that have raised objections should explain their reasons in a transparent manner .
on: The non-objection mechanism should be used judiciously and in the spirit of inclusivity, and objections should be accompanied by transparent justification
on: Whether transparency and justification are required when states exercise the non-objection mechanism
Japan emphasised that as cyber threats become increasingly sophisticated, it is essential to draw on private sector expertise in assessing threats and developing concrete responses through a multi-stakeholder approach
Arg. 2
Japan emphasised the importance of the multi-stakeholder approach, noting that as cyber threats become increasingly sophisticated and complex, it is essential to draw on the expertise of the private sector in assessing threats and developing concrete responses. Japan considered that public-private cooperation within the global mechanism will be further strengthened through expert briefings and interactive discussions in both plenary sessions and DTGs.
Japan stated that as cyber threats become increasingly sophisticated and complex, it is essential to draw on the expertise of the private sector in assessing threats and developing concrete responses . Japan considered that public-private cooperation within the global mechanism will be further strengthened through expert briefings and interactive public-private discussions in the plenary sessions, as well as DTGs, deepening common understanding and awareness of cybersecurity issues among all nations .
on: Stakeholders bring essential expertise that governments alone cannot provide, and their participation strengthens the effectiveness of the global mechanism
Japan supported the Chair's appointment of co-facilitators, believing they will contribute to fostering constructive discussions in the DTGs under the Chair's leadership
Arg. 3
Japan expressed support for the Chair's appointment of co-facilitators from the four countries, believing they will contribute to fostering constructive discussions in the DTGs under the Chair's leadership. Japan also emphasised the importance of DTG1 prioritising concrete discussions on pressing issues such as ransomware and attacks on critical infrastructure.
Japan stated that it believes the co-facilitators from the four countries appointed by the Chair will contribute to fostering constructive discussions in the DTGs under the Chair’s leadership, and therefore Japan supports the Chair’s appointment of the co-facilitators . Japan also emphasised that it is important that DTG1 prioritise and hold concrete discussions focused on pressing issues such as ransomware attacks and cyber attacks on critical infrastructure .
on: Whether the Chair had the authority to appoint co-facilitators for the DTGs without consensus
Japan emphasised that DTG1 should prioritise concrete discussions on pressing issues such as ransomware and attacks on critical infrastructure using specific scenarios, while DTG2 should ensure broad stakeholder participation and address capacity building efficiently
Arg. 4
Japan outlined its priorities for the two DTGs, emphasising that DTG1 should prioritise concrete discussions focused on pressing issues such as ransomware attacks and cyber attacks on critical infrastructure, using specific scenarios and drawing on briefings by experts including from the private sector. DTG2 should ensure broad stakeholder participation while advancing discussions on how to approach capacity building efficiently and effectively, taking into account the needs of each country.
Japan stated that it is important that DTG1 prioritise and hold concrete discussions focused on pressing issues such as ransomware attacks and cyber attacks on critical infrastructure, with specific scenarios in mind, drawing on briefings by experts including from the private sector . Japan also stated that it is important that DTG2 ensure broad stakeholder participation, including from the private sector, while eliminating duplication in assistance efforts and advancing discussions on how to approach capacity building in an efficient and effective manner, taking into account the needs of each country .
on: The DTGs represent a key innovation of the process that should be action-oriented, practical, and focused on implementation of the framework for responsible state behaviour
on: Whether DTG topics, timetables, and outcomes require unanimous consensus approval by all member states
Iran argued that the agreed modalities apply to the global mechanism as a whole, including DTGs, and that technical briefers should be drawn exclusively from accredited stakeholders
Arg. 1
Iran argued that the open-ended working group adopted specific modalities governing stakeholder participation in the global mechanism as a whole, including dedicated thematic groups, and that no distinction is drawn between plenary meetings and DTG meetings for the purposes of stakeholder participation. Iran stated that technical briefers should be drawn exclusively from among stakeholders accredited in accordance with the agreed modalities.
Iran stated that neither Annex C to the third annual progress report nor Annex A to the final report draws any distinction between plenary meetings and dedicated thematic group meetings for the purposes of stakeholder participation . Iran argued that while general UN practice may be relevant where agreed procedures are absent, it cannot supersede or modify modalities that member states have specifically negotiated and adopted by consensus for a particular mechanism .
Iran argued that the proposal to authorise the Chair to appoint facilitators was removed from the initial draft during OEWG negotiations because it did not enjoy consensus, meaning the agreed outcome deliberately did not confer such authority to the Chair
Arg. 2
Iran argued that the modalities governing the appointment of facilitators and their functions are already clearly set out in the agreed OEWG documents. The delegation recalled that during negotiations on the modalities of the global mechanism in the OEWG, the proposal to authorise the Chair to appoint facilitators appeared in the initial draft but was ultimately removed because it did not enjoy the consensus of member states, meaning the agreed outcome deliberately did not confer such authority to the Chair.
Iran recalled that during the negotiations on the modalities of the global mechanism in the OEWG, the proposal to authorise the Chair to appoint the facilitators appeared in the initial draft but was ultimately removed because it did not enjoy the consensus of member states . Iran argued that the agreed outcome therefore reflects a deliberate decision by states not to confer such authority to the Chair, and that the Chair’s approach to the appointment of facilitators is not consistent with the consensus-based decision-making modality agreed for the global mechanism .
on: Whether the Chair had the authority to appoint co-facilitators for the DTGs without consensus
Iran stated that discussion topics and timetables for DTGs should be agreed by consensus among all member states, and expressed reservations about co-facilitator summaries, preferring outcomes recorded as rolling text evolving into consensus recommendations
Arg. 3
Iran stated that discussion topics and timetables for DTGs should be agreed by consensus among all member states to reflect the priorities and concerns of all countries, and should fully and faithfully reflect all five pillars in a balanced manner. Iran also expressed reservations about the preparation of co-facilitator summaries, arguing that summaries inevitably reflect the characterisation of the discussion and cannot fully capture the positions of all delegations, preferring instead that outcomes be recorded from the outset as rolling text evolving into consensus recommendations.
Iran argued that discussion topics as well as the timetable for the dedicated thematic groups should be agreed by consensus among all member states to reflect the priorities and concerns of all countries, and should fully and faithfully reflect all five pillars in a balanced manner without according priority to certain issues at the expense of others . Iran expressed reservations about co-facilitator summaries, noting that experience in other UN processes has demonstrated that it is impossible in practice to ensure complete objectivity, and suggested that it would be preferable to record outcomes from the outset in the form of rolling text which could progressively evolve into consensus recommendations .
on: Whether DTG topics, timetables, and outcomes require unanimous consensus approval by all member states
Iran argued that the agreed modalities apply to the global mechanism as a whole including DTGs, and that no stakeholders other than accredited briefers may participate, with briefings being optional and requiring approval of all member states
Arg. 4
Iran argued that the agreed modalities governing stakeholder participation apply to the global mechanism as a whole, including dedicated thematic groups, and that there is no need to rely on the practice of other UN processes. The delegation stated that technical briefers should be drawn exclusively from among accredited stakeholders, and that the pool of experts should consist solely of stakeholders accredited through the established consensus-based process.
Iran stated that the global mechanism is governed by stakeholder participation modalities that were specifically negotiated and agreed by member states, and that while general UN practice may be relevant where agreed procedures are absent, it cannot supersede or modify modalities that member states have specifically negotiated and adopted by consensus . Iran argued that technical briefers should be drawn exclusively from among stakeholders accredited in accordance with the agreed modalities, and that the pool of experts from which technical briefers may be selected should consist solely of stakeholders accredited by member states through the established consensus-based process .
Chile stated that excluding over half of applicants is difficult to align with the commitment to promote systematic and substantive interaction with stakeholders, and that broad vetoes without known reasons contradict the spirit of inclusivity
Arg. 1
Chile argued that the inclusion of over half of applicants is difficult to align with the commitment assumed by member states to promote substantive and systematic interaction with stakeholders. The delegation stated that broad-based vetoes without any known reasons contradict the progress made in the 2025 consensus and the spirit of inclusivity that was agreed upon.
Chile stated that the inclusion of over half of applicants is difficult to align with the commitment assumed by member states to promote a substantive and systematic interaction with stakeholders on the basis of Point A, Annex 1 of Report 257, and that such restrictive participation could weaken that commitment from the very beginning of the global mechanism . Chile argued that broad-based vetoes without any known reasons contradict the progress made in the 2025 consensus and the spirit of inclusivity that was agreed upon .
on: Legitimacy and scale of Russia's use of the non-objection mechanism to block stakeholder accreditation
Chile expressed hope that the situation of blocked stakeholders would not extend to the work of the DTGs, as the non-objection procedure was contemplated only for substantive plenary sessions and review conferences, not thematic working groups
Arg. 2
Chile expressed hope that the situation of blocked stakeholders would not be extended to the work of the dedicated thematic working groups. The delegation argued that on the basis of the agreed modalities, the non-objection procedure was contemplated for substantive plenary sessions and review conferences only, and was not contemplated to apply to the thematic working groups.
Chile stated that on the basis of the modalities agreed upon by consensus, the non-objection procedure was contemplated for substantive plenary sessions as well as review conferences, and it was not contemplated that this would be applied to the thematic working groups . Chile expressed hope to have broad and substantive participation from stakeholders in the DTGs, whose experiences and knowledge will contribute to the work .
on: The agreed modalities for stakeholder participation apply to formal plenary sessions and review conferences, and the objection mechanism does not apply to the informal Dedicated Thematic Groups
on: Whether the non-objection mechanism and accreditation requirements apply to DTGs or only to formal plenary sessions and review conferences
Germany expressed regret that some states failed to exercise restraint in assessing stakeholder accreditation requests, and noted that the EU member states provided written explanation for their own objection in the spirit of transparent dialogue
Arg. 1
Germany expressed regret that some states failed to exercise restraint when assessing stakeholder accreditation requests for the plenary meeting, instead using their veto power almost indiscriminately, with more than half of the entities applying for accreditation rejected by few states. Germany noted that in the spirit of transparent and open dialogue, EU member states provided a written explanation for having vetoed the accreditation of one stakeholder whose behaviour was deemed to contravene the ambition of the global mechanism.
Germany expressed regret that some states failed to exercise restraint when assessing stakeholder accreditation requests for the plenary meeting, instead using their veto power almost indiscriminately, with more than half of the entities applying for accreditation rejected, most of them by few states . Germany noted that in the spirit of transparent and open dialogue following their veto, in accordance with Annex 1 of the final report of the Open-ended Working Group, the EU member states provided a written explanation for having vetoed the accreditation of one stakeholder whose behaviour was deemed to contravene the ambition of the global mechanism .
on: The non-objection mechanism should be used judiciously and in the spirit of inclusivity, and objections should be accompanied by transparent justification
on: Whether transparency and justification are required when states exercise the non-objection mechanism
Germany highlighted the potential for greater inclusivity in the agreed hybrid modalities for DTGs, noting that remote participation will allow experts of smaller states and stakeholders with limited resources to participate
Arg. 2
Germany highlighted the potential for greater inclusivity in the agreed hybrid modalities for DTGs, noting that remote participation will allow experts of smaller states and stakeholders with limited resources to participate in discussions. The delegation also emphasised that academia, the private sector, technical experts, and NGOs can provide meaningful insights to advance discussions on all elements of the framework during the DTGs.
Germany noted that it sees potential for greater inclusivity in the agreed hybrid modalities for DTGs, and that remote participation will allow experts of smaller states and stakeholders with limited resources to participate in the discussions, while also recognising some of the challenges brought forward by some delegations related to that . Germany stated that as noted by Kiribati, stakeholder participation is not an abstract question but will have direct impact on the work and effectiveness, also with regard to capacity building, and that academia, the private sector, technical experts, and NGOs can provide meaningful insights to advance discussions on all elements of the framework during the DTGs .
on: The agreed modalities for stakeholder participation apply to formal plenary sessions and review conferences, and the objection mechanism does not apply to the informal Dedicated Thematic Groups
on: Whether the non-objection mechanism and accreditation requirements apply to DTGs or only to formal plenary sessions and review conferences
The United Kingdom deeply regretted Russia's excessive use of the non-objection mechanism, including blocking six stakeholders that had made meaningful contributions to the OEWG, and reiterated that DTG participation does not require accreditation
Arg. 1
The United Kingdom deeply regretted Russia's excessive use of the non-objection mechanism to block stakeholder participation in the plenary, noting that Russia objected to more than half of all accreditation applicants, including six stakeholders that were accredited and made meaningful contributions to the OEWG. The delegation reiterated that dedicated thematic groups are informal working groups and as such stakeholder participation at DTGs does not require accreditation.
The United Kingdom noted that Russia has objected to more than half of all accreditation applicants, including six stakeholders that were accredited and made meaningful contributions to the OEWG, and argued that such a large number of objections is clearly inconsistent with the commitment all states have made to exercise the non-objection mechanism judiciously . The United Kingdom reiterated that the dedicated thematic groups are informal working groups and as such stakeholder participation at DTGs does not require accreditation, consistent with both the modalities agreed by consensus and with established UN practice including the May 2024 intersessional of the OEWG where unaccredited stakeholders attended and contributed to discussions .
on: The non-objection mechanism should be used judiciously and in the spirit of inclusivity, and objections should be accompanied by transparent justification
on: Whether transparency and justification are required when states exercise the non-objection mechanism
The United Kingdom reiterated that DTGs are informal working groups and stakeholder participation does not require accreditation, consistent with agreed modalities and established UN practice including the May 2024 OEWG intersessional
Arg. 2
The United Kingdom reiterated for the avoidance of doubt that the dedicated thematic groups are informal working groups, and as such stakeholder participation at DTGs does not require accreditation. The delegation argued this is consistent with both the modalities agreed by consensus and with established UN practice, citing the May 2024 intersessional of the OEWG where unaccredited stakeholders attended and contributed to discussions.
The United Kingdom stated that the dedicated thematic groups are informal working groups and as such stakeholder participation at DTGs does not require accreditation, consistent with both the modalities agreed by consensus and with established UN practice . The delegation cited the May 2024 intersessional of the OEWG where unaccredited stakeholders attended and contributed to discussions as an example of this established UN practice .
on: The agreed modalities for stakeholder participation apply to formal plenary sessions and review conferences, and the objection mechanism does not apply to the informal Dedicated Thematic Groups
on: Whether the non-objection mechanism and accreditation requirements apply to DTGs or only to formal plenary sessions and review conferences
Republic of Korea aligned with Canada and the EU, stating that the global mechanism should be open and inclusive, and that grounds for any objection should be made transparent
Arg. 1
The Republic of Korea aligned itself with Canada and the EU, emphasising that the global mechanism should be open and inclusive to fully benefit from the expertise and experience of stakeholders. The delegation stated that in cases where a member state objects to the participation of a specific stakeholder, the grounds for such an objection should also be made transparent.
The Republic of Korea stated that given the rapid pace of technological development, the meaningful participation of multi-stakeholders is indispensable if states are to respond effectively to the evolving cyber landscape . The delegation stated that in cases where a member state objects to the participation of a specific stakeholder, the grounds for such an objection should also be made transparent .
on: The non-objection mechanism should be used judiciously and in the spirit of inclusivity, and objections should be accompanied by transparent justification
on: Whether transparency and justification are required when states exercise the non-objection mechanism
Poland condemned Russia's mass blocking of NGOs without substantive justification, citing the example of the Łódź Cyber Hub, and argued that raising objections en masse undermines the legitimacy of the process
Arg. 1
Poland condemned Russia's blocking of numerous non-governmental organisations on a massive scale without substantive justification, citing the specific example of the Polish Łódź Cyber Hub, a centre of research on international law in cyberspace operating within a public academic institution. Poland argued that raising objections en masse without justification runs counter to the commitment to exercise the objection mechanism judicially and in a spirit of inclusivity, and undermines the legitimacy of the process itself.
Poland cited the example of the Polish Łódź Cyber Hub, a centre of research on international law in cyberspace operating since 2021 within the Department of Public International Law and International Relations at the Faculty of Law and Administration of the University of Łódź, which has engaged in shaping cybersecurity policy at the United Nations including through the Open-Ended Working Group . Poland noted that an objection to the university’s participation was raised by a single member state without providing a substantive justification, and argued that raising objections en masse without justification runs counter to the commitment to exercise the objection mechanism judicially and undermines the legitimacy of the process .
on: The non-objection mechanism should be used judiciously and in the spirit of inclusivity, and objections should be accompanied by transparent justification
on: Whether transparency and justification are required when states exercise the non-objection mechanism
Estonia explained its own objection to JSC Positive Technologies, citing its links to the FSB and EU sanctions, and argued that inclusivity cannot come at the expense of integrity, trust, and security
Arg. 1
Estonia explained its own objection to JSC Positive Technologies, citing its links to the FSB and the fact that it has been subjected to EU sanctions, and argued that inclusivity cannot come at the expense of integrity, trust, and security. Estonia emphasised that it did not hide behind procedures but set out its reasons in writing and made them publicly available, arguing that transparency matters especially when objections are raised.
Estonia noted that JSC Positive Technologies is part of Positive Group BJSC and operates in the Russian IT sector, holding a licence administered by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB), and has been identified as supporting Russian government clients including the FSB . Estonia noted that Positive Group BJSC was subjected to EU sanctions in the context of Russia’s actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of Ukraine, as part of the EU’s 11th sanction package adopted on 23 June 2023 .
on: The non-objection mechanism should be used judiciously and in the spirit of inclusivity, and objections should be accompanied by transparent justification
on: Whether transparency and justification are required when states exercise the non-objection mechanism
The United States stated it did not object to a single stakeholder and condemned Russia's wholesale effort to strip the mechanism of independent expertise, arguing this hollows out the substance of the mechanism
Arg. 1
The United States stated that it did not object to a single stakeholder submitted by members and condemned Russia's wholesale effort to block dozens of established, credentialled organisations, respected research institutions, and civil society groups from multiple regions. The delegation argued that systematically excluding organisations with the deepest technical and operational knowledge does not protect the intergovernmental character of the mechanism but hollows out its substance.
The United States stated that it did not object to a single stakeholder submitted by the members in the room, while the Russian Federation objected to over 40 . The United States argued that one delegation has moved to block dozens of established credentialled organisations, along with respected research institutions and civil society groups from multiple regions, describing this as not a case-by-case scrutiny but a wholesale effort to strip the mechanism of independent expertise .
on: The non-objection mechanism should be used judiciously and in the spirit of inclusivity, and objections should be accompanied by transparent justification
on: Legitimacy and scale of Russia's use of the non-objection mechanism to block stakeholder accreditation
The private sector, technical community, academia, and civil society own and operate most of the digital infrastructure and their expertise is a prerequisite for doing this work seriously, not merely a courtesy
Arg. 2
The United States argued that the private sector, technical community, academia, and civil society own and operate most of the infrastructure that the body is trying to keep secure, and that their expertise is not a courtesy but a prerequisite for doing this work seriously. The delegation noted that the cyber domain was not created by governments but by the private sector, specifically private Western companies.
The United States stated that the private sector, the technical community, academia, and civil society own and operate most of the infrastructure in this body, and it is trying to keep it secure, and that their expertise is not a courtesy but a prerequisite for doing this work seriously . The United States noted that the cyber domain was not created by governments but by the private sector, specifically private Western companies that also champion freedom of expression and the inalienable right of every man and woman to be free .
on: Stakeholders bring essential expertise that governments alone cannot provide, and their participation strengthens the effectiveness of the global mechanism
Nicaragua recalled that the modalities for stakeholder participation were negotiated and approved by consensus, fully recognising the right of states to present objections, and that organisations with political activities cannot contribute impartially
Arg. 1
Nicaragua recalled that the modalities for participation for stakeholders were negotiated and approved by consensus by member states, and that these fully recognise the right of states to present objections with respect to the accreditation of NGOs. The delegation argued that this right should be respected and cannot be reinterpreted or substituted, and that organisations that develop activities against certain states or have political activities will have difficulty contributing impartially.
Nicaragua stated that the modalities for participation for stakeholders were negotiated and approved by consensus by member states, and that these fully recognise the right of states to present objections with respect to the accreditation of NGOs . Nicaragua argued that this right should be respected and cannot be reinterpreted or substituted, and that organisations that develop activities against certain states or have political activities will have a difficult time contributing impartially to the work of the mechanism .
on: Whether transparency and justification are required when states exercise the non-objection mechanism
Nicaragua, on behalf of the Group of Like-Minded States, expressed strong disappointment with the Chair's approach to appointing co-facilitators without consensus, disassociating from the procedure and stating it should not serve as a precedent
Arg. 2
Nicaragua, on behalf of the Group of Like-Minded States including Belarus, Burkina Faso, China, Cuba, DPRK, Iran, Russia, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, expressed strong disappointment with the Chair's approach to appointing co-facilitators of the dedicated thematic groups without consensus. The group disassociated itself from the procedure followed in making this decision and stated it will not consider it as a precedent for future functioning of the global mechanism.
Nicaragua, on behalf of the Group of Like-Minded States, expressed strong disappointment with the approach of the Chair to appoint co-facilitators of the dedicated thematic groups . The group stated that it disassociates itself from the procedure followed in making this decision and will not consider it as a precedent for future functioning of the global mechanism, and called for co-facilitators to be either elected or appointed on the basis of consensus among all member states .
on: The global mechanism is state-led and consensus-based, with decision-making remaining the exclusive prerogative of member states
on: Whether the Chair had the authority to appoint co-facilitators for the DTGs without consensus
Cuba reaffirmed that participation of other stakeholders should be based on the principle of non-objection as agreed, and that modalities should be respected comprehensively to ensure non-politicised and impartial participation
Arg. 1
Cuba reaffirmed that the global mechanism is a member-states-led body and that consensus constitutes the fundamental principle guiding its work. The delegation stated that the participation of other stakeholders should be based upon the principle of non-objection as agreed in the open-ended working group, and that modalities agreed for this mechanism should be respected comprehensively to ensure non-politicised and impartial participation.
Cuba stated that the participation of other stakeholders should be based upon the principle of non-objection, as was agreed upon in the open-ended working group which led to the creation of this mechanism . Cuba argued that modalities agreed upon for this mechanism should be respected comprehensively in order to ensure that other stakeholders are able to participate in a non-politicised and impartial fashion .
on: Whether transparency and justification are required when states exercise the non-objection mechanism
Cuba expressed deep concern that the procedure followed to name co-facilitators is incompatible with the member-states-led nature of the Global Mechanism and the principle of consensus, and should not constitute a precedent
Arg. 2
Cuba expressed deep concern that the procedure followed by the chairmanship to name co-facilitators for the DTGs is incompatible with the nature of the Global Mechanism as a member-states-led body and with the principle of consensus that guides its work. The delegation argued that consensus is the only rule to adopt decisions in the Global Mechanism, applying to both procedural and substantive matters, and that the procedure followed should not constitute a precedent.
Cuba stated that it considers the approach of naming co-facilitators to be incompatible with the nature of the Global Mechanism as a body that is member-states-led, nor compatible with the principle of consensus that guides its work . Cuba argued that consensus is the only rule to adopt decisions in the Global Mechanism and should be applied to matters of procedure as well as substantive matters, and that the procedure followed to adopt the decision on co-facilitators should not constitute a precedent for the future working of the global mechanism .
on: The global mechanism is state-led and consensus-based, with decision-making remaining the exclusive prerogative of member states
on: Whether the Chair had the authority to appoint co-facilitators for the DTGs without consensus
Cuba stated that the rules for stakeholder participation should also be applied to the dedicated thematic working groups, in strict accordance with approved modalities
Arg. 3
Cuba stated that the rules for stakeholder participation should also be applied to the dedicated thematic working groups, in strict accordance with the approved modalities. The delegation argued that any understanding reached on this matter should be duly reflected in relevant documents that guide the work of these groups.
Cuba stated that the rules for stakeholder participation should also be applied to the dedicated thematic working groups . Cuba argued that it is critical that the scope and mandate of the DTGs strictly corresponds to what is established by member states in the open-ended working group, and that any understanding reached should be duly reflected in relevant documents that guide the work of these groups to preserve the continuity of deliberations and avoid diverging interpretations .
on: Whether DTG topics, timetables, and outcomes require unanimous consensus approval by all member states
Australia underlined the importance of meaningful cooperation with the multi-stakeholder community and urged member states to use the non-objection mechanism judiciously and transparently, supporting Estonia's transparency in explaining their objection
Arg. 1
Australia underlined the importance of meaningful cooperation with the multi-stakeholder community, inclusive of industry, the technical community, civil society, and academia, noting that these stakeholders are often closest to the threats and are essential partners in prevention, response, and recovery. Australia urged member states to use the non-objection mechanism judiciously and transparently, and strongly supported Estonia's transparency in explaining their objection.
Australia stated that it underlines the importance of meaningful cooperation with the multi-stakeholder community, inclusive of industry, the technical community, civil society, and academia, noting that these stakeholders are often closest to the threats and are essential partners in prevention, response, and recovery . Australia stated that it strongly supports Estonia’s transparency in explaining their objection to the participation of a stakeholder .
on: The non-objection mechanism should be used judiciously and in the spirit of inclusivity, and objections should be accompanied by transparent justification
on: Whether transparency and justification are required when states exercise the non-objection mechanism
Australia reiterated its understanding that objections to multi-stakeholders in the plenary will not apply to their participation in the DTGs
Arg. 2
Australia reiterated its understanding that the objections raised against multi-stakeholders for plenary participation will not apply to their participation in the DTGs. The delegation supported the joint multi-stakeholder statement and the recommendations contained therein.
Australia stated that it wants to reiterate its understanding that these objections will not apply to the participation of objected multi-stakeholders in the DTGs . Australia also referred to and supported the Joint Multi-Stakeholder Statement and the recommendations contained therein .
on: The agreed modalities for stakeholder participation apply to formal plenary sessions and review conferences, and the objection mechanism does not apply to the informal Dedicated Thematic Groups
on: Whether the non-objection mechanism and accreditation requirements apply to DTGs or only to formal plenary sessions and review conferences
Ireland expressed strong regret at the objection to 43 stakeholders, a majority of those that applied, and supported the joint multi-stakeholder statement
Arg. 1
Ireland expressed strong regret that the recent outcomes of the accreditation process led to the objection of 43 stakeholders, representing a majority of those that applied within the procedure. The delegation emphasised that stakeholders have a key role to play in both the general process and in the DTGs, and that the global mechanism would lose a great deal without their technical and operational expertise.
Ireland stated that it joins with many others in expressing strong regret that the recent outcomes of the accreditation process have led to the objection to 43 stakeholders, which is a majority of those that applied within the procedure . Ireland noted that stakeholders have a key role to play in both the general process and in the DTGs, and that the global mechanism would lose a great deal without their technical and operational expertise and insights .
on: The non-objection mechanism should be used judiciously and in the spirit of inclusivity, and objections should be accompanied by transparent justification
on: Legitimacy and scale of Russia's use of the non-objection mechanism to block stakeholder accreditation
Mauritius stated that the effectiveness of the global mechanism will benefit from being open and inclusive, as governments alone cannot address all challenges, and that participation should be guided by transparency and equitable geographical representation
Arg. 1
Mauritius stated that the effectiveness of the global mechanism will benefit from being open, inclusive, and practical in its approach, as the evolving cyber landscape is such that governments alone cannot address all challenges. The delegation noted that the private sector owns and operates much of the world's digital infrastructure, while academia, the technical community, and civil society contribute valuable research, policy perspectives, and capacity building experience.
Mauritius stated that the private sector owns and operates much of the world’s digital infrastructure and possesses significant technical expertise, while academia, the technical community, and civil society contribute valuable research, policy perspectives, technical knowledge, and capacity building experience . Mauritius noted that participation should be guided by principles of transparency, inclusivity, equitable geographical representation, and appropriate safeguards to ensure accountability and avoid conflicts of interest .
Mauritius considered that clear and predictable rules of procedure for DTGs would be important, covering objectives, scope, meeting formats, submission modalities, co-chair roles, timelines, and mechanisms for coordination among DTGs
Arg. 2
Mauritius considered that clear and predictable rules of procedure for DTGs would be important to ensure efficient and inclusive discussions. The delegation outlined a comprehensive list of matters that the rules of procedure could usefully address, including objectives and scope of each DTG, frequency and format of meetings, modalities for written contributions, the role of chairs, timelines, and mechanisms for coordination among DTGs.
Mauritius stated that clear and predictable rules of procedure for DTGs will be important to ensure efficient and inclusive discussions, and that without prejudging the outcome of negotiations, the rules of procedure could usefully address matters such as the objectives and scope of each DTG, the frequency and format of meetings, modalities for the submission and circulation of written contributions by member states, the role of the chair and co-chairs in facilitating discussions and preparing reports, timelines for work programmes and deliverables, procedures for documenting discussions, and mechanisms to promote coordination and coherence among DTGs .
Nigeria (African group) deferred its statement but was noted as a speaker on this matter
Arg. 1
Nigeria, speaking on behalf of the African group, indicated that it would deliver its statement later rather than at the scheduled time. No substantive content was provided at this point in the session.
Venezuela argued that naming co-facilitators for thematic groups should be subject to consultations with all member states on the basis of consensus, and that a 50-50 developed/developing country split over-represents developed countries
Arg. 1
Venezuela reaffirmed the importance of preserving the principle of consensus in all decisions and activities of the global mechanism, including those done in the framework of the thematic groups. The delegation argued that the naming of co-facilitators for these thematic groups should be subject to consultations with all member states on the basis of consensus, and that a 50-50 distribution between developed and developing countries does not reflect a truly equitable distribution given that developing countries represent a considerably higher proportion in the United Nations.
Venezuela stated that it is very important that the naming of co-facilitators for the thematic groups be subject to consultations with all member states and done on the basis of consensus . Venezuela noted that a 50-50 distribution between developed and developing countries does not reflect a truly equitable distribution because developing countries represent a considerably higher proportion in the United Nations, and therefore the proposed division could translate into over-representation of developed countries .
on: Whether the Chair had the authority to appoint co-facilitators for the DTGs without consensus
Morocco expressed support for the mechanism's organisation and welcomed the appointment of co-facilitators, while calling for clarity on practical modalities for participation to allow delegations with limited capacity to prepare properly
Arg. 1
Morocco welcomed the appointment of the four co-facilitators from Egypt, Australia, Malaysia, and the Netherlands, and expressed the wish that they carry out their work in a spirit of neutrality. The delegation called for practical modalities for participation to be clarified as soon as possible to allow delegations with more limited capacity to prepare properly.
Morocco welcomed the appointment of the four co-facilitators from Egypt, Australia, Malaysia, and the Netherlands, and expressed the wish that these experts carry out their work in a spirit of neutrality, which is a condition of the confidence that all their colleagues have in them . Morocco stated that it hopes the practical modalities for participation will be clarified as soon as possible to allow delegations with more limited capacity to be able to prepare properly .
on: Whether the Chair had the authority to appoint co-facilitators for the DTGs without consensus
Philippines aligned with the EU, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Australia, emphasising that multi-stakeholder coordination plays a vital role in enriching cyber resilience and that developing countries benefit from diverse perspectives
Arg. 1
The Philippines aligned with the EU, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Australia, emphasising that multi-stakeholder coordination plays a vital role in enriching and improving cyber resilience by bringing together technical experts from academia, civil society, and other sectors. The delegation noted that as a country with developing cyber and technological maturity, it relies on the support of and partnerships with the private sector, academia, civil society, and international partnerships.
The Philippines stated that as a country with developing cyber and technological maturity, it relies on the support of and partnerships with the private sector, the academe, civil society, and international partnerships . The Philippines noted that multi-stakeholder coordination plays a vital role in enriching and improving cyber resilience by bringing together technical experts from the academe and civil society, and that its country, as well as others similarly situated, will benefit from diverse perspectives that deepen situational awareness and help prepare for real-world operational needs .
Albania expressed concern regarding the outcomes of the accreditation process, noting that objections to well-established organisations risk depriving member states of valuable expertise at a time when cyber threats are increasingly complex
Arg. 1
Albania expressed concern regarding the outcomes of the recent stakeholder accreditation process, noting that objections to applicant entities including organisations with well-established expertise and a proven record of contribution to international cybersecurity discussions raise serious concerns regarding transparency, predictability, and inclusiveness. The delegation argued that this risks depriving member states of valuable expertise precisely at a time when cyber threats are becoming increasingly complex.
Albania stated that the objection to applicant entities, including a number of organisations with well-established expertise and a proven record of contribution to international cybersecurity discussions, from whom delegations have all learned extensively in the last year, raises serious concern regarding transparency, predictability, and inclusiveness . Albania argued that this risks depriving member states of valuable expertise precisely at the time when cyber threats are becoming increasingly complex and transactional .
on: The non-objection mechanism should be used judiciously and in the spirit of inclusivity, and objections should be accompanied by transparent justification
on: Legitimacy and scale of Russia's use of the non-objection mechanism to block stakeholder accreditation
Ukraine echoed calls for explaining reasons behind stakeholder exclusion and emphasised that DTGs as informal consultations should be accessible for stakeholders based on their diligence and expertise
Arg. 1
Ukraine aligned with the EU and echoed statements by Canada, Japan, the US, and EU member states emphasising the need to explain the reasons behind stakeholder exclusion. The delegation also emphasised that DTGs, as an informal consultations format, should be accessible for stakeholders based on their diligence and expertise in the first place.
Ukraine stated that it would like to echo the statements made earlier by Canada, Japan, the US, the EU, and EU member states, emphasising the need to explain the reasons behind the stakeholder exclusion . Ukraine stated that with respect to its understanding, DTGs as the informal consultations format should be accessible for stakeholders based on their diligence and expertise in the first place .
on: The non-objection mechanism should be used judiciously and in the spirit of inclusivity, and objections should be accompanied by transparent justification
on: Legitimacy and scale of Russia's use of the non-objection mechanism to block stakeholder accreditation
Ukraine emphasised that DTGs as informal consultations should be accessible for stakeholders based on their diligence and expertise in the first place
Arg. 2
Ukraine emphasised that the DTGs, as an informal consultations format, should be accessible for stakeholders based on their diligence and expertise. The delegation also noted the importance of being able to bring to broad attention cases of malicious behaviour in cyberspace exercised by some stakeholders.
Ukraine stated that with respect to its understanding, DTGs as the informal consultations format should be accessible for stakeholders based on their diligence and expertise in the first place . Ukraine also noted that it thinks it would be useful for the international community to be able to follow the cases of malicious behaviour in cyberspace exercised by some stakeholders, and views it as important that cases of such misuse can be brought to the broad attention of the international community .
on: The agreed modalities for stakeholder participation apply to formal plenary sessions and review conferences, and the objection mechanism does not apply to the informal Dedicated Thematic Groups
on: Whether the non-objection mechanism and accreditation requirements apply to DTGs or only to formal plenary sessions and review conferences
Session Knowledge Graph
Speakers · Topics · Arguments · Relationships
A large majority of delegations agreed that the non-objection mechanism should be exercised judiciously and in the spirit of inclusivity, as explicitly agreed in the OEWG final report . Canada noted that more than 50% of stakeholders were blocked, with Russia alone raising 43 objections . Japan stated that objections should be accompanied by appropriate justification and explained transparently . Kiribati argued that transparency costs the objecting state little while silence costs the rest a great deal . Germany noted that EU member states provided written explanation for their own objection as an example of transparent practice . Estonia similarly explained its objection to JSC Positive Technologies in writing and made it publicly available . The broad coalition of delegations expressing this view ranged from small island states like Kiribati to major powers like the United States , reflecting near-universal agreement among Western and developing country delegations on this principle.
Over 50% of stakeholders that applied to participate in plenaries have been blocked, with Russia alone raising 43 objections, which is inconsistent with the agreed spirit of inclusivity and the call to use the non-objection mechanism judiciously
Portugal expressed concern that an unusually high number of stakeholder plenary accreditations were blocked, contrary to the agreed spirit of inclusivity, undermining access to essential expertise
Mexico reiterated that the non-objection mechanism should not be interpreted as giving a state the capacity to block stakeholders that contribute to implementing the mechanism's mandate, but should be used to seek the greatest level of support
The Netherlands deeply regretted that 50 of 92 multi-stakeholders were objected to, with 43 blocked by one member state without proper explanation, going against the spirit of what was agreed in the OEWG
Japan expressed concern that objections were raised in a non-judicious manner and stated that any objections should be accompanied by appropriate justification and explained transparently
Kiribati, as a small island state, emphasised that objecting states should share the basis of their objections so concerns can be understood and resolved, as transparency costs little but silence costs the rest a great deal
Germany expressed regret that some states failed to exercise restraint in assessing stakeholder accreditation requests, and noted that the EU member states provided written explanation for their own objection in the spirit of transparent dialogue
The United Kingdom deeply regretted Russia's excessive use of the non-objection mechanism, including blocking six stakeholders that had made meaningful contributions to the OEWG, and reiterated that DTG participation does not require accreditation
Republic of Korea aligned with Canada and the EU, stating that the global mechanism should be open and inclusive, and that grounds for any objection should be made transparent
Poland condemned Russia's mass blocking of NGOs without substantive justification, citing the example of the Łódź Cyber Hub, and argued that raising objections en masse undermines the legitimacy of the process
Estonia explained its own objection to JSC Positive Technologies, citing its links to the FSB and EU sanctions, and argued that inclusivity cannot come at the expense of integrity, trust, and security
The United States stated it did not object to a single stakeholder and condemned Russia's wholesale effort to strip the mechanism of independent expertise, arguing this hollows out the substance of the mechanism
Australia underlined the importance of meaningful cooperation with the multi-stakeholder community and urged member states to use the non-objection mechanism judiciously and transparently, supporting Estonia's transparency in explaining their objection
Ireland expressed strong regret at the objection to 43 stakeholders, a majority of those that applied, and supported the joint multi-stakeholder statement
Albania expressed concern regarding the outcomes of the accreditation process, noting that objections to well-established organisations risk depriving member states of valuable expertise at a time when cyber threats are increasingly complex
Ukraine echoed calls for explaining reasons behind stakeholder exclusion and emphasised that DTGs as informal consultations should be accessible for stakeholders based on their diligence and expertise
Across a wide range of delegations, there was strong agreement that stakeholders possess expertise that governments alone cannot replicate. Switzerland articulated this clearly, noting that the private sector owns and operates much of the world’s digital infrastructure, the technical community develops and secures it, academia advances collective understanding, and civil society contributes on resilience, human rights, and capacity building . The United States described stakeholder expertise as ‘not a courtesy but a prerequisite for doing this work seriously’ . Kiribati shared its national experience, noting that its cybersecurity posture was built with the support of technical partners and regional bodies, and that stakeholders sharpened the quality of deliberations . Malawi emphasised that if the objective is implementation, those who contribute to implementation must be meaningfully engaged . Japan noted that as cyber threats become increasingly sophisticated, it is essential to draw on private sector expertise . New Zealand highlighted that for smaller, geographically isolated countries, stakeholder participation levels the information playing field .
Stakeholders contribute expertise through training, simulations, research, public outreach, threat assessments, and raising awareness on human rights and gender matters related to cybersecurity, and their exclusion deprives member states of essential knowledge
Switzerland noted that the private sector owns and operates much of the world's digital infrastructure, the technical community develops and secures it, academia advances collective understanding, and civil society contributes on resilience and human rights
Netherlands stated that multi-stakeholders should be able to participate in a meaningful manner in the DTGs themselves and speak in their own capacity, given the informal nature of the DTGs
Japan emphasised that as cyber threats become increasingly sophisticated, it is essential to draw on private sector expertise in assessing threats and developing concrete responses through a multi-stakeholder approach
For small island states like Kiribati, cybersecurity capacity was built with the support of technical partners and regional bodies, and stakeholders sharpened the quality of deliberations and helped move the mechanism from description toward delivery
The private sector, technical community, academia, and civil society own and operate most of the digital infrastructure and their expertise is a prerequisite for doing this work seriously, not merely a courtesy
Malawi underscored that meaningful stakeholder participation is indispensable to an implementation-oriented global mechanism, as those who contribute to implementation must be meaningfully engaged throughout the process
Portugal expressed concern that an unusually high number of stakeholder plenary accreditations were blocked, contrary to the agreed spirit of inclusivity, undermining access to essential expertise
This reflects a broad consensus documented across multistakeholder governance literature, which emphasises open, accessible processes and the value of non-state expertise for achieving tangible outcomes [S139]. The promotion of multistakeholder diplomacy has nonetheless generated ongoing controversy within the state-centred international system [S132].
A significant group of delegations agreed that the non-objection mechanism for stakeholder accreditation applies only to formal plenary sessions and review conferences, not to the informal DTGs. Canada recalled that stakeholders facing plenary vetoes will be able to join and participate in the December informal thematic groups . Portugal explicitly concurred that the agreed objection mechanism applies only to formal meetings . The United Kingdom reiterated this for the avoidance of doubt, citing the May 2024 OEWG intersessional where unaccredited stakeholders attended and contributed as established UN practice . Italy cited paragraph 15 of Annex I to the OEWG final report as clearly affirming that accreditation is needed for plenary and review conferences only . Chile stated that the non-objection procedure was not contemplated to apply to thematic working groups . Australia reiterated its understanding that objections will not apply to participation in DTGs .
Portugal concurred that the agreed objection mechanism applies only to formal meetings such as plenaries and review conferences, not to informal thematic groups where affected stakeholders will be able to participate
Netherlands stated that multi-stakeholders should be able to participate in a meaningful manner in the DTGs themselves and speak in their own capacity, given the informal nature of the DTGs
Chile expressed hope that the situation of blocked stakeholders would not extend to the work of the DTGs, as the non-objection procedure was contemplated only for substantive plenary sessions and review conferences, not thematic working groups
The United Kingdom reiterated that DTGs are informal working groups and stakeholder participation does not require accreditation, consistent with agreed modalities and established UN practice including the May 2024 OEWG intersessional
Italy argued that paragraph 15 of Annex I to the OEWG final report clearly affirms that accreditation is needed for plenary and review conferences only, and that DTGs have an informal nature not requiring prior accreditation for stakeholders
Australia reiterated its understanding that objections to multi-stakeholders in the plenary will not apply to their participation in the DTGs
Ukraine emphasised that DTGs as informal consultations should be accessible for stakeholders based on their diligence and expertise in the first place
Germany highlighted the potential for greater inclusivity in the agreed hybrid modalities for DTGs, noting that remote participation will allow experts of smaller states and stakeholders with limited resources to participate
This aligns with the OEWG Final Report modalities, which specify that accredited stakeholders may attend substantive plenary sessions and review conferences of the Global Mechanism [S136]. The distinction between formal and informal settings is a recurring structural question in the organisational sessions [S127].
There was broad agreement that the DTGs represent a key innovation of the process. Nakamitsu described them as complementing plenary meetings through in-depth expert discussions, staying true to their action-oriented and focused nature . The EU stated that the agendas of the plenary, the DTGs, and the Global Roundtable for Capacity Building are complementary , and that DTG work should provide focused, topic-based discussions drawing on expert briefings . Mexico proposed that discussions be structured around scenarios allowing exchange of national experiences and identification of common challenges, avoiding duplication of conceptual debates already held in plenary . Japan emphasised that DTG1 should prioritise concrete discussions on pressing issues such as ransomware and attacks on critical infrastructure . Italy reaffirmed the importance of making the DTGs operational as soon as possible as the real added value of the mechanism . Canada proposed one or two guiding questions per session with integrated interventions addressing all pillars .
The DTGs represent a key innovation of the process, complementing plenary meetings through in-depth expert discussions, and should benefit from a broad array of expert briefings to inform states' deliberations
The European Union supported focused, topic-based DTG discussions drawing on expert briefings, with co-facilitators updating the plenary verbally and potentially transmitting written recommendations agreed in the spirit of consensus
Mexico considered that DTG discussions should be structured around scenarios allowing exchange of national experiences, identification of common challenges, and extraction of specific lessons, avoiding duplication of conceptual debates already held in plenary
Japan emphasised that DTG1 should prioritise concrete discussions on pressing issues such as ransomware and attacks on critical infrastructure using specific scenarios, while DTG2 should ensure broad stakeholder participation and address capacity building efficiently
Switzerland welcomed the appointment of co-facilitators in line with UN practice as an important step in preparing for the December DTG meetings
Italy reaffirmed the importance of making the DTGs operational as soon as possible, as they represent the real added value of the mechanism
Canada proposed that DTG guiding questions should focus on priorities broadly shared across UN membership, with one or two questions per session, integrated interventions addressing all pillars, and stakeholder participation with dedicated interactive time
Thailand proposed that the DTGs should discuss topics on capacity building on, first, addressing advanced cyber threats, including artificial intelligence security, quantum readiness, as well as post-quantum cryptography and operational technology security, and providing assistance with national legal and policy frameworks and the application of the DTGs
Despite deep disagreements on other matters, all delegations agreed that the global mechanism is fundamentally state-led and that decision-making remains the exclusive prerogative of member states. The Chair stated that ultimately decisions rest upon member states and consensus continues to be the basis . Nicaragua, on behalf of the Group of Like-Minded States, reaffirmed that the GM is a state-led body and that consensus is the fundamental principle guiding its work . Mexico, while supporting the Chair’s appointment of co-facilitators, reiterated that any recommendation coming out of the thematic groups should be considered and, if warranted, adopted by member states in the plenary . Kiribati fully respected that negotiation and decision-making remain the prerogative of member states . Colombia stated that the participation of stakeholders is fully compatible with the intergovernmental character of the global mechanism, with negotiating, adopting decisions, and determining results exclusively within the remit of member states . Even the EU, which supported the co-facilitator appointments, described them as part of the Chair’s team serving in a personal capacity .
The mechanism's value will be measured by its capacity to create understanding, strengthen trust, and produce tangible results, with consensus being built through commitment, flexibility, and political will
The European Union welcomed the timely appointment of co-facilitators in line with UN practice, viewing them as part of the Chair's team to help operationalise the DTGs over the coming two years
Mexico expressed support for the Chair's prerogative to name co-facilitators pursuant to established practice in other GA processes, welcoming the four nominations as reflecting adequate geographical, gender, and technical balance
Nicaragua, on behalf of the Group of Like-Minded States, expressed strong disappointment with the Chair's approach to appointing co-facilitators without consensus, disassociating from the procedure and stating it should not serve as a precedent
Cuba expressed deep concern that the procedure followed to name co-facilitators is incompatible with the member-states-led nature of the Global Mechanism and the principle of consensus, and should not constitute a precedent
Russia stated it does not recognise the Chair's decision to appoint co-facilitators, arguing it contradicts UNGA-approved parameters and was made in circumvention of the consensus procedure and in violation of the principle of the guiding role of states
China supported NGO involvement in principle but emphasised that NGOs must respect agreed procedures and meet established criteria, and that the same rules applying to plenary participation should apply to DTGs
Kiribati fully respects that this is an intergovernmental process and that negotiation and decision-making remain the prerogative of member states
Malawi underscored that meaningful stakeholder participation is indispensable to an implementation-oriented global mechanism, as those who contribute to implementation must be meaningfully engaged throughout the process
The state-centred nature of the international system and its limited accommodation of non-state actors is well-documented [S132]. The tension between state primacy and multistakeholder participation is a core feature of digital governance diplomacy, with inclusive and consensus-based work called for explicitly in the first organisational session [S128].
A large coalition of Western, Asia-Pacific, and developing country delegations shared the view that Russia’s mass use of the non-objection mechanism was contrary to the agreed spirit of inclusivity and the requirement to use the mechanism judiciously. Canada noted that Russia alone raised 43 objections and that this approach is not in line with the letter or spirit of the consensus provision . The EU cited the specific example of the EU Institute for Security Studies being objected to despite its significant contributions . Switzerland highlighted the irony that Russia, which initiated the OEWG and thereby gave stakeholders access to ICT discussions at the UN, is now preventing states from accessing the expertise required to fulfil the mandate . Poland gave the specific example of the Łódź Cyber Hub, a public academic institution, being blocked without substantive justification . The United States described Russia’s approach as ‘a wholesale effort to strip this mechanism of independent expertise’ . Germany noted that more than half of entities applying for accreditation were rejected, most by few states .
The Group of Like-Minded States, including Nicaragua, Cuba, Russia, Iran, China, and Venezuela, shared the view that the agreed modalities for stakeholder participation must be respected comprehensively, including the right of states to object to NGO accreditation. Russia stated that member states have every right to refuse accreditation of any NGO and that all organisations it refused did not meet the criterion of objectivity and non-politicisation . Nicaragua argued that the right to present objections should be respected and cannot be reinterpreted or substituted . Cuba stated that modalities should be respected comprehensively to ensure non-politicised and impartial participation . Iran argued that the agreed modalities apply to the global mechanism as a whole, including DTGs, and that general UN practice cannot supersede specifically negotiated modalities . China emphasised that the same rules of NGO participation applying to the plenary should also apply to DTGs .
The Group of Like-Minded States shared the view that the Chair’s appointment of co-facilitators for the DTGs was illegitimate because it was not done by consensus. Nicaragua, on behalf of the group, expressed strong disappointment and stated that the group disassociates itself from the procedure and will not consider it as a precedent . Russia stated that it does not recognise this decision, arguing it was made in circumvention of the consensus procedure and in violation of the principle of the guiding role of states . Iran provided a historical argument, recalling that during OEWG negotiations, the proposal to authorise the Chair to appoint facilitators appeared in the initial draft but was ultimately removed because it did not enjoy consensus , meaning the agreed outcome deliberately did not confer such authority to the Chair . Venezuela added that a 50-50 split between developed and developing countries does not reflect a truly equitable distribution given that developing countries represent a considerably higher proportion in the UN .
A broad coalition of delegations welcomed the Chair’s appointment of co-facilitators as consistent with UN practice and as an important step in operationalising the DTGs. Canada invited states to refrain from significant departures from UN practice for informal cybersecurity meetings and referenced the precedent set by the OEWG for informal meetings . The EU welcomed the timely appointment in line with UN practice, viewing co-facilitators as part of the Chair’s team in their personal capacity . Mexico supported the Chair’s prerogative to name co-facilitators pursuant to established practice in other GA processes . Switzerland emphasised that it is crucial to start preparing for the work of the DTGs without delay . Italy stated that the appointment does not contravene any modality or rule and ensures appropriate balance . Colombia welcomed the selection bearing in mind technical experience and the principle of gender equality .
Smaller and developing country delegations shared a particularly acute concern about the exclusion of stakeholders, emphasising that they rely more heavily on external expertise than larger states. Kiribati noted that its national strategy, maturity assessment, legal frameworks, and operational capabilities were shaped with the support of technical partners and regional bodies , and that for a small island state, the stakeholders excluded are very often precisely the partners on whom states like theirs are most dependent . New Zealand highlighted that as a smaller and geographically isolated country, it does not always have ready access to the expertise and insights of international representatives from academia, civil society, and industry . Malawi stated that stakeholder participation has informed and strengthened its ongoing efforts to advance its national cybersecurity framework . The Philippines noted that as a country with developing cyber and technological maturity, it relies on the support of and partnerships with the private sector, academia, and civil society . Mexico noted that excluded entities include those from regions that are underrepresented .
Several delegations shared a vision for how the DTGs should function in practice, emphasising scenario-based, practical, and implementation-focused discussions with expert briefings. The EU proposed focused, topic-based discussions drawing on expert briefings followed by states’ interventions exchanging best practices , with co-facilitators providing verbal updates and potentially transmitting written recommendations agreed in the spirit of consensus . Canada proposed one or two guiding questions or topics potentially linked to a case study, with delegations responding through integrated interventions addressing all pillars . Mexico proposed discussions structured around scenarios allowing exchange of national experiences and identification of common challenges, avoiding duplication of conceptual debates . Japan emphasised concrete discussions on pressing issues such as ransomware and attacks on critical infrastructure with specific scenarios . Switzerland emphasised the need to know which topics will be discussed, how discussions will be structured, and which experts states should send .
While Russia and Western states were deeply divided on the appropriateness of the mass objections, there was an unexpected implicit consensus that when objections are raised, some form of justification is appropriate. Estonia explicitly set out its reasons in writing and made them publicly available, stating ‘transparency matters, especially when objections are raised’ . Australia strongly supported Estonia’s transparency in explaining their objection . Germany noted that EU member states provided a written explanation for their veto . Even Russia, in defending its objections, provided a general rationale – that the refused organisations practised unfounded political attribution of computer attacks or politicised propaganda – and also expressed disappointment at the rejection of Russian NGOs and called for clarification of why they were blocked . This suggests that even the most vocal defender of the right to object implicitly acknowledged that some explanation is expected, creating an unexpected area of procedural convergence on the principle of transparency, even if the substance of the objections remained deeply contested.
Despite profound disagreements on procedural matters, all delegations – including those in the Group of Like-Minded States – expressed commitment to the success of the global mechanism and to delivering practical results. Nicaragua, on behalf of the Group of Like-Minded States, welcomed the start of substantive work and reaffirmed commitment to work constructively in good faith with all member states . Russia stated it is ready for constructive work within the mechanism . Cuba reiterated its willingness to continue working constructively with all member states in the spirit of dialogue, mutual respect, and good faith . The Chair expressed hope that the first biennium would be remembered as where member states decided to transform decades of work into permanent cooperation . Malawi echoed the Chair’s aspiration that the mechanism not be remembered as just another meeting at the UN . This cross-cutting commitment to the mechanism’s success, even amid sharp procedural disputes, represents an unexpected area of consensus that provides a foundation for continued engagement.
Despite being on opposite sides of many substantive debates, China and the Chair – along with Mauritius and Kiribati – shared the view that the size of a country does not determine the significance of its contribution to multilateral processes. The Chair stated that El Salvador accepted the honour with humility but also with firm conviction that small states can significantly contribute to consensus building . China, in a notably supportive statement, said that the size of a country does not matter at the end of the day, and that what matters is a deep understanding of the situation and an objective and balanced approach to find compromise . Mauritius concurred with China’s observation that the meaningful contribution of member states should not be determined by their size . Kiribati demonstrated this principle in practice by making a substantive and candid contribution on stakeholder participation despite being a small island state . This cross-ideological consensus on the value of small state participation was unexpected given the broader divisions in the room.
The session revealed three distinct clusters of agreement and disagreement. First, there was near-universal agreement among a large majority of delegations – spanning Western states, Asia-Pacific countries, Latin American states, and small island developing states – that Russia’s mass use of the non-objection mechanism to block over 40 stakeholders was contrary to the agreed spirit of inclusivity and the requirement to use the mechanism judiciously . Second, there was a sharp and fundamental divide between the Group of Like-Minded States (Russia, China, Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, Venezuela, and others) and the majority of delegations on the legitimacy of the Chair’s appointment of co-facilitators for the DTGs, with the former group refusing to recognise the decision and the latter welcoming it as consistent with UN practice . Third, there was a significant interpretive divide on whether the agreed modalities for stakeholder participation apply to the informal DTGs, with Western and like-minded states arguing the objection mechanism does not apply to informal meetings , while the Group of Like-Minded States argued the modalities apply to the mechanism as a whole . Despite these divisions, all delegations expressed commitment to the success of the global mechanism and to delivering practical results .
Russia defended its 43 objections by invoking paragraph 15i of the agreed modalities, arguing that the blocked organisations practised unfounded political attribution of cyber attacks or politicised propaganda, and therefore could not contribute impartially . Russia also expressed disappointment at the rejection of Russian NGOs . In sharp contrast, the overwhelming majority of delegations condemned the scale and opacity of Russia’s objections. Canada noted that more than 50% of stakeholders were blocked, with Russia alone raising 43 objections, and argued this is inconsistent with the agreed call to use the mechanism judiciously bearing in mind the spirit of inclusivity . The EU cited the blocking of the EU Institute for Security Studies as a concrete example of harm . Switzerland pointedly noted the irony that Russia, which initiated the OEWG and thereby gave stakeholders access to UN ICT discussions, is now preventing states from accessing the expertise required to fulfil the mandate . The United States described Russia’s approach as a wholesale effort to strip the mechanism of independent expertise that hollows out its substance . Poland specifically challenged Russia’s justification, arguing that the Łódź Cyber Hub, a public academic institution, clearly does not engage in political attribution and that Russia’s decision was itself driven by a politicised agenda . Estonia, by contrast, provided a model of transparency by publicly explaining in writing its own objection to JSC Positive Technologies, citing its FSB links and EU sanctions .
Russia defended its objections, stating that all organisations refused accreditation did not meet the criterion of objectivity and non-politicisation, as they practised unfounded political attribution of cyber attacks or carried out politicised propaganda
Over 50% of stakeholders that applied to participate in plenaries have been blocked, with Russia alone raising 43 objections, which is inconsistent with the agreed spirit of inclusivity and the call to use the non-objection mechanism judiciously
The EU expressed strong regret that 50 stakeholders were objected to, representing a majority of the 70 entities that applied, demonstrating a concerning lack of transparency, predictability, and consistency with the OEWG consensus
Portugal expressed concern that an unusually high number of stakeholder plenary accreditations were blocked, contrary to the agreed spirit of inclusivity, undermining access to essential expertise
Mexico reiterated that the non-objection mechanism should not be interpreted as giving a state the capacity to block stakeholders that contribute to implementing the mechanism's mandate, but should be used to seek the greatest level of support
The Netherlands deeply regretted that 50 of 92 multi-stakeholders were objected to, with 43 blocked by one member state without proper explanation, going against the spirit of what was agreed in the OEWG
Switzerland expressed deep regret that objections were raised against a large number of qualified stakeholders, noting that Russia, despite having initiated the OEWG, is now preventing states from accessing expertise required to fulfil the mandate
New Zealand highlighted that mass non-transparent objections deprive smaller, geographically isolated countries of access to international expertise, undermining the spirit of inclusivity and the practical purpose of the mechanism
Japan expressed concern that objections were raised in a non-judicious manner and stated that any objections should be accompanied by appropriate justification and explained transparently
Poland condemned Russia's mass blocking of NGOs without substantive justification, citing the example of the Łódź Cyber Hub, and argued that raising objections en masse undermines the legitimacy of the process
Estonia explained its own objection to JSC Positive Technologies, citing its links to the FSB and EU sanctions, and argued that inclusivity cannot come at the expense of integrity, trust, and security
The United Kingdom deeply regretted Russia's excessive use of the non-objection mechanism, including blocking six stakeholders that had made meaningful contributions to the OEWG, and reiterated that DTG participation does not require accreditation
Republic of Korea aligned with Canada and the EU, stating that the global mechanism should be open and inclusive, and that grounds for any objection should be made transparent
Germany expressed regret that some states failed to exercise restraint in assessing stakeholder accreditation requests, and noted that the EU member states provided written explanation for their own objection in the spirit of transparent dialogue
The United States stated it did not object to a single stakeholder and condemned Russia's wholesale effort to strip the mechanism of independent expertise, arguing this hollows out the substance of the mechanism
Ireland expressed strong regret at the objection to 43 stakeholders, a majority of those that applied, and supported the joint multi-stakeholder statement
Australia underlined the importance of meaningful cooperation with the multi-stakeholder community and urged member states to use the non-objection mechanism judiciously and transparently, supporting Estonia's transparency in explaining their objection
Albania expressed concern regarding the outcomes of the accreditation process, noting that objections to well-established organisations risk depriving member states of valuable expertise at a time when cyber threats are increasingly complex
Ukraine echoed calls for explaining reasons behind stakeholder exclusion and emphasised that DTGs as informal consultations should be accessible for stakeholders based on their diligence and expertise
Chile stated that excluding over half of applicants is difficult to align with the commitment to promote systematic and substantive interaction with stakeholders, and that broad vetoes without known reasons contradict the spirit of inclusivity
Kiribati, as a small island state, emphasised that objecting states should share the basis of their objections so concerns can be understood and resolved, as transparency costs little but silence costs the rest a great deal
Russia’s use of procedural mechanisms to raise objections has been a recurring pattern across UN ICT security negotiations, including in the Ad Hoc Committee process [S143]. The OEWG Final Report established the accreditation modalities that underpin the non-objection mechanism [S136], and Russia’s objections in the organisational sessions have drawn significant pushback from other delegations [S128].
The Group of Like-Minded States (Belarus, Burkina Faso, China, Cuba, DPRK, Iran, Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua) expressed strong disappointment with the Chair’s approach to appointing co-facilitators, disassociating from the procedure and stating it should not serve as a precedent . Russia argued that consultations from April to June showed no consensus was reached on candidates, and that the Chair’s decision contradicts UNGA-approved parameters and was made in circumvention of the consensus procedure . Iran provided a specific historical argument: the proposal to authorise the Chair to appoint facilitators appeared in the initial OEWG draft but was deliberately removed because it did not enjoy consensus, meaning the agreed outcome intentionally did not confer such authority . Venezuela additionally argued that a 50-50 split between developed and developing countries over-represents developed countries given their smaller proportion in the UN . In contrast, the EU welcomed the appointment as timely and in line with UN practice , Canada invited states to refrain from departures from UN practice for informal cybersecurity meetings , Mexico supported the Chair’s prerogative pursuant to established GA practice , and Italy affirmed the appointment does not contravene any modality or rule .
Russia stated it does not recognise the Chair's decision to appoint co-facilitators, arguing it contradicts UNGA-approved parameters and was made in circumvention of the consensus procedure and in violation of the principle of the guiding role of states
Nicaragua, on behalf of the Group of Like-Minded States, expressed strong disappointment with the Chair's approach to appointing co-facilitators without consensus, disassociating from the procedure and stating it should not serve as a precedent
Cuba expressed deep concern that the procedure followed to name co-facilitators is incompatible with the member-states-led nature of the Global Mechanism and the principle of consensus, and should not constitute a precedent
Iran argued that the proposal to authorise the Chair to appoint facilitators was removed from the initial draft during OEWG negotiations because it did not enjoy consensus, meaning the agreed outcome deliberately did not confer such authority to the Chair
Venezuela argued that naming co-facilitators for thematic groups should be subject to consultations with all member states on the basis of consensus, and that a 50-50 developed/developing country split over-represents developed countries
The European Union welcomed the timely appointment of co-facilitators in line with UN practice, viewing them as part of the Chair's team to help operationalise the DTGs over the coming two years
Canada welcomed the appointment of co-facilitators for the informal DTGs and invited states to refrain from significant departures from UN practice for informal cybersecurity meetings
Mexico expressed support for the Chair's prerogative to name co-facilitators pursuant to established practice in other GA processes, welcoming the four nominations as reflecting adequate geographical, gender, and technical balance
Japan supported the Chair's appointment of co-facilitators, believing they will contribute to fostering constructive discussions in the DTGs under the Chair's leadership
Switzerland welcomed the appointment of co-facilitators in line with UN practice as an important step in preparing for the December DTG meetings
Italy affirmed that the appointment of co-facilitators does not contravene any modality or rule and ensures appropriate balance in geographical, development, and gender terms
Colombia supported and welcomed the selection of co-facilitators on an individual basis, considering that reflecting geographic balance between developed and developing countries favours a more inclusive and representative dynamic
Morocco expressed support for the mechanism's organisation and welcomed the appointment of co-facilitators, while calling for clarity on practical modalities for participation to allow delegations with limited capacity to prepare properly
Iran provided direct historical context, noting that a proposal granting the Chair authority to appoint DTG facilitators appeared in the initial OEWG draft text but was deliberately removed due to lack of agreement among member states [S127]. This makes the current dispute a continuation of an unresolved drafting controversy from the OEWG process.
This disagreement centred on the legal interpretation of the agreed OEWG modalities. Russia argued that according to paragraph 8a of Annex 1 to the OEWG final report, no stakeholders other than briefers may participate in DTGs, that briefings are optional and require approval of all member states, and that speakers must be selected from accredited NGOs . Iran argued that neither Annex C to the third annual progress report nor Annex A to the final report draws any distinction between plenary meetings and DTG meetings for the purposes of stakeholder participation, and that general UN practice cannot supersede specifically negotiated modalities . Cuba and China similarly argued the same rules should apply to DTGs as to plenaries . In direct contrast, the UK reiterated for the avoidance of doubt that DTGs are informal working groups and stakeholder participation does not require accreditation, citing both the agreed modalities and established UN practice including the May 2024 OEWG intersessional where unaccredited stakeholders attended . Italy cited paragraph 15 of Annex I as clearly affirming accreditation is needed for plenary and review conferences only . Canada referenced the precedent of the May 2024 OEWG informals where all stakeholders, whether accredited or not, could participate as discussants or expert briefers .
Russia argued that the list of topics for DTGs should be developed and approved transparently and unanimously, that reports not unanimously approved cannot be regarded as legitimate, and that only accredited NGOs may serve as briefers
Iran argued that the agreed modalities apply to the global mechanism as a whole, including DTGs, and that no stakeholders other than accredited briefers may participate, with briefings being optional and requiring approval of all member states
Cuba stated that the rules for stakeholder participation should also be applied to the dedicated thematic working groups, in strict accordance with approved modalities
China argued that if DTGs use a totally different set of rules of procedure from the plenary, it will undermine the competence of member states and the seriousness of final outcomes, risking DTGs becoming mere workshops or side events
Nicaragua recalled that the modalities for stakeholder participation were negotiated and approved by consensus, fully recognising the right of states to present objections, and that organisations with political activities cannot contribute impartially
Canada welcomed the appointment of co-facilitators for the informal DTGs and invited states to refrain from significant departures from UN practice for informal cybersecurity meetings
The United Kingdom reiterated that DTGs are informal working groups and stakeholder participation does not require accreditation, consistent with agreed modalities and established UN practice including the May 2024 OEWG intersessional
Portugal concurred that the agreed objection mechanism applies only to formal meetings such as plenaries and review conferences, not to informal thematic groups where affected stakeholders will be able to participate
Chile expressed hope that the situation of blocked stakeholders would not extend to the work of the DTGs, as the non-objection procedure was contemplated only for substantive plenary sessions and review conferences, not thematic working groups
Italy argued that paragraph 15 of Annex I to the OEWG final report clearly affirms that accreditation is needed for plenary and review conferences only, and that DTGs have an informal nature not requiring prior accreditation for stakeholders
Netherlands stated that multi-stakeholders should be able to participate in a meaningful manner in the DTGs themselves and speak in their own capacity, given the informal nature of the DTGs
Australia reiterated its understanding that objections to multi-stakeholders in the plenary will not apply to their participation in the DTGs
Ukraine emphasised that DTGs as informal consultations should be accessible for stakeholders based on their diligence and expertise in the first place
Germany highlighted the potential for greater inclusivity in the agreed hybrid modalities for DTGs, noting that remote participation will allow experts of smaller states and stakeholders with limited resources to participate
The OEWG Final Report specifies that accredited stakeholders may attend substantive plenary sessions and review conferences [S136], leaving the status of informal DTGs ambiguous. This ambiguity is at the heart of the procedural dispute in the organisational sessions [S127].
Russia argued that the list of topics for DTGs should be developed and approved transparently and unanimously, taking into account the priorities and concerns of all member states, and that reports of co-facilitators not unanimously approved by states cannot be regarded as legitimate . Iran expressed reservations about co-facilitator summaries, arguing that experience in other UN processes has demonstrated it is impossible to ensure complete objectivity, and suggested outcomes be recorded from the outset as rolling text evolving into consensus recommendations . Cuba urged strict compliance with agreed modalities, including the centrality of consensus . In contrast, the EU proposed that co-facilitators could update the plenary verbally and potentially transmit written recommendations agreed upon by states within the DTG context in the spirit of consensus , Canada proposed focused guiding questions with one or two topics , Mexico proposed scenario-based discussions to avoid duplicating conceptual debates , and Japan proposed concrete discussions on ransomware and critical infrastructure for DTG1 . These delegations envisaged a more flexible, Chair-guided process rather than requiring unanimous approval at every step.
Russia argued that the list of topics for DTGs should be developed and approved transparently and unanimously, that reports not unanimously approved cannot be regarded as legitimate, and that only accredited NGOs may serve as briefers
Iran stated that discussion topics and timetables for DTGs should be agreed by consensus among all member states, and expressed reservations about co-facilitator summaries, preferring outcomes recorded as rolling text evolving into consensus recommendations
Cuba stated that the rules for stakeholder participation should also be applied to the dedicated thematic working groups, in strict accordance with approved modalities
The European Union supported focused, topic-based DTG discussions drawing on expert briefings, with co-facilitators updating the plenary verbally and potentially transmitting written recommendations agreed in the spirit of consensus
Canada proposed that DTG guiding questions should focus on priorities broadly shared across UN membership, with one or two questions per session, integrated interventions addressing all pillars, and stakeholder participation with dedicated interactive time
Mexico considered that DTG discussions should be structured around scenarios allowing exchange of national experiences, identification of common challenges, and extraction of specific lessons, avoiding duplication of conceptual debates already held in plenary
Switzerland welcomed the appointment of co-facilitators in line with UN practice as an important step in preparing for the December DTG meetings
Japan emphasised that DTG1 should prioritise concrete discussions on pressing issues such as ransomware and attacks on critical infrastructure using specific scenarios, while DTG2 should ensure broad stakeholder participation and address capacity building efficiently
Mexico has explicitly argued against interpreting consensus as requiring unanimous agreement from all 193 member states, contending that such an approach leads to paralysis and allows a single state to place its interests above the collective majority [S146]. This reflects a broader tension in multilateral processes between consensus norms and effective decision-making [S131].
Russia provided general justifications for its objections – that blocked organisations practised unfounded political attribution or politicised propaganda – but did not provide specific, publicly available written explanations for each objection . Nicaragua and Cuba similarly defended the right to object without detailed public justification . In contrast, Japan stated that any objections should be accompanied by appropriate justification and explained transparently , the Republic of Korea called for grounds to be made transparent , and Germany noted that EU member states provided a written explanation for their own veto in the spirit of transparent dialogue . Estonia explicitly contrasted its approach with Russia’s, stating that it did not hide behind procedures but set out its reasons in writing and made them publicly available, arguing that transparency matters especially when objections are raised and helps preserve trust in the process . Kiribati argued that transparency costs the objecting state little while silence costs the rest a great deal . Poland challenged Russia’s general justification as clearly inapplicable to the Łódź Cyber Hub, suggesting Russia’s decision was itself driven by a politicised agenda .
Russia defended its objections, stating that all organisations refused accreditation did not meet the criterion of objectivity and non-politicisation, as they practised unfounded political attribution of cyber attacks or carried out politicised propaganda
Nicaragua recalled that the modalities for stakeholder participation were negotiated and approved by consensus, fully recognising the right of states to present objections, and that organisations with political activities cannot contribute impartially
Cuba reaffirmed that participation of other stakeholders should be based on the principle of non-objection as agreed, and that modalities should be respected comprehensively to ensure non-politicised and impartial participation
Japan expressed concern that objections were raised in a non-judicious manner and stated that any objections should be accompanied by appropriate justification and explained transparently
Canada welcomed the appointment of co-facilitators for the informal DTGs and invited states to refrain from significant departures from UN practice for informal cybersecurity meetings
The United Kingdom deeply regretted Russia's excessive use of the non-objection mechanism, including blocking six stakeholders that had made meaningful contributions to the OEWG, and reiterated that DTG participation does not require accreditation
Republic of Korea aligned with Canada and the EU, stating that the global mechanism should be open and inclusive, and that grounds for any objection should be made transparent
Germany expressed regret that some states failed to exercise restraint in assessing stakeholder accreditation requests, and noted that the EU member states provided written explanation for their own objection in the spirit of transparent dialogue
Estonia explained its own objection to JSC Positive Technologies, citing its links to the FSB and EU sanctions, and argued that inclusivity cannot come at the expense of integrity, trust, and security
Poland condemned Russia's mass blocking of NGOs without substantive justification, citing the example of the Łódź Cyber Hub, and argued that raising objections en masse undermines the legitimacy of the process
Kiribati, as a small island state, emphasised that objecting states should share the basis of their objections so concerns can be understood and resolved, as transparency costs little but silence costs the rest a great deal
Australia underlined the importance of meaningful cooperation with the multi-stakeholder community and urged member states to use the non-objection mechanism judiciously and transparently, supporting Estonia's transparency in explaining their objection
While the main disagreement about co-facilitator appointment focused on the procedure (consensus vs. Chair’s prerogative), Venezuela introduced an unexpected additional dimension: that a 50-50 split between developed and developing countries does not reflect a truly equitable distribution because developing countries represent a considerably higher proportion in the United Nations, and therefore the proposed division could translate into over-representation of developed countries . This argument was not raised by other like-minded states and introduced a North-South equity dimension to what was primarily a procedural dispute. Colombia, by contrast, viewed the geographic balance between developed and developing countries as a positive feature that favours a more inclusive and representative dynamic , directly contradicting Venezuela’s framing of the same 50-50 split.
Iran introduced an unexpected and specific historical argument about the negotiating history of the OEWG modalities, claiming that the proposal to authorise the Chair to appoint facilitators appeared in the initial draft but was ultimately removed because it did not enjoy the consensus of member states . This argument, if accurate, would suggest that the silence in the final text on this point was a deliberate omission rather than a gap to be filled by UN practice. No other delegation directly rebutted this specific historical claim, making it an unexpected and potentially significant legal argument that went largely unanswered. The pro-appointment delegations relied on general UN practice arguments rather than engaging with Iran’s specific negotiating history argument.
The United States introduced an unexpected ideological dimension to the stakeholder debate by stating that the cyber domain was not created by governments but by the private sector, specifically private Western companies that also happen to champion freedom of expression and the inalienable right of every man and woman to be free across the world, and suggesting this may be the heart of the problem . This framing went beyond the procedural and technical arguments made by other delegations and introduced a values-based geopolitical argument that implicitly characterised Russia’s objections as ideologically motivated opposition to Western-aligned civil society. This was unexpected in a forum where most delegations carefully avoided such explicit geopolitical framing, and it directly connected the stakeholder accreditation dispute to broader East-West tensions over internet governance and freedom of expression.
Colombia raised an unexpected practical concern that was not addressed by any other delegation: the availability of simultaneous interpretation in DTG meetings as a condition that is practical but critical for the effective functioning of thematic groups . Mexico echoed the concern about multilingualism but no other delegation engaged with this issue. Given that the DTGs are intended to involve technical experts from different regions and linguistic contexts, the absence of interpretation could effectively exclude non-English-speaking experts, creating a digital divide within the mechanism itself. This practical concern was unexpected in a session dominated by high-level procedural and political disputes, and it highlighted a concrete implementation challenge that had not been prominently discussed.
Estonia’s detailed public explanation of its objection to JSC Positive Technologies created an unexpected dynamic in the debate. While the session was dominated by criticism of Russia’s mass objections, Estonia’s intervention revealed that Western states had also exercised the non-objection mechanism, albeit for a single entity and with full public transparency . This created an unexpected symmetry: Russia had also expressed disappointment at the rejection of Russian NGOs , suggesting that objections were being raised on both sides. Estonia explicitly framed its approach as a model of transparency – setting out reasons in writing and making them publicly available – in contrast to Russia’s approach . Australia specifically praised Estonia’s transparency , and Germany noted the EU’s written explanation as an example of the spirit of transparent dialogue . This unexpected revelation complicated the simple narrative of one side blocking stakeholders and the other side supporting inclusion.
The session revealed three major, deeply entrenched areas of disagreement: (1) the legitimacy and scale of Russia’s use of the non-objection mechanism to block over 40 stakeholders from plenary participation, with the overwhelming majority of delegations condemning the approach as contrary to the agreed spirit of inclusivity ; (2) whether the Chair had the authority to appoint co-facilitators for the DTGs without consensus, with the Group of Like-Minded States (Russia, China, Cuba, Iran, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and others) formally disassociating from the decision , while a larger group of states supported the appointment as consistent with UN practice ; and (3) whether the non-objection mechanism and accreditation requirements apply to DTGs or only to formal plenaries, with a fundamental interpretive divide between those reading the agreed text as applying to the whole mechanism and those reading it as applying only to formal meetings . A secondary but significant disagreement concerned whether objecting states are required to provide transparent, public justifications for their objections or whether the right to object can be exercised without detailed explanation .
All delegations agreed that the non-objection mechanism agreed by consensus in the OEWG final report is the applicable framework for stakeholder accreditation . All sides acknowledged that member states have the right to raise objections . The disagreement was not about whether the mechanism exists or whether states have the right to object, but about how that right should be exercised — whether judiciously and with transparency, or broadly and without detailed public justification. Even Russia acknowledged the modalities call for caution , while critics cited the same text to argue Russia violated its spirit . Both sides also agreed that stakeholders should contribute in a non-politicised and impartial manner , differing only on whether the blocked organisations met that standard.
Over 50% of stakeholders that applied to participate in plenaries have been blocked, with Russia alone raising 43 objections, which is inconsistent with the agreed spirit of inclusivity and the call to use the non-objection mechanism judiciously Russia defended its objections, stating that all organisations refused accreditation did not meet the criterion of objectivity and non-politicisation, as they practised unfounded political attribution of cyber attacks or carried out politicised propaganda Nicaragua recalled that the modalities for stakeholder participation were negotiated and approved by consensus, fully recognising the right of states to present objections, and that organisations with political activities cannot contribute impartially China supported NGO involvement in principle but emphasised that NGOs must respect agreed procedures and meet established criteria, and that the same rules applying to plenary participation should apply to DTGs
All delegations agreed that the DTGs are a key innovation of the global mechanism and that they should function effectively to produce practical, action-oriented outcomes . Both sides agreed that co-facilitators should act with neutrality, impartiality, and in service of member states . The disagreement was specifically about the procedure for appointing co-facilitators — whether the Chair could do so in line with UN practice or whether consensus of all member states was required . Both sides also agreed that the DTG discussions should be structured around the five pillars of the framework , differing on whether the Chair or unanimous member state agreement should determine the specific topics.
The European Union welcomed the timely appointment of co-facilitators in line with UN practice, viewing them as part of the Chair’s team to help operationalise the DTGs over the coming two years Russia stated it does not recognise the Chair’s decision to appoint co-facilitators, arguing it contradicts UNGA-approved parameters and was made in circumvention of the consensus procedure and in violation of the principle of the guiding role of states Nicaragua, on behalf of the Group of Like-Minded States, expressed strong disappointment with the Chair’s approach to appointing co-facilitators without consensus, disassociating from the procedure and stating it should not serve as a precedent Cuba expressed deep concern that the procedure followed to name co-facilitators is incompatible with the member-states-led nature of the Global Mechanism and the principle of consensus, and should not constitute a precedent
All delegations agreed that the DTGs should produce substantive, action-oriented outcomes that feed into the plenary process and that the state-led, intergovernmental character of the mechanism must be preserved . Both sides agreed that expert briefings in DTGs can be valuable . The fundamental disagreement was about whether the accreditation rules that apply to formal plenaries also apply to the informal DTGs, and whether non-accredited stakeholders can participate in DTGs. The UK cited the May 2024 OEWG intersessional as precedent for unaccredited stakeholder participation in informals , while Russia argued that paragraph 8a of Annex 1 restricts DTG participation to accredited briefers only .
Canada welcomed the appointment of co-facilitators for the informal DTGs and invited states to refrain from significant departures from UN practice for informal cybersecurity meetings The United Kingdom reiterated that DTGs are informal working groups and stakeholder participation does not require accreditation, consistent with agreed modalities and established UN practice including the May 2024 OEWG intersessional Russia argued that the list of topics for DTGs should be developed and approved transparently and unanimously, that reports not unanimously approved cannot be regarded as legitimate, and that only accredited NGOs may serve as briefers Iran argued that the agreed modalities apply to the global mechanism as a whole, including DTGs, and that no stakeholders other than accredited briefers may participate, with briefings being optional and requiring approval of all member states China argued that if DTGs use a totally different set of rules of procedure from the plenary, it will undermine the competence of member states and the seriousness of final outcomes, risking DTGs becoming mere workshops or side events
All delegations, including Russia, China, Cuba, and Nicaragua, agreed in principle that stakeholders can play a valuable role in the global mechanism and that their participation should be non-politicised and technically oriented . Russia stated it supports in principle the involvement of NGOs . The disagreement was about which specific organisations meet the criteria for participation and who has the authority to make that determination. Western states argued that the blocked organisations were legitimate technical contributors , while Russia and like-minded states argued those organisations failed the non-politicisation criterion .
Stakeholders contribute expertise through training, simulations, research, public outreach, threat assessments, and raising awareness on human rights and gender matters related to cybersecurity, and their exclusion deprives member states of essential knowledge Russia defended its objections, stating that all organisations refused accreditation did not meet the criterion of objectivity and non-politicisation, as they practised unfounded political attribution of cyber attacks or carried out politicised propaganda Nicaragua recalled that the modalities for stakeholder participation were negotiated and approved by consensus, fully recognising the right of states to present objections, and that organisations with political activities cannot contribute impartially China supported NGO involvement in principle but emphasised that NGOs must respect agreed procedures and meet established criteria, and that the same rules applying to plenary participation should apply to DTGs For small island states like Kiribati, cybersecurity capacity was built with the support of technical partners and regional bodies, and stakeholders sharpened the quality of deliberations and helped move the mechanism from description toward delivery
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The Global Mechanism on ICTs in the context of international security held its first substantive plenary session, marking a historic milestone as the first permanent, single-track, consensually agreed forum for ICT security discussions at the UN.
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The provisional agenda for the 2026 and 2027 substantive plenary sessions was adopted by consensus, representing a significant early achievement of the session.
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A deeply divisive issue emerged regarding stakeholder accreditation: over 50% of the 70–92 entities that applied to participate in the plenary were blocked, with Russia alone raising 43 objections, prompting widespread condemnation from a large majority of delegations.
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The vast majority of delegations expressed that the mass use of the non-objection mechanism by Russia was inconsistent with the agreed spirit of inclusivity and the call to use the mechanism judiciously, as enshrined in the OEWG final report.
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Russia defended its objections on the grounds that the blocked organisations engaged in politicised attribution of cyber attacks or propaganda, and maintained that member states have every right to refuse accreditation under the agreed modalities.
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A clear divide emerged between two blocs: a large majority of states supporting broad, inclusive stakeholder participation and the Chair’s authority to appoint co-facilitators in line with UN practice; and a Group of Like-Minded States (including Russia, China, Cuba, Iran, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Belarus, Burkina Faso, DPRK) opposing both positions.
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The Chair appointed four co-facilitators for the Dedicated Thematic Groups (DTGs) from Australia, Egypt, Malaysia, and the Netherlands, reflecting geographic and gender balance, but this decision was contested by the Group of Like-Minded States as circumventing the consensus principle.
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There is broad agreement that DTGs represent a key innovation of the mechanism and should produce action-oriented, practical outcomes complementing the plenary, but significant disagreement exists over their rules of procedure, stakeholder participation modalities, and reporting mechanisms.
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A fundamental interpretive dispute exists over whether the non-objection mechanism for stakeholder accreditation applies exclusively to formal plenary sessions and review conferences, or also to the informal DTG meetings.
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Estonia provided a transparent, written explanation for its own objection to JSC Positive Technologies, citing its links to the FSB and EU sanctions, and was commended by several delegations for this transparency.
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Small and developing states, including Kiribati, Malawi, New Zealand, and the Philippines, emphasised their particular dependence on stakeholder expertise given limited in-house technical capacity, making mass objections especially harmful to them.
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The Chair committed to continuing to use her good offices to facilitate stakeholder engagement and to convene informal dialogues with stakeholders on a systematic, substantive, and sustained basis.
“Russia alone raised 43 objections. Canada does not consider that this approach to vetoes is in line with the letter or spirit of consensus in paragraph 15E… The broad brush approach of Russia is particularly detrimental to the quality of the work of our body. It deprives member states of expertise essential to meaningful cybersecurity discussions.”
“Transparency here costs the objecting state little. Silence costs the rest of us a great deal. For a small island state like Kiribati, this is not an abstract concern. We do not have deep benches of in-house expertise to fall back on. The stakeholders excluded from a room like this one are very often precisely the partners on whom states like ours are most dependent. Every capable voice kept out is a loss we feel more acutely than most.”
“All of these organisations that our country refused accreditation for did not meet this criterion [of objectivity and non-politicisation]. The analysis of their work showed that these NGOs practised and still practise unfounded political attribution of computer attacks, or they carry out politicised propaganda to tarnish the reputation of these countries.”
“Stakeholder participation must strengthen the global mechanism, not weaken it. It must not provide a platform to entities that contribute to, enable, or are closely linked with malicious cyber activity or Russia’s aggression against another state… Estonia, on behalf of the European Union and its member states, objected to the participation of JSC Positive Technologies. In doing so, we did not hide behind procedures. We set out our reasons in writing and made them publicly available. Because transparency matters, especially when objections are raised.”
“The domain is unique. It was not created by governments. It was created by the private sector, specifically private Western companies that also happen to champion freedom of expression and the inalienable right of every man and woman to be free across the world. Perhaps this is the heart of the problem… this is equivalent to holding an agricultural convention and not inviting farmers to participate — that is how silly.”
“If the DTG mechanism uses a totally different set of procedures, rules of procedures, it will dent the competence of member states in their discussions and it will also dent the seriousness of the final outcome coming out of the DTG discussions. If things go on like this, DTG will become nothing more than a workshop or even a side event.”
“We strongly disagree that on the matter of appointing co-facilitators for the dedicated thematic groups states are basically presented with their fait accompli… Russia does not recognize this decision. It was made in circumvention of the consensus procedure and in violation of the principle of the guiding role of states.”
“During the negotiations on the modalities of the global mechanism in the OEWG, the proposal to authorize the Chair to appoint the facilitators appeared in the initial draft, but was ultimately removed because it did not enjoy the consensus of member states. The agreed outcome, therefore, reflects a deliberate decision by states not to confer such authority to the Chair.”
“The history of multilateral processes is rarely written in great moments of unanimity. More frequently, it is built through small steps, difficult compromises, and the willingness to keep talking even when there are differences.”
“The consensus that we were able to reach in 2025 strengthened the transparency and accountability with regards to the modalities… Broad-based vetoes without any known reasons contradict that progress and the spirit of inclusivity that we agreed upon. The participation of stakeholders is fully compatible with the intergovernmental character of the global mechanism.”
What are the specific justifications provided by Russia for objecting to the accreditation of over 43 stakeholder organisations?
Multiple delegations noted that Russia blocked over 43 stakeholders without providing transparent or substantive justification. Understanding the specific reasons is critical to assessing whether the non-objection mechanism was used judiciously and in the spirit of inclusivity as agreed by consensus, and to potentially resolving outstanding accreditation concerns.
Why were Russian NGOs blocked from accreditation, and what clarification can be provided on the basis for those objections?
Russia expressed disappointment at the rejection of Russian NGOs and requested clarification on why they were blocked. This is important for ensuring the non-objection mechanism is applied consistently and transparently across all member states.
How should the non-objection mechanism be applied to the Dedicated Thematic Groups (DTGs), given disagreement over whether the plenary accreditation rules extend to informal DTG meetings?
There is a fundamental disagreement between member states about whether the accreditation and non-objection procedures agreed for plenary sessions also apply to the informal DTGs. Resolving this question is essential for determining who can participate in the December DTG meetings and for the overall functioning of the mechanism.
What is the legal and procedural basis for the Chair’s authority to appoint co-facilitators for the DTGs without a consensus decision of all member states?
A significant group of states contested the Chair’s appointment of co-facilitators, arguing it circumvented the consensus principle. Clarifying the procedural basis for this appointment is critical to the legitimacy of the DTGs and to preventing similar disputes in future biennia.
How should the outcomes and recommendations of the DTGs be transmitted to the plenary, and what form should co-facilitator summaries or reports take?
There is disagreement over whether co-facilitator summaries are appropriate, whether they can be objective, and whether outcomes should instead take the form of a rolling negotiated text. Resolving this is essential for ensuring DTG outputs are credible and can be incorporated into plenary outcomes.
Which specific topics should be prioritised for discussion in DTG1 and DTG2, and how should these topics be selected in a manner that reflects all five pillars of the framework for responsible state behaviour?
Multiple delegations offered proposals for DTG topics, including ransomware, critical infrastructure attacks, AI security, quantum readiness, post-quantum cryptography, capacity building, and international law. A structured, consensus-based process for selecting and balancing topics across all five pillars is needed to guide the December DTG meetings.
How can the global mechanism ensure that stakeholders from underrepresented regions, particularly developing countries and small island developing states, are able to participate meaningfully in both plenary sessions and DTGs?
Several delegations, particularly from smaller and developing states, highlighted that mass objections to stakeholder accreditation disproportionately affect their access to technical expertise. Further research and practical arrangements are needed to ensure equitable participation across regions.
How should the pool of technical experts for DTG briefings be constituted, and must briefers be drawn exclusively from accredited stakeholders or can non-accredited experts participate?
There is a direct conflict between states that argue only accredited NGOs may brief in DTGs and those that argue the informal nature of DTGs allows broader expert participation. Resolving this question is necessary before the December DTG meetings can be effectively organised.
What practical arrangements, including simultaneous interpretation and hybrid participation, can be put in place to ensure smaller delegations and those with limited resources can meaningfully participate in DTG meetings?
Several delegations raised the practical challenge of ensuring multilingual and hybrid access to DTG meetings, particularly for smaller states. Concrete arrangements need to be developed before December to ensure inclusive participation.
What guiding questions or scenario-based topics should structure the DTG discussions, and how far in advance should these be communicated to delegations and stakeholders?
Delegations stressed the need for sufficient advance notice of guiding questions and topics to allow meaningful preparation. The process for developing and communicating these questions needs to be clarified to ensure productive DTG sessions in December.
How should the impact of emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence, on the cyber threat landscape be assessed and addressed within the framework of the global mechanism?
Both the opening statement and the Chair’s remarks highlighted AI as a growing factor in cyber threats and as a threat multiplier. Further research and structured discussion on AI’s implications for international security and responsible state behaviour are needed as part of the mechanism’s substantive agenda.
How can the global mechanism ensure that the implementation of norms for responsible state behaviour moves from conceptual discussion to concrete, measurable outcomes, particularly for developing countries?
A recurring theme was the need to move from agreements to implementation and from commitments to tangible results. Further work is needed to identify practical implementation pathways, especially for states with limited capacity.
What criteria should be used to determine whether a stakeholder’s activities are sufficiently non-politicised and impartial to warrant accreditation, and who should make that determination?
Russia argued that blocked organisations engaged in political attribution or propaganda, while other states disputed this characterisation. Developing clear, agreed criteria for assessing stakeholder impartiality would reduce disputes and improve the predictability of the accreditation process.
Should the co-facilitators of the DTGs be required to produce written summaries of discussions, and if so, what safeguards should be in place to ensure objectivity and balanced representation of all delegations’ views?
Iran raised concerns that written summaries inevitably reflect the characterisation of the facilitator and cannot fully capture all positions. This question needs to be resolved to ensure DTG outputs are trusted and usable by all member states.
How should the global mechanism address the relationship between cybersecurity and human rights, including gender dimensions, given that some of the blocked stakeholders were specifically focused on these issues?
Several delegations noted that blocked stakeholders included organisations with expertise on human rights and gender matters related to cybersecurity. Further consideration is needed on how these perspectives can be incorporated into the mechanism’s work.
What lessons can be drawn from the previous Open-Ended Working Group’s informal intersessional meetings, particularly the May 2024 intersessional, to inform the organisation of the December DTG meetings?
Canada and the United Kingdom referenced the May 2024 OEWG intersessional as a relevant precedent for how informal meetings should be organised, including on stakeholder participation. A systematic review of that precedent would help guide the DTG working methods.
How can the global mechanism ensure that the 50/50 split between developed and developing country co-facilitators is genuinely equitable given that developing countries represent a considerably larger proportion of UN membership?
Venezuela raised the concern that a 50/50 split between developed and developing countries may over-represent developed countries relative to their share of UN membership. This question of equitable representation in the co-facilitator structure warrants further consideration.
What mechanisms can be established to allow cases of malicious cyber behaviour by stakeholders to be brought to the attention of the international community, both through official attribution and through exchanges in plenary meetings?
Ukraine suggested it would be useful for the international community to be able to follow cases of malicious cyber behaviour by stakeholders, referencing Estonia’s intervention on Positive Technologies. Developing a structured process for such exchanges would improve transparency and accountability.
How should the global mechanism handle objections to stakeholder accreditation where the objecting state is itself alleged to have a politicised motivation for the objection?
Poland argued that Russia’s objection to the Łódź Cyber Hub appeared to be driven by a politicised agenda rather than legitimate concerns about impartiality. This raises a broader question about how the mechanism can guard against the misuse of the non-objection procedure for political purposes.
What rules of procedure should govern the DTGs, including on objectives, scope, frequency, format, written contributions, reporting timelines, and coordination among DTGs?
Mauritius called for clear and predictable rules of procedure for the DTGs covering a wide range of operational matters. Developing these rules is essential for the efficient and inclusive functioning of the DTGs and for ensuring all delegations, particularly those with limited capacity, can participate meaningfully.
