1. The Atlantic Declaration: A Framework for a twenty-first century US-UK Economic Partnership
Today the United States and the United Kingdom are announcing the Atlantic Declaration for a Twenty-First Century U.S.-UK Economic Partnership to ensure that our unique alliance is adapted, reinforced, and reimagined for the challenges of this moment.
Over the last century, the essential partnership between the United States and the United Kingdom has enabled us to lead together on issues of global importance. Since the signing of the Atlantic Charter in 1941, we have worked together to shape an open and rules-based international order based on our enduring support for shared values. In the New Atlantic Charter signed in 2021, we underscored and refreshed this vision. Together, we also designed an international economic architecture that has underpinned our economic strength and helped to lift millions around the world out of poverty. Our essential bilateral relationship is underpinned by the closest cooperation on defence and security, a thriving economic relationship, leadership in science and technology, and deep ties between our people and civil societies.
U.S.-UK cooperation and joint leadership is as essential today as ever – both internationally and for the security and prosperity of our people at home. To achieve this, we must keep pace with changes in the world around us and adapt our alliance to them. The global economy is undergoing one of the greatest transformations since the Industrial Revolution. Breakthroughs in innovation offer enormous potential if we can harness them to work for, not against, our democracies and security. The transition to the clean energy economies of the future is an opportunity to improve jobs and livelihoods and deepen the resilience of our economies. At the same time, the nature of national security is changing. Technology, economics, and national security are more deeply intertwined than ever before. We face new challenges to international stability – from authoritarian states such as Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC); disruptive technologies; non-state actors; and transnational challenges like climate change.
Over the past year, we have taken steps to deepen our unrivalled defence, security, and intelligence relationship across every theatre in the globe in which we cooperate, recognizing the indivisibility of security in the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific and other regions. We have energised our traditional alliances and built new and innovative partnerships based on deeper cooperation on technology, trade, and security. We have stood shoulder to shoulder in our resolve to support Ukraine for as long as it takes in the face of Russia’s illegal, unjustifiable, and unprovoked war of aggression and to preserve a free, independent, and sovereign Ukraine. We are committed to continuing to strengthen NATO’s ability to deter further attempts to undermine Alliance security, in support of NATO’s new Strategic Concept.
We have taken significant steps to implement AUKUS, including announcing our plans to support Australia acquiring conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines. Through our deeper engagement in the Indo-Pacific we are working more closely than ever before with our partners to support a free and open region. Through the U.S.-UK Indo-Pacific Dialogue we will continue to find new opportunities to coordinate our approaches, to support ASEAN and ASEAN centrality, to partner with the Pacific Islands, to coordinate on economic and technological advancement, and to contribute to regional peace and stability, including through AUKUS and expanded joint exercises and planning, including trilaterally.
Today, we are announcing the Atlantic Declaration for a Twenty-First Century U.S.-UK Economic Partnership to build on that partnership in the economic sphere. The United States and the United Kingdom resolve to partner to build resilient, diversified, and secure supply chains and reduce strategic dependencies. We remain committed to continuing to lead in the technologies of the future and advance the closest possible coordination on our economic security and technology protection toolkits to ensure that emerging technologies work for, not against, our democracies and security. And as democratic and open societies we resolve to work together to ensure the safety, prosperity, and security of our nations and peoples while driving growth in living standards across the world.
The Atlantic Declaration and accompanying Action Plan form the basis of a new type of innovative partnership across the full spectrum of our economic, technological, commercial and trade relations; a first of its kind that has never been tried before, and which demands our joint leadership and imagination to realise in full.
It will constitute a new economic security framework covering ever-closer cooperation on critical and emerging technologies and stronger protective toolkits. It will support the United States and the United Kingdom in our efforts to harness the energy transition and technological breakthroughs to drive broadly shared growth, create good jobs, and leave no community behind. It will explore ways to deepen our trade and investment relationship. And it will strengthen our alliance across defence, science, health security, and space – allowing us to explore increased cooperation in other areas for mutual economic benefit.
These are the pressing economic issues of our time. These are the issues that demand the United States and the United Kingdom to lead together.
1.1 Action Plan for a Twenty-First Century U.S.-UK Economic Partnership (ADAPT)
Deep economic ties between the United States and the United Kingdom have long been a source of mutual strength. The U.S.-UK bilateral investment relationship is the largest in the world, with over $1.5 trillion in stock [£ 1.2 trillion] supporting more than 2.7 million jobs in both countries. As we evolve our unparalleled economic relationship to reflect today’s challenges, we have an opportunity to exemplify what a twenty-first century economic partnership should look like. Together the United States and the United Kingdom can lead in building a new form of economic partnership that advances economic growth and competitiveness, that builds capacity, resilience, and inclusiveness, and works for our workers and communities. A partnership that works for our hard-working businesses, works for our climate, and works for our national security.
As the first steps in this new partnership, we are today announcing and taking concrete and coordinated actions to deepen this partnership across five pillars, by:
ensuring U.S.-UK leadership in critical and emerging technologies,
advancing ever-closer cooperation on our economic security and technology protection toolkits and supply chains,
partnering on an inclusive and responsible digital transformation,
building the clean energy economy of the future, and
further strengthening our alliance across defence, health security, and space.
Senior White House and Downing Street representatives will convene biannually under the Atlantic Declaration Action Plan (ADAPT) to develop and drive forward concrete progress across the Atlantic Declaration Action Plan and ensure increasing ambition over the next months and years.
1.2 1. Ensuring U.S.-UK Leadership in Critical and Emerging Technologies
A handful of critical and emerging technologies are forming the backbone of new industries and shaping our national security landscape. These technologies include semiconductors, quantum technologies, artificial intelligence, cutting-edge telecommunications, and synthetic biology. As the home of world-leading companies and academic institutions, we are committed to ensuring the United States and the United Kingdom continue to lead across these sectors. We intend to do so by collaborating on tangible research and development joint efforts , deepening public-private dialogue across our priority technologies, jointly mobilizing private capital towards strategic technologies and by improving reciprocal talent flows. These long term initiatives are the initial steps in a long-term partnership and will fall under existing U.S.-UK frameworks including the U.S.-UK Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation, the U.S.-UK Comprehensive Dialogue on Technology and Data, and additional forums as applicable, through which we will develop and deliver a shared workplan on critical and emerging technologies, to be updated and taken forward within the next twelve months.
Launching collaborative work on priority technologies. We intend to explore joint efforts and collaborative R&D in a range of critical and emerging technologies and pursue a set of initial activities, including the following:
Pursuing a range of quantum technologies initiatives to address fundamental research questions in quantum science and other initiatives to reduce barriers to U.S.-UK collaboration, such as increasing researcher and student mobility, and exploring workforce development activities to foster the exchange of people and ideas.
Cementing leadership by the United States and the United Kingdom in cutting-edge telecoms by setting out a joint vision, taking forward joint R&D projects, and deepening cooperation on technical activity in innovative 5G and 6G solutions, including more ambitious cooperation to accelerate Open RAN to market, and to increase the diversity and resilience of critical supply chains.
Deepening cooperation on synthetic biology with a view to concluding a joint workplan to drive public and private cooperation, exchanges, and joint research, developing novel applications and promoting our economic security through improved supply chain pathways for biomanufacturing and biotechnologies.
Exploring collaborative R&D in areas that support advanced semiconductor technologies, such as advanced materials and compound semiconductors, beginning in the next twelve months, and facilitating collaboration among our national research institutes.
Accelerating our cooperation on AI with a focus on ensuring the safe and responsible development of the technology.
Mobilising private capital towards strategic technologies.
We intend to support the growth of companies in both countries across these critical and emerging technologies. We intend to work together to crowd in private capital to ensure companies in these areas have the ability to emerge and scale. To this end, we commit to set up a U.S.-UK Strategic Technologies Investor Council within the next twelve months. We will use this newly formed Council to bring leading investors from both sides of the Atlantic together with national security experts to analyse where funding gaps currently exist and unlock new private investment in critical and emerging technologies.
Facilitating reciprocal talent flows.
We recognise the need for a skilled workforce across our technology sectors. As part of meeting this objective, we leverage expertise from across the public sector, industry, and academia to advise on how we best improve U.S.-UK reciprocal talent flows. The United States welcomes funding from the United Kingdom for expansion of Marshall and Fulbright scholarships focused on science, technology, engineering, and mathematics subjects, to deepen the wider exchange of talent between our two countries.
1.3 2. Advancing Ever Closer Cooperation on Technology Protection, Economic Security Toolkits and Supply Chains
Many of our technology protection tools were designed for a different time, a different set of threats, and a different set of technologies. We recognise that our current regulatory frameworks related to export controls, investment screening, sanctions, and research and development security are essential tools that should correspond to a changing geostrategic and technological environment. We intend to take concrete steps to update and more closely align our respective toolkits across all these areas to prevent the leakage of sensitive and dual-use emerging technologies, and other export-controlled commodities and technologies. We will work to enhance our information-sharing mechanisms on threat information with relevant stakeholders in the policy and intelligence communities, including deepening our cooperation on investment security.
Addressing the national security risks posed by certain types of outbound investment.
As allies with a close and long-standing defence partnership, and as global leaders in critical and emerging technologies, we have a shared objective in preventing our companies’ capital and expertise from fueling technological advances that will enhance the military and intelligence capabilities of countries of concern. We are taking steps to ensure that our respective toolkits are adequate to meet our shared objective. The United States is working to develop a targeted set of controls on outbound investments in sensitive technologies with a core national security nexus. The United Kingdom intends to complement this by swiftly engaging a range of business and financial stakeholders to develop an evidence base to assess and inform how the UK can best calibrate its actions to respond effectively to these risks and meet our shared objective. As we act according to our own respective timelines, we will communicate clearly to the private sector regarding our joint resolve and shared objectives in this area.
Ensuring flexible and coordinated export controls.
Against the backdrop of a rapidly shifting and ever more sophisticated technological landscape, our toolkits must address evolving challenges. We will therefore work together to enable our respective toolkits to work in a complementary way, implementing export controls related to certain sensitive technologies, including targeting end-uses of concern, and considering our approach to tackling the challenge of intangible transfers. The United Kingdom has enhanced its capability in this area by expanding the scope of its Military End Use Controls (MEUC) regime and is progressing work – due to complete by the autumn – to understand its impact. The United Kingdom will consult later this year on updating its export control regime and consider how best to flexibly and rapidly tackle sensitive technology transfers. The United Kingdom will also consult on the targeting of end uses and end-users of concern. Building on our existing cooperation and recognising that the multilateral system faces challenges in accommodating new realities and that creative solutions are necessary, both sides will advance work and bilateral consultations in the coming months to enable deeper collaboration and ensure both our export control systems are able together to tackle the identified threats.
Strengthening our world-leading partnership across sanctions strategy, design, targeting, implementation and enforcement.
We will continue to coordinate our work to tackle sanctions evasion and intend to jointly target those facilitating Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in Russia, Belarus, and in third countries, including those who help Russia acquire goods and technology that support Russian aggression. We intend to enhance our ability to collect, analyse, and share information and data with a financial sanctions nexus from our financial institutions and businesses, including for identification of companies and individuals financially supporting or facilitating payments to Russia’s war machine. We further intend to work closely together to protect humanitarian activity from unintended impacts of sanctions, building on our significant cooperation on the landmark UN Security Council Resolution 2664. We have implemented exceptions for humanitarian activities in our UN programs. The United States has implemented these exceptions in its autonomous sanctions programs, and the United Kingdom will take this further in its autonomous sanctions programs as appropriate. We will also continue joint work to underline that food supplies, are not the target of our sanctions.
Reducing our vulnerabilities across critical technology supply chains.
Recent events have shown that our supply chains need to be made more resilient to geopolitical incidents, natural disasters, third country policies, economic coercion, and other possible shocks. The United Kingdom and United States recognise the strategic and shared imperative of building resilient semiconductor and other critical technology supply chains and are putting in place robust strategies to minimise disruptions. In order to further this cooperation, the United States and the United Kingdom will work bilaterally to share analysis, develop, and deepen our channels for coordination and timely consultation during critical technology supply chain disruptions and crises.
1.4 Partnering on an Inclusive and Responsible Digital Transformation
As we promote the critical and emerging technology ecosystems in our countries, we will work together to shape the policy environment around technology and enable further responsible innovation.
Enhancing cooperation on data.
The trusted and secure flow of data across our borders is foundational to efforts to further innovation. To that end, we have committed in principle to establish a U.S.-UK Data Bridge to facilitate data flows between our countries while ensuring strong and effective privacy protections. We are working to finalise our respective assessments swiftly to implement this framework. We also intend to coordinate to further promote trust in the digital economy, including through support for the Global Cross-Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) Forum and the OECD’s Declaration on Government Access to Personal Data Held by Private Sector Entities, and to build shared understandings on data security risks.
Accelerating cooperation on AI.
The United States and the United Kingdom recognise Artificial Intelligence (AI) has the potential to transform our societies and economies and share a commitment to the role of government action to unlock the opportunities and mitigate the risks arising from the rapid development of these technologies. We will accelerate our cooperation on AI with a focus on ensuring the safe and responsible development of the technology. Both nations welcome ongoing activity internationally including at the OECD, UN, Global Partnership for AI, Council of Europe, and International Standards Organisations, as well as the G7 Hiroshima AI Process, and recognise the need to go further particularly with respect to the risks and opportunities AI presents.
The United States welcomes the Prime Minister’s plans to launch the first Global Summit on AI Safety, to be hosted in the United Kingdom this year, and commits to attend at a high level. This effort, which fits with the United Kingdom’s comprehensive and balanced approach to AI risks and opportunities, will bring together key countries, as well as leading technology companies and researchers, to drive targeted, rapid international action focused on safety and security at the frontier of this technology, including exploring safety measures to evaluate and monitor risks from AI. The United States has taken strong action to promote responsible innovation and is undertaking a process to advance a comprehensive approach to AI-related risk and opportunities, including comprehensive engagement with companies, research, civil society, and our allies and partners.
Deepening collaboration on Privacy Enhancing Technologies.
To maximise the responsible use of data, we intend to launch a Collaboration on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) that will allow us to gain more valuable insight from data and train responsible AI models, enabling economic and societal benefits, while protecting individuals’ privacy and our democratic principles.
1.5 4. Building the Clean Energy Economy of the Future
The United States and the United Kingdom are both committed to meeting our goals under the Paris Agreement, building a clean energy economy, strengthening resilient supply chains, and investing in our industrial bases. We share a belief that building a clean energy economy is one of the most significant opportunities to create good jobs with high labour standards. We affirm that bold investment and strategic public funding are necessary to achieve these goals. We are committed to deepening cooperation to develop and strengthen clean energy supply chains, including building diverse, resilient, and secure critical mineral and battery supply chains that reduce unwanted strategic dependencies to meet our defence, economic, energy security, and climate goals. As we pursue our national strategies, we will work to align our approaches wherever possible to make clean energy technologies more affordable for all nations and help drive a global, just, and secure energy transition for workers and communities that will leave no one behind. We are committed to making the 2020s the decisive decade for climate action, implementing our respective ambitious 2030 nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement, and meeting our 2050 net zero emission goals.
Launching negotiations on a Critical Minerals Agreement.
With congressional consultation, we intend to immediately begin negotiations on a targeted critical minerals agreement covering the five relevant critical minerals most important for electric vehicles – cobalt, graphite, lithium, manganese, and nickel – that are extracted or processed in the United Kingdom count toward sourcing requirements for clean vehicles eligible for the Section 30D clean vehicle tax credit of the Inflation Reduction Act. We intend to use these focused negotiations to ensure the consistency of our approaches on supply chain diversification and robust labour and environmental standards to support the creation of well-paying jobs with a free and fair choice to join a labour union on both sides of the Atlantic. Through our strong U.S.-UK partnership we will work towards increasing our respective and collective clean energy industrial capacity, boosting electric vehicle production and deployment, and expanding access to sustainable, secure, high-standard critical mineral and battery supply chains.
Partnering on a Joint Clean Energy Supply Chain Action Plan.
Today we are announcing the launch of a one-year Joint Clean Energy Supply Chain Action Plan. Through the U.S.-UK Joint Action Group on Energy Security and Affordability (the JAG), the United States and the United Kingdom will, by the end of 2023, identify and decide on near-term actions our two countries can take in parallel and together to accelerate the buildout of capacity in our countries and third countries sufficient to meet the clean energy demands of the future. We intend to conduct public-private consultations across key clean energy supply chains, including offshore wind and electric vehicle batteries, and conduct rapid stress-test exercises across key clean energy supply chains, which could form a model for future work on supply chain resilience.
Launching a Civil Nuclear Partnership.
Building on our unique economic and security relationship, and recognizing our complementary capabilities, we are launching a civil nuclear partnership overseen by senior officials in both governments. The JAG will also be mobilised to set near-term priorities for joint action to encourage the establishment of new infrastructure and end-to-end fuel cycle capabilities by 2030 in both continents, and substantially minimise reliance on Russian fuel, supplies, and services. Our joint activity and leadership will support and facilitate the safe, secure, and sustainable international deployment of advanced, peaceful nuclear technologies, including small modular reactors, in accordance with the highest non-proliferation standards and consistent with a 1.5 degree Celsius limit on global warming. These priorities will form the basis of a Joint Standing Committee on Nuclear Energy Cooperation (JSCNEC), which is designed to deliver on shared commitments by the end of the year and serve as an enduring bilateral forum to advance shared policy goals across existing engagement mechanisms, including near-term actions identified through the JAG, and facilitate exchanges on new and evolving technical and policy developments regarding nuclear energy.
1.6 5. Strengthening our Alliance Across Defence, Health Security, and Space
We are further strengthening the U.S.-UK alliance in emerging areas with critical nexuses to economic resilience and economic security.
Continuing to optimise our longstanding defence cooperation.
We continue to optimise our longstanding defence cooperation and ensure that defence and technology trade and exports between our countries are as frictionless as possible, particularly as part of our efforts to enable collaboration in and between AUKUS nations. To this end, the President plans to ask the United States Congress to add the United Kingdom as a “domestic source” within the meaning of Title III of the Defense Production Act. Doing so would deepen industrial base collaboration, accelerate, and strengthen AUKUS implementation, build new opportunities for United States investment in multiple strategic sectors, and support our efforts to increase our respective and collective industrial capacity across both clean energy and key technology sectors. Together the U.S. and the UK are taking steps to streamline defence trade between our nations, including the U.S. proposal to Congress to modernise export control laws to enhance collaboration between and among AUKUS nations. The UK is also examining its export control regime to streamline the flow of defence trade among the AUKUS partners.
Strengthening bilateral cooperation on biological and health security.
Building on the New Atlantic Charter, we commit to strengthening bilateral collaboration between our two nations on biological security, reflecting our shared ambition to bolster future heath and economic resilience against a growing and diverse spectrum of biological threats (deliberate, accidental, or natural), including drug-resistant infections. To this end, we will increase our collaboration to overcome the market failures that prevent vital research and development of anti-microbial vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics – via mechanisms such as the Combating Antibiotic Resistant Bacteria Biopharmaceutical Accelerator (CARB-X). We will enhance our cooperation on tackling emerging infectious disease threats with pandemic or epidemic potential and promote biosafety, biosecurity, and responsible innovation in the biotechnology and life science sectors domestically and internationally to realise the full potential of the growing bioeconomy. We reaffirm our commitment to strengthen global norms against the misuse of biology and prohibitions on the development of biological weapons.
Looking to the future and deepening our partnership across all sectors of space cooperation.
We recognise recent bilateral innovation in commercial space launch and are committed to further strengthening bilateral commercial space cooperation, including in the field of deep space communications. We are committed to taking tangible steps to deepen our collaboration on space sustainability and our respective regulations. The United States welcomes the close partnership with the United Kingdom on heliophysics missions and the United Kingdom’s contribution to the NASA Helioswarm mission in particular. The United States welcomes potential participation by the United Kingdom in future commercial space station concepts. The United States and the United Kingdom are committed to studying opportunities for cooperation on space nuclear power and propulsion in accordance with their respective domestic laws and consistent with international obligations and commitments.
As part of the process towards developing a Global Digital Compact (GDC), the UN Secretary-General has issued a policy brief outlining areas in which ‘the need for multistakeholder digital cooperation is urgent’: closing the digital divide and advancing sustainable development goals (SDGs), making the online space open and safe for everyone, and governing artificial intelligence (AI) for humanity.
The policy brief also suggests objectives and actions to advance such cooperation and ‘safeguard and advance our digital future’. These are structured around the following topics:
Digital connectivity and capacity building. The overarching objectives here are to close the digital divide and empower people to participate fully in the digital economy. Proposed actions range from common targets for universal and meaningful connectivity to putting in place or strengthening public education for digital literacy.
Digital cooperation to accelerate progress on the SDGs. Objectives include making targeted investments in digital public infrastructure and services, making data representative, interoperable, and accessible, and developing globally harmonised digital sustainability standards. Among the proposed actions are the development of definitions of safe, inclusive, and sustainable digital public infrastructures, fostering open and accessible data ecosystems, and developing a common blueprint on digital transformation (something the UN would do).
Upholding human rights. Putting human rights at the centre of the digital future, ending the gender digital divide, and protecting workers are the outlined objectives in this area. One key proposed action is the establishment of a digital human rights advisory mechanism, facilitated by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, to provide guidance on human rights and technology issues.
An inclusive, open, secure, and shared internet. There are two objectives: safeguarding the free and shared nature of the internet, and reinforcing accountable multistakeholder governance. Some of the proposed actions include commitments from governments to avoid blanket internet shutdowns and refrain from actions disrupting critical infrastructures.
Digital trust and security. Objectives range from strengthening multistakeholder cooperation to elaborate norms, guidelines, and principles on the responsible use of digital technologies, to building capacity and expanding the global cybersecurity workforce. The proposed overarching action is for stakeholders to commit to developing common standards and industry codes of conduct to address harmful content on digital platforms.
Data protection and empowerment. Ensuring that data are governed for the benefit of all, empowering people to control their personal data, and developing interoperable standards for data quality as envisioned as key objectives. Among the proposed actions are an invitation for countries to consider adopting a declaration on data rights and seeking convergence on principles for data governance through a potential Global Data Compact.
Agile governance of AI and other emerging technologies. The proposed objectives relate to ensuring transparency, reliability, safety, and human control in the design and use of AI; putting transparency, fairness, and accountability at the core of AI governance; and combining existing norms, regulations, and standards into a framework for agile governance of AI. Actions envisioned range from establishing a high-level advisory body for AI to building regulatory capacity in the public sector.
Global digital commons. Objectives include ensuring inclusive digital cooperation, enabling regular and sustained exchanges across states, regions, and industry sectors, and developing and governing technologies in ways that enable sustainable development, empower people, and address harms.
The document further notes that ‘the success of a GDC will rest on its implementation’. This implementation would be done by different stakeholders at the national, regional, and sectoral level, and be supported by spaces such as the Internet Governance Forum and the World Summit on the Information Society Forum. One suggested way to support multistakeholder participation is through a trust fund that could sponsor a Digital Cooperation Fellowship Programme.
As a mechanism to follow up on the implementation of the GDC, the policy brief suggests that the Secretary-General could be tasked to convene an annual Digital Cooperation Forum (DCF). The mandate of the forum would also include, among other things, facilitating collaboration across digital multistakeholder frameworks and reducing duplication; promoting cross-border learning in digital governance; and identifying and promoting policy solutions to emerging digital challenges and governance gaps.
This text is taken from the original PDF of Policy Brief 5.
About Policy Brief 5
As part of the process towards developing a Global Digital Compact (GDC), the UN Secretary-General has issued a policy brief outlining areas in which ‘the need for multistakeholder digital cooperation is urgent’: closing the digital divide and advancing sustainable development goals (SDGs), making the online space open and safe for everyone, and governing artificial intelligence (AI) for humanity.
The policy brief also suggests objectives and actions to advance such cooperation and ‘safeguard and advance our digital future’.
Before you read the full text of the brief below, you can consult the summary of the brief here.
Introduction
Chapeau
The challenges that we face can be addressed only through stronger international cooperation. The Summit of the Future in 2024 is an opportunity to agree on multilateral solutions for a better tomorrow, strengthening global governance for both present and future generations (General Assembly resolution 76/307). In my capacity as Secretary-General, I have been invited to provide inputs to the preparations for the Summit in the form of action-oriented recommendations, building on the proposals contained in my report entitled “Our Common Agenda” (A/75/982), which was itself a response to the declaration on the commemoration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the United Nations (General Assembly resolution 75/1). The present policy brief is one such input. It elaborates on the ideas first proposed in Our Common Agenda, taking into account subsequent guidance from Member States and over one year of intergovernmental and multi-stakeholder consultations, and rooted in the purposes and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments.
20 most frequently used words in the Policy Brief 5.
Purpose of this policy brief
The present brief proposes the development of a Global Digital Compact that would set out principles, objectives and actions for advancing an open, free, secure and human-centred digital future, one that is anchored in universal human rights and that enables the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals. It outlines areas in which the need for multi-stakeholder digital cooperation is urgent and sets out how a Global Digital Compact can help to realize the commitment in the declaration on the commemoration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the United Nations (General Assembly resolution 75/1) to “shaping a shared vision on digital cooperation” by providing an inclusive global framework. Such a framework is essential for the multi-stakeholder action required to overcome digital, data and innovation divides and to achieve the governance required for a sustainable digital future.
Our digital world is one of divides. In 2002, when governments first recognized the challenge of the digital divide, 1 billion people had access to the Internet. Today, 5.3 billion are digitally connected, yet the divide persists across regions, gender, income, language and age groups. Some 89 percent of people in Europe are online, but only 21 percent of women in low-income countries use the Internet.1ITU, Facts and Figures 2022, https://www.itu.int/itu-d/reports/statistics/facts-figures-2022 While digitally deliverable services now account for almost two thirds of global services trade, access is unaffordable in some parts of the world. The cost of a smart phone in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa is more than 40 per cent of average monthly income and African users pay more than three times the global average for mobile data.2ITU, Facts and Figures 2022, https://www.itu.int/itu-d/reports/statistics/facts-figures-2022Fewer than half of the world’s countries track digital skills, and the data that exists highlights the depth of digital learning gaps.3See Wiley Digital Skills Gap Index 2021, https://dsgi.wiley.com/
Two decades since the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), the digital divide is still a gulf.
Data divides are also growing. As data is collected and used in digital applications it generates huge commercial and social value. While monthly global data traffic is forecast to grow more than 400 per cent by 2026, activity is concentrated among a few global players.4UNIDO, Industrial Development Report 2020: Industrializing in the digital age, UNIDO, 2020Many developing countries are at risk of becoming mere providers of raw data, while having to pay for the services that their data helps to produce.
The innovation divide is even more stark. Digital technologies have moved beyond the Internet and mobile devices into autonomous intelligent systems and networks, generative artificial intelligence (AI), virtual and mixed reality, distributed ledger technologies (such as blockchain), digital currencies and quantum technologies. The wealth generated by these innovations is highly unequal, dominated by a handful of big platforms and States.5The United States and China account for half the world’s hyperscale data centres, 70 per cent of global AI talent and almost 90 per cent of the market capitalization of the world’s largest digital platforms. UNCTAD, 2021
Inequality is rising. Enormous investments in technology have not been accompanied by spending on public education and infrastructure. Digital technology has led to massive gains in productivity and value, but these benefits are not resulting in shared prosperity.6Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, Power and Progress, PublicAffairs, 2023 The wealth of the top 1 per cent is growing exponentially: between 1995 and 2021, they accounted for 38 per cent of the increase in global wealth, while the bottom 50 per cent took 2 per cent.7World Inequality Report 2022, https://wir2022.wid.world/www-site/uploads/2022/01/Summary_WorldInequalityReport2022_English.pdfDigital technologies are accelerating the concentration of economic power in an ever smaller group of elites and companies: the combined wealth of tech billionaires, $2.1 trillion in 2022, is greater than the annual GDP of more than half of the Group of 20 economies.8Forbes, ‘Here are the richest tech billionaires 2022’, April 5, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/rachelsandler/2022/04/05/here-are-the-richest-tech-billionaires 2022/?sh=56545e5a5e37
Behind these divides is a massive governance gap. New technologies are lacking even basic guardrails. It is harder to bring a soft toy than an AI chatbot to market today. Because such digital technologies are privately developed, Governments are constantly lagging behind in regulating them in the public interest. As a result of decades of underinvestment in State capacities, public institutions in most countries are illequipped to assess and respond to digital challenges. Very few can compete with private actors to harness talent and offer incentives to digitally skilled people to work in the public sector. Public administrations are being hollowed out at the time that they are most needed to support safe and equitable digital transformations.
As was observed during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, the use of digital technologies has brought unparalleled opportunities for how we live, learn, work and communicate. It has also brought great harm through irresponsible and malicious use and criminal abuses, as well as negative unintended consequences and environmental impacts. With States vying for political and military advantage through technological dominance, the risks of destabilizing competition, escalation, and accidents mount. Even as societies grapple with these threats, newer technologies are raising fundamental questions concerning the features that make humans unique.
We urgently need to find ways to harness digital technologies for the benefit of all. We need national and international governance arrangements that prevent their misuse. We must shape innovation in ways that reflect universal human values and protect the planet. Unilateral regional, national or industry actions are insufficient: this cooperation must be global and multi-stakeholder to prevent digital inequalities becoming irreversible global chasms.
I propose the development of a Global Digital Compact that would set out principles, objectives and actions to advance an open, free, secure and human-centred digital future, one that is anchored in universal human rights and that enables the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals.
I outline three areas in which the need for multi-stakeholder digital cooperation is urgent. I set out how a Global Digital Compact can help to realize the commitment in the declaration on the commemoration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the United Nations (General Assembly resolution 75/1) to shaping a shared vision on digital cooperation by providing an inclusive global framework. Such a framework is essential for the multi-stakeholder action required to overcome digital, data and innovation divides and to achieve the governance required for a sustainable digital future.
What does a shared vision on digital cooperation involve?
A shared vision on digital cooperation requires collectively setting goals and pursuing action to safeguard and advance our digital future.
Closing the digital divide and advancing the Sustainable Development Goals
We have already set ambitious goals for universal and meaningful connectivity. The Kigali Declaration of 2022, agreed at the World Telecommunication Development Conference, details what that involves: available, interoperable, high-quality and sustainable infrastructure; inclusive, affordable and secure coverage; and the capacity and skills for people to make full and safe use of connectivity. At the Transforming Education Summit held in September 2022, 90 per cent of the 133 national commitments contained references to digital learning and skills. Follow-up actions include initiatives to expand public digital learning opportunities for making free and open education resources accessible to teachers, learners and families in rural as well as urban communities.9https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/report_on_the_2022_transforming_education_summit.pdf
What is needed now is concerted action to connect the remaining 2.7 billion people, more than 1 billion of whom are children and most of whom live in least developed countries; policy and financial investments to make broadband and mobile devices affordable and reliable; and a global effort to strengthen digital learning and skills, with targeted efforts for women, girls and young people, so that everyone can take full advantage of the opportunities of connectivity and employers and workers can adapt to digital transformation.
Supply-side initiatives are not enough for a human-centred digital transformation. A demand pull is also needed through the provision of digital public goods and services that are meaningful for people and communities. Governments, including in the context of the Group of 20, and multi-stakeholder partnerships, such as the Digital Public Goods Alliance, are exploring options for developing digital public infrastructure. These public goods harness huge amounts of data that, if safely governed and effectively used, can help countries to accelerate their development and advance the achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. To enable schools, medical facilities, businesses and cultural institutions to pool resources and draw upon public data, digital public infrastructure must be open, inclusive, secure and interoperable. The capacities of public administrations to manage and provide digital services must be urgently built.
As societies invest in these goods, a wealth of knowledge, best practices and experience is being gathered. The task before us now is to create common frameworks and standards for digital public infrastructure and services, build multi-stakeholder partnerships for scaling up their provision and ensure that people and public servants have the skills and opportunities to use and create value from digital technologies.
Digital public services for forcibly displaced people
Leaving no one behind also means putting in place robust and accessible arrangements for people who have been forcibly displaced, currently numbering 103 million. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is creating an accessible entry point for safely communicating their needs and accessing humanitarian services and is working with host communities and Governments to ensure that forcibly displaced communities are included in the development and implementation of digital public services.
We must also nurture innovation for development in areas in which we are falling behind. We know the cross-cutting potential of digital technologies to advance progress across the Sustainable Development Goals beyond quality education (Goal 4) and industry, innovation and infrastructure (Goal 9).
What we have not yet done is harness data at scale, make them globally accessible and use them to inform national and international development plans and programmes as well as public-private partnerships, e-commerce, technological entrepreneurship and capital investments. Progress towards achieving 41 per cent of the 92 environmental Sustainable Development Goals indicators, for example, cannot currently be globally measured owing to a lack of interoperable data and standardized reporting. Overcoming this fragmentation and adopting global environmental data standards are critical to enabling action to address the triple planetary crisis. Networks, such as the Coalition for Digital Environmental Sustainability facilitated by the United Nations Environment Programme, can help to promote common sustainability standards and access to environmental data and to align incentives for accelerating green transitions.
Urgent investments are needed in “data commons”, which pool data and digital infrastructure across borders, build flagship data sets and standards for interoperability and bring together data and AI expertise from public and private institutions to build insights and applications for the Sustainable Development Goals.
Figure II
GLOBAL DIGITAL COOPERATION AND THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS
Digital IDs linked with bank or mobile money accounts can improve the delivery of social protection coverage and serve to better reach eligible beneficiaries. Digital technologies may help to reduce leakage, errors and costs in the design of social protection programmes.
Drone technology can monitor crops and provide information on how much water is needed. Software systems available through mobile apps can monitor and analyse data to help farmers to decide when to plant, fertilize, irrigate and harvest their crops.
Novel platform-based vaccine technologies and smart vaccine manufacturing techniques help to produce greater numbers of higher-quality vaccines. Open-source platforms can help accelerate and scale up vaccine delivery.
Accessible and affordable connectivity allows young people to use open, free and high-quality digital skills and training platforms. Smart digital platforms can be made accessible in local languages and used to align curricula with internationally recognized standards and certification.
Connectivity enables women and girls to access information and communicate for their safety and development. It can allow girls to access support services, learn about sexual and reproductive health and express their voices.
Internet of things-based precision irrigation and leakage management systems enable the monitoring and management of water resources. In urban areas, artificial intelligence systems draw upon data such as rain forecasts and the number of rooftops to determine rainfall run-off.
Next-generation digital networks have lower energy consumption, and smart grids can support electrification and more affordable connectivity. Artificial intelligence technology can be used for predictive maintenance of electrical utilities, enabling automatic backups and limiting downtime.
Internet availability leads to more jobs. Labour force participation and wage employment increase in areas with Internet availability. Use of local-language videos and decision support applications on smartphones supports personalized advice resulting in better jobs.
Mobile digital technologies are enabling high-quality communications infrastructure and networks to expand into underserved remote and rural areas. Data and artificial intelligence technologies can accelerate innovation and productivity in key sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing.
Digital public goods and applications such as mobile money are enabling access to financial and other services for all members of societies, including women and girls, rural communities and displaced people.
Intelligent systems deploy information from remote sensors to guide traffic signals and maximize the efficient flow of commuters in urban areas. They can be used to design safe transportation for vulnerable and underserved communities.
Digital technologies such as 3D printing, the Internet of things, big data, cloud computing and blockchain can support a circular economy and supply chain resilience, in particular in manufacturing industries.
Information and communications technology solutions can help to cut nearly 10 times more carbon dioxide than they emit. Digital technologies combined with ecological design can help to reduce natural resources and other materials used in products by up to 90 per cent, lessening the impact of material extraction.
Satellite imaging and machine learning can help find and collect the 5 trillion pieces of ocean plastic trash. Online portals and mobile-based tools can connect the plastics supply chain, track the flow of waste materials, and help create transparent digital marketplaces for plastic waste.
Sensors and monitors connected to the Internet of things, cloud-based data platforms, blockchain-enabled tracking systems and digital product passports unlock new capabilities for the measurement and tracking of environmental and social impacts across value chains.
Public technologies and e-government services, where well designed and applied, enable people to access public services, reduce waste and corruption and create data that allow public institutions to target needs more effectively.
Partnerships between States, private sector and civil society leverage the capacity of digital tools to provide solutions for development across the Sustainable Development Goals. Examples include the Digital Public Infrastructure Alliance, the Coalition for Digital Environmental Sustainability and public-private partnerships for disaster response.
Making the online space open and safe for everyone
We have committed to applying human rights online and to putting in place specific measures to protect people and communities, in particular women, children, young people and older persons, persons with disabilities, Indigenous peoples and ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities. However, in every society around the world, harm is rampant. Open, safe and secure use of the Internet is slipping away from us – potentially permanently.
Government shutdowns of the Internet, data-fuelled State surveillance and predatory business models pose serious risks to human rights. Disinformation, hate speech and malicious and criminal activity in cyberspace raise the risks and costs for everyone online.
United Nations processes addressing cybersecurity have identified norms of responsible State behaviour to help safeguard peace and security online and are exploring confidence and capacity-building measures to advance them. States are also exploring legally binding arrangements to tackle criminal threats as well as capacity for Governments and judiciaries to counter, investigate, prosecute and adjudicate on cybercrime. Regions and States are putting in place legislation for online safety. Some digital platforms are investing resources in better detecting and responding to online abuse, and curricula are being introduced to develop digitally literate citizens capable of thinking critically and taking protective action.
However, these approaches are proving insufficient to address harms. The onus for safety should not lie with users. Profiting from an online presence and access to users’ data must not become a race to the bottom in terms of corporate responsibility. We need transparency, accountability, oversight and capacity to make the online space open, safe and secure. As the High-level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism has also emphasized, this must be a collective effort to ensure that regional, national or industry initiatives, however well-meaning, do not further fragment the Internet.
Action in four areas is essential. First, we must balance the incentive for governments and industry to maximize data collection with principles and standards for policies and practices that protect data and the right to privacy. Personal data should only be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes, and their processing must be relevant and limited to what is necessary for those purposes. People need to be able to control their personal data and how the data are used. Public and commercial digital platforms need to enable meaningful choices for opting in and out, and people need the knowledge and skills to avail of those choices.
Second, we must apply the same safe design approaches and standards that we use across physical industries – cars, food, pharmaceuticals and toys – to digital technologies and platforms. Developing a shared understanding of what constitutes physical and mental harm based on universal human rights, and aligning safety standards across regions, countries and industries, can help to build a global culture of digital trust and security. Ethics and safety teams cannot be optional: technology companies must invest in standing capacities for responsible development and risk management.
Third, we must strengthen accountability for harmful and malicious acts online. The Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights provide a framework for assessing risks and mitigating, and providing remedies for, harm when necessary. As highlighted in my forthcoming policy brief on information integrity on digital platforms, given the transnational nature of digital platforms, transparency and safety measures must be interoperable, and prompt redressal should not be reserved for a privileged few.
Fourth, we must protect the global nature of the Internet and the physical infrastructure that underpins it. 10For example, new undersea cables, which promise to connect more than 1.4 billion Africans, are owned by a handful of commercial actors. The Internet is governed by long-established multi-stakeholder institutions. While legal and regulatory approaches may differ among jurisdictions, concerted efforts must be made to maintain active policy compatibility and the interoperability of the Internet.
Governing Artificial Intelligence for Humanity
The pace of digital technology development is challenging our governance systems. Tools that worked well in the past – public policy processes and legislation – are too siloed to anticipate and too slow to respond to the multiple ways in which innovations affect us.
Artificial intelligence developments show how dangerous this governance gap has become. Companies are racing to bring AI technology to the marketplace before outputs are explainable and reliable and before their consequences have been comprehensively assessed. Education is being transformed overnight. The ability to create believable content at scale and low cost is intensifying misinformation and disinformation threats. The future of work may change without sufficient time for institutions to adapt. States may be incentivized to develop and deploy AI-enabled systems for data collection, judicial proceedings, surveillance and warfare without the guardrails in place to ensure that such uses are lawful. Introducing autonomy into weapon systems without human accountability and control may lead us into uncharted waters in terms of international security. The potential for escalation and for global harms that we cannot mitigate is alarming.
Artificial intelligence holds immense potential for our economies, societies and the planet. Applied well, AI can increase efficiency, and support resource managment, climate mitigation, disaster response and productive economic transformation. We are beginning to realize the scale of its disruptive potential, both positive and negative, but we have yet to come together to consider the issues, much less to collaborate on identifying risks and agile ways of mitigating them.
I welcome the growing interest among AI experts on how best to govern the development and use of AI. We need a global, multidisciplinary conversation in order to examine, assess and align the application of AI and other emerging technologies. Over 100 sets of ethical AI principles have been developed by different stakeholders, and they share many common ideas, including the need for AI applications to be reliable, transparent, accountable, overseen by humans and capable of being shut down.11UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of AI, November 2021. Different stakeholders are adapting existing frameworks or developing new ones for risk management and redress. They need to be harmonized and effective across borders. Industry self-regulation is not enough. We need to bring stakeholders together in a meaningful effort to consider the implications of emerging technologies and ensure that they align with universal human rights and values before their widespread application in our societies, economies, militaries and politics.
We also need to bend the arc of digital investment more towards solving societal problems and shared global challenges. Digital innovations, if consciously applied, can help to overcome obstacles to progress on the Sustainable Development Goals, but only if they rest on a diverse global foundation. Without engaging global talent and diverse and representative data sets, the application of digital solutions will not be sufficient to achieve the scale needed to advance the Goals. And without involving public administrations, small and medium-sized enterprises and communities in crafting locally relevant applications, they will not have the impact that we seek.
A Global Digital Compact
Digital technologies today are similar to natural resources such as air and water. Our well-being and development depend on their global availability. Their potential can be optimized only through shared access and use. As much we are adapting our stewardship of energy and water in the climate crisis, we must collectively address the risk of digital harms and maximize the potential for common good.
Some of the most crucial parts of the digital space already function in this way. Internet protocols are managed through international frameworks and open standards. Much of the open-source software that enables these is community stewarded. Information available on the Internet, such as the Digital Library of the Commons, is provided through public networked arrangements. Not all of the public goods are available globally, and they are vulnerable to harmful attacks and neglect.
As the High-level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism notes, we have yet to put in place a global framework in which States and non-State actors participate fully in shaping our shared digital space and which promotes and supports interoperable governance across digital domains. Until we do so, our responses to digital challenges will be incomplete.
The United Nations is only one actor in this firmament, but it is the only global entity that can convene and facilitate the collaboration needed. The Organization must meet its responsibilities to support governments, companies, experts and civil society in engaging effectively, through data gathering, the sharing of best practices and, where requested, technical assistance. It must lead by example in breaking down the silos of digital activity and building capacities across the three pillars of the Organization: peace and security, human rights and sustainable development.
Vision, purpose and scope
A Global Digital Compact would articulate a shared vision of an open, free, secure and human-centred digital future that rests on the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 2030 Agenda.
The purpose of the Compact would be to advance multi-stakeholder cooperation in order to achieve this vision. It would articulate shared principles and objectives and identify concrete actions for their implementation. It would establish a global framework for bringing together and leveraging existing digital cooperation processes to support dialogue and collaboration among regional, national, industry and expert organizations and platforms, according to their respective mandates and competencies, and facilitate new governance arrangements where needed.
The Compact would be initiated and led by Member States with the full participation of other stakeholders. Its implementation would be open to all relevant stakeholders, including digital platforms, private sector actors, digital technology-focused coalitions and civil society organizations. Endorsing its principles and objectives and committing to the alignment of respective policies and practices with these would be requirements for participation in its implementation.
Objectives and actions
The Compact should set out principles and objectives for multi-stakeholder action. The principles set out in the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society of 2005 and important multi-stakeholder processes that have emerged since then offer a good foundation on which to build.
Objectives could be aligned with the broad objectives or themes being explored in jointly facilitated consultations. To support their practical implementation, the Compact should also identify achievable and measurable actions. Potential objectives and related actions could include the following objectives.
A: Digital connectivity and capacity-building
I propose the following objectives:
Close the digital divide to connect all people, especially vulnerable groups, to the Internet in ways that are meaningful and affordable
Empower people through digital skills and capabilities to participate fully in the digital economy, protect themselves from harm and pursue their physical and mental wellbeing and development
Accordingly, I propose the following actions:
Member States should:
Commit to putting in place policies and new financial models to encourage telecommunications operators to bring affordable connectivity to hard-to-reach areas
Commit to strengthening or instituting public education for digital literacy and transdisciplinary skills and to incentivise lifelong learning for workers
Commit to extending connectivity mapping and building currently being undertaken for schools to medical facilities and relevant public institutions
Commit to coordinating actions, subsidies and incentives for digital technical and vocational training and public access facilities, in particular for women and girls and people living in rural areas
Set the target of creating 1 million ‘digital champions’ for the SDGs by 2030, a quarter of them in Africa, by creating a Capacity Development Network that leverages existing initiatives to pool training content, trainers and case studies, develop common competency frameworks and deliver a Digital for Sustainable Development Goals training standard
Multilateral organizations should:
Set a revised target of USD 100 billion for pledges to the Partner2Connect Coalition by 2030 (International Telecommunication Union)
accelerate efforts to connect all schools to the internet by 2030 (Giga initiative of the International Telecommunication Union and United Nations Children’s Fund)
B: Digital cooperation to accelerate progress on the Sustainable Development Goals
I propose the following objectives:
Make targeted investments in digital public infrastructure and services, and advance global knowledge and sharing of best practices on digital public goods to serve as a catalyst for progress on the SDGs
Ensure that data are a force multiplier for progress on the Goals by making data representative, interoperable and accessible
Pool data, AI expertise and infrastructure across borders to generate innovations for meeting the Goals targets
Develop environmental sustainability by design and globally harmonized digital sustainability standards and safeguards to protect the planet
Accordingly, I propose the following actions:
Member States should:
Develop, with other stakeholders, a framework of design principles that are based on best practices, and a set of definitions for safe, inclusive and sustainable digital public infrastructure
Build and maintain a global repository of experiences for digital public infrastructure and digital public services
Allocate an agreed percentage of total international development assistance for digital transformation with a particular focus on public administration capacity-building
All stakeholders should:
Commit to completing the identification of gaps in SDG data and make 90 per cent of Goal tracking data available and publicly accessible by 2030
Commit to fostering open and accessible data ecosystems that enable earlier, faster, and more targeted disaster mitigation and crisis response, including through the UN Complex Risk Analytics Fund and the WMO Systematic Observations Financing Facility
Create collaborative research initiatives for data and AI applications for the Goals in priority areas such as agriculture, education, energy, health and green transitions13The importance of such collaborative data and AI “commons” has been noted in the June 2019 Report of the High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation as well as the Report of the High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilaterlism, which calls for a data impact hub to pool data-related capacities across public and private sectors for greater resilience and more reliable provision of global public goods.
Commit to building a global online resource of trusted and open environmental data for researchers and policymakers, together with the necessary licenses, quality standards, infrastructure and safeguards to support green digital transformation
Multilateral and regional organizations should:
Establish pooled financing mechanisms to support governments in planning and designing digital public infrastructure and services
Expand voluntary purpose codes of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in order to track and report financing for data and digital transformation across all development sectors and Sustainable Development Goals
Utilize the common blueprint on digital transformations, to be devised by the United Nationsas an end-to-end guide for digital development and as a tool for leveraging a new digital window in the joint Sustainable Development Goals trust fund to assist country-led digital transformation initiatives supported by resident coordinators and United Nations country teams
C: Upholding Human Rights
I propose the following objectives:
Make human rights the foundation of an open, safe, secure digital future with human dignity at its core
End the gender digital divide by ensuring that online spaces are non-discriminatory and safe for women, and by expanding women’s participation in the technology sector and digital policymaking
Apply international labour rights regardless of the mode of work and protect workers against digital surveillance, arbitrary algorithmic decisions and loss of agency over their labour
Accordingly, I propose the following actions:
Member States should:
Commit to establishing a digital human rights advisory mechanism, facilitated by OHCHR that would provide practical guidance on human rights and technology issues, building on the work of the human rights mechanisms and experts, showcase good practices, and convene stakeholders to explore effective and coherent responses to legislative or regulatory issues
All stakeholders should:
Commit to reflect existing legal commitments in regional, national and industry policies and standards and take specific measures to protect and empower women, children, young people, older persons, persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities to fully benefit from digital technologies
In the case of Governments, employers and workers, commit to uphold labour rights supported by ILO, and promote meaningful and equitable employment opportunities through innovative regulation, social protection and investment policies.
D: An inclusive, open, secure and shared Internet
I propose the following objectives:
Safeguard the free and shared nature of the Internet as a unique and irreplaceable global public asset
Reinforce accountable multi-stakeholder governance of the internet to help harness its potential to advance the SDGs and leave no one behind.
Accordingly, I propose the following actions:
Member States should:
Commit to avoiding blanket internet shutdowns, which run counter to efforts to close the digital divide, and ensure that targeted measures are proportional and non-discriminatory, undertaken only as necessary for transparently-reported and legitimate aims, and in accordance with international human rights law
Commit in the context of UN cyber diplomacy processes, to refraining from actions that would disrupt, damage or destroy critical infrastructure that provides services across borders or the infrastructure that underpins the general availability and integrity of the Internet
All Stakeholders should:
Commit to upholding net neutrality, non-discriminatory traffic management, technical standards, infrastructure and data interoperability, and platform and device neutrality to support an open, interconnected internet
E: Digital trust and security
I propose the following objectives:
Strengthen cooperation across governments, industry, experts and civil society to elaborate and implement norms, guidelines and principles of responsible use of digital technologies
Develop robust accountability criteria and standards for digital platforms and users to address disinformation, hate speech and other harmful online content
Build capacity and expand the global cyber security workforce and develop trust labels and certification schemes as well as effective regional and national oversight bodies
Mainstream gender in digital policies and in technology design, and ensure zero tolerance for gender-based violence in order to create a more equal and connected world for women and girls
Accordingly, I propose the following actions:
All stakeholders should:
Commit to developing common standards, guidelines and industry codes of conduct to address harmful content on digital platforms and promote safe civic spaces, as follows:
Online safety commissioners from different jurisdictions should collaborate to develop shared understandings and best practices that respect freedom of expression and access to information while protecting against harm.
Social media platforms commit to and put in place co-regulation mechanisms, such as social media councils, that would ensure adherence to agreed standards across the industry. The standards underlying the mechanism could be based on the proposed Code of Conduct for Information Integrity on Digital Platforms and benefit from the discussions at the Internet for Trust – Towards Guidelines for Regulating Digital Platforms for Information as a Public Good global conference organized by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
Multi-stakeholder alliances, such as the Action Coalition on Technology and Innovation for Gender Equality should help to develop standard measurement of online violence against women and girls and methodologies to better measure, track and counter patterns of harm.
Children’s needs should be a priority for safety policies and standards, including with respect to age-appropriate design and access, and platforms must share child-impact assessments and data with regulators and researchers14The Child Online Protection Initiative of the International Telecommunication Union, the child-centred digital equality framework of the United Nations Children’s Fund and the Standard for an Age Appropriate Digital Services Framework based on the 5Rights Principles for Children of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. could be useful in that regard.
F: Data protection and empowerment
I propose the following objectives:
Ensure that data are governed for the benefit of all and in ways that avoid harming people and communities
Provide people with the capacity and tools to manage and control their personal data, including options and skills to opt in or out of digital platforms and the use of their data for training algorithms
Develop multilevel and interoperable standards and frameworks for data quality, measurement and use, in full respect of intellectual property rights, to enable safe and secure data flow and an inclusive global economy
Accordingly, I propose the following actions:
Member States and regional organizations should:
Legally mandate protections for personal data and privacy based on, for example, the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection and the European Union General Data Protection Regulation. Such protections could:
Empower citizens with meaningful and revocable consent and options in respect of how their data are used
Supplement legal protections with independent, publicly accessible ombudspersons and other fiduciaries
Consider the adoption of a declaration on data rights that enshrines transparency to ensure scrutable data driven decisions, interoperability and portability, and protections against behaviour manipulation and discrimination.
Consider the call by the High level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism to seek convergence on principles for data governance through a Global Data Compact in a new International Decade for Data
All stakeholders should:
Commit to developing common definitions and data standards for interoperability, access to data according to type of data and data quality and measurement and to their monitoring and enforcement
Commit to enhancing agency and control by people over the use of their personal data, including opt-out choices, enhanced interoperability, data portability and encryption options
Consider the recommendation by the High-level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism on the multi-stakeholder development of a Global Data Compact for adoption by Member States by 2030.
Objective G: Agile governance of AI and other emerging technologies
I propose the following objectives:
Ensure that the design and use of AI and other emerging technologies are transparent, reliable, safe and under accountable human control
Make transparency, fairness and accountability the core of AI governance, taking into account the responsibility of governments to identify and address the risks that AI systems could entail, and the responsibility of researchers and companies developing AI systems to monitor, transparently communicate and address such risks
Combine international guidance and norms, national regulatory frameworks and technical standards into a framework for agile governance of AI with an active exchange of lessons learned and emerging best practices across borders, industries and sectors
In the case of regulators, coordinate – across digital, competition, taxation, consumer protection, online safety and data protection policies as well as labour rights, to ensure the alignment of emerging digital technologies with our human values
Accordingly, I propose the following actions:
Member States should:
Urgently launch, together with industry, a global collaborative research and development effort to ensure that AI systems are safe, fair, accountable, transparent, interpretable, trustworthy and aligned with human values. They should also consider mandating that a minimum percentage of investments in AI be allocated to AI governance and ensuring that AI systems are aligned with human values. In that respect, Member States should consider the recommendation by the High-level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism that a fund be developed to incentivize research and preparedness on the existential risks that could arise from ungoverned AI evolution
Establish a high-level advisory body for AI within the framework of the Global Data Compact. This body could include Member State experts, relevant United Nations entities, industry representatives, academic institutions and civil society groups that would meet regularly to consider emerging regional, national and industry AI governance arrangements. It could offer perspectives on how ethical, safety and other regulatory standards could be aligned, interoperable and compliant with universal human rights and rule of law frameworks. The advisory body could publicly share the outcomes of its deliberations and, where relevant, offer recommendations and ideas on the governance of AI technologies, including options for internationally agreed measures and standards
Agree with industry associations to develop sector-based guidelines in order to ensure that technology developers and other users have applicable, relatable guidance for the design, implementation and audit of AI-derived tools in specific settings. Relevant United Nations entities, such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization through its recommendation on the ethics of AI and the World Health Organization (WHO) through its Ethics and governance of artificial intelligence for health: WHO guidance, could support stakeholders in developing sector-specific due diligence and impact assessments
Commit, together with technology developers and digital platforms, to reinforcing transparency and accountability measures, including establishing human rights and ethics teams and transdisciplinary and independent oversight boards, documenting and reporting cases of harm caused by AI systems, sharing lessons learned and developing redressal measures
Commit to building cross-domain and multi-stakeholder regulatory capacity in the public sector, including judicial capacity as noted by the High-level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism, to ensure that regulations and public procurement of systems based on AI and other emerging technologies advance inclusion, safety, security and the prompt addressing of risks as they arise
Consider prohibitions on the use of technology applications whose potential or actual impacts cannot be justified under international human rights law, including those that fail the necessity, distinction and proportionality tests
H: Global digital commons
I propose the following objectives:
Develop and govern digital technologies in ways that enable sustainable development, empower people, and anticipate risks and harms and address them effectively
Ensure that digital cooperation is inclusive and enable all relevant stakeholders to contribute meaningfully according to their respective mandates, functions and competencies
Agree that the foundations of our cooperation are the Charter of the United Nations, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the framework of universally recognized human rights and international humanitarian law
Enable regular and sustained exchange across States, regions, industry sectors and issues to support the learning of lessons and best practices, governance innovation and capacities and to ensure that digital governance is continuously aligned with our shared values
Accordingly, I propose the following actions:
All stakeholders should:
Commit to sharing governance and regulatory experience, align international principles and frameworks with national measures and industry practices, improve regulatory capacity, and develop agile governance measures to keep up with the rapid pace of technology
Commit to taking forward the principles, objectives and actions set out in the Global Digital Compact through a framework for sustained, practical multi-stakeholder cooperation as described below
Implementation, follow-up and review
The success of a Global Digital Compact will rest on its implementation. Different stakeholders would be responsible for implementing the Compact at the national, regional and sectoral levels, taking into account regional contexts and respecting national policies, mandates and competencies. Existing cooperation mechanisms, especially the Internet Governance Forum and the World Summit on the Information Society, as well as United Nations entities, including ITU, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the United Nations Development Programme, would play an important role in supporting implementation, providing knowledge on issues and sectoral information, guidance and practical expertise to facilitate dialogue and action on agreed objectives.
Such individual efforts, however, must be underpinned by sustained, networked collaboration. Without that collaboration, we will not overcome the fragmented and irregular policy discussions that have characterized digital coordination to date. Without a transparent and accountable implementation framework, duplication of efforts will persist and policy and technical standard-setting functions will continue to be blurred across forums. We need a networked multilateral arrangement that supports the establishment of converging agendas, facilitates communication across different work areas and incentivizes the participation of relevant policy actors and the alignment of norms and standards. Such a global framework is essential to support knowledge-sharing, best practices and the learning of lessons on digital governance that can be translated into national and regional regulatory arrangements and industry standards. The High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism has proposed the establishment of a global commission on just and sustainable digitalization to meet those objectives.
Multi-stakeholder implementation
I share the view of the Advisory Board’s that while a global framework should be driven by Member States, the involvement of the private sector and civil society is essential. Their involvement is also critical to the development of the governance innovations that we need. An agile approach to multi-stakeholder implementation of the Compact is essential to avoid creating bureaucratic structures that are too rigid and slow-moving. Examples of tripartite approaches include civil society participation in the conferences of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the membership of private sector entities in ITU, the tripartite structure of the International Labour Organization and industry initiatives such as the Kimberley Process. Private sector participation should be inclusive and should reflect large companies and small and medium-sized enterprises as well as start-ups through representative bodies. This would ensure that narrow corporate interests do not dominate the discussion and that innovative practices of smaller businesses to address risks and add value to Sustainable Development Goal acceleration efforts are highlighted.
Digital technologies could be used to allow wider consultation, communication and information-sharing, especially among civil society organizations. Opportunities for participation could be regularly reviewed so that the Compact implementation framework remains inclusive and keeps pace with technology developments.
Multistakeholder participation could be supported by a trust fund that could, inter alia, sponsor a Digital Cooperation Fellowship programme and civil society participation, as well as the maintenance of a UN portal.15A Digital Cooperation Fellows initiative could draw on the model of the UN Disarmament Fellows programme.To support young people’s input, my Envoys on Technology and Envoy on Youth could draw on the proposed UN Youth Town Hall.16See my Policy Brief No 4.
A Digital Cooperation Forum
Regular assesment of the implementation of the Compact would be essential to keep pace with technology developments. The Summit of the Future, in establishing a Global Digital Compact, could task me to convene an annual Digital Cooperation Forum to support tripartite engagement and follow up on the implementation of the Compact. The Digital Cooperation Forum would support Member States and private sector and civil society stakeholders, as the High-level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism also recommends, to:
Discuss and review the implementation of agreed Global Digital Compact principles and commitments;
Facilitate transparent dialogue and collaboration across digital multi-stakeholder frameworks and reduce duplication of effort where relevant and appropriate;
Support evidence-based knowledge and information-sharing on main digital trends;
Pool lessons learned and promote crossborder learning on digital governance;
Identify and promote policy solutions to emerging digital challenges and governance gaps;
Highlight policy priorities for individual and collective stakeholder decision-making and action.
The Digital Cooperation Forum would accommodate existing forums and initiatives in a hub-and-spoke arrangement and help to identify gaps where multi-stakeholder action is required. Existing forums and initiatives, many of which are listed in annex I to the present policy brief, would support the translation of Compact objectives into practical action within their respective areas of expertise. The Digital Cooperation Forum would help to promote communication and alignment among them and focus collaboration around the priority areas set out in the Compact. Internet governance objectives and actions, for example, would continue to be supported by the Internet Governance Forum and relevant multi-stakeholder bodies such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers and the Internet Engineering Task Force. The recently established Internet Governance Forum Leadership Panel on Effective Multilateralism, in accordance with its mandate to enhance the impact of those bodies, could share Internet Governance Forum outputs in the Compact implementation framework, leveraging relevant expertise from the Forum’s Multistakeholder Advisory Group.17See the terms of reference of the Internet Governance Forum Leadership Panel, available at www.intgovforum.org/en/content/terms-of-reference-for-the-igf-leadership-panel.
The actions proposed in the present policy brief to address governance gaps could strengthen the implementation of the Compact. Where relevant, they would support collaboration in priority areas, including in the preparation of the annual Digital Cooperation Forum. These include, for example, the digital human rights advisory mechanism and initiatives in support of digital public infrastructure and capacity development.
A hub-and-spoke arrangement would also help stakeholders to identify and address gaps in multi-stakeholder cooperation, such as international data and AI governance. The high-level advisory body on AI, for example, would facilitate a structured exchange of national and industry experiences to align AI development with human rights and values and to assist researchers and innovators with practical guidance on developing responsible and trustworthy AI.
To support the preparation of the agenda of the Digital Cooperation Forum, I would establish a tripartite advisory group drawn from a diverse and representative group of State, non-State and United Nations participatory stakeholders, building upon the experience of multi-stakeholder implementation of the Road Map for Digital Cooperation. Membership would rotate every two years to enable the participation of diverse stakeholders and benefit from wide skills and perspectives. The preparation of the Forum could also include regional consultations facilitated by United Nations regional economic commissions, in cooperation with regional organizations, so that the priorities and perspectives of different regional contexts are reflected in the agenda and the content of discussions. The commissions could also facilitate context-specific follow-up and exchange. The Digital Cooperation Forum would be informed by an annual report provided by the United Nations Secretariat, building on input provided through a digital platform open to contributions from stakeholders and publicly accessible. The report would provide data-driven updates on progress across actions agreed upon in the Compact and resulting stakeholder initiatives. A live and accessible United Nations portal would provide a single entry point to access the wide range of United Nations data resources and tools now available on digital developments.
The Forum would be action-oriented and focused on assessing and communicating digital governance progress and gaps, facilitating peer learning and exchange and distilling – much faster than we do now – key trends and challenges in emerging technologies. It would catalyze practical efforts such as a potential global network of digital regulators cutting across regulatory domains.18One such example is the International Competition Network launched in 2001 in New York by antitrust officials from 14 jurisdictions.It would not seek to negotiate outcomes but rather to reflect, via accessible mapping, visuals and policy notes,19One such example is the International Competition Network launched in 2001 in New York by antitrust officials from 14 jurisdictions.where progress is being made and where we need to go.
Conclusion
Almost four years have passed since the High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation published its report. More than two years have passed since the release of my Road Map for Digital Cooperation and Our Common Agenda, which outlined options for practical action to advance digital cooperation. The High-level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism has offered important new ideas. The time for talking about the need for digital cooperation has long passed. We need to focus on how we make this a reality. We need to act now, and with speed, if we are to recover the potential of digital technologies for the equitable and sustainable development that is slipping away from us and the planetary crisis that confronts us. We must work together if we are to restore the trust that unconsidered, irresponsible or malicious use of digital technologies has damaged in and among societies, the private sector and States. Furthermore, we must commit to sustained follow-up and review, so that agreed principles and priorities are translated into practice and we do not retreat into siloed debates.
The ideas set out in the present policy brief are neither exclusive nor exhaustive. They can, however, provide a basis for discussion and debate in the consultations on the Global Digital Compact that are currently under way. The United Nations system stands ready to assist, at the deliberations in the Summit of the Future, in considering those ideas and in exploring new ideas. Whatever directions we take, they must be towards concrete and meaningful multi-stakeholder action if we are not to leave our planet, our people and our humanity behind.
Annex I: UN intergovernmental and multi-stakeholder digital cooperation bodies and forums with Member States and other relevant stakeholders
The present list does not include United Nations programmatic initiatives to advance United Nations and/or multi-stakeholder cooperation in specific issue areas, for example the Partner2Connect Digital Coalition of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to accelerate universal and meaningful connectivity in the hardest-to-connect communities.
Intergovernmental bodies established by the General Assembly or Specialized Agencies of the United Nations system
Ad Hoc Committee to Elaborate a Comprehensive International Convention on Countering the Use of Information and Communications Technologies for Criminal Purposes (since 2021); Commission on Science and Technology for Development (annual since 2006 to serve, inter alia, as the focal point for system-wide follow-up to the outcomes of the World Summit on the Information Society); Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (six since 2004); ITU Plenipotentiary Conference and ITU conferences (every four years); World Radiocommunication Conference, World Telecommunication Development Conference and World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly; Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems in the context of the objectives and purposes of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (since 2016); Open-ended Working Group on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (2019– 2021); open-ended working group on security of and in the use of information and communications technologies (since 2021); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Intergovernmental Group of Experts on E-commerce and the Digital Economy (since 2016).
Multi-stakeholder bodies established by the General Assembly
Internet Governance Forum (annual, since 2005); multi-stakeholder forum on science, technology and innovation for the Sustainable Development Goals (annual since 2016 as part of the Technology Facilitation Mechanism; hosted by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the Secretariat); World Summit on the Information Society, implementation, follow-up and review processes (every 10 years, since 2005).
Multi-stakeholder forums convened by the United Nations entities
Broadband Commission for Sustainable Development to promote universal connectivity and its working groups (since 2010, hosted by ITU and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)); Action Coalition on Technology and Innovation for Gender Equality of the Generation Equality Forum (since 2021, organized by the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women)); Forum on Business and Human Rights to promote dialogue and cooperation on business and human rights (since 2011, hosted by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights under the guidance of a working group established by the Human Rights Council); World Summit on the Information Society Forum facilitating the implementation of its action lines for advancing sustainable development (since 2009, co-organized by ITU, UNESCO, the United Nations Development Programme and UNCTAD and the action lines co-facilitators); United Nations World Data Forum (since 2017, organized by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs).
Selected multi-stakeholder conferences organized by the United Nations entities
Artificial Intelligence for Good Global Summit (since 2017, organized by ITU and co-convened with Switzerland); Global Forum on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence (since 2022, UNESCO); International Forum on Artificial Intelligence and Education (since 2019, co-organized by UNESCO and China); Internet for Trust Conference (UNESCO in 2023); Tech against Terrorism (since 2017, Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate); UNCTAD eWeek (biennially since 2015); UNESCO digital learning week (since 2011); International Day for Universal Access to Information conference (since 2016, UNESCO).
Other multi-stakeholder platforms
There are several other relevant multi-stakeholder forums, many focused on specific areas of digital cooperation, which are not reflected in the figure. These include Christchurch Call, Committee on Data of the International Science Council, data.org, Digital Impact Alliance, Digital Public Goods Alliance, EDISON Alliance, Global Digital Health Partnership, Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence, Global Partnership for Action on Gender-based Online Harassment and Abuse, ICT4D Conference, Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace, RightsCon, as well as long-standing multi-stakeholder forums, in particular the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers and Internet Engineering Task Force.
Annex II. Selected UN documents on digital technologies
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
• The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Resolution 217 A, December 1948 • International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI), December 1966
• Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personnel Data Files, A/RES/45/95, 1990 • World Summit on the Information Society, A/RES/56/183, January 2002
• Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, A/RES/70/1, September 2015
• Outcome document of the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on the overall review of the implementation of the outcomes of the World Summit on the Information Society A/RES/70/125, December 2015
• Declaration on the commemoration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, A/RES/75/1, September 2020.
• Follow-up to the report of the Secretary-General entitled “Our Common Agenda, A/RES/76/6, November 2021
• Effective promotion of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, A/RES/76/168, December 2021
• Countering disinformation for the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, A/RES/76/227, December 2021
• Strengthening national and international efforts, including with the private sector, to protect children from sexual exploitation and abuse, A/RES/77/233, December 2022
ECOSOC
• Prevention, protection and international cooperation against the use of new information technologies to abuse and/or exploit children, 2011/33, July 2011
• Socially just transition towards sustainable development: the role of digital technologies on social development and well-being of all, E/RES/2021/10, June 2021
• Open-source technologies for sustainable development, E/RES/2021/30, July 2021
• Assessment of the progress made in the implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the World Summit on the Information Society, E/RES/2022/15, 2022 (and previous resolutions since 2006)
• Science, technology and innovation for development, E//RES/2022/16, 2022
Human Rights Council
• Human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, A/HRC/RES/17/4, July 2011
• Rights of the child: information and communications technologies and child sexual exploitation, A/HRC/RES/31/7, April 2016
• Accelerating efforts to eliminate violence against women and girls: preventing and responding to violence against women and girls in digital contexts, A/HRC/RES/38/5, July 2018
• Freedom of opinion and expression, A/HRC/RES/44/12, July 2020
• Human rights of older persons, A/HRC/RES/48/3, October 2021
• Countering Cyberbullying, A/HRC/RES/51/1, October 2022
• Neurotechnology and human rights, A/HRC/RES/51/3, October 2022
UN Treaty Bodies
• UN CRC, General comment No. 16 (2013) on State obligations regarding the impact of the business sector on children’s rights, CRC/C/GC/16, April 2013
• UN CEDAW, General recommendation No. 35 on gender-based violence against women, updating general recommendation No. 19, CEDAW/C/GC/35, July 2017
• UN CRC, General comment No. 25 (2021) on children’s rights in relation to the digital environment, CRC/C/GC/25, March 2021
International Telecommunication Union
• ITU Plenipotentiary Conference, The Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union, CS CV, 1992
• ITU Radio Regulations, 1992, current version 2020
• Resolutions adopted at the ITU Plenipotentiary Conferences, most recently, 2022
• Resolutions adopted at the World Telecommunication Standardization Assemblies(the most recent – the World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA-20)
• Resolutions adopted at the World Telecommunication Development Conferences(the most recent – the World Telecommunication Development Conference (WTDC, Kigali, 2022)
• Resolutions adopted at the World Conference on International Telecommunications(WCIT 12)
• Radio Regulations and Revisions adopted at the World Radiocommunication Conferences (WRC)
• Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations, June 1998
UNESCO
• Charter on the Preservation of Digital Heritage, October 2003
• General Conference Resolution 38 C/53 of 10 August 2015 endorsing the ROAM principles for Internet Universality.
Declarations and Recommendations
• Windhoek+30 Declaration: Information as a Public Good, April-May 2021
• Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, November 2021
• Recommendation on Open Science, November 2021
UNODC
• Resolution adopted in the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Resolution 20/7, Promotion of activities relating to combating cybercrime, including technical assistance and capacity-building, 2011
• Strengthening international cooperation to combat cybercrime, Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Resolution 26/4, 2017
• Improving the protection of children against trafficking in persons, including by addressing the criminal misuse of information and communications technologies, Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Resolution 27/3, 2018
• Declaration adopted at the 14th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, A/CONF.234/16, March 2021
World Health Assembly
• Resolution on Digital Health WHA71.7, May 2018
World Meteorological Organization
• WMO Unified Data Policy Resolution (Res.1), October 2021
World Summit on Information Society (Geneva and Tunis, 2003-2005)
• Geneva Declaration of Principles WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/0004
• Geneva Plan of Action WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/0005
• Tunis Commitment WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/7
• Tunis Agenda for the Information Society WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6 (rev. 1)
Annex III: Consultations
The present policy brief builds upon the foundation laid by the report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation of June 2019, the Secretary-General’s Road Map for Digital Cooperation of June 2020 and the report of the Secretary-General entitled “Our Common Agenda” (A/75/982).
It has benefited from interaction with different stakeholders representing Governments, international organizations, civil society, including academia and youth, the private sector and the technology community. These consultations and meetings were held over nine months between June 2022 and March 2023, in person in Barcelona, Spain, Berlin, Brasilia, Brussels, Bucharest, Doha, Geneva, Kigali, Mexico City, Nairobi, New Delhi, New York, Riyadh, Tokyo, Valletta and Vienna, as well as online.
The following United Nations entities contributed inputs: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, International Labour Organization, International Telecommunication Union, Office for Disarmament Affairs, Office of the SecretaryGeneral’s Envoy on Youth, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Environment Programme, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, United Nations Population Fund, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, United Nations Children’s Fund, United Nations Industrial Development Organization, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Food Programme, World Intellectual Property Organization, World Health Organization and World Meteorological Organization. More than 80 stakeholders submitted inputs and 40 supplementary documents online. The inputs of the Internet Governance Forum Leadership Panel have also informed the policy brief.
The 2023 Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) concluded its work with the adoption of a report during its second session (15–19 May 2023). According to the advance version of the final report (CCW/GGE.1/2023/2), the GGE concluded that when characterising weapon systems built from emerging technologies in the area of LAWS, it is crucial to consider the potential future developments of these technologies. The group also affirmed that states must observe particular compliance with international humanitarian law throughout the life cycle of such weapon systems. States should limit the types of targets and the duration and scope of operations with which the weapon systems can engage; adequate training must be given to human operators. In cases where the weapon system based on technologies in the area of LAWS cannot comply with international law, the system must not be deployed.
The US Department of Defence (DoD) has released the National Defence Science and Technology Strategy (NDSTS) to outline science and technology priorities, goals, and investments. The NDSTS will guide the future of the defence research and engineering enterprise along three main goals: focusing on the joint mission by investing in information systems and establishing processes for rigorous, threat-informed analysis; creating and fielding capabilities at speed and scale by fostering a more vibrant defence innovation ecosystem; and ensuring the foundations for research and development. The strategy emphasises the need to develop asymmetric capabilities that will help ensure national security over the long term and leverage critical emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing to achieve the objectives of the National Defence Strategy.
With the NDSTS the DoD seeks to ‘make carefully crafted decisions that bolster the DoD’s comparative advantages’, according to Heidi Shyu, DoD Chief Technology Officer.
The European Parliament is finalising the text of the proposed AI Act ahead of a key committee vote on 11 May 2023 The AI Act is a landmark EU legislative proposal aimed at regulating artificial intelligence based on its potential to cause harm. The lawmakers have worked on a fine-tuned version of the compromise amendments, reflecting a broader political agreement reached at the end of April but also including last-minute changes and important details on how the deal has been operationalised.
The Act imposes a stricter regime for so-called foundation models, powerful AI systems that can power other AI applications and requires for generative foundation models to ensure more transparency on their models. The fines for foundation model providers breaching the AI rules has been set up to €10 million or 2% annual turnover, whichever is higher as in previous texts. In addition, MEPs have added an ‘extra layer’ meaning that the categorisation will not be automatic, and the systems will also have to pose a ‘significant risk’ to qualify as high-risk. MEPs also introduced the institution of the AI Office, a new EU body to support the harmonised application of the rules and cross-border investigations.
In the USA, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) is releasing a public request for information (RFI) to learn more about the automated tools used by employers to surveil, monitor, evaluate, and manage workers. The main arguments of the RFI are that automated tools used by employers to surveil, monitor, evaluate, and manage workers should be better understood, that the federal government should respond to any relevant risks and opportunities associated with these tools, and that best practices should be shared with employers, worker organizations, technology vendors, developers, and others in civil society. The RFI is intended to advance the government’s understanding of the design, deployment, prevalence, and impacts of automated tools, to inform new policy responses, to share relevant research, data, and findings with the public, and to amplify best practices among employers, worker organisations, technology vendors, developers, and others in civil society. To that end, the RFI proposes to gather workers’ firsthand experiences with surveillance technologies, details from employers, technology developers, and vendors on how they develop, sell, and use these technologies, best practices for mitigating risks to workers, relevant data and research, and ideas for how the federal government should respond to any relevant risks and opportunities.
On 29-30 April 2023, G7 digital and tech ministers met in Takasaki, Japan, to discuss a wide range of digital policy topics, from data governance and artificial intelligence (AI), to digital infrastructure and competition. The outcomes of the meeting – which was also attended by representatives of India, Indonesia, Ukraine, the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, the International Telecommunication Union, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, UN, and the World Bank Group – include a ministerial declaration and several action plans and commitments to be endorsed at the upcoming G7 Hiroshima Summit.
During the meeting, G7 digital and tech ministers committed to strengthening cooperation on cross-border data flows, and operationalising Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT) through an Institutional Arrangement for Partnership (IAP). IAP, expected to be launched in the coming months, is dedicated to ‘bringing governments and stakeholders together to operationalise DFFT through principles-based, solutions-oriented, evidence-based, multistakeholder, and cross-sectoral cooperation’. According to the ministers, focus areas for IAP should include data location, regulatory cooperation, trusted government access to data, and data sharing.
The ministers further noted the importance of enhancing the security and resilience of digital infrastructures. In this regard, they have committed to strengthening cooperation – within G7 and with like-minded partners – to support and enhance network resilience through measures such as ensuring and extending secure and resilient routes of submarine cables. Moreover, the group endorsed the G7 Vision of the future network in the Beyond 5G/6G era, and is committed to enhancing cooperation on research, development, and international standards setting towards building digital infrastructure for the 2030s and beyond. These commitments are also reflected in a G7 Action Plan for building a secure and resilient digital infrastructure.
In addition to expressing a commitment to promoting an open, free, global, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet, G7 ministers condemned government-imposed internet shutdowns and network restrictions. When it comes to global digital governance processes, the ministers expressed support for the UN Internet Governance Forum (IGF) as the ‘leading multistakeholder forum for Internet policy discussions’ and have proposed that the upcoming Global Digital Compact reinforce, build on, and contribute to the success of the IGF and World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) process. Also included in the internet governance section is a commitment to protecting democratic institutions and values from foreign threats, including foreign information manipulation and interference, disinformation and other forms of foreign malign activity. These issues are further detailed in an accompanying G7 Action Plan for open, free, global, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet.
On matters related to emerging and disruptive technologies, the ministers acknowledged the need for ‘agile, more distributed, and multistakeholder governance and legal frameworks, designed for operationalising the principles of the rule of law, due process, democracy, and respect for human rights, while harnessing the opportunities for innovation’. They also called for the development of sustainable supply chains and agreed to continue discussions on developing collective approaches to immersive technologies such as the metaverse.
With AI high on the meeting agenda, the ministers have stressed the importance of international discussions on AI governance and interoperability between AI governance frameworks, and expressed support for the development of tools for trustworthy AI (e.g. (non)regulatory frameworks, technical standards, assurance techniques) through multistakeholder international organisations. The role of technical standards in building trustworthy AI and in fostering interoperability across AI governance frameworks was highlighted both in the ministerial declaration and in the G7 Action Plan for promoting global interoperability between tools for trustworthy AI.
When it comes to AI policies and regulations, the ministers noted that these should be human-centric, based on democratic values, risk-based, and forward-looking. The opportunities and challenges of generative AI technologies were also tackled, as ministers announced plans to convene future discussions on issues such as governance, safeguarding intellectual property rights, promoting transparency, and addressing disinformation.
On matters of digital competition, the declaration highlights the importance of both using existing competition enforcement tools and developing and implementing new or updated competition policy or regulatory frameworks ‘to address issues caused by entrenched market power, promote competition, and stimulate innovation’. A summit related to digital competition for competition authorities and policymakers is planned for the fall of 2023.
AI has the potential to transform food in many ways, including crop optimization, food waste reduction, and recreating animal foods from plants. Consumers are interested in trying robot-made food, with 77 percent of them wanting to give it a try, according to the 2023 FoodBytes report.
Companies at the forefront of new product development use AI to reimagine staples like cheese, milk, and meat using solely plant inputs. Food and AI industries are getting together.
One of the pioneers in AI-driven food production is Chilean The Not Company (Not Co) which has recreated animal foods from plants. Using this tool, NotCo has developed a wide range of products such as NotMilk, NotBurger, NotChicken. Not Co products started entering the leading chains, such as Starbucks and Burger King.
Two companies, Karakuri and Quorn, have partnered to optimize meatless chicken. NotCo has also partnered with Kraft Heinz.
Food production, the basis of our survival and the cornerstone of civilisation, is likely to change profoundly in the coming period. This change will trigger a major impact on our lifestyle and economy.
Democratic Senator Michael Bennet introduced a bill that would create a task force to revise US policies on artificial intelligence (AI). During a period of 18 months, the task force would identify shortfalls in regulatory oversight of AI and recommend necessary reforms in its final report. The task force would include an official from the Office of Management and Budget, the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the Office of Science and Technology Policy as well as privacy and civil liberties officers from the Departments of Justice, State, Treasury, Defense, and other executive branch agencies.
‘There’s going to have to be a lot of education around this set of issues because they’re not well understood,’ stated Senator Michael Bennet, while also noting that ‘there’s going to be a lot of improvisation and iterative approaches to try to wrestle with this because AI is so new to everyone in the government’.
