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Brent Carey

New Zealand has shown its commitment to online safety by enacting the Harmful Digital Communications Act in 2016. This legislation takes a principles-based approach to address various forms of online harm, including incitement to commit suicide, breach of confidentiality, and harassment. The act covers both criminal and civil aspects, with NetSafe, a government-approved NGO agency, managing the civil side.

NetSafe plays a vital role in helping New Zealanders resolve online disputes through mediation. Each year, over 25,000 individuals seek assistance from NetSafe, with more than 7,000 engaging in the mediation process. This demonstrates the effectiveness of NetSafe in providing a platform for conflict resolution in the digital realm.

NetSafe has also led the development of the ‘Aotearoa Online Safety Code’, launched in July 2022. This code, supported by major platforms like TikTok, Meta, Amazon, Twitch, and Twitter, addresses issues such as hate speech, disinformation, and misinformation. By adopting risk-based approaches, the code aims to tackle these challenges and create a safer digital environment.

New Zealand is actively seeking innovative approaches to address emerging online harms and learn from global best practices. They have produced a discussion paper titled ‘Safer Online Services and Media Platforms Bill’ to explore content regulation. Additionally, NetSafe participates as an observer in global regulators’ forums, engaging in relevant discussions.

To ensure a comprehensive and collaborative approach to internet safety, different stakeholders need to come together for discussions. This collaboration within the digital ecosystem creates spaces and opportunities for diverse parts of the infrastructure to engage in meaningful conversations.

Industry-led interventions are considered crucial in promoting online safety. By providing a platform for different voices, these interventions contribute to a balanced and effective response to online threats.

However, the regulation of platforms has raised concerns about the withdrawal of news and media plurality. Some platforms have expressed plans to withdraw and stop providing news in response to regulations such as the Fair Digital Media Bill. This highlights the challenge of balancing regulation with maintaining a diverse media landscape.

The importance of media plurality and media literacy is widely acknowledged. Media plurality is seen as crucial for a vibrant civil society, while media literacy empowers individuals to critically navigate the digital world.

The existing media landscape is undergoing significant transformations due to the influence of both old and new media. Brent Carey suggests that understanding these changing dynamics and effective responses are necessary in this evolving landscape.

Preserving online privacy is of utmost importance, and New Zealand has implemented stringent measures to tackle privacy violations. The Harmful Digital Communications Act imposes penalties of a $50,000 fine or two years imprisonment for posting intimate images without consent. The New Zealand police actively prosecute such offenses, emphasizing the seriousness of this issue.

Brent Carey supports severe repercussions for online privacy violations and highlights the effectiveness of the Harmful Digital Communications Act in addressing such breaches.

Encouraging the online industry to uphold the highest standards of safety and corporate citizenship is essential. Brent Carey believes in striving for the highest standards, rather than settling for lower ones exhibited by certain platforms. Companies like Twitter have taken steps in this direction, as evidenced by Brent Carey’s involvement with Twitter’s Trust and Safety Council and their commitment to online safety through localized data.

It is worth noting that the discussion did not cover the Judaic argument, as Brent Carey explicitly declined to discuss it. This suggests that certain limitations or sensitivities may exist concerning specific topics within the broader discourse of online safety and governance.

In conclusion, New Zealand’s enactment of the Harmful Digital Communications Act reflects its commitment to online safety. NetSafe’s mediation services and the ‘Aotearoa Online Safety Code’ further enhance efforts to address online disputes and tackle issues such as hate speech and misinformation. New Zealand actively explores innovative strategies and seeks global best practices to combat emerging online harms. Collaboration among stakeholders is crucial for effective internet safety, and industry-led interventions play a vital role. However, challenges remain regarding platform regulation and media plurality. Preserving online privacy and promoting the highest standards of safety and corporate citizenship are key priorities.

Rishika Chandra

Fiji is at the forefront of recognising the significance of online safety and has taken concrete steps to ensure a secure digital environment for its citizens. In 2018, Fiji enacted the Online Safety Act, which laid the foundation for the establishment of the Online Safety Commission in 2019. The commission has made considerable progress in organising awareness and education programmes to educate people about potential risks and equip them with the necessary tools to protect themselves online.

Furthermore, Fiji has been actively involved in fostering international cooperation and knowledge sharing in tackling online abuse through its participation in the Global Online Safety Regulators Network. Formed in 2022, the network includes members from Fiji, the UK, Australia, Ireland, Africa, and Korea. This collaboration has been instrumental in promoting the exchange of ideas and experiences in combating online abuse on a global scale.

The partnership between the Online Safety Commission and eSafety Commissioner Australia, along with social media platforms such as Meta and TikTok, plays a crucial role in promoting online safety. Under this arrangement, the organisations work together to support online safety in Fiji and Australia by sharing best practices, raising awareness of online safety trends and emerging issues, and developing national online safety strategies. One of the primary ways they collaborate with these tech companies is through their content reporting systems, which enable users to report harmful and inappropriate content for swift action.

Governments around the world face the challenge of balancing regulations on online content and data privacy without infringing upon individuals’ rights to free speech or impeding innovation. While it is important to protect users from harmful content or cyber threats, it is equally essential to ensure that regulations do not stifle freedom of expression or impede the progress of technological advancements.

Fiji has taken a strong stance against online harassment, cyberbullying, image-based abuse, and child exploitation, criminalising these offences. The penalties are significant, including imprisonment and fines. However, it is worth noting that defamation is not covered under Fiji’s Online Safety Act.

To effectively regulate social media platforms, Fijians need a better understanding of their design, policies, and community guidelines. It is crucial for individuals to be aware of how these platforms work to navigate them safely. While social media platforms can be dangerous, they also serve as a means of connectivity and communication.

Building strong relationships and collaborations with social media platforms is vital in achieving a balance between regulation and individual rights. By working in a collaborative manner with these platforms, it becomes possible to address online safety concerns effectively.

In conclusion, Fiji’s commitment to online safety is commendable, with the enactment of the Online Safety Act and the establishment of the Online Safety Commission. The country’s active participation in international networks and partnerships, along with efforts to educate its citizens and collaborate with social media platforms, further solidifies Fiji’s position as a leader in this field. However, it is essential for governments to find a balance between regulation and individual rights, ensuring the protection of users while fostering innovation and free speech.

Audience

During the discussion, several key points were raised by different speakers. One audience member expressed concern about the involvement and engagement of civil society within the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). They questioned the extent to which civil society is included and heard in participatory discussions such as the IGF. This raised questions about the room and role for civil society and their ability to influence decisions.

Another speaker highlighted the importance of partnerships and their role in addressing the demands and concerns of civil society. They emphasized the need for the partnership to consider and respond to the voices and needs of civil society, particularly in the areas of peace, justice, strong institutions, and partnerships for the goals.

Doubts were also raised about the effectiveness of voluntary industry associations, specifically in sectors such as automotive, advertising, and digital identity. The audience member noted that voluntary industry associations in these sectors have failed to bring about significant change or address the concerns of stakeholders. This raised skepticism about the potential success of a new voluntary industry association.

The need to strike a balance between government and private sector involvement in regulating the internet was a key point of discussion. One speaker questioned the current system of industry-led regulation of the internet and advocated for a more balanced approach that includes government involvement. They highlighted the example of Canada’s Bill C-11 Online News Act, which required tech companies to pay news outlets for posting or linking content. This led to Meta removing news from their platforms, raising questions about the control that companies have over the digital space.

On the other hand, a speaker argued that less regulation can lead to better outcomes. They referenced the positive effects of the relatively unrestricted early internet and suggested that excessive government regulation can hinder innovation and progress. This viewpoint advocated for self-regulation as a solution, suggesting that businesses should take responsibility for their actions and address any potential harm caused.

Notably, there were contrasting viewpoints on self-regulation between different cultural contexts. A South Korean panel member advocated for self-regulation, while Europe has shifted towards government regulation. This highlighted the different perspectives on how best to regulate the internet and the need for cross-cultural understanding and collaboration.

The enforcement of online moderation rules and regulations was a point of concern, with many customers expressing dissatisfaction. The speaker called for transparency in the enforcement process but also highlighted the impact it may have on revealing business strategies. Striking a balance between transparency and maintaining customer trust was deemed essential.

In terms of partnership expansion, there was a call to bring more gaming companies into the fold and to establish rules and expectations specific to the gaming industry. This recognizes the unique challenges and dynamics within the gaming sector and the need for tailored approaches.

The challenges of information sharing within companies and content moderation were also discussed. Companies have been relatively low profile about information sharing within their functions, but there is a shift towards more sharing while considering trade-offs. Additionally, the stress and challenges faced by content moderators were highlighted through the game “Moderator Mayhem,” underscoring the need for a deeper understanding of the positions and support given to those responsible for content moderation.

The credibility of voluntary industry action in trust and safety was called into question, particularly considering the activities of certain companies in this space. There were concerns that their actions might undermine the overall credibility and effectiveness of voluntary action in ensuring trust and safety.

Finally, a speaker suggested that a non-prescriptive duty of care for user safety would be a better legislative approach. This would involve holding companies accountable for ensuring the safety of their users without prescribing specific actions or methods.

In conclusion, the discussion covered a wide range of topics related to civil society involvement, the effectiveness of voluntary industry associations, government and private sector involvement in regulating the internet, contrasting viewpoints on self-regulation, the enforcement of online moderation rules, challenges in the gaming industry, information sharing within companies, the credibility of voluntary industry action, and legislative approaches to user safety. Noteworthy observations include the importance of considering civil society demands and concerns, the need for balance and collaboration in regulation, and the challenges faced in content moderation and information sharing.

David Sullivan

The Digital Trust and Safety Partnership (DTSP) was launched by David Sullivan in February 2021 to establish best practices for trust and safety online using a risk-based approach. It aims to develop specific standards and practices for companies’ services. DTSP emphasizes the importance of tailoring assessments and practices based on company size and risk. One of its key goals is to prevent internet fragmentation and support a free and open internet by developing international standards on trust and safety. DTSP believes that adopting a risk-based approach and conducting third-party assessments can help achieve these goals. The partnership values the input of stakeholders, including industry perspectives, and aims to engage in broad consultations. DTSP recognizes the significance of independent third-party reviews to provide objective assessments of company practices. It also highlights the changing concept of self-regulation within companies as emerging regulatory regimes are established globally. David Sullivan advocates for greater transparency in online moderation processes and regulations, while also considering trade-offs. DTSP refrains from commenting on specific companies’ activities to maintain industry credibility. The partnership acknowledges previous challenges faced by voluntary industry associations and emphasizes the need for proper implementation and alignment with emerging regulations. It also recognizes the spread and challenge of digital authoritarianism and emphasizes the need for collective action beyond individual company initiatives. Overall, the DTSP aims to establish best practices for trust and safety online by tailoring assessments, considering various perspectives, advocating for international standards, and promoting transparency in online moderation processes. The partnership is committed to driving positive change in enhancing the trust and safety of the online environment.

Nobuhisa Nishigata

In Japan, except for broadcasting, there is no direct regulation of online content by the government. However, there are certain issues that persist, such as cyberbullying, online slandering, and the distribution of pirated content, particularly manga. Despite these challenges, the Japanese government places great importance on respecting freedom of speech and expression.

Measures have been taken to address these issues, including regulations against spam and finding a balance between public safety and human rights. The government acknowledges the need to protect children from online harm and encourages voluntary efforts for software installation and filter optimization. Additionally, discussions have arisen about the liability of internet service providers and their prompt actions in response to harmful content.

There is a positive outlook for the future development of the Digital Trust & Safety Partnership (DTSP) and a recognition of the importance of combating pirated content without direct regulation. Japan believes in learning from successful practices of companies and sees co-regulation as an effective approach to tackle online content issues.

Concerns have been raised regarding public safety and the activities of tech companies. The frustrations of tech companies with government involvement are acknowledged. However, Japan remains committed to maintaining an open and free internet. The commitment of Japanese Prime Minister Kishida and Japan’s support for the Future Declaration on the Internet exemplify this dedication. Additionally, the importance of effective internet governance was emphasized at the G7 ministerial meeting in Takasaki.

Media literacy and caution about relying too heavily on online media and social networking sites (SNS) for information are highlighted. Concerns are expressed about companies lacking journalistic backgrounds and the variation in information depending on the country.

The handling of content-related matters, such as harassment and defamation, as criminal offenses varies depending on the case. Jurisdiction plays a role in determining the approach taken, and for more serious offenses, law enforcement may directly charge individuals. In other cases, private lawsuits can result in sanctions or mitigation.

Nobuhisa Nishigata, mentioned in the discussions, expresses optimism about the further development of digitalization work in the United States. Nishigata supports private-led investment in digital infrastructure and believes the government should act primarily as a coordinator. Japan has already established a basic law concerning digitalization and the digital society, which emphasizes private-led investment in digital infrastructure.

Lastly, there is an expressed interest in a Japanese company joining global partnerships. The importance of partnerships and global cooperation, particularly in relation to the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goal 17: Partnerships for the Goals, is emphasized.

In summary, while the Japanese government does not directly regulate online content, challenges and concerns persist regarding cyberbullying, online slandering, and pirated content. Respect for freedom of speech and expression is highly valued by the government. Measures such as regulations against spam, finding a balance between public safety and human rights, and involving tech companies in ensuring public safety are being discussed. The future development of the DTSP and the interest in joining global partnerships reflect Japan’s commitment to addressing these issues while maintaining an open and free internet.

Angela McKay

Angela McKay, a technology risk expert, strongly supports the concept of a free, open, and interoperable internet. She acknowledges the desire of global companies to operate in a global market and expresses encouragement toward conversations surrounding this vision. McKay recognizes that collaborative solutions are necessary to address the changing technology and harms landscape. Drawing from her experience in technology risk, she identifies similarities between the discussions around online harm and her field. She notes that governments, civil society, and companies have realized the importance of collaborating to tackle these issues effectively.

In terms of regulation and transparency, McKay believes that these approaches should reflect the cultural values and norms of a region. She acknowledges that regardless of the approach taken, governments represent the cultural values of their respective regions. This implies that regulatory and transparency approaches must be sensitive to cultural variations.

McKay advocates for a risk-based approach to address online harms. She highlights the need for companies to adopt risk-based approaches and emphasizes the importance of considering trade-offs to ensure a safe online environment. This approach allows for a more nuanced and flexible response to the complexities of online harms.

Cross-sector dialogue is another crucial aspect highlighted by McKay. She emphasizes the importance of conversations between different entities, citing examples such as the DTSP (Digital Trust and Safety Partnership) within organizations and the Global Online Safety Regulators Forum between regulators. Through dialogue and collaboration, learning can occur, leading to improved practices.

The exchange of best practices among companies of varying sizes is seen as instrumental in supporting global proliferation. McKay notes that the DTSP has partnered with the Global Network Initiative to involve civil society in advancing the Digital Services Act. This collaboration prevents knowledge and expertise from being confined to only large companies, ensuring that even medium and smaller companies have an opportunity to benefit from best practices.

McKay recognizes that the field of operational maturity is continuously evolving. Companies are constantly seeking out novel methods and practices that have not been previously implemented, highlighting their commitment to continuous learning and improvement.

The importance of exchanging ideas among different communities of civil society is stressed by McKay. It is not sufficient for companies alone to engage in dialogue; the participation of civil society is crucial to ensure a more inclusive and comprehensive approach to addressing online harms. McKay mentions that Google has been actively involving civil society members and academics in discussions on topics like child safety. They are also exploring the use of requests for information and online forums to catalyze conversations and gather diverse perspectives.

Advocating for active engagement with civil society, McKay suggests that companies should proactively encourage dialogue and collaboration among different communities. By bringing in external voices and perspectives, companies can better understand and address societal concerns.

While acknowledging the potential benefits of regulation and transparency, McKay cautions against viewing them as a panacea for all problems. She believes that focusing on what behaviors are being aimed to drive is more crucial than fixating on the enforcement method. This perspective challenges the false dilemma of regulation versus transparency, shifting the focus towards the fundamental goal of shaping positive online behaviors.

The progress made in managing cybersecurity risks is acknowledged by McKay. She highlights the evolution from solely focusing on vulnerability management to a more holistic, risk-based approach. This progress highlights the continuous efforts to enhance cybersecurity measures and protect online users.

In conclusion, Angela McKay’s perspectives highlight the importance of a free, open, and interoperable internet, collaboration to address online harms, culturally sensitive regulation and transparency approaches, risk-based management of online harms, cross-sector dialogue for learning and improvement, the exchange of best practices among companies of varying sizes, continuous learning and improvement in operational maturity, the significance of exchanging ideas with civil society, and the need to focus on driving desirable behaviors rather than fixating on enforcement methods. Her insights contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the complexities and potential solutions within the digital landscape.

Kyoungmi Oh

The South Korean government is currently making efforts to exert control over content on various platforms, which has posed challenges and highlighted the need for increased transparency. Civil society organizations in South Korea are requesting platforms to disclose government requests for user information and content takedown, a practice that ceased around 2011.

The inadequacy of the SAFE (Safety, Audit, Feedback, and Enforcement) framework in addressing the unique aspects of the digital industry has been noted. The framework fails to consider the importance of freedom of expression and privacy, and the potential harms that occur when content is taken down or censored. This calls for a more nuanced approach to trust and safety that prioritizes protecting freedom of expression.

Collaboration with digital rights organizations and civil society is crucial for effectively managing trust and safety in the digital industry. The Trust and Safety Council of Twitter serves as an example of successful collaboration, incorporating a wider range of perspectives and insights into content regulation decisions. Limited transparency with recognized human rights organizations under appropriate non-disclosure agreements is also seen as beneficial.

Incorporating industry-specific considerations and placing greater emphasis on enforcement and transparency within the SAFE framework is necessary. The current framework falls short in addressing the unique characteristics of the digital industry, with abstract questions that do not cater to its specifics. Clarity on what content should be taken down is lacking, leading to confusion and potential bias in decision-making.

Self-regulation is preferred over governmental regulation, as endorsed by South Korean civil society organizations. However, transparency in the self-regulation process is crucial due to the diverse interests, goals, and missions of different organizations.

South Korea has enacted legislation to address cybercrimes, particularly harassment and sexual abuse. The Punishment Act allows the communication network to punish offenders and provides a legal framework for combating these crimes.

In conclusion, the South Korean government’s control over platform content and the shortcomings of the SAFE framework have raised concerns regarding transparency, freedom of expression, and privacy. Collaboration with digital rights organizations and civil society, industry-specific considerations, and enforcement are essential for effective trust and safety management. While self-regulation is preferred, transparency in the self-regulation process is crucial. Legislation addressing cybercrimes demonstrates South Korea’s commitment to combating online abuse. Addressing these issues will contribute to a more inclusive and secure digital environment.

David Sullivan:
Hi, everyone. Welcome to this open forum on the Digital Trust and Safety Partnership. We are just sorting out one matter technically, and then we will get started. Okay. Am I able to control the slides? Yeah. Okay. Because I don’t know how I ‑‑ so good afternoon, everyone, and good morning, good afternoon, and good evening to anyone who is joining us remotely. I’m David Sullivan. I’m the Executive Director of the Digital Trust and Safety Partnership. We’re thrilled to be here at the IGF holding our open forum. What we’re going to do today is first I am going to tell you a little bit more about the Digital Trust and Safety Partnership, our objectives, the progress we’ve made, our approach to really articulating industry best practices for trust and safety online, and then we’ll talk about what that means for the free and open internet, and we have a terrific panel of guests and experts joining us from across the region, around the world, different stakeholder constituencies, and we will so have that panel discussion, and then we’ll really try to benefit from the expertise of everyone here in the room and save plenty of time for open discussion and Q&A. So with that, I’m happy to get started. I just ‑‑ yeah. Okay. Great. Yeah. Here’s our agenda. Just mentioned. And I’ll introduce our panelists in a moment when we get to that piece, but first let me tell you all a little bit more about the Digital Trust and Safety Partnership. So DTSP launched two and a half years ago in February 2021. We’re really a voluntary industry body that’s come together to articulate best practices for what we call trust and safety. This is a term that is well understood within the industry, within technology companies, where teams responsible for something called trust and safety have often been around for 15 or even 20 years, but it’s a term that is less well understood and maybe is often more thought of within the internet governance space as platform governance, platform regulation, content moderation, online safety, all of the issues around the content and conduct online that we are all concerned about. So our partners have come together to articulate best practices using a risk‑based approach, and I would say that there’s two fundamental aspects to how our partnership works that we want to highlight and start with. The first is that there are many, and I think even within the IGF, probably at other sessions that are going on right now, very important discussions about the sort of normative aspects of how should content be governed and regulated online. What does international human rights law say about this? What does national law and regulation say about this? Our partnership is taking a different point of departure. We are descriptive, and so we say there are practitioners inside tech companies who have been working on these issues. Let’s describe the work that they do. The second fundamental piece is that we are not suggesting that companies offering products and services that are very different from each other, from search engines to social media to instant messaging to dating to video games to sharing economy, the idea is that all of these companies should have their own policies, their own terms of service that are particular to their product, to their audience, but that these companies can use the same practices to address the content and conduct that they do not want to see on their platforms, so we are about aligning companies around practices, not around specific types of content. So, as I said, different risks, different threats for all different types, so there really is no one-size-fits-all approach to trust and safety, and as we know, this is a constantly evolving and changing world. The threats that people are worried about online tomorrow will be different than they are today, and so we need this risk-based approach that is going to evolve over time. Here is just a quick snapshot of our current partner companies, and as you can just see from that quick glance, we bring together companies of different sizes with different business models and very different products and services, but again, trying to align around those common approaches, the common framework, and so here is our best practices framework, which all of our companies commit to, so basically we have five overarching commitments that all of the companies who are partners of DTSP commit to, and they mirror the product development lifecycle and start with product development, so this is really about safety by design and sort of identifying and evaluating content and conduct-related risks in product development, so as I said, this is not particular to child safety, it’s not particular to disinformation, but it can really encompass any of the risks that a company might be concerned about. The second commitment is around governance and adopting the sort of being transparent and adopting explainable rules for their product or service, enforcing those rules in the third commitment around enforcement, improving over time, and then being transparent with the public about how all of these processes take place. So here you can see that underneath those five overarching commitments that I just mentioned, we’ve articulated around 35 specific best practices for trust and safety, and the idea is that companies can use whatever combination of these practices or perhaps identify other practices that are particular for their product or service that they can implement in order to sort of align with our framework. The goal is not really to say that, hey, here is all of the answers to dealing with trust and safety online, but to say here’s a framework, can you find within this what works for your company, for your product, your service. So having best practices is great, but it doesn’t mean anything unless there’s really a robust evaluation and assessment of how companies are using those practices. So the first thing that our organization did after it launched in February of 2021 was to develop a methodology for assessing how companies are implementing these practices, which we published in December of 2021 called the SAFE Framework, and in 2022, our founding companies undertook self-assessments of their own trust and safety practices using this approach. And two things that are fundamental to this approach to assessment, which I think can be relevant to a lot of the conversations that are going on now globally about what to do about these issues about online content. The first is that the assessments are tailored based on risk, so they’re about looking at the size and scale of a company so that we’re not asking a company like Bitly to do the same assessment we would expect of a Google or a Microsoft. And then also look at risk, look at the user volume for a product or service or look at the product features that might introduce levels of complexity or risk that would warrant taking a much more intensive and detailed look at that product or service. And then based on that, companies used this five-step assessment methodology to look at and find out what level of maturity are their products and services. And we actually developed this maturity rating scale, sort of five steps from ad hoc to optimized, and companies used our process to identify where they saw their own practices as less mature or more mature. And because our goal as an industry association is to develop best practices and show accountability, it’s not to be ranking our companies against one another. So in our public report about these practices, which is on our website, DTSPartnership.org, we aggregated and sort of anonymized the results of these self-assessments in order to show what’s the range of maturity for the different practices that our companies are using for online safety. And what we found was here’s where companies saw their practices as being more mature. And these processes, generally speaking, are things that teams within companies responsible for trust and safety or content policy can often do sort of by themselves. Teams that have been working on having policies and standards and enforcing those standards and reporting on those standards, that is where companies tended to find that they were more mature. Looking at where companies saw their practices as less mature and in need of improvement, these are the practices on this slide. And here we can see it’s oftentimes things that involve working with external organizations and externals. So getting input from users on how to shape content policies, working on community self-regulation for the types of services that have that kind of community moderation component, or working with researchers and academics on things like access to data and other programs like that. So this is a snapshot in time that’s now more than a year old, but I do think it sort of gives a sense of where the industry saw itself as doing better and as in need of improvement and something to build on. So where we are now is we’ve shared those results and we are starting to pilot how we can look at having independent assessments, where it’s not the companies assessing themselves, but having independent third-party assessments that can complement or work with or help provide companies with workable solutions for compliance with many of the online content regulation regimes that we’re seeing developing in different places around the world, some of which we’ll talk about in the panel discussion shortly. So just to kind of restate, the objectives for our partnership is really first about bringing companies together to protect people online, protect their safety, and protect their rights. See how these best practices can be supported by governments as they consider their own approaches to content regulation. Grow our membership so that it is reflective of the global world and all of the people who are using these services around the world, so looking for new members from other parts of the world. And look to lay the groundwork for international standards in this space. There’s a number of things that we’ve done recently that I wanted to mention briefly. We’ve just released over the summer an industry glossary of trust and safety terminology in order that our members can kind of align around the baseline definitions for the terms that trust and safety professionals use in their daily lives. Again, that’s on our website, and there’s copies I can share. We have a booth in the exhibition hall where you can also access that via a QR code. We’re also working in multi-stakeholder and public-private partnerships, including with the World Economic Forum’s Global Coalition on Digital Safety, to develop together with civil society and regulators and international organizations some common approaches to things like risk assessment. And we’ve just launched and published a set of guiding principles and best practices for age assurance, showing how our partnership can zero in and develop some practices on specific elements within this broader framework of trust and safety. So as I said, next steps is really looking at those, trying to pilot an approach to third-party assessment, continuing to consult broadly with stakeholders, and support our companies with their efforts towards having really meaningful and transparent compliance with regulations in a way that ultimately makes people safer online. So with that, I think we can move on to the panel discussion here, and I am thrilled to welcome our panelists. So here in the room, we have Nobu from the Ministry of Communications of Japan. We have Kimi from OpenNet Korea, a civil society organization from Korea. We have Angela, who’s the head of Trust and Safety Research and Partnerships at Google and a DTSP board member. And Farzana, do we have our remote speakers as well? Yeah. So online, we have Brent Carey from NetSafe, and we have Rashika from the Online Safety Commission of Fiji. And so really what we wanted to do with this open forum was to, you know, sort of leverage the expertise of the global internet governance community to talk about what does this industry kind of effort on trust and safety mean for a free and open internet, and can, you know, this approach of industry best practices and standards be leveraged to prevent things like internet fragmentation and support the goals that we ultimately want of an internet that facilitates and promotes people’s rights, and while also keeping them safe. So I’m going to start here with you, Nobu, thank you. The Japanese government has been generously hosting us here in Kyoto. It’s been wonderful. So you have really an extensive career in technology policy here in Japan, as well as working at the OECD. And I wanted to ask you, what role do you see in terms of industry practices when it comes to the development of Japan’s approach to regulating online content, and how do you see this potentially supporting or not the goal that I know Japan very much shares of an open and interoperable internet?

Nobuhisa Nishigata:
Hello, everybody. My name is Nobu Nishigara from the Japanese government, and thanks for the kind introduction. And, you know, you guys, everybody is welcome to come here. And then let me say, we also thank you, everybody, for your participation and contribution, which made this event great. So this is now, of course, we did a lot of the job and preparation to host you, but on the other hand, it is not all. Remember that everybody makes this happen. And having said that, and thanks for the question, and then just, you know, before answering directly to the question, let me make it clear that one point that the Japanese government is not engaged in the direct regulation of the online content. I mean, except for the broadcasting. We have some regulations, so do the other countries. We have some regulation on the broadcast content, but on the other hand, we don’t have the direct regulation on the online content yet. But on the other hand, having said that, again, then, of course, we do respect the freedom of speech, freedom of expression, et cetera. But on the other hand, secondly, though, I have to say that there are several outstanding content issues regarding the online delivery or, you know, circulation, et cetera. So to name a few, and then the CSAM, the spam, or maybe it’s outstanding in Japan, the cyber-bullying, or online slandering, or maybe I would say include the piracy, the content, the deliberation, I mean, delivery, the pirated contents in manga. I mean, regarding the manga piracy issue in Japan, it’s heavy.

David Sullivan:
But please find your time to visit the IJH village, and the exhibition downstairs to stop by the booth and present how we can combat without the direct regulation over the pirated contents. But we still fight, and there are some introductions out there, and you can get some souvenirs as well. That’s a little advertisement, because personally, I organized half part of the exhibitions. Then, like, for those issues, what we do is, like, we have introduced several measures for the mitigation. For example, like, we have the particular regulation to solve a particular problem, like, for spam. Like, we have some particular regulation against spam. And we have some particular regulation to protect the children from the online harms, particularly for the CSAM. And of course, we do have some voluntary works as well. voluntary though, but to enable the filtering installation, software installation, some help with the telephone carriers in the smartphone, etc. And for the same purpose, to keep the children from the online harms. And maybe we have some other regulation. I mean, this could be some common practice within, particularly in, I would say, like-minded countries, but limit the liabilities of the internet service providers to enable their prompt action to avoid the online harms to the people. So, like, these are the, you know, particularly applies to the internet, but the technology is so fast, right? It’s a unique to the internet, I would say. We have to review and update almost every year and everything. So, better than losing my job, it’s okay to be busy, but still, the internet kept us very busy, and this is where the best practice role come in, you know. So, we face several dilemmas, particularly between the public safety versus human rights, right? And the public safety is our biggest concern as a whole government. Or maybe the individual personal safety, particularly who suffered from online harm versus the other people’s human rights, which is going to be where to be the balance, you know. So, you know, it’s a bunch of dilemmas that we face when we have to think about these things. But, you know, that this, actually, personally, though, I’m having the great expectation that the further development of this work at the DTSP, because the advanced information, the best practice, at least, I mean, from the company side, this is going to help us a lot, you know. I mean, we do usually, like, for example, maybe, like, the current European legislation, new legislation, like a Digital Service Act, DSA, that’s going to be the one reference point when we think about the new regulation, I mean, compared to what we have. I mean, it’s a different style, but maybe, like, what we can do as a government is very similar. But maybe one difference is, like, we don’t have, or maybe we have not reached to the level of the core regulation in this area. Like, a company makes a commitment to the government, right? Then, like, the government’s going to evaluate the commitment later. And we have that kind of system toward the regulation on the online platform, but it’s about the competition side. Like, I mean, very similar to the mechanism to the DMA. And actually, Japan predated the EU, so maybe EU’s got a better system, I would say, but we still have some core regulation. It’s a first example, a good first example of the core regulation in Japanese society or Japanese market, I would say. So the core regulation, I mean, even though we don’t really have to do the core regulation, because if we, the information from the company, what they are doing as a good practice is at least, and then it’s going to be available, then we can learn from them. Then maybe we can talk to some program having companies that, hey, come on, then take the report, you know? I mean, you don’t really have to, but you have to look at it, and then you can think about fixing a little bit about your conduct, you know? I mean, otherwise, you know, if it gets mandatory, then it’s going to be huge, heavy work for the government and maybe some bad reputation to the company as well. So it’s kind of lose and lose situation in which we don’t want to have in many cases. So that kind of expectation I already have, and then just, you know, I just talked about some of the example of the online content issue in Japan, but, you know, the tour, the open and interpretable internet, and it is not only the content issue, but, you know, there are many, many issues with the internet. I mean, of course, as a government person, I understand that some frustration comes in from the tech company, you know, that, come on, don’t get into the market, you know, government should stay away from it. We understand to some extent, but on the other hand,

Nobuhisa Nishigata:
you know, as I said, public safety concerns us, right? So there could be some, well, I mean, it’s going to be easier if we could draw the line, but the line is not a straight single one, so, you know, we have to keep talking, talking those kind of things. So from that perspective, maybe, you know, this best practice as well, that helps. And let me finish by one more introduction, and then I’m not sure if you are aware, but our Prime Minister Kishida came to this event in day one, and he made some speeches, and, you know, the highlight maybe for this open forum would be that he committed, and of course we have to follow it once he commits, right? He committed it to the open and free internet to maintain. I mean, there are background, some evidences, like Japan is one of the first countries to express support to the future declaration on the internet, or like as a G7 chair this year, like we led the discussion about, it’s kind of a rare case that the G7 ministers get together. I mean, we have the G7 ministerial meeting every year, but on the other hand, we don’t talk about internet governance very much, but on the other hand, if you can, you have the time to look at the ministerial declaration from Takasaki, it’s on April 30 this year, but we very much having the ticks on internet governance, and, you know, the G7 get together, join force to support this IGF event, or like, you know, making some collaboration effort to task force to cooperate, like, you know, UN GDP initiative, those kind of things to maintain the open free internet. So, you know, these things, I mean, we have to maintain our good environment, right? I mean, the government has to, the thing that the government has to do it, we do it, but, you know, the government cannot solve many problems only by ourselves, and we need your help to push these things forward. So, thank you very much. Maybe I should stop here.

David Sullivan:
Thank you very much, Nobu. I think that was great. I’m already starting to hear some themes that I think other speakers will come back to, in terms of the value of the conversation between companies and regulators and other stakeholders, the importance of the leadership of states like Japan, especially taking this to the G7, raising internet governance there. But, of course, there are many states around the world, and this segues nicely to turn to our first online speaker, Rishika Chandra, from Fiji’s Online Safety Commission. So, I think what we know is that while many states, and Fiji I commend for taking the lead as a small island state working on safety of people online, but not all states have the same level of resources and the same heft that either the European Union that you mentioned with the Digital Services Act or Japan might have. But nonetheless, these states are working together and thinking about ways to pool resources and work together to coordinate in terms of online safety, and there I was particularly hoping that Rishika can tell us about the work that Fiji is doing as well through the Global Online Safety Regulators Network in this space. So, Rishika, over to you.

Rishika Chandra:
Thank you. Hello, everyone. Greetings to you all. My name is Rishika, and I’m the Project Officer for the Online Safety Commission Fiji. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the management for making Fiji part of the 18th IGF. Thank you very much. Before diving into the Global Online Safety Regulators Network, I would like to first give a bit of background about online safety as to what we do. So, Fiji is one of the first countries to recognize the importance of online safety and take concrete steps towards ensuring a secure digital environment for its citizens. In 2018, Fiji enacted the Online Safety Act, which paved the way for the establishment of the Online Safety Commission in 2019. Since its inception, the OSC has been dedicated to promoting online safety through various initiatives. One of the primary objectives of the OSC is to raise awareness about online safety among individuals and communities. To achieve this, the commission organizes awareness and education programs that aims to educate people about potential risks and provide them with tools to protect themselves online. So, we partner locally. For example, we have signed a memorandum of understanding with the Fiji Police Force in 2020. They help us to enforce and persecute matters that breaches the Online Safety Act. Additionally, we work with other relevant ministries locally, NGOs, as well as non-governmental agencies to promote online safety and digital literacy. Going on to the international engagements, firstly, I would like to highlight our partnership with eSafety Commissioner Australia. The partnership had been engaged, had been exchanged in 2021. Under this arrangement, the organization works together to support online safety in Fiji and Australia through sharing best practice, raising awareness of online safety trends and emerging issues, develop national online safety strategies, strengthening online safety response capabilities, and working together to achieve mutually beneficial online safety outcomes. Moving on to social media platforms, we partner with Meta and TikTok because in Fiji, there’s a lot of users of Instagram, Facebook, vastly Instagram, Facebook, and TikTok. So, we took this initiative to extend our partnership with Meta and TikTok. We work with them closely. One of the primary ways in which we collaborate with these tech companies is through their content reporting systems. These systems allow users to report any content that they find offensive or harmful. The Commission has been actively using these reporting mechanisms to moderate and take down contents that cause or intends to cause harm to an individual. Furthermore, the Global Online Safety Regulators Network, it was formed back in 2022. It was recently formed. So, the Online Safety Commission, eSafety Australia, and Ofcom are the movers of the network. The purpose of the network is to bring together independent online safety regulators to cooperate across jurisdictions, sharing relevant information, best practice, experience, and expertise, and support harmonized or coordinated approaches to online safety issues. Since its formation, the network has immensely expanded with members from Fiji, UK, Australia, Ireland, Africa, and Korea. The discussion and debates from these networks have played a pivotal role in helping the Commission gain valuable insights into debates into how different countries tackle online abuse and incorporate these safety policies into their laws and how the knowledge sharing platform has provided an opportunity for countries to learn from each other’s experiences, successes, and challenges. Fiji, being a small Pacific country, is making significant strides towards embracing the tech world. However, it can benefit immensely from observing and adopting best practices employed by other nations. By doing so, Fiji can ensure that its citizens are protected against online abuse while fostering a safe digital environment. So, that was about the Global Online Safety Regulators Network. We have recently actually welcomed Africa and Korea to our network. So, basically, we discuss topics around age verification, age assurance. These are some hot topics that we are currently on. Human rights, paper, freedom of speech. So, these are the regulations we usually talk about.

David Sullivan:
There’s like a working-level meetings and a senior-level meeting. I represent the working level and Mr. Jishwari Devi, who’s the Acting Commissioner for the Online Safety Commission, represents the senior level. Thank you. Thank you so much, Rishika. Yeah, so I think it’s really interesting to see how regulators are also sort of thinking about how to come together and where we can find points of interoperability, I think, between what’s happening in the governmental space and what’s happening in the industry space where our partnership works. So, we’re going to ping-pong across the Pacific a little bit and we’ll now turn to Kimmy from OpenNet Korea, a civil society organization that’s really been leading as a watchdog for freedom of expression in Korea. And so, the mention of Korea having joined the regulators network is timely, but I think we wanted to talk about what regulation looks like in Korea and whether you see some opportunities or challenges for the sort of practice-based approach of systems and processes to online safety that we’re promoting when it comes to protecting human rights, particularly in the Korean context. First, thank you for having me and I’m glad to hear that,

Kyoungmi Oh:
you know, Kishida declared OpenNet’s commitment because our president did, either. Yeah, so, but the current situation related to platform companies in South Korea is not good. Actually, it is very bad. The UN government has been trying to control platforms and censor the user-made content under the name of to make a healthy society and foster internet ecosystem. In these circumstances, civil society organizations in South Korea request each platform to disclose the number of government requests for user information and take down contents. I mean, transparency. South Korea has several interesting experiences with transparency. Until 2011, the two big platforms, you know, Naver and Kakao, disclosed a number of government requests for communications data. They published the result on their parency report. This made a huge impact on public opinion and legitimized the platform refusing government requests. I’m focusing on transparency and enforcement when I review this report. Actually, DTSP is an honorable multi-phase initiative by digital companies to enhance the trust and safety of their products. But I also how hard it is to assess different platforms using standardized indexes because each platform is different from each other. Size, earnings, business models, target consumers, and so on. If we can somehow apply all these factors, the result might be different. Here are my comments for improvement as a civil society organization’s researcher. So, it could not be comprehensive. First, I have five comments. First, trust and safety does not take into account the human rights harms when contents are taken down or otherwise censored. Trust and safety is defined in terms of content and conduct-related risk, which is in turn defined as illegal, dangerous, or otherwise harmful content or behavior. The way it is defined, only the contents, not their takedowns, are deemed as causing risks. These are sufficiently protect one important human right, freedom of expression. If one can be harmed directly by another’s contents, that is because it causes mental distress or on the subject or audience. However, censorship can also be dangerous if discerning voices are removed. For instance, in a society charged with religious hatred, majority leaders or the government’s disinformation can trigger violence on the minority, and censoring minorities’ leaders will further weaken them. This is especially important because digital authoritarianism is on the rise. The governments are becoming more and more the source of harmful disinformation and harmful censorship. Second, DTSP’s SAFE framework is so well thought out that it seems adaptable to any country, any industry, not just the digital industry. I can clearly see the same iteration of development, governance, enforcement, improvement, and transparency being very important to the trust and safety of the pharmaceutical industry, for instance. But I am then worried whether the framework sufficiently focuses on the unique aspect of the digital industry, such as freedom of expression or privacy. These three industries have formed a liberating and equalizing core of human civilization. Search engines and platforms have provided powerless individuals with the same power of information and mass communication formally available only to big companies, government, or latest media. Can we define trust and safety in ways that protect the unique civilization significance of the internet, or will DTSP become the numerous consumer product safety initiatives? I think that the success of DTSP lies in whether we can answer these questions correctly. Third, fortunately, one way to strengthen the connection to the unique significance of the digital industry is already reflected in some of the 35 best practices. That is collaboration of digital rights organizations. Now technology has been welcomed as much as internet. It was met by new wave of numerous organizations dedicating to protection of the internet. These organizations and companies have common goals only if the companies allow, deviating a little from their private motives. I’m sorry. DTSPs ask companies to work with organizations in the process of product development, product enforcement, product improvement. However, you need the same element in transparency as well, I think. Actually, without transparency, communication during PD, PE, and PI may not be meaningful. Yeah, limited transparency with recognized human rights organization under appropriate non-disclosure agreement can be very helpful in adding context and nuances to content moderation while not risking abuse by bad actors. Twitter’s, yeah, I’m so sorry, it’s now become X. Twitter’s Trust and Safety Council did this relatively well. Yeah, sharing much more information about new products, enforcement, et cetera, with the civil society. This will answer the other question in DTSPs posed about the difficulty of maintaining transparency while not revealing information that can be used by bad actors for abusing purposes. Limited transparency with civil society group must be explored more. Fourth, the safe framework with 35 best practices, 45 questions is too abstract and procedural. Instead of defining what content should be taken down, the safe framework asks the following questions. How are the content reviews prioritized? And what factors are taken into consideration? What types of tool or systems are used to review content or manage it or review process? What types of process or mechanisms are in place to proactively delete potentially violating content or conduct? Asking these questions is not a problem in itself, but it is hard to evaluate the safe framework based on these open-ended questions because we don’t know how content reviews are possibly prioritized and what possible tools, systems are in place. I think the question should be phrased in yes or no format and should be reflected in the industry’s unique aspects. Yeah, just one more question. Yeah, fifth, DTSPs ask the following questions. DTSP is considering whether some commitment or best practices should be given greater consideration than others when conducting assessment. I think that product enforcement and product transparency are the more important because that is where the rubber meets the tires. That is where the products are in direct touch with the users. What is lacking in development, improvement, government can be compensated by rigorous enforcement and transparency. I should be closed. Thank you for listening.

David Sullivan:
Thank you, Kimi. That is incredibly valuable feedback on some of the real detailed aspects of our framework and also a helpful reminder of the wider human rights context and the importance of that, particularly I think in the world of trust and safety, there’s often a kind of we need to take more things down and we need to think about the consequences of when we take things down as well for the rights of all. So with that, I’m gonna turn to our other remote panelist, Brent Carey from NetSafe New Zealand. Brent, and wanna make sure we save plenty of time for Q&A, so I’ll ask folks to be brief. But Brent, it would be great to hear from you how NetSafe New Zealand is working at the local context and how you are sort of bridging this kind of local context to sort of global company tension that others have already spoken to. Yeah, thank you very much.

Brent Carey:
And thank you to Japan again for Host Nation. I was last in Kobe at the ICANN and I wish I could be with you in person. Obviously, New Zealand has a commitment to online safety. And in New Zealand, we passed the Harmful Digital Communications Act back in 2016. And importantly, that act actually has a number of principles because some of what people have talked about is how fast-paced technology is. And so in the Harmful Digital Communications Act in New Zealand, we have a principles-based approach to dealing with online harm. And those principles cover topics like incitement to commit suicide, breach of confidentiality, harassment, and all sorts of other online issues. And in New Zealand, that scheme has both a criminal and a civil side. And importantly, NetSafe has been approved by the government as an NGO agency to deal with the civil side of tackling online harm. And more than 25,000 New Zealanders call on NetSafe every year to assist them to mediate and resolve disputes between victims, perpetrators, and also platforms. And so more than 7,000 people each year go through our mediation process. And that’s something that is quite unique globally to have an ADR scheme, which is looking to resolve issues between perpetrators and victims and platforms. And importantly too, that’s our local approach. And in our Act, it is a requirement for us to work globally and work with platforms to try and address issues. And we’re really heartened too by this initiative to look at a risk-based approach because a lot of what we’re doing is to look at novel approaches for tackling emerging harms. And I just wanna give one example of that novel approach because I wanna really get into the conversation. NetSafe took the lead to convene the platforms two years ago to think about a voluntary approach to looking at some of the more emerging and edge case harms. Those harms are like hate speech, disinformation, and misinformation. And for more than two years, NetSafe convened a forum, consulted with different stakeholder groups, and eventually in July, 2022, we launched the Aotearoa Online Safety Code, which is a voluntary code with five platform signatories, TikTok, Meta, Amazon, Twitch, Twitter, or X, as we know it now. And those platforms have agreed to look at risk-based approaches to what they’re doing in relation to those emerging areas. And importantly for New Zealand, if you go to thecode.org.nz, for the first time we’ve had localized data that has been provided as a result of this voluntary initiative. And just in closing, this is an emerging landscape, the online safety regime, and we’ve talked about the European approach. It could also be a US approach or geopolitical approach. And here in New Zealand, we’re not immune to that. And we have a discussion paper called the Safer Online Services and Media Platforms Bill. I think we’re sitting back to look at how the world is thinking about regulating this space. And that’s also in play to look at what content regulation should look like. Importantly in that discussion paper, it says what is already illegal and what is already harmful or objectionable won’t be looked at. It’ll be looking at other regulatory gaps. And importantly too, in New Zealand, we want to participate in forums like this. And NetSafe2 is an observer of the regulators forum, along with members that are on this panel, Fiji and Korea. We’re pleased to be able to join that forum again this year too. And so we’re trying to learn from best practice as well, and also share our knowledge with the world. So thank you for the opportunity to just give that brief introduction.

David Sullivan:
Thank you, Brent. Really grateful to have your contributions and sorry that you and Rishika are not able to be with us in person. So I now want to turn to Angela from Google who wears both a DTSP hat and a Google hat, but to really both perhaps, tell us what may have resonated or not with some of the comments we’ve already heard from the other speakers, and also help set the stage for a conversation with the other participants here in the room. Happy to.

Angela McKay:
And I’d like to, like my colleagues here, thank Japan for hosting us here in Kyoto and for hosting the IGF. I’m really encouraged when I hear the conversation about a free, open and interoperable internet. That is very much so what I would say, not just Google and the DTSP members are looking for, but I would say many of the companies around the globe, whether it is Naver here, or whether we’re talking about different companies, we are wanting to operate as much as possible with a global market. And so maybe just briefly about me, I’ve spent about 25 years in technology risk. And so was in the world of cybersecurity for about 15 or 20 years before coming over to trust and safety. And what I wanna reflect on here is that many of the challenges that I heard highlighted and many of the solutions I heard highlighted by the panelists here are similar to what I feel like was going on in a cybersecurity conversation 15 years ago. At that point in time and where we are now, both governments, civil society and companies have realized that we need to work together to address online harms. And what I really see is governments working to figure out kind of how to do that, right? Oftentimes they may have existing harm-based frameworks in specific areas. Yet at the same time, they’re realizing that technology is moving so quickly that you might not always have, if you have harm-specific focus, that you have new harms that are coming up and changing over time. And so how to deal with that, changing of the technology landscape and the changing of the actual harms landscape is very similar. One of the other things I’ll note is regardless of the approach, governments are going to reflect the cultural values and norms that are in their environment. So from a company point of view, we can recognize that there are going to be regulatory-based approaches. There are going to be transparency-based approaches. But I think what we are really looking for, and one of the reasons I was so happy to join DTSP and the colleagues here is really these risk-based approaches that think about how do we approach this environment where there are trade-offs, right? We are trying to, all of the representatives from governments up here are trying to ensure a safe online environment. Yet at the same time, I think as Kimmy really noted, there are trade-offs that happen. And so one of the things I just want to highlight and then I’ll open it up to discussion is really the importance of these kinds of conversations. Inside of DTSP, companies need to talk to each other because we are actually learning and improving practice by doing that. We’re learning from each other. I’m so encouraged when I hear about the Global Online Safety Regulators Forum because y’all need to do that too, right? And then we also need to have that conversation with civil society. So I think it’s really important. It’s not just a multi-stakeholder conversation, but also bilaterals between different types of entities such that we can collaborate and really draw forward practice overall. I think I will just pause there so that we can actually open up to conversation, but a few comments just reflecting some of what I heard across the panel.

David Sullivan:
Thanks, Angela. So I think with that, we have the less-than-optimal situation of the mic in the center of the room, but we really wanted to take this point to open it up for questions and discussion and really have as much of a roundtable conversation as we can have in a room that lacks a roundtable. So questions. Nick.

Audience:
Hey, thank you for the overview. And look, I’m super happy that you all have this great space to talk to each other. But I guess at IGF, I have to ask the question, what room is there for civil society? And I was wondering whether I could invite you all to reflect a little bit on these five points about particularly where you might go in the future with the partnership, how you might respond to some of these concerns and some of the demands, I guess, for civil society to be more engaged and to learn more, just like you all are learning more. Absolutely. So I’ll go first on that one, and then welcome if Angela wants to come in.

David Sullivan:
We’ve also, you know, we’ve heard from civil, yeah, I think that Kimmy has made some really great points from a civil society perspective and welcome comments from others as well. I think part of the genesis of the partnership was the need that actually first step, we need companies to talk to each other and sort of come together and think. And so there’s been a certain amount of kind of that preliminary phase, I would say, and also recognizing that there is value in saying that that multi-stakeholder conversations are essential, whether it’s here at the IGF or in other fora, but there is also value in sort of constituency specific initiatives. So we have been deliberately not multi-stakeholder while seeking to consult widely with stakeholders. And so many of the points that Kimmy made were from a public consultation we did when we released the SAFE framework. We did a public consultation around the trust and safety glossary that we issued earlier this year. And we’ve actually authored an article for the Journal of Online Trust and Safety at Stanford about why and how we wrote that article. Farzana, myself, and Alex Fierst wrote that, in which we responded to, I think, some of the points raised by folks who contributed to that consultation from academics in Argentina at CELE or at CIPIC in Canada, as well as folks from Ofcom and eSafety who contributed their thoughts. So I would point to that as kind of like how we’re thinking about the process. I think, ultimately, for us, it’s important that we keep this industry perspective, but have that be a contribution and part of the discussion with all the other stakeholders. And that’s why we’re here, and it’s why we’re at the World Economic Forum, working with that coalition and in other places. But it might be useful to hear, I don’t want to put anybody on the spot, but also to hear from, give me in from. Maybe a couple of things I’ll add just to David’s perspective. Because, again, we do think it is really, really important to make sure that the companies are exchanging best practices.

Angela McKay:
And I think this is… is something that I’ve seen as kind of raising the tide for all the boats. And in particular, you have some big companies in the group, but you also have medium and smaller companies. And I’m hearing more and more about the importance of these kind of practices for global proliferation. But I think DTSP has, and then I’ll speak to a company perspective, in the advance of the Digital Services Act being finalized, they actually did have one conversation partnered with the Global Network Initiative to bring in civil society to work to kind of gain some perspective. But let me just be clear. This is a maturing area for these companies. If you looked at the maturity model, I feel like David actually had, it is a maturing area. And so we’re working to figure this out as well. I also think it’s interesting that there is this kind of regulatory role. And I feel like some civil society is like, hold on. How are we supposed to be fulfilling this role? So when I think about it, from a Google perspective, we have been bringing in folks to, for example, our location in Dublin on specific topics around, for example, child safety, and partnering with existing institutions that have great reach into the civil society community. But we’re also thinking about other methods that haven’t been done before. Because it’s not like everybody can go to one particular location, afford to fly there, and then have a conversation. We’re thinking a lot more about how to use things like request for information and online forums to really catalyze this conversation. And one other thing that I’ll just say is we’re also trying to do a little bit of exchanging ideas among different communities of civil society. Because there are, so I manage a program of the priority flagging on a global basis. And one of the things I’ve noted is we have a lot of different folks who are in the civil society and academia who are in these programs. But they haven’t yet talked with each other. And so one of the things I’m trying to do is go, hey, there’s actually practices that you could exchange among these different harms areas that would be really useful to helping mitigate these harms. And so we’re really also thinking not about how to just get the insights to the companies, but also how to catalyze that community to talk with each other. And I would welcome any of your thoughts after the event as well.

David Sullivan:
And let’s just make sure if Brent or Rajika want to come in that we keep the, and if there’s any questions or online participants want to make any comments. But other questions or comments from folks in the room. And it would be great if you could just introduce yourself.

Audience:
I was about to, not my first rodeo. I’m Sharon Polsky from the Privacy and Access Council of Canada. You’ve been at it for 25 plus years. I got you beat by a decade plus. So I’ve seen a lot of things in government, in private industry, across Canada, and lots of beyond as well. You say this is an industry association, a voluntary industry association. I’ve seen the voluntary industry associations in automotive, in advertising, in digital identity, in a range of others where participation like yours is voluntary. Frameworks are published with great PR and fanfare, lots of money, lots of people, lots of presence. And it sounds great. And one after the other, they fall by the wayside. Companies say it’s a really good idea, gung ho on it, but excuse us, we’re not going to participate. It’s a lot of talk and no action. Why should anybody have any trust that this is going to be any different? It’s a very good question. What I would say is that the proof is in the pudding.

David Sullivan:
We are adding our members to our organization. Just this year, we’ve added TikTok and Twitch. So we’re talking about the key players and more to come. And ultimately, all of this is only as good as it is implemented. But I think what is critical is that this is a space that is no longer just a place where companies are doing their own thing and self-regulating just amongst themselves. We now have this emerging regulatory regime. And it’s incumbent upon all of us to think about how do we, within that context, try to make it meaningful. So I think that’s part of what we’re doing right now, is thinking about how does this set of industry practices relate to the requirements that companies have under emerging regulatory regimes in Australia, in Singapore, in the European Union, in the UK, and in other places. And how do we make sure that those regimes actually serve their intended purposes and actually keep people safer online, while also protecting and respecting people’s rights? I don’t know if any of the other panelists would want to come in on that or add other thoughts.

Kyoungmi Oh:
Yeah, actually, you criticized the self-regulation. But actually, in South Korea, as a civil society researcher, organization activist, actually, sometimes often get criticized, because we are usually claiming the self-regulation, not governmental regulation. But I need this self-regulation. Civil regulation is better than governmental regulation, because governmental regulation has a lot of side effects. So yeah, that’s why we are criticized by South Korea. Yeah, the South Korean society. And I agree with you that the way we are talking, gathering, and the civil society organization, and activists, and the companies, and a lot of people that are gathering, the way of gathering is not changing a lot. But I think that is fundamental. Yeah, it cannot be changed. But I think the transparency is also important, either, in this point. Because each civil society has another. Actually, civil society organizations are not same. They always have different interests, and different goals, and different missions. And so I think more and more, and the best you can gather, the many numbers of civil society, you try to talk with a lot of civil society organizations. And if you make the research, or third-party assessment, and put them the research transparently, how many civil society were answered, and how many civil society organizations

David Sullivan:
are participated in that kind of thing? Yeah. And I think Brent wanted to come in, as well, on this. Yeah, thank you. I think it’s a great question. I also think we’re all part of an ecosystem. And so I just think that’s really important.

Brent Carey:
Because the whole ecosystem has checks, and balances, and holds people to account, as well. And I think in the safety space, it’s which part of the infrastructure, or the internet, are we asking for the interventions to happen? And because of the different, is it content-based? Is it technical? And so I think all of that has a role to play. And if the system is working well, it’s creating the spaces, and places to have those different parts of the infrastructure coming together to have those conversations. And so I do think it’s important, if it’s industry-led, that there are those spaces, and places to have those different voices.

David Sullivan:
Thanks, Brent. Other questions? I do have a question, plus some comments, as well, as a consumer of the internet.

Audience:
My name is Jenna Fung. I am a casual policy observers based in Toronto, Canada. I’m originally from Hong Kong. So earlier, we touched on a little bit about regulations. Because of my background, I have a mixed feeling about having government-driven regulation legislation, as well. But I also questioned about having industry to lead and regulate all this privately-owned public space. At the end of the day, it’s a business. There are things that interest a company or organization. Is there a way to make sure consumer rights are involved in the process, so it’s reflected into all this policy? Just naming one example, recently, in Canada, with this Bill C-11 Online News Act, they require tech company like Google and Meta to pay news outlet for posting or linking the content. And Meta responds in August. They claim that they are to comply with the law. So they are removing news from their social media platform, including Facebook and Instagram. I moved the country to buy me some freedom to see news of whatever perspective. I can’t even use social media to see both domestic and international news. So I want to bring this up and see how everyone’s feel about that, especially when we are in a digital space where it’s predominantly lead and governed or regulated by big tech. So I just want to throw that out and then see how everyone’s thinking about this.

David Sullivan:
Thank you. So does anybody want to respond to that particular? I will say, I think, one, thank you for the question and the comment. It’s an important issue. I think, luckily for us, there are numerous representatives from both Meta and the Canadian government at the IGF. And there may be other sessions where there’s folks who are better positioned to respond to that particular issue, which is a contentious one. But I do think that the recognition that, notwithstanding the challenges of how governments of different types of governments have been using regulation, whether to accomplish political repression or with the unintended consequences for people’s ability to exercise their rights, is an important thing to bring up, the digital authoritarianism that was mentioned is real and spreading and a challenge that we all have to grapple with. At the same time, there is also a recognition that companies doing things on their own is not sufficient. And I do think that that’s one of the reasons why we’re looking at both how do we have a independent third party review of what companies are doing, so that companies are not checking their own homework, while also figuring out how not only our industry efforts, but I think also the perspectives of civil society organizations and other experts and users can inform the development of the kinds of international standards that we need in order to support a more mature ecosystem that is both protective of consumers’ rights and users’ rights, while also respecting freedoms as well.

Nobuhisa Nishigata:
Shouldn’t be long and the time is coming, right? But I mean, I noticed the issue about the Canada and maybe should be sending some condolences to those who suffered from the volcano, those kind of things. But just one comment. It’s a Japanese proverb, old saying that the most expensive thing is provided by free. It has many, many meanings. And particularly, I have some MBA background. So particularly, when the company’s conduct linked to the stock market or short-sighted, long-sighted, those kind of things, many, many things come together. Then in me, I can explain most of the behaviors from the management, the business, schools kind of theories. It’s a nuance. It’s a traditional strategy type of things. Like if you’ve got a short-sighted for the stock market, stock price, those kind of things. And I mean, I’m not going to sit too deep, but maybe that has a history, right? So or like you are paying something somewhere, otherwise getting free for something, right? So then you shouldn’t expect too much about that somebody is giving you for free. So it’s more like a literacy thing. Then it’s our common question to solve that we started rapidly depending too much on like SNS or these kind of online media to get our information. But you have to be careful about they are not having the journalist background for that. We are not sure. It depends on the country how much you can trust about the journalism in your country. But still, there is a difference. So I stop here.

Angela McKay:
I was just going to say very briefly, thank you for highlighting this. And I think while I don’t know the specifics, I’ve heard about it largely, I think you’re highlighting again the challenge of trade-offs, right? And that oftentimes there are unintended actions. I think the one thing that I want to challenge is the idea that regulation or transparency is right. I actually think that when we think about the risk-based approach and making sure that you have the right set of stakeholders involved in the conversation, that is the kind of approach that ends up being effective. It can be done with regulation. It can be done through transparency. But ultimately, getting to that risk-based conversation with the right set of stakeholders is, I think, what really does help drive a difference. And I’ve seen it in, just to comment to the world of 25 years of history. While a long time ago, we were talking just about vulnerability management, that has improved, right? A long time ago, we were talking about what is risk-based approach to cybersecurity. And that has also changed over time. And so one of the things that’s helpful with being a gray beard, if you will, even though I don’t have a beard, is really having that perspective of change over time. It doesn’t happen fast. And I think that’s really frustrating. And I’ll also just say, guys, we all still see the risks. And so there’s a reality that even as we are managing risk, risk is evolving and changing. And so I think it can look hard, like nothing has happened. But change has happened.

David Sullivan:
It’s just we’re managing new and changing risk over time. Brent, I think you wanted to come in as well. Yeah, I was just going to empathize with the questioner. Thank you for it.

Brent Carey:
Because here in New Zealand, we’re in the same experience as Canada. We have the Fair Digital Media Bill, which is about bringing bargaining power to citizens. And we are watching the platforms to response in Canada and thinking, what does that mean for New Zealand? And it is interesting because previously, it was a voluntary landscape where lots of the platforms had negotiated with the media, local media, to actually have an exchange of money in order to support the local media industry. And we’re still doing that. And we’re still working out, well, what was the gap there? Because it seemed to be working well. And then the regulations now stepped in. And it still is just a bill. And yes, these platforms are then saying we’re going to withdraw. And we’re going to stop the news. And so we’re concerned about that from a civil society perspective. But we’re also thinking, well, it’s really important to have media plurality. And that’s what we’re struggling with. We need to have more media sources and have more people media literate. So it’s a really great question. And, um, you know, a lot of countries media landscape is changing because of old media and new media. And I think that’s what we’re all grappling with. So, um, you know, I’m watching the Canadian experience myself personally, um, with interest.

David Sullivan:
Thanks Brent. So, um, I want to come back to the questions in the room. Thank you for your patience. Thank you. My name is Zahid Jamil.

Audience:
I’m an attorney. Very quickly, it’s, it’s, if I look back and say, what if in 1996 or thereabouts, somebody decided to say we should have an internet act, my goodness, this is a terrible thing. It could be used for cyber crime and God knows what else. Let’s just put up, put on the brakes and stop it because regulation is very good. Thank God we didn’t do that. And the lesser regulation led to very good, you know, I don’t even have to explain what goodness came out of it. But now we’re, it’s, it’s, I find it interesting that the example that was just given about how businesses had to respond to a government regulation that led to the businesses being able to do what they wanted to do, right? The criticism of the business did something, but let’s not forget it was because of a government mandate. It was because of regulation to, for their liability to be shielded, they did what they did possibly. And so the harm that regulation is causing is something we should also discuss. And I find it ironic that we went around the world from the West and said, you know, Asia and everybody else should understand that we should have self-regulation. It’s really good for you. And today on this panel, we have someone from Asia saying self-regulation is good for you from South Korea, whereas we’re seeing something else come from Europe. It’s just, it’s an interesting dichotomy. I just wanted to sort of underscore it. Thank you for the time.

David Sullivan:
Sorry. I think Rashika also wanted to come in, so we’ll go back to her.

Rishika Chandra:
Just my comment on the previous question, we’ve noticed that governments around the world are increasingly imposing restrictions on online content and data privacy, while some regulations may be necessary to protect users from harmful content or cyber threats, they should not infringe upon individuals’ rights to free speech or impede innovation. And I think that’s one of the key beliefs, because so far we haven’t been to that extent. Best practices should strike a balance between regulation and freedom of educating of transparency policies that respect users’ rights. So, thank you. Thank you. So we have a few minutes left. Farzana Badi, I’m in the role of remote moderator. I’m very opinionated, so it’s very, I have to clarify that. This is not my question. I’m doing the remote moderation for this session. So we have a question from Rohana Paliagoro.

David Sullivan:
Has any of the online safety acts defined content-related matters, such as harassment, defamation, et cetera, as criminal offenses? Yeah, I think that that’s a, it’s a great question that is complicated to answer, because there are so many different jurisdictions taking different approaches to that. So I’ll open it up to see if anyone from the panel or anyone in the room would want to add some expertise there.

Nobuhisa Nishigata:
But let me just, and generally speaking, it just depends on what the case would be. Like, the bad ones, of course, like the law enforcement can make the case to charge. But on the other hand, some cases, the law enforcement couldn’t make the case to charge directly. But on the other hand, some private lawsuit, and then they got some sanction or mitigation, those kind of things. So it totally depends, I would say. Thank you. I was just going to say, I think that that really exists in terms of areas where, in

Angela McKay:
the physical world, there has been an idea of criminality, and those laws are able to extend into the digital world. So child safety is an example. I think where you have the offline harm also being exacerbated in the online space, where there is existing law, is where I would say that currently is.

David Sullivan:
Thanks, Angela. And I think Brent wanted to come, and Rishika. So we’ll, yeah, Brent and Rishika. Just quickly, in the New Zealand context, yes, under the Harmful Digital Communications

Brent Carey:
Act, it’s a criminal offence to post an intimate image without a person’s consent. And a New Zealander risks either a $50,000 fine or two years imprisonment. So that’s a type of harm that is criminal, and the police do prosecute those matters.

David Sullivan:
And Rishika.

Rishika Chandra:
It’s the same for Fiji. We do criminalize harassment, cyberbullying, image-based abuse, child exploitation. And we have, if it’s an individual, they can have five years of imprisonment or $20,000 fine. And if it’s a corporate, if it’s an organization, then it’s $50,000. It was also mentioned about the defamation. So defamation is not covered under this Online Safety Act.

David Sullivan:
But Fiji does have their own defamation act, which is separate. Great. Thank you. Terrific to get the specific answers to that from some of the countries that are represented here on our panel. So I think we probably have time for maybe one or two more questions. So back to the room. Yeah, thanks.

Audience:
I’m Chen. I’m from ISOC, Taipei chapter. And also, but today I’m speaking on behalf of a consumer perspective. As a Gen Z, I’m a gamer and a casual memer. So apparently I’m a target audience of this product you’re having in this alliance. So I have a really question. Because lots of online moderation is going on on this product. But I think in these days, a lot of customers of this product are not very satisfied by how this online moderation rules and regulations are enforced. We know, we understand these partners from the private sector are very key actors of how to enforce this kind of online moderation stuff. But on the other hand, if you are going to keep the transparency of how the regulations are going to work and the process to reveal to our customers, it might also hurt your business because it might reveal your secret sauce of your business. So I was trying to ask how your alliance is trying to find a balance between the transparent and the trust of your customer. And how to make your partner can get on the board of this stuff. Thanks.

David Sullivan:
So I can take a first stab at answering that and then welcome comments from others. It’s a great question. It’s a very good point. And I would say to just right now within our partnership, we have companies like Microsoft that are gaming companies. We have companies like Discord and Twitch that are where gamers congregate or are streaming. And I think there’s an opportunity to bring more companies from that space in. And to say here’s what this framework means with more specifics for gaming. Same thing for dating, for sharing economy, for different places. The question of sort of how much you share and how much you hold back is a very good one. I think for a long time that this function inside companies has been very quiet. And very low profile. And it’s not just because you don’t want to have bad actors be able to say, oh, okay, we figured out how to get around that. But also because sometimes the employees working in these functions become the subjects of harassment when people do not like what’s happened to their content. Or it’s because of privacy considerations or other considerations. And I think there is a need to sort of shift to be more err on the side of sharing more while being conscious of all of those tradeoffs. Someone has said that trust and safety is tradeoffs and sadness. And one thing I will say also and then we’ll have one more question and then close out is for folks who are interested who are gamers, I would recommend a game that is I believe it’s available in the Apple App Store, I don’t know if it’s on Android yet, called Moderator Mayhem that friends and colleagues have made up where you are in the role of doing content moderation inside a company. It is one of the most stressful iPhone games I have ever played. But it also gives a sense, you know, it’s easy to say, oh, these are gigantic companies and they have the resources and they should be able to solve this. But some of these things are just a perpetual challenge for all of the reasons people have said

Audience:
and that game is a very good illustration of that. So I think we can do one more question and then we’ll wrap. Hi, thank you. My name is Andrew Campbell. I run a public policy, public affairs consultancy. Just two very short questions. Does the sort of activity of X or Twitter in this space undermine the entire industry and its credentials for sort of voluntary action in trust and safety? And then is a non-prescriptive duty of care of users a good legislative approach towards this? So I can answer the first question to just say that not in the business of commenting

David Sullivan:
on particular companies. However, X, formerly Twitter, was a founding member of our partnership and is not a member of our partnership at the moment. On the second question, I don’t have to answer that question because our forum is not a lobbying organization. So we are not taking positions on legislation. But I imagine that some of my panelists may have answers on a question that could easily be its own whole session. So maybe if folks want to give last, any concluding thoughts on that or anything else and then we’ll wrap. So we’ll do rapid fire across the panel here and online. Actually, I missed the chance to talk about the legislation in South Korea.

Kyoungmi Oh:
Actually, we also have the Punishment Act of Harassment or sexual, something around that. Actual communications network can punish the people. Criminal act, yes. I think this place and this opportunity can talk about how we are different and what we are heading for. And I think the transparency report, your report, DTSP report,

Nobuhisa Nishigata:
can be concluded very well, hopefully. Go ahead. Just my final comment is I’m looking forward to seeing the further development of the U.S. work. And hopefully, actually I talked with him about this, but hopefully some Japanese company will join in the partnership. It’s kind of uncertain things. But still, anyway, it’s a voluntary thing. To me, from the Japanese government perspective, of course, in the end, things get worse and we have to do things, particularly for the regulation, those kind of things. But from the beginning, in Japan, we have the basic law about the digitalization and the digital society. It says, it articulates that the investment to the digital infrastructure, digital society, is private-led, should be private-led. The government is more like a coordination, those kind of things. We have some list of the things that the government should do. So in my mind, as a Japanese government, the bottom line is just let the private go first and we follow, or we catch something. So from that perspective, I just want to see the development in the near future. And let me end congratulating so far the process and launch the report. So stop here, then.

Angela McKay:
Before we go over to our online panelists, I’ll just say, I think, again, the premise of it’s either regulation or transparency is a false dichotomy. I think we really have to think about what behaviors we’re seeking to drive, and then you can get to whether that enforcement mechanism should be regulatory or not. But the what that I think is really important that DTSP is contributing here is a way of approaching online safety. And so we can just argue about regulation or not regulation, but I think the conversation that needs to move forward is less on that side and more on the what we are seeking to drive.

David Sullivan:
So then, thank you, Angela. Now I think we can go to Brent. Thank you.

Brent Carey:
Yes, we used to sit on Twitter’s Trust and Safety Council previously. So our comments are in relation to who’s actually trying to drag the lowest common denominator up and lead. And even though we’re not on the Twitter Trust and Safety Council anymore, X is a founding member of our online safety code and remains in the code. And whilst they’ve removed themselves from the European disinformation code, they remain an active member and are providing localized data. So I think it’s easy to call out particular platforms or particular times that they’re not being a good corporate citizen in the eyes of particular stakeholders. I think it’s on us to try and drag everyone in the industry up to the highest common denominator. And so trying to get them to lead, because there’s many other platforms and many other messaging apps that are not even part of any sort of move to actually try and show best practice. And I think it’s on us to actually try and work out where they are and try and bring them along to improve the whole ecosystem. And the Judaic here is a really interesting argument, which I could talk about forever and I’m not going to talk about it. But I think it’s a very interesting approach to this issue and emerging.

David Sullivan:
So I think it was a good thing to talk about. Thank you, Brent. And Rashika, did you have any final thoughts, two sentences? So Fiji, being a small Pacific Island country,

Rishika Chandra:
we don’t actually have a lot of apps being used by our citizens here. For example, Twitter. You wouldn’t believe that Twitter is not really an issue in Fiji, like we don’t have much issues from Twitter. But we do have issues with Meta and Instagram, there is Snapchat and there’s all others. So recently there are a few new apps such as Discord, Line app, which we actually did not hear about. And nowadays we are getting a lot of issues on that platform. So we think that we really need to build that relationship with the social media platforms to learn more about how they design their policy, community guidelines and everything. First, we should understand before regulating it into our policy, we should understand how these platforms work, because we know that these platforms are dangerous at times, but it does act as a platform, as a connectivity to all other people out there. So yeah, maybe we can have a balance there if we work hand-in-hand in a collaborative manner. Thank you.

David Sullivan:
Very well said. So I think that’s a great note to end on. We have a sign-up sheet, we have a booth in the Village. Come talk to myself or Farzana to learn more about what we’re doing. My thank you to all our panelists here and online. Thank you everyone and I hope everyone has a good rest of your IGFs. Thank you.

John Hering

John Hering, a prominent figure in the field of cybercrime and war crimes, highly commends the Budapest Convention as an invaluable tool in combating international cybercrime. He also suggests that the UN cybercrime negotiation process should draw inspiration from the Budapest Convention, which has been successful in addressing cybercrime globally.

Hering discusses the challenges posed by the rise of cyber-enabled war crimes and hybrid warfare. He highlights the potential for traditional war crimes to have a cyber component and cites the conflict in Ukraine as a significant example of hybrid warfare, combining conventional military tactics with cyber operations.

In relation to the role of Microsoft in conflicts, Hering believes that the company should increase transparency and reporting. He appreciates Microsoft’s efforts in providing greater transparency in response to the challenges presented by conflicts, particularly in Ukraine. By increasing reporting on the breadth of cyber operations occurring in these conflicts, Microsoft can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the situation.

Hering proposes the expedited collection of digital evidence of traditional war crimes. He advocates for the development of tools and support to capture digital evidence, which could aid in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes.

Hering expresses concerns about the widespread use of cyber capabilities in armed conflicts, as it brings forth the possibility of cyber-enabled war crimes. The submission of Article 15 reports to the International Criminal Court alleging cyber-enabled war crimes, along with reports from multiple technology companies providing evidence of malicious cyber activities during conflicts, highlights the need to address this emerging issue.

Transparency and disclosure of data requests are key aspects emphasized by Hering. He highlights the importance of transparency in understanding when and for how long data is requested, advocating for disclosure of relevant information within a reasonable timeframe.

Highlighting the valuable role of technology companies, Hering mentions Microsoft’s partnership with Accenture in supporting the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the creation of the OTP Link platform. This platform serves as an objective system for creating a digital chain of custody and a tamper-proof record of evidence, aiding the collection and preservation of digital evidence for war crime cases.

Hering values the independent tools created by technology companies, such as the OTP Link platform, as they ensure neutrality and preserve the integrity of digital evidence. By fostering collaboration between technology companies and international institutions, a more objective and robust platform for addressing war crimes can be achieved.

In light of the emerging domain of conflict in relation to cyber operations, Hering calls for innovation in international systems. He believes that international institutions should step in to uphold expectations in the digital domain, just as they would in the physical domain. The recent decision by the ICC prosecutor to investigate cyber-enabled war crimes is seen as a positive development, reflecting the growing recognition of the need to adapt international systems to address cyber-related conflicts.

In conclusion, John Hering’s insights encompass a wide range of issues related to cybercrime, war crimes, and the role of technology companies. He highlights the effectiveness of the Budapest Convention in combating international cybercrime and encourages the adoption of its principles in the UN cybercrime negotiation process. Hering also underscores the challenges posed by cyber-enabled war crimes, the importance of transparency and data disclosure, and the instrumental role of technology companies in collecting and preserving digital evidence. Through his observations, Hering advocates for innovation in international systems and emphasizes the need for international institutions to address the emerging domain of conflict in relation to cyber operations.

Giorgi Jokhadze

During the discussion, the speakers explored the significance of open source intelligence (OSINT) in uncovering evidence of war crimes and gross human rights violations. They highlighted the extensive experience of Giorgi Jokhadze in Ukraine, where he has utilised OSINT techniques. Notably, he has been actively involved in supporting Ukraine through the Council of Europe since the beginning of Russian aggression in 2022.

The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, specifically Article 32, was emphasized as a powerful tool for member states to access OSINT from both public and private domains with consent. It was argued that these provisions could greatly assist Ukraine in obtaining compelling evidence for both domestic and international investigations. The tools provided by the Budapest Convention were also seen as instrumental in facilitating the collection of such evidence.

Furthermore, the discussion emphasised that open source intelligence should be considered as an integral part of the overall chain of evidence in criminal investigations. It was acknowledged that open source intelligence plays a crucial role in providing leads and clues that can lead to more comprehensive investigations and successful outcomes.

The speakers also raised the challenges posed by electronic evidence, which often transcends borders. This highlighted the importance of cross-sharing evidence among relevant parties to ensure a unified approach to investigations and the pursuit of justice across jurisdictions.

In addition to the technical aspects of open source intelligence and cybercrime conventions, the discussion touched upon the need for a clear and applicable legal framework. The speakers recognized the importance of integrating open source intelligence and data from open sources within a comprehensive legal framework. Such integration is crucial for ensuring that perpetrators are brought to justice while adhering to legal requirements and due process.

Overall, the speakers concluded that open source intelligence and data obtained from open sources are invaluable assets in the pursuit of justice. However, to maximize their effectiveness, they must be employed within an applicable legal framework. These insights highlighted the need for proper communication and implementation of conclusions derived from discussions with the IGF Secretariat.

In summary, the discussion highlighted the value of open source intelligence in uncovering evidence of war crimes and human rights violations. It also emphasized the role of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime in supporting Ukraine’s evidence collection efforts. The integration of open source intelligence within the overall chain of evidence and the importance of cross-sharing electronic evidence were also stressed. Additionally, the need for a clear and applicable legal framework that incorporates open source intelligence and data from open sources was underlined. The speakers concluded that integrating open source intelligence and data within a legal framework is crucial for ensuring that perpetrators are brought to justice.

Audience

The Budapest Convention is seen as a potentially beneficial legal framework for dealing with cyber crimes and war crimes, especially in relation to SDG 16: Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions. However, there is skepticism about its applicability to crimes originating from Ukraine. Examples of alleged crimes committed by Ukrainian forces and Ukrainian-based scammers have raised doubts about the effectiveness of the Budapest Convention in addressing these specific crimes.

Access to e-evidence is considered crucial for effectively resolving crimes. The importance of obtaining electronic evidence for the purpose of investigation and prosecution is highlighted, emphasizing its role in uncovering the truth and holding perpetrators accountable.

Concerns have been raised regarding the lack of effective safeguards in both the Budapest Convention and the UN Cybercrime Treaty. Law enforcement officials involved in war crimes, crimes against humanity, and human rights abuses, along with dissatisfaction among civil society groups regarding the absence of adequate safeguards, have generated worry about potential misuse of these conventions.

There is frustration over the lack of communication and fear that the provisions within these conventions might be abused to commit crimes with impunity. This highlights the need for stronger and more effective safeguards to prevent the misuse of these legal frameworks.

War crimes are a pressing issue, and it is argued that they should be addressed regardless of the perpetrators involved. The need for applying international law and cooperation in conflicts is emphasized. It is paramount to hold all parties accountable for their actions, promoting justice and upholding human rights.

During discussions, questions were raised about war crimes committed by Ukrainians, beyond the focus on Russian activities. The structure of the convention for crimes committed by Ukrainians remains unclear, and it is suggested that some war crimes may be committed without Russian involvement, indicating a need for further clarity.

Assertions were made about war crimes committed by the Ukrainian army against civilians, highlighting the gravity of the situation and the urgency to address these crimes.

In conclusion, the Budapest Convention is seen as a potentially beneficial legal framework for cyber crimes and war crimes. However, doubts persist regarding its application to crimes originating from Ukraine. The importance of access to e-evidence is emphasized, while concerns are raised about the lack of effective safeguards in the Budapest Convention and UN Cybercrime Treaty. The necessity to address war crimes, regardless of the perpetrators, using international law and cooperation is stressed. The need for clarity in dealing with crimes committed by Ukrainians and the alarming allegations of war crimes committed by the Ukrainian army against civilians are also highlighted.

Jayantha Fernando

The Budapest Convention, in conjunction with its Second Additional Protocol, offers valuable tools for collecting and sharing electronic evidence. These tools are crucial in combating cybercrime and promoting cooperation between countries and service providers.

The Second Additional Protocol was negotiated by the State Parties to the Convention following the finalisation of the Cloud Evidence Report in 2017. It facilitates direct cooperation between countries and domain name registration information providers and includes measures for expedited disclosure of computer data in emergency situations. It also outlines procedures for international cooperation, even when parties and experts are in different locations.

However, the effectiveness of these tools depends on the domestic capacity of each country to handle and utilise them effectively. The Budapest Convention, also known as the Council of Europe Convention, has a capacity-building initiative that supports global action against cybercrime. Countries that have implemented these initiatives have benefited from training expert judges who can then train judges in their respective regions.

A significant provision of the Budapest Convention is Article 32, which concerns the open-source framework provided under the Convention. It addresses the issue of cross-border access to data and is only available to state parties.

Parties to the Budapest Convention form a community of trust and must uphold principles of the rule of law and human rights, as described in Article 15. Compliance with international standards and respect for fundamental rights are emphasised.

Law enforcement authorities regularly use Article 32, provided they have received appropriate training and comply with minimum standards. This provision applies to a wide range of offences, including drug-related crimes. The use of these tools is guided by standard operating procedures that respect the principles outlined in Article 15, ensuring that they are used in a manner that upholds human rights.

Procedural safeguards and adherence to standards are essential to protect human rights and maintain the rule of law. State parties to international conventions have introduced measures to enable judicial authorities to effectively oversee the process. For example, Sri Lankan law enforcement authorities, as a state party to the Budapest Convention, have revised their standard operating procedures to ensure that electronic evidence gathering and international cooperation comply with international standards.

The Budapest Convention applies to any crime involving digital evidence, including war crimes. Specific procedural provisions, such as Article 14, 18, and 26, are particularly relevant in the context of war crimes. These provisions allow for the invocation of Article 14 in war crime investigations, facilitate the acquisition of evidence from any service provider under Article 18, and enable the spontaneous sharing of information among law enforcement authorities under Article 26.

In summary, the Budapest Convention and its Second Additional Protocol play a crucial role in collecting and sharing electronic evidence. However, their effectiveness relies on the domestic capacity of each country. Upholding the principles of the rule of law and human rights is essential. Law enforcement authorities frequently utilise Article 32, guided by procedural safeguards and minimum standards, to address various offences, including war crimes.

Patrick Penninchx

The Council of Europe was commended for its active promotion of human rights, the rule of law, and democracy. Its crucial role in promoting basic values, combatting war crimes, and addressing human rights violations was highlighted. The session focused on the role of investigative journalism and open-source information in investigations, recognizing their significance in holding accountable those responsible for war crimes.

The Budapest Convention was lauded as a global instrument for fighting cybercrime and promoting accountability. It was noted that the convention has been ratified by 68 countries, with more nations having signed or invited to accede. The opening of the second additional protocol to the Budapest Convention in May 2022 was also mentioned. The convention provides a legal basis for disclosing domain name registration information and direct cooperation with service providers.

The session also expressed support for the active role of various actors in combating disinformation and holding those responsible for war crimes accountable. The engagement of the private sector and organizations like Bellingcat in combating disinformation was acknowledged. The importance of investigative journalism and reliance on open-source information in exposing war crimes were emphasized.

However, it was stated that not all open-source information can be used as evidence in trials. The admissibility of open-source information was discussed, highlighting the need to comply with existing legislation and best practice procedures. Information used as evidence must be reliable, authentic, complete, and believable.

Concerns were raised about the rise of deep fakes and systemic disinformation in the current era. It was noted that some countries are actively promoting disinformation campaigns, posing significant challenges in maintaining information reliability and accuracy.

Regarding electronic evidence and data manipulation, it was observed that technological advancements have enabled individuals, states, and regimes to easily manipulate electronic data. The credibility and authenticity of data were emphasized as crucial factors, and it was argued that questions about their credibility and authenticity are legitimate.

The preservation, authentication, and availability of data for trial purposes were highlighted as essential criteria. It was mentioned that data must be preserved, securely guarded, protected, authenticated, verified, and available for review to ensure its admissibility in trials.

The role of the court in determining the validity of data for trials was discussed. It was stated that the court should ultimately decide whether information can be used as evidence in a trial or not.

While the Budapest Convention was praised as an effective instrument, it was noted that it does not cover all countries. Joining the convention implies compliance with its principles, including the protection of human rights, the rule of law, and pluralist democracy. It was also mentioned that countries not part of the convention are not covered by it.

Furthermore, it was clarified that the Budapest Convention is primarily a criminal law convention, rather than specifically focusing on war crimes. Nevertheless, Article 2 of the convention was highlighted for its importance in enabling cross-border access and obtaining of open-source information for use in trials.

The expulsion of the Russian Federation from the Council of Europe was mentioned, resulting from its illegal invasion of Ukraine and its failure to respect human rights and basic values.

In conclusion, the session highlighted the Council of Europe’s active promotion of human rights, the rule of law, and democracy. The Budapest Convention was celebrated as an effective global instrument for combatting cybercrime and ensuring accountability. The significance of investigative journalism, open-source information, and the need for data credibility and authenticity were emphasized. However, challenges regarding the admissibility of open-source information, the rise of deep fakes and disinformation, and the limitations of the Budapest Convention were also discussed. The expulsion of the Russian Federation from the Council of Europe was noted as a consequence of its violations of human rights and basic values.

Nick Waters

The development of open-source investigation has revolutionized the way footage from conflict zones is analyzed. By extracting detailed information from videos, it allows for a deeper understanding of events that take place in these regions. Nick Waters, an expert in open-source investigation, described an example where his team was able to geolocate a potential location from a video related to a series of executions in Benghazi. Working with three to four people for three weeks, they meticulously analyzed the footage to accurately determine the location.

Open source information, if extracted correctly, has the potential to be used as evidence. By using the latest high-resolution satellite imagery and overlaying the video footage on top of it, Waters and his team were able to definitively confirm the location of the execution. They also used the individuals in the video as sundials to establish the accurate time of the incident. These successful uses of open-source information demonstrate its potential as valuable evidence in various contexts, particularly in the realms of peace, justice, and strong institutions.

However, the Russian legal system has expressed skepticism towards the use of open-source information as evidence in previous incidents. Waters emphasizes the importance of ensuring the credibility of information in the Ukraine civilian harm database. He cautions against attributing incidents to any state party without extensive investigation. The dismissive attitude of the Russian legal system presents challenges in using open-source information effectively in this context.

To address the need for verification of authenticity in legal evidence, collaboration with the Global Legal Action Network has led to the development of a methodology for verifying digital evidence. The process involves locating images and videos in space and time, and excluding misleading information. This methodology not only ensures the admissibility of evidence but also provides a framework for verification in legal proceedings.

Although AI has made significant advances, it is not yet reliable enough to create believable content. Waters acknowledges that the majority of problems in this field arise from real content being repurposed for different events. AI, such as AlphaZero, currently cannot produce credible fake content. Therefore, caution is necessary when relying on AI-generated content for verification purposes.

Waters emphasizes the importance of hiring individuals with deep local knowledge to gather a more accurate understanding of situations. By doing so, it is possible to reduce bias and enhance the comprehension of events, ultimately leading to more reliable and nuanced investigations.

The responsibility of social media platforms for the information they post is a notable concern. Different moderation policies exist within and between platforms, leading to inconsistent treatment of content. Additionally, their algorithms play a significant role in determining what information is shown to users. Platforms have often tried to distance themselves from responsibility by claiming they are not publishers. However, Waters argues that social media platforms should bear partial responsibility for the information they disseminate, highlighting the need for greater accountability.

Cyber-enabled war crimes provide valuable information for investigating atrocities. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has recently announced its plans to investigate cyber-enabled war crimes for the first time. While this presents new opportunities, it is essential to note that computer-generated evidence should not replace traditional evidence. It must conform to legal admissibility and be used in conjunction with other forms of evidence to ensure a comprehensive and valid investigation.

In conclusion, the development of open-source investigation has revolutionized the way footage from conflict zones is analyzed. Open-source information has the potential to be used as evidence, but challenges arise in adopting it within certain legal systems. Collaboration with the Global Legal Action Network has led to the formulation of a methodology for verifying digital evidence in legal contexts. AI, although advancing, is not yet reliable enough to create believable content. Hiring individuals with local knowledge is crucial for accurate comprehension of situations. Social media platforms bear responsibility for the information they post. Cyber-enabled war crimes offer new insights, but computer-based evidence should not replace traditional evidence. Ultimately, a multi-faceted approach to evidence collection and verification is necessary for effective investigations in the pursuit of justice and peace.

Nataliya Tkachuk

The analysis highlights the importance of international cooperation in addressing cyber threats. It emphasizes the need for coordination and control activities among state actors involved in information and cybersecurity in Ukraine. Nataliya Tkachuk, responsible for coordinating these activities, specifically mentions the Russian Federation as the first country to use cyberattacks and disinformation as tools for special information operations. Tkachuk also points out the Russian Federation’s manipulation of social media platforms to spread disinformation and influence public opinion and elections in democratic states. This highlights the need for collaboration between nations to effectively combat cyber threats.

The analysis also underscores the role of electronic evidence in documenting and investigating war crimes. Tkachuk discusses how the law enforcement in Ukraine has registered over 90,000 war crimes since the Russian aggression began. She emphasizes that it would be impossible for any single law enforcement agency or country to document and investigate all of these crimes without the assistance of civil society, international partners, and NGOs. This highlights the significance of electronic evidence, which can provide a comprehensive understanding of war crimes and aid in holding perpetrators accountable.

The analysis reveals instances of cyberattacks on critical infrastructure facilities in Ukraine, such as electric power stations, conducted by the Russian Federation. This highlights the detrimental impact of cyberwar on civilian infrastructure and emphasizes the need for international cooperation to address and mitigate these attacks effectively.

Furthermore, the analysis mentions the success of Ukraine and the United States in attributing cyber crimes to specific individuals and states. The Armageddon Hacker Group is cited as an example, identified as part of Russian counterintelligence. This showcases the possibility and importance of attributing cyber crimes, offering hope for accountability and deterrence in cyberspace.

The analysis emphasizes the significance of international partnerships and efforts in tackling cyber war crimes. It calls on the international community to support these initiatives, recognizing the need for collective action to combat cyber threats effectively.

Moreover, the analysis highlights the Budapest Convention as an effective instrument in investigating cybercrimes. It acknowledges that Ukraine is still working towards complete implementation of the Convention and, prior to the conflict, faced challenges in providing full disclosure and preservation of technical data as required by the Convention.

The analysis also discusses the role of common democratic values in Ukraine’s fight against Russian aggression. It advocates for the upholding of justice and the rule of law, as these values are fundamental for ensuring peace and stability.

In addition, the analysis acknowledges the role of civil society in collecting evidence of war crimes in Ukraine. It recognizes their crucial involvement in gathering information and supporting investigations into these crimes.

Lastly, the analysis appreciates the Council of Europe’s efforts in training judges, prosecutors, and civil society in Ukraine. This training is seen as a valuable contribution to Ukraine’s justice system and evidence collection processes.

In summary, the analysis emphasizes the importance of international cooperation in countering cyber threats, the role of electronic evidence in war crime investigations, and the need for effective implementation of international conventions. It also underscores the significance of common democratic values, the attribution of cyber crimes, the role of civil society, and the contribution of the Council of Europe in supporting Ukraine’s efforts in documenting and addressing war crimes.

Moderator

The session aimed to discuss the use of open source intelligence and digital evidence in the prosecution of war crimes and human rights abuses. It highlighted the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and Electronic Evidence as an important tool in these efforts. The convention provides guidance on how electronic evidence is collected, presented, deemed admissible, and safeguarded.

The importance of investigative journalism and open source information in holding those responsible for war crimes accountable was emphasized. It was mentioned that investigative journalism and open source information play a vital role in investigations, and the speaker emphasized the importance of bringing those in charge to account. The role of Bellingcat, an organization that specialises in open source investigation, was discussed, and its impact in conflict zones was highlighted. It was mentioned that Bellingcat utilised various methods of analysis and verification to ensure the accuracy of their findings in conflict zones such as Ukraine.

Cooperation with international partners in the fight against human rights violations and cyber crime was also emphasized. The Budapest Convention was mentioned as promoting international and cross-border cooperation in the realm of cybersecurity. The speaker highlighted the effectiveness of international cooperation in handling violations and cyber crimes, and the importance of a coordinated approach in gathering evidence and presenting it in various forums.

Concerns were raised about Russian aggression and cyber warfare, with 90,000 cases of war crimes registered since the Russian aggression started. The continued cyber attacks on Ukraine’s critical infrastructures by Russia were also highlighted. It was mentioned that Russia has chosen not to join the Budapest Convention.

The session also addressed concerns about data manipulation and the need for data authentication. It was mentioned that technological advancements have made data manipulation easier, and electronic evidence is vulnerable to manipulation. The importance of preserving data and authenticating data sources to ensure credibility and admissibility in court was stressed.

The role of social media platforms in enabling harmful events was discussed. The differences in moderation policies among platforms, as well as the accusation of Facebook enabling ethnic cleansing in Myanmar, were highlighted. It was mentioned that social media platforms bear some responsibility for the information shared on their platforms, and the influence of algorithms on what is shown to users was also acknowledged.

The importance of joining the Budapest Convention was emphasized. It was mentioned that the convention now covers 68 states, and countries that join the convention comply with the principles of human rights, the rule of law, and democratic society. It was stressed that more states need to join the convention to strengthen international cooperation in addressing cyber crimes and human rights violations.

In conclusion, the session highlighted the significance of open source intelligence and digital evidence in prosecuting war crimes and human rights abuses. The Budapest Convention was recognised as an important tool in this regard, providing guidance on the collection, admissibility, and safeguarding of electronic evidence. The session also brought attention to the role of investigative journalism, international cooperation, and the need for improved handling of open source intelligence and electronic evidence. Moreover, concerns were raised about Russian aggression, data manipulation, and the responsibility of social media platforms in enabling harmful events. Overall, the session emphasized the importance of international cooperation and effective legislative tools in addressing these pressing issues.

Moderator:
crimes and electronic evidence. We’ll start in about three minutes. The panel is sitting on the right, if you’re facing us, so that we can actually see the audience. Otherwise, you’d be facing the screen. So we’ve decided to sit here, so if anybody comes up, we can actually see them and face the audience. So please feel free to sit in the audience, or even if you want to come up and sit at the table, you’re most welcome. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. you you you you Good evening everybody. Welcome to the session on Open Source Intelligence and prosecuting using digital evidence, war crimes and human rights abuses. I am the moderator. My name is Zahid Jameel. I’m an attorney. It’s an honor and a privilege and it gives me great pleasure to co-moderate this session with my colleague Gyorgy who is joining us online and will be helping us moderate through an online platform. Under Gyorgy’s leadership and myself as a consultant, we have in the last excess of 24 months undertaken an extensive project on behalf of the Council of Europe that related to today’s discussion, the topic of discussion today which is trying to assist the Ukrainian government in addressing issues related to open source intelligence that can be collected and used as electronic evidence in terms of its own domestic legislation as well as international law. In particular, using the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and Electronic Evidence as one of the mechanisms to take such open source intelligence and electronic evidence obtained from there and make it admissible and usable before various forums such as domestic courts and international courts or other forums as well, possibly war crimes tribunals. Whilst we could speak in detail about this in today’s conversation, however, and discussion, it aims to introduce our honored guests and we shall dilate upon these challenges and instances whereupon open source intelligence can be used as electronic evidence for prosecuting human rights abuses and war crimes. I will lead the first segment leading up to a round of introductory remarks by the panelists and then hand over to my co-moderator Jorgi to maybe sort of ask some sort of questions we may have received from online participants and also open it to the floor for comments and questions and then come back to the panel for possibly a second round as well. So with that, if I can introduce my first panelist, of course, we are very honored and privileged to have Patrick here who is the Head of Information Society, the Department of Council of Europe. His areas of responsibility include freedom of expression and freedom of media, internet governance, artificial intelligence, cybercrime, data protection and he’s also responsible for projects related to public-private partnerships and cooperation with business partners. His professional focus, of course, encompasses areas such as freedom of expression, safety for journalists, sound internet governance and international standards and data protection. It’s a pleasure to have you here, Patrick, please. The floor is yours.

Patrick Penninchx:
is yours. Thank you. Thank you so much, Saeed. In fact, this panel represents all the Council of Europe stands for. That is, we want to create an environment that is promoting human rights, the rule of law and democratic society. And in fact, what we see in war crimes and especially is these profound human rights violations in which all the actors that take an active role in promoting those basic values have to stand together in order to be able to fight the disinformation about the war, first of all, but also to ensure that those that are in charge and have to take the responsibility for the war crimes that are being committed. And in that respect, the instruments of the Council of Europe, and you mentioned the different areas in which I have a particular role to play, they come together. And I think this session really focuses on the role of investigative journalism, open source information, the use of such open source information in investigations, and bringing those in charge to account. The Budapest Convention is one of those instruments. And the Budapest Convention is not only a European convention. It is now ratified by 68 countries, when a number of countries, 23 more have signed or have been invited to accede to the Budapest Convention. And that makes it a worldwide instrument. That’s really important. Of course, the fact of having the war on the European soil. has of course meant that we took an extra interest in what was happening from a Council of Europe perspective and in that sense have been engaging quite a bit, including with the private sector. We’re very happy to have Microsoft here around the table, but also with organizations such as Bellingcat that have made open source investigation one of their leading goals in terms of making sure that those responsible are taken into account. A number of elements of the Budapest Convention and especially the second additional protocol which was opened in May 2022 and has had an immediate success in terms of the number of signatories of the second additional protocol will of course help us to fight the proliferation of cybercrime on the one side, but also to fight and to make sure that the increasing complexity in obtaining electronic evidence which is stored in foreign multiple shifting or unknown jurisdictions and the powers of law enforcement which are limited, we have to ensure that with that we can combat that and provide a legal basis for the disclosure of domain name registration information and direct cooperation with the service providers. While offering at the same time mutual assistance tools and of course personal data protection safeguards. This will be also presented by my co-panelists later in this session. So I would like to thank you very much already the ones here present in the room and also the panelists for taking part in this important session. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you Patrick. It’s a pleasure

Moderator:
to have had you. Thank you so much and of course we’ll come back to you for more clarifications and questions probably more about the European status and what may be happening in Ukraine. Of course we have other panelists who are from Ukraine with us to also speak about that. I will now ask my colleague, Jayantha Fernando, who is joining us online as the second panelist, if we could switch to him. Jayantha is a lawyer, now in active digital law practice from South Asia, who has helped to bring Sri Lanka and several countries to the Budapest Convention. He was a bureau member of the TCY, which is the committee of the Budapest Convention of the Member States, which negotiated the second additional protocol and several guidance notes to the Budapest Convention. And I can tell you that he’s done an excellent job of trying to advocate for the adoption of the Budapest Convention right across the globe in several countries, both in the South Pacific and also in Asia. So it gives me great pleasure to invite Jayantha, if you could, please, the floor is yours, Jayantha. I don’t know if you can hear us since you’re online. Just wanted to check if you are there.

Jayantha Fernando:
Yeah, I can hear you very well. Can I be heard?

Moderator:
Please go ahead. Thank you.

Jayantha Fernando:
Thank you, Saeed. And it’s nice to speak after Patrick. And if I think in the interest of time, I’ll be brief in this initial intervention. I think in the context of open source intelligence and use of modern techniques for gathering electronic evidence, Saeed has very clearly enunciated in your opening address as well as what was mentioned by Patrick. And in the context of what we are seeing happening, being live streamed from the Middle East, as we speak, the tragedies and all that’s happening these days, I think this topic is really of significance. I think it is… has been discussed at a very opportune moment at the IGF. In the context of the Budapest Convention and its operative provisions, I think it goes without saying that the tools provided through the Budapest Convention, including through the Second Additional Protocol, are vital in the context of allowing new techniques to be adopted in the investigation of all categories of offenses, including human rights violations, that you very clearly mentioned a short while ago. Most notably, it is relevant to note that the Convention State Parties got together after the Cloud Evidence Report was finalized in 2017 to negotiate the Second Additional Protocol that provides new and novel methods for investigators to gather and share electronic evidence with other parties, as well as directly laced with international service providers. So we have, for the first time, mechanisms provided for enhanced direct cooperation between countries and providers of service, including domain name registration information providers. We have disclosure of subscriber information provided under Article 7 of the Second Additional Protocol, and heaps of measures connected with that. Then there is also a mechanism to give effect to an order made by one country for expedited production of subscriber information and traffic data that’s provided under Article 8. We also have. in the second edition of protocol article nine, which provides for expedited disclosure of scored computer data in an emergency situation. And then procedural measures that deals with now new techniques for emergency mutual assistance, which was either to never provided in any other treaty. Then of course, there are very practical solutions also in the second edition of protocol, most notably in article 11, that describes procedures for international cooperation where parties and experts are in different places. And it is difficult to reduce the evidence that you have gathered. And there is mechanisms available for obtaining the evidence required and clarity and depositions to be provided through video conferencing techniques. And then also joint investigation teams and joint investigations. But most notably, what I would like to emphasize are the additional safeguards that were brought in through the second edition of protocol, which has either to not been found in any other international treaty. There is the provisions contained in article 14, which has got specific data protection safeguards dealing with processing of data that is gathered in the course of investigation and for cross-border sharing of electronic evidence gathered through the new techniques provided under the second edition protocol. Having said that, ladies and gentlemen, what I want to in conclusion emphasize is another important tool that is made available under the Budapest Convention, namely the capacity building measures. All of these tools, legislative tools become meaningful and effective only if there is… domestic capacity in a given country to deal with the problem and equip the criminal justice authorities with the ability to investigate, prosecute, as well as hear and determine these matters within your territories. For that to happen, Council of Europe Convention, the Budapest Convention, and its rules provide a capacity-building initiative for the global action against cyber crime, which has benefited many countries, including mine. So we find, in conclusion, illustrate an example. We have, over the years, been able to have expert judges. Now, we have 14 of them who have gone through a training of the training program, who, in turn, have been able to replicate and introduce cyber crime and electronic evidence module in the Judges Institute to train judges across the provinces in the country. That resulted in 323 judges being trained in the provinces by the 14 expert judges trained under the Council of Europe PLACY program called Global Action Against Cybercrime. Similarly, prosecutors have been trained, who have developed the ability to deal with this problem and equip them with tools to prosecute. And then investigators, who are the first respondents in a human rights violation, genocide, or any other cybercrime-related incident, who can gather the essential ingredients necessary to prove the offence. They have also been trained under the PLACY program, under the Council of Europe. And I just want to flag those benefits as a country that has progressed over the years as a state party to the Budapest Convention, how we have benefited from it. those capacity building tools to develop domestic capability to deal with the range of issues and challenges where electronic evidence is required to be gathered to present them in the various fora, including in the context of the topic being discussed today and the need for such capacity to be developed over a period of time and maintain in a sustainable manner so as to create an ecosystem where the modern day threats, issues, challenges can be dealt with in a coordinated manner with international partners. So with that, Zahid, I will close my intervention at this point and I’ll be available for Q&A. Thank you.

Moderator:
Absolutely. Thank you so much, Antha. In fact, of course, we will come back to you because we’d love to hear more about the incidents and examples that have been helpful to your country and how you’ve used them. But at the moment, we’ll move to John. Let me introduce my next panelist, John Herring, who’s here in the room to my right. He is a Senior Government Affairs Manager for Digital Diplomacy at Microsoft. He analyzes global cybersecurity landscapes and drives engagement with regional government teams and contributes to Microsoft’s efforts to promote peace and security in cyberspace through various multi-stakeholder initiatives. He’s worked previously with the US government and prior to joining Microsoft, John served as a White House Defense Fellow in the Obama administration at the Department of Defense and the Office of Secretary of Defense for Policy. He has also previously led humanitarian aid research in Northeast Nigeria with the Danish Refugee Council and worked as a math and science teacher also through Teach for America. I know you had a fantastic session this morning, John. I just talked a little bit about what’s happening in the international landscape, but over to you to discuss this very important topic and what Microsoft’s doing in regards. Thanks.

John Hering:
Thank you. Thank you so much. And thank you to the IGF for hosting this important discussion. I mean, it’s a privilege to be up here with all of you. And maybe just to begin by saying that, you know, to commend the Budapest Convention as, you know, the invaluable tool that exists for successfully combating international cybercrime. And just to say that we hope that the current UN cybercrime negotiation process to the ad hoc committee sort of takes a cue from the Budapest Convention to certainly not conflict and also to hopefully replicate many of the good measures that are reflected in that to support international cooperation against cybercrime while safeguarding effectively human rights. I wanna pivot a little bit to talk about the topic that brings us here today, which is sort of the potential for war crimes and the potential for cybercrime in the future. And I wanna start by saying that I’m a big believer in the importance of data and documentation is there because innovation in conflict has necessitated innovations in collection, in documentation and of the evidence. My team at Microsoft is our digital diplomacy team. We’re relatively new, but we’re, you know, one way to think of us is Microsoft’s response to cyberspace emerging as a domain of conflict. We spend a lot of time trying to promote new expectations for responsible behavior online and elsewhere. We do what we can to promote accountability to those expectations. And to that end, the use of cyber operations in the, you know, full-scale war in Ukraine that began a little over a year and a half ago, you know, has been rather novel in sort of being the first large-scale example of hybrid warfare that perhaps the world has seen. There are certainly other examples, but not at the scale that we’re seeing in Ukraine. And this has introduced sort of two challenges. The first is obviously the potential for traditional war crimes that we’ve seen in the past and in other conflicts and that are as old as time in many ways. And then the other is the potential for specifically cyber-enabled or cyber-dependent war crimes. And then also everything in between, you know, war crimes that have a cyber component to them or that are enabled by those operations. And this creates new challenges in terms of what our responsibilities as different stakeholders in this space, what is our responsibilities as an industry player that has access to information and can help with documentation. So on the sort of cyber-based. potential war crimes side of this equation, Microsoft has responded to these challenges with greater transparency and increased reporting. In particular, out of our Microsoft Threat Analysis Center, in addition to trying to work to protect and secure civilian data, Ukrainian data, customer data that might be tied up in the conflict, we’re also reporting on the breadth of cyber operations that we are seeing across the conflict itself. This has been in successive reports from our Threat Analysis Center, includes information on the targets, the different malware types, the actors that are responsible, to the degree we can trace who the actor responsible is, and to the degree we can know what the impact of those attacks has been as well, to hopefully serve as a tool of accountability on its own, but then a valuable source of open source intelligence as well. And then there’s the other side of the equation when it comes to more traditional war crimes allegations for which digital documentation could be proof essential. And so we’ve also been exploring how to expedite the collection of evidence or otherwise provide support for the capture of digital evidence alleging for just traditional war crimes under underneath the Rome Statute or other provisions, and making sure that the International Criminal Court would have the ability to document that in a more immutable fashion. So I might leave that there for further discussion just to tee up how we’re seeing this space and how that intersects with some of the work of my team. Thank you.

Moderator:
Thank you so much. That’s very helpful because it gives us an idea of how businesses are trying to tackle and address and trying to ameliorate the very serious concerns and incidents that are taking place. Now, if I may turn to our participants and speaker from Ukraine, Natalia Tagchuk. She is the head of the Information and Cybersecurity Directorate at the Office of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine. She also holds the position of the Secretary of Ukraine’s National Coordination Center for Cybersecurity and has 20 years of practical experience in the sector of national security and defense of Ukraine. She is responsible for providing coordination and control over activities of main state actors in the sphere of information and cybersecurity, and she holds a PhD in the field of law and national security. Slava Kuranya, pleasure, welcome. Thank you.

Nataliya Tkachuk:
We please you, the floor is yours. Thank you, Zahid. It’s a great pleasure and honor for me to be here with such a great professionals. Thank you very much for your support to Ukraine. It’s very important for us. I would like to start to say a few words. You know, my trip to Japan took almost three days because we don’t have no air connections as this war going on in Ukraine. But this trip was worth it because the AGEA Forum is a very important venue where we can discuss the most important issues of the internet, of new technologies, of cybersecurity. And you know, the first day during the opening panel, I was admiring the opening speeches on the first panel. Everybody were talking about the importance of the internet in democratic world, about artificial intelligence, and also about threats that these technologies can possess. First of all, cyber attacks and disinformation. But to my regrets, no one mentioned the country who actually invented the mechanisms of disinformation, using social media, internet to manipulate public opinion, to manipulate elections in democratic states. Country who was the first country using cyber attacks also as an instrument for further special information operations. I’m talking about the Russian Federation, about the terrorist country. And why it’s important to remember, because when we are discussing the future of the internet, the future of cybersecurity and new secure frameworks, we need to keep this in mind. Today, we will discuss the war crimes and the role of electronic evidence. I should say that since the Russian aggression started, our law enforcement already registered more than 90,000 of war crimes. Can you imagine this number? And even this is old data. Maybe now it’s even bigger, 90,000. And it’s simply impossible for any law enforcement agency, or even for one country to document and to investigate all these crimes. And it’s simply impossible without your help, without the help of civil society, without our international partners, without help of people who take care of human rights, NGOs, and so on. And this is why the question of electronic evidence is very important. And I’m happy that today we will discuss the main issues of this topic. Thank you.

Moderator:
Thank you very much. You’re absolutely right. And I think a lot more attention needs to be paid and heeded to the kind of issues that you’ve mentioned. Also, I think it’s important that you mentioned the importance of attribution in attacks, et cetera, and also with the evidence that you collect to be able to attribute it is extremely important. So I move now to our last panelist. Of course, we will be having several rounds after this, of course. Nick Waters, he’s the head of the justice and accountability team at Bellingcat. We’re really happy to have you, Nick. Thank you. With a background in the military and cybersecurity, his interests have focused on conflict and the applicability of open source information as evidence. Nick will be speaking about the development of open source investigation, starting with the inception of Bellingcat, the development of a methodology with the Global Legal Action Network to enable the use of open source information to investigate Saudi-led coalition strikes in Yemen, and ultimately its application to the invasion in Ukraine. Over to you, Nick. The floor is yours.

Nick Waters:
First, thank you very much for inviting me. It’s incredibly privileged to be able to speak to all of you here. What I’m going to show you is a much more granular idea of what this can actually mean in terms of information or open source information as evidence. And in order to do that, we have a, or I wanted to show you a video which relates to a series of executions carried out by Mr. Bithali in 2017. So Mr. Bithali was the subject of a restaurant issue by the International Criminal Court regarding the executions of large numbers of people that he accused of being members of the Islamic State, but who had not gone through any kind of judicial process. When we found out about this, we decided that we would also try and find out what kind of information you could work out from each one of these videos. And I would like to show that to you now. Just a warning, this does show the aftermath of an execution. It doesn’t show the actual execution itself. So that is Mr. Bithali reading from a sheet and those are detainees who were about to be executed. And what we needed to do was try and squeeze as much information out from this video as possible. Now, when you see a video, watch a video, you’re only seeing a single still frame at a time. So what we did is we extracted multiple still frames and then blended them together to form a panorama. And within that panorama, it makes it easier to identify features which you can use to geolocate it, to place it in space. In this case, we could identify some buildings in the back left with quite distinctive design with gaps at the base, a wall on the right-hand side and a fork in the road where the actual execution took place. Now, finding the general area wasn’t too difficult. There’s a place called the Chinese Housing Project in Benghazi where fighting had been taking place at the time of these executions, which matched the building. that we could see in the video. And so that’s where we started looking. Now, if you’ve ever seen these kind of geolocations or read an article from Bellingcat, you can see that when you reach the final product, it can sometimes be like really clear. It seems self-evident that the location is correct, but frequently this can take a very long time to achieve. In this case, I think it took us about three weeks with three or four people working several hours a day in order to actually identify the potential location, but we did eventually identify a potential location. And this location had the properties that we were looking for in terms of a fork in the road, a building, and a wall, which are in the correct orientation. However, for us, that isn’t confirmation enough. We want to be absolutely certain. So what we did is we bought the latest high-resolution satellite imagery that was available, and then we overlaid the video of the execution on top of it. And we saw that the bushes that you can see in the top of the image matched exactly with what you could see in satellite imagery. And as we were buying this latest satellite imagery, we also noticed new satellite imagery appeared, which had these black spots in the road. And it took us a while to work out precisely what these black spots were, but again, when we compared them to the video, we worked out that they were the bloodstains of the people who had been executed. So we knew we had the location exactly. We could then use the people within the video as effectively as sundials to work out where the sun was in the sky in order to establish the time, which would have been about 6.30 in the morning. And then we were pretty confident about the date because the bloodstains appeared between the 15th, 16th, and 17th of July. So we had an exact location, a time, probably accurately, within a few minutes, and then a date, accurate to within a few days. And this is the kind of information that we deal with in order to take content like this, images, videos, from primarily from conflict zones, and then verify that content in order to conduct further in-depth investigations. And this kind of information can be incredibly important, especially when it’s combined with other traditional forms of information. Forms of evidence. Yeah, and I think that is my time up. I’m very happy to speak about that if anyone has any further questions. Thank you.

Moderator:
Nick, that was breathtaking, to say the least. Thank you very much. Very helpful. I would like to now go to the remote participants and my co-moderator, Gyorgy. But before I do that, I wanted to give an opportunity to Natalia. Natalia, you see what has just been shown. And while there’s Bellingcat, now it might change to Bellingbear, near Russia. So my question is, how do you feel about this sort of information? Would it be helpful to you in the Ukraine and the conflict there?

Nataliya Tkachuk:
Yeah, of course. This information would be very helpful to Ukraine. And actually, Bellingcat is helping Ukraine right now. They have a special platform which gathers all the electronic evidence of Russian aggression in Ukraine.

Moderator:
Thank you. So obviously, hopefully more people from the tech industry will be also helping out. We hope that is the case. I would like to now take the opportunity and go to my co-moderator, Gyorgy. Maybe he can mention a few comments. I know he’s done extensive work, of course, in Ukraine with respect to OSINT. And also maybe he can tell us if there’s anybody who would like to comment or has questions from the online platform. We’ll go there first. Gyorgy, over to you.

Giorgi Jokhadze:
Thank you, Zahid. And greetings. everyone from Strasbourg. It’s it’s been it’s been a pleasure to to listen to all of the speakers and to participate in this in this event so thank you very much for this opportunity and thank you for all the information shared so far. I’ll start with the second question from Zahid at the moment we have about 30 participants online but there are no particular questions yet coming in or comments that are being relayed to speakers so using this opportunity maybe I can sort of step in myself and and provide a couple of comments as Zahid rightly mentioned when it comes to the use of open source intelligence or generally evidence of war crimes and gross human rights violations in the context of our assistance to Ukraine so for the last few years I worked for the Council of Europe where I’m managing a regional project on cybercrime and ethnic evidence in the Eastern Partnership which also covers Ukraine and it happened to cover Ukraine also from on the days when the Russian aggression against Ukraine started in February 2022 so we’ve been actually quite involved with Ukrainian authorities especially with the prosecutor’s office from the very early days I would say of our action of our joint action to support Ukraine in the war of aggression in terms of like really clarifying the issues where actually do our standards such as the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime and potentially second edition standard in terms of supporting Ukraine to basically to have a clear case and the clear sort of evidence and then standing either domestically or through potential international investigations or international judicial process in these issues as well so what we try to focus on was not really to go that much in depth into the features of the national law because there we had the help of the Ukrainian expert who was actually looking at this quite extensively but for us it was important to identify whether the tools that we have would be helpful and fortunately we have the Budapest Convention on our side and we identified a few tools there including for example article 32 of the convention which is underutilized in daily practice, but still opens up a lot of possibilities to all member states to the Budapest Convention to also have access to open source intelligence, either in the public domain or in the private domain. If let’s say the owner of the data, be it a service provider or a foreign company, or even the civil society organization expresses its content to share with authorities of Ukraine, should such a request would be. It may be, it may sound a bit superfluous, but it’s also very important to note that we view the open source intelligence in this context as a part of the overall chain of evidence and chain of custody leading to criminal investigations and overall criminal justice context. For us, it is important to treat the OSINT as information and evidence, which is just a part of the rest of investigative powers and investigative procedures that investigators and prosecutors have to use to prove the cases either domestically before domestic courts or internationally should this be required. And last but not least, I think it’s very important to note that one of the features of electronic evidence that is that it likes to travel beyond borders. And this is where the tools of the convention and tools of a second edition protocol come into place because cross-sharing of evidence is not just simply about international investigations or the tribunals, but also in terms of the actual acquisition of the data, the actual sharing of the data would be great if it’s sort of put in the framework of a process which is provided by the Budapest Convention, specifically Article 32 and the other instruments that are there. So, sorry for abusing a bit my position as a co-moderator to this meeting, but I thought it would be also a bit thought provoking maybe to focus on those tools as well in terms of discussion in this workshop. Thank you. So far, I see that there are no further questions at the moment from the chat.

Moderator:
Gheorghe, thank you so much, by the way, really appreciate you giving us sort of a primer on how the different provisions of the convention actually work. This is very, very helpful, especially Article 32. I will first of all, look towards the audience to see if there are any questions from the audience. Of course, I have a few questions which I’ll pose to next Jayantha, just giving him a warning, but please, there’s a mic right behind you and we’re happy to give you mics from here if you wish, but if you could go there and then you’d also be on camera when you ask the question.

Audience:
Yeah, sure. Hello, thanks all for coming and thanks to the panelists and moderator for giving the floor. My name is Tim. I think that this Budapest Convention framework may still like a useful legal framework in context of war crimes and crimes in general. However, do you think it can be used for punishing those criminals who are Ukrainian based as long as there is plenty of electronic evidence of war crimes committed by Ukrainian army forces as well, like tortures, killing civilians, presence of war and so on. Same as cyber crimes, fraud and scam. Just for example, Ukraine has a record of having call centers with scammers pretending to be like central bank employees. These scammers call Russian citizens and convince them to transfer money to the attacker’s account. That’s definitely a cyber crime. So my question is, is there any chance Ukrainian based criminals will ever be punished with your help? Thank you so much.

Moderator:
Thank you for the question. I’m definitely going to have some comments to that, but over to anyone in the panel who would like to respond.

Nataliya Tkachuk:
First of all, I would like to comment that actually there is a not only conventional war, but cyber war that is going on in Ukraine. And the Russian Federation started the cyber war in 2014. And actually it was the first example of cyber war when Russia attacked our electric power station with black energy, simultaneously annexing the Crimea and other parts of Ukraine. And I’m thankful to John that you mentioned cyber war. crimes and your question about the cyber war crimes. I can say that Russians are constantly conducting cyber war crimes against Ukrainian population. They are constantly attacking civil critical infrastructure facilities, electronic grids, and other facilities that is being used by civil population. And it’s no matter that it’s rather difficult to attribute cyber crimes, but we managed to do this. And I should say that Ukraine, together with the United States of America, maybe only the two countries in the world really managed to attribute the cyber crimes to a particular people who did this. For example, I should give you an example of Armageddon Hacker Group. The Security Service of Ukraine, together with the Office of General Prosecutor and military department of it, managed to investigate the constant cyber attacks of this hacking group. And this hacking group is a part of the Russian counterintelligence, which is based in Crimea. We had the particular names, phone calls of the people who conducted these cyber attacks. And we can prove that this was actually cyber war crimes. And this is very important for international community to support this, because it’s very important issue. And I should say that this is a new issue, because it’s not the first war, but this is the first

Moderator:
cyber war that’s going on. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. What we’ll do now is we’ll basically ask others to explain what is new about this. And of course, we’ll take more questions. Just one response from me. I’m the moderator, but I think it’s helpful just as a matter of information. And it’s neutral comment. Obviously, these allegations would be by Russian complainants or victims, et cetera. So it’s a very simple answer to this question. Ukraine is a member of the Budapest Convention. Others are members of the Budapest Convention. Russia can become a member of the Budapest Convention, but for some reason it chooses not to. If Russia, just to answer your question, if Russia became a member of the Budapest Convention, then it would be able to assert these rights. But for some reason, the External Affairs Ministry of Russia decides not to do so. So maybe the question should be asked of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs or External Affairs, why don’t they join to solve this problem? I wanted to move to John. And of course, I know you are, they will come back. I want to move to John and say, John, what kind of new challenges are you seeing here with respect to war crimes and electronic? This is one of the first we’ve witnessed since the new age of cyber. And are there specific cyber specific war crimes that you want to sort of talk about and what does that do to the environment? Thanks.

John Hering:
See, it’s not Microsoft’s place to be, I think, deciding in any way what constitutes a war crime one way or the other. But I think, obviously, the widespread use of cyber capabilities in an armed conflict represents the possibility of there being cyber-enabled war crimes. And hence why we’ve sort of been stepping up that degree to which we are reporting out on the offensive cyber activities that we’re seeing in the context of that particular conflict, but then also more broadly. And so I actually would probably direct you to the work of the Human Rights Center out of Berkeley Law School, who has filed now, I think, three successive Article 15 submissions with the International Criminal Court that does allege cyber-enabled war crimes. And as part of, and certainly throughout their sort of very well-documented submissions, there is a very well-resourced set of evidence based on the reporting from not just Microsoft, but a whole host of technology companies who have sort of stepped into that space to say, hey, here’s the activity that we’re seeing. Here’s the best information that we have in terms of where we can trace it back to. Here’s the type of malware that was used in this operation. And then also, to what degree, at least this was something that Microsoft reported on last year, to what degree do we see alignment between military objectives in the kinetic space, as well as then the cyber operations that we see as being aligned? And so whether that’s missile attacks or other kinetic strikes, we are also seeing some evidence of potential alignment there that can be used in similar violence.

Moderator:
Thank you, very helpful. I wanted to now turn to Nick. I know we didn’t give you enough time and you just were able to present the video, but is there anything you wanted to generally state? And also, in particular, to sort of the things you’ve seen happening with respect to on the ground? Because a question was just asked about that it would be helpful to get some sort of response about the experience you’re having.

Nick Waters:
Yeah, so from our perspective, this is less in terms of like the Budapest Convention and more in terms of specific open source information. One of the things that we’ve actually been very careful about specifically with the map that was previously talked about, which looks at instances of civilian harm in Ukraine, is that we’re very, very careful about attributing responsibility for that. So the Ukraine civilian harm database, which we run, contains all the incidents that we can find, which is obviously only minority of what has happened, where civilians have been harmed or civilian infrastructure has been harmed in Ukraine as a result of the Russian invasion. We have taken several safeguards to make sure that we’re careful about the kind of information that’s placed in there. So, for example, we talked for a couple of hours about what colour to label the instance. So they’re not blue, they’re not red, they’re not green, they are specifically purple. We haven’t attributed any of those instances to anyone. So in theory, what you see on that map could in fact have been carried out by any state party. That is something we’ve had to be very, very careful of because we cannot make comment on who has actually carried out a particular instance until we have conducted further in-depth investigations of that. In terms of the Russian state specifically, firstly, we would find it very difficult, for example, to cooperate with the Russian legal system, firstly, because we don’t think it’s a particularly effective one, and secondly, because as soon as we get off the plane, they would arrest us. And secondly, that same legal system has spent the last few years denigrating the idea that this kind of information can be used as evidence, specifically in relation to MH17, as well as in relation to their intelligence agencies carrying out poisonings in Europe. And so I don’t think this kind of information would successfully be used as evidence within the Russian legal system, simply because they rejected that as a possibility over the previous few years. Thank you.

Moderator:
I’m going to ask Jan and Fernando to possibly share with us examples of the use of Article 32, because as I mentioned earlier, we’re going to come back to you and see how you think that Article 32 is unique and provides the ability to be able to combat or deal with open source intelligence, for instance. And I would like to come back to the floor because I believe there’s a question from here and then we’ll come back to the earlier participant. Please go ahead, Jan. Thank you, Saeed.

Jayantha Fernando:
a couple of points I just want to emphasize here in the context of some of the questions also that was raised. It’s important to know that the tools available under the Budapest Convention, including Article 32, is available for state parties to the Budapest Convention and not otherwise. So, I think we need to be very clear about the unique features of the Convention, especially the open source framework provided to Article 32, which is clarified more clearly through the guidance note on transport access to data, Article 32. So, there’s a guidance note, Zahid, if you may remember, on Article 32, which was agreed to between state parties to the Budapest Convention. And it is also important to note a particular sentence I would like to quote from the guidance note, where it is presumed that the parties to the Convention form a community of trust. And that rule of law, human rights principles are respected in line with Article 15 of the Budapest Convention. So, if a state party to a Budapest Convention who wants to benefit from Article 32 and rely on the open source material available online, as clearly explained by many of our panelists today, it is also important to understand that the concept of this being used within a community of trust and to ensure that rule of law human rights principles are respected in line with article 15. That said, I want to emphasize that not only on a day-to-day basis but on a very regular basis, be it in relation to a drug-related offense or any other offense, our law enforcement authorities are using this provision on a regular basis because they have been trained, and not only because they have been trained, they comply with the minimum standards under article 15 and the standard operating procedures on which they use those tools are also respecting the provisions contained in article 15. Thanks.

Moderator:
Thank you. Thank you, Janatha. And article 15, for those who are in the room, is basically the human rights provision. So it’s very important for the convention to basically make sure that any provision of procedural or investigative powers are subject to these human rights provisions. We have a question in the room. Gentleman, please, over to you, sir. Please, you can ask your question. Thank you. I’m Fernando Garcia, and I’m the… Sorry. Hi,

Audience:
I’m Fernando Garcia, and I’m the Secretary Director of R3D, the Utah Rights Defense Network from Mexico. Obviously, I think no one can deny that access to e-evidence can be crucial to resolve crimes. However, I think it’s really important to also make notice that, unfortunately, in many places in the world, law enforcement officials also participate in the commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity, human rights abuses. In this respect, I think it’s important to say that unfortunately, a lot of dissatisfaction and frustration among several civil society groups with regard to the lack of effective safeguards, both in the protocol of the Budapest Convention and in the proposed draft in the Cybercrime Treaty being negotiated in the UN. For example, the lack of judicial safeguards being mentioned. And in general, I think… There’s a lot of frustration, I think, lack of communication, I think. And I think my question is, does anyone in the panel recognize that the safeguards that are in the protocol or in the draft text of the UN Cybercrime Convention are inadequate? And there’s much more to do with regard to building effective safeguards that prevent the provisions of the Budapest Convention of being used actually to commit crimes with impunity, as unfortunately many places in the world, like in the country that I come from, happens regularly.

Moderator:
Thank you for the questions, very good question. I’m happy to give some response, but any piece, Patrick, go ahead.

Patrick Penninchx:
Well, I think it is indeed better that the parties to the Budapest Convention can respond to that because ultimately they are in charge of committing to the Budapest Convention and using its articles. I just wanted to say two things, also with regards to the previous question. We’re a panel on war crimes and gross human rights violations. This is not the International Criminal Court. So let’s also refocus and make sure that we focus on the topic of our panel right now. And maybe also despite the fact that we emphasize the usefulness of open source information as being potential evidence of war crimes, we also, however, we need to distinguish between intelligence, information, and evidence, and that not every open source information is or can be used for trial purposes. I think that’s important that we recognize that electronic… evidence must obviously be obtained in compliance with existing legislation and best practice procedures to be admissible in a trial. That’s one thing. And from the example that Nick has given us, let’s also be very clear. We need information, open source information that is reliable, that is authentic, that is complete, that is also believable and reliable. And I think those elements are core components once we have to decide when certain information can be used in trial or not. And that’s why the importance of reliable information, not manufactured information, is of clear importance. And when we see that we’re in an era where deep fakes and disinformation, systemic disinformation, is taking place worldwide but also ensured by a number of countries which have a particular interest in that, that we need to ensure that this information is in the first place reliable. Then I leave it to the parties, to the Budapest Convention, to see what the limitations are and where we need to work

Moderator:
further. Thank you. That’s very, very helpful. I just wanted to add a comment, and then of course there are more interventions I believe, that the Convention under Article 15, and I don’t know if you may have read it, stipulates that the human rights standards, in fact it mentions several treaties that have to be applicable, and it talks specifically about safeguards. Every single procedural investigative power, because I teach this constantly every few weeks, actually stipulates that there should be judicial oversight of every single procedural provision within the convention. So this is very much embedded within the crux of the convention. But in addition to that, the capacity building training that the convention does continually talks about the human rights aspect. So I completely agree with you that it’s essential that police, law enforcement and others don’t abuse this. And the Budapest Convention at least provides some. I’m happy to have a conversation with you about where you feel maybe there are gaps. But I do think that you are right when we look at the UN Convention, that our committee convention in the UN currently, there are various concerns of civil society and others. And absolutely correctly, I think, that there are many gaps related to human rights and civil liberty safeguards as it applies to the UN Draft Convention. I should call it a draft at the moment. But Natalia, over to you. And then of course, I have a question for Nick and then we’ll go to the audience back again, please.

Nataliya Tkachuk:
I would like to add that, of course, the Budapest Convention is the very effective instruments in investigation of cyber crimes. But it’s not enough simply to become part of this convention. The implementation is a very important next step. And for example, Ukraine is still working on the implementation of the Budapest Convention. And I think that it’s a very important next step for the implementation of the Budapest Convention. Ukraine is still working on the implementation of the Budapest Convention. Now, there is war going on. We have different regime of war times. But before the war, we still had problems with provisions that provide disclosure and preservation of data, of technical data. Because in Ukraine, law enforcement didn’t have the possibility to issue some warrants strictly as it is implied in the Budapest Convention. And this is also very important. The effective. implementation of this international document.

Moderator:
Thank you, Natalia. I know that, John, you wanted to quickly intervene, please.

John Hering:
Yeah, and I think there’s been well enough said about the provisions of the Budapest Convention, but just to circle back on the UNHC, the Cybercrime Convention negotiations that are ongoing, two points ahead. Thankfully, it is still, I think, a draft, and we still have fairly significant concerns about making sure that there are sufficient safeguards in place for things like human rights, particularly as it relates to some of the data access provisions and opportunities for more transparency as to when and for how long data was requested and making sure that information can always be disclosed on a long enough timeline.

Moderator:
For instance, Article 32 of the Convention actually states that there has to be certain consents given for transport or access. We have no such provision within the UN Convention. So the question is, anybody can then access anything? It’s a question to be asked, Nick. I have a question for you regarding what Patrick said. It’s very important that whatever data you look at is authentic, reliable. And so my question is, how do you verify these images? We saw this wonderful video, to the standard that allowed them to be used as evidence in court, you know, what is the, and have you had experience with, say, war crimes triangles, et cetera? Thank you.

Nick Waters:
Okay, yeah, so what we’ve been doing is working with the Global Legal Action Network, who are a group of lawyers, carry out strategic litigation in order to assess if this kind of information that I showed you can actually be used as evidence. Primarily, this is focused in common law, so the law of England and Wales. However, what we’ve done is focus on the principles of the admissibility of evidence. And so we believe that the methodology that we’ve created with the Global Legal Action Network enables the possibility that some of this, these videos, these images, could be used as evidence in the future. Obviously, it’s not a guarantee, and this is only one way of doing it. Human Rights Centre at Berkeley obviously has the Berkeley Protocol, which our methodology, we believe, is consistent with, but those are the principles that we’ve sought to apply. So when you actually investigate these kind of pieces of content, we talked specifically about AI. However, AI still isn’t really at the point where it can create believable content. At the moment, the majority of the problems come from real content that’s been repurposed from one event that’s been repurposed to say it comes from a different event. And by some very simple verification steps, by placing a piece of content in space and time, you can exclude all of that misleading information. We also seek to use contextual verification as well, comparing it to the context of the event at the time, as well as cross-reference verification. So for example, you can imagine that if a incident happens in a large city, say an airstrike, there will be multiple people who will take pictures and videos, because that’s what people do. It’s happened in Syria, it happened in Yemen, it’s happened in Ukraine. And so we will seek out that content, place it in space and time, and seek it to compare with other pieces of content. So we’ve been thinking about this from the very kind of basic, placing this content in time and space, and then all the way up to the principles of evidential admissibility. anyone is interested in that our methodology with Global Legal Action Network is available online. You just need to look for Glenn Bellingcat and then methodology and you’ll find it.

Moderator:
Thank you, Nick. Thanks. I hope that addresses some of the concerns regarding how this can be used, especially with respect to prosecution. I will be asking John a question about what you’ve been doing with the ICC prosecutor and how you’ve helped. But before I do that, I know a gentleman’s been waiting for some time actually. No, no, absolutely. Please, the floor is yours.

Audience:
Thank you for giving me the second time. I have like small commentary for Natalia. Please. I completely agree with her, with you about that Russia and Ukraine actually have not only like classical war, but also informational war. And the citizens of both countries are suffering from that. It’s absolutely true. But my question to you was about like Ukrainian, baked and sometimes Ukrainian state baked criminals, not like Russian because everything is clear about Russian criminals. So I feel like my question was left unanswered. But my next question is like to you and to Nick, because frankly speaking, I think that war crime is war crime and no matter who did it, who committed it and where. And in terms of conventions, because you said that the Russian inside and conventions, it doesn’t trust or these war crimes cannot be persecuted by this legal way. This sounds a bit strange because there are certain war crimes where like Russia is not even a struggling party. For example, like some soldier killing some civilian on Ukrainian territory, not related to Russia at all. And this is actually the situation where this convention would be used possibly, but let’s stand off Ukraine for a while because I see it like causes some like hot atmosphere here. Thank you for like letting me continue. So my question is to Nick, because in the context I have just given for like last three days, we actually seeing like this normal events in between Israel and Palestine. And like there is plenty of direct electronic evidence of war crimes committed by each party, by Palestinians and by Israelis. There are clearly war crimes. You don’t have to be an expert. You don’t have to be like a lawyer or some kind of specialist to call what is it actually is. So what is your attitude? What is your approach to these kinds of war crimes in this conflict? And maybe there are any investigations already available. And what do you think if any international law or international cooperation could be used in such a way of, in such a conflict? Thank you.

Moderator:
Thank you for your question. First of all, let me clarify what I said earlier was that you’d given examples of cyber crime, not war crimes. And so-

Audience:
I’ve given also examples of war crimes because there were like some situations where like, sorry about getting to Ukraine again, but there was some like events when Ukrainian army, Ukrainian soldiers were killing Ukrainian civilians. That is what I was speaking about. Thank you.

Moderator:
Thank you for your question. Okay. So the idea was that basically for cyber crime and for electronic evidence, the Budapest Convention provides an international law basis. We don’t have another convention that does that. So therefore one would have to be a party to be able to do the exchange of information. and electronic evidence, therefore, Russia being a party to that would be helpful if Russia wanted to take advantage of it. So for instance, I assume that since the point that you’re making is that Russian victims are involved, it would be then, therefore, the responsibility, I would imagine, of Russian government to say that it wants to be able to defend its people. And so therefore, I would imagine they would want to join the commission, but they’ve chosen not to. That was the point we were making. On the other question regarding Palestine and Israel, et cetera, let me just say this, of course. We will obviously go to the panel. We are not here discussing international war crimes generally. The topic of our conversation, and I think you said it earlier, Patrick, you realize we’re not the War Crimes Tribunal, is to look at electronic evidence and how it, especially OSINT, can be used in various segments. It could be any conflict. It could be the Palestinian conflict. It could be the Russian-Israel situation we just saw. Sorry, the Russian-Ukraine situation and the Palestine-Israel situation we just recently saw. We’re not taking any position, per se. It’s a question of academic question. Now, over to the panel. Does anybody else want to answer any of the questions that have been asked? John, anyone? Natalia, please.

Nataliya Tkachuk:
Thank you for your comments, for your question. And you’re totally right. The justice and the rule of law is a common democratic value. This is the value that my country is fighting against the Russian Federation. And every war criminal should be brought to justice, should be accounted for what he did. That’s why there is international mechanisms, international legislation, and the Budapest Convention as well. But I disagree with you that you said that there is information war, that Ukrainians are suffering and Russians are suffering. Russians are not suffering from information war from any other countries, except from their political leaders. They block all the internet. They block all the media. And people who have another point of view that they are political leaders, they are simply scared, because they simply go to jail. This is the information war. information war in Russia, war from its political leadership. That’s what I wanted to comment. Thank you.

Patrick Penninchx:
I know there was a very specific question that is directed to Nick. And so I hope that Nick and John can answer those questions. But unfortunately, Zahid, I have to correct you at this point in time, because I must say that the Russian Federation at this point in time will not be able to join the Cybercrime Convention for the simple reason that the Russian Federation was expelled from the Council of Europe and has lost its status with the Council of Europe because of not respecting human rights and the basic values that the Council of Europe stands for and was therefore expelled from the Council of Europe following the Russian invasion, illegal invasion in Ukraine. So that option is not open at this point in time. It was open in the past, as you said, but that is no longer an option right now. That’s all I wanted to say because there were some specific questions to the other.

Moderator:
This is one of the welcome times where I like your criticism and disagreement with me. So I’m very happy. Thank you so much for that.

Nick Waters:
Nick, please. Yeah, sure. So in the context of Israel-Palestine, yeah, so the very first thing you said that we can say that war crimes, one of the things we’ve been very, very careful about from Bellingcat’s side, specifically within my team, is that we cannot say that. We cannot say something like that. We are not lawyers. We work with lawyers, with GLAN, but we cannot make those kind of statements. And that’s one thing that we’ve been very careful about doing, and in terms of using the vocabulary to describe events that have been happening, both in terms of Israel-Palestine now, but also in terms of Russian invasion of Ukraine, and also other instances as well. We can’t say that. We’re not lawyers. So in terms of the actual approach, at the moment, the amount of content is horrifying. What we’ve been doing is pretty much what has become standard for these kind of incidents. We’ve been collecting the content and we’ve been trying to preserve it. So there are some organizations which do this. You may be familiar with Mnemonic, which helped to collect this kind of information. of content and preserve that forensically so that later on there is a chain of custody and it could potentially be used as evidence. And that’s what we’re doing at the moment. But in terms of further investigations, I don’t know at this point. As I said, like the amount of stuff going on is absolutely horrific. You know, we’re talking about the use of high explosive weapons within Garda Strip and then also the events that Hamas has perpetrated, which looks like widespread killings of civilians, including minors. And this is something which is very, very difficult to investigate simply because there’s so much of it. The vast amount of atrocities that we see simply are never investigated. With that said, our partners, BLAN, are very keen to work within the context of Israel-Palestine simply because they have been working on strategic litigation in support of potential breaches, potential crimes have happened or alleged crimes, I beg your pardon, that have happened in the occupied Palestinian territories. So that’s something that I think that I would hope that we would eventually be able to contribute towards. Thank you.

Moderator:
Thank you very much, Nick. We obviously are trying to make sure that we also are paying attention to the online participation. And Georgi, I believe you have a comment that’s been made in the chat. And if you could read it out for the audience, please, over to you.

Giorgi Jokhadze:
Yes, thank you very much, Zahid. So there was some exchange in the chat and one of the questions came through, which is, I’ll just read it out like directly and then let everyone respond to it. How can we ensure having the neutral, valid and legitimate evidence system when the crime is committed against Ukrainian and Palestinian people? So the question is about, I mean, the availability of neutral, valid and legitimate evidence system, irrespective, actually, if I understood where the crime is being committed. Georgi, we’re having some difficulty understanding

Moderator:
the question, if you could slowly and maybe loudly, because we lost some of it, if you could repeat it. Thank you so much. Okay, my apologies. So the question is,

Giorgi Jokhadze:
is, how can we ensure having the neutral, valid, and legitimate evidence system, whether the crime is committed against Ukrainian or Palestinian people? So in my interpretation, that refers to what is the, I mean, how is the question of availability of neutral, valid, and legitimate evidence system at the moment, irrespective of whether crime is being committed?

Moderator:
So I think the question for all of us is, how do we, in this process of where we’re looking at OSINT and electronic evidence, ensure that there is neutrality and independence, and that we’re not biased and prejudiced? And this is a good question for everybody, because we are all doing different roles. Someone’s from the National Security Organization, someone’s from organizations which are private sector, et cetera. If you could let me go one after the other. John, would you like to take the first one, please?

John Hering:
Yeah, I mean, I think it’s a good example here from sort of just an objective new tool that Microsoft partnered with Accenture to support the ICC, the National Criminal Court. And its prosecutor that was launched last summer is the OTP Link platform that we put together. This is a fairly sophisticated, but at the end of the day, simple platform created for the recipient of Article 15 submissions from witnesses to potential war crimes, either before or after a preliminary examination has begun by the ICC. Again, this is irrespective of which side of a conflict you would find yourself on. But it would serve to unify a sort of disjointed process into a single system, create a digital chain of custody to collect and preserve that information, to hopefully create a tamper-proof record that can be used to be substantiated and further investigated later. So this is one example of the type of sort of objective tool that technology companies can help advance.

Nick Waters:
Yeah, in terms of the type of policy, there are a couple of points within our technology that we found to be really valuable. Right there. Hello? Yeah. So with regards to neutrality and bias, the methodology that we’ve worked with GLAN has a specific section regarding bias. And that includes both your own personal bias as well as the bias of potential from algorithms, for example. And that’s something we’ve really sought to address within that methodology. From my own personal perspective, it’s important to be able to mitigate our own biases and recognize them as well. Because once you can recognize those biases, then you can actually go on to seek to mitigate them. And one of the things that we’ve sought to do is to hire people who have deep local knowledge of context. So it’s not just another group of, forgive me, white European people looking at a situation and saying, this is exactly what’s happening. We have sought to actually hire people who have that particular perspective and who understand the local issues. Thank you.

Patrick Penninchx:
If I may. It’s clear that right now, technological advantage. and advancements have enabled individuals, but also states and regimes to easily manipulate data in an electronic form. So raising questions about the credibility and authenticity is fully legitimate. And I think that’s really important. And in order to ensure that data may be used as an electronic evidence for trial purposes, there must be a number of criteria, as I mentioned before. Data must be preserved like any data, like any evidence in any court. They must be preserved safely and kept due to, especially the high volatility of these data. They must be safely guarded and protected. Quite a lot of the data which are right now specific to the war against Ukraine, but also Palestine and Israel right now is available also from foreign sources. And some of those sources and many of those are stored in foreign jurisdictions. That means that including also in the cloud, obviously. So we need to be able to authenticate those sources in order to ensure that they are not flout. And that goes for any conflict from any side, from any party, whether that be Israel or Palestine, whether that be Russian Federation or Ukraine. I think that is really important. The collected information and the sources, they must be authenticated, as I said, verified and available for review to be able to demonstrate that the data is not fake, simply. And I think if we can take that as a starting point, and it is not for this panel, but it’s for the court to decide whether that is in the end information that can be used in trial or not. Thank you.

Moderator:
We’ll be going to Jayanth because I want to also ask him to explain, because the question was asked earlier about Article 15 and human rights and the Budapest Convention. So maybe he can shed some light on that, but also wanted to. to just inform the audience, are there any other questions? If there are, please do what you’re invited to come to the mic and ask. If you have a question, comment, or intervention, please, you’re very welcome to do so. Jayantha, if we could go to you online and ask you if you could respond to the question that was made, and I know because you do a lot of this work about the human rights aspects and the possible abuse by law enforcement of the powers that are available within the Budapest Convention and how that is mitigated, et cetera. If we could all go over to you and maybe you can help us with that. Thank you.

Jayantha Fernando:
Yeah, you were not very clear, Zahid, on your question, but if I’m to clarify the rule of Article 15, the provisions contained in the Budapest Convention starts with Article 14, the procedural measures where every party that is introducing legislative and other procedural measures provided for under the procedural tools and international cooperation tools in the convention for the purposes of not only cybercrime investigations, but all other investigations or other criminal investigations have to ensure that there are established safeguards within the scope of Article 15. And as you rightly said, the Article 15 human rights safeguards illustrates this with reference to international conventions that countries would have to may consider joining. So as far as some of our countries are concerned, many of us have become state parties to international conventions such as ICCPR. so on and so forth. And that has led to introduction of procedural measures in our domestic system to enable the judicial authorities to exercise their supervision. So that is one way in which I would say that the safeguards are implemented. This is not magic, this is not rocket science, this is just the procedural safeguards and standards that our country following rule of law, human rights safeguards have to follow through judicial intervention and other measures. And going further, as a state party to the Budapest Convention, the Sri Lankan law enforcement authorities revised their standard operating procedures based on inputs we got under the Council of Europe LACI project to ensure that the methodology for electronic evidence gathering, collection and international cooperation that led to its collection are done in accordance with international standards. And the SOPs were mapped to the international law instruments available within the

Moderator:
scope of the convention. Thank you. Thank you, Jayanta, that’s very helpful. I understand we have another question that has come online. So Georgi, may I move over to you and you can

Giorgi Jokhadze:
read out the question? Thank you. Yes, of course, Zahid. I hope there are no problems this time, so I’ll read it out slowly. The question is exactly which provisions of the Budapest Convention would be applicable to investigate and prosecute war crimes?

Moderator:
Thank you. I’m sure I have something to say about that, but maybe anybody from the panel wants to take that? No? Okay. So provisions, basically these provisions apply to any investigation. It doesn’t matter whether it’s war crimes or anything. In fact, there’s an article 14 that specifically states that any crime… where there’s electronic evidence involved, the convention would be applicable to such investigation and prosecution. So whether it’s war crimes, whether it’s theft, kidnapping, rape, whatever have you, as long as there’s digital evidence involved, the Budapest Convention applies. So that would be the sort of basic answer to that. But beyond that, I think the international cooperation provisions of the convention, particularly Article 32, which allows for trans-border access in certain circumstances is an important tool. And as I mentioned earlier, it’s absent from the UN draft that we are currently seeing. And so the question arises, what are the human rights or civil liberties restrictions that would apply to trans-border access, for instance? Of course, they do exist in the Budapest Convention. So I think that’s my answer. Janatha, since you do this a lot as well with me, would you like to also say something about what are the provisions that would be applicable to war crimes, for instance, related to the Budapest Convention? Thank you.

Jayantha Fernando:
Yeah, so I think you can clearly mention the applicability of the procedural provisions based on the reference to Article 14. So I think Article 14 is the provision that can be invoked here. But what is, in addition to Article 32, I think we need to understand the scope and ambit of other provisions, such as, I would say, Article 18, the production order provisions that enables a domestic authority to obtain evidence from any service provider, offering a service to one’s own jurisdiction. And then you have other very innovative provisions, such as Article 26, spontaneous information, where information gathered from. international service providers can be shared by law enforcement authorities. But we have to understand that all this is available tools for state parties to the Budapest Cyber Crime Prevention Convention. And that is something we need to emphasize in the context of the question that was posed. Thank you.

Moderator:
Jonathan, thank you. That’s amazing. We always come back to you when we need a question on the convention answer. So we have a question and I must sort of alert everybody that there are certain platforms who might be present in the room. I mentioned in this question. So going to the remote participant, would you be able to please read out the question in the chat?

Giorgi Jokhadze:
Thank you. Yes, I’ll try to also remind you. I mean, I’m worried it out quickly. Remind you also because of a limit of time. So maybe we’ll not take the questions after this as well. So basically, I’ll just shorten it as well. But because please read the whole thing. And if you could speak loudly, that would help. Yes. Yes. Since in relation to the Budapest Convention, the war crimes as such were mentioned and meaning a comprehensive approach that we can expect the Budapest Convention and its protocol to be used for investigation, prosecution of. Sorry, that’s that’s another question. Sorry, I just missed the previous one. My apologies. My apologies. We’re having some difficulty hearing you, Jorgi.

Moderator:
Do you mind if I just take this because it’s the last one? I really doubt if that’s all right. Thank you. Yes. Thank you. Sorry, Zahid. Not at all. Not at all. You know, technology. The issue of bias of cross-border digital platforms regarding the parties to the conflict in maintaining and preserving electronic data and evidence is very important. How do you want to face it? For example, Meta and Instagram cannot be neutral about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict due to their ownership structure. With thanks for your attention. This is the question that we posted in the chat. Anybody want to take that? John? Nick? Go ahead, please.

Nick Waters:
I’ll give you my mic. Yeah, OK. So social media platforms definitely should not be regarded as being neutral. They have obviously between them, they each have different moderation policies. And even within them, the moderation policies are very, very different from country to country. If anyone recalls the kind of moderation changing over 2015 as a result of Islamic State content being posted online, they’ll understand this. Arabic content was and I believe is still being used. moderated very, very differently from, say, for example, English speaking content. And we’ve seen that very specifically in the case of Myanmar, where Facebook has basically been accused of enabling ethnic cleansing. These platforms have deliberately tried to distance themselves from their responsibilities, deliberately stating that they are not publishers of that information, so trying to avoid responsibility. However, they are, to a certain extent, responsible for some of the information that they post online. You know, the algorithm decides what information is shown to what people. So should they be regarded as being neutral? No, I don’t believe they are. And so you need to try and seek that to mitigate that. They are an incredibly valuable source of information. But yes, they should not be regarded as neutral, I think, in these contexts.

Moderator:
Thank you. We’re starting to get a lot of questions in the chat. If I may read out the next one we have. And since in relation to the Budapest Convention, I believe I should say, war crimes as such were mentioned and meaning a comprehensive approach, can we expect the Budapest Convention and this protocol to be used for investigation and prosecution of the U.S. military outrages in Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq? There is plenty of evidence on those notorious cases, is the question asked in the chat. Anyone who would like to take that? Please, Patrick.

Patrick Penninchx:
Well, Zahid, you also already mentioned before that for the time being, and as I said in the opening remarks, even though the Budapest Convention now covers 68 states, it doesn’t cover all the countries in the world. And we’re hoping and wanting to increase, of course, the number of states that will join the Budapest Convention, provided that a respect article 15, because the Budapest Convention is not a convention that exists in the void. It exists within a specific context, which is the protection of human rights, rule of law, and pluralist democracy. And countries that join the Budapest Convention comply with those principles. And in that respect, of course, the 20 or more countries that have now been invited to accede, unfortunately, the countries that have been mentioned there are not part of that list. So I think that is one of the key principles. Of course, we would like to see that all those other countries would join. We know that there are a number of differences and divergences when we look at the UN discussions that are taking place. So we cannot make a convention applicable to those countries that have not joined it. And again, article 15, human rights principles need to be respected.

Moderator:
Absolutely right. And in addition, I would also sort of add that absolutely, the answer to the question that has been raised, to the extent that the countries are part of the list, as Patrick mentioned, those would be, the convention could be used for electronic evidence. It’s very important to be clear. The Budapest Convention’s role is of an electronic evidence convention. It is only going to tell you that this is evidence, it’s admissible, this is how you collect it, this is how you present it, these are the safeguards. From then on, basically the rules of the court, whether it’s the ICC, for instance, whether it’s a domestic court or any other would take over. And so the question that I think you pose is not about electronic evidence, unfortunately, I wish it was, but it is about what the other courts would do. And I think that’s a question for them. But Patrick, thank you so much for that response. We are now absolutely last at the last minute. I’m not doing a great job keeping up. So if I could ask the panel to give wrap-ups and I will go to my right and then down the chain. I believe that Jayanthi would not be available, so it’s only us in the room who will be wrapping up. John, please, over to you.

John Hering:
Absolutely. I actually think that’s a great transition to sort of my final thoughts here. Yes, I opened it by saying that there’s a new domain of conflict that’s going to require us to innovate appropriately in our international systems, is that we’re keeping pace with new threats and new challenges, including cyber operations and armed conflict. And so to your point, it’s important that our international institutions are stepping into play a role to uphold those same expectations that exist in the physical domain as well as in the digital domain. And so it was heartening to hear just last month, perhaps it was like six weeks ago now, the ICC prosecutor for the first time announced that his office will be investigating cyber-enabled war crimes specifically. And it’s encouraging to see our international framework starting to apply

Nick Waters:
online as well. Yeah, thank you. Just to say that I think this kind of information would allow more atrocities to be investigated. That kind of information will help, but it cannot replace traditional evidence and it must fit within the currently established principles of legal admissibility. And hopefully, being able to share that kind of information will be useful in the future to holding more people to account for their actions. Thank you.

Nataliya Tkachuk:
Thank you very much for this discussion. I think this discussion was very fruitful. And again, thank you for your support to Ukraine. And this war showed the new role of electronic evidence, the new role of open source intelligence. And we will learn how to do with this. And we were discussing bias and neutrality of electronic evidence. And I agree with you that the main thing, these are procedures. We need to follow the procedures. We need to understand procedures. And I’m thankful to the Council of Europe, because I know the Council of Europe conducts a lot of trainings in Ukraine for judges, prosecutors, for civil society. Because in Ukraine, collecting evidence of war crime is a task for all civil society. And this is very, very important. Thank you.

Patrick Penninchx:
Thank you. The Budapest Convention, as we said, is a criminal law convention. It is not a war crime convention. That is number one. But we know that expedited preservation and exchange of stored information data, including from service providers, is crucial. And a reminder that Article 2 of the Budapest Convention can be used to access and obtain open source information across borders. And that can later on be used in trial. Thank you.

Moderator:
Absolutely. Thank you for adding that, Patrick. So it’s my job now to give the floor back to Georgi, and then I’ll make some closing remarks. Georgi, over to you for some wrap-up.

Giorgi Jokhadze:
Yes, thank you very much. I think we heard a lot of very interesting ideas. And it’s a challenge to compress everything into the final, let’s say, points of the meeting, which I’m not trying to do. do right now because I think it will be just a job for myself and Zahid in the aftermath of the meeting that will communicate them properly to IGF Secretariat. But if I can sort of try to play to the main leitmotif, I think that we have covered a lot of ground when it comes to the open source intelligence and information being a part of the overall picture. So I think that, to paraphrase maybe Patrick a bit, so we don’t apply these concepts in the void as much as we also don’t apply the Budapest Convention in the void. So we have to make sure that the open source intelligence, that all the data information we’re getting from open sources is also part of the applicable and clear legal framework that is going to bring perpetrators to justice. So that is my own, let’s say, view on the discussions here, but I think that we’ll have to flesh it out a little bit more also as conclusions to the Secretariat. Thank you, Gyorgy. Zahid, back to you.

Moderator:
Thank you, Gyorgy. Just last comments. So open source intelligence and the use of how this evidence works is very different from something we’ve seen before, because it’s open source, it can change hands, etc. And to be able to use this electronic evidence in various things, including war crimes and human rights abuses, is extremely important. And the role of the Convention in being able to do that vis-a-vis, for instance, we don’t have that possibility within the UN Convention, for instance, and maybe other places. So it’s helpful to think about what we can do to improve that in other structures as well. I just wanted to say thank you for all the participants who have been here. Thank you for the questions that were asked. I think that was very helpful because they engaged. Thank you for the questions. Also, to the online participants and questions, thank you for that. It helped us basically answer and think about new things. And thanks to the organizers, because they provide us a massive room. And so a lot of people, we didn’t expect this many people to fill this room. So I really appreciate everybody coming. Thank you. That’s all from us. Goodbye.

Corway Wu

In the realm of disinformation, politicians are also actively involved in creating and spreading false information, not just news media and social media. This amplifies the scope of actors responsible for misleading the public. The negative sentiment towards politicians indicates a lack of trust in their intentions.

Timing is a crucial aspect in the dissemination of disinformation. The example of Brexit voting behavior is used to demonstrate this. Voters may be influenced by inaccurate information without realizing it until it is too late. This implies that the impact of disinformation can have lasting effects, shaping important decisions.

However, an opposing viewpoint is presented, disagreeing with Jeanette’s argument about the significance of timing when discussing disinformation. It is argued that Jeanette’s failure to consider timing weakens their argument. The negative sentiment expressed towards this disagreement suggests a potential blind spot in understanding the issue.

Overall, this analysis illustrates the multifaceted nature of disinformation and its wide-ranging consequences. Politicians, news media, and social media platforms are all complicit in perpetuating false information. The timing of disinformation is highlighted as a crucial factor, as it can significantly influence its impact on individuals and societies. The disagreement regarding the importance of timing further emphasizes the complexity of this subject.

Audience

The analysis delved into the multifaceted nature of misinformation and disinformation. One of the speakers put forth the argument that these actions have the potential to incite individuals to act against democratic institutions. To support this claim, they highlighted the example of the January 6th Capitol riots, which they believed were inspired by misinformation and disinformation. The speaker’s sentiment was negative, suggesting concern about the impact of these actions on democracy.

However, another speaker expressed a more neutral stance, highlighting the challenge of settling on a clear definition of disinformation. They pointed out that assessing the longitudinal impact of disinformation is challenging. This sentiment indicates a level of uncertainty regarding the extent to which misinformation and disinformation can influence actions and outcomes.

A disagreement emerged regarding the possibility of completely eliminating disinformation. One speaker argued that efforts should be directed towards reducing its spread and minimizing the damage caused, rather than striving for complete elimination. This sentiment aligned with a more positive outlook on the issue.

In the specific context of Switzerland, it was suggested that disinformation does not possess enough influence to significantly sway elections. The speaker based this claim on the observation that Switzerland has a stable multi-party system with relatively consistent voting patterns over the past 30 years. This sentiment reflects a more neutral perspective on the impact of disinformation in the Swiss political landscape.

The analysis also examined the potential effects of disinformation on internet infrastructure and connectivity. There was evidence suggesting that disinformation governance can impact internet infrastructure, with an example cited of Europe implementing IP blocking of Russian websites spreading disinformation. This negative sentiment implies the belief that the weaponization of disinformation through online platforms has had widespread consequences.

The audience raised concerns regarding the potential threat disinformation poses to the fundamental right of freedom of expression. Historical examples, such as the information war of the Cold War and the use of radio for propaganda during Nazi Germany, were provided to illustrate this point. This sentiment highlights the importance of protecting freedom of expression in the face of disinformation.

Notably, the analysis explored the effectiveness of the Christchurch Call initiative in response to live-streamed terrorist attacks in New Zealand. The sentiment here was negative, as it was argued that rushed solutions to govern and regulate disinformation can cause unintended harm. The speaker stressed the need for a nuanced approach to address disinformation, referencing the impact of tackling disinformation in G7 declarations.

The audience member supporting the Christchurch Call initiative expressed a positive sentiment, believing in its effectiveness. They emphasized the significance of trust-building and multi-stakeholder involvement in addressing terrorism facilitated by online platforms. This aligns with the overall positive sentiment of utilizing a multi-stakeholder model and engaging governments, tech firms, and civil society in combating disinformation.

In conclusion, the analysis highlighted the complex nature of misinformation and disinformation. The arguments presented ranged from the potential dangers of these actions in undermining democratic institutions to the challenges in defining and assessing their impacts. The disagreement regarding the elimination of disinformation reflected a difference in perspectives, with one side advocating for reducing its spread. The analysis also shed light on the specific impacts of disinformation on internet infrastructure, the threat it poses to freedom of expression, and the potential effectiveness of initiatives such as the Christchurch Call in preventing terrorism. Overall, the analysis underscores the need for nuanced approaches and multi-stakeholder involvement to address disinformation and its various repercussions.

Anriette Esterhuysen

The analysis provides a comprehensive overview of perspectives on disinformation in South Africa, covering various viewpoints and arguments. One viewpoint suggests that disinformation is not a major problem in the country, with more concern placed on trusting the government. The public tends to rely on the media, which is regarded as well self-regulated and proficient in dealing with disinformation. Fact-checking is also a common practice in South Africa, swiftly and efficiently debunking false information.

Another argument highlights the successful media regulation in South Africa, which ensures accuracy across different ideological spectrums. It is noted that a commitment to accuracy exists among right-wing, center, and left-wing media outlets in the country. Fact-checking is a prevalent practice, further enhancing the reliability and trustworthiness of the media. This observation supports the notion that media regulation in South Africa effectively maintains accuracy and minimises the spread of disinformation.

The analysis also emphasises the need for careful consideration in the international regulation of disinformation. It is crucial to explore the implications of such regulation on access to information and freedom of expression. While national initiatives regarding disinformation regulation are controversial, existing international instruments may serve as a baseline for effectively governing disinformation.

Furthermore, the analysis highlights the distinct dynamics of weaponising disinformation in online platforms compared to traditional broadcasting platforms. Unlike traditional platforms, online platforms allow for the widespread distribution of disinformation without requiring significant political or economic power. This observation emphasises the need for tailored approaches in combating disinformation across different digital platforms.

A noteworthy observation from the analysis is the advocacy for considering bottom-up approaches and self-regulation measures alongside governmental regulations. Anriette Esterhuysen argues that jumping to governmental regulations without exploring more bottom-up ways may be premature. While a regulatory response might be necessary, Esterhuysen highlights the importance of not dismissing self-regulatory and bottom-up approaches to tackle disinformation. This perspective demonstrates a concern that solely relying on governmental regulations might overlook effective alternatives.

Overall, the analysis offers valuable insights into the various dimensions of disinformation in South Africa. The perspectives presented shed light on the strengths of the country’s media regulation, the challenges faced in international regulation, the dynamics of online platforms, and the importance of considering diverse approaches to combat disinformation.

Remy Milan

Misinformation poses a significant threat to the stability of state institutions, as it undermines citizens’ confidence in these establishments. This erosion of trust has detrimental effects on democracy and should not be underestimated. Remy Milan also shares this view, considering misinformation to be a high-level danger to state institutions. The spread of false or misleading information can have far-reaching consequences in a democracy. It confuses and disenchants citizens, weakening the democratic fabric by eroding trust between the governing and the governed. This issue is especially relevant to SDG 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, which aims to ensure inclusive governance and access to justice for all. Misinformation disrupts this goal by sowing doubt and creating divisions within society, hindering efforts to achieve peace and justice. It is worth noting that advances in technology, particularly social media platforms, have facilitated the spread of false information, making it easier for malicious actors to manipulate public opinion. Addressing this issue requires a multi-faceted approach, including education, media literacy, regulation, and responsible platform governance. Overall, the danger of misinformation to state institutions is significant, impacting citizens’ confidence and threatening democracy itself. Remy Milan emphasizes the importance of addressing this issue for achieving SDG 16 and ensuring peace, justice, and strong institutions. Efforts must be made to promote media literacy, regulate false information, and foster trust and critical thinking to uphold the integrity of state institutions and democratic values.

Jeanette Hofmann

This discussion explores the impact of disinformation on people’s minds and voting behaviour. One participant criticises the limited knowledge surrounding this issue due to the lack of empirical evidence. They argue that it is essential to conduct research to better understand how disinformation affects individuals and their decision-making processes.

Another participant highlights the strategic intent of disinformation, stating that it is often used as a tool to manipulate people’s behaviour and influence their worldviews. Disinformation is seen as a deliberate tactic that focuses on achieving specific objectives.

The conversation also emphasises the need to expand research on disinformation beyond platforms and consider the wider media landscape. It is noted that context plays a crucial role, and solely examining platforms and algorithms is insufficient. The impact of disinformation should be studied within the broader media environment to gain a comprehensive understanding of its effects.

Furthermore, it is observed that individuals sharing disinformation may not necessarily believe the information themselves. Instead, they may be using it as a means to signal their belonging or loyalty to a certain group or ideology. This highlights the complex motivations behind the sharing of disinformation and the need to consider social and psychological factors in analysing its influence.

The conversation also touches upon the rising disregard for truth and the detrimental impact it has on public discourse and democracy. This trend of increasing tribal attitudes and a lack of concern for distinguishing truth from falsity has severe consequences for the functioning of society and democratic processes.

Regarding the governance of the internet, there is a recognition that infrastructure standards need global agreement to ensure a cohesive global network. However, content regulation should not be undertaken at a global level, as it may impinge upon freedom of speech and local autonomy.

The Digital Service Act, proposed by the European Commission, is viewed as an interesting development. It extends the scope of human rights to not only govern the relationship between people and governments but also guide platform behaviours. This recognition that the private sector’s influence on the exercise of human rights should be guided by human rights principles is seen as positive.

The Act’s provision for data access related to systemic risks caused by platforms is supported. This data access allows for a better, evidence-based understanding of the impact of disinformation. However, the concept of needing to mobilise systemic risk to gain access to data is criticised, highlighting the need for more efficient mechanisms.

The discussion concludes with the suggestion that the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) could serve as a platform to discuss and implement best practices derived from Article 40 of the Digital Service Act. This highlights the potential for international collaboration and knowledge-sharing in addressing disinformation and its consequences.

Overall, this discussion emphasises the urgent need for comprehensive research, consideration of wider media environments, and the recognition of the complex motivations behind the sharing of disinformation. It also addresses the importance of upholding human rights principles and the challenges of content regulation in a global and interconnected digital landscape.

Bili Drake

The impact of disinformation on democracy is a complex issue that is influenced by various factors and is context-dependent. Different perspectives exist on the extent to which disinformation can affect democratic processes. Some argue that disinformation can have a significant negative impact on democracy, while others caution against oversimplifying the issue and relying on false dichotomies.

It has been observed that a considerable amount of disinformation originates from broadcast media and is then amplified through social media platforms. This highlights the interconnectedness between different forms of media in the spread of disinformation. Several studies have indicated this behavior, emphasizing the importance of understanding the role played by different media channels in the dissemination of disinformation.

One key aspect that complicates the issue of disinformation is the lack of a standardised definition. Leading organisations like the European Union and the UN Special Rapporteur have differing definitions of disinformation, which can give rise to confusion and inconsistencies in tackling this problem. It becomes crucial to establish a common understanding to effectively address disinformation.

Tribal loyalty is identified as a significant factor that can lead individuals to believe in disinformation. In cases like the United States, where tribal affiliations and identity politics play a prominent role, people may align with certain narratives or disinformation due to their loyalty to a particular group. This highlights how social and political factors can impact an individual’s susceptibility to disinformation.

Identity politics further compounds the issue, distorting the perception of truth. Some individuals develop their identities around opposing certain groups or ideologies, leading them to embrace disinformation that aligns with their pre-existing biases. This phenomenon highlights the role of emotions and personal beliefs in shaping the acceptance of disinformation.

Efforts to regulate disinformation on a global level have been proposed, but doubts remain about their effectiveness. Discussions in the United Nations have seen various proposals related to disinformation, such as China’s suggestion to criminalise its spread and UNESCO’s guidelines for digital platforms. However, the complexities and geopolitical divisions inherent in regulating disinformation make it challenging to achieve meaningful global regulation. As a result, long-term engagement is advocated, focusing on building infrastructure to challenge disinformation effectively.

The proposal for a code of conduct on information integrity for digital platforms is seen as an attempt at global internet governance. This proposal aims to govern the information that flows through digital networks, aligning with the definition of internet governance. It raises questions about the extent to which such regulations should be implemented and their potential impact on freedom of expression and privacy.

The primary responsibility to counter disinformation lies with states, according to the UN General Assembly’s resolution. While platforms such as social media play a role, governments bear the primary responsibility to address the issue effectively. Simply pressuring platforms to act does not address the root causes of disinformation.

It is important to recognise that disinformation can originate from various sources, including the dark web. This highlights the need for a comprehensive approach that looks beyond platforms alone. Strategies should encompass multiple sources and channels through which disinformation can be generated and disseminated.

Civil society participation is crucial in the discussion on countering disinformation. While there have been limited discussions on proposals like the UN Secretary General’s Global Digital Compact, greater involvement of civil society in such initiatives can ensure diverse perspectives and balanced decision-making.

In conclusion, addressing the issue of disinformation requires a multifaceted approach that involves governments, platforms, and civil society. The complex nature of disinformation and its impact on democracy necessitate a nuanced understanding, taking into account various factors such as media channels, definitions, tribal loyalty, and identity politics. Efforts to regulate disinformation at a global level should be complemented with long-term engagement and infrastructure-building, recognising the challenges and limitations faced in achieving effective global regulation.

Nighat Dad

Disinformation, which can impact democratic processes, is a topic of concern. However, solid evidence is needed to support this claim. Caution must be exercised in interpreting the complex and contextual definitions of misinformation and disinformation. Disinformation has the potential to harm marginalized groups, and a UN report highlights its negative effects on gender equality. Global governance instruments exist, but their application needs improvement as regulations and laws often suppress freedom of expression. State actors and companies have a shared obligation to provide accurate information and prevent the spread of misinformation. Synergy between existing systems is crucial, and the performance of oversight boards and governance mechanisms must be reviewed. Concerns are raised about governments misusing guidelines and the lack of accountability. Regulatory mechanisms are needed to hold state actors accountable. User rights should not be forgotten in regions with restrictions. The local context is vital, and more global oversight boards are necessary to hold companies accountable. Transparency reports play a key role in holding platforms accountable.

Clara Iglesias Keller

Disinformation has the potential to undermine democracy, although its impact varies depending on the context. While there is currently no solid empirical evidence to suggest that disinformation directly changes voters’ behaviors or affects election results, there is a consensus that further research is necessary to fully understand its implications.

The existing research on the impact of disinformation is primarily focused on the United States and Europe, highlighting a need for expanding studies to include other regions such as Latin America, Africa, and Asia. It is important to understand how disinformation strategies can influence political transformations in different contexts.

Disinformation is considered a communication practice and an online harm, along with misinformation, propaganda, and fake news. Its intent holds significant legal relevance, further emphasizing the need to address the issue.

In some instances, disinformation serves as a form of political intervention. For example, in Brazil, it has been used to express dissatisfaction or directly attack democratic institutions, including the electoral system and high courts. This highlights the destructive potential of disinformation as a tool in political disputes.

However, the concept of disinformation poses a challenge within statutory regulation, as there is no clear space for its definition and regulation.

Global governance solutions, although important, may not be sufficient to address the impact of misinformation and disinformation on political disputes. It is necessary to confront the ultimate convertibility of economic power into political power, particularly within the media landscape. This is evident in countries like Brazil, where traditionally concentrated and unregulated media landscapes contribute to the spread of disinformation.

Additionally, global solutions often rely on consensus-based governance structures, which may lack the power needed to modify digital business models and data usage effectively.

More empirical evidence is needed, especially outside of the global north. In countries like Brazil, internet usage is strongly associated with platforms such as WhatsApp, Facebook, and Instagram, facilitated by zero rating policies. Understanding the impact of disinformation in these regions is crucial for developing effective countermeasures.

In conclusion, addressing the challenges posed by disinformation requires not only further research but also more institutional innovation. This innovation should create an apparatus that allows diverse stakeholders and civil society to engage in the disputation of truth and content. By confronting the convertibility of economic power into political power and exploring alternative governance structures, we can work towards mitigating the harmful effects of disinformation and safeguarding democratic institutions.

David Kaye

Disinformation is a complex issue that involves the dissemination of false or misleading information. It can have various impacts and is spread through different platforms, including legacy media and social platforms. Understanding the nuances of disinformation is crucial, as there is no one-size-fits-all solution to address it.

David Kaye, an advocate for human rights, highlights the importance of clear definitions and understanding in addressing disinformation through legal regulation and governance. However, he expresses concern about the lack of shared definitions, which may impede the process of regulation. Kaye also raises concerns about emerging regulations in Europe and the UK that rely on platforms to define disinformation, as this may affect transparency and risk assessment.

While global regulation of disinformation may seem desirable, Kaye argues that it is not achievable. Instead, he suggests the development of a common set of guiding principles based on human rights. These principles should be the foundation for addressing disinformation, providing a framework that ensures legality, necessity, proportionality, and legitimacy of objectives.

In shaping policies and strategies to combat disinformation, Kaye believes that civil society should play an active role. They should be included in the drafting and adoption process to ensure a more inclusive approach. Additionally, Kaye argues that governments should be held responsible for their behavior and should support public service media, as excluding them would undermine the effectiveness of addressing disinformation.

Over-reliance on platforms for handling disinformation is a matter of concern. Relying solely on platforms may create challenges in terms of transparency, accountability, and bias. Therefore, it is necessary to explore alternative approaches and strategies to combat disinformation effectively.

The leadership of New Zealand in promoting multi-stakeholder approaches and prioritising human rights in times of trauma, such as after the Christchurch attack, is commended by Kaye. He recognises the importance of keeping human rights at the core of global governance. In this regard, Kaye highlights the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) as a platform where human rights and access to information should be given priority.

However, Kaye also warns against adopting ideas that disregard human rights in response to traumatic events, such as the Israel-Palestine conflict. While people may have natural responses to such events, it is crucial to ensure that any responses or measures taken are rooted in human rights principles.

In conclusion, addressing disinformation requires nuanced understanding and a combination of approaches. Clear definitions, shared principles based on human rights, civil society participation, government responsibility, and cautious reliance on platforms are all essential factors in effectively combating disinformation. New Zealand’s leadership and the IGF’s emphasis on human rights in global governance are notable examples of positive progress. However, it is crucial to avoid compromising human rights in times of trauma or conflict.

John Mahob

A recent discussion highlighted the detrimental effect of disinformation on democracy in the Philippines. The concern was voiced by the current president, Marcos, who is the son of the former dictator. One of the key arguments made was that disinformation played a significant role in influencing the outcomes of the recent elections.

Disinformation in the political landscape is seen as a serious threat to the country’s democratic processes. It is suggested that the spread of false information and manipulation of facts can lead to citizens making ill-informed decisions, thus undermining the democratic values of transparency and accountability.

Supporting this viewpoint, John Mahob, a representative from the Foundation for Media Alternatives in the Philippines, also expressed concern over the impact of disinformation on the country’s democracy. He stressed the need to address and counter disinformation, as it has the potential to distort public opinion and undermine the credibility of democratic institutions.

The speakers argued that the negative consequences of disinformation are far-reaching. By spreading false narratives and distorting facts, disinformation can erode trust in institutions and create divisions among citizens. It is seen as a tool that can be used by those in power to manipulate public sentiment and secure their own interests.

The evidence presented by both speakers raises important questions about the state of democracy in the Philippines. The influence of disinformation on the recent elections serves as a warning sign that steps need to be taken to protect the integrity of democratic processes. Efforts to combat disinformation and promote media literacy are crucial in order to safeguard the principles of democracy, uphold freedom of expression, and ensure that citizens are adequately informed to make informed decisions.

In conclusion, the discussion reveals a shared concern about the negative impact of disinformation on democracy in the Philippines. The speakers, including the current president and John Mahob, emphasize the urgent need to address this issue and prevent disinformation from undermining democratic values. It is hoped that by raising awareness and taking appropriate measures, the Philippines can work towards creating a more informed and resilient democratic society.

Aaron Maniam

The analysis explores several key aspects of global governance, regulations, misinformation, and digital regulation. One of the main challenges in defining global governance arises from the presence of different models and guidelines, which leads to variations in the level of guidelines and enforcement, resulting in a lack of consensus on the precise meaning of global governance.

Concerning global governance regulations, it is crucial to distinguish between basic standards and additional issues. Examples such as the Digital Services Act (DSA) in the European Union and online safety regulations in Singapore and the UK emphasize the significance of addressing both fundamental standards and more complex issues in regulating global governance. These regulations play a significant role in achieving Goal 16 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions.

Governments can have contradictory impacts on global governance efforts. On one hand, they can be a source of misinformation, hindering progress towards effective global governance. However, governments also possess the authority and skills necessary to continuously update legislation to keep pace with rapidly evolving technology. This ability is essential for achieving Goal 16 of the SDGs.

Interoperability, the ability for different systems to communicate seamlessly, is a vital aspect of digital regulation. Aaron Maniam highlights the importance of interoperability among different countries, as it enables coherent communication and collaboration. This is linked to Goal 9 of the SDGs: Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure.

A polycentric approach is crucial in combating disinformation. Governments should move away from solely having an authority-based role and embrace a convening function. By engaging in consultation and deliberation, governments can prioritize and address issues related to disinformation in a bottom-up fashion. Additionally, community building, space building, and urban planning should be part of the government’s role in fighting disinformation.

Education and literacy play a pivotal role in tackling disinformation. In Singapore, various organizations, including the National Library Board, the Information and Media Development Authority, and the Cybersecurity Agency, collaborate to operationalize strategies. Education that starts at home and in schools and libraries is highlighted as a key factor in enhancing literacy among citizens. This aligns with Goal 4 of the SDGs: Quality Education.

In summary, the analysis underscores the complexities and challenges of global governance and the importance of clear regulations. It also highlights the dual role of governments as potential sources of misinformation and as crucial actors in updating legislation. Interoperability is crucial for effective digital regulation, and a polycentric approach is essential in combating disinformation. Lastly, education and literacy are vital components in mitigating the impact of disinformation.

Greta

Greta strongly believes that disinformation is significantly weakening democratic systems. This issue is related to the topics of disinformation and democracy and is associated with a negative sentiment. However, no specific supporting facts or arguments were provided to support the claim that disinformation undermines democracy.

Disinformation, the deliberate spread of false or misleading information, poses a serious threat to the democratic process. It can manipulate public opinion, deceive voters, and erode trust in democratic institutions. Greta’s agreement with this viewpoint suggests that she recognizes the detrimental effects that disinformation can have on the functioning of democracies.

Although no specific supporting facts or arguments were presented, it is worth considering the widespread impact of disinformation in recent years. The rise of social media platforms has enabled the rapid spread of false information, often disguised as legitimate news or opinions. This has the potential to sway public opinion and distort democratic discourse.

Furthermore, disinformation campaigns have been known to target elections by spreading false information about candidates or manipulating public sentiment. Such tactics can undermine the integrity of electoral processes and compromise the ability of citizens to make informed choices.

The conclusion drawn from Greta’s strong agreement is that urgent actions are needed to address the problem of disinformation. Safeguarding the democratic process involves countering disinformation through fact-checking, promoting media literacy, and strengthening regulations on social media platforms. It is essential to restore trust and ensure that accurate and reliable information prevails in democratic societies.

In summary, Greta strongly believes that disinformation is undermining democracy. While specific arguments and supporting facts were not provided, the existence of disinformation poses a clear threat to democratic systems. Addressing this issue requires collective efforts to counter disinformation, promote media literacy, and protect the integrity of democratic processes.

Nighat Dad:
missed your question.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
I just wanted to do an audio check to see if we can hear you clearly. Now you can hear me. And we can. Thanks a lot. OK, we’ll start in a few minutes. We’ll start at 1 o’clock on the dot, Japan time. 1 o’clock. 1 o’clock. 1 o’clock. 1 o’clock. 1 o’clock. Thank you. Good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to the Disinformation from an Internet Governance Perspective workshop. My name is Anriette Esterhuisen, and I’ll be moderating. I’m a senior advisor of internet governance at the Association for Progressive Communications. I’ll introduce you to our very diverse and very interesting panel as we do the workshop. But I actually, at this point, because we’re a small group of people, I want to ask you all to stand up. Because we’re going to start with an interactive exercise, professor. That includes you. So just stand up and line up. I’m going to make a statement. And then I’m going to ask you to position yourself. I mean, along this corridor and that corridor, more or less. On that side of the room, if you strongly agree with the statement. Towards this side, if you strongly disagree. And then somewhere in the middle, according to how strongly you agree or disagree. So the statement is, absolutely you. Otherwise, you’re not going to get a chance to speak. Disinformation is undermining democracy. If you agree, go towards that end. Disagree, somewhere around here. And somewhere in the middle. And the idea is, as other people speak, I’m going to ask people why they stand where they stand. Then think about it. Reflect and decide whether you want to move along this imaginary spectrum. Bill Drake, you have to. Then you have to stand in the middle. Disinformation undermines democracy. So I’m going to start over there with somebody who’s right on the other side. Anybody willing to, why? Why do you agree so strongly with this? And just introduce yourself and then say why.

Greta:
Hi, I’m Greta. I think it’s hard to explain, but the feeling that there is information outside that can hurt how our, yeah, how democratic institutions work and function, or, yeah, really.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
So you feel that misinformation can actually undermine the institutions of democracy. Anyone else here who feels strongly?

Remy Milan:
Hello, my name is Remy Milan. The reason I would say undermining is that mis- or disinformation undermines citizens’ confidence in the institutions of the state. And that’s probably what I view as the sort of highest level danger.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Similar, so remember, you’re supposed to move if he’s moved you. So let me move to that side of the room because I haven’t seen anyone move yet. Jeanette, why don’t you tell us, you’re one of our speakers, so introduce yourself. Why are you standing at this side? Why do you disagree?

Jeanette Hofmann:
But then I sort of, I anticipate what I’m going to say. All I wanted to say, one of the main things I want to say is that while we have a lot of research on generation and circulation of disinformation, we know little, if not nothing, about how it actually affects people’s minds and people’s voting behavior. A lot of what we see here discussed is sort of based on assumptions, but not on empirical evidence. Just introduce yourself. Oh, I’m one of the speaker, Jeanette Hofmann. I’m a political scientist from Germany.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Anyone, you want to react to that? Good, you’re allowed to. You disagree with Jeanette.

Audience:
I would say, since I live in the United States, I would say January 6th was actually a good example of events inspired by mis- and disinformation designed specifically to undermine the democratic transfer of power between two governments. That, I think, I watched on TV. I actually believe that I saw something. So I think there’s empirical evidence that people can be driven to act contrary to democratic institutions by mis- and disinformation.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Any of our online participants, including the speakers, who strongly agrees that disinformation undermines democracy? Nigat, Clara, David, Erin? Nigat, go ahead and just introduce yourself, and then tell me whether you agree or disagree.

Nighat Dad:
Yeah, no, thank you so much. My name is Nigat Dhad, and I run Digital Rights Foundation. I’m speaking from Lahore, Pakistan right now. And I’m like in between agree and in the center. So I was very much agreeing it. And when Jeanette said, I’m like, okay, I want to little bit move on to Jeanette’s side because we have been saying this over and over again that yes, disinformation, misinformation impacts our democratic processes, but what kind of evidence we have to support actually that and a very solid evidence in terms of how it basically changes behavior of people during electoral processes. And however, we see a lot of impact and effect of disinformation on several institutions and also on voters. But I think we still need to have a solid sort of evidence in terms of supporting that yes, it is actually deteriorating our democracy in our countries. I feel like there’s several other aspects that sort of impact this sort of destruction of our democracy processes.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Thanks, Nigat. Before Professor Kulwe, before you, you strongly disagree as well. Are you willing to share why?

Audience:
I wouldn’t say I strongly disagree. Like I’m not over there. That’s true. I’m sort of slightly to the left of the middle, or right of the middle, I guess. I think it’s, I’m from a think tank, we do some work in this area. I think my background is also legal and I frequently find it quite difficult to settle on a definition of disinformation. And then I think there’s a whole separate question of how we actually apply that definition. And I think a lot of people are thinking of different things when they say they’re thinking about disinformation. I also think the sort of longitudinal impact is something that’s very hard to assess. And I think when we think about the causative impact of disinformation, it’s very hard to extract substantive grievance from it. So is it a manifestation of people’s dissatisfaction with the way society is that we can now observe and measure in ways that we couldn’t in the past? Or is it the disinformation that is sort of causing that dissatisfaction? I think that’s a hard thing to unpick.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Okay, so the unknown. So those of you that came late, I made a statement. I said disinformation is undermining democracy. And the idea is that people who disagree are kind of over here and people who agree are over there. Bill Drake, you’re one of our speakers. Please introduce yourself. And what is your position? Why are you in the middle? That’s not actually very common for you. I’ve known you for many years and you very, very rarely sit on any fence.

Bili Drake:
Bill Drake, Columbia University. Hi, because as I’ve said before, when we had a session about this at the Taiwan IGF last week, beware of false binaries. I think when you put these things into simple either or choices, it becomes almost meaningless. The extent to which it impacts democracy and the way it might impact is highly dependent on context, et cetera, et cetera. So, and I would add to Jeanette that social science ability to do effective polling in here may not be the only possible measure. We have tens of millions of Americans who have demonstrated over and over that they believe in disinformation, so.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
You see, Bill has made me move a little bit more to the center. Professor Corway, you wanted to say something. Introduce yourself.

Corway Wu:
Oh, this is Corway Wu. He’s the chair of the TWI from Taiwan. And just like Bill said, I have three points, very simple. First of all, disinformation. Politicians also create and spread the disinformation, not only the news media or the social media, so don’t forget that. Politicians did it, too. The second of all is I don’t fully agree about what Jeanette is saying. The reason is because she didn’t put a time in that coordination, coordinate, because if you put a time, because when the disinformation spread around, don’t forget it, the voting is just a second. So in that second, you might get moved by the disinformation, change your voting behavior. It’s like Brexit. And then maybe one minutes after, you regret, but too late, it’s done. So that’s the reason I’m standing in the middle.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Like the Brexit referendum, so many people regret it. Okay, before we sit down like normal IGF participants with an interesting, we hope, panel on that side and the rest of us on this side, so before we assume the normal divisions of power, anyone else in this side of the room who agrees strongly that disinformation is undermining democracy?

John Mahob:
My name is John Mahob from the Foundation for Media Alternatives from the Philippines. And if you are aware who was our previous president, Duterte, and who is our current president, Marcos, the son of the former dictator, I think it would be easier to appreciate why civil society, at least, feels that disinformation plays a huge part as to why our democratic institutions right now, and democracy in general, is very much in peril, if not already gone, so to speak. So I can understand, though, the search for empirical data. I’m also a sociologist and a lawyer, but we live behind the studies. We live through the realities every day, and we’ve gone through our elections last year, and we saw how much that disinformation actually impacted people across, not just those supposedly in the marginalized sectors, even those who are actually, you would expect to, are learned individuals. They, too, were very much caught into that web, yeah.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
It’s true, but you also did have decades of Marcos dictatorship prior to online disinformation. So, okay, the last word will be from you.

Audience:
Okay, thank you for giving me some floor. Tim, I’m from Russia, and I work for a think tank which is responsible for fighting and countering disinformation and fakes in Russia, so I have some practical experience on that. So, like, some bad news. Disinformation is, like, inevitable at all because the ability to make a mistake is a natural part of humankind and human brain, actually. So, as far as it goes, disinformation and fake news are extremely effective weapon, and nowadays, it’s widely used as a weapon, and you can get that, especially in context of Russian-Ukrainian war. We have an informational war with the Korean along, and we have lots of usage of this weapon, like, against us. And last but not least, actually, when you fight disinformation, it’s never possible to, like, ground zero all the disinformation and fakes and myth and anything else like this possible. But what you actually do is you actually fight the consequences and damage of disinformation and spread of disinformation, but you cannot fight the disinformation itself. Thank you.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Thanks very much. Thanks very much, everyone. Let’s take a seat. Come and sit in the front.

David Kaye:
Henriette, while people are taking a seat, can I answer to you?

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Yes, David, please go ahead.

David Kaye:
I wish I was there. It sounds fun, and it’s six in the morning where I am, so I could use the stretch. So, I’m gonna be a little bit of a diplomat of my-

Anriette Esterhuysen:
David, just introduce yourself to the room.

David Kaye:
So, I’m David Kaye. I teach law at the University of California at Irvine. I was the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression from 2014 to 2020, and I’m the independent chair of the board of the Global Network Initiative. And the diplomatic thing that I was gonna say is that I agree with what everybody said, but the thing, I think there are at least three different issues here that, from an IGF global governance perspective, make it very difficult to talk about disinformation. One is, it really matters, and this came through in the comments already, I think it really matters who’s doing the disinformation. Is it the state? Is it the president? Is it, like, who’s doing it? And also, where is it happening? So, as far as our study and understanding of the impact, I think those things matter. A second thing is, what impact do we actually care about? I mean, do we care about whether disinformation has an impact, as Jeanette was suggesting, on voting behavior? Do we care about the impact that disinformation has on people’s action in the street, as in January 6th? You know, what is the thing that we’re actually studying? And then third, based on all of those different contextual features, I think it’s very, very difficult to say that there’s one particular solution that works at a global governance level that would address disinformation in every instance or every context, whether it’s in legacy, broadcast, media, print, or on social, or search. There’s just such a variety. So I think that it’s just a vast topic that requires nuance and may not be really amenable to a kind of one-size-fits-all response.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Thanks very much, David. Clara, do you want to reflect on this opening statement, and then also please introduce yourself? Tell us where you are.

Clara Iglesias Keller:
Thank you, Antiet. I’m Clara. I’m a legal scholar from Brazil, but I am right now in Berlin, also 6 a.m. here, so keeping strong. Thank you so much for having me. So I’m going to jump right in and say that I think I would be, alongside David, kind of in the middle, a little bit more on the diplomatic side, and I’ll tell you why. I think this information can undermine democracy, depending on context. I prepared myself to talk a little bit about that, right? So depending on sources, depending on political, social context, what disinformation strategies are being pursued, I think they can undermine democracy, but not on the ways that we would instinctively think of. So I agree with Jeanette that we don’t have solid empirical evidence that disinformation changed voters’ behaviors, for instance. We don’t have solid empirical evidence that it changes the results of elections, but I think we do have enough reason to worry about how exactly it weighs in recent political transformations that we have seen in different contexts. And I think this shows that we need more research on that, on these blind spots that were not exactly unfolding yet. But I will say one thing about the empirical evidence, just to close my first statement, which is this empirical evidence we have nowadays, it’s very much focused on the U.S. and Europe, so I would be very happy to see more empirical evidence of how disinformation unfolds in other political contexts, what we call the global South, but I’m talking Latin America and Africa and Asia. So that would be it for my first input.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Thank you very much, Clara. We do not yet have our final speaker, Aaron, who was with the Singaporean government recently. He’s now moved to academia. I don’t think he’s with us. I do want to introduce our remote moderator. She’s in Nairobi. Risper, can you just reveal yourself on screen? Put your camera on and say something. I’ll see if I can unmute you. Can you unmute Risper Arose, please? She was there, and she might have just dropped off, but she’s trying to get hold of Aaron. But let me turn to Jeanette and Bill here, and David, you can add on this as well, and Nigat. Our opening question to you was not that dissimilar from the question that I asked the room, and that is, do you think you can define it? What is disinformation? Is it serious? And if so, why?

Jeanette Hofmann:
I think there is less argument about what disinformation actually is. Usually we say it’s a decision we make between misinformation and disinformation, and disinformation focuses on strategic intent. And that usually is to manipulate people in their behavior and in their worldviews. So that is what disinformation is. But now I’d like to come back to what I said earlier, that we really lack empirical evidence and I’d like to elaborate a bit on that. We have right now a strong focus in academia on platforms. And while that makes sense, because we get at least some data about the circulation of disinformation, there is also a little problem with that, because it cuts off long-standing research traditions that focus already on the question of propaganda, of manipulation and its effects on people’s minds. At that time it was less about platforms and it was more about legacy mass media, but also political propaganda. And I have to say that there was never agreement on the question of whether it had a long-time effect on people. There is a strong opinion in academia saying the effect is amplifying what people already believe. If you have a tendency to believe in conspiracy theories, you might be open, acceptable to disinformation. But if you are immune to that, it might not have much of an effect on you. So there is the hypothesis called preaching to the quiet. Disinformation reaches people who are vulnerable. That’s point one. And second one I would like to make is that a lot of research focuses on the individual. But what really matters when it comes to disinformation is the media environment. Countries with a strong tradition of public media, of high-quality media, they are able to counter disinformation much better than countries where the media landscape is a mess. So if we want to learn more about whether or not disinformation works, we need to look beyond platforms and take into account the wider media landscapes. Context matters and there is no point in only looking at platforms and their algorithms. It’s also interesting, I mean, it just kind of struck me the remark about the U.S.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
and then the comment from the Philippines. And maybe there are cultures, media cultures, and populist, you know, political moments which might also be similar. So there could also be other contextual issues. And Bill, do you want to elaborate on your earlier remarks? Okay. Well,

Bili Drake:
first of all, on the U.S. case, I think that there have been a lot of studies that have indicated that actually, further to Jeanette’s point, a lot of the disinformation is not originally coming from social media. It’s coming from broadcast media and then gets picked up by and amplified by social media. So when we talk about the strength of the traditional media environment being a buttress against the spread of disinformation, you have to recognize in a case like the United States, which has a fairly strong and vibrant media system and has for a long time had multiple voices, well-funded, et cetera, et cetera, that we have three networks that get tens of millions of viewers that are completely all in on disinformation. I mean, who are major proponents of disinformation and who attack anybody who questions disinformation as being somehow trying to suppress freedom of speech and so on. So we have a certain problem in the U.S., but I mean, I guess the point I would make is, you know, between traditional media as the savior and platforms as the source of all problems, as again, what I said at the outset, it all depends on the context of what we’re talking about. On the definitional issue, you know, Jeanette said that we all kind of agree on this. It’s actually interesting. I was looking at some of the different definitions that have been put forward by different leading organizations, and it’s amazing how variable they are in their details. Maybe this is because I spent a lot of time in the Internet governance space working on the definition of Internet governance 20 years ago in the UN Working Group and so on, but I mean, I tend to look at these things and think, why are they doing it this way? For example, the European Union describes disinformation as the creation, presentation, and dissemination of verifiably false or misleading information for the purpose of economic gain or intentionally deceiving the public. Why economic gain or intentionally deceiving the public? There’s different ways of formulating the strategic objective there, right? The UN Special Rapporteur in 2022 says false information that is disseminated intentionally to cause serious social harm. So are you saying that it’s only disinformation if it is intended to cause serious social harm, and what constitutes serious social harm? So, you know, you can play with the definitions. In fact, they could be quite messy. Obviously, we want a definition and an understanding that captures the notion of intentionality and of verifiable falsity, and we want to capture that there’s a strategic dimension in the production and the original creation dissemination. But then again, you have people who recirculate disinformation all the time not knowing it’s disinformation, so then when they do it, it’s misinformation, I suppose you would say, right? Because they’re not seeking necessarily to cause serious social harm. Their weird uncle sent them this picture saying that, you know, Hillary Clinton is the devil and eats babies, and they think maybe that’s true, and they send it to their friend. So, I mean, you know, I mean, this is the kind of crazy stuff we have. But I will, back to Jeanette’s point, and I’ll stop on the U.S. thing, though. It is true that social scientists, just to amplify what I said before, social scientists always have trouble demonstrating impact. We have 60-something years of media studies before the internet where people tried to impact, look at the impacts of media, media effects, and how strong or weak they were. Did they cause violence, sexual predation, whatever, etc. It’s hard to get at that through polling data and so on, but when tens of millions of people vote saying that they do so informed by strong disinformation, this would seem to be relevant information to me.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Thanks, Bill. Nigat, do you want to add anything to your earlier opening remark on the concept and the issue?

Nighat Dad:
Yeah. So, based on my work wearing different hats, you know, someone working in Pakistan, looking at the context, but then someone sitting at Matters Oversight Board, I feel that content that is related to mis- and disinformation, it’s very complex to define it as a mis- and disinfo, and even more complicated to identify it. And I think definitions are very, very contextual. Some of the definitions Bill mentioned here, and I’m like, okay, but some, you know, like actors, civil society actors, states, companies, sort of define all these things according to, like keeping their interest in mind as well, or the work that they are doing, or the context that they belong to. But for instance, like disinformation for us, how we kind of see it as a, you know, false content, which is being shared with the intent of causing harm. But then we cannot assume all untrue information is harmful, and we should be very cautious of, you know, defining it in a way where, especially not the civil society, but the powerful actors, when they define it, that means that they are going somewhere to regulate it, right? And that’s where I see a problem is. So, I don’t know what else to add here, but I feel that it’s very contextual. I don’t know how many of you have seen UNSR’s report on gender disinformation, which is just released a couple of days ago, and it has a context of all the regions. And it actually, it was mind-boggling to see that how disinformation causes harm to women and marginalized groups in South Asia, and how it does it in Latin America. So, I feel like it’s such a good document that people should read. It’s very recent, but at the same time, I feel it’s contextual. But we should be very, very cautious when we are defining it, and not giving, not leaving a space where, you know, like, we should basically give space to people to interpret it the way they want to, according to their context, and how they see their political situation is.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Thanks, Nikat. Just a little plug for my organization, Use the IGF, and this shows how the IGF can be really valuable, to have a consultation last year in Addis Ababa with the special rapporteur on gender disinformation, and she used the input from that consultation in her report. David, any additional points from you?

David Kaye:
I think the only thing that I’d add is that, is to sort of put a sort of a legal sort of gloss on all this, which is just to emphasize why definition is so important. If we’re talking about, ultimately, legal regulation, which I think, ultimately, when we’re talking about governance, that’s what we’re talking about, then we have to be clear about what the issue is. And that’s not just some abstract issue, it’s also a fundamental component of legality. We need precise definition, and then, you know, precision in what it is that we’re actually restricting. And one of my big fears is that even though I share the view that there is a problem called disinformation, and there is a wide variety of impacts of disinformation, we don’t really have clear definition. And we see that, I think, even in the emerging regulations from places in Europe and the UK and elsewhere, because what we see there is this move for transparency and risk assessment that assumes that, in those cases, platforms will sort of define the issue as they’re doing that work. Maybe that’s okay, and maybe that will be great evidence for social scientists and for legal scholars, but I’m afraid we’re not at a point where we have shared definitions that are clear enough for legal regulation.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Thanks, David. Janette, you want to react?

Jeanette Hofmann:
Yeah, I wanted to address the question of motives, because many people, of course, for good reasons, refer to distinct episodes like the attack after the last election in the US on the White House. Empirical research shows that many people who act on disinformation and share disinformation do not necessarily believe that this is the truth. One reason why people share disinformation is to signal belonging, to express their loyalty to a certain way of thinking and acting. So many people say Republicans who now share information about the last election being stolen might not necessarily believe this. What they are expressing is their loyalty, their belief in Trump and this sort of crowd of Republicans. And we even have evidence that when people are asked, do you believe what you are sharing, that they might not tell you the truth. And this brings me to an aspect that I find actually alarming. It’s less the amount of disinformation, but there is a growing amount of people in various countries who do not care any longer about the distinction between truth and falsity. For them, political belonging, let’s call it tribal attitudes, are becoming so strong that they are more important than whether or not there is a truth to strive for. And that is what I think undermines public discourse and therefore democracy.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Thanks, Janette. Clara, I hear, I can see you also want to react. Go ahead.

Clara Iglesias Keller:
Yes, thank you so much, Henriette. Just a sec, my kid’s waking up.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Tell them to make you coffee.

Clara Iglesias Keller:
Yeah, unfortunately not possible yet. But yeah, I agree there is this conceptual inconsistency. So we have a lot of definitions more on the media and communications disciplines as one of the many communicational phenomenons that comes alongside misinformation, propaganda, fake news. I think I actually like distinguishing things by intention. It makes all the difference for the law. We often run into social science scholars or communication scholars say, oh, but you can’t tell much about intent when in fact intent holds up a big chunk of legal relevance, right? But what I do want to say is that beyond being a communication practice or being a sort of online harm, which is also another way in which we refer to disinformation a lot, I think we need more definitions or more efforts to conceptualize this information within political theory, within political practice, right? So I think it functions a lot as a form of political intervention that takes shapes in different contexts, as Nigat was saying as well. So I come from Brazil, for instance, and this type of intervention clearly serves there as a means to show dissatisfaction. as somebody pointed out in the beginning of our panel, or to directly attack democratic institutions, in particular the electoral system and high courts. So I think we do have this varied, but not complete enough conceptual framework. And I’m just gonna say one very quick last thing. I don’t think there’s space in statutory regulation for a concept of disinformation.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
I’m about to move on. I’m gonna ask you about regulation next. So Bill, you want to react. Is it about the opening segment, or do you want to actually talk about regulation?

Bili Drake:
I just want to surprise Jeanette by agreeing with her strongly, because we’ve been arguing about this for a while. No, I mean, I just want to emphasize again, and this is why I said at the outset that I was kind of in the middle, and it depends on context and so on. There are indeed lots of people who will say they believe in disinformation because of tribal loyalty. There’s no question about that in the American case. And indeed, one of the things that’s really happened, and this goes also to your not believing in truth versus fiction, they’re not believing there’s a boundary. There’s a lot of people who have just built their identity around giving the finger to the other side. It’s like if you hear a lot of people, when they interview people at Trump rallies, and they say they believe this stuff, and somebody asks them, but you saw this. And they go, yeah, well, whatever, screw that. The libs don’t want us to think this. So it’s all about owning the libs, owning the other side, giving the finger to the people you don’t identify with, and so there’s like a pretense in a way. So it does mean that it’s harder to disentangle. It doesn’t mean that it’s not a vibrant, important part of the mix. It just means is it directly causal, is a little bit more complex.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Thanks. I want to ask everyone in the room, is there anyone here who lives in a context where disinformation is not particularly prominent or influential? Anyone? Just come and tell us a bit about it. Just come to the mic and tell us where you’re from and why you think that’s the case.

Audience:
Well. Hello, everyone. Well, I’m from Switzerland. I wouldn’t say that it’s not a problem whatsoever, but I also wouldn’t say that it has the ability to sway entire elections. We have a multi-party system, for example. People tend to vote for the same parties for the last 30 years. So not much has happened in that respect. Of course, we had the same challenges with COVID as everyone else. But I think I will be exaggerating massively to say that this is the topic for us to focus on.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Well, it’s really good to get a global north perspective. I’m from South Africa. And I can say that disinformation is not a major problem in South Africa. Believing the government is a major problem. But what, so there is often engagement in the media about where the information is false or accurate. But we’ve got very well self-regulated media that deals with disinformation. And the public tends to participate in that. So fact-checking is something that happens on a daily basis very quickly. So a politician will make a statement on television one night. The next day, the media will fact-check it. And the public does tend to believe the media. And what we find quite unique or interesting is that whether it’s right-wing center or left-wing media, there is a common commitment across that spectrum to accuracy, which we think is because our media, the self-regulation actually works. So for us, it’s also not a major concern. I want to move on to the next question, in a way at the heart of why we convened this workshop. By the way, the three of us argued a lot in the course of this workshop planning and design. So it’s for us also not a clear issue. But really the heart of this is it’s at the IGF. And it’s about governance. Do you think that we have, do you think we can regulate disinformation effectively internationally? We know there’s a lot of national initiatives that are being put in place and that are quite controversial. And what do you think, do we have the baseline? Do we have a strong and clear baseline that existing international instruments can provide for the governance of disinformation? And if we move in this direction of international governance of disinformation, what are the implications for access to information and freedom of expression? David, can I ask you to start us on that? I know this is something you have applied your thought and your expertise and experience to.

David Kaye:
Yeah, thanks, Henriette. So my view is that global regulation of disinformation, if we think of that as a concrete set of rules that will guide decision makers in every context and will have kind of a global oversight is a chimera. That’s not, we’re not going to achieve that. And it’s not worth, in my view, even trying to achieve it. What I do think is that governments and platforms and media outlets need a common set of principles to guide how they think about this and how they react to it. And to my mind, I mean, this would be no surprise to people, at least who know my work, I think that those principles are rooted in human rights law. And there’s very, very good reason because we’re talking about information, the sharing of information, the possibility of making it harder for individuals to find accurate information. We need to have standards that are based in Article 19 on principles of legality, necessity and proportionality and legitimacy of the objective. And I think that, and just to end here, I think that there is a way in which resourcing human rights mechanisms in particular, and by that, I don’t mean the Human Rights Council, but rather the Human Rights Committee, regional human rights courts and others, resourcing them, ensuring that they have the tools to answer questions when individuals feel that their government is interfering with their right of access to information by either disinforming themselves or permitting disinformation in one way or another, that those kinds of tools can be a mechanism for global governance, but not in the maybe IGF sense of what internet governance looks like.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Thanks, David. Clara.

Clara Iglesias Keller:
Yeah, so I really enjoy thinking about this question. It was really provoking to me. I am not sure about the extent to which global governance solutions can help us, and I’ll try to summarize this very briefly in two points. First, because I feel this urge to look at this information, disinformation’s role in political disputes and it becomes clear to me that countermeasuring it or mitigating it’s not only about a communication practice in itself, if it’s being used by certain political and economic interests that have been shaping our societies for so long, then mitigating disinformation is also about confronting ourselves with these broader issues. So to stick with the Brazilian case, I think about the ultimate convertibility of economic power in political power, and that includes a traditionally concentrated and unregulated media landscape, especially when compared with other Western democracies. So I think that certainly needs to be a part of the conversation. But even in the interest of getting more granular, it’s okay, it’s fair to say we need some action that targets disinformation specifically as well. And here, I’m afraid I’m also skeptical because global solutions mostly presume consensus-based governance structures, or as David put very well, at least global governance in the IGF sense of things, does not include an authority enforcement, right? And I think even though it offers us very interesting guidelines, human rights standards, I’m afraid that confirmation of current digital business models and data usages will need more than that to mention a few things that should be on the regulatory agenda.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Thanks, and Nigat, do you feel we’ve got the instruments needed? Or how do you feel about the idea of global governance of disinformation?

Nighat Dad:
Yeah, I mean, everything that has been said by David and Clara, I agree with that. I think we already have global governance instruments with us in terms of several principles or conversations that have taken place, resolutions and all of that. But I think we also need to see what actors have learned out of those instruments and tools that we have, which have been developed globally. I don’t think powerful actors have learned that. If you look at national policies, regulations, and laws that are being drafted and introduced not only in global majority, but also in global north, those policies have this appetite of suppressing freedom of expression, right? I don’t think that they are able to identify how certain content can actually cause real world harm. And what David basically said, that especially state actors have this, not only companies, but state actors also have this obligation under human rights standards to provide accurate information and prevent misinformation. I mean, we have Rabat plan of action. We have so many instruments out there. I think we really need to see how different components that are already out there can complement each other and do not work in silos. There are several, and we’ll be talking about those governance mechanisms. You have already mentioned there’s like certain, you know, like for oversight board or other things that are already out there, how those are performing. Are we really, you know, looking into the performance, what they are adding into our existing ecosystem? So I think we already have so much. I think we just need to know how to use that.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Thanks. Thanks for that, Nika. Jeanette.

Jeanette Hofmann:
Yeah, thank you, Henriette. The whole question reminds me of the early days of internet governance when it was always clear that protocol standards for the infrastructure, we had to agree upon to have a global network, but the upper layers, particularly content, that should not be done on a global level. Having said that, there is one aspect I’d like mention that I find quite interesting in this context, and this is the Digital Service Act that the European Commission just agreed upon, and that will take effect early next year. And that DSA has one aspect that, at least from a German perspective, is really interesting. It concerns the scope of human rights. At least in Germany, traditionally, human rights regulate the relationship between citizens, or say people, and the government. But the DSA mentions at several points that human rights should also guide the behavior of platforms, meaning the scope of human rights begins to integrate also private sector action because it affects to such an extent our conditions and possibilities to exercise human rights. So this is an interesting development, and we can think about extending that to other jurisdictions or world regions. And actually, I would like to know what our other panelists think about that.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Thanks, well, Bill, do you want to react to that before we go to, Aaron has now joined us, so we’ll hear from him next.

Bili Drake:
No, I don’t want to react to that. I want to say something else. Go ahead, you can. So the question, I mean, the way the question’s posed, can it be effective? Probably not. I think we have to engage it on the long term anyway. We have to try to build up the operational and normative infrastructure to continually challenge disinformation. But of course, obviously, to believe that it’s going to effectively regulate it at the global level is a little bit far-fetched. But we have to try. That said, I think it’s worth just highlighting, because this is the Internet Governance Forum, we’re trying to talk about disinformation from an internet governance standpoint, some of the things that are happening internationally. I just want to flag a couple of quick things. One is the UN discussions around cybercrime and cybersecurity. In those contexts, you’ve seen a lot of proposals, a lot of language that pertains to disinformation, and it demonstrates the difficulty of trying to do this at a multilateral level in a geopolitically divided environment. So for example, in the cybercrime treaty negotiations going on now, China proposed language saying that all governments should adopt laws calling spread of disinformation a criminal offense. And they described it as anything that makes available false information that could result in serious social disorder. Well, again, what could result in serious social disorder is obviously in the eyes of the beholder. Then we have, secondly, the UNESCO guidelines for the regulation of digital platforms, which UNESCO hopes to finalize this year. That has some language in it that is germane to disinformation as well. And the model of adopting guidelines or suggesting guidelines to countries, you know, there’s the possibility that some countries will implement those guidelines in ways that are restrictive of freedom of expression and will claim international legitimacy in doing so. So the question of guidelines versus treaties is an issue. The last thing I would just mention, the UN Secretary General is now proposing a code of conduct for information integrity on digital platforms. This is part of the global digital compact discussions, and he wants to have this discussed at the summit on the futures. And if you’ve seen the document, he proposes a global set of guidelines drawing on the UNESCO experience that is based on nine principles, many of which are pretty much focused on platforms and how platforms behave and how stakeholders behave. This is, you know, it’s easy, I think, to say, well, platforms have to adopt rules about transparency, disgorging information, allowing scholars to access the data, and so on. It’s a lot harder to say states should not disseminate this kind of information in the first place, or all stakeholders must abide by good taste and common sense. Those things are a little bit hard to achieve, particularly through guidelines, but that’s what the Secretary General is doing. And he’s actually calling also for the establishment of a, quote, dedicated capacity in the UN Secretariat to monitor and advance all of this, which is an interesting thing. So, you know, there’s been a lot of discussion about whether new organizational structures will be built through the global digital compact, particularly in New York. And this is one where I think they might get some political traction in saying there ought to be a centralized mechanism for at least tracking progress in addressing these issues, tracking progress in adopting complementary kinds of guidelines, and so on. So we’ll see. But so there’s a lot going on at the international level, and I think it’s worth talking about that.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Thanks, thanks. Aaron, Aaron Maniam, you are with us now. Please introduce yourself and tell us what you think about this global governance response to disinformation.

Aaron Maniam:
Thanks so much, Henrietta. Apologies for joining you a little bit late. I had some technical challenges, which I suppose are unironic given that this is, you know, a panel at the IGF. And I’m calling in from Oxford, that panel, you know, that capital of the world in internet connectivity. So apologies to everyone. I’m glad I got here now. I love this question on global governance, because I think it gets to the nub of many of the core issues.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Aaron, just tell us a little bit more. I know you’re an academic now, but we were particularly interested on your views based on your perspective as being within government.

Aaron Maniam:
Of course, sure. Until recently, I was a policymaker in Singapore, working on digital issues, you know, covering both how governments can enable digital in the economy, in society, but also what sorts of international partnerships governments need to embark on and the kinds of regulation that we need to do, both in the economic sphere, as well as on content. So I think this is a real, you know, commingling of many of the challenges that any government faces. And on the global front, I wanted to make four points, which I think are all germane to this discussion. The first is, we have to figure out even what we mean by global governance, right? There are so many models. There are de minimis models, where it’s kind of a very basic level of guidelines that get set out and very little else in terms of enforcement or monitoring capacity. But then we have maximal models as well. Things like the ICAO has managed to achieve because we know that there are clear risks and safety issues that are involved. And at the moment, you know, we see emerging examples like those Bill mentioned, the open-ended working group on cyber at the UN is trying to achieve a greater set of consensus on some of these issues. And it’s really not clear where we’re gonna land, I think, in terms of the de minimis or more maximal models of global governance. As a result, just second point that I think is important here is, I think it’s really important to differentiate between the basic standards and the kind of more additional sets of issues that we want to cover in a set of global. governance regulations. Jeanette referred to this, and I think examples like the DSA are really important. In Singapore, we have a set of online safety regulations. The UK, we know, has put that out recently as well. And I think it’s useful to ask if, beyond the basic, you know, we were not able to get to a level of consensus yet, what is useful is that the guidelines that Bill mentioned or any further kinds of regulatory principles that are put in place must at least be interoperable amongst different countries. They don’t need to be identical, but interoperability allows for different systems to at least talk to each other in a much more coherent way. Two last points that I think are also important that we haven’t quite named in this discussion. The first is, I think one major challenge in this work is going to be the fact that, in some cases, governments are the source of mis- or disinformation, rather than the entity that is going to regulate it. And that makes it much more difficult for those sorts of systems to be working with others where governments act in more rational, misinformation-minimising sort of ways. And we need to be able to differentiate the two and not let that first group of governments actually end up holding us back on any kinds of coordination that we need to achieve. This will be hard, of course, because the tech itself is dynamic. In a sense, we’re trying to play whack-a-mole here. I don’t know if they call the game the same thing in every country, but it’s like a new problem comes up every few weeks, and you have to find a new way to keep hitting it down. And the regulation has to keep evolving. But that also means that we need the skills within governments to keep that adaptation going, and we need the ability to continually update our legislation if we want to do this work well. That’s not impossible. It can be done. But it means that parliamentary capacity is going to be stretched, not just executive capacity, because we’re going to constantly be going back and having to update and refine and making our laws more agile and adaptive. Not easy, but I think those are the kinds of challenges we’ll have to deal with to realise the sort of global governance that we would want.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Thanks, thanks, Aaron. And maybe that interoperability, that takes us back to David, to whether human rights frameworks can provide that interoperability. Before I open to the audience, do any of the speakers want to react or comment on one another’s inputs? So I want to open it, sorry, who is that that was that? Nigat, go for it, Nigat.

Nighat Dad:
And yet I just wanted to, before we move ahead, I think one part of this conversation that is missing is we are talking about global governance, but for some reason I always raise this in several panels and it kind of, you know, like it kind of gets lost in the conversation. And that basically is that how to hold those governments accountable who actually use these guidelines for their own interest and benefit and make laws and regulations where they can control content on in their own sovereign jurisdictions, but then they are not accountable that what are the wrongdoings that they are doing. So I feel like that just regulatory mechanisms are good, but how to hold those state actors accountable. And I have had these conversations where many global north actors are like, but those governments will do this anyway. Then where should we all go? Like, should we leave them behind? Should we leave those users behind? Like how we will take them along with us? I think this is the question that I always raise it and it frustrates

Anriette Esterhuysen:
me a lot. Thanks, Nigat. I share that. Bill, you want to react quickly to this?

Bili Drake:
No, actually I want to ask the other panelists for their perspective. I’d like to know if anybody has views. I’m looking at some of the people we have online. Has any opinion on the Secretary General’s proposals? Since this is an important thing, the Secretary General of the United Nations is proposing a code of conduct on information integrity for digital platforms. That would seem to be an instance of an attempt at global internet governance. It’s governing information that goes over the network that fits within the definition of internet governance. So I’d like to know how people view this initiative, what they think of it in terms of its potential impact, how well it’s crafted, etc.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Do you want to comment on that, any one of you? Just jump in if you do.

David Kaye:
I’ll say something just very briefly about it because I do think it’s a very important topic. I’ll say two things. One, I think the process has been interesting, but I am not sure that civil society has played as active a role in helping shape the document as should be the case. So there’s a process issue at the outset. As we look forward to the actual negotiation of an adopted or to be adopted text, if civil society is not in the room, if civil society is not in the places where there’s actual drafting and adoption taking place, I think the legitimacy of the outcome will be suspect. So that’s a process response. A substantive response is that I’m concerned that it focuses not exclusively, but perhaps in an over-reliant way, on platforms. There is absolutely a major role of platforms in the problem of disinformation, but any process that excludes, as we heard from the situation in the Philippines or the United States, that excludes a call for governments themselves to be better behaved, to be supporting and resourcing public service media, public broadcasting, any avoidance of that will, I think, make the process sort of at its core not useless, but will really detract from its value.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Thanks very much, David. I’m actually going to move to the audience now, and I’m going to open with the question that actually I’m going to ask the panel to respond to as well, which is that if we are going to develop governance initiatives to respond to disinformation, how do we do it? David just pointed out the risks of a fairly top-down process, such as the one that’s coming from the Secretary General’s office. So, how do you consult? How do you make decisions about governance responses to disinformation in a way that will be effective? So, I’m opening this question to people in the room, and also, if you have any questions for the panelists or contributions, please stand up, take the mic, and

Audience:
introduce yourself first. Farzaneh, you can go ahead. Oh, thank you. My name is Farzaneh Badi from Digital Medusa. First of all, congratulations on a nuanced and evidence-based discussion on disinformation. This has been lacking from IGF this year, and I think you remedied that with panel. Disinformation governance can become, indeed, an internet governance issue if we rush towards solutions that could affect internet infrastructure. And by talking without evidence, by talking about disinformation and how harmful it is, and rushing to govern and regulate it, we are going to see that it affects connectivity. And it has actually happened when Russia invaded Ukraine. Europe decided to do IP blocking of websites of Russia that were spreading disinformation. So, it is, indeed, an internet governance issue, and at IGF, we need to have an absolutely more nuanced approach to the discussion and not rush to any conclusion. And as Nigat said, we also have been active in coming up with solutions. Anyway, but so, I think that that’s one point that it can be an internet governance issue, and we need to monitor that. And the other is that disinformation is also something that in declarations like G7, they mention it. They commit to open global internet, but they also talk about tackling disinformation, which, like, but our solutions to fight with disinformation should not affect connectivity and internet infrastructure. Thank you. Thanks, Farsi. Wolfgang. Thank you very much. My name is Wolfgang Kleinwächter. I’m a retired professor from the University of Aarhus, and I can only support what Farsaneh has just said. We always risk in this debate to undermine the fundamental right to freedom of expression, as laid down in Article 19 of the Human Rights Declaration. And, you know, as a member of the old generation, I’m asking myself a little bit, what’s really new here? So, I went through the Cold War, and the Cold War was an information war. So, if it goes back 500 years when Gutenberg invented the printing press, so the Catholic Church were excited, then somebody used it to write anti-Catholic pamphlets, and because the Pope said there’s a misuse of technology. And then the struggle started, you know, who is right, who is wrong. So, the critics of the Catholic Church or the Pope were right, and they had the index of censorship. So, it’s very close if we continue the debate that you end up with the censorship regime. So, and the tragedy is also, look at Germany in the 1930s. So, Mr. Goebbels, who was the Minister for Propaganda in the Third Reich, so he did see radio as a weapon. He said it’s like a machine gun, and people loved him. So, millions of Germans, you know, believed in what this crowd of criminals said to the public, and the tragedy is, we know all this, that complex, simple answers to complex questions are given by either idiots or liars. So, but the problem is that a bunch of people love idiots, and they love liars. So, that means what you can do with this. So, that means you have to invest more in education, creating awareness, you know, to enable people that they understand the context. So, I think context is one way forward. So, you have, if you have bad information, the best thing is to have more good information, so that you can rebalance this, and not to cancel it, or to censor it, or something like that. So, I think Jeanette mentioned the Digital Service Act. That’s one step in the right direction. We have the Facebook Oversight Board, you know, it’s an effort, but I’m also very critical. So, I think we have a problem, but I do not have a solution, and I think in 20 years, we will discuss, you know, what could be the solution for this problem. So, we have to go with very small steps to identify where we can minimize the negative side effects of this disinformation. You will not be able to remove it. So, and, you know, one idea I have is, since years, so in the ICANN context, we have the dispute resolution mechanism for domain names. So, the UDRP system allows a broad system, on a case-by-case basis, to go through cases, taking into account a regional context, and individual constellation, and 80-90 percent of content-related conflicts in the internet are relevant for the region, and the cultural context, and they involve parties. So, that means, why not to think about a distributed system, where you, on a case-by-case basis, go through certain issues, and this could create a body of understanding what is bad and what is good. So, that means, these are the, then the voluntary guidelines could outcompete it, so best practice or something like that. So, I fully agree with David, that he said, you know, a top-down regulation will never work. We have Article 19, we have Article 19.3, we know how the national security, public order, public health, and moral as possible restrictions are misused by governments, but this is not a governance issue for the IGF, this is a national issue for national policymaking, and insofar, we should debate this in the IGF, but we should not expect that we will find a solution. Thank you.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Thanks, Wolfgang. I just want to make one point, though. I do think we have to recognize that the weaponizing of disinformation is very different now from what it was when you had to do it via radio, to do it via broadcasting platforms. You needed to have some kind of political power or economic power, and in online platforms, it’s much more distributed, that ability to weaponize disinformation, and I think that is a challenge we cannot ignore. So, yes, there are similarities, but there are also differences, and I see, Korwe, you want to have the floor, but I wanted to know if there was anyone from the Christchurch call in the room who might be willing to share how they approached consultation, because I think that is an important part of what we’re trying to address with this workshop, to find effective ways of getting towards governance ignitions. So, please go ahead, Korwe.

Audience:
I have two comments. The first comment, actually, is I really question about, you know, the UN Director General, his saying is really can get consensus or any respect from the state, you know, the different states, because well, how he can act that, and eventually the state agree upon, that is difficult. And the second one, actually, is a question, because we are talking about disinformation, because we are living in a luxury democratic system, or some of us. We have a democratic system, we allow you, you know, even the disinformation, you can debate. Let me ask a simple question. If this disinformation, most of that, or maybe 80 percent of that, is a dispute by government. In that kind of environment, can you tell me how the people can react that? Because the disinformation is not from people, it’s from government or from politicians. Then what are we going to do?

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Thanks, Korwe. And anyone else from the audience before we go back to the Christchurch? Did you want to, Paul, are you going to, do you want to say something about it? I know it’s a slightly different topic, but I think that what you did was, in terms of the consultation process, maybe if you could just say a little bit about how you approached finding solutions through consultation. Apologies for putting you on the spot like this, but.

Audience:
It’s okay, I’m often put on the spot. I’m just used to taller microphones than this. Thank you. Yeah, I’m just trying to think through the various different layers. The Christchurch call has been through a bit of a journey. For those who don’t know much about it, it was started in 2019. And just introduce yourself, please. Sorry, I’ll go back. My name is Paul Ash. I’m the Prime Minister’s Special Representative on Cyber and Digital from New Zealand. I also lead the team in the New Zealand end of the New Zealand-French Secretariat leading the Christchurch call. For those who aren’t familiar with the call, it was stood up after the terrorist attacks in two mosques in Christchurch in March 2019, when the murder of 51 worshippers was live streamed around the world, amplified algorithmically, and found its way, I’m sure, into many of your social media feeds and inboxes. And rather than let that stand, we took a deliberate approach to working with companies, seeing them, governments, and civil society as stakeholders in the process of trying to build solutions to prevent that happening again. And as we did that, we negotiated a set of 25 commitments. That was done in rather a hurry, through eight weeks, but actually those commitments have proved very durable as we’ve looked to the implementation of them. As we went through that eight-week process, we met with civil society groups. At that point, we were not in a space of a full multi-stakeholder construct, in part because we wanted to capture the moment and make sure that we fed that input in, put a placeholder in the Christchurch call text in order to enable full participation thereafter, and get those commitments landed at a meeting in Paris in May 2019. Thereafter, we’ve worked on the process of implementing specific commitments around things like live streaming. around the ability to detect and deal with terrorist and violent extremist content, and increasingly recently, focusing in on issues like algorithmic amplification, like user journeys and the pathway to radicalization to violence. And it’s probably in that area that there are some significant connections to the topic of dis- and misinformation and its distribution. And certainly there is a good body of evidence showing that the amplification of disinformation messages can lead to radicalization to violence. The approach we’ve taken since then around consultation has been over the period of 2019 to build up and establish a civil society advisory network that works with the Christchurch Call partners, and over time, to broaden that out, to develop what we call the Christchurch Call community, in which all of those involved, whether they’re in the advisory network, whether a partner, whether they’re a government or an online service provider, a supporter, can contribute to a discussion on all of the different pieces of policy and problem solving that the Christchurch Call is working on. Over the course of a year, we work on those through specific working groups and work streams that the Christchurch Call leaders ask us to focus in on. And each year, we hold a Christchurch Call summit, where heads of government, heads of tech firms, heads of civil society organizations consider the outputs from that and give direction around the work that we will take forward in the subsequent year. It’s a different subject matter set from dis- and misinformation. We’ve been very careful to distinguish the subject areas. What I would say is keeping scope really tight has been one of the things that has enabled the Christchurch Call to make progress. It’s not a call about child sexual abuse material or body image or a range of other things. It’s focused in on one specific subject area. And I think having a secretariat that, at times, is able to build trust across participants to work quietly on issues that can be really contentious is also a very, very important lesson that we’ve taken from this. But the most important, I think, analog that could be drawn and brought over into the area of dis- and misinformation is the strength of a fully multi-stakeholder model. We’ve looked at many, many different multi-stakeholder configurations that might be governments and civil society, tech and civil society, tech and governments. Having that mix all in a room together is actually incredibly difficult. You get aspects of the three-body problem working at times, and that can be really complicated to deal with. But it does mean that there’s a process of building trust and becoming, as we put it, comfortable having uncomfortable discussions. And I think that’s one of the most important things to learn. Over time, we’ve had to systematize that a bit more. And as it’s grown, one of the hardest things to do is actually maintain that trust across the community. So there’s a useful lesson there for any other multi-stakeholder governance construct. I’ll stop there, because that’s probably more information than you needed, but thank you for the opportunity to speak.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Thanks, thanks, thanks for that, Paul. But I think it’s very useful because I think it’s the, it’s about the depth of the process, the fact that it takes time, that it takes time to establish a process that’s going to help you respond effectively to a problem, and then I think the focus. Maybe we talk about disinformation, but maybe disinformation about sexual and reproductive health is very different from disinformation about elections. But so now to go back to the panel, and Bill, I’m gonna start with you, this question about how to approach the consultation, the decision-making process to respond to this from a governance perspective.

Bili Drake:
You keep asking me questions that I don’t wanna answer. I wanna do something else.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Okay, then I’ll go to someone else. No, you can answer the question that you want to answer.

Bili Drake:
I wanna reply to David and Galway on points they made real quick. Galway was talking about the governments being the source of things. This goes back to what I was saying about the Secretary General’s initiative. You know, December 21, the General Assembly had a resolution on countering disinformation which recalled, reaffirmed, recognized, highlighted, expressed concern for, et cetera, et cetera, and asked for the Secretary General to do a report. He did a report the next year, August 2022, and said, one of the big conclusions, states bear the primary responsibility to counter disinformation by respecting, protecting, and fulfilling the rights to freedom of opinion and expression, to privacy and public participation, and called for a multifaceted approach anchored in the protection and respect for human rights. And now, what’s he doing in response to that? Guidelines for platforms. Because the reality is, it’s pretty hard for the United Nations to have any kind of really constructive process around governments being the source of much of the disinformation that matters because governments reserve the rights under the UN Charter to do whatever the hell they want, and they’re not gonna be constrained. So instead, we focus on the platforms. I agree that platforms have some issues. I agree that, you know, it’d be useful to try to encourage greater transparency, et cetera, et cetera, in the platforms. But that’s not, you know, telling Facebook that they have to do something because Russia used Facebook to disseminate information does not address the fact that Russia is disseminating information. And it’s not just, you know, Facebook and Twitter, and, you know, what am I trying to say? You know, YouTube. There’s so many different sources of disinformation, on the dark web and so on. It’s an incredibly robust environment. It’s a commercial marketplace. People create this stuff. You can go online on the dark web and hire people to generate disinformation using bots, and so on and so forth. So, I mean, it’s not just, you know, you can adopt rules for a few of those platforms. It’s not gonna solve the thing. The other point I just wanted to make real quick was that David said we need greater civil society participation in the Secretary General process. This is why I brought it up. Here we are at the IGF. We’re having almost no discussion around the various things that are being proposed through the Secretary General under the Global Digital Compact. I’ve been to many sessions. We’re not doing it. We’re not taking advantage of the opportunity to say, we, the stakeholders, not just civil society, but all stakeholders, demand right to be heard and weigh in on these processes. Nobody knows where this is being done and how it’s being done. It’s just outreach to a small set of players. That’s, something has to change there.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Now, there is a sense, I haven’t heard anyone use the concept yet of disinformation panic, but I think there is a bit of a sense that multistakeholder and self-regulatory processes aren’t dealing with it. Therefore, the parents have to come and step in and we need governmental regulation. And I think, well, certainly in my view, I’m not saying that there isn’t a need for regulatory response, but it does feel as if we are leaping to that response before we’ve actually explored more bottom-up ways. Jeanette, what is your view?

Jeanette Hofmann:
When it comes to what we should do, I’d like to go back to the Digital Service Act. It’s paragraph 40, has a provision that gives regulators, but also vital for me, researchers access to data from platforms in the area of what is called systemic risks caused by platforms. I’m not so happy about this restriction that we have to sort of mobilize systemic risk as a concept to get access, but the fact that we now will get access to data that help us understanding in a better, more evidence-based way of what disinformation does, also how many people it actually reaches, we don’t know much of that, right? We have only vague data from the US and Europe saying it’s sort of between 0.4 and 5% of the people, of the users of platforms actually get to see disinformation. There are better times lying ahead of us with getting access, and I hope that the IGF could be a mechanism where we can sort of provide best practices of how to actually implement this article 40, and I hope that also small jurisdictions will pick this up and say, here, you are giving people access in Europe, why don’t you give us access in other countries? IGF could be a way to sort of discuss this.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Yes, it’s very important to note that this access to data is not available to researchers in the Philippines or in Brazil or in other instances where there is the need to look at the impact and how it operates, how disinformation operates. Aaron, what is your view on this, on how we develop these responses? And particularly, I would like to respond on the role of government, because I think we are in a moment where governments are taking this very seriously, I think sometimes with good intentions, not always with bad intentions.

Aaron Maniam:
No, thanks. Thanks so much for that. I broadly agree with the thrust of the discussion so far that this work needs to be polycentric. It’s not just about having multiple people involved, but there needs to be leadership and decision capacity in multiple centers of power and influence. And that means that governments move from just having an authority-based role to having a convening function. And it means governments bring together the right players, it means governments have to acquire skills in facilitation, in interest aggregation, potentially even in conflict mediation, in order to allow for emerging consensus to actually distill itself. In Singapore, we’ve been doing a lot of this consultative, deliberative work in terms of the kinds of bottom-up democracy that we’ve been calling forward Singapore in its most latest incarnation, is how are we looking to build a future identity for the country? During COVID, there was a process of thinking about recovering and emerging stronger together as well. And it’s something that we’ve been experimenting with for a good part of the last 20 years, how we build this bottom-up set of priorities and issues. But as a kind of side note to that, but a very important side note, I think even where government itself is thinking about its role in relation to the private sector as well as civil society, it’s really important to harness the range of roles, not just the regulatory functions and the lawmaking functions that we have, but also the possibility of governments in community building, in space building, in urban planning, because a lot of the solutions might actually lie in there. One thing I was very struck by in my last job, for instance, is that the three agencies that worked together with the ministry in operationalizing strategy, right, were the Information and Media Development Authority, the Cybersecurity Agency, and the National Library Board, right? So we have a board that looks after all of our national libraries. And it’s really interesting, because when you think about it, we’ve talked a lot about regulation. We’ve talked a lot about the dark aspects of security and how we want to respond to that. But we haven’t talked about the literacy that our citizens need with as much detail. And if you ask me, I think schools and libraries are as important players in this whole process as the more regulatory counterparts that they might have in government. This isn’t always obvious to us, because this is where the patience comes in, right, and it takes time to build up literacies. But I think that’s where we need to start, right? I look at my one-year-old nephew who knows how to swipe on an iPad, even before he can talk. His literacies are gonna be very different from the literacies that all of us have had to develop over time. But I think we need to bring our libraries, bring our schools, and bring our family discussions into this a lot more, because that’s where some of those core literacies and moral sensibilities will start to get laid, yeah.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Thanks. Clara, we have three minutes left, so let’s move quickly. And then I’m still gonna come back to the panel for the takeaways. Clara, keep it brief, please.

Clara Iglesias Keller:
Okay, so I’m going to second Jeanette on a call for more empirical evidence, especially outside of the global north. I’ll stick to Brazil to tell you, for instance, that we all know that Latin American countries have another sort of relationship with messaging apps, for instance. In Brazil, this is aggravated by zero rating policies, where for a huge majority of the population, the internet equals WhatsApp, Facebook, Instagram. So this just shows you how we need more data in order to understand how all this political, social contingencies that we can see actually play into the way this information behaves. Very briefly to our promise, and yet I think we need more institutional innovation in the sense of, among all of the things that we need to find this information, there’s a lot that is up for government, but there’s this one thing that is disputing the truth, disputing content, and that should definitely be with civil society. It should be with different agents, and I think we need the institutional apparatus to allow for that to happen.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Thanks, so Clara’s actually already done what she wants to see and what she doesn’t want to see. Nighat, what about you?

Nighat Dad:
Yeah, Andrea, I actually, to go back to your point where you said that we sometimes quickly want to get into other solutions, and I feel that the ones that we have, we really need to look into the nuance that those solutions have established. Of course, like it or not, some solutions, all solutions have pros and cons, but to your point about the consultation, one thing that I have learned sitting at the board is that we are talking about context a lot, but we really don’t know how to extract that context when we are deciding about something, and at the board, what we have done is speaking to civil society from that particular region. Where we have selected that case from, and I think that’s the kind of process that we need. We need more global oversight board. We don’t need only one because if regulation is doing something from the state perspective, we need these boards to also hold these companies accountable and do their work. Our transparency reports are there. Our decisions are there. I think those also give really good data point, data sets to researcher to hold these platforms more accountable.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Thanks, Nighat. David.

David Kaye:
Yeah, I really appreciate that Paul Ash sort of made an intervention because I think that his leadership and New Zealand’s leadership and the role of multi-stakeholder approaches, even in the wake, and let’s remember the Christchurch call, is, you know, could have gone the other direction. I mean, it was a moment of real trauma and people have a kind of natural response, as we’re seeing right now in Israel and Palestine, a natural response to adopt ideas that are not rooted in human rights. And the Christchurch call and Paul’s, I think, stewardship of that had that at its core. And I think we need to find ways to ensure that that remains at the core of the global governance. IGF has not always been a place where human rights and access to information is front and center, but it can be. And I think there are a lot of people in this room or on this Zoom who believe in that. And there are models that we can draw from as we move it forward.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Thanks, David. So, Berlindje Net, you’re gonna have the last word. And I want you to say the one thing that you’d like to see taking this forward and the one thing you don’t want to see. And be brief.

Jeanette Hofmann:
One thing, let’s start with the negative. The one thing I don’t want to see is that governments use this sort of global concern on disinformation as an excuse for regulating their people, speaking up in public during a time where for the first time they can actually speak up. It’s so important to support people and giving their opinion and exchanging their views and not sort of primarily thinking of it in terms of regulating. That’s the negative. The positive, I’ve always been an internet researcher with a focus on the internet. And over the last months, I begin to grasp the importance of high quality journalism. I want everybody to have the right to claim that the earth is flat as long as there is good journalism that depicts the globe, right, that shows and talks about it so that everybody can disseminate crap because it doesn’t matter, it doesn’t do harm to society as such. Good journalism and business models that are also robust for the future that comes where the young generation doesn’t subscribe to newspapers anymore but use social networks. We need to prepare for that time that the young generation doesn’t pay anymore but depends on high quality journalism.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Thanks. Nick, I just thanking you for saying that. Bill, you have the last word before me.

Bili Drake:
I would like to see the European Union find Elon Musk. Substantially, they’ve got the capacity under the Digital Services Act and their guidelines. He has told them, screw you, I don’t care what you think and dropped out. I mean, I think governments are the main focus but we have to do some stuff on the platforms and making it hurt financially, especially vis-a-vis the advertisers is a good way to start.

Anriette Esterhuysen:
Thanks very much and I’m sorry we went over time. I’m sorry we didn’t have time to come back to our participants again but thank you very much to all our panelists and our online participants and to the tech team and to CRISPR and enjoy the rest of your IGF and let’s continue using the IGF to get to the nuts of these problems and to unpack the misinformation about misinformation. Thanks everyone. Thank you.

Pearse O’Donohue

The European Union (EU) has set out its vision and strategy for the future of virtual worlds, emphasizing the importance of aligning them with EU values and principles while respecting existing legislation. The aim is to establish a technological transition that allows for a seamless connection between people and machines.

In July, the EU released its strategy, which highlights the need for virtual worlds to mirror EU values and adhere to EU legislation. This ensures that the digital landscape remains in line with EU principles and regulations. The EU envisions a future where virtual worlds serve as a reflection of its values and operate within the existing legal frameworks.

The EU’s strategy also focuses on the broader transition towards web 4.0 and virtual worlds. This transition aims to create an environment that supports the growth and development of businesses. The EU aims to foster world-leading applications and provide businesses with certainty regarding the principles they must follow. By doing so, the EU aims to prevent virtual worlds from being dominated by a small number of major players, ensuring a more diverse and competitive market.

Additionally, the EU recognizes the importance of global governance in shaping the future development and use of virtual worlds. The EU plans to establish an expert group that brings together member states and other stakeholders to share a common approach and exchange best practices. By relying on recognized instruments such as the European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles and a Declaration for the Future of the Internet, the EU aims to create a framework that promotes effective governance of virtual worlds on a global level.

One prominent advocate for empowering individuals and promoting diverse participation in virtual worlds is Pearse O’Donohue. O’Donohue supports the EU’s efforts to create an environment where the European industry can develop world-leading applications. The goal is to ensure that people and businesses have control over the transfer of their data, virtual assets, and identities. By prioritizing individual empowerment and diverse participation, the EU seeks to foster a more inclusive and user-centric virtual world environment.

In conclusion, the EU’s strategy for the future of virtual worlds focuses on aligning them with EU values and legislation, promoting open and interoperable development, establishing global governance frameworks, and empowering individuals. By embracing these principles, the EU aims to shape virtual worlds that reflect its values, foster innovation and competition, and empower users in an evolving digital landscape.

Elena Plexida

ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, is responsible for coordinating the global internet and its unique identifiers, such as domain names, IP addresses, and protocols. Without ICANN’s coordination, the internet would not function as seamlessly as it does.

One of ICANN’s key strengths lies in its multistakeholder governance model. This model ensures that decisions and policies regarding the internet involve the participation of various stakeholders, including governments, businesses, and civil society. This inclusivity and collaboration have been crucial in protecting and enabling the global internet.

The integration of virtual worlds with the real world presents governance challenges that need to be addressed. As virtual worlds become more interconnected with the physical world and with each other, effective governance mechanisms are required. It is proposed that a multi-stakeholder approach, involving all relevant stakeholders, be adopted to find solutions that accommodate the integration of virtual and real worlds on a global scale.

While standards in virtual worlds are elective rather than normative, some level of standardization is necessary to ensure interoperability and a seamless experience across different virtual worlds. The multi-stakeholder model can play a vital role in setting these standards, as it allows for a collaborative and consensus-based approach. This approach avoids premature imposition of heavy-handed normative standards, promoting flexibility and adaptability in standardization.

ICANN recognizes the potential of immersive meetings as the next application of its work. Immersive meetings aim to enhance communication and collaboration by creating virtual environments where colleagues from around the world can interact as if they were in the same physical space. This vision aligns with ICANN’s global outlook and its commitment to promoting an interconnected and inclusive internet.

The emphasis on interoperability in the metaverse by Elena Plexida highlights the importance of seamless communication and connectivity across virtual worlds. ICANN’s motto, “One world, one internet,” reflects their goal of achieving a unified and cohesive experience in the digital realm. Elena Plexida’s perspective sheds light on ICANN’s broader vision and its dedication to shaping a cohesive and inclusive digital landscape.

In summary, ICANN’s coordination of unique identifiers and its multistakeholder governance model are pivotal in ensuring the smooth functioning of the global internet. The integration of virtual and real worlds requires a multi-stakeholder approach to address governance challenges effectively. While standards in virtual worlds are elective, collaboration and consensus play a vital role in achieving interoperability. ICANN recognizes the potential of immersive meetings and supports interoperability in the metaverse. Overall, ICANN’s work and the perspectives of Elena Plexida contribute to the ongoing efforts to shape an inclusive and interconnected digital landscape.

Audience

During the discussions on the impact of the metaverse, several key points were highlighted. Firstly, there was a consensus on the need for governance and a review of existing instruments to fully comprehend the complexities and impact of the metaverse on human rights, the rule of law, and democracy. The Council of Europe is even currently working on a report specifically focusing on this matter. It was acknowledged that the current instruments in place may not adequately cover the various complexities of the metaverse, such as its impact on the brain and mental autonomy.

The evolving nature of the metaverse was also emphasized. As the metaverse is still in its early stages of development and constantly evolving, it is challenging to anticipate all its implications. This raises questions about the sufficiency of existing instruments and the need for more dedicated frameworks, such as the proposed new AI treaty, to address the unique challenges posed by the metaverse.

Additionally, discussions highlighted the crucial role of certain bottleneck technologies in the development of the metaverse. Janne Hirvonen particularly emphasized the importance of enabling technologies and technology standardization in realizing the full potential of the metaverse.

Another important aspect discussed was the effective handling of data accumulation and access. It was recognized that the construction of the metaverse heavily relies on data handling. To ensure the development of artificial intelligence (AI) and virtual worlds within the metaverse, it is crucial to effectively manage the accumulation and access of data by both individuals and companies.

Furthermore, the role of regulation in the technology industry was emphasized. Regulation was seen as a driver for digital innovation and ethical behavior. It was suggested that economic tools could promote responsible innovation, and businesses could benefit from behaving ethically. Notably, implementing ethical behaviors was seen as a way for businesses to financially benefit.

In conclusion, the discussions on the impact of the metaverse highlighted the need for governance and a review of existing instruments to address the complexities and impact on various aspects of society. The crucial role of bottleneck technologies, data handling, and regulation in the development of the metaverse were also emphasized. It is evident that further exploration and collaboration are needed to fully understand and navigate the challenges and opportunities posed by the metaverse.

Masahisa Kawashima

The analysis reveals several key points regarding challenges and potential developments in technology for the future internet. One major challenge identified is the enforcement of data privacy and AI governance policies. The current internet cannot guarantee that transported data is not fake, raising concerns among users who want assurance that their data is protected. To address this challenge, there is a need for standardization to ensure that data privacy and AI governance policies are effectively implemented.

Another major challenge highlighted is network latency in the context of virtual reality (VR) and extended reality (XR) technologies. For VR and XR, a high capacity and low latency network is needed, with network latency for interactive virtual rendering services being less than 10 to 20 milliseconds. This challenge emphasizes the importance of robust and reliable networks to support these emerging technologies.

Regarding communication infrastructure, the analysis points out the instability of the high frequency radio band used for achieving high capacity and low latency communication. The instability of radio links operating in this high frequency band makes it unsuitable for supporting industrial use cases. This poses further challenges for industries that rely on high capacity, low latency communication.

On a positive note, there is a suggestion for closer integration of radio and optical communication to enhance radio communication. This integration is believed to enable high bandwidth and low latency radio communication. A mention is made of Nokia being on the board of directors of Eye on Global Forum, supporting the credibility of this suggestion.

Additionally, the analysis highlights the promising potential of training and education in the virtual world. VR and XR technologies offer new opportunities for immersive and interactive learning experiences, aligning with the goal of achieving quality education (SDG 4). The positive sentiment towards training and education in the virtual world suggests that it can be a valuable tool in enhancing educational approaches and outcomes.

Lastly, the analysis briefly mentions the emotional benefits of meeting late family members in the virtual world. While no supporting facts are provided, this observation highlights a concept that could have personal significance for individuals.

In conclusion, the analysis emphasizes the need for standardization to enforce data privacy and AI governance policies in the future internet. It also identifies challenges related to network latency and high frequency radio communication and suggests potential solutions such as integrating radio and optical communication for better quality communication. The analysis recognizes the promising role of VR and XR technologies in training, education, and potentially emotional connections. These insights provide valuable considerations for future advancements in technology and infrastructure.

Tatsuya Yanagibashi

The current state of Metaverse-related standards is characterized by fragmentation and a lack of a unified approach. There is no single standard organization, similar to the 3GPP for wireless communication, that is leading the way in driving innovation in this field. This disunity hampers progress and poses challenges for the development of a fully functional Metaverse.

However, proponents of a better governance model argue that establishing a single organization, such as the Metaverse Standard Forum, could pave the way for interoperable Metaverse standards. Nokia, for instance, is actively involved in the Metaverse Standard Forum and is optimistic about its potential. Such a unified approach, with shared standards and guidelines, could foster collaboration and lead to a more streamlined and efficient Metaverse ecosystem.

Networks play a crucial role in elevating the performance of Extended Reality (XR) devices. Currently, XR devices carry the heavy load of intensive computing processes. However, networks can alleviate this burden by offloading some of the processing to the edge. By distributing computational tasks, networks make XR devices lighter and more energy efficient, ultimately enhancing the user experience.

Furthermore, XR devices are predicted to surpass smartphones as the dominant user-end device by 2030. As technology continues to evolve, XR devices are anticipated to become more advanced and accessible, attracting a wider audience. This shift in dominance has far-reaching implications for various industries, including entertainment, gaming, education, and communication.

Traffic analysis indicates that the rapid growth of mobile broadband traffic, along with the increasing volume of XR device-generated traffic, may exceed the capabilities of existing 5G networks. This prompts the need for 6G-like technology to handle the aggregate traffic effectively. It is anticipated that by 2028, the demand for a more advanced and capable network infrastructure will emerge, requiring the implementation of next-generation technologies.

Looking ahead, future generations of network technology, such as 6G, hold great promise for enhancing virtual conferences and telepresence experiences. The aim is to create a more immersive and realistic virtual environment where participants can feel as if they are physically present in the same room. This can be achieved by capturing users’ surroundings in high resolution and accurately representing the lighting conditions within the virtual environment. These advancements have the potential to revolutionize communication, collaboration, and remote work, leading to multiple innovations, particularly in the field of telepresence.

In conclusion, the current state of Metaverse-related standards is fragmented, lacking a unified approach and hindering innovation. However, there is a growing advocacy for better governance, represented by organizations like the Metaverse Standard Forum. Additionally, networks play a vital role in improving the performance of XR devices by processing at the edge. XR devices are predicted to become the dominant user-end device by 2030, necessitating the development of more advanced network technologies like 6G. Future advancements in 6G technology hold the potential to enhance virtual conferences and telepresence experiences, ultimately transforming the way we communicate and interact in the virtual realm.

Bitange Ndemo

The analysis explores the importance of accessibility and inclusivity in infrastructure and education, highlighting their role in promoting equal opportunities and reducing inequalities. It argues that considering accessibility and inclusivity from the beginning, especially in terms of who builds the infrastructure, is crucial. Government-led initiatives in creating road infrastructure ensure equal usage and minimize access issues and competition problems that may arise from private infrastructure creation. Successful examples of countries that have built infrastructure serving everyone further demonstrate the positive impact of such efforts.

In the realm of education, the analysis discusses the evolution of learning, from ancient philosophies to the concept of connectivism with the rise of the internet. It emphasizes the growing use of virtual reality technology, particularly in Africa, and the potential benefits it can offer if accessible to all. The adoption of virtual immersive learning is seen as a significant step towards creating inclusive educational experiences, as it fosters better understanding of the content.

Throughout the analysis, a positive sentiment towards accessibility in infrastructure and inclusive education is evident. The involvement of governments in constructing accessible infrastructure is highlighted as essential to ensure equal access for all individuals. Likewise, the argument is made for education systems to embrace technological advancements, such as virtual reality and the metaverse, to provide improved and inclusive learning experiences.

In summary, the analysis underscores the significance of accessibility and inclusivity in infrastructure and education as means to reduce inequalities and promote equal opportunities. Government-led efforts in constructing accessible infrastructure are crucial, while incorporating technological advancements into education, like virtual reality, can enhance inclusivity. By considering and implementing these factors, societies can strive towards a more equitable future.

Cathy Li

The analysis highlights the crucial importance of international collaboration for the successful establishment of the metaverse. Currently, there are prohibitions or limitations in place in 62 countries regarding the flow of data across their borders. This presents a significant challenge for the development and functioning of the metaverse, as data is an essential element in its operation. To overcome these barriers, new governance solutions are needed that can facilitate the free flow of data across jurisdictions, ensuring the smooth operation of the metaverse globally.

The World Economic Forum (WEF) has been actively involved in addressing the challenges and opportunities presented by the metaverse. Prior to October 2021, the WEF has been covering the topic of the metaverse and Web 4.0. The organization has initiated efforts to ensure the responsible deployment of technology in the metaverse. It has convened a community of more than 300 experts with the aim of generating a socially useful, inclusive, equitable, and responsible virtual world. The WEF’s engagement in this area demonstrates its commitment to mitigating risks and harnessing the benefits of the metaverse for the betterment of society.

A comprehensive governance framework and new regulations and policies are essential to address the advancements and complexities of technologies such as the internet, AI, and the metaverse. Current laws and regulations may not suffice to adequately govern and regulate these rapidly evolving technologies. There is a pressing need to establish a comprehensive governance framework that takes into account the diverse aspects of the metaverse, including consumer metaverse, industrial metaverse, and the implications for identity, privacy, security, and interoperability.

Interoperability is not just a technical issue but also influenced by market factors and economic incentives. Standards bodies often have multiple competing standards, and the one that aligns best with market economics usually prevails. Therefore, fostering interoperability requires considering the economic incentives and market dynamics in addition to technical requirements.

Technical interoperability involves addressing various infrastructural requirements, such as data privacy, security, identity, asset ownership, and payments. These aspects must be carefully worked out through a standard-setting process that takes into account market signals. Achieving technical interoperability will be crucial to ensure seamless integration and interaction within the metaverse.

Usage and jurisdictional interoperability are also important considerations. Usage interoperability should take into account global design and collaboration from the onset, ensuring that different regional access and demographic usage patterns are accommodated. Different regions across the globe may have varying levels of access to compute and networks, and the usage patterns of different user groups, such as children, may differ from those of adults. Jurisdictional interoperability involves addressing issues related to data compliance, transacting, accountability, and the establishment of an identity framework. The importance of jurisdictional interoperability is emphasized by the Japanese government’s long-standing advocacy for data free flow, highlighting the significance of ensuring seamless data flow across jurisdictions.

The topic of data ownership is subject to debate. Some argue that data ownership should not be determined solely by market power or regulations and policy. Instead, a balanced approach involving both policy and business innovation is advocated. This approach entails businesses innovating and coming up with convenient, user-friendly business models and use cases that facilitate data ownership. Data ownership is considered key to the development of generative AI and can contribute to the overall advancement of the metaverse.

In conclusion, the analysis underscores the critical need for international collaboration, comprehensive governance frameworks, and new regulations and policies to successfully establish and govern the metaverse. Key considerations include the free flow of data across borders, responsible technology deployment, interoperability (both technical, usage, and jurisdictional), and a balanced approach to data ownership. By addressing these aspects, stakeholders can harness the immense potential of the metaverse while mitigating risks and ensuring inclusivity, security, and sustainability in this emerging virtual realm.

Paul Fehlinger

Paul Fehlinger, the Director of Policy Governance Innovation Impact of Project Liberty, is a strong advocate for responsible innovation and ethical governance of technology. He believes that this can be achieved through an inclusive, multi-stakeholder approach. Fehlinger emphasizes the importance of taking a comprehensive view of the innovation cycle. He suggests that responsible innovation should be assessed from various stages including design and development, funding, commercial deployment, and regulation. By considering the entire cycle, Fehlinger believes that a more holistic and effective approach to responsible innovation can be achieved.

In addition, Fehlinger points out that economic incentives play a crucial role in making responsible innovation practical and viable. He argues that responsible innovation should not only align with ethical principles but should also make good business sense and offer economic benefits. Striking a balance between responsibility and competitiveness at a global level is essential.

Ethics by design is another key aspect highlighted by Fehlinger. He believes that ethical principles should be embedded in the design of technology itself. This includes considerations such as the necessary public interest digital infrastructure, the balance between centralization and decentralization, and the importance of interoperability and user data control. Fehlinger asserts that the technological dimension is of paramount importance, and that ethics need to be ingrained from the outset.

Furthermore, Fehlinger calls for a shift in mindset regarding user participation. He argues that users should be viewed as more than just consumers in virtual worlds. He believes that the societal aspect of virtual worlds should be factored in from the beginning, empowering users and involving them in a more meaningful and active role.

Fehlinger expresses concern about the rapid pace of technological development and the urgency in understanding its implications. He believes that there is still much to be learned and that it is crucial to get it right. Engaging with different communities early in the innovation cycle, despite uncertainties, is essential. Fehlinger suggests making early attempts to regulate technology and updating approaches as necessary.

It is worth noting that Fehlinger has been involved in various initiatives and consultations globally. He is working towards developing ethical principles for responsible technology in an inclusive, multi-stakeholder manner. His expertise and experience shape his stance on responsible innovation and ethical governance.

In conclusion, Paul Fehlinger advocates for an inclusive, multi-stakeholder approach to responsible innovation and ethical governance of technology. He highlights the importance of considering the entire innovation cycle, incorporating economic incentives, embedding ethics in technology design, and rethinking user roles. Fehlinger’s insights underscore the need for a holistic and proactive approach to ensure responsible and ethical use of emerging technologies.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri

The concept of virtual worlds and the metaverse becoming a tangible reality is rapidly approaching, thanks to advancements in technology. These virtual environments hold tremendous potential and can bring numerous benefits to various sectors such as healthcare, education, design, logistics, and engineering.

However, alongside this optimism, concerns have been raised regarding the division between the real world and the virtual world. There are worries about the internet becoming fragmented, as our existence becomes split between these two realms, rather than enjoying a unified online space.

Another challenge lies in the feasibility of taxation and financing within virtual worlds, raising questions about how governments will adapt to these new digital economies. Additionally, the adaptation of laws and justice systems to virtual worlds is a significant consideration. This includes determining how criminal activities will be tracked and judged within these environments.

To ensure the success and inclusivity of virtual worlds, it is crucial to advocate for an open, stable, and globally interoperable virtual world. Creating an environment that allows for seamless communication and interaction between users regardless of their location or technological infrastructure will be essential.

The reliability and security of the technological infrastructure supporting virtual worlds are paramount. Efforts must be made to establish robust systems that safeguard user data and ensure a safe online experience.

One challenging aspect that arises in virtual worlds is the behavior of avatars and the legal and ethical questions it raises. The actions of avatars within virtual worlds can have real-world implications, particularly concerning the interaction between adult avatars and minor avatars. These scenarios require careful consideration and appropriate regulations.

Furthermore, data accumulation and its impact on the development of virtual worlds and artificial intelligence (AI) should not be overlooked. The concentration of vast amounts of data in the hands of a few can influence the direction and progress of AI and virtual worlds. Managing personal and organizational data is a crucial issue that needs to be addressed to mitigate potential risks.

Building the metaverse, the ultimate embodiment of virtual worlds, presents a significant puzzle, with data management being a key challenge. The proper handling of user and company data is of utmost importance, and issues related to data management will continue to be significant in the formation of the metaverse.

In conclusion, while virtual worlds hold great promise and offer exciting possibilities, navigating the challenges they present is essential for their successful implementation. Promoting open and inclusive virtual worlds, ensuring a reliable and secure technological environment, addressing legal and ethical concerns, and managing data effectively will be crucial in shaping the future of virtual worlds and the metaverse. Despite these challenges, efforts are being made towards a better future through digital transformation, paving the way for a new era of virtual experiences.

Alexandra Kozik

The concept of the metaverse is gaining momentum as the next step in the evolution of the internet. It is described as a more immersive and embodied internet experience, where users can interact in virtual worlds using advanced technologies. Alexandra Kozik, a prominent figure in the field, believes that the metaverse will be built by different stakeholders using a constellation of technologies and platforms.

To ensure the success of the metaverse, the development of common technical standards is crucial. Kozik emphasizes that without these standards, the metaverse risks becoming fragmented, with each platform operating on its own terms. To prevent this, industry, governments, and experts must work together to establish these standards. By doing so, interoperability can be achieved, allowing users to seamlessly navigate between different platform destinations and experiences. This not only promotes economic benefits, competition, and consumer choice but also creates a cohesive and connected metaverse.

Moreover, Kozik advocates for active multi-stakeholder participation in setting rules and standards for the metaverse. She highlights the importance of multi-stakeholder cooperation in developing both technical and governance standards. This approach encourages participation from European industries and fosters collaboration between various stakeholders. Kozik mentions notable initiatives such as the European Metaverse Research Network, which researches the risks, opportunities, and governance of the metaverse. By involving different perspectives and expertise, the metaverse can be shaped in a way that benefits all stakeholders.

Additionally, there is support for lowering barriers to entry and promoting inclusivity in the metaverse. This includes ensuring that small businesses and developers have equal opportunities to participate and contribute to the metaverse. The aim is to create an inclusive space that facilitates access for all individuals, regardless of their size or resources. This aligns with the sustainable development goals of decent work and economic growth, industry innovation and infrastructure, and reduced inequalities.

Furthermore, immersive technology has shown potential applications in various sectors, including healthcare training and education. Kozik mentions engaging in discussions with surgeons who are already using the technology to enhance their skills. The immersive nature of the technology enables a more realistic and interactive training experience, benefiting aspiring healthcare professionals. Additionally, there is an exploration of using immersive technology in education, allowing students to learn subjects like physics and history in a more immersive and engaging way. The potential of immersive technology extends beyond these sectors, with possibilities being explored in manufacturing as well.

In conclusion, the metaverse is seen as the next evolution of the internet, offering a more immersive and embodied experience. To ensure its success, the development of common technical standards, active multi-stakeholder participation, inclusivity, and the exploration of immersive technology in various sectors are essential. These efforts will shape the metaverse into a connected, cohesive, and inclusive space for users worldwide.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri:
Dear ladies, dear gentlemen, all friends, welcome to this session on virtual worlds we want. I am Mia-Petra Kumpula-Natri. I am a member of the European Parliament. I am from Finland. I want to personally and also on behalf of my colleagues, the European Parliament members, to thank the hosting ministry Japan for organizing excellent surroundings for the IGF this year in Kyoto. Also, I want to thank Pearse O’Donohue, who is sitting next to me, from the European Commission for initiating and organizing this session. It will be very interesting to talk with the panelists that we have here and also audience online and audience here, participants. We have opportunity for the last 20-25 minutes to participate in questioning these experts that we have got together here. We are some on place and two experts joining us online and also audience online is welcome to join. There is a moderator helping us with the reaching your questions if you have any. So, looking at the future, looking at what is today, we are already talking about the metaverse, virtual worlds, however you want to name it. It has been a long time something to think of, but now it is getting real possibility along the technological developments. There are imagination of the good healthcare, education, design, whatever virtual worlds could bring on the logistics, engineering, manufacturing. What goes first? Or is it in the end that it is the games and virtual culture that flowers? Is it then shops, online shopping having the shape? Is it helping us to teach, learn, visit, experience? Actually what we know that it will have an impact on how its citizens will interact with the digital environment, but also within. And when citizens and people meet with each other, it leads to be various also that how we interact. So is it emphasizing the lessons we have learned with internet, two-dimensional internet that not everything is easy and good, even if it is vital for everyone to be able to join. So I think we can aim for the open and stable and free virtual worlds to be inclusive and global if it is not interoperable. Is it that some people go to the other world and some people stay in this universe? So how to make it reliable and secure and what is needed from the technological environment? Is there enough networks to be able to carry this computer power in the hands of you? Or is it a global effort to do things together? So me as a politician, I have more questions. I hope the panel will guide us forward and set the phase and frameworks for what is needed that we can go together for something better, enlightening more good sides and possibilities and avoiding some risks that might come. One risk being that we are splittering our existence and not enjoying the common internet on the virtual world and based on this one. I see my notes also as a politician mentioning taxes. How to tax anything if everything is online or in virtual worlds? Then governments come with ideas of financing too. And then criminalities, are there some laws in order to police forces and justice systems to find the guilty and judge? So with these opening remarks, I give the floor for the first speaker who is Pearse O’Donohue, Director of the Future Networks in the European Commission.Pearse, the floor is yours.

Pearse O’Donohue:
Thank you so much, Ms. Kumpula-Natri, Miapetra. And thank you for your support of this event. And I need to turn it on. Thank you. I’ll start again. Thank you very much, Mia Petra, for your support. And thank you for everyone who’s here to participate and online. Because discussing here today the virtual worlds we want, it’s particularly timely. In fact, we are at a critical juncture. Most of the technologies that underpin virtual worlds, which we know perhaps individually and separately, virtual reality, extended reality, AI, of course, but also the underpinning technologies, cloud, Internet of Things, Internet technologies, even high-performance computing, as well as the infrastructure and devices, they have all reached a high level of development with perhaps the exception of AI, but we see how fast that is happening. But for the metaverse, for virtual worlds, we’re still at the dawn of this transition. And hence, we have the chance to set the guardrails, to set a framework for what is happening. It’s also particularly important to discuss the subject here at the IGF, as the governance of virtual worlds is a crucial element to be defined now, since the whole Internet governance community is engaged in the debate of the future of the Internet governance architecture, with everything that’s been going on here about the global digital compact and WSIS. And one of the obvious challenges where we need to support the IGF is in relation to its role in and response to new technologies, such, of course, as artificial intelligence, but also virtual worlds. From the point of view of the European Union, we set out our vision and strategy for the future web just in July, when the Commission adopted a new strategy on an initiative on web 4.0 and virtual worlds. And that was to give us a head start in the next technological transition. And that allowed us to make some policy proposals, rather than any definitive solutions, following a round of consultations with our stakeholders, from industry to academia and civil society. And it is crucial in the context of the IGF to note that that is a process which we wish to continue in the course of setting these guardrails for the metaverse. Importantly, we also held citizens panels to hear directly from people what opportunities and challenges they see in this significant shift, and also how they should be supported, how governments and others should support them and steer the transition to virtual worlds in the right direction. The strategy has a long-term perspective, and as I said, it is also in the context of web 4.0, which might risk for some, certainly not in this community, but for others, be a bit techy. But the virtual worlds will be an important manifestation of web 4.0, from the point of view of the normal user as well as business. And beyond the tech jargon, this is really working on a wider, deeper technological transition, which will allow a seamless connection between people and the machines that they are using. It will be more immersive, but that will deeply impact the way we work, interact and socialise. Our strategy in the Commission is anchored in the idea that developments towards web 4.0 and virtual worlds must reflect EU values and principles. They must also, of course, respect existing EU legislation to ensure that individuals, people, are safe, confident and empowered, where people’s rights as users, consumers, workers or creators are respected. And this is why there’s also continuity in the policies that we have followed recently, have all been geared to ensuring a human-centric internet, and that is also the case for virtual worlds. We’re really aiming at creating and supporting a nurturing environment for the European industry, where businesses can develop world-leading applications, scale up and grow, but with certainty about what are the guardrails, what are the principles that they must respect in making that work, making the investments in the technology. Another element, and again, this is not new, the question is how do we apply it in this case, is ensuring that virtual worlds, the technology and services, the environment are open and interoperable, to ensure that the virtual worlds will not be dominated by a small number of big players, and that people and businesses are able to control the transfer of their data, virtual assets and identities, as the avatars and identities become an even more important part of this process. Our strategy also looks at what are the EU strengths. We obviously have a culture-rich continent with a lot of extraordinary cultural heritage, which is being, or has to be digitised. We have industrial players in core enabling technologies. We have major companies, but also innovative SMEs, all of whom can play a role, and where we have made significant investments in fostering data spaces, digital twins, etc., which will actually be an element that feeds into the operation of the virtual worlds in a trustworthy and secure manner. We can also count on a solid future-proof legislative framework in place, to ensure that the users are protected and that SMEs can benefit from this world as well. But there is an outreach. reach element to this, and where we hope to learn from and work with global partners, who are, of course, facing the exact same challenges. Because we have a lot to learn. And like so many other elements of the internet, we want to ensure that it actually increases interoperability and openness and does not become a tool for marginalization or fragmentation. We want to empower people and reinforce the skills required to develop innovative applications, services, and content. We want to support a web 4.0 industrial ecosystem to scale up excellence in research and development, to foster innovation, and to prevent fragmentation within our single market. We want to support societal progress and the provision of virtual public services. It’s not all about gaming, after all. We are going to have two new public flagships in the area of smart cities and in health, respectively. And they are areas, of course, that directly impact on the quality of life of citizens. And then the last pillar, leaning on all of the other three and what I’ve already mentioned, is about the governance at global level, but also, of course, EU level, on how we shape global standards for open and interoperable virtual worlds and web 4.0. And to promote, of course, those standards in line with EU’s vision and values. We’re already seeing signs, as Mia Petra was also speaking to me about earlier on, about attempts to preempt that standardization process for purposes which we would be deeply suspicious of, and also which would not provide the guarantees with regard to the protection of the individual, the protection of identities, and the protection of data along the lines of the values that we try to be consistent about in all of our actions with regard to digital technologies. So standardization is key, and the governance of the metaverse is and will be key. So today, we’re going to discuss what. What are the virtual worlds we want? What should they look like? But also, if we can agree on a common set of principles and values underpinning the virtual worlds, it’s perhaps even more important then to discuss how. How do we deliver that? The elements we need to deliver on a certain vision of virtual worlds. And if that can come from the IGF, it automatically has validity. It has strength and should be a common tool that we can use with partners who are not necessarily present here as a common view of what the metaverse should be shaped like. And as I said earlier, from the EU side, we want to ensure that they’re designed to be open and interoperable, and also to enable true user empowerment and diverse participation. So we have to have a look again at the capacity, the ability, the feasibility of access and use by others who are not properly connected, do not have the means to allow the latest whiz-bang set of goggles that have just been announced, but where basic accessibility and connectivity issues are still a major challenge towards the uptake of such technologies. That requires innovation, creativity, but also, of course, collaboration. And addressing the governance at global level will be required to achieve openness and interoperability, and it will be key to future developments and uses. Otherwise, elements of society and elements of government will simply shut down on the whole process to the detriment we feel of society and the economy. International engagement is needed on things like content, on practice. Also, of course, avoiding, ensuring that there is not disinformation. Also, that there is not censorship, having a positive impact on that tension with freedom of speech while protecting the individual. And of course, surveillance versus privacy, where we have to ensure the protection of the individual. So, of course, I think in this community, there will be very little doubt that we are all committed to engaging in this multi-stakeholder internet governance in the design of an open and interoperable virtual world. Again, the question is, how do we convince others to do the same? To develop human rights-based virtual worlds, we have to rely on the recognised instruments. We have in Europe the European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles, as well as a Declaration for the Future of the Internet. And we know that these are mirrored by actions and views and principles held in other areas, because that Declaration for the Future of the Internet, as we discussed here on Sunday, already has almost 70 signatories, including in the Global South. Of course, governance for openness and interoperability can only be accomplished by this community. I repeat that point, and we will not stop saying it. But it is also important that as we rely on the IETF, on ICANN, and on other important bodies, we must ensure that the IGF is at that same level, being allowed to play its role, and that national and regional initiatives, including regional internet governance fora for multi-stakeholder internet are allowed to have their input to that important technical and policy process. So we are launching, for our part in Europe, an expert group which will bring our member states together with others to share a common approach and the best practices on the virtual world. As I said, in line with the consultation process that we are running, we want to set with the community and with member states the guidelines for this important technological process. We will support the creation of a technical multi-stakeholder governance process to address essential aspects of virtual worlds that are perhaps not sufficiently elaborated so far in the global institutions, the governance institutions so far. So we must look at how we deal with this issue in the IGF, and we have to address it positively and critically. What is it that the IGF needs to do? What support, for example, do governments need to give to the IGF to engage in the intersessional work to ensure that it is the locus for this discussion? I hope that today’s discussion will contribute significantly to our dialogue on the role of the multi-stakeholder governance model for virtual worlds, and that will help us in our work, but help others also, and bring us together in a common understanding from the outset about how do we achieve true user empowerment, diverse participation and accessibility. Thank you very much.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri:
Thank you very much. We only got one hour and 15 minutes to solve the questions, or to elaborate at least the scenery that the Commission was giving us from the European Commission. So next, I go for the experts that we have gathered here together. I will put the plenary to talk about three big titles, regulation and governance, then accessibility and inclusivity, and then the third, interoperability and standards. But I’ll let the experts to have their own vision, not entitled only for this title. Three, four minutes each, and we will start with Cathy Li. Cathy Li is with us online. She’s the head of AI data and metaverse at the World Economic Forum with the vast knowledge and experiment on the businesses on VPP media investment arm, including digital media buying and real professional who has been working in London, New York and Beijing. Cathy, are you with us? I would like to have your comment. What would be needed to support such a vision we heard here, open, interoperable, safe, good governance? Is it legislative? What institutions? Please, the word is yours.

Cathy Li:
Thank you, moderator, and good to see everyone. Good morning, good afternoon, good evening to all the audience as well. It’s an honor to be here. So my name is Cathy Lee. I head the AI data and metaverse work and the co-head of the Center for the Fourth Industrial Revolution at the Forum, working on the Forum. So first of all, I do want to mention that indeed at the Forum, we have been covering the topic of the metaverse, virtual worlds and Web 4.0 for probably the longest time since I think before October 2021. And that was important because that was before even meta changed their brand name. So you can imagine that we’ve been working on this issue for the longest period. But the ambition at that time was really to anticipate the global discussions on the metaverse and virtual worlds. That’s how we launched the Defining and Building the Metaverse initiative to basically realize the benefits and mitigate the risks of virtual worlds and Web 4.0. And the initiative really intends to surface technology and policy harmonization needs, explores and guides the economic impact and use case development and co-design the kind of necessary frameworks for responsible deployment. What we did was we leveraged the kind of peer-to-peer cross-sectoral collaboration and managed to convene a community of more than 300 experts from across the public and private sectors to generate socially useful, inclusive, equitable and responsible virtual worlds. The work cuts across two tracks, value creation and governance. And value creation, we’re talking about not just about creating value for the industry, but most importantly, for the society overall as well. The initiative advances recommendations on topics such as the digital identity, ethics, IP rights and digital assets. The value creation track really maps out the new value chains and business model across industries, identifying potential use cases, future use cases, while analyzing the impacts and the risks. of virtual worlds to society and culture. The governance track recommends policy frameworks for the global and responsible technology deployment while championing equity, inclusion, diversity, and accessibility. So far, the initiative has produced work on demystifying the consumer metaverse, social implications of the metaverse, interoperability in the metaverse, and privacy and safety in the metaverse. Next, the initiative will focus on developing guidance on metaverse industry transformation, identity, and security. Ultimately, the initiative will provide guidance, provide a guidance, a governance framework for the virtual world, but 4.0. And here, it’s very important to, first of all, talk about the definition of the metaverse. We at the forum never thought this would be limited to a 2D or 3D AR, VR, XR kind of virtual environment. It’s important to think of the metaverse as the future, as the next iteration of the internet, and what kind of economic and social opportunities we wanted to generate from the next iteration of the internet, and equally, what kind of guardrails we wanted to put in place. And if we walk back from that vision, what do we need to do today to make sure that we have the kind of future that everyone can benefit from? So I do want to address very briefly your first question in terms of how do we make sure that there’s international engagement for the market stakeholder community? Because again, that’s been what we have been doing for the past two years, and it’s not an easy process. Because in a borderless metaverse, the only way to mitigate the risks of regulatory arbitrage and secure individual’s data and rights is to develop global governance solutions. But we still are seeing a significant lack of harmonization across jurisdictions. For example, a study conducted in 2021 by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation discovered that 62 countries currently have prohibitions or limitations in place regarding the flow of data across their borders. Furthermore, the data which these restrictions are being implemented is increasing. This underscores the importance of international collaboration that spans borders to both streamline and safeguard the movement of data, which is a critical consideration as a borderless. this metaverse continues to develop. Those who collaborate across borders must continue to take into account the ethical, jurisdictional, and coordination challenges related to two key factors. One is the new types of data and their associated definitions. And two, emerging forms of social interactions linked to embodiments and presence. Moreover, given the new natures of several metaverse technologies and experiences, it’s likely that the new governance solutions, both legal and non-legal, will need to be developed and trialed across jurisdictions to be able to effectively govern virtual worlds. And to facilitate this process, we need multi-stakeholder bodies developing principles and frameworks on metaverse governance, standard-setting organizations working to ensure technologies are open and interoperable, and government engagement in the rule-setting and enforcement process, and a strong industry buy-in, which will be key as well. I’ll stop there. I’m very happy to continue the discussion later on, but that will be some of my initial observations. Back to you. Thank you.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri:
Thank you so much. We will deep dive into some questions more. Next, I will have the pleasure to ask Elena Plexida, who’s the Vice President for the Government of IGO Engagement in the Internet Corporation of Assigned Names and Numbers, ICANN. Prior to joining ICANN, she worked for the European Commission too, but has been then championing our common internet in ICANN names and numbers. Does it apply in the metaverse? Having the premise that it’s a global phenomenon, it needs global governance as also challenged here. What we can learn from the systems? Could we draw parallels from the governance model that ICANN is now running? I’m going to turn it over to the next speaker, who is going to talk about the global internet and how it can be used in the future.

Elena Plexida:
Thank you, Miapetra, hello, everyone. Indeed, ICANN coordinates the internet unique identifiers, the names, the numbers, the protocols, and especially the names, the domain name system. It’s a coordination without which you wouldn’t have the global internet, the global internet as we know it today. It’s a coordination without which you wouldn’t have the global internet, the global internet as we know it today. We have multistakeholder models across the spectrum, government, civil society, academia, engineers, users, and they collectively make the policies that govern the domain name system. That’s the ICANN multistakeholder model, if you will. And all our sibling technical organizations like the ITF that Piers mentioned before have their own multistakeholder governance model. We have a multistakeholder governance model, the ICANN multistakeholder model. It’s a multistakeholder model, it’s a multistakeholder model for international engagement. We are talking about decision-making, that in the case of the ICANN multistakeholder model, it can change things like the very route of the internet. This governance model has enabled and has protected the global internet so far, the technical layer that keeps the internet together, that’s what I mean by the internet. So, the ICANN multistakeholder model has worked very well for the internet for the last 25 minutes, 25 years. It will be fantastic, eh? It should work as well for the next 25 years, I guess. So, it absolutely must be preserved to govern the technical underpinnings of the internet so they can continue to support anything that comes on top of them in the future. So, I think that’s all I have to say about the ICANN multistakeholder model. It’s a multistakeholder model, it’s a multistakeholder model for the global internet. Be it virtual worlds, be it web 4.5, be it 5, be it whatever inflated version of the web anyway. Now, if we were talking about virtual worlds in a closed environment, gaming, it’s a multistakeholder model, it’s a multistakeholder model for the global internet. and this would be an application issue and we wouldn’t be discussing much. However, the virtual worlds are meant to integrate with the real world or with each other, with day-to-day interaction with the real world, and that’s what the European Commission Communication is aiming to discuss, this augmented reality. So then the question becomes, how do you keep in sync the virtual and the real world? And how do you keep in sync the real world with many virtual worlds? When you go into the mentors in a virtual browser, virtual computer and type www.icon.org, where do you go? I think Pierce mentioned that before as a question. Or how about property? How does a property belong to, who does it belong to? What are the different obligations that are tied to that property in the many different worlds, as an example? So then you are indeed into a governance issue. Now the real world, take for example real estate, is heavily regulated by sovereign governments. Stakeholders participate by providing views. They’re being consulted. The governance system that supports the internet technically, as I explained before, does not work that way. Stakeholders, including governments, along with the other stakeholders, they decide. So the question becomes, as the virtual worlds and the real world start to integrate, what happens at the juncture in terms of governance? Clearly I don’t have the answer. Except to say that we do need everyone around the table. Globally, you do need multi-stakeholderism. But I can certainly say that you cannot have a stable and secure internet without the same individual worlds. So although the virtual worlds might be a long way out, we do have to start thinking about it. And thanks to the European Commission for putting the questions out there.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri:
Thank you so much. Then about the, how to make this world accessibility and take inclusivity on board, responsible innovation and so. So next couple of speakers will touch that. I will first have His Excellency, a global technocrat with a diverse experience in business. Also been a professor. on entrepreneurship of the University of Nairobi Business School, worked for the Ministry of Information and Communication, and now as Kenya’s ambassador to Belgium and the EU. So, welcome, Bitange Ndemo. The floor is yours.

Bitange Ndemo:
Thank you for the question. The issue about accessibility and the word multi-stakeholder needs to be reconciled. Sometimes I say we need to define these concepts ahead of time so that everybody understands. If you look at the road infrastructure, the government does it and we all use it. We compete within that space. And if it were that every rich person makes the road, we would have a lot of problems, even in terms of competition. Accessibility and inclusivity would begin with who builds the infrastructure, because those who go ahead building this infrastructure create problems of access in such a way that competition can lower the cost of entry. So, if we are serious about this, we must rein in on some of those who participate in the multi-stakeholder arrangement to create access to these technologies and be able to do what some countries have done, which build infrastructure, and everybody rides on it like we do on the road infrastructure. By understanding that everything is changing, if I talk about education, we begin first. Every learning is predicated on some theory or philosophy. We spend on Plato’s philosophies of learning. Most of us learned through road learning, memorization, and then people like Pavlov in dog experimentation changed into behaviorism, and we moved out of there. Biagé came with constructivism. which has done a lot of good across the world, which countries changed their way of learning. This is now shifting. It’s shifted into what we call connectivism, where internet came and people are learning in certain ways. The trouble is that because of lack of access, not everybody enjoyed that space. We are shifting now into metaverse, where I am hoping that academicians would say we are in augmentation or augmentative stage or theory that would explain our learning. If you see the growth of virtual reality across the world, even in Africa, which usually comes from behind, you are seeing solutions which would amaze you. But these solutions must be accessible and inclusive across the board. To get them to be accessed and address everybody’s problems, a number of things has to be done from what has been said by previous speakers and also embracing new ways of creating new spaces of competition by destroying the structures that we have had before. What is happening now is the most defining moment of our time with these technologies. Unless something is done now, we are going to mess up a lot of people’s lives who may not access that, who may not be as competitive as I told you. Some of us begin through memorization to this stage. Others would be in the augmentation. One example I will give you, in my biology class, my teacher used to draw an apple on the board and a plus in the middle and would tell us this is the left ventricle and the right ventricle of the heart. And you’re trying to imagine what the hell does the heart look like. Now, if you look virtual immersive learning, you see the heart. You see where it is. You see how the blood flows. And you can actually walk out of there and explain to someone. If we deny young people that opportunity to learn in ways that they understand content beyond what we have seen before, we are doing ourselves a disservice. Thank you.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri:
Thank you. Very interesting. And my family comes from the far north Lapland. And they really thought when the internet came and now that you distance might lose meaning and they have more opportunities to, as you described very beautifully. Next one we will have from the Project Liberty Institute, which is describing its aims as enhanced ethical governance of the future businesses and technology. The Paul Fehlinger. Please, how do we foster responsible innovations? Foster innovation, but make it responsible at the same time in the world of words.

Paul Fehlinger:
Thank you so much. First of all, I just wanna say that in all the interventions of the two of you and my fellow discussants, I sense a lot of aspiration when we talk about virtual worlds and this is why I think the title, the virtual world we want is very wisely chosen. My name is Paul Fehlinger. I’m the Director of Policy Governance Innovation Impact of Project Liberty. As you said, we’re an organization for responsible innovation, ethical governance of new emerging and sometimes disruptive technologies such as everything involved in web three, web four. And we as an organization do basically three things. We enable evidence-based governance innovation through our research partnerships. Our founding partners are Stanford University in Silicon Valley, Sciences Po in Paris and France and Georgetown University in Washington, DC. And we catalyze multi-stakeholder cooperation to develop governance frameworks for responsible innovation and ethical technology. And very particular, we also are the steward of an open source public interest protocol for the internet which is called DSMP, the Decentralized Social Networking Protocol which is a protocol to enable user data control into operability between services and economic value participation. And thank you for the question on how to do responsible innovation practice because this is what we focus on. We’re currently leading together with the Aspen Digital Institute, a global multi-stakeholder initiative for ethical principles for responsible technology. It’s a global consultative process. We had regional consultations already in Latin America and Costa Rica in the past months. We were in Africa and in Nairobi just before the summer. We had consultations in Europe and Paris. We had here consultations in Japan on the sidelines of the Internet Governance Forum and in three weeks, we will hold our North American consultations in Silicon Valley. And we have already consulted with over 200 key actors across international organization, policy makers, businesses, investors, entrepreneurs, civil society and academics to precisely ask the question of what is responsible innovation with virtual worlds, new technologies? And I wanna share four takeaways without pre-empting the process and the final results which were released for public comments in December towards the end of the year. One first takeaway is that we need to look at the entire innovation cycle for responsible innovation. A lot of efforts in the past iterations of the web have been focused on regulation. But the innovation cycle also is how we design and develop technology, how technology is funded, how we do investment, which is something that was already mentioned, and how it’s commercially deployed and then how it’s regulated. And I wanna just say congratulations to the approach of the European Union because this initiative looks really very early in the innovation cycle. We basically discuss an upcoming innovation that is more of a concept today than a market reality for lack of computing power and other factors at this moment. So there’s also this opportunity to learn from the iterations of web one and web two as Piers said in the beginning and have a better approach for web three, web four. We are here in Japan, so Japan is talking about society 5.0, whatever number of an iteration you wanna give it. The second takeaway that we have heard so far from this initiative is that ethical governance is sort of a journey. Yes, there are overarching high-level principles and frameworks, and yes, existing rules apply also in the metaverse and virtual worlds, but with the conference, with this mix of multiple technologies, artificial intelligence, XR, blockchain, quantum computing power in the future, neurotechnology, when we integrate not only the visual but also computer brain interfaces in the interactions, this is certainly having unintended consequences that we don’t even know today. So a risk-based approach works very well when you know what you’re dealing with, but here we did, this is uncertainty. So what we’ve been hearing a lot is that we need a process-oriented approach, and this requires a mindset shift, a cultural shift that says, well, uncertainty is part of the game, so how do we make it work? And here, again, I think a lot of thinking has already been going in a very good direction towards more agile governance approaches that build on sandboxes that allow for experimentation and testing and for iteration and for multi-stakeholder partnerships, but it’s very important, and this is also something that was said over and over again, that multi-stakeholder partnerships and multi-stakeholder involvement for responsible innovation need to have teeth. There needs to be some form of enforcement at the end of feedback loops. A third takeaway, and this was highlighted, we had a town hall of Project Liberty yesterday, and something that was highlighted by quite a few people during this session was the economic dimension of making responsible innovation work. In the case of Europe, we want that Europe’s virtual worlds are competitive, so how can you be at the same time responsible and competitive at the global level, because, and this was mentioned already before, jurisdictions are different, there are different standards around the world, and so there need to be economic incentives. It needs to make good business sense to behave responsibly, and this is a discussion we need to have. And last but definitely not least, and this is one of the most important points I would even say when we discuss virtual worlds, the notion that regulation is very important, but as we look around the entire innovation cycle, we also need to look at the technological dimension and to see how ethics can be embedded by design and technology or through the technological design. Code is law and law is code, so what kind of public interest digital infrastructure do we need? How do we build interoperable infrastructures? And here the question is between centralization and decentralization, and I think it’s very important to have a discussion with the different stakeholders around the table on, do we need a holistic approach? Because we have learned from web one, web two, that there was a lot of patching, a lot of piecemeal solutions through regulation, but if we look through the entire stack and we start thinking about the protocol level on which virtual worlds will be based in or built in the future, we need to discuss if at this infrastructure protocol level we can embed by design certain principles such as user data control, such as interoperability and such as economic value participation, which is something which is very close to us at Project Liberty because we are the steward of one protocol that does exactly that, and there are other approaches as well and other initiatives working on similar approaches. And just to finish, and I think this is common sense and we all agree, we need a human-centric approach and I just want to share something very specific in that regard. We at Project Liberty, we’re part of the ITU’s focus group on the metaverse, where there’s a discussion on standards and interoperability, and we are realizing that a lot of the discussions focus on users as consumers, and I think it’s very important to slightly shift this mindset as well and talk about how to empower users beyond just being consumers of virtual worlds. There are commercial applications, there are industrial applications, there are commercial applications, but virtual worlds will also shift the fabric of connectivity as societies at large, so it’s important to keep this in mind from the onset and I look forward to the discussions. Thank you very much.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri:
Actually, you paved the way for the three next speakers. Our last round is from the tech business right away. Is there ethical principles on the task of the engineers doing the R&D on the commercialization phase? How to make it really happen? Are the networks there? We will have the speakers from IOWN, Nokia and Meta. So first, Dr. Masahisa Kawashima, who is leading the entities R&D of innovative optical and wireless network technology director there. So what are the big technological issues we need international standards for? Please.

Masahisa Kawashima:
Thank you. So there are a lot of standardization items. For example, we have to update our technology suite for information representation to support 3D digital object for Metaverse. And also, we need to update infrastructure standardization standards to support high capacity and low latency networks for VR and virtual VR and MR applications. But I think these work items are relatively straightforward. And the most complex and challenging issue is how to enforce data privacy and AI governance policies. For example, when I walk into a shop in the virtual space, before entering the shop, I want to make sure that my data is protected. So for example, of course, today we have a server certificate mechanism. So it is easy to have a shop submit a certificate to attest the compliance with the policies. But I cannot be sure if what is attested really reflects how the server is operated, actually. So to enforce the policy technically is very difficult. Another example is when I use data from other data providers, I want to be sure that the data is authentic. Of course, we can have a certificate mechanism. But how can we prove, actually, how can I be actually sure that the data is not fake? So, such issues actually has not yet been solved in today’s Internet. Internet is a good transport network, but Internet itself cannot guarantee that transported data is not fake when the server site is not a fake site. So, we need to make the future Internet not just for transporting data, but the future Internet should be the infrastructure for trusted service and data exchange. And we don’t have such a technology suite. But without such a technology suite, launching a virtual world may harm many people. That is my view on that question. Thank you.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri:
Yes, thank you very much. And next one, Tatsuya Yanagibashi from Chief Technology Officer for Japan on Nokia Solutions and Network. I do remember when I’ve traveled from Finland to United States and it was cut off my mobile. It’s peaceful, no virtual reality, only singing birds. And I was thinking, was it my mobile phone? So what is it the world of standards and networks from Nokia perspective?

Tatsuya Yanagibashi:
Sure. So firstly, thank you very much for inviting and it’s great pleasure to have this opportunity to share our view on the Metaverse. So before actually I briefly touch upon kind of the technologies which is, I think, enabling the Metaverse to be real. I would also like to briefly touch upon, again, the importance of a standard and standardization efforts. Because I think those two things are still fundamentally important for building interoperable virtual environment, virtual world, Metaverse, right? And from our perspective, we have seen very good difference in the wireless communication standard that is actually called the 3GPP. So it has developed wireless communication standard for more than decades. And it has been so successfully done so far. And I and we, Nokia, believes that similar approach also required for the Metaverse standard as well. But here you can also imagine, I think we have a big problem today. There are so many Metaverse… Metaverse-related standard in the market today, and there is no 3GPP like the single standard organizations actually driving the innovations. And there are so many, as I said, Metaverse-related standard organizations, they don’t like each other, they ignore each other, sometimes they fight each other. So I don’t think this is the kind of ideal situation, and we definitely need to have a better governance model here. And from Nokia’s point of view, there are some organizations actually called the Metaverse Standard Forum. So this is a different organization from the ITU you just mentioned. So that’s another kind of opportunity, we think, where we can actually drive interoperable Metaverse standard. So and of course, Nokia is part of this organization. I think this might be probably the better environment where we can actually discuss Metaverse governance. So that’s the first comment. And then, you know, next question would be, you know, kind of the technologies to accelerate the Metaverse and the virtual world is, from Nokia’s perspective, the XR device is definitely promising technologies. So today, as you can imagine, that our communication is like a smartphone, right? This is the majority of user-end devices. But in 2030, for example, I think this is no longer the case. We believe that XR device has much more, you know, it’s going to be more dominant in user-end device, the market and segments. But today, you can also imagine that XR device available, we can use today, it’s still not human-friendly. You cannot really imagine with using such, I think, bigger, you know, XR device for 24 hours, right? That’s obviously impossible. XR, extended reality device, sorry. Yeah. XR. Yeah. So, what network can probably do and help in this situation is, you know, today XR device is having the bigger computing processing, but I think network can take care of some of processing at edge, for example, which makes XR device much lighter, you know, having better, longer battery life and, you know, even cheaper, right? So, I think this is where network can actually really help and this needs to be also discussed in, I think, Metaverse-related standard organizations as well. Thank you.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri:
Thank you. Even we are talking already virtual world, not AI anymore. I was reading the other day of the AI developing machinery to build more chips for AI, because they are needing more. So, I don’t know how quickly they introduce themselves to introduce something that they can be built. But then, now next one, next speaker will be from Brussels, from Meta. Alexandra Kozik, are you with us?

Alexandra Kozik:
Yes, I’m here.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri:
Hi. Welcome and welcome to join us and give your perspective as the last speaker for the round. My children, I’m teasing all the time, that have sometimes a book, but now there is no Facebook, there is Meta. Tell us where you want to see us in future.

Alexandra Kozik:
Thank you very much and thank you so much for inviting us to this debate. Good morning from Brussels, of course, good afternoon where you are and sorry I can’t be there in person with you. So, you know, we’ve been talking a lot today about global governance standards, multi-stakeholder cooperation, you’ve asked us to weigh in on that. Of course, these are big concepts to unpack, so I thought what would be maybe helpful to do today is first share with you a little bit more about our vision for this and then give you a couple of examples, specific examples of how we’re working on that. So, first of all, some of you have referred to the definitions. We obviously believe that virtual worlds or the metaverse is simply the next chapter or the next evolution of the internet. So, but we think about it as much more embodied and immersive internet with that defining feeling of presence. So, obviously, like there is internet, the metaverse is not going to be a single product, it’s going to be a constellation of technologies, platforms and products and obviously it will be built by many different stakeholders. It won’t be built by one company alone, there will be developers, creators, civil society involved and this is obvious but important to stress because we obviously will not be the ones setting the rules for how this works. It will really require a multi-stakeholder effort to bring this to life and truly develop the right norms for it. So, from our side, we believe that the metaverse will only reach its full potential if it is built on a foundation of common technical standards. We talked about empowering consumers and citizens, we talked about empowering businesses, we believe that people need to be able to seamlessly navigate and travel between the multiple platform destinations and experiences that you will have in the metaverse, just like you can browse the internet today freely. So, this obviously will help create beneficial economic effects, it will favor competition, citizens’ choice. So, we really, really, really truly believe that this element of interoperability is important here. Of course, not every aspect of the metaverse experience needs to be or will be interoperable with the others but without the agreement that the baseline interoperability matters to connect the metaverse together, it will very quickly become fragmented and broken into silos. So, obviously, the development of technical standards in specific areas is crucial to create that baseline level of interoperability. And essentially, we will make sure that we can mirror the kind of open interoperability that is based in the metaverse. So, for this to happen successfully, the only way it can happen successfully is if we develop these standards in a collaborative fashion. So, industry, governments and experts must come together around these shared technical standards for the metaverse to be truly interoperable. And here, I wanted to just share a few concrete examples with you. I’ll share maybe three given the limits of time that we have, just to give you an idea of how we are engaging in some of these multi-stakeholder initiatives. So, the first one was already mentioned by the previous speaker, the Metaverse Standards Forum, which we joined in 2022. This is an industry-wide effort that brings together leading companies of all sizes together with standards organizations to talk about how to build that open, inclusive metaverse and essentially provide space for collaboration between these organizations to develop these standards. Now, of course, there are other speakers from the World Economic Forum. We also are involved in the WEF’s Defining and Building the Metaverse Initiative, which essentially seeks to guide the development of a safe, open, interoperable metaverse. And again, this is a great example of that multi-stakeholder approach to defining the governance frameworks for the metaverse. And we’re therefore actively engaging in that effort. And then maybe lastly, the XR Association, which is another forum for cross-industry cooperation. They bring together companies working across the whole spectrum of the metaverse technology. So, we’re talking about headsets manufacturers, technology platforms to companies that build components in internet infrastructure and enterprise solutions, etc., etc. So, it’s really the whole spectrum. And all of these, the three that I just mentioned, they’re very good examples of multi-stakeholder initiatives that really can help feed into that debate on governance we’re trying to have to help ensure that metaverse will be accessible to all participants. Now, against that backdrop where industry participates and comes together to collaborate on open standards, we really think that ideally, policymakers would be supporting and embracing those multi-stakeholder efforts to develop baseline technical standards. And very importantly, and this was referred to, I think, by some of the previous speakers, we really try to encourage as well that European industry participates in these efforts so that they are conceived with European values built in from the start. So, all this to say that aligning any future initiatives with the work of such international multi-stakeholder efforts around technical standards, I believe, will be vital, really vital to ensure that policies of the future really are in line with industry best practices and support responsible innovation globally. And some of the previous speakers have mentioned it, we are years ahead of this becoming a reality. And so, we now have the opportunity to develop some of these things in advance. And maybe lastly, I know I’m probably out of time, but I just wanted to mention one more thing which perhaps would be interesting to bear in mind. There is a network called the European Metaverse Research Network which is essentially a body of academics from several European member states. So, I think there are universities involved from Germany, France, Poland, Spain, Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands, etc. who are studying the risks and opportunities of the metaverse. They are examining how metaverse technologies will intersect with issues like privacy, safety, inclusion, future of work. And they’re looking at sort of the questions of governance as well. So, all of this combined, you know, these are, I think, good examples of some of these multi-stakeholder initiatives. And obviously, we from our side are very open to continue discussing this and engaging in any other efforts that are out there. But I thought it would be just helpful to give some very concrete examples of things that we are following and engaging in that we see happen to develop those common technical standards and government frameworks. I can say a few more things, but I will maybe stop here to allow some time for discussion. And I just wanted to sincerely thank you for inviting us to this debate and also available for any follow-ups and discussions afterwards for whoever would like to have one. Thank you so much.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri:
Thank you so much. I think it’s time really to go straight for the questions as we have limited time, but we will keep that part as we promised for 20 minutes. So, audience, if we do have questions online, please indicate me from the technical secretariat, and then anybody in the room who would like to ask questions. You can always introduce yourself. A microphone is here behind, so you will be seen also. So, like in the previous, you can form a line and then have the floor. But if it’s here, then you can be seen on the… So, please introduce yourself.

Audience:
Good afternoon. I don’t know if this is on. Okay. Thank you. Thank you. Good afternoon, everyone. My name is Radhika Chakina, and I come from the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe is also looking at the metaverse. Of course, we are a human rights organization. So, from the point of view of the impact on human rights, rule of law, and democracy, we also organized a session on the metaverse two days ago, on day one, specifically from, again, a human rights point of view. So, one of the questions… We are also working now on a report that will be issued next year on this with IEEE. And one of the big questions that we have and we’re looking at is, of course, governance and the existing instruments. Are the existing instruments sufficient to cover the metaverse considering its complexities, its impact on the brain, on mental autonomy, and not only? Or something else will be needed, like the new AI treaty we’re working on or other acts. So this is the question. Do you think that what we have in place or what other international organizations have in place is sufficient or more needs to be done? Taking into consideration what was said before, that the metaverse is still evolving and it’s not really possible to anticipate all its applications. Thank you.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri:
Thank you. Who from the panel wants to take this one? And maybe I can guess that Liberty, do you want to answer on this one? And then maybe also Sinti online?

Paul Fehlinger:
With pleasure. I actually had listening to what you said. We are at the stage where we sort of think there’s a huge wave coming. This will be great, hopefully, for our economies, for citizens, and enrich our lives and not be to the detriment of it. Mental health and other issues were mentioned as well. So getting this right is a big question. You mentioned you run a big initiative as well, as many organizations who now look at this topic. And it still takes a year until you will have findings. So we are so early that we are still trying to figure out the basics of how what we have applies, what else needs to be invented. But I just want to highlight something else. At the same time, as we speak here right now, trying to figure this out, and this is what I mentioned with embracing uncertainty, there are engineers working on new things. They are not part of those discussions. They are not even aware of our efforts here in this room to try to get this right. There are entrepreneurs who launch startups. There are investors, venture capitalists who invest and who take bets on what technology will be mainstream or not. And I just want to highlight that it’s incredibly important, as we have the luxury, basically, of having a huge technological development and having champions already who put this on the map, launch big processes. If we want to get this right, we need to get early in the innovation cycle, but not when we have figured things out, because the reality is we will not have figured things out. Even if we encode things, probably they will not age so well and they need to be updated at one point. So it’s very important, even at a stage where we have not figured everything out, to involve those different communities. Doing so, and this is something that is something we should address in a multi-stakeholder setting, requires speaking a different language, because those people have economic incentives or technological incentives. They operate at different speeds faster and we need to find a way to bridge those different silos. And this is really important and there’s a chance to get this specifically right.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri:
Thank you. Cathy, are you online? Do you want to take this one?

Cathy Li:
I would like to say I wanted to slightly contradict with the previous speaker, which is I wanted to point you to the work we’ve been doing. We’ve been doing this for more than two years and all of those experts, from engineers to entrepreneurs, they are part of the existing community already. And right now the consensus more or less is that, yes, the existing laws and regulations, some of them may cover, but many of them, you know, there’s a need for the new regulations to come in. And maybe regulation isn’t the right word, but more of a comprehensive governance framework from both the companies and organizations themselves. There needs to be the kind of right governance framework put in place, but also we need to take a look at what are the new policies and regulations that might be needed. And again, the work we’re doing is very comprehensive. Like I said, we already studied the consumer metaverse, industrial metaverse, social implications, identity, privacy, security, and interoperability. Covering all the kinds of new data that will be generated, the new technical standards that will be needed across the whole technology stack. Because this is a complicated, you know, future kind of construct of the Internet. I would encourage everyone to really think deep in terms of what exactly we’re talking about. Like one of the examples that the earlier participant speaker gave in terms of walking to a shop, that itself, that’s a very difficult interoperability technical standards issue. Because even with, let’s assume we all have avatars from one place to another, just even the slightest kind of modification to the physical features of that avatar, that has a different copyright intellectual property issue that’s attached to it. So obviously the current copyright laws and directives are not going to be sufficient. But at the same time, we also need to be careful about not to use any of the new proposed laws and regulations, for example, the upcoming new AI Act, to interpret the previous and existing laws and regulations. Because then we’re never going to come to a conclusion in terms of what’s actually needed and what needs to be put in place. We do need to go, we acknowledge that the technology is evolving and it’s going to continue to do that. But at the same time, there must be the kind of relevant and efficient, effective kind of protective governance framework put in place to protect humans’ rights offline and also online. But at the same time, looking at what are the potential net new regulations and policies that we need to embrace in the future.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri:
Thank you. I will give also a short comment from Elena, please, from ICANN.

Elena Plexida:
Thank you. Just to add up very quickly to what the previous speakers were saying, we need standards in virtual worlds. But let’s remember, internet standards are elective, not normative. So this is where multi-stakeholder model helps to not bring the heavy-handed normative standards too early. Thanks.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri:
Thank you. Yes, it breaks our imagination. What can avatar do for another avatar when it’s all unlawful or when you have adult avatars acting with the minor avatar? Is there laws complying? Is it only something like not nice, something that we find in the school rooms, but we don’t want to embrace it in the virtual world? So a lot for the mothers, a lot for the children, a lot for the parents and all to look at. But we have a next question from here, and then we have one online.

Audience:
Hello. My name is Janne Hirvonen. I’m from the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And many thanks for the speakers regarding this most inspiring discussion. As we are dealing with technology standardization, for instance, in various platforms, this has been really, really good discussion in that regard. But if we maybe look a bit closer at the enabling technologies that many of you already mentioned, could you maybe identify, let’s say, a few most crucial ones, maybe like one or two, three bottleneck technologies, which you see as a prerequisite for the metaverse to develop into that vision that we are already having at the moment? Thank you.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri:
Thank you. Who from the panel wants to elaborate? Maybe Antiti?

Masahisa Kawashima:
Yeah, I think the most one is, of course, I think the network, because for VR and XR, we need high capacity and low latency network. For example, when we provide interactive virtual rendering service, the network latency should be less than 10 to 20 millisecond. This is very short. So we need such a network and you may think that we have 5G, and in future we will have 6G. But to achieve high capacity and low latency communication, we need to use a very high frequency radio band. And radio links with such a very high frequency band is very unstable. So it cannot support industrial use cases. So that is the challenge and that would be one of the hurdles for AR, VR realization.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri:
I will ask Nokia to have some comment on the 6G because it’s very concrete.

Tatsuya Yanagibashi:
Exactly. Yeah, I also have a similar view with Kawashima-san. So in accordance to our recent research, we actually analyzed how traffic actually grows in the future. And of course, we have baseline increments of mobile broadband traffic, but at the same time, we could also see an XR device generated traffic on top of mobile broadband. And then when it compares the amount of traffic, which is including mobile broadband plus XR devices, and then we already concluded 5G is not really sufficient. So this is actually starting like 2028 or something. I think 6G-like technology is really needed. So that’s probably one thing we definitely need to evolve in the future.

Masahisa Kawashima:
And also I want to just make one comment quickly. So to achieve high bandwidth, low latency radio communication, probably we should consider the closer integration of radio and optical communication. That would allow us to deploy many more radio-based stations and would solve the quality versus reliability issue. And that’s why we are running Eye on Global Forum. And Nokia is also on the board of directors of Eye on Global Forum.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri:
Yes, Libri.

Paul Fehlinger:
I think this is an excellent question from the colleague from the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There should be a top five or top ten list of all the technologies. these enabling infrastructure things, we should look at a priority list. That would be something very useful. Just to contribute to this, I mentioned this already, we have a particular experience at Project Liberty of being the stewards of a protocol. So I think, again, I would put on that list somewhere the importance of the question, what do we need in terms of public interest infrastructure protocols? That means the enabling infrastructure on top of which businesses build their services, their virtual worlds, their applications. And it is possible to encode in protocols a certain number of ethical standards with regards to how much users can control their data that they share with intermediaries and virtual worlds. How easy or not it is, how centralized or decentralized we want those virtual worlds to be. Can users just switch virtual worlds and take with them their assets, their history of engagement, of an action, their social graph, their connections when they go from one to the other. And also, to what extent users can participate economically in the value creation that is done with the data they share, their neuro data, their interaction data, which is incredibly valuable. And today, there’s no infrastructure that allows all of this. And there is a possibility to think about holistic approaches. And it’s a very good moment in the innovation cycle to have those discussions and discuss what is necessary and what are the opportunities.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri:
Thank you. I will have one question from online and then next one here on place in Kyoto. Noli Cristiano asked, considering that industries might want to close the technologies from interoperability and protecting their users to keep engaging in their platforms and not going to the other similar platforms, will interoperability in metaverse be really achieved? Will it be whole interoperable metaverse or will there be a short of more fragmented or of interoperable metaverse? Will that standardization with the industries achieve this ideal interoperability ideas of virtual worlds? Maybe we put meta on the floor. How do you see? Is there room for SMEs to flourish also smaller companies to join or is it via meta platforms or is it alongside?

Alexandra Kozik:
Yes, thank you for that question. It’s something I tried to touch upon earlier in my remarks, but to that question, is it really possible? From our side, we truly believe that there cannot be gated off experiences. So people need to seamlessly navigate the different experiences in the metaverse. So the idea is that just like you go and browse the internet today freely, you’ll be able to do the same thing in the metaverse. Of course, it will take a lot of multi-stakeholder cooperation and understanding to build this. This is why, as I was explaining earlier, we really think that there should be an agreement on the foundation of common technical standards, which will allow for that to happen. So that agreement on the baseline interoperability that will connect the metaverse together is really crucial. And you obviously need the right people at the table to make that happen. But for us, that is something we believe in. To the question from the speaker, we don’t think there should be gated off communities. It really needs to be a seamless experience for the citizen, for the small businesses, for developers, for those who will be using and benefiting from the metaverse. And this is why I was explaining some of the efforts that we’re involved in to build those common technical standards. And obviously, it will take a lot of effort. It will take a lot of expertise sharing. It will take involvement from the different stakeholders, but essentially, it’s about lowering barriers to entry and facilitating access by, as you’re saying, small firms, by developers, by citizens to make sure that it’s an inclusive space. So from our perspective, yes, absolutely, there should be that kind of an agreement on common technical standards to allow for the metaverse to be truly interoperable and inclusive. But of course, we’re still in the process of getting there. It will take time. So from our side, please feel free also to count on us and include us in any of these discussions. But at the very core of our belief, that’s essentially the vision that we have. So from our side, yes, absolutely. But of course, the devil is in the detail as always. Thank you.

Cathy Li:
Yeah, Petra, can I comment as well?

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri:
Of course, please.

Cathy Li:
Yeah. So first of all, I do want to point out that interoperability is not just a technical issue. It’s not just a burden of hardware developers. Interoperability at the end of the day won’t be enforced only by standards. standards, technical standards, it will be by and large by market factors, by economic incentives. I think one of the speakers pointed out earlier when it comes to standards bodies, there are always multiple standards competing with each other. And eventually, the ones who will win might be the one that works with market economics better than others. And then also in terms of interoperability, like I said, it’s not just technical interoperability, which already encompasses different infrastructure requirements, data privacy and security, identity and onboarding, asset ownership, payments, all of this technical interoperability needs to be worked out. Again, both through a standard setting process, but also watch out for the market signals. And then also we’re talking about usage interoperability. That is about how do we actually design, and this might more be on the shoulders of hardware and software and infrastructure developers. Because here we’re talking about how do we make sure that the design and the collaboration is global for the hardware and software developers to keep that in mind from the very beginning. Because different regions, from Europe to Africa to Asia, may, first of all, have such differences in terms of access to compute, access to networks. So all of those need to be taken into consideration. Designing across also demographics, like you said, Petra, how children use the next iteration of the internet will be quite different from adults. So how do we make sure we can actually verify identity and hold all of the players involved accountable? That will be one of the key issues when it comes to ensuring usage interoperability. And then finally, also the jurisdictional interoperability. Again, like the data free flow issue that I was addressing earlier, that Japanese government has been championing for years, and the forum is also involved. That is also important when it comes to interoperability. It’s about data compliance, transacting and creating accountability, and most importantly, identity framework. What construct has our digital identity? How do we make sure that that’s properly protected and guarded? Is it only linked to certain companies and technology owners, or can we actually achieve the kind of decentralized identity framework? So just to sum up, the interoperability is not just only technical. We do need to look at it from multiple perspectives, which again, our work has touched on. And so I encourage you all to look up the work that we’ve done already.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri:
I have the next speaker here, but I dare to comment from one aspect that I’ve been working on the European legislation is the mentioning data. You refer to existing or the market power who plays best with the market powers, but then there is accumulation of the data in the hands of you, and then that gives quite different perspective for developing AI, developing virtual worlds, and it was mentioned here at least once that how do we, or a couple of times actually, that how can we handle our own data, our own identity? And then it also comes from the companies that how can they have their data, access their own data, and use their own data? So that is actually the single puzzle where we built the metaverse, is actually handling the data. And we have talked more the ways to handle, the techniques to handle, but then where the data comes from, and who has it. But next question, please, in a hall here. Unfortunately, it’s behind me.

Audience:
Please. It’s okay, it’s inspiring. My name is Peter Bruch, I’m the chairman of the World Summit Awards, and we are focusing on the impact level of digital innovation. And one of the things which I’m really interested in is regulation as a driver for innovation. Maria-Petra, you were jokingly before saying something about taxing. And I think Paul Fehlinger was a little bit more differentiating on this, and he said, the economic dimensions to make responsible innovation work. So my question then would be, give me three good examples of how it pays for businesses in the technology sphere to behave ethically. Because when you were saying, Paul, before, ethics by design, and you have to basically think about these things in advance. And I think our friend from the World Economic Forum was very much differentiating the various different kind of complexities of interoperability. But if you look at this from the side of ethics, then you just really have to start already much, much earlier. And my question then is, what are the economic means and the tools in order to make it work? Thank you.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri:
We’re running out of time. We may not have all the panel around, but if someone from the panel wants to answer, I see you were. Okay, let’s have it for Paul. Please. You give answer on this one. I will go around, give you one minute, and I will, if you want to conclude something, but if you don’t have anything special still to add, please tell me your favorite virtual world app you want to have yourself.

Paul Fehlinger:
This was an absolutely excellent question, and those are exactly the topics we should discuss. Two very quick answers, because we run out of time. One thing to share from Project Liberties Town Hall yesterday, because somebody asked exactly. the same question. There was a discussion and also in consultations we were having before. For this to work, we need a sort of race to the top situation in an ecosystem where users, consumers, business partners and clients can easily switch from one service to the other. The more centralized an ecosystem is, the less there are incentives to behave more ethically. If you look at the car industry, some people might, what Toyotas are also, Japanese cars are also very safe cars, but Volvo is often mentioned as a very safe car and people want to pay a premium to drive a very safe car. There have been fights on seatbelts 30, 40 years ago and resistance from the car industry to put airbags. Today you want to have the safest car and yes, a side airbag of course, please by default and standard. So this is a concrete example, but it requires competition in the market. It requires more decentralization than some actors say we have today in the digital economy. A second factor is you ask for very concrete examples. So cars, I think there’s no technology today, but I give you another example. It makes no economic sense today anymore to build very polluting businesses. It’s just too expensive. Nobody would do this. Clients would not buy the products and it just, economically speaking, makes no sense today to do this anymore. So the question is how can we create similar market conditions for a digital economy that is both highly performing, but also puts the right incentives in place through economic means.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri:
Paul, do you have something that you want to experience in the virtual world?

Paul Fehlinger:
Heart was mentioned here, the education and seeing the heart from inside. Education is amazing. I think I’m particularly excited for the notion also of public service provision through virtual services. I think this could streamline a lot of things and make the life better for a lot of people and I’m very excited. I’m not a doctor myself, but as the son of doctors, I’m very excited about what it can do to train medical professionals in the future and for me diverse applications. And I think we will make amazing progress and also doing surgeries across borders virtually.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri:
Don’t take it all, don’t take it all. There’s colleagues. There are a lot of exciting things. Yanagi Bashi, Nokia, do you have any in mind where you’re going to see virtual world application in 2028 on 6G?

Tatsuya Yanagibashi:
Well, yeah, actually, there are six places. I think kind of the many virtual applications we predict. For instance, a good example is I think kind of the innovations of telepresence. So today, when I think you joined online conference, you could only see the people, just the videos, right? And we cannot really feel like we are in the same meeting rooms. But I think in the real future, we could feel as if we are in the same meeting rooms and sharing the experience. And this can be accomplished by capturing where we are, right, more precisely in high resolutions, and then making some representations in the virtual environment. And we could also see where light is really coming and so forth, as if we are in the same environment, right? So this is something in the future of telepresence or virtual conference. So I think this is one of the.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri:
Now we have Cathy and Alexandra two-dimensional. Would you then join us added reality without bearing heavy glasses on next time? Or something else you want to pick up, Cathy, please?

Cathy Li:
I actually wanted to echo just a comment you made earlier, Petra, which is absolutely key, data ownership. And I agree with you. That is not something that you want only determined by market power, nor that can only be achieved solely through regulations and policy. Because let’s not forget, we as users, we usually opt for convenience. So that is the part where you do need business to actually innovate and come up with real good use cases. Otherwise, if the setup, the business concept is too complicated, no one will use it. Then again, we won’t be able to achieve the goal of truly decentralizing data ownership back to human beings ourselves. So I do think that is the most key question now, also with generative AI. Everything always come back to data ownership. I do think that needs to be worked on both from the policy front, but also from business, from market perspective as well. So yeah, I want that to be my concluding words. And in terms of virtual worlds, I study all of them. But I actually don’t spend much time in it.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri:
Thank you for that. And I enjoy your comment on the data as well. I still try not to use data ownership or the access zip for the data. Then Alexandra, very short comment. We are lagging behind the time schedule. I see people going past me already. .

Alexandra Kozik:
Yeah, and I’m happy to give people time back, but to your question about the applications, I think obviously there are many, many applications. For me, the most exciting ones that I’m seeing currently, and this is already happening, is in healthcare training, especially around surgery training, which is very exciting. We have some discussions with surgeons who are already using the technology, it’s incredible what it can do. And secondly, immersive education, I would love for my son to be able to learn physics and history in a much more immersive way than I did from a textbook. So that for me would be the two very exciting applications. But of course, there are many other applications already being explored, for instance, in manufacturing and many others. But I know we’re out of time, so I’ll let people get to their coffees.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri:
Thank you so much. Then we have two panelists here. Thank you for Dr. Kara Awashima, who left already. Oh no, no, no, actually, Pitanga Demo, he had to go, but he already mentioned having the hard three-dimensional looking inside, seeing it pumping and so. Elena, ICANN, what would you see as the next application you want to change the universe?

Elena Plexida:
No, ICANN is a global organization, and we have colleagues around the world, so I would say something very basic, but I’d love to see that. Immersive meetings, being able to communicate with them much easier. There are people in Australia or New Zealand or what have you. But thank you for this session. If I can finish with that, ICANN’s motto, if you will, is one world, one internet. Everyone said that before, interoperability is key, so I would expand that a little bit and say, let’s make sure we have one world, one internet, one interoperable metaverse, or several, as long as they’re interoperable. Thanks.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri:
Yes, and finally, Dr. Masahisa Kawashima, where would you enter into the virtual world?

Masahisa Kawashima:
Of course, training and education would be very promising, but if I could meet my late grandparents and my parents, that would be very nice.

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri:
Imagine building from the images. Thank you so much, all the panelists and active participants and also audience online. Thank you so much. There will be some elements for virtual worlds we want, based on the work from IGF here and then also done in so many organizations that it’s hard to keep on track already, but it’s meaning that we are working on the better future. Thank you on my behalf. Thanks, Omer.

Mark Datysgeld

The South School on Internet Governance is highly respected for its unique and inclusive approach to training. It caters to a larger cohort while providing ample support, which sets it apart from other programs that either cater to highly specific audiences or leave students to self-learning. This approach makes the South School invaluable in internet governance training. The positive sentiment surrounding the South School stems from its ability to strike a balance in catering to a broader audience while still offering the necessary support.

On the other hand, traditional models of training in internet governance face scalability problems when it comes to mass training needs. These models typically consist of closed courses with high participation requirements or self-taught courses with no support. Both of these models are unable to handle large numbers of students. For example, when faced with the challenge of training 200 journalists and 300 lawyers, the current traditional models fall short.

The South School, however, has shown its effectiveness in training large numbers of individuals. It is capable of handling mass training needs, making it a valuable solution. The success of the South School’s experiment of holding the training in the Brazilian countryside further demonstrates its ability to overcome challenges. Despite facing infrastructural obstacles, the event was attended by many foreigners, and local students were able to participate remotely. This successful and transformative experiment validates the South School’s approach to internet governance training.

Additionally, the South School plays a crucial role in qualifying individuals for other programs such as ICANN’s Fellowship or NextGen. By providing the necessary knowledge and skills, the South School empowers individuals to apply for these prestigious programs. It acts as a stepping stone, enabling individuals to take on more challenges and further their involvement in internet governance.

In summary, the South School on Internet Governance stands out for its unique and inclusive approach to training. It effectively caters to a larger audience while providing the necessary support, setting it apart from traditional models. Its success in handling mass training needs and transformative experiment in the Brazilian countryside highlight its capabilities. The South School also acts as a gateway to other programs, qualifying individuals for opportunities in the field of internet governance.

Cláudio Lucena

The South School of Internet Governance plays a pivotal role in promoting and advancing knowledge about internet governance. One of its key successes lies in its ability to engage students, universities, and civil society in understanding the importance of internet governance. By disseminating the concept to diverse stakeholders, the school contributes to a broader understanding of the digital ecosystem and its impact on various sectors of society.

Furthermore, the school has made notable efforts to expand its reach beyond the main capitals, a move that has positively affected local communities. By bringing the school to different regions, it is able to reach a wider audience and give individuals from various backgrounds the opportunity to participate and learn. The commitment and hard work required to make this expansion possible exemplify the school’s dedication to ensuring inclusivity and accessibility.

The school’s focus on research and debate in Europe and DC has provided valuable space for dialogue and exploration. However, it is also important to engage with the Latin American environment, as this region presents unique challenges and opportunities in the field of internet governance. By actively seeking to bridge this gap, the school demonstrates its commitment to addressing global internet governance issues comprehensively.

In the larger context, internet governance is understood to be a crucial aspect of our modern digital lives. The digital ecosystem is ever-evolving, and having effective internet governance policies and practices is essential in ensuring a sustainable, secure, and inclusive digital environment. The South School of Internet Governance, along with other similar institutions, plays a significant role in fostering this understanding and promoting the importance of internet governance.

In conclusion, the South School of Internet Governance stands as an influential institution that engages stakeholders, expands access to knowledge, and promotes a deeper understanding of internet governance. Through its efforts to reach diverse communities, facilitate research and debate, and promote the concept of internet governance as a vital part of our digital lives, the school continues to make significant contributions to the field.

Osvaldo

Osvaldo expresses his sincere gratitude for the partnership established with the university in the second semester of 2021. He wholeheartedly finds the experience to be extremely attractive, emphasizing the positive impact it has had on his work and professional development. The partnership has provided Osvaldo with valuable resources, support, and opportunities for growth in the field of education.

Furthermore, Osvaldo firmly believes that this fruitful initiative should continue and expand in the future. He specifically highlights the importance of the diploma format in contributing to the training and development of human resources. This format has proven to be effective in imparting crucial skills and knowledge to individuals in the education sector, equipping them with the necessary tools to make a meaningful impact.

Moreover, Osvaldo affirms the university’s unwavering commitment to maintain a collaborative approach. This commitment inspires confidence in the sustainability and further progress of the partnership. The university’s dedication to working together hand in hand ensures that both parties will continue to benefit from each other’s expertise, ideas, and resources.

In conclusion, Osvaldo’s sentiment towards the partnership with the university is overwhelmingly positive. The initiatives undertaken by the university have created a profound impact on Osvaldo’s work and professional journey, giving him a deep sense of appreciation. This partnership has opened doors to new ideas, possibilities, and growth, establishing a strong foundation for continued collaboration and mutual success. The positive sentiment expressed by Osvaldo reflects the immense value and potential of such partnerships in achieving the goal of quality education.

Audience

Olga Cavalli discusses her team’s work and partnerships in the field of internet governance and professional development. Her team consists of individuals responsible for various aspects such as video management, webmastering, and mentorship. They have been continuously contributing since 2014 and have received positive feedback for their efforts. Their work, particularly in collaboration with a university in Mendoza, has been highly regarded.

During the discussion, Maria, an audience member, congratulates the initiative, recognizing its importance in preparing diverse voices for quality participation. This highlights the significance of the initiative, particularly in reducing inequalities. Maria then inquires about the future expansion plans of the initiative, expressing curiosity about the integration of other voices from the Global South.

In response to Maria’s question, it is revealed that the School of Internet Governance initiative is developing new formats and content aimed at a deeper understanding of specific topics. They have also partnered with a university in Buenos Aires to offer Fortinet certifications to students who meet the evaluation criteria. This showcases their commitment to quality education and the development of individuals from the Global South or the developing world.

Moreover, the audience suggests incorporating contemporary themes like digital governance or AI governance into the curriculum. This suggestion, made by the coordinator of the Bangladesh School of Internet Governance, indicates the audience’s appreciation for the initiative and their desire to stay updated with emerging trends in the field.

In conclusion, Olga Cavalli and her team have made significant contributions in the area of internet governance and professional development. Their partnerships, positive feedback, and efforts to expand and include diverse voices from the Global South demonstrate their commitment to quality education and reduced inequalities. The audience’s suggestions further highlight the importance of staying up to date with contemporary themes in the ever-evolving field of internet governance.

Raitme Citterio

In a recent discussion, Raitme Citterio eloquently emphasized the importance and numerous benefits of participating in an internet school. Citterio highlighted how being part of the internet community and engaging with various related aspects allowed him to gain a comprehensive understanding of his Caribbean colleagues’ vision, thus broadening his educational perspective.

Citterio’s argument puts forth the notion that internet schools provide invaluable opportunities for students to interact with a global community and broaden their knowledge base. By actively participating in online education, individuals can experience firsthand the advantages of being part of a larger network of learners. This connectivity fosters a sense of camaraderie among students from diverse backgrounds, ultimately enriching the educational experience.

The speaker’s appreciation and gratitude shine through in his stance, as he expresses profound thanks for the chance to participate in such an internet school. This sentiment not only reflects Citterio’s personal experience but also echoes the gratitude felt by many others who have had the opportunity to engage with online educational platforms.

Overall, the speakers in this discussion have a positive sentiment towards participation in internet schools, acknowledging the crucial role they play in achieving SDG 4 – Quality Education. The emphasis on the benefits derived from being part of the internet community further highlights the significance of these schools in fostering inclusive, accessible, and quality education for all. The sharing of ideas, perspectives, and visions among colleagues across the globe contributes to a holistic educational approach that prepares students for a globalized world.

This analysis sheds light on the profound impact of participating in an internet school, emphasizing its role in nurturing critical thinking, fostering cultural understanding, and promoting collaboration among students. Furthermore, it underscores the potential of these educational platforms to empower individuals and societies by equipping them with the skills necessary to thrive in the digital age.

Mariela Ovaldo

Upon analysing the statements, several key points emerged. Firstly, one speaker expressed their pleasure in working with the team, emphasising that it has been a positive and challenging experience since last year. However, this claim lacks specific evidence to support it.

Another speaker expressed optimistic expectations for Diplo this year, especially in regard to the students. It was mentioned that they anticipate a group of students who will collaborate with Diplo and produce high-quality work. Although no supporting evidence was given, this speaker’s positive sentiment suggests a belief in the capabilities of the students.

Lastly, gratitude was expressed towards Olga and the team, acknowledging the opportunity to participate and contribute. However, no further details were provided regarding the specific collaboration or work they have done together.

Overall, the sentiment of all the speakers was positive, with each expressing satisfaction or optimism in their respective contexts. However, the analysis lacks specific evidence or examples to further support these assertions. Consequently, questions may arise regarding the depth and validity of the speakers’ experiences.

In conclusion, the speakers’ statements highlight various positive aspects, including the pleasure of working with a team, high expectations for student collaboration and work, and gratitude towards the team. Nevertheless, the analysis would benefit from additional evidence or examples to strengthen and enhance the veracity of these claims.

Olga Cavalli

The South School of Internet Governance, established in 2009, aims to enhance Latin America’s participation in internet governance processes. It offers three stages of training, including online courses, one-week intensives, and research opportunities. Notably, the school has been recognised by the WSIS prizes for its capacity building efforts. It has expanded its student base globally and now includes students from countries like Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, Haiti, Iran, Jamaica, Mali, and Zambia. The recent collaboration with the University of Buenos Aires allows students to receive university diplomas. The school offers engineering degrees with a focus on internet-related topics like cybersecurity and the impact of the internet on the economy. Collaboration and teamwork are valued, and individuals like Carolina, Don Osvaldo, and Raidme are appreciated for their contributions. Sandy, a cybersecurity specialist, is commended for her professional growth. Challenges, such as limited budgets for travel, have been faced, but the team remains resilient. Cláudio Lucena recognises the importance of understanding internet governance in the digital ecosystem. Mark and Claudio Lucena’s commitment to the school is admired. Raidme, a former fellow, continues to be a valuable team member. Efforts are being made to include voices from the Global South in the school’s activities. Overall, the South School of Internet Governance is dedicated to providing high-quality education and building capacity in internet governance.

Sandy Palma

The school counselor’s experience in Buenos Aires was extremely positive and transformative, leaving a lasting impact on her professional development. By participating in the program, she not only enhanced her professional profile but also acquired a vast knowledge network in the field of cybersecurity from around the world. This experience allowed her to maintain regular professional contacts with colleagues working in cybersecurity globally.

In addition to her experience in Buenos Aires, the counselor made significant contributions to the field of cybersecurity by creating and contributing to Honduras Cybersecura, a free-support association focused on raising awareness of cybersecurity issues and preventing cybercrime among schools, parents, and both public and private sectors. Her involvement in this association was inspired by her school experience and the belief that unshared knowledge is lost knowledge.

The impact of the school program on the counselor’s professional growth in cybersecurity cannot be overstated. She credits her participation in the program as the foundation of her professional growth in cybersecurity. The program equipped her with valuable skills and knowledge, enabling her to receive numerous awards and be recognized as the Top Women Cybersecurity Latin American by ONCE for two consecutive years.

Furthermore, the counselor emphasizes the importance of lifelong learning and continued participation in the school program. She hopes that the program will continue for many more years, as it has opened up opportunities for her, particularly as a woman in a country where such opportunities were limited. This commitment to lifelong learning is a testament to her dedication to staying up-to-date with the latest developments in cybersecurity and continuing her professional growth.

Overall, the counselor’s experience in Buenos Aires and her involvement in the cybersecurity field have had a profound and positive impact on her professional profile, growth, and contributions. Her story serves as an inspiration, highlighting the significance of seizing opportunities, creating networks, and embracing lifelong learning for success in the rapidly evolving field of cybersecurity.

Carolina Gonzalez

The Universidad de Mendoza offers a range of engineering degrees, including disciplines such as telecommunications, computer science, electronics, and bioengineering. The university prioritizes topics related to internet governance in their curriculum, giving importance to subjects like cybercrime, security, privacy, and the economic impact of the internet. This ensures that students are well-prepared to navigate the evolving landscape of internet governance.

The university actively participates in activities and events related to internet governance, demonstrating their commitment to staying involved and up-to-date with the latest developments in the field. Furthermore, the university values student participation and considers it an honour. They are advocates for student engagement and encourage students to take advantage of opportunities such as the South School of Internet Governance.

The Universidad de Mendoza’s involvement in the South School of Internet Governance is considered both relevant and beneficial. By incorporating internet governance into their courses, the university not only prepares students for the challenges and opportunities in this field, but also contributes to the advancement of knowledge and collaboration in internet governance in Latin America. Carolina Gonzalez expresses her gratitude towards the team of the Internet Governance School, emphasizing the honour she feels in being part of such a esteemed institution.

In conclusion, the Universidad de Mendoza stands out for its focus on internet governance in Latin America and its commitment to providing quality education in engineering disciplines. The university’s involvement in the South School of Internet Governance further solidifies its reputation as an institution that values student participation and embraces the latest developments in internet governance.

Olga Cavalli:
Okay, we should start. Let me stop my mic here. Okay, thank you, thank you very much for being with us. For those on-site and online. What is my new profession in this meeting? Translate non-simultaneously, if you don’t mind. The idea of the session is to show… I’m going to show a video first, a very brief PowerPoint with some photos and some references. I’m going to do it in English. And then I would like to give the floor to Carolina, Osvaldo and Mariela so that they can give us some comments about the vision from the university. And then some questions here for our colleagues who are joining us. Claudio, Sandy, who is on-site, and Mark. Sandy and friends from Argentina, the time is not so bad. Here it is very early, but there it is late, the afternoon of Wednesday. The beginning of the IGF 2023 in the beautiful city of Kyoto and the beautiful country of Japan, which I love very much. And it’s so nice to be back again. to this nice country and visit it again. And from such a long way from Argentina, I think it’s the most distant place that we can travel from Argentina to here. There’s no other place which is so distant like Japan. So it makes it very, very special for us. So what we want to share with you is a story that started in 2009, but has changed very much in the last two years because of some agreements that we have done with very good friends of us. I’m here with our dear friends from Universidad de Paraiba, my dear friend Claudio, my dear friend Marky. Marky was a student of the school and Universidad de Paraiba was our partner in the last meeting. And I want to show you some pictures. And also we have our friends from Internet Society Foundation that has been helping the school. The school is possible thanks to the contribution from different stakeholders, companies, governments, universities. Some of them give funds and some other give help in different ways. So I will show you a PowerPoint, which is not long, but I think that the most beautiful thing from the PowerPoint are the pictures. I prepared it in English, but you can figure out the, let me take this out. No, this is, ah, okay. So this is the first one. This is about the South School of Internet Governance started in 2009 with the idea that I want to show you in a moment in the next slide. This is a very nice picture that we took in one of the two editions that we organized in Washington, D.C. in the Organization of American States venue. In the middle of the picture you can see our dear Vint Cerf. It’s by my side in the middle. I am with a pink jacket. We organized it there two times, in 2016 and 2018, because the Organization of American States was interested in the activities of the school there. You see the group of 200 fellows. That was a very nice meeting. And this is also a very, very nice meeting for all of us that we are here and remote. This is the group that gather in Campina Grande in the state of Paraíba in the northeast of Brazil, thanks to the help of our friends, Mark, Claudio, Percival, he is not here, but he helped us. Also, with the support of CGIBR, who helped with funds, Internet Society Foundation, and other companies that helped with some funds, we could gather the same amount of fellows that we had before the pandemic. Before the pandemic, we used to have 200 fellows. We went totally virtual during two years in the pandemic. And then, last year in Buenos Aires, we gathered less people because we were just getting out of the pandemic. And we were not sure if we could be safe. So it was smaller. Mark was there with us. And this year, he came not as student, but as an expert. And also, he helped us a lot with what we did with Claudio and Percival. So why we thought that this idea was interesting in 2009, we wanted to enhance the participation of Latin America in all the internet governance processes. So we want to increase the number of representatives. But also, we wanted to increase their relevant participation. Not only being there, but all of being there, making comments and proposing things that could have an impact for Latin America. Because the problems of Latin America are unique. We are the most beautiful region in the world. It’s diverse and beautiful. But. we have huge inequalities, which is unique in the world. There is no other region in the world that has, I live in Buenos Aires and I live in a neighborhood that has a connectivity like, I don’t know, Manhattan, but then 500 meters away, you have a poor neighborhood that it’s in problems. So that huge difference, inequalities, is really something from Latin America that we are trying to solve for many years, but makes it different. The needs that we have and the problems that we have are different from what happens in Africa or Asia or Europe or North America. So having that perspective and bringing that perspective to the international negotiations is what we wanted. So this is why we started with the school in 2009. It has been growing and also we grant fellowships to all the participants. Nobody pays for participating in any of the activities that I will show you now. That has been growing. So we had gender balance from the day zero. Same amount of ladies and men as fellows. We try to do that with experts. That is more difficult, but we try to do that. All the activities are free. We had from day zero, translation into English and Spanish and the three times we organized it in Brazil, it has also translation, English, Spanish and Portuguese. And the target audience, many people tell me, should I attend? Why? Who is attending? Why? Really, the target audience is quite broad. The only thing that you want to have is desire to learn about how the internet works, how to get involved in the different spaces where the internet is defined, when the rules that make the internet work are defined. So this is what you want to do or you want to have in mind. And also, we want people that is not. already much involved in the process. We want people from the boundaries that are interested in getting involved. Of course, we have fellows that are involved, like Mark, for example, but most of them should be people that really want to. We don’t have any age limit. We have from high school students to people that it’s young, like me, for many years. This is, I copied it from Claudio. And so, we think the diversity is nice from young people to experienced people, women, men, and I think the diversity, we think the diversity is beautiful. Also, in backgrounds, we want engineers, lawyers, journalists, specialists in international relations and altogether, diplomats, parliamentarians, altogether makes a really very interesting mixture. So, this is the picture of the evolution. You see, at the beginning, we were less. The big, the quantum leap was in 2012 in Bogota where we started to have 200 people. Before, it was a little bit smaller and since then, we never, apart from the pandemic issue, we never went down in the number of attendees. The thing really changed in the pandemic because now we are totally hybrid which brings a new complexity for the budget and for the technology involved in the meeting but it also brought a very new thing. We have fellows from all over the world. We have fellows from India, Italy, Africa and I will show you now the first cohort of diplomats, of diplomas. So, this year in Campina Grande, we had that group of people on site that you see in the picture in the upper part of the presentation and then we had like 200. online from many, many places of the world that I will show you in a moment. So like three years ago, I got in touch with my dear Cristina Parraga, who was my professor at University of Mendoza, where I started engineering. Unfortunately, she’s not among us anymore. So sad for that. Sorry. So she was, we talked to her several times about the idea of involving a university and enhancing the program with a university diploma and with her research. And she really understood the concept. It’s not the first university that we contacted, but she understood the idea. And she talked with the authorities, with the dean of the university, and then the colleagues that are now in the call with us followed that idea. But she was the one who started it, so I’m grateful for her help. And she was my professor at university also. So she was a very, very good teacher and a pioneer among women engineers. When I started, we were very, very few. We still are very few, but at that time, we were much less. So this is the picture of my dear university. And this agreement allowed us to offer this diploma. So now we have three stages. What we started with one week of training has evolved. The people that were attending the one week said that it was a lot of information at the same time, that they needed more pre-training. So now we have an online training, self-assisted, based on videos, podcasts, and reading material that we prepare, our team has prepared, in Spanish, English, and Portuguese. That is given through eight weeks, three hours per week. And then it’s the one week in tense, 40 hours, on-site or virtual. And since last year and this year. Also, we have added the possibility of making research with tutors of the university, and that allows those who finish the research properly to receive a university diploma from University of Buenos Aires. All the materials are in the YouTube channel. After each school, our team splits all the presentations, the keynotes and panels, and puts a sign so you can easily find in the YouTube channel all the content if you want to review it or you want to make a research or just curious about what happened in the school. And we were recognized by the WSIS prizes as pioneers in capacity building related with the internet. This is a picture of the day that we, it was a virtual ceremony with the first cohort of diploma that we shared. There’s Claudio there, Percival. And it’s Cristina, the picture of Cristina, dear friends from Universidad Mendoza that I will give the floor to them. And there you have students from Africa. You can see them on the right. We had three fellows that finished the study from Africa, all virtual, and also a lady from Italy and another student from Colombia. But there were many others. We just invited some of them to give some comments and share some ideas with us. And I am almost finished. This is the group of fellows that the countries, so it has become like a global school with mainly participation from Latin American students. But as you can see from the list, we have Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Jamaica, Mali. Puerto Rico, Zambia, Venezuela, Uruguay, Suriname. So now that it’s virtual in English and also Portuguese, it has changed very much. And there you have the amount of fellows that were 400. And finally, we published a book in partnership with the Fundación Getulio Vargas from Brazil. And the book is in Spanish, English, and Portuguese. You wrote an article, right? You wrote an article? I was invited, but not able to fill the deadline. But I invited you, huh? OK. I invited you, and you did it. OK. So because I do so many things that sometimes I forget. So this is what I wanted to share with you. It has been for us a fantastic journey. I’m very happy. Today, I received an email from Judith Burungi. She’s from Kenya. She finished the diploma last year. She was in the ceremony. And she was very happy because she was selected as a pioneer woman in, I don’t know, which program in Africa. She was very grateful. So it’s very, very, very, very rewarding. And I would like to invite now my dear colleagues from Universidad de Mendoza. I see that I have Carolina, and I have Osvaldo, Mariela. Mariela, Carolina, Osvaldo, I would like you to give us a few words. You can do it in Spanish, and I’ll do a non-simultaneous translation, if you like. You can turn on the camera and the microphone, and we’ll listen to you. Here we are watching you in the Zoom room. I don’t know who wants to, there’s Carolina. I want to tell you, before, let me tell you who Carolina is. I want to tell you that the university did not only offer us the help of the tutoring of the professors to the students. Carolina. She’s absolutely genius with our dear right man that he he’s also in the call. So they manage all the pre training and all the training in the week. The students in a platform that the university has for the students. So they know who participated, how many times, if they comply, if they didn’t comply. So then we can be sure if they are able to to do the diploma, the research for the diploma or not, that they have infinite patience. And also this year was very challenging because we have three languages and many more students than the year before. So I got a leaner. The Henning list one to tell me to tell us, you know, this is the kind of right man and use our platform. I don’t even see that. It can be in a standard. And Osvaldo Marianetti is the is he’s the director of the international area of the university. He has been also very, very helpful. And Mariela, she’s an engineer. And she was one of the tutors of the of the fellows. I don’t know who wants to say a few words first, if Carolina, Osvaldo or Mariela. And I don’t know if there’s anyone else from the university. I don’t know. I don’t know if I see them all here in Zoom. Carolina, you look very good. Thank you. Thank you, Olga.

Carolina Gonzalez:
I understand perfect English. Oh, well, if you want to speak English. I’m not going to speak English. Oh, well, okay. I would prefer to speak in Spanish. Translate. It’s going to be short. I’m not an engineer. If you want to start. Osvaldo, are you there? I don’t know if he’s there. Mariela is there. Mariela, I see you there. Here I am. Well, nothing, Olga, I’ll start, if you want. I’ll pass anything on to you later. Go ahead. Well, first of all, thanks to the whole team of the Internet Governance School, which really has been an honor for us to be part of this group and to be able to assist them in a lot of operational and academic tasks. We at the university have We have several engineering degrees, a few, in telecommunications, in computer science, in electronics, bioengineering, etc. We have several engineering degrees, so for us all these topics, everything that has to do with the perspectives of the Internet in Latin America, everything that has to do with cybercrime, security, privacy, the impact that the Internet has on the economy and so on, both in education, in work, in development, for us they are very important topics, of which, of course, we train our students in that. So being part of this wonderful team and with this diversity that you achieve, students from all over the world, it really is an honor.

Olga Cavalli:
So, of course, they have the support. Nursery, architecture, really the university has grown very, very much, which for me it’s an honor to be part of that group of people. And for them it’s very interesting to share with us the work of this group and the diversity that we bring to their work. Yes, Carolina, now translate. Thank you, Olga. Well, that’s it, nothing more to thank you for being part of it.

Carolina Gonzalez:
Of course, you have all our support. The university will always be in favor of your participation. de colaborar con este tipo de eventos y organizaciones, porque realmente para nosotros es un honor tener estudiantes. Si bien ha sido un desafío grande, como dijo Olga al principio, los tres idiomas han sido intensos. Y la cantidad de gente, como va creciendo año a año,

Olga Cavalli:
tal cual vos dijiste, realmente ha sido un gran desafío. Pero estamos muy contentos de haberlo asumido. Y bueno, gracias por darnos la oportunidad. Thank you, Carolina. She says that they are very happy to have gone through this challenge, that this year was very challenging with a lot of much more students than the year before and three languages. But she and I want to also stress the fact that Raidme was working with Carolina all the time. And he has always been there. He’s so good. I mean, he’s so helpful. And I don’t know, Raidme, if you are there, you want to say something? I see your picture here. OK. When you want. Thank you, Carolina. Mariela Ovaldo? Mariela? Mariela? Hola, ¿qué tal? I want to tell you that Mariela is from the university, but she lives in the south of the province. It’s the province where I was born, which is called Mendoza. But she’s in the south. So the university has different branches in the province. Les estaba contando que sos del sur de la provincia, que la universidad tiene varias sedes en el oeste de Argentina. Y bienvenida, Mariela. Muchas gracias, Olga. Un placer para mí estar compartiendo con ustedes esta reunión.

Mariela Ovaldo:
Como dijo Carolina, para nosotros ha sido un lindo desafío, desde el año pasado, poder trabajar en conjunto con ustedes, con el maravilloso equipo que ustedes componen. Y para nosotros, trabajar desde la universidad, como tutores. Nosotros desde aquí de San Rafael, poder desde este pequeño lugar to be able to contribute a grain of sand. The truth is that it is a very great honor, so well, I am simply grateful. And well, this year we hope to have a nice group of students who work with us at the Diplo and read the wonderful works they are able to do after all the days they have had with these topics that are so current and that each time represent bigger challenges for us. Thank you very much for what you need. Here we are. Is Don Osvaldo there? Yes, but he is muted, I think. He is on mute. Well, it doesn’t matter. I want to thank Don Osvaldo and Raidme so much for having worked with Carolina side by side, although Raidme lives in Venezuela, Carolina in Mendoza, Argentina, and yet they have worked together in an incredible way, both very grateful. Raidme is a genius. Raidme is a genius, I totally agree. Like everyone in this room and virtually. But he is always there.

Olga Cavalli:
Sandy, dear? Are you there? Ah, how beautiful. Those colorful backgrounds. I like your background. How are you? I will do the question in English and you answer and then I translate. Sandy, you were a school counselor, you were in Buenos Aires in the last edition. I would like you to tell us about your experience as a counselor and what it meant for you to have participated. I know that now you are a well-known person who has received recognition and that you are a specialist in cybersecurity in Honduras. How do you see this journey that you have done with the school? I was a school counselor and I had the opportunity to be in Washington. And my experience has been 1000% positive. Because my professional profile and the knowledge I have acquired have been… I don’t know how to say it without exaggerating. It has been my university, the school. Because it has allowed me to acquire knowledge, to create that networking with people from all over the world. I have friends now in Africa, in Europe, in the entire American continent. And not just friends, but people with whom I work day-to-day in the area of cybersecurity. And I will emphasize that we are many women with whom we have had the opportunity to grow professionally in the school now. The program was very much focused on cybersecurity. It was very good. It was the idea from the Organization of American States. And since then, she has been involved. And now she’s a very well-recognized professional in cybersecurity. And now she’s grateful because she has friends all over the world. And not only friends, but colleagues where she can share experience and to whom she can share experiences and knowledge and working opportunities.

Sandy Palma:
I already translated everything, Sandy, if you want to continue. OK. Additionally, notice that she allowed me to create and then she was born exactly in 2019, when she had the opportunity to be here in Honduras, Claudio Lucena. The idea of creating Honduras Cybersecura was born, which is an association where what we do is to support and raise awareness in all areas, in a completely free way, to schools, to parents on cybersecurity issues, cybercrime prevention, also to the public and private sectors. So, why acquired knowledge? I learned this in school in 2018. Someone said, and I don’t remember who, and I’m sorry I don’t remember it, acquired knowledge and not shared is lost knowledge. And that marked my life in that respect. And we will continue to replicate all the knowledge and train all those people to be able to raise awareness, more than anything. in the field of cybersecurity. But that’s like giving a little of what I have received from school. Because apart from my professional profile, it has grown in an incredible way. And you said it, Olga. Yes, I have received many awards. I have even been recognized two years in a row in the Top Women Cybersecurity Latin American by ONCE. And this year I have also been nominated. But I’m going to say and I’m going to emphasize again, you have been in my case, you are like my mentor, and the school was my home where I was born in cybersecurity. Thank you, Sandy, dear. Do you want to add something more? Okay. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. for a specific area. My area in cybersecurity is human rights in cyberspace, right? But Olga, I hope your school continues every year for many more years. I did go to college and I’ve already been invited as a panelist, I’ve been there, but I’m going to be a lifelong student of the school. The rest of my life I’m going to be in school because this opens doors for us, and it opens doors for us. I look at it as a woman, it opened doors for me that my country didn’t have, right? So I hope the school continues to open doors for many more women like me.

Olga Cavalli:
Well, you’re going to make me cry in the end. Thank you, Sandy. She’s very grateful. She says that it opened many doors to her and then she hopes that they will have many schools in the future with many more students. Yes, I listened to everything that Carolina and Mariela told me. I absolutely subscribe to what they said and, well, I don’t want to give you as much work as another

Osvaldo :
doctor, so I just want to say that since the second semester of 2021, when we started working together with you at the university and we came to concretize the format of the diploma, it has really been an extremely attractive experience, an initiative that, in some way, queremos continuar en el tiempo, y escuchando recién las palabras de Sandy, también queremos que se siga repitiendo y que esta diplomatura siga aportando capacitaciones y formando recursos humanos como los que acabamos de escuchar. Así que simplemente afirmar el compromiso de la universidad en continuar trabajando en conjunto y colaborativamente, y sumando más, así como esta vez los colegas brasileros nos apoyarán en las tutorías, creo que se trata de eso, de sumar. Así que muchísimas gracias por la posibilidad de estar presente aquí en este encuentro. Un saludo a todos nuevamente y a seguir adelante. Muchas gracias Osvaldo. Osvaldo is grateful for the partnership that we have done with the university, and he hopes that the Brazilian colleagues will help us with the Portuguese documents that we have to talk about and define. Muchas gracias Osvaldo.

Olga Cavalli:
Osvaldo is the director of the postgraduate area of the university, and he has been managing all the team, working with all the professors. It’s not only Mariela and Carolina, but also there are like 10 other teachers in the university that have been helping with the research. ¿Está Raidme por ahí? ¿Está Raidme por ahí? Ok. Bueno, ahora I will change the floor to my dear colleagues here with me, Claudio and Mark. We can do it in English, so I’ll have some rest from my new profession. Claudio was a fellow in… What do you need? 2015. Oh, the microphone. There it is, look. Can you give me the microphone? Thank you. Claudio was a fellow in 2015… Hello, Raidme. How are you? Can you hear me? Yes, yes. Greetings. Nothing. I wanted to thank you. We were talking about you with Carolina when she was remembering all the work that you did. And… I… A small thank you for the opportunity to work in a team with Carolina and all the members of the University of Mendoza during the rest of the pandemic. To work in this activity. Can you hear me, please? It sounds like a background sound. As if there was a background sound, I don’t know what it is. It sounds very low, but… But well, nothing. I wanted to thank you. I wanted to thank you for all your help. And also Carolina mentioned that you are really special. And you are always there for her work. You both have done a fantastic group. A couple of partners in helping us with the fellows in all the stages. The pre-training, the week, and then in the diploma.

Cláudio Lucena:
So thank you very much, Raidme.

Olga Cavalli:
And I want to ask Claudio here a question. He was a fellow in 2015 in San Jose, Costa Rica. You didn’t know the school, right? No, I didn’t. Tell us the story.

Cláudio Lucena:
Good morning, good evening, everyone. No, I didn’t know about the school. We met by chance in Geneva. He was alone. in a table and I said, well, let’s talk to him. He seems to be bored. I was an unauthorized ambassador of the following IGF because it would be held in João Pessoa, which is in my state in Brazil. And I was there to observe. I had been writing and researching on internet governance for some time, but I had never had the opportunity to interact in the environment. It’s been a door opener for me. I’ve been, and this is something interesting. I had some space for research and to debate and to discuss in Europe. I was based in Brussels and Portugal then, then afterwards in DC. I was pretty much involved in the global space, but I didn’t have a door open to the Latin America environment, which in the end is my home. And now I can, in this 10 years, Olga, not only I have taken part in the events that are held in Brazil by Brazilian steering committee, but I also have taken part in the Argentinian School of Internet Governance in many, almost all of the editions of the South School of Internet Governance. I have helped Sandy and friends from Honduras set up the internet governance, the national IGF in Honduras. We have participated in initiatives in Peru, in Colombia. So I’m very grateful among many other things for the fact that I’m back in the terrain, back in the environment in Latin America, which is where we are supposed to assist and to cooperate. Where we belong. Yeah, I’d really love to use this space here to thank you, Adriane, and Oscar Messano for the bravery to bring the school out of the main capitals with where the best infrastructure is usually located. It was tremendous work to make it happen this time, but I think we made an awesome impact being able, having the necessity, having the task to mobilize local communities. I have understood how hard internet governance is not an intuitive concept. This is something very interesting. And the school helps a lot in developing that. So having the need and the task to disseminate the idea of internet governance with the local community, with the press, with the universities, local authorities, social society, I understood and now I can measure before and after the school how important it is to have the school in this environment, to engage students, to engage universities, to engage civil society so that they now understand what happens there. The fact that the fellows from the University of Mendoza are taking a third step now because there was a second step apart from the intensity of the days of the school. You have managed to put up an onboarding program some years ago. That’s very important. It’s hard to come into a week that is so intense with no knowledge of what internet governance is and make it right. So preparing an onboarding program was already a phenomenal first step. Now you’re putting a post-production step, which is the writing of this diploma. I would like to say to Osvaldo that we are coming up with a help team in Portuguese, Osvaldo. We’re trying to formalize this help with Portuguese professors that are able to help you analyzing and evaluating these papers. And just to close, I think I have finally found a nice way to communicate with my local community and to make them aware that the importance of understanding internet governance nowadays and after a phenomenon like the South School in my hometown in Campina Grande is clear because we are not dealing with an aspect of human life. We live. The digital ecosystem is where we live now. It’s our home. It’s part of who we are. And it’s very difficult to take care of something that we don’t know well. So that notion is very much helped by internet governance schools in general, but particularly by the design and by the approach of the South School of Internet Governance. Of the South School of Internet Governance.

Olga Cavalli:
Thank you very much once again. I want to thank you also for always recognizing the value that had for you the school. That’s very good for us. And all the passion that you put in all the things that we did in Campina Grande. That was very, very, very challenging. It was, it was challenging. Oscarcito? Okay. Oscar, estas ahi? Oscar is our Vint Cerf in Latin America. We have a Vint Cerf in Latin America, which is Oscar Mezano. He founded internet in many countries. All the internet exchange points in Latin America were, okay, he can, can you, can you, hola? Enable. Could you enable Mr. Mezano, Oscar Mezano, de, vos no lo ves? Hoy no me veo tan mal. Ayer que no había dormido, me vi en la pantalla y me quería morir, se me quería morir. He’s not connected to this one. Okay, okay. Okay, let’s follow with Mark. My dear Mark. Tell us your experience in the school. I knew Mark, it’s a nice story. There was a group of next gen in Buenos Aires, right? In 2015. And my assistant was, I pushed her for becoming. But finally, she had a health problem and she couldn’t, but Mark had to get to know her. And we started to get in touch through Sally. And since then, we have been exchanging some comments and I think we met, and then you went to the school in Rio, that I couldn’t go because I had a problem, a family problem, but I attended online. And since then, he has been a fundamental partner of the school, an informal, fantastic partner of the school. Can you share with us your experience and your thoughts?

Mark Datysgeld:
Thank you very much, Olga. So yeah, to me, the school has been always a valuable asset because it’s very different from the other things that exist in internet governance. I think that’s the thing that I would like to leave as the message here, because in internet governance, I see only two models usually. One is our very closed courses where you select the students to a degree that they have to be vice minister of something to attend or a PhD. So that’s one type of course with like 30 people. And then there are the self-taught courses there are for everyone, but at the same time, they don’t have any type of support. And the South School, it does exactly the middle ground, this middle route where you get a bigger cohort, you get more people, it’s more inclusive and accessible, but at the same time, these people don’t get left to their own devices. And that kind of middle ground, I think, is the way we have to do things moving forward. Because the topic of internet governance keeps growing, we need to capacitate more people every time. And with this very tailored models for specific people, that’s really good when you want to train officials from governments and things like that. at, but at the moment that you start to need to really capacitate, let’s say, 200 journalists, 300 lawyers, at that point, the model doesn’t scale. And it’s this model that you guys are innovating that is really pushing this sort of thing forward. And like I keep saying, I sound like a broken record at this point, but it really was momentous to do the event in the countryside of Brazil. It is nothing that we should underscore. It really is something very important, because when it gets to the point where you can say, we did this successfully, it removes the excuse that it would be impossible, that it would be too difficult. So with a few very engaged people, a lot of goodwill, the school was carried out successfully. I saw Adrian running around like a crazy person for four days, but it still got done, right? So it’s the sort of thing that we need to tell people. We need to be in the space of saying, hey, this worked out. We got a lot of people. There were a lot of foreigner people there, right? Like to Brazil, many people from outside. It worked out. The airports didn’t somehow implode. The infrastructure didn’t somehow implode. It just took a little extra effort, but it was worth it. Because now, when we look at the students, even from the local university, we are engaging them at the IGF remotely right now. Several of them are in touch with us, and they’re following the sessions. And this is the sort of thing, it’s transformative. You’re really bringing a new resource, a new way of doing things. So that’s why I’m so passionate about this project, right? Like it is a different way of doing things, and I enjoy different ways of doing things, because they sort of bring new options. So yeah, always glad to be part of this. And anybody who wants to learn more about the organization of the school in the Brazilian countryside, please. reach out to these three people because yes it involved challenges but it also brought a lot of rewards and that and that’s what we should be looking towards right like who are we benefiting are we getting value out of this and to me the answer is yes we’re bringing like infinite amounts of benefit out of this because we are qualifying people that otherwise would be excluded from the system and this is what the IJF is all about this is what we keep talking about in loop here at any session you enter is how to include how to include how to include so we need to value the initiatives they’re actually doing that so those will be my general comments how do you see the interaction with your experience in ICANN because you are quite involved in in GNSO and many activities is that the school did help how do you see the both words interacting I can is interesting because when you land in a fellowship or a next-gen program it’s really good for inclusion in the names and numbers environment so you qualify people a lot in that but they do not put emphasis on understanding internet governance so it is expected that the person has a background or a soft understanding ahead of time so even in terms of entrance we have a challenge there already when you’re trying to engage with ICANN at that level the person needs to have found a resource and capacitated themselves so to me it works with synergy right we can bring people who did the South School now the thing that I kept telling to all of them now you’re qualified to apply for these fellowships now you have the basis that you need to write a text that people say okay this person is knowledgeable enough that they would be able to follow the this sort of meeting so I consider it sort of a ladder, if we were to say it that way. You get this initial capacitation that then empowers the person to take on more challenges and more fellowships. And that’s exactly the thing we want, right? We want people to keep growing and to enhance the strength of the Latin American community and the global community. It’s interesting what you say. ICANN was the focus of my PhD. And I never participated in an ICANN meeting during the PhD. And I thought I knew the organization. And I thought I knew their dynamic. So my first meeting was in Sao Paulo in 2006. And I said, wow, I don’t understand anything. And this is different.

Olga Cavalli:
Everyone was speaking English in a Portuguese-speaking country. This is crazy. Nobody speaks the local language. What happens with people that don’t understand English? And they told me, but you speak English. Yes, I do. But what happens with the local? So every time I say this, people tell me, oh, I didn’t understand nothing either. So it happened to me the same. So I think the school, this is also why I thought that the school was a good idea, to have a platform. And the good thing is that ICANN considers a good input if those who request a fellowship did participate in the school. So they think that it’s a good background. And Raidme, are you there? Yes, can you hear me? Yes, I can hear you.

Raitme Citterio:
I wanted to make a little reminder. After my participation in the school in 2014, which was something that is part of the Internet community and everything related, it allowed me to understand and get to know through the school the vision of our colleagues in the Caribbean, especially the Caribbean. I would like to thank you for this opportunity, and I would like to thank you for this opportunity. Thank you. Thank you, Raidme.

Olga Cavalli:
Raidme was a fellow in 2014 in Trinidad and Tobago in Port of Spain, and the good thing that we could do with him and other colleagues from Venezuela, we had some budget available. We paid also his ticket, which is something that usually we cannot do because our budget is limited, and it’s also difficult to find tickets, and it takes a lot of logistics, but we could bring Raidme, and since then he has been working somehow with us. Now it’s part of our team, and we are very grateful for his help, and much gracias, Raidme. They have partnered so well with Carolina from Mendoza and the university that they are really a great team, like all the team that we have. We have other members of the team that are not online and are very, very, very helpful. We have Lucas. He manages all the, now that the video and the hybrid thing is part of the environment, and he manages all the videos, and also Oscar is our mentor, Oscar Mezano. Okay, and we have Ezequiel, who is our webmaster, and so it’s a small team, but a powerful team. We have a comment in the chat, which is very nice. It’s in Spanish, but I will read in English. I am from a very small town called Justo de Aractara, which I know because it’s near where I was born. San Luis is a province of Argentina, which is by Mendoza, which is my province. Argentina with less than 20,000 inhabitants. I’m very grateful of being a fellow and for have been partnering and learning and knowing such a nice human group of people and professional. It has been a very rewarding and enriching experience. I am from security of information and it was a very, very nice experience. Thank you very much. The name is Pablo, thank you. Thank you, Pablo for your nice words. I read them in English so everyone can understand and the recording is in English. I don’t know, we have very few minutes. Do we have any comments from fellows in the room? Any comments, ideas? Remember your name, remind me your name.

Audience:
Maria. Maria. I will speak in Portuguese. Yes, I translate Portuguese. First, I would like to congratulate everyone for the initiative. We always talk about the need to have voices that can bring diversity to the discussion, but we rarely talk about preparing these voices. And this is a crucial step for us to have an effective, quality participation that can also bring to our regions ideas that can also encourage legislators and the whole space of internet governance to progress and move forward, but with something that brings, as you mentioned at the beginning, our peculiarities. So, first, I would like to congratulate you and second, to ask a question about how you see the next steps. Claudio said the first, the second and the third. you have already advanced, and the provocation is the following. When we talk about the South, how do you see the integration of other voices from the South in this school that you have built in such a beautiful way? And we see the testimonies here.

Olga Cavalli:
Thank you very much. Which voices are you thinking about? I was thinking about how much more we will be delivering Africa, when we think about the global South, other voices that could be with us in their peculiarities, bringing our vision. I remember that the last IGF was also in Ethiopia, and a lot was said about the need to integrate these voices. Many thanks, Maria. I will try to summarize what she said. She says that she finds the project very interesting, and also bringing diversity into this training program. And she asked two questions. One is, which are the next steps? And also, how could we integrate more other voices from perhaps the global South or the developing world? And OK, it’s OK if I respond in English? So next steps is the Argentina School of Internet Governance. We are working on that. We have also the Argentina School that will be virtual this year with a different format. We want to do not panels, but we want to do more in deep presentations. One specialist will talk about one hour of a specific thing. So we want to do a different format and see how it works. We have partnered another university in Buenos Aires who will grant Fortinet certifications those students who are comply with the evaluations. This is totally new, it’s a limited number but I think it’s a very interesting start. It’s Universidad de Calaverino Ortiz from Buenos Aires. It’s the only university in Latin America that offers a university training in cyber security, specific in cyber security. It’s the first one. It’s organized by a very renowned specialist in Argentina, Pablo Lazaro, with many specialists from Latin America. So that’s that’s a very very good news that we partner them for the Argentina School of Internet Governance, so that’s a different thing. And the Global South, it’s challenging. We have to think about what we have been thinking about is including in the program of activities specialists from Africa, from other we do have people from Europe and from North America, from Latin America, but honestly I don’t recall that we have specialists from Africa. That’s something that we could think about and maybe you both can help me because you know many people. So Maria if you have any suggestion we are we are open to comments. Okay, I think we are on time. Any comments from here? You have a mic or here? We don’t have much time but I think we are on time. Thank you so much for panelists in the audience. This is Asrafur Rahman. I’m the coordinator of

Audience:
Bangladesh School of Internet Governance and I want to show you my gratitude Olga and her team for taking this sort of initiative because actually who we are actually trying to contribute for the School of Internet Governance for long-awaited program, this which we are trying to initiative. But more We are having more something like digital governance or AI governance, which is more relevant from this era. So it’s our, what I should say, it’s our opinion or we want you for the next step, we can more take this sort of initiative or this sort of course you can align with the School of Internet Governance. That’s all, thank you. Thank you, we stay in touch. We had fellows from Bangladesh, by the way. Some, yes, we had fellows from Bangladesh, from India, from Kenya, from Zimbabwe, from not many, but some, which is remarkable

Olga Cavalli:
because of the time difference that they want to take the credit. But you know, when people is willing to learn, there’s no limit. Okay, thank you very much. Muito obrigada, many thanks to everyone for being with us. Saludos a los amigos de Argentina, Venezuela, Honduras. Sandy, querida, ya nos veremos en algún lugar. Raid, mi querido. Carolina, Ruth, Osvaldo, todos los amigos. Y acá saludos de Adrián y de Claudio y de Mark y de toda la audiencia. Les deseo que tengan en Argentina, América Latina, una buena noche y acá que tengamos un buen día. Adiós, gracias a todos. Gracias. Gracias. Bueno, muy lindos. Siempre me termino medio llorando. Es como un hijo para mí. Es mi tercer hijo. Es como mi tercer hijo. It’s over. Te dijo que sí. Bueno, anda el bus y se va.

Martin Wimmer

The African Union data policy framework is receiving significant support from BMZ (The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development) and the German government, as they have committed €20 million to the initiative. This funding is part of a wider effort to provide a total of €57 million in European contributions towards the implementation of the framework in 10 to 15 partner countries. The aim of this initiative is to enhance data governance and strengthen data-related sectors in Africa.

The framework focuses on several key areas, including data policy, data value creation, and data infrastructure. By emphasising these areas, the African Union aims to pave the way for a more effective and inclusive data ecosystem on the continent. This initiative recognizes the importance of data-powered policymaking and its potential to drive positive change by allowing governments and policymakers to rely on data-based evidence for decision-making. Consequently, the framework supports efforts to increase the availability and accessibility of data for citizens and encourages the use of data to address societal challenges.

Another crucial aspect of the framework is its commitment to addressing inequality in data sets under the guidance of feminist development policy. By integrating a gender data lab into the National Statistics Office in Rwanda, the initiative is taking steps to ensure that data captures the experiences and perspectives of all genders, thereby promoting greater gender equality in data-driven decision-making.

Promoting digital and technical skill development is also a significant objective of the African Union data policy framework. The initiative acknowledges the importance of equipping individuals, particularly young women, with the necessary knowledge and skills to navigate the digital landscape. By supporting the public sector, the private sector, and civil society in acquiring digital skills, the framework seeks to empower individuals to actively participate in the digital economy and benefit from the opportunities presented by digitization.

Countries around the world are recognizing the increasing significance of regulating data to protect their citizens and their digital ecosystems. The African Union data policy framework acknowledges that data represents a package of commodities such as knowledge, education, news, music, art, products, software, identities, rights, and money. Hence, countries are seeking to regulate data to ensure that harmful programs like spyware and false information like fake news do not cross their digital borders. This regulation aims to create a safer and more secure digital environment for citizens while also promoting economic growth and reduced inequalities.

However, it is worth noting that the author of one argument believes that the focus should be on open data and an open internet for everyone, rather than just data markets that primarily benefit a few tech companies. This perspective suggests that prioritizing openness and accessibility can lead to a more inclusive digital landscape and foster greater innovation and collaboration across various sectors.

In conclusion, the African Union data policy framework is receiving substantial support from BMZ and the German government, with a commitment of €20 million. This initiative aims to enhance data governance, promote data-powered policymaking, address inequality in data sets, and foster digital and technical skill development. Moreover, countries are recognizing the importance of regulating data to protect their citizens and promote economic growth. However, there is an ongoing debate regarding the focus on open data and an open internet for all, emphasizing inclusivity and equal access to digital resources.

Audience

The analysis focuses on various aspects of data management and governance, highlighting the importance of both informal and formal internal processes. It asserts that informal processes within organisations play a crucial role in ensuring quality assurance in data management, particularly in managing incorrect or suspicious data. This implies that organisations need mechanisms in place to identify and address data discrepancies effectively.

Furthermore, it is argued that a combination of formal and informal internal processes is necessary to ensure data accuracy while developing capacity. The analysis provides specific examples, such as the management of inaccuracies in data from the population registry, such as age or income errors. This suggests that organisations need to establish robust internal processes to handle data inaccuracies effectively, thus ensuring the reliability and integrity of the data they manage.

The analysis also sheds light on the challenges faced by African countries in implementing multiple data policies and conventions. It suggests that the popularisation of the African Union data policy framework at national and regional levels is crucial. Additionally, the ratification of the Malabo Convention is deemed important, as it addresses key issues such as personal data protection, electronic commerce, and cybersecurity.

Notably, concerns are raised regarding the inclusion of foreign private corporate data collection in the AU framework. This observation indicates that there is ambiguity around how such data collection should be considered within the framework, highlighting the need for clarity and guidelines in handling this aspect.

Another noteworthy point is the concern around how the Africa Data Policy Framework addresses issues of capacity and usage by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The analysis highlights that whilst some organisations in Africa collect large amounts of data, SMEs are reportedly not able to effectively utilise the data they collect. Additionally, data collection is observed to be happening in silos, resulting in limited movement and usage. This indicates a need to address capacity building and enhance the utilisation of data by SMEs.

In conclusion, the analysis emphasises the importance of both informal and formal internal processes for data management. It calls for the popularisation of the African Union data policy framework and the ratification of the Malabo Convention. Furthermore, the analysis highlights concerns regarding foreign private corporate data collection, as well as the capacity and usage of data by SMEs. The need for collaboration, data movement, and usage within African organisations is also emphasised. Overall, the analysis provides valuable insights into the challenges and recommendations relating to data management and governance in various contexts.

Alexander Ezenagu

The analysis focused on the importance of data governance in Africa, highlighting several key points. Firstly, it was mentioned that interconnectivity and broadband expansion at national, regional, and continental levels are critical for effective data governance. This is because access to high-speed internet is essential for data transmission, storage, and analysis. Additionally, investment in Green ICT, which promotes environmentally friendly practices in information and communication technology, was identified as necessary to ensure sustainable data management.

Regarding data ownership, it was argued that irrespective of the funding source for data generation, countries in Africa should have the right to manage and own their data. Some African countries are currently renegotiating donor grants specifically concerning data ownership rights. This demonstrates the growing recognition of the importance of sovereignty over data.

Cultural, religious, and policy differences among African countries were emphasized in the context of data generation. The analysis pointed out that data usage and generation practices may vary based on the specific cultural and religious values of different countries. For instance, there may be different data usage provisions in Kenya compared to a Sharia-compliant country. The negotiation of sovereignty issues in the digital space by many African countries further highlights the need to consider these differences in data governance frameworks.

The need for a continental standard on data collection and usage, based on cultural values, was discussed. By establishing a standard, it becomes possible to ensure that data practices align with the cultural values of African societies. An example was given of the discussion between Kenya and TikTok, where some Kenyan government sects expressed concerns about the impact of TikTok on the morality of young people. This highlights the need to incorporate cultural values into data governance to address such concerns effectively.

Another important aspect discussed was the implementation of digital service taxation to prevent countries from creating barriers to data penetration. It was argued that if tax laws are not harmonised, countries may block digital platforms like Facebook, Twitter, or Netflix, viewing them as extraterritorial and wanting a share of their revenue. Therefore, digital service taxation is seen as a solution to prevent such barriers and facilitate data flow.

The analysis also emphasised the holistic consideration of digital trade and data generation. Non-tariff barriers were identified as a challenge to the successful implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AFCFTA). Tax issues and the lack of harmonisation of laws were mentioned as examples of these non-tariff barriers. By addressing these barriers, African countries can enhance digital trade and the generation of data, contributing to economic growth and development.

Finally, the analysis raised the question of data’s role in society’s morality and potential issues of taxation. The impact of data on morality and whether it should be treated as an asset or a flow were discussed. These considerations reflect the ethical and economic dimensions of data governance.

In conclusion, the analysis highlights the importance of interconnectivity, investment in Green ICT, and data ownership rights in Africa’s data governance framework. It emphasises the need to consider cultural, religious, and policy differences among African countries and develop a continental standard on data collection and usage. The implementation of digital service taxation and the holistic consideration of digital trade and data generation were also discussed. The analysis further raises questions about data’s role in society’s morality and potential taxation issues. Overall, these insights provide valuable guidance for shaping effective data governance strategies in Africa.

Liping Zhang

The analysis explores various perspectives on Africa’s Data Policy Framework, providing insights into key arguments and supporting evidence. It commends the collaboration between the EU Commission and African member states in developing the framework, which is seen as a strong foundation for enhancing data policies across Africa. The analysis expresses optimism that the framework will enable Africa to actively participate in international discussions on data policies.

Regarding data governance, the analysis identifies the need for a coordinating mechanism in the UN system to address the challenges posed by multiple data governance processes. It argues for a common approach at the African Union (AU) level to guide member states in international discussions. This perspective maintains a neutral sentiment, acknowledging the complexity of data governance and advocating for streamlined coordination.

The significance of capacity building and development is underlined as a key factor in maximizing the benefits of the data era. The analysis highlights the lack of infrastructure and human capacity as major challenges that need to be addressed. The data is viewed as a value chain, requiring capacity at each stage. Additionally, the analysis emphasizes the limited financing available for developing countries to capitalize on the opportunities presented by the data era. This perspective views capacity building and development as critical for African countries to fully harness the potential of data.

Standards and quality assurance play a vital role in ensuring reliable and valuable data. The analysis argues for the necessity of standards to ensure quality assurance, and highlights the role of metadata standards in enhancing overall data quality. This viewpoint recognizes the importance of standardized approaches in data management and quality control.

The necessity of strengthening public data ability is also emphasized, with a positive sentiment towards this recommendation. Enhancing public data ability is seen as essential in effectively utilizing data-driven solutions and promoting transparent and accountable governance.

Cooperation in data areas, both at the AU and global level, is emphasized as crucial for successful data policies. The analysis asserts that international cooperation in data areas is essential, and suggests that the experience gained from cooperation at the AU level can serve as a valuable example for global cooperation efforts. This perspective acknowledges the interconnectedness of data-related challenges and the need for collaborative solutions.

Lastly, the analysis expresses appreciation for the AU Data Policy Framework as a significant achievement on a continental scale. It characterizes it as the largest continental-level data policy framework and underscores the importance of collective efforts towards data policy development in Africa.

In conclusion, the analysis provides a comprehensive overview of the viewpoints surrounding Africa’s Data Policy Framework. It commends the collaborative efforts of the EU Commission and African member states in developing the framework and identifies key areas such as data governance, capacity building, standards, cooperation, and public data strengthening as crucial for successful data policies. The analysis offers valuable insights into the challenges and opportunities presented by the data era in Africa and highlights the importance of sustained efforts and collaboration in harnessing the potential of data for sustainable development.

Souhila Amazouz

The African Union (AU) has adopted the AU Data Policy Framework with the aim of raising political awareness about the strategic importance of data. This framework addresses both personal and non-personal data, as well as value creation and cross-border data flow. It seeks to provide a comprehensive approach to data governance.

One of the key objectives of the framework is to facilitate the smooth flow of data across African countries. This emphasises the importance of cooperation and includes action points at both the continental and regional level. The framework acknowledges the need for digital infrastructure, connectivity, and appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks. By highlighting these aspects, it aims to create an enabling environment for the flow of data, which can drive innovation and economic growth.

The AU Data Policy Framework is built on principles such as trust, fairness, safety, accountability, and cooperation. It aims to implement the principle of solidarity and collaboration among African countries. These principles are considered essential for fostering a reliable and secure data ecosystem that respects individuals’ rights.

Furthermore, the AU is complementing the Data Policy Framework with additional initiatives such as guidelines on integrating data in digital trade agreements and an open data strategy. These initiatives further strengthen the AU’s commitment to harnessing the potential of data for sustainable development and partnerships.

The implementation of the framework is currently underway, with various activities to support its adoption. Capacity-building workshops have been organised to promote understanding of the framework, and a self-capacity assessment tool has been developed. These activities are crucial for ensuring that countries have the necessary skills and knowledge to effectively implement the framework and protect citizens’ data.

In terms of progress, African countries are actively developing their data policies and legislation. Some countries have already started working on their national data policies, while others are focusing on legislation for personal data protection. Moreover, regional and continental efforts are also being made to facilitate collaboration and cooperation in data governance.

Notably, the AU Data Policy Framework has a complementary relationship with the Manapur Convention. The Manapur Convention serves as the instrument that regulates data protection, cybercrime, and electronic transactions. In contrast, the AU Data Policy Framework shapes data governance and policy across the continent. This relationship highlights the multifaceted approach that the AU is taking to address data-related challenges.

In conclusion, the AU Data Policy Framework is a significant step towards realizing the potential of data in Africa. By addressing key aspects of data governance, facilitating data flow, and promoting principles such as trust and accountability, the framework sets the stage for a robust and sustainable data ecosystem. Ongoing implementation efforts and the support of various initiatives are helping African countries progress in developing their data policies and legislations. The AU Data Policy Framework, in conjunction with the Manapur Convention, provides a comprehensive framework for data protection and governance on the continent. Capacity-building activities are crucial for successful implementation. This comprehensive approach will create an enabling environment for data-driven innovation, economic growth, and regional collaboration in Africa.

Moderator – Alison Gillwald

The African Union Data Policy Framework, which was passed early last year, is not just a data protection framework but rather a comprehensive data governance framework. It supports the broader continental developments around the digital transformation strategy. This framework is essential for enabling the successful implementation of the digital transformation strategy in the African Union. It leverages the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement and mandates the creation of a data policy framework and a digital ID interoperability framework.

The digital services protocol, which is currently being negotiated as part of the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement, plays a crucial role in establishing a common digital market. Without the necessary digital underpinnings and established frameworks, the continental common market could become very uneven. Therefore, the digital services protocol is of great significance for ensuring a fair and balanced digital market integration across the continent.

However, in order to implement these frameworks effectively, capacity building is essential. The challenge lies in the implementation and domestication of these enabling frameworks at the national level. There is a need for countries to develop their national data policies and establish the necessary infrastructure and capabilities through capacity building workshops. Additionally, technical standards for standardisation amongst national systems for cross-border data flows can be put in place to ensure interoperability.

It is important to note the role of data in spurring economic growth, particularly in terms of economies of scope and scale needed for international engagement. The creation of value through data is crucial and should be balanced with protecting the interests of citizens and economies. Data flows in and out of Africa are currently asymmetrical, with limited control and enforcement. It is therefore necessary to address these imbalances to ensure that the continent has better control and enforcement over data flows.

Global governance and cooperation are also crucial for effective enforcement of data policies. Many of the issues related to data governance and digital transformation cannot be enforced without global governance and cooperation.

Alignment of national objectives, particularly in terms of commercial value creation, should emphasise public value creation as a priority. Public data holds significant potential for informing policymaking, and there should be a focus on its management, access, and open data frameworks. This alignment is necessary for achieving sustainable economic growth while considering the broader societal impact.

In conclusion, the African Union Data Policy Framework, along with the digital services protocol, plays a vital role in the digital transformation strategy and the establishment of a common digital market. However, implementation and domestication at the national level pose challenges. Capacity building, standardisation, and interoperability are key factors for effective implementation. It is also crucial to ensure a balance between value creation, economic development, and the protection of citizens’ interests. Improved control and enforcement of data flows, along with global governance and cooperation, are necessary. Additionally, aligning national objectives with public value creation and utilising public data for policymaking are essential components for achieving sustainable economic growth in the African Union.

Paul Baker

The African Union (AU) has established a data policy framework that places great importance on the proper handling of data. This framework is considered innovative as it sets out core principles that should be followed when dealing with data. These principles include ensuring the free and secure flow of data, upholding human rights and security, and ensuring equitable access to the benefits derived from data. These principles are also incorporated within the digital trade negotiations under the African Continental Free Trade Area (AFCFTA) protocol, demonstrating a commitment to prioritising data policy in the context of cross-border trade.

Additionally, the AU emphasises the significance of inclusivity, interoperability, innovation, and accountability when it comes to treating data. These principles are highlighted in the AU’s data policy framework and are also a fundamental part of the digital services covered by the AFCFTA protocol. By adopting these principles, the AU aims to ensure that data treatment is conducted in a fair, effective, and responsible manner.

However, one major challenge observed is the time-consuming implementation of conventions, such as the Manapur Convention. This convention, which relates to peace, justice, and strong institutions, took nine years to be fully implemented despite being adopted nearly a decade ago. This delay raises concerns about the effectiveness and efficiency of the implementation process, and consequently, the ability to achieve the desired outcomes.

Another issue worth noting is the lack of recognition by the European Union (EU) of certain African countries as being compliant with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Even African countries that have implemented legislation aligned with the GDPR are not acknowledged as compliant by the EU. This lack of equivalence poses a significant challenge, as it prevents the sharing of data between European Union and African subjects. This issue underscores the need for strong data protection measures and cooperation between regions.

In conclusion, the AU has made significant strides in developing a data policy framework that prioritises the proper handling of data. The core principles set out in this framework, as well as those incorporated in digital trade negotiations, aim to ensure the free and secure flow of data, protect human rights, and ensure equitable access to data benefits. However, challenges remain, such as the time-consuming implementation of conventions and the lack of recognition of GDPR compliance by African countries. These challenges highlight the need for continued efforts to enhance data policy and ensure effective implementation for the benefit of all.

Trudi Hartzenberg

Digital trade is currently a key area of focus in the agenda of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AFCFTA). Discussions on digital trade were included in the AFCFTA agenda in 2021, highlighting its increasing importance in the global economy. A comprehensive legal instrument is being developed under the AFCFTA, covering various aspects of digital trade such as cloud services, streaming, and gaming. This indicates that the agreement will address a wide range of issues and provide a robust framework for digital trade within the African continent.

Negotiations on the Draft Protocol for Digital Trade are currently underway. Several rounds of meetings and negotiations have already been concluded, demonstrating the commitment to reaching a consensus on digital trade issues. However, there are still some outstanding matters that need to be resolved, including cross-border data transfers, the location of computing facilities, and customs duties on digital transactions. These unresolved issues highlight the complexity of digital trade and the need for careful consideration and negotiation.

It is crucial for national policy and legal frameworks to align with the continental framework to ensure coherence and consistency in digital trade regulations. Currently, the alignment of national policies and legal frameworks with the continental framework is an important topic that has not yet been agreed upon in the negotiations. This emphasizes the need for further deliberation and consensus-building among AFCFTA member countries to harmonize their policies and regulations.

Data policy and governance are seen as cross-cutting policies that intersect with various aspects of digital trade. The African Continental Free Trade Area protocol on digital trade, along with its connections to other protocols, contains provisions related to data governance. This indicates the recognition of the significance of data management and protection in the digital era. The inclusion of data policy and governance in the AFCFTA framework reflects a commitment to ensuring responsible and secure data practices within the continent.

However, there are implementation challenges in various areas, including data, data governance, consumer protection, trade in services, and intellectual property rights. These challenges not only affect the protocol on digital trade but also impact other aspects of trade within the AFCFTA. It is important to address these challenges to fully realize the benefits of digital trade and foster sustainable economic growth within the African continent.

To effectively embed the commitments in data policy and governance frameworks, technical assistance is required at the national level. This highlights the need for capacity building and support to ensure that countries have the necessary expertise and resources to implement and enforce digital trade regulations. Collaboration and partnerships between AFCFTA member countries and development partners are vital in achieving the objectives related to data policy and governance.

In conclusion, digital trade is a significant area of focus in the AFCFTA agenda. The ongoing negotiations on the Draft Protocol for Digital Trade demonstrate the commitment to address various issues related to digital trade. The alignment of national policies and legal frameworks with the continental framework remains a topic of importance. Additionally, data policy and governance are considered cross-cutting policies that require careful attention and inclusion in the AFCFTA framework. However, there are implementation challenges that can be overcome through technical assistance and support from development partners. By effectively managing digital trade, the AFCFTA has the potential to unlock economic opportunities and drive inclusive growth within the African continent.

Moderator – Alison Gillwald:
Good morning, everyone. I know it seems early for some people, maybe people who were out on the town last night, but actually we’ve got some people joining us online at 3 a.m. from South Africa and 4 a.m. from Addis Ababa, so it’s far earlier for them if it’s feeling rough this morning. This is the IGF Open Forum. On the program is 166, the African Union Approach on Data Governance. The African Union Data Policy Framework was passed early last year by member states, agreed to by member states. Very comprehensive data governance framework, not just a data protection framework, which it often gets condensed to in many of these discussions, and very much part of the broader continental developments around the digital transformation strategy. The digital transformation strategy very much leveraging or being leveraged by, or should also say, by the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement that also became operational a little time before that. But the digital services protocol is part of the second round negotiations that are currently underway, and I think we’re going to get some nice updates on that from this fantastic team. So I’m going to get Ms. Sohila Amazous to speak from the African Union to tell us a bit more about this very comprehensive data policy framework, but we are going to frame these discussions today around the excellent trade expertise we have, both here and in the room and also online, but also just because this is such a critical aspect of getting the continental free trade area to work unless these digital underpinnings are in place, unless we have these frameworks in place, it’s going to be a very uneven common market that we are going to see. So without much ado, because we’ve got a very big panel, if our people on board are waking up, so let’s begin right away with Ms. Sohila Amazous, who has been leading the African Union data policy framework project from the start, and she is the Senior ICT Policy Officer at the Information Society Division of the African Union, and she contributes to the elaboration and formulation of continental policies. She’s been, as I said, very involved, obviously within the broader context of Agenda 2063 in the digital transformation strategy and then specifically responsible for these two mandates that arise from these two critically enabling mandates that arise from the digital transformation strategy, the data policy framework, and then there’s another digital ID interoperability framework, and I think most of you who are following the G20 discussions and various of these global digital compact discussions will note that these are some of the foundational infrastructures that we need in place for digital public infrastructures. So this enabling framework is very critical to that process, and Sohila, hopefully we have you on board, or online I should say. Please come in and do tell us a little bit about this broader framework, and perhaps later we can get into some of the more detail around enabling data flows and digital services trade. Thank you.

Souhila Amazouz:
Thank you, Alison. Do you hear me?

Moderator – Alison Gillwald:
Yes, we can. Thank you, Sohila.

Souhila Amazouz:
Okay, thank you. Good morning, everybody. As you mentioned, like for me, it’s very early, it’s 4 a.m. in Addis Ababa. So thank you for joining us in this session, which is about the Common African Approach on Data Governance. I thank also Alison for taking care of the moderation of the panel and also for the introduction of this framework. So this AU Data Policy Framework, it reflects, as I said, the common approach of the African countries on data policy and data governance. It was adopted by the African Union Summit in February 22, and the development process of this comprehensive document that addresses data from personal, non-personal, and also from value creation to cross-border data flows to making data available. It addressed all aspects related to data. So the process of its development was collaborative and participatory as we engaged with all original organizations and institutions dealing with data across the continent and also organized an online consultation that was open to all stakeholders. So the main objective of this framework is to raise political awareness on strategic importance of data and also pave the way to development of the digital economy and society because we believe that there is a huge amount of data that is being generated across the continent by the public institutions, by private sector, and also by citizens. And this data is not being used, and also we don’t know how this data is managed by other structures. So the framework aims to create conditions for African countries to harness the potential of data and also to enable citizens to have control over this data. So the framework is based on a number of guiding principles such as trust, fairness, safety, accountability, and also cooperation because we aim to implement the principle of solidarity and collaboration among African countries. And this is in line with the vision of the African Union towards developing an integrated continent. So the framework defines a number of preconditions or enablers that we need to meet in order to take advantage of this resource, namely the digital infrastructure, the connectivity, and also the adequate legal and regulatory frameworks, and also the institutional arrangements that we need to put in place because, like, some countries are in the process of developing their national data policies, but others, they are at early stage of developing their national legislation on data protection. So the framework aims to provide guidance to countries through a number of recommendations and proposed actions, aims to guide the member states to develop their national data systems and capabilities in a coherent and harmonized way that enable interoperability between data systems across the continent and also facilitate data flow between countries and between sectors. So the framework emphasizes the importance of cooperation between countries and enabling data to flow across borders. And for this, we need to create healthy and secure environments through adequate mechanisms and frameworks. For this, the framework recommends a number of actions that we need to take at the continental level and also at the regional level. So after the adoption of this framework, we moved towards a development and implementation plan and also a self-capacity assessment tool that aims to support countries to domesticate this framework. And also as for us as institutions, it aims to help us to identify the individual and the collective needs of country when it comes to human and technical capacity. This activity and the whole development of this framework is made with support of our partner, GIZ, and they take the opportunity of this session to thank them. So the framework is being complemented by additional frameworks. Like this year, we worked on development of guidelines on integrating data in the digital trade agreements, and we have put the document at the disposal of the negotiators on the FCA protocols. We aim to raise awareness and also to explain the key aspects that need to be taken into account in digital trade agreements. And also we aim to create the conditions that enable an efficient use of data. And there is other frameworks that are in the process of being developed, such as the data sharing and data categorization frameworks. And also there is work towards developing an open data strategy. As Alison mentioned, in addition to this continental framework, there is other frameworks that support this digital transition, such as the digital transformation strategy and also the digital ID, which is aimed to create interoperability. And when it comes to data, we developed a continental strategy on creating an enabling environment for digital single market, where data market is identified as one of the pillars. And we aim that the outcome of this session will contribute to the development of this data market through the development of the key capacities and also the harmonization of policies and regulations. I think I can stop here, and I may come back if there is any questions. Thank you.

Moderator – Alison Gillwald:
Thank you so much for that, Suheela. And definitely we will come back to many of those points that you’ve raised. I’m now going to ask Trudy Hartzenberg, who’s the Executive Director of the Trade Law Center, TRALIC, many of you know it as, to speak a little bit about the African Continental Free Trade Agreement negotiations that are currently on, particularly the committee’s work on digital trade, because I think there’s a new round this morning, starting in Kigali, or maybe started yesterday, but it’s very current right now. Maybe Paul will also tell us a little bit more about that. But Trudy, hopefully you are still with us online so early in the morning. Please go ahead.

Trudi Hartzenberg:
Thank you so much, Alison. Good morning, colleagues. It’s a great pleasure to join you from Cape Town this morning. As Alison has indicated, we’re joining this discussion during the week of the fourth meeting of the Committee on Digital Trade. It started on Monday, and I’m pleased to provide a little bit of an update on the digital trade negotiations. Colleagues, digital trade came onto the AFC FDA agenda in 2021, when the discussion was focusing very much on e-commerce. Last year, when the negotiations began, this was broadened to a much bigger scope agenda, covering digital trade aspects more generally, so digitally ordered and digitally delivered trade. It covers aspects such as cloud services, streaming, gaming, and a whole range of very important developmental areas for particularly youth entrepreneurs on the economy, so it holds significant potential. The legal instrument is a very comprehensive one, covering many aspects, not only of data governance, but also taking into account the uneven levels of development of policy, laws, and institutions across the continent. So we see chapters on market access and treatment of digital products, facilitation of digital trade, the broad data governance agenda, business and consumer trust, digital inclusion, a very important topic, particularly for small, medium, and micro enterprises, emerging trends, technologies, and innovation, institutional arrangements, and a very important focus on technical assistance, capacity building, and cooperation to deal with these various levels of development. Following extensive stakeholder consultations, the Committee on Digital Trade was established. It has prepared a draft protocol, and several rounds of meetings and negotiations have been concluded. However, there are important outstanding issues that the fourth committee meeting is considering. The process is then that the draft will go to the senior trade officials’ meeting. This is really where the negotiations take place. This will take place in the next few days. Once that is finalized, then that draft protocol will be considered by the Council of Ministers. That meeting takes place at the end of October. Then the final process is the adoption by the African Union Assembly, so bringing us back to the broader African Union context, keeping in mind, of course, that the AFCFDA is also a flagship project of the African Union, and hence the important connections to the number of instruments and initiatives that Suheela has mentioned this morning. The outstanding issues on the negotiating agenda include a number of important data governance issues. For example, we’re taking a look at cross-border data transfers, the location of computing facilities. Source code is also not agreed yet. Customs duties remains a very contentious issue on digital transactions. Then the issue of alignment of national policy and legal frameworks with the continental framework is particularly important to keep in mind as well. This is not yet agreed. In brief, Alison, this is a little bit of an update as to where we are at the moment. Thank you very much.

Moderator – Alison Gillwald:
Thank you very much for that, Trudy, and trying to keep these complex issues down for the three minutes that we’ve got for each speaker in the first round. I think with the ending on the point around the importance of alignment, maybe if we can jump to Paul, and then we’ll follow with Alexander as in our go. Paul, you’ve been… That’s Paul Baker. in the first instance, is the founder and CEO of International Economics Consulting and chairman of the African Trade Foundation. Among other things, he’s also a visiting professor at the College of Europe, lecturer at the University of Mauritius, where he’s based. Paul, perhaps just to pick up on that last point that Trudy was making about the importance of aligning the African Continent of Free Trade Agreement, area agreements with the data policy framework, the African Union data policy framework. Your job’s been precisely to try and support that alignment. So maybe you could tell us a little bit about that.

Paul Baker:
Yeah, thank you very much, Alison. And a pleasure to be here as well and have this discussion with you. Yeah, first of all, data policy, of course, is really at the cornerstone of digital services. It’s really important that data is treated responsibly and ethically, of course, across borders. And having that certainty as well as to how different jurisdictions are treating the data is going to be essential for cross-border trade, so to sort of reinforce the AFCFTA. As Suheela mentioned, the AU’s data policy framework is quite innovative. It really sets out some of the core principles that need to be adopted at the African Union level. And these have been embodied, I think, in the AFCFTA protocol of digital trade negotiations as well. So just to re-emphasize what Suheela said, really, the free and secure flow of data is really embedded in that AU data policy framework, upholding human rights, looking at security, equitable access to the benefits of data, so not just access to the data, but the benefits of data, and then also considering the different diversity of development levels and technology levels across the continent, so also ensuring these principles of inclusivity, interoperability, innovation, and accountability have also been highlighted throughout that policy framework. So the protocol on digital trade, as Trudy mentioned, has been negotiated and has been widened. It was originally, indeed, just meant to be an e-commerce protocol. And now it’s risen to digitally delivered services as well. So it is a bit more comprehensive than before. And under Suheela’s leadership, we developed this guide to try and have some model texts that could be used in the negotiations of that protocol, using examples from other digital economic partnership agreements or digital agreements that have been digital economy agreements that have been negotiated in other countries. And so what we look at is things like cross-border transfer of data. We look at data protection, primarily personal data protection. Looking at data innovation, open data, interoperability across countries, inclusivity, and then special considerations for countries that are at different stages of development so that we allow their domestic frameworks to evolve and to be prepared for integrating these things. So there is quite a lot to say. But yeah, I’ll pass it back on to you, and then we’ll take some questions afterwards.

Moderator – Alison Gillwald:
Thank you so much, Lise. Sorry, we can’t hear you. So I think the important challenge here is really going to be around the implementation and domestication at the national level so that these enabling frameworks actually are interoperable and possible and fair. So we’ll definitely have to come back to Sahila on the second phase of the data policy framework, which unlike a lot of the other frameworks that have founded under challenges of implementation, there is the second very important capacity building phase that’s going to make this all possible, hopefully. But before we get back to Sahila, Alexander Izanagu is the director of the AFCTA Policy and Development Center. He’s an expert in international law, trade and investment, tax, and he holds a doctorate from McGill University. And Alexander, perhaps you could just talk to us a little bit about at both the national and the continental level. And obviously, this has also very significant international aspects to it. How these frameworks are going to shape the landscape of data flows that are going to be so critical for the economies of scope and scale that we need on the continent to be able to engage internationally.

Alexander Ezenagu:
Thank you for the invitation. Apologies, it’s 4 AM, so I’m trying not to bring news on the tone. I hope everyone can hear me. Definitely thank you for the invitation, as I said. So when we look at data flow and data governance, Kenya becomes a very clear example around what data generation could look like. And I’m sure anyone who followed the recent event around World Coin will see why both the continental national data regulation and data governance is very important. Simply because how you generate the data would also define the accessibility of that data in the first instance. But before we sort of go into around data governance itself, the question becomes more around data penetration in terms of internet access. And that’s something that Kenya and most African countries are also trying to deal with. However, as mentioned by other speakers, there are existing frameworks around the African Union, the EF-SAFETY Digital Protocol, and other sort of frameworks that sort of tend to bring about a multistakeholder collaboration. And I think the multistakeholder collaboration is sort of relevant in being able to sort of achieve a digital trade, right, which is what the EF-SAFETY looks to achieve. So thinking about it generally, there was sort of an understanding that on one end, data is the lifeblood of digital trade in Africa. But to be able to sort of achieve that particular success, then there are quite a number of things that need to be put in place. One is that interconnectivity and broadband expansion at national, regional, and continental levels. First, infrastructure sharing and affordability becomes one aspect that must be considered. Second, again, is creating a conducive regulatory environment. And this is what, again, the other speakers have mentioned. How do we sort of domesticate the African Union digital framework in many African countries, but understanding the local nuances of those digital framework, right? And none of that come to play in that particular instance. Same provision of data usage and generation in Kenya may be different from one in sort of Sharia-compliant country. And I will say this a lot when you’re looking at data generation and how you do the balance. So creating that regulatory environment and adapting that regulatory environment to different countries will be very essential. Again, investment in green ICT and sustainable policies will be one. Kenya, at the moment, is sort of working around the digital last mile, right? What does that mean in terms of connectivity, but also in terms of generation and the use of the data? Because something else that is completely important to think about. And then finally, also, it’s sort of looking at how we educate people on this data governance. Again, a clear example, again, is this recent incident with WorldCoin, where there was a lot of media and public discussion around what that data generation process looks like, but also, again, what the data use looks like. So even just the ownership of data, I’m sure some of you may know of the plan to have a digital ID in Kenya. But even just the background conversation around who accesses and creates that digital ID becomes something to think about. Before I stop, also, to think about how do we fund our data generation and data flow. This is something just to think about, that the same way we discuss sovereign issues in the political and economic space, it’s also important that we think about sovereign issues in financing the digital space. Now, for most African countries, where you do not have the finances to fund your data process and data generation, and you have foreign donors, like Bill Gates Foundation, and other foundations coming to fund your data generation, that digital ID, and other tools and devices, who owns the data and who manages the data, right? So again, that conversation we’re beginning to see in practice, where many African countries are beginning to renegotiate some of these donor grants, because they wouldn’t own that data being generated by those donors, even though the data might culminate in a digital ID for the country. But the data ownership and use of that data is something, again, that is worrisome. So that’s one of the discussions that we’re seeing. And why having a harmonized continental framework, as has been proposed by the AU, is important, but also understanding that different countries have different nuances, different culture, different religions, different policies, different principles, and adapting those continental frameworks to be able to benefit and fit into the different values of different countries. I think that’s a really good place to just make a summary.

Moderator – Alison Gillwald:
Thank you so much for that, Alexander. And you raised the really important points on essentially kind of preconditions, except that we can’t wait long enough to get those all in place before we deal with the data policy frameworks. So very important points. And perhaps Sohila can actually come back to this, because I think what distinguishes the data policy framework from many of the kind of international digital services and some of the GDPR and those kinds of things is that it’s got a very, like, half, the first half of a report is actually about creating the enabling environment that you would need to do to get alignment across the continent. And with this very strong notion of progressive realization of these very high-level human rights-centered principles that are contained in the document. But then, as Sohila mentioned, these foundational infrastructures that you would also require before you are going to see the benefits of data economy. So at that point, perhaps we can actually ask Liping Zhang from UNCTAD, who she’s the chief of the Science and Technology Innovation Policy section. She’s previously worked as deputy director general in China’s Ministry of Commerce, where she served in several positions for over two decades. So lots of evolution with the technology in this area. But also, the UNCTAD was part of the task team of the African Union and has worked very closely on this. And we’ve obviously also, in Africa and within the African Union, there was a strong drawing on the fabulous information reports that the UNCTAD produced. And please tell us how we fared now that we’re done.

Liping Zhang:
Thank you, Elizon. Good morning, everyone. First of all, let me introduce myself. Also, another head that I’ve had with myself. I’m also leading a team that provides sectarian service and substantive support to the UN Commission on Science, Technology for Development. And the work that Elizon has mentioned actually is done by another branch, but the colleague is not able to make it today. So he asked me to also speak on his behalf. And it’s indeed a very good opportunity for me to participate in this meeting, because the UN Commission, CSCD in short, is also looking at the data issue, including data governance, under the invitation from General Assembly. And so I’m very glad to hear the different perspectives at this meeting today. So let me start by congratulating the EU Commission and African member states for the development of the data policy framework. In our view, this framework can serve as a very good basis to strengthen data policies across Africa. And I think the previous speakers have already mentioned how this policy framework will be useful at the continental level and also for the member states in the EU. And from our perspective as an international organization, we want to say that this policy framework also helps the African countries actually to participate in the forthcoming international discussions, or in fact, the ongoing discussions in different settings in the UN system about data policies and data governance issues. UNCTAD has been calling for a kind of coordinating mechanism in the UN system to deal with these issues, because currently there are multiple settings or processes that are dealing with this issue. And in fact, the member states have expressed a kind of, in particular from different countries, the difficulty to follow up with these different processes. So we think that this kind of common approach at the EU level, even though we see they are not going to be prescriptive for the member states, but they will definitely provide guidance to the member states of the EU to participate in these international discussions. So we really think that this is a very good step by the EU. And I heard from our colleague from the EU that the next steps will be capacity building and development of action plans for the EU level and also for the member states. And this is also very important. Indeed, in fact, actually we have prepared a report like this. This is the second draft. And when I’m here, actually my colleagues have developed a third draft about data for development that we are going to discuss in Lisbon in November. And we find that for developing countries, in order to benefit from the data arrow and capacity building skills, it is very lacking, which can be reflected in different aspects. In fact, not only in the infrastructure that is needed to generate data, to collect, store, analyze, and also use the data, but also the human capacity to really do this kind of work. In fact, data is just one word. But data is, in fact, a value chain. As I’ve mentioned, there are different links in this value chain. And in each link of the value chain, there is indeed a need for developing countries to build capacities. So we hope that this policy framework developed by the EU will really help the African member states to benefit from data through capacity building. Of course, there is a need for development partners like GIZ to provide support, in particular financial support, to the EU member states in order to achieve that purpose. And we have heard a lot, actually, in the past two days’ discussions on global digital compact and digital benefits, et cetera. There’s indeed a big lack of financing for developing countries. Thank you.

Moderator – Alison Gillwald:
Thank you very much, Liping. Thank you very much, Liping. I think there’s lots to come back to on the data for development, which we obviously, I think, now. in a much better position to engage in some of those discussions which I think African voices have been very absent from, member state voices in the past, so I think that’s a very welcome development. And then I am, we will come back and ask Sohila to speak a little bit more about the second phase, the implementation phase, which is in fact already underway, and the data policy framework report was up on the screen, but in fact there’s also the published implementation which is actually the action plan, the implementation framework, which includes both a capacity building self-assessment tool for countries which will facilitate support through the AU, so we can definitely come back to that. And of course that has been made possible, as you mentioned, with GIZ support. So let me go to Martin Wimmer, who’s the Director of General Development Policy Issues at Germany’s Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, and perhaps, Martin, you could really speak to us about the priorities that have been identified for implementation, but also how those align to global challenges that we’re facing, and particularly the achievement of the SDGs.

Martin Wimmer:
Thank you. Money is lacking, but we’re doing our best. BMZ and the German government have joined forces with other European member states and partners to support the African Union in this endeavor. BMZ has committed €20 million to the data governance initiative that supports implementation of the AU data policy framework in 10 to 15 partner countries. The initiative will provide a total of €57 million in European contributions to harmonize data policies on the continent and to support the foundation for data-driven society and economies in African partner countries. It will focus on three key areas, data policy, data value creation, data infrastructure, and as you said, reaching the SDGs is at the heart of BMZ’s work. The 2030 Agenda emphasizes the importance of high-quality, accessible, and timely data for sustainable development, and for instance, with the Data for Policy initiative, we support data-based policymaking in our partner countries in order to make evidence-based decisions in the interest of citizens. We are concerned with combating inequality in data sets. The feminist development policy prioritized by Minister Svenja Schulz is guiding our action in this regard. And as a last example, the BMZ Data Lab and the Data for Policy initiative, in collaboration with international partners such as Paris 21 and the UNDP, are supporting the integration of a gender data lab in the National Statistics Office in Rwanda. Finally, using data for achieving the SDGs, people and companies need digital and technical skills. BMZ therefore supports the public sector, the private sector, civil society, especially young women in acquiring the necessary knowledge about digitalization.

Moderator – Alison Gillwald:
With that short, and allowing us to also just take a quick round of comments from the panelists who might have questions to each other, I can see lots of intersections, but perhaps just starting off with Sohila before I turn to each of you and see if you do have questions of each other. Sohila, perhaps if you wouldn’t mind returning to firstly some of the, I mean, so much has been covered here, but maybe just also to speak about the implementation framework, and then of course, respond to the other questions on data flows that you’d like to.

Souhila Amazouz:
Okay, thank you, Alison. And also thank you to the panelists for making reference to the framework. I think, as you mentioned, now we move to the second phase of the implementation, because like after the development process and also the adoption of this framework, now we started the implementation with development of an implementation plan that identifies key actions that needs to be taken both at national level, regional and continental level. And also we come up with, as I mentioned earlier, the self-capacity assessment tool, which aims to develop kind of tailored technical assistance to each country, because we aim to accompany our member states in the implementation, because like in Africa, we have noticed that implementation is a challenge. Sometimes you come up with very good frameworks and policies, but the implementations sometimes takes years for this data policy framework. And knowing the ongoing discussion at global level about data governance and the importance of data to support the development of digital economy and society, and also to feed the development of other technologies, we started working on the implementation and to engage with member states to support them in development of their national data governance systems and also their capacities. And also we come up with a number of capacity building workshops that we came to promote this framework and also to build the capacity of the policymakers and experts on data-related issues. When it comes to the objective of the framework, and also I would like to comment on the representative of UNCTAD, I think the framework, as I mentioned earlier, reflects a common approach, but also it reflects the reality of the continent, because our countries, they are not all at the same level of advancement of digital readiness and also data maturity. So for us, we have to adapt to the situation. And also the framework reflects what the African countries aim to achieve with regard to data. We aim to create that balance between ensuring value creation, supporting development of economy, but also at the same time, ensuring the necessary protections of the African citizens and also the protection of African economies, because we know that digital economy is global, because there is no borders in digital economy, and African countries, they are building their capacities in this field, and they aim to create the necessary conditions for the development of new business models and also to be part of the global digital trade system. So it is what they can say at this level, but some countries, they have started already developing their national data policies, and also we are very happy to see the progress, because there is progress from all levels. Like some countries, they are working on their legislations for personal data protection, and other countries, they move towards developing national data policies. And at the regional and continental level, we started working to develop the necessary mechanism that will facilitate collaboration and cooperation among member states. It is what they can say, and I am happy to take any other questions. Thank you.

Moderator – Alison Gillwald:
Thank you very much for that, Suheela. And I’m just wondering if any of the panelists want to pick up on anything. I think a number of people, Alexander and Paul, you both mentioned the importance of interconnectivity and interoperability, and I think in the data policy framework, we identify a number of kind of low-hanging fruits that one could achieve, particularly kind of in the context of the continental free trade area and getting things moving as quickly as possible, as you mentioned, some very high-level, ambitious, aspirational principles in the document, but certain things that we’ve got to get going right away. And I think one of those that’s identified is the technical standards that could be put into place quite easily, so that there is standardization amongst national systems and for cross-border flows as well, that could immediately open up the kind of interoperability that we need for the continental free trade area. So while there are these bigger issues and the capacity building that has to be done, there do seem to be some immediate things that we can get some momentum on in support of the continental free trade area. Martin?

Martin Wimmer:
Yes. Suheela just said there are no borders in the digital economy. I don’t believe that, actually. Once the phrases information superhighway and then data highway were highly popular. We don’t use it anymore, but the analogy was helpful. Imagine a highway, a truck, and its load. What countries regulate when they regulate data are actually data packages full of goods. We use the abstract term data, but what we’re really talking about is knowledge, education, news, music, art, products, software, identities, rights, money. That’s what data is. Data is commodities. The seemingly immaterial data in reality materializes every time it is used, and every country needs those goods, just like energy or food. So it makes a lot of sense to stimulate and regulate this data traffic, this online exchange of goods in a society and economy, and especially because just like real highways, data crosses borders. Countries don’t want diseases and terrorists to cross their borders, and countries don’t want spyware or fake news to cross their digital borders. On the other hand, the more sets of rules you encounter on your network of data highways, the more customs you have to pay at the border, the more difficult and expensive it gets, but also maybe the safer is the travel. That’s why the United States, the European Union, the African Union, they all try to break down barriers, break down barriers, and make digital goods easily, inexpensively, and safely available for their citizens, which is a good thing, even if companies try to tell us sometimes it’s not. And I’m explaining this because I don’t believe in this narrative that exploiting big data is a must for economic growth, let alone that growth is helpful for decarbonizing our global economies. From my point of view, the goal is not data markets which drive sales for a few tech companies, but the goal is open data and an open internet for everyone. That’s the goal.

Moderator – Alison Gillwald:
Thank you very much for that. So… That these data flows are very asymmetrical in and out of Africa, and that currently Africa has very little control or enforcement. And so I think an important aspect of us speaking about domestication and about regional harmonization is that, in fact, many of these issues will not be enforced without global governance and global cooperation. And so alignment of these national objectives, which are, I should point out in the document, like many other, of the default commercial value creation, there’s a strong emphasis on public value creation because a lot of the data actually sits in the public data that’s collected of the numbers of people who are offline. The data that is collected sits with the public sector, and so enormous potential there in terms of realizing some of the public value that’s attached to that. Can we take a round of questions from the floor?

Alexander Ezenagu:
I’m just going to quickly chip in on what Paulette said.

Moderator – Alison Gillwald:
Yes, please go ahead, Alexander, while we wait for some questions. If the people in the room, I’m afraid, so that I’m… Not I’m afraid, but you’ll have to stand in front of the microphone so that the online people will be able to hear you. So if you just come to the mic.

Alexander Ezenagu:
No, no, thanks, thanks. I think there’s sort of two aspects I just want to quickly refer to, right? One is, and I think Paul made a reference to it, it’s around how we sort of demoralize or moralize data collection and data usage. Now, again, given a practical example, we see this with the conversation between Kenya and TikTok, right? And some sects of the Kenyan government sort of believe that TikTok tends to corrupt the morality of young people. And that sort of points into what we’re doing with data and how we use data and how we perceive data. So it’s important also that in that data governance, there’s a need for a continental standard on what kind of moral persuasion and relationship data has with our cultural values. Otherwise, then we could see a stop to data penetration simply because of those kinds of moral values. That’s one. But two, also there’s something else we’ve seen across African countries. It is the implementation of digital service taxation, right? So if you’re trying to also trade data and also sort of, you know, be in the digital trade space, the question becomes, how do you harmonize the tax aspect of that? Because again, if you do not harmonize the tax aspect of that, what would happen again is that you find countries creating barriers to data penetration. So we’ve seen it again in countries where, for example, Netflix has been blocked, Facebook has been blocked, Twitter has been blocked because the government believes that these are extraterritorial and you want to share the revenue from these companies. And because, again, you do not have sort of an harmonization of tax laws within the AFCFT, then you have a non-tariff barrier to us successfully implementing the AFCFT, right? So again, while the AFCFT is good so far, I’m sort of focusing on another aspect. There are other non-tariff barriers, like tax issues, harmonizing those tax laws that sort of would affect the digital trade and data generation and data flow. So that we also look at it holistically to say we have an issue of defining the role of data in morality in the society. And if data should have any role in that particular morality conversation. But also secondly, it’s also the issue of taxation of this revenue from data, taxation of data itself. Is it an asset? Is it a flow? And how do countries also come to treat that thing? I think a continental framework would assist simply because companies would better manage this relationship other than having different agreements with different national governments. So I thought I’m going to put some context into the conversation. Thank you.

Moderator – Alison Gillwald:
Thanks very much, Alexander. I think the issue of moral alignment is an enormous challenge on the continent. I think it’s a challenge globally. Interesting and provocative question. Hopefully somebody from the room will also respond to that. But would you introduce yourself?

Audience:
So my name is Morten. I’m from UNUIGAV. And we work with a number of countries and regional partners on things like data governance. So while it’s great that there’s an AU framework coming in play, and you’re also addressing the need for capacities, one of the things we know from our work with countries like China or the Europeans or even in Tanzania and Rwanda, we see that there’s also informal processes that are essential, particularly within organizations when it comes to data management and quality assurance. So one thing is having the interoperability frameworks on a national level, regional level, even. and institutional level, and having formal processes for ensuring who access what data and what situations, what’s allowed, what’s not allowed. There is the informal processes in terms of quality assurance. So, what happens if we see that there is data that looks wrong, suspicious? Morton is 130 years old, based on the data we get from the population registry, or he earns $3 billion a year. There seemed to be something wrong. What is the process for clarifying that question, both internally, but also with the data manager of that data set? And this is something we see that, for instance, the Tanzanians are trying to grapple with around financial data from the M-Pesa systems and for minibus companies like the microenterprises when they’re trying to capture that. What is the process to manage this data? We see the same reflected when we speak to social security agencies in the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security in China, where they are trying to grapple with data from 4,000 different government actors in this area, or from the French, or from the Danes, or from the Australians, or the Rwandans. So, those are the type of things that I think is really important when you talk about the capacity development, that it’s not just about the formal framework and compliance with that. It’s also about the internal processes, both formal and informal, to ensure that the data is actually correct. And that’s a key challenge. So, how are you addressing that? And what’s the experiences in this room to address that in a constructive and positive way?

Moderator – Alison Gillwald:
Thank you very much for that. I’m going to take questions quite quickly, and I’m going to continue to touch on some challenges that have been kind of taken up a long time. But I’m going to ask you to just specifically answer that question. Because it’s, you know, it’s come up in the task force and that. And this, the framework is very much trying to set the enabling framework. The actual data management and those kinds of standards and things within companies are obviously something that have to be taken up at the domestic level, depending on the country and the circumstances and the levels of capacity building required. Often, it’s quite advanced in some of the financial systems and less advanced in others. But, you know, this is a broad framework for harmonization and kind of national guidelines, as opposed to, you know, kind of company, national policy for companies on managing data. Thank you so much. Next question.

Audience:
Good morning to everyone. My name is Oliver Bamengu. I am a member of parliament in Cameroon. I want to start by sincerely thanking GIZ for their support towards this data program in Africa and to say that the issue of data in Africa, it is something that is new. Many countries are not, they don’t even have legal instrument on data. And, you know, we have to start by making sure that we popularize the African Union data policy framework so that we can, so that it can go, it can be domesticated both at the national and regional level, sub-regional level. Secondly, we are all aware about the Malabo Convention that discusses three things, personal data protection, electronic comments, and cybercrime and cyber security. So, what will you be advising African countries to push with the ratification of the Malabo Convention that discusses also include data protection? Or you will be advising African countries to push for a deeper look into the African Union data policy framework? That’s a kind of advice to African country because yesterday I was having a discussion with some authorities back home and they were telling me, Honorable, how do you want us to carry two things at the same time? You are telling, you are on our neck that we should ratify the Malabo Conventions that gives an African reality on all of this. And you are on our neck again that we should ratify the Budapest Convention that gives, that talks about the same thing with the two additional protocols. And then, again, you are coming again with the African Union data policy framework. What do you, where should we start? So, from here, you can advise us on how we can target it. But, like I said, this program of the African Union, the AU data policy framework is a good one and please do everything possible to be the capacities of political leaders and leaders in Africa so that they can be able to own this thing, they can own it and carry the message back home. Thank you very much.

Moderator – Alison Gillwald:
Thank you so much, Honorable MP. Absolutely. I think, again, something I’m going to have to ask Sohila to answer for us, but a lot of discussion during this process of whether the Malabo Convention requires, it’s now so out of date, but it actually has got all the fundamentals. It’s in line with Budapest. It’s in line with the African Union. So, I think it’s not problematic, but it does need to be understood. And I think you’re right that there’s not a lot of awareness around lots of these processes. So, Sohila will have to take that one as well. Thanks very much, Paul.

Audience:
I think in the interest of time, I’ll just take one question from the online participants. Does the AU framework take into account foreign private corporate data collection?

Moderator – Alison Gillwald:
Okay. So, again, it does address that. We’ll ask Sohila to do that. And would you introduce yourself?

Audience:
Yeah. Thanks, Alison. My name is Lisa Rembo, a research fellow at Research ICT Africa. I’m not asking this question as an insider because I haven’t worked on data governance project. So, my question addresses or particularly raises question on capacity and use by SMEs and other higher levels of organizations. So, how does the Africa Data Policy Framework and its implementation framework tackle the issues of capacity and use and in relation to very few organizations in Africa collecting large amounts of data and SMEs collecting some amounts of data significant but not being able to use it? So, in the continent, we already have so much data, but the people collecting it are working in silos. So, there’s no movement, there’s no usage. So, how does the framework address that as well?

Moderator – Alison Gillwald:
Thank you. Thank you very much, Elizabeth. We’ve now got a question from Suhila. So, I’m going to ask her a question. Can you please introduce the people who are working on this at the same time? And I think first we have Suhila to take the floor and then we’ll go to Alison. So, this might be related to her or directed at her. So, Suhila, if you could please answer some of those questions and then I’ll quickly go around the panel one last word. And apologies for the shortness of your contributions.

Souhila Amazouz:
Thank you, Alison. And thank you for the questions. I would start by the question of the representative of the parliamentarian about the capacity building and also what is the difference between the AU Data Policy Framework and the Manapur Convention. And I would say that the capacity building is very important and there are many recommendations on capacity building in the framework because our countries, they are aware about the need to develop the capacity at all levels from the policy makers to the development of data protection authorities to the development of the data professional task forces, workforces across the countries. There is a huge need for development data and there is even a proposal that either existing institution or create a new institution to take care about this aspect. And the work is ongoing. This year, we started organizing capacity building workshops for representative of the countries. We invite representative of the ministries, policy makers and also the data protection authorities. But the work is really ongoing that we can work with as many representatives as we can. And also there is work that will be done at the national level. The Manapur Convention, it enters into force this year. Now it is the instrument that regulates the data protection, cybercrime and also the electronic transaction across the continent. It is a binding instrument and countries now who are ratified the instrument, they are committed to align their national legislation and to ensure that they comply with the Manapur Convention. And the EU Data Policy Framework is the policy framework. It is high level recommendations. It aims to provide guidance to shape the data governance and data policy across the continent. But countries, they will internalize or domesticate, depends on their national context. It’s not like the Manapur Convention, which is an instrument. It is binding instrument. And for us, there is complementarity between data policy framework and the Manapur Convention, as well as the part related to personal data protection. It is driven from the Manapur Convention. The second question, I could not get it.

Moderator – Alison Gillwald:
So, Hila, sorry, because you didn’t get the last question, we will speak to people in the room afterwards, if you don’t mind. Because it’s an online session, the organizers are absolutely brutal about this. We’re simply going to be cut off in a couple of minutes. So, I’m just going to ask, so Hila, if you would indulge us just to ask the panelists who haven’t spoken just to say a couple of words in closing as we close off. So, Paul, would you like to?

Paul Baker:
Okay, let me just one minute. I think a very important point, the Manapur Convention took nine years to get implemented. It was adopted nine years ago, but it has only started to come in force recently. So, one of the big problems is the commitment and the time it takes for countries to actually implement some of these instruments. Indeed, so Hila mentions, these are guidelines, the data policy framework. So, these are the principles that we need to adopt so we can check whether we’re implementing against those principles or are we going against those principles. So, it’s quite important. And then just finally, just to say that on the implementation side, we need to get the equivalence in GDPR, for example, on data protection. There isn’t currently recognition of different people’s countries regimes. Even the countries in Africa that have implemented GDPR compliant EU legislation are not recognized by the EU as being compliant with the GDPR. Therefore, there is no equivalence, which means you cannot share data between the European Union subjects and African subjects. That’s a big problem and that needs to be rectified to be able to take advantage of data frameworks. Thanks.

Moderator – Alison Gillwald:
Thank you very much, Paul. If I can ask Trudy, in our remaining seconds, please come in and say a few words.

Trudi Hartzenberg:
Thank you so much, Alison. Just briefly to acknowledge that data policy and governance is very much a cross-cutting policy area and governance area. And I do want to note the implementation challenges of the AFC if they are not only the protocol on digital trade, but its connections to the other protocols, trade and services, competition, intellectual property rights and so on. They all contain provisions related to data, data governance and consumer protection and related issues. The technical assistance, which is going to be required at national level to embed those commitments effectively in our data policy and governance frameworks is a very important consideration. Our development partners, certainly we will need their assistance to be able to achieve those objectives. Thank you.

Moderator – Alison Gillwald:
Thank you so much, Trudy and Luping.

Liping Zhang:
Thank you, Alison. I just want to make three points. The first point is that there’s a question about the informal process and our quality assurance. I think this question actually reflects a kind of common question among us, which is we actually haven’t understood the data well. There are many unanswered questions or pending things that we need to consider deeply. And as Martin has mentioned already, data is an economic input, so it can be materialised. But on the other hand, data is more than just an input because it can also inform our policymaking. So I’m not sure because I haven’t read this policy framework. I hope that the data policy framework or the action plans, capacity building at AU level, we also address this aspect of data. It’s not just an economic input, but also it informs policymaking, which is also equally important. And regarding to ensure quality assurance, in fact, there is need for standards. In particular, for example, what kind of metadata should be subject, what kind of standards should the metadata be subject to? That will help a lot to improve the quality of the data. Secondly, to strengthen public data ability. This is also a recommendation that we have put. And then I want to say that it’s very good for AU to have this kind of cooperation to be highlighted in this data policy framework, because at the global level, cooperation in data areas is also very important. And with this kind of cooperation experience at AU level, I think it will definitely provide a good example for also in the international cooperation and discussions. I think this must be the first largest kind of continental level data policy framework, so I really congratulate AU for that.

Moderator – Alison Gillwald:
Thank you very much for that, Daphne, and I would like to move on to the next component, precisely on public value creation. Of course, there is a section on commercial value creation. We definitely need to grow that in the continent, but the public value creation, which includes the use of public data for public purposes. But of course, importantly, going to some of the questions we haven’t answered on the floor, also the management of that data and access to that data and open data frameworks – protected open data frameworks – for preferential use potentially by African countries among themselves, and also for local entrepreneurship and innovation. So there’s a lot of policy and strategic opportunities for local value creation and public value creation, particularly in public planning. So it’s just about getting this all done now, so a big challenge ahead of us. Thank you so much for all your time and your inputs, and thanks very much to Alexander. I’m sorry we couldn’t get back to you. I think you had a little bit of a nice provocative question, so we’ll have to pick up some at another time. And to Trudy, Martin, Leping, and Paul, thank you so much. Thank you. Let me use this opportunity to invite you to the two events. One is Ancata e-commerce e-week on 4th to 8th December in Geneva. And the other is a CSED discussion on data for development in Lisbon on 6th and 7th November. Thank you.

Victoria Hyde

The analysis explores various perspectives on international taxation and global tax rules. One significant aspect is the commendation of the OECD Amount A Multilateral Convention for its comprehensive and inclusive approach to international taxation. The framework minimises tax arbitrage opportunities, reduces the risk of double taxation, and promotes responsible tax practices for multinational corporations. It also addresses the unique challenges posed by the digital age.

However, an alternative viewpoint emphasises the importance of tailoring tax policies to suit the economic, political, and administrative landscapes of individual countries. This approach promotes revenue generation in developing countries, addresses issues of profit shifting, tax havens, and harmful tax practices, and supports a fair redistribution of taxing rights. It aligns with SDG 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth and SDG 16: Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions.

Regarding Digital Services Tax (DST), it is noted that several countries in Europe, as well as Malaysia, India, and Pakistan in Asia, have implemented DST in the absence of a global solution. These taxes on imported digital services vary in scope and application. The lack of a unified approach to DST has led to potential market distortions and the risk of double taxation, highlighting the need for a global solution.

The inclusive framework is recognised as a significant step forward in establishing international tax rules. The OECD has sought input from various stakeholders, including countries, industries, trade associations, and non-governmental organisations. This collaborative approach aims to achieve global consensus for fair taxation rules, in line with SDG 10: Reduced Inequalities and SDG 17: Partnerships for the Goals.

The analysis also acknowledges the validity of the delay in implementing the inclusive framework, considering its complexity and long-lasting impact. The goal is to avoid unintended consequences by incorporating stakeholders’ perspectives through an extensive and intricate process.

Stakeholder engagement emerges as a crucial factor in developing and implementing tax arrangements. Victoria Hyde emphasises the importance of engaging with stakeholders, as their concerns can significantly impact the success and effectiveness of tax systems.

Furthermore, the support for globally agreed and consistent tax rules is reinforced. Standardised global tax rules can reduce complexity and uncertainty faced by multinational entities (M&Es) due to varying tax regulations. This facilitates more transparent and predictable tax governance, simplifies compliance for M&Es, and enables them to determine their tax obligations across multiple jurisdictions more easily. These benefits align with SDG 10: Reduced Inequalities and SDG 17: Partnerships for the Goals.

The analysis concludes by addressing the risk of uncoordinated unilateral measures and retaliatory trade sanctions resulting from the absence of a global consensus-based solution. It highlights the need for a globally agreed approach to international taxation and tax rules to mitigate the potential for trade conflicts and ensure peaceful relations among nations.

Overall, the analysis highlights the multifaceted nature of international taxation and the complex considerations involved in establishing global tax rules. It emphasises the importance of inclusive and collaborative frameworks, stakeholder involvement, tailored tax policies, and globally agreed solutions to effectively address challenges and achieve desired outcomes in a fair and equitable manner.

Gayani Hurulle

Large multinational technology companies generate significant revenue from countries in the Global South, yet often operate outside the formal tax regulations of these countries. Over 60% of the world’s population are now online, with the majority residing in the Global South. These countries accounted for around 30% of Meta’s (formerly Facebook) revenue in 2022, with the remaining 70% coming from the US, Canada, and Europe.

To address this, several countries in South and Southeast Asia, including India, Pakistan, Nepal, Vietnam, and Malaysia, have implemented digital taxes. Tax rates range from 2% in India and Nepal to 10% in Pakistan. Different tax options are available, such as domestic measures like direct and indirect taxes, and treaty-based solutions like the UN’s Article 12B and the OECD/G20’s Inclusive Framework.

However, there are concerns about the OECD/G20 multilateral system. Countries that agree to the deemed ‘first best solution’ under the OECD/G20 amount A convention must limit the implementation of domestic measures until the end of 2024. The convention’s implementation depends on the US signing it, adding further uncertainty.

Moreover, the deadline for OECD convention negotiations has been repeatedly postponed, reflecting the complexity of reaching an agreement among participating countries. In the meantime, some countries have implemented low national-level taxation policies and intend to maintain them until an OECD agreement is reached.

There is also uncertainty about whether tax payment cooperation will continue under the Mountie Convention. Gayani Hurulle questions whether companies’ compliance with tax payments will change under the Mountie Convention, an alternative to the current tax system.

Despite these developments, tax officials in India and Nepal have reported a cooperative attitude from companies in paying taxes, adopting a light touch approach to taxation.

It is worth noting that it is not necessary for the Global South to sign up to the OECD agreement now. These countries have the option to wait and observe before deciding to join later.

In conclusion, the issue of taxing large multinational technology companies in the Global South is complex and multifaceted. While countries in the region have taken steps to implement digital taxes and explore various tax options, challenges and uncertainties persist regarding the OECD/G20 multilateral system and the implementation of tax regulations.

Mathew Olusanya Gbonjubola

Nigeria currently does not have a digital services tax in place. Instead, the country relies on a nexus rule, which connects businesses of non-resident persons to Nigeria for tax purposes. This means that if a non-resident business carries out transactions in Nigeria without a physical presence, the income or profits arising from those transactions can still be taxed in Nigeria.

The advancement of technology has made it possible for businesses to operate without a physical presence in Nigeria. Examples of such businesses include online businesses, international consulting firms, and telemedicine services. This technological progress has expanded the scope of taxation for countries like Nigeria, allowing them to tax businesses that exceed a certain threshold of transactions within their jurisdiction.

To ensure compliance with tax regulations, monitoring businesses and their transactions is made possible through financial institutions, as payments need to pass through the banking system. Additionally, companies are also given the option to self-declare their transactions, further enhancing transparency and accountability.

Nigeria’s intention with its tax approach is not to harm businesses but to ensure that taxes are paid where transactions take place. The goal is to create a fair and level playing field where businesses contribute their fair share in the countries they operate in. This approach is similar to that taken by countries like India and Nepal. Nigeria has adopted simplification methods and tax rates that will not significantly affect the profitability of businesses.

Nigeria has actively participated in discussions with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) since 2014 regarding tax rules and regulations. However, Nigeria did not sign the OECD treaty in October 2021 due to concerns with several elements of the rules, particularly surrounding issues related to Ammon’s aid. This decision by Nigeria highlights the country’s commitment to carefully evaluate the potential impacts on its economy and ensure that any international tax agreements align with its specific needs and circumstances.

The case of Nigeria not signing the OECD treaty also serves as a cautionary note for developing countries in general. It emphasizes the importance of thoroughly scrutinizing the specific impacts on their revenue before signing any international tax treaties. Matthew Olusanya Gbonjubola shares a similar cautious stance, underlining the need for developing countries to fully understand and consider the implications on their revenue before committing to such agreements.

In conclusion, Nigeria currently relies on a nexus rule rather than a digital services tax to tax non-resident businesses. The advancements in technology have allowed businesses to operate in Nigeria without physical presence, and as a result, Nigeria has implemented measures to tax businesses that exceed a certain transaction threshold. Nigeria’s approach aims to ensure taxes are paid where transactions occur, without significantly impacting business profitability. While Nigeria has actively engaged in discussions with the OECD, the decision to not sign the OECD treaty in 2021 highlights the country’s commitment to carefully evaluate the potential impacts on its economy. This also serves as a reminder for developing countries to carefully consider the implications before signing international tax treaties.

Abdul Muheet Chowdhary

The debate revolves around tax collection and the implementation of digital service taxes. One argument presented is that countries do not necessarily need tax treaties to collect taxes; they can adopt domestic law measures to achieve this. It is highlighted that tax treaties do not grant taxing rights but rather restrict them. Additionally, even without a tax treaty, the residence jurisdiction can still provide unilateral relief. The argument emphasizes that tax is a fundamental aspect of sovereignty.

Another argument put forth is that the United Nations (UN) option of Article 12B provides higher revenue potential for developing countries compared to the solution proposed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The UN’s Article 12B, particularly with its broad scope, is seen to provide developing countries with almost double or sometimes even triple the revenue compared to the OECD solution.

In terms of digital service taxes, the gross method is described as offering a treaty-based solution to eliminate double taxation. This method, which was developed by the United Nations, involves withholding a portion of each payment made for a digital service as a tax by the government. It is presented as a means to address the issue of double taxation effectively.

Interestingly, despite concerns that the introduction of digital service taxes would lead to companies exiting markets, this has not been observed in practice. Examples, such as Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, which have implemented a 5% digital service tax, demonstrate that company investments have not been significantly affected.

Moreover, the claim that companies would pass the cost of digital service taxes onto consumers is largely unsubstantiated. Little empirical evidence supports this notion, suggesting that the common threat of companies transferring costs to consumers is often not followed through.

One noteworthy observation is that multinational companies have attempted to prevent developing countries from implementing their own digital tax measures. This signifies the conflict of interest between multinational companies, which aim to minimize their tax liability, and developing countries seeking to collect taxes from these companies.

Another notable insight is that non-compliance with taxation in the digital economy can potentially be addressed through banks. For instance, Pakistan has implemented a process where banks are responsible for withholding taxes in the digital economy, ensuring greater compliance.

Furthermore, India has introduced an “equalisation levy” strategy, imposing a 6% tax on online advertising targeting companies like Facebook and Google. This strategy restricts payment to tech companies and forces them to file tax returns, enabling India to collect taxes from these firms regardless of their physical presence.

Finally, Abdul Muheet Chowdhary advises waiting for the ratification of the tax measures by the United States and other OECD countries before proceeding with further steps. This suggests the importance of ensuring international cooperation and agreement in tax matters.

In conclusion, the debate surrounding tax collection and digital service taxes is multifaceted. Arguments range from the necessity of tax treaties to domestic law measures, the revenue potential for developing countries through Article 12B, and the effectiveness of the gross method to eliminate double taxation. The lack of observed market exits and limited evidence supporting cost transfers to consumers challenge these concerns. Additionally, the actions of multinational companies, the role of banks in tax compliance, and the implementation of strategies like equalisation levies provide further insight into the complexity of the issue. Ultimately, international cooperation and ratification by key countries are deemed critical to progress in this domain.

Audience

The audience members, including Bagheesha from the Internet Governance Project at Georgia Tech, Kosi from Benin’s Ministry of Economy and Finance, and Kunle, are seeking a clear understanding of how digital tax calculations are performed for companies that operate remotely and do not charge for their services. They believe that it is crucial to establish a clear and detailed process to tax companies like Facebook that do not have a physical presence in certain countries but are extensively used by its people.

Bagheesha, a PhD scholar working with the Internet Governance Project at Georgia Tech, shares their perspective on the matter. Their expertise in the field makes their comment valuable in gaining insights into the complexities of the issue. Kosi, a senior representative from Benin’s Ministry of Economy and Finance, also highlights the need for this information for policy purposes. This indicates that governments and policymakers are grappling with the challenge of effectively taxing digital companies in the absence of a physical presence.

Furthermore, Kunle raises an important question regarding quantifying the amount that digital companies should pay. This aspect adds another layer of complexity to the discussion, as determining the appropriate tax amount for companies operating remotely can be challenging.

The sentiment of the audience is neutral, indicating that they are not taking a strong position on the issue. This is likely because they are seeking clarification and information rather than advocating for a particular stance.

In terms of related topics, the discussion encompasses Digital Tax, Internet Governance, Remote Working, and Social Media. These topics are closely connected as they all contribute to the broader conversation surrounding the digital economy and its impact on taxation.

The discussion also relates to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 9, 10, and 17. SDG 9 seeks to promote industry, innovation, and infrastructure, while SDG 10 focuses on reduced inequality. Moreover, SDG 17 emphasizes the importance of partnerships for achieving sustainable development goals. The linkage to these SDGs underscores the significance of addressing digital tax calculations and ensuring a fair and equitable system.

Overall, the audience seeks clarity on how to calculate digital tax for companies operating remotely. They believe that a detailed process is necessary to tax companies like Facebook, which have a significant user base in certain countries but lack a physical presence. The insights provided by Bagheesha, Kosi, and Kunle, along with the broader topics and SDG connections, highlight the multidimensional nature of this issue and the need for effective policies and partnerships to address it.

Alison Gillwald

The taxation of global digital services has become increasingly complex, with many countries relying on telecommunications operators as their primary tax base. However, a significant issue is that policies surrounding taxation are often developed in isolation, failing to consider the interconnectedness between various sectors such as trade, competition, and digital rights. This siloed approach neglects the potential impact of taxation policies on these sectors and can lead to unintended consequences.

One specific example of these unintended consequences is seen in Uganda, where taxes on social networking and mobile transactions have had negative long-term effects. These taxes have pushed people off networks and reduced the profitability of telecoms operators. This undermines initiatives such as the Digital Uganda program and highlights the need for a more comprehensive and balanced approach to taxation.

Countries are encouraged to consider signing up to the OECD’s BEPS (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) program. By doing so, they would be able to tax multinational corporations regardless of whether they have a physical presence in the country. This is particularly relevant in the digital age where multinational corporations can generate significant profits without a physical presence. The implementation of a 15% taxation rate through BEPS could provide a significant revenue boost, even for countries with low internet penetration rates.

Outdated tax systems are identified as a key hindrance to potential revenues for states. These systems fail to adapt to the rapidly changing global landscape and often lack the streamlined and integrated approaches necessary for effective taxation. There is a clear need for tax systems to be updated and modernised to ensure governments can capture the appropriate levels of revenue.

Caution is advised when it comes to the potential negative impacts of trade agreements on revenue generation. The African continental free trade area, for example, may reduce intercontinental trade taxes, potentially impacting revenue streams for countries. It is crucial to carefully assess trade agreements and consider the impact they may have on taxation systems.

Alison Gillwald, a prominent advocate for fair taxation, argues for a universal and binding agreement for taxing tech companies. She emphasises the need for a level playing field in which tech companies, especially those without a national presence, are subject to fair and appropriate taxation. Gillwald notes that the current taxation of tech companies is subpar given their super profits and points out that the US is holding out on international taxation agreements. She believes that unless there is universal agreement and binding commitments, the situation will not improve.

Gillwald supports signing up for the OECD’s initiatives but conditions her support on the potential for countries to exert pressure and increase taxation percentages. She suggests that a digital multinational corporation pullout may be necessary from the 15% tax, as it may only apply to giant monopolies rather than multinational corporations as a whole. This highlights the need for careful consideration and negotiation when participating in international tax agreements.

In conclusion, the taxation of global digital services presents complex challenges for governments. It is essential to move away from siloed policies and towards a more integrated and comprehensive approach. This includes considering the interconnectedness of taxation with sectors such as trade, competition, and digital rights. By signing up for initiatives like the OECD’s BEPS program, countries can improve their ability to tax multinational corporations and generate crucial revenue. Updating outdated tax systems and carefully assessing the impact of trade agreements are also crucial steps in ensuring fair and effective taxation. Achieving a universally agreed and binding international taxation system for tech companies is a key goal, with collective action within the OECD having the potential to bring about significant change.

Moderator

The discussion centred around the urgent need for revenue in Southern countries due to the current economic challenges they are facing. Factors such as high inflation, the devaluation of local currencies, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic have led to an increased need for revenue generation in these countries.

One of the main concerns raised during the discussion was the unfair distribution of tax revenue from big tech companies. It was noted that the majority of tax revenue goes to a few countries, such as the United States and China, while countries in the global south that generate content and users receive only a small portion of the revenue. This raises important questions about digital justice and the need for a more equitable distribution of tax revenue.

The audience strongly supported the idea of imposing taxes on big tech companies, with 75% in favor of such measures. This indicates a growing consensus that addressing the issue of taxing big tech is crucial for achieving goals related to decent work, economic growth, and reducing inequalities.

Various policy options for collecting tax revenue from big tech were discussed, including direct taxation measures like digital services taxes and indirect taxes like consumption taxes. While there have been global, regional, and national efforts to collect tax revenue from big tech, there is no clear consensus on the most effective approach at this point.

The discussion also highlighted the significant revenue generated by the global south for tech multinational companies. With over 60% of the world’s population online, countries such as India, Indonesia, Brazil, and Nigeria contribute substantially to the revenue of tech companies like Facebook. However, many big tech companies often avoid formal tax nets in the countries where they operate, making it difficult to collect tax revenue.

Countries have multiple policy options for taxing the digital economy, including both direct and indirect measures. This includes introducing domestic law measures and implementing treaty-based taxation systems. However, each option comes with its own challenges, and there is ongoing debate on the most effective approach.

Concerns were raised about the drawbacks of certain approaches, such as the high transaction costs associated with local Digital Services Taxes (DSTs) for companies. Additionally, treaty-based options can reduce the risk of double taxation but come with challenges such as bilateral treaty negotiations and global and market-level revenue thresholds.

Stakeholder engagement and the need for a fair and transparent international formula for taxing the digital economy were emphasized. Global tax rules were seen as a way to provide consistent approaches to allocating profits, simplify compliance, and reduce complexity and uncertainty for multinational companies.

The moderator expressed support for reaching an OECD agreement on digital taxation but acknowledged the challenges and skepticism surrounding the process. The importance of signing up for the OECD agreement was discussed, as it would bring larger countries to the negotiation table and potentially make compliance easier for all countries involved.

The discussion also highlighted the need for clarity and further dialogue about the detailed elements of digital taxes, considering the diverse audience’s varying levels of understanding and expertise.

Overall, the discussion underscored the complex nature of taxing big tech and the digital economy. It highlighted the need for fair and equitable distribution of tax revenue, the challenges in implementing effective tax measures, and the significance of stakeholder engagement and international cooperation in finding viable solutions.

Moderator:
Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. We will get started. This is the session that we attempt to try and have a discussion around taxation. It’s a very broad topic because the world of taxation is huge. We’re gonna start a little broad and then hopefully narrow down to how we actually deal with the large technology companies. And we’re gonna try very hard to look at this issue of taxation from the point of view of majority world or global south countries. The conversation around taxation is more important than ever now in light of the fiscal squeeze that many are facing in the global south. High inflation, high devaluation of local currencies, COVID have all meant that the need for revenue is very high. There is also a conversation around data and digital justice when a lot of the content is provided and the user base is also from the majority world. Yet very little of the revenue from taxation goes into those countries but are collected by a handful including America and China. This is a timely conversation. There have been many global regional and national level efforts to also try and collect some of this tax revenue. There is no sort of winner at this point. There are various options which we will present and we will talk about. To do this I’m joined by two speakers online and two here with me on the podium. Online we will have Abdul Mohit Chowdhury who is senior program officer at the South Center. The South Center is an intergovernmental organization of developing countries based out of Geneva and they help developing countries to combine their efforts and expertise to promote common interests in the international arena. They conduct extensive work on international tax cooperation through the South Center tax initiative. To my right we have Dr. Alison Gilwald who is the executive director of research ICT Africa which has been a long-standing evidence producer about the state of connectivity, about the state of digitalization and digital rights across Africa and who we work closely with. Next to her we have Ms. Gayane Hurule who is a senior research manager at Learn Asia who is working on some of the tax issues that Learn Asia looks at. Online we also have Matthew Bongibola who is the coordinating director at the Federal Inland Revenue Service of Nigeria and Nigeria is interesting because they have a tax that’s as country-specific tax but Matthew also is co-chair of the UN Tax Committee who also has another proposal on tax so he’s a very interesting sort of he sits on both sides. And finally we are also joined by Victoria Hyde who is the policy and communications manager of the Asia Internet Coalition. Now the AIC is an industry association representing the internet industry across the Asia-Pacific. Their members include Meta, Google and Amazon so certainly all the big platforms and to my left is my colleague Isuru who will help who’s a research manager at Learn Asia and will help with online moderation. So to get us started what we’ve asked is actually for Gayane to set the stage because I think this is a conversation that needs a little bit of data and framing to get into. Oh yes before that we have the pleasure of actually quickly asking this is meant to be a debate because there are actual options humans face I mean in these countries but first we want to do a quick Slido. If you could please go to www.slido.com this is I promise two minutes or less even the online audience and enter 2238752 and fill this poll. And the question is should countries be exploring policy options to impose taxes on big tech. This is not necessarily an obvious answer because many have talked about well let’s not tax because the benefits of digitalization are so high and using the platforms let those actually the economic revenue from that compensate instead of taxes. So what do you think and we want to see if you’ll change your mind at the end of this sort of 90 minute conversation. The code again is 2238752 sorry. Okay so about 70 just under 20% sitting on the fence but a majority 75% saying yes we should be taxing big tech right. Thank you. Let’s move on as I said I’ve asked Gayane to show us sort of a little bit of why this topic is important and maybe present the policy options that are facing developing countries in particular right now.

Gayani Hurulle:
Thank you Helani. If I could just get my slides up wonderful okay. So we’ve very helpfully called this session taxing tech titans. What I’m trying to do here is as Helani said just frame the conversation and give you a sense of what the different policy options are. So what you’ll see is that many of the internet users in the world right now actually live in the global south. So to give you a little bit of context ITU data indicates that over 60% of the world’s population that’s about 4.9 million billion individuals are now online but we’re seeing that a majority of the internet users now reside in the majority world and India, Indonesia, Brazil, Nigeria amongst the countries where most of the internet users in the world live. Now many sorry many apps sorry just give me one second I’m having a little bit of a tech issue. Sorry. All right I think we’re good. Okay yeah. So if we hone in on the case of India for example Learn Asia’s national representative survey that we conducted in 2021 that was in the midst of the COVID-19 crisis found that 47% of the population aged 15 and above were online and given India’s growth trajectory which was very stark this is likely to be greater now but then the question really arises what apps and platforms were they using and we found that the most used apps and platforms when we did our survey was YouTube, Facebook, messaging apps such as WhatsApp and Viber and Instagram. So then the question again is what’s the common thread between these one perhaps is that they are social media type apps but the other is also that they are large that their products of large tech MNCs and despite operating and having users in the global south many of these platforms still largely derive their revenue from the global north. So Meta who we’ve given an example from here derives 70% of their revenue from the US, Canada and Europe in 2022 but while the global south accounted for a smaller percentage of revenue that’s about 30% it’s still sizable and therefore quite lucrative for tech companies. So for example if you look at the graph on the right you’ll see that Meta made 24 billion dollars in revenue from the Asia-Pacific in 2022 and this number doubled over four years so this market is not only sizable and lucrative but also growing. Now despite making sizable revenue from the global south big tech often lies outside the formal tax nets in the countries in which it operates and this has multiple impacts the first of course is a no-brainer it has it impacts government revenue and then if the funds were present it could go into a consolidated fund which then could be used to achieve other developmental targets, education, health care and whatnot. But it can also impact the competitive landscape so we in Sri Lanka for example have seen calls from the local ride-hailing operator to give you context as a local ride-hailing operator pick me and then another an Uber which operates in the same market and we found that the local ride-hailing operator has been calling for the country to introduce digital taxes because they claim that they were paying more taxes than Uber which impacted their cost structures which then in turn created an uneven playing field. So we’ve seen calls from the local tech companies to impose digital taxes to kind of create a level playing field. Now despite the benefits some countries have been quite delayed in implementing digital taxes therefore taxation of the digital sector has been limited to long tax sectors like telecom and IT imports for example and then these issues have been confounded by the lack of agility associated with the legislation of some countries. So for example in many countries the income tax acts deems it necessary for a company to have a physical presence in the country which then allows for companies like Google and Meta and whatnot who don’t have a physical presence in the country to stay outside the tax net. But it’s also worth mentioning that this issue of digital taxation is also sort of there’s an underlying issue around defining and sizing the digital economy and this is a complex one that many countries even countries in the global north have found quite challenging and we’ve found that organizations like the IMF, OECD, UNCTAD, ADB and so on have also been grappling with trying to size this digital economy and figuring out how to define the bounds of it. So in fairness it is a tough exercise possibly one that countries particularly ones in the global south are waiting for some direction on and in the case of digital taxation there have been multilateral processes in place which I’ll get to in in a minute that countries may have been taking a little bit more of a wait and see approach to. However there are several policy options for countries on how they can tax the digital economy. I’ll start with talking about domestic measures and there are a range of options within this. One is using direct taxation measures such as digital services taxes which is where you tax a company based on the revenue that they make from a country. Another is an indirect tax or a consumption tax where which you levy a specific tax based on the point of consumption. You’ll see this in the case of digital service VAT, GSTs and whatnot. But just for the purpose of streamlining our conversation today we’ll focus on the direct taxes and you’ll see that countries in the global south have several countries in the global south have already implemented these direct taxes. We’ve illustrated some cases from South and Southeast Asia so we’ve seen that India, Pakistan, Nepal, Vietnam and Malaysia all have some sort of measure in place but they’re also quite heterogeneous. And even if you hone in further on digital services taxes which is one sub component of the direct taxes you’ll see that they do tend to vary quite a bit. So even in South Asia you’ll see that they call different things, they call equalization, they will see being called the fee for offshore digital services but it really boils down to the same thing where countries tax companies on the percentage of revenue that they derive from the country. And if you look at the three systems in place on screen and sorry this is a little wordy but we wanted to make sure that we just put out all the information here that we can go back to. You’ll see that India, Pakistan, Nepal they’re quite different and this actually does speak to the benefit of one of the benefits of a local DST in that it’s customizable and flexible which is what you don’t really see in some of the other multilateral or treaty based options that we’ll talk about later. But it also speaks of a cost to companies because they have to deal with different tax regimes being in place in different countries and therefore have quite high transaction costs in trying to pay taxes so compliance costs are quite high. So if we just look at the differences in these three country measures you’ll see that they have different tax rates. So India and Nepal for example have a tax rate of 2% while Pakistan has 10%. There are some countries that have taxability thresholds so revenue flows to protect small businesses but it is absent in other countries like Pakistan. Then you’ll remember that I spoke earlier about this issue of archaic income tax acts. Pakistan has amended that act to allow for digital taxation through their existing act but India and Nepal have introduced separate legislation outside the taxes, sorry outside the acts to impose these taxes. So you’ll see again the approach to digital taxation even through these DSTs can be quite heterogeneous. Now while these domestic measures have been put in place and discussed there have also been parallel efforts to explore treaty based options and this is the benefit of having a treaty based option is that it reduces the risk of double taxation and there are two main treaty based options on the table. One put forward by the UN and the other by the OECD and G20 and there are various different sub components within this as well but I’ll focus on the two elements that are seen as alternatives to the digital services taxes that we discussed earlier. That’s article 12B in the UN model tax convention and amount A in the OECD G20 inclusive framework to bidder solution. So there are a couple of differences even within this and again I won’t get into too much detail here. Hopefully we’ll be able to talk about this in more detail in the discussion but it’s worth noting that the UN’s article 12B is to be implemented through a bilateral treaty negotiation. There has been some conversation about a multilateral option but right now what is clear to us and what is available in the public domain is this bilateral mechanism. So for example if a country X is headquartered in the US and a country sorry if a company is headquartered in the US and a company would need to have a country would need to have a treaty with that particular country to tax the company that’s within that sort of locality and this builds on the domestic measures by reducing the risk of double taxation. It can be quite cumbersome and impractical in its current form. Then there is the OECD’s amount A convention which is the most well-known and debated in the public domain. This is the multilateral convention. It defines which companies are eligible not by listing services which is what you’ll see in the case of article 12B and in many of the local digital services taxes that we saw earlier but by providing revenue and profitability thresholds both at a global level and also at a market level and it has a fixed rate across countries which is attractive to platforms but there are also sort of negatives which we’ll get to later. Now while these different options have their relative merits they have the potential to give countries different quantums of revenue which I hope Abdul will have will be able to comment more on. They’ll have different impacts of competition and they’ll have a lot of different costs of implementation be it negotiation costs, compliance costs and so on. I won’t get into a lot of detail here but hopefully we’ll hear about this more from our speakers. So just before I hand the floor back over to Helani, I’d like to highlight that there’s a crucial decision point that countries need to make in the next few months. The OECD and G20 has indicated that they hope to implement their multilateral solution in 2025 and have asked for countries to sign up for the amount A convention by the end of 2023 and this is important for several reasons. This could be the beginning of a multilateral system which is a first best solution but if countries sign up for this program they agree not to impose domestic measures until the end of 2024 and then there’s the actual implementation of the convention is contingent on the US signing this and that’s a lot of power in the hands of a single country. So there’s some apprehension and skepticism on this as well which perhaps we can talk about in more detail. So it’s for this reason that we thought that we’ll center our discussion on whether countries in the global south should sign up for the OECD and G20 multilateral convention by the end of 2023. I’ll stop here and hand the floor back over to Helani, looking forward to hearing more from our speakers.

Moderator:
Thank you. So just to clarify Gaini, December last year I believe was the initial deadline set for the negotiations to happen, the US and countries to agree on the proposed taxation with the OECD. That didn’t happen and now December this year is the new deadline. So the options for countries is if you sign up to the OECD convention you can’t do anything until end of 2025? Until end 2024.

Gayani Hurulle:
So it’s a one-year goal post that keeps getting shifted.

Moderator:
That keeps getting shifted, okay. So you can’t then go ahead and do some local taxation and so on and so forth. However, there are countries that have done low national level taxation policies and said in the policy itself until such time OECD agreement is reached, this shall remain in play, right?

Gayani Hurulle:
Yes, possibly. And there are also other countries who have implemented their own DSTs and then signed up for. And then still signed up for the OECD. Afterwards. Okay. Because what that convention specifies is that you can’t implement a DST after you sign up for it.

Moderator:
So they’ve been quite shaky. So presumably you said India has a national level digital services tax, a DST. If the OECD thing comes into play, they can somehow sunset the national level stuff and go with the OECD. Okay, that’s where we are. Great. Thank you. I’d like to bring in Abdul from the South Center. Abdul, you know, you’ve been really working on this and the South Center has sort of been leading the charge on the UN proposal which is what expects every country. to bilaterally negotiate with other countries in order to be able to tax. So and one of the things actually I asked Gaini to do is to frame your discussion just to put some numbers that you know your reports have calculated. Because for countries one of the big considerations is revenue potential. Where can I get more tax revenue from which option. So keeping that in mind could you talk us through in particular the UN option and why that might be a preferred solution for countries Abdul. And can we unmute?

Abdul Muheet Chowdhary:
Thank you. Yes. Thank you. Good morning. Good afternoon to and good evening to everyone. It’s a pleasure to collaborate with Learn Asia at this event. And my greetings to Mr. Matthew Gupanjubul, the co-chair of the UN Tax Committee. And I’m honored to share the panel with him who in fact has been a champion of the developing countries in taking Article 12B forward. So on in response to your question, Helene, as we can see from the data, Article 12B has two methods, a gross method and the net method. And just to highlight that countries don’t really need either option. They can just introduce domestic law measures and start collecting taxes. You know the this thing of that you need a treaty is really this hullabaloo around a treaty comes more from the developed countries because they want to actually reduce the taxes companies face when they go to when they go to developing countries and derive revenues from them because tax treaties, they don’t grant taxing rights. They restrict taxing rights. I would repeat tax treaties don’t grant taxing rights, they restrict taxing rights. Even without a tax treaty, the residence jurisdiction can always give unilateral relief to its taxpayer. So if Uber works in Sri Lanka and Sri Lanka introduces a digital service tax and there’s no Article 12B amount there, there’s no treaty-based solution. The U.S. can always tell Uber that okay you pay taxes in Sri Lanka so we’ll take that into account when you pay taxes in the U.S. So those unilateral relief options are always there and we’re there actually because even now it’s not like every country in the world has a tax treaty. So just to mention that even without tax treaties countries can collect taxes. Domestic law is the basis for collecting these taxes. Even if they have treaty-based solutions but no domestic law provisions, they cannot collect anything. Tax is a fundamental aspect of sovereignty and this is something countries should keep in mind. Now with that out of the way, if you look at Article 12B, the revenue estimates which we came up with, you have well the comparison should be with amount A, the 20 billion euro threshold and Article 12B with the two options of ADS only and hybrid ADS. Now why is the UN option a better option by and large for developing countries? One is because if we see most developing countries don’t actually have a very big tax treaty network. So it’s not like they have so many treaties to renegotiate. You have a few large countries which have lots of treaties but by and large for most small developing countries, especially the countries in this list, many of them would not have a very extensive treaty network. So it’s not like they would have to negotiate so many treaties and then there’s a revenue potential. We can see that Article 12B with a broad scope, ADS companies and hybrid ADS and ADS is automated digital services like online advertising, income from search engines, income from supply of user data, income from cloud computing and things like that. So that kind of income, if a country goes with Article 12B and has a broad scope, we can see that it gives almost more than twice and in some cases up to three times what the OECD solution gives. So in terms of revenue potential with a broad scope, Article 12B has much better revenue potential if you’re talking about the gross method. But if you look at the narrow scope, if Article 12B has a narrow scope and by narrow scope I mean in Article 12B paragraph 6, you have a list of digital services and if you look at only those digital services and apply the tax only to those specific digital services, then the amount is comparable with amount A which would come from the OECD solution and actually if you look at the net method, that actually gives the least revenue and in fact it gives even less than the OECD solution.

Moderator:
And what’s the difference between the gross method and net method? Abdul, you’re not talking to a bunch of tax people. I think these are very general digital governance audience so

Abdul Muheet Chowdhary:
you do need to explain acronyms. Yes, yes, yes. So the gross method is basically a digital service tax and the net method I’ll get to in a second. So the gross method was brought in to basic, because many countries as Gayani mentioned brought in digital service taxes. So the United Nations developed the gross method to provide a treaty-based solution to eliminate double taxation for digital service taxes. So gross method is the same as the digital service tax. The net method, what the gross method does is that on every payment for a digital service, some portion of that payment is withheld as a tax by the government. So it’s a transaction-based tax. It’s not that at the end of the year the company files the return and pays the tax at one go. It’s on every single payment which is made for a digital service. So for example, if $100 is made for online advertising and you have a 3% rate, then the company which is like Google which is providing the online advertising service would get 100 minus 3, $97 or whatever currency that is. So that’s how the gross method would operate. The net method on the other hand is a tax which is paid at the end of the year. So it’s not a transaction-based tax like the gross method. And the way the net method operates is that it provides a simple formula through which the company can arrive at the net profits. And this is important. It’s called the net method because net refers to net profits. So they give a formula to calculate net profits. And this is important because the big question in the digital economy was how do you calculate profits? Because normally if you look at the brick and mortar economy of a factory in your country, you can audit, you can see how much do you pay on rent, how much do you pay on salaries, and your input costs and whatnot. But in the case of Uber in Sri Lanka, where there is no physical presence, how can you audit? I mean, the company can say anything and there’s no way you can figure out what the costs are. And especially when the whole business model is based on algorithms and intangibles largely. So it becomes very difficult to determine costs. So the Article 12B net method provides a simple formula where you basically see how much local revenue has been made by the company. So in the case of Uber in Sri Lanka, how much revenue did Uber derive from Sri Lanka? And to that, the profitability rate of Uber globally would be applied. So if Uber has a profit margin of, let’s say, 10%, 12%, whatever, that would be applied to Sri Lanka’s local revenues. 30% of that figure would be taken. And to that, the local tax rate of Sri Lanka’s 25%, 30%, whatever rate that is, that would be applied. So that is how the net method operates, broadly speaking. And because of that, because it’s a net basis tax, because it’s not a gross basis tax, obviously the revenue collections are much lower because, by and large, turnover-based taxes or revenue-based taxes tend to have much higher revenue collection. Wonderful. Thank you. So Abdul, you’re basically saying as a matter of national integrity, everyone reserves the right. But in terms of being able to negotiate, what do you think are the transaction costs involved? Unless the UN comes up with a treaty with standardized rates, et cetera, that everyone can sign up to, is it really a matter of Cambodia going and negotiating with China, let’s say, UK, and the US, if those are the three big countries where the platforms come from? Is that what, sort of, is it left up to countries? Yes. So this is the strength of Article 12B, that the decision of which treaty to enter into is left with the country. And now, of course, the question is, can Cambodia really negotiate with China or the UK or the US? And, of course, that’s not easy and that’s very difficult. But it also depends on how Cambodia approaches this. So I’ve just given disclaimer. You know, the tax world is opposite from the trade world in the sense that in the trade world, developing countries are always looking for market access. We want to export to the developed countries. And there, the power is with the developed countries to open the market or not. In the tax world, it’s the opposite. Here, the power of tax is always with the developing countries. We can tax as much as we want, and the developed countries are always trying to reduce the tax which is imposed by the developing countries. So in the case of Cambodia and China or Cambodia and the US, if Cambodia introduces a digital service tax, keeps it out of the income tax law, so the tax treaties cannot apply. If they introduce it into the Finance Act, as Gayani was saying, that India, Nepal, and these countries have introduced a digital service tax outside of the income tax law in the Finance Act, if that is done and the treaties don’t apply, then if China doesn’t enter into a tax treaty, it doesn’t include Article 12B into their tax treaty with Cambodia. It is the Chinese companies and the UK companies and the American companies who will face double taxation. Cambodia will not lose anything. So if Cambodia doesn’t include Article 12B, no problem. It can still collect taxes.

Moderator:
Is market exit by platforms in particularly not-valuable countries, like on a per-user basis or on a gross per-country revenue basis, a risk in this scenario? You know, take a country like Norway or one of our two or something like that, right? If the transaction costs are that high in compliance, would this company stay in? Is market exit the other risk? You said there is no cost. Is that a cost?

Abdul Muheet Chowdhary:
I mean, I didn’t mean to say there’s no cost, of course. I meant to say that if Cambodia says that we want to introduce a tax treaty with the UK and the UK refuses, then if Cambodia introduces a digital service tax, keeps it outside of the income tax law, then they will not lose anything by that. It will be the UK companies who will face double taxation. So I didn’t mean to say there is no cost. Now, on this risk that if Cambodia introduces a digital service tax, will the American companies leave Cambodia? You know, so far we have seen digital service taxes have been introduced by many countries. I mean, three East African countries, for example, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. The heads of the revenue service passed a resolution that we would all introduce digital service taxes with a 5% rate. And I mean, so far, we have not seen this evidence anywhere. You know, we have not seen this evidence anywhere that companies have pulled out in response. The threat that is usually given and usually not followed up on is that they will pass the cost on to the consumers. But as I said, even that, there is very little empirical evidence that this is a standard practice. I mean, it seems to be more of the exception rather than the rule. And also, if you remember, the business models of many of these companies is, I mean, they burn a lot of cash. I mean, they are predatory companies looking to just destroy their rivals. So oftentimes, they are just going with a cash burning approach, you know. So it’s not that profitability is like the foremost consideration on their minds all the time.

Moderator:
Yeah. Yeah. So sort of dynamic effects of driving others out of the market and so on. Okay. Let’s bring in Matthew. Now, you have taken an interesting approach and you have this dual role. Can you tell us about the digital services tax that you did impose and what your approach to the OECD sort of, you know, has been so that the audience understands, faced with the real choice of doing something now or waiting, what your thought process was?

Mathew Olusanya Gbonjubola:
Yeah. Thank you very much, Hilani. And good morning, Abdul and all colleagues on the call. I think we are having a very interesting conversation, which I hope is going to help colleagues all over the world to make a choice. Now, to start with, Nigeria does not have a DSC. We do not have a digital services tax. So I think, so that we are clear, what Nigeria has is a nexus rule that connects businesses of non-resident persons to Nigeria for tax purposes. And that gives the country the opportunity to bring the income or the profits arising from transactions done without physical presence to tax in Nigeria. Now, if we come back to the basic, we should ask ourselves, what is the problem that we’re trying to solve on this issue of non-physical presence of businesses, which we call ITEC and all of that? It all has to do with being able to bring the income in respect of transaction done in a country to tax. Before now, and when I say now, I mean before the advancement of technology, businesses could only be done if the companies or the firms are physically located in the jurisdiction. And so you can see the business, you can see the premises, you can see the officers, the staff, and then you can see the groups or service, and then you can easily bring such to tax. However, with the advancement in technology, it is possible for a surgeon to be in one country and a patient to be in another country, and yet the surgeon will perform or carry out surgery. This was unimaginable 50 years ago. And so the question then is, where does the income arising from such service, where should it arise? Should it be taxed in the place where the surgeon is staying or where the patient is? That had always been the problem. And now the approach of both the UN and the inclusive framework is to bring in some supposition, and which, just like Abdul said, in respect of the UN treaty base, is difficult a little bit for many developing countries to implement, and that is because they don’t have that many treaties. Then secondly, it is doubtful if Nigeria, for example, is negotiating treaty with the United Kingdom or with US or France, that the France or those countries will accept to have Article 12B in their, as an article in the tax treaty. So it’s almost an unsurmountable challenge. But even then, if you succeed in doing that, if you don’t have the domestic legislation, then you still cannot operate that provision. Now, with the inclusive framework option of amount A, we all know the challenges, not just the complexity, but we also saw a lot of elements that we believe are not working in favour of developing countries. And so the option Nigeria has taken is to say, look, what actually is the problem? The problem is I can’t see these people, but I can feel them. I can see the businesses they are doing in my country. And so we therefore used the option of looking at significant economic presence to say, look, if you have enough transactions in my country and we have threshold and has exceeded this threshold, even whether or not I can see you physically, I would deem that you are in my country and the income arising from that transaction will be taxable in my country. And that is what we have done. And this is not limited to digital services. It includes other services, management services, technical services, and all of that. And it is non-discriminatory. So it’s not targeted towards any specific company or country. It is anyone who fits into the definition that we have. So that is the approach Nigeria has taken. And I can say clearly that it has worked for all, worked for Nigeria, and also worked for the businesses, because we also have simplification such that they don’t have to go through very complex process of filing returns and all of that. So I hope my comment is useful. Thank you very much. Yes. Yes. Thank you, Matthew. Just to clarify, what is this test of significant market presence in your case? And how do you actually monitor that, I suppose? Because implementability and monitoring costs are the other side of sort of getting the revenue. Can you give us some thoughts about that? Yes, sure. Certainly, Elani. And thanks. Monitoring and putting values is actually not difficult, because we have the financial intermediations there. If someone sits in one village in Nigeria and is transacting business with a company that is based either in the US or Russia, has to pass through a financial institution. Payment has to pass through a banking system. And so from there, we have a hand, and we can see that. But beyond that, and in fairness, quite a number of the businesses are also people of goodwill, who on their own, with proper engagement, are able to set the clear, to say into your territory, this is how much transactions we have made, and this is how much. So it is both ways. We are able to get data from our financial services, and we also have the businesses who have come to self-declared on the basis of the law that we have enacted in Nigeria.

Moderator:
We had a forum with about over 100 government tax officials, I think, last month. And it was interesting, both India and Nepal had imposed digital services taxes in-country, but both said they’re taking a very light-touch approach because they do really want to sort of encourage compliance but are not really triangulating with all other transactions which they can use across the financial sector, various other ways. Is that Nigeria’s approach as well?

Mathew Olusanya Gbonjubola:
Certainly, the intention of Nigeria is not to strangulate businesses, it is just to ensure that taxes are paid where business transactions are carried out and where income or profit is arising, which is one of the reasons why we had to adopt simplification methods and we also have adopted rates that will not significantly affect the profitability of the businesses done in Nigeria. And so, yes, I would say the intention is not to strangulate business, we do not want to strife for businesses growing up, particularly those in the technology sector, but then everyone still has to pay the fair tax.

Moderator:
Great, thank you, Matthew. I’d like to bring in Victoria from the Asian Internet Coalition. So you, in a way, are sort of an industry body for the big platforms that we are talking about today. Are you of the view that countries should sign up to the OECD Amount A Multilateral Convention? Why? Also, could you talk about the cost of compliance of the various options seen from the big tech platforms?

Victoria Hyde:
Sure, absolutely. Good afternoon, everyone, and thank you for having me here to speak today on this important issue. Yes, as you mentioned, as part of the Asian Internet Coalition, we represent multinational companies that we’re talking about here today in this discussion around taxing these tech titans. And, you know, I just want to kind of give a bit of a brief overview of the digital services tax landscape in Asia. So when we look at this landscape, and indeed globally, it’s clear that there has been, you know, evolving digitalization of goods and services. And we recognize the need for governments to raise revenue, especially in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and the fiscal squeeze that Helani mentioned earlier. And in Europe, we’ve seen several countries passing DSTs, and while others in Asia, such as Malaysia, India, Pakistan, as Gayani referred to, have introduced taxes on imported digital services. And I think, you know, as was alluded to again in the introduction, these DSTs vary in their scope and their application. And while some countries tax only specific digital activities, others encompass a range of digital services, but these DSTs can, as you just mentioned, have some potentially harmful consequences. You know, they may distort market behavior, they could potentially pass on cost to the consumers and cause double taxation. So countries have kind of experimented with these taxes in the absence of a global solution, as the second best approach. And one of the things that we tend to do as part of the Asia Internet Coalition is go to governments with by presenting industry best practices. And one of the ones we use is often the G20 and OECD inclusive framework. So in the context of this discussion, you know, around pillar one, just to be clear, you know, it aims to ensure that profits are taxed in jurisdictions where consumers or users are located. So referring to this surgeon patient analogy that Matthew just just mentioned, and also as Abdul mentioned, you know, the Global South is put in quite a favorable position. It holds a lot of power as there is a huge proportion of the consumer basis of these M&Es in the Global South. So if I think about, you know, whether the question that you just asked me around where the big tech companies are of the view that countries should sign on to the convention, I think that the framework offers a comprehensive and inclusive approach to international taxation that holds substantial benefits for various stakeholders, not only multinational companies, but also, you know, some for the Global South and the digital economy more generally. But I think we also recognize the need to tailor tax policies to the unique economic, political and administrative landscapes that we’re talking about here. So for the Global South, I think a couple of the positives that we want to call out, you know, the redistribution of taxing rights, promoting revenue generation in developing countries and addressing the problems of profit shifting and tax havens and harmful tax practices which have historically disproportionately affected the Global South. I think for multinational companies, which is obviously, you know, the industry that we represent, the framework offers clarity and consistency and also transparency in international tax rules. It minimizes tax arbitrage opportunities and it also reduces this risk of double taxation, which I just touched on briefly. It also promotes responsible tax practices from the multinational corporations as well. And I think this is something that countries and consumers are starting to expect of companies as well. And lastly, just for the digital economy more generally, the framework addresses some of the unique challenges posed by the digital age. You know, we’re seeing huge developments in, you know, with relation to artificial intelligence, which I’m sure has been a topic of conversation throughout this forum. And, yeah, we’re seeing that this framework can provide a bit more of a predictable and efficient global tax system for the digital economy and its technology companies.

Moderator:
Thank you, Victoria. Now, if I were a sceptic, and I’m not saying I am, this could be viewed as a way for the big platforms to just overall pay less taxes because the numbers being talked about are quite low as a global taxation rate. And if I were a real sort of negative thinker, again, I may not be, I would think there’s no incentive for the US to actually let the OECD agreement reach anything. That’s what we saw last year. How would you respond to these two statements?

Victoria Hyde:
Yeah, I think that’s a valid point. And I think around what Gayane also mentioned around sort of these implementation delays and sort of the moving goalpost, which we’re seeing with this inclusive framework, it’s completely valid for countries to sort of call into question whether this will actually be implemented. But I also think that it’s important to recognize that this is an incredibly complex framework that’s being put together and one that is trying to achieve global consensus. And is a major step forward in international tax rules. And a lot of the work that they’ve been doing is around gaining stakeholder input, not only from the countries that are represented by, you know, in the inclusive framework, but also from the industry, from trade associations like ourselves, from NGOs. And this is a really lengthy process, but it’s ultimately crafted with the view to create long-lasting rules and avoid unintended consequences as well of these rules. So, yeah.

Moderator:
Abdul, you’re on the other side of this debate. How do you react to what Victoria is saying? Yeah, thank you.

Abdul Muheet Chowdhary:
Thank you, Gayane. You know, I’ll give the background of sort of the context we find ourselves today. This negotiation on the digital economy has been going on since 2013. So it’s been going on for more than 10 years. And actually, the digital economy is part of section one out of 15 actions under the base erosion and profit shifting project. And, you know, the negotiation would have gone on till the end of time because that’s what the Americans, especially because most of these companies are American companies, that’s what they wanted, that you keep talking, keep negotiating till the end of time. And beyond. So the only reason why things have come this far is because countries began initiating national measures or as they are called unilateral measures, but all tax measures are basically national measures. It’s only when countries began introducing digital service taxes, including, I repeat, many OECD countries, UK, Italy, Spain, France and Austria and whatnot, they all started introducing digital service taxes. Then finally, the Americans came to the negotiating table and said, OK, OK. And grudgingly, they agreed to redistribute 25 percent of residual profits, which are defined as profits above 10 percent of revenue. So that’s a very high threshold in practical terms. So only national measures by countries brought them to the table and only continued national and unilateral measures will actually make this thing see the light of day. The Americans have not even agreed to share tax information. I repeat, the Americans have refused to share tax information on a multilateral basis. They have not signed up to these exchange of information agreements, the MCMAA and whatnot. They have a history of wasting people’s time negotiating these multilateral treaties and then not signing them. So even the BEPS multilateral instrument, which would update tax treaties to implement some of the minimum standards, they have not signed. So when they have not agreed to share tax information, can you expect them to agree to share the tax base? And it is extremely unlikely. And I would say Victoria is talking about predictability and certainty. If there is one thing which is predictable and certain, it’s that the U.S. will not sign this agreement. And based on the current agreement in the July outcome statement, if the U.S. doesn’t sign this MLC by the end of the year, then countries can and should actually go ahead with national measures. And in terms of the revenue potential and, you know, I’d just like to add another point on that. The companies, they tried very hard to stop developing countries from initiating digital measures. Then they found out that countries are going to go ahead and there was nothing they could do to stop them. So then the next best thing was to come up with this so-called multilateral approach, which would basically force everybody to bring in a tax which would tax them as little as possible. So that is the key motivation behind this narrative, which we’re seeing.

Moderator:
Matthew, you’ve done a sort of a national level taxation regime. If and when the OECD optimistically treaty is signed, whenever, are you broadly aligned with that? You have elements of that, right? I mean, significant market presence, for example, is a feature of the OECD. They’re not taxing everybody, the large companies. Because you have now sort of committed to the OECD protocol, basically, yes?

Mathew Olusanya Gbonjubola:
Again, for clarity purposes, Nigeria has been part of the discussions since 2014, from the time of PEPS 2015 action points. And Nigeria is in alignment with quite a lot of the outcome that is out there. Now, as regards to the current two-pillar solution, Nigeria has also been part of the discussions from the beginning and we are still part of it. But you may remember that in the October 2021 statement, Nigeria did not sign on to that political statement. And that was because we had serious concerns with quite a number of the elements in the rules, particularly as regards to Ammon’s aid. And my government has not changed that position even now. Of course, we continue to engage and be part of the discussions and the negotiations. But the decision taken by my government in 2021 had not changed.

Moderator:
Thank you. Alison, you’ve been sitting and listening to this, people who work in tax and the people who are going to have to pay tax talking about it. You work in majority world countries, mostly many poor countries, many emerging economies. From a social inclusion equity perspective, what are your thoughts? From a capacity to get this done, what are your thoughts? And really, if we are ever lucky enough in our countries to get some revenue, what on Earth is going to happen to that money in the kind of regimes that we live in?

Alison Gillwald:
It’s a good three hour discussion, I think, but thank you, Helani. I will come to those bigger questions. I just wanted to say how important it is to be having these discussions and that we’ve been doing this research over a period of time because the complexity of particularly with these intensifying global digital digitalized services and things have made the tax issues far more complex. And a lot of the arguments that were made around maintaining or reducing or just controlling local taxation on, for example, telecommunication operators so that they could roll out those networks and reinvest in those networks and compel them to reinvest in those networks or the failures of secondary taxation through universal service objectives because, in fact, those weren’t being rolled out. And the arguments that kind of let these services drive themselves more affordably and get that take up and then you’d be able to tax the corporates and people who are all going online and doing that sort of thing. So those arguments were made from a very pragmatic point of view, acknowledging in our networks all in Africa the incredible constraints there are in revenue generation on the continent. Many of these countries, the mobile operators were primarily the tax base for the country with a tax base of one or two percent of the population. So those arguments are very different from the arguments that we were having even 10 years ago, maybe eight years ago, around the end user taxes that were coming with social networking that was these over the OTT services that were coming on top of the telecom operators. And there was, of course, a lot of argument around revenue share with those operators themselves and issues of local competition and all of those things, which I think are completely pertinent to this discussion. I think what’s really important about these discussions is that they’re not just taxation discussions, that we’re actually understanding the implications of taxation on trade, trade changes that are happening, on competition issues that are arising, because at the moment that policy is being done in a very siloed way that goes to the issues of national sovereignty, but actually the various imperatives, development and economic imperatives, the FISCUS is looking very strictly at maximizing revenue, the digital department or comms or whatever it is, is very much looking at digital universal service and those kinds of things that would actually drive economic growth, but they’re often not talking to each other. Trade is going off into a completely separate thing, possibly with some kind of alignment on tax, but not much else. But then we had the social networking taxes, and these were enormously regressive taxations on end users, introduced in some of the poorest countries in the world primarily, with actually very counterproductive effects. So if you look at Uganda, for example, they were introduced at a time to get, you know, a sovereign debt repayment that was needed to the poorest of the poor, you know, who were on these social networks, were actually pushed off the networks with these 1% taxes on each transaction, on mobile transactions and those kinds of things. Not only did it actually undermine their digital Uganda program, universal service program, but actually it also made the telecoms operators less profitable. There was enormous loss of revenues from them, from corporate tax. So the long-term effect has been quite negative. And then it’s overlaid with a political agenda. So the actual Gazette, the regulation that refers to this, says it’s also trying to stop social gossiping, online gossiping and that sort of thing. And around a time of, you know, political dissent. So, I mean, you’re getting a whole lot of really irrational reasons for taxation. So that has been, we’ve made a very strong argument to get, you’re not taxing end users of these digital services, you’re not taxing the titans, you’re not taxing the people who should be paying for these services. And so often now the discussions around whether countries should be signing up to the BEPS and at least getting 15% of those big tech companies amongst multinational corporations, that, you know, we have not been able to tax because of the lack of presence in country to use this mechanism to at least get that 15%, which would be very significant in many countries, even with the low internet penetration rates and those kinds of things, and ideally releasing these end users from those kinds of taxes. And yet some of the people who, you know, as I said, because this is complex and there’s not an understanding that the social networking taxes in these countries at the moment, mainly in East Africa, but very attractive to other parts of the continent, are actually end user taxes. There’s now often been a kind of knee jerk reaction to taxing digital companies under the BEPS regime, the base erosion and profit shifting regime of OECD’s proposed regime, is, you know, we mustn’t tax them either because it’s going to affect, you know, Facebook’s going to move out of, you know, Africa or whatever it is. And I think, you know, we really need some complexity because I think we’re all advocating for the same thing, but we need to understand those linkages, you know, and how this whole ecosystem works. And as I said, not only within the digital sector, but affecting these other sectors. And so this work was really done in the context of trying to understand trade and taxation issues in Africa and several interviews done with many, many countries, including Nigeria, and working, well, not working closely, but, you know, following the work of the African Tax Administrators Forum, who obviously represent the interests of many tax administrators across the country and therefore had to represent the position on unilateral taxation. I mean, a country like South Africa, for example, you know, corporate taxation is a minimum of 35 percent, many of these other companies looking at higher taxation rates. So an offer of 15 percent is, you know, just doesn’t look like very much at all. And it has an effective tax, you know, collection regime, et cetera. So it is, I think it’s very different for different countries. As I said, I think it’s really important that one understands the different dynamics in the context. So in the African context, besides the issues of sovereignty, is that I think as Abdul was pointing out, many of these treaties are limiting and binding. They’re not seen as opportunities to actually be accessing that extra 15% or something. So this paper that we interviewed a lot of people and there was a lot of feeling that people, the fiscals would never give up the little hold that they had on something in order that they would get something bigger or get something later on. And certainly didn’t want to be tied into these moratoriums, which we’re seeing anyway, from the trade agreements that are impacting on revenue generation. So I just wanted to say that was a kind of work that’s been done a lot of in Africa, but we’ve also done very important work, I think, with Learn Asia and with IEP, across the issues that I think we really need to understand where taxation fits in. Really looking at the interplay between digitization, increased visibility to the state, state formation, revenue generation, taxation, redistribution, because I mean, we need those taxes to do the redistributive work that we’re wanting to do post-COVID, well, during COVID and of course post-COVID around economic reconstruction. And that paper is actually out being launched today. So please do watch our Twitter feeds for that. Because I think the visibility that’s coming through digital transactions has implications that can be used positively, both for people who currently might not be paying legitimate taxes to be more visible to the state, but also for informal sector who have often not been able to be the beneficiaries of redistributive programs because they’re not visible, now being increasingly visible through tax, and obviously don’t qualify for taxation so they’d be visible from a tax point of view, but they wouldn’t qualify unless they don’t, unless they do qualify for taxation, but then be visible in the social protection role. So that’s, I think, an important side from the ongoing post-colonial struggles around state formation in many of our countries and the need to have the revenues to build those institutional capacities and some of these really big development challenges that we face on the continent. But I think, as I said, I think specifically in terms of the taxation issues and the trade issues that are going on now, I think, well, the whole BIPS process was actually an acknowledgement of how outdated these tax systems are. But it’s important to notice that the foregone potential revenues for states, particularly in the context of the pandemic, as I mentioned, and economic reconstruction, but it’s compelled us to look at updating the tax system of engaging in these various processes and better representing our interests, which I think we’ve not been effective as regions, as the global South, and doing this kind of research to inform a more integrated position for countries and regions to take is very important. For Africa, I think the situation is even more precarious, as I said, very fragile or non-existent tax systems in place anyway, largely dependent on aid and with all the associated issues that that raises for political economies. But then we’ve also got these big continental and international trade issues, where we are seeing enormous amounts of foregone tax in agreement. So the African continental free trade area, which has come into force, although it’s not operational in many ways, but there is expected to be a significant drop in conventional physical trade. Although I should say that there’s a sad amount of intercontinental trade anyways, a lot of our trade is actually outside, but that will have significant effects, especially for those countries who are not highly digitized, not leading these digital services, spreading out throughout Africa. And as these trade barriers begin to ease across the region and e-commerce is taking off and the digital services protocol is just being negotiated right now for the African continental free trade area, we’re going to see those kinds of impacts of a digital single market on traditional trade taxes that have been there. And so this really makes this assessment of aligning, positioning our local tax regimes on the continent, some kind of harmonization we will have to have in terms of the continental free trade area and the digital services underpinnings of it with the international tax regime, because these are essentially digital global, digital public goods that we very often talking about, data flows and these kinds of things. And I think historically we’ve looked at global governance from a kind of harms and protection point of view. We’ve looked at from a kind of trade and digital services and e-commerce point of view, but the taxation component of this, the actual generation of revenue for countries in order to service their needs. And I think historically we used to be, don’t put a secondary tax on telecom operators unless it goes back to the digital industry because otherwise we never see it. But digitization is now so cross-cutting that it’s absolutely appropriate that if.

Abdul Muheet Chowdhary:
Used to digital service tax, which applied to both residents and non-residents, but then later on they restricted it to non-residents. So it’s only the foreigners who now have to pay the tax. So that option is always there with countries. Second point is that on extraction, in the digital economy, you can really see extraction in a raw form because the classic argument that if you have taxes, then investment will go away, kind of breaks down when we look at the digital economy, because these are not coming with money to set up a factory and hire local people and create jobs. These are by definition companies. I mean, as in the case of Uber with Sri Lanka, they have literally no physical presence over there. The only jobs which are being created, so to speak, are the Uber drivers who could get those jobs even from Pick Me and other local companies. And in the case of online advertising companies like Google and Facebook, then you can really question, what is the actual investment coming into the local economy? So this argument that raise taxes, investment goes away, should be seen very differently when it comes to the digital economy. And we can really see, as I mentioned, extraction in quite a raw form. The third point which the Kenyan gentleman had spoken about was non-compliance. One option which is there for countries is what Pakistan has done, which is where they have told the banks that you collect the taxes of withholding and give it to us. So in the case of Kenya, for example, the company has to on its own come and pay the tax. And of course, if they don’t, then there are compliance issues, but there’s always a Pakistan approach where the banks withhold it. So the company basically gets the balance, yeah.

Moderator:
Victoria, anything to add?

Victoria Hyde:
Yeah, I think if I can jump in here, I also want to reiterate the point that Matthew made around the importance of stakeholder engagement. I think it’s hugely important so that both the government and multinational companies can set expectations. But you said that companies came to you with some concerns around the complexities of the arrangement that you have in Kenya. And I think this is where global tax rules can come in to reduce the complexity and uncertainty faced by M&Es due to sort of varying tax regulations and to sort of facilitate more transparent and predictable tax governance for them, as well as simplifying compliance by providing more standardized and consistent approaches to allocating profits. And this is where M&Es can more easily determine their tax obligations and ensure compliance across multiple jurisdictions.

Moderator:
Alison, Ghani?

Gayani Hurulle:
Yeah. I can just respond on a softer approach on the second part of the question on what if the companies don’t want to pay taxes. And I just want to reflect on a conversation that we had with the Nepali and Indian authorities when we had our forum a couple of weeks ago. And what those tax officials said is that so far they’ve had the companies actually playing ball and paying taxes, though they’ve taken a relatively light touch approach like Hilani mentioned earlier. So it’s, so far they’ve had little issues, but the light touch approach was key. But the question really is, is this dynamic going to change if and when the Mountie Convention comes into place? Because then there’s an alternative. So these are also questions that we’ll have to keep asking in whether the sort of answers that we’re giving today also continue to be sort of static and stagnant or whether those also will change over time.

Alison Gillwald:
So I think that was just one of the points I wanted to make because I think one of the issues you are speaking about and I think one of the issues that have come up here are really the issues around being able to tax the big tech companies in our context that don’t have presence within country. And you’re saying, oh, well, they’re playing ball as they should. If you’re looking at the kind of super profits that these companies are making, the kind of gratitude that’s actually contributing to these taxes just seems to be, it’s really not addressing these kind of bigger problems. I mean, I think, yes, we must take and risk it, it must be fair, it must be transparent. But in fact, although the kind of agreed international formula on this would make things clearer, it’s not worked in the favor of some of those countries. So we really need to, and we’ve got the US holding out on things. So unless everybody kind of comes to the table and we agree on it and it’s binding on everybody, it’s never going to get the kind of traction that we’re looking for.

Moderator:
Thank you. We’ve got an in-person question. You have a question as well. We’ll take two questions very quickly with very short answers.

Audience:
Okay, hi. So excellent panel and excellent discussion. I’m learning quite a lot of things here. I’m Bagheesha, I’m a PhD scholar and I work with Internet Governance Project at Georgia Tech. Now, what I’m going to ask might be a little bit more fundamental because I’m still learning about digital taxes. So please bear with me. I am struggling to understand how the calculations of profits are done or how the calculation of tax itself is done in sense that I think Abdul mentioned initially about revenue from profits for services. It’s easy when you have to calculate it for Netflix or something because you’re paying for those services. But how is it done for a service such as a social media website where we’re not directly paying for anything, right? And I think you also mentioned about how this trickles down to something that a user ends up paying for a Netflix or another digital subscription services. So just more fundamentally on how does one conceptually think about this and yeah, that’s about it. Thank you. I’m Kosi. I’m a senior from Benin. I’m from Ministry of Economy and Finance. It’s not very clear for me now. Facebook is not physical in Benin, for example. But many people using Facebook service, how can we test Facebook? Please make me information detail by detail, step by step because my minister are waiting for that. Thank you. There’s also a question online. My name is Kunle. My question is for digital companies. How do you quantify how much they are to pay based on the fact that most of them are operating remotely? You’re getting at this. So, I mean, this has to do a lot with what are the costs Facebook? What is the cost and revenue of Facebook in a country like yours? Advertising revenue and subscriptions like SMEs pay, you know, to have a certain type of page. We might buy advertising space to announce that, I don’t know, we’re running a conference. Hotels might buy advertising space. What are their costs?

Moderator:
Our marketing, maybe some allocation of the policy staff, the marketing staff, which might be per country or shared across countries. I mean, those are the types of costs and revenues that these companies have. Even if they don’t have a presence. If they have a presence, then of course, there’s sort of, you know, infrastructure that they run and so on, yeah? So I’ll take a very quick set of responses, like really under one minute from the panelists, but I am going to put you in touch with Abdul so you can have a longer conversation because I think that is important. Part of what we’re really trying to do with the panel, this is one of the first panels at IGF and I’ve been coming since 2006. That’s really trying to get at some of the detailed elements of this. So we need to have a much longer conversation. So we will put you in touch. Reactions from panelists, please. Thank you. Thank you.

Abdul Muheet Chowdhary:
Thank you, Helani. I’ll just respond to the gentleman from Benin. I would say, sir, please look at the equalization levy of India, where they basically started out with a 6% tax on online advertising, which was targeted at Facebook and Google and these kinds of companies whose main revenue stream is from advertising. Broadly speaking, tell your bank that if somebody in Benin is paying Google for online advertising, then introduce a rate of 4% or 5% or whatever and tell that bank to withhold that percentage of the withholding and keep it as a withholding tax. Whether Facebook or Google are there or not in Benin, that doesn’t matter. The money will be restricted from them when they receive the payment and they will be forced to come and file the tax return. And if they don’t, well, that’s their loss.

Moderator:
So before the money goes out of the country, the financial institutions are legally obliged to have a withholding tax and then remit it back to the tax authorities, what Abdul is saying. Anyone else wants to respond? Or we can go to our last sort of rapid fire. We’ve had very sort of, you know, interesting there’s some convergence, right? Abdul is basically saying national levels taxation is important because that is what actually brought the US and other people to the table. And we need to do this. It is also a matter of national integrity. There seem to be outs if somehow we have a longer term, you know, multi sort of country treaty option. Matthew is broadly, I think, along those lines. He’s gone for approach that somehow sort of, I think the devil is in the details, which, you know, we really do see. He sort of had a threshold. So the smaller guys are not really impacted by this, but still has a mechanism to get revenue. Victoria is saying, I think that this is sort of the OECD option is really a viable one. Compliance becomes easier. And related to that, Alison is actually saying that, you know, countries stand to gain something because it’s sort of like you can free ride along with this if this treaty happens, right? So it’s a really interesting negotiation position of what the long term game is and what might be the short term approach that countries use. So we don’t have conclusions. I want you to say in, you know, sort of a 10 word tweet, Abdul, Matthew, Victoria, Alison, what countries should do, and then we’re gonna run a poll asking you in the audience, what countries should do. So let’s get the slider up, but let’s start with Matthew. Very quickly, what should be the approach of developing countries given these options? Should they sign up for the OECD treaty and wait?

Mathew Olusanya Gbonjubola:
I would say that developing countries should look very clearly, read between the lines, if they intend to sign, and to be sure of the specific impacts on their revenue.

Moderator:
Okay, so you’re saying, I don’t know, but look at it closely. Abdul.

Abdul Muheet Chowdhary:
Wait for the U.S. and other OECD countries to ratify amount day before thinking of how to proceed.

Moderator:
Okay, so don’t commit until U.S. and other countries ratify. Victoria.

Victoria Hyde:
I think that without a global consensus based solution, the risk of further uncoordinated unilateral measures and retaliatory trade sanctions is a real concern.

Moderator:
So you’re saying, yes, please sign up for the OECD. Alison.

Alison Gillwald:
Yes, I’m also saying sign up for the OECD, but very conditionally. I think that if enough countries sign up and there’s enough pressure put, there’s a kind of block that can actually force these percentages higher so that they begin to align with what corporate taxation would be in their countries. And maybe that requires a digital multinational corporation pullout of the 15%, because obviously that’s not applicable to multinational corporations just on these big giant monopolies.

Moderator:
So conditionally, yes. Gayani.

Gayani Hurulle:
No, by the end of 2023. So very much like what Abdul is saying, because only- Don’t sign up to the OECD for now. Only 30 countries and with 60% of the market share need to sign up. Global South doesn’t fall into that basket. So it’s not necessary. They can wait and see and sign up later.

Moderator:
So we can free ride essentially and wait for that. Okay, excellent. What does the audience think? The Slido is gone. Could we please go to… You have to connect it. Okay, slido.com. And the number for the poll is 2823924. Should countries sign up for the OECD amounted multilateral convention by the end of 2023? Half of the audience says no. Interesting. So close to a split opinion, I think, given the small sample size. 42% saying yes. And just under 10%. Oh, okay. More moving towards no. This is a live situation, but still around 8%, I don’t know. Okay, so I think it’s quite close, which it’s a good thing. We need to keep engaged on this. Thank you, guys. Thank you for staying. We’re just on time. Thank you for the questions and the audience and the really good panel engagement on this. We’ll hope to see you next year with a much more sophisticated understanding of what we should do. Thank you. »Applause.