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Summary

This workshop focused on comparing multistakeholder Internet governance approaches in Canada and Lebanon. Participants from various stakeholder groups discussed how their countries engage diverse voices in Internet governance processes.

The Canadian approach was highlighted as having formal and informal mechanisms for stakeholder engagement. The government actively seeks input from different groups to inform its positions at international forums. Technical operators like CIRA play a key role in convening stakeholders and providing expertise on policy issues. The Canadian Internet Governance Forum (CIGF) was noted as an important platform for national dialogue.

In Lebanon, despite challenges from ongoing crises, efforts are being made to implement a multistakeholder model. The Lebanon IGF, supported by ESCWA, provides a platform for inclusive dialogue. Academic institutions like AUB contribute by hosting events and integrating Internet governance topics into curricula. However, engaging youth and students remains a challenge.

Both countries emphasized the importance of using technology to foster inclusivity and overcome geographical barriers. Virtual platforms and collaborative tools have become essential for stakeholder engagement, especially in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Key takeaways included the need for both formal and informal engagement processes, the importance of convening diverse stakeholders, and leveraging technology for inclusive participation. Participants also highlighted opportunities for collaboration between Canadian and Lebanese Internet governance initiatives.

The discussion underscored that while approaches may differ based on local contexts, the core principles of multistakeholderism are applicable in both developed and developing country settings.

Keypoints

Major discussion points:

– Comparing multistakeholder Internet governance approaches in Canada and Lebanon

– Role of government, technical community, academia, and international organizations in fostering multistakeholder collaboration

– Challenges and strategies for inclusive participation, especially across large/diverse countries

– Use of technology to enable broader engagement in Internet governance processes

– Importance of both formal and informal mechanisms for stakeholder input

The overall purpose of the discussion was to share best practices and lessons learned on implementing multistakeholder Internet governance models in two different national contexts (Canada and Lebanon). Speakers aimed to identify successful strategies that could potentially be adapted or applied in other countries.

The tone of the discussion was collaborative and constructive throughout. Speakers were eager to share their experiences and insights, while also expressing interest in learning from others. There was a sense of mutual respect between participants from Canada and Lebanon, with recognition that both countries face challenges in multistakeholder engagement despite their different circumstances. The tone became more forward-looking towards the end, with participants discussing potential future collaborations.

Speakers

– Chafic Caya: Moderator

– Dana Cramer: Online moderator

– Charles Noir: Vice President of Community Investment Policy and Advocacy at CIRA (Canadian Internet Registration Authority)

– David Bedard: Internet Governance Manager at Department of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada

– Mirna El Hajj Barbar: Program Management Officer at ESCWA, leading the Arab Digital Inclusion Platform

– Maha Zouwayhed: Representative of American University of Beirut, Office of Innovation and Transformation

Additional speakers:

– Dr. Hosein Badran: Participant from the audience, involved in Arab IGF and Canadian IGF

– Manal Abdel Samad: Ex-Minister of Information from Lebanon (mentioned but did not speak)

– Zeina Bou Harb: Lebanon IGF Secretariat (mentioned but did not speak)

– Sabrina Wilkinson: Reporter for the session (mentioned but did not speak)

Multistakeholder Internet Governance: Comparing Canadian and Lebanese Approaches

This workshop focused on comparing multistakeholder Internet governance approaches in Canada and Lebanon, bringing together participants from various stakeholder groups to discuss how their countries engage diverse voices in Internet governance processes. The discussion was moderated by Chafic Caya, with Dana Cramer serving as the online moderator.

Canadian Approach:

David Bedard, representing the Canadian government, highlighted both formal and informal mechanisms for stakeholder engagement. He emphasised the government’s role as a convener, bringing stakeholders together to hear their concerns and priorities. This input is then integrated into Canada’s positions at international forums such as ICANN, IGF, and ITU. Bedard noted that virtual participation has enabled broader engagement, particularly across Canada’s large and diverse geography.

Charles Noir from CIRA (Canadian Internet Registration Authority) explained how technical operators play a crucial role in convening stakeholders and providing expertise on policy issues. CIRA actively monitors both domestic and international policy spaces, looking at trends that may affect them as an operator or impact the global Internet’s multistakeholder governance model. Noir also mentioned CIRA’s community investment initiatives, which support Internet-related projects across Canada. He highlighted the Technical Coalition for Multi-Stakeholderism (TCCM) as an example of international collaboration among technical communities.

The Canadian Internet Governance Forum (CIGF) was noted as an important platform for national dialogue, bringing together diverse stakeholders to discuss Internet governance issues.

Lebanese Approach:

Mirna El Hajj Barbar from ESCWA highlighted the Lebanon IGF as a platform for inclusive dialogue, supported by regional organisations. She noted that digital platforms have become essential for collaborative decision-making and online preparation processes for regional forums. El Hajj Barbar also mentioned a survey conducted by ESCWA in 2004, which revealed a lack of awareness about Internet governance issues in the region, leading to the establishment of the Arab IGF.

Maha Zouwayhed, representing the American University of Beirut (AUB), discussed how academic institutions contribute by hosting events and integrating Internet governance topics into curricula. She emphasised how technology has played a transformative role in fostering internal and international collaborations, enabling inclusivity and accessibility by removing barriers to participation. It was noted in the chat that AUB has hosted the Lebanon IGF twice.

El Hajj Barbar pointed out that engaging youth and students remains a challenge in Lebanon. She noted that students were generally unfamiliar with Internet governance concerns and lacked proper engagement in processes at national, regional, and global levels. This was attributed to the absence of Internet governance topics in university curricula. Additionally, she highlighted challenges in implementing the multistakeholder approach in Lebanon, including limited resources and the need to align Internet governance with pressing national issues during times of crisis.

Shared Challenges and Opportunities:

Both countries emphasised the importance of using technology to foster inclusivity and overcome geographical barriers. Virtual platforms and collaborative tools have become essential for stakeholder engagement, especially in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Dr. Hosein Badran, a participant involved in both Arab and Canadian IGFs, stressed the importance of inclusive stakeholder representation across different contexts.

Challenges in implementing multistakeholder models were discussed, including:

1. Engaging diverse voices across large and diverse countries

2. Aligning Internet governance with national priorities during crises

3. Lack of student familiarity with Internet governance

4. Need for sustainable funding mechanisms

International Collaboration:

The discussion highlighted opportunities for collaboration between Canadian and Lebanese Internet governance initiatives. Preparatory processes for international meetings, technical community coalitions across countries, and regional digital agendas were identified as areas for potential cooperation.

Key Takeaways and Resolutions:

1. Both Canada and Lebanon can implement multistakeholder Internet governance approaches, though with methods suited to their contexts.

2. Government plays an important role as a convener to bring diverse stakeholders together.

3. Technical communities provide valuable expertise to inform policy discussions.

4. Academia is crucial for fostering innovation and engaging students in Internet governance.

5. Regional organisations like ESCWA play a key supporting role for national Internet governance initiatives.

6. Technology and virtual platforms are essential for enabling inclusive participation across geographies.

7. International collaboration and knowledge sharing between countries is valuable for advancing Internet governance.

8. CIRA offered to engage in dialogue with Lebanese stakeholders around WSIS+20 and technical domain name system issues.

9. Participants were invited to contribute to the upcoming Arab IGF 7 in February 2025 in Amman, Jordan.

10. Stakeholders were encouraged to engage with ESCWA’s Arab Digital Agenda initiative.

Unresolved Issues:

1. How to sustainably fund national IGF initiatives, especially in developing countries.

2. How to effectively engage students and youth in Internet governance processes.

3. How to align Internet governance priorities with pressing national issues during times of crisis.

4. The potential for Lebanon to create an organization similar to CIRA to handle collaboration and coordination, as suggested by Chafic Caya.

5. Addressing Zainab Al-Hab’s question about using the national IGF platform to promote the new gTLDs program.

Conclusion:

The discussion underscored that while approaches may differ based on local contexts, the core principles of multistakeholderism are applicable in both Canadian and Lebanese settings. The overall tone was collaborative and constructive, with participants eager to share experiences and learn from one another. This exchange set the stage for potential future collaborations between Canadian and Lebanese Internet governance initiatives, emphasizing the value of international knowledge sharing and cooperation in advancing inclusive and effective Internet governance practices.

Chafic Caya: Hello, hello. One, two, three. Okay. Okay, great. So, good afternoon, everyone. On behalf of the Lebanon IGF and of the Canadian Registration Internet Authority, CIRA, I would like to welcome you all to this workshop entitled Multistakeholder Internet Governance from Best Practices in Two Countries, Lebanon and IGF. So, the main critical question for today will be how to drive multistakeholder and get diverse voices around one table in two different environments, Canada and Lebanon. And I believe Canada and Lebanon is the best example to show that Lebanon as a developing country with its diversity and political complexity is still challenging in its multistakeholder progress toward inclusivity and collaboration. While Canada, with its robust and well-established multistakeholder approach is another example and we’ll hear from the experts that they are with us today. So, before I start, thank you for CIRA, thank you for online participants, and thank you for Sabrina, the reporter of this session, and thanks for the Lebanon IGF Secretariat, Zaina Bouharb, for their efforts and support to make this session happen. So, thank you so much for being with us today. And just to give you the importance of this session, we have the ex-Minister of Information from Lebanon, Her Excellency Manal Abdelsamad, with us today. with a lot of the Esquire United Nations with Ayman, here our colleague with Rita, we have the Lebanon ISOC. So all the actors, the elites in the Lebanon ISOC are there just to get experience from you, dear friends from Canada. So let’s see what’s the difference between the Lebanese and Canadian path in the multi-stakeholder environment. So let me start. I will not address you, please. Can you introduce yourselves? So we can have some more time. And I will start, we have online, I will not forget our two speakers online. We have Mirna Barber, and we have Maz Weyhed from the Lebanon IGF MAG, who will join us online. And we have on site, our dear colleagues, David and Charles, they will be here on site. And I will leave the floor to our moderator, Dana Kramer, so you can introduce the speakers and give like an overview how this session will go during these 90 minutes. So Dana, I will give you the floor. Thank you so much, Shafiq, for such a warm welcome. It’s really great to see such a diversity of stakeholders in the room. And also too, I think it’s really inspiring that we’re seeing your Lebanese colleagues who have also come as well. It’s a wonderful show of support. And I know we have some really great Canadians and those based in Canada in the room, additionally. So I am the online moderator for this session. So if you are online and have any questions, please feel free to post them into the chat if you would like them read out.

Dana Cramer: Or you can raise your hand and we will work with technical support to unmute you. If there are any technical difficulties within the session for unmuting, we will read out your question from the chat to ensure that your perspective is brought into the room. In terms of introducing… the speakers. I think that everyone would probably be best at introducing themselves because they’ll be able to identify to their stakeholder position and where they come to this topic as well. So I’ll pass the microphone to Charles.

Charles Noir: Good afternoon, everybody. My name is Charles Noir, and I’m the Vice President of Community Investment Policy and Advocacy at CIRA, the Canadian Internet Registration Authority. I’m thrilled to be here in Saudi Arabia with you. Thank you to our hosts for this wonderful IGF. I’ll be speaking today as a Canadian, but from a technical operator perspective. CIRA runs the .ca. We’re a ccTLD and been quite active in the multi-stakeholder community and internet governance for some time. I’ll hand it over to my colleague, David.

David Bedard: Thanks, Charles. I just want to echo what a great IGF this has been, and thank you to the government of Saudi Arabia. It’s been wonderful, and thank you for everybody in the room and online. My name is David Bedard, and I’m the Internet Governance Manager at our industry department, which is a long name, but it’s our Department of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada. The acronym for that, which I might reference, is ISED. In my spot, we are obviously a government stakeholder, and we engage broadly with the community. We manage both our participation at ICANN, so I’m the Government of Canada’s representative at ICANN as well, and we lead on the IGF as well as feed inputs to our Global Affairs Department on the WSIS process and broader internet governance discussions. That’s kind of where I’m coming at this discussion from. Thank you.

Mirna El Hajj Barbar: Thank you, David. I will go to the online speakers. Please, Myrna, go ahead. Good morning, everybody. My name is Myrna El-Haj Barber. I am Program Management Officer at ESCO, working within the Digital Cooperation and Digital Development Program. I’m also leading the Arab Digital Inclusion Platform at ESCWA, and I witnessed actually the launch of the Arab IGF as well as the Lebanon IGF.

Chafic Caya: Thank you, Yorna. Maha?

Maha Zouwayhed: Hello, everyone. I am Maha Zwayhed. I represent the American University of Beirut. I work at the Office of Innovation and Transformation at the university. I currently handle the Innovation Center, and I used to work in IT business development and was involved in many collaboration initiatives by the American University of Beirut. So we represent the academic sector, and of course, I’ll try to share some experience related to the national level collaborations in Lebanon.

Chafic Caya: Thank you so much. So as you can see, we have the five stakeholders, technical, government, intergovernmental, academic, and civil society. Thank you so much for being with us today. So my first question directly to Charles. To set the scene, give us an overview on the multi-stakeholder approach in Canada and how CIRA is implementing this multi-stakeholderism around or inside Canada to get all the stakeholders around one table.

Charles Noir: Well, thanks for the question, Shafiq. I think what I’d like to start off with by saying is as a technical operator in Canada, I’ve certainly noticed and benefit from a really active ecosystem within the internet governance community. And in terms of some of what we’re doing to engage, I think a lot of us around the room are doing. We’re very active in the ICANN space, for example, as a technical operator where we’re a member of the CCNSO, the Country Code Name Supporting Organization. As we run the .ca, it’s our primary purpose, we’re very involved in the domain namespace through ICANN. I think we’ve been an active participant in all IGFs since they were created and ongoing. We sponsor, sole sponsor of the Canadian IGFs, so we’re very active in the national and regional initiative space, which has been a real pleasure, particularly as we move into the WSIS process. I’d say that the global engagement that we do is very much reflected also in our domestic approach as well. We’re very active, not only in talking and working with registrars and registries, again, in the technical community across the country. As the .ca operator, we certainly are involved in policy processes along the way that can include both legislation at the federal level and at the domestic level, or sorry, federal and provincial levels. Largely, I would say that we have a fairly healthy multi-stakeholder environment in Canada. I feel that government in particular has been wide open to hearing from stakeholders. I feel that we’ve also been very lucky to have had an opportunity to convene and collaborate with other technical operators and organizations throughout the ecosystem. Overall, I feel that the participation as a technical operator is going well. I know there are some challenges and we might get into that in a bit, but largely that’s how we see ourselves playing in this ecosystem.

Chafic Caya: Thank you so much. I will go to Mirna. Mirna, you mentioned something interesting, the role of ASQA in supporting both the Arab IGF and the Liberian IGF. So can you give us Can you provide us an overview of the Lebanon IGF and how you manage to support this national activity?

Mirna El Hajj Barbar: Yes, thank you, thank you, Shafi. Actually, first of all, I would like to congratulate the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for hosting this year’s IGF in such an outstanding manner. Unfortunately, I couldn’t be with you due to personal commitments. I’m also very grateful to the invitation to participate in this workshop. Thank you to you, Shafi, Sabrina, Dana, and Zainab. It is really a pleasure to be part of this important discussion. Regarding actually the Lebanon Internet Governance Forum is, as you know, a national initiative that involves all the relevant stakeholders and provides an opportunity for open and inclusive dialogue. It also creates opportunities for knowledge sharing and exchange ideas on issues related to Internet Governance. The Lebanon IGF model follows actually the same structure and mechanisms that the United Nations approach actually suggests within its fundamental principles, from openness to transparency, inclusivity, and multi-stakeholder participation, and specifically a bottom-up approach. Now, regarding the role of ESCWA in supporting the Lebanon IGF, I would like to mention, first of all, that ESCWA has been and still is a key player in advancing Internet Governance, not only at regional and national level, but also at the global level. arena. Actually, UNESCO was involved in the internet governance process since its inception in 2005 and 2006, and we are continuing working on all these global processes. So, building on its contribution at the global level and its leadership in launching the Arab IGF in 2012 with the League of Arab States and all other stakeholders from all sectors in the Arab region, ESCWA actually extended its expertise to support the Lebanon IGF, where actually, while we recognized actually the need for a local platform for such an open dialogue on internet governance issues, ESCWA encouraged and supported and worked very closely with the main stakeholders in Lebanon, namely the Ministry of ICT and OJERO, and many other representatives from the private sector, the technical community, academia, and NGOs, in order to establish such a forum. Actually, that was launched in 2018, but the work took us between one year and a half or two years before. So, in addition to providing technical assistance and facilitating consultations towards launching this forum, ESCWA played also a very important role in drafting the Lebanon IGF Charter and the related terms of reference, based on the fundamental principles of the UN, and this to ensure actually a structured, multi-stakeholder and inclusive framework for the forum.

Chafic Caya: Thank you, Mirna.

Mirna El Hajj Barbar: Thank you.

Chafic Caya: Thank you for this overview. And this gives us a picture of how much important is the collaboration, not only between the stakeholders, but between the stakeholders and the international and regional organizations. From this, I will change with David, from the government perspective. How do you see the involvement of Canadian government in this multi-stakeholder approach in Canada? And how do you deal with all these different opinions and visions from the different stakeholder groups?

David Bedard: Thanks, Shafiq. That’s a great question. So I’ll just first start off by saying that within sort of the multi-stakeholder internet governance, we at ICED employ a variety of different strategies in terms of bringing voices together. We really see ourselves as a convener, especially from the government, to get stakeholders around the table to hear their concerns, hear their priorities, and figure out ways that we can integrate some of those concerns and priorities into our work as we participate in various international forum like ICANN or the IGF or the ITU. So domestically, when engaging in the multi-stakeholder process, we aim to collaborate with other stakeholders directly. So we work together to determine how to prepare our strategies collectively. So I think it’s really important for us as government to hear what our stakeholders have to say, especially when we’re heading into multilateral spaces that may not be as open to other stakeholder inputs. So we really rely on them for meaningful input and engagement. So one example of this engagement we have at ICED is we have Canadian preparatory committee calls before each ITU meetings, and we do this for ICANN as well and for IGF so we can share some Canadian priorities and we can hear from our stakeholders. to help inform our own Canadian positions on the ground. So we have these before each and every meeting. And it’s an opportunity to share best practices, to meet, talk about concerns, and just have an open and honest dialogue about their priorities and about where the government of Canada looks to push some of our priorities on the ground and how our stakeholders can help contribute to that process. We’re also sort of working with our stakeholders to make this a bit more of an iterative process. So we do a lot of conversing and engaging with our stakeholders before each and every meeting. But we’re really trying to work on reporting out after the meeting is done to make sure our stakeholders know, especially if they’re not able to participate in the meetings, if they’re smaller, for instance. So we want to make it an iterative process so they know how we’ve used their input on the ground as well. And so we want a feedback loop, a constant feedback loop with our stakeholders. And we’re extremely fortunate to have a wide range of experts in our internet governance space in Canada. And we need to engage and continue to engage with them, especially with the upcoming WSIS. So we actually just had our kickoff meeting with our stakeholders last week. Some of the people in the room here were there to articulate some priorities that we see in the WSIS to discuss how, in Canada, what we want to see out of that process. And so we really look forward to continuing engaging with them. So, yeah, so those are some of the ways in which we collate some of the stakeholder inputs in Canada. And, you know, there’s lots of work that we need to do in terms of making sure that it remains inclusive and we get lots of smaller voices in the room from smaller organizations as well. Thanks.

Chafic Caya: Thank you, David. Very interesting. And I believe this is the first takeaway for the Lebanon IGF. I believe my colleague Zeyna, IGF Secretariat, to have this coordination meeting with the Ministry of ICT in Lebanon before these big meetings, not to go in silence. So thank you, David. It’s interesting feedback from you. I’ll go to the academic stakeholder group. Maha, we know that AUB hosted one of the IGF sessions in the past, and during the last two days here, we heard a lot that there is a lack in academic presence in the IGF discussions. So how AUB, which is the American university in Beirut, one of the prestigious universities in the region, deal with this? How do you support the Lebanon IGF, and how can you encourage more academics to join these IGF discussions?

Maha Zouwayhed: Thank you, Shafiq. So first, thank you for having me in this session. Well, I’ll start by speaking about AUB specifically. We have established mechanisms internally to keep engaging the academic body. So, for example, as the Office of Innovation and Transformation, we have periodical meetings and designated communication channels. Nothing, absolutely nothing is rolled out without the involvement of academics. And the best example was when we hosted the event, and every year, in fact, when we are planning the Lebanese Internet Governance Forum, we also make sure to always incorporate the academic part. Yeah, so basically, whenever we want to roll out any initiative or take any strategic decision or initiative, we activate these channels. We make sure that the academic input is equally there, as well as the… business, industry, and technical input. Did I answer your question, Shafiq?

Chafic Caya: Thank you, Maha, thank you, yes, sure. Just I will go back to the online participants. We have about 20 online participants. Dana, if you, they have any comments, any feedbacks from the online, please let’s hear their voices, and I will come back to the room to see if there is any feedback for this first round of setting the scene.

Dana Cramer: We don’t have feedback at the moment, however, for those who are online, if you would like to begin typing in any questions or unmuting yourselves, or raising your hand to be unmuted, my apologies, then we would love to hear from you. We’ll just give five seconds to collect thoughts, and then move on.

Chafic Caya: I know the culture here is they try to take the microphone, so please put your feedback and comments in the chat room for the Zoom. Thank you. So, same here for the audience. If you have any feedback, if you have any comment, please raise your hand, and we’ll have your feedback, especially coming from, I see colleagues from RMUS, I see colleagues, you know, Canada here, Dr. Baderan, please, go ahead.

Dr. Hosein Badran: Thank you so much. It’s a great pleasure to be here. Thank you, Shafiq, for organizing this session, and Charles, Sarah. I am very fortunate because my background covers two continents, originally from Egypt, but I am a Canadian, so I have the pleasure and the honor to participate in the Arab IGF on the steering committee, and also in the Canadian IGF as part of the planning and program committee. I have the pleasure to participate with ISAD in the preparatory process for ITUT meetings, which is very important because technology and innovation needs to be aware of the developments and have a… a position to protect the investment, protect the intranet as an open and secure and trustworthy platform. And on the WSIS side, that’s very important and congratulations to the Canadian government to set up this process to engage multi-stakeholders from different backgrounds, from academia, technical community, business community and individual experts to convey their priorities and impressions about the WSIS process. I think this is a model to be followed by other governments as we have just discussed in the previous session on the Arab region preparation and priorities for the WSIS. It’s very important to have a common regional priority and agenda but also individual stakeholders are encouraged to approach their national delegations, national governments to set their priority on national level. Ultimately, the multilateral process will set the negotiations and set the priorities for the global process. So this kind of engagement, direct engagement with the government is very, very much needed and thank you for that.

Chafic Caya: Well said, Dr. Rouhani. Really, yes, this is what I would like to take from this workshop is experience from Canada, the government of Canada, how they work with all these stakeholders. Dana?

Dana Cramer: Speaking of another stakeholder group, Zaina had noted in a chat that AUB hosted Lebanon IGF two times, once at their campus for engaging students and I think that’s a great perspective to bring in that youth element to youth engagement within the internet governance area. So thank you, Zaina, for posting your comments. If there are any others, please post them and we will address them accordingly.

Chafic Caya: Thank you, Dana. Thank you so much. So I will change with Dr. Bedran on the support of the governments to this multistakeholder approach. Back to you, David. Please tell us more how the Canadian government work with the different stakeholder groups from academia to private to technical to civil society and What is your magic, let’s say, tool to get these people together? Thanks, Shafiq.

David Bedard: Thanks, Shafiq. I think that’s a… It’s a good question. I mean, we do have, like… So, I’ll start from… We have formal processes. Like Hussein was saying, and like I said earlier, we have the Canadian preparatory processes. They’re very formal. So, you know, sometimes we don’t… We don’t always reach everybody that we should, especially smaller players in this space. Particularly, you know, we like to see youth at the table, and now they’re very well engaged, or they’re very well organized now, so it makes it a little bit easier. We can reach out to Dana to get youth involved and to others involved, but we really also rely on our larger stakeholders, like CIRA has the Technical Coalition for Multi-Stakeholderism, so that’s a great initiative that we know where to go to so they can collate other smaller organizations and we can hear some of their voices who we might not… We’re not on the ground, so we don’t have the same reach as some people do that play in this space every single day and live and breathe some of these issues. So, it’s really incumbent on us to casually and informally reach out to as many stakeholders that we can outside of more formal processes in order to get as many voices around the table as possible. So, that’s one element. And the only other thing that I’ll add is that the relationship element is really important for Government of Canada, so we work very closely with our Global Affairs Department and we really try to institute a no-wrong-doors approach, but it’s important for government officials to be out at things like the IGF and at IT meetings and expanding our networks and putting faces to names so people know who in the government… It’s not just a big, scary bureaucracy, but they can actually see somebody they can speak to and they can develop relationships with them, so that’s a really important element as well. So, as much as I know everybody’s resources are an issue, but as long as… you can try to make the case to get out there and meet people, it’s really important as well.

Chafic Caya: Thank you, David. I believe that makes me a little bit more comfortable with myself because in this region, when we talk about Internet governance, we say, yeah, it’s the government who leads. So, Canada, the government leads, which is good. That means we are not doing things in the wrong way. Going back to Maha, just to make it for you, because, yeah, sorry, you hosted twice the Liberal IJF, not one. So, tell us about the experience. How you supported and how you will continue to support the Liberal IJF as an academia?

Maha Zouwayhed: Well, in fact, we enjoy a very good relationship with multi-stakeholder groups in Lebanon, including the governmental sector and civil society and, in fact, working in the Lebanese Internet Governance Forum group really added a lot to our sources for identifying priorities, also to bring value from what we are doing because we have a lot of other multi-stakeholder initiatives going on in Lebanon. For example, we support the .lb domain. We have the Tech Care Consortium that is a consortium of eight universities. We have international collaborations that have national impact, such as HPC for Lebanon. So, we try to blend all this and deploy it to integrate with the initiatives that the Internet Governance Forum is trying to support. All the way, it’s always with the academic part, for example. So when we did the National Cyber Security Day, it was the content was planned and composed between our academic faculty members in collaboration with CERN and multiple colleagues from the Lebanese chapter in IGF. And also we make sure that this is sustainable. So we always bring back this feedback and engagement to academia. And we try to foster and simulate innovation to this end. So we constantly also incorporate this into our innovation programs, innovation priorities, academic research and projects. One other thing we did is, for example, when we wanted to implement the digital accessibility on the national level, we also resorted to our colleagues in the Internet Governance Forum. And it was incorporated in several sessions and capacity building sessions that was presented by the Lebanese chapter. And also it’s now being rolled out in multiple universities as part of the consortium we are working with, with the syndicates, professional syndicates, industry leaders. So I don’t know Shafiq if I demonstrated enough how it works. So it’s basically fixed communication channels, collaboration platforms and events. And yeah, basically that’s it.

Chafic Caya: Thank you Maha. I think this is one strong point for IGF. So we have now one. One for Canada, one for Lebanon, not, you know. You talked about the innovation, about the capacity building. That makes me go to Charles as a technical community. In the region here, we open the doors with capacity building, with sharing expertise. In Canada, what the role of the technical community, how you engage with other multi-stakeholder groups?

Charles Noir: Yeah, that’s a great question. And I think the way that I approach it is we do two things, really. First, we think about ways that we can engage as an organization ourselves in the processes that we need to engage in. And then secondly, we think about ways that we can use our organization and our resources as a convening power to bring other stakeholders to the table that may be in the same community to start to understand where we have shared interests or concerns. And I’ll back up now and say from the first perspective, CIRA as an organization certainly monitors the policy space very closely. We have a team. I lead a team that looks at both the domestic and at the international space. We’re first and foremost looking to see where policy and trends are moving within the internet governance space or with internet legislation that may affect us as an operator, but also may affect the global internet in ways that we think may undermine the multi-stakeholder nature, bottom-up way that the internet is governed. So we have a framework. There’s three principles that we use. We’ll take any issue and look at it from a monitor, engage, and lead perspective. Very few things we lead. In this space, there’s a lot that we can be looking at as an organization, as a technical operator, whether that’s different visions of protocol, what’s coming out of that, coming in from the IETF, what’s coming in from a domestic legislation point of view. And we need to decide where is best our resources are spent. For example, we’ve invested a great deal of time and effort in participating in the cyber security legislation that’s before the parliament in Canada at the moment. We’ve done that because we believe that certain aspects of the legislation could be improved. And we do that because we also, our vision, our mandate, we believe, is to have a trusted internet for Canadians, and cyber security is a big part of that. So we really link into the domestic space where we feel that that’s most appropriate. In terms of convening stakeholders, for example, during the GDC process, we were very fortunate to have a strong working relationship, we have a regular working relationship with ISED. We also, with our partners at Global Affairs and our foreign ministry. During that experience, we reached out, we took on the role of reaching out as a technical operator to technical operators across the country, seeking their views on what was being proposed within the GDC process. And we took those back, and then we worked those up into a summary and provided that to our government, so that our government could bring that to the table and be able to identify the top three issues or so that as a technical community, collectively, we agreed on as being very important. So again, just to sum up, CIRA is in a unique position, I think, as a technical operator to be able to offer technical advice on legal policy issues that may not be necessarily front of mind for policymakers who are dealing with really difficult things like content regulation, really difficult social political issues. As a technical operator, we can bring a certain degree of expertise to that that others can’t. And at the same time, we have an opportunity to bring that community together within the country and connect that into a global system as well.

Chafic Caya: Thank you, Charles, really this is very interesting coming from the technical community who are involved in making policy or supporting making the policy, not making the policy. Because here in this region, this is a gap. And I look at Mirna from ESCOA, because I know ESCOA play an important role in supporting or doing research and papers to support making policies for the Arab region and in Lebanon. So Mirna, what are the challenges that ESCOA face in dealing with these topics at a national level in Lebanon?

Mirna El Hajj Barbar: Yes, actually, it is not an ESCOA challenge, it’s a general challenge, actually, implementing multistakeholder approach at national level or at regional level should take into consideration first of all the cultural environment and the local culture of the community. In Lebanon, also, there is some specificities for the environment. So some challenges were presented because or in light of the ongoing political security and economic crisis. And this is since 2017, actually, which have significantly shifted the national priorities away from initiatives like Internet governance, forums, discussions, dialogue, and something like that. The crisis in Lebanon created an environment where all stakeholders from all sectors, so from government, private sector, technical community, academia, students, everybody were driven to focus more on their immediate political and economic concerns. This challenge was, presented a big challenge on how, the question was on how we can align or adjust the discussions within the Internet Governance Forum in Lebanon with the urgent needs of the country. Also, we worked a lot to provide guidance or advices on how the digital inclusion and digital governance can remediate or can contribute to address some of the current problems at the national level or at the community level. Also there was another challenge regarding how to engage all groups. So mainly I would like to focus on one category which is very important because it forms actually our future, either in the dialogue or in the policy making, which is the group of students or youth. Actually in Lebanon, students were unfamiliar with Internet Governance concerns and lacked the proper engagement within the processes of Internet Governance at regional, global and of course at national level. And this is due to that our curriculum at the universities does not include any related the topics or something like that and here I would like to recommend that we need to introduce some topics of internet governance and policy dialogue policy making within the curriculum of at the university in order to get more students engaged. To remediate to this problem actually we thank a lot the technical community and the academia where we partnership a lot in order to provide capacity building workshops to provide necessary knowledge and skills to engage meaningfully youth into the IGF in Lebanon in particular and at the global and regional level.

Chafic Caya: Thank you Mirna so much for for this input and that makes the score two to technical community in both countries they are doing their well their job excellent. Thank you Mirna. I believe I will have a question from online.

Dana Cramer: We do have a question online from Zaina Bauharb in Lebanon saying Canada is a huge country compared to Lebanon how can the Canadian organizing committee include all voices from the different provinces and I’m assuming this would also be different between the Canadian IGF and the youth IGF in Canada but I’ll transfer it over to Charles I guess or David.

David Bedard: Sure thanks that’s a really good question and I’ll just from the government of Canada perspective I won’t lie it’s a challenge we have a vast country that is you know lots of rural and remote communities that are not as well connected as larger urban larger urban centers in southern provinces so It’s something that we are continually trying to improve. Technology always helps as communities start getting online and they’re more connected now than ever. So we definitely rely on technology to help us out. So all of our meetings and all of our strategies, our virtual participation is an option. And that’s a lesson learned from COVID. I think that everybody learned that lesson that we can operate more efficiently and more effectively and engage a lot of stakeholders when we have hybrid environments. So we absolutely always integrate that into our ongoing engagement. And also just connecting with larger stakeholders, we encourage them to also reach out to their networks and sort of create, cast a wider net for us. So we can’t be everywhere at once, but I think if we have good connections and good relationships with the folks that we do have, they can then take messages to their community as well and sort of bring their concerns to the table too.

Charles Noir: Just to echo a bit of David, in terms of the CIGF, yes, Canada is very large. We have a volunteer committee that organizes and I think you’ve heard Dr. Hossain talk about that. We rely very much on the community to come together from various parts of Canada to develop and to push forward ideas that we’re gonna take forward into an IGF for that year. We as CIRA are often looking as a national operator across from coast to coast, where we can reach out to folks that we may know that are interested or where we make calls to different parts of the country for participation and interest. On that same note, we. We have had the CIGF in different locations across the country, but this, as you alluded to, does take resources, time, and effort in a country the size of Canada, which can take six hours to get from one side to the other. Again, CIRA’s been fortunate enough to be able to support. We do rely very much on regional expertise and regional views. There’s really no sense of having a CIGF without having representation from different parts and communities across the country, and also from different backgrounds and different stakeholder groups. So we’re very conscious about trying to level that out. We’re not always able to do so. It is sometimes more centered around parts of the country than others, but we really work hard to reach out. Just really quickly, CIRA is very involved with also investing in communities across the country. That’s also under my remit. So we do take a percentage of the revenue that we take in, and we do put that back into community projects. Over the last 10 years, we put about $12 million back into the community, and that’s included also supporting youth IGF initiatives, as well as communities that are both in the north or in very rural conditions.

Chafic Caya: Thank you, Charles, for this. I believe that this is another point to be taken for the Lebanon IGF to create such an authority or organization like CIRA, so they can handle all this collaboration and coordination between the youth IGF and the academic, and to have some fellowship or funds to fund some people to join IGF. By the way, the main reason behind my colleagues, they didn’t attend this event, because there was no fund. And we know that we are volunteers. We are not paid for such volunteering activities. So I believe, yes, it’s important to have an organization to handle all these, even small details, but important details to make the national IGFs inclusive. I will go to Lebanon IGF, to Maha and Myrna. Talking about the technology tools as a tool to make this multi-stakeholder approach inclusive for everyone, in Lebanon at the IGF, how you use the technology to foster this inclusivity? I’ll start, Myrna or Maha, I give the floor for you. You heard the Canadian point of view, so please let us know how Lebanon IGF is dealing with this technology to get more engagement in the multi-stakeholder process. Myrna?

Maha Zouwayhed: Okay, so we always capitalize on the technical capabilities in Lebanon and the intellectual wealth, and we are so lucky for that. So technology played a transformative role in fostering either internal collaborations or international collaborations. In fact, it’s all what we have. And it proved very high value and very high return on investment. So first of all, technology enabled inclusivity and accessibility. This way we were able to reach everyone, everywhere, at any time, removing barriers. physical barriers or circumstantial barriers or cultural barriers. Today, with all the advanced conferencing and collaboration tools and AI, we also removed the language barriers. People of any ability and background are able to be involved and to enrich the collaboration. There’s also a technology enables knowledge sharing. We are able to create knowledge hubs and deploy collaboration tools to bring every input possible from every user group. It also enhances the stakeholders’ transparency. We deployed data-driven insights and interactive dashboards. We also utilized the national research and education networks on national level and on global level. This also availed many resources for the different players in the ecosystem. We also tried to foster innovation through deploying virtual innovation labs and open source platforms. And lastly, we also used the technology to scale our collaborations and initiatives nationally and globally. Mirna, did I forget something? Mirna?

Mirna El Hajj Barbar: Yes, yes. Excuse me. No, actually, I think you covered the… you covered the main pillars actually on how to capitalize on technologies in order to foster multi-stakeholder approach or very policy dialogue and also how to boost research and development within the technological labs and so on in order to serve these policies. From a broader actually aspect and within the work of ESCOA, I would like to say that ESCOA has always harnessed the technology to enhance collaboration, engagement across all stakeholders in the region, in the Arab region, at local level, within a community, small community, a specific community within a sector or also with the global forums. Actually, we use a lot everything related to virtual platforms, collaborative tools, surveys in order to actually gather all perspectives from different stakeholders. I would like to mention here, for example, the survey that ESCOA conducted during the first quarter of 2004 and this was actually to engage stakeholders and to overcome the geographical barrier for those stakeholders all over the region. in order to discuss very important topics related to digital cooperation related to the WSIS the plus 20 review and its linkages to GDC and this was perfectly conducted throughout all the region and we gather all the information we result and which is which which resulted with a very nice outcome document that was channeled to the UNGA in New York in order to actually transport or convey the voice of the Arab community toward these global processes. So the use of digital platforms supports a lot of the collaborative decision-making process. This is for me and for us we believe on that and it allow actually timely data-driven policy development. We should be on real time so we are all living on this digital space. We are in a one village, digital village. So I would like also to mention and here I will call up Shafi and Zeina and I don’t know if we have colleagues from the Arab IGF MAG but you remember that all the preparations for the Arab IGF 7 that will take place in Jordan between 23rd and the 26th of February 2015. All the preparations for the whole program went online. So this is a really fantastic tool. It is in our hand. We should use it to strengthen our regional and national collaboration and to engage and empower all stakeholders and minorities, all groups who are left behind. So this is all. Thank you.

Chafic Caya: Thank you, Vienna. Thank you so much. I think our 60 minutes as a discussion will come to the end, but before we open the floor to the audience and to the online participants, here just I want to give you one or two minutes for each speaker just to recap what’s the takeaway, how you see the way forward. David, please.

David Bedard: Yeah, thanks. I think for governments, I think it’s really important to implement both informal and formal processes for people to get involved in your preparatory processes for when you’re making decisions about Internet governance and when you’re developing positions for various meetings. And I think that’s I think governments can really, really, really benefit in thinking about a variety of stakeholders and creating forums that make it conducive for them to actually participate, making sure that the forums are diverse and making sure that you get out there and you meet people and you’re not just a big, scary bureaucracy, but you’re actually like a person that people can talk to and bring their concerns to.

Chafic Caya: Well stated. Charles, technical community.

Charles Noir: This thing that I would take away from this as a technical operator is there is, you know, we’re participating as a technical community within the technical community. So even within the technical community, for example, there’s a significant degree of players. with a number of different viewpoints. So no matter what group you’re coming from in terms of that multi-stakeholder position, there’s opportunities to organize, convene, and come together on issues that are very important. And from a technical perspective, for us, we’re very centered on critical internet resources, the domain name system, the root server, all of the aspects that make the plumbing of the internet work. It doesn’t mean that we’re not particularly interested in other things that are happening, but as our stakeholder group, we can bring the most to this discussion around those issues in terms of how the internet operates. And we can do that by convening both across Canada as technical operators, but we’re also doing so, as David mentioned, very internationally as a technical community for a technical, sorry, a technical coalition, technical community coalition for multi-stakeholders, I’m sorry, TCCM. Great. TCCM.global. Anyways, my point is that we can come together as operators, we don’t need to come together as all operators, and the same thing for governments, academics, civil society.

Chafic Caya: Thank you, Charles. Mirna, one minute to wrap up.

Mirna El Hajj Barbar: Yes, actually, thank you for this very interesting discussion. In conclusion, I would like to say that the ESCQA contribution to advancing internet governance at regional and the local level highlight its commitment to fostering and implementing global principles at national and local levels. So looking ahead, actually, ESCQA will continue. to champion these models and all its initiatives, such as Arab IGF, other initiatives. And here we have many initiatives that we would like to invite you to contribute to and to be engaged and involved in these tracks, such as, for example, you are all invited to participate to the Arab IGF 7 next February 2025 in Amman. Also, we developed this year the Arab Digital Agenda, which is actually a general framework covering all sectors from strategies to building the ICT sector to entrepreneurship, digital transformation, and so on. And we are open to have all stakeholders engage and in a collaborative way, in order to implement some of the goals and the targets, but also to expand its scope to cover many other sectors within its evolution towards edition number two. Thank you. We also just one final remark, Shafiq. Our track on regional collaboration regarding the WSIS plus 20 review, as well as the GDC implementation processes. So we have our platforms, we have our series of consultations, and we invite you all to collaborate and be engaged in these tracks. Thank you.

Chafic Caya: Thank you, and this is really important to get the national and regional voices to the global scene. And I believe ESCO and the United Nations, they are the right venue to engage and get all these feedbacks, and then. share it with the global IG processes, GDC, WSIS Plus 20, and the global IGF. Maha, one minute, what you have in mind at the end, as a conclusion?

Maha Zouwayhed: Well, my takeaway that technology, Internet, and governance, these are all public interests. So naturally, it cannot bring value unless every representative group of the public is engaged in it in order to have inclusive solutions and inclusive development and collective growth. Looking forward, well, it has been always the best thing we do. If we keep on doing what we know, we will never evolve. So the best thing we can do to evolve is to keep working together and involving as much stakeholder groups as it takes to do real effective solutions and move forward.

Chafic Caya: Thank you, Maha. Dana, the floor is yours. Any online participants, online comments, feedbacks?

Dana Cramer: We do have one from Rudy Shusani saying, being Canadian and Lebanese, how can we open bridges in between both IGFs for future collaborations?

Chafic Caya: Excellent question, and I believe Charles came this morning to me with the first initiative. I will let you talk about it, Charles.

Charles Noir: Right, well, so thanks for the question. I think in between these big meetings and events, it’s important to identify first who it is that you want to talk to. For example, CIRA is certainly open to engaging in dialogue around the WSIS Plus 20, if that’s of interest, or around the domain name system in general, anything technical that refers to country code top-level domains, we’re very happy to do so. Additionally, I would offer that we’re certainly also able to point in the general direction of folks within our technical community in Canada that would be open for dialogue at any time, and we certainly reach out to folks like Shafiq and others to come and be involved in various programs that we’re looking at setting over the next, I would say, eight months, particularly around WSIS Plus 20. Some of those are more invitation-based, others are more open, but a good starting point is to reach out to us individually, and so we can get people connected both at the working level and as well in the executive space.

Chafic Caya: Thank you, Charles. I believe that Sabrina is noting all this as a reporter for the session, so yeah, this will be an excellent action, call for action, coming from the, from CIRA or the Canadian IGF. Dana?

Dana Cramer: We have a question from Zainab Al-Hab, Lebanon. My question is to David. My GAC colleague, is it relevant using the national IGF platform to promote the new GTLDs program?

David Bedard: So the national IGF space for CIGF for the new GTLDs? Yeah, okay. Yeah, I think, I mean, to promote, I mean, I think it’s important that people know that it exists and that it’s coming up, and we think it’s gonna really, it’s gonna be a change space in terms of what’s gonna happen at ICANN, and it certainly is a priority. It’s a priority for government. I know that lots of folks are tracking it, so it’s certainly, we use venues, we engage very much with the CIGF, the youth IGF now, so I mean it’s certainly a space that we can bring our priorities to, and we can discuss our priorities with stakeholders, and priorities that I can, like the new round is certainly one of those priorities, so yeah, it’s certainly something that we can speak to, yeah.

Chafic Caya: So, we don’t have any other participation or feedback from online, so I know that now it’s lunchtime, and I know that people now they are hungry after a long day, you know, we give this 30 minutes in case we have any online participation or Q&A, but I am happy to give you your liberty if it’s done, and we don’t have any comment or feedback from online. Nothing? Perfect, because we did a lot, I think what we did in 70 minutes will take us the whole next year to, if we want to execute it, so once again, I would like to thank CIRA, David, Charles, I would like to thank Sabrina online for her efforts and for the follow-up, IGF Lebanon, Mirna, Maha, and the Secretary Zainab, really I appreciate your efforts, and hopefully next time you will be with us here on site. Thanks Dana for your support and online moderation, it’s really, it’s not an easy job to follow up on all this, and once again, as you can see, even though Lebanon is a developing country, Canada is a developed country, but both countries are working in multi-stakeholder environment with different approaches, but these approaches works, taking in consideration the environment that we or the stakeholders live and the challenges that we are facing every day. Thank you once again. Thank you so much. Thank you.

Agreement Points

Importance of multistakeholder approach in Internet Governance

David Bedard

Charles Noir

Maha Zouwayhed

Mirna El Hajj Barbar

Dr. Hosein Badran

Government as convener of stakeholder input

Technical community providing expertise on policy issues

Academia fostering innovation and student engagement

Regional organizations supporting national initiatives

Importance of inclusive stakeholder representation

All speakers emphasized the importance of involving diverse stakeholders in Internet Governance processes, including government, technical community, academia, and civil society.

Role of technology in fostering inclusivity

David Bedard

Maha Zouwayhed

Mirna El Hajj Barbar

Virtual participation enabling broader engagement

Technology removing barriers to participation

Digital platforms supporting collaborative decision-making

Speakers agreed that technology plays a crucial role in enabling broader participation and overcoming geographical, cultural, and other barriers in Internet Governance processes.

Similar Viewpoints

Both speakers emphasized the importance of collaboration between government and technical community in shaping Internet Governance policies.

David Bedard

Charles Noir

Government as convener of stakeholder input

Technical community providing expertise on policy issues

Both speakers highlighted the need for greater engagement of students and youth in Internet Governance processes, particularly through academic initiatives.

Maha Zouwayhed

Mirna El Hajj Barbar

Academia fostering innovation and student engagement

Lack of student familiarity with internet governance

Unexpected Consensus

Challenges in implementing multistakeholder models

David Bedard

Mirna El Hajj Barbar

Chafic Caya

Engaging diverse voices across a large country

Aligning internet governance with national priorities during crises

Need for sustainable funding mechanisms

Despite coming from different contexts (Canada and Lebanon), speakers agreed on the challenges of implementing multistakeholder models, including geographical barriers, national crises, and funding issues.

Overall Assessment

Summary

The main areas of agreement included the importance of multistakeholder approaches, the role of technology in fostering inclusivity, and the challenges in implementing multistakeholder models across different contexts.

Consensus level

There was a high level of consensus among speakers on the fundamental principles of multistakeholder Internet Governance. This consensus suggests a shared understanding of best practices across different national contexts, which could facilitate international collaboration and knowledge sharing in the field of Internet Governance.

Different Viewpoints

Approach to stakeholder engagement

David Bedard

Charles Noir

Government as convener of stakeholder input

Technical community providing expertise on policy issues

While both speakers emphasize the importance of stakeholder engagement, they differ in their approaches. David Bedard focuses on the government’s role as a convener, bringing stakeholders together, while Charles Noir emphasizes the technical community’s role in providing expertise on policy issues.

Unexpected Differences

Focus on student engagement

Maha Zouwayhed

Mirna El Hajj Barbar

Academia fostering innovation and student engagement

Lack of student familiarity with internet governance

While both speakers are from Lebanon, they present contrasting views on student engagement in internet governance. Maha highlights AUB’s efforts to engage students, while Mirna points out the general lack of student familiarity with the topic in Lebanon. This unexpected difference highlights potential disparities in academic approaches within the same country.

Overall Assessment

summary

The main areas of disagreement revolve around approaches to stakeholder engagement, the role of technology in fostering inclusivity, and the level of student involvement in internet governance.

difference_level

The level of disagreement among speakers is relatively low, with most differences stemming from varying contexts (developed vs. developing countries) and specific roles (government, technical community, academia). These differences provide valuable insights into the diverse challenges and approaches in implementing multistakeholder internet governance models across different regions.

Partial Agreements

Both speakers agree on the importance of using technology to enhance participation and decision-making in internet governance. However, they differ in their specific approaches and contexts, with David focusing on national engagement in Canada and Mirna emphasizing regional collaboration in the Arab world.

David Bedard

Mirna El Hajj Barbar

Virtual participation enabling broader engagement

Digital platforms supporting collaborative decision-making

Similar Viewpoints

Both speakers emphasized the importance of collaboration between government and technical community in shaping Internet Governance policies.

David Bedard

Charles Noir

Government as convener of stakeholder input

Technical community providing expertise on policy issues

Both speakers highlighted the need for greater engagement of students and youth in Internet Governance processes, particularly through academic initiatives.

Maha Zouwayhed

Mirna El Hajj Barbar

Academia fostering innovation and student engagement

Lack of student familiarity with internet governance

Key Takeaways

Both developed (Canada) and developing (Lebanon) countries can implement multistakeholder internet governance approaches, though with different methods suited to their contexts

Government plays an important role as a convener to bring diverse stakeholders together

Technical communities can provide valuable expertise to inform policy discussions

Academia is crucial for fostering innovation and engaging students in internet governance

Regional organizations like ESCWA play a key supporting role for national internet governance initiatives

Technology and virtual platforms are essential for enabling inclusive participation across geographies

International collaboration and knowledge sharing between countries is valuable for advancing internet governance

Resolutions and Action Items

CIRA offered to engage in dialogue with Lebanese stakeholders around WSIS+20 and technical domain name system issues

Participants were invited to contribute to upcoming Arab IGF 7 in February 2025 in Amman

Stakeholders were encouraged to engage with ESCWA’s Arab Digital Agenda initiative

Unresolved Issues

How to sustainably fund national IGF initiatives, especially in developing countries

How to effectively engage students and youth in internet governance processes

How to align internet governance priorities with pressing national issues during times of crisis

Suggested Compromises

Using both formal and informal engagement processes to balance structure with flexibility in stakeholder participation

Leveraging larger stakeholders to help reach and include smaller organizations and voices in the process

Balancing in-person and virtual participation methods to maximize inclusivity while maintaining relationship-building

We really see ourselves as a convener, especially from the government, to get stakeholders around the table to hear their concerns, hear their priorities, and figure out ways that we can integrate some of those concerns and priorities into our work as we participate in various international forum like ICANN or the IGF or the ITU.

speaker

David Bedard

reason

This comment provides insight into how the Canadian government approaches multi-stakeholder engagement, emphasizing their role as a facilitator rather than a top-down decision maker.

impact

It set the tone for discussing concrete practices of stakeholder engagement and prompted others to share their approaches to inclusivity.

CIRA as an organization certainly monitors the policy space very closely. We have a team. I lead a team that looks at both the domestic and at the international space. We’re first and foremost looking to see where policy and trends are moving within the internet governance space or with internet legislation that may affect us as an operator, but also may affect the global internet in ways that we think may undermine the multi-stakeholder nature, bottom-up way that the internet is governed.

speaker

Charles Noir

reason

This comment highlights the proactive role that technical operators can play in policy discussions, bridging technical expertise with policy implications.

impact

It expanded the discussion to consider how different stakeholders can contribute unique perspectives to internet governance, beyond just participating in forums.

Actually in Lebanon, students were unfamiliar with Internet Governance concerns and lacked the proper engagement within the processes of Internet Governance at regional, global and of course at national level. And this is due to that our curriculum at the universities does not include any related the topics or something like that and here I would like to recommend that we need to introduce some topics of internet governance and policy dialogue policy making within the curriculum of at the university in order to get more students engaged.

speaker

Mirna El Hajj Barbar

reason

This comment identifies a critical gap in education and engagement of youth in internet governance, particularly in developing countries.

impact

It shifted the conversation to consider long-term strategies for building capacity and engaging future generations in internet governance discussions.

Technology played a transformative role in fostering either internal collaborations or international collaborations. In fact, it’s all what we have. And it proved very high value and very high return on investment. So first of all, technology enabled inclusivity and accessibility. This way we were able to reach everyone, everywhere, at any time, removing barriers.

speaker

Maha Zouwayhed

reason

This comment emphasizes the crucial role of technology in enabling inclusive participation, especially in challenging contexts like Lebanon.

impact

It prompted a deeper discussion on how technology can be leveraged to overcome geographical, economic, and cultural barriers to participation in internet governance.

Overall Assessment

These key comments shaped the discussion by highlighting diverse approaches to multi-stakeholder engagement across different contexts. They broadened the conversation from formal processes to include proactive policy monitoring, education and capacity building, and leveraging technology for inclusivity. The discussion evolved from describing current practices to identifying challenges and proposing solutions for more effective and inclusive internet governance, particularly emphasizing the importance of engaging youth and overcoming barriers in developing countries.

How can the Lebanese IGF implement coordination meetings with the Ministry of ICT before major international meetings?

speaker

Chafic Caya

explanation

This was identified as a key takeaway from the Canadian approach to ensure national priorities are represented in international forums.

How can Lebanon create an organization similar to CIRA to handle collaboration and coordination between youth IGF, academia, and provide funding for IGF participation?

speaker

Chafic Caya

explanation

This was suggested as a way to improve inclusivity and support for the Lebanon IGF, addressing the lack of funding that prevented some participants from attending events.

How can internet governance topics be introduced into university curricula in Lebanon?

speaker

Mirna El Hajj Barbar

explanation

This was recommended as a way to engage more students and youth in internet governance processes and discussions.

How can bridges be opened between Canadian and Lebanese IGFs for future collaborations?

speaker

Rudy Shusani (online participant)

explanation

This question aims to explore potential partnerships and knowledge sharing between the two national IGFs.

Is it relevant to use the national IGF platform to promote the new gTLDs program?

speaker

Zainab Al-Hab (online participant)

explanation

This question seeks to understand how national IGFs can be used to raise awareness about important ICANN initiatives like the new gTLD program.

Summary

This discussion focused on the importance of multilingualism on the internet and the challenges of implementing universal acceptance (UA) of internationalized domain names (IDNs) and email addresses. Government representatives from India, Egypt, and the UK presented case studies on their efforts to promote multilingualism online. Key themes included the technical readiness but slow uptake of IDNs, the need for greater awareness and confidence among users, and the critical role of universal acceptance in enabling a truly multilingual internet experience.

Speakers highlighted that while technical solutions for IDNs exist, challenges remain in widespread implementation and user adoption. The discussion emphasized that universal acceptance is essential for digital inclusion, as it allows people to navigate the internet in their native languages. Participants noted that governments can play a crucial role by leading by example, incorporating UA readiness into procurement processes, and promoting awareness.

The conversation expanded to include the importance of accessibility for people with disabilities and the need to consider sign languages in multilingual internet discussions. Experts stressed that the issue has evolved from a purely technical problem to a social policy challenge requiring collaboration across sectors. The discussion highlighted the roles of various stakeholders, including governments, big tech companies, universities, and DNS participants, in advancing universal acceptance.

Participants agreed that framing the issue in terms of digital inclusion could help broaden understanding and support. The discussion concluded with calls for continued collaboration, capacity building, and integration of internationalization concepts into educational curricula to equip future professionals with necessary skills for implementing a truly multilingual internet.

Keypoints

Major discussion points:

– The importance of multilingualism and internationalized domain names (IDNs) for digital inclusion and reaching the next billion internet users

– Technical challenges around universal acceptance of IDNs and internationalized email addresses

– The need for governments to promote and implement multilingual internet services

– The role of various stakeholders (governments, tech companies, universities, etc.) in advancing universal acceptance

– Moving beyond technical solutions to address policy, awareness, and implementation challenges

Overall purpose/goal:

The discussion aimed to highlight government efforts to promote multilingualism on the internet, share case studies, and explore ways to advance universal acceptance of internationalized domain names and email addresses to create a more inclusive internet.

Tone:

The tone was collaborative and solution-oriented throughout. Participants shared challenges but focused on opportunities and ways different stakeholders could work together to make progress. There was a sense of urgency about the importance of the issue, balanced with recognition of the complexity and need for sustained effort from multiple parties.

Speakers

– Owen Fletcher: Moderator

– Jaisha Wray: Associate Administrator, Office of International Affairs at NTIA

– Pradeep Kumar Verma: Scientist D, Government of India’s Ministry of Electronics and IT

– Nigel Hickson: Senior Advisor on Internet Governance and the Domain Name System, UK Department for Science, Innovation, and Technology

– Manal Ismail: Chief Expert for Internet Policies, National Telecom Regulatory Authority, Egypt

Additional speakers:

– Teresa: Representative from ICANN

– Keith Drazek: Representative from Verisign

– Sabina: From the dynamic coalition of accessibility and disability, Mexico

– Sadhvi Saran: Representative from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

– Ram Mohan: Chief Strategy Officer at Identity Digital

– Anil Kumar-Jain: Chair of USG in ICANN

– Jen Chung: Representative from DotAsia organization

– Sarmad: Role not specified, likely associated with ICANN

Multilingualism and Universal Acceptance on the Internet: A Comprehensive Discussion

This report summarizes a discussion on the importance of multilingualism on the internet and the challenges of implementing universal acceptance (UA) of internationalized domain names (IDNs) and email addresses. Government representatives from India, Egypt, and the UK presented case studies on their efforts to promote multilingualism online, while other stakeholders contributed insights on technical, policy, and social aspects of the issue.

Key Themes and Agreements

1. Importance of Multilingualism for Digital Inclusion

Speakers strongly agreed on the critical role of multilingualism in achieving digital inclusion and enabling meaningful internet access for diverse populations. Jaisha Wray, Associate Administrator at NTIA, emphasized that multilingualism is essential for digital inclusion and meaningful connectivity. Ram Mohan, Chief Strategy Officer at Identity Digital, argued that language is a fundamental requirement for internet access and digital services. Manal Ismail, from Egypt’s National Telecom Regulatory Authority, highlighted that a multilingual internet provides a gateway for the next billion users.

2. Technical Progress and Implementation Challenges

While technical solutions for IDNs exist, challenges remain in widespread implementation and user adoption. IDNs are functionally operational at the DNS level, but there is a need to focus on the application layer for full UA implementation. Ram Mohan emphasized that the focus should shift from technical issues to social policy and implementation aspects of UA.

3. Government Initiatives and Role

Multiple speakers highlighted government-led initiatives to promote multilingualism and universal acceptance in their respective countries. Governments can play a crucial role by leading by example, incorporating UA readiness into procurement processes, and promoting awareness.

4. Multi-stakeholder Collaboration

Participants emphasized the importance of involving multiple stakeholders in UA implementation, including governments, big tech companies, universities, and DNS participants such as registries and registrars. Jaisha Wray highlighted the necessity of multi-stakeholder collaboration for policy development.

5. Education and Capacity Building

Speakers agreed on the importance of integrating UA concepts into education and professional development. There was a call for better integration of internationalization concepts in university curricula and the inclusion of UA readiness requirements in tenders and contracts.

Case Studies

1. India: Pradeep Kumar Verma from India’s Ministry of Electronics and IT discussed the launch of the Bhasanet portal to promote multilingual internet. He also mentioned the MGMD project, which aims to create multilingual domain names for government websites.

2. Egypt: Manal Ismail shared Egypt’s experiences with IDN ccTLD and their work on UA deployment in government projects. She highlighted the challenges faced with right-to-left scripts like Arabic and the importance of UA for digital inclusion.

3. United Kingdom: Nigel Hickson from the UK’s Department for Science, Innovation, and Technology discussed the country’s recognition of the importance of providing government services in multiple languages. He also mentioned the UK’s experiences with IDNs in Wales.

Thought-Provoking Insights

1. Ram Mohan suggested reframing UA and IDN discussions in terms of digital inclusion to increase understanding and adoption. He also called for toolkits to help policymakers implement language services.

2. Nigel Hickson emphasized the role of governments in ensuring equitable access to public services across languages.

3. Sarmad identified a gap in university education regarding internationalization in software development and called for capacity development in this area.

4. Sabina from Mexico highlighted the importance of including sign language and considerations for people with disabilities in the multilingual internet discussion.

5. Sadhvi from the ITU shared information about their work on multilingualization of IDNs.

6. Anil Kumar-Jain emphasized the role of big tech companies, universities, and DNS participants in implementing UA.

Conclusion

The discussion highlighted the complex interplay of technical, policy, and social factors in achieving a truly multilingual internet. While progress has been made in technical solutions, the focus is shifting towards implementation, policy development, and user adoption. Multi-stakeholder collaboration, government leadership, and integration of UA concepts into education emerged as key strategies for advancing universal acceptance and creating a more inclusive digital world.

As the internet continues to evolve, addressing these challenges will be crucial for ensuring that the next billion users can access and navigate the digital landscape in their own languages, thereby fostering greater digital inclusion and equitable access to information and services worldwide.

Owen Fletcher: from Jayshia Ray, our Associate Administrator within my office, the Office of International Affairs at NTIA. Thank you. We’ve co-organized this Open Forum with our colleagues from the governments of Egypt, India, and the United Kingdom. I will be moderating and introducing our speakers. We are going to start with opening remarks from Jayshia ray, our Associate Administrator within my office, the Office of International Affairs at NTIA. Thank you.

Jaisha Wray: Thank you for that introduction, Owen, and thank you all for joining us either in person or as a part of our online audience. Also thank you to our host, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and to the IGF Secretariat for supporting today’s event. Everyone online deserves access to a digital sphere that is diverse, inclusive, and that serves their needs. In order to create this digital sphere and enable meaningful connectivity, we must acknowledge the fundamental role that language plays on the internet. We also know that additional work to improve multilingualism on the internet is critically needed. There are over 7,000 languages and dialects used globally, but only about 10 of those languages have any substantial online presence. The multi-stakeholder community has developed technical solutions to enable a more multilingual internet. One goal of our discussion today is to highlight that governments can do more to advance the implementation of those solutions. Now a number of challenges must be addressed in order to reach our goal of a truly multilingual internet. An important place to start is ensuring that everyone can navigate the internet in their own language. But to do this, we need domain names in all languages, and we need those domain names to work in the same way that English domain names do now. This means software applications must treat all top-level domains equally, regardless of the script they are in, and this is really the basis of the term universal acceptance. The multi-stakeholder internet community must work together to build policy that encourages the universal acceptance of all domain names and email addresses, namely those that are not based in the Latin alphabet character set. In addition to the issue of universal acceptance, we need a better understanding of the market dynamics impacting the uptake of internationalized domain names, or IDNs. As we continue to pursue progress towards a multilingual internet, we must consider where the technical solutions are succeeding and where more work is needed. Finally, local language content, the delivery of which is enabled by IDNs and universal acceptance, is also a key element of the multilingual internet and requires its own policy interventions. During today’s Open Forum, government representatives from India, Egypt, and the United Kingdom will present on their activities to promote multilingualism on the internet, including through efforts to promote universal acceptance, the uptake of internationalized domain names, and local content development. During last year’s IGF in Kyoto, NTIA held a workshop on digital inclusion and multilingualism on the internet. We recognized the important role of domain names in promoting linguistic diversity online, the connection between meaningful connectivity and multilingualism, and that universal acceptance is really a foundational requirement for a multilingual internet. This year, by focusing on the role that governments can play in the pursuit of internet multilingualism, our intent is that this Open Forum continues to build momentum and raise awareness of this critical issue. We aim to highlight the lessons learned so far and look ahead to next steps. We’d also like to recognize the significant and ongoing work of industry, relevant technical and international organizations, and the TLD operator community in advancing IDNs and universal acceptance. I’ll also note that many of the folks working on these issues are with us here today. We are very pleased that you are here and actively contributing to the discussions, and we’d really encourage you to engage in the discussion following the presentations because we are interested in your reflections on government efforts to raise awareness and accelerate adoption. Through the efforts of all of us and all stakeholders, improved multilingualism on the internet will provide a gateway to the next billion of internet users. With that, I will turn it back to Owen Fletcher, our moderator today, who will introduce our case study presenters. Thank you. Owen Fletcher Thank you, Jaysha. I’m hitting the next slide button. We will have three case studies presented. Our first one is from Mr. Pradeep Kumar Verma, Scientist D from the Government of India’s Ministry of Electronics and IT. Pradeep, please go ahead. Pradeep Kumar Verma Thank you, Owen.

Pradeep Kumar Verma: I think I’m audible. So I will be presenting two case studies from India. So one is on the Bhasanet portal, and one is Mera Gaon and Mera Dharohar, known as MGMD. So first of all, I will say about India’s linguistic and cultural heritage and strength So India has a 22 scheduled official languages that covers 15 IDNs, CCTLD, which is under 11 scripts. And the thing is, all the domain names in IDNs have been started for all these 22 official languages. So first of all, I would like to say that under these 22 scheduled languages, they follow one-to-many and many-to-many relations. That means one script may cover eight languages, even one language may cover two scripts. So that is the diversity and the strength of the Indian languages. So just I will take a tour on the Global Universal Acceptance Day. So in 2023, India took a lead in official launching of Global UADA on March 28. After that, on regional UADA during 2024, India has launched Bhasanet portal. So this portal basically promotes the multilingual internet and enhances the UA acceptability in India. So this initiative basically equips the developers and the other technical communities with the necessary tools and the processes, documents, and how this would go with the universal acceptance. So these are some highlights of the Bhasanet portal. So this portal covers all 22 languages. This portal itself covers all 22 domain names. And so the content part of this portal covers all 22 scheduled languages. So basically, this portal covers the SOPs for the technical communities, for the startups, frequently asked questions, the UA code samples that is basically in the Java, Python, and other languages. And we also provide the ticketing system for the support if anyone wants to come and develop their portal in their native language for their IDN. So he can just raise a ticket and one-to-one he can communicate with the linguistic expert and the expert who is working in the IDN field. So this is a snapshot of the portal. Next I will come to the Mera Gaon Meri Dharohar, MGMD. So it’s My Village and My Heritage. So under this project and with the collaboration of the Ministry of Culture, Government of India, we have provided 0.6 million villages with their digital identities. So each village has their digital identity, their domain name in .in as well as .bharat. So this is covered under the zone mgmt.in and mgmt.bharat and their respective languages. So this is the important parameters. So each domain name will have under .in and .bharat. So this is an interactive village, culture, village, tourism, all the things will be displayed under this portal. So this covers significantly the inclusivity from the diverse society of India. So this also bridge the linguistic barrier. So this is an example of the IDN domains we have formed basically for the government website. So what the government services are there in the displayed in the government website. So one can browse with their Hindi IDN domain names.

Owen Fletcher: Thank you. Thank you very much. Now I’m disconnecting. No. OK, thank you, Pradeep. Our next case study will be presented by Ms. Manal Ismail from the government of Egypt’s National Telecom Regulatory Authority, where she is the chief expert for internet policies. Please go ahead, Manal. Thank you. Sorry, Manal, please hold. We can’t hear you. We’re trying to fix it. Manal, try saying something maybe. I still don’t hear Manal, no. Sorry, everyone could hear Nigel, right? No? OK. We can’t hear Nigel. Nigel is muted now. Oh, Nigel’s muted now. Nigel, can you try saying something for me? No? No, OK. Working on it, sorry. Nigel and Manal, could you try speaking again? Still no. No. OK. Thank you for your patience. Our tech support is still working on it. Please try again, Manal and Nigel. Not hearing Manal. Nigel, can you try, too, just in case? Also no. So I think we’re going. Can I make a few remarks? So while we wait for tech support to, thanks, everyone. So tech support will keep trying to resolve this. Manal and Nigel, we will come back to you. We’re going out of order just because we don’t want everyone waiting too long. So we can start with some other people. Can you hear me? No? Try saying something again? Hello? OK, Nigel, could you mute for me? Owen, can you hear me? Yes, and now with one of you muted and one of you not, I think we’re on track. Thank you for everyone’s patience. We’ll go back to our normal program. And Manal, I think we’re ready for you. Thank you. Great.

Manal Ismail: Thank you very much, Owen. I was just saying that I regret not being able to join you in person. But thanks for the opportunity to speak. And thanks to Saudi Arabia for hosting this year’s IGF and availing remote participation. So with one third of the world population still being offline, we need to think about the reasons and how to make sure that technology is really serving humanity in that respect. One important reason for this is language being an access barrier to those who can only communicate in their mother tongue. And with digital inclusion being a top priority, a truly multilingual internet becomes a necessity to have the next billion internet users connect meaningfully to the internet. To enable multilingual access to the internet, we have to work on all its components equally. So namely, the multilingual local content, internationalized domain names, email address internationalization, and universal acceptance, as Jaisha already mentioned in her opening remarks as well. So universal acceptance is the missing piece of the puzzle needed to complement ongoing efforts on IDN delegations and creation of multilingual online content. It’s needed to ensure a smooth, seamless, end-to-end multilingual experience on the internet that allows users around the world to navigate the internet entirely in their local languages. Universal acceptance aims at making all valid domain names and email addresses work seamlessly in all internet applications, devices, and systems, irrespective of their script, language, or length. And by work here, we mean that internet applications and systems must accept, validate, store, process, and display all domain names in a predictable and consistent manner. We have now more than 1,200 new GTLDs, around 100 of which are IDNs. And we have around 60 IDN country code top-level domains. We have mailboxes now that are no longer just an ASCII. And we have another round of new GTLDs on its way. This makes universal acceptance a fundamental requirement for unleashing the full potential of IDNs and internationalized email addresses and providing a truly multilingual and digitally inclusive internet. I would like to start by providing quick highlights from the recently published URID IDN world. report 2024, which provides insights into the status and trends of the global market of IDNs. An estimated 85% of ccTLDs and an estimated 41% of gTLDs currently support IDN registrations. Yet, while a significant number of ccTLDs, 85%, offer IDN registrations, the actual number of IDN registrations remains relatively low at 1.2% of the global domain name market, highlighting the limited penetration of IDNs. Additionally, they are also concentrated among only a handful of ccTLDs. Moreover, despite the apparent availability of IDN registrations and how they seem to be supported, well supported, the actual uptake of IDNs has been remarkably slow over the years. In fact, per the URED report, only three ccTLDs witnessed notable growth in their IDN registrations over the past year, while the majority of ccTLDs experienced minimal or no growth at all, with 19 ccTLDs reporting contraction in their total IDN registrations. Moving to our case in Egypt, and from our experience with Egypt’s IDN ccTLD, it really aligns with the findings of the URED report. So, Egypt IDN ccTLD.Masr was among the first batch of IDN delegations in 2010, along with Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Russia. And upon launch, we reached around 40 or 50% of the .eg registrations in just a few weeks. Yet, over the years, we suffered very low renewal rates, resulting in significant reduction in the number of registered domain names under the IDN ccTLD, and we currently stand at 1 tenth the number we started with in 2010. The main reason for this very low renewal rate under Egypt IDN ccTLD was identified to be the malfunctioning of internationalized email addresses, which is attributed to the lack of wide deployment of universal acceptance. So, even if users successfully register an IDN, they may encounter issues when attempting to use that domain name in email addresses, some web browsers, or other online services, leading to frustration and confusion of end users. It’s also related to compatibility issues with many existing software application systems, which were designed with the assumption that domain names would only contain ASCII characters, and sometimes even with the assumption of certain lengths. Consequently, users may opt for ASCII domain names to avoid potential compatibility issues, even if an IDN would better represent their language or culture identity. Regarding the wide deployment of universal acceptance, there are, of course, challenges, and this includes the need to aware and convince both the supply and the demand sides at the same time. There is no appealing product to attract demand, and there is no pressing demand to trigger supply. So, it’s a really unique situation. Also, universal acceptance needs to be very widely deployed before it starts to bear its fruits. And another reason could be that users with no language barrier finds that everything is working fine, and those who are offline because of language barrier, they are taking it for granted and they are not aware there is a solution to this problem. Another thing could be that the business model itself may not be pressing or that appealing today, but of course the counter argument to this is that the deployment is straightforward, it’s future-proof, it provides a market edge, and is expected to trigger demand and open up a new market. And finally, it’s a multi-stakeholder issue, so it has technical, strategic, commercial, and cultural dimensions, and hence it needs the buy-in of all the relevant stakeholders. Focusing more on why governments should care on working on universal acceptance, readiness, and internet multilingualism, this of course serves the government’s efforts and objectives on digital transformation, as well as digital and social inclusion, preserving culture, and advancing digital identity, ensuring government online services are reaching citizens nationwide, stimulating growth of local IDNs market and online multilingual content by increasing competition and fostering innovation, providing more customer choice, availing internationalized email addresses which have been hindering the uptake of IDNs for some time now, and driving the use of local IDN domains and email addresses as opposed to ASCII ones hosted off borders. It also serves government efforts in increasing internet penetration and bridging the digital divide, promoting digital literacy and facilitating meaningful access to the internet, and last but not least, acquiring future proof systems and applications. So in Egypt, we’ve been trying to promote awareness on universal acceptance and work on its deployment. We have started with the government as key stakeholder and main driver for government digital transformation projects. We are trying to align with the governmental projects and initiatives, reaching out to software companies to get them involved, setting pilots for proof of concept, and also working with academia on graduation projects, conducting hackathons on universal acceptance, and holding hands-on and technical training also on deployment of internationalized email addresses. We’re also trying to reach out to survey, identify, and prioritize platforms and tools that are most commonly used in order to assess their UA readiness, and accordingly organize engagement activities with the relevant stakeholders. Beyond that, it’s great to see multilingualism, universality, and meaningful access to the internet on global agendas, including the UN SDGs, Sustainable Development Goals, ITU, UNESCO, and most recently, the Pact of the Future and Global Digital Contact. So we look forward to working with everyone on availing a truly multilingual internet experience as we owe it to those who need it. Apologies if I exceeded the 10 minutes, and I’ll leave it at this and pass the floor back to you, Owen, and look forward to the rest of our discussion. Thank you.

Owen Fletcher: Thank you, Manal. I think we’ve had two very interesting presentations so far with lots of ideas that we can dig into in the discussion session. Before that, let’s have our third case study coming from Nigel Hickson of the United Kingdom, where he is Senior Advisor on Internet Governance and the Domain Name System for the Department for Science, Innovation, and Technology. Nigel, go ahead. Yes, yes, and good afternoon. Thank you. Thank you, Owen. Can you hear me? I

Nigel Hickson: suppose I ought to ask that, given the earlier problems. It’s all good. Well, it’s an absolute delight to take part in this session. I would like Manal to apologise for not being there. I very much wanted to be in Riyadh, but unfortunately not on this occasion. I’ve been a great advocate and fan, if you like, of the UNIGF, and I’m delighted it’s in Saudi Arabia. It’s such an important year for the UNIGF, and I hope everyone is having a great time. I’m sure you are. I’ve managed to listen to a number of sessions, and there seems to be a lot of enthusiasm. enthusiasm in the hallways, so to speak, and thank you also to the US NTIA for putting on this session. I think it’s incredibly timely. And as Manal said, this is an issue that is, if you like, rising up the international agenda and has become, if you like, more prominent as it should be than perhaps it was a few years ago. And perhaps in our discussions to follow this session, we can reflect on what more can be done to promote the importance of multilingualism on the internet and the problems of universal acceptance. So I’m going to be fairly short in my presentation on behalf of the UK government. The UK has always, if you like, recognised the importance of multilingualism. We have a very diverse multilingual population in the UK and in terms of citizens and residents applying for government services, we recognise the importance of providing not only government services in very many languages so people can understand what they’re applying for and what they’re entitled for in terms of public benefits and schooling and hospitalisation and lots of other things connected with the health service, but also that they can use their own scripts. And so it is very important, and I believe it’s important for all countries. And therefore, you know, in addition to the technical work that we have to do to ensure that we can use international domain names and scripts in non-Latin characters, we also have to ensure that our citizens and residents and other people know that they can use different languages and different scripts in their communication with government. I’ll come on to that in a second, but I think that is an area where we really do need to concentrate. In the UK, it’s been a very much of an incremental approach in terms of ensuring that for government services there is universal acceptance, that people can use their own characters and they can use international domain names. This has been a, if you like, responsibility of our UK Cabinet Office who are responsible, who have a large team responsible for gov.uk. Gov.uk in the UK is the single portal that people go to to access government services. And by and large, efforts are made to ensure that all the communications on gov.uk can accept IDNs without having to, if you like, convert the email addresses and the content back to the underlying ASCII equivalent scripts, which is the way that it’s still done in some areas, but that obviously is not the ideal way forward. But that leads me on to the second point, because as well as the, if you like, the technical approaches that are being taken and have been taken in many areas already to ensure this acceptability issue, we also have to ensure that people understand that they can do this. And I was struck by Manal’s example, that the use of the CCTLD, the IDN CCTLD, the usage has gone down to 10% of what it was when it launched or in the early days. And to an extent, I think this comes down to lack of confidence. When I was doing a bit of research for this presentation this morning and talking to some people responsible for our own services in the UK, they said that many users would not know how to use an IDN, if you like. Although, if you like, an IDN in various Indian scripts or other scripts might be a much better way for them to communicate because it would be easier for them. They would not necessarily have the confidence or the knowledge to do that and therefore, you know, tend to go back to the Latin script alternative, perhaps using a mixture of their own scripts and Latin scripts. So, I think we do have a lot to do in this area to ensure that users understand the availability of the systems to other scripts. I have an example from Wales, which is a part of the UK, which is a fairly large region in the UK. And it has its own .wales, which is a Latin-based generic top-level domain. But in the use of that domain, we only have 15 examples of where advantage has been taken of the ability to use Welsh diacritics. So, you know, we do have a problem in promoting this ability of people to or promoting the ability of people to use IDNs. So, I see, you know, and I hope we can go further on this in discussion. I see three critical challenges, if you like, for us. The first is, is the lack of confidence that people necessarily have perhaps to use international domain names and we need to do more to promote them that they can be used. We know there are problems, of course, with universal acceptance, but it is a bit of a chicken and egg situation in that if public authorities and if other institutions feel that there is no real use of these international domain names and they’re not seeing a problem, then they might not be taking the steps to ensure that they can be used on their systems. Secondly, the criticality of universal acceptance ahead of the next round for generic top-level domains. I mean, Manal and I and others and Santosh are involved in much of the ICANN work. ICANN has done some incredible work on multilingualism on the internet through the Universal Acceptance Steering Group and the UA Day that has been institutionalised. But going into the next round of generic top-level domains where we’re going to hopefully have more and more applications for IDNs, we must indeed do all we can to ensure that there is this further work so that they are accepted. And we must be honest with our applicants for generic top-level domains that there are still issues with universal acceptance. So, and the third point which I think I’ve covered to a large extent is that governments can do a lot more. We’re not suggesting we all should go out and regulate or pass laws or make regulation or, you know, sort of bang, you know, it’s not a case of discipline, it’s not necessarily a case of passing legislation. But what it is, it’s a case of working with the private sector, it’s a case of working with local authorities, it’s a case of working with educational institutions so people can understand what they can do already. Because if we’re going to really have multilingualism on the internet, people need to be confident to use their own languages and not to, if you like, have to use the English language as a substitution. Far too often we read case studies where people that have come to the UK and understandably are still, you know, trying to understand the English work on things are too worried to go online and instead get their relations and friends to apply for government services for them and that’s something we want to stop. I’ve talked for too long but this is really important work that we’re discussing here. Thank you. Okay, Nigel and all of our speakers, thank you. Nobody spoke for too long. I think that was all very useful and I’m hitting the slide button to officially enter the discussion phase. So during our brief delay earlier, I already spoke to a couple of people who I know have comments and there are a lot of stakeholders in the room, physically, hopefully also on Zoom, who are very actively engaged on this issue. So I’m going to invite Teresa or anyone else from ICANN who might like to speak first as we were talking about it earlier, I’ll bring in the microphone. Thank you.

Speaker 1: Thanks so much. Wow. It’s a privilege to be here and also to hear the speakers and thank you very much for organizing this event. The power to be able to engage on the Internet in your own language or script is incredibly important and something I think we often don’t appreciate. We like to speak in our own language, we like to read in our own language, we like to communicate in our own language and we should be able to do that on the Internet as well. And we should have a choice of the extensions to the right of the dot or to the left of the dot and how that works. So with that sort of bridging of internationalized domain names and universal acceptance, from our perspective and from ICANN’s limited mandate and mission, we play our part in trying to ensure a truly inclusive Internet on all levels. And to achieve this digital inclusivity, it takes more than just getting the people online and the speakers in their case studies observed this. It requires addressing some of the unique barriers such as the geographical or linguistical diversity. And so with that, the internationalized domain names and the technical aspect and the coding aspect of that can play a role in breaking down the barriers. You can fully unlock the IDN part, but unless you can actually communicate on that, hence the universal acceptance, that has to be a priority. And while we don’t have a mission in that, we certainly play a role in trying to help with that, around that. And with that, it means to ensure that all valid domain names and email addresses, regardless of script, can work seamlessly across the Internet on any device. And that’s WhatsApp, whatever it might be that you’re using that day of the week. There’s been a lot of work around this. My colleagues, Sarmad, Pitanan, and Seda, are online. They’re the versed experts on this. So if anybody has a question beyond my bandwidth or knowledge, please, let’s bring them in. But progress has been made, but we have a lot of gaps. So for instance, if we look at any of the testing right now, it shows that only about 11% of the top 1,000 global websites can accept internationalized email addresses, and just 22.2 of email servers can support them. That’s not a lot, not given the world population and the numbers of languages and scripts and dimensions to the right or to the left of the dot. And so these challenges highlight the urgent need for universal acceptance to become a technical and operational reality that platform providers, that other providers, whether it’s tech organizations, content management systems, email tools, web hosting tools, can enable this. But it’s not just a technical requirement. It’s essential, really, for the expansion and to provide a gateway for the next billion Internet users to navigate the Internet in a meaningful way. IDNs are already being used in diverse sectors, including government services. We’ve been hearing some presentations here, health, tourism, business. As open source software and big tech applications begin to embrace local languages. But we still have a lot to do. In the context of ICANN, we’re also looking at this as we look to open the next round. We anticipate or we would hope that we get interest for people to have their identity, whether it’s a visible identity or a source that they go to through an application, to have that ability to be in the language or the script or in the extension to the right or the left of the dot in the way they want. So in partnership with others, we have a lot of work to do. And some of it is just showing how somebody can code something. And other things are, you know, creating awareness at university levels and various other programs that are there. But the partnerships are important. And thank you for taking the initiative on the awareness here.

Owen Fletcher: Keith from Verisign also, I think, has a comment ready. Thank you very much, Owen. Can you hear me? Okay. So, hi. I’m Keith from Verisign.

Speaker 2: Just wanted to give a little bit of Verisign’s history and experience with IDNs. Verisign first launched IDNs at the second level, and .com would have remained ASCII back in the year 2000. I can say that my current boss, Patrick Kane, who is now a senior vice president in the company, started out as an IDN project manager or product manager. So Verisign has a long history of engagement with IDNs. During the 2012 round of new GTLDs, Verisign applied for 12 versions of .com and .net, nine in .com and three in .net. The transliteration would be, for example, in Cyrillic, K-O-M, the characters for com, the way that it sounds in a number of different scripts. And so Verisign’s very much committed to supporting and promoting IDNs. And in fact, about two-and-a-half weeks ago, we had an event that commits Verisign to continuing the development and uptake of multilingual characters, IDNs, within the ICANN process. So we’re committed to helping promote the multilingualism and the uptake of IDNs on the Internet. I do want to just… Is that better? Okay. So, sorry about that. I hope you got some of that. I won’t repeat myself. But I think it’s important to underscore what’s been said by a few others in that the registration and the resolution of IDNs works, right? It’s functionally operational. The challenge right now in… So at the DNS level, IDNs are functional. The challenge is at the level of the… Further up the stack, if you will, where the application layer, we have a real challenge where the application, such as email services or browsers or other services that rely on the DNS, is where the conflict exists. And I think that’s where we have quite a bit more work to do in terms of the universal acceptance aspect. And a member of my team has been a member of the universal acceptance steering group. We continue to see value in that initiative. So more work to be done. There’s more policy work and implementation work going on in ICANN right now around the topic of IDN variants, for example. But functionally, they work at the DNS level. It’s a question of making sure that they’re operational at the application layer. So thank you.

Owen Fletcher: Thank you. Now, I see hands up. Thank you. So we’re going to have a good discussion. I wanted to go to a chat question that I think we had in Zoom first, and I’ll open it up. Okay. We have a question for Manal that came in online. And the question is, would you be able to elaborate more about the challenges that are specific for right-to-left languages like Arabic and Farsi?

Manal Ismail: Thank you, Batool, for the question. And as Teresa mentioned, and also others, there are even more challenges with the right-to-left scripts than the usual left-to-right scripts. I’m not a technical expert, but I have one of my colleagues in the room. So if you don’t mind, we can pass this question to Abdelmonem. He’s currently in person in the room and maybe in a better position to answer this technical question. Yeah, please. Yeah, thank you.

Owen Fletcher: Thank you, Manal.

Audience: This is Abdelmonem Ghalila for The Record. I am working for the Telecom Regulator of Egypt to maintain and operate the IDN-CST LED of Egypt, which is IDN-1, which is an Arabic one. Actually, there are a lot of issues related to the Arabic language, especially the first one is related to the context. When you write a domain name inside your browser, there is a protocol, which is English, HTTP or HTTPS, then slash slash dot semicolon is the Arabic name. If you copy that and add it inside the world, it will be reflected. So how could you read it? You could read it from the left side or the right side. And this is one of the issues. This is one of the display issues. Yeah, assume that you have an email address that has a domain name in Arabic and the mailbox name itself in English. How could the application, how could you as a human read this email address from right or from left? If you read it from right, you will see that the domain name at this moment is the actual mailbox name and the left side is the domain name. If you read it from left to right, you will have the first part to be the mailbox and the second part is the domain name. This is one of the issues. The time you are trying to write the dot. inside your keyboard which you have the context of the keyboard in right to left it will differ from the other one when you press the dot which is left to right context at your keyboard. This is not limited for the issues for Arabic script. Another one which affects the security is related to the homograph attacks. There are some letters inside Arabic script that could be several different code points for the same shape of the letter. So if me for example use one of the domain names that have one of the letters which with one of this you know code letter and ignore the others could be some kind of homograph attack. Maybe someone will go and register the other domain name maybe in Urdu language. So it is one of the security issues that’s related to some of the issues or some of the issues or related to a right to left script. This is another one I would like to highlight here that universal acceptance is not limited for domain names and email addresses that are inside the mailbox that are inside the mail application or inside the browser. There are a large segment of the population who couldn’t even write their own local language. For example assume that for Arabic language I couldn’t write Arabic language and I couldn’t I don’t know English as well. How could I go online? There is another opportunity to handle this. There are a plenity of application iOS application and Android application that they could use open the mic and I say that I wanna go google.com I wanna go something in Arabic dot something in Arabic but the issues will be here that there are different accents for different people. So universal acceptance plays a critical role here in order to make such application you already as well in order to handle the largest segment of people who couldn’t write their own local language or even English. Thank you. Comment over here. Hello everyone my name is Sabina I’m from Mexico and I’m from the dynamic coalition of accessibility and disability. I think that one of the big challenges of the multilingual internet it’s how to include people with disabilities. I think about the sign language that it’s recognized as a language for the deaf community but I don’t see that it’s even mentioned in any of this of this forums or so I think we should be thinking how to include people with all kind of disabilities in these discussions and how to include other languages like the sign languages on the discussion. Thank you.

Owen Fletcher: Yes so while we’re at it I’m also going to invite questions for our our speaker first I think we’re good for our next commenter go ahead. Hello I’m Sadhvi from

Audience: the International Telecommunication Union or the ITU. Thank you for this very important discussion. Multilingualization of IDNs is something that the ITU has been looking at for several years as well as a fundamental driver of universal connectivity as we’ve heard but also for building digital skills and literacy around the world. We received a mandate from our 193 member states now now 194 through our plenipotentiary conference several years ago and that continues to be renewed at the last one in 2022 to focus on this topic particularly looking at it from the lens of technical solutions but also capacity development. It’s something that we also look at under the WSIS framework under Action Line C8 I believe on cultural and linguistic diversity and local content and through that work closely with other UN system entities as well including UNESCO but also outside the system with with ICANN and I thank Teresa for her for her great remarks earlier today. I wanted to highlight that we have what we call a council working group on international internet related public policy issues. It’s a bit of a mouthful but CWG Internet for short and actually Mr. Nigel Hickson who who spoke to us earlier today is a vice chair of that group as well. We’ve released or opened up a public consultation in October which is going to be running until the 11th of January on the topic of the role of public policy on the multilingualization of the internet. I warmly welcome all of you to take a look at our website and encourage you know organizations and stakeholders that you know who might be interested to contribute to that conversation and also present their contributions to the member states of the CWG Internet at our meeting. It’s a hybrid meeting in February. Thank you. Ram can you raise your hand so Andrew. Thank you. I’m Ram Mohan. I’m the chief strategy officer at Identity Digital and I worked in this area for a little while so I wanted to focus my energy on governments and some of the things that that governments ought to be thinking about. Governments want to provide services to their populations. That’s fundamentally one of the things they want to do and they want to and they’re moving to provide these services you know online to to make a lot of their services accessible online. Now connectivity and even meaningful connectivity requires language to become a core component of design and planning. Often when governments plan services and plan rollout of services you find that the the language component is sometimes in the design phase but often you’ll find that when they it’s only when it comes to the rollout that they recognize that language is now what excludes their populations from having agency online right. So I think that the important thing here in addition to universal acceptance and having internationalized domain names we need to understand that accessibility in your own language to services and the ability to navigate the internet in your own language is really a crucial table stakes kind of a basic requirement. The internet has become a significant utility in the world. When you when you have people in the global south but anywhere in the world when when people have money in addition to food and other essentials they absolutely subscribe to having internet access right. But what use internet access if you cannot have that access convert to meaningfulness in your own language right. So the language accessibility is really where I think we need to have the next stage of development. The the problems that the panel and all of you have been talking about on universal acceptance and internationalized domain names they are no longer technical problems. The technical problems are long solved they are long done. The real problems have to do with policymakers not just having the will or the intent but actually getting a toolkit that allows them to say I do have an intent to deploy language and deploy language services but how do I go about doing that right. So I think the creation of toolkits the creation of methods that allow for the tool providers and the service providers as well as governments who want to make those services accessible we need something that pulls all of these folks together right. Because you have silos you have you know the Unicode consortium knows how to take any language and or any script and make it accessible online. But how does somebody in the United States how does a Cherokee know how to take the Cherokee language and get that converted to Unicode right. And that you need to have that communication in Cherokee to that local population right. And that’s the kind of thing that governments ought to be starting to think about. Thank you.

Owen Fletcher: Thank you. So as the conversation goes on we’re getting more and more interesting aspects of this complicated situation. Jan I see your hand up I’ll go to you in a second. I wanted to ask Pradeep and Manal or Nigel if you’d like to comment to about content generation for domain or for you know websites using the IDNs that you’ve spoken about. So it sounds like provision of government services is a common theme. But in addition or the other types of content available on the existing IDNs that you’ve spoken about.

Pradeep Kumar Verma: Thank you. I’d like to highlight that in India we have 22 official languages, but there are many other dialects and many accents spoken throughout India, maybe in the numbers of 500. And if you ask about the content generation, most of the information today in the social media is absorbed by their content in their native language. So government services and websites, already the content in their local language has been already being generated. And we have already developed some tools, even in the Digital India Bhasini program, where we are providing support in the AI-based model, so that even local people can generate their content, even they use the open AI, and there are many tools developed within this program, so that it can even convert text to speech, speech to text, and other methods, they are more comfortable. Thank you.

Owen Fletcher: Manohar and Nigel, did you have anything? It’s optional. Yes, if I may, just very briefly to just to emphasize, I think the importance of what

Nigel Hickson: Ram was saying about, you know, that this has moved on from just being a sort of technical issue to a social policy issue, and, you know, as I put in the chat, I think we just need to do more as governments to ensure that citizens in our countries that are challenged with the native language can access public services on an equitable basis to those that use the native language. I mean, we have to ensure equality, what comes back to me, you know, having been around this game for, you know, too long, to an extent, was when we first had online services at all, was the requirements that we put in place, which are still there, although they are being eroded to an extent where people accessing or wanting public services shouldn’t have to. It shouldn’t be assumed that everyone has a smartphone. It shouldn’t be assumed that everyone has a form of internet access. We have to ensure that, you know, our marginalized communities can still have the benefit of being able to apply for grants or benefits or whatever the application is on an equitable basis. So I think we need to do more to ensure that people can know that they can use their own scripts and their own dialects. Thank you. Let’s go to Manal and then I see another hand up online.

Manal Ismail: Thank you, Owen, and just to agree with what has been said so far and also to echo what has been indicated from the floor that also accessibility issues need to be taken into consideration. Definitely, if we’re saying no one should be left behind, then we really should mean no one should be left behind. I fully agree that governments can do more. I have already went through a long list of strategic objectives. But in addition to that, governments could also work with other stakeholders on conducting awareness activities, organizing workshops, hackathons, trainings, train-the-trainer activities, setting proof-of-concept pilots, assist in stock-taking efforts, provide incentives to vendors and favor systems, applications and platforms that are UA-ready in tenders or purchase orders, add a requirement for UA readiness where applicable in relevant licenses or contracts, and add a requirement for creating local presence or web pages or platforms or portals in local languages under the relevant ID and CCTLD for national projects, initiatives and events, and of course, lead by example in that respect. And I would even add promoting the topic in relevant curricula and graduation projects. I leave it at this. Thank you. And one last thing is that it is indeed a win-win for all stakeholders. So for governments, we have already went through the strategic objectives. For business, it’s a market edge and market growth and addresses customer satisfaction. For the end user, it’s definitely enhanced user experience and a seamless end-to-end multilingual experience. And globally, as was also mentioned through the ITU, it caters for the needs of the next billion, bridging the digital divide, allows us to be more inclusive, addresses an aspect of human rights and contributes to achieving the global agendas we’ve already mentioned earlier. I leave it at this.

Owen Fletcher: Thank you, Owen. Back to you. Thank you. I’d like to go to Anil Kumar-Jain, if I’m saying your name correctly from the Zoom. Then I actually would like to go back to Jen, like I said, and then on to Sarmad. Thanks. I’m not hearing anything, though. And the Zoom disappeared from the screen. Okay. Yeah. Thank you.

Audience: Anil Kumar-Jain, for the record. I am chair of USG in ICANN. I’m patiently listening to the panelists and the contributors after the panel discussion. Thank you very much. I think it is a wonderful discussion. Now, the awareness about universal acceptance is catching up, and not within ICANN, but in United Nations, ITU, and other organizations. Now, the discussion which was being discussed is that the role of the government in implementing the universal acceptance. First of all, I would like to thank Teresa and Ram, affirming that the technical issues in implementing UA is already completed. So now the universal acceptance as a problem is implementable. It is available. It is workable. Now, in addition to the government, what USG has recognized is that there are roles of other. Second one next to government is the big techs, big techs like social media platforms, Google, Meta, and big techs like Apple, who are able to reach to a majority of the population. So if they are able to do that, I think acceptance of universal acceptance becomes a reality. And I am happy that Google, Meta, they have implementation of universal acceptance in their strategic plan. The third is the universities. They are the young population. They are training the young population. In USG, we have defined a UA academic curricula, which is of two grades. One is the basic one, and second is the advanced one. Universities can start introduction of UA in their existing IT program and then subsequently develop this as a module and maybe as a course in future. This will help the future generation to adopt the UA and understand the importance of UA. The fourth aspect, which is the DNS participant. Who are the DNS participants? As has been explained by Manal, that 85% of the CCTLDs and 41% of GTLDs are UA ready. It means that the registries have adopted UA and made the system available. But what about the registrars and the sub-registrars? What about the ISPs who are providing the connectivity? I think they also are required to be UA ready, and they have to make their system UA ready. It is important that all the players are required to be there. I understand that the awareness about UA is well-coordinated and conducted by the UA day program, which we are running for the last two years. At the same time, what Nigel has said is the lack of confidence. I think it is important. Thank you, Nigel, for bringing up this issue. We have to remove the fear that in case we are using a local language domain, either in browser or in email, we are able to reach to the right side. That is important. Good that a lot of information has come to us. And I can assure the audience that UASG will take all appropriate steps to ensure that UA should be able to reach to maximum population and next 1 billion internet users should come from non-English speaking population. Thank you.

Owen Fletcher: From the room, thanks.

Audience: Thanks so and this is Jen Chung from DotAsia organization. I look around the room both in person and online I see many faces that have been engaged deeply in this universal acceptance and internationalized domain names issues for many, many years. I think Ram has spoken earlier, he really undersold himself, he says he’s been in this for a little bit, no he’s been in this for almost since the very, very beginning. For DotAsia of course we absolutely support all the efforts to achieve universal acceptance, achieve EAI, achieve more uptake of internationalized domain names. I think really when you’re talking about the technical part of it, Ram has also stressed earlier it has been solved but the real problem right now is getting these toolkits, getting these tools that the UASG which Anil has very, very kindly, very in depth told us what they were trying to do and what materials they’re providing for everyone to use to the people who can use them, to the different companies, service providers, ISPs. As a registry operator we also have to do more as well. I know that Keith has mentioned the many, many things that VeriSign has done and also supported throughout the years. I think Edmund and Pat were on the same IDN group almost 25 years ago now. Maybe I’m aging them. I’m not really sure. But really when you’re talking to people who don’t really understand what universal acceptance or IDN is, you have to couch it in words that they already do understand. It is under the umbrella of digital inclusion and I think if you say the words digital inclusion everybody understands. Big corporations, governments, they all have different budgets, different teams looking at digital inclusion and a multilingual internet is an essential foundation for digital inclusion. The next billion coming online do not have English as their native language, may not even have it as their second, third or even fourth language. So really that’s the foundation of that. And without universal acceptance, I guess people who don’t speak English as a first language will forever remain second class citizens. It’s not as bleak as I just mentioned here. There is so much work that has been done already and so much work that I did come in a little late to this session. But it is really encouraging to see the governments of the U.S., U.K., Egypt and India already showing all the good work and the case studies both of successes and things that we can learn from that we can build upon. And I think the key message here also is it requires so many different stakeholders, cross sectoral and especially with government as a key driver. I’m going to stress for my last point is I think Manal put it really brilliantly, requiring that as part of the government procurement services, the tendering, leading by example, that is the biggest thing that the governments can do to lead this and then of course private sector industry will absolutely be like right on the heels of providing that service and providing all those benefits that we can all see. So that’s just my two cents on that.

Owen Fletcher: Thank you, Jen. Great comments. So on the screen, I’m only seeing Anil’s hand up, but I assume Sarmad’s hand is still up. We have about eight or nine minutes left. Let’s go to Sarmad. Still there. Right. If you would like to speak, Sarmad, please go ahead and unmute. I’m sorry, Owen. Sarmad is saying in the chat that he’s unable to unmute. All right. Well, let’s go to any other questions or comments for now. All right. Looking around the room. Ram, go ahead. I’ll bring you this mic. It’s working well. Thank you, Owen. I hope you can hear me with this microphone. Okay. Great. This is Ram again. I wanted to just briefly amplify and echo what Jen was just saying a few minutes ago. The future forward and the future opportunity for a multilingual Internet is to start speaking about this, to have governments, to have industry, to have civil society, academia, start speaking about this problem no longer as a problem, but as an opportunity for greater digital inclusion. Language is at the base of digital inclusion, and you have to have language as a core component of digital inclusion. We ought to start thinking about universal acceptance, internationalized domain names, these terms that in many ways actually do not translate well into many other languages. Try saying universal acceptance in Arabic. Try saying universal acceptance in Chinese. It doesn’t translate well. I think we really also ought to start thinking about transforming the semantics of what we’re talking about and starting to change this into a semantics based on digital inclusion that has language as a core component. Thanks. Thank you. All right. Sarmad, if you’re able to unmute at this point, please go ahead. Otherwise, do we have any other hands up in Zoom or comments from the room? Hello.

Audience: This is Sarmad. Can you hear me? Yes, we hear you. Go ahead. Okay. Thank you very much. I actually wanted to follow up. Anil actually raised good points. One of the key, I guess, challenges which need to be addressed is also capacity development. Internationalization for, I guess, in software development, which is sort of a key component on which internationalized domain names and internationalized email addresses are based, is still not something which is taught in universities. And so students or professionals which are coming out of the universities, for example, this is still not a very comfortable skill. So as Anil also shared, one of the things we are working on is actually developing or integrating curriculum which integrates internationalization, internationalized domain names, and internationalized email concepts into the curriculum so that once when the professionals, young professionals which come out, they are aware of not only these concepts, but they are also equipped with the skills to make sure that these are implemented in the technology.

Owen Fletcher: Thank you. Thank you. So I haven’t seen anybody else raise their hand on Zoom or in the room. If anyone has a final one-minute comment, now is your chance. Otherwise, I’m going to conclude for us by, first of all, thanking our presenters of case studies again, which provided the foundation, I think, for a very interesting discussion. I think it’s clear that everyone here recognizes the importance of making the Internet more multilingual and the value that will bring and the relevance of this issue to digital inclusion, among other important priorities. It’s also clear, I think, that there is not a silver bullet single solution, and therefore I’m glad to see the active participation from this group because it’s obvious that a lot of stakeholders will need to continue to work together to help advance us toward the end goals here. So thank you, everybody, for coming. I’m hoping that this leads to further discussions. We’ll see you next time. Wait, wait, wait. Huh? Oh, sure. Pradeep, Nigel, Manal, before closing, did you want to say anything in conclusion as well? Thank you, Owen.

Manal Ismail: Just to thank you, thank the host, and as mentioned earlier, we need to work collaboratively to achieve this as we owe it to everyone who needs it.

Owen Fletcher: Thank you. Just to echo that and thank you, Owen, for organizing this, but also for the great discussion we’ve had on the chat and what people in the room have brought to this. I think I’ve made several notes, and I think we’ve all got work to do. Thank you. That’s the real end. Thank you, everyone.

Agreement Points

Importance of multilingualism for digital inclusion

Jaisha Wray

Ram Mohan

Manal Ismail

Nigel Hickson

Multilingualism is essential for digital inclusion and meaningful connectivity

Language is a fundamental requirement for internet access and digital services

Multilingual internet provides a gateway for the next billion users

Governments should ensure equitable access to online services in different languages

All speakers emphasized the critical role of multilingualism in achieving digital inclusion and enabling meaningful internet access for diverse populations.

Need for government initiatives to promote multilingualism

Manal Ismail

Nigel Hickson

Pradeep Kumar Verma

Egypt working on universal acceptance deployment in government projects

UK recognizing importance of providing government services in multiple languages

India launched Bhasanet portal to promote multilingual internet

Multiple speakers highlighted government-led initiatives to promote multilingualism and universal acceptance in their respective countries.

Similar Viewpoints

Both speakers argue that the technical foundations for IDNs and UA are in place, and the focus should now shift to implementation at the application layer and addressing social policy issues.

Ram Mohan

Speaker 2

Shift focus from technical issues to social policy and implementation

Need to focus on application layer for full UA implementation

These speakers emphasize the importance of involving multiple stakeholders, including governments, big tech companies, and DNS participants, in implementing universal acceptance.

Manal Ismail

Audience

Governments can include UA readiness requirements in tenders and contracts

Big tech companies play a crucial role in implementing UA

DNS participants like registries and registrars need to be UA ready

Unexpected Consensus

Integration of UA in education

Audience

Manal Ismail

Need for better integration of internationalization concepts in university curricula

Governments can include UA readiness requirements in tenders and contracts

While most discussions focused on technical and policy aspects, there was an unexpected consensus on the importance of integrating UA concepts into education and professional development, suggesting a long-term approach to addressing the challenge.

Overall Assessment

Summary

There was strong agreement on the importance of multilingualism for digital inclusion, the need for government initiatives to promote UA, and the shift from technical solutions to implementation and policy challenges. Speakers also agreed on the importance of involving multiple stakeholders in UA implementation.

Consensus level

High level of consensus on core issues, with speakers from different countries and organizations sharing similar viewpoints. This suggests a unified understanding of the challenges and potential solutions for promoting multilingualism on the internet, which could facilitate coordinated efforts to address these issues globally.

Different Viewpoints

Focus of efforts for universal acceptance implementation

Ram Mohan

Speaker 2

Shift focus from technical issues to social policy and implementation

Need to focus on application layer for full UA implementation

While Ram Mohan argues for shifting focus to social policy and implementation, Speaker 2 emphasizes the need to focus on the application layer for full UA implementation.

Unexpected Differences

Overall Assessment

summary

The main areas of disagreement revolve around the focus of efforts for implementing universal acceptance and the specific roles of different stakeholders in promoting multilingualism.

difference_level

The level of disagreement among the speakers is relatively low. Most speakers agree on the importance of multilingualism and universal acceptance, with minor differences in their proposed approaches or areas of focus. These differences do not significantly impede the overall goal of promoting a multilingual internet, but rather offer diverse perspectives on how to achieve it.

Partial Agreements

Both speakers agree on the importance of government involvement in promoting multilingualism, but they propose different approaches. Manal Ismail suggests including UA readiness requirements in tenders and contracts, while Nigel Hickson focuses on providing government services in multiple languages.

Manal Ismail

Nigel Hickson

Governments can include UA readiness requirements in tenders and contracts

UK recognizing importance of providing government services in multiple languages

Similar Viewpoints

Both speakers argue that the technical foundations for IDNs and UA are in place, and the focus should now shift to implementation at the application layer and addressing social policy issues.

Ram Mohan

Speaker 2

Shift focus from technical issues to social policy and implementation

Need to focus on application layer for full UA implementation

These speakers emphasize the importance of involving multiple stakeholders, including governments, big tech companies, and DNS participants, in implementing universal acceptance.

Manal Ismail

Audience

Governments can include UA readiness requirements in tenders and contracts

Big tech companies play a crucial role in implementing UA

DNS participants like registries and registrars need to be UA ready

Key Takeaways

Multilingualism on the internet is crucial for digital inclusion and meaningful connectivity

Universal Acceptance (UA) of internationalized domain names and email addresses remains a significant challenge

Governments play a key role in promoting multilingualism and UA through policies and initiatives

Multi-stakeholder collaboration is necessary to advance UA and internationalized domain names (IDNs)

Technical solutions for IDNs exist, but implementation at the application layer is still lacking

Framing UA and IDNs as part of broader digital inclusion efforts may help increase adoption

Resolutions and Action Items

Governments to consider including UA readiness requirements in tenders and contracts

Universities to introduce UA concepts in IT curricula

Stakeholders to continue awareness-raising activities like UA Day

UASG to take steps to ensure UA reaches maximum population and next 1 billion internet users

Unresolved Issues

How to increase user confidence in using IDNs and local scripts

Addressing specific challenges for right-to-left scripts like Arabic

Improving uptake of IDNs, which remains low despite technical availability

Integrating accessibility considerations for people with disabilities into multilingual internet efforts

Suggested Compromises

Shifting focus from technical issues to social policy and implementation aspects of UA

Reframing UA and IDN discussions in terms of digital inclusion to increase understanding and adoption

We have now more than 1,200 new GTLDs, around 100 of which are IDNs. And we have around 60 IDN country code top-level domains. We have mailboxes now that are no longer just an ASCII. And we have another round of new GTLDs on its way. This makes universal acceptance a fundamental requirement for unleashing the full potential of IDNs and internationalized email addresses and providing a truly multilingual and digitally inclusive internet.

speaker

Manal Ismail

reason

This comment provides important context on the current state of internationalized domain names (IDNs) and highlights why universal acceptance is crucial for digital inclusion.

impact

It set the stage for much of the subsequent discussion by emphasizing the urgency and importance of universal acceptance for a multilingual internet.

The problems that the panel and all of you have been talking about on universal acceptance and internationalized domain names they are no longer technical problems. The technical problems are long solved they are long done. The real problems have to do with policymakers not just having the will or the intent but actually getting a toolkit that allows them to say I do have an intent to deploy language and deploy language services but how do I go about doing that right.

speaker

Ram Mohan

reason

This comment shifts the focus from technical challenges to policy and implementation challenges, highlighting a key barrier to progress.

impact

It redirected the conversation towards practical steps for implementation and the need for toolkits and guidance for policymakers.

Language is at the base of digital inclusion, and you have to have language as a core component of digital inclusion. We ought to start thinking about universal acceptance, internationalized domain names, these terms that in many ways actually do not translate well into many other languages.

speaker

Ram Mohan

reason

This comment reframes the discussion of universal acceptance and IDNs in terms of digital inclusion, making it more accessible and relevant to a broader audience.

impact

It encouraged participants to think about how to communicate these concepts more effectively across languages and cultures.

I think we just need to do more as governments to ensure that citizens in our countries that are challenged with the native language can access public services on an equitable basis to those that use the native language.

speaker

Nigel Hickson

reason

This comment highlights the role of governments in ensuring equitable access to public services across languages.

impact

It sparked discussion about specific actions governments can take to promote linguistic inclusivity in public services.

Internationalization for, I guess, in software development, which is sort of a key component on which internationalized domain names and internationalized email addresses are based, is still not something which is taught in universities.

speaker

Sarmad

reason

This comment identifies a gap in education and training that is hindering progress on universal acceptance and IDNs.

impact

It led to discussion about the need for curriculum development and capacity building in the field of internationalization.

Overall Assessment

These key comments shaped the discussion by shifting focus from technical challenges to policy, implementation, and education barriers. They emphasized the importance of framing the issue in terms of digital inclusion, highlighted the crucial role of governments, and identified specific areas for action such as developing toolkits for policymakers and integrating internationalization into university curricula. The discussion evolved from a technical conversation about IDNs and universal acceptance to a broader dialogue about digital inclusion, policy implementation, and capacity building.

How can sign languages be included in discussions about multilingual internet?

speaker

Sabina from Mexico

explanation

Including sign languages is important for ensuring accessibility for the deaf community in multilingual internet efforts

How can governments create toolkits to help deploy language services online?

speaker

Ram Mohan

explanation

Toolkits would help policymakers and service providers implement language accessibility in online government services

How can fear and lack of confidence in using local language domains be addressed?

speaker

Nigel Hickson and Anil Kumar-Jain

explanation

Overcoming this barrier is crucial for increasing adoption of internationalized domain names

How can internationalization and IDN concepts be better integrated into university curricula?

speaker

Sarmad

explanation

This would help equip new professionals with skills to implement multilingual technologies

How can the semantics around universal acceptance and IDNs be reframed in terms of digital inclusion?

speaker

Ram Mohan

explanation

Changing the language used could help communicate the importance of these issues more effectively across languages and cultures

Summary

This panel discussion focused on cyber diplomacy in the African context, exploring its importance, challenges, and opportunities. The panelists, including government officials, experts, and parliamentarians, emphasized the growing significance of cybersecurity for Africa’s digital economy and national security. They highlighted that cybercrime costs Africa approximately 10% of its GDP, underscoring the urgent need for robust cybersecurity measures.

Key themes emerged around the need for capacity building, international collaboration, and the development of appropriate legislation and policies. The Namibian Minister shared her country’s progress in implementing cybersecurity strategies and legislation, while other panelists stressed the importance of regional cooperation and participation in global cyber diplomacy forums. The discussion also touched on the challenges of limited resources and the need for African countries to balance national security concerns with international collaboration.

Panelists agreed that Africa needs to strengthen its cyber ecosystem, including education and training programs, to reduce dependency on foreign technology providers. They also emphasized the importance of trust-building among nations and the need for multi-stakeholder engagement in cyber diplomacy efforts. The role of parliamentarians in crafting appropriate legislation was highlighted, as was the need for alignment between national, regional, and global cybersecurity initiatives.

The discussion concluded with recommendations for fostering international collaboration, building capacity across various sectors, developing norms and standards, and improving public-private partnerships in cybersecurity. Overall, the panel underscored the critical importance of cyber diplomacy for Africa’s digital future and its role in the global cyber landscape.

Keypoints

Major discussion points:

– The importance of cyber diplomacy for Africa’s digital economy and security

– Challenges faced by African countries in participating in global cyber diplomacy efforts

– The need for capacity building, legislation, and infrastructure to support cyber security

– The role of collaboration between countries and different stakeholders (government, private sector, civil society)

– Balancing national security concerns with international cooperation on cyber issues

The overall purpose of the discussion was to explore the concept of cyber diplomacy in the African context, highlighting its importance for the continent’s digital development and security while identifying challenges and opportunities for African countries to engage more effectively in global cyber diplomacy efforts.

Speakers

– Mactar Seck, Moderator

– Emma Theofelus, Minister of Information, Communication and Technology of Namibia

– Tereza Horejsova, Senior Outreach Manager at the Global Forum for Cyber Security Expert

– Katherine Getao, Cyber Diplomacy expert at the Diplo Foundation

– Beyza Unal, Head of Science and Technology Unit, UNIDIR

– Susan Ndalama, Member of Parliament of Malawi, member of the African Parliamentarian Network

Cyber Diplomacy in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities

This panel discussion explored cyber diplomacy in the African context, highlighting its importance for the continent’s digital development and security while identifying challenges and opportunities for African countries to engage more effectively in global cyber diplomacy efforts. Cyber diplomacy was broadly defined as the intersection of cybersecurity, international relations, and how governments handle diplomatic topics related to cyberspace.

The Importance of Cyber Diplomacy for Africa

The discussion underscored the critical importance of cyber diplomacy for Africa’s digital future and its role in the global cyber landscape. Panelists emphasized the significant economic impact of cybercrime and the urgent need to address cybersecurity issues on the continent.

Challenges Faced by African Countries

Key challenges faced by African countries in participating in global cyber diplomacy efforts include:

1. Low participation in international cyber negotiations

2. Need for funding and prioritization of cybersecurity amid competing interests

3. Limited resources and infrastructure

4. Dependency on foreign technology providers

Emma Theofelus, Minister of Information, Communication and Technology of Namibia, provided insights into Namibia’s efforts to establish cybersecurity foundations. She described their development of a national cyber security strategy, efforts to pass appropriate legislation, and recent experiences with cyber attacks. Theofelus highlighted the difficulties in keeping pace with rapidly evolving cyber threats, developing local expertise, and acquiring necessary equipment and software, all while facing funding constraints and competing national priorities.

Opportunities and Recommendations

Despite the challenges, the panelists identified opportunities for Africa in cyber diplomacy:

1. Exploiting emerging technologies and innovation

2. Strengthening regional cooperation and local capabilities

3. Developing norms and standards for cybersecurity

Recommendations for enhancing cyber diplomacy in Africa included:

1. Implementing comprehensive national cybersecurity strategies

2. Fostering international collaboration to increase African participation in global discussions

3. Investing in capacity building for all relevant actors

4. Building trust at national, regional, and continental levels

5. Improving public-private partnerships

6. Developing and implementing cyber-related legislation and regulatory frameworks

Capacity Building and Resource Allocation

A recurring theme was the need for capacity building and strategic resource allocation. Katherine Getao, Cyber Diplomacy expert at the Diplo Foundation, suggested leveraging foreign service academies for training diplomats in cyber issues. She also proposed using teleconferencing tools to overcome resource constraints and emphasized the importance of online training and courses for capacity building.

Tereza Horejsova, Senior Outreach Manager from the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise (GFCE), highlighted the GFCE’s initiatives in Africa, including regional hubs to connect various stakeholders and efforts to train cyber professionals.

Emma Theofelus stressed the need for a conversation between the Global North and Global South regarding financing of cybersecurity interventions.

Role of Different Stakeholders

The panelists emphasized the importance of multi-stakeholder engagement, including parliamentarians, technical agencies, diplomats, the private sector, and youth. Katherine Getao highlighted the potential of Africa’s youth population in driving cybersecurity innovation.

Balancing National Security and International Collaboration

The discussion touched on the delicate balance between protecting national interests and fostering international cooperation. Katherine Getao emphasized the importance of trust-building in international collaboration and suggested that African countries need a strategic approach to technology.

Additional Considerations

1. Beyza Unal, Head of Science and Technology Unit at UNDIR, mentioned the Women in Cyber project, highlighting the importance of gender inclusivity in cybersecurity.

2. The importance of identifying critical infrastructure in national cybersecurity strategies was noted.

3. An audience member suggested converting existing diplomats to cyber diplomacy experts as a potential solution to capacity challenges.

The discussion concluded with recognition of the complex challenges facing African countries in cyber diplomacy, but also with optimism about the continent’s potential to play a larger role in shaping global cyber norms and policies. Continued dialogue, capacity building, and strategic collaboration were emphasized as key to enhancing Africa’s position in the global cyber landscape.

Mactar Seck: Why cybersecurity is a key challenge in the continent? Because when we look at the negative impact in term of economic, cyber crime cost to 10% of the Africa GDP. Today, we are going to discuss cyber diplomacy in the Africa context. Why the subject is very important for the continent is for three reasons. The first, we have seen a lot of progress on digital economy in the African continent. We estimated by 2025, the digital economy will generate approximately $180 billion. But we are facing also several challenges. One of the key challenges now, deep in this digital economy, it is a cyber security, cyber crime. Why? As of today, cyber crime could cost around 10% of the Africa GDP. And we need to overcome this challenge. And we have several orientations for that. First, we need to build the capacity. We need to put in place the key regulatory framework. We need also to collaborate, because cyber security is not in one country. It is at the continental level, at the regional level, and at the world level. And through this, there is a new concept, an evolutive concept. It is called cyber diplomacy. That addresses the intersection between cyber security and international relations. And why today, we are going to discuss this concept. what key achievement and what is an opportunity for Africa to be part in this world discussion, global discussion on cyber diplomacy. As you know, it is a new concept. Today, I have the honor to moderate this panel with Excellency Honorable Minister Emma Theoforis, the Minister of Information, Communication and Technology of Namibia. And also, I’m going to have also Mrs. Teresa, Senior Outreach Manager from the Global Forum for Cyber Security Expert. Also of our Honorable Susan, Member of Parliament of Malawi, also member of the African Parliamentarian Network. I’m going to have also Mrs. Beaza, Head of Science and Technology Unit at UNDIR. As well, Katherine Getao, Cyber Diplomacy at the Diplo Foundation. We have five distinguished representative and panelists who represent all across Africa. And they are only female. I think it’s not gender balance, but gender disparity. Now, let me start by, I told at the beginning, it is an evolving concept on cyber diplomacy. We can have several understanding. Before we start our discussion, I would like to ask each of our panelists to give us in one minute, an understanding on cyber diplomacy. I’m going to start by the Honorable Minister.

Emma Theofelus: Okay, all right. Thank you so much, Mactar, and a very good afternoon to everybody here live from IGF in Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, and all our listeners and viewers online and participants. Very happy to be discussing this very important aspect of cyber diplomacy in Africa, looking at multi-stakeholder engagement. And in my small definition, I think cyber diplomacy touches on the ability of either states or multi-stakeholder actors, whether it’s intergovernmental organizations, to freely talk about the challenges that come with cybersecurity matters and the ability to converge to try to handle them. I’m talking about skills development. I’m talking about investment of financing. I’m talking about the ability to actually share cooperation between countries when one country is unable to handle cyber incidences. And I think it requires some level of deliberation, some level of discussion, some level of cooperation between institutions and countries to be able to have some cyber diplomacy in order to handle the challenges that come with cyber security. Thank you.

Tereza Horejsova: Thank you very much also, Mactar, for organizing the session. Very important topic, of course. So cyber diplomacy basically is how governments handle new topics that have emerged on the diplomatic agenda in the recent years and how they defend their interests in cyberspace in this respect. And I would like to stress the link to capacity building that Madam Minister has already brought up. Thank you.

Mactar Seck: Thank you very much. I think from my side, a lot has been said. I would say cyber diplomacy is like coordination between governments, whereby we want to make sure that our people are safe on issues of cybersecurity, and also making sure that we can promote friendly relations, especially on the cyberspace. Thank you very much.

Katherine Getao: It’s a pleasure to be here. So I believe cyber diplomacy is the field that will enable us to not only mitigate the risks that you mentioned in cyber security and cyber crime, but also to exploit the huge emerging opportunities for developing countries. We’ve seen that developing countries have really taken up this technology in social areas, like social media, as well as in technical and innovation areas. It forms a framework for collaboration between states, between single state and the private sector, who innovate, own, and manage the technology, and civil society, who are the advocates for emerging issues. And it gives us the areas where we focus, such as emerging technology, the norms and the culture that we adopt as a globe, the confidence building measures that prevent and manage areas of conflict, the development of international law that keeps us all in check, and also enables us to collaborate on very important issues, which you also mentioned, such as capacity building. So I’d say cyber diplomacy is a very broad field that gives us a framework to work on all these areas and create a peaceful, safe and productive cyberspace.

Mactar Seck: Thank you very much. Let me go now to Mrs. Beza.

Beyza Unal: Thank you very much. I completely agree with the other speakers. Coming from the UN side, cyber diplomacy really entails the diplomatic tools and strategies to address issues that relate to the cyberspace in general. And it could entail negotiation of treaties, norms, rules, setting up norms, rules and principles or certain standards. And the whole idea is really to understand what type of guardrails necessary in order for states to work together and to be able to mitigate the risks that emerge in cyberspace. It could also focus on many issues. You mentioned about cybersecurity and cybercrime. It could also include governance of the internet, international cooperation related matters, confidence building matters, capacity building matters, managing threats, as I mentioned. So the topic is really, really broad. Also, cyber diplomacy takes place between states, but multi-stakeholder community also has an important role within the discussion. And also, I would say that The topic itself includes not only the state-to-state relations and how to regulate state-to-state relations, including prevention of state-sponsored cyber attacks, for instance, and so on, but also it could also focus on frameworks to combat non-state actors. The UN Cybercrime Treaty, for instance, is a good example of that. Thanks.

Mactar Seck: All definitions are related to collaboration, capacity building, we have something in common, negotiation, norms, standards, and infrastructure. Now, I’m going to stay with Beyza, because the one issue on cyber diplomacy is the low participation of African countries in international negotiations. We can have examples of the United Nations group of government experts dealing with this issue. Since 2004, we have only eight countries selected in this discussion, in this group, very low compared to the challenge of the continent. Beyza, as you are head of this technology division at UNIDIR, and you work a long time with the UN, can you give us the global picture of the cyber diplomacy at the international level, as well as the participation on Africa please?

Beyza Unal: Yes, sure. So I can focus on the international peace and security elements, the pillar that we focus on in the UN system, which covers the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (INIDIR) mandate. Firstly, perhaps I could just mention a little bit of the evolution of how discussions have evolved within the UN context on cybersecurity issues. Believe it or not, the first resolution actually on cybersecurity was in 1998. So it’s been a very long time. And from 1998 onwards, we had seen a steady involvement of states. So initially, the discussion started in only a number of states being interested in the topic. And now what we’re seeing an inclusive space for all countries to be able to raise their voice on the topic. So from 1998 onwards, we had six group of governmental experts’ meetings. Basically, it means that the number of states that involved on those meetings were limited around 25 states or so. And we also had two open-ended working group (OEWG) meetings which were open to all countries. It was an inclusive intergovernmental multilateral discussion. As I said, each meeting, each intersessional or each multilateral meeting added up to the previous work that’s been done in this space. For instance, in 2015, states agreed to set up 11 voluntary and non-binding norms of responsible state behavior and this is quite important because the framework provides the guardrails of what is acceptable in cyberspace and what is not acceptable. And from 2015 to today if you look at it now the discussions is about norms is about how to implement those norms and whether there are more norms that are necessary. Whether some of the norms should be binding in nature or not. So there’s this great evolution that we’re seeing from states and the last OEWG meeting. The current OEWG started in 2021 and it’s going to be until 2025. It had many achievements so far and I think some of those achievements really relate to the African countries. First of all, I think we should recognize that this OEWG and the previous work that’s been done focus fundamentally on the capacity building element and it’s actually in one of the annual progress reports that was adopted by consensus. It’s acknowledged and recognized that capacity building is part of confidence building measure. So if you want to actually address state to state relations and build confidence, we need to also build capacities. And the draft program itself has a capacity building sub-theme as well that the chair has put together. And one of the elements as an achievement that’s a concrete achievement from this work is that it’s set up a points of contact directly. That’s basically states assigning diplomatic and technical experts. They gave us the name of those experts and we created a directory of that in order to facilitate communication between states in case of a cyber incident, in case they would like to share information with each other but that they don’t know who their counterparts are. Around 111 states have signed up to the POC directory. There are many African states also a part of that POC directory and we would like to increase these numbers so we’re reaching out to developing countries specifically for them to nominate names for us. But the POC directory, the points of contact directory was established in 2023-2024 so it’s only in one year we were able to get 111 states sign up to it so that’s really a good achievement. You also asked me how to increase the participation of African countries in these meetings. It has been always a challenge. One of the things that the chair has been doing is that in the OEWG meetings we are putting the meetings in hybrid format where teleconference setup is established and that really is all about connectivity and inclusivity even if you’re not in the room you would be able to hear what’s happening in the room. It’s not the same as being in the room I completely would agree on that. So as part of the work for instance in UNODA we are reaching to countries that has the capacity and that has the funds to be able to provide us those funds so that we could fly in countries from developed states to developing countries and so on. Ireland, for instance, has been really at the forefront on providing those funds in order to ensure better participation from developing countries in these meetings. There is also, outside of the UN actually, there’s also a women in cyber group that several countries are funding, ensuring that women delegates from developing countries would be able to come into these sessions and speak at these sessions. Thanks to actually that women in cyber initiative, we were able to get 50-50% participation, speaking roles in the OEWG discussions. So it is not perfect, but we’re putting all the efforts in place to ensure that developing countries and their voices are being heard. And also we’re doing everything to develop that a stronger diplomatic presence of those countries are there. Thank you.

Mactar Seck: Thank you very much for this global picture. I’m sure the minister hear you and we’ll see how we can increase the African participation in this negotiation. Now I’m going to give the floor to my dear friend, Honorable Minister Emma. She’s one of the key ministers of ICT in the continent. We are very proud of the work you are doing at national and continental level. We work together since some years. We have seen a lot of progress made by Namibia and also your contribution on the Africa digital agenda. Now, my question is, at the national level, if there is any initiative on cyber diplomacy or you plan to have this initiative in the future?

Emma Theofelus: Thank you so much, Mactar. And thank you to Beyza for giving us a rundown of how the role of multilateralism is very important in trying to achieve cyber diplomacy. And I can almost liken it to corporations that exist in the physical world, the corporations of Interpol in relation to our police agencies across our country, so even corporations of military trainings for various countries that might have advanced technology versus others. And I think that’s very similar to what we’re trying to achieve with the hope of multilateralism as a lever towards cyber diplomacy. So coming back to your question, Mactar, I think in Namibia, we have tried very hard to start with the right foundations because cyber security matters are moving so fast and so quickly that sometimes countries, and especially developing countries, cannot catch up very quickly in terms of ensuring the right legislation is in place, ensuring that it has the right experts in country to deal with possible incidences, having the right equipment and software sometimes because of the lack of funding and the competing interests in country. So in Namibia, we have done one or two things. One, we have tried to put down the right foundations of legislation. We’ve come up with a cyber security strategy that will run until 2025 to coincide with the working group’s timeline until 2025. And now we’re busy revisiting the current strategy to look at the next five years until 2030. And it’s very important for us because our strategies come with an implementation plan. and a costed implementation plan, so there is a commitment from government to put the necessary funding in place to implement the strategy. Secondly, we are busy with our cybercrime bill. It’s currently still with cabinet before it’s tabled in the National Assembly in our parliament, with the hopes that at least by next year we can start with a cybercrime law that is able to govern all cyber matters in the country. And thirdly, that I’d like to mention here, we have successfully implemented a Namibian computer security incidents response team. And this is very important to us because we just experienced a cyber attack two or three days ago. In fact, I was on my way to Riyadh when the cyber attack happened on our telecommunications company and our Ministry of Health. But thankfully because of a NAMSRT that we have established and that we costed and funded towards the tune of 20 million Namibian dollars, they were able to spring into action and now the situation is under control. But a lot of this money went not only to capacity, it went to a lot of equipment, which many a times costs a lot of money and software. And unfortunately for a country like Namibia now, where we’re in a state of emergency, where we’re experiencing our worst drought in 100 years, there’s so many competing interests and many countries are unable to prioritize 20 million of their currency money towards a possible cyberattack they could experience in the near future. And it’s so uncertain, you never know when it’s going to hit as opposed to a state of emergency situation happening at that moment, which many countries are experiencing. So this discussion around… Truly, cyber diplomacy and a multilateralism approach to prioritizing funding around cybersecurity matters is important. And it’s an honest discussion we need to have between developing and developed countries. Because it’s no secret that many of the attacks are coming from cyber hacking organizations in the Global North attacking Global South countries. So how do we ensure that we help developing countries put the necessary safeguards in place with funding that they do not always have to ensure that their critical infrastructure is protected? I’m talking about telecommunications, I’m talking about water infrastructure, electricity grid infrastructure, which could literally cripple developing countries. So these are some of the activities we are doing in our country, but we know too well that we are still not at the level we want to be at. Because if the attacks become frequent, which they will become frequent, in 2023 Namibia experienced 2.7 million cyber attacks. And thankfully, we’re able to contain the majority of them, and they did not do too much damage on our institutions and our economy. But we are seeing that the cyber attacks are becoming more sophisticated. The hackers are becoming smarter in the way they target our critical infrastructure. And we just do not always have the necessary funding to wield them off. So thank you for that question, and I hope I’ve painted the picture.

Mactar Seck: Thank you very much. This is a very comprehensive response. I think you are fully right. We need this discussion between the Global South and the Global North about this attack. You are right also on several policies put in place in the country to fight the cyber crime. Now, let me go back to Katherine. You have a long experience in Nairobi, in Kenya, as a representative in a cyber diplomacy group. For you, what are the key challenges and opportunities for African countries in this cyber diplomacy discussion?

Katherine Getao: Well, thank you very much for that question, Moktar, and I’ve been listening to my fellow panelists with interest. Now, I took part in three United Nations Group of Governmental Experts, the 2015, the 2017, and the COVID one that spread all the way from 2019 to 2021 because of the challenges. And I would say that the developing countries, even though there were a few countries represented, there were about three countries per group, although over the whole period there were around eight countries. But their contribution was very significant. First of all, I’d say in 2015, we were sort of disinterested parties because we had the big boys and big girls in the room and they had very clear interests. But Africa came in often as a moderating because we were just looking at the issues. The second thing I would say is that the OEWG was actually born from the 2017 group, even though there was no consensus in that group. There are 11 countries that met and said that we need to allow the whole world to participate in this dialogue because there is no country in the world now that does not have cyber activities in its economy, in society, in government, and therefore all countries should have a chance to participate in global policymaking. And this is even more true for Africa because we know that we have a very young population. 65% of our population is young and they are very digital. They have grown up with this technology. They use it all the time. If I think of Kenya, we use this technology from morning to evening and especially the young. From something as simple as paying for a bus ticket to health issues, our health system is now being managed on mobile to our money. So every part is affected. And when we either receive cyberattacks from inside or outside the country, or when we lose opportunity, for example, we’ve never been able to spread our technology in the whole world, the way you have Visa and MasterCard and the others. There are certain realities in the global field, which means that African technology is not spreading worldwide as it should. So we lose opportunities. So that effort of the developing countries, Senegal, Egypt, Kenya, to say no, not just a few countries, but the whole world was very important. And in the 2021 group, we saw how we could participate. Even it’s the last thing I’ll say, even as I’m participating in this meeting now, using teleconferencing, which means there didn’t have to be a huge investment. So the collaboration and the working together that we need to make cyber diplomacy and cybersecurity a reality on our continent. it does not have to be overly expensive. We can meet and form relationships using this technology in a more cost effective way. So I think there are huge, huge opportunities for Africa and that’s where I like to focus, even as I appreciate the importance of mitigating and defeating the risks created by cyber insecurity and cyber crime.

Mactar Seck: Thank you. Thank you very much. I think we know very well now the challenge, understand very well the challenge faced by African country to be part of this global negotiation and you provide also some takeaway for reflection. Honorable Susan, we learn from the Honorable Minister, we learn from the Honorable Minister, from Catherine and from Biaza, the global picture at the national level, at international level, as well as the challenge and opportunity. As a member of parliament of Malawi and also a member of the African parliamentary network, what role you have seen for the parliamentary in this discussion?

Susan Ndalama: Thank you very much, Doctor. As parliamentarians, we have a very crucial role that we play, especially in coming up with policies, regulations, legislations, as well as on the issues of governance. As members of parliament, most of the times we are left out on these issues and mostly maybe the executive would take up these issues and then maybe have negotiations with other nations, leaving us out as members of parliament. But when we want to come up with the legislation, we want to know what are the… issues that have been agreed upon, what have nations agreed upon, so that when you are coming up with the legislation, it should be in line with those negotiations. So as members of parliament, we belong to different committees. And I believe that if we are able to use these committees as, for instance, the international relations committee, the ICT committee, together with the defense committee, and maybe the trade committee, we should be able to come up with proper legislation, which will be able to, for different countries, to make sure that we are able also to learn from other countries. For instance, what is Namibia doing on issues of, on cyber security? What is Zambia or maybe the neighboring countries doing? So that when we are coming up with that legislation, it should be in line with what our neighbors are also having. We may come up with a legislation, for instance, in Malawi on cyber security. But then when we go to Namibia, we check their legislation. It’s totally, it’s talking differently about what we have in Malawi. For instance, we are talking about cyber security. Most of the issues are happening, not internally, but maybe outside Malawi. In that case, we would want Namibia to help us when those issues happen. How can we be able to come out to work with Namibia? We should be able to come up with a legislation, which will be, can be maybe from both sides, it will be something that will work from both sides. If something happens in Namibia, we should be able to collaborate. We talk to Namibia and say, this has happened and we have noted, this is coming from your country. Help us so that we can be able to. maybe to keep these issues of cyber security. So for me, I would believe that it’s not something that can be done by one stakeholder, but we need to work together with the executive, with CSOs and other non-government organizations to make sure that we collaborate and come up with the best for Africa. If we work in isolation, if we work, maybe the executive works on its own and then the legislators works on their own, then we will not be able to achieve what we want to achieve. So from my side, I would believe that we have the ball in our hands. We are the people that come up with the legislation. We have to be concerted. We have to be together in coming up with the best for Africa. We believe that as members of parliament, you have mentioned about APNIC. We are not only talking about one country in Africa, we are in all countries in Africa. And with that, we believe that we are representing the whole continent of Africa. So we should be able to work together and make sure that every member of parliament, as we have come here, we have learned something. We have discussed this issue. We go out there, share with our colleagues what can be done, what should be done, what can we as legislators take home and then work together as Africa. Otherwise, I think from my side, that’s what I can say. But we are very ready to come up with the best legislation. Namibia has mentioned here that they have come up with the best legislation on the same. So we should be ready to do that. Thank you very much. Thank you very much for that.

Mactar Seck: I think you can start the discussion now. No, you highlight very important thing. Collaboration is a key now in this cyber diplomacy space. Now I’m going to Tereza. As a Global Forum for Cyber Security Expert, you have a lot of initiatives in cyber diplomacy across the world. And also you work with several organizations like the UN Economic Commission for Africa. Can you highlight some key initiatives and their impact in the continent and also what you plan to do with UNECA on this initiative for next year to support better African countries?

Tereza Horejsova: Thank you very much for the question. In your intro, Mactar, you have mentioned a very scary number in terms of how much percentage cybercrime costs Africa, 10% of GDP. That is not a nice number. At the same time, we can observe that many digital projects that are being implemented in Africa, cyber security is still not as much at the focus as it should be. So there seems to be a little bit of a disconnect. And if there is something that we as the GFCE, the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise, can do in this respect, we will happily do it. Then how? We are a global organization, now over 200 members and partners from various stakeholder groups. We have governments, we have civil society, we have academia, technical community, private sector. Because as you have also mentioned, dear colleague, involvement of various stakeholders in covering this issue, it’s key. It’s not just a question for governments. Now, to zoom in a little bit more, what we felt in the last year is that it’s not us in the headquarters in the Hague who should be telling what countries need in terms of their cyber capacity building, so we are trying to decentralize much more and have a bit more demand driven to cyber capacity building which practically speaking happened through the creation of GFCE hubs, regional hubs and in the context of this session, I of course need to highlight the hub, the regional hub that we have for Africa whose director is Moctar Yedaly and also Martin Koyabe who are here at the IGF and who are working for the hub. What we are actually trying to do a little bit more on the regional level is to help connect the dots a little bit more, help to see if we can practically contribute to better matchmaking, less duplication of efforts because the hub can be those eyes and ears on the continent, can also pass the message you know further to the global community, to implementers and also to donors because very important work that we are trying to do at the GFCE also at the regional level is to work more with the donors so that they align their efforts because something that we’ve been hearing from not only Africa but many other continents is that the donor efforts are not coordinated, they are often ad hoc, they are not complementing each other as efficiently as they could. So that’s a little bit on the context but the bottom line is everything we do comes down to cyber capacity building and cyber capacity building is connected to another issue which is very simple, very practical but also the hardest one and that’s the question of financial resources because much more is needed. One concrete action that we are trying to do in this respect is throughout our efforts of the so-called Global Conference on Cyber Capacity Building GC3B which took its first edition place in Ghana, Accra last year and we will have the next one in Geneva in May. The outcome document of the conference has been the so-called Accra call, where we also try to really encourage global community to do some concrete action, which also, by the way, includes the question of unlocking more resources and also understanding that cyber security is really linked to digital resilience and development of countries in question. So other concrete, you know, points that I would really like to mention, especially as you have organized this question, is the MOU, the Memorandum of Understanding that we have signed with UNECA and we are really looking forward to working much more closely and complementing the efforts. I’m also very happy when Beyza mentioned the Women in Cyber project. Indeed, it’s one of those projects where we really believe that immersion does the magic, that we have helped facilitate on behalf of the funding governments participation of so many women from various regions, including Africa, to really get involved in the session of the Open Ended Working Group. So I will maybe stop here and happy to elaborate more in the discussion.

Mactar Seck: Thank you so much for highlighting all these key initiatives in the continent and we’re looking forward to our fruitful collaboration for next year. We already started the establishment of the Cyber Security Center in Togo also. We have to look at how we can include the cyber diplomacy component. Now let me open the floor for first round of observation or questions. Don’t hesitate, we have the experts here. You can ask any question, you will find the answer. I want to take the floor now for the first round of questions. Check online if you have a question.

Audience: Good afternoon, everybody. It’s all the points has been raised so far. So actually, I’m very happy with all the point that’s been raised so far. Well, I have one very good question. And the question goes like this. Since many African countries are highly dependent on foreign technology providers and their cyber security policies. This means that we are being shaped or influenced by SNF actors, including technology companies and foreign governments. What is Africa really doing to liberate himself from this autonomy in shaping its cyber diplomacy strategies and policies? Because I really want us to differentiate between collaboration and dependency. Thank you.

Mactar Seck: Another question. It is a new subject. You have to ask us questions to understand better.

Audience: My name is Francis from Kenya, the Communications Authority of Kenya, which is a regulator. Very interesting discussion from all the panelists. My question is about the need to balance between the need because cyber security issues are now matters of national.

Mactar Seck: Thank you. Let me go back to the panelist, and after I will come back to you. Any other questions here? All right, Honorable Minister, I give you the floor to answer to the second question. And the first one, I think anyone can provide input.

Emma Theofelus: Thank you very much, Mactar. Thank you very much for the question on the balance between national security and collaboration. I think I can liken it in terms of existing security cooperation between various countries. When it comes to, for example, cooperation of countries around Interpol and military exercises of one country being conducted in another country. Of course, one would hope that you don’t compromise your ability to deal with any. so-called enemy, should there be an attack on your national security infrastructure. But I think there is much more value in countries then sharing best practices and learning from one another, especially when there are no hostilities. And I think we can replicate the same around cyber security matters. Perhaps look at ways in which countries can try to strengthen their cyber security systems by allowing a so-called more advanced country to test their systems and possibly look at other ways in which to strengthen them. I think that’s the best way to do it, to do it when there is no time of crisis, when actually you have the ability to handle the situation, to do proper crisis management, when there is no real threat, but you do the necessary exercises to continuously test. It would be a tragedy for a country like Namibia to believe it has the best cyber security systems and then one day there comes a real threat and we don’t. I think I would rather know that we don’t have the best systems because we actually tested upon the best, who also believe they have the best security systems and we can test them. But I also wanted to add that in addition to cooperation with countries, it goes beyond national security matters. It also goes with legal matters. Imagine a hacker who has done significant damage in a country by hacking critical infrastructure, siphoning amounts of money or putting the country’s national security at risk and this person is apprehended in Malawi. It would be best to have a legal instrument between Namibia and Malawi in terms of prosecution. Either this person is prosecuted in Malawi and then served their sentence in Malawi or there is some level of cooperation between our two countries for this cyber criminal to be able to come to Namibia and face the Namibia’s prosecution courts and prisons. So I think those are some types of the cooperation that go beyond just infrastructure and go really around cooperation between our two countries. That if there is a cyber criminal in Malawi, Namibia must be able to claim that criminal so that they can face and face the law in Namibia. So I think those are ways we can cooperate without necessarily having the question of putting our national security at risk.

Mactar Seck: Thank you. For the first question, I think anyone can provide input. Let me start with Beyza for the first question.

Beyza Unal: For the first question, I think the importance in here is focusing on a multifaceted approach for self-sufficiency because the question was about how to decrease dependency to other actors and states. So I think one way of looking at it is really strengthening regional cooperation and also empowering local capabilities. So it would be important to create a cyber ecosystem at the national level, for instance, developing a robust cybersecurity infrastructure at the national level, but also regional and sub-regional levels with countries that are trustworthy, that the country itself trusts, I think should be able to easily cooperate with each other. Another important element of that self-sufficiency and linked to that, creating that cyber ecosystem is really setting up the the training and the education that is necessary for cyber professionals and training the new next generation of cyber professionals. And I think there are there are non-state actors, I mean, NGOs, I should say, not non-state actors, there are NGOs, there are academic organizations that could help with that capacity building to provide that training. So it doesn’t have to be coming directly from another government or country or representative. It could come from the multistakeholder community, which is, which is the good part of that discussion today, that like the role of the multistakeholder community. But it’s really all starts with how a state prioritizes its cyber related matters. So, you know, we could talk about critical infrastructure, there is no definition of a critical infrastructure, every country has different infrastructure for them to be named as critical. We, for instance, go to Singapore for cybersecurity fellowship that we hold there for for developing countries. One of the first things that Singapore says is that the water infrastructure is considered crucial and critical for Singapore. For some countries, it may not be right. So it’s important at the national level. While setting up those national policies to identify, what are the priorities and what are the priorities that need to be protected? What are the infrastructures that are considered critical? And in those infrastructures, what are the networks that need to be protected? Not all of the networks need to be protected under one critical infrastructure setting as well. So we need to also kind of triage, which elements of that needs to be protected. be protected as well. And then I think under that, you need to also establish layers of protection around data protection laws, for instance. And lastly, I would also say, for international cooperation purposes, you know, you can be self-sufficient, but also still relying on other countries, because in a globalized world, it’s impossible to be completely independent from others. And I think it’s not healthy as well. So as a country, it’s important to establish clear boundaries in which areas to share information, for instance, for international cooperation purposes. And if you could be able to do that as a state, then it becomes also easy to rely on countries in the areas that you would like to rely on and be self-sufficient in other areas.

Mactar Seck: Thank you. Thank you. Katherine, you want to add something?

Katherine Getao: Yes, please. So on the first question, yes, it is a concern that when you are totally dependent on the developed world for your technology, obviously, you have to follow the norms and the standards created by those technology providers. So I’d say there are three areas which I believe Africa still has a chance to assert itself, not only as a consumer of technology, but also somebody who drives technology. First is that cyber diplomacy, participating in the development of international policy, which will also affect and control these globalized companies. So part of the reason why Africa should really be involved in cyber diplomacy and international policy, cyber policymaking processes, is to make sure that the emerging policy is coherent with the needs and the priorities of Africa. Secondly, I think there is continental technology that’s coming up. And this is really a chance for Africa to put its money where its mouth is, and even have a preference for African technology, technology that is appropriate for our culture that has been locally developed, that will create jobs for young people in Africa. And this includes, I think several countries have tried to promote open source approaches to technology development. It hasn’t been very successful, but I don’t think we should give up. We should be moving towards an area where we are more in control of the technology that we consume. And lastly, I think Africa has a huge advantage in having the largest youthful population, people who are ready and available to have their capacity built and to become major players, not only in Africa, but globally in supporting systems, in providing cybersecurity, in innovating systems, and in creating the future, even in the adoption of new technologies. So if we have a strategic approach to technology, and not just a passive consumer-based approach, I believe we will address your issues. The only issue I would add on the second question is the issue of trust. It is impossible for countries to work together if they don’t trust each other. And so among our cyber diplomacy efforts, there must be trust building efforts to make sure that countries can trust each other when they need to work together on solving issues which are sensitive to their national security. Thank you.

Tereza Horejsova: If a country anywhere is dependent just on one donor, be it private sector actor or one government, it’s a vulnerable position to be in. And that’s why, again, you know, back to the point I made at the beginning of this session, investing resources in cyber capacity building is our global responsibility. It is not a smart approach, you know, if donors kind of count on others to step in because that can cause messy situations and kind of safer for everybody is if more actors are involved in providing resources and if they communicate with each other to provide the resources based on how the recipient countries define their needs because they know what they need. They don’t need to be taught what they need. Thank you.

Audience: I was not allowed to speak previously. Thank you for the chance and for the floor. So very exciting to hear the success story of the Namibia, the Honorable Minister Adepictus, the very initiative they are really doing on cyber diplomacy arena. They successfully really implemented different strategies even to combat, you know, and then safeguard the national, I’ll say 2.7 million attacks were really successfully contained because they really implemented the cyber diplomacy strategy for the national level. We know that cyber diplomacy is not about cyber security issues, it’s all about international cyber governance, cyber security collaboration, and it’s also digital rights and freedom, and it’s also an issue of economic and technological negotiation. Our Honorable Minister, I think your experience will be really a lesson for the rest of the African countries. So we have a shortage of human resource and human capital, a skilled human capital in this emerging field. How did you manage to bring this skilled manpower so that you incorporated all this essential cyber diplomacy components on board so that your national sovereignty is protected? So that would be really a good lesson for the rest of the African countries. Thank you, Mactar.

Mactar Seck: Thank you.

Audiece: Okay, good afternoon, everyone. My name is Sorin Assefa. I think my question is directed to Katherine. Having an experience as a government representative to be in this negotiation table, and as you know that I think only South Africa, Kenya, Mauritius, or Egypt, they are quite active in this diplomatic or UN norm-setting process. What do you think we should have as an innovative solution, converting our ambassadors or existing diplomat to cyber diplomacy, and most importantly, bridging the gap from New York to Geneva and all the way to the home of the African Union? What kind of capacity building strategy we should drive to ensure that with our limited resource, we are catching up with the rest of the world? Thank you.

Mactar Seck: Thank you, Sorin.

Audience: My name is Isad from Chad. I am Pan-African U.S. ambassador for Internet Governance at Pan-African U.S. I’ve been training at Pan-African U.S. for Internet Governance Fellowship, which has been initiated by my esteemed founder. So my question is mainly focused on capacity building, as my founder mentioned it. So what role can international partnership play in strengthening African cybersecurity infrastructure? And how should African nations approach such partnership diplomatically? Thank you.

Tereza Horejsova: Thank you very much. I’ll also try to be brief, because I know we will soon have to end. What the GFCE can offer, it depends also on how many members and partners from the continent we have. So there are, of course, many African countries that are already members of the GFCE, and there are many African organizations that are partners to the GFCE, not many. If we also get more on board, we can try to bring more voices of the African priorities in cyber capacity building to the global audience and encourage international cooperation that you have mentioned in your question. I would suggest that talk to Martin, who has joined us, because he can tell you really so much from the Africa hub point of view, how we can kind of leverage the needs of the continent further. So I hope it’s helpful for these things. And I have to mention, partnership and membership in the GFCE, it’s for free, yes. It’s not like a paid partnership.

Mactar Seck: But we do encourage to have more on board to kind of help us push the mission. OK, Katherine, please.

Katherine Getao: So how can we leverage on the existing meetings? Firstly, I think there are people who are making efforts. GFCE, who have just told us what they do, have done a lot of training, especially at the regional level. DiploFoundation, also supported by GIZ, have also been training the regional bodies and also the AU to make sure that diplomats, because in many cases for African countries, you can’t afford to send a fresh person. So it is usually the in-country diplomat who is already in the UN mission of that country who participates in that process. And if they are not well versed in cyber issues, of course, they will be handicapped. Many of them are also quite overloaded with work in many committees at the UN. So continued capacity building and support of the diplomats who are already at the missions could be an important strategy. And this doesn’t always have to be done face to face, which is expensive. It can also be done through online trainings and courses, which they can follow. We’ve also been trying to influence the foreign service academies, which they have in various countries, and get them to take up these kinds of capacity building activities, whether they’re drawing on the resources which have already been done by GFCE or DiploFoundation, or whether they are supported to develop bespoke courses which are relevant. So the foreign service academies are already there in country, so it will be a matter of building their capacity to also support their diplomats who are coming into the service in the area of cyber diplomacy. The third thing I’ll mention is there usually has to be a lot of collaboration between the technical agencies, such as the CERTs and the cyber security agencies, some of the ICT agencies in country, both in the public sector and private, and also the diplomats who are going to represent the country in these processes. So supporting in-country exercises and in-country trainings that bring all these agencies together so that you familiarize them, you build trust between them, means that you will have higher quality representatives participating in these global processes, because they can also consult. If they know their colleagues at home in the technical sphere or in the diplomatic sphere, depending on who is representing the country, they are quickly able to get the kind of backstop support that they need as they participate in global processes. So those are just a few of the suggestions that I can make that would help us quickly get up to speed. and to participate more effectively and even more aggressively in international processes. Thank you very much.

Susan Ndalama: As parliamentarians, we want to be capacitated with information on how best we can handle these issues. You have rightly said this is a new thing that has just come up and as parliamentarians, we have to be aligned to what our role should be especially when we are coming up with legislation. So we need more capacity building sessions to make sure that we are in line, we are aligned to this and as well as we should be able to have the skills on how we can be part of this cyber diplomacy. Thank you.

Mactar Seck: Thank you. I’ll give the floor now to the Honorable Minister to answer the question and your final remark before we conclude.

Emma Theofelus: Thank you so much Mactar and thank you to the question by Dr. Dereje Yohannes. Thank you. You asked how Namibia has in the meantime been able to defend off some of the cyber attacks especially the ones we experienced last year and of course the one we are now able to handle that just came up with our largest telecommunication company. Well the first one was to ensure we have the right legislation in place. I indicated that we have the cyber security strategy which outlines everybody’s role from public sector actors to private sector actors to civil society and where that money will be coming from and at this point in time it’s mostly coming from treasury. but we’re hoping that we find other alternative ways to get the necessary funding to put the systems in place to support our efforts. Secondly, we have at our National University of Science and Technology, we have a department for Informatics and Computing and there is a four-year degree course on cyber security that has definitely increased the capacity in-country of cyber security graduates and cyber security experts in the country to be able to, one, be able to be deployed in the various institutions, whether in the public sector or private sector, but to have this in-country capacity. But I must also add that we are not yet satisfied because the cyber security space is constantly changing. We need more and more experts, even with the ones we are graduating, we need more. But we also need those that are able to handle the ever-changing landscape, which means we need more that will be working and others that will be continuously studying to ensure that they are constantly capacitated to handle these incidences. So we have mitigated the best we could now, but there is definitely more to be done and it’s a continuous process. Like I said, it’s, you know, investment intensive. It requires one actively prioritizing that we’re going to put X amount of million Namibian dollars to ensure that the necessary skill set in the country exists and to ensure that we’re able to mitigate any cyber incidences. And finally, I’d like to thank UNECA and all partners for convening this very important discussion. But I want to emphasize truly that when it comes to multilateralism and the Global North and Global South conversation about the financing of cyber security interventions, we must look at the various contributing factors as to why developing countries are unable to prioritise cyber security, where they are unable to put the necessary financing in place, where they are unable to put courses in their national universities with experts, and this comes down to the ability of those countries to service some of their international financing loans, which attract higher interest more than any other countries on the planet, and the ability for these countries to prioritise because many times they are repaying loans as opposed to investing in areas that matter to protect their critical infrastructure.

Mactar Seck: Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Honourable Minister, and we are at the end of this session. Now, for takeaway, we agreed during the discussion that cyber diplomacy, the key objective is to enhance global security at the national level, regional and the world level. It is one key objective of this cyber diplomacy. Also, to promote safeguard in the cyber space, it is something very important we discuss, as well as to safeguard human rights, because we have the direct link between cybersecurity and human rights. And for that, following the several discussions, we can have some key recommendations. First, for that, we need to put in place the right strategy, like what Namibia is doing now. Also, we have to foster international collaboration to increase participation in Africa in the global discussion on the cyber diplomacy. Second recommendation, capacity building is a key, and we need to build the capacity of all actors, starting by the policy making, the parliamentarian, law judicial corps, all people involved in this digital space should be, their capacity should be built. Another point, it is we have to build trust, because when we talk about international collaboration without trust, it will not work. We need to build trust at the national level first, at the sub-regional and the continental level. And also, we need to improve the collaboration between private and partnership forces, private and public sector, we need to collaborate together to put in place the right infrastructure, because we need also to develop the norm and the standard, which is very important in terms of cybersecurity. It is some key takeaways from this meeting. This session, I would like to thank all the panelists for their very good insights. I learned a lot from them today. And thank you once again for the members of the panel, and the round of applause of them. Thank you also, participants, for your active participation.

Agreement Points

Importance of cyber diplomacy

Mactar Seck

Emma Theofelus

Tereza Horejsova

Katherine Getao

Beyza Unal

Cyber diplomacy addresses intersection of cybersecurity and international relations

Involves ability of states and stakeholders to discuss cybersecurity challenges

Focuses on how governments handle new diplomatic topics related to cyberspace

Provides framework for collaboration between states, private sector, and civil society

Entails diplomatic tools to address cyberspace issues like treaties and norms

All speakers agreed on the importance of cyber diplomacy as a means to address cybersecurity challenges through international cooperation and dialogue.

Need for capacity building

Emma Theofelus

Tereza Horejsova

Susan Ndalama

Need for funding and prioritization of cybersecurity amid competing interests

Need for capacity building and training of cyber professionals

Invest in capacity building for all relevant actors

Multiple speakers emphasized the importance of capacity building and training in cybersecurity to enhance cyber diplomacy efforts.

Multi-stakeholder engagement

Emma Theofelus

Katherine Getao

Susan Ndalama

Importance of multi-stakeholder engagement including private sector

Provides framework for collaboration between states, private sector, and civil society

Parliamentarians play crucial role in policies and legislation

Several speakers highlighted the importance of involving various stakeholders, including the private sector, civil society, and parliamentarians, in cyber diplomacy efforts.

Similar Viewpoints

Both speakers emphasized the need for strategic approaches and international collaboration to enhance Africa’s participation in global cyber diplomacy discussions.

Mactar Seck

Emma Theofelus

Put in place right strategy, like what Namibia is doing now. Also, we have to foster international collaboration to increase participation in Africa in the global discussion on the cyber diplomacy.

Improve public-private partnerships

Both speakers stressed the importance of building trust and strengthening cooperation at various levels to enhance cyber diplomacy efforts.

Katherine Getao

Beyza Unal

Build trust at national, regional and continental levels

Importance of strengthening regional cooperation and local capabilities

Unexpected Consensus

Role of youth in cyber initiatives

Katherine Getao

Need to involve youth population in cyber initiatives

While not explicitly mentioned by other speakers, Katherine Getao’s emphasis on involving the young population in cyber initiatives was an unexpected point that could have significant implications for the future of cyber diplomacy in Africa.

Overall Assessment

Summary

The speakers generally agreed on the importance of cyber diplomacy, the need for capacity building, multi-stakeholder engagement, and international collaboration. There was also consensus on the challenges faced by African countries in participating in global cyber diplomacy discussions and the need for strategic approaches to address these challenges.

Consensus level

High level of consensus among speakers, with agreement on key issues and challenges. This consensus suggests a shared understanding of the importance of cyber diplomacy for Africa and the need for concerted efforts to enhance African participation in global cyber diplomacy discussions. The implications of this consensus include potential for coordinated action among African countries to strengthen their cyber diplomacy capabilities and increase their influence in international cybersecurity negotiations.

Different Viewpoints

Approach to reducing dependency on foreign technology

Beyza Unal

Katherine Getao

Importance of strengthening regional cooperation and local capabilities

Opportunity for Africa to exploit emerging technologies and innovation

While both speakers emphasize the importance of local capabilities, Beyza Unal focuses on regional cooperation, while Katherine Getao emphasizes exploiting emerging technologies and innovation.

Unexpected Differences

Overall Assessment

summary

The main areas of disagreement were subtle and primarily focused on different emphases rather than outright contradictions. Speakers generally agreed on the importance of cyber diplomacy, capacity building, and regional cooperation, but had slightly different approaches or focus areas.

difference_level

The level of disagreement among the speakers was low. This suggests a general consensus on the importance of cyber diplomacy for Africa and the need for increased participation and capacity building. The slight differences in emphasis may actually be complementary, potentially leading to a more comprehensive approach to cyber diplomacy in Africa.

Partial Agreements

Both speakers agree on the need for investment in cybersecurity, but Emma Theofelus emphasizes the challenge of securing funding amid competing national priorities, while Tereza Horejsova focuses on the specific need for capacity building and training.

Emma Theofelus

Tereza Horejsova

Need for funding and prioritization of cybersecurity amid competing interests

Need for capacity building and training of cyber professionals

Similar Viewpoints

Both speakers emphasized the need for strategic approaches and international collaboration to enhance Africa’s participation in global cyber diplomacy discussions.

Mactar Seck

Emma Theofelus

Put in place right strategy, like what Namibia is doing now. Also, we have to foster international collaboration to increase participation in Africa in the global discussion on the cyber diplomacy.

Improve public-private partnerships

Both speakers stressed the importance of building trust and strengthening cooperation at various levels to enhance cyber diplomacy efforts.

Katherine Getao

Beyza Unal

Build trust at national, regional and continental levels

Importance of strengthening regional cooperation and local capabilities

Key Takeaways

Cyber diplomacy is crucial for enhancing global cybersecurity at national, regional and international levels

Africa faces challenges in cyber diplomacy including low participation in international negotiations and lack of resources

Capacity building is essential for improving Africa’s cyber diplomacy capabilities

Multi-stakeholder collaboration and trust-building are key for effective cyber diplomacy

Africa has opportunities to assert itself in shaping cyber policies and technologies

Resolutions and Action Items

Put in place comprehensive national cybersecurity strategies

Increase African participation in global cyber diplomacy discussions

Invest in capacity building for policymakers, parliamentarians, and technical experts

Develop public-private partnerships to strengthen cybersecurity infrastructure

Create and implement cyber-related legislation and regulatory frameworks

Unresolved Issues

How to secure adequate funding for cybersecurity initiatives in African countries with competing priorities

How to reduce dependency on foreign technology providers while building local capabilities

How to effectively bridge the gap between technical experts and diplomats in cyber negotiations

How to increase the number of skilled cyber professionals in African countries

Suggested Compromises

Balancing national security concerns with international collaboration on cybersecurity

Leveraging existing diplomatic missions for cyber diplomacy while building specialized cyber expertise

Utilizing both in-person and online training to build capacity cost-effectively

Combining local technology development with strategic international partnerships

Why cyber security is a key challenge in the continent? Because when we look at the negative impact in term of economic, cyber crime cost to 10% of the Africa GDP.

speaker

Mactar Seck

reason

This comment sets the stage for the entire discussion by highlighting the massive economic impact of cybercrime in Africa, emphasizing the urgency of addressing cybersecurity issues.

impact

It framed the subsequent discussion around the economic implications of cybersecurity and the need for Africa to take action.

Cyber diplomacy basically is how do governments handle new topics that have emerged on the diplomatic agenda in the recent years and how they kind of defend their interest in cyberspace in this respect.

speaker

Tereza Horejsova

reason

This concise definition of cyber diplomacy helps ground the discussion in concrete terms and highlights the governmental aspect.

impact

It shifted the conversation towards discussing specific governmental actions and international cooperation in cybersecurity.

In Namibia, we have tried very hard to start with the right foundations because cyber security matters are moving so fast and so quickly that sometimes countries, and especially developing countries, cannot catch up very quickly in terms of ensuring the right legislation is in place, ensuring that it has the right experts in country to deal with possible incidences, having the right equipment and software sometimes because of the lack of funding and the competing interests in country.

speaker

Emma Theofelus

reason

This comment provides a real-world example of the challenges faced by African countries in implementing cybersecurity measures, highlighting the complexity of the issue.

impact

It deepened the discussion by introducing practical challenges and the need for comprehensive strategies, leading to more detailed exploration of capacity building and resource allocation.

Even as I’m participating in this meeting now, using teleconferencing, which means there didn’t have to be a huge investment. So the collaboration and the working together that we need to make cyber diplomacy and cybersecurity a reality on our continent does not have to be overly expensive.

speaker

Katherine Getao

reason

This comment introduces an innovative perspective on how technology itself can be leveraged to overcome resource constraints in cyber diplomacy.

impact

It shifted the conversation towards more practical, cost-effective solutions for increasing African participation in global cyber diplomacy discussions.

Since many African countries are highly dependent on foreign technology providers and their cyber security policies. This means that we are being shaped or influenced by SNF actors, including technology companies and foreign governments. What is Africa really doing to liberate himself from this autonomy in shaping its cyber diplomacy strategies and policies?

speaker

Audience member

reason

This question challenges the panel to address the issue of technological dependency and its impact on Africa’s cyber diplomacy autonomy.

impact

It led to a deeper discussion about self-sufficiency, regional cooperation, and the need for Africa to develop its own technological capabilities and policies.

Overall Assessment

These key comments shaped the discussion by progressively deepening the analysis of cyber diplomacy in Africa. They moved the conversation from defining the problem and its economic impact to exploring practical challenges, innovative solutions, and the need for African autonomy in cybersecurity. The discussion evolved from theoretical concepts to real-world applications, emphasizing the importance of capacity building, resource allocation, and regional cooperation. The comments also highlighted the tension between the need for international collaboration and the desire for African countries to develop their own capabilities and policies in the cyber realm.

How can African countries decrease dependency on foreign technology providers and shape their own cyber diplomacy strategies?

speaker

Audience member (Dr. Yohannes)

explanation

This is important to ensure African countries have autonomy in shaping their cyber policies and are not overly influenced by external actors.

How can countries balance national security concerns with the need for international collaboration on cybersecurity?

speaker

Audience member (Francis from Kenya)

explanation

This balance is crucial for effective cyber diplomacy while protecting national interests.

What innovative solutions can be implemented to convert existing diplomats to cyber diplomacy and bridge the gap between different international forums?

speaker

Audience member (Sorin Assefa)

explanation

This is important for increasing African representation and effectiveness in international cyber diplomacy negotiations.

What role can international partnerships play in strengthening African cybersecurity infrastructure?

speaker

Audience member (Isad from Chad)

explanation

International partnerships could be key to addressing resource and expertise gaps in African cybersecurity.

How can African countries approach international partnerships diplomatically in the context of cybersecurity?

speaker

Audience member (Isad from Chad)

explanation

This is important for ensuring mutually beneficial and respectful partnerships in cybersecurity.

How can African countries find alternative ways to fund cybersecurity efforts beyond relying on national treasuries?

speaker

Emma Theofelus

explanation

This is crucial for sustaining and expanding cybersecurity initiatives in resource-constrained environments.

How can the impact of international financing loans and debt repayment on African countries’ ability to invest in cybersecurity be addressed?

speaker

Emma Theofelus

explanation

This is important for understanding and addressing systemic barriers to cybersecurity investment in African countries.

Summary

This discussion focused on the future of digital governance and the challenges facing the Global South in the digital age. Experts from various fields shared insights on topics including linguistic diversity, business social networks, digital sovereignty, and the role of youth in shaping digital policies.

The Global Digital Compact (GDC) was a central theme, with speakers discussing its potential to address digital divides and promote inclusive development. However, concerns were raised about the influence of large tech companies and the need for more effective international collaboration. The importance of bridging language barriers and preserving linguistic diversity online was emphasized as crucial for global digital inclusion.

Speakers highlighted the need for affordable and universal connectivity, especially in underserved regions. The role of energy infrastructure in enabling digital access was discussed, with examples of nuclear power projects supporting connectivity in remote areas. The challenges of digital colonialism were addressed, with calls for empowering local digital ecosystems and promoting data sovereignty.

Legal and regulatory issues surrounding big tech companies were explored, including recent antitrust cases and the difficulties in holding global platforms accountable across jurisdictions. The importance of considering cultural and social norms when implementing digital policies was stressed.

Youth representation in digital governance was emphasized as critical, with speakers advocating for meaningful engagement of young people in decision-making processes. The discussion concluded with reflections on the need for a balanced approach to digital governance, combining multi-stakeholder engagement with appropriate government oversight to create a fair and inclusive digital future.

Keypoints

Major discussion points:

– The challenges of implementing the Global Digital Compact, including resistance from big tech companies and differing technological capabilities between countries

– The need to bridge digital divides and avoid digital neocolonialism, especially for the Global South

– The role of youth voices and multistakeholder engagement in digital governance

– Legal and regulatory challenges in holding big tech companies accountable across different jurisdictions

– Russia’s experiences developing domestic IT solutions and digital sovereignty in response to sanctions

Overall purpose:

The discussion aimed to examine the implications of the Global Digital Compact and explore ways to create a more equitable digital future, especially for developing countries, while considering perspectives from different stakeholders including youth, industry, and government.

Tone:

The tone was generally serious and analytical, with speakers providing expert perspectives on complex policy issues. There were moments of optimism about potential solutions, but also notes of skepticism about the challenges ahead. The youth perspective brought a more hopeful and forward-looking tone to the latter part of the discussion.

Speakers

– Vasily Zudin: Moderator, representative of the Center for Global IT Cooperation

– Olga Makarova: Director of the Department of Commercial Resource Management at MTS

– Semyon Tenyaev: Russian IT entrepreneur, investor, head of the BBC group of companies, founder of TenChat social network

– Milos Jovanovic: Representative of Open Link Group

– Roberto Zambrana: MAG member, experienced in multi-stakeholder engagements

– Pavel Zakharov: Member of the Internet Technological Association, experienced in combating disinformation and fact-checking

– Alim: Co-moderator for second part of discussion

– Bogdan Chernyshov: Head of the Rosatom Youth Council

– Alexandra Kozina: Lawyer in dispute resolution and mediation practice at Art Deluxe

– Saba Tiku Beyene: Member of IGF Multi-Stakeholder Advisory Group, youth representative

– Vadim Glushenko: Director of the Center for Global IT Cooperation

Additional speakers:

– AUDIENCE: Unidentified audience member who spoke

The discussion focused on the future of digital governance and the challenges facing the Global South in the digital age. Experts from various fields shared insights on topics including linguistic diversity, business social networks, digital sovereignty, and the role of youth in shaping digital policies.

Global Digital Compact and Digital Divides

The Global Digital Compact (GDC) emerged as a central theme, with speakers discussing its potential to address digital divides and promote inclusive development. Milos Jovanovic highlighted the GDC’s capacity to foster economic growth in developing countries. However, concerns were raised about the influence of large tech companies and the need for more effective international collaboration. Vadim Glushenko pointed out that GDC implementation faces resistance from tech giants and inequality between countries.

Saba Tiku Beyene emphasised the need to balance a multistakeholder approach with government participation in the GDC. This view contrasted somewhat with Glushenko’s emphasis on the challenges posed by tech giants’ resistance, suggesting that government involvement may face significant obstacles.

Linguistic Diversity and Digital Inclusion

The importance of bridging language barriers and preserving linguistic diversity online was emphasised as crucial for global digital inclusion. Olga Makarova provided an in-depth presentation on language barriers on the internet, highlighting how they hinder access to knowledge. She discussed the potential of machine translation technologies to address this aspect of the digital divide, while also noting the challenges in preserving linguistic diversity and cultural nuances in digital spaces.

Digital Sovereignty and Fragmentation

The challenges of digital colonialism were addressed, with calls for empowering local digital ecosystems and promoting data sovereignty. Olga Makarova expressed concerns about internet fragmentation risks due to geopolitical tensions and payment restrictions. Semyon Tenyaev presented on the TenChat social network, advocating for decentralized social networks to protect national data sovereignty while enabling global connectivity.

Structure and Operations of Big Tech Companies

Alexandra Kozina provided a detailed presentation on the structure and operations of big tech companies globally. She discussed recent antitrust cases and fines against major tech companies, particularly focusing on Google’s practices. Kozina emphasised that tech giants need to consider cultural differences and local laws when operating globally, highlighting the complexities of regulating these companies across different jurisdictions.

Combating Disinformation

Pavel Zakharov briefly touched on the topic of disinformation, arguing that current approaches to fighting it are often ineffective and risk censorship. He advocated for a focus on education and cooperation rather than restrictions, stating, “The best way to make your armor against disinformation is to know more.” Zakharov also mentioned the importance of fact-checking in combating misinformation.

Youth Engagement and Multistakeholder Approach

Youth representation in digital governance was emphasised as critical. Ms. Sabatikou stressed the importance of integrating youth voices, stating, “Young people are not just stakeholders in digital governance, but rather we are the agents of change.” She advocated for meaningful engagement of young people in decision-making processes related to digital policies.

Center for Global IT Cooperation Initiatives

Vadim Glushenko presented on the activities and initiatives of the Center for Global IT Cooperation. He discussed the organization’s efforts to promote international dialogue on digital governance issues and its work on various projects related to the Global Digital Compact.

Rosatom’s Digital Projects

Bogdan Chernyshov provided an overview of Rosatom’s various projects, highlighting the company’s involvement in digital initiatives beyond its core nuclear energy business. This presentation offered insights into how traditional industries are adapting to and contributing to the digital landscape.

Unresolved Issues and Future Challenges

The discussion highlighted several unresolved issues, including:

1. Effectively implementing the Global Digital Compact given resistance from tech giants and inequality between countries

2. Balancing multistakeholder approach with increased government participation in digital governance

3. Addressing payment restrictions that risk internet fragmentation

4. Effectively regulating big tech companies across different jurisdictions

5. Combating disinformation while preserving freedom of expression

The discussion concluded by emphasizing the need for a balanced approach to digital governance, combining multi-stakeholder engagement with appropriate government oversight. Speakers stressed the importance of international cooperation, youth involvement, and innovative solutions to address linguistic barriers and promote digital sovereignty. The complexity of the issues discussed underscores the need for continued dialogue and collaboration to create a fair, inclusive, and sustainable digital future for all.

Vasily Zudin: Yeah, I think that I check speakers, speakers online. I didn’t speak to anybody on the phone. Dear colleagues, do you hear me? Is it okay? Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Okay. Dear colleagues, members of the IGF community, it’s a pleasure for me to be here, to be with us. It’s a pleasure to be part of this company. Once again, the fourth time in my career. I would also like to thank the hosting country of Saudi Arabia for organizing the forum at such a magnificent venue. My name is Vasili Zudin. I represent the Center for Global IT Cooperation, a Moscow-based organization which aims to foster valuable ICT connections across continent for a brighter and more just digital future for all of us. We annually contribute to the activities of the IGF and also operate as an NRI actor, hosting Russia IGF and its youth version since 2021. Voice of expert community, representative of the government sector, private business and youth, therefore of great significance to us. It is our aim after all to build bridges of IT cooperation and to promote new approaches to internet governance. Today we have a list of highly experienced experts with us on the panel who hopefully share their versions of the digital technological world after the global digital compact and the future of ICT sector development in the global south. GDS is an ambiguous document that at the same time caused a wave of discussions and disputes. A great many still disagree with numerous points of the Compact, with the function that was granted to big tech companies, and the fact that the Compact is in fact a soft law document not affecting the real states of affairs. However, today we are not here to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the GDC. We have gathered to understand where our digital world is moving next and what problems we have yet to solve. I believe it is paramount to seek ways how we can bridge growing digital divides and avoid the new era of digital neocolonialism, where few control the resources and limited opportunities for the rest. Through engaging in meaningful discussion and most importantly technologies and right action we can strike a balance between private interests, government policies, and interests of users. With that focal point in mind, I would like to pass my word to our first speaker, Olga Makarova, Director of the Department of Commercial Resource Management at MTS. Olga is an active member of the IGF community who even proposed several years ago her own unique mathematical formula to calculate the level of internet fragmentation. Today she wants to offer us the solution for the language barriers on the web at the same time preserving linguistic diversity. Olga, the stage is yours and the mic is yours too.

Olga Makarova: Thank you. Just a moment. Hello. Let’s start with a quick introduction. My name is Olga Makarova. I am the Director of the Department of Commercial Resource Management at MTS. Hello. Let’s start with a quick introduction. Does anyone know how many languages there are in the world? According to the Ethnologue, there are about 7168 living languages. That’s awesome. Linguistic diversity provides the key to other cultures and makes the world a more vibrant place. However, linguistic diversity also has a downside. We can hardly find a person who speaks all languages. So we often have to use the dominant language to communicate. But people whose native language is not the dominant language in their community are often reluctant to speak publicly, for fear of being misunderstood. In the world of linguistic diversity, language barriers are inevitable. Today the dominant language in the world is English. Here are languages of the most famous authors. 67% of the works are written in English. The top 101 books were written by writers from Kenya and Nigeria. But the most famous books were written in English. In 1998, the Zimbabwe International Book Fair, Ali Mazri, launched the project 100 Best African Books of the 20th Century. The project aimed to compile a list of the 100 best books by African writers to draw the world’s attention to their works. The list was published in February 2002. And only five books from this list were translated into Russian language. All these books were English. Does anyone know how many Russian books have been translated into languages understandable to people living in Africa? All my attempts to find such figures have failed. So, English has been and remains the dominant language, including on the Internet. People with limited English proficiency face additional barriers to accessing it. knowledge. Another important area where language barriers need to be removed healthcare. Healthcare providers and their patients often speak different languages. Language barriers are a common problem in healthcare settings around the world. Misunderstanding or failure to communicate are the main cause of incorrect diagnosis and dramatic consequences of incorrect treatment. On the slide you can see some figures by country but what about qualified interpreters to communicate in such cases? This is not an option. The lack of legal framework qualified interpreters especially for rare languages and financial constraints do not allow this to be used. Machine translation where users write or speak sentences and they are instantly translated seems like a viable way to break down language barrier. The slide shows some statistics on machine translation accuracy by language groups. As you can see the accuracy of machine translation is significantly higher for European language groups. We still lack the data to proper translation in African groups. Some data from Goldman Sachs and Stanford University estimate that by 2025 investments in AI will reach 200 billion dollars. Stanford University’s artificial intelligence index report notes that the most significant AI machine learning systems released in 2022 the most common class of systems were language-based. Some historical facts. In early 2000s some IT companies used the meaning text model and explanatory combinatorial dictionary to create their own machine translation systems. The goal of such systems was a universal semantic hierarchy. which was a huge tree of concepts built from the general to the specific. Google Translate was launched in 2006. At first, it worked very poorly and generated memes rather than translation. But it was created with little or no input from linguists. Google Translate has used and continues to use a different approach, statistical. Complex language models were discarded and forgotten. Huge amounts of data became the basis. The price was scalability. In 2009, people from the Google team published a paper called The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Data. The title of the article echoes the title of the article The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Nature of Sciences, written by physicist Eugene Wigner in 1960. The author knows that sciences involve people rather than elementary particles. They have proven more resilient to elegant mathematics. In the paper, they explain why in complex theory we will never succeed in processing language. They demonstrate that simple models and large amounts of data are much more effective than complex models with insufficient data. They would advise to follow the data and choose a representation that can use unsupervised learning or unlabeled data. In 2019, Canadian computer scientist Richard Sutton published a paper called A Bitter Lesson. He writes, we have to learn the bitter lessons that building in how the thing does not work in the long run. He concludes that only two methods can make scaling successful, searching, search and learning. To follow these guidelines, we need the single, open and unfragmented Internet capable of handling massive volumes of cross-border data flows. But the Internet always been and remains a set of structurally fragmented but interconnected autonomous systems. Only the Internet protocols and the ability of different stakeholders’ networks to interconnect make the Internet a single, open, and unfragmented public online environment. So our networks need to be able to connect and interconnect, but no one connects or interconnects without paying. Therefore, we need to be able to pay for services we need. But today we see a new type of stakeholders. These are banks. Banks have their own compliance procedures for assessing the legality and appropriateness of payment, which do not take into account the threats and consequences of Internet fragmentation. Many banks block many payments for communication, interconnection, and Internet services from Russia and some other areas without any explanation from their side. The risks of Internet fragmentation are not taken into account. But if one party fails to pay for services, this will result in the termination of agreements, termination of all services, and breaking down all connections. The Russian language segment of the Internet and other segments of the Internet connected to the global Internet through Russia may be separated. The result will be the technical level fragmentation. Banks don’t want to achieve anything in terms of Internet fragmentation. They just don’t think about it. It’s just not their business. Bank managers are confident that no one will blame them if the Internet fragments. But they are terrified that one wrong payment due to sanctions, or more precisely, due to the bank’s compliance manager’s understanding of sanction policy, will prove fatal to both their careers and their banking business. Alas, we are witnessing a perfect example of my slow inaction. Where I spend depends on where you sit. We don’t have a suitable solution today, the range of stakeholders turned out to be wider. You can see an example of the impact of such measures on the Internet. Today carriers and users from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and some other countries get the cheapest and fastest access to the European segment of the Internet only through Russia due to their geographical location. Their Internet business may also suffer. It would be advisable to provide for some certification procedures of carriers through the ITU, which would allow them to pay for telecommunication and Internet services without additional checks and assessment by banks. The geopolitical situation is changing dramatically. The problem with payment may affect different countries, not only Russia. Let’s try to work together. Let’s try to keep the Internet open and unpunctuated. Thank you.

Vasily Zudin: Olga, thank you very much for your highly informative input. I’m proud of the fact that we can share our own experience here on this stage. As you mentioned, Russia is actively developing its own linguistic segment of the Internet. We also have our own Cyrillic TLD. Speaking of all things Russian and Cyrillic, our next speaker is a newcomer to the IGS community, yet he has his own highly competitive digital product, which he looks forward to sharing with the world. Semyon Teneyev is a Russian IT entrepreneur, investor, head of the BBC group of companies and most importantly, founder of TenChat social network. Semyon, what makes your social network so different from other major players and how do you intend to promote it across the countries of global youth? The microphone is yours, please.

Semyon Teneyev: Yeah, thank you. Hello everyone, madame, monsieur, ladies and gentlemen. Okay, let’s discuss about future of business social network or maybe how I see, how can I see this goal so if we discuss about personal data, big data platform, social networks, it means that future all over the world will be not in one area, it will be many, many centers of information. Mostly it depends of structure of data, cause the main reason of all system is that the data is a new gold in all systems. What I mean, mostly countries use free source or absolutely free programs and don’t pay any money, but we need to understand that if you don’t pay nothing, you pay by information and all information cost money. So it’s in new age, on new century, I can, I want to repeat one more time, the data become the new gold. So what’s the main, What are the main global challenges we have now in this area? Firstly, as my colleague said before, it’s ensuring country sovereignty. Also, protection of personal data, development of own technology, and access to global B2B market and global human market. So, in our business social network, which become the biggest one on Russian market and some markets on Soviet Union countries’ border, we think that business social network can be much useful than original social network like Facebook and other one, because the main goal, which can connect people from many countries, it’s job, it’s trading, it’s deals, because everyone need to pay salary, to make money for their family. So, one of the way to structure such kind of application is global investments. So, we develop our application as super app with mostly effective way to make deals across the country. We include B2B marketplace. trading platform, tenders platform with government contracts, job vacancy, investment platform, and so it’s our new view how to make global social business network. Otherwise, we make the unique offer to other country. We go in by absolutely new way how to take new markets by TenChart. We give it by license to countries. So all over the world, we make the first decentralized global social network which each country have its own part in that territory. So it make a big opportunities because the personal data will stay on the country, investments stay in the country, people find the best job in their country. So it’s make every country more standard without a global leader. So it’s one of the little piece of our system. Thank you.

Vasily Zudin: Semyon, thank you very much for your informative input. May I ask you one more question? What features do you believe TenChart and Russian tech in general may offer to the developing world? Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.

Semyon Teneyev: One of the features we connect to the social network, to business social network, tender platform. What it means? We know that the most countries have a big part of government economy inside. For example, it means tenders, some kind of deals with government, and sometimes nobody knows about this and don’t have information. And we’re trying to connect people, business, and government in one app. Not only people and business. We connect all three sides. I repeat one more, business, people, and government in one application.

Vasily Zudin: Thank you very much. Thank you, Semyon, for your really interesting reports. It’s fantastic. Dear Milos, it is pleasant to see you in Riyadh, especially among our speakers, and you are also a major contributor to IJS processes. Open Link Group is quite active in Europe, Asia, and Africa. What is your view concerning the global digital combat, and most importantly, how may Global South, in your view, benefit from it?

Milos Jovanovic: So thank you very much, Vasily, for this introduction. Ladies and gentlemen, it’s truly an honor to be here in Riyadh among such distinguished experts and leaders. I would like to extend my gratitude to our hosts and organizers for facilitating this vital dialogue on the future of the digital world. No? How it works? Yeah, it’s okay? Okay. For the future of the digital world, when discussing the Global Digital Compact, I see it not just as a framework, but as a vision for shaping a more inclusive and equitable digital future. The Compact holds the promise of addressing some of the most pressing challenges we face today, particularly for the Global South. For many developing countries, like Serbia, where I came from, the Compact could become a catalyst for change, bridging the digital divide, reducing inequality and fostering economic growth. To achieve this, three key priorities stand out. First, we must ensure affordable and universal connectivity. There is a big problem, and we discuss always this topic. Speaking about Africa, for example, when we attended IGF in Addis Ababa, one of the key topics was connectivity of Africa, because we know that Africa is not a well-connected continent, speaking about some countries which don’t have universal access to internet, and that’s the big problem. So access to internet is no longer a luxury. It is a fundamental driver of education, healthcare and economic opportunity. And when we speak about healthcare, I personally participated in some projects in Balkans and Serbia, speaking about digitalization of healthcare industry, and it’s very important if you have opportunity to have a really good connection, I mean, speaking about digital technologies, with your doctor, speaking about electronic health records, about everything what modern healthcare industry could offer to you. So second, the compact should encourage investments in local digital ecosystems. And this is really important, speaking about fragmentation and digital fragmentation processes. We must empower entrepreneurs. nurture talent, and enable the creation of technologies that are tailored to the needs of local communities. And this is also important, speaking about current geopolitical moments, when we see different technological zones, and I always mention this, when you visit China, for example, you are not allowed to use Western services like American services, Microsoft, and all others. For example, when you are in the United States, in Western Europe, and generally Europe, we have huge discussion about Huawei equipments, Chinese equipments, and all other aspects of, they would say, non-secure hardware. And for example, as I know, because I spend a lot of time in Russia, they have really strict laws speaking about data, and about data of Russian citizens. They force Russian government, force that all data of Russian citizens should be stored in the territory of Russian Federation. This is really important, and I support this. So third, we must foster international collaboration to ensure that knowledge and technology flow freely, supporting growth rather than dependency. And when I was in Moscow a few weeks ago, actually a few days ago, we discussed how China and Russia made systems to test each other’s technology. So when we speak about technology transfer, it’s very important that other side, and the side which will receive technology, have opportunity to test and to make some test speaking about data, and who will control data. So this is really important. However, we can’t ignore the realities of digital colonialism. Much of the global South still finds itself in position where technology primarily serves the interests of tax giants rather than local populations. International organizations, governments, and private sectors must address this imbalance. This can be achieved by promoting open standards, and we discussed about it, supporting data sovereignty, developing localized infrastructure, and creating fairer regulatory frameworks. Let me be clear at the end, this is not a simple task. It requires a unified global effort to hold powerful actors accountable, while simultaneously empowering developing economies to shape their own digital futures. But generally, I remain optimistic, and we discussed about what we have to do in the upcoming years. With initiatives like the Global Digital Compact, we have a unique opportunity to redefine the rules of engagement in the digital space. In closing, let me emphasize this, the Compact will succeed if inclusivity, cooperation, and accountability remain at its core. Together, we have the chance to create a digital world where no one is left behind. Thank you very much.

Vasily Zudin: Thank you, Milos. Can I ask one more question for you? Do you accept that the international organizations have yet to do a lot of work to combat digital colonialism and keep tech giants at bay? Can we say like that?

Milos Jovanovic: Speaking about tech giants, when we speak about big companies everywhere in the West, in the East, in China, in Russia, it’s always about controlling the data. So I think this is a discussion. Who controls everything? Technology giants or, for example, legal frameworks, speaking about some national assemblies and so on and so on. I always make a conclusion that people who know technology have an advantage compared to people who know just legal aspects because they develop technologies. And speaking about big companies, I think international organizations are not in a position to control the data. to control them, actually, frankly speaking. So it’s up to local governments, and I will say to countries to control. So I will say in Riyadh as much as we do.

Vasily Zudin: It’s a pleasure to have you with us. To say that you are an active member of IJF community for many years is to say nothing. You were a MAC member and also had a lot of experience when it came to multi-stakeholder engagements. What does, in your opinion, the adoption of the Global Digital Compact mean for the international community?

AUDIENCE: Thank you very much, Vasily. And I want to say hello to my distinguished panelists as well. Well, I would like to move a little bit the answer maybe from what our colleagues said before, and I totally support regarding all the good things and opportunities, perhaps, that there’s the Global Digital Compact and some other processes as well, like the one that we had in NETMundial plus 10 recently. And if we read both of them, then we will identify several aspects that are very common, and I think everyone will be subscribing. And that’s why I think that’s the nice part of this process. But the other part, talking about Global South, is related with the current situation that we have. And I think that’s also something that we need to reflect on. We know that near three… or around three billion of population is not currently connected, but we need to remember that most of this population is in the global south. That’s the main problem, and it’s due to different barriers. Olga was mentioning the one with languages, for instance, but we also have barriers in gender, in many cultures, in many regions. Women are not usually used to work with computers, and worse, to have access to internet. We also have cultural barriers. We have regional barriers regarding the people that can access to these services in the rural areas, and the ones that live in urban areas, and of course, can enjoy all the good things that internet has. So for these people, for these regions, for this near three billion of the population in the world, actually the problems like fragmentations, like cyber crime, like all the other problems, or even the new emerging issues like artificial intelligence, are not in the discussion. I mean, they are thinking in just how we can connect to internet, and that’s why that matter is still an issue, and it’s going to be still an issue in the future, if as a community, as a global community, don’t think about the ways of reaching all these places, all these regions in the world. We know that despite the different efforts that the internet service providers, the telecommunications providers, have done during these last years, still it’s very difficult for them to actually reach these kind of communities, because of the difficult of return of the investment. That’s, of course, the reason, the major reason. So we need to contribute as well. It’s another important factor. First share approach, which is a recent topic that is emerging in different forums. Of course, I don’t support this approach about having in general or requiring in general to the digital content developers to actually pay any kind of fee or whatever, but at the same time, it’s important to realize that some of these big players, not all of the players, not all of the digital players, but some of these big players are actually able to, and actually they are doing many things. They are actually contributing with investment, contributing with deployment of infrastructure, but not, I will say, not in a most controlled way. I mean, yes, it’s their money, of course, but I think that there’s a room for coordinating with the governments specifically, just in this kind of processes, just in this kind of investment that are required in different countries, especially in the global south. So that’s something that we also need to think about and discuss. So this take us to another, and I’m just talking about, as I said before, not the fantastic stuff of the GDC, but the challenges, and one of those in the global south is how effective our regional and sub-regional, not multi-stakeholders, I will say, multilateral organizations can be. I mean, how effective they can be in order first to agree on common grounds, to agree in common regulations, to actually tackle all these challenges that we are facing in the near future, like the ones that I mentioned before regarding connectivity. I don’t know, but I always mentioned this as an example. The tradition that the Europeans have regarding this collaboration, very effective collaboration with common regulations, is something that in global south, especially in Latin America, that’s where I come from, we need to take as a good example. Actually, we are very caring in our region, in LAC, but at the same time, the problem is that each of the governments has their own agenda for this matter. So I think it’s important to agree in certain elements. One of those is connectivity. Maybe the others will be, of course, emerging. So being effective in this original area to provide this kind of inputs on those for the governments to actually act, to actually do, in a way. Because at the end, as you know, the governments are the ones that can be signing an agreement like the GDC, but they have to move from the agreement, from the shared principles, to the action. And those actions come in policies, and we are still so much delayed in issuing this kind of policies, so we can actually get this expected universal connection that we all want. So I will say that.

Vasily Zudin: Thank you very much, Roberto. And one more question, please. Is there a risk of minimising the role of the technical community in the digital maker paradigm? What do you think about this fact? Is there a risk of minimising the role of the technical community in the digital maker paradigm?

AUDIENCE: Well, I don’t think so, because of the nature of the ecosystem. There are key… communities with a very specific role. I would like to mention some of them like Internet Engineering Task Force or IEEE that will still be leading the technical area about the standards, about the technologies, about the proposals and there are newcomers as well and more than newcomers, new actors I will say regarding the technical arena. We’ve heard a lot of innovations, a lot of proposals, technical proposals from different, I’m not going to mention any but you may think which of them I am talking about and I think we can imagine that there might be very nice examples of new policies or new protocols etc but the processes themselves must be very transparent. If there are just a lot of key players working in these protocols and they come up with fantastic ideas but if those didn’t come back from a bottom-up process I think it could become an issue in the future. So because internet as it is now was actually a result of that kind of participative, inclusive and very transparent process all over these years.

Vasily Zudin: Thank you Roberta, thank you for your impressive speech and for your participating in our session. Our next speaker is Pavel Zakharov, a member of the Internet Technological Association. Pavel has a vast experience when it comes to combat disinformation and fact-checking and I must say that fact-checking is essential in the informational world we found ourselves in and it is a matter of national security, a matter of safety, often a question of human lives. And I would like to extend the floor to you, Mr. Zakharov.

Pavel Zakharov: Thank you for giving me the floor. As an active member of the Russian fact-checking community, I would like to share with you my opinion, my idea that can change our beliefs in fakes. But first of all, I want to say that it stayed on the official website of the Global Digital Compact, that its implementation requires a global effort. And one of the key commitments of GDI is building a digital space that is free, that is independent, that is open, fact-based. And it’s about disinformation, maybe. It’s maybe about combating disinformation. But nowadays, disinformation is portrayed in media as a main topic of concern to Internet users. It’s now seen as a weapon in a global informational war. But in my opinion, this escalation to the problem of military level looks unwise and maybe is completely dangerous. Because lies have always existed. And misinformation has always influenced people’s decisions, people’s behavior. Nothing new. The fight against disinformation today is becoming a convenient excuse for censorship, for reducing freedom of speech. And under the pretext of combating disinformation, digital platforms limit the promotion of materials which contain different points of views. Under this pretext, media released unwanted. And under this pretext, companies and organizations are being imposed sanctions. And the one thing is demand proof. The very principle of presumption of innocence is violated when it comes to coverting misinformation. One would think that such a stubborn struggle should lead to positive results. But let’s take a look at data. According to Ipsos study in 2024, at least a third of population of our planet believes fakes. And if we take a closer look, the situation is even worse in developing countries where up to 62% of population believes fakes. And those countries are active members of such famous international networks like IFCN, International Fact-Checking Network. So fact-checking doesn’t work. But it’s active. So it’s a good thing. And it’s a good thing to understand. Checking, checking, checking. It can be, to be processed this information. Even input, it’s used, it’s spread in certain platforms. So it’s possible to find all the fakes. This is pretty much easier to produce fakes than debunk. And the game changer here is AI. We need to change the approach. We need to abandon the principle of the limitation and punishment and start moving toward cooperation and resilience. The more restrictions are imposed to dissemination of information in the world, the less protected users will be against the disinformation. We need to communicate more. We need to interact more. We need to create informal communities. And that’s the key. As I said earlier, it’s time for us to move from confrontation to cooperation. And I want to remind you one thing. In the 1960s, Western countries and the Soviet Union moved from the open confrontation to the reducing level of aggression. That time, they resumed economic, scientific and cultural cooperation. And this period is now called the Tant, the relaxation of stagnant international relations. I’m sure that now is the best time for us to start to look at each other and to set the new rules of the game. It’s time for digital detente. And I think those who are really interested in creating open and secure digital space can agree to work together, regardless of differences in our views or benefits. That’s all we need now. Relax a bit. Thank you.

Vasily Zudin: Well, thank you very much for this useful information. And one more question. How to identify that this… information is fake, because sometimes it’s really difficult to see difference between fake and truth.

Pavel Zakharov: I think that there is no way to define every fake. Even me as an expert, I cannot see all the fakes. I’ve catched a lot of times I see fake and then after a few days I remember this and oh, that was fake. But one thing is important and it’s knowledge. If you know something, it’s really hard to change your opinion about the thing. So the best way to make your armor against disinformation is to know more. I think it’s that.

Vasily Zudin: Pavel, as you can see, we heard the opinions and elaborations of one generation and now I believe it’s time to hear the voices of youth representatives and I would like to thank our first row of presenters for their meaningful inputs and invite our second court team to join the discussions. Thank you. Thank you very much. Alim is co-moderator now of the second part of discussion.

Alim: Hello guys, hopefully you can hear me, the translation must also work. We have with us several esteemed speakers, yes, a moment. So we have with us several representatives of youth, who are also experts in IT sector and active IGF members. This is Bogdan Chernyshov, the head of the Rosatom Youth Council, Alexander Kozhin, representative of the lawyer representing Art Deluxe. And also we have with us an active IGF member from Ethiopia, who is a MAG member, Sabatikou. I saw her somewhere, she had to take a call, she’ll come back to us in several minutes, I hope. So our first speaker today, our first expert in this second round of workshop is Bogdan Chernyshov, and he represents essentially Rosatom. Rosatom is a world-renowned state nuclear energy corporation, which develops energy as well as a digital infrastructure all across the world, allowing entire nations to benefit from cheap, clear, and effective energy, power their houses, factories, schools, universities, and digital facilities. Bogdan, please, the floor is yours. What do you think about global, yes, clicker, here’s the clicker, please go ahead.

Bogdan Chernyshov: Okay, great. Good afternoon, dear colleagues. It’s a great honor to be here with you at IGF forum. And today I’d like to introduce you our company and… So, as you can see on the slide, Rosatom is a big company, which consists of more than 460 companies, which are working in very different scientific fields. So we have more… than four different businesses. And right now, Rosatom consists of not only companies, research universities, which are located in the Russian Federation. We’re also working with our international partners, and right now we are developing more than 60 different international projects. And right now, the portfolio of foreign orders of Rosatom has reached more than $200 billion last year. But today, I’m here to present you not only our company, also I’m heading… Great. Also, I’m heading the community of young scientists of Rosatom, and our two main goals is to provide connection between government universities and our real factories and research universities to create projects, which are based on the theoretical field of governance, university science, and our tasks of real industry. And the second one is to provide a community in which scientists can connect with each other and create different scientific projects, which are based on the intersection of their scientific interests and scientific directions. As you can see on the slide, we consist of more than 90 young scientists who are leading the key projects in the spheres like nuclear energy, hydrogen energy, wind energy. Also, we are working on the creation of new materials by application of the approach of digital material science. By application, of course, common material science. There are work on the healthcare sphere in the nuclear medicine production by creation of isotopes for curing the cancer and other diseases. Of course, there are personalized medicine by application of technologies of 3D printing. And there are other technologies. As you can see, electronic photonics, we have experts in plasma, laser technologies. our scientists created 50 qubits quantum computer and they’re working of course is in artificial intelligence with digital twins and a lot of, a lot of. So I’d like to go back to the main goal, to the main goal of Rosatom and of course it’s generation of energy. Of course all of us know that we can provide digital infrastructure transfer to this new technologies without energy. So Rosatom has a great experience in that field and our first nuclear power plants has celebrated its 70th jubilee this year. So since that time we upgraded our skills and right now the progress of the building of nuclear power plants you can see on the map of Russia. So our experience which we have got for this year, we are implementing into international projects and right now we are working with countries like China, Egypt, Hungary and other countries. But we use nuclear energy not only for production of nuclear power plants and provides an opportunity to our partners to get green energy sources. Also we are building ships, especially nuclear icebreakers which are working on the same principles and they require, the type of reactors requires less energy. So we use it for transfer of cargoes via northern sea route and the amounts of cargoes which we are transferring you can see on the slide. So to 230 that amount will reach 150 million tons. But that experience which we got of building smaller reactors, we are using to produce and make next step in creation of nuclear power plants, especially small NPPs. And as you can see on the slide, we will build in the condition of severe cold temperature a new nuclear power plant, small one, and it will be located in the Republic of Sakhaikutya, so you can see that on geotech. Also here we can see the strategy of building these small nuclear power plants. The main fact about that strategy is that these facilities will be built in the areas to which access is very hard. And especially in these locations are located huge mineral deposits. But the main feature also about this region is that we should provide connection of electricity to provide a digital connection of the people in these areas. But as I said on the second slide, we consist of a big amount of companies, more than 400. And I’m a research scientist of Gilded MedJoint Stock Company. I would like to tell you about projects on which we are working. And there is, you can see, different materials for spheres like electronic, photonics, we produce superconductors, we produce different monocrystals. And our production also consists of rare earth metals and different alloys. And we produce it in very different forms like alloys, powders. We can create details with simple form, for example, of sputtering targets for creation of different coatings of our electronic components. Of course, there are production in the complex, which has complex geometry, which we can make by application of additive technologies. But unfortunately, right now, I have not many time as a session. So I’d like you to invite to the session, which will be held on the last day of IGF. And we will talk about real scientific projects, which has impact on the design of North region. So thank you for your attention. The community of young scientists and Rosatom in general are always looking forward to future cooperation and experience exchange. Thank you.

Alim: Well done. I think this was very interesting. interesting because we were trying to bring something new to IGF format in a sense that we obviously, we discussed digital technologies, internet, but I think that energy, when it comes to energy, generation of electricity, when it comes to infrastructure or Saturn and the project which it does not only in Russia, but across the world in countries of global south, they are paramount, especially when we talk about bridging digital device. And our next speaker is Alexandra Kozina, lawyer in dispute resolution and mediation practice at Art Deluxe, a famous lawyer firm, which has been suing Google for many years and defending the interests of ordinary users in the face of large transnational corporations. Alexandra, what do you think? We talked a lot today about the so-called tech giants. What real threats do players like Google, Meta and others pose to the global south? Is it hard to fight the Goliath?

Alexandra Kozina: Oh, yes, it’s really hard to fight the Goliath. And I would like to start my presentation to tell you more about the recent cases the big tech had. And that will be, I hope, very interesting. And… Let’s wait for several minutes. I see the tech guys are on it. So this is it. Yes. So before I start and before any technical problems will be solved, I would like to thank you for participating in this section. I would like to thank IGF for this amazing opportunity to share ideas with my co-panelists and with the Central for Global Cooperation. I hope you will enjoy my presentation and we’ll have some questions. Okay. Questions. Okay. So speaking about the big tech, my allegation today is that the big tech needs to change because recently the big tech violated some laws in different countries. And we need to take very crucial attention on this point. I will concentrate your attention on four parts of my speech. Firstly, I will tell you about how the big tech companies operate globally, how they structure their business in different jurisdictions. Secondly, I will tell you more about what… should the global tech company pay attention to when they’re doing business globally. And this is very interesting and very important because not only written laws the big tech need to take into account, but as well social rules and cultural traits. Thirdly, we will talk about the recent cases in antitrust law and in civil law. I will give you a brief overview of these cases and I hope you will find it interesting. And finally we will maybe brainstorm some ideas how we can deal with this problem in the future. So this is a brief information about me. I work in dispute resolution and arbitration and deal with the telecommunication media and technology problems. And this is my photo. That is how I look when I’m hungry. Very serious. But in general, I’m very cheerful. So come talk to me after the session. Yeah. Okay. So long story short, then the big tech structured business globally, it has around three models it can face. So the first model is when the head company decides to open a separate entity on the territory of other jurisdictions. For example, Google on the territory of Russia had previously their separate entity. And the point is the separate entity has separate assets and is in general independent of the decision of the head company. But that that presumption can be overcome by the doctrine of withdrawing of corporate will. And simply saying this doctrine says that if the subsidiary acted on the behalf of the parent company or with the active knowledge of the parent company, you can you, the parent company, for any misconduct a subsidiary company do on the territory of the jurisdiction, and vice versa. And that is actually the best model for the consumers of the big tech. We will revert shortly to that question. Yeah. Model B. So if the big tech company do not want to open any separate entity with separate assets, it can open a representative. The thing is, the representative is not a separate entity in the terms of law. It has no assets. And if you face a misconduct from the head company, you cannot sue the representative. And the best example on the territory of Russia is Apple and Facebook. A couple of years ago, they had separate representatives on the territory of Russia. And the representative exists only for the public function. So to communicate with tax officers, antitrust managers, and so on. And you cannot, of course, sue the representative. But we have some advantages in that point. If we want to have a dispute on the territory of Russia, we can sue the head company. But we can sue a representative as well as a core defendant. And we can notify the head company through the representative. Of course, it’s easier than to file a claim abroad. And the last model. And the last model is the worst model for the consumers, for the business companies who deal with the big tech. Because big tech can decide not to open any separate structure or representative at all. And the best examples is Amazon or Meta in Russia. in Russia. They have never had any separate entities or representatives, but they actually sold and sell some services and digital products on the territory of Russia. And the disadvantages of that approach is that consumer or business have high costs of proceedings abroad because he needs to go directly to the head. Businesses have unequal bargaining power with the big tech because they cannot talk to them via email or so on. And actually in that business structure, the customers actually have a lack of remedies. Moving on to the second part of my speech about what’s the… Yes, one second. Next slide, please. Yeah, so as I said earlier, the big tech can choose free business structures to conduct business abroad, but what should they take into account when doing business globally? First of all, they need to understand informal institution of each of the country. And by informal institutions, I mean socially shared rules, traditions, cultural traits. It’s not a secret that, for example, Arab region countries or US or European Union differ a lot. And global digital company need to take into account these differences. And secondly, but not from the point of characterization, the global company need to take into account formal institution. And by formal institution, I mean written and unwritten laws. And the next slide will show you the non- exhaustive list… Oh, sorry. Sorry, sorry. Yeah. And the next time we’ll show you… the non-exhaustive list of laws which regulate digital business, for example, in Russia and I think as well as in any other country. And these laws the Big Tech should take into account very crucially. And the recent cases concerning the Big Tech show that the Big Tech ignores these laws. And let’s talk about that more. So I would like to present you the recent Russian judgments against Google. And that information is very interesting because on the territory of Russian Federation, last four years, around 20 separate judgments were published. And the judgments state that Google violated its own policies, then it blocked Russian media channels. And the thing with the judgments was that several claimants submitted claims on recognition and enforcement of such judgments on the territory of different countries. And I only choose some of them, like Turkey, Hungary, Algeria, South Africa, but actually the number of countries were up to 20, I guess. And the interesting thing is that on the territory of South Africa, South African High Court seized all Google assets, all Google subsidiary assets on the territory of South Africa because of the judgment existed. And I want to talk about more of the sum of fines. Actually, according to this judgment, for non-compliance with the judgment, Google was forced to pay a sum of money called judiciary fine or a strand in the territory of Russia. And the amount of fines, as per information of last month, which were written on BBC, The Guardian and Forbes. was 20 decillion USD. Decillion is a surprising number because it contains 36 zeros after the actual amount. And the global internet created a variety of jokes about that sum. And I wanna share with you my favorite joke because it’s actually very funny. Yeah. And of course, this situation which presented on the joke is, I guess, cannot in the future, but what is not funny? I wanna tell you about recent, yeah, very funny joke. Next slide, please. I wanna tell you about recent antitrust cases and the amount of fines presented on the slide is not joke at all. Because last decade showed that alphabet companies or Google companies, in particular, violated several laws on the territory of European Union. And that resulted. The amount of fines in amount of $8 billion. So I added QR. So if you are interested in information of their cases, you can just scan it and read in short articles. But Google is not the only company which is under investigation of antitrust officers. Actually, every big tech company, and by big tech, I mean, American big tech, is under investigations in several countries. So Apple in European Union, Qualcomm, Meta, its subsidiary, Facebook, and it’s. subsidiary meta-platforms. And the list is not exhaustive. And by representing these cases, I am not trying to say that the Big Tech is evil and we should all ban them, but I wanted to set a discussion on how the Big Tech is performing globally. Because it is very important for the Big Tech, with so many valuable resources, with all this knowledge and technology, to understand cultural traits and differences, to understand laws differences, because laws differ from country to country. And the last example of how the Big Tech violates law is how the alphabet violates its own financial laws. As you can see on the slide, I presented you the screenshots of last quarterly financial statement of Alphabet, so it’s 2024. And each of the financial statements has the part called legal matters. In that part, the Big Tech or any other company which has shares globally transmitted need to disclose the significant legal information about the cases. And as you can see on the slide, Alphabet disclosed the information about antitrust cases, which I presented on a few slides back, but it did not disclose any information about Russian court judgments. And this is what we need to talk about more, because why Alphabet disclosed antitrust cases with the financing amount 8 billion dollars and did not say anything in particular about Russian judgments, the amount of fines of which is 20 decillion dollars. So it’s 10 with 36 zeros. It’s amazing. And moreover, about this case, Alphabet did not communicate with the state officials, with journalists, with investors, with claimants on the resolving of this issue. And I think that this ignorance on the opinion of Russian media companies, of Russian government, of the government of any other country who has not so much bargaining power to set rules on the internet is what we need to concentrate about on this forum and in the future, because we need to somehow shift the market position of the big tech. Not to ban them, but to make some rules for them. Because if we do not make some rules for them, they will do anything and everything, and we will not have any opportunity to somehow stop them in the future. So, thank you for your attention. I hope you enjoyed my presentation, and I hope you will have some questions afterwards.

Alim: Thank you so much, Alexandra. It was very interesting to hear about the experience of fighting with Google, Alphabet, and other big tech giants in order to keep them at bay, to keep them in check and control, obviously. It’s necessary when we talk about digital divides and the security of the global South, the avoidance in order to avoid the new forms of digital neocolonialism. We have to ensure and enforce law and order. And speaking of global South, Ms. Sabatiko, you are an active member of youth community, and since recently, rather recently, a member of the IGF Multi-Stakeholder Advisory Group. I suppose it’s a great honor for us to have you partaking in this discussion. Moreover, you already were a MAG member when the Global Digital Compact was being accepted. Should, in your opinion, digital governance remain a domain of multi-stakeholder engagement? or it is in the interest of the world to increase government participation perhaps and the implementation of hard law practices? Where is the place of youth in all of this as well?

Ms. Sabatiko: Thank you very much, I hope you can hear me. And thank you so much for the kind introduction and it’s an honor to be part of this important discussion. So my intervention will be very short. Indeed the digital governance is at a critical juncture and for years the multi-stakeholder approach has been at the heart as well as the backbone of internet governance ecosystem bringing together diverse perspectives of different stakeholder groups such as private, civil society, the government and as well as the technical community. And so this model has been very effective as it reflects the very true nature of the internet which is decentralized, which is collaborative and global. However, as digital technologies are increasing shaping every aspect of our lives governments are becoming more involved and if we talk about for example issues such as cyber security, platform accountability data sovereignty and digital inequalities or the digital divide the attention of government is indeed needed. And so regulation in many cases is very important to ensure that public safety, fairness and equity is there. Yet too much government control or risk is that excluding key voices as well as the innovation. And so this is where the global digital compact or the GDC can really play a transformative role. First it offers a chance to redefine the rule of the game for digital governance by balancing these dynamics. And a truly effective GDC, it must uphold the principle of multistakeholderism, where every decisions are informed by the involvement of all actors, not just governments. But it should also provide a framework where governments can take responsibility in areas that require regulations, such as curbing online harms or ensuring data rights. Now, so when you talk about use, where does the voice of the young people fit into all of this? And I think for this, use are not just stakeholders in digital governance, but rather we are the agents of change. And young people are the largest groups of internet users, but we are also innovators, we are creators, and leaders of shaping the digital future. But in most of the discussions, young people are underrepresented when it comes to, let’s say, policymaking. And so, for example, in many discussions about the platform accountability or global standards, use voices are missing, even though these issues are very important for us. So the GDC can really play a very important role in this by integrating the voice of young people. And that might mean creating youth leadership, creating mentorship programs, or mentoring emerging voices, ensuring that youth-driven solutions are there. And beyond that, young people need to be meaningfully engaged in decision-making processes, not just as participants, but also as contributors to many key discussions as well. So in my view. I think we need both, which is multi-stakeholder approach that values collaboration and inclusivity, as well as government participation in order to address these global challenges. So, striking this balance is very important. And the GDC can pave the way for a more inclusive, as well as equitable and sustainable digital future where every voice matters, especially of those young people. Thank you.

Alim: Thank you very much for this interesting point of view, and especially your opinion on the GDC and the points which you mentioned about the youth. I wholeheartedly agree. Representing the Center for Global IT Cooperation, we also do a lot of work in terms of youth empowerment. And it is absolutely important not only to speak about the youth, not only to give youth a certain platform and make their voices heard. It’s important to engage youth, to make them integrally part of the process. So, in my view, we should fight all forms of discrimination, including ageism. And when it comes to youth, the perfect position of youth empowerment is when there is no division between youth and non-youth, when youth has become integral part of all policy-making processes. And speaking of youth especially, our center has a myriad of initiatives which are aimed at youth support. One of them is a youth digital forum, Youth Russian Internet Governance Forum. And that’s why I would like to present our next speaker, who is a director of the Center for Global IT Cooperation, Vadim Glushenko, who will elaborate on the activities we undertake, not only within the IGF format, but also in the broader expert community in Russia and globally. Vadim, please, the floor is yours.

Vadim Glushenko: Thank you. Can you hear me? Yeah, wonderful. Thank you very much, Alim, and hi, everyone. I hope my intervention is last but not least. Well, first, I would like to reflect on the GDC. As probably everyone here, we were full of hopes and enthusiastic. But the hopes are still the hopes. The Center for Global IT Cooperation, as Alim mentioned, has played its role. We collected a number of views and visions from the Russian expert community, like 40 of them, and sent a holistic, common position to the Office of the Tech Envoy. And since that time, we have been waiting. Well, that is why we are especially sensitive about the outcome. The very idea of the Global Digital Compact has a set of rules that outline the contours of the future Internet governance system, and set the vector of development of AI algorithms, which are based on the principles of security, equality, and non-discrimination, that is in line with the UN Sustainable Development Goals, is quite good. And, of course, it deserves attention. And definitely, this new Global Digital Compact will open a new era for both Internet governance and for digital governance. Well, still, as it often happens, the initial expectations from the GDC have been shattered by the real interests of the global digital platforms, large transnational businesses. The private sector is not at all interested in being under the tight control of governments or human rights NGOs or international oversight institutions. And today, we’ve heard an exciting story from Alexander about the fight against Google or fight with Google that proves this presumption. This is the first reason why the implementation of the GDC will meet objective difficulties. And the second reason lies in the different technological potential of the countries. It is difficult in the world of capitalist economy to call for equality between rich and poor, developed and technologically immature. Therefore, under the guise of the GDC provisions, I think we will see that the IT giants will be pushing their interests in countries and regions where they don’t have actually their own digital alternatives and opportunities to compete on equal grounds with those giants. In this regards, the real force that can counter digital neocolonialism is neither the GDC, nor the Pact for the Future. Nor any soft law acts, but I would say that the joint initiatives of the international expert community, as well as time-tested and proven effective digital solutions such as those we have heard about today. As we can see, the Russian IT industry has appeared to be strong and stress-resilient enough to survive unprecedented Western sanctions. At the end of the day, isn’t it cool not to depend on the global digital platforms? Russian IT solutions are not non-politicized and could be customized for any client individually. And CJITC is becoming an important player in the IT export sphere. Apart from our activities on the NRI track, on the IGF track, the Center is striving to assist IT companies in Russia and abroad to find each other and to establish partnerships so that trustworthy and reliable digital solutions are applied in the countries of the Global South to strengthen their digital sovereignty. And believe me, after years of harsh sanctions, we’ve learned something about digital sovereignty. For this purpose, we not just study global, regional and national IT markets to identify the demand and seek for potential partners, but also we’ve launched a dedicated tool, a marketplace of digital solutions. And it is not only about software. It’s about IT education and IT consulting. This portal also contains a detailed guide on how to launch an IT business in Russia for foreign citizens. You can learn more actually at our booth in the IJF village just behind this workshop room. To conclude, I’d like to share one idea that is literally in the air. I’ve heard it a number of times recently and even in the course of discussions at the IJF, both formal and informal. All of us are aware of how important the ESG principles are for business. And nothing and no one can stop digital transformation of… And the crucial… …cybersecurity in the ESG principles, making it a separate domain. At the end of the day, ESGC sounds not bad. Well, with this, I would like to ask you to stay tuned and let’s create a fair digital future together. Thank you.

Alim: Dear experts, listeners. Well, maybe we have some questions from the audience. In case there are some questions, I would like to ask you to raise your hand to our team speakers. General questions? No questions? Neither have I seen any in the chat. So, in that case, and I think our time is… Raining up dear experts listeners and contributors to the discussion. I wholeheartedly Thank you for this fruitful round of conversations and presentations we had I hope that our debates will Continue after the session and the ideas that were discussed here today will grow to become something bigger the future of the internet is in it in Inextricably linked to the future of humanity today the global south suffers the most from injustices famine wars ecological predicaments and inequality of access We can only create a fair digital order when we include all Stakeholders in internet governance and ensure a world order based upon the UN Charter and respect for human rights Thank you for your thoughts Inputs and your fairness. See you soon Thank you

Agreement Points

Challenges in implementing the Global Digital Compact

Milos Jovanovic

Saba Tiku Beyene

Vadim Glushenko

GDC can address digital divide and foster economic growth in developing countries

GDC must balance multistakeholder approach with government participation

GDC implementation faces resistance from tech giants and inequality between countries

The speakers agree that while the Global Digital Compact has potential benefits, its implementation faces significant challenges due to resistance from tech companies and the need to balance various stakeholder interests.

Importance of youth engagement in digital governance

Saba Tiku Beyene

Alim

Importance of integrating youth voices in decision-making processes

Youth-focused initiatives like Russian Internet Governance Forum

Both speakers emphasize the need to involve young people in digital governance processes and decision-making.

Similar Viewpoints

Both speakers express concerns about internet fragmentation and advocate for solutions that protect national interests and data sovereignty.

Olga Makarova

Semyon Tenyaev

Internet fragmentation risks due to geopolitical tensions and payment restrictions

Need for decentralized social networks to protect national data sovereignty

Both speakers highlight the challenges posed by large tech companies and the need for regulation or alternative solutions.

Alexandra Kozina

Vadim Glushenko

Recent antitrust cases and fines against major tech companies

GDC implementation faces resistance from tech giants and inequality between countries

Unexpected Consensus

Importance of local technological solutions

Semyon Tenyaev

Vadim Glushenko

Bogdan Chernyshov

Need for decentralized social networks to protect national data sovereignty

Russian IT industry has developed resilient solutions amid sanctions

Nuclear energy infrastructure enables digital connectivity in remote areas

Despite coming from different sectors, these speakers all emphasize the importance of developing local technological solutions to address specific needs and challenges, which is an unexpected area of consensus.

Overall Assessment

Summary

The main areas of agreement include the challenges in implementing the Global Digital Compact, the importance of youth engagement in digital governance, concerns about internet fragmentation and data sovereignty, and the need for local technological solutions.

Consensus level

There is a moderate level of consensus among the speakers on broad issues such as the challenges facing digital governance and the need for inclusive approaches. However, there are divergent views on specific solutions and approaches. This implies that while there is general agreement on the problems, finding universally accepted solutions remains a challenge in the field of internet governance.

Different Viewpoints

Approach to combating disinformation

Pavel Zakharov

Alexandra Kozina

Current approaches to fighting disinformation are ineffective and risk censorship

Recent antitrust cases and fines against major tech companies

Pavel Zakharov argues for a shift away from restrictions and punishments in combating disinformation, focusing instead on education and cooperation. In contrast, Alexandra Kozina highlights the need for stricter regulation and enforcement against tech companies, as evidenced by recent antitrust cases and fines.

Role of government in digital governance

Saba Tiku Beyene

Vadim Glushenko

GDC must balance multistakeholder approach with government participation

GDC implementation faces resistance from tech giants and inequality between countries

Saba Tiku Beyene advocates for a balance between multistakeholder approach and increased government participation in digital governance. Vadim Glushenko, however, emphasizes the challenges posed by tech giants’ resistance and inequality between countries, suggesting that government involvement may face significant obstacles.

Unexpected Differences

Approach to digital sovereignty

Semyon Tenyaev

Vadim Glushenko

Need for decentralized social networks to protect national data sovereignty

Russian IT industry has developed resilient solutions amid sanctions

While both speakers are from Russia, they present different approaches to digital sovereignty. Semyon Tenyaev advocates for a global, decentralized approach, while Vadim Glushenko emphasizes the development of national IT solutions in response to sanctions. This unexpected difference highlights the complexity of balancing national interests with global connectivity.

Overall Assessment

summary

The main areas of disagreement revolve around the approach to regulating tech companies, the role of government in digital governance, and strategies for achieving digital sovereignty and universal connectivity.

difference_level

The level of disagreement among speakers is moderate. While there are clear differences in approaches and priorities, there is also a shared recognition of the importance of addressing digital divides, ensuring data protection, and promoting inclusive digital governance. These disagreements reflect the complex and multifaceted nature of global digital challenges, highlighting the need for continued dialogue and collaboration to find effective solutions.

Partial Agreements

Both speakers agree on the importance of universal connectivity, but propose different solutions. Milos Jovanovic emphasizes affordable access, while Bogdan Chernyshov suggests using nuclear energy infrastructure to enable connectivity in remote areas.

Milos Jovanovic

Bogdan Chernyshov

Importance of affordable and universal connectivity

Nuclear energy infrastructure enables digital connectivity in remote areas

Both speakers agree on the need for localized approaches to digital services, but differ in their proposed solutions. Semyon Teneyev advocates for decentralized social networks, while Alexandra Kozina emphasizes the importance of tech giants adapting to local cultural and legal contexts.

Semyon Tenyaev

Alexandra Kozina

Need for decentralized social networks to protect national data sovereignty

Tech giants need to consider cultural differences and local laws when operating globally

Similar Viewpoints

Both speakers express concerns about internet fragmentation and advocate for solutions that protect national interests and data sovereignty.

Olga Makarova

Semyon Tenyaev

Internet fragmentation risks due to geopolitical tensions and payment restrictions

Need for decentralized social networks to protect national data sovereignty

Both speakers highlight the challenges posed by large tech companies and the need for regulation or alternative solutions.

Alexandra Kozina

Vadim Glushenko

Recent antitrust cases and fines against major tech companies

GDC implementation faces resistance from tech giants and inequality between countries

Key Takeaways

The Global Digital Compact (GDC) has potential to address digital divides and foster economic growth in developing countries, but faces challenges in implementation.

Digital sovereignty and internet fragmentation are growing concerns, especially for countries facing sanctions or geopolitical tensions.

Regulation of big tech companies is needed, but must balance innovation with government oversight and consider cultural/legal differences across countries.

Bridging the digital divide requires addressing issues like language barriers, connectivity, and infrastructure development.

Current approaches to combating disinformation may be ineffective and risk censorship; education and cooperation are suggested as alternatives.

Youth engagement is crucial in digital governance and policy-making processes.

Resolutions and Action Items

Develop certification procedures through ITU to allow carriers to pay for telecommunication and internet services without additional bank checks

Integrate youth voices more meaningfully in digital governance decision-making processes

Launch a marketplace of digital solutions to connect IT companies and strengthen digital sovereignty in Global South countries

Unresolved Issues

How to effectively implement the Global Digital Compact given resistance from tech giants and inequality between countries

How to balance multistakeholder approach with increased government participation in digital governance

How to address payment restrictions that risk internet fragmentation

How to effectively regulate big tech companies across different jurisdictions

How to combat disinformation without resorting to censorship

Suggested Compromises

Balance multistakeholder approach in internet governance with increased government participation where regulation is needed

Develop decentralized social networks that protect national data sovereignty while enabling global connectivity

Focus on education and cooperation to combat disinformation rather than imposing restrictions

We need to contribute as well. It’s another important factor. First share approach, which is a recent topic that is emerging in different forums. Of course, I don’t support this approach about having in general or requiring in general to the digital content developers to actually pay any kind of fee or whatever, but at the same time, it’s important to realize that some of these big players, not all of the players, not all of the digital players, but some of these big players are actually able to, and actually they are doing many things. They are actually contributing with investment, contributing with deployment of infrastructure, but not, I will say, not in a most controlled way.

speaker

Roberto Zambrana

reason

This comment introduces a nuanced perspective on the role of big tech companies in infrastructure development, acknowledging their contributions while also highlighting the need for more coordinated efforts.

impact

It shifted the conversation from a purely critical view of big tech to a more balanced discussion of their potential role in addressing digital divides.

I think that there is no way to define every fake. Even me as an expert, I cannot see all the fakes. I’ve catched a lot of times I see fake and then after a few days I remember this and oh, that was fake. But one thing is important and it’s knowledge. If you know something, it’s really hard to change your opinion about the thing. So the best way to make your armor against disinformation is to know more.

speaker

Pavel Zakharov

reason

This comment provides a realistic and pragmatic approach to dealing with misinformation, emphasizing education and critical thinking over purely technological solutions.

impact

It challenged the notion that fact-checking alone can solve the problem of misinformation and steered the discussion towards the importance of digital literacy.

Use are not just stakeholders in digital governance, but rather we are the agents of change. And young people are the largest groups of internet users, but we are also innovators, we are creators, and leaders of shaping the digital future. But in most of the discussions, young people are underrepresented when it comes to, let’s say, policymaking.

speaker

Saba Tiku Beyene

reason

This comment highlights the crucial role of youth in shaping digital governance and the need for their meaningful inclusion in decision-making processes.

impact

It brought attention to the importance of intergenerational collaboration in digital governance and emphasized the need for more inclusive policymaking processes.

Overall Assessment

These key comments shaped the discussion by introducing more nuanced perspectives on complex issues like the role of big tech, misinformation, and youth participation in digital governance. They moved the conversation beyond simplistic critiques or solutions, encouraging a more holistic and balanced approach to addressing challenges in the digital sphere. The discussion evolved from focusing solely on problems to exploring potential solutions and emphasizing the importance of diverse stakeholder involvement, particularly youth, in shaping the future of digital governance.

How can we bridge growing digital divides and avoid a new era of digital neocolonialism?

speaker

Vasily Zudin

explanation

This is a key challenge in ensuring equitable global digital development

How can we make fact-checking more effective in combating disinformation?

speaker

Pavel Zakharov

explanation

Current fact-checking efforts don’t seem to be working well enough to counter the spread of misinformation

How can we ensure affordable and universal connectivity, especially in Africa?

speaker

Milos Jovanovic

explanation

Lack of connectivity is a major barrier to digital inclusion in developing countries

How can we encourage investments in local digital ecosystems in developing countries?

speaker

Milos Jovanovic

explanation

This is important for nurturing local talent and creating technologies tailored to local needs

How can we foster international collaboration to ensure knowledge and technology flow freely while supporting growth rather than dependency?

speaker

Milos Jovanovic

explanation

This is crucial for balanced global digital development

How can we make regional and sub-regional multilateral organizations more effective in tackling digital challenges in the Global South?

speaker

Roberto Zambrana

explanation

These organizations could play a key role in addressing regional digital issues

How can we better integrate youth voices into digital governance and policymaking?

speaker

Saba Tiku Beyene

explanation

Young people are underrepresented in discussions about issues that greatly affect them

How can we strike a balance between multi-stakeholder engagement and increased government participation in digital governance?

speaker

Saba Tiku Beyene

explanation

This balance is crucial for addressing global digital challenges effectively

How can we prevent the Global Digital Compact from being co-opted by the interests of global digital platforms and large transnational businesses?

speaker

Vadim Glushenko

explanation

This is important to ensure the GDC serves its intended purpose of creating a fair digital order

How can countries with different technological potentials be brought to a more equal footing in the global digital economy?

speaker

Vadim Glushenko

explanation

This is crucial for avoiding digital neocolonialism and ensuring fair digital development

Summary

This discussion focused on cyber diplomacy and peace in the Middle East, led by James Shires due to the absence of other panelists. Shires explained that cyber diplomacy involves diplomatic efforts around cybersecurity issues, distinct from digital diplomacy. He noted that cyber diplomacy in the Middle East has evolved significantly in recent years, with countries becoming more engaged in international cybersecurity processes.

The conversation covered various aspects of cybersecurity in the region, including the use of AI in conflicts, content moderation, and the role of private sector actors. Shires highlighted the complexities of defining cybersecurity universally, as definitions often reflect cultural values and opinions. He also discussed the challenges of assessing cybersecurity maturity in the Middle East compared to other regions, emphasizing the importance of considering local priorities and goals.

The discussion touched on the impact of external actors and infrastructure ownership on cyber diplomacy in the Middle East. Shires noted the push for data localization in Gulf states and the involvement of private sector companies in cybersecurity efforts. He also addressed the connection between cybersecurity and democracy, as well as the evolving role of private companies in conflict situations.

To promote cyber peace in the region, Shires recommended improving data collection on cyber threats, fostering multi-stakeholder collaboration, enhancing internet connectivity, and increasing engagement with UN processes. He emphasized the importance of regional mechanisms in developing cybersecurity practices and competencies that can be translated to the global level.

Keypoints

Major discussion points:

– Cyber diplomacy in the Middle East, including challenges and opportunities

– Use of AI and digital technologies in conflicts, particularly in Gaza

– Data localization and digital sovereignty efforts in the region

– Role of private sector companies in cybersecurity and conflicts

– Need for better data and multi-stakeholder approaches to cyber peace

Overall purpose/goal:

The discussion aimed to explore cyber peace and diplomacy issues in the Middle East, covering both regional dynamics and connections to global cybersecurity governance. It sought to provide nuanced perspectives beyond typical Western framings of cyber threats in the region.

Speakers

– James Shires, Co-director at Virtual Routes

Area of expertise: Cyber peace and diplomacy in the Middle East

(Multiple audience members asked questions and made comments)

Cyber Diplomacy and Peace in the Middle East: A Comprehensive Overview

This impromptu discussion, led by Dr. James Shires, co-director of Virtual Routes, focused on cyber diplomacy and peace in the Middle East. The conversation covered various aspects of cybersecurity in the region, including the use of AI in conflicts, content moderation, and the role of private sector actors.

Definition and Scope of Cyber Diplomacy

Dr. Shires began by clarifying the definition of cyber diplomacy, distinguishing it from digital diplomacy. He explained that cyber diplomacy specifically refers to diplomatic efforts surrounding cybersecurity issues, characterised by the involvement of transnational stakeholders and the private sector. This definition set the foundation for the subsequent discussion, focusing on cybersecurity aspects in international relations rather than broader digital issues.

Evolution of Cyber Diplomacy in the Middle East

The discussion highlighted that Middle Eastern states have become increasingly engaged in cyber diplomacy in recent years, particularly concerning the UN cybercrime convention negotiation process. Dr. Shires noted a significant shift from little engagement to active participation in the UN processes. He also underlined the concept of “maturity” in assessing cyber diplomacy landscapes, emphasizing the importance of understanding regional contexts.

Challenges in Cybersecurity

Several challenges in the realm of cybersecurity were discussed:

1. Infrastructure Vulnerabilities: Dr. Shires pointed out that some countries, such as Iran, are more vulnerable to cyberattacks due to infrastructure weaknesses.

2. Data Localisation: There is a significant push for data localisation and digital sovereignty in Gulf states, reflecting concerns about data ownership and control.

3. AI in Conflicts: The use of AI targeting systems in conflicts, particularly in Gaza, was raised as a major concern. This led to an extensive discussion about the potential for indiscriminate attacks and the ethical implications of AI in warfare.

4. Private Sector Involvement: The increasing role of private sector tech companies in cybersecurity and conflicts was noted, particularly in the context of Israel and Gaza. This highlighted the complex landscape of cyber actors in the region.

5. Content Moderation and Disinformation: The challenges of managing online content and combating disinformation in the region were discussed.

Defining Cybersecurity

A significant part of the discussion focused on the challenges of defining cybersecurity. Dr. Shires emphasized that there is no universally agreed definition, and that different actors often have varying interpretations based on their interests and contexts. This lack of a common definition was noted as an ongoing challenge in the field of cyber diplomacy.

Recommendations for Cyber Peace

In response to a question from the audience, Dr. Shires offered several recommendations to promote cyber peace in the region:

1. Improved Data Collection: There is a need for better data on cyber threats and actors in the region.

2. Multistakeholder Collaboration: Working collaboratively with civil society and industry was suggested as a crucial approach to addressing cybersecurity issues.

3. Enhanced Engagement with the UN Processes: While developing regional cybersecurity practices, there should be increased engagement with UN processes.

Reconstruction Efforts

The discussion briefly touched on reconstruction efforts in conflict-affected areas like Gaza and Yemen, highlighting the importance of considering cybersecurity in post-conflict rebuilding.

Conclusion

The discussion provided a comprehensive overview of the current state of cyber diplomacy and peace in the Middle East. It highlighted the complex interplay between technological advancements, geopolitical interests, and ethical considerations in the realm of cybersecurity. The conversation emphasized the need for improved data collection, multi-stakeholder collaboration, and engagement with international processes to address the evolving challenges in this field. As the region continues to develop its cyber capabilities and diplomatic strategies, these insights will be crucial in shaping future policies and practices in cyber diplomacy and peace.

James Shires: Good afternoon. This is slightly awkward, because this session was organized on cyber peace and diplomacy in the Middle East. Unfortunately, the speakers were unable to make it due to urgent health issues. So they didn’t manage to make it on their flight. I am the only speaker who was planning to this session, who is actually here in person. But we emailed the Secretariat to say, can we cancel the session due to the lack of speakers? They did not remove it from the agenda. And so you are all here, because you’re expecting to see a session on cyber peace and diplomacy in the Middle East, although we do not have panelists. Now, and that applies to everyone online, as well. So hi, everybody online, and thank you for joining. We have two options. Option one is everyone enjoys the Riyadh sun, has a coffee, finds another workshop they would like to engage in. Option two is we have more of an open discussion on cyber peace and diplomacy in the Middle East. I should introduce myself. My name is James Shires. I’m co-director of an organization called Virtual Routes. And my background is on researching cyber peace and diplomacy in the Middle East. I wrote a book called ‘The Politics of Cybersecurity in the Middle East’, and have worked on this extensively throughout the region. So if you would like to have a conversation, an open conversation, about these issues with me, I am very open to that. If you would rather get a coffee or go to a different workshop, then I will not be offended in the slightest. Everyone is still here. OK. So let me set the scene somewhat, because this is a controversial topic. It’s one that doesn’t often get the attention it deserves. If you especially talk to outsiders, policymakers in Europe and the US, about cyber peace or cybersecurity in the Middle East, they will think of one country, usually. And they’ll worry about a country that has both been the target of significant cyber operations, and has also conducted those offensive cyber operations itself. And that’s Iran. So the framing in a lot of the Western policy world on cyber Middle East is an Iranian cyber threat. Just as if you were to go to the same conferences, and say you’re worried about the major threats, you would hear talk of another three or four similar states. The same list of states. But that is not the kind of cyber peace and diplomacy in the Middle East that I want to talk about today. Because my experience and my research in this area suggests that there’s a lot more nuance. There’s a lot more interesting things going on. And that, actually, there are some really promising signs of cyber diplomacy in the Middle East that other areas can work on as well. I can talk about a few of those examples if we’d like to. But I can also just open the floor to your own reflections. We have someone who already said it. We, I think the scheduling for the panels is currently, I would say, in flux. As in, the secretariat have not responded too much to request to cancel or move panels around. Any rescheduling for me, I think, is risky. Because it probably just wouldn’t happen. So, would anyone like to open the floor for any questions? Why did you come to this session? What did you expect to hear from this session? I have a microphone, I can pass around.

AUDIENCE: Hello, everyone. So, maybe my question here is, what is cyber diplomacy to you? And how has the difference in the global landscape today inspired the creation, or like, the general idea of cyber diplomacy?

James Shires: There’s a whole set of questions on cyber diplomacy, as in the use of cyber or digital tools or digital diplomacy that is very interesting and important. How do ministries of foreign affairs adapt to the digital world? How do they use AI, for example, in their day-to-day lives? That’s not, for me, cyber diplomacy. It’s diplomacy about cybersecurity issues. It’s distinct because these issues have stakeholders that are much more transnational than many other issues, right, you can’t necessarily tie down the technical community governing the internet to particular states or responsible states. And it’s also a lot more based on the private sector as well, right? So that, for me, is cyber diplomacy in general. It has its own challenges based on the kinds of actors involved, and also the technical experience required for the issue itself. So if you want to engage in cyber diplomacy, there’s a relatively high bar to entry. Now, that’s not unusual in diplomacy. Most diplomacy on science and technology requires some level of existing knowledge, but cyber diplomacy may be more than others. So that would be my framework for what cyber diplomacy is. Now, please, go ahead.

AUDIENCE: How do you think it’s going to look five years from now, 10 years from now? Because maybe five years ago and 10 years ago, it wasn’t the same, it wasn’t what it is now.

James Shires: So to bring the conversation back to the Middle East, five years ago, there was very little cyber diplomacy in the Middle East, I would say, right? The extent to which most Middle East states engaged with UN cybersecurity governance processes was very little. You had some at places like the Open Ended Working Group, the OEWG, putting forward relatively virtual statements at the start of every group, right? So Iran would make sure it aligned with particular views, mainly sort of rejecting what it saw as kind of the Western dominance of these processes. And so would Syria align with that as well, right? So you saw some coalition building, but many other states just didn’t engage at all. That really changed with the UN Cybercrime Convention, right? Because there’s a long history to cybercrime laws in the region, right? They have not signed up to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, which was the European mechanism, but they did have very early cybercrime laws often in the Gulf, right? So the first in Saudi Arabia was in 2006, and then it was updated eight years later after the Arab Spring and after the Arab Convention on Cybercrime, right? But for by the League of Arab States. So the idea of a UN Convention on Cybercrime was something that really, I think, spoke to these states more so. And you had a lot of very active engagement, especially towards the end of that process. So that’s where I see that going from there. Now, you said, where does it go in the future? Now, we’ve had lots of attempts by Saudi Arabia and other states to put forward new means of cyber diplomacy. You’ve had things like the digital cooperation organization. I expect to see more of those efforts. I expect to see a lot more cyber diplomacy as soft power, as the ability to include things like cybersecurity issues on major geopolitical stages, you have the Doha forum in Qatar, you have the Manama dialogues in Bahrain, all of these states are trying to put forward, you know, their take and their interpretation of geopolitical issues and to act as a convening space for quite sensitive geopolitical topics. I expect cyberspace to continue and grow in those areas as well. There are more microphones, if anyone else would like to come in, please. One there and then we’re here. And do come to the purple table. It’s nice if you like it.

AUDIENCE: Thank you. So when I look at cybersecurity, there’s a digital infrastructure component, right? So we are seeing in some of the wars targeted removal of ICT infrastructure, which means people are not. And that’s a big part. So how would so one question is, in that realm, how would cyber diplomacy actually act? The second one is actually the softer part. So there’s the algorithmic part, right? So when you are having a project that can identify targets very specifically that are downloaded from one area, and then remove them in war, this becomes a major challenge, but it may not just it may not be war, it could be disinformation. So we’re also seeing a lot of disinformation come in at the same time. So I think there’s three things that I’m looking at. One is the information and the literacy and maybe how that works over there. Romania just now had an issue where they actually cancelled their presidential elections or postponed it because of this issue. Where would it come in? So rebuilding after, for example, a war, we often see it’s the same people who supply the equipment for the war, which I find very strange. So just asking your view of very delicate balances.

James Shires: Okay, that’s three big questions, right? There’s one cyber tools in conflict and regulating cyber tools in conflict. There’s two, which is content issues like misinformation and disinformation. And there’s three, which is conflict reconstruction, right? So let’s let’s let’s talk about them separately, right? The first one, cyber tools in conflict. Now, here, I would like to do a little bit of a contrast with a global perspective. In the years after the Stuxnet virus, when everyone thought this is the advent of cyber war, you had lots of commentators saying, this is what cyber war will look like. It’ll be high sophistication, extremely high resource investment targeted at sort of strategic sites. You have a lot of speculation in the following years about what cyber war will look like after that. You then have the Ukraine conflict in 2022. And this challenges expectations, right? Cyber tools are blunted, right? The cyber defenders seem to have a good chance of repelling cyberattacks. There’s a lot of capacity building and investment going into Ukraine’s allies doing that. Then you have Israel’s invasion of Gaza. And there, the only cyber component, really sort of truly understood is the sort of the link to actors outside the conflict for a very simple reason. All infrastructure in Gaza is targeted and pretty much destroyed. Not just telecoms infrastructure, but water and energy and everything else. So there is no cyber tools in conflict in the Gaza side, because there is no use of cyber tools there. On the other side, you have a bigger conversation about the role of digital intelligence in targeting in conflict. That’s not necessarily sort of cybersecurity narrowly understood. Compromising devices, getting into devices. But this idea that in conflict, you use digital signals and device signals to do kinetic targeting, i.e. to kill people and bomb people, is extremely obvious in both those conflicts. In Ukraine, it goes from things like mobile phones on the frontline, and malicious apps being used by soldiers, then being used for drone strikes. In Gaza, it’s stuff like AI targeting systems, putting up lists of potential target sites to Israeli missile strikes, right? So this idea of digital targeting in conflict changes the landscape significantly, it sometimes gives greater advantage to already asymmetric conflicts. And by that, I mean, it enables states to bomb more, and to bomb more indiscriminately. The third, so that’s, that’s just a quick thing on cyber tools in conflict, right, as where we are now. The second point is on content and disinformation. Now, we’ve already talked about cybercrime laws. Now, most cybercrime laws in this region have a strong content component, right? They have a error saying disinformation or fake news or certain kinds of content will be prosecuted, will be considered crimes under this law. That’s not the case in other regions. So the Budapest Convention, for example, very clearly excluded content from its list of potential criminalizable offences. This was very much a political decision, right, as one that a lot of, for want of a better word, Western countries rejected wholesale up until the concerns about mis and disinformation stemming from largely from the US elections, right? They then understood that there was some need to focus on disinformation and content issues. There’s also a parallel discussion of online safety, right, of bullying and much more human security issues affecting content moderation and regulation. So both of these pressures have essentially slightly flattened the spectrum of positions for how to regulate content online. Most states now agree that there should be some regulation of online content. They disagree significantly about how much and what kinds of content, right? But most of these disagreements don’t necessarily lie in the technology itself, they lie in the definitions underlying that technology. For example, of a what is a criminal act online? What is a what violates national laws on media freedom and similar, right? So there’s a wide range of spectrum there. And there are a wide range of positions here in the region as well. Now, of course, there’s mis and disinformation become such a tangled topic, because you have to really piece it apart, right? So when you tracking disinformation operations around the Gaza conflict, right, they are doing, essentially, they are tracking kinds of the kinds of opinion that might be widely seen on many streets in many, many Arab countries, right. So it’s very difficult to disentangle the identification of disinformation from the political sides and positions that are taken by the people feeding that, or either promoting or reading that information. I’ll probably leave that there, because there’s a lot more we could say about that. The third point, say again, reconstruction. Now, I don’t have much to say on reconstruction, especially in the Middle East context, because the obvious point places here are in the war after the war in Yemen, and whatever will happen after Gaza, right, there will be a lot of investment required on. And of course, increasingly, you see Lebanon requiring massive reconstruction funds as well, right? The way in which cyber relates to that is in a way quite surface level, right, because frankly, it’s physical reconstruction, it’s all other kinds of infrastructure need to be rebuilt. But maybe there’s an opportunity there, right? Maybe there’s ability to bring in new forms of like very modern telecoms infrastructure, right? This is me trying to be as optimistic as possible in a situation that is incredibly pessimistic. So I would say there is maybe some potential for reconstruction, but the big decisions about who pays for it, even when it happens, right, we’re not there yet. So I wouldn’t be able to comment any further. There’s a question online. So should I read out the question? Well, yeah. Gaza has become the world’s first laboratory for testing and using, this is a question, artificial intelligence-based systems and weapons to commit apartheid war crimes and genocide against the oppressed Palestinian people. That has led to huge numbers of civilian deaths. What can be the role and responsibility of the United Nations governments in dealing with the weaponization of artificial intelligence that is contrary to human values and international law? So thank you very much for this question. And I’m not sure where to look because panelists can’t really see me. So this is a crucial point, right? And I have a feeling that many of you are at this panel because it is the only panel on any topic remotely like this at the current IGF, right? You scroll through the schedule. There is a panel tomorrow afternoon on transnational repression and cybercrime. So you should make sure that you attend that if you’re around. But there is not much discussion of conflict in general. There is certainly not much discussion of the conflict in Gaza, and let alone any discussion of the use of AI targeting tools that I mentioned. The Lavender system or others in terms of how that should be addressed by the UN. Now, I’ll make two short points. One is that the UN system is already mobilizing to look at the war in Gaza from a point of view of international law and what is prosecutable and not, especially by the International Criminal Court. So that is already happening. It happens slowly. There are prosecutors there looking at the well-publicized indictments of the leaders on both sides that is happening. So that is happening by the ICC, which obviously there are discussions of jurisdiction. But the UN system itself, there are also resolutions condemning what is happening, but then go into the existing geopolitical divides, right? Whether this is a security council or at the General Assembly. So the UN system is mobilizing, but always could do more. Now, this is better. Now, in terms of the IGF, question one would be whether the IGF should address AI itself, right? It is the internet governance forum. One could argue it has a narrow mandate to address internet governance, which does not include all the many social and conflict-related implications of AI, right? So it could say this is not part of our mandate. Now, we have already heard from the many high level speeches yesterday and so far, but the Internet Governance Forum does intend to include AI very firmly within its remit and you can see from many panels on AI ethics and responsibility and social impacts that this is the case. So I would say that certainly the Internet Governance Forum should look at the use of AI in conflict. It should link to other initiatives like the REAM summits, responsible use of military AI to understand not only how AI is being used now, but what is the potential for putting guardrails on it in future. If the lessons from the cyber security debate are anything, like tell us anything, they tell us that the intergovernmental multilateral process for putting anything in place around AI, especially military will be long and convoluted and probably dissatisfactory at the end. So, but there’s still hope. Please go ahead, yeah. I’m actually also going to, I had another meeting I thought, so the power wasn’t going on, but I’m just going to send a quick message while you discuss that, please.

AUDIENCE: As the public researchers about cyber diplomacy in the Middle East, United Nations has published it. So if there is, where can we read this? It’s good to watch or it’s good to read these stuffs. I was just going to chime in on the last matter about the use of AI in kinetic conflict. So, on the military side, the phrase to look for is human in the loop, because that’s how military people think of it, right? Is if there’s a human in the decision-making loop and the kill chain, then there’s ultimately a person upon whom responsibility falls and they know how to do that. Whereas if it was just software all the way down, then it’s machine learning, training data, who filtered the data, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. And ultimately everyone can evade any responsibility for anything. And on the NGO side, there’s the campaign to stop killer robots, which is the coalition of NGOs that are working in this area.

James Shires: Thanks, Bill. And to tie that human in the loop conversation back to what the question was asking about, which is Israel’s actions in Gaza, right? There is not a discussion there about there not being humans in the loop, right? That is not the issue that is taking center stage. The issue is that the humans in the loop are operating with insufficient constraints on collateral damage, on targeting limitations, on the numbers of strikes they’re conducting, et cetera, et cetera. So it’s a very difficult, it’s a very different scenario about how to regulate the use of AI in conflict when the real problems coming from the use of AI are not from the use of itself. It’s from its incorporation into the existing decision-making, flaws in decision-making. I hope that helps answer the question. We had one here, which was, where’d you read about this, right? So there’s a book called Cyber War and Peace in the Middle East, which was published by the US DC-based Middle East Institute a couple of years ago. There’s a book on the politics of cybersecurity in the Middle East, which you don’t want to read. And there’s also recent work, especially on the AI and the Gaza War, for example, by Anwar Majeneh, who’s at Stonehill College in the US. So yeah, there’s a few people writing on this, but it’s not a very large community either. So I can have my card afterwards. I will send you a list of references. Can I go online and then come back to you? Because I think there was an online question. So again, I’ll read it out. Existing internet governance system is not sufficient to respond to the policy issues related to data, domain names, safety, health, common infrastructure, technical standards and content, and requires the adoption of a comprehensive approach and a new architecture. Can the smart combination of multilateral governance model plus multi-stakeholder consultation be appropriate? Can the model of ICAO, the International Aviation Organization, be a good example to ensure the legality, health, and safety of cyberspace? So I guess this is not a Middle East-related question, but it is an important question. It’s well, how fit for purpose is the current internet governance system? Now, the International Civil Aviation Organization is a really interesting example, because there you have an extremely highly regulated industry, right? Not only is airplane building a very highly regulated activity, but airplane communications, everything to do with airspace, is extremely highly regulated, right? So in a way, it is kind of the opposite of the internet, right? The internet, by default, by design, in the technologies, is not regulated, right? Anyone can use it, they can set it up, they can create a network, they can connect that network to other networks, and so on, right? So, in a way, the ICAO is the wrong, is exactly, entirely the wrong end of the spectrum to think about internet governance, right? You have very few actors who are already used to highly, high levels of regulation, cooperating to ensure they can build and maintain sort of safe passage for aircraft. The internet, on the other hand, is sort of a really wide diversity of actors, all of whom are able to do what they want and try and do what they want really quickly, and so you have to try and bring those in. So, I think a combination of a multilateral governance model plus multistakeholder consultation, I think, would just be insufficient, right? You just would not get the right people around the room, you would not be enabled to enforce or act on any recommendations or things that are made because you wouldn’t have, yeah, the multilateral governance would not be effective. That’s what I’d say there, but I know there are other people in the room who might want to come in as well. So, would you like to come in? You want to come in, please? You have a, you have a question? Okay, we have two questions, and if you’d have, you have a question, right? Okay, I’ve answered it already. Okay, you have a question, you go. And we have one at the back there, go ahead.

AUDIENCE: Can you hear me? I can hear you, yeah. So, the fact that we have like different definitions for that certain cybersecurity term, we are going to lead an effort to find like a unified definition for a single cybersecurity term. What the step that should be followed?

James Shires: So, we would like to have a single universally agreed definition of cybersecurity. Now, the problem arises, right, when you start stepping outside of technical definitions of security, right? So, the classic technical definition are things like confidentiality, availability, and integrity, right? And you can define those definitions and you can define those properties within networks relatively well, right? With those classic Alice Bob diagrams about who can read what when, that’s how you’d get to those definitions. But even then, integrity, right? Which is usually the communication is the same as coming out as it was going in, and it also hasn’t had some kind of time, it has the right timestamp as well, right? Because if you delay communication, that’s also a failure of integrity. These properties have also been redefined, right? So, a lot of the disinformation and misinformation work is badged as integrity work, right? So, maybe Facebook or Meta would try and think about their content moderation efforts within that framework. So, you very quickly get pushing at the boundaries of these technical concepts to make them include much thicker ideas about what shouldn’t be included. And that’s the root of the problem with defining cybersecurity. Because then you get into things like, okay, well, what is security? It means, does it mean that you don’t have the, there’s no access to a network, right? You have a secure network. That’s a very kind of black and white definition, right? There’s inside and outside. Is it being able to respond and make sure you can continue to function, right? That’s much more resilience focused definition of security. Or as many people around this forum say, is it, should there be a human idea of cybersecurity, right? It’s like, it’s actually, what does it mean for people, whether something, whether they are secure or not in what they do online. And that’s possibly the thickest definition you have, which includes everything to do with content, all the technical aspects of cybersecurity and everything else. So, the reason we find it hard to define cybersecurity is because contained within this discussion is a lot of our own values and opinions and our cultural background as well, right? So, we start unpicking those whenever we start to get to the definition. So, I don’t think there will be a single definition. I might be wrong. If someone can give me a single universally agreed definition of cybersecurity, I’d love to hear it. Do you have a microphone? Yeah, that feels odd.

AUDIENCE: Yeah, I was just wondering, how would you assess the maturity of the cyber diplomacy landscape in the Middle East compared to other regions of the global South, whether it be Africa or Southeast Asia or Latin America or the Caribbean?

James Shires: Yeah. So, I would say maturity is an, I don’t like the term maturity, point one. There’s a ITU maturity index. There’s a lot of maturity surveys. And it implies that all that’s needed is sort of a certain amount of capacity and then everyone will engage in the same way, right? So, the problems come from lack of maturity. I actually think that that’s not necessarily the case here, right? So, you have very deliberate choices by states, what they invest in. Do they invest in cyber diplomacy? Like, classically understood. Do they see the UN discussions, the OEWG, et cetera, as providing value? Or do they do something else as well, right? Do they do something more national or more regional? So, I think you can do a regional comparison. You can do them based on indexes, such as the ITU index. You can do them based on the Oxford Cybersecurity Capacity Building, maturity model, right? There’s a lot of ways you can do inter-regional comparison. My preference is always to say, okay, what is the, what are people, or decision makers and leaders in the region, what do they want to get out of these discussions? And are they getting those out of them? Are they getting what they want out of them? So, for example, with the ITU index, right, are they able to communicate that their, that their country is digitally advancing, right? That it’s a tech power or a tech hub for the region, right? You’ve seen that very powerfully in the UAE, in Saudi Arabia, right? Are they able to say, in terms of capacity building, to devote projects, to devote funding to projects they are interested in, right? In maybe countries that they have a diplomatic interest in, whether that’s in the Horn of Africa, in Djibouti or somewhere else. Yes, of course, right? And are they able to do education? There’s a lot of very impressive open education initiatives in Arabic and in English, in the Emirates and Qatar and Saudi Arabia, to really reach the population. So, yes, there’s a lot of activity there, right? The way that, when I’ve done, I’m speaking to people at professional conferences, things like that in the region, often this then becomes, so if you reject the global indexes of maturity and you say, it’s all about what you want, this then becomes a conversation about standards. Okay, how many companies in the region are obeying ISO 27,000? How many of them are obeying the NIST or how many of them are adopting the NIST standard, right? Because you don’t obey it. And there you might get a much lower answer, right? You might say, actually, they’re either doing it for only audit purposes, but they are not sort of practicing the kinds of measures that they would advise, or they are even not engaging in the standards conversation at all. And there you can point to probably more reliable metrics. There are lower levels of maturity, especially in some sectors in this region that would need a lot of advancing to go further on. But that’s possible at a regional level, right? So you could do that through the GCC, through the Gulf Cooperation Council Committee. Yeah, further on as well, so please.

AUDIENCE: Thank you, so if I look at, I guess the whole panel’s on cyber diplomacy and peace, right, so there’s an angle where you have to look at peace within the Middle East, that is Middle East by Middle East, and maybe there’s Middle East with others, because we know there’s a lot of actors outside Middle East involved in the Middle East, which disrupts peace, right? So if cyber diplomacy is about influence and getting people aligned to the cause, and everybody wants peace, because peace is when you prosper, you don’t prosper very much unless you’re selling things that disrupt that, right? So most of the hardware and the tech comes from other sides of the world. How will this impact cyber diplomacy in the future when you control the narrative, or you control the data? And we see that already, I think out of 500 cables, most of them, 99% is private sector cables. And if you look at the private sector companies owning them, you know where they are, they’re mostly in the West. So do you think this becomes a challenge in the future?

James Shires: I certainly think it does. I think, so there’s a very, there’s two answers to the question. One, like, ownership of hardware, of infrastructure, and ownership of data are both really live issues, especially for this region. There’s a strong push for data localization. So if you look at cloud regulations in the Gulf States, you look at agreements that they’ve struck with main cloud providers, they are really pushing for localization agreements through partnership with local companies. So if you have Google Cloud Platform, Amazon, etc., then they are working with partner companies, and they are also asking for dedicated data centers. Now, I published something quite recently on this, on the role of cloud computing and cybersecurity in diplomatic interaction, so between Israel and the UAE through the Abraham Accords, and some of that analysis showed how meaningless some of this is. So the requirements that Israel and the UAE put on the data centers, they said you have to have local data centers. Okay, great. But actually, we want a whole cloud region. Okay, right. So we want our own independent cloud region here, which is actually at least three independent… If you remember that, at least three independent data centers are at least like certain physical distance apart, right? And they didn’t build these data centers. They just rented some of them. Some of them weren’t sufficiently apart to count as a cloud region, so they just changed the definition slightly, right? So this demand for localization is kind of met in name but not in reality. So yeah, that’s point one. Point two is kind of the role of external actors, right? And here, you know, you have to look at what is really going on in terms of offensive cyber tools. And here we switched tack slightly to go to kind of a threat landscape. There’s an actor called, by the threat, intelligence industry predatory sparrow, which has been linked to cyber attacks in Iran that have had disruptive effects on railways, on steel plants, on fuel stations, things like that. Now, part of this is because kind of the infrastructure in Iran, as far as I know, is outdated, right? It doesn’t have the ability to modernize its whole digital critical infrastructure, right? So relatively easy to target. But also, you know, this actor, whoever it is, activist or state sponsored, is pushing the boundaries, right? They are disrupting critical infrastructure to a certain extent and then rolling back on that, not going as far as they claim they could do. So there’s also actors in the Middle East that are consciously pushing the boundaries of what is acceptable through cyber conflict and seeing how far they can go there. And that’s a really worrying trend. Please, I don’t know if this one works.

AUDIENCE: I think it does. We’ll share a mic. I’ll put these on so I can hear. No, actually, I don’t need it. Thanks for organizing this session. Actually, it’s a good opportunity because we get a chance to talk. So I really like this. I had a couple of reflections. I don’t come from the security field. But one thing that has, and I’m based in Belgium. My name is Jamal Shaheen. I’m based in Belgium at the University of Belgium. So I just had a couple of questions. And I’ll start with one, which is about in Europe, at least, we see this connection between cybersecurity. It’s now with the new European Commission that’s just been put in. They’re bringing this connection between cybersecurity and democracy or stability of institutions in the field. And I was wondering whether that’s something that you’ve seen panning out in this area. And then the second question was, as part of the Ukraine conflict, I’ve noticed that companies like Microsoft have been publishing reports, threat reports. Which have been saying what Microsoft as a private actor has been doing to defend Ukraine. And changing the landscape from security actor to the types of security actors that you talk about when you talk about cyber diplomacy. Maybe incorporating different types of actors. I was wondering how that’s playing out in this region, particularly in light of the last question. When we talk about different types of actors. Is the private sector now playing a bigger role? And of course, that private sector being largely based outside of the region. Is that playing an important role in this space? And how will that play out? Because then the opposite of that is they’re moving towards more calls for digital sovereignty. You call data localization, but digital sovereignty. Which only further gives space for more conflictual responses. I’m a bit concerned about that kind of evolution of this dialogue.

James Shires: Yeah. Oh, yeah. That’s right. Thank you. Thank you. Very. Yeah. Really interesting points. Right. So. On the first one, this idea that the private sector is becoming almost a combatant. Right. They are providing support in Ukraine via Microsoft. Critical services. Some of them defense services. Some of the military services. Right. And it’s very hard to distinguish. If you provide a cloud platform to the Ukrainian government, some of it is used for defense. Some of it is not. What is a legitimate target then for the other side? How far do they become involved in that war? These are really difficult questions that I think a lot of people are very worried about. And I also think that the boundaries are being really tested there. So, in the Middle East complex that I’ve talked about, in Yemen and in Gaza, there’s not the same question at the moment. There’s not the same involvement of private sector actors on the defensive. Now, there are on the Israeli side. So, it’s a major cybersecurity hub. There are big Israeli companies. You might want to check out the Palestine Laboratory, which is a very carefully researched book on the use of the Palestinian territories for developing technologies throughout Israel’s history. So, that’s not just to do with AI in Gaza now, but it’s a longer term phenomenon. And that means that companies are very closely connected to the Israeli state. That’s not a new thing, and it’s entirely conscious as well. You have Israeli leaders like Netanyahu very much selling the cybersecurity industry through things like NSO Group and others that they sell. It’s very much to this region and this country as well, that they are using cyber offensive and defensive as diplomacy. And a lot of the recruitment comes out of the military. So, this idea that the private sector is involved comes from a very, I guess it would say a European or American squeamishness. A Silicon Valley idea that these companies are not part of the state. They’re not associated with state military activities. It just doesn’t exist in the Israeli context. Right. So, that’s why it’s really different. And because they’re such a central hub, they don’t have the need for international companies to come in the same way. And of course, on the other side in Gaza and Yemen, they’re not getting the same level of support. Just to state the blatantly obvious. There is no one going in and saying, okay, we will migrate your cloud infrastructure online. We will provide you with a digital e-government service. None of that is happening purely because of political priorities.

AUDIENCE: If we needed cyber peace or we needed peace in the region, and you come back to your main frame of question, what are the four or five things you recommend we do? Three things. Thank you so much for giving me a wrap up.

James Shires: And for those online, I know we had a couple of questions. I hope you found this stimulating. And just to remind everyone who’s joined a little bit later, I am kind of having a discussion because many of the panelists couldn’t originally make it. So thank you, everyone, for sticking with it. What are the four or five things in terms of cyber peace? Now, the first is data, right? Data on use of cyber tools in conflict, on the actors using those tools, right? At the moment we rely on, as this gentleman said, private sector threat intelligence reports that are very skewed towards certain actors. It’s not a good source of data, but it’s the only one most researchers have. So, new and different kinds of data about what kinds of cyber security threats there are on the ground, right? And then you can have a conversation about how to counter those threats once you know more about them. Working in a multistakeholder way, right? Working more with civil society, with industry and with internet governance organizations that aim to promote non-political aims, right? So, there’s a lot of controversy here in the region, right? You have everything we’ve talked about so far today from content moderation and censorship to offensive cyber tools and spyware and things like that. Finding ways where countries can agree that they want greater and better internet access, maybe, and better connectivity would be number two, right? And using diplomacy to achieve those aims. And then number three would be plugging in as much as possible to the UN processes, right? They have all the flaws that I’ve already talked about, but at the moment there are no alternatives, right? And if you use regional mechanisms, whether it’s the GCC, whether it’s other regional groupings, to develop your own practices, to develop states’ competencies and collaboration in cyber security, and then translate that to the global level, to the multilateral level, that I think would be the last recommendation. Thank you all for what has been an extremely interesting conversation. Please do follow up. I have some cards here. I know I said I promised people some references. I promised people some things to read, and I will definitely do that if you come and approach me afterwards. So thank you so much.

Agreement Points

Importance of data on cyber threats

James Shires

AUDIENCE

Gather better data on cyber threats and actors in the region

There is a need for more data on cyber threats and tools used in conflicts in the region

Both James Shires and an audience member emphasized the need for better data on cyber threats and tools used in conflicts in the Middle East region.

AI use in conflicts raises concerns

James Shires

AUDIENCE

AI targeting systems are being used in conflicts like Gaza, raising concerns about indiscriminate attacks

There are calls for the UN and IGF to address the use of AI in conflicts

Both James Shires and an audience member expressed concerns about the use of AI in conflicts, particularly in Gaza, and the need for addressing its implications.

Similar Viewpoints

Both recognize the increasing role of private sector and non-governmental actors in cybersecurity and conflicts, suggesting a need for multi-stakeholder approaches.

James Shires

AUDIENCE

Work in a multi-stakeholder way with civil society and industry

Private sector tech companies are playing an increasing role in cybersecurity and conflicts

Unexpected Consensus

Limitations of current cyber diplomacy frameworks

James Shires

AUDIENCE

Engage more with UN processes while developing regional cybersecurity practices

There are calls for the UN and IGF to address the use of AI in conflicts

Despite different focuses, both James Shires and the audience member unexpectedly agreed on the need for more engagement with international bodies like the UN, while also recognizing the limitations of current frameworks in addressing emerging issues like AI in conflicts.

Overall Assessment

Summary

The main areas of agreement centered around the need for better data on cyber threats, concerns about AI use in conflicts, the increasing role of private sector in cybersecurity, and the need for more engagement with international bodies while developing regional practices.

Consensus level

There was a moderate level of consensus on key issues, particularly on the need for better data and addressing AI in conflicts. This consensus suggests a shared recognition of emerging challenges in cybersecurity and diplomacy in the Middle East, which could potentially lead to more collaborative efforts in addressing these issues.

Different Viewpoints

Definition and scope of cyber diplomacy

James Shires

AUDIENCE

Cyber diplomacy is diplomacy about cybersecurity issues, distinct due to transnational stakeholders and private sector involvement

There are calls for the UN and IGF to address the use of AI in conflicts

While James Shires focuses on cybersecurity issues in his definition of cyber diplomacy, an audience member suggests expanding its scope to include AI use in conflicts, implying a broader interpretation of cyber diplomacy.

Unexpected Differences

Role of private sector in cybersecurity and conflicts

James Shires

AUDIENCE

Infrastructure vulnerabilities make some countries like Iran easier targets for cyberattacks

Private sector tech companies are playing an increasing role in cybersecurity and conflicts

While James Shires focuses on state-level vulnerabilities and attacks, an audience member unexpectedly brings up the increasing role of private sector tech companies in cybersecurity and conflicts. This difference highlights a potential gap in the discussion about the evolving landscape of cyber actors.

Overall Assessment

summary

The main areas of disagreement revolve around the scope of cyber diplomacy, the focus of data collection efforts, and the role of different actors in cybersecurity and conflicts.

difference_level

The level of disagreement appears to be moderate. While there are some differences in perspective, they seem to stem from different areas of focus rather than fundamental disagreements. These differences highlight the complexity of cyber diplomacy and security in the Middle East, suggesting a need for a more comprehensive and multi-stakeholder approach to address the region’s cybersecurity challenges.

Partial Agreements

Both James Shires and the audience agree on the need for better data on cyber threats in the region. However, they differ in their focus, with Shires emphasizing the importance of unbiased data sources, while the audience member specifically highlights the need for data on tools used in conflicts.

James Shires

AUDIENCE

Gather better data on cyber threats and actors in the region

There is a need for more data on cyber threats and tools used in conflicts in the region

Similar Viewpoints

Both recognize the increasing role of private sector and non-governmental actors in cybersecurity and conflicts, suggesting a need for multi-stakeholder approaches.

James Shires

AUDIENCE

Work in a multi-stakeholder way with civil society and industry

Private sector tech companies are playing an increasing role in cybersecurity and conflicts

Key Takeaways

Cyber diplomacy in the Middle East has increased in recent years, especially around cybercrime conventions

Middle Eastern states are using cyber diplomacy as soft power to promote their geopolitical interests

AI targeting systems are being used in conflicts like Gaza, raising concerns about indiscriminate attacks

There is a push for data localization and digital sovereignty in Gulf states

Private sector tech companies are playing an increasing role in cybersecurity and conflicts in the region

Resolutions and Action Items

Gather better data on cyber threats and actors in the Middle East region

Work in a multi-stakeholder way with civil society and industry on cybersecurity issues

Engage more with UN processes while developing regional cybersecurity practices

Unresolved Issues

How to effectively regulate the use of AI in military conflicts

The role of the UN and IGF in addressing AI weaponization

How to balance digital sovereignty efforts with international cooperation on cybersecurity

The lack of a universally agreed definition of cybersecurity

Suggested Compromises

None identified

For me, cyber diplomacy is the, is diplomacy about cybersecurity issues, right? There’s a whole set of questions on cyber diplomacy, as in the use of cyber or digital tools or digital diplomacy that is very interesting and important. How do ministries of foreign affairs adapt to the digital world? How do they use AI, for example, in their day-to-day lives? That’s not, for me, cyber diplomacy. It’s diplomacy about cybersecurity issues.

speaker

James Shires

reason

This comment provides a clear definition and scope for cyber diplomacy, distinguishing it from digital diplomacy. It sets the foundation for the rest of the discussion by clarifying the topic.

impact

This definition helped focus the conversation on specific aspects of cybersecurity in international relations, rather than broader digital issues.

Gaza has become the world’s first laboratory for testing and using artificial intelligence-based systems and weapons to commit apartheid war crimes and genocide against the oppressed Palestinian people. That has led to huge numbers of civilian deaths. What can be the role and responsibility of the United Nations governments and UNIGF in dealing with the weaponization of artificial intelligence that is contrary to human values and international law?

speaker

Online Audience Member

reason

This comment brings up a highly controversial and current issue, connecting AI, cybersecurity, and ongoing conflicts. It challenges the discussion to address real-world applications and ethical implications.

impact

This question shifted the conversation towards the ethical use of AI in conflict situations and the role of international organizations in regulating such technologies.

As the public researchers about cyber diplomacy in the Middle East, United Nations has published it. So if there is, where can we read this? It’s good to watch or it’s good to read these stuffs.

speaker

Audience Member

reason

This question highlights the need for accessible, credible sources of information on cyber diplomacy in the Middle East, pointing to a gap in public knowledge.

impact

It led to a brief discussion on available resources and literature on the topic, potentially helping attendees find more information after the session.

Ownership of hardware, of infrastructure, and ownership of data are both really live issues, especially for this region. There’s a strong push for data localization.

speaker

James Shires

reason

This comment introduces the important concepts of data sovereignty and localization, which are crucial in understanding the geopolitics of cybersecurity in the Middle East.

impact

It broadened the discussion to include economic and political aspects of cybersecurity, beyond just technical issues.

In Europe, at least, we see this connection between cybersecurity. It’s now with the new European Commission that’s just been put in. They’re bringing this connection between cybersecurity and democracy or stability of institutions in the field. And I was wondering whether that’s something that you’ve seen panning out in this area.

speaker

Jamal Shaheen

reason

This comment introduces a comparative perspective, bringing in European approaches to cybersecurity and its connection to democratic institutions.

impact

It prompted a discussion on the differences between European and Middle Eastern approaches to cybersecurity, highlighting the importance of regional context.

Overall Assessment

These key comments shaped the discussion by broadening its scope from a narrow focus on cyber diplomacy to include ethical considerations of AI in conflict, data sovereignty, and regional differences in approaches to cybersecurity. The discussion evolved from defining terms to exploring real-world applications and implications, particularly in the context of ongoing conflicts in the Middle East. The comments also highlighted the interconnectedness of cybersecurity with broader political, economic, and ethical issues, demonstrating the complexity of the topic and the need for multifaceted approaches in both research and policy-making.

How will cyber diplomacy look 5-10 years from now?

speaker

Audience member

explanation

Understanding future trends in cyber diplomacy is important for anticipating challenges and opportunities in the field.

How would cyber diplomacy act in the realm of targeted removal of ICT infrastructure during conflicts?

speaker

Audience member

explanation

This is crucial for understanding the role of cyber diplomacy in protecting critical infrastructure during conflicts.

What can be the role and responsibility of the United Nations, governments, and UNIGF in dealing with the weaponization of artificial intelligence that is contrary to human values and international law?

speaker

Online participant

explanation

This question addresses the urgent need for international governance and regulation of AI in warfare.

What steps should be followed to find a unified definition for cybersecurity terms?

speaker

Audience member

explanation

A common understanding of cybersecurity terms is essential for effective international cooperation and policy-making.

How would you assess the maturity of the cyber diplomacy landscape in the Middle East compared to other regions of the global South?

speaker

Audience member

explanation

This comparison is important for understanding regional differences and potential areas for improvement in cyber diplomacy.

How will the control of hardware, tech, and data by Western companies impact cyber diplomacy in the future?

speaker

Audience member

explanation

This question addresses the potential power imbalances in cyber diplomacy due to technological disparities between regions.

Is there a connection between cybersecurity and democracy or stability of institutions in the Middle East, similar to what is seen in Europe?

speaker

Jamal Shaheen

explanation

Understanding this connection is important for assessing the broader societal impacts of cybersecurity policies.

How is the role of private sector companies in cybersecurity and conflict playing out in the Middle East?

speaker

Jamal Shaheen

explanation

This question explores the changing dynamics of cyber actors and the potential implications for regional stability and sovereignty.

Summary

This discussion focused on the interoperability of AI governance, exploring its scope and potential mechanisms. Participants examined the concept of interoperability in AI governance, addressing issues that need global attention and obstacles to implementation. Key topics included the role of multilateral and multi-stakeholder approaches, the importance of trust-building, and the need for cultural and sustainable interoperability.

Speakers emphasized the significance of balancing regional variations with global approaches, highlighting the need for flexibility in governance frameworks. The discussion touched on the challenges of the digital divide and the importance of capacity building in developing countries. The role of the United Nations in global AI governance was a central point, with participants acknowledging its legitimacy while noting limitations in enforcement capabilities.

The conversation explored various forums and mechanisms for implementing AI governance, including the potential of blockchain technology and the need for agile responses to rapid technological advancements. Participants stressed the importance of streamlining efforts to avoid duplication and the need for clear mandates in international bodies.

The discussion also addressed concerns about AI sovereignty and data flows, suggesting potential solutions like “data embassies.” Speakers highlighted the need for a balance between efficiency and fairness in governance structures and the importance of prioritizing key issues in international forums.

Overall, the discussion underscored the complexity of achieving interoperability in AI governance and the need for continued dialogue and cooperation among diverse stakeholders to address global challenges while respecting regional and national interests.

Keypoints

Major discussion points:

– Understanding interoperability of AI governance, including legal, semantic, and technical layers

– The role of different actors (governments, private sector, civil society) in addressing AI interoperability

– Balancing regional variations with global approaches to AI governance

– The role of the United Nations and other international bodies in global AI governance

– Challenges of AI sovereignty and data flows between countries

The overall purpose of the discussion was to explore different perspectives on how to achieve interoperability in AI governance at a global level, while respecting regional and national differences. The panelists aimed to identify key issues, challenges, and potential solutions for creating more aligned and coordinated approaches to governing AI internationally.

The tone of the discussion was collaborative and constructive throughout. Panelists built on each other’s points and offered complementary perspectives. There was general agreement on the importance of interoperability and international cooperation, even while acknowledging challenges. The tone became slightly more urgent when discussing the need for the UN and other bodies to move quickly enough to keep pace with AI developments.

Speakers

– Olga Cavalli: Director of the South School of Internet Governance, Dean of the National Defense University of Argentina

– Yik Chan Chin: Associate Professor from Beijing Normal University, Co-leader of the IGF Policy Network on Artificial Intelligence

– Sam Daws: Senior Advisor of Oxford Martin Artificial Intelligence Governance Initiative, Director of Multilateral Artificial Intelligence

– Mauricio Gibson: Head of International Artificial Intelligence Policy, Artificial Intelligence Policy Directorate, Department of Science, Innovation and Technology, United Kingdom

– Xiao Zhang: Deputy Director of China Internet Network Information Center, Deputy Director of China IGF

– Poncelet Ileleji: CEO of Yoko Labs, Banjul, Gambia

– Neha Mishra: Assistant Professor from Geneva Graduate Institute, Switzerland

– Heramb Podar: Centre for AI and Digital Policy, India

Additional speakers:

– Dino Cataldo Dell’Accio: Chief Information Officer at the United Nations Venture Fund, Leader of the dynamic coalition on blockchain assurance standardization at IGF

Expanded Summary of AI Governance Interoperability Discussion

Introduction

This discussion, featuring experts from various fields and regions, focused on the interoperability of AI governance, exploring its scope, potential mechanisms, and challenges. The conversation aimed to identify key issues and potential solutions for creating more aligned and coordinated approaches to governing AI internationally while respecting regional and national differences.

Understanding AI Interoperability

The discussion began with a broad definition of AI interoperability, extending beyond technical aspects to include legal, semantic, and policy dimensions. It encompasses the ways through which different initiatives, including laws, regulations, policies, codes, and standards that regulate and govern artificial intelligence across the world, could work together more effectively and impactfully.

Speakers expanded on this concept, emphasising various aspects:

1. Yik Chan Chin stressed the importance of a broad definition beyond technical systems.

2. Sam Daws highlighted cultural interoperability and sustainability aspects.

3. Mauricio Gibson emphasised the need to balance regional variations with global approaches.

4. Xiao Zhang positioned AI interoperability as part of broader digital transformation.

5. Poncelet Ileleji underscored the importance of inclusivity and public interest in interoperability.

Key Issues and Obstacles for Global AI Governance

The discussion identified several critical challenges in achieving global AI governance interoperability:

1. Risk categorisation, liability, and training data risks (Yik Chan Chin)

2. Geopolitical tensions and unequal distribution of AI capabilities (Yik Chan Chin)

3. Sustainability and energy demands of AI systems (Sam Daws)

4. Keeping pace with rapid technological advancement (Mauricio Gibson)

5. Trust-building and data sovereignty concerns (Xiao Zhang)

Yik Chan Chin elaborated on specific global issues that need addressing, including:

– Harmonizing risk categorization across different jurisdictions

– Addressing liability issues for AI-caused harm

– Managing risks associated with training data and model outputs

– Tackling the unequal distribution of AI capabilities globally

Sam Daws particularly emphasised the need for an interoperable global approach to AI sustainability, noting the increasing energy demands of AI systems and the importance of measuring, tracking, and incentivising better energy and water use in data centres, chips, and algorithms.

Role of Different Actors in Addressing AI Interoperability

The speakers agreed on the importance of involving multiple stakeholders and diverse perspectives in addressing AI interoperability and governance. Key points included:

1. The importance of multi-stakeholder and interdisciplinary approaches (Yik Chan Chin)

2. The need for cross-regional forums for lesson sharing, such as the UN AI Advisory Body and regional initiatives like the Council of Europe and CAHAI (Sam Daws)

3. The government’s role in convening stakeholders and capacity building (Mauricio Gibson)

4. A multilateral orientation with multi-stakeholder engagement (Xiao Zhang)

5. The UN’s convening power and coordination role (Neha Mishra)

Mauricio Gibson emphasized the need for clarity in messaging and avoiding duplication in multilateral efforts. Xiao Zhang stressed the importance of finding priorities and focusing on them in UN efforts.

United Nations’ Role in Global AI Governance

The speakers generally agreed on the UN’s important role in AI governance, highlighting its legitimacy, capability for rapid response, and potential as a platform for dialogue and collaboration. Specific points included:

1. The UN as a platform for policy dialogue and collaboration (Yik Chan Chin)

2. The UN’s capability for rapid response in emergencies (Sam Daws)

3. The need to streamline UN agencies and define clear duties (Mauricio Gibson)

4. The UN’s legitimacy from equal representation of countries (Xiao Zhang)

5. The potential for a UN enforcement role in AI safety/security (Poncelet Ileleji)

Cultural and Inclusivity Aspects

An important area of consensus emerged around the importance of cultural aspects and inclusivity in AI interoperability. Sam Daws and Poncelet Ileleji both emphasised these points, highlighting the need for diverse cultural inputs into AI development, including insights from low-resource languages and indigenous peoples.

AI Sovereignty and Trust

In response to an online question, the discussion touched on AI sovereignty. Xiao Zhang emphasised trust as a fundamental issue in AI development and governance, shifting the focus from technical aspects to human and social factors. This led to further discussion on how to build trust in AI systems and the role of different stakeholders in this process.

Role of IGF and National and Regional Initiatives (NRIs)

Xiao Zhang highlighted the importance of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and its National and Regional Initiatives (NRIs) in AI governance. He emphasized their role in fostering multi-stakeholder dialogue and contributing to the development of AI governance frameworks at various levels.

Blockchain and AI Integration

Dino Cataldo Dell’Accio, an audience member, introduced the potential of integrating blockchain technology with AI to address interoperability and trust issues. He suggested this could provide a common layer of trust and transparency for AI systems, potentially enhancing interoperability and addressing some governance challenges.

Digital Economy Agreements

Neha Mishra brought up the relevance of digital economy agreements in relation to AI interoperability, suggesting that these agreements could play a role in facilitating cross-border data flows and AI governance.

Conclusion

The discussion underscored the complexity of achieving interoperability in AI governance and the need for continued dialogue and cooperation among diverse stakeholders. Key takeaways included the need for a broad understanding of AI interoperability, the importance of multi-stakeholder approaches, the challenge of balancing regional variations with global approaches, and the critical role of the UN in facilitating dialogue and coordination.

While there was general agreement on many points, unresolved issues remain, including how to effectively streamline and coordinate AI governance efforts across multiple UN agencies and forums, specific mechanisms to bridge the AI divide between developed and developing countries, and how to balance data sovereignty concerns with the need for global interoperability.

The Policy Network on AI (PNAI) announced its upcoming session and the release of its main report on AI interoperability and other issues. Participants were encouraged to attend the session and read the report for further insights on AI governance interoperability and good practices.

Olga Cavalli: Are we ready? Okay, thank you. Thank you very much for being with us at lunchtime. This is really remarkable. Thank you for being with us. My name is Olga Cavalli. I’m from Argentina. I’m the director of the South School of Internet Governance. By the way, our booth is over there. And I am the dean of the National Defense University of Argentina. And I’ve been invited to moderate this very important session. Thank you very much for inviting me as moderator. This is a great honor for me. This session is a workshop, Interoperability of Artificial Intelligence Governance, Scope and Mechanisms. So let me very briefly give the scope of this workshop. Interoperability is often understood as the ability of different systems to communicate and work seamlessly together. This is the concept that we all have about interoperability of different systems, software and machines. But the IGF Policy Network on Artificial Intelligence, also called PNI, definition of interoperability in the 2023 report is slightly different. I think it’s more broad, which is very interesting. The report, this definition includes the ways through which different initiatives, including laws, regulations, policies, codes, standards that regulate and govern artificial intelligence across the world, could work together in legal, semantic and technical layers that become more effective and impactful. This reminds me of the definition that was made by the WIEGEC about Internet Governance. That was a broader definition of Internet Governance, not only the technical identifiers and the technical coordination. At the same time, development and uptake of artificial intelligence systems are proliferating. them all the time at unprecedented pace and across sectors. A concerted effort in governing artificial intelligence is vital to harness the opportunities while remaining the challenge and risk as a result of new technologies. We all are working on different regulations in different countries and regions. As artificial intelligence is increasingly embedded in our society, it is critical that global governance frameworks encourage interoperability to promote a safe, secure, fair and innovative artificial intelligence ecosystem. So finally, interoperable systems and interoperable governance frameworks that effectively address the risks and impacts become really imperative. This is why we are here with a group of very distinguished panelists that I will introduce them now. We have Dr. Ying-Chang Ching. She’s an associate professor from Beijing Normal University from China and she’s also co-leader of the IGF Policy Network on Artificial Intelligence, PENI. Thank you for being with us, Ying. From remote, we have Mr. Poncelet Nyeleki. I hope I pronounced it correctly. He’s the CEO of Yoko Labs, Banjul from Gambia, Africa. Well, are you here? Hello. I can see you. We have Mr. Sam Doss. He’s senior advisor of Oxford Martin Artificial Intelligence Governance Initiative, Oxford University, United Kingdom. And also, he’s the director of Multilateral Artificial Intelligence. And we have Dr. Xiao Chang. She’s deputy director of China Internet Network Information Center, CINIC, and deputy director of China IGF. And we have Mr. Mauricio Gibson. Mauricio is head of International Artificial Intelligence Policy, Artificial Intelligence Policy Directorate. Department of Science, Innovation and Technology from the United Kingdom. So, welcome all of you. Thank you. And also, we have a very, very big audience, which is fantastic. And we have to deal with this noise and sound thing, but we will manage. Don’t worry. And also, we have a discussant that she will give us her input at the end of the interventions of our panelists, Dr. Neha Misha. She’s Assistant Professor from Geneva Graduate Institute, and she’s in Switzerland. So, we will organize our workshop in this way. We have three policy questions that will be answered by our distinguished panelists. And then, we have some comments from Neha from remote. And then, we will open the floor for the intervention of our audience. So, I will post first the first policy question to our distinguished panelists, which is about understanding the interoperability of AI governance. So, for the panelists, what is your understanding of interoperability? And what are the most issues that need to be addressed at the global level? And what are the obstacles? I don’t know who would like to start responding this question. I won’t put you on the spot. Okay. Welcome. The floor is yours.

Yik Chan Chin: Thank you, Olga. So, I speak on behalf of the PNAI because I’m the co-leader of the subgroup on the interoperability of AI governance. So, from a PNAI’s point of view, as Olga mentioned, we take a broad understanding of the interoperability. So, we particularly look at legal, semantic, and technical layer of the interoperability because we identified that the most important layers in terms of interoperability. So, we also look at how the law, regulation, policy, code, standard across a different part of the world can work together and address those important problems at a global level and make it more effective and impactful. So in terms of a global issue we would recommend to address in the short term or the medium term, there are several of them. I think the most important is AI models risk categorization and the evaluations. I think most of the country will agree on that. But we have a different approach in terms of the categorized risk and also evaluate mechanism. The second one, we identify liability, the liability of the AI system. And the third one is the risk of the AI training data. So we know that the AI system depends on the data that used to train the AI. So the risk of the training data is the third issue we think is important to address globally. And the third one, the last one is a technical standardization, the alignment of the technical standard and the regulatory fragmentation and the divergence requirement. So these are the global issue we recommend to focus on. So what is a major obstacle? The major obstacle, first of all, we identify is geopolitical tensions, the tensions between different powers in the world. And the second one is lack of the trust, lack of the trust among different countries, regions, and even the countries. And the third one is unequal distribution of AI technology and the maturity of their policymaking. So we see different AI technology power that have different power dynamics and the maturity of their governance. And the third one, that is about AI interoperability policy. Because we see a lot of the national, regional, international interoperability policy, but they have a different principle, values, objectives, and the priority. I think that’s it. That’s all for me. Thank you.

Olga Cavalli: Thank you very much. That was very interesting, especially following the comments in the Open Ceremony about the difference between the Global South and the North. Sam, you want to also tell us about what is your understanding about interoperability?

Sam Daws: Thank you very much. It’s a real pleasure and privilege to be here. I wanted to commend Yik-Chan Chin and the others for a wonderful P&I report on interoperability. Building on her comments, I would add that two areas I think that we need to additionally focus on. One is we need an interoperable global approach to the sustainability of AI. So AI and energy demands are set to grow with increasing multimodal inference with the use of IoT data and with agentic AI. So we need interoperable ways to measure, to track and to incentivise better energy and water use of data centres of chips, algorithmic efficiency and data sobriety. So work is already underway on this in the ITU, ISO, IEC, IEEE-SA or these Geneva-based acronyms. But also with the International Energy Agency on the energy track, partners such as the Green Software Foundation and the UN Environmental Programme, which takes a triple planetary crisis approach mapping the full life cycle of AI, all the way from mining through to end-of-life reuse. We also need international scientific collaboration for AI’s positive climate contributions. For example, in new materials research in solar PV and batteries and climate weather modelling through digital twins. also especially I think looking towards Belen in Brazil, COP30 next year, AI will really help deliver efficiency targets across all industries. So what are the obstacles to this particular issue area? Well building on Yip Chan’s remarks, national security and economic competition factors are significant. We’ve seen US export controls on high-end chips on China and in return China restricting gallium germanium antimony in response. Countries then race to acquire high-end chips detracting focus from building interoperability on sustainability approaches. The other obstacle is that tracking energy use by grids and companies can be economically sensitive. So companies don’t always volunteer this themselves and while companies have been doing a remarkable job, NVIDIA, Google and so on, in achieving 100x efficiencies in data centers and chips and software design, the overall electricity of use of AI continues to rise. So we need a multi-stakeholder framework for industry transparency and accountability. Singapore is a great member state example of integrating sustainability into its AI verify and model gen AI frameworks. And lastly I want to touch briefly just in one minute on cultural interoperability because it’s not talked about enough in AI governance but we really need cultural interoperability addressed at a global level. For humanity to flourish it’s vital that our diverse cultures feed into AI so we can better use it to live good and meaningful lives and that includes insights from low resource languages and also the wisdom of indigenous as people who have a minimal digital footprint, not captured by large language models trained on the internet. The trend for valid reasons towards sovereign AI at a national and regional level, especially in data governance and LLM worldviews, is, I think, going to continue. That’s not in itself an obstacle to interoperability. The obstacle would be if we have a fragmentation into a closed loop of culturally informed, epistemological, generative AI ecosystems – it’s a bit of a mouthful – such as a more socially conservative BRICS AI alliance that President Putin announced this week, an ecosystem around that, alongside a more liberal Western one, creating two bounded rationalities, separated by mistrust.

Olga Cavalli: About sustainability and how that affects our environment. Because we use technology, but technology has impact in the environment. That’s very interesting. Also, what you mentioned about the society and languages. Languages are my hobby, so I commend you for that comment. And I commend you both for being so respectful about the time, responding to the questions. Any comments from Echan or Mauricio? Yes, please, what’s for you interoperability?

Mauricio Gibson: People hear me? Yes. Thank you all for having me. It’s a pleasure to be here. I’m going to build on what everyone said, and it’s really helpful insights here, but give it a more practical government application perspective. So I think recognizing what people have said, I believe that, you know, there are innately going to be those different government interests, which at times will compete, but I think seeing how interoperability can happen is looking at the sort of broader areas where there are opportunities for cooperation and recognizing and honing in those particular areas and also looking at how we can plug the gaps and continue to build on those areas where there are gaps and sort of work towards that further progression of coordination. And I think a lot of that is sort of building those foundations and building blocks of what are the core principles that we’re starting to see across different governance work streams. And I think, you know, that doesn’t necessarily mean to be harmonization, but just really like building on that, because there will be the regional and domestic variation. And just, yeah, working on that gradually is a fundamental element of it. Though, I think what are the sort of core issues for interoperability and the obstacles that need to be overcome? I think, yeah, echoing what everyone said here, but also I think thinking more broadly about the sort of technological advancement of AI. And, you know, we’re hearing a lot more about not just gen AI, but agentic AI and the many challenges on governance of this, not least because of the nature of who is responsible building on liability there. You know, keeping up in terms of governance with these challenges is going to be a real battle. And so from the UK perspective, I think the science behind the most advanced AI, which is progressing, you know, at an exponential rate is a real focus, or has been a real focus, not least with the safety reporting that we’ve been producing, or secretariating the producing and bringing a lot of scientific evidence on this. And the state of the science, you know, it’s rapidly evolving, and we’re having to, you know, been having to produce a lot of reporting on a regular basis. And even by that point, you know, is that gonna be out of date? You know, how can we keep up with that? And understanding the scientific basis is gonna be a vital thing to try and overcome. I think the other thing is building on what people have said as a sort of capacity building element to, you know, I think there are differing understandings in different environments. The digital divide is so significant and given the advances in technology, we, you know, supporting policy officials, civil servants, public sector, and all, you know, everyone to support their AI talent uptake in all sorts of parts of the world will help an understanding of how they can engage in the governance process at the international level and in their own domestic system too. And I think a third point is supporting that is the sort of clarity and messaging that is needed to different communities across the world. So to support on things like sustainability or on the sort of cultural cross exchange of information, I think, you know, how do we land the key points that are needed to support that interoperability? And one element of that I think is using the different forums and I think what we’re seeing though, however, is in the multilateral domain, there is still a lot of duplication and the messaging isn’t clear and it’s not very clear how or where people want to sort of prioritize particular engagement on governance in these different areas. So some people are seeing some things happening in the UN, some people want to see in other areas, but one obstacle that needs to be overcome is the duplication, some of the activity and how can we try and manage that, see how they fit together and that’s gonna be a real challenge, I think, and something that we need to sort of work together on going forward.

Olga Cavalli: Thank you, Mauricio. You bring a very interesting point. It’s especially for developing economies. This is sometimes it’s hard to follow up with all the spaces where all these things are debated and decisions are made. made and policies are developed, maybe at the regional or global level, so that’s extremely challenging. And also you brought an interesting concept about capacity building, which is, as we know, cyber security, cyber defence, cyber crime, artificial intelligence, we are running short with the people trained. Yi-Chan, you want to add any comment?

Xiao Zhang: Actually, I think you might, I want to respond to your questions and I think you would respond to all the speakers. And we have three questions, one by one. The first one is your understanding, my understanding of what is interoperability of AI system. And for me, I think I use one word is one, it should be one ecosystem. Let me give example, I want to make comparison to internet. You know, for the internet in the past 50 years, only 50 years, and as I can say, it’s a one world, one internet. Why? It’s digital economy, it’s flourishing, there’s so many applications, but we have found something in common, and we divide internet governance to layers, at least in the technical layer, I mean, logic layer, we found TCP and IP, and we can connect them, we obey the same rules. That means, even though the contents, different countries have different regulations for the contents or something like that, but under the technical layer, we obey the same regulation. So that means we can work together, ecosystem. So as an internet user, you can use any application, you send email, you call VIP, or you search online, or something, you don’t feel that you are roaming around the world. seamlessly. I mean that we’re very very seamlessly. That means you feel very, you don’t feel that where it is. So I think for AI system, at least we should find something that we can work together as one ecosystem. So that’s my response to the first question. And the second one is what’s the priority, what’s the most important thing that we should do? I think actually because we have different culture, we have different development stages, and the priority for each country is not the same. For economic growth, for different areas. So our understanding of AI governance is quite different. I think because 2.6 billion people around the world have no access to internet. So AI means nothing to them. We cannot leave them behind. So maybe I think the most important thing is to sit down and find the priority of all the questions of AI and find priorities. What is the, we can narrow down, what is the global issue and what is maybe for developing countries and for Africa and for, we can one by one go. It’s not just AI risk or something like that. They have no AI. How to say AI risk? So I think development issue is also very important. And for the third one, so question is what’s the obstacle? As Professor Chen said, we actually have a lot of discussion. I think trust is the most important issue. There is, AI is built on trust. And it’s not limited to the geopolitical reasons. We shouldn’t have different ecosystem. So it’s all this ecosystem are built on trust. So how to build trust? I think this is something we need to discuss. Thank you.

Olga Cavalli: Thank you very much about trust. as we know, artificial intelligence is based off a big amount of data, capacity of processing that data, and some algorithms that gather that information. So trust is, I would say that it’s a layer overall that gives this tool the confidence for us to use it. So that’s a very interesting point from you. So I will address our distinguished panelists the second question, which is, how can different actors address interoperability and how can we balance regional variations with global approaches? Who would like to start? I don’t want to put someone on the spot. Xiao, Yichen, okay.

Yik Chan Chin: So yeah, I’m Yichen and this is Xiao. So yeah, I think I just jump in because from the PNAS perspective, just want to mention that we just released, now we’re going to release our main report in the main hall in the 4, 3.30. We have main sections. So in that main session, we’re going to report, release our report, this year’s report. So part of the report is interoperability and also liability and environmental issues and the labor issues. So welcome to join us in the main hall. So from the PNAS perspective, I think we are look at, I think how can we work together? I think multistakeholder is very important and the way from our own experience, cause I’m leading the group. So we got a lot of the input from different sectors and from around the world. So it just surprised how much information evidence you can collect through the multistakeholder models because we have a different sector, private government and academia. So that is really, really impressive for me personally. and as a group as well. And the second thing I think that interdisciplinary research is very important because it’s really complicated to understand the AI system and how to evaluate, how to test, how to know the security and the safety issue. So for us, I think it’s a multi-stakeholder plus the interdisciplinary research team is important. So in terms of how to balance between the regional variation and the need for global harmonization alignments, I think that’s a crucial issue because we have to respect the regional and the national diversity, where at the same times, you know, try to align at the global level. What we suggest is that, first of all, they have like a, do not recognize, we do not think actually we need only one global layer, like we have UN, of course, at the global level, but UN’s role, it’s not to everything. Actually, it’s more about the coordination. So we actually, we respect the regional diversity and the national diversity. So first of all, I think that we have to make sure local needs has to be met, just like Xiao mentioned. So we have local needs and regional needs. Then what’s happening at the next level, so it’s bottom up from a community, from national. Now we have a regional initiative, we already saw so many regional initiatives, like Latin America, African unions, and Asians, and of course, EU. So we have seen all these regional initiatives, but what we need to do in the end is how do we coordinate and meet all these national, regional initiatives to the global level. So that’s what we need to do in terms of interoperability. So definitely we can do this. The first way we can use that is in our report, we identified some existing very effective mechanism to do the global interoperability. For example, like we talk about UN as a multistakeholder platform for us to negotiate. and communicate. So this is one way we can have some policy dialogue. The second one, we can think about the international collaboration in terms of the AI safety governance. So we have a good example set up by the K government in terms of the test and the verified AI safety. And then there’s many AI safety institutes already set up in Europe and also in Japan, in US, even in China, they’re going to, we have a regional one, we do not have a national one. So this is a good kind of a collaboration. And the third one is kind of a technical industry self-regulation and the technical integration. So this is an existing mechanism already there, it can help to do the global interoperability. And then the second mechanism we can use is a compatibility mechanism. So for example, we’re talking about like a mutual recognition so we can have a mutual recognition with regulatory approach. So we have a divergence in terms of regulation, but then we can have some mutual recognition and all. So this is one kind of a mechanism. The second one, we can rely on the international standards set up by the IEEE ISO. And they also collaborated together, all these international standards setting under the ITU, they collaborated together as well to align with each other. Second, we can talk about a certificate, security certificate, okay. And also joint AI safety testing or alignment mandate. In the end, still we can have a harmonization of the AI regulation or even the harmonization of the AI principle and terminology. The last one I want to mention is very important in terms of national and regional policymaking. So the policymaker in the national domestic level and the regional level, when they do the policy, they should try to incorporate. international standard in their policymaking. So when they’re doing policymaking, first of all, of course, we have to respect a domestic public interest objectives. But at the same time, if they try to align with the regional international standard, which will reduce the unnecessary barriers and the cost in the end, you know, for the interoperabilities. So try to ensure alignments of global standard. And the last one is increasing international regulatory coercions. So reduce unnecessary sections and divergence about the regulatory framework. I think I’ll stop there.

Olga Cavalli: Thank you. Thank you very much. And also this difference between mainly developing economies by technology developed by developed economies. So, and once they have to develop the regulations, then they have to have that in mind. So thank you very much for your comments. Who would like to follow Mauricio? Sam, please go ahead.

Sam Daws: Building on Nick Chan’s comments, the regional approaches reflecting diverse cultural approaches and interests is not in itself a bad thing. It’s inevitable. And I think it can be very positive. But policy interoperability can be more difficult once nations have enshrined their approaches in law when negotiated regional agreements. At that point, tools like international crosswalks, other tools remain valuable to determine docking points and to clarify taxonomy and language differences. But in the future, I think we can do better in two ways. And I’ve tried a bit creatively about this question. First is to start earlier. So start early in understanding the nascent approaches of other regions at the same time that we draft our own national and regional approaches. Those of you familiar with UN negotiations, negotiating UN resolutions, know that once a region has negotiated a common position, it’s very hard to unpick it in the face of criticism or objections from other groups. So sometimes just being aware of the key concerns of other groups can allow subtle changes in language or in framing rather than on substance as we elaborate our own position, which then aids interoperability of approaches later. And I think we can consciously use the four tracks coming out of the UN Digital Compact and the H-Lab so that we can use them for early iterative knowledge. exchange through policy dialogue, through standards exchange, through scientific convening and through capacity building. The other sort of area I thought we could be creative with is using cross regional forums. So forums that have at least one member state from more than one region for lesson learning to reduce regional siloing of AI approaches. So let’s use cross regional political, cultural, economic and scientific forum at both a member state and a multi-stakeholder level. So we’ve got the IGF of course now, other examples, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the DCO that Saudi Arabia leads, the Digital Forum of Small States, Singapore leads, CISA in Central Asia that Kazakhstan leads, the Arab League, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the CIS, the Organization of Turkic States, OECD GPAY, BRICS and the Belt and Road. All of these have a contribution. And also we mustn’t forget the role of the International Science Council, the ISC and National Academies. I think those are vital, especially since two or three years ago, the ISC embraced the social sciences as well as the natural sciences. And I feel strongly that psychologists, economists and social anthropologists have important insights into how human behavior can be an obstacle to policy interoperability approaches. So we need them at the table. And then lastly, the network of AI safety institutes can also play a potential cross regional interoperability role. But I would say only if it can broaden its membership and its agenda to widen its relevance to the global South.

Olga Cavalli: Thank you, Sam. And thank you for. naming the examples of inter-regional spaces of debate, because I was going to ask you, but you already mentioned that. I will think about something for Latin America, or maybe we can talk about that.

Sam Daws: I would say CEPI-ELAPE for Latin America.

Olga Cavalli: Okay, thank you for that. And who would like to follow? Please, Yichen.

Xiao Zhang: Well, I’m Shell. I can add something. Well, definitely multi-stakeholder engagement is very important, but definitely I think the AI governance should be multilateral oriented. So I think I’m a little different from the two, but we find something common. Both multi-stakeholder and multilateral engagement are very important, but AI governance is very different. So I still want to make a comparison with internet governance. You know, when internet just happens, something happens, it’s not that it’s not harm, it do not harm, no harm normally, but AI is totally different. With the beginning of AI, we know it can bring risks. It could be like comparable to the atomic bomb, and we know it can, all of the life could be at risk. So it’s definitely because of the, because it could be using a weapon in the military, or because it needs the sanity or something like this. So it’s totally different from the internet. It must be the country oriented. So I think it’s a multilateral, very important things, the engagement on multilateral, they have resources. It’s not something technical problem, it’s something of the legal, it’s something understanding of AI, what it is, and it’s a harm it could bring. So normally, of course, multi-stakeholder engagement is very important, very important, but multilateral is definitely should, because they have the resources, we have the action to take. So I think the both of the start two sides are very important, and it’s totally different from internet governance. Thank you.

Olga Cavalli: I think you bring a very interesting- Very interesting point. So when you mean multilateral, you mean governments talking to governments? Is that the idea, like United Nations? And the interaction that you mentioned with the multi-stakeholder spaces, I think that would be the ideal way to work. Because governments have a special role in taking care of economy, security of the country, ordering the laws and all the environment. So very interesting point of view. Mauricio, you want to add something?

Mauricio Gibson: Thank you. Yeah, I mean, just building on what Chet was saying, I think, and what you were saying, Olga, about the role the government could play. I mean, giving that government perspective here, you know, we can convene a range of different stakeholders, you know, using that interaction, and engage these spaces to really understand the issues that are being reflected by different stakeholders, and help funnel that into action and policy domestically and internationally. I guess that’s a useful conduit that we can provide in delivering the needs of the stakeholders. Building on what you were saying, and others were saying, I guess, you know, there is the resource question. There is the resource that governments have. And I think building on, I think, what I was saying before, again, about capacity building, and the particular role governments can play by using that resource. So we can point to a UK-led AI for development program where we’ve invested almost 80 billion, 80 million, sorry, in development programs in Africa, now increasingly in Asia. And a lot of that can go into skills and to compute. And that’s a clear example of where we can really, like, leverage the resource that we have to support what’s going on the ground. You know, further action on sort of upskilling and governance is a key component of that too, not least, I think, in many areas. And I think particularly on safety, I think it’s an area that we’re trying to use our resource, our experience in convening. a safety institute using the AI Safety Summits to really highlight to a wider global audience about all the safety components and risks that have been mentioned by my colleagues here. I think a second point is also sort of the better communication of the key tools that support things like interoperability in the private sector. So practical examples I can give. So we’ve got the UK, as we funded the AI Standards Hub, which is an international networking mechanism that can help socialize technical standards across the world and bring together a different industry and a multi-stakeholder environment to really talk about these particular areas. And I think by having those conversations that can really bring to light a lot of the really areas that might come across as a bit difficult to access in the sort of standard setting community to a wider audience. We’ve developed sort of AI management essentials as well, which is a self-assessment tool to make sure that, you know, if you’re a business, you can support assurance, support the trustworthiness, developing things in line with policymaking, sorry, policy principles that might be of importance. So like transparency, accountability, things like this. But then, you know, thinking back to, I guess, the sort of public sector adoption element, how can we support and communicate to the public sector ourselves and really enhancing the processes for enabling them to really build the uptake on a lot of this too. And I think with that, you know, going a bit more deeply or a bit broader actually in terms of implementation. So obligations like, you know, we can talk about interoperability in terms of the, you know, the important principles that we might share, but it’s how do you help implement that in practice? And I think there’s a role for governments to support those mechanisms, working with regulators, ensuring that there is the necessary support, guidance and upskilling for those who are working domestically. to look at the international activity and bring it to the domestic level as well and translating the things that are happening at the international level, which we’re working together and doing that domestically. I think one particular example also in sort of the more advanced AI front is the work that the G7 has been doing on sort of the Hiroshima AI process, which is looking at codes of conduct for advanced AI. OECD is looking to implement that. And there’s a case of like monitoring and then keeping that going and a regular assessment of what’s going on to help implement obligations. And then I guess also like, how do we strengthen the foundational principles? So looking at what we were just talking about, so reinforcing whilst we’re implementing, it’s also important to like bring to light where those overlaps are with other areas. So for, I would give a practical example of recent engagements. So we’ve sponsored an OECD and African Union dialogue. The second one took place in Cairo a month ago. This was a really positive space where there was a workshopping on an African charter of trustworthy AI. So what was looked at was a range of different governance mechanisms and tools, including the OECD principles, which looks towards interoperability as well as the UNESCO ethics recommendations. Bringing all these together and looking at how we can draw on different things to support new work that is happening in the African environment. And we want to sort of continue with that work and help support it. So it’s kind of strengthening what’s out there, bringing those two things together and helping that communication and using the resource that we have to help support it is a really key thing. And finally, on your second part of your question about the sort of regional disparities and bringing that together in the global environment, how do we do that and getting the balance right? So the OECD African Union is a combination of two regional activities, bringing that together is a really helpful example. Another example is… This year we adopted and signed the world’s first AI treaty, which is the Council of Europe on Human Rights through Law and Democracy. This was really interesting because it brought together a global grouping and even with that, there were a few challenges in really like getting agreement on some of the core principles and the real detail, but we got there in the end because we were able to keep language broad and flexible enough to enable different global regulatory regimes to engage in it. And I think that’s the key thing. So obviously, whilst it’s a legally binding treaty, enabling space in text to support regional variation is gonna be really key in getting that balance. And I think that’s something that we have to sort of continue to recognize whilst we work towards interoperability and move and progress in these revolution of discussions in this space.

Olga Cavalli: Thank you, Mauricio, for this very good examples of cooperation. And I love the standards hub. I like very much that concept. You know, all the internet is global, it’s based on standards as you were mentioned at the beginning. So I think that agreeing on global standards is the key to have a global understanding of anything. So thank you very much, Mauricio. And now I will share the third question. And thank you all of you for being so respectful of times. Some of you took a little bit more, but some others a little bit less. So it’s a good balance in between all of you. And so the last question for you is, the role of the United Nations in global artificial intelligence governance. What role should the United Nations play in tackling the artificial intelligence governance? Who would like to start? Sam, please go ahead.

Sam Daws: Thank you very much. Before that, I’ve just noticed that Poncele from Gambia has disappeared from our screen and it would be valuable to get an African perspective. You’re there, great. so yeah make sure that he’s still accessible, great to see you. First and foremost the UN can help build trust to gender interoperability so this is very much building on Xiao’s point and trust is not a fixed constant it’s based on regular interaction so people-to-people contact which is why IGF is of such value it’s based on attitude we need to approach this issue with empathy with approaching knowing the other with curiosity and trust is built on experience so a track record of cooperation through predictable tracks so we can begin by an integrated global implementation of the two UN General Assembly resolutions agreed by consensus this year one proposed on responsible AI by the US co-sponsored by China and the other proposed by China on AI capacity building co-sponsored by the United States and both of those are guided by again universally agreed UNESCO recommendations on ethical AI so I think that is our foundation. Then I would suggest we focus on AI capacity areas capacity building in areas where cooperation has already shown to be able to be advanced despite geopolitical headwinds so this is areas like food security, biodiversity, climate change, health emergency prevention, macroeconomic stabilization, counter-terrorism and crime and data for the implementation of the UN sustainable development goals. The GDC and the HLAB on AI have given us a good roadmap it’s clear that the role of the UN is not or at least not for now to regulate AI nor is it to enforce compliance but that may come over time but the UN Secretary General can provide moral leadership on the need for inclusive AI. ITU, other agencies, DESA, UNDP can help bridge the AI digital divide through capacity building. The UN can be a source of scientific insights and expert data to guide decision making and convene policy dialogue in a standard setting. So lastly, and this is again trying to be a bit creative, I think the UN should look at the success of common security in the peace and security domain and look at whether those organizations could also play a role. I think if existing common security organizations established to build trust in the peace and security and economic domains, they could collaborate also in areas where AI can support shared objectives and knowledge exchange. So I’ve got a different set of acronyms here to the cross-regional ones, but the OSCE, CISA, ASEAN, the African Union, the EU, the GCC, the OAS from Latin America, Caribbean community from Gulag, the Pacific Forum, these are all examples where they have shown demonstrated ability to build confidence building through diplomatic engagement, which could be applicable. And finally, we’ve seen the emergence in the peace and security AI space of some very good initiatives by the Netherlands and South Korea, co-sponsored more recently by countries like Switzerland, Kenya, and others on the responsible AI in the military realm. And those have been very good. They’ve included China, which is really important. We’ve also seen US-China bilateral successful consultations on not using AI in nuclear guidance systems. I think we need to move in a direction of travel to back to the UN for AI peace and security. So the Security Council being more seized of AI in peace and security, it’s already done some work, as well as the UN’s work on non-proliferation and disarmament in Geneva and Vienna. Thank you.

Olga Cavalli: Thanks to you, Sam. Thank you for summarizing what has been happening in the UN. and your suggestions about the future. That’s very interesting. Who would like to follow the comments from Sam? Yes, please, the floor is yours.

Yik Chan Chin: Thank you, Sam, because we know he’s an expert in terms of the UN. So thank you very much for your comment, very insightful comment. So I think from the PNAS perspective, as we mentioned before, so international collaboration, the UN’s two resolutions is one example how to do the international collaboration. And the second one is very important. Actually, the UN has a function and also has a legitimacy to form the common objective of governance, because this is from the UN General Assembly. And so, for example, like a safe, secure, trustworthy, artificial intelligence, which is agreed in the General Assembly, that’s the two resolutions. So this is the two functions. And the third one is about IJF. The UN should strengthen the governance for the non-stakeholder, especially like a kind of police dialogue, which can have a marginal system structure to facilitate the exchange and to understand your policy and legislation. The best practice, of course, of the country and the cultures, because it’s very important that black people come to IJF. Sometimes, some colleagues told me, it’s just a talking show, because we talk here all the time. So we do not have enforcement power, okay? It’s very important to understand each other, build up the personal connections and a dialogue. So actually, it’s the most important, the multistakeholder platform, and that you should use it as a platform to have a dialogue, to have a dialogue, to have a dialogue with each other. built up a global AI dialogue. But at the same time, it also strengthens AIG’s capacity. For example, in terms of financial support, medical support, and resources support. Of course, there’s other overlapping functions by different agents. That’s why I really want to give one example, which is my personal example. So I’m part of the OEWG. Many people know that. So it’s about ICT securities. So the OEWG is a binary process. The Singapore ambassador took over as a chair, and then he was on the OEWG. So what he did for me, he invited a multi-stakeholder, like other sector, like private, and also an NGO, to participate in the OEWG, and give them a policy consultation role. So he listened to me, or Joe, some private sector joined in this consultation, was asking them, you know, the OEWG process, would you really help? Because I was invited as a representative from China, but I’m not, and to brief the delegate about the security issues. So we can see this is, the UN is doing some reform in terms of how do they cooperate with the multi-stakeholder dynamics and the multilateral process. So this is a very positive progress. So I’m going to the OEWG, and set up a presence, you know, other agents, other multilateral process. Thank you.

Olga Cavalli: Thank you very much. We already mentioned this, this side of the plan about multilateral and multi-stakeholder spaces. Ms. Yunxiao. Okay, sounds good. Yep.

Mauricio Gibson: Yeah, I’ll be right back. Thanks for the floor and yeah thanks my colleagues for setting that out. I mean yeah I think there are a lot of really interesting opportunities at the UN and I think from the perspective it’s a real opportunity here I think with the conclusion of the dualistic compact that’s been mentioned and you know there’s an opportunity I think for us to really like capture the opportunities that are presented with the UN’s convening power bringing every country and a range of stakeholders together through environments like this to really highlight potential of cross-cultural information exchange and sharing and building that mutual understanding and I think really highlighting and reinforcing the points that you were saying Chan about the building that understanding is I think really fundamental to the value add here in the UN and I think the one thing to sort of clarify is there are because of that fact that there are so many different UN bodies and agencies I think it’s really important to reinforce the importance of complementarity coordination role for the UN to to not duplicate but highlight where it has those different value adds depending on each relevant agency and an activity that is going on you know see as mentioned UNDP has a role in capacity building more widely on AI governance we’re seeing more interest across different agencies to play to play a bigger role but I think what we need is coordination so and an understanding through each agency what exactly is needed to be delivered on the ground giving that practical benefit moving away from just conversation about the principles on interoperability and coordination between these but actually supporting coordination on the ground and delivering actual benefits to those communities who are most acutely feeling the digital divide as well. I think just one of the ways of actually delivering on that, you know, looking at what you mentioned, Sam, about these global dialogue on AI governments, such as one initiative, which has been proposed through the final Global Digital Compact text, and which is just about to launch in terms of negotiations for the modalities of it. I think it’s important that we really, like, highlight the opportunity for sharing information in these forums and actually building that understanding somewhere like this, highlighting the different initiatives that are around enforcing those points about, you know, these are the actions that we are doing, how to build and understand that, bringing those together. And there is a role, you know, for the IGF to be considered, and it’s interesting you mentioned that, and the role of the OEWG, you know, kind of, you know, we need to, like, consider these in these next stages of thinking about that. And I think, on top of that, it’s important that we don’t, you know, create too many things. It’s meant to be in the margins of existing conferences. How can we leverage those existing activities? You know, the ITU AI for Good Summit, there is the UNESCO Global Forum on Ethics as well. How can we work together on these? And then you also mentioned the sort of scientific panel on AI, and so the UK is very interested in this because we produced safety reporting, so on advanced AI risk, which is on an expert panel, leading the scientists, synthesizing research, and I think there’s a role for this. And the role for the UN to really highlight and reinforce a lot of the research that is out there and bring it to a wider audience so we can support that inclusivity in terms of the understanding of science and actually move forward when you have that understanding of science. But I think, again, like, you know, it’s ensuring these are clear and grounded in, you know, scope, the scope is clear, the mandates are clear, so we don’t get into a situation where things are muddied. And that is also reflective of why a lot of people. We are talking about the WSIS process. There are consideration of the role of AI in this process, but we need to make sure that there’s effective coordination so it actually best delivers for people through effective AI governance. And just the final thing to underpin a lot of this is, as I mentioned before, there’s differing approaches, there’s technological advancement that is moving so quickly. It’s vital that we stay alert to the need for agility in AI governance and flexible approaches that can adapt to different developments in the world. I think at times, the UN might not be the quickest moving institution and the system is not the most quick moving, but we need to recognize that we need to keep up with the advanced technology and that’s a fundamental thing as well.

Olga Cavalli: Thank you, Mauricio. I like the concept that you mentioned about the United Nations being the point of… Spreading information to other countries that are part of it. Yixuan, the floor is yours.

Xiao Zhang: Absolutely. As Chris said, I totally agree. At the UN, the United Nations, the best place… Governance… Park… Is… Should actually be more important as it is based on… Yixuan was telling me… Some successful experience in… Like… Climate… Sensitivity… And… So, I think… Something totally different… It’s actually part of the digital transformation of economy and society. It should not be something very… It’s not a single thing. It should be… Actually, it’s part of the digital… Part of the economy, society, and system. So, I see this provides a best place for us to… And, you know, I can come here and I don’t have the energy, resources, and budget to go anywhere. So, I can come here once a year, but I do have, for example… Also, in the UN system, not only… Which is here, but also you have… Again, it’s a must-see program. And I just think it’s a good one. So, we need simultaneous… I think… Resources, and we have… You know, now we have to… I’m not sure if I’m… You know, it’s just like… It’s important to keep making up, but like… And this should continue. I’ve seen how the GDC has something… Something… Solid tasks, solid tasks. And I believe that IGF could… To carry… To carry some of the tasks. That should be the main track. Thank you.

Olga Cavalli: Thank you very much. And for this sort of combination of United Nations and IGF. Yeah, interesting. We have not forgotten you. I will give the floor to you now that our distinguished speakers here in the room have already answered the questions. Would you like to comment about the three questions that we have been talking about? What is the role of the United Nations and how different actors could interact to work on this very important issue? Welcome, the floor is yours.

Poncelet Ileleji: Thank you very much, Olga. Thank you to all the speakers, Professor Chin, Sam and Mauricio. I would like to say first and foremost that we have seen all the three questions that were asked. All my colleagues and speakers, talking from a PN AI perspective, spoke about the three key pillars of what we are talking about in terms of measures, tools and mechanisms, in terms of interaction and interconnection and in terms of communication and cooperation. And I will want to focus, coming from the Global South perspective, I would like to focus on the communication and cooperation part, you know, I have to be a little bit biased here. And I’ll say one thing that guides me in this is for us to remember that at the end of the day, we have in September the Governing for AI for Humanity by the UN advisory body. And one of the key recommendations was about the set up of an independent international scientific panel on AI, which should be multidisciplinary. And we also have issues that I feel that… Some talked about them, and one that was very key for me, if I relate it to recommendation one of that UN advisory body report, deals with producing quarterly thematic research, which will help achieve the SDGs. And when we look at whether it’s climatic issues, when we look at poverty, these are things that AI can be used as an enabler. We have to remember that at the end of the day, we want people to have inclusivity. We want public interest to be well-represented. And within the policy network for AI, we try to look at things from that perspective. In as much as possible, we have various stakeholders, but we try to look at the constituencies we come from. And that is why aligning it with all the regional initiatives, whether it’s the African Union, whether it’s the EU, is very important. But I think if AI can make a difference to us achieving the SDGs, we have gone a long way, where we build on trust and equity. Thank you.

Olga Cavalli: Thank you very much for that, especially as I think about trust and contributions about countries and organizations. I would like to give the floor now to Miha. She has been patiently listening to all of what our colleagues have been saying. Miha, what’s your comments about the debate and exchange of ideas that we have been having?

Neha Mishra: Thank you. Thank you very much, Olga. And also I joined the others in congratulating the PNI for the report, and I’m so delighted to be a part of this panel. So the discussion has been an embarrassment of riches. I really don’t know how I can add, but I wanted to weave some of the ideas that I thought was common through the discussions. The first thing I thought that was very interesting… is the different dimensions of interoperability that the different speakers mentioned. In addition to the technical, legal, and the semantic interoperability, which is often discussed, there were also other dimensions of cultural interoperability or sustainable or environmental-related issues being brought together. I think it was quite interesting when some of the governmental perspectives were shared, particularly how to navigate the different interests of different governments to figure out an interoperability framework that might be feasible. Also, I think here from a practical implementation perspective, questions might be relevant in terms of thinking about whether it needs a more modular approach, whether it’s something to be tested in specific sectors, how incremental it should be, and what the prospects of a multi-stakeholder approach are, because one thing that I thought was common through the discussion also was that multi-stakeholderism and multilateralism need to align with each other, and there can be certain tension points that need to be resolved. I also found it very interesting that a lot of the speakers, including Poncelot, brought this idea of the developmental divide, the AI divide, and there was a lot of very, very encouraging discussion on how to bridge the different gaps. I think one perspective I would like to add to that is that while it is great to think of capacity-building initiatives of more meaningful international regulatory cooperation, one should also be conscious about the limits of interoperability in the sense that in certain scenarios, developing countries, least-developed countries may not be able to participate in many of the interoperability dialogues. So to that extent, it is important to assess what are the areas in which we are looking for interoperability and how representative those discussions are. And while I fully encourage that it is important to have these open dialogues, to have more sustained technical and capacity building initiatives, this is an incremental slow process and developing countries should not lose their autonomy to decide how they want to develop their AI frameworks given that it can have very specific influences across different communities. And that’s why it was very important, I think, at the beginning to highlight the cultural aspect of the human layer of interoperability into the discussions. I also found it very interesting that we discussed so many different variety of tools and mechanisms and different stakeholders, different organizations, including at the global level, the UN, that can contribute to different aspects of interoperability. But at the same time, I agree with Mauricio that it’s important to streamline these efforts and to not duplicate these efforts. From a Global South perspective, I think the question is also really very practical as to if there are multiple fora, they only are able to invest that many resources and they might have to choose between different fora and that also can create competition between different fora. And in that sense, I think the UN still has a very continued important role as being the umbrella organization or the framework organization where a lot of, at least the high level values could develop. But at the same time, I think it’s inevitable and that’s why I think it was very helpful that Sam mentioned so many different examples, both of intra-regional, inter-regional and different kinds of even transnational policy networks. And I think even Mauricio mentioned how the private sector could be involved because I think between In setting these high-level principles and achieving them in practice, there are many, many different stakeholders, including private sector, civil society, academics, engineers, technical bodies, different cultural groups, different communities, and really bringing them together is not an easy task. So it was quite helpful to have that overarching perspective. I think one last point I would like to mention is that, and this is a question that we often think of, even from my disciplinary training as an international lawyer, one question we often think of is, you know, how multilateralism is changing in the current world, and even in the context of, I think, looking at AI interoperability, I think, especially because the development of the technology is not necessarily always state-driven, but also driven by a variety of private organization and standard development bodies, I think the need to find better modalities of engagement between the multi-stakeholder bodies, the transnational regulatory bodies, the private sector bodies, and the multilateral bodies is important. And I don’t think it is going to be a perfect process. I think it is about continuing efforts and figuring out what are the tension points, geopolitical conflicts that are completely not resolvable, and what can be, and it was great to see also many examples being discussed, where despite all the geopolitical differences, the developmental differences, there are common points of consensus and coordination that one can see at the UN level or at other international or regional bodies. I’ll end my comments here. Thank you so much.

Olga Cavalli: Thank you, Priya, for such a very concise and complete summary of what has been discuss and I like the concept that you mentioned that this is a process. I think the journey is a destination that we are going through. We have been talking about internet governance for almost 20 years so far, so maybe we think how many years are we going to talk about artificial intelligence. I would like to give the floor now to our nice audience that have been patiently waiting for an opportunity to talk. Please grab a mic and introduce yourself and tell us your name

Dino Cataldo Dell’Accio: and your organization. Thank you very much for the very engaging and enlightening discussion. My name is Dino Delacroix, I’m the Chief Information Officer at the United Nations Venture Fund and I’m also involved in the IGF. I play several roles. One of my roles is to lead the dynamic coalition on blockchain assurance standardization. The comment and question that I would like to pose to the speakers is I think it’s time to acknowledge that AI does not work in isolation but there is a convergence of AI with many other technologies and I think there is an opportunity for example see how the convergence between AI and blockchain can indeed address many of the issues presented by the interoperability needs. There were many references to trust and I think blockchain can indeed provide that common layer of trust in demonstrating that there is at least a data source because on blockchain we can store data sets that can be audited, can be verified in a transparent manner, can be validated as an input to the AI and also there is a synergy between the two technologies not only one way but both ways. The ability of AI to calculate and predict the volume of transactions for blockchain can usually it to be relatively slow and not performant, can help blockchain scalability issues. So that’s the point I wanted to bring to attention. Thank you.

Olga Cavalli: Thank you very much for your comments. Any other questions, comments from the audience? Do we have online questions?

Heramb Podar: Yes, so we also have a number of comments and a question from the online audience. So I think a bunch of you touched on how multi-stakeholder bodies such as the UN are in the point of information sharing, but they are ultimately relatively slow. So what would you want to see in terms of improving them to address this kind of rapid pace of technology and to keep up with that pace?

Mauricio Gibson: Yeah, that’s a very good question and yeah, it touches on the last points I was making at the end there, which I think is a fundamental question. I think the challenge is, if we’re getting to the crux of it, so UN reform is a long drawn out process. I think we’d have to think about these new stages of AI governance as we move to the next chapter of implementing the Global Digital Compact and WSIS and consider what are our core priorities we need to work on to achieve that agility. For example, with the scientific panel, we need to learn lessons and draw on the experiences of previous scientific panels that have been developed. Some have taken a lot longer than others. Some have different parallel political negotiating processes. I think if there’s a way of connecting with sort of more multi-stakeholder ad hoc engagement, so for example, the UK’s international AI safety reporting, you know, secretariat outside the UN, if we can draw on the experiences of existing initiatives that doesn’t require new UN bodies necessarily to be stood up to take a while to keep up with the technology, that would be a much better way of being more nimble and agile to the advances of the technology and that can apply in other areas as well.

Heramb Podar: So, another question we had from the online audience is how do we promote, you know, AI sovereignty? A lot of countries are worried about, you know, how data flows, how, who keeps the data and, you know, there’s a lot of countries, particularly India as an example, Russia as an example, who want to develop their own kind of national intelligences. So how do we balance that and balance, you know, this kind of like broader interoperability conversation around, you know, global south inclusion and having a unified approach?

Olga Cavalli: Who would like to take the question? Sam, go ahead, the floor is yours.

Sam Daws: So just on blockchain, absolutely, I think indelible, sorry, indelible ledgers are, I think, a real tool in increasing accountability in the future. Blockchain is one such thing, and it’s great to hear that someone involved in the UN pension fund is thinking about it for that purpose. On the speed of technology, we’ve got an exponential increase, and not just the UN, but I think governments are finding it very hard to actually set policies in response to it. The UN is capable of very rapid response. I worked in Kofi Annan’s office in the early 2000s, and we worked on a 24-7 response time for conflicts around the world. So if you look at the IAEA, the UN Security Council, the work of the World Food Programme in UNHCR in emergency situations, WHO in Ebola outbreaks and so on, we see remarkable ability to come to speed. But member states must want that capability. Member states have failed again and again at providing an independent preventive capability and strategic forecasting and these sorts of areas to international organisations. So I think there’s that, and where the UN takes a longer time, it’s often valuable to actually grow understanding of culture issues over time. So I think there is a role for the UN to be slow and steady, and there’s a role for the UN to be fast. I think it’s only after we have a major AI accident, God forbid, that we’re likely to see agreement that the UN can have the capacity for enforcement in the AI safety and security realm. In the meantime, the UN will rely on each nation state’s intelligence, military, foreign affairs, other resources to be able to monitor threats and challenges in real time. And lastly, on data sovereignty, there’s an interesting idea that’s floated of data embassies where you can have data of your own country stored somewhere else where perhaps you can have renewable power to power the data centre quite cheaply, but that that data is inviolable in the same way that diplomats are inviolable. So you can have these little kind of data embassies around the world. I think that’s an interesting concept that could be developed further.

Yik Chan Chin: OK, yeah, I think the blockchain, you know, I think in China or even in the private company already use the blockchain to do the security and encryption. So yeah, I agree with that. In terms of UN’s role, I think just like Mauritius said, there’s so many overlapping agents. So in order to streamline, they need to have a clear definition of each duties and reduce the overlapping. And I agree with Sam, because I’m personally involved in OEWG process. I think the UN has a big capacity, you know, collect and reach out to around the world, collect information from multi-stakeholder, even bilateral countries, you know. But the negotiation between states is so slow, personal experience, very slow. So how can they speed up the negotiation process? I think that’s the key. And in terms of sovereignty issue, AI sovereignty, my colleague published a paper on that. So I think the thing is, we need to figure out, as I said, what should be solved internationally, globally, what should be left for the individual country, left to their own jurisdiction. And this has to be discussed. This is a process, we have to reach agreement on that. Just like internet, you know. Some, like, we have a core infrastructure, which is public good, even global public good. But in terms of the content moderation, which is left to the national jurisdictions. So we need to have common jurisdictions, and at the same time, national jurisdictions. Thank you, that’s my comment.

Xiao Zhang: Yes. I want to respond to the online question of the UN, United Nations. Well, I think UN is not perfect, and a lot of limitations. But it’s better than nothing. And you see, I think always there is a balance between efficiency and fairness, and always a balance. So I think what we should do, maybe we call on the leadership in the AI era. Because the leadership’s awareness of what is happening is so important. And it should be AGL, assumption, engagement, something like this. And also, what I should suggest, is narrow it down. We find some priorities on the UN agenda. GDCL following, and find some priority, and we can focus. And step by step, I think the UN still could play a very important role in the AI era. And besides, I think for the engagement of the IGF and the multi-stakeholder approach. And I think, actually, we can strengthen this approach, because we have NRI, the National Regional Branch of each IGF. It’s very, very important. And if we have every NRI, it can support the policymaking of AI. So that’s my point. And I still think UN and IGF could play an important role in this era.

Olga Cavalli: Thank you all very much. Any other questions from the audience? From online? Haram? No. So I will give the floor, one last comment from. each of our distinguished panelists who would like to start, and then we have aquestion online.

Heramb Podar: Okay, can you read it? Yes, so IamSarmanova asks, in which specific forum do you see global implementation focused AI governance coordination taking place, especially as we think about, you know, duplication between all of these different forums and potential geopolitical tensions or baggage which might come with certain forums?

Olga Cavalli: Who would like to take that? I think, Sam, you’re the expert.

Sam Daws: I’m not the expert. Everybody is here. I mean, I would say that the UN being the treaty-based universal body is the go-to for where we can to implement AI governance mechanisms. So that’s the UN General Assembly, its six committees, and the tracks that the Global Digital Compact have set in train. And I think we’re going to see wonderful synergies within and across those four tracks going forward, and I hope we can then bring in all the valuable regional, mini-lateral, and national approaches into that. But the UN is only as strong as the willingness of its member states to cooperate. So the UN is great at the level of principles, but as I said, I don’t think there’s appetite among member states to get into regulation and enforcement. So we’ll need into operability, which I think is one of the purposes of this panel, is that reality. Thank you.

Olga Cavalli: Thank you, Sam.

Yik Chan Chin: I think I totally agree with Sam. I think the UN, one of the reasons, I think a very fundamental reason, is the UN, every country has one vote. So it’s equal, okay? Because no matter you are small, medium, or the strong nation, each country has one vote. So this gives the fundamental legitimacy of the UN, you know, we have an equal fit to participate. So yeah, so UN will, from PNN’s perspective, you can read our report. So we support UN as the focal point for AI governance or dialogue, but the enforcement, you know, it’s just like Sam said, how the state gives, each state gives the power to UN, you know, to at least laterally, in terms of the safety issue, security issue, maybe we can give more power to UN for the enforcement. Thank you.

Xiao Zhang: I totally agree with Ike.

Olga Cavalli: Thank you. Any comments from Mauricio Bonslet or Niha? Yeah, thank you very much, colleagues.

Poncelet Ileleji: I totally agree with all my colleagues, and I would encourage colleagues to read the SOP group report on AI governance in terms of interoperability and good practices that was led by my colleague, Professor Yeh Chin, who did a fantastic job on that. It covers a lot of stuff. And no matter what happens within interoperability, we have to know that public interest and inclusivity matters. And that will be my closing remark. Thank you very much.

Olga Cavalli: Thank you very much. Neha, any comments, final comments?

Neha Mishra: One thing we haven’t spoken about at all, but I just want to add it to the mix, is that increasingly, certain digital economy agreements are also looking at interoperability-related issues and trying to find synergy between technical and regulatory interoperability. And that’s something I want to add to the mix, because we haven’t discussed it at all. And I think there are prospects. I think there are prospects, especially at the regional level, or between like-minded countries that sign these digital economy agreements. Thank you.

Olga Cavalli: Thank you, Neha. Thank you, Poncelet. We have four minutes. I will give the floor for the last comment. We have more comments from audience? Any other questions from the audience, from online? No, from the audience. OK. Last comments of the three, four minutes that we have. I cannot read from five minutes. I know. OK. I think we have had a very interesting session. Thank you all very much. Thank you, I-Chan, Chiao, Sam, Mauricio, Neha, Haram, Poncelet, and all the audience. Thank you for being so patient and so active in participating in this very important session. Thank you for allowing me to moderate it. You want to say something? Please go ahead.

Xiao Zhang: I propose a group picture.

Olga Cavalli: Oh, a picture. Yes, that’s very important. Now we take a picture. And yes.

Heramb Podar: Just a very quick note. I’ll share the link to the interoperability report. I’ll share the link to the interoperability report. since it was mentioned by a lot of my speakers and a lot of the panelists also, co-authors on the report. We also have, for those in person, the PNAI session happening in the main Peter E. Hall, which starts in, I believe, about 20 minutes. So we look forward to seeing you there. And if you have more questions or you want to just know more about the PNAI work, please feel free to join. Thank you.

Olga Cavalli: Thank you for that. I participated and I was one of the leaders of the PNAI and labor issues. So thank you for allowing me also to do that. No sacas una foto? OK. Let’s do the picture. Thank you all very much. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Escuchame, como se puede borrar esa imagen? No, eso. Yes. Can you remove that?

Heramb Podar: I don’t. I can’t have that. They will have to remove it. Give me one second. Give me one minute.

Mauricio Gibson: Oh, no. We’ve lost him. Poncele, can you come back? Poncele? Poncele, can you come back? Poncele? Can you hear us? Poncele, are you there? Hello? OK.

Agreement Points

Importance of multi-stakeholder approach

Yik Chan Chin

Sam Daws

Mauricio Gibson

Importance of multi-stakeholder and interdisciplinary approaches

Cross-regional forums for lesson sharing

Government role in convening stakeholders and capacity building

The speakers agree on the importance of involving multiple stakeholders and diverse perspectives in addressing AI interoperability and governance.

UN’s role in AI governance

Yik Chan Chin

Sam Daws

Xiao Zhang

UN as platform for policy dialogue and collaboration

UN’s capability for rapid response in emergencies

UN’s legitimacy from equal representation of countries

The speakers agree on the UN’s important role in AI governance, highlighting its legitimacy, capability for rapid response, and potential as a platform for dialogue and collaboration.

Similar Viewpoints

Both speakers emphasize the need to address the challenges posed by the rapid advancement of AI technology, including its sustainability and energy demands.

Sam Daws

Mauricio Gibson

Sustainability and energy demands of AI systems

Keeping up with rapid technological advancement

Both speakers highlight the challenges posed by geopolitical tensions, unequal distribution of AI capabilities, and issues of trust and data sovereignty in AI governance.

Yik Chan Chin

Xiao Zhang

Geopolitical tensions and unequal distribution of AI capabilities

Trust and data sovereignty concerns

Unexpected Consensus

Cultural aspects of AI interoperability

Sam Daws

Poncelet Ileleji

Cultural interoperability and sustainability aspects

Inclusivity and public interest in interoperability

Despite their different backgrounds, both speakers emphasize the importance of cultural aspects and inclusivity in AI interoperability, which is an unexpected area of consensus given the often technical focus of AI discussions.

Overall Assessment

Summary

The main areas of agreement include the importance of multi-stakeholder approaches, the UN’s role in AI governance, the need to address rapid technological advancements, and the significance of cultural and inclusivity aspects in AI interoperability.

Consensus level

There is a moderate to high level of consensus among the speakers on key issues, suggesting a shared understanding of the challenges and potential solutions in AI governance and interoperability. This consensus implies that there is a strong foundation for developing collaborative approaches to AI governance, although differences in emphasis and specific concerns remain.

Different Viewpoints

Role of multilateralism vs multi-stakeholderism in AI governance

Xiao Zhang

Yik Chan Chin

Xiao Zhang argues that AI governance should be multilaterally oriented while recognizing the importance of multi-stakeholder engagement. She emphasizes that countries must lead AI governance due to its potential risks and impacts.

Yik Chan Chin emphasizes the importance of multi-stakeholder and interdisciplinary approaches in addressing AI interoperability. She suggests that these approaches can help collect diverse information and evidence from different sectors around the world.

While both speakers acknowledge the importance of multi-stakeholder engagement, Xiao Zhang emphasizes a stronger role for multilateral, country-led governance, while Yik Chan Chin places more emphasis on multi-stakeholder approaches.

Unexpected Differences

Overall Assessment

summary

The main areas of disagreement centered around the balance between multilateral and multi-stakeholder approaches in AI governance, and the specific ways to improve the UN’s effectiveness in this domain.

difference_level

The level of disagreement among the speakers was relatively low. Most speakers shared similar views on the importance of interoperability, the need for global cooperation, and the significant role of the UN in AI governance. The differences were mainly in emphasis and specific implementation strategies rather than fundamental disagreements. This suggests a generally aligned perspective on the topic, which could facilitate progress in developing global AI governance frameworks.

Partial Agreements

Both speakers agree on the importance of the UN’s role in AI governance, but they differ on how to improve its effectiveness. Sam Daws focuses on the UN’s potential for rapid response given member states’ support, while Mauricio Gibson emphasizes the need for streamlining and clear definition of duties among UN agencies.

Sam Daws

Mauricio Gibson

Sam Daws argues that the UN is capable of very rapid response when needed. He suggests that the UN’s speed in AI governance depends on member states’ willingness to provide it with the necessary capabilities.

Mauricio Gibson suggests the need to streamline UN agencies and clearly define their duties to reduce overlapping and duplication of efforts. He emphasizes the importance of coordination and understanding what each agency needs to deliver on the ground.

Similar Viewpoints

Both speakers emphasize the need to address the challenges posed by the rapid advancement of AI technology, including its sustainability and energy demands.

Sam Daws

Mauricio Gibson

Sustainability and energy demands of AI systems

Keeping up with rapid technological advancement

Both speakers highlight the challenges posed by geopolitical tensions, unequal distribution of AI capabilities, and issues of trust and data sovereignty in AI governance.

Yik Chan Chin

Xiao Zhang

Geopolitical tensions and unequal distribution of AI capabilities

Trust and data sovereignty concerns

Key Takeaways

AI interoperability needs to be understood broadly, encompassing technical, legal, semantic, cultural and sustainability aspects

Multi-stakeholder and interdisciplinary approaches are crucial for addressing AI interoperability challenges

There is a need to balance regional variations with global approaches to AI governance

The UN has an important role to play in AI governance, particularly in facilitating dialogue and coordination

Trust-building and addressing the AI divide between developed and developing countries are key challenges

Rapid technological advancement poses challenges for governance frameworks to keep pace

Resolutions and Action Items

The Policy Network on AI (PNAI) will release its main report on AI interoperability and other issues

Participants encouraged reading the PNAI report on AI governance interoperability and good practices

Unresolved Issues

How to effectively streamline and coordinate AI governance efforts across multiple UN agencies and forums

Specific mechanisms to bridge the AI divide between developed and developing countries

How to balance data sovereignty concerns with the need for global interoperability

Concrete steps to make UN processes more agile in responding to rapid AI advancements

Suggested Compromises

Using existing cross-regional forums to facilitate dialogue and lesson-sharing on AI governance

Leveraging both multilateral and multi-stakeholder approaches in a complementary manner

Focusing UN efforts on coordination and high-level principles rather than detailed regulation

Allowing for regional variations in AI governance approaches while working towards global alignment on key issues

Interoperability is often understood as the ability of different systems to communicate and work seamlessly together. But the IGF Policy Network on Artificial Intelligence definition of interoperability in the 2023 report is slightly different. The report, this definition includes the ways through which different initiatives, including laws, regulations, policies, codes, standards that regulate and govern artificial intelligence across the world, could work together in legal, semantic and technical layers that become more effective and impactful.

speaker

Olga Cavalli

reason

This comment introduces a broader definition of interoperability that goes beyond technical aspects to include legal and policy dimensions. It sets the stage for a more comprehensive discussion.

impact

This framing shaped the entire discussion by encouraging participants to consider interoperability from multiple angles, including legal, semantic, and technical layers.

We need an interoperable global approach to the sustainability of AI. So AI and energy demands are set to grow with increasing multimodal inference with the use of IoT data and with agentic AI. So we need interoperable ways to measure, to track and to incentivise better energy and water use of data centres of chips, algorithmic efficiency and data sobriety.

speaker

Sam Daws

reason

This comment introduces the important dimension of sustainability in AI governance, which had not been mentioned before.

impact

It broadened the scope of the discussion to include environmental concerns and sparked further comments on the need for a holistic approach to AI governance.

For humanity to flourish it’s vital that our diverse cultures feed into AI so we can better use it to live good and meaningful lives and that includes insights from low resource languages and also the wisdom of indigenous as people who have a minimal digital footprint, not captured by large language models trained on the internet.

speaker

Sam Daws

reason

This comment highlights the importance of cultural diversity and inclusion in AI development, bringing attention to often overlooked perspectives.

impact

It led to further discussion on the need for inclusive AI governance and the challenges of bridging the digital divide.

Trust is the most important issue. There is, AI is built on trust. And it’s not limited to the geopolitical reasons. We shouldn’t have different ecosystem. So it’s all this ecosystem are built on trust. So how to build trust? I think this is something we need to discuss.

speaker

Xiao Zhang

reason

This comment emphasizes the fundamental importance of trust in AI systems and governance, shifting the focus from technical aspects to human and social factors.

impact

It led to further discussion on how to build trust in AI systems and the role of different stakeholders in this process.

From a Global South perspective, I think the question is also really very practical as to if there are multiple fora, they only are able to invest that many resources and they might have to choose between different fora and that also can create competition between different fora.

speaker

Neha Mishra

reason

This comment brings attention to the practical challenges faced by Global South countries in participating in multiple AI governance forums, highlighting issues of resource constraints and potential forum shopping.

impact

It led to a more nuanced discussion about the need for streamlined and inclusive global governance mechanisms that consider the constraints of developing countries.

Overall Assessment

These key comments shaped the discussion by broadening its scope from purely technical considerations to include legal, policy, sustainability, cultural, and trust dimensions of AI governance. They also highlighted the challenges of creating truly global and inclusive governance mechanisms, particularly considering the resource constraints of developing countries. The discussion evolved from defining interoperability to exploring its practical implications across various domains and stakeholders, emphasizing the need for a holistic, inclusive, and trust-based approach to AI governance.

How can we develop interoperable approaches to measure, track and incentivize better energy and water use of AI systems?

speaker

Sam Daws

explanation

This is important to address the sustainability challenges posed by increasing AI energy demands.

How can we build cultural interoperability into AI governance frameworks?

speaker

Sam Daws

explanation

This is crucial to ensure AI systems reflect diverse cultural perspectives and wisdom, including from low-resource languages and indigenous peoples.

How can we improve the speed and agility of UN processes to keep up with the rapid pace of AI technology development?

speaker

Online audience member

explanation

This is important to ensure global governance mechanisms can effectively address emerging AI challenges in a timely manner.

How can we balance national AI sovereignty concerns with the need for global interoperability?

speaker

Online audience member

explanation

This is crucial to reconcile countries’ desires to develop their own AI capabilities with the benefits of a unified global approach.

How can blockchain technology be integrated with AI to address interoperability and trust issues?

speaker

Dino Cataldo Dell’Accio

explanation

This could provide a common layer of trust and transparency for AI systems.

In which specific forum should global implementation-focused AI governance coordination take place?

speaker

Online audience member (IamSarmanova)

explanation

This is important to avoid duplication of efforts and address potential geopolitical tensions in different forums.

How can digital economy agreements contribute to AI interoperability?

speaker

Neha Mishra

explanation

This could provide another avenue for addressing interoperability issues, especially at regional levels or between like-minded countries.

Summary

This Internet Governance Forum 2024 session focused on protecting and ensuring access to internet infrastructure during conflicts and crises. Panelists discussed the impacts of internet shutdowns and infrastructure destruction on civilians, highlighting how these actions violate human rights and hinder humanitarian efforts. They examined existing normative frameworks, including international laws and UN resolutions, that address internet access and critical infrastructure protection.

The discussion emphasized the disproportionate harm caused by internet shutdowns and the need for governments to refrain from such actions. Panelists explored various responses and alternatives, including technical solutions from private sector companies and initiatives by international organizations like the ITU. The role of humanitarian agencies in providing internet access during crises was also debated.

Participants stressed the importance of multi-stakeholder collaboration to address these challenges. They called for better implementation of existing norms rather than creating new ones. Suggestions for action included stigmatizing internet shutdowns, penalizing governments that implement them, and improving coordination among various stakeholders.

The session concluded with proposals for the IGF community to take more concrete steps. These included potentially creating a best practice forum on the topic, incorporating internet access considerations into conflict monitoring by bodies like the UN Security Council, and leveraging the upcoming WSIS+20 review process to highlight these issues. Overall, the discussion underscored the critical need to protect internet access and infrastructure as essential resources for civilian populations, especially during conflicts and crises.

Keypoints

Major discussion points:

– The impact of internet shutdowns and infrastructure destruction on civilians, especially in conflict zones

– Existing international laws and norms regarding protection of internet access and infrastructure

– The role of different stakeholders (governments, companies, civil society) in responding to and preventing shutdowns

– Technical and policy solutions to maintain connectivity during crises

– The need for more coordinated, consistent responses from the international community

The overall purpose of the discussion was to explore how to protect and ensure internet access for civilians during conflicts, natural disasters, and other crises. The panelists aimed to identify gaps in current frameworks and propose concrete actions the Internet Governance Forum community could take.

The tone of the discussion was largely serious and concerned, given the gravity of the issues being discussed. However, there were also moments of constructive problem-solving and cautious optimism about potential solutions. The tone became more action-oriented towards the end as participants proposed specific next steps.

Speakers

– Anriette Esterhuysen: Director of the IGF, from South Africa

– Mohamed Shareef: Private sector, Digital Telecommunications company, former minister of state for digital and communications in the Maldives

– Cynthia Lesufi: Minister counsellor in the South African mission in Geneva, ITU council working group chair

– Lama Fakih: Director of Middle East and North Africa work at Human Rights Watch

– Kojo Boakye: Meta Vice President for policy for Africa and the Middle East

– Nadim Nashif: Executive director of 7amleh, the Arab Centre for Social Media Advancement, from Palestine

– Peter Micek: From Access Now, teaches at Columbia University

Additional speakers:

– Ernst Noorman: Cyber ambassador of the Netherlands

– Audience members who asked questions (unnamed)

Internet Governance Forum 2024 Session: Protecting Internet Access During Conflicts and Crises

This Internet Governance Forum (IGF) 2024 session addressed the critical issue of protecting and ensuring access to internet infrastructure during conflicts and crises. The discussion brought together experts from government, private sector, civil society, and international organisations to explore challenges and potential solutions for maintaining internet connectivity in times of upheaval.

Key Impacts of Internet Disruptions and Infrastructure Destruction

The panellists unanimously agreed that internet disruptions and infrastructure destruction have severe humanitarian consequences and violate human rights. Lama Fakih, Director of Middle East and North Africa work at Human Rights Watch, emphasised that such disruptions not only infringe upon human rights but also hinder humanitarian aid efforts, citing specific examples from Gaza where internet shutdowns have impeded access to vital information and services. Nadim Nashif from 7amleh highlighted the devastating impact of infrastructure destruction in Gaza on the civilian population, including the loss of communication with family members and access to essential online services.

Mohamed Shareef, from the private sector and formerly of the Maldives government, raised the important issue of climate change threatening internet infrastructure in small island states, broadening the conversation beyond human-caused disruptions.

Kojo Boakye from Meta highlighted the significant economic costs of internet shutdowns, noting that they can cost countries up to 1.9% of their daily GDP.

Normative Frameworks and Legal Obligations

The session explored existing normative frameworks and legal obligations regarding the protection of internet access and infrastructure. Ernst Noorman, Cyber Ambassador of the Netherlands, pointed out that the UN General Assembly has endorsed 11 norms prohibiting damaging critical infrastructure in cyberspace. He also discussed the Freedom Online Coalition’s work in promoting internet freedom and human rights online.

Lama Fakih elaborated that international human rights law requires internet restrictions to be necessary and proportionate. Cynthia Lesufi, from the South African mission in Geneva, highlighted ITU resolutions calling for assistance in rebuilding telecommunications infrastructure after conflicts or disasters, specifically mentioning the ITU Council resolution on assistance to Palestine for rebuilding its telecom networks.

Responses and Alternatives to Internet Disruptions

The discussion then turned to potential responses and alternatives to internet disruptions. Kojo Boakye described how the private sector is developing technical solutions, such as WhatsApp proxy, to maintain connectivity during shutdowns. Peter Micek from Access Now highlighted the role of humanitarian agencies in providing connectivity in crisis situations and suggested the creation of a UN cable-laying fleet to assist in infrastructure rebuilding efforts.

Civil society organisations were recognised for their important work in documenting violations and providing technical assistance. Anriette Esterhuysen, Director of the IGF, emphasised the need for rapid response capabilities to repair infrastructure in affected areas.

Role of the Internet Governance Community

The panellists agreed on the crucial role the internet governance community can play in addressing these challenges. Ernst Noorman suggested that the IGF could establish best practices for protecting internet access during conflicts and crises and emphasised the need for capacity building and multistakeholder involvement in implementing norms.

Lama Fakih called for efforts to stigmatise internet shutdowns by governments, framing them as unacceptable actions by states. Kojo Boakye suggested penalizing governments that implement internet shutdowns.

Cynthia Lesufi highlighted the importance of incorporating these issues into the upcoming WSIS+20 review process. Peter Micek referenced the Global Digital Compact as a potential framework for addressing internet shutdown issues.

Areas of Disagreement and Partial Agreement

While there was broad consensus on the importance of maintaining internet access, some differences emerged regarding the roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders. For instance, while Lama Fakih emphasised the legal obligations of governments under international human rights law, Kojo Boakye focused on the role of private sector companies in developing technical solutions.

Thought-Provoking Comments and Future Directions

Several thought-provoking comments shaped the discussion, including Lama Fakih’s description of ongoing internet disruptions in Gaza and Mohamed Shareef’s insights on the unique challenges faced by small island nations.

An audience member from Sudan provided a powerful testimony about the impact of internet shutdowns in their country, highlighting the severe consequences for civilian populations and the challenges faced by humanitarian agencies in providing connectivity during crises.

The session concluded with proposals for concrete actions, including exploring the establishment of an IGF best practice forum on protecting internet access in conflicts and crises, highlighting internet infrastructure protection issues in the WSIS+20 review process, and developing a working group to implement Global Digital Compact language on internet shutdowns.

Unresolved issues remained, such as how to effectively enforce international laws and norms against internet shutdowns, and how to balance legitimate security concerns with maintaining internet access. The discussion also raised important questions about content moderation in crisis situations, the role of platforms in ensuring equitable access globally, and the potential for technical solutions like ESIM infrastructure and community networks built on decentralised power grids.

In conclusion, the session underscored the critical need to protect internet access and infrastructure as essential resources for civilian populations, especially during conflicts and crises. It highlighted the importance of multi-stakeholder collaboration and the implementation of existing norms, while also identifying areas for further research and action by the IGF community.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to this Internet Governance Forum 2024 main session under the theme of the contribution to the Internet, to peace and sustainability. My name is Anriette Esterhuysen, I’m from South Africa. I’m the director of the IGF, and I’m the director of the IGF’s international forum on international and global communications, and this session is, I think, one of the most significant and maybe one of the most topical sessions that we have at this year’s IGF. It’s trying to address the concern of how do we protect and ensure access to Internet access, and we’re going to explore this session from the perspective of what the impact is, what the impact is on ordinary people, on communities, when Internet infrastructure is destroyed or becomes unavailable. And we’re going to look at what are the norms? Are there norms, are there normative frameworks for responding or preventing this from happening? And then we’re also going to look at what are the alternatives? What measures can be taken? What actions can be taken to get this multi-stakeholder community to play the role that it is usually so fundamentally committed to, which is to ensure an open, free, interoperable Internet for everyone. And then finally, we will look at future-oriented actions. Where are the gaps? Are there gaps at the normative level? Are there gaps at the implementation level? And what can the IGF do? So, I’m balancing too many devices here. To introduce you to my panel, and then I’m also going to introduce you to my fellow moderator, which is Peter Micek from Access Now, who’s joining us from New York. I can hear an echo. Can everyone hear the echo? Is there anything we can do about the echo? Should I hold the microphone? Okay, so, I’m going to move a little bit further away. That helps, that helps. So, Peter Micek will join us from New York, and he’ll make some opening remarks, but I first wanted to introduce you to my panel. So, starting immediately from my left, we have Mohamed Shareef, who’s currently with the private sector, in a company called Digital Telecommunications, and he’s been a minister of state for digital and communications in the Maldives. Next to him, we have Ambassador Allen Snoherman, the cyber ambassador of the Netherlands. And next to him, I’m very pleased and proud to have my compatriot, Ms. Cynthia Lesufi, who’s minister counsellor in the South African mission in Geneva, and she’s also the international telecommunications union council working group chair for the world summit on the information society, and the sustainable development goals. Next to Cynthia, we have Lama Fakih from Human Rights Watch, who leads their work. She’s the director of Middle East and North Africa work at Human Rights Watch. And next to Lama, we have Kodjo Boakye, who is the Meta Vice President of the Middle East and North Africa, and she’s also the director of Human Rights Watch. And next to Kodjo Boakye, who is the Meta Vice President for policy for Africa and the Middle East. And then joining us online, we have from Palestine, Nadim Nassif, executive director of Hamleh, the centre, the Arab Centre for Social Media Advancement, and also joining us online is Professor Madeleine Carr. Is Madeleine with us already? Good. And also, Professor Nassif, who is the director of the Centre for Social Policy and Cybersecurity at University College London. To get us welcome, Peter and Nadim and Madeleine and everyone else who’s with us online. Peter, do you want to start us off with some of the reflections and talking points that we feel we should try and address in this session?

Peter Micek: I’m excited to explore this intersection of connectivity, infrastructure, and instability, and how they relate to peace, development, and sustainability. It’s core to the work of my organization, Access Now, and my teaching at Columbia University. Taking this beyond to start the context of Internet governance, but to sustainable development broadly, we have sobering new facts. The global multidimensional poverty index published by the UNDP in October.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Peter, just pause a little bit. We have an audio issue. Can our tech support team please help? Peter, try speaking again. Let’s test if it works. Go ahead, speak.

Peter Micek: I don’t think we can hear you right now. Can you hear me, not if you can hear me?

Anriette Esterhuysen: Okay, try speaking. We can’t hear you. My colleagues here who helped organize this session, can you just check and help us fix this? Okay, I think while Peter, let’s try once more. Try speaking again.

Peter Micek: As I was saying, the new multidimensional poverty index by UNDP in Oxford found that 1. 1 billion people are living in acute poverty, and a staggering 455 million of them are in countries experiencing war or fragility. That’s nearly half of people in acute poverty are experiencing war, and these conflicts have intensified. These don’t always go in the right direction. In 2023, last year, the keep it on coalition that my organization used documented the highest number of Internet shutdowns in the world. These Internet shutdowns occurred in 39 countries, and nearly half of them were in countries experiencing war or fragility. These Internet shutdowns are intentional disruptions, and unfortunately, it looks like 2024 saw even higher numbers than 2023, despite states in the global digital compact saying we must, quote, refrain from Internet shutdowns and measures that target Internet access. So with all of these problems, what do we do? In response, we attempt to mitigate the impact of these shutdowns, and we do this by using the technical innovations of the ITF. In response, we attempt to mitigate. We scramble to create works around through technological innovation, public and private donors devote energy and resources to whip up networks in dire conditions, while humanitarian actors increasingly relying on digital, say, cloud -based systems or biometric solutions, remote delivery platforms, and community engagement platforms, are automated. They are just like we are looking to these technical fixes, whether it’s satellite, internet, or joining emergency telecommunications clusters to provide quick import of hardware and assets. We’re looking at ways to make sure that we’re not just automating the systems, but we’re also automating the technology. We’re looking at ways to make sure that we’re not just selling hardware and assets and seeking unlikely partnerships across all industries in real-time. This is tough work and it’s a scramble, so there has to be a better way. All of our societal systems rely in some way on connectivity and electricity. We recognize the sheer and growing importance of connectivity in civilian life, and, perhaps, more so when everything around you is engulfed in violence and war. So, I want to put out there that we need to focus on connectivity and providing it and protecting that infrastructure, because it’s a lot harder to bring back, and these Sisyphean efforts in the moment of crisis encounter a lot of trouble. So, let’s start by looking at first principles in addition to the reactive workarounds that we’ve all been putting together. Thank you.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Thanks a lot. Peter, I want to check French translation sorted out now. There were issues with the French interpretation, so I just am assuming that it is okay. I’m just checking on the Zoom to see if it is. And it looks now they cannot hear me. I’m not audible. So, I’m going to go back to the slides. And it looks now they cannot hear me. I’m not audible. The Zoom participants say that they cannot hear me. No audio for Zoom. I can’t see the tech team. Who’s doing the zoom? Can you hear me on through the headsets? People in the room can hear me. No one can hear me on remote. You still can’t hear me? No. Sorry, peace, can you please try and find someone who’s dealing with the zoom and sort this problem out? Thank you. The zoom participants have lost audio completely. Oh it’s back, it’s back. Peace, it’s fine, it’s back. I think it’s back now. Good. So let’s look at what the impacts are. So Lama, I want you to start. When we talk about these disruptions and the destruction of infrastructure or the interference of infrastructure or damage, what does this actually mean for people on the ground, for ordinary citizens, for civilians, for communities?

Lama Fakih: Thank you, I hope everyone can hear me well. During times of conflict, civilians, journalists, first responders.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Sorry, I am so sorry to interrupt you, but no, the zoom audio problem has not been sorted out. So we’ll continue, but please can we have our virtual participants able to hear this session? Can you see the transcript? Nadim and Peter, can you see the the captioning? Just nod if you are able to. Oh you can’t hear me, so let’s go ahead, Lama, I’ll type. Thank you.

Lama Fakih: So as I was saying, during times of conflict, civilians, journalists, first responders, they rely on the internet to document and share evidence of abuse and to provide life-saving assistance. During times of political crisis, protesters leverage the internet to organize online and to stand up for their rights. And yet time and again, we have seen states and armed groups take action to deliberately shut down access and to destroy telecommunication systems in ways that violate people’s rights. In conflicts, as Peter was laying out, there may be multiple causes of these disruptions to communications networks, and they are sometimes deployed in tandem. Palestinians in Gaza have endured over a year of ongoing phone and internet disruption as a result of relentless airstrikes by the Israeli government and other actions that the government has taken. These actions have included damage to core communication infrastructure, cuts to electricity, fuel blockades, and apparently deliberate shutdowns through technical means. According to UN OCHA, on October 10, airstrikes conducted by the Israeli military targeted several telecommunications installations, destroyed two of three main lines for mobile communication, and this left residents in Gaza reliant on just one line for mobile and internet connectivity. It resulted in disruptions to services, and on October 27, at the start of Israel’s ground incursion into Gaza, the connectivity came to a grinding halt during an approximately 34-hour communications blackout. Paltel, one of the few remaining service providers that is still operational in Gaza, confirmed to Human Rights Watch in November of 2023 that when service was restored without their intervention, it was clear that the disruptions were intentional. In times of conflict, authorities and armed groups should refrain from deliberately shutting down or destroying telecoms infrastructures because of the disproportionate harm that it has on civilians. When governments and armed groups target the infrastructure, they often justify these measures as necessary for public safety, curbing the spread of misinformation or for legitimate military reasons. But such sweeping measures are more like collective punishment. When the internet is off, people’s ability to express themselves is limited. The economy suffers. Journalists are not able to upload evidence of abuses that they are documenting. Students are cut off from their lessons. Taxes can’t be paid, and those needing health care often cannot access life-saving assistance. When India blocked access to the internet in Kashmir for months in late 2019, Indian officials justified the action by saying it was necessary to temporarily limit access to the internet during the period of crisis to avoid permanent loss of life. Four UN special rapporteurs condemned the move, however, warning that the shutdown in Kashmir was inconsistent with the norms of necessity and proportionality. In other words, inconsistent with the law. Practically, at least one study by a researcher at the Stanford Global Digital Policy Incubator has found that shutdowns are actually counterproductive to deterring violent incidents. It tracked a quadrupling of violence when networks were disrupted as compared to cases when the internet stayed on. Shutdowns, they draw headlines, but subtler, equally devastating techniques to manipulate the internet deserve attention too. Authorities possess an arsenal, ranging from blocking specific social media applications or messaging applications, to throttling traffic, to restricting live streaming. And these are all the types of weapons that we need to contend with in ensuring that people have connectivity during times of crisis and conflict. Thank you.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Thanks very much, Lama. And I believe that our Zoom participants can hear now if they use not original audio, but if they go to one of the language tracks. So audio works in English, and you can also select captioning to those of you who are online by clicking on more at the bottom of your Zoom screen and selecting captions. And Nadeem, can you tell us a little bit more about the very specific context, and I know Hamle has done research on this, on the impact of the destruction of telecommunications infrastructure in Gaza, and what that is doing to people.

Nadim Nassif: Hi, everybody. I’m not sure if you are hearing me or not, because there are issues with the audio. We can hear you. So thank you, everybody, for having us today and having the possibility to speak and to be part of this event. I am here also and was asked to speak also about the current situation, specifically in Gaza, and basically regarding the destruction of the infrastructure, the telecom infrastructure, as was mentioned before. But I think it’s important also to go a little bit back at this, because the infrastructure in Gaza has been held captive and controlled by the Israeli occupation since 1967, right? So the occupation, the Israeli occupation, controlled the Palestinian telecom infrastructure since the occupation of 1967. And since then, basically, it’s a kind of a hostage infrastructure that was not allowed to perform, to progress. Historically also, when also agreements were signed by the Palestinian Authority and Israel, it was agreed, basically, that this arrangement will develop into a Palestinian telecommunication industry or sector that will be independent, finally, as there will be an independent Palestinian state. I’m talking now about early 90s, 93, 94, with the Oslo agreements, with Paris Accords, all of these agreements that happened at that time never were realized. And until today, as we know, I mean, obviously, there was no Palestinian independent state and the telecom infrastructure is yet to be controlled by the Israeli side, which means basically that all the components of the Palestinian telecom, whether it would be for cell towers or for other components, has to get approval by the Israeli side, right? And for many years and for economic reasons and for assuming that also Palestinian users would prefer Israeli telecommunication companies rather than Palestinian ones, they prevented the Palestinian telecommunication sector from developing. So that sector was held captive. But we also need to remember that also there is no independence in the sense of being connected with the world. All the infrastructure basically goes through the Israeli side, right? And the Israeli side is giving… the Palestinian side, the access to the worldwide internet. And simply as they have the access, they can also cut the access. And this is basically what happened in Gaza. So during the war, during the genocide that is happening in Gaza, it’s not only about destruction of the infrastructure that Israel did, and deliberate attacks on the infrastructure, on the cell towers, it also performed at least 17 times of deliberate shutdown, total shutdown of the whole internet and telecommunication of the Palestinians in Gaza. Now, in our research, in our last research that we published in Hamle, we basically speak about an infrastructure that the assumption or the estimate is basically 75%. At that time, we speaking about the research that was done in summer this year, that 75% of the infrastructure was damaged, and 50% of the telecommunication infrastructure was totally destroyed. That does not exist. We assume that since then the level of destruction is even much worse. So this is where we are now, we are at a situation where there’s a whole destruction of the telecommunication. And we know the impact, I mean, the humanitarian impact, how connectivity is a lifeline in the crisis, how families cannot call their loved one to make sure that they are okay, they cannot call for hospitals, for help. Even people who were under the rubble and need some time to call when they are in that situation for help, they cannot do this. So you can imagine how much this is a devastating situation that people cannot call for any kind of help, cannot communicate with their families in times of crisis, in times where this communication is most needed. I think it’s important really to think about what’s happening on the broader context, because if this is being a precedent, and in wartime, countries and governments like the Israeli government can do this, this probably will be repeated in other places, because I think many things and many borders and limits that we were used to be respected in the international law, in the international humanitarian law are being broke by Israel and violated by the Israeli government. I think we also need to think what’s the impact globally on other wars, on other conflict zones, when such thing happen in the future, and why collectively we need to think about mechanisms, how we can stop that, how we can prevent this, their situation from happening in other places. I think for Gazans, there’s a need for obviously for ceasefire to stop the attack, to stop the genocide, to stop the war. But beyond that, there are immediate solutions that need to be given to Gazans in order to overcome the right now situation, specifically when we speak about emergency people, specifically when we speak about journalists and media people who need the connection. So E-SIMS was and still one of the solutions, and there are other technical solutions that the telecom company, the Palestinian company, speaking about like cells on wheels and other kind of technical solution. But obviously there’s a need for long-term solution, and I think it’s really important to emphasize when we speak about the future, and hopefully the day after when there will be ceasefire, that there will be a reconstruction of the Palestinian telecommunication sector, that this telecommunication sector will get the newest technologies in order to move on. One thing that I did not mention at the beginning, that we’re speaking about the telecom infrastructure in Gaza that was destroyed, but this telecom infrastructure that was destroyed, we are talking about second generation, right? I think Gaza before the war was one of the last places on the globe having only second generation. So the need now is basically that the international community will put enough pressure that there will be a reconstruction after the ceasefire also on the telecom, and that Israel will allow the newest technology to enter Gaza to be rebuilt and to make sure that the people there are reconnecting, and there is a long-term solution happening there. Again, I think many people spoke about Palestine and what was happening in Palestine as one kind of one big laboratory in terms of surveillance, in terms of infrastructure, but what’s happening there is really something that is impacting globally. It’s not only a Palestinian’s problem. Lots of the impact there, lots of the precedent that’s happening in Gaza, unfortunately, we will see them in other places if we don’t put the right mechanisms to stop that and to have enough pressure on Israel to stop the war on their side. Thank you for having me.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Thanks very much, Nadim, for that. Peter, I’ve been kind of kicked out of the Zoom, or my Zoom is frozen, so I’m relying on you to watch what happens online. I mean, we’ve talked about shutouts, we’ve talked about the destruction of infrastructure. I’m not sure, Lama, I was so busy with the tech issues. If you mentioned sanctions, because I think that’s another form of excluding people, such as in the case of Sudan, which has been not just impacted by war and conflict, but also for a long time by sanctions, which has made people not able to access certain applications and services. But, Sharif, I wanted you to talk about climate change, and specifically the situation of small island developing states, who are incredibly vulnerable to cyclones, to other forms of disruptions, tsunamis. How does that kind of, when you have one fiber-optic cable link, how does that affect people if it’s disrupted?

Mohamed Shareef: Thank you. Well, let me start by thanking IGF for giving us this opportunity. Small island states, island nations, our connectivity to the rest of the world is really primarily these days with submarine cables. So if you take the case of the Maldives, we have a few submarine cables landing in the Maldives. Two of them connect us to India and Sri Lanka, and we have three more cables that we are working on connecting us directly to the Southeast Asia and all the way up to Europe. But also, hundreds of small community, island communities connected by domestic submarine cables, hundreds and hundreds of kilometers from north of south in the ocean. Now, we depend on this as a nation today for everything. Especially when things go wrong. In crisis, we depend on connectivity even more than usual. So we talk about natural hazards as opposed to natural disasters because we as humans have a bigger part to play in the disaster or the crisis than nature itself. Nature gives us the hazards like earthquakes or tsunamis. But today with climate change, the frequency and the power of these events actually pose significant threat, which means these submarine cables that come onto our islands face threats from erosion of the beaches and the power of tidal waves, right? Plus, we don’t have the capacity to go and repair this as developing nations. So we definitely need to invest in our own submarine cable laying and repair capabilities, including these extremely expensive vessels. So today, climate change is a new front that is opening up to us. And actually, studies show that the long-term impact of sea level rise will have a much more and very significant effect as more and more of coastal areas get washed into the sea. We may have to redeploy all these landing points, maybe even 20, 30 kilometers inland, but we don’t have 20, 30 kilometers in small islands to move this. So yeah, definitely it is extremely important for us that critical infrastructure protection becomes part of the COP series and funding goes into developing alternatives. So in the Maldives, we are one of the first countries in South Asia to connect with Starlink. And there are other alternatives that maybe in the next round we’ll talk about. Thank you.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Thanks for that, Sharif. Let’s talk a little bit now about what the Normative Framework is that exists. Unfortunately, Madeline Carr cannot join us. She’s having an issue with her registration. But we have Ambassador Norman and Lama Yu as well. But starting with you, Ambassador, you are part of, the Dutch government has come I’m wondering if you could talk a little bit about the multistakeholder community, the multistakeholder community, which is currently chairing the Freedom Online Coalition. I know this is an issue that you have looked at, and also, the Netherlands introduced this idea of the norm to protect the public core of the Internet. What do you feel we have within this multistakeholder community from a normative framework that gives guidelines? Well, the norm of the public core, I think, is very clear. It says that no state or non-state actor should interfere with the public core of the Internet. And it says then explicitly, it defines that public core as including transmission media, naming and numbering systems, as critical Internet resources. But from your perspective, what do we have from a normative, at the level of normative frameworks? And what do we have from a multistakeholder community? And what do we have from a multistakeholder community?

Ernst Noorman: Thank you. Thank you very much for also mentioning the public core, which was indeed a concept introduced by the Netherlands in 2015. But actually, I also have to talk about the UN, because we talk a lot right now also in the so-called open-ended working world, but also, I want to talk a little bit about the open-ended working world. So, as I mentioned, we know that the UN, the older states, have established several non-binding norms on the responsible state behavior in cyberspace. And these 11 norms have been endorsed by the General Assembly. And are part of a framework of the responsible state behavior in cyberspace. And these 11 norms have been endorsed by the General Assembly. And these 11 norms have been endorsed by the General Assembly. And these 11 norms have to do with critical infrastructure. First, states that, first, it states that states should not conduct or knowingly support ICT activity contrary to its obligations on the international law that intentionally damages critical infrastructure. And according to the third norm, states should respond to appropriate requests for assistance by another state whose critical infrastructure is subject to malicious ICT acts. Now, what’s interesting is that norms, that while norms provide that it’s up to states to designate the national critical infrastructure, which is kind of logic, you know, like the Netherlands, for us, the Port of Rotterdam is critical, while for Switzerland, of course, it’s critical. And, of course, the port is less important. So, yeah, it depends really on the country itself. But they do include as examples of critical infrastructure, the technical infrastructure essential to the general availability or integrity of the Internet. And while these norms are nonbinding, they do articulate a clear expectation by the international community with regard to the behavior of states. So, the first step is to designate the critical infrastructure, which is the critical infrastructure, and for the normative framework to be valuable, it needs to be implemented effectively. And effective implementation means complementary initiatives and enhance each organization and stakeholders to support the resilience of critical infrastructure, also in time of conflict. So, the second step is to designate the critical infrastructure, which is the critical infrastructure, and for the technical community, also part of the FOC, by the way, the Freedom Online Coalition. Of course, these organizations in charge of the functioning of the Internet have a role in ensuring a resilient infrastructure and general availability in the integrity of the Internet. Now, who should better understand what is needed other than these organizations? The first step is to designate the critical infrastructure, which is the critical infrastructure, and for the technical community, it needs to be implemented effectively. And I briefly, I believe that there’s an important role for the ITU in coordinating responses, which is probably a lesser-known function of the ITU. They do important work in disaster relief, but also in crisis, such as in Ukraine and Gaza, and we need collective expertise in coalitions, but also in multilateral agreements, and for now my colleague zenie who’s in the room, I shall introduce him to you very shortly. So, at the third chair, my name is

Anriette Esterhuysen:

Ernst Noorman: My name is off. I’m a member of the European Union, and I’m a member of the European Union, and I’m a member of the European Union, and I would like to share with you a little bit about how we as a European Union can contribute as a advisory body, and further thinking on ensuring how submarine cables can be protected, how they can become more resilient, and how we can quicker repair also in case of malfunctioning or damaging the submarine cables, and how we can make sure that they are protected. Now, most importantly also with technical organizations such as ITU, but also ICANN and NCC and other regional organizations need to remain neutral for them to be able to function effectively. They also mean for all of us that we need to show some restraint in asking these organizations to intervene in functioning of the public core of the Internet, or the global digital networks that carry out data. So you talk about sanctions, but on this level, we say you should leave them, do their neutral work to protect the core of the Internet, to make sure that, indeed, human rights workers, activists, journalists, healthcare workers, can keep working on and using the Internet. Thank you.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Thank you, Ambassador Dohm. You actually make it sound so clear and simple, and yet we know in practice it’s not. But, Lama, are there human rights norms and international human rights law that applies in these contexts?

Lama Fakih: Thank you. And in parallel to the normative frameworks that the Ambassador clearly laid out, we have a lso the legal frameworks of international human rights law and humanitarian law. And under international human rights law, governments have an obligation to ensure that Internet-based restrictions and attacks on infrastructure are both necessary and proportionate to a very specific security concern. General shutdowns and attacks on infrastructure violate multiple rights, including the rights of the freedom of expression and information, and hinder other rights, like the right to freedom of assembly. In their 2015 joint declaration on freedom of expression and responses to conflict situations, United Nations experts and rapporteurs declared that, even in times of conflict, using communications kill switches can never be justified unless there is an international human rights law. And, as a result of the international human rights law, constitutional human rights law. And, even in times of conflict, using communications kill switches can never be justified under human rights law. Multiple UN resolutions have condemned intentional disruption of Internet access, and they call on states to refrain from carrying them out, including during conflict. And now, when it comes to the laws of war, while computer warfare is an important part of the international human rights law, it is also an important part of the international human rights law. And, as was specifically addressed in the Geneva conventions, the basic principles and rules on the methods and means of warfare remain applicable. That means that attacks must be targeted against military objectives. They can neither be indiscriminate nor arbitrary. And, the principle of necessity under human rights law is likely to be unlawfully disproportionate, whether carried out by airstrikes or cyber warfare. The principle of necessity under human rights law permits measures that accomplish a legitimate military objective that are not otherwise prohibited by international humanitarian law. But, shutting down the Internet may serve a legitimate military objective. The principle of proportionality prohibits actions in which the expected civilian harm is excessive in relation to the military advantage. And we know that Internet and phone shutdowns and attacks on critical infrastructure can cause considerable harm to the civilian population, including leading to death and injury by preventing civilians from communicating with each other around safety considerations. They also hinder the work of journalists and human rights monitors, who can provide information on the situation on the ground, including reporting of possible laws of war as violations. And, importantly, the restrictions hamper the ability of humanitarian agencies to assess and provide assistance to populations at risk. The lack of information regarding the conditions and circumstances of human rights violations is a problem. And, as I said, the principle of proportionality prohibits actions in which the expected civilian harm is excessive in relation to the military advantage. may also increase the likelihood of injury and death. I think this is very acute in the in the case of Gaza which Nadeem has also laid out for us. A complete shutdown of internet and phone communications to large areas can also amount to a form of collective punishment by imposing penalties on people without a clear legal basis. And with regard to the ITU, article 34 of the ITU’s constitution on the stoppage of telecommunications gives license to ITU member countries to block telecommunications in quote which may appear dangerous to the security of the state or contrary to its laws to public order or to decency end quote. While article 35 on the suspension of services gives member states quote the right to suspend the International Telecommunication Service. These articles have been invoked by some states as granting legal authority to block communications including to implement internet shutdowns. These provisions must however be applied together with and subject to the additional obligations that states have under international human rights law to respect the rights of freedom of expression and other applicable rights. Both the Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association have called on states to consider revising those provisions in order to align them explicitly with international human rights standards. The Special Rapporteur has also recommended that the ITU issue guidance clarifying that those provisions should never be understood as authorizing internet shutdowns. In a welcome move the ITU did take the historic step of condemning the communications blackout in Gaza and called for life-saving access to networks to be restored there.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Thanks very much for that Lama and I mean it’s actually I think really notable that there is an elaborate body of international laws and norms that do apply in these contexts. Before I open it to the audience I want to ask Peter, Nadim and our panelists in the room if you have anything to add before we move on to the next segment which will be looking at alternatives and responses. But anything to add at this point or any questions you have for one another? Anyone from the audience with a question? If you have a question you have to move to the front to the stage and Peter if you can solicit comments online please.

Peter Micek: Definitely we do have comments online talking about the alarming trend of internet shutdowns including during critical times like protests, elections and civil unrest. If I could use my prerogative I would just add that those ITU rules even do require some process, some procedural requirements that states notify the ITU for example of the disruptions and the reason for the temporary stoppage and blockage in telecoms and often these procedural these procedural requirements are not followed and you’ll see that even in states that do allow for internet shutdowns under law that they’re often not followed according to procedure and so there’s no notice to the population of the reason, of the duration, the extent of the blocking and yeah as a lawyer personally that has given courts the opportunity to step in and say you may have this power but you are not exercising it according to the methods and the protocols set out in law. So just one more aspect. Ambassador Norman and then Korto.

Ernst Noorman: Thank you. One point I would like to add because I didn’t go into the Freedom Online Coalition actually which we’re chairing this year maybe not all knows about the Freedom Online Coalition but it’s a coalition that exists since 2011 and that is a coalition of countries including also an advisory network of NGOs, academia but also the private sector in how to protect human rights online and we are chairing this year the Human Rights Coalition and now we have we added four members this year and now we are 42 member coalition and the the objective is to to strengthen ourselves also in the discussions at mainly UN level like now also with the WSIS plus 20 process with the angle of human rights how to protect the internet how to protect the open accessibility and operability of the internet the freedom on the net is an extremely important topic and also internet shutdowns has been discussed time and again also what’s how to bring it about also in the international discussions to see to ensure more responsible behavior of states as you know Lama already indicated also in her contribution on the rules which already exist on keeping the communication lines open we did a lot of effort also in the GDC to ensure a strong language also on the on the internet shutdowns we were looking for stronger language stronger linkage to to international law in the end that was not part of it but it was indeed that internet shutdown should be avoided but we are very much aware as a freedom online coalition we have to continue working on that it’s it’s not an issue that’s been settled in actually the freedom on the net report of Freedom House has showed it has been on the increase unfortunately thank you

Anriette Esterhuysen: thanks ambassador.

Kojo Boakye : Yet thanks for the interventions from my esteemed colleagues on the right and the overview from Peter a couple of things I wanted to point out in part because I’ve been I feel like I’ve been part of this WSIS process since 2005 and a crew and along that and along those years I’ve learned quite a lot from listening to people I think we broadly use the term internet shutdowns and there may be some people who are less learned that might think the whole place it goes dark I also want to point out there are partial internet shutdowns that arguably just as challenging or if not more so in some cases especially when you see particular apps or particular parts of the internet which are used for freedom of expression and exercising human rights I think the other piece that’s really important as well and I’ve sometimes we forget about it and I have to remind people not that many need reminding that there are so many people still offline so Peter’s great overview I think spoke about 1.1 billion people in abject poverty and 50% of those people being subject to their infrastructure or whatever being out of place it’s important to remind ourselves that despite the huge effort and impact we’ve had in connecting people so many people still remain offline and actually many of the problems we’ve spoken about especially with regard to sustainability and the challenges that come from that actually amount to people being in abject poverty not being connected not being able to get jobs and actually destroying parts of the ecosystem themselves as a result as they seek to eke out a life so I just wanted to point that out but I felt the opening comments were fantastic.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Thanks Kodjo that’s always important for us to acknowledge we have two speakers from from the audience and introduce yourself and be brief.

Audience: Hello my name is JJ I come from New York City and I run an internet resilience research firm. This is one of the most robust conversations I’ve heard from this forum on the concept of shutdowns and you guys mentioned some really good points one gentleman I believe the Dutch man Dutch ambassador mentioned e-sims and then there was also discussion about COP and energy my question would be that I’ve lived through an internet shutdown I’m from Tigray and I’ve experienced what it looks like from a diasporic perspective to be shut off from your community so my question would be if we accept that the internet infrastructure is tied to the power infrastructure and we accept that e-sims in Gaza have allowed for still a constant live streaming of the atrocities then do you feel that as a coalition the UN and various member states have a duty to their citizens who are from those regions that they have encouraged to emigrate to their countries for various economic benefits and support do they have a duty to focus on e-sims and power infrastructure because their citizens deserve the ability to connect and communicate with their family members in these in these shutdowns regions and how do you see a coalition that actually focuses on these nation-states duty to their citizens to get involved in these conversations thank you thanks JJ the

Anriette Esterhuysen: Next person.

Audience: Thank you my name is Khaled Mansour I serve on meta oversight board as Lama made clear we have enough body of international human rights law to oblige countries not to cut the internet services especially when there are dire consequences humanitarian and not only human rights but humanitarian and lives of people who which are lost now the question is that there’s no enforcement or enforceability of this big body of international human rights law and also states and rightly so maybe still have the sovereign right to take decisions using other elements of the international law to justify that and I guess my question to Lama and maybe to Nadim and others what would be the way out in in light of the lack of enforceable We’ve got to find a new device, the basic of the platform, which is scared of slow development, mechanisms, but secondly in lack of a technical solution that probably will happen in a few years where Internet access will not be subject to sovereign authority. Thank you.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Lama, one was directed to you, Nadim but anyone else want to comment on that?

Lama Fakih: I think issues around compliance with international human rights law are always a challenge. We do need to see enforcement from, you know, other countries. And in the context of Internet shutdowns, I mean, these are abuses that often take place in the context of other violations that are also being perpetrated. So, the government of Iraq may be using excessive force against the people of Iraq, but they’re also using excessive force against protesters. And the actions in response to that that stakes can take are varied, and they can include things like targeted sanctions, in some cases, stopping providing military assistance, condemnation, but also accountability does need to be a critical component of this, and, you know, we have seen in the context of war crimes that are being perpetrated, and we have seen with the crisis in Gaza, that there has been a real crisis in enforcement, and ensuring that there are accountability for crimes, but, at the same time, there are judicial processes that are moving forward, that I think we need to support and invest in, and collectively use our influence with other governments to use their legislation. So, I think, you know, we need to make sure that we’re using our influence, and we need to use our leverage to ensure more rights-respecting practice.

Ernst Noorman: Thank you, also, for that, those easy questions, and I felt, indeed, as one of the speakers said, that we have a lot of dialogue, a lot of diplomacy, and diplomacy means negotiation, but also a lot of dialogue, and enforcement of voluntary norms, or international law, has always been a challenge, but it doesn’t mean we are excluded from responsibility to really have serious, in-depth consultations with other countries. We, for instance, have, from my perspective, a lot of dialogue, and I think, you know, we need to make sure that we don’t exclude other countries, and especially also in the position of the chair of the Freedom Online Coalition, I always felt it rather actually easy to bring up a subject like human rights online, internet shutdowns, and our concerns, if that would happen in a certain country, and then, you know, ask a question, what they think about it, and I think also what Lama said, I think, you know, we are not excluded from responsibility, and we have to be able to do that, and I think that’s also the reason why we have such an argument for governments, and for me, then, to present those arguments, that it’s actually counterproductive, such a measure, but it’s, in the end, also, you know, in this world, it’s complicated, we have different interests, different views on topics, but it’s our role as diplomats to try to convince each other. » Thank you.

Peter Micek: We have a hand online. Nadim, can you come in?

Nadim Nassif: I think the main issue of the main one here is accountability, and it’s clearly that there’s a lack of accountability to governments and states who are violating, specifically when we are talking about the Gaza and the Israeli government, that is not being held accountable. I think, for me, as a Palestinian, it’s very sad to see the double standard that’s happening in this aspect, because the enforcement that happened when the Russians invaded and occupied Ukraine was very clear, it did not include negotiation, there was very clear opposition, also from governments, but also from companies, by the way, companies that were connected to that crisis in a very decisive way, in a way that they blocked certain content, allowed certain content, companies like Starlink and others suggested help and gave help, not in a conditional way. This was totally the opposite when it comes to the Palestinians and when it comes to the Israeli government and how we deal. And I think this is just, we learn from this that there is a lack of accountability in the way that some of the Western companies and some of the Western governments are dealing with the situation. I’m not saying that this was not, it’s great that it happened in Ukraine and it’s great that there was a decisive approach. The problem that this approach does not happen in the global majority countries when there’s a tragedy, a conflict, a genocide. I mean, I’m speaking about Palestine, but I can speak about other places and how those people who are supposed to be protecting democracy and human rights values and enforcing did not have any clear state or any clear action in those cases.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Thanks, Nadim, for mentioning that. And I think that’s one of the issues we want to address in this session. How do we have a more coherent, consistent response, both in terms of international and international humanitarian law, but also from the Internet global multi-stakeholder community? Let’s now move on to, did you want to add something there quickly?

Lama Fakih: Quickly. I feel we didn’t respond to JJ’s question. And I just wanted to say I think in some respects the answer to Internet shutdowns has been, the response has been more from private sector engagement in terms of trying to find solutions for people on the ground. And I hear you in what you’re saying in terms of what more can states do to ensure that their residents or their citizens are able to maintain connectivity with others where they’re suffering from Internet shutdowns. But I do think it’s a space where innovative solutions coming from the private sector can really also reinforce what governments are doing to try to keep people connected. And I think, you know, looking at how ESIMs have been used in Gaza, but also thinking about how people have tried to circumvent shutdowns in places like Iran, there needs to be a strong alliance there in terms of thinking through the solutions.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Thanks, Lama. Yes, what responses? Let’s move on to this. Khodro, to start with you, what are the alternatives? How do private sector companies, how can they respond? What are the concrete technical, operational and policy measures? And I see Peter is just also adding a question here. Can international laws regarding to shutdowns be taken to international courts?

Kojo Boakye : I mean, I think, Lama, you implied, yes, we can. But, Khodro, yes, the private sector, how does it respond and how can it respond in such contexts? I like to think that our approach and effort to responding is comprehensive, despite some of the challenges that people have outlined, not only in their comments, but also in their questions. I think as you spoke, you asked about policy. So, for us as a company, we have founded our work on human rights principles. We have a global human rights policy. We’re part of the global network initiative alongside other companies. We have the UN guiding principles on business and human rights as well that all our work is founded in. And I think having that mainstreamed into the company, not just within policy teams and not those teams that just focus on human rights, but into everything we do in terms of product development as well, is a super important start. And then I think it’s about analyzing some of those issues. The short-term shocks we have in terms of total Internet shutdowns and partial Internet shutdowns that I mentioned where particular services or parts of the Internet are shut down is something we’ve been thinking about for a long time. I think Lama just spoke about what do we do when governments, when governments shut down the Internet? I think the example was Iran. But we could cite a number of other governments who have sought to shut down the Internet either by destroying infrastructure or in some cases phoning mobile operators and telling them to turn the service off. We can think about how we might continue to deliver services to ensure that people don’t remain voiceless. One of the steps we’ve taken is with WhatsApp, for example, which I think everybody here I assume has used. We’ve built a proxy service to WhatsApp where volunteers and others around the world set up servers to enable people to continue using a version of WhatsApp that enables them in places like Iran to carry on connecting with people, to carry on delivering services and help and sharing information about what’s going on. I think that’s important. But I think I’ve also been struck by the fact that the way we’ve approached infrastructure. So one of the challenges that a number of people on the panel have mentioned, the challenges we have around infrastructure, certainly submarine cables, this was a vivid example where submarine cables are cut. I am heartened by the fact that our most recent builds like 2Africa, the longest submarine cable in the world, the first to connect east to west, west to east of Africa, however you want to do it, more connected to Africa. I can give you all the talk. I can give you all the talk. I can give you all the talk. to the point that I was just making, and I think that’s a really important point. I think we have a lot of different talking points, but what I’m heartened by is the fact that we buried that cable more than 50% deeper than other submarine cables or submarine cables are normally buried, in part because we’re trying to ensure that the cuts that we have seen, and my own family have suffered from in Ghana, when SAP free is cut and suddenly the Internet is cut off for five days as they seek to go to the other end of the world. So, I think that’s a really comprehensive approach to dealing with things. And then in the midst of crisis, I think there are ways, and I think we’ve spoken about a range of crisis, one, conflict, which obviously we’ve seen affect infrastructure and services everywhere, but also natural disasters, and I think in those instances, and most recently, I can think of earthquakes in Morocco, Turkey, devastating earthquakes everywhere, but certainly more devastating than some we might see in Turkey or in the Middle East, and I think that’s a really important approach to dealing with those. But I think that’s also a way of working with disaster agencies, sharing data for good with agencies like disaster relief to enable people to be helped in the way those disaster agencies do, and also sharing some of our network insights with some of our private sector partners in the mobile industry. Where is your network damaged most? How should you be routing particular traffic to ensure that people can stay connected? And how do you build networks that are more resilient to shocks? And how do you build networks that are more resilient to disruptive policy, and how do you mainstream that into the company? How do we work in the midst of crisis or Internet shutdowns as they happen, i.e., the WhatsApp proxy? And then thinking about the future, how do we build networks that are more resilient to the kind of shocks? And then for companies like ours that have a range of data that could be used to support people in the way that they do, how do we build networks that are more resilient to the kind of shocks? And how do we do that in a compliant way, but certainly how do we share that with organizations who are best placed to help? And I think we’ve done all of that, but there is, for us and many of our competitors, as well as our partners in government and civil society, much, much, much more work to do.

Anriette Esterhuysen: And thanks, Gordian. Just a follow-up question on that. I’m not sure if it’s a question of collaboration, but I’m just wondering, is there a collaborative mechanism of some kind between different private sector corporations?

Kojo Boakye : Yeah, I mean, META has always been about partnership. The keep-it-on initiative that Peter described is not news to us. We’ve been a key part of that and continue to be. We continue to work with, as I mentioned, NGOs, and any other kind of partners. Our infrastructure builds. We have a lot of partners in the private sector. We have a lot of partners in the civil society. We have a lot of partners in the civil society, et cetera, et cetera. So we will continue to approach it in this way through partnership. We think that’s key. And then in the context of these current conflicts, the conflict in Gaza, the conflict in the war in Russia and Ukraine, what measures have you taken in the Gaza context, for example? I think we have a range of partners looking at that. We have sought to keep voice and expression open when possible. I know there are a number of allegations about what ourselves and many other companies have done, but we have a team dedicated, not only our global human rights team, but also within my team, a community engagement and action team that is dedicated to continue engaging with those on the ground. If I gave you more insights into the work we’ve done with journalists, we know how many journalists have been killed in this conflict, and with other organisations on the ground, it would take far too much time. But we are proud of the work we’ve done, but clearly, as I said earlier, have much more work to do in this conflict, as you’ve mentioned, the Ukrainian conflict, and the other conflict that I have to stress, we should not forget, the conflict in Sudan at the moment as well, in which 12, more than 12 million people have been displaced, and we continue to work hard on that as well.

Anriette Esterhuysen: In fact, we have many Sudanese participants here at the IJF, so it’s good to hear from them as well. Cynthia, I want to turn to you, because I think one of the most significant responses, at least from the inter-governmental sector, has been the ITU Council resolution on assistance to Palestine in restoring infrastructure, and I think it’s been very significant that certainly from where I am, I look at this issue, we’ve probably had a more public and a more deliberate response from the inter-governmental community than from the multi-stakeholder community, which I think is a challenge to the IJF, but tell us a bit about that resolution, how it came about, and how you see it having an impact.

Cynthia Lesufi: Thank you, and I also want to take this opportunity to thank the organisers to give us this opportunity to come and speak here. Perhaps the first thing that one would want to highlight in terms of the role of the ITU in as far as the issue of Palestine is concerned is to firstly look at the preamble of the ITU constitution, which is quite clear in terms of the increasing significance of the telecommunications and the economic and social development of all nations, and the convention of the ITU goes further to state that its objective is to facilitate the development of telecommunications services, and also to provide the widespread benefit of new telecommunications technologies, and also to facilitate the development of new telecommunications technologies for all people around the globe. And, earlier on, we heard about the persisting digital divide that the world continues to experience, and maybe just to give specific numbers in terms of what the ITU has published to date in terms of the people who are on the internet, which is about 5.5 billion people who are online, which then would give us an estimate of about 68 per cent of the global population online. However, this does not mean that our problems are over, and I’m talking from the point of view of ITU, is that the digital divide persists to really haunt all of us. And, having said that, you mentioned that the ITU has been adopted a resolution, a council resolution, but perhaps there’s a need to also mention that before the adoption of the council resolution this year in 2024, the ITU have actually adopted a plan for building of the telecommunication infrastructure in countries which are in need. For instance, there’s a plenipotentiary conference which the ITU adopted, which is resolution 125, which, among others, is calling for a framework of activities by the three sectors of the ITU to continue and enhance in order to provide the assistance and the support to Palestine for building and developing its infrastructure. And, it is also, that resolution is also calling to enable Palestine to urgently extend and install and own and manage its own fibre and broadband telecommunication networks, and including fibre optics links between governments and major states. But, in addition to that, there’s another plenipotentiary resolution that the ITU has adopted, which is on assisting and supporting countries in special need for building their telecommunication sector. And, that resolution, in particular, it resolves that the special action undertaken by the General Secretary of the ITU and the Director of the Development Bureau with special assistance from the Radio Communication Bureau of the ITU and the standardisation sector should continue to be activated in order to provide appropriate assistance and support to countries in special need, referred to, there is an annexure to that resolution which lists all the countries that need assistance in terms of rebuilding their telecommunication infrastructure. But, again, as you’ve said, the ITU recently in its Council of 2024 adopted the ITU Council resolution, which is a new resolution in addition to what I’ve mentioned. And, the resolution, it is actually calling for continued assisting in the monitoring and providing regular reports on particular needs of Palestine in the field of telecommunication and to prepare proposals for effective technical assistance. And, among other things, that resolution resolves to direct or to instruct the directors of the three sectors of the ITU particularly to monitor and provide regular reports on particular needs of Palestine in the field of telecommunication and to prepare proposals for effective technical assistance. And, in addition to that, to carry out the assessment on the impact of the war in Palestine on ITU programmes and activities in the region and to provide the report to the Council. And thirdly, that resolution calls to ensure adequate financial and human resource mobilization, including under the budget of the ITU and the Information Communication Technology Development Fund for the implementation of the actions that are proposed by the number of ITU resolutions. And with this, it is quite clear that the ITU is really, and its members, is trying to put together the resolutions that are guiding its membership to ensure that the problems that are currently experienced in Gaza and any other country as a result of the devastating wars and the conflict that are happening in the world, the ITU is actually putting in place measures and procedures to ensure that those countries, they rebuild their telecommunication infrastructure. And I think I’ll stop at this. Thank you.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Thanks a lot for that, Cynthia. And, you know, I think it’s also worth us looking and sharing if there are people in the audience or online from the internet technical community that have engaged in similar initiatives to respond and assist, to share that as well. Because I would assume also, Cynthia, that implementing that resolution will require collaboration. Not, you know, ITU member states are not going to be able to do that on their own. They’d have to work with the private sector, they’d have to work with national ministries, civil society and the technical community. But I want to hand over to Peter here. My battery is also running out. Any comments online that we should share? Any questions you have? Before we go into our final segment, we’re just looking at what can this community do to help get us to a more concrete place of securing access and infrastructure?

Peter Micek: Thank you so much. I do want to follow up on that great presentation of the work at the International Telecommunication Union. It’s really been remarkable and heartening to see that really swift action across the ITU in response to the conflict and the war in Gaza. And as you say, coming out with coordination programs that are applicable across many situations of conflict and crisis. So building on that, I wanted to ask what coordination should we expect from humanitarian aid agencies to provide populations they serve with access to the internet or to secure and open communications tools? Now, I know, you know, in Sudan, for example, most agencies have trouble fulfilling their missions of accessing people in need. And in those places, there are citizen led mutual aid groups standing up to play a role in ensuring access. While in Gaza, as we’ve heard, there are restrictions on the transfer of telecoms, hardware and assets to those in need. So what can we expect and what should we expect from these aid agencies?

Anriette Esterhuysen: Anyone wanting to respond to that? Cynthia? Lama? Kodjo, did you not hear the question? The question is what response from the international humanitarian agencies? Is that right, Peter? And you can repeat the question.

Peter Micek: Okay. Sure. So I was noting that in places like Sudan, humanitarian aid agencies are having trouble accessing the population in need. And their mutual aid groups have played a role in providing access to the internet. In Gaza, there are restrictions on transferring telecoms hardware to populations in need. In these situations, what should we expect of humanitarian and aid agencies to fulfill their mission of protection of civilians and the provision of aid? Should we expect them to provide access to the internet and secure telecoms?

Anriette Esterhuysen: I would say I think some of them try to do that. I think the International Red Cross and Red Crescent does try to do that. I think, can they do it alone? I think that is very, very difficult for them to do. I think they recognize that they need to do that, but it’s extremely difficult for them to do that. And not all of them have the capacity to do that. But Cynthia, I see you wanted to add that. Yes.

Cynthia Lesufi: Thank you. Earlier on, you said that in terms of the implementation of some of the resolutions that the ITU have adopted, it’s not easy to implement them. And that’s quite… You are quite correct. It’s not easy at all. And you pointed out to the continuation of the multi-stakeholder approach in terms of implementing some of this. And now I’m talking from the ITU perspective and trying to respond to the question is that I think from the ITU, as Ambassador has mentioned before, we are operating in a very… It’s a diplomatic environment and the decisions that we take are based on consensus based. And the continuous deliberation is quite important. So for the ITU, if I were to talk from that perspective, we believe in continuous facilitation of cross stakeholder dialogue towards co creating and aligning around common agenda for action and advocacy regarding the non fragmentation of the internet infrastructure during conflict. And from where we are standing as ITU member states is that this will ensure combining and leveraging the complementary roles and diverse capabilities of larger stakeholders and promote that inclusive participation in protecting the internet infrastructure. Thank you.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Thanks, Cynthia. Lama, do you want to add? Just briefly also, I mean, to respond, Peter, to your question.

Lama Fakih: I think governments have an obligation to facilitate deliveries of humanitarian assistance. And when they are encumbering internet access, they are encumbering those operations in unlawful ways. And I think there will be humanitarian agencies that do seek to provide connectivity for their staff and in the communities where they’re operating so that they can deliver on their mission. It’s not their obligation to do so. And I think what can help is the monitoring of the impact that the lack of connectivity also has on the delivery of assistance, because that also helps to underline where the government is also not adhering to its obligations under the law.

Kojo Boakye : Everything that Lama said, and then I think it’s not… I asked for a repeat of the question, but very mindful that it doesn’t feel like my place to call on humanitarian agencies to do much more than we at Metta see them doing already. We’ve supplied ad credits to a number of humanitarian agencies working on all the conflicts that you’ve mentioned and more. WhatsApp has become a key tool for many humanitarian agencies, and we see the effort they go to. I think some of the comments that have been made about the breakdown of the response of the international community to many of these crises probably highlight some of the challenges they face, and it would be great to have someone from that particular community, the disaster agency response community on this panel to speak to it. But thanks for repeating the question.

Anriette Esterhuysen: In fact, we did have real interest from Philippe Stoll from the Red Cross to be here, but he was not able to participate. They actually do very significant work in this field. I see there’s a question. I don’t know if they are online hands, Peter, but I see two people. Please go ahead briefly, introduce yourself and ask your question.

Audience: Thank you. My name is Michel Lambert. I’m working with the Canadian organization called Equality. We are dedicated to build alternative technology, particularly to respond to Internet shutdowns, network disruption, and we also manage the SplinterCon process. I hope most of you know it. The SplinterCon process is gathering every meeting, like hundreds of people with new technologies, particularly to respond to those situations. The last edition was last week in Berlin. My comment is, I mean, we have all kinds of technologies and they’re working, working well, working not well, but globally speaking, we are not having access to the resource to implement them properly as the political side or the big private sector is struggling to find ways to respond to the issues. We’re not having really… We could play a role there, but we’re still maintaining some sort of the margin. We just have some sort of resource to small project. It’s looking nice, it’s fun, but then at the end of the day, we’re not responding to the crisis to the level that we could eventually do it. So I feel that’s a bit of a lost opportunity that the world is having here and that we could engage more, particularly in… crisis where we know that tomorrow there’ll be another situation and we still are not involving, engaging enough to to use the resource that we have. So I’m just, it’s a call. We are here, that community is here, it’s an alternative to response and we could eventually contribute more if there would be some means to engage with us. Thank you.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Thanks Michel and I think we’re going to come back to you how this community can respond soon. The next speaker please.

Audience: Yes, hi everyone. My name is Mike Walton. I’m from the United Nations Refugee Agency. I just want to flag up the Connectivity for Refugees project that we work on and that is truly a multi-stakeholder approach and working with ITU, GSMA and many governments on this. So connectivity in crisis is critical. As soon as a connected then information is critical. We have 14 million refugees visiting our help websites. Without that access they would not be able to have access to that information. But I also want to flag up that as soon as those connectivity and those communication channels are up, they can also be the subject of misuse and across the multiple languages and the multiple platforms that exist, it’s a question to the panel. How can we make sure that we can moderate and we can ensure content policies are properly policed or managed when there are so many different languages and so many different capacities in place and what’s the balance between the people role in this and what’s the balance between the AI role in that if there is one at all?

Anriette Esterhuysen: Thanks for that. We actually fairly deliberately did not want to delve into content moderation because it is in itself such a challenging issue. But I’m gonna let Peter take over from me right now and I see Nadim has his

Peter Micek: hand up. Yes, just before there’s some comments in the chat about also an initiative in Ukraine of operators trying to provide hardware and support to keep the internet working. There’s also concern about states asserting kind of sovereignty and sovereign rights and to push back against I think efforts to serve populations in their states. So yeah, Nadim, please take it away.

Nadim Nassif: Thank you, Peter. I just wanted to add something. I know that you, Henriette, said you don’t want to get into content moderation, but just to say that it’s important also to speak about access on platforms, access that is a responsibility of the companies because we are speaking about physical infrastructure and to get the access through them. But what would happen if you do have the internet access but the platform is deplatforming you or preventing you from using it? And we saw this in social media platforms, including Meta, that is deplatforming and restricting accounts during the war in Palestine and in other places, not allowing newsworthiness, not allowing journalists to do their job, not allowing also human rights defenders to document the violations that are happening on the ground. But this is not only social media issue, this is also a payment platform, digital payment platform. We know that paper, for example, a major one, is not allowing certain countries to use its platform and this is very problematic. We know that there are crowdfunding platforms that have been deplatforming certain people when they try to make donations for Gaza or for other places. So just to say that it’s not only about the infrastructure, we need also to speak about the access that people have or do not have from which countries, especially when it comes to the global majority, that they are either not allowed to use this platform or even when they are on the platform, they are being deplatformed. And I think this is also an important issue to deal with.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Peter, anyone online that wants to respond? Anyone here that wants to respond? I think this gets at the fragmentation discussions a bit that we’ve seen previous internet governance forums. And also the IGF has the policy network on internet fragmentation, which I think has one of the aspects of their work that I think is very significant, is their highlighting of the fragmentation of user experience, which is something we can’t underestimate. Any of the panelists want to add anything before we go into our what next segment? Any other questions from the room? I saw a comment earlier in the Zoom, while I was still in the Zoom, with someone expressing concern that there’s also harmful use of infrastructure, or infrastructure can be used, or internet infrastructure can be used by people with bad intentions. I think that’s actually important point, but I want to come back because I think Lama covered that. And I was part of the Global Stability Commission, or Global Stability of Cybers… Global Commission Stability of Cyber States, who worked with the public core norm. And our conclusion was, is that when it comes to the internet, it’s very difficult to isolate what part of that infrastructure is being used by hospitals, by aid workers, as opposed to what’s being used by bad actors. And I think your point, Lama, about proportionality is very, very relevant here. And I think this notion that it’s legitimate to disrupt or destroy internet infrastructure, because bad actors are using it, I think illustrates how disproportional a response that is. But I think there was a… Peter, am I right?

Peter Micek: There was a comment to that effect in the chat. Yes, definitely, that under the guise of protecting internet infrastructure, states could be protecting combatants, or protecting their own sovereignty in ways that are ultimately harmful, or malicious even.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Well, let’s move on, if nobody is going to add anything. I think I also just want to recognize that we have probably not done justice to the range of responses, and alternatives, and solutions that are being developed by businesses, by civil society organizations, relief organizations, activists, national governments, local governments. I think there is a lot happening also in the internet technical community, but I think it’s very fragmented, and it’s very hard for us, I think, to see those responses connect to normative frameworks, and application and compliance of international law, and of voluntary norms. But let’s now think about the internet governance multi stakeholder community that comes together here at the IGF. And panelists, what do you think this community should be done? I think you all made it quite clear that the gap is not really at the level of norms, or is there a gap at norms, if you want to highlight that. What do you think the IGF can do, and participants in the IGF community from the internet technical community, as well as from governments, from the UN system, and civil society, what can we do to prevent what seems to be very ad hoc responses to these types of disruptions and destructions? Ad hoc, characterized by double standards, often too late, too little. So, I’m going… Kodja, you look like you have something to say, so I’m going to start with you.

Kojo Boakye : I was trying to capture the question in terms of what we can do, what we can do as a multi stakeholder group, or as individuals.

Anriette Esterhuysen: I think you’re very welcome to talk about what you can do as individuals or individual companies, but I think what we want to get at is a more structured intervention, a more coherent intervention, which can galvanize the diversity of role players and actors that we have in this forum, and that can create more compliance, more consistence, more coherence, and ultimately, that can ensure that people have access to the internet in context of conflict and crisis.

Kojo Boakye : I think that’s helpful. I think, having sat on this panel and learned from others coming in and previously, I think this diversity that you speak about is beautiful in many ways, but also creates some challenges in understanding exactly what different parties and indeed, the multi stakeholder group might do. And I think conversations like this are very, very helpful, but capturing the ways in which companies, civil society organizations, governments, international organizations, etc., are working toward this would be the first step. And to be frank, and because I’m a simple man and we like to simplify things sometimes in order to get them done, carving away some of the things that drive that diversity, if that makes sense. I think there are a myriad of things and that can create some confusion and ambiguity of exactly what we might do. And I think clarity over what works, and I know that there are infinite things that work, but clarity over what works, what’s optimal, and works would be really, really important. And whether that’s under the guise of the IGF, which I think continues to be a super important platform. the guise of the ITU or or the UN itself. I’m not, it’s above my pay grade to answer that particular question.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Thanks Gorcho. Ambassador.

Ernst Noorman: I’m not sure it’s my pay grade but I will go into the UN part also. You know the discussions on norms are incredibly difficult and challenging and it’s of course geopolitics is in play with the subjects in all discussions. But now we have a set of norms which are not non-legally binding and but they are based on and complement international law. So we have a recognized, we have recognized that international law applies in cyberspace. This means that we have some legally binding obligations under the Charter but also under international humanitarian law and human rights law. So what we need now is not new norms as some countries are suggesting but we have to make sure that the 11 norms we have endorsed are now also being implemented. And to ensure implement implementation is efficient we need engagement of all stakeholders. This means of course a role for the UN agencies and the technical community as well as the private sector, civil society and academia. And next year the open-ended working group will end its mandate and we hope that will be followed by an action-oriented mechanism allowing for constructive and active participation of stakeholders and with the so-called program of action. So our focus right now should be on implementation. The implementation should not only be multi-stakeholder but also multidisciplinary and multisectoral. And we also need to develop a common understanding how international law applies and we have welcomed the resolution adopted recently at the conference of the ICRC that provides further elements on the application of international humanitarian law in the context of the use of ICTs. And we should work hard on capacity building and that’s also something we cannot do alone as states we do that have to do that all together. This means this is the basis for great implementation of the normative framework and we can leave no one behind and growing expertise on cyber is crucial. We always say you know cyber security and and cyberspace is teamwork we have to work to do that together to make it resilient and to keep it open and free and accessible. Maybe a nice example how we also do the capacity building at the UN level is the women in cyber program where we together with a number of countries have meanwhile trained about 47 women from countries who were not actively participating at discussion in New York and now we have turned 47 women and they are actively at the table well trained with good contribution which means that not only the female voices heard in 2023 more than 50% of the contribution were from women but it also countries who are previously not involved didn’t under really understand the discussions are now completely involved and understand the topics can play an important role. So in that sense I think it’s a common and shared responsibility also to make sure that everyone has a capacity and that’s some also a military stakeholder involvement which is one of the main topics at the IGF here today. Thank you.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Thanks Ambasar. At least part of what you said sounds like something that an internet governance forum, best practice forum, one of the intersessional modalities in the IGF could actually look at. My organization is very involved in a best practice forum on online gender-based violence about six, seven, eight years ago and it really helped map how our responses can take place without compromising human rights. But Sharif, what do you think can be done?

Mohamed Shareef: From the perspective of climate change, extreme weather and in the context of small island nations, I think IGF, particularly the specialized dynamic coalitions within the IGF, could actually play a bigger role in supporting the island nations take the case of making resilient digital development in these small islands to the COP series and support these nations in securing funds for digital resilience and hence bridge the gap between technology, multi-stakeholder technology efforts going on here and multi-stakeholder environmental discussions in how the developed world can support the developing nations with the challenges they are facing with respect to man-made climate change and the result that we are talking about, disruption to internet. Thank you.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Thanks a lot, Sharif. Lama?

Lama Fakih: Thank you. I think we need to stigmatize internet shutdowns so that it is, you know, it is the act of a pariah state to shut down the internet. The internet is so intertwined in our ability to realize our rights that undermining connectivity is, you know, so abhorrent that states in good standing do not exercise this kind of behavior. And I think we do that by enforcing the normative framework with things like the keep it on campaign which access now has spearheaded and we do work collectively to minimize the effectiveness of attempts to shut down the internet and I think a lot of the initiatives there have been generated from the private sector and we can think through more of what are ways to undermine governments who are trying to do this and there’s a role here also for internet service providers because it’s, you know, the governments that dictate the blackouts as internet service providers that are actually implementing them and what more can they do to push back against these requests to interpret them narrowly. Is there scope under domestic law to file lawsuits in response to these demands? You know, businesses also do have responsibilities under the guiding principles, the UN guiding principles, businesses and human rights which should anchor them in thinking about how to respond to these requests which can be far-reaching and also have far-reaching consequences on human rights.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Thanks for that, Lama. Peter, there’s a comment online.

Peter Micek: Yes, just a very practical proposal for a project to fund and operate a mini fleet of UN cable laying ships. So it’s very expensive to lay these submarine cables and very expensive to operate the ships that repair them but to help LDCs and developing countries especially after climate crises to get faster service maybe a little UN cable keeping force.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Yeah, a rapid response. Kojo, yes, and by the way I didn’t buy that comment about the simple man, not for a minute by the way. So I’m gonna give you the mic again.

Kojo Boakye : Microphone. I’m so sorry, should always remember the microphone. No, I just wanted to add to what Lama was saying about stigmatize which I think is super important and I just had a quick chat with her off camera offline and we spoke about the need to penalize as well and I think one of the things that we’ve found really helpful in our engagements with those governments who have either decided to do full internet shutdowns or partial internet shutdowns of things like Instagram and Facebook is the actual cost to the economy and actually when all of us are well-tuned with speaking with policymakers it boils down to costs and benefits many of their decisions and some of the decisions we’ve spoken some of the things we’ve spoken about here today have boiled down to a government or a regime or whomever assuming will this enable me to keep stay in power or not others it’s you know an economic cost or whatever else and actually pointing out the cost and letting that information become part of their calculus of this cost-benefit analysis is so so important so I’m I align with Lama on stigmatize where possible penalize but really that engagement and ensuring that governments understand the cost is really really important and the fact that in many countries the digital economy is the economy now it underpins everything has become helpful in that.

Anriette Esterhuysen: it’s absolutely true but I also can you know having worked to oppose and counter shutdowns sometimes governments that shut down the internet is very much aware of the cost that does not stop them and and that’s

Kojo Boakye : what I meant sometimes you’re not going to get around a government who believe this is the only way I’m going to maintain national security or stay in power but increasingly you want those that information to be part of their calculus and I think that’s really really important

Cynthia Lesufi: yes thank you I’m just thinking aloud as I’m sitting here and listening I’m sitting here and thinking, as I’m listening to my fellow panellists, I’m trying to answer the question that you have asked. And I’m saying to myself, perhaps we, as the Internet Governance Forum community, we have a good opportunity in front of us. I mean, next year, we’re talking about the versus plus 20 review process. And some of these ideas that I’m sharing here, perhaps there is a need for us to consider highlighting them or reflecting them in the versus plus 20 review process. And just to make them more visible and try and solve some of the challenges that we spoke about here. So I think that’s what I thought we should consider as the IGF community to consider. Thank you.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Thank you very much for that. Very relevant remarks, Cynthia. Nadim?

Nadim Nassif: Yes, I think, I mean, obviously, as a civil society organization, we are limited with our capacity and what we can do. But I think it’s important to keep our work in terms of the research, in terms of documenting the violations that are happening there, also from the side of governments, but also from the side of companies and to make sure that there is at least a process of accountability and that there is publicity to those violations that are happening. But beyond that, I think it’s also important for us as civil society, especially ones who are in the humanitarian field, to give the needed assistance possible. In terms of ESEMs, like short assistance and other technical small solutions maybe that are still in our capacity to help the residents, especially when we speak about segments of the population like journalists, media people, first responders and others, their work is urgent and it’s important to keep them online, to keep them connected with the rest of the world.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Thanks, Nadim. Peter?

Peter Micek: Thank you. So the chat, again, is getting very technical and concrete, which is great. There’s another suggestion for ESEM infrastructure and community networks that exist on top of a decentralized power grid. So I started by talking about how conflicts, you know, impact access to electricity, and there is a proposal for a fleet of Wi-Fi-capable networks that are portable batteries charged by mobile solar stations. And so, yeah, just very concrete proposals. But if I could use my prerogative and speak a bit to the normative and governance discussions, this has been really rich. I think, again, from our respective pathway to preserve civilian telecommunications is to have armed groups, armed groups of people, armed groups of society, and the normative and governance discussions is to have armed groups and armies respected as non-military in nature, and as the OHCHR recently said, and through our own documentation, we found the Internet is a resource indispensable to the survival of civilian populations. As Lama said, the principles of distinction and proportionality in the corporate and private sector absolutely plays a role. They’re being targeted with partial shutdowns, but they also can at times push back and help circumvent disruptions and even hold governments accountable. We’ve seen companies file lawsuits against governments for demanding disproportionate disruptions. As we’ve gathered today at the IGF, it’s, I think, a good time to re-assert if we’re going to reach the 2030 agenda and provide Internet access in all countries to protect our common digital home, recognize the protected status of the public core, and remind folks that to preserve connectivity and conflict, the responsibility lies first and foremost with the parties to the conflicts themselves, and those parties perhaps in the environmental and climate realm accountable for that climate change. This, of course, though, means, as we’ve heard, we can and must proceed in concert together. We can’t see destruction of ICTs normalized as part of conflict, but rather part of the solution. Protecting civilians in conflict and preserving access to good legitimate information sources requires robust connectivity. If I could just put out there what I’ve heard in terms of a few ways forward, I think the Global Digital Compact did set out good language on Internet shutdowns. Perhaps there’s a working group to implement that language that could come forth. There could be new best practice forum on this topic at the IGF. I know we’ll be convening again soon in Norway in June. The Freedom Online Coalition has spoken and will speak further, I think, about telecommunications access in conflict, and I expect them to continue coordination with those 41 member states. And then on accountability, I think it is incumbent on courts like the International Criminal Court and regional bodies, the OECD, which recently did fine against telecom A1 in Austria for contributing to a shutdown, to find accountability. And even the UN Security Council, I think, should incorporate attention to access to telecommunications and the conflicts that it monitors. So that’s enough from me, I think, using my prerogative. Thank you,

Anriette Esterhuysen: Thanks very much, Peter. Yes, I think I just want to really add, I mean, Lama said we should stigmatize shutdowns. I would like us to stigmatize violation of international law. You know, I think we’ve become as a global community far too tolerant of the disregarding of international law by some of our member states in the UN community. I really do think there’s a role for the IGF in this place, because while I think that the international legal framework might clarify what some of the accountabilities of states are, I think we need to explore what the technical community can do. I think we might see an absence of a technical community voice in these contexts, and that might simply be because they’re not clear on exactly what their roles and accountabilities are. And I think that’s something that the IGF can explore. And I think Cynthia mentioned WSIS, and there are two concepts that were part of WSIS that I think is very relevant here, and that’s international cooperation and digital solidarity. I think if we can use the IGF and use this space to build that solidarity and build that cooperation, we’re in an era of people talk about the digital Cold War. I think that’s the work of the IGF, to counteract digital Cold Wars and to build the kind of collaboration across borders and across stakeholder groups to ensure that people have access always, everywhere. So thanks very much to everyone, to the panelists, and thank you to the MAG members, to Lito and Peace and others who assisted with organizing this session, to the captioners and the tech team, even though the Zoom was a disaster in the beginning, we forgive you, and to everyone who is here to join in this session. Thank you very much. And a big hand to the panel.

Audience: Excuse me, I’m here, I’m just short, I was waiting, sorry, but I think because I’m not tall, sorry, I just want to suggest something, I’m from Sudan, work as a researcher with the grassroots movement, from 2018 to 2022, the internet has been shut down in Sudan collectively for like up to four months, and when the war starts, tomorrow it will be one year out of the internet in Sudan, and when the international community talk about the humanitarian aid, especially inside Khartoum, the food plan asks people to apply online, and that’s when we say it’s not that flexible idea, and you need to talk with the grassroots people and emergency room people to know the solution for this stuff, but how we can ask people to apply online, and there is no internet to have the food aid. The second thing, when it comes to the internet, the RSF can bring the Starlink, and it’s equal for one hour, like two dollars, just for people to ask for help. I think when the international community can work with the Starlink people, or work with the grassroots movement, we can find the solution to help those people to ask for help at this online thing, and yes, I agree with the section for 30 years, that also affect in our rights as a human being to have an access to ask for help. Thank you.

Agreement Points

Internet disruptions violate human rights and hinder humanitarian aid

Lama Fakih

Nadim Nashif

Peter Micek

Disruptions violate human rights and hinder humanitarian aid

Destruction of infrastructure in Gaza has devastating humanitarian impact

Humanitarian agencies working to provide connectivity in crises

The speakers agree that internet disruptions and infrastructure destruction have severe humanitarian consequences, violating human rights and impeding aid efforts.

Need for multi-stakeholder approach to protect internet access

Ernst Noorman

Cynthia Lesufi

Anriette Esterhuysen

IGF could establish best practices for protecting internet access

Importance of highlighting issues in WSIS+20 review process

IGF should explore roles and responsibilities of technical community

The speakers emphasize the importance of multi-stakeholder engagement in establishing best practices and norms for protecting internet access, particularly through forums like the IGF and WSIS+20 review process.

Similar Viewpoints

Both speakers emphasize the importance of international legal frameworks and norms in regulating state behavior regarding internet access and infrastructure protection.

Lama Fakih

Ernst Noorman

International human rights law requires internet restrictions be necessary and proportionate

UN norms prohibit damaging critical infrastructure in cyberspace

Both speakers highlight the role of non-state actors in developing technical solutions and providing connectivity during crises or shutdowns.

Kojo Boakye

Peter Micek

Private sector developing technical solutions like WhatsApp proxy

Humanitarian agencies working to provide connectivity in crises

Unexpected Consensus

Climate change impact on internet infrastructure

Mohamed Shareef

Anriette Esterhuysen

Climate change threatens internet infrastructure in small island states

Need for rapid response capabilities to repair infrastructure

While the discussion primarily focused on conflict-related disruptions, there was unexpected consensus on the need to address climate change impacts on internet infrastructure, particularly for vulnerable states.

Overall Assessment

Summary

The main areas of agreement include the humanitarian impact of internet disruptions, the need for multi-stakeholder approaches to protect internet access, the importance of international legal frameworks, and the role of non-state actors in providing technical solutions.

Consensus level

There is a moderate to high level of consensus among the speakers on the fundamental issues surrounding internet disruptions and infrastructure protection. This consensus suggests a strong foundation for developing comprehensive strategies to address these challenges, though specific implementation details may require further discussion and negotiation.

Different Viewpoints

Role of private sector in addressing internet disruptions

Lama Fakih

Kojo Boakye

International human rights law requires internet restrictions be necessary and proportionate

Private sector developing technical solutions like WhatsApp proxy

While Lama Fakih emphasizes the legal obligations of governments under international human rights law, Kojo Boakye focuses on the role of private sector companies in developing technical solutions to maintain internet access during disruptions.

Unexpected Differences

Focus on climate change impacts

Mohamed Shareef

Other speakers

Climate change threatens internet infrastructure in small island states

While most speakers focused on conflicts and intentional disruptions, Mohamed Shareef unexpectedly highlighted the threat of climate change to internet infrastructure in small island states. This broadens the discussion beyond human-caused disruptions to include environmental factors.

Overall Assessment

summary

The main areas of disagreement centered around the roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders (governments, private sector, international organizations) in addressing internet disruptions and protecting infrastructure.

difference_level

The level of disagreement was moderate. While speakers generally agreed on the importance of maintaining internet access, they had different perspectives on how to achieve this goal. These differences reflect the complex, multi-stakeholder nature of internet governance and highlight the need for collaborative approaches that involve all relevant actors.

Partial Agreements

Both speakers agree on the importance of international frameworks for protecting internet infrastructure, but they focus on different aspects. Ernst Noorman emphasizes UN norms prohibiting damage to infrastructure, while Cynthia Lesufi highlights ITU resolutions for rebuilding infrastructure after conflicts or disasters.

Ernst Noorman

Cynthia Lesufi

UN norms prohibit damaging critical infrastructure in cyberspace

ITU resolutions call for assistance in rebuilding telecom infrastructure

Similar Viewpoints

Both speakers emphasize the importance of international legal frameworks and norms in regulating state behavior regarding internet access and infrastructure protection.

Lama Fakih

Ernst Noorman

International human rights law requires internet restrictions be necessary and proportionate

UN norms prohibit damaging critical infrastructure in cyberspace

Both speakers highlight the role of non-state actors in developing technical solutions and providing connectivity during crises or shutdowns.

Kojo Boakye

Peter Micek

Private sector developing technical solutions like WhatsApp proxy

Humanitarian agencies working to provide connectivity in crises

Key Takeaways

Internet disruptions and infrastructure destruction have severe humanitarian impacts and violate human rights

There are existing normative frameworks and legal obligations that prohibit damaging critical internet infrastructure

Multi-stakeholder collaboration is needed to develop technical solutions and provide connectivity in crises

The Internet Governance Forum (IGF) community has a role to play in establishing best practices and exploring responsibilities of different stakeholders

Resolutions and Action Items

Explore establishing an IGF best practice forum on protecting internet access in conflicts and crises

Highlight internet infrastructure protection issues in the WSIS+20 review process

Develop a working group to implement Global Digital Compact language on internet shutdowns

Freedom Online Coalition to continue coordination on telecommunications access in conflict

Unresolved Issues

How to effectively enforce international laws and norms against internet shutdowns

Specific roles and responsibilities of the technical community in protecting internet infrastructure

How to address content moderation and platform access issues during crises

Balancing legitimate security concerns with maintaining internet access

Suggested Compromises

Focus on implementing existing norms rather than developing new ones

Engage with governments to highlight economic costs of shutdowns while acknowledging security concerns

Develop rapid response capabilities for infrastructure repair while respecting state sovereignty

Palestinians in Gaza have endured over a year of ongoing phone and internet disruption as a result of relentless airstrikes by the Israeli government and other actions that the government has taken. These actions have included damage to core communication infrastructure, cuts to electricity, fuel blockades, and apparently deliberate shutdowns through technical means.

speaker

Lama Fakih

reason

This comment provided concrete examples of how internet infrastructure can be disrupted or destroyed during conflict, highlighting the multifaceted nature of the problem.

impact

It shifted the discussion from general concepts to specific, real-world impacts, prompting further exploration of the humanitarian consequences of such disruptions.

Small island states, island nations, our connectivity to the rest of the world is really primarily these days with submarine cables. So if you take the case of the Maldives, we have a few submarine cables landing in the Maldives. Two of them connect us to India and Sri Lanka, and we have three more cables that we are working on connecting us directly to the Southeast Asia and all the way up to Europe.

speaker

Mohamed Shareef

reason

This comment introduced the unique challenges faced by small island nations in maintaining internet connectivity, bringing attention to the geographical and infrastructural aspects of the issue.

impact

It broadened the scope of the discussion to include climate change and natural disasters as factors affecting internet access, leading to considerations of how to build more resilient infrastructure.

We have a set of norms which are not non-legally binding and but they are based on and complement international law. So we have a recognized, we have recognized that international law applies in cyberspace. This means that we have some legally binding obligations under the Charter but also under international humanitarian law and human rights law.

speaker

Ernst Noorman

reason

This comment provided important context on the existing legal and normative frameworks governing internet access and infrastructure protection during conflicts.

impact

It shifted the conversation towards discussing implementation and enforcement of existing norms, rather than creating new ones, and emphasized the need for multi-stakeholder engagement in this process.

I think we need to stigmatize internet shutdowns so that it is, you know, it is the act of a pariah state to shut down the internet. The internet is so intertwined in our ability to realize our rights that undermining connectivity is, you know, so abhorrent that states in good standing do not exercise this kind of behavior.

speaker

Lama Fakih

reason

This comment proposed a strong stance on internet shutdowns, framing them as unacceptable actions by states.

impact

It sparked discussion on how to create social and political pressure against internet shutdowns, leading to suggestions for penalization and emphasizing the economic costs of such actions.

Perhaps we, as the Internet Governance Forum community, we have a good opportunity in front of us. I mean, next year, we’re talking about the versus plus 20 review process. And some of these ideas that I’m sharing here, perhaps there is a need for us to consider highlighting them or reflecting them in the versus plus 20 review process.

speaker

Cynthia Lesufi

reason

This comment connected the discussion to broader internet governance processes, suggesting a concrete way to move the conversation forward.

impact

It provided a practical next step for the IGF community to address the issues discussed, potentially influencing future policy discussions.

Overall Assessment

These key comments shaped the discussion by grounding it in real-world examples, highlighting the complexity of the issue across different contexts (conflict zones, small island states), and emphasizing the need for multi-stakeholder approaches. They also shifted the conversation from describing problems to proposing solutions, including strengthening existing norms, creating social and economic pressures against internet shutdowns, and leveraging upcoming policy processes to address these issues. The discussion evolved from a focus on technical and legal aspects to include broader considerations of human rights, economic impacts, and the role of various stakeholders in ensuring internet access and protecting infrastructure.

How can we ensure content policies are properly policed or managed across multiple languages and platforms in crisis situations?

speaker

Mike Walton (UN Refugee Agency)

explanation

This is important to address the challenges of content moderation in multilingual crisis contexts while balancing human and AI roles.

How can we address the issue of platforms deplatforming or restricting access to users from certain countries, especially those from the Global South?

speaker

Nadim Nashif

explanation

This is crucial to ensure equitable access to digital platforms and services globally, beyond just physical infrastructure.

What role can the technical community play in protecting internet access and infrastructure during conflicts and crises?

speaker

Anriette Esterhuysen

explanation

Understanding the technical community’s role is important for developing comprehensive strategies to maintain internet access in crisis situations.

How can we implement a UN-operated fleet of cable-laying ships to assist developing countries in maintaining and repairing submarine cables, especially after climate crises?

speaker

Online participant (via Peter Micek)

explanation

This proposal addresses the need for faster internet service restoration in developing countries affected by climate events.

How can we develop ESIM infrastructure and community networks that exist on top of a decentralized power grid?

speaker

Online participant (via Peter Micek)

explanation

This technical solution could provide resilient internet access in areas with unreliable power infrastructure.

How can the IGF community incorporate discussions on protecting internet access during conflicts into the WSIS+20 review process?

speaker

Cynthia Lesufi

explanation

This would help highlight and address challenges related to internet access in conflict zones at a high-level policy forum.

How can we better coordinate humanitarian aid agencies to provide populations they serve with access to the internet or secure and open communications tools?

speaker

Peter Micek

explanation

This is crucial for ensuring effective aid delivery and communication in crisis situations.

Summary

This panel discussion focused on the intersection of AI innovation and privacy protection, exploring challenges and potential solutions in AI governance. Experts from various fields, including government, academia, and regulatory bodies, shared insights on balancing technological advancement with privacy rights.

The discussion highlighted the OECD’s recent work in updating AI principles and establishing a partnership with the Global Partnership on AI. Panelists emphasized the importance of a comprehensive approach to AI governance, considering privacy alongside other values such as fairness, transparency, and human agency. They noted the challenges in balancing these sometimes conflicting priorities, particularly when dealing with human rights that cannot be traded off.

Privacy concerns were examined across the AI lifecycle, from data collection to model deployment and retirement. The experts stressed the need for age-appropriate design in AI systems, especially concerning children’s data protection. The conversation also touched on the convergence of AI with other technologies like blockchain and neurotechnology, highlighting the complexity of privacy protection in a rapidly evolving technological landscape.

Panelists discussed the role of data protection authorities in developing practical approaches to safeguard privacy while fostering innovation. They emphasized the importance of global governance frameworks and the need to translate principles into enforceable actions. The discussion concluded with calls for strengthened legal frameworks, increased transparency, and greater involvement of civil society in AI and privacy-related policymaking.

Overall, the panel underscored the critical nature of privacy protection in AI development and deployment, advocating for a balanced approach that considers both innovation and human rights.

Keypoints

Major discussion points:

– The intersection of AI and privacy, including challenges and risks

– The need for global governance frameworks and cooperation on AI and privacy

– The AI lifecycle and how privacy considerations apply at each stage

– The role of data protection authorities in regulating AI and privacy

– Balancing innovation with privacy protection in AI development

Overall purpose:

The goal of this discussion was to explore the complex relationship between AI and privacy, examining key challenges, policy approaches, and potential solutions for protecting privacy rights while fostering responsible AI innovation. The panel aimed to bring together diverse perspectives from government, academia, technical experts, and regulators to have a comprehensive dialogue on this important issue.

Tone:

The overall tone was informative and collaborative. Speakers shared insights from their respective areas of expertise in a constructive manner. There was a sense of urgency about addressing privacy challenges, but also optimism about finding solutions through cooperation. The tone became slightly more impassioned toward the end as audience members raised additional concerns, but remained respectful and solution-oriented throughout.

Speakers

– Lucia Russo: Moderator

– Juraj Čorba: Senior expert for digital regulation and governance from the Slovak Ministry of Informatization; Chair of the OECD AI working on official investment governance; Chair of the Global Partnership on AI

– Clara Neppel: Senior director at IEEE; Co-chair of the OECD expert group on AI data and privacy

– Thiago Guimarães Moraes: Specialist on AI governance and data protection at the Brazilian Data Protection Authority

– Jimena Viveros: Member of the UN Secretary General’s High-Level Advisory Body on AI, Managing Director and CEO of IQuilibriumAI

AI Innovation and Privacy Protection: Challenges and Solutions in Governance

This panel discussion brought together experts from government, academia, and regulatory bodies to explore the complex intersection of AI innovation and privacy protection. The conversation highlighted key challenges in AI governance and potential solutions for safeguarding privacy rights while fostering responsible technological advancement.

Key Themes and Challenges

1. Privacy Concerns in Advanced AI Systems

The panelists unanimously agreed that advanced AI systems pose significant privacy challenges due to their extensive data requirements. Juraj Čorba, representing the Slovak Ministry of Informatisation and the OECD, emphasized that AI’s dependence on data inherently creates privacy issues. Clara Neppel from IEEE noted that generative AI exacerbates these concerns through vast data collection and potential re-identification of individuals.

Specific examples of privacy challenges included:

– The potential for AI systems to infer sensitive information from seemingly innocuous data

– Risks of re-identification in anonymized datasets

– Challenges in obtaining meaningful consent for data use in complex AI systems

Thiago Guimarães Moraes, from the Brazilian Data Protection Authority, highlighted the complex trade-offs between privacy, fairness, and utility in AI systems. Jimena Viveros, a member of the UN Secretary General’s High-Level Advisory Board on AI, expanded on this, noting that AI data collection and use can have far-reaching effects on democratic institutions and geopolitics.

2. Global Governance and Regulatory Frameworks

There was strong consensus on the need for global governance frameworks and harmonized regulations to address the transboundary nature of data and AI-related privacy challenges. Čorba mentioned that the OECD has updated its AI principles and definition to reflect technological developments and privacy concerns. He also highlighted the relevance of the UN Digital Compact in relation to AI governance.

Viveros advocated for UN recommendations aimed at creating a global AI data framework to protect human rights. She also proposed recognizing data as a “digital public good,” sparking discussion about new approaches to data governance in the AI era.

Moraes highlighted the role of data protection authorities in developing guidance and regulatory sandboxes to address AI privacy issues. He emphasized their work in:

– Providing technical assistance to organizations implementing AI

– Developing guidelines for privacy-enhancing technologies

– Collaborating with other regulatory bodies to address cross-cutting issues

3. Balancing Innovation and Privacy Protection

A key point of discussion was the challenge of balancing AI innovation with privacy protection. Neppel stressed the importance of weighing the economic benefits of AI against privacy risks. She introduced the concept of the AI lifecycle and its implications for privacy, noting that privacy considerations must be integrated at every stage of AI development and deployment.

Moraes emphasized the need for privacy-enhancing technologies and techniques like differential privacy. However, he argued that from a human rights perspective, privacy and other fundamental rights cannot be compromised or traded off, stating, “Human rights cannot be traded off. And that’s here one of the main challenges. We are talking about trade-off of values in a technical level that they cannot mean undermining of human rights.”

4. Intersections with Other Technologies

The discussion highlighted the importance of considering AI privacy issues within the broader context of emerging technologies. Čorba noted that the convergence of AI with technologies like blockchain and neurotechnology creates new privacy challenges. He stressed the need to consider the full “digital stack” when addressing AI and privacy governance.

An audience member raised the specific issue of blockchain’s immutability and its implications for data privacy. The panelists acknowledged the challenges this poses, particularly concerning data deletion rights and the right to be forgotten.

Key Solutions and Recommendations

1. Age-Appropriate Design and Children’s Data Protection

Neppel emphasized the crucial importance of age-appropriate design in AI systems, particularly concerning children’s data protection. She highlighted the need for special safeguards and considerations when AI systems interact with or process data from minors.

2. Privacy-Enhancing Technologies and Techniques

The panelists discussed various technical approaches to enhancing privacy in AI systems. Differential privacy was highlighted as a potential technique to balance data utility with privacy protection. Moraes stressed the importance of these technologies in practical implementation of privacy principles.

3. Global Cooperation and Harmonized Regulations

There was strong agreement on the need for international cooperation in developing AI governance frameworks. The speakers advocated for harmonized regulations and the adoption of international AI governance standards at national levels. Čorba mentioned the OECD’s expert group on AI, data, and privacy as an example of ongoing international efforts.

4. Strengthening Legal Frameworks

The discussion concluded with calls for strengthened legal frameworks to ensure effective privacy protection in the age of AI. This includes updating legislation to keep pace with technological advancements and raising public awareness about AI and privacy issues.

Thought-Provoking Insights

Jimena Viveros provided a particularly impactful perspective, stating, “AI is data, so we cannot have AI without data. And data comes with privacy issues, that’s just a problem.” This succinctly captured the fundamental tension at the heart of the discussion.

Thiago Guimarães Moraes emphasized the non-negotiable nature of human rights in AI development, highlighting the challenge of balancing technical trade-offs without compromising fundamental rights.

Conclusion

The panel discussion underscored the critical importance of addressing privacy concerns in AI development and deployment. While there was broad agreement on the challenges and the need for global cooperation, the conversation revealed the complexity of balancing innovation, economic benefits, and fundamental rights protection.

Key takeaways included:

– The need for privacy considerations throughout the AI lifecycle

– The importance of international collaboration in developing governance frameworks

– The role of data protection authorities in guiding responsible AI implementation

– The potential of privacy-enhancing technologies in addressing AI privacy challenges

As AI continues to advance, ongoing dialogue and collaborative efforts will be crucial in developing effective governance frameworks that safeguard privacy while fostering responsible technological progress. The discussion highlighted that while technical solutions are important, they must be underpinned by strong legal frameworks and a commitment to protecting fundamental human rights in the digital age.

Lucia Russo: organized by the OECD on how to harness AI innovation while protecting privacy rights and exactly this is the very focus of this panel today and it’s a concern that has been heightened by recent developments in the technology and the OECD recommendation in its revision earlier this year has evolved to reflect the evolving technological landscape increased challenges raised by advanced AI systems include privacy rights so in our discussions today we would like to navigate these three main aspects the privacy challenges in the advanced AI systems and the policy landscape for AI governance and in relation with privacy and how to develop practical forward-looking solutions. I am joined for this discussion today by an exceptional panel of experts who bring diverse perspectives on AI governance spanning from government policy technical community academia and regulators and so I would like to join and to welcome today Juraj Korba senior experts for digital regulation and governance from the Slovak Ministry of Informatization and Juraj is the chair of the OECD AI working on official investment governance and chair of the global partnership on AI. We have Clara Neppel senior director at IEEE and co-chair of the OECD expert group on AI data and privacy and Tiago Guimarães Moraes specialist on AI governance and data protection at the Brazilian Data Protection Authority. We will also have Ximena Viveiros joining us I believe a little later and she’s a member of the UN secretary general’s high-level advisory body on AI. So the way this panel will unfold will be to have our speakers bring their perspectives around this topic and then we will also have time for a discussion with the audience both here and then online we are monitoring the chat so we will give voice to those who have questions online. So I will now start with Juraj and there should be some slides on the screen. So Juraj as the chair of the working party on AI governance played a key role in guiding the discussions that have led to decisions of OECD recommendation on AI. Motivations behind updating the OECD recommendation and also tell us what were the primary costs that were advanced AI systems and how these affect those.

Juraj Čorba: One, two, three, do you hear me please? If you could change please my machine I’m afraid it’s not properly. Mike, sounds like Mike, right thanks. One, two, three. Oh, this is better now, I hope, or not really. Is it better? One, two, three. But anyway, at least you hear me. So first of all, I would like to thank the organizers for providing again an opportunity for the international organizations to share the latest results of their work, including the OECD. We are happy to be here. This has been an outstanding year for us at the OECD, for us who work in the AI agenda, for multiple reasons. One of the reasons is the fact that we have created a so-called integrated partnership with the Global Partnership on AI. So the family of countries that cooperate and share knowledge together, and not only knowledge, but hopefully also solutions. The family is expanding, so now we are covering 44 different jurisdictions from all around the world. I was trying to calculate actually what proportion of the world population we cover in the Global Partnership on AI now, and it’s 40% of the world population. So it’s really a significant club. Now, notwithstanding the enlargement and possible further enlargement in 2025, we managed, as was already mentioned by Lucia, to update the first ever intergovernmental document on AI, which was adopted in 2019 by the OECD, the so-called OECD AI principles, which were then later incorporated into G20 AI principles, into the first international convention on AI at the Council of Europe, with participation of non-European countries, and to some extent also into the AI Act of the European Union, with which some of you may be familiar with. So there are some successes that we really can look back at, and I must say I’m proud for the whole group that we managed. Now, when it comes to the reasons why we had to update the OECD AI principles in 2024, it was primarily for reasons of clarity, for reasons of reflecting on the latest technological development, and of course we had to take account of many different interests that have been raised. As you know, the OECD works, and now also the Global Partnership on AI, after the integration, we all work on a consensus basis. So in order to be able to actually come to any modifications, any updates, we had to listen to basically hundreds of people, not only people acting on behalf of the governments, but also people involved in the expert groups. You will learn more from Clara on the go. So this was a very interesting exercise, but surprisingly enough, we managed to have this revision updated in May by the ministers in Paris. Now, one of the key milestones that I would like to convey to you, on the basis of the work that we did, is actually the definition of the Artificial Intelligence as such. So when we discuss the impact of Artificial Intelligence on privacy or personal data, we really need to make sure that we discuss the same thing. In other words, what is actually the Artificial Intelligence when we talk about it? How we can recognize, or can we actually recognize and make a clear difference between AI and what we would call classical software systems? Now, you can judge our work. If you go to the OECD website, you will find an explanatory memorandum on the updated AI definition there. You will see how we actually arrived at the final solution. I recommend you to read this. And of course, there it is clear from the definition as such that any AI is highly dependent on data, on its quality, and of course, there is a clear bridge to the privacy concerns. The last thing in relation to the AI definition I would like to mention is, of course, the fact that the definition is imperfect by definition. In other words, it’s a work in progress. It will be reviewed again. And we also need to understand that making a clear line between software as we know it, or as we knew it, and the new elements that we call Artificial Intelligence is not necessarily as clear-cut as we would wish. We should rather see it as a scale, because also, of course, the systems that we call AI, they are also dependent and interact with classical software as well. So, it’s very delicate. Now, with the privacy, of course, we need to realize that, as I mentioned, AI is hungry for data. It needs data to be actually built and to work properly. The thing is that, of course, any restrictions on the use of data can be detrimental for building of AI models. At the same time, to complete the triangle, it’s not only about building of models and systems, but it’s of course also about the way security environments access information about us and evaluate possible threats and risks. So any limitations there, of course, interact also with this field, which is not always discussed, but we need to be aware of this. So it’s a delicate balance we need to draw between the protection of privacy on one hand, and security needs and the needs of building up of AI models and systems on the other hand. There are three principles in our OECD AI principles, which are foundational also now for the whole global partnership on AI community. And these three principles, they explicitly mention the need to protect privacy. But of course, we recognize that even inside this broad family of countries and jurisdictions, the approaches to privacy vary. And they are, of course, also contingent on certain cultural notions, on political approaches. So many issues are in place there. With that, I would like to commend the work of the expert groups. We have multiple groups comprised of experts feeding into the work of our bodies at the Global Partnership on AI and at the OECD. So this is a treasure, a big asset that we can build upon. You are all welcomed to find out more about the way we work. And of course, the more we can engage with you in a meaningful way, the more knowledge and the more understanding we can build. And last but not least, I would like to also commend the work of the UN Advisory Board on AI, of which Ximena is a distinguished member, for Mexico. If you look at the UN Advisory Board report that was published in September, and if you look at the UN Digital Compact that was adopted in New York City also in December, there you will find that basically when it comes to the first pillar of the UN Digital Compact, which is to create knowledge and understanding of the AI systems and the impacts on economy, society, etc., it is actually the OECD and the Global Partnership on AI that is relied on to feed into this first pillar of the UN Digital Compact to provide the necessary knowledge to share it with the global community. So besides the opportunity there at the OECD and Global Partnership on AI to engage with all of you, we can certainly then engage also at the global level together. With that, Lucia, thank you very much again for having me here today.

Lucia Russo: Thank you, Juraj, for providing this overview also of the most recent work of the OECD and what we have been engaged in during this past very busy year. So now I would like to welcome and turn to Ximena. Ximena, you are an international lawyer and scholar and advisor on AI and peace and security. You also lead a consultancy firm, iEquilibrium AI, which is specialized on AI and peace and security. And as we heard, you served as a member of the United Nations Secretary General High-Level Advisory Board on AI. What we would like to hear from you is if you could unpack the social risks that you have identified with the intersection of AI and privacy and perhaps also comment on how proposed UN recommendations aim to create a more robust global framework for responsible AI deployment. Thank you.

Jimena Viveros: Hello. I don’t know if anyone can hear me. Yes? Okay, great. So it is great to be here, sorry for the delay. So thank you for the introduction. And I would also like to start commending the work of the OECD and the new partnership with JIPAI, which I think is going to be very fruitful and going to be very good for advancing global governance and recommendations in this space. So I’m happy to be an expert in different of the working groups. I look forward to contributing on that. So as Juraj was saying, AI is data, so we cannot have AI without data. And data comes with privacy issues, that’s just a problem. So when we look at it from the perspective of peace and security at large, it brings a lot of problems. Because if we look at it even from, say, the civilian domain, we live in a society where everything we consume, it consumes back our data. Whether we willingly accept it or, you know, just because there’s no other choice. So all of that data gathering by all of these platforms is then fed into systems, which could be civilian, which could be military, which could be of some security organizations, intelligence organizations, and we don’t know what the purpose of it will be at the end. So we see this problem also in terms of all of the decision support systems. And for, say, autonomous weapons and other types of security implications that come along with the systems that work in this space. So we have a lot of complications regarding that. What we also find is now the big hype with generative AI and all of the breaches that come in that space, which we are all very familiar with. Which is all just exacerbated by the different jurisdictions and approaches that are being used universally. So what we’re witnessing is just a patchwork of initiatives. So that’s why we should really strive towards global governance. And the work that we did at the advisory body of the Secretary General leading to the Summit of the Future, and what was a part of the Global Digital Compact and the Pact for the Future, it included this because we mentioned the security problems that comes with all of this data breaches, hacking, misuse of information, malicious or unintended uses, both in the civilian and the military domain, which affects the broader international stability frameworks. So we, in the report, highlighted that even beyond the implications of data and privacy security problems at the individual or at the community level, there’s also very large-scale impact on society. And we say in the report that it could even affect democratic institutions as a whole, in terms of misinformation and the erroneous use of data, which can also affect the geopolitical, the economy in different parts of the world, in different regions, as we have seen already. Another problem that we have with data and with privacy in terms of security is the fact that we are now shifting the power dynamics of the world in terms of the technological dependency. So it’s not about who has the best systems, it’s about who has the best data or who has more data. And that is something that has been accumulated even years before AI was booming, like it is now. So we have a problem. We also have a problem in the lack of data. It’s a risk in itself because misrepresentation, bias, all of these things are a clear problem in terms of data. And this also affects the privacy of children. That’s a big risk that we have identified and everything regarding future generations. So now the question is what we can do about this. So first of all, we should really recognize data as a digital public good. This is something that is also stated in the Global Digital Compact and that has been quite at the high list of the agendas of the Secretary General. All these common digital goods. So data is one of them. And what we could do is create a global AI data framework to protect all kinds of human rights that can be affected by the use of data. And obviously implicating privacy issues. The GDC also offers some solutions, for example, awareness raising, capacity building, controlled cross-border data flows to foster a responsible, equitable, and interoperable framework to maximize the data benefits while minimizing the risks to data security and privacy. Because as I said, the lack of data is also a risk in itself. So that’s why it’s so important the work that the OECD and GPAI has been doing in this respect. Because it’s precisely that. Awareness raising and capacity building and just bringing experts together to come up with solutions. Because the risks and the problems we have identified many times. The thing is how to do it. do it and how to come up with actionable recommendations because this is vital. So the OECD recommendations that were revised now this year with all of the human-centered AI issues is vital and I recommend for whoever hasn’t read it that to read it because it’s a really important material that you can find there and obviously cooperation and synergies across organizations, across jurisdictions, across communities, across everything is vital because everything is complementary and everything helps. So with that I will close. Thank you.

Lucia Russo: Okay, thank you so much Ximena for this is really great work that you have been doing and outlining also the key risks and also some policy solutions already. So now I will move to Clara. As we heard from your eye the OECD has also established an expert group looking at particularly the interrelations between AI data and privacy and you are co-chairing that expert group. So what we would like to hear from you is what are the motivations that led to the establishment of this group but also what methodological approach you’re using to assess comprehensively privacy risks across the AI life cycle and lastly if you could please share with the audience the key findings that have emerged from the first report that was published with the support of the expert group.

Clara Neppel: Thank you for inviting me here as well and I’m very pleased to share our experience with this cross-section what you just mentioned, the collaboration between different communities. So as mentioned by both of my co-panelists before we had privacy issues with AI even before generative AI but this has been exacerbated with the vast collection of data across basically geographies but also the possibility to then re-identify individuals but also to identify let’s say characteristics which were not even disclosed in the first place. I think I very much like to say even very often you are surprised by the thing that the system knows about you which can be accurate or not accurate and if it’s accurate then you’re a kind of Orwellian space and if it’s not accurate you’re in a kind of a Kafka space. So luckily we now know that at least generative AI is not always to be relied on so I think that’s maybe the positive effect of let’s say the vast adoption of AI. So with the OECD that has been so active in AI governance as mentioned by Jura there are already a lot of expert groups so I’m part of the AI and climate expert group as well as on the AI futures expert group and I’m co-chairing now this expert group on AI data governance and privacy and so you asked me about the motivation of why we created this. So I think that in the AI communities you will find a lot of technologies of course also civil society and so on which are looking to the different aspects of AI that start realizing and also establishing frameworks for governance for these different aspects. In the data privacy community we already have an established frameworks, we have jurisdictions we know how to enforce, we have also institutions and of course methodologies. So what we saw in the AI space that there is a lot of innovation that you just mentioned also addressing privacy but without knowing that there is already a lot of work going on in the other community and the other way around. So this was I think the main motivation to bring these two communities together and establish this working group and indeed the first deliverable of this working group is this report that was published in June. So one of the deliverable outcomes was really also to map the principles, the AI principles to the privacy principles and as you can see here it’s a lot. I will just go into some which I think are specifically relevant. So principle one is really about inclusive growth, sustainable development and well-being and I think here it’s really something which is very close to my heart namely to weighing economic and social benefits of AI against risk to privacy right and really this for me translates to have the right balance between the metrics of success. So not only concentrate on profit and performance but really also on planet and people and I think that has a lot to do with what we just heard before and privacy being one of the important aspects here. The second is really about really respecting the rule of law, human rights and democratic values and here it’s also interesting to learn from each other’s terminology. So we both have established definition of what transparency means but it’s not for instance exactly the same justice for fairness in the AI space. Transparency relates more into how the system is set up, what kind of deliverable, so how understanding what the outcome is. In the privacy space it’s more about data collection and the intended use. So again we needed to map the different definitions also so that we have the same language and here I also see the human rights impact assessment. So I just had a session yesterday about Huderia which was set up by the Council of Europe, the human right impact assessment framework that also needs to be harmonized with the data protection requirements. So I already talked about transparency. I think robustness security is something that Ximena also alluded to. Here it’s also coordinating or data security technologies, privacy and enhancing technologies being for instance one of the most important ones. And last but not least it’s about also accountability and here I think that’s what we bring, let’s say I’m a technologist myself, what we bring to the data privacy community is the understanding of the technical aspects. So specifically to the AI lifecycle and where in the AI lifecycle privacy can play an important role. Also beyond data collection because also at the inference space and also other phases privacy is important. So yes the next one. So this is basically the AI lifecycle which is now the basis for further developing privacy related recommendations but also others. This is, as you can see, it starts from planning and design and what is new now, this was also revised, is that we have a new phase of retire and decommissioning. So it goes through collection and processing of data, building of models, testing, make it available for use and deployment operation and monitoring. And you can see here, so basically what we want to do now as a next step of our working group is to go to every phase and see which recommendations, policy recommendations we have for these phases. Especially when it comes to collection and processing of data we have to see what does it mean, you know, the limitation of AI when it comes to data collection, what does it mean if we are looking at a large language model, data scraping for the web, what are the privacy implications to that, which are of course a lot. What is the role of synthetic data? A lot of large language models are now fed by synthetic data which is also generated by models itself. So here I think it’s an important evolution that we also need to take into account. And of course data quality which as was mentioned before is important for accuracy but also for discrimination and bias. And we go further as you can see here then what is going to be important also to see what does it mean to have a right to forget in the AI systems, what kind of oversight and accountability as well as transparency measures we can put in place. We know now for the moment the data cards but we should work towards having more than that for transparency. And well I think that basically this is a work in progress. So as I said we want to go into each of these phases and also share and welcoming also inputs. Thank you.

Lucia Russo: Thank you, Clara, for this overview. This is really instructive as well for those of us who are not privacy experts as you are. And so it’s good to see how privacy affects each of the stages of the life cycle of an AI system. So I will now turn to Tiago, who is a specialist and he has the perspective also of the Brazilian Data Protection Authority. And what I would like to ask you is what are the most critical privacy challenges that you are observing in the context of advanced AI systems? And also on the practical side, how are data protection authorities developing practical approaches and solutions to protect privacy rights and while fostering innovation? I’ll come with the mic.

Thiago Guimarães Moraes: Okay, well, first of all, thanks a lot, Lucia, for the invitation, for not only the invitation to be here, but also for an invitation for being part of this community of the Group of Experts on AI Data and Privacy, which I’ve been following since the beginning of the year. So basically since its inauguration, right? And it has been amazing to be part of this community where we see the amazing work that has been done, which you just very accurately gave some highlights today. And I could start from here. I could say that many of these topics that have been just highlighted by Clara is part of the day-to-day critical thinking that regulators such as data protection authorities have been struggling on. And what I would like to share here, and starting from this challenges perspective, is that as privacy community starts to understand what AI governance and AI regulation means, when you start from the privacy, data protection, and standing point, is that you have to see how all these other values that now are coming. And that’s why I put that circle there, where we have like privacy, fairness, cybersecurity, transparency, human agency, and I know there are others, but these are some of the main values that we see in several frameworks. They come, and when you look at it in a more technical level, and you see the technical community is always thinking about trade-offs, which does make sense on a technical perspective, because what you’re trying as a technician is like to create parameters and try to see like how much you can achieve of any of these values. But at the same time, and as like anyone that works with policymaking, especially for a legal approach, human rights cannot be traded off. And that’s here one of the main challenges. We are talking about trade-off of values in a technical level that they cannot mean undermining of human rights. So this for me is the biggest challenge, and not only for regulators from the privacy field, but in any other, but for sure, since data protection authorities have been working with managing the rights to privacy and data protection, this means that this is our day-to-day looking how these measures are coming and working in a balancing of the human rights that we should be concerned about. And just to give an idea, and this is like the other images I’m sharing, the one in the middle, it just shows this very quite, I would say, a bit of a common sense that when we are talking about one of the main features of like de-identifying with the idea of anonymization, we have this anonymization like privacy utility trade-off, right? And this, of course, is just very illustrative. I’m putting this arc because we shared the work before where we show, okay, what we might be looking here is trying to find this optimal point where you can still assure some level of privacy, but guaranteeing utility for the system, of course. But when we go to real use case, things are not so simple, especially when we are considering other values. So just to consider between privacy and fairness, for example, fairness itself is already challenging for you to define on a technical level, and there are several parameters for that to try to guarantee some aspects of what fairness could mean in a technical level, like some ideas of group fairness and some parameters that try to translate what we should expect in the idea of statistical parity, for example. But when you add to that privacy issues and like how to bring, for example, privacy techniques, privacy enhancing techniques here, it gets even more challenging. And I’m just sharing here in the last part some of the work that we found of, like, this is not the NPD’s work, but it’s work of, like, the technical community that has been working, the privacy community who has been working on that, how they were trying to find this adequate balance on how, for example, you embed differential privacy, which is a technique that, like, for the privacy communities well know, how you can use that and try to find this balance. It’s still ensuring a good fairness level as well for this fairness parameters, for example. And what was particularly interesting in this research, and that’s why I’m sharing here, is that they found out that when you’re looking for federated learning models, which are models that are trained at local level, and then you aggregate all the data for the main AI model, you can apply differential privacy in the local parameters to ensure, first, a better privacy protection, because if you’re just applying the global level, you actually leave the local models unprotected from the privacy perspective. But another interesting thing is that you have to fine tune the level of noise that you’re adding on the differential privacy, because if you go too far, you don’t only lose accuracy, but you bring several issues of, like… Okay. Yeah. Okay. So, maybe now… Can you listen to me? Oh. Okay. Half of the room is listening to me. Yes? Okay. Good. So, well, then let’s turn then to the last slide, so I can… Oh, it’s me here. Oh, good. How do we go? So, this is just also very generally speaking, like, what DPAs such as… Yeah. Okay. Now… Okay. Yeah. I mean, every Internet Governance Forum, we have a free digital forum, we should have tech stuff, so we see how challenging that can be in practice, right? So, talking about… Ah, I see. Okay. Thanks for the tip. So, well, the DPAs, NPD has been doing that, but several others, they have been working first on guidance, like, so we can share best practice, good practice on some specific topics. Just recently, NPD has published a work on the DPAs, a work on the idea of, like, how generative AI is bringing some challenges for privacy, like what Clara just said, that sometimes synthetic content is being created, which it can infer some personal data, and it can infer in an accurate and an inaccurate way, and in both cases, there are consequences. So, we try to tackle a bit of, like, what’s part of this discussion, and we know some other peers have been doing the same, so we know, like, in France, for example, Kenil has been doing a very interesting work on that, and Singapore, the authority there, is doing a sandbox on the paths for generative AI, privacy-enhanced technologies for generative AI, so we see that, like, the works are doing, we are doing both in the theoretical level with guidance, but also more hands-on, like sandboxes. Us, as the Brazilian Data Protection Authority, we are starting a pilot sandbox next year on algorithmic transparency, so we can discuss this concept and what does this mean in the context of a data protection framework, like ours in this case, the Brazilian GPD, and besides that, we have been also, all the DPAs, I could say, have been asking themselves what are the roles, now that we have AI regulations coming up, and we have to think, should Should we be the main central AI authority, or even if that’s not the case, because sometimes can be very political level discussion, what will be our role and how we can ensure that our role is still guaranteed and protected, even like if we are now in a more complex environment where we have to work together with other regulators that are also dealing with data-related, data governance-related issues. So I think I’ll stop from here, but thanks again for the invitation.

Lucia Russo: Thank you, Tiago. It works? Okay. So I have some follow-up questions, but I would like this to be also a conversation with you. So with Mike, maybe I give you this.

Audience: Thank you very much. You can hear okay? Thank you very much for these very interesting interventions. The issue… That’s a really great example. Hold it like this. Okay. That’s okay? Okay. Thank you. This is a really nice case study of what’s happening across technologies, of this issue of convergence. I’m with UNICEF. We’re looking at… I’ve led work on AI and the high-level advisory board and how AI impacts children, and we’re looking at how neurotechnology impacts children. And AI and neurotechnology have converged. So these issues, privacy is the issue, but if you even look at the technologies, whose responsibility is it to set the governance rules? So I was really interested to hear about the working group. And my question, Clara, is kind of what’s the end goal of this interesting and useful exercise? Because it sounds like there are some governance recommendations within the AI space, within the privacy space. You’re looking at kind of mapping them, but what’s the output? Is it a new merge set, or is it kind of an update on both sides, or do we update the principles from time to time, which is necessary? UNICEF also has recommendations for AI and children, and we’ve been reflecting. They came out 2021. The world has changed. It’s time to refresh those. The principles stay, but how you apply them is… So yes, that’s… Where do we go from here? Thank you.

Clara Neppel: Thank you. And thank you for bringing up the issue of children. And actually, I also wanted to bring it because it’s, I think, a big issue, not only on privacy, but also on mental health of our future generation. So I think that we have different issues how we can tackle this. So just to give you an example of now specifically age-appropriate design, because that is something which I think we need to take into account in the AI design system. And we are working, for instance, IEEE with the Five Rights Foundation to set up, I hope, a universal standard of how to collect children’s data. Okay? If you can hear me. And so I think that is one of the practical examples of what we can do for the moment on a voluntary basis. But in certain jurisdictions, it is already like in, I think, in the UK, where it is obligatory. So also, I think this is what we want to do in the working group, is first of all, understand what are the issues, what are already… Do we already have solutions that we can leverage from each other? To identify the gaps, and some of them would be very certainly policy recommendations, but we also very clearly want to target the developers, for instance, when it comes to scraping data, so that they understand what the policy implications are… Sorry, what the legal implications are, because a lot of them don’t have that. So it’s both sides.

Lucia Russo: Is there any other question? Yes.

Audience: Hello. Thank you so much for the presentation. I’m from Nanting Youth Development Service Centre, and in my study field, there’s this technology called blockchain, specifically for data, and by storing data in multiple different sectors, any slight changes to the data can be tracked and detected. But at this, very much protected transparency of data, but this technique in itself is at the centre of debate on privacy. So, like you said, it’s like a trade-off system. So I want to know how you guys think of this technology and how we can actually find that balance.

Thiago Guimarães Moraes: Okay. Okay, yes. So, actually… Does it work? Okay. So, yeah, thanks for the question, because it’s actually very important, and then I can try to give an idea of, like, as a DPA, I shared the experience of the Brazilian Data Protection Authority, but also from what we heard of other peers, some similar approach happened. Like, we do look… Usually, most data protection authorities, DPAs, as we call, we have units that work with monitoring technology progress. I am part of one of these units there in Brazil. We know other institutions, like in the UK, in France, they have something similar. The interesting thing about this innovation technology monitoring units is that they have to look not only to AI, but several other technologies, like blockchain. So blockchain, for example, is a topic that we also follow. We have, like… Part of our team is working on looking on specific privacy-related issues, and with the blockchain technologies. One very big challenge, and when we’re talking about privacy and blockchain, is because usually when you register information, the blockchain, it stays in the blockchain. And we do have a right for elimination of personal data. So how can we do that, right, if personal data is embedded in the blockchain? So what I can say for you is that this is part of the discussion that we’re having. It’s very challenging when we decide to provide a solution, because we have to be very sure what we are proposing in a policy level. So far, as I know, this is a topic that the privacy regulators, the privacy community has been discussing, but I am not aware of a very strong argument of how it should work. And I do believe that what we need to come to this answer is to be better engaged with the technical community that’s working on that. And we’ve seen this work happening in the AI governance level. I can say this work of the OECD is a big example, and I think we should have more of the same in the blockchain discussion, because eventually we will actually be seeing these two emerging technologies getting together more and more as time passes by. So thanks for bringing blockchain to the discussion.

Juraj Čorba: If I may, I’ll just briefly intervene. One, two, three. Do you hear me? Okay. So on the topic of converging technologies, just like blockchain and other, it is very important actually to realize that when we talk about privacy and AI, we cannot really discuss only this. You really need to have a whole picture of the whole digital stack. In other words, we can hardly talk about governance of privacy in AI without actually fully understanding the implications of digital platforms for privacy and the way platforms are being driven by AI or enabling AI via collection of data about the users, right? The same applies to Internet of Things, because those data taken from the sensors from the Internet of Things, they will feed into the AI systems. The same applies to digital finance, possibly now also to some new efforts in the field of biology, which can be even more delicate when it comes to privacy and our biological predispositions and design. So there, I think it’s a very good example. Also, of course, blockchain as well. But this point that was raised really leads us to the necessity to have a full picture of how these different digital spheres interact and how they are integrated into the most sophisticated services and products available on the market, because the most successful ones on the market, they manage to integrate all these environments together. And of course, then the implications for privacy are even more imminent.

Jimena Viveros: So just to add on the conversation, I think what we, if we’re talking about human rights, and I think we should, start from there. The right to privacy stems from the right to identity, right? So, which also is very linked with the right to be forgotten, right? So, what we’re witnessing now is we’re trying to create or foster the protection of our personal digital identity or signature or print, and that is a new type of concept that we haven’t had thought about before. So, when this information, our personal information, especially when it comes to biometrics, genomics, neurotechnologies that are happening, and all types of personal and information, when it’s locked into something, such as blockchain or any other technology or any other environment, it’s complicated, and especially because sometimes the capturing of this information isn’t necessarily consensual or well-informed, and this is a problem that has been happening for a long time, but the situation now is what is being given to this information, whether it’s locked, whether it’s just being captured now or whatever is happening. So, because, again, coming back to the implications on peace and security, I mean, we can think of, in law enforcement, you know, predictive policing, we can think of border control, we can think, again, with biometrics, which is pretty dangerous, and then even in governmental services, you know, even access to healthcare, access to loans, access to financial services, housing, whatever, like all of these things are being predetermined by the data that is stored and how they represent or misrepresent a person. So, I think it’s very important to remember that at the basis of privacy, it’s identity, and that is the one most precious thing that we have, and that’s why we should all strive to protect it.

Lucia Russo: Thank you so much, all the speakers. We have two questions here and one online. Okay, I think I’ll take the one online first, but we have only two minutes to go. So, please, quick reaction from the speakers. How do we deal with privacy by design within the AI changing state? One quick reaction so that we can hear another question from the floor.

Thiago Guimarães Moraes: Well, it was, it’s very welcome, this discussion, because when we started discussing by design process, like privacy by design, we are talking, we’re asking how we go hands-on from now, right? Okay, we are building amazing policy frameworks, but how these frameworks translate to concrete considerations, and what I can say that has been proven to be a nice experience from the part of the DPAs is using the sandboxes, because all the privacy sandboxes that have been organized, like from CNIL, from the Norwegian DPA, the ICO, Brazil now, Singapore, we see that like we usually bring some discussion that in the end of the day, what we are trying to test with that particular given technology, like AI, for example, but it can also be blockchain technologies or just a data sharing practice, is come up in the end with like good practice and way of like how this actually is a practical experimentation on privacy by design. So I would stop here, because I know we don’t have much time.

Clara Neppel: I would just like to add one sentence here. I think some of the issues are so important that it should be enforced, like coming back to the children, I think that the collection of children data should be really regulated, because that has enormous implications for them and for our society. And for others, I think that the context will be important. Again, what was mentioned before, privacy is dependent on the context. Some things need to be enforced by regulation. Sometimes we need to take privacy into account for a specific use and without trade-offs, hopefully, or having the optimal trade-off. Thank you.

Lucia Russo: Thank you. I think we are at time and five minutes. Thank you. Okay, so please.

Audience: Thank you very much. Martina Legal Malakova from Slovakia. I have the question for Emina. Have you seen the lawyers today could protect the human rights that today for the new emerging technologies, we don’t have often the laws, but we have only principles? Thank you.

Jimena Viveros: Yes, so that’s a problem indeed. I mean, these principles, these guidelines are very useful as stepping stones, but they’re not binding. And then we come to the problem of enforceability. So, what we need is the adoption of the standards, protocols, guidelines, principles, however you want to call them or frame them, and get them adopted at the national level and push for them to be actually consolidated into global governance. Because if we don’t have a global framework that’s global, like internationally, because all of this is transboundary. So, if you know, like, again, coming back to what I said at the beginning, we just have like this patchwork of initiatives, even if the regional, that’s not enough. We need something that’s global, so that everyone is protected in the same way, because our information is everywhere. So, we just need to convert principle into action and action that is enforceable, that it can be monitored, that can be, you know, verified, and that there’s proper oversight mechanisms. So, that’s why I was mentioning before, like a centralized authority that controls all of this and conducts all of this oversight at the international level would be a good approach. But in the meantime, all we can do, and it’s very valuable work, is these principles, which are ethical values, whatever, but stemming always from human rights, which already are existing. And the problem now that we’re facing is the revamping of even those basic human rights that have been there for the past 70 years. But with the excuse of AI, everyone is kind of like opening up the box again and rethinking whether they are applicable. They’re always applicable, but we just need to find the way to integrate it into the reality that we’re living in. So, the solution is get governments to regularize it in a harmonized way, and then make it a global governance regime. Thank you.

Lucia Russo: Okay, the very, very last question.

Audience: Thank you so much for your presentation. My name is Hasara Tebi. I’m from Mawadda Association for Family Stability at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. What I have is actually not a question. It’s an input, a fit of mind. So, the rapid advancement of AI technology had led to increased collection and processing of personal data, overturned without sufficient safeguards to protect privacy. Innovation in AI heavily relies on vast amounts of data, heightening the risk of privacy violation and misuse of data in ways that can harm individuals. There is a growing concern that current legalization lags behind technological progress, creating gaps that allow the explosion of personal information without explicit consent or comprehensive understanding by individuals. We call to strengthen legal frameworks, update and enhance legislation to ensure effective privacy protection in the age of AI, ensure transparency and accountability, require companies and organizations to clearly disclose how data is collected and used, while implementing the robust accountability mechanism for violations. Engage civil society to include civil society organization and users in the development of AI and privacy-related policies and regulations. We recommended the following. Develop impact assessment tools, create and utilize tools to assess the impact of AI technologies on privacy before their implementation, raise awareness and provide training, organize training programs for developers and policy makers to emphasize the importance of privacy and strategies to protect it during the design and deployment of AI system. And finally, encourage exceptional initiatives such as His Royal Highness the Crown Prince’s Global Child Protection in Cyberspace, CBC initiatives, which aims to strengthen collective action, unify international efforts and raise global awareness among decision makers about the growing threat to children in cyberspace. Thank you.

Lucia Russo: Thank you so much and I think we couldn’t have a better way to end this passionating debate. I think we could have gone on and on discussing with you. It’s a topic that deserves a lot of the policy attention as we are seeing and this is really at the core of the discussions that we are undertaking in the international AI governance and privacy sphere. So with that, I would really like to thank the distinguished speakers here, Juraj, Ximena, Clara, Tiago for their excellent contributions, but as well as the audience for participating so vividly in this discussion with us. Thank you.

Agreement Points

AI systems pose significant privacy challenges

Juraj Čorba

Clara Neppel

Thiago Guimaraes Moraes

Jimena Viveros

AI systems are highly dependent on data, creating privacy concerns

Generative AI exacerbates privacy issues through vast data collection and potential re-identification

Trade-offs between privacy, fairness, and utility in AI systems pose challenges

AI’s use of biometric and genomic data raises concerns about digital identity protection

All speakers agreed that advanced AI systems, particularly generative AI, pose significant privacy challenges due to their extensive data requirements and potential for re-identification or misuse of personal information.

Need for global governance and harmonized regulations

Juraj Čorba

Jimena Viveros

Thiago Guimaraes Moraes

OECD updated AI principles to reflect technological developments and privacy concerns

Need for global governance and harmonized regulations to address transboundary nature of data

Data protection authorities are developing guidance and sandboxes to address AI privacy issues

The speakers emphasized the importance of developing global governance frameworks and harmonized regulations to address the transboundary nature of data and AI-related privacy challenges.

Similar Viewpoints

Both speakers highlighted the need to balance the benefits of AI against potential risks to privacy and broader societal impacts, including effects on democratic institutions and geopolitics.

Clara Neppel

Jimena Viveros

Importance of weighing economic benefits of AI against privacy risks

AI data collection and use can affect democratic institutions and geopolitics

Both speakers emphasized the importance of implementing specific technical and design measures to enhance privacy protection in AI systems, particularly for vulnerable groups like children.

Thiago Guimaraes Moraes

Clara Neppel

Need for privacy-enhancing technologies and techniques like differential privacy

Importance of age-appropriate design and protecting children’s data

Unexpected Consensus

Convergence of AI with other technologies creating new privacy challenges

Juraj Čorba

Thiago Guimaraes Moraes

Convergence of AI with other technologies like blockchain and neurotechnology creates new privacy challenges

Blockchain’s immutability poses challenges for data deletion rights

While the focus was primarily on AI, there was unexpected consensus on the need to consider privacy challenges arising from the convergence of AI with other emerging technologies like blockchain and neurotechnology.

Overall Assessment

Summary

The speakers generally agreed on the significant privacy challenges posed by advanced AI systems, the need for global governance frameworks, and the importance of balancing innovation with privacy protection. There was also consensus on the need to consider the convergence of AI with other technologies in addressing privacy issues.

Consensus level

High level of consensus among speakers, suggesting a strong foundation for developing comprehensive approaches to AI governance and privacy protection. This consensus implies that future policy discussions and regulatory efforts may focus on implementing globally harmonized frameworks that address the complex interplay between AI, privacy, and other emerging technologies.

Different Viewpoints

Approach to privacy protection in AI systems

Clara Neppel

Thiago Guimaraes Moraes

Importance of weighing economic benefits of AI against privacy risks

Trade-offs between privacy, fairness, and utility in AI systems pose challenges

While Clara Neppel emphasizes balancing economic benefits against privacy risks, Thiago Guimaraes Moraes highlights the challenges in balancing privacy, fairness, and utility, stating that from a human rights perspective, these values cannot be compromised.

Unexpected Differences

Role of blockchain in privacy protection

Thiago Guimaraes Moraes

Juraj Čorba

Blockchain’s immutability poses challenges for data deletion rights

Convergence of AI with other technologies like blockchain and neurotechnology creates new privacy challenges

While both speakers mention blockchain, their perspectives differ unexpectedly. Thiago Guimaraes Moraes focuses on the challenges blockchain poses for data deletion rights, while Juraj Čorba sees blockchain as part of a broader convergence of technologies creating new privacy challenges.

Overall Assessment

summary

The main areas of disagreement revolve around the approach to balancing privacy protection with innovation in AI, the specific methods for implementing privacy safeguards, and the role of emerging technologies in privacy challenges.

difference_level

The level of disagreement among the speakers is moderate. While they generally agree on the importance of privacy protection in AI systems, they differ in their approaches and emphasis on specific aspects. These differences reflect the complexity of the issue and the need for multifaceted solutions in AI governance and privacy protection.

Partial Agreements

Both speakers agree on the need for enhanced privacy protection, particularly for children’s data. However, they propose different approaches: Clara Neppel suggests age-appropriate design and universal standards, while Thiago Guimaraes Moraes focuses on privacy-enhancing technologies like differential privacy.

Clara Neppel

Thiago Guimaraes Moraes

Importance of age-appropriate design and protecting children’s data

Need for privacy-enhancing technologies and techniques like differential privacy

Similar Viewpoints

Both speakers highlighted the need to balance the benefits of AI against potential risks to privacy and broader societal impacts, including effects on democratic institutions and geopolitics.

Clara Neppel

Jimena Viveros

Importance of weighing economic benefits of AI against privacy risks

AI data collection and use can affect democratic institutions and geopolitics

Both speakers emphasized the importance of implementing specific technical and design measures to enhance privacy protection in AI systems, particularly for vulnerable groups like children.

Thiago Guimaraes Moraes

Clara Neppel

Need for privacy-enhancing technologies and techniques like differential privacy

Importance of age-appropriate design and protecting children’s data

Key Takeaways

Advanced AI systems pose significant privacy challenges due to their reliance on vast amounts of data

There is a need for global governance frameworks and harmonized regulations to address AI privacy issues

Balancing innovation with privacy protection is a key challenge in AI development and deployment

The convergence of AI with other technologies creates new privacy risks that need to be addressed

Protecting children’s data and implementing age-appropriate design in AI systems is crucial

Resolutions and Action Items

OECD expert group to continue mapping AI principles to privacy principles and develop recommendations for each stage of the AI lifecycle

Data protection authorities to provide guidance and conduct regulatory sandboxes on AI privacy issues

Push for adoption of international AI governance standards at national levels

Unresolved Issues

How to implement privacy-by-design principles in rapidly evolving AI systems

Balancing trade-offs between privacy, fairness, and utility in AI systems

Addressing privacy challenges posed by blockchain and other emerging technologies in conjunction with AI

Enforceability of non-binding AI ethics principles and guidelines

Suggested Compromises

Using differential privacy techniques to balance privacy protection and data utility in AI systems

Developing universal standards for collecting children’s data that balance protection and innovation

Considering context-specific approaches to privacy regulation, with stricter enforcement for critical areas like children’s data

AI is data, so we cannot have AI without data. And data comes with privacy issues, that’s just a problem.

speaker

Jimena Viveros

reason

This succinctly captures the fundamental tension between AI development and privacy concerns.

impact

It set the tone for much of the subsequent discussion about balancing AI innovation with privacy protections.

We should really recognize data as a digital public good.

speaker

Jimena Viveros

reason

This reframes how we think about data ownership and governance in the AI era.

impact

It sparked discussion about creating global frameworks for data and AI governance to protect rights while fostering innovation.

Human rights cannot be traded off. And that’s here one of the main challenges. We are talking about trade-off of values in a technical level that they cannot mean undermining of human rights.

speaker

Thiago Guimaraes Moraes

reason

It highlights the tension between technical optimization and fundamental rights protection in AI development.

impact

It shifted the conversation to focus more on how to implement human rights protections in practice when developing AI systems.

We can hardly talk about governance of privacy in AI without actually fully understanding the implications of digital platforms for privacy and the way platforms are being driven by AI or enabling AI via collection of data about the users, right?

speaker

Juraj Čorba

reason

This comment emphasizes the interconnected nature of AI, privacy, and other digital technologies.

impact

It broadened the scope of the discussion to consider AI privacy issues in the context of the entire digital ecosystem.

At the basis of privacy, it’s identity, and that is the one most precious thing that we have, and that’s why we should all strive to protect it.

speaker

Jimena Viveros

reason

This comment gets to the core of why privacy matters, connecting it to fundamental human rights and identity.

impact

It refocused the discussion on the human impact of privacy violations and the importance of protecting individual identity in the digital age.

Overall Assessment

These key comments shaped the discussion by highlighting the complex interplay between AI development, data usage, and privacy protection. They moved the conversation from abstract principles to practical challenges in implementing privacy safeguards, while emphasizing the need for global cooperation and human rights-based approaches. The discussion evolved from technical considerations to broader societal implications, underscoring the multifaceted nature of AI governance and privacy protection in the digital age.

How to balance economic and social benefits of AI against risks to privacy rights?

speaker

Clara Neppel

explanation

This is a key challenge in developing AI governance frameworks that protect privacy while enabling innovation.

How to implement age-appropriate design in AI systems to protect children’s privacy and mental health?

speaker

Clara Neppel

explanation

Protecting children’s data and wellbeing is a critical issue as AI systems become more prevalent.

How to address the challenge of the right to erasure of personal data in blockchain systems?

speaker

Thiago Guimaraes Moraes

explanation

This highlights the tension between blockchain’s immutability and data protection rights.

How to create a global AI data framework to protect human rights affected by data use?

speaker

Jimena Viveros

explanation

A global framework is needed to address the transboundary nature of AI and data flows.

How to develop practical, enforceable global governance mechanisms for AI and privacy?

speaker

Jimena Viveros

explanation

Moving from principles to enforceable rules is crucial for effective AI governance.

How to implement privacy by design within the rapidly changing AI landscape?

speaker

Audience member (online)

explanation

This is important for proactively addressing privacy concerns in AI development.

How to strengthen legal frameworks to ensure effective privacy protection in the age of AI?

speaker

Hasara Tebi (audience member)

explanation

Updating legislation is crucial to keep pace with technological advancements in AI.