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Summary

This discussion focused on “Judging in the Digital Age: Cybersecurity and Digital Evidence,” examining how courts worldwide are adapting to function as digital ecosystems where evidence, records, and hearings increasingly exist online. Dr. Naza Nicholas from Tanzania’s Internet Society opened the session by explaining the initiative’s goal to bridge the gap between judiciary systems and internet governance spaces, building on previous efforts since 2022 to bring judges into digital rights discussions.

Judge Eliamani Laltaika from Tanzania’s High Court outlined the five key considerations courts use when evaluating digital evidence: relevance, authenticity, system integrity, chain of custody, and statutory compliance. He emphasized that these principles apply regardless of whether evidence originates domestically or internationally, and noted that everyone creates digital evidence through daily activities like taking photos or using messaging apps.

Professor Peter Swire from Georgia Tech highlighted three critical areas where digital evidence differs from traditional evidence: authentication challenges in verifying identity, maintaining chain of custody through digital signatures and hash functions, and addressing AI hallucinations where artificial intelligence systems may generate false citations or information. He recommended implementing two-factor authentication and systematic verification of AI-generated content.

The discussion addressed significant challenges including spyware surveillance, with Dr. Jacqueline Pegato from Data Privacy Brazil citing cases where surveillance tools were used against activists and even Supreme Court justices. Advocate Umar Khan from Pakistan emphasized the need for balanced surveillance that protects both security and privacy rights, while Marin Ashraf from IT4Change discussed specific challenges in prosecuting online gender-based violence cases, particularly regarding evidence authentication and platform cooperation.

Participants identified critical gaps including outdated legislation, insufficient judicial training in cybersecurity, and the need for better international cooperation frameworks. The session concluded with calls for continued capacity building, multi-stakeholder dialogue, and systematic reforms to ensure courts can effectively handle digital evidence while protecting fundamental rights in an increasingly connected world.

Keypoints

## Major Discussion Points:

– **Digital Evidence Authentication and Chain of Custody**: The panel extensively discussed the five key considerations for admitting digital evidence in courts: relevance, authenticity, system integrity, chain of custody, and statutory compliance. Speakers emphasized the challenges of verifying digital evidence, especially when it originates from different jurisdictions or involves AI-generated content.

– **Cross-Border Legal Cooperation and Jurisdictional Challenges**: Multiple speakers addressed the complexities of handling digital evidence that crosses international boundaries, discussing the need for legal harmonization, mutual legal assistance treaties, and standardized procedures for accessing data from foreign jurisdictions while respecting data protection laws.

– **State Surveillance vs. Individual Rights**: The discussion covered the tension between legitimate law enforcement needs for digital surveillance and cybersecurity measures versus protecting individual privacy rights and ensuring fair trials. The Brazilian spyware case and Pakistani digital rights experiences were highlighted as examples of this ongoing challenge.

– **Online Gender-Based Violence and Platform Accountability**: Speakers examined the specific challenges courts face when dealing with online gender-based violence cases, including difficulties in obtaining digital evidence from platforms, ensuring survivor privacy, and addressing algorithmic amplification of harm.

– **Judicial Capacity Building and Training Gaps**: A recurring theme was the urgent need for specialized training for judges and legal professionals in cybersecurity, digital forensics, AI literacy, and data protection to keep pace with rapidly evolving technology and emerging forms of digital crime.

## Overall Purpose:

The session aimed to bridge the gap between the judiciary and the internet governance community by creating a permanent platform for dialogue and exchange. The goal was to bring judges into the Internet Governance Forum space, break down institutional silos, and equip judicial systems with the knowledge and tools needed to handle digital evidence and cybersecurity challenges in the modern era.

## Overall Tone:

The discussion maintained a collaborative and educational tone throughout, characterized by mutual respect among panelists from different jurisdictions and backgrounds. The atmosphere was constructive and forward-looking, with speakers sharing practical experiences and concrete recommendations. There was a sense of urgency about addressing the digital knowledge gap in judicial systems, but the tone remained optimistic about the potential for capacity building and international cooperation. The session concluded on an encouraging note, with participants expressing commitment to continued collaboration and training initiatives.

Speakers

**Speakers from the provided list:**

– **Naza Nicholas** – Dr. Naza Nicholas Kirama from Tanzania, works with Internet Society Tanzania Chapter, coordinator for the Tanzania Internet Governance Forum

– **Eliamani Isaya Laltaika** – Honorable Dr. Eliamani Isaya Laltaika, sitting judge of High Court of Tanzania

– **Peter Swire** – Professor at Georgia Tech, law professor teaching in the College of Computing, leader of the Cross-Border Data Forum, expert on cross-border data and law enforcement access issues

– **Jacqueline Pegato** – Works with Data Privacy Brazil, a Brazilian NGO focused on digital rights in Brazil and the Global South

– **Umar Khan** – Advocate of the high court in Pakistan, digital rights and defense lawyer, works on cyber cases in Pakistan

– **Marin Ashraf** – Senior research associate at IT4Change (India-based not-for-profit organization), works on online gender-based violence, digital platform accountability, information integrity, and AI governance issues

– **Adriana Castro** – Professor at External University in Colombia

– **Participant** – (Role/expertise not specified in transcript)

**Additional speakers:**

None identified beyond the provided speakers names list.

# Judging in the Digital Age: Cybersecurity and Digital Evidence – Discussion Report

## Introduction and Context

The session “Judging in the Digital Age: Cybersecurity and Digital Evidence” aimed to bridge the gap between judicial systems and internet governance communities. Dr. Naza Nicholas from Tanzania’s Internet Society opened by explaining that this initiative began in 2023 in Japan, building on efforts to bring judges into digital rights discussions and create dialogue platforms between the judiciary and multi-stakeholder internet governance spaces.

The panel included Judge Eliamani Isaya Laltaika from Tanzania’s High Court, Professor Peter Swire from Georgia Tech, Dr. Jacqueline Pegato from Data Privacy Brazil, Advocate Umar Khan from Pakistan’s high court, Marin Ashraf from India’s IT4Change, and Professor Adriana Castro from Colombia’s External University. Dr. Nicholas outlined four key questions the session would address: how courts assess digital evidence, balancing surveillance with privacy rights, handling cross-border digital evidence, and protecting court systems from cyber threats.

## Digital Evidence Assessment Framework

Judge Laltaika established the foundational principles courts use when evaluating digital evidence, emphasizing five key considerations: relevance, authenticity, system integrity, chain of custody, and statutory compliance. He noted that “digital evidence assessment follows the same principles regardless of jurisdiction, with no discrimination between domestic and foreign evidence.”

The judge provided historical context, explaining that digital evidence is relatively new in legal development, beginning in the late 1970s in the United States. He made the discussion relevant by observing that “each one of you is currently creating digital evidence or electronic evidence from the pictures you are taking, from your geolocation, from the voices you are sending over WhatsApp.”

## Technical Challenges and AI Concerns

Professor Swire highlighted critical differences between digital and traditional evidence, particularly around authentication and chain of custody. He emphasized that two-factor authentication is significantly more secure than password-based systems and that digital signatures using mathematical hash operations can prove document integrity.

Swire raised concerns about AI-generated content, providing a specific example: “We know that AI can have hallucinations. We’ve seen law cases in the United States where a lawyer just put in a question to the AI system and got back case citations that were not true. They made them up.” He recommended systematic verification of AI-generated content, suggesting judges sample-check citations when full verification isn’t feasible.

## Surveillance and Privacy Rights

Dr. Pegato presented concerning examples of spyware surveillance tools being used against activists and Supreme Court justices in Brazil. She argued that “when surveillance happens outside transparent legal frameworks, courts are sidelined and unable to guarantee fundamental rights they are tasked to protect.” She emphasized that spyware tools “move way beyond traditional investigative methods, such as telephonic interceptions” and require strict judicial oversight.

Advocate Khan offered a different perspective, acknowledging that “surveillance is necessary for cybersecurity but must balance legality, proportionality, and transparency while protecting constitutional rights to privacy and dignity.” This highlighted different approaches to surveillance regulation across jurisdictions.

## Online Gender-Based Violence Challenges

Marin Ashraf addressed specific challenges courts face with online gender-based violence cases. She explained that “digital evidence in online gender-based violence cases often fails to meet burden of proof due to authentication certificate difficulties and lack of platform cooperation.” Her research in India found that “in many cases, even if the prosecution fails to even submit digital evidence, and the main barrier here comes from the lack of cooperation from the digital platforms.”

Ashraf emphasized that courts must understand how platforms and algorithms can amplify harms against survivors, arguing for “ecosystem-level changes in sensitisation and inclusive policies for handling online violence cases.”

## Cross-Border Evidence and Jurisdictional Issues

The panel discussed complexities of handling digital evidence crossing international boundaries. Judge Laltaika noted that “international collaboration mechanisms are necessary for data exchange and extraterritorial expertise in cybercrime cases.” Professor Castro raised practical concerns about “notification and contact information procedures present ongoing challenges in data protection investigations.”

Dr. Nicholas emphasized that “legal harmonisation across jurisdictions is needed to handle digital evidence uniformly and share best practices from diverse legal systems,” highlighting the need for standardized procedures accommodating the borderless nature of digital evidence.

## Judicial Training and Capacity Building

A recurring theme was the urgent need for specialized training. Judge Laltaika acknowledged that “many courts still operate in physical form without understanding digital evidence, creating risks of wrongful convictions.” He advocated for “capacity building programmes should invite judges to forums and designate specific training programmes.”

Dr. Pegato reinforced this, stating that “judges need continuous specialised training in cybersecurity, digital forensics, and data protection to address knowledge gaps.” Advocate Khan noted that “legal frameworks need updating as outdated laws from 2015 cannot adequately address 2025 digital crimes.”

## Cybersecurity for Court Systems

The discussion revealed different approaches to protecting judicial systems from cyber threats. Professor Swire advocated for courts having independent backup systems, arguing that “courts need backup systems and offline storage to protect against ransomware attacks that could lock up judicial files.”

Judge Laltaika presented an alternative view, suggesting that “courts can leverage government data centres for security standards rather than operating in isolation.” He explained that “the judiciary does not operate in silo… we are part of the government. So the standard of security that applies to records of parliament or state house applies to the court as well.”

## Data Protection in Legal Proceedings

The panel addressed balancing transparency in legal proceedings with privacy protection. Dr. Pegato noted that “Brazil has constitutional right to data protection and comprehensive LGPD law but lacks criminal data protection framework,” highlighting legislative gaps even in jurisdictions with advanced privacy laws.

Professor Swire mentioned practical solutions such as protective orders for handling sensitive information, while Professor Castro reinforced the complexity of these issues in cross-border contexts where different privacy regimes must be reconciled.

## Key Implementation Challenges

Several critical challenges emerged from the discussion. Platform cooperation remains problematic, with companies often unresponsive to law enforcement requests for digital evidence. Resource constraints limit courts’ ability to develop comprehensive cybersecurity infrastructure, particularly in developing countries.

Authentication certificate difficulties create barriers to justice access, especially when complainants lack computer resources. Outdated legal frameworks struggle to address rapidly evolving digital crimes and technologies, creating persistent gaps between legal capabilities and technological realities.

## Proposed Solutions

The panel identified concrete steps for addressing these challenges. Continuing dialogue between multi-stakeholder communities and judiciary through IGF sessions was seen as essential. Developing technical and legal standards for digital chain of custody, including metadata preservation and authentication layers, emerged as a priority.

Establishing systematic training programmes for judges in cybersecurity and digital forensics through judicial academies was universally supported. Creating multi-stakeholder dialogue platforms among courts, technologists, civil society, and policymakers was identified as crucial for collaborative solutions.

Updating legal frameworks to address contemporary digital crimes and implementing cybersecurity protocols for courts were emphasized as urgent needs.

## Conclusion

The session successfully brought together diverse stakeholders to address common challenges courts face in adapting to digital evidence and cybersecurity threats. While speakers represented different legal traditions and perspectives, they shared recognition of the urgent need for judicial capacity building, proper digital evidence procedures, and balanced approaches to surveillance and privacy rights.

The discussion established a foundation for ongoing collaboration between traditionally separate communities, demonstrating that technological challenges create opportunities for judicial reform across diverse legal systems. The commitment to continued dialogue and capacity building provides a pathway for ensuring justice systems can effectively serve populations in an increasingly digital world while protecting fundamental rights.

Naza Nicholas: Thank you so much, and you’re welcome to this session, Judging in the Digital Age, Cybersecurity and Digital Evidence. And we are on Channel 5. If you would take your equipment and turn it on, put it on Channel 5. Today we have a number of speakers from various jurisdictions in terms of our IGF, you know, segments. And can I have this slide, please? Thank you. My name is Dr. Naza Nicholas Kirama from Tanzania. I work with Internet Society Tanzania Chapter, and I also double up as the coordinator for the Tanzania Internet Governance Forum. And today we are going to have a very good session on Judging in the Digital Age, Cybersecurity and Digital Evidence. And why are we here? We are here because courts globally are now digital ecosystems, and evidence records and even hearings actually exist online. Digital evidence is central to more than cases, mobile data, emails, metadata, surveillance footage, blockchain logs, AI-generated content. We have things like… Welcome to the session on digital rights online. We have been working tirelessly since 2023, 2022, to bring the judiciary, especially judges, to the Internet Governance Space, and it started in 2023. In Japan, we had a session called Judges on Digital Rights Online. And the goal is to break the silos, to link judiciary with the Internet Governance Space, and to create a platform for dialogue and exchange. We are working with experts, technologists, and policemakers, and not forgetting the regular Internet users. This session builds on the momentum by creating a permanent platform for dialogue and exchange. We are not just talking tech, we are reshaping the judicial culture for the future. We hope to strengthen the social Islam dynamics in the world and reach different levels of accessibility of the electronic device, in the regulatory commission, in opposing and expressing an open commentary in the district. In January, we launched a new report on cybersecurity in the IQ and we are trying to structure this report. How do we protect institutions? That is question number three. AI and justice. Can we trust machines, machine learning in evidence analysis or sentencing? Question number four. Training gaps. Judges need continuous specialized training to keep up with emerging tech and things like AI. The next slide is about our vision. We need to continue to be resilient, digitally literate, to have those in the judicial system. We need to build legal harmonization across jurisdictions to handle digital evidence uniformly. Share best practices from diverse legal systems. Civil, common, and hybrid traditions. And also develop capacity building programs, cyber law, data protection, digital forensic, and AI literacy. Also we foster collaboration between judiciary, civil society, tech developers, and also empower courts not just to catch up, but lead in shaping responsible digital justice. With that introduction, now I take this whole burden to the Honorable Dr. Eliamani Laltaika from the High Court of Tanzania. And the issue of the whole of this that I have been able to talk about. Honorable Eliamani, as a sitting judge of High Court in Tanzania, Are your courts currently addressing challenges related to admissibility of digital evidence, especially when such evidence originates from outside your jurisdiction or lacks clear standard for authentication?

Eliamani Isaya Laltaika: Thank you very much, Dr. Naza. First and foremost, my appreciation to the IGF Secretariat for their willingness and continuous support to engage the judiciary in this very important part of the 21st century legal process. Before I answer your question, Dr. Naza, I would like to kind of unpack some of these concepts. From a legal point of view, cyber security, these processes, legal, policy, economic, social and even diplomatic processes are to keep the cyberspace safe for all users, including children, people with disability and across regions. So that is the whole concept of cyber security is to ensure that the cyberspace is safe for all of us to use. And digital evidence, also known as electronic evidence, this is now the information with probative value presented to a court for a judge to consider in making a decision whether something has happened or has not. And digital evidence or electronic evidence is a newcomer in the development of law and judiciaries all over the world. It started in the late 70s in the U.S. Before that, only hard copies were used to prove something that has happened or not. When courts consider whether to admit evidence or not, there are usually five considerations. And this doesn’t really distinguish whether that piece of evidence is from one’s jurisdiction or it’s from some other country. Number one, relevance. I would ask counsel who is addressing me or I will use my own conviction to judge whether a certain piece of evidence is relevant to the case I’m addressing. If it doesn’t, it’s not relevant, however impressive it is. Number two, authenticity. The evidence must be shown to be what it purports to be. If you are telling me this is a video of someone stabbing a knife on some innocent passerby, I should be able to know that that is actually what is being done. It’s not a cartoon that has been curated. Number three, integrity of the system. I should be able to verify the system from which that video was extracted or that piece of paper or that email was printed out. Number four, chain of custody. I should know who took care of that piece of evidence. How many hands did it change through before it came to my court? And finally, and this is a little bit technical, I would check whether it complies with the statutory requirements. I would like to focus on the evidence of my own country. Every country has its own legal system, its own precedent, its own way of judging evidence. So if a piece of evidence passes that process, there is no discrimination whether it is from my jurisdiction or not. And I would only say that people thought these are only things from the movie, but I can say that these are actual things that are happening. And each one of you is currently creating digital evidence or electronic evidence from the pictures you are taking, from your geolocation, from the voices you are sending over WhatsApp. Everything, the meta tags can be used to authenticate that so-and-so was in Norway at this date and this is what he did. Everything you are doing, from shopping online to walking into a casino, that is actually building some sort of a digital evidence ecosystem. What does this mean in practice? It means cyber security law is much, much, much beyond what many people consider criminal. Law, as I said two years ago in Japan, is not only about punishing people. There are so many roles of the law and I will conclude by this, that law can play a punitive role. So-and-so has done something wrong and must be punished. Law can play a facilitative role.

Naza Nicholas: Can you hear us?

Peter Swire: Can you hear me right now?

Naza Nicholas: Yes, we can hear you loud and clear. If you can spend one minute to introduce yourself.

Peter Swire: and the background. Yes. Okay. And I don’t know if the video is working. Maybe it doesn’t work. Oh, there it goes. Okay. Hello. I’m in Spain today. My name is Peter Swire. I’m a professor at Georgia Tech. My background is a law professor, but I teach in the College of Computing, so I work on these issues. I also work on these issues as the leader of the Cross-Border Data Forum, where we do a lot of research on issues of data going across borders, especially law enforcement access. So that’s a little bit of my background. Is there a specific question you’d like me to address?

Naza Nicholas: Yes. The question I have for you, professor, is what are the key principles or methodologies that judges and lawyers must understand to critically assess the reliability and chain of custody for digital evidence, especially when it is presented through automated or AI-generated tools? You have five minutes.

Peter Swire: Yes, and I’ll try to stay within the time. So first of all, thank you for including me here today. I’m teaching in Spain this summer, and I feel honored to get to participate in this panel. I will turn to your question with just a little bit of background first, because we have resources at the Cross-Border Data Forum that talks about issues of government access to data across borders, such as the Budapest Convention and how to compare it to the new UN Cybercrime Convention. So we have a very recent study on the Cross-Border Data Forum about this. We’ve also written about how regional conventions, such as in Africa, might be useful for having governments get access to law enforcement requests that exist in other countries, because without that access, the United States has a blocking statute, and it’s hard to get the content of email communications for the judges. So that is background. I would like to emphasize three areas where the digital evidence issues are different. But first, I’ll tell you how much the digital issues are the same. So listening to our distinguished judge just now, his principles for evidence, including relevance and dependability, are the principles of evidence that existed before the Internet happened in a very large extent. And so each country has its own. You’ve always faced the problem that maybe this piece of paper has a fake signature on it. Now it might be a fake document electronically, but it’s been the same problem for judges since forever about whether to believe the evidence that comes into court. So for the three things I’d emphasize, the first is authentication. Somebody might say that they are writing from a police agency or a prosecutor’s office, but in fact, they’re faking it. They might be from some other place. And so and this was mentioned by the judge. And so the first thing to trust in evidence is that you’re dealing with the right party, that is the right person sending you the data. And in a world now where passwords can be broken many times, the standard good technology is to have what’s called two factor authentication. And many of you have used this where you log in with a password, then they send you a code and you send the code. And that’s much harder to fake than than simply a password based system. So that’s the first thing, some some confidence you’re dealing with the right people for authentication. The second question is chain of custody and whether you believe the document that came from Alice is the same document that’s received by Bob. And we have well-established procedures, what are called digital signatures. And the basic idea is Alice sends a document and they do a mathematical operation on it called a hash. And this unique number that emerges on the far end. And if even one sentence or one word in the document is changed, the hash of the document changes. And so these digital signatures are a mechanism to prove what left from Alice is the same thing received by. Bobb, such as the court system. And so systems of digital signatures are very important. The third question that’s come up more recently is what about AI? And we know that AI can have hallucinations. We’ve seen law cases in the United States where a lawyer just put in a question to the AI system and got back case citations that were not true. They made them up. Because AI and large language models use predictive technology, not definite technology, when they are trying to send evidence. And so when you receive a set of documents that have been generated by AI or might have been generated by AI, should you believe all the citations? And there’s no perfect answer to this, but one answer to this is to double check the citations. Maybe if you have time, you double check all of the citations. You go to the link in the page and make sure it says what they say it says. And that’s something, when I worked with a judge as a clerk, we did already. We checked to make sure the lawyers were giving us a proper citation. But if there’s too many citations to check in this way, maybe you do a sample. Maybe you try 10, or you try 50, or whatever the number is, and start to see whether you have any fake citations come in. So I think what I’m emphasizing for today is, in many ways, the problems are the same judges have had since forever. But we have to be sure about authentication. Is this really the person? We have to have some assurances on chain of custody and authenticity, and that’s digital signatures. And we have to worry about hallucinations in AI. And that means checking the sources, because otherwise it might be a fake citation that you don’t trust. So I’ll stop there. Thank you very much.

Naza Nicholas: Thank you, Professor. Now we have learned that there is a definitely predictive and definitive citations and all that. And that is why we are bringing the whole court system into the IGF. I want to now go to Dr. Jacqueline, who is here with us. And Dr. Jacqueline, if you would spend the next one minute to introduce yourself and then I will do a question for you.

Jacqueline Pegato: Of course. Thank you so much for having me. My name is Jacqueline Pegato. I’m with Data Privacy Brazil, a Brazilian NGO working with digital rights in Brazil and also in the Global South. It’s a pleasure to be here. Although I’m not a lawyer, I’ll try my best to address your question.

Naza Nicholas: Thank you so much, because we are a multi-stakeholder driven body of the United Nations, the IGF. Now I receive the order from the judge for every speaker to stay within five minutes. Thank you, Professor, for staying within five minutes. It was actually around 3.43 minutes. Now, Dr. Jacqueline, with the rise of things like spyware, the state surveillance tools being used in the name of national security, how should the judiciary respond when such technologies are used together with evidence? What role do courts play in safeguarding rights while navigating cases where surveillance methods themselves may be legally or ethically contested?

Jacqueline Pegato: Thank you. I think I’m going to first bring the concept of spyware for those who are not familiar with it. But I think most of us know by now that spyware refers to surveillance technologies used to secretly extract data from personal devices and networks, often without the user’s knowledge and with minimal legal oversight. So while presented as legitimate tools in the context of national security or law enforcement, these tools are increasingly being used in ways that erode democratic institutions. that I think exemplifies this threat. First Mile, a spyware tool, was deployed by intelligence officials to surveil targets that ranged from activists to Supreme Court justice themselves. So it is a paradigmatic case that stresses the most salient features of this type of surveillance. But it’s only one example in a broader context of lack of oversight. This incident reveals a structural problem. When surveillance happens outside transparent legal frameworks, courts are sidelined and unable to guarantee fundamental rights they are tasked to protect. And in the Brazilian context of use of spyware by the state, there is a Supreme Court case pending in which the regulatory gap that allows for the current state of things is being challenged as unconstitutional. In this case, we argue that the use of different spyware for surveillance by the state should be ruled unconstitutional, since even in possible legitimate contexts of criminal persecution and law enforcement, the nature of how they work and their affordances move way beyond traditional investigative methods, such as telephonic interceptions. Taking advantage of vulnerabilities found in other platforms and networks. resulting in a level of intrusion that is difficult to justify under democratic parameters. However, even if the entire system is not ruled unconstitutional, we are requesting that strict criteria be established for the use of spyware, analogous to the existing regulations for other cases of breach of confidentiality, particularly the requirements of prior judicial authorization and adherence to similar strictness as in other situations of confidentiality breach, the constitutional interpretation of communication confidentiality updated to contemporary standards of intrusiveness, the inclusion of mechanisms to respect the chain of custody, the individualization of subjects subjected to intrusion procedures, and the development of other parameters compatible with the constitutional order. So I’ll stop here now. Thank you.

Naza Nicholas: Thank you, Dr. Jacqueline. That was very informative. And I’m very glad that you could do this submission. Now I go to Advocate Umar Khan from Pakistan. If you can introduce yourself first.

Umar Khan: Thank you so much, Dr. Nazer. Thank you so much, IGF, and the new trick into this IGF somehow following from the last two IGF. This is Umar Khan from Pakistan. I’m basically a high court lawyer and working on the digital rights, dealing cyber cases in Pakistan, which is a bit new thing in Pakistan. Onward, we are having our first national law from 2016 Prevention of Electronics Crime Act. So this is from my side. Yeah, Dr. Nazer. Thank you so much, Umar Khan, advocate of the high court in Pakistan. You have a vast experience as a digital rights and defense lawyer. How do you see the balance between state surveillance for cybersecurity and the individual’s right to fair trial, particularly when digital forensics are used to prosecute cybercrime? Very important question. I think there are two questions within one question, digital forensics and digital surveillance. Basically, to prosecute a digital crime or a cybercrime, it is very much important. Digital surveillance is the same as the government or the state is looking after the general public. Also in the digital world, when the world has become a globe, on just one click there are certain issues related to the people, general masses, are also arising at the same time. So I believe that surveillance is a key. Without it, you cannot go with the internet. Everybody will be doing their own job. Everybody can do a crime. So surveillance is just to monitor, track and collect data. But the main thing is the key, the balance, that how they keep the balance, look into the principle of legality, professionality and with that the transparency. That if the surveillance they are doing, the state agencies are doing, whether it is protecting the rights of the people, along with that, is this not violating the right to privacy, the right to dignity, which are the constitutional rights given to the humans, to the citizens, by the law, by the constitution, or by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. So I believe that surveillance, data collection, and all these things are important but how the data collected from the end user are protected because we have seen in the world that on the state level the data of the user have been shared so I believe that this is very important. The second one that the important thing is the digital evidence in forensic so by the end of the day if a crime has been committed it is the evidence that has to prove whether the crime has committed or not. The way the professor and the honorable judge has mentioned that the chain of the custody the evidence that reached the court that is very much important and without forensic it is not possible to prove whether it is to be proved in the way that the evidence that has been collected is according to the law is it following the SOPs whether the forensic the legality of the evidence so I believe that whenever it is happening you are prosecuting a crime you are collecting evidence it has to follow the standard of a digital forensic in a way that it has been proved because forgery is very much important is very much easy now AI has become a tool that can create hurdles for the people so it is the state that should ensure the standard of the digital process in the way that a crime that has committed should be prosecuted in a way that the right to a fair trial has not been violated which is very important this is from my side.

Naza Nicholas: Thank you so much I appreciate your intervention and now I go to Marin Ashraf she’s a tech research policy researcher and I would like to ask you to to use the next one to to introduce yourself and that will be followed by a question

Marin Ashraf: yeah thank you Dr. Nasir. Hi everyone my name is Marin and I am a senior research associate at IT4Change which is an India-based not-for-profit organization working at the intersections of digital technology and social justice. My core area of work includes working on online gender-based violence and legal and policy responses to it, digital platform accountability, information integrity, and AI governance issues. Very happy to be here and to share the space with the esteemed panelists.

Naza Nicholas: Thank you so much, Marin. I know you are doing a fantastic job of research and informing the community. Your work experience explores the intersection of tech and governance and social justice. From a feminist legal and policy perspective, how can judicial systems be better equipped to handle cases of online gender-based violence and platform-related harms, especially when evidence is embedded within opaque algorithms and transnational digital ecosystems?

Marin Ashraf: Thank you, Dr. Nasir. To answer that question, I would like to first briefly share some insights from my research that IT4Change, the organization that I work with, undertook on judicial approaches to online gender-based violence cases in India. The challenges that are commonly encountered in prosecuting such cases, especially the digital evidentiary issues. Online gender-based violence is typically dealt as a criminal offense in India under the General Penal Code and the Information Technology Act. As with any criminal offense, it becomes crucial to prove the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable doubt. In our study, we found that in several cases of online gender-based violence, it unfortunately failed to meet the high burden of proof that is required because of difficulties in bringing in expert testimony, relying on witnesses, and ensuring the admissibility of digital evidence. So under Indian law, digital evidence will be admissible under two conditions. Either it has to be if the original computer source in which the evidence is recorded is produced, and in which case it’s a primary evidence, or if the copies of the electronic record are produced, in which case we need a certificate of authentication. And in our research study, we found that in many cases the court tend to dismiss the digital evidence because of lack of authentication certificate. And the issue is that it’s very difficult to sometimes obtain the authentication certificate, especially if the complainant doesn’t have access to the computer resource, or in many cases they might have applied to obtain the certificate, but it is not issued, or they may not be aware how to get the authentication certificate. So in such cases, the court tend to dismiss, of course, because of concerns of authenticity. And that means depriving a crucial piece of evidence, which might only be the single evidence in many cases, and thus depriving access to justice for the survivors. Now another issue is that in many cases, even if the prosecution fails to even submit digital evidence, and the main barrier here comes from the lack of cooperation from the digital platforms, like social media platforms, in responding to requests from law enforcement agencies to provide information. Despite the police asking for information from the social media platforms or from telecom service providers, sometimes there’s a delay in responding to it. And another issue with respect to digital evidence is the threat to privacy. Because in many cases, the evidence and other materials and the devices has to be submitted to the state or the police, and there have been concerns of manipulation or leaking to the accused side. So there is significant threat to privacy in that regard, the chain of custody, in preserving the chain of custody. Now, apart from the digital evidentiary issues, I also wanted to touch…

Naza Nicholas: If we were to come up with one red flag, judges should look for a digital forensic report. What would that be?

Peter Swire: Well, I hadn’t prepared that question.

Naza Nicholas: Yes.

Peter Swire: I thought you might ask of one piece of advice to judicial systems that they would do. Yes. And I want to mention the problem of ransomware, which is the possibility that a bad actor will try to lock up the files of a court system so that the judges and the courts lose access to the files. And when I teach my cybersecurity class, I say to people, for ransomware, the most important thing is to have some offline backups of your records, if at all possible. And you also have to protect your backup system from attack, because the bad guys try to get into your backup system. We have seen a lot of, in the United States, state and local governments get hit with these attacks. We have seen court systems get hit with these ransomware attacks. And having a good backup, where you can go back and get everything the way it was yesterday, that’s a huge help if you’re able to have that kind of technical backup in place. You asked about red flags. I think that the thing I would worry about is whether somebody on the other end of the line is really who they say they are, right? We know in our personal lives that we think we might be talking to somebody on social media, and it’s somebody else. And so finding some way to have a channel to communicate with them, and a second channel to make sure they are who they really say they are, that kind of two-factor thing is important, because otherwise you might be getting evidence from somebody who’s not even the right person.

Naza Nicholas: Thank you, Professor. Now I go to Dr. Jacqueline. I know you are not a lawyer, but we are all, you know, in some way or somehow we’ll be ending up in court. So what would be your suggestion or recommendations on spyware? If you could spend like one minute to respond to that.

Jacqueline Pegato: Sure. Thank you for the question. We have in our project, Data Privacy Brazil, we are developing some key recommendations on the research. And just to also clarify that I spoke about the Brazilian case, but we also, this is not an exclusive view of Brazil. We have cases in Colombia. We have a very important precedence in the US with the Pegasus and the ruling ordering to damages to META. But yeah, let me say some recommendations we are working on in terms of, I think we have four recommendations, key recommendations, I would say. The first one is to develop technical and legal standards for the digital chain of custody, including metadata preservation, access logs, authentication layers and independent audit trails. The second one would be trained judges and legal professionals in cybersecurity, digital forensics and especially data protection. The digital knowledge gap within our courts is a risk we can no longer afford in this scenario. The third recommendation would be to equip courts with cybersecurity protocols and contingency plans to strengthen institutional resilience against cyber threats, including unauthorized access to judicial data. And last but not least, of course, promote multistakeholder dialogue among courts, technologists, civil society and policymakers. I think judicial systems must evolve collaboratively to meet these realities we are talking about here. So thank you.

Naza Nicholas: Thank you so much. Marin, can you share one way courts could be more responsive to survivors of online violence? If you could put that in one minute, I think it would be very short and clear.

Marin Ashraf: Yeah, sure. I’ll try. So I think one of the important ways, as I said in my previous intervention, that it’s very important to understand the online public sphere itself and how the unique vulnerabilities that people face in the online sphere, especially also the role of the platforms and the algorithms in amplifying the harms. Secondly, it’s really important for the courts to uphold the right to privacy of the survivors in cases of OHV.

Eliamani Isaya Laltaika: using a computer system while in a plane or a ship registered in Tanzania, the law will catch up with you. So to be able to exchange data and get, you know, extra territorial expertise, one must be able to collaborate. And I’m seeing a positive development within the East African community where there are initiatives to empower judges and the legal fraternity to borrow a phrase from my panelist here on how to really get into the 21st century well-equipped with protecting citizenry. Thank you.

Naza Nicholas: Thank you, Dr. Judge. Uma, I know from the legal perspective serving the civil society, what do you think should be the legal safeguards that are of most urgent to protect, you know, defendants in digital crime cases?

Umar Khan: Very important question. There’s a principle the honorable judge will know that innocent until proven guilty. So a person is innocent until he is proven guilty. So there are certain challenges which are often faced by the defendants in the digital crimes. And I will just mention a few of them. One of them is like updating outdated law legislations because every day new thing is happening in the digital world. So with this, a law passed in 2015 cannot be brought in 2025 because digital crimes are…

Participant: case in Ecuador and would like to know your perspective. I don’t know if it will be contempt of court, but Ola Bini is a digital rights defender, has been facing a political judicial case in Ecuador since 2019. His case illustrates the risks of misusing digital evidence in judicial proceedings. In his trial, the prosecutor’s office used a simple photograph which showed the connection from an unverified user to an IP to support an alleged attempt to gain unauthorized access to a state telecommunication system. Marta says, commonsensically, that a single photograph is not in itself evidence of a digital crime. So Marta wants to know, in addition to the need for digital forensics, what other protocols must be in place to ensure that alleged digital evidence

Peter Swire: Okay. There’s many good possible first steps, but one thing is to have backup so that you don’t lose the court records. And that’s what I said about ransomware. So now, even in a resource-constrained place, digital storage is relatively inexpensive. And if you lose all the records because of a cyber attack, now you have a very hard time doing your judging. But if at least you have the records saved, then you can start again tomorrow and have a good chance to have a fair trial.

Eliamani Isaya Laltaika: Thank you very much. To share a practical experience from my country, we have our slot in the data center. So the judiciary does not operate in silo, like it has its own way of preserving. No, we are part of the government. So the standard of security that applies to records of parliament or state house applies to the court as well. So we do not foresee anyone easily targeting the judiciary and succeeding because you are targeting the heart of the government.

Naza Nicholas: Thank you, Judge. I saw a hand and then there’s another hand over here. If you can be on the mic. So do we have to take all the questions and then we’ll respond at once? Yes, as they come.

Adriana Castro: Yes. Hi, my name is Adriana Castro. I’m a professor at External University in Colombia. And I would like to raise an additional issue. A moment before the digital evidence, the contact information and notification. The Ibero-American data protection network composed of data protection authorities recently published an open letter to the companies accountable on data processing. It’s an open invitation directed to the companies which massively process

Eliamani Isaya Laltaika: The goal of cyber security is to ensure that the cyberspace is safe for all users, including people with disabilities and even children. With progressive data protection laws, there are ways that judges are instructed to ensure in-camera hearing.

Peter Swire: So in the United States, we have a law about medical privacy that’s called HIPAA, which I worked on when we created it. And it has a mechanism for what they call qualified protective orders. So one possibility is only the judge looks at the evidence, the sensitive evidence in camera, just the judge. Another possibility is they close the courtroom just for the medical information so that both parties see it. And both of those are allowed by the judge to create a protective order around this very sensitive information. So there’s a model for that that you can find easily online if you look for it for qualified protective orders.

Naza Nicholas: Thank you so much. I see, I don’t see, is there any question from online? Okay. Thank you so much. And now I go to, is there anybody? There was a lady who asked the question, I think.

Eliamani Isaya Laltaika: That was not responded. I just wanted to say a sentence or two from the lady, a professor from Colombia. There are current ongoing UN mechanisms to ensure that country laws are not too restrictive. So there are diplomatic processes to collaborate and ensure that data flows easily for purposes of conviction and adducing evidence. At the moment we are

Naza Nicholas: Eliamani, today we have participated in this judging in the digital era, cyber security and digital evidence. If you look at the way you have interacted with the audience, the questions that they have brought to the panelists, what would be your parting shot today?

Jacqueline Pegato: I’m going back to Brazil because it’s the context that I know. In Brazil we have the right to data protection as a constitutional right. This happened in 2022 and I think it was a great victory. We also have a comprehensive general data protection law, we call LGPD, that is in place also with an independent data protection authority. But we still don’t have a criminal data protection framework. So I think that’s an important gap to address. And I think all of the questions and discussions that we raised here today could share this concern of having this framework to fight against private related crimes and also these weaknesses of the judicial system, their ability to handle cyber crime effectively. So this gap in Brazil has been identified and debated in some legislative reform efforts, including the reform of the Brazilian Code of Criminal Procedure and some specific advocacy efforts, but no law has been approved so far. So I think that’s one development that we still have to fight for.

Naza Nicholas: Thank you, Dr. Jacqueline. Marin, the same question goes to you also. Just in one minute, if you can give your parting shot, what would you like to see in the future?

Marin Ashraf: Speaking from the perspective of the area of work that I work in that is online gender-based violence, I think court should be safe spaces for women and other survivors of online violence that are seeking justice. It’s very important that criminal justice system undertake ecosystem level changes in sensitization and inclusive policies and equip judges and law enforcement to deal with online violence cases in a sensitive and rights respecting manner. At the same time, it’s also important to update our laws to reflect the current realities and to to even to recognize newer forms of violence like gender trolling or gender-based hate speech, doxxing. So not all jurisdictions have yet recognized. So the changes at the legislature levels are also crucial for the judiciary to work effectively in this case. Thank you.

Naza Nicholas: Professor Peter

Peter Swire: Yes, thank you very much and thank you for being able to participate remotely in this very well organized session today. What I want to come back to the data protection point that’s come up a couple of times. So the cross-border data forum we created seven years ago, and it has stated goals in the website. One of them is that government should get access to data when there’s a legitimate government need. You know, there’s an actual crime. Maybe there’s a warrant with a judicial court order. On the other hand, we also have to have privacy and data protection happen when these requests come in. So imagine if you’re a company or imagine if you’re a court and there’s a request from some other country and you don’t know the practices there. Maybe it’s a request for data that’s really to stop political dissent. Maybe it’s illegitimate and not protecting data protection rules. And so our work has been for seven years to try to figure out how do we have correct access when it’s criminal and there’s the right showing. How to have privacy and data protection when those rights need to be upheld as part of the system. And how can we make it workable so that the people who hold the data know what their responsibility is.

Naza Nicholas: What will be your parting shot today?

Eliamani Isaya Laltaika: My parting shot actually is just to say thank you to the many people, especially the civil society, fraternity, who are doing a fantastic job to ensure that there is capacity building for judges. My colleagues here from India and from Brazil, even from Pakistan, have highlighted that there is this knowledge gap. It’s true that some of us are not aware of some of these developments in the cyberspace. You can find a court that is still in its physical form, and if you ask someone about digital evidence, that is the hardest question you can ask. But we can generally narrow the gap by ensuring that we invite judges to some of these fora. We designate programs for capacity building, and many of us will attend. We will not stay in courts only to wait to convict someone wrongfully because we don’t know the law or we don’t know just a bit of science. So thank you very much, Dr. Naza. You have been a trailblazer in Tanzania. That’s how you got me out of my chamber to travel with you many places to try and learn, and I can assure you that what you are doing is making a difference, not only in Tanzania but across the continent and some other parts of the world. Thank you.

Umar Khan: Thank you so much, Dr. Nazer. And I believe this is for the second time I’m sitting with the people from the Sambi ground or the relevant background towards the legal or judiciary track. So I believe it should be continued by the end of the day. Crimes are happening, and it is the courts, the prosecutors, the lawyers, and the agencies who are going to handle these cases. And as mentioned by the Honorable Judge, High Court Tanzania, that the capacity building of the judges are very important. They should not just sit in the courts. It is very important. And I’m happy that from the last time when we sit in the Saudi, when we go back home, we just tried to have a training for the judicial academy of my province. Unfortunately, that didn’t happen because of the timing in the Ramadan. But I’m hopeful that this time when I go back home, we are having some judges to be trained, inshallah, and we will be looking into your support. Thank you once again.

Naza Nicholas: Thank you so much. Is the professor from Columbia still around? If you have one minute for your parting shot. If you have anything to say, one minute.

Adriana Castro: I would say just that there are still a lot of challenges in Columbia. We have the main challenge of notification. I mentioned something about data protection investigations, but also in human rights procedures, we have a specific issue on notification. So that’s one of the main capacity building areas that we will look forward. Thank you very much.

Naza Nicholas: Professor, I think I’ll keep in touch. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for attending our session. We have come to the end of our session. Thank you so much for your contribution, and thank you so much for listening. And one of our goals of our session is to bridge the divide between the multi-stakeholder and the judiciary, to make sure that we inform and transform the judiciary to become the better institution and get the judiciary out of their silos so we can make justice better for every single one of us. Thank you so much. So if we can come for a picture, for a photo. Thank you so much. Thank you so much.

Agreement points

Need for judicial capacity building and training in digital technologies

Speakers

– Eliamani Isaya Laltaika
– Jacqueline Pegato
– Umar Khan

Arguments

Many courts still operate in physical form without understanding digital evidence, creating risks of wrongful convictions

Capacity building programs should invite judges to forums and designate specific training programs

Judges need continuous specialized training in cybersecurity, digital forensics, and data protection to address knowledge gaps

Legal frameworks need updating as outdated laws from 2015 cannot adequately address 2025 digital crimes

Summary

All speakers agreed that there is a significant knowledge gap in the judiciary regarding digital evidence and emerging technologies, requiring systematic capacity building programs and continuous training to prevent wrongful decisions and keep pace with technological developments.

Topics

Capacity development | Legal and regulatory

Importance of proper digital evidence authentication and chain of custody

Speakers

– Eliamani Isaya Laltaika
– Peter Swire
– Jacqueline Pegato
– Participant

Arguments

Courts must verify five key considerations for digital evidence: relevance, authenticity, integrity of system, chain of custody, and statutory compliance

Authentication requires confidence in dealing with the right parties, with two-factor authentication being more secure than password-based systems

Digital signatures using mathematical hash operations can prove document integrity from sender to receiver

Technical and legal standards must be developed for digital chain of custody, including metadata preservation and independent audit trails

A simple photograph showing IP connection is insufficient evidence for digital crimes without proper forensic protocols

Summary

Speakers unanimously emphasized that digital evidence requires rigorous authentication processes, proper chain of custody documentation, and technical standards to ensure reliability and admissibility in court proceedings.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Need for balance between surveillance/security and privacy rights

Speakers

– Jacqueline Pegato
– Umar Khan
– Peter Swire

Arguments

Spyware tools are increasingly used beyond legitimate law enforcement, eroding democratic institutions and requiring strict judicial oversight

Courts should establish strict criteria for spyware use, including prior judicial authorization and constitutional interpretation updated for contemporary intrusion standards

Surveillance is necessary for cybersecurity but must balance legality, proportionality, and transparency while protecting constitutional rights to privacy and dignity

Courts need mechanisms like qualified protective orders for handling sensitive information, including in-camera hearings

Summary

Speakers agreed that while surveillance and security measures are necessary for cybersecurity, they must be balanced with privacy rights through proper legal frameworks, judicial oversight, and constitutional protections.

Topics

Human rights | Cybersecurity

Similar viewpoints

Both speakers emphasized that digital evidence evaluation should follow consistent principles regardless of origin, and that courts need robust cybersecurity infrastructure including backup systems to protect against cyber threats.

Speakers

– Eliamani Isaya Laltaika
– Peter Swire

Arguments

Digital evidence assessment follows the same principles regardless of jurisdiction, with no discrimination between domestic and foreign evidence

Courts need backup systems and offline storage to protect against ransomware attacks that could lock up judicial files

Courts can leverage government data centers for security standards rather than operating in isolation

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity | Infrastructure

Both speakers highlighted gaps in legal frameworks and the need for comprehensive reforms to address digital rights violations, particularly emphasizing the challenges faced by vulnerable groups in accessing justice through digital evidence.

Speakers

– Jacqueline Pegato
– Marin Ashraf

Arguments

Brazil has constitutional right to data protection and comprehensive LGPD law but lacks criminal data protection framework

Digital evidence in online gender-based violence cases often fails to meet burden of proof due to authentication certificate difficulties and lack of platform cooperation

Criminal justice systems need ecosystem-level changes in sensitization and inclusive policies for handling online violence cases

Topics

Human rights | Legal and regulatory

Both speakers emphasized the risks posed by AI technology in legal proceedings and the need for courts to develop systematic approaches to verify AI-generated content while building institutional resilience against cyber threats.

Speakers

– Peter Swire
– Jacqueline Pegato

Arguments

AI systems can have hallucinations and generate fake citations, requiring judges to double-check sources and citations

Courts should distinguish between predictive AI technology and definitive evidence when assessing reliability

Judges should sample-check citations when there are too many to verify individually

Judicial systems should have cybersecurity protocols and contingency plans to strengthen institutional resilience

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Unexpected consensus

Cross-border cooperation and legal harmonization

Speakers

– Eliamani Isaya Laltaika
– Naza Nicholas
– Adriana Castro

Arguments

International collaboration mechanisms are necessary for data exchange and extraterritorial expertise in cybercrime cases

Legal harmonization across jurisdictions is needed to handle digital evidence uniformly and share best practices from diverse legal systems

Notification and contact information procedures present ongoing challenges in data protection investigations

Explanation

Despite representing different legal systems (Tanzania’s common law, Brazil’s civil law, and Colombia’s hybrid system), speakers showed unexpected consensus on the need for international cooperation and harmonized approaches to digital evidence, suggesting that technological challenges transcend traditional legal system boundaries.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Jurisdiction

Multi-stakeholder approach to judicial reform

Speakers

– Eliamani Isaya Laltaika
– Jacqueline Pegato
– Marin Ashraf

Arguments

Capacity building programs should invite judges to forums and designate specific training programs

Judges need continuous specialized training in cybersecurity, digital forensics, and data protection to address knowledge gaps

Courts must understand online vulnerabilities and the role of platforms and algorithms in amplifying harms against survivors

Explanation

Unexpectedly, a sitting judge (Laltaika) showed strong alignment with civil society advocates (Pegato and Ashraf) on the need for collaborative, multi-stakeholder approaches to judicial education and reform, breaking down traditional institutional silos.

Topics

Capacity development | Human rights | Legal and regulatory

Overall assessment

Summary

The discussion revealed strong consensus across all speakers on three main areas: the critical need for judicial capacity building in digital technologies, the importance of rigorous digital evidence authentication processes, and the necessity of balancing security measures with privacy rights. Speakers also agreed on the need for international cooperation and multi-stakeholder approaches to address digital justice challenges.

Consensus level

High level of consensus with significant implications for digital justice reform. The agreement between judicial officials and civil society advocates suggests a shared understanding of the challenges and potential for collaborative solutions. This consensus indicates readiness for systematic reforms in judicial systems globally, including harmonized standards for digital evidence, comprehensive training programs, and balanced approaches to surveillance and privacy rights. The unexpected alignment between different legal traditions and stakeholder groups suggests that technological challenges are creating common ground for judicial reform across diverse legal systems.

Different viewpoints

Approach to cybersecurity infrastructure for courts

Speakers

– Peter Swire
– Eliamani Isaya Laltaika

Arguments

Courts need backup systems and offline storage to protect against ransomware attacks that could lock up judicial files

Courts can leverage government data centers for security standards rather than operating in isolation

Summary

Professor Swire advocates for courts to have independent backup systems and offline storage as protection against ransomware, while Judge Laltaika argues that courts should integrate with government data centers rather than operate independently for security

Topics

Cybersecurity | Infrastructure

Scope of spyware regulation

Speakers

– Jacqueline Pegato
– Umar Khan

Arguments

Spyware tools are increasingly used beyond legitimate law enforcement, eroding democratic institutions and requiring strict judicial oversight

Surveillance is necessary for cybersecurity but must balance legality, proportionality, and transparency while protecting constitutional rights to privacy and dignity

Summary

Jacqueline takes a more restrictive stance on spyware, arguing it erodes democratic institutions and should face strict judicial oversight, while Umar Khan sees surveillance as necessary for cybersecurity with appropriate balancing of rights

Topics

Human rights | Cybersecurity

Unexpected differences

Individual vs. institutional approach to judicial cybersecurity

Speakers

– Peter Swire
– Eliamani Isaya Laltaika

Arguments

Courts need backup systems and offline storage to protect against ransomware attacks that could lock up judicial files

Courts can leverage government data centers for security standards rather than operating in isolation

Explanation

This disagreement is unexpected because both speakers are cybersecurity experts, yet they have fundamentally different philosophies about whether courts should have independent security infrastructure or integrate with government systems. This reflects deeper questions about judicial independence versus efficiency

Topics

Cybersecurity | Infrastructure

Overall assessment

Summary

The discussion showed remarkable consensus on the need for judicial modernization, capacity building, and better digital evidence handling, with disagreements mainly on implementation approaches rather than fundamental goals

Disagreement level

Low to moderate disagreement level. Most speakers agreed on core principles but differed on specific methodologies and priorities. The main tensions were between individual versus institutional approaches to security, and between restrictive versus balanced approaches to surveillance. These disagreements reflect practical implementation challenges rather than fundamental philosophical differences, suggesting good potential for collaborative solutions.

Partial agreements

Similar viewpoints

Both speakers emphasized that digital evidence evaluation should follow consistent principles regardless of origin, and that courts need robust cybersecurity infrastructure including backup systems to protect against cyber threats.

Speakers

– Eliamani Isaya Laltaika
– Peter Swire

Arguments

Digital evidence assessment follows the same principles regardless of jurisdiction, with no discrimination between domestic and foreign evidence

Courts need backup systems and offline storage to protect against ransomware attacks that could lock up judicial files

Courts can leverage government data centers for security standards rather than operating in isolation

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity | Infrastructure

Both speakers highlighted gaps in legal frameworks and the need for comprehensive reforms to address digital rights violations, particularly emphasizing the challenges faced by vulnerable groups in accessing justice through digital evidence.

Speakers

– Jacqueline Pegato
– Marin Ashraf

Arguments

Brazil has constitutional right to data protection and comprehensive LGPD law but lacks criminal data protection framework

Digital evidence in online gender-based violence cases often fails to meet burden of proof due to authentication certificate difficulties and lack of platform cooperation

Criminal justice systems need ecosystem-level changes in sensitization and inclusive policies for handling online violence cases

Topics

Human rights | Legal and regulatory

Both speakers emphasized the risks posed by AI technology in legal proceedings and the need for courts to develop systematic approaches to verify AI-generated content while building institutional resilience against cyber threats.

Speakers

– Peter Swire
– Jacqueline Pegato

Arguments

AI systems can have hallucinations and generate fake citations, requiring judges to double-check sources and citations

Courts should distinguish between predictive AI technology and definitive evidence when assessing reliability

Judges should sample-check citations when there are too many to verify individually

Judicial systems should have cybersecurity protocols and contingency plans to strengthen institutional resilience

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Key takeaways

Courts must establish five key considerations for digital evidence admissibility: relevance, authenticity, integrity of system, chain of custody, and statutory compliance, with no discrimination between domestic and foreign evidence

AI-generated evidence poses new challenges as AI systems can hallucinate and create fake citations, requiring judges to double-check sources and sample-verify citations when volume is too large

Digital authentication requires two-factor verification and digital signatures using mathematical hash operations to ensure document integrity from sender to receiver

State surveillance tools like spyware require strict judicial oversight with prior authorization, constitutional interpretation updated for contemporary intrusion standards, and balance between security needs and privacy rights

Online gender-based violence cases face unique challenges with digital evidence authentication and platform cooperation, requiring courts to understand online vulnerabilities and algorithmic harm amplification

Cross-border digital evidence cooperation requires legal harmonization across jurisdictions and international collaboration mechanisms for data exchange in cybercrime cases

Judicial capacity building is critical as many judges lack knowledge of digital evidence, cybersecurity, and data protection, creating risks of wrongful convictions

Courts need robust cybersecurity infrastructure including backup systems, offline storage, and contingency plans to protect against ransomware attacks and maintain judicial operations

Resolutions and action items

Continue bridging the divide between multi-stakeholder community and judiciary through IGF sessions to transform judicial institutions

Develop technical and legal standards for digital chain of custody including metadata preservation, access logs, authentication layers and independent audit trails

Establish training programs for judges in cybersecurity, digital forensics, and data protection through judicial academies and capacity building initiatives

Create multistakeholder dialogue platforms among courts, technologists, civil society and policymakers for collaborative judicial system evolution

Update legal frameworks to address contemporary digital crimes and recognize newer forms of online violence like gender trolling and doxxing

Implement cybersecurity protocols and contingency plans to strengthen institutional resilience against cyber threats

Advocate for comprehensive criminal data protection frameworks in jurisdictions lacking such legislation

Unresolved issues

How to effectively balance state surveillance needs for cybersecurity with individual privacy rights and fair trial guarantees in practice

Lack of platform cooperation in providing digital evidence for law enforcement requests, causing delays and evidence gaps

Notification and contact information procedures in cross-border data protection investigations remain challenging

Outdated legal frameworks cannot adequately address rapidly evolving digital crimes and technologies

Resource constraints in developing comprehensive backup systems and cybersecurity infrastructure for courts

Gaps in criminal data protection frameworks in various jurisdictions including Brazil

Difficulty obtaining authentication certificates for digital evidence, particularly when complainants lack access to computer resources

Privacy threats and chain of custody concerns when digital devices must be submitted to law enforcement

Suggested compromises

Use qualified protective orders allowing judges to review sensitive evidence in-camera or close courtrooms only for sensitive information while maintaining transparency for other proceedings

Implement sample-checking of citations when full verification is not feasible due to volume constraints

Leverage existing government data center infrastructure for judicial cybersecurity rather than courts operating in isolation

Establish strict criteria for spyware use analogous to existing regulations for other confidentiality breaches while allowing legitimate law enforcement applications

Develop progressive data protection laws with in-camera hearing provisions to balance transparency with privacy protection

Create mechanisms for legitimate government access to data with proper judicial oversight while maintaining privacy and data protection when rights need to be upheld

Digital evidence is a newcomer in the development of law and judiciaries all over the world. It started in the late 70s in the U.S. Before that, only hard copies were used to prove something that has happened or not… each one of you is currently creating digital evidence or electronic evidence from the pictures you are taking, from your geolocation, from the voices you are sending over WhatsApp.

Speaker

Eliamani Isaya Laltaika

Reason

This comment was particularly insightful because it reframed digital evidence from an abstract legal concept to something personally relevant to every participant. By connecting everyday digital activities to evidence creation, Judge Laltaika made the technical discussion accessible and highlighted the ubiquity of digital footprints in modern life.

Impact

This observation shifted the discussion from theoretical legal principles to practical, personal implications. It helped establish the relevance of the topic for all participants and set the foundation for understanding why digital evidence standards matter for everyone, not just legal professionals.

We know that AI can have hallucinations. We’ve seen law cases in the United States where a lawyer just put in a question to the AI system and got back case citations that were not true. They made them up. Because AI and large language models use predictive technology, not definite technology.

Speaker

Peter Swire

Reason

This comment introduced a critical distinction between predictive and definitive technology that fundamentally challenges how courts might approach AI-generated evidence. The concept of AI ‘hallucinations’ in legal contexts represents a new category of evidentiary risk that traditional legal frameworks weren’t designed to handle.

Impact

This insight prompted a deeper discussion about verification methods and introduced the need for new protocols like citation checking. It elevated the conversation from basic digital evidence authentication to the more complex challenge of AI-generated content, influencing subsequent discussions about verification standards.

When surveillance happens outside transparent legal frameworks, courts are sidelined and unable to guarantee fundamental rights they are tasked to protect… the nature of how they work and their affordances move way beyond traditional investigative methods, such as telephonic interceptions.

Speaker

Jacqueline Pegato

Reason

This comment was thought-provoking because it highlighted how advanced surveillance technologies can undermine judicial authority itself. By pointing out that spyware capabilities exceed traditional investigative methods, Pegato challenged the adequacy of existing legal frameworks and raised questions about institutional power balance.

Impact

This observation shifted the discussion from technical evidence handling to broader questions of judicial oversight and democratic accountability. It introduced the concept that technology might be outpacing the law’s ability to maintain checks and balances, prompting discussions about constitutional interpretation and regulatory gaps.

In many cases, even if the prosecution fails to even submit digital evidence, and the main barrier here comes from the lack of cooperation from the digital platforms, like social media platforms, in responding to requests from law enforcement agencies to provide information.

Speaker

Marin Ashraf

Reason

This comment revealed a critical gap between legal authority and practical enforcement in the digital age. It highlighted how private platforms’ cooperation (or lack thereof) can determine access to justice, particularly for vulnerable populations like survivors of online gender-based violence.

Impact

This insight broadened the discussion beyond technical evidence standards to include jurisdictional and corporate accountability issues. It introduced the concept that justice outcomes might depend on private companies’ policies and responsiveness, adding a new dimension to the conversation about digital justice.

There’s a principle the honorable judge will know that innocent until proven guilty… there are certain challenges which are often faced by the defendants in the digital crimes. And I will just mention a few of them. One of them is like updating outdated law legislations because every day new thing is happening in the digital world.

Speaker

Umar Khan

Reason

This comment was insightful because it highlighted the tension between fundamental legal principles and rapidly evolving technology. Khan pointed out that the speed of technological change creates a structural challenge for legal systems that rely on precedent and established procedures.

Impact

This observation prompted discussion about the need for adaptive legal frameworks and continuous judicial education. It shifted focus to the systemic challenge of keeping legal systems current with technological developments, influencing later discussions about capacity building and international cooperation.

So the judiciary does not operate in silo, like it has its own way of preserving. No, we are part of the government. So the standard of security that applies to records of parliament or state house applies to the court as well.

Speaker

Eliamani Isaya Laltaika

Reason

This comment challenged assumptions about judicial independence in cybersecurity contexts. It revealed how digital infrastructure requirements might blur traditional separations between branches of government, raising questions about both security benefits and potential vulnerabilities.

Impact

This insight prompted discussion about institutional cybersecurity strategies and highlighted practical considerations for court system protection. It added a governance dimension to the technical discussion and influenced thinking about collaborative approaches to judicial cybersecurity.

Overall assessment

These key comments collectively transformed the discussion from a technical examination of digital evidence procedures into a comprehensive exploration of how technology is reshaping fundamental aspects of justice systems. The most impactful insights connected abstract legal concepts to personal experience, revealed gaps between legal authority and practical enforcement, and highlighted how technological change challenges traditional legal frameworks. The comments created a progression from individual evidence handling to systemic questions about judicial authority, democratic oversight, and institutional adaptation. This evolution helped establish the session’s central theme: that digital transformation requires not just new technical skills, but fundamental reconsideration of how justice systems operate in the digital age. The discussion successfully bridged technical, legal, and policy perspectives, achieving the stated goal of bringing judiciary concerns into the broader internet governance conversation.

How do we protect institutions from cyber threats?

Speaker

Naza Nicholas

Explanation

This was identified as question number three in the introduction, highlighting the need for institutional cybersecurity measures to protect judicial systems

AI and justice – Can we trust machines, machine learning in evidence analysis or sentencing?

Speaker

Naza Nicholas

Explanation

This was identified as question number four, addressing the critical issue of AI reliability in judicial decision-making processes

Training gaps – Judges need continuous specialized training to keep up with emerging tech and things like AI

Speaker

Naza Nicholas

Explanation

This highlights the ongoing need for judicial education and capacity building in digital technologies

What other protocols must be in place to ensure that alleged digital evidence is properly authenticated beyond digital forensics?

Speaker

Participant (Marta)

Explanation

This question arose from the Ola Bini case in Ecuador, emphasizing the need for comprehensive protocols to prevent misuse of digital evidence

How to handle contact information and notification issues in cross-border data processing cases?

Speaker

Adriana Castro

Explanation

This addresses practical challenges in international cooperation for digital evidence collection and data protection compliance

How to protect sensitive personal data during judicial proceedings while ensuring fair trial rights?

Speaker

Adriana Castro

Explanation

This concerns balancing transparency in legal proceedings with privacy protection, especially for sensitive personal information

Development of criminal data protection framework in jurisdictions that lack comprehensive cyber crime laws

Speaker

Jacqueline Pegato

Explanation

This addresses legislative gaps in countries like Brazil that have data protection laws but lack specific criminal frameworks for data-related crimes

How to update outdated legislation to address rapidly evolving digital crimes?

Speaker

Umar Khan

Explanation

This highlights the challenge of keeping legal frameworks current with technological developments in cybercrime

How to establish judicial training programs and capacity building initiatives across different jurisdictions?

Speaker

Multiple speakers (Eliamani Laltaika, Umar Khan)

Explanation

This addresses the urgent need for systematic education of judges and legal professionals in digital evidence and cybersecurity matters

How to improve cooperation between digital platforms and law enforcement agencies for evidence collection in online gender-based violence cases?

Speaker

Marin Ashraf

Explanation

This addresses practical barriers in obtaining digital evidence from social media platforms and service providers for prosecution of online violence cases

Summary

This discussion focused on exploring communication barriers in internet governance by experimenting with multilingual participation rather than defaulting to English as the common language. Virginia (Ginger) Paque, the session moderator, initiated the experiment by suspending the rule of English as the universal language, despite being the only native English speaker among nearly two dozen participants. The session began with various speakers defining internet governance in their preferred languages, with most referencing the WGIG definition that emphasizes multistakeholder collaboration between governments, the private sector, and civil society.

The core experiment involved participants communicating in their native languages to simulate a “Tower of Babel” scenario and observe what challenges and solutions emerged. Several participants reported feeling confused and migraine-inducing chaos when unable to understand others, with people naturally clustering into language groups with speakers they could comprehend. Some participants discovered they were the only representatives of their languages present, including speakers of Maltese, Samoan, Cape Verdean Creole, and Chichewa.

Ken Huang from Lingo AI presented artificial intelligence as a potential solution, explaining that AI can theoretically process all 7,000 human languages but defaults to English and major languages when data sets are insufficient. Other technological solutions discussed included real-time translation devices and the need for better multilingual datasets. Participants debated whether English should remain the de facto international language due to its practical effectiveness, or whether multiple language options should be provided to increase inclusivity.

The discussion revealed the political and cultural complexities of language choice, with examples from India and China where English serves as a neutral option among competing local languages. The experiment ultimately highlighted both the necessity of common communication methods and the potential for technological solutions to bridge linguistic divides in global internet governance discussions.

Keypoints

**Major Discussion Points:**

– **Language barriers in global internet governance discussions** – The session explored how requiring English as a common language excludes voices and creates communication challenges, despite most participants being non-native English speakers

– **Experimental multilingual communication approach** – Participants engaged in a “Tower of Babel” experiment where English was suspended as the required language, allowing people to communicate in their native languages to observe what happens

– **Technology solutions for language barriers** – Discussion of AI translation capabilities, with insights that AI thinks in mathematics rather than any specific language, and exploration of real-time translation tools and their current limitations

– **The politics and practicality of language choice** – Debate over whether English should remain the default international language due to its practical effectiveness versus concerns about linguistic imperialism and the need for more inclusive multilingual options

– **Isolation of minority language speakers** – Recognition that many participants were the sole representatives of their native languages (Maltese, Samoan, various Creoles, etc.), highlighting the challenge of meaningful participation in global forums

**Overall Purpose:**

The discussion aimed to examine and challenge the dominance of English in international internet governance forums by experimenting with multilingual communication approaches and exploring technological and policy solutions to make global discussions more linguistically inclusive.

**Overall Tone:**

The tone began as experimental and somewhat chaotic during the multilingual exercise, with participants reporting confusion and difficulty communicating. However, it evolved into a thoughtful, collaborative discussion as participants shared insights from the experiment. The atmosphere remained respectful and constructive throughout, with genuine curiosity about finding solutions to language barriers, though some participants ultimately concluded that English remains practically necessary for international communication.

Speakers

**Speakers from the provided list:**

– **Virginia (Ginger) Paque**: Diplo, Representative of CADE consortium, native English speaker, session moderator and organizer

– **Abed Kataya**: SMEX, CADE

– **Kenneth Harry Msiska**: Forus, CADE

– **Stephanie Borg Psaila**: Diplo, CADE, Maltese speaker

– **Karolina Iwańska**: ENCL, CADE

– **Slavica Karajicic**: Diplo, Cade

– **Bimsara Malshan**: Fusion, CADE

– **Ken Huang**: Co-founder of Lingo AI, from Singapore Internet Governance Forum

**Additional speakers:**

– **Audience members** (multiple unnamed participants who shared observations during the discussion, including speakers of various languages such as Chinese, German, Samoan, Hindi, Cape Verdean Creole, Chichewa, and others)

– **Una**: Participant from China, involved in language technology research and community language projects

# Report: Experimental Discussion on Multilingual Communication Barriers in Internet Governance

## Executive Summary

This experimental session, moderated by Virginia (Ginger) Paque, explored communication barriers in internet governance forums through a unique “Tower of Babel” approach. The session brought together participants from diverse linguistic backgrounds to examine challenges and potential solutions for multilingual participation in global digital policy discussions. The experiment involved temporarily suspending English as the universal language to allow participants to experience firsthand the communication barriers that typically remain hidden when English dominance is accepted as standard practice.

The session revealed tensions between linguistic inclusivity and practical communication needs, highlighting the complex relationship between language, technology, and global governance. Participants discussed questions of fairness, efficiency, and the role of emerging technologies in bridging linguistic divides.

## Participant Overview and Experimental Context

The discussion featured participants from various linguistic backgrounds, with Virginia (Ginger) Paque serving as moderator. As she noted, “I have spent most of my life speaking Spanish although English is my native language.” Key participants included Abed Kataya, Kenneth Harry Msiska, Stephanie Borg Psaila from Malta, Karolina Iwańska, Slavica Karajicic, Bimsara Malshan, and Ken Huang, co-founder of Lingo AI from the Singapore Internet Governance Forum.

Participants represented languages including Chinese, German, Samoan, Hindi, Cape Verdean Creole, Chichewa, Swahili, and others, creating a genuinely multilingual environment for the experiment.

## Definitions of Internet Governance

Before the multilingual experiment, participants provided definitions of internet governance in their preferred languages. Abed Kataya emphasized comprehensive collaboration, defining it as involving cooperation between government, the private sector, civil society, and technical communities. Kenneth Harry Msiska referenced the WGIG definition, describing it as establishing rules, policies, and procedures applied jointly by all stakeholders.

Stephanie Borg Psaila offered a different perspective, critiquing the terminology itself for overemphasizing government roles with insufficient attention to civil society participation. Other participants provided complementary definitions: Karolina Iwańska emphasized decentralized management, Slavica Karajicic highlighted the multidisciplinary nature encompassing infrastructure, standards, security, law, economics, development, culture, and human rights, and Bimsara Malshan focused on shared principles and decision-making procedures.

## The Tower of Babel Experiment

The session’s central experiment involved encouraging participants to communicate in their native languages to observe emerging challenges and solutions. Paque initiated this experiment despite being a native English speaker, stating her goal was to highlight issues with English dominance.

The immediate results varied among participants. Some reported confusion during the multilingual phase, with one audience member describing the experience as “chaotic” and noting they could only connect with Swahili speakers. However, Paque herself observed that it was quite controlled chaos.

Participants naturally began clustering into linguistic groups, seeking speakers of languages they could understand. Several participants discovered they were the sole representatives of their native languages at the forum, including Borg Psaila as the only Maltese speaker and others representing Samoan, Cape Verdean Creole, and Chichewa.

## Technological Solutions and AI Capabilities

Ken Huang presented insights on artificial intelligence capabilities, explaining that AI can theoretically process all 7,000 human languages but defaults to English and major languages when data sets prove insufficient. He noted that “AI can design their own native computing languages” distinct from human languages, suggesting possibilities for communication systems that transcend traditional linguistic boundaries.

An audience member added that AI “thinks in mathematics and digital proximity” rather than any specific language, making it potentially culturally neutral. However, participants also noted limitations, with current AI speech recognition handling only about 100 languages with limited effectiveness, and 95% of internet language data existing in English.

The discussion revealed that Google Translate is adding “100 languages every year,” showing progress in technological solutions while acknowledging current constraints.

## The English Dominance Discussion

The session revealed different perspectives on English as a common language. After experiencing the multilingual experiment, one participant concluded that “English is the solution for the chaotic Tower of Babel situation.” A Hindi-speaking participant explained that in India’s multilingual context, English serves as a politically neutral option when native languages carry political implications.

Abed Kataya provided historical context, noting that English is “the third most spoken native language globally” following Chinese Mandarin and Spanish, but serves as the current business language due to power structures. He suggested that language dominance follows historical patterns, with different languages serving as lingua francas in different eras.

However, Paque questioned the fairness of requiring English when most participants are non-native speakers. Borg Psaila proposed alternative approaches, suggesting multiple language options with simultaneous interpretation, similar to UN and EU practices.

## Cross-Linguistic Communication Approaches

The discussion explored alternatives to the binary choice between English dominance and multilingual chaos. Participants identified cross-linguistic communication as a promising approach, where speakers of related languages can communicate in their native tongues while understanding responses in different but related languages. Examples mentioned included “Portuñol, Spanglish” as forms of cross-linguistic communication.

One observation noted that when Spanish and Hindi speakers attempted to communicate, some words were “close enough to English” to facilitate understanding, demonstrating natural bridges between languages.

Paque also raised the topic of internationalized domain names as another aspect of multilingual internet governance that requires consideration.

## Areas of Agreement and Disagreement

Participants demonstrated consensus on several issues, including the need for multistakeholder collaboration in internet governance and acknowledgment that language barriers create challenges in international forums. There was also general agreement that AI offers potential for addressing language barriers while facing current limitations.

However, significant disagreements emerged regarding solutions. The most notable disagreement concerned whether to maintain English as the universal solution or implement multiple language options. Borg Psaila advocated for multiple language choices with interpretation, while others defended English as practical and effective.

Disagreements also emerged about AI capabilities, with varying levels of optimism about technological solutions versus emphasis on current limitations.

## Key Insights and Observations

The experimental approach provided several insights into multilingual communication challenges. The session demonstrated that language barriers create genuine difficulties in international forums, though the severity of these challenges varied among participants. The experiment showed how participants naturally seek linguistic connections and form communication clusters.

The discussion highlighted both the practical effectiveness of English as a common language and concerns about fairness when most participants are non-native speakers. Technological solutions emerged as promising but currently limited, particularly for less common languages and oral communication.

The session also revealed that different participants have varying tolerance for multilingual communication challenges, with some finding creative ways to bridge language gaps while others prefer clear common language solutions.

## Conclusion

This experimental session provided insights into the complex challenges of multilingual communication in internet governance forums. By temporarily suspending English dominance, participants experienced linguistic barriers firsthand and explored various approaches to multilingual communication.

While no definitive solutions emerged, the discussion revealed the trade-offs between inclusion and practicality, the potential and limitations of technological solutions, and the varying perspectives on language choice in international forums. The session demonstrated that addressing communication barriers requires balancing practical communication needs with concerns about fairness and inclusion.

The experiment highlighted that meaningful progress on linguistic inclusion may require a willingness to experiment with established practices while acknowledging both practical constraints and equity concerns in international governance processes.

Virginia (Ginger) Paque: Good morning, buenos dias. Hola, como estan? Soy Ginger para el consorcio CADE, where we will all be working together. We’re starting with the proposition that the largest, strongest challenge to multi-stakeholder inclusion and voices in global processes is communication. This challenge predates the digital divide. It underlies the digital divide. So we will now try to work with that problem because principle two resolving that challenge of communication is the fact that the biggest challenge to communication is language. We have been communicating in CAID in English in spite of the fact that out of almost two dozen people, I am the only person who is a native English speaker. Is that fair? We are proposing now for this session to start with a basic discussion of internet governance without the stipulation of English as the imposed common language. So the rule of English as a common language is now suspended. I can speak English because it’s my native language. If English is internative language, there are no rules. There’s a suspended rule. So I invite you all to participate. We will start with our definitions and I invite my colleagues who will start the discussion with internet governance in their own languages and then we will open the floor and ask each of you to be a participant, a panelist, and an active member. Thank you very much and welcome.

Abed Kataya: The internet governance is the development and implementation of the comprehensive government and private sector, civil society and technical society, all in turn, of the principles, standards, rules, and procedures for decision-making and joint activities that form the development of the internet and its use and the setting of programs that define the form of the internet and its use. The internet governance is an essential issue because of the internet’s potential to enhance the sustainable development of humanity and the building of comprehensive knowledge societies and to enhance the free flow of information and ideas all over the world. And now I leave you with my colleague, Kenneth Harry Msiska.

Kenneth Harry Msiska: Thank you very much. According to the WGIG (Working Group on Internet Governance), governance means establishing rules, policies, and appropriate procedures that are applied jointly by all stakeholders—such as governments, companies, and non-governmental organizations—while respecting principles, frameworks, laws, and decision-making processes, as well as policies that promote governance and its effective implementation.

Virginia (Ginger) Paque: The WIEGIG definition of internet governance stipulates that internet governance is the development and application by governments, the private sector, and civil society in their respective roles of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programs that shape the evolution and the use of the internet. The WIEGIG definition of internet governance stipulates that internet governance is the development and application by governments, the private sector, and civil society in their respective roles of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programs that shape the evolution and the use of the internet.

Stephanie Borg Psaila: Internet governance focuses on the role of government in shaping digital policy. The phrase places importance on the role of government in governance, but less on the role of civil society. development and application by governments, the private sector, and civil society in their

Karolina Iwańska: Internet governance uses the same word we would use to describe managing a company, a team, or a crisis. So “Internet governance” emphasizes the decentralized nature of the Internet, rather than its focus on regulations or government institutions.

Slavica Karajicic: Internet governance is the development and application of common principles, norms, rules, decision-making processes and programs that shape the evolution and use of the Internet, by governments, the private sector and civil society, in their specific roles. It is a multidisciplinary field, encompassing many aspects: infrastructure, standards, security, law, economics, development, culture, human rights, etc. (Dictionary of Internet and Communications)

Bimsara Malshan: respective roles of shared principles, norms, rules, decisions-making procedures, and programs that shape the evolution and the use of the internet. The WIEGIG definition of internet governance stipulates that internet governance is the development and application by governments, the private sector, and civil society in their respective roles of shared principles, norms, rules, decisions-making procedures, and programs that shape the evolution and the use of the internet.

Virginia (Ginger) Paque: Thank you very much for listening, we now invite everyone in yours place or get up and join us, the closer you are to the stage, the better talk, the more the camera will capture this experiment in vivo. Again, I’m speaking English because it is my native language, I invite you to remember that we have we suspended English as a common or universal language i invite you to use whatever language, gesture or way of communication that works, we are trying to see what hepen to see what whoul hepeneds if we had honest tower of babel. Would you please join us, I know we have other languages… To simulate what is, how are we going to join silos… There are some questions we are going to consider. This right now is a group exercise, we don’t have individual speakers, we will have individual speakers after this group exercise, so this is a group exercise, so let’s experiment. Okay, I’m hearing a lot of things going on Because of the chaos, which is not that chaotic But I’ve heard a lot of people not understanding each other I invite you to take your places or to stay standing We’ll do a little bit more directed analysis now Where we have people speaking in their own languages Or English or however you want To communicate the best you can As we work out, for instance, any of the questions If I can ask Slavica to please put the questions back on the screen Because that’s where we’ll be going now I hope you have the basic context from our cheat sheet I invite, we have four microphones So if people want to speak, come around But come up this way so the camera can catch you I invite you to tell us your suggestions For instance, I had a gentleman who was I was very pleased, was representing the Chinese language Where are you? He was proposing actually an AI solution I hope you will come up and join us at the mic I invite you to all come up with 30-second interventions Especially representing languages that have not been used And if you have a solution, what worked right now? What didn’t work? Anybody talking sign language? Did anyone find themselves saying, I can’t understand what you’re telling me? So what happened? Come and tell us. 30 seconds each. Come on up. Come and tell us about your solution. You have 30 seconds. Anybody who wants to, mic is open, we have four mics 30 Seconds each to tell us your answers Or your comments. Please go ahead.

Ken Huang: I’m from Lingo AI, I’m the co-founder. We are from the Singapore Internet Governance Forum. We are also the co-founders. So, what language does AI think in? AI is thinking AI can think in every language All 7,000 languages But if we don’t have enough data sets Then it thinks in English And other major languages

Virginia (Ginger) Paque: How interesting. So we have a default language for AI as well

Ken Huang: You know, AI actually can talk in Other than the 7,000 languages. They can design their own Native computing languages. It’s different from human languages

Virginia (Ginger) Paque: And that is such an interesting concept Which is why i invite you all to visit the booth And find out more about this project Because is AI our solution? Is that how we’re going to communicate in the future? What does AI do? So please join the booth to find out more about that possibility Because it’s one of our possible solutions What else do you think? What did you find out? What’s your observation from that flash experiment?

Audience: Excellent experience. Thank you for organizing it It was easy and interesting to find a conversational partner Due to the label So labeling the label of the language that people speak Because majority of people here speak more than one language And we could have had a list of languages On our chests To easily find more communication languages And surprisingly you can find people that speak.

Virginia (Ginger) Paque: What would be the common language? That is very interesting We did encourage people to put their native language Their first language to see the diversity of primary languages But that is an excellent suggestion Because we would have helped direct those silos First of all Which would have formed if we find commonalities And we might also have found That there is an alternative second language Or common language So yes, I like that. Next time we’ll have to try it This is our first experiment We need to know what did you think? What did you hear? What did you find out?

Audience: I have an answer here From the experiment I almost got a migraine Everyone was speaking whatever I was not understanding I was only picking from the Swahili speakers So those are the African languages And from Uganda I think we have the Bantu Or the two languages so they sort of overlap The Spaniards and the rest It’s chaotic.

Virginia (Ginger) Paque: Does anyone dare to share?

Audience: Thank you for the experiment

Virginia (Ginger) Paque: Can you come up so the camera might catch you? Walk up while you’re talking Keep going

Audience: So I saw that during the experiment people from the same nation would gather up Together in small groups like the English speakers I was speaking Chinese with my Chinese fellows I feel like that separates us as a nation Because we would only be in groups of the people we understand So I do think English as a common language Does work in an international context English is the solution for the chaotic Tower of Babel situation So I do think English is the solution for the chaos

Virginia (Ginger) Paque: Thank you What is your native language?

Audience: German but I do speak Chinese

Virginia (Ginger) Paque: So you chose and Chinese is one of the candidates for a common language Except that I have given conferences in situations for Chinese people Who have the common language of English Because they don’t understand each other That happens also in Africa and parts of the US So Samoa, would you please join us? Thank you very much

Audience: Thank you To me it was a confusing one Because I’m the only Samoan here And only me understand my language So in this global platform It should be a common language For all of us can understand each other So as we know that English we say is an international language So we need to learn that so that we can communicate There are some exceptions It depends on the target and the market And the number of people in that space And then you can have that common language Or your native language to communicate But for international ones like here It should be a common language So that we can easily communicate

Virginia (Ginger) Paque: Do I have anyone waiting?

Audience: Hi, so I was talking to the gentleman I don’t know if he’s here He was talking in Spanish and I was talking in Hindi But the thing was some of the words that he was saying Were close enough to English that I could kind of understand So that’s there And then the second thing is in Hindi I don’t even know I looked up what the word for internet is I don’t think there is a word So some of these newer terms there are not even native terms for them that exist And then just coming back to the point of India has so many dialects We have no national language because language is very political And there are some languages like Hindi That seem to be the national language Then there’s pushback from other regions because of culture So English becomes the default language Because it’s politically the most equal So that’s just one point

Virginia (Ginger) Paque: So I have a couple of things Please pardon me for monopolizing the mic And raise your hand when you want to join in Come on up in the meantime English is the de facto second language And perhaps is the best solution because it works There are those who would say English is an imposed language And you use the word political So I ask you to consider And add your comments If you think English has been imposed Or yes, it’s imposed, but it works The other thing I would like to also ask Is how many of you Think you’re the only speaker of your language We know of two, we think Only one Maltese speaker, only one Samoan Only one Polish What language is yours? Can you get to a mic? Can you come up?

Audience: I speak two types of Creole And I think I’m one of the few Cape Verdeans here In Oslo

Virginia (Ginger) Paque: Excellent, so we now have at least four people Who represent, they’re the only representative Of their language That’s a challenge that they have obviously overcome And please feel free to comment And please look for a mic or come up to speak We want to hear your reactions

Audience: I’m from Malawi, and my local language is Chichewa But according to the experience What I try to do is just to use Geese as one of the Speakers of my language And I think that’s a challenge And I think that’s a challenge And I think that’s a challenge And I think that’s a challenge as well as the sign language because I could see like there are different tags so when I look at the person it was just pointing at the language so I could understand like he was telling me like I’m coming from this particular region and what’s your name where are you coming from so it was all about guessing and also about sign language but the experience was so fun and it taught me something that language is the best thing to do more especially in international gatherings like this we need to have a common language common ground which we can use but just like as the portrait of the Tower of Babel if we have different languages it is so hard for us to understand each other and also to pursue a common goal thank you

Virginia (Ginger) Paque: How many people, u,m anyone ready is anyone waiting for a mic please take the mic this is you you are the panellists where are my panellists

Stephanie Borg Psaila: can I hi I’m not only the only one who speaks Maltese I’m probably the only Maltese here right I have never been to an IGF with maybe one or two exceptions where there were other people from Malta at the IGF wherever it’s been organized so I’m a bit isolated but English breaks down that isolation strangely enough it was in Italian that we communicated so we found a second language there or a third I would say I want to challenge the notion of one solution of English being one solution and I would add to our colleague from the Council of Europe who was mentioning choices and I think this is actually the way forward of having choices it is why the UN has several official languages it is why the EU has multiple official language so perhaps rather than saying let’s have English as a common language why not give people more options I’m not saying 1000 option to choose from because that would be taking it a bit too far right but what if in the discussions that we have there are more simultaneous interpretations in at least a handful of different languages that people have choices which language to follow I think we would tick more boxes in terms of participation of people if there were even more languages I’m not expecting any fora to choose Maltese as another possibility that would be wouldn’t make a lot of sense but there are so many other languages which are you know a lot of people know Spanish, Chinese, Swahili, German, French, so many

Virginia (Ginger) Paque: and your point of those of us we can talk to Italians I should explain I spent most of my life speaking Spanish although English is my native language and we have Portunol, Spanglish, well there are many more combinations where we actually do speak our own languages and we are answered in the other language which we can understand so Stephanie that’s an exciting possibility of looking for channels joining in together would you have a comment on that you have you deal with a lot of languages and you had an interesting

Audience: recently I was in a also interesting presentation on large language models and I learned that AI doesn’t think in any language it thinks in terms of maths mathematics the proximity of different notions which are coded in digits so indeed let’s not how to say be fooled by the idea that one language is going to predominate it is mathematics actually all digital or everything which is digital are digits zero or one I think that’s it so it is important to use this platform as I mean the digital world and the AI as a neutral culturally relatively neutral of course it feeds on existing data but that evolves quickly and basically I would say let’s trust and explore this world.

Virginia (Ginger) Paque: and hope that those who are writing the algorithms speak a lot of languages what one I’m sorry for this bad joke I’m going to make at least in digital and binary we only have to learn two letters it’s not like these languages my colleagues just have been speaking that I can’t even read zero and one I can understand anyone else on that and I would go back to a comment do you have a response to that my friend that the AI thank you very much for that addition I think it’s very important to our look search for solutions

Audience: hello everyone my name is Una and I came from China you know in China there’s the official language is Mandarin but actually there are around 60 local languages and nuances and they speak in different ways of the communication so once the Chinese people learning English and when they go to the international platform they are not going to speak and communicate very well because there’s no such very like more practice every day in English so we see that the problem is that not languages is like a barriers it’s not like a barrier not languages is like a barriers it’s not like bridges they can connect everyone that we are in the IGF and we speak different languages around hundreds of languages that hundreds of countries that we are from but we can only speak in English to communicate so we are now do some consumption it’s like how we can connect like speak with our own native languages and we use like some hardwares like earphones can translate all the languages into other native languages let’s see I speak Chinese you speak English and we can understand well in each other native languages so we know that Google Translate has added 100 languages every year for inclusive language development but actually there’s some text to text translation but not on the oral communication so kind of the technologies like AISR can only recognize 100 languages but not in a very high quality that means you cannot rely on that technology so we lack of the data sets because almost 95% of data sets or languages data in the internet is English so the rest of languages and the people are not communicating in their own internet language in the internet that’s the problem so the current logical models understand in English or Spanish or Chinese but not all the other languages so there leads to the buyers that means AI cannot understand your own culture your own native languages or your own native like local like the knowledge there so language is very complex yeah so we are now doing some project research on like community on the community language community side that means all the people from all the world they can contribute their native knowledge in their own native language.

Virginia (Ginger) Paque: that’s amazing that that’s a very eye-opening insight and we really appreciate that especially added to others on that note you mentioned technology and both the advantages of and shortcomings which was excellent I did wonder if we would see people pulling out their phones for Google Translate to help them during the discussion I did not see any cases of that so that’s very interesting if there are techies in the group I I’m always curious whether the use of the internationalized domain names might have so because they they have to rationalize all of these different languages and it comes into I think a combination rather than a dominance because we do of course need our our domain names in languages we can comprehend or we can’t use the internet I have someone else

Abed Kataya: oh yeah it’s me oh so actually uh let me uh explain something that English is the third most spoken language native spoken language in the world it’s not the first one uh the first one is the Chinese Mandarin the second one is Spanish the third one is the English and I think why we are speaking English now especially in the business it’s a business language because it is uh yeah because it is uh like the dominant uh the dominant powers language that’s why and every era has its own language I mean let’s imagine that Arabic has used to be like the dominant language before then Spanish in some eras and then that like so I think maybe next we’re gonna speak Chinese Mandarin we don’t know as our business language.

Virginia (Ginger) Paque: well we definitely have a way forward I would love anyone who can to take but we do need to close the the timer’s yelling at me in red um which makes sense I thank you all for your input we apologize for the chaos but the chaos was important certainly among our thank yous thank you to all of you and we should have a slide with thank you in many languages but I don’t see it thank you to the tech team for supporting us thank you for the online participants who are watching us and can’t raise their voices in whatever language they want thank you all very very much an applause for you

Agreement points

Internet governance requires multi-stakeholder collaboration

Internet governance involves comprehensive collaboration between government, private sector, civil society and technical communities in developing principles and standards

Internet governance establishes rules, policies and procedures applied jointly by all stakeholders while respecting frameworks and decision-making processes

Internet governance is multidisciplinary, encompassing infrastructure, standards, security, law, economics, development, culture and human rights

Internet governance involves shared principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures that shape internet evolution and use

All speakers agree that internet governance fundamentally requires collaboration among multiple stakeholders including governments, private sector, civil society, and technical communities to develop shared principles, norms, and decision-making procedures

Legal and regulatory

Language barriers create significant challenges in international forums

Communication challenge predates and underlies the digital divide, with language being the biggest barrier to communication

Some participants are the only speakers of their native language at international forums, creating isolation

Chaos and confusion result when people cannot understand each other in multilingual settings

Language separation creates national silos where people only communicate within their linguistic groups

Speakers consistently acknowledge that language barriers pose fundamental challenges to effective communication and participation in international internet governance discussions

Sociocultural

Similar viewpoints

Both speakers challenge the dominance of English as the sole common language and advocate for more inclusive multilingual approaches in international forums

English dominance is unfair when only one participant is a native English speaker among dozens

Multiple language options should be provided rather than imposing one common language, similar to UN and EU practices with official languages

Sociocultural

Technology and AI solutions have potential for addressing language barriers but currently face significant limitations due to data bias toward English and major languages

AI can theoretically think in all 7,000 languages but defaults to English and major languages when data sets are insufficient

AI thinks in mathematics and digit proximity rather than any specific language, making it culturally neutral

Current translation technology lacks high-quality oral communication capabilities and sufficient data sets for most languages, with 95% of internet language data being in English

Infrastructure

English functions as a practical common language solution despite not being the most widely spoken native language, serving as a politically neutral option in complex multilingual contexts

English is the third most spoken native language globally, following Chinese Mandarin and Spanish, and serves as the current business language due to dominant power structures

English serves as the de facto second language and works effectively as a practical solution

English functions as a politically neutral default language in multilingual contexts like India where native languages are politically charged

Sociocultural

Unexpected consensus

English as both problem and solution

English dominance is unfair when only one participant is a native English speaker among dozens

English serves as the de facto second language and works effectively as a practical solution

English functions as a politically neutral default language in multilingual contexts like India where native languages are politically charged

English is necessary as a common language for international gatherings to pursue common goals

Despite initial criticism of English dominance, there emerged unexpected consensus that English, while problematic, serves as an effective practical solution for international communication. Even those who challenged its dominance acknowledged its utility

Sociocultural

Technology limitations despite AI potential

AI can theoretically think in all 7,000 languages but defaults to English and major languages when data sets are insufficient

Current translation technology lacks high-quality oral communication capabilities and sufficient data sets for most languages, with 95% of internet language data being in English

Despite presenting AI as a potential solution, there was unexpected consensus that current technology actually reinforces language inequalities due to data bias, making it less viable as an immediate solution than initially suggested

Infrastructure

Overall assessment

Summary

The discussion revealed strong consensus on the fundamental challenges of language barriers in internet governance and the need for multi-stakeholder collaboration, but also unexpected agreement that English, despite its problematic dominance, remains the most practical current solution

Consensus level

High consensus on problem identification and moderate consensus on solutions. The implications suggest that while participants recognize the inequity of English dominance, they also acknowledge practical constraints that make immediate alternatives difficult to implement. This creates a tension between idealistic multilingual goals and pragmatic communication needs in international internet governance forums.

Different viewpoints

English as the universal solution vs. multiple language options

Multiple language options should be provided rather than imposing one common language, similar to UN and EU practices with official languages

English serves as the de facto second language and works effectively as a practical solution

English is necessary as a common language for international gatherings to pursue common goals

Borg Psaila advocates for multiple language choices with simultaneous interpretation in several languages, while audience members argue that English works effectively as a single common language solution for international forums

Sociocultural

Fairness vs. practicality of English dominance

English dominance is unfair when only one participant is a native English speaker among dozens

English serves as the de facto second language and works effectively as a practical solution

English functions as a politically neutral default language in multilingual contexts like India where native languages are politically charged

Paque questions the fairness of English dominance when most participants are non-native speakers, while audience members defend English as a practical and politically neutral solution that works effectively

Sociocultural

AI language capabilities and limitations

AI can theoretically think in all 7,000 languages but defaults to English and major languages when data sets are insufficient

Current translation technology lacks high-quality oral communication capabilities and sufficient data sets for most languages, with 95% of internet language data being in English

Huang presents AI as having broad language capabilities across 7,000 languages, while an audience member emphasizes significant limitations in current AI translation technology, particularly for oral communication and less common languages

Infrastructure

Unexpected differences

Definition emphasis in internet governance

Internet governance focuses primarily on government’s role in shaping digital policy with less emphasis on civil society

Internet governance involves comprehensive collaboration between government, private sector, civil society and technical communities in developing principles and standards

Internet governance emphasizes decentralized management rather than focusing on regulations or government institutions

While most speakers provided standard multi-stakeholder definitions of internet governance, Borg Psaila uniquely critiqued the terminology itself for overemphasizing government roles. This was unexpected as it challenged the fundamental framing rather than just the content of internet governance definitions

Legal and regulatory

Historical context of language dominance

English is the third most spoken native language globally, following Chinese Mandarin and Spanish, and serves as the current business language due to dominant power structures

English serves as the de facto second language and works effectively as a practical solution

Kataya’s historical perspective on language dominance cycles (Arabic, Spanish, English, potentially Chinese) was unexpected as it reframed the English dominance debate from a practical communication issue to a broader discussion of power structures and historical patterns

Sociocultural

Overall assessment

Summary

The main areas of disagreement center on language solutions for international communication, with fundamental tensions between fairness/inclusion versus practicality/efficiency, and between single-language versus multi-language approaches

Disagreement level

Moderate to high disagreement with significant implications. The disagreements reveal deeper tensions about power structures, cultural representation, and practical governance in international forums. These disagreements could impact policy decisions about language accommodation, technology investment priorities, and the fundamental approach to inclusive participation in internet governance processes

Partial agreements

Similar viewpoints

Both speakers challenge the dominance of English as the sole common language and advocate for more inclusive multilingual approaches in international forums

English dominance is unfair when only one participant is a native English speaker among dozens

Multiple language options should be provided rather than imposing one common language, similar to UN and EU practices with official languages

Sociocultural

Technology and AI solutions have potential for addressing language barriers but currently face significant limitations due to data bias toward English and major languages

AI can theoretically think in all 7,000 languages but defaults to English and major languages when data sets are insufficient

AI thinks in mathematics and digit proximity rather than any specific language, making it culturally neutral

Current translation technology lacks high-quality oral communication capabilities and sufficient data sets for most languages, with 95% of internet language data being in English

Infrastructure

English functions as a practical common language solution despite not being the most widely spoken native language, serving as a politically neutral option in complex multilingual contexts

English is the third most spoken native language globally, following Chinese Mandarin and Spanish, and serves as the current business language due to dominant power structures

English serves as the de facto second language and works effectively as a practical solution

English functions as a politically neutral default language in multilingual contexts like India where native languages are politically charged

Sociocultural

Key takeaways

Language barriers are a fundamental challenge in global internet governance that predates and underlies the digital divide

English dominance in international forums creates unfairness when most participants are non-native speakers

Multilingual communication without a common language leads to chaos and formation of linguistic silos where people only communicate within their language groups

Many participants at international forums are isolated as the sole representatives of their native languages

Internet governance is defined as a multistakeholder process involving governments, private sector, civil society, and technical communities in developing shared principles and standards

AI and technology offer potential solutions but currently default to English due to insufficient data sets in other languages, with 95% of internet language data being in English

English serves as a practical common language solution despite being imposed, functioning as a politically neutral option in multilingual contexts

Cross-linguistic communication is possible between related languages where speakers can understand each other while using their native tongues

Resolutions and action items

Participants were invited to visit the AI booth to learn more about technological solutions for language barriers

Suggestion to implement language labeling systems in future experiments to help people find common communication languages

Proposal to provide multiple language options with simultaneous interpretation in several major languages rather than imposing one common language

Community-based projects should be developed to allow people to contribute native knowledge in their own languages to address AI language bias

Unresolved issues

Whether English should continue as the imposed common language or if alternative multilingual approaches should be adopted

How to address the technological limitations of current translation systems, particularly for oral communication

How to develop sufficient data sets for the thousands of underrepresented languages in AI systems

How to balance practical communication needs with linguistic diversity and cultural preservation in international forums

Whether AI will eventually provide a universal solution to language barriers or if human-centered approaches are needed

How to address the political and cultural implications of language dominance in global governance

What the future common language might be as global power structures shift (Chinese Mandarin was suggested as a possibility)

Suggested compromises

Providing multiple language options with simultaneous interpretation in several major languages instead of enforcing one common language

Using language labeling systems to help participants identify shared languages and form communication bridges

Accepting English as a practical solution while acknowledging its imposed nature and working toward more inclusive alternatives

Leveraging AI and technology as culturally neutral tools while building better data sets for underrepresented languages

Allowing cross-linguistic communication where speakers of related languages can communicate in their native tongues while understanding each other

Combining technological solutions with human-centered approaches to address both practical and cultural needs

So what language does AI think in? AI is thinking AI can think in every language All 7,000 languages But if we don’t have enough data sets Then it thinks in English And other major languages… AI actually can talk in Other than the 7,000 languages They can design their own Native computing languages It’s different from human languages

Speaker

Ken Huang

Reason

This comment fundamentally reframes the language barrier discussion by introducing AI as both a potential solution and a new complexity. It reveals that AI has its own linguistic limitations (defaulting to English due to data availability) while also having capabilities beyond human languages through native computing languages.

Impact

This shifted the conversation from purely human-centered language solutions to technological possibilities. It prompted Virginia to immediately recognize this as a potential solution worth exploring further, leading to discussion about visiting their booth and whether ‘AI is our solution’ for future communication.

I almost got a migraine Everyone was speaking whatever I was not understanding I was only picking from the Swahili speakers So those are the African languages… It’s chaotic

Speaker

Audience member

Reason

This brutally honest reaction captures the real human cost of language barriers – the physical and emotional stress of being excluded from communication. It provides visceral evidence of why the Tower of Babel experiment was meaningful.

Impact

This comment grounded the theoretical discussion in lived experience, validating the premise that language barriers create genuine suffering and exclusion. It reinforced the urgency of finding solutions and made the abstract concept of communication challenges tangible.

So I do think English as a common language Does work in an international context English is the solution for the chaotic Tower of Babel situation So I do think English is the solution for the chaos

Speaker

German/Chinese speaking audience member

Reason

Coming from someone whose native language is German but who chose to communicate in Chinese during the experiment, this represents a pragmatic conclusion based on direct experience. It’s particularly insightful because it comes from someone who experienced the chaos firsthand and made a reasoned choice.

Impact

This comment introduced the first strong argument for English as a practical solution, setting up a debate between idealism (multilingual inclusion) and pragmatism (English as lingua franca) that continued throughout the discussion.

And then just coming back to the point of India has so many dialects We have no national language because language is very political… English becomes the default language Because it’s politically the most equal

Speaker

Hindi-speaking audience member

Reason

This comment reveals the deep political dimensions of language choice, showing how English can paradoxically serve as a neutral option when local languages carry political baggage. It also highlights how newer concepts like ‘internet’ may not have native language equivalents.

Impact

This shifted the discussion from viewing English as purely imposed to understanding it as sometimes politically neutral. It introduced the concept of language politics and the practical reality that technical terms often lack native equivalents, adding nuance to the debate.

I want to challenge the notion of one solution of English being one solution… why not give people more options… what if in the discussions that we have there are more simultaneous interpretations in at least a handful of different languages that people have choices

Speaker

Stephanie Borg Psaila

Reason

This comment reframes the entire debate from a binary choice (English vs. native languages) to a multiple-choice solution. Drawing on UN and EU models, it offers a practical middle ground that acknowledges both inclusion needs and practical constraints.

Impact

This comment elevated the discussion from either/or thinking to both/and solutions, introducing the concept of strategic multilingualism. It moved the conversation toward more sophisticated policy solutions rather than simple language dominance.

AI doesn’t think in any language it thinks in terms of maths mathematics the proximity of different notions which are coded in digits… it is mathematics actually all digital or everything which is digital are digits zero or one… let’s trust and explore this world

Speaker

Audience member

Reason

This comment provides a fundamental insight into how AI actually processes language – not linguistically but mathematically. It suggests that digital solutions might be culturally neutral in ways human languages cannot be.

Impact

This deepened the technological discussion by explaining the mathematical foundation of AI language processing. It offered hope for truly neutral communication tools while also prompting Virginia’s humorous observation that binary language only requires learning ‘two letters.’

Almost 95% of data sets or languages data in the internet is English so the rest of languages and the people are not communicating in their own internet language… AI cannot understand your own culture your own native languages or your own native like local like the knowledge

Speaker

Una from China

Reason

This comment exposes the fundamental data bias in AI systems and connects it to cultural preservation. It reveals how technological solutions may perpetuate rather than solve linguistic inequality, while also describing community-based solutions.

Impact

This comment brought the discussion full circle by showing how even technological solutions reflect existing power imbalances. It introduced the concept of community-driven language preservation and highlighted the cultural dimensions of the digital divide.

Overall assessment

These key comments transformed what began as an experimental demonstration into a sophisticated multilayered discussion about language, power, technology, and inclusion. The conversation evolved from experiencing the chaos of multilingual communication to exploring three distinct solution pathways: pragmatic acceptance of English dominance, strategic multilingualism with multiple official languages, and technological solutions through AI. The most impactful comments revealed the political dimensions of language choice, the limitations and possibilities of AI solutions, and the deep connection between language access and cultural preservation. Together, they demonstrated that the language barrier in global governance is not just a communication problem but a complex intersection of politics, technology, culture, and power that requires nuanced, multi-pronged solutions rather than simple universal fixes.

Is AI our solution for multilingual communication? How will we communicate in the future using AI?

Speaker

Virginia (Ginger) Paque

Explanation

This question emerged after Ken Huang presented AI’s capability to think in multiple languages, prompting exploration of whether AI could solve multilingual communication challenges in global governance

What language does AI think in, and how does it handle the 7,000 human languages?

Speaker

Ken Huang

Explanation

This raises important questions about AI’s linguistic capabilities and limitations, particularly regarding data sets and default languages in AI systems

How can we develop better oral communication translation technology beyond current text-to-text translation?

Speaker

Una (from China)

Explanation

Current AI speech recognition can only handle about 100 languages with limited quality, creating a gap in real-time multilingual communication

How can we address the data imbalance where 95% of internet language data is in English?

Speaker

Una (from China)

Explanation

This imbalance affects AI’s ability to understand and process non-English languages and cultures, creating barriers to inclusive communication

Could internationalized domain names provide insights for multilingual internet governance?

Speaker

Virginia (Ginger) Paque

Explanation

Domain names must work across different languages and writing systems, potentially offering lessons for broader multilingual communication solutions

How can we create community-driven projects where people contribute native knowledge in their own languages?

Speaker

Una (from China)

Explanation

This addresses the need for more inclusive data collection and knowledge sharing that preserves cultural and linguistic diversity

What would happen if we provided multiple language options with simultaneous interpretation rather than defaulting to English?

Speaker

Stephanie Borg Psaila

Explanation

This challenges the single-language approach and explores how offering choices in major languages could improve participation in global forums

How can we better utilize cross-language communication where people speak their native language and understand responses in another language?

Speaker

Virginia (Ginger) Paque and Stephanie Borg Psaila

Explanation

This explores the phenomenon of asymmetric multilingual communication as a potential solution to language barriers

Is English an imposed language or simply the most practical solution for international communication?

Speaker

Virginia (Ginger) Paque

Explanation

This addresses the political and practical dimensions of language choice in global governance, questioning whether English dominance is problematic or pragmatic

Summary

This discussion, titled “Update Required,” focused on ensuring tech companies respect international humanitarian law and evolving standards regarding private sector roles in armed conflicts. The panel featured experts Marwa Fatafta from Access Now, Chantal Joris from Article 19, and Kiran Aziz from KLP, a Norwegian pension fund, discussing corporate accountability in conflict zones.

Fatafta emphasized that tech companies are never neutral actors in armed conflicts, outlining three ways they contribute to harm: directly causing human rights violations through censorship, providing technological assistance to military forces, and mirroring state policies of discrimination. She cited examples from Gaza, including Google and Amazon’s Project Nimbus providing cloud services to Israeli military, and Microsoft supplying engineering services to defense units. Despite civil society pressure, she noted no meaningful positive changes in corporate behavior, with companies increasingly dropping voluntary commitments against military AI development.

Joris explained the legal framework, noting that both international humanitarian law and human rights law apply during conflicts, with enforcement primarily through international criminal law and domestic courts. She highlighted challenges in attribution and evidence gathering, particularly as tech companies become more integrated with military operations. The discussion revealed that corporate executives could theoretically face liability under international criminal law, though few precedents exist.

Aziz described investor perspectives, explaining how institutional investors rely on public information and civil society reports to assess risks. She noted the extreme difficulty in engaging tech companies compared to traditional sectors, leading to exclusions from investment portfolios when companies fail to respond to human rights concerns. The panel concluded that stronger government regulation, transparency requirements, and strategic litigation are essential for meaningful corporate accountability in the tech sector.

Keypoints

## Major Discussion Points:

– **Tech companies’ direct involvement in armed conflicts**: Discussion of how technology companies are not neutral actors but actively contribute to conflicts through providing cloud computing services, AI tools, facial recognition technologies, and other services to military forces, with specific examples from the Gaza conflict including Google’s Project Nimbus and Microsoft’s engineering services to Israeli military units.

– **Legal frameworks and enforcement challenges**: Examination of how international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law apply to tech companies, the difficulties in establishing corporate accountability under current legal systems, and the potential for strategic litigation through domestic courts, international criminal law, and investor pressure.

– **Corporate transparency and due diligence failures**: Analysis of tech companies’ extremely low response rates to civil society inquiries (4% compared to 26% for companies in Russia/Ukraine conflicts), their refusal to conduct meaningful human rights due diligence, and their lack of transparency about operations in conflict zones.

– **Evidence requirements for accountability**: Discussion of what types of evidence are needed to hold tech companies accountable, including impact stories, corporate relationship mapping, government contract transparency, and the burden of proof challenges in different legal contexts.

– **Increasing militarization of civilian tech**: Concern about the trend of tech companies dropping voluntary commitments against military applications, forming partnerships with defense contractors, and executives joining military units, blurring the lines between civilian technology and military operations.

## Overall Purpose:

The discussion aimed to explore avenues for ensuring tech companies respect international humanitarian law and to develop strategies for corporate accountability in the technology sector’s role in armed conflicts. The session sought to identify enforcement mechanisms, evidence requirements, and collaborative approaches between civil society, investors, and legal systems to address the largely unchecked influence of tech companies in conflict situations.

## Overall Tone:

The discussion maintained a serious, urgent, and somewhat frustrated tone throughout. Speakers expressed deep concern about the lack of corporate accountability and transparency, with particular frustration about companies’ unwillingness to engage meaningfully with civil society. The tone was analytical and solution-oriented, with participants sharing expertise and brainstorming practical approaches, but there was an underlying sense of urgency given the ongoing conflicts and the increasing integration of technology into warfare. The atmosphere was collaborative among panelists and audience members, united in their concern about the current state of corporate responsibility in the tech sector.

Speakers

– **Meredith Veit**: Session moderator, leads the discussion on tech companies and international humanitarian law

– **Marwa Fatafta**: From Access Now, leads policy and advocacy work on digital rights in the Middle East and North Africa, has written extensively on digital occupation in Palestine and focuses on the role of new technologies in armed conflicts

– **Kiran Aziz**: Representative from KLP (Norwegian pension fund), works on investor engagement and exclusion policies related to human rights violations

– **Chantal Joris**: From Article 19, senior legal officer focusing on platform regulation and freedom of expression

– **Audience**: Multiple audience members who asked questions during the Q&A session

**Additional speakers:**

– **Dr. Pichamon Yeophantong**: Mentioned multiple times in transcript but role/expertise not clearly defined

– **Phillipe Stoll**: Mentioned multiple times in transcript but role/expertise not clearly defined

– **Jalal Abukhater**: Mentioned in transcript but role/expertise not clearly defined

– **Annette Esserhausen**: Audience member, works with the Association for Progressive Communications

– **Monika Ermert**: Audience member, reporter

– **Audrey Moklay**: Audience member, from Open Mic

– **Sadhana**: Audience member who asked a question about the Genocide Convention

# Update Required: Ensuring Tech Companies Respect International Humanitarian Law

## Executive Summary

The panel discussion “Update Required” examined the critical issue of ensuring technology companies comply with international humanitarian law in armed conflicts. Moderated by Meredith Veit, the session brought together experts including Marwa Fatafta from Access Now, who leads policy and advocacy work on digital rights in the Middle East and North Africa; Chantal Joris from Article 19, focusing on platform regulation and freedom of expression; and Kiran Aziz from KLP, a Norwegian pension fund, who works on investor engagement regarding human rights violations.

The discussion revealed that technology companies are increasingly active participants in armed conflicts rather than neutral service providers. A particularly striking finding was the dramatically low response rate from tech companies to accountability inquiries—only 4% compared to 26% for similar outreach regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The panel explored multiple avenues for accountability, from legal frameworks to investor pressure, while acknowledging significant barriers including corporate opacity and government protection of domestic tech companies.

*Note: This summary is based on a transcript with significant technical issues and garbled sections, particularly affecting the complete capture of some speakers’ contributions.*

## The Challenge of Tech Company Neutrality

Marwa Fatafta fundamentally challenged the notion of tech company neutrality, stating: “Tech companies are never neutral actors in situations of armed conflict. They exacerbate the dynamics of the conflict and sometimes even drive them or fuel them, particularly in contexts where there are asymmetries of power between warring parties.”

Fatafta outlined three primary ways tech companies contribute to harm in conflict zones:

**Direct Human Rights Violations**: Companies engage in systematic censorship and content removal that mirrors state policies of discrimination. In the Palestine context, this includes widespread removal of Palestine-related content and suppression of documentation of human rights violations.

**Technological Assistance to Military Forces**: Fatafta provided specific examples from the Gaza conflict, including Google and Amazon’s Project Nimbus, described as a $1.2 billion contract providing cloud computing services to the Israeli military, and Microsoft’s provision of 19,000 hours of engineering and consultancy services to Israeli defense units including “Unit A200 and Unit 9900.”

**Mirroring State Policies**: Technology companies replicate discriminatory state policies through their service provision, including differential geographic service availability and varying representations of occupied territories.

## The Militarization Trend

A concerning development highlighted by Fatafta was the increasing militarization of civilian technology companies: “There’s a surge in increasing militarization of civilian tech… both Google and OpenAI have both quietly dropped their voluntary commitments earlier this year not to build AI for military use or surveillance purposes.”

She also noted the direct integration of tech executives into military structures: “Senior executives from high-tech firms, specifically Meta, OpenAI and Palantir, are joining the US Army Reserve at a new unit called Executive Innovation Corp.”

This trend represents a fundamental shift in the technology sector’s relationship with military operations, moving from maintaining ethical boundaries to actively pursuing defense partnerships.

## Legal Framework Perspectives

Chantal Joris provided legal context on how international humanitarian law applies to technology companies, though the transcript quality limits the complete capture of her contributions. She discussed the potential for corporate executives to face liability under international criminal law, noting that “corporate executives, in theory, under the very, very high thresholds that are under the Rome Statute could be liable under international criminal law.”

Joris emphasized the importance of government transparency, noting that many service contracts fall under national security exemptions, limiting access to crucial evidence needed for accountability efforts.

## The Accountability Gap

Perhaps the most striking revelation was the extent of corporate resistance to accountability measures. As noted in the opening remarks, there was “an astonishingly low 4% response rate from companies,” which was described as “unprecedented,” particularly when compared to the 26% response rate for similar outreach regarding tech companies operating in Russia and Ukraine.

Fatafta noted that even when companies claim to conduct human rights due diligence, these processes are fundamentally flawed: “Even when companies claim to conduct audits, they lack insight into how their technologies are used, making due diligence ineffective.”

## Investor Perspectives

Kiran Aziz provided insights into how institutional investors approach tech company accountability. She explained that “institutional investors rely on long-term perspectives that incorporate material risks including human rights violations as financial risks.”

However, investors face significant challenges due to corporate opacity: “Investors depend heavily on civil society reports and public domain information since companies provide inadequate reporting on human rights impacts.”

Aziz noted that “exclusion of companies from investment portfolios can be effective when done transparently with public documentation of reasons,” but emphasized that “tech companies are increasingly difficult to engage with compared to traditional sectors, often only referencing policies without discussing concrete matters.”

## Government Protection and Political Barriers

The discussion revealed how government policies actively shield tech companies from accountability measures. Fatafta highlighted the political dimensions: “The Trump administration is taking an extremely protectionist approach to their tech sector… they will not grant visas to foreign officials who have mandated quote-unquote censorship by these companies.”

This government protection creates significant barriers to international accountability efforts and reflects the strategic importance of tech companies to national competitiveness.

## Evidence and Documentation Challenges

The discussion emphasized the critical importance of evidence gathering for accountability efforts. Audience members stressed the need for:

– **Impact stories** showing how specific corporate actions led to concrete human rights violations

– **Corporate relationship mapping** to understand broader patterns of partnerships

– **Hard evidence** including contracts and internal communications for litigation

– **Risk assessment documentation** for investor engagement

The challenge is that different accountability mechanisms require different types of evidence, but corporate opacity makes gathering any form of evidence extremely difficult.

## Audience Engagement and Practical Concerns

Significant portions of the discussion involved audience questions and responses, reflecting concerns about:

– The effectiveness of different accountability mechanisms

– The role of documentation in building cases against tech companies

– Strategies for overcoming corporate resistance to engagement

– The adequacy of current legal frameworks for addressing tech sector challenges

## Areas of Consensus

Despite different professional backgrounds, the panelists demonstrated consensus on several critical issues:

– Tech companies are not neutral actors in conflicts

– Voluntary corporate responsibility frameworks have failed

– Corporate transparency is inadequate, with unprecedented resistance to accountability

– Current due diligence frameworks are insufficient for the tech sector

– The militarization trend is deeply concerning

## Unresolved Challenges

The discussion highlighted several unresolved questions:

– How to effectively regulate US-based tech companies given government protectionism

– What burden of proof standards should apply to corporate due diligence

– How to address attribution challenges when tech executives integrate into military structures

– How to access information protected under national security classifications

## Conclusion

The “Update Required” discussion revealed the significant challenges in holding technology companies accountable for their roles in armed conflicts. The combination of corporate resistance, government protection, and inadequate legal frameworks creates substantial barriers to accountability.

The speakers’ consensus suggests that incremental reforms are insufficient and that systemic change is required, including new legal frameworks specifically designed for the tech sector and coordinated international action. The path forward requires acknowledging that tech companies are active conflict participants and developing appropriate accountability mechanisms.

The discussion’s title proves apt—an update is indeed required not just for tech companies’ practices, but for the entire ecosystem of accountability mechanisms needed to address the unprecedented challenges posed by the technology sector’s role in armed conflicts.

*This summary reflects the content available in the provided transcript, which contained significant technical issues and incomplete sections that may have affected the complete capture of all speakers’ contributions.*

Meredith Veit: Welcome to the session, Update Required. We’re going to discuss avenues for ensuring that tech companies respect international humanitarian law, as well as evolving international norms and standards regarding the role of private sector actors in conflict. I have three fantastic experts here that are going to help guide us through the discussion today. Get prepared. This is going to be quite active. We have mics here on either side of the room. So we expect a lot of audience participation, given all the expertise as well out there and online. First we have Marwa Fatafta from Access Now. She leads their policy and advocacy work on digital rights in the Middle East and North Africa. And she’s written extensively on the digital occupation in Palestine and focuses on the role of new technologies in armed conflicts. We also have Chantal Jordis from Article 19. She is a senior legal officer focusing on platform regulation and freedom of expression in… Meredith Veit, Marwa Fatafta, Dr. Pichamon Yeophantong, Kiran Aziz, Phillipe Stoll, Dr. Pichamon Yeophantong, Kiran Aziz, Phillipe Stoll, Dr. Pichamon Yeophantong, Kiran Aziz, Phillipe Stoll, Dr. Pichamon Yeophantong, Kiran Aziz, Phillipe Stoll, Dr. Pichamon Yeophantong, the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. In 2014, we conducted a survey on heightened and Dr. Pichamon Yeophantong. We have a total of 70 human rights due diligence with over 104 technology companies operating in or providing services to the occupied Palestinian territories and or Israel, and only three companies got back to us in detail actually responding to the questions of the survey, making it nearly impossible to actually determine if and how heightened human rights due diligence is actually occurring at all in a context that has long been exposed to conflict related risk. We have also reached out to a number of tech companies in the Middle East. We have also reached out to a number of tech companies in the Middle East. An astonishingly low 4% response rate from companies is unprecedented in the resource center’s history, and previously we had sent a similar survey to tech companies that were operating in Russia and Ukraine, and 26% had responded by comparison, and, of course, both of these numbers are abysmally low, 26% and 4%, which means we need more transparency about what is happening in around the world, where the conflict is taking place and what the impact is looking like upon Afghanistan. One thing I will note is that USAID and hundreds of oil companies are working together. In Afghanistan, so for instance, with coal companies, we have no threat to Iran. We have no threat to earthquakes or lagoons. We have no threat to Gaza or 2006. One other thing I will notice is that companies are profiting from conflicts but they are exacerbating them, further hurt-earning harms. We don’t have a handful of instances where we have seen corporate accountability for aiding war crimes and crimes against humanity playing out in courts and boardrooms, whether it’s convictions or sanctions and they are really rolling back their collectively to uphold their principal principles. We’re going to talk about a few of these. and Dr. Pichamon Yeophantong. We are excited to be here today. We have heard a lot of things today such as governments placing export controls on companies that are selling dual-use tech to maligned actors. There’s currently a stakeholder resolution before Alphabet requesting that the company carry out heightened human rights due diligence regarding its operations in conflict zones. And there are a number of Norwegian investors, some of which borrowed laws due diligence from all Western governments over their misconduct in relation to conflict in international law. And while these examples are incredibly important and noteworthy, and hopefully we surface even more examples during this discussion today, these should not be the exception. Guaranteeing that tech companies are not involved in breaching international humanitarian law should be the minimum requirement. And for the tech sector, we have yet to set a strong enough precedent for accountability, and therefore it is not possible to say that no major tech companies or executives have been criminally convicted for violating international humanitarian law, although there is mounting evidence, and as we know, tech companies are not neutral actors in many conflicts. So we’re going to spend the rest of our time today, about 50 minutes, discussing this topic together and diving into more about what’s needed for greater corporate accountability for the tech sector’s largely unchecked and increasingly powerful and pervasive role in conflict. So we can start off with our expert interventions, and then we’ll open up to the floor to talk a bit further together. So first I’ll start off all the way to my left with Marwa, asking her to kick us off. Can you reflect a little bit more on different ways in which tech companies have been involved in conflict, and have we seen any meaningful positive change in regard to corporate behavior in response to civil society or regulatory pressure?

Marwa Fatafta: Thank you very much, Meredith, and thanks, everyone, for attending this session. I will start with the point you ended with, to emphasise on the fact that tech companies are never neutral actors in situations of armed conflict. They exacerbate the dynamics of the conflict and sometimes even drive them or fuel them, particularly in contexts where there are asymmetries of power between warring parties. They can facilitate human rights abuses or even in some cases contribute to atrocity crimes. I have been primarily focused on the unfolding genocide in Gaza over the past year and a half. Most of my examples will derive from this particular context, which is important because in some ways it might be a foreshadow to the future of cyber warfare and the involvement of tech companies. I will expand on that in due course. I can summarise the ways in which tech companies have been involved in conflict in three notable patterns. Firstly, tech companies can be responsible for directly causing adverse human rights impacts that undermine or violate people’s rights, including the right to freedom of expression, the right to a peaceful association and assembly, the right to bodily security, non-discrimination, among other rights encoded and enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and also economic, social and cultural rights. An example of that is what you mentioned with regards to censorship by social media companies and the systematic removal of Palestine-related content online. The second trend is that some companies indeed can contribute to adverse impacts via third parties, such as, for example, the Israeli government or another military. Companies provide direct technological assistance, products, services in the context of Gaza. This includes cloud computing services, AI tools such as LLMs, facial recognition technologies, among others, which have been linked to egregious violations of international law, gross human rights abuses, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and possibly the crime of genocide, which is pending before the International Court of Justice. And here I want to mention maybe just a few examples. We know, for instance, that Google and Amazon, they have this $1.2 billion project providing a national cloud service or infrastructure to the Israeli government called Project Nimbus. During the war, the start of the war, those services have surged in demand. So we know that Google has deepened its business relationship with Israel, particularly with the Ministry of Defense in March 2024, and provided them with a landing zone. They even created, according to media reports, a classified team composed of Israeli nationals with security clearances specifically tasked with receiving sensitive information from the Israeli government and also to provide specialized training with government security agencies and participate in joint drills and scenarios tailored to specific threats. Amazon Web Services also had provided, according to media reports, provided Israel’s military intelligence with server farms that allow for endless storage for mass surveillance data that Israel has gathered on almost everyone in the Gaza Strip. And beyond supplying cloud infrastructure, according to media investigations, they have, on occasion, Dr Pichamon Yeophantong, Kiran Aziz, Phillipe Stoll, Meredith Veit, Jalal Abukhater, Dr. This is just to demonstrate that the services they provide are substantial in nature, indicated by the surge and high demand that we’ve seen across these different companies. And also another point that I would like to mention is that this is not only about providing technological support, but actually providing human resources, trainings, joint exercises, for example, some leaked documents from Microsoft had shown that the Israeli Ministry of Defense had purchased approximately 19,000 hours of engineering and consultancy services from Microsoft. And Microsoft teams had provided on-site, so on military basis, as well as assistance, and remotely to the IDF, including to units called Unit A200 and Unit 9900, which are notorious for surveillance and military surveillance in particular. A third trend or way in which the companies or tech companies can or are involved in armed conflict is sometimes the companies can contribute to adverse impacts in parallel with a third party, in this case, you know, with the Israeli government or the military, leading to cumulative impacts. For instance, a number of tech companies have mirrored Israel’s state policy of apartheid and segregation in the way they provide or prohibit or withdraw their services to the Palestinians. One clear example of that is, for instance, Google Maps, which if you use it in the West Bank or in the occupied Palestinian territories, it only treats you as if you are an Israeli settler. So you’re only given roads and maps that connect Israeli settlements, but you’re not given any roads between, for example, Palestinian towns or villages, putting people at direct risk, safety risk. PayPal is another interesting example, where if you are an Israeli settler living in an illegal settlement, you can access, for example, PayPal financial services. But if you’re a Palestinian, you’re deprived of that service, which contributes to the development of the Palestinian communities and economy, something that has been written about by the World Bank and other UN agencies, showing again the degree in which these tech companies, by depriving or refusing to provide their services for whatever reason, to communities that are going through a situation of military occupation, for instance, can contribute to the cumulative impact of the occupying power or the policies that they have enshrined in that area. To your question, have we seen any positive shifts? Quick answer, no. Unfortunately, and particularly in the Palestine context, the survey that you have shared in the beginning is really an experience that we share ourselves. We have written letters and have tried to meaningfully engage with tech companies to point out, first to point and show evidence, a body of evidence of the harms that they are directly or indirectly contributing to. But most of those attempts have gone unproductively. We haven’t gotten any productive answers from the companies with regards to their conduct, or, for instance, they were unable to even answer very simple questions such as have you conducted a heightened human rights due diligence in order to mitigate and identify and mitigate such harms? There’s zero transparency with regards to that conduct. But also, even when they do succumb to pressure, for example, Microsoft had recently issued a statement after a year and a half of public mobilization, not only from civil society, but particularly from their tech workers, in which they said, well, we conducted an audit to see whether our technologies have contributed to harm or targeting of civilians in the Gaza Strip. And while we don’t have an insight into how our technologies are used by Israel, especially in air-gapped military bases, we concluded that we have not contributed to any harm. And that contradiction in itself shows you how even UNGPs have, you know, when companies say we’re going to do a heightened human rights due diligence, that results in a box-sticking exercise where they really don’t have any insight or ability to control how their technologies are being used. Finally, I do want to end on a note that I think quite the opposite of what, where or where we want to see companies going. There’s a surge in increasing militarization of civilian tech provided by those companies. For example, both Google and OpenAI have both quietly dropped their voluntary commitments earlier this year not to build AI for military use or surveillance purposes, signaling their readiness to deepen their ties with the arms industry. Within a month of amending its AI principles, Google signed a formal partnership with Lockheed Martin, one of the biggest defence contractors in the world. Open AI, which maintains a non-profit status, also announced a partnership with a defence tech company called Anduril to deploy its technologies in the battlefield. Anduril and Meta are also partnering to design, build and field a range of integrated virtual reality products for the US military. And last week, there was a very disturbing announcement that senior executives from high-tech firms, specifically Meta, Open AI and Palantir, are joining the US Army Reserve at a new unit called Executive Innovation Corp. In the rank of lieutenant colonels to provide tech advice for the US military. So there we see a trend where not only tech companies are providing militaries with their services, but are actually possibly even combatants or taking an active role in the military, which has implications that Chantal maybe can…

Meredith Veit: This is a perfect segue. Thanks, Marwa. Chantal, can you tell us a little bit more about amongst these blurred lines and confusing commitments and changing the definition of what actually is a tech company, what is a defence company and are they one and the same now? What does the hard law actually tell us when we’re talking about international humanitarian law and what friction exists in applying IHL to companies and how does this relate to other existing frameworks that should be helping to guide states and companies like international human rights law? Thank you, Meredith, and thanks everyone for joining.

Chantal Joris: I will try to unpack some of these questions a little bit. I think there’s a few interesting developments also that Marwa mentioned. One thing I remember, I believe it was in Washington Post, where there was the the headline of the the social media company Meta is providing these like virtual reality products for For the US military and I was like well Is it then still really a social network like these these companies are clearly merging into something? So so much bigger and that has obviously been going on for a long time and and also when we look at this increased integration into the military Legally speaking, I think it also raises some quite significant questions around Attribution. So we think about you know, where does it sit and does it become a state obligation if a Meta executive? Operates within the military then again, okay He might be a combatant but also it gives rise to to state obligations directly So I think yeah There’s a lot of questions that that are based on the facts that that become Become more merged and and become more complicated to answer Maybe I will first talk a little bit about the the legal obligations and then about thoughts when it comes to enforcement and I think we need to look at so both international humanitarian law and human rights law because in a sense they They are different in their application and although they’ve both applied during armed conflicts, but also in that sense they there’s different opportunities for For enforcement and accountability, I would say So for example when when it comes to humanitarian law, of course It starts applying in in times of armed conflict non-international armed conflict international armed conflict And it’s actually more sort of used to apply to actors that are also not state actors So be like non non state armed groups, but also to individuals and and applying it to companies It wouldn’t necessarily directly apply to a company but it does apply to individuals that operate within a company When those business activities have an access to an armed conflict and as we’ve heard now Traditionally speaking, you might be thinking more of a mining company that is on the ground or a private military security company that is on the battlefield. But with these technology companies, they might have seemed a bit further removed, but they are increasingly so closely intertwined with how these battles are fought with the military that I think there is, in most cases, in many cases, obviously always context dependent and so on. But the relatively easy point to make that there is this nexus to an armed conflict. And so that means that the staff in that sense also would have to, would also be bound by IHL. And at the same time, human rights law is, we have this very famous soft law instrument of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which more prominently speaks about human rights and humanitarian law. But in terms of hard law, you would be, it’s more established as long as we don’t have a business and human rights treaty, international treaty, it’s of course more established for state actors. And that also translates in a sense into a bit of a difference when it comes to enforcement. So when you look at enforcement and accountability, in terms of humanitarian law, you will primarily think about international criminal law. Or let’s say, I mean, I think some people in the humanitarian sector would disagree because they say enforcement is not only litigation enforcement, but I speak specifically about legal obligations and litigations in that sense. There as well on the international level, you might be able under some circumstances to go to the International Criminal Court. We’ve seen recently the ICC is in the moment, is at the moment drafting a policy on, the office of the prosecutor of the ICC is drafting a policy on how cyber innovation… cyber conduct might fall under the Rome Statute. And there, you know, at the ICC, you might not have legal persons as such that can be accountable or criminally liable. But corporate executives, in theory, under the very, very high thresholds that are under the Rome Statute could be liable under international criminal law. So that’s on the international level, although probably we still have a bit of a way to go until this is an actual realistic prospect that those are the cases that are actually brought by the prosecutor. Let’s see, let’s hope, let’s hope not. On a domestic level, I think not only with respect to tech companies, generally speaking, sort of liability for war crimes for corporate executives is not something where we have a huge amount of case law. There is the Lundin Oil case, where we talk about corporate executives potentially being liable for aiding and abetting war crimes. There’s also the Lafarge case, where it was really the company’s liability itself that was at stake. But so these cases are becoming more prominent, but so often it really depends on the domestic framework. Do we have something like universal jurisdiction enshrined in the domestic criminal code? Is there, again, corporate, potential corporate criminal responsibility, or does it only have to go through the individuals? And depending on that, you know what evidence you might need to provide, you know what legal grounds you need to prove, and you can start building a case. Just to finish up, also, of course, human rights instruments in some domestic jurisdictions, there can be a domestic legal obligation, in a sense, to conduct human rights diligence, might include heightened human rights due diligence as well. We have also seen cases being brought against companies against the parent companies in the UK over some of their operations in Zambia. I think that is something that we can learn. How did they bring these cases? What evidence did they bring? How can we translate this into the tech sector that is more opaque, probably more intransparent than other sectors that we might be used to?

Meredith Veit: And this is a great setup for how we’re going to open up the floor to questions soon. We’re going to discuss what kind of evidence is needed and how can we work more collaboratively to get there. When it comes to investors, there may be different criteria about what constitutes evidence for investor action. What kind of information do investors typically need? Or at what point can investors actually act when it comes to portfolio companies being implicated with regards to allegations of potential violations of international law? Are there any examples that you can talk about from your experience with KLP?

Kiran Aziz: Thank you very much. And not least for having this conversation, which is much needed. Unfortunately, I thought I’d just start by just very briefly give an introduction about how we work as investors and what kind of opportunities we have and not at least limitations. And I think what I will say is mostly the case for a lot of the large institutional investors. And, you know, if you look at most of the international investors, they have a long-term perspective because they are investing people’s pension and saving money. And when you take a long-term perspective into account, it’s just not about the financial returns, but it is also some material risk which lies in a company. And this is where you’re trying to embedding respect for human rights into. Dr. Pichamon Yeophantong, Kiran Aziz, Phillipe Stoll, Meredith Veit, Jalal Abukhater, Dr. Dr. Pichamon Yeophantong, Kiran Aziz, Phillipe Stoll, Meredith Veit, Jalal Abukhater, Dr. Dr. Pichamon Yeophantong, Kiran Aziz, Phillipe Stoll, Meredith Veit, Jalal Abukhater, Dr. Dr. Pichamon Yeophantong, Kiran Aziz, Phillipe Stoll, Meredith Veit, Jalal Abukhater, Dr. Pichamon Yeophantong, Kiran Aziz, Phillipe Stoll, Meredith Veit, Jalal Abukhater, Dr. These practices are coming into a legal obligation, such as in Norway we have a Transparency Act which demands investors to perform due diligence on their investments. And how do we know that there is a risk within a company? Well, you know, we as investors, we rely on information which is in the public domain. And this could be information, of course, from companies reporting. But when it comes to human rights, especially in conflict areas, you would see that there are… I wouldn’t say the company’s resources or the information or reporting from the companies is a really helpful tool. It’s mostly coming from the civil society. And this is where we, when we engage on this topic, it’s just not about engaging with companies but it’s also really vital to engage with vital stakeholders. And the UN High Commission on Human Rights and such as yours have done a really, really great job in very often conducting reports which tells that companies are present in some conflict areas where they have direct involvement. And this is where it is challenging because, as you said, there are about 110 armed conflicts. And it’s not necessary that we will have an exposure to all of these. There will be few such as the war in Gaza, West Bank, Myanmar, Yemen, Sudan to mention some. Where we see the companies play a vital role compared to a lot of other conflicts of war which have been in the presence such as in Afghanistan and so on. But again, I think our challenge as investors is really much about getting information which can link what’s happening of human rights violations up to the company’s contribution. And this is where we struggle and we really need help from vital stakeholders. and others. And just not the companies. And that’s one thing. And the other thing is if we often look at UNGPs, you would see that performing high due diligence is a really core perspective or the core tool, which we are also trying to implement in our investments. And when you are a passive investor, let’s say you invest in index funds, normally companies become part of your portfolio and then you perform a kind of due diligence later on. But what we have done now, given that it has been so much focus on UNGPs, is that we have started to screen companies up front. We did that when Saudi Arabia came as a new market in our portfolio. Then we conducted companies up front before we decided to invest. And also because due to Saudi’s involvement in the war in Yemen. And you know, we have traditionally been used to work with business models, which are quite traditional. The expectations which are there, the standards which are there, are very much tailored for traditional business, arm companies and so on. But you see that the tech companies are playing a much more important role. And we are really struggling, we as investors, to get an engagement with the companies at all. If there is an engagement, it’s very often that they would just like to give reference to their policies and they are not really interested in discussing the concrete matter. That’s one thing. And the other thing is also what we are seeing that, I would say, we as investors, you know, we have some tools, but they are limited. Because we really depend on the governments that they take the responsibility. I think this is a development which is sadly in a direction where less and less government parties are taking their responsibility. And most of the responsibility is left to the investors and business communities. And when it comes to… conflict areas we we try as much as we can but I have to say that especially when it comes to tech companies and I think it’s just regardless of KLP but most of investor we engage with that we are struggling with getting an engagement with the company at all and then you sit there you have information conducted from some of the civil society which says that the companies might contribute and then you are not able to get engagement with the companies well you know I would say that the proof of burden would be on the company side because we have given them a really fair chance to to express why their involvement should be seen as a contribution human rights violation or not and if they are not responding to our our queries then exclusion would be or or first choice it’s not that you know we would like to do that but I think this is where it’s really important that we even exclude a company at least for KLP we give a quite thorough exclusion document and this is a way to hold companies accountable but this is also to help other investors to get insight about where we draw the line between what is acceptable and not acceptable and I think this is also a way to try to put the companies on agenda and their contribution and we have seen we excluded you mentioned in your introduction we have excluded a lot of companies and I think it’s just that we are transparent about the exclusion which has really led that more investors have followed our exclusions and I think it’s also important for the companies to understand that you know if they improve their practices they can be re-included so I think I would stop there and then we can I’m happy to address the questions you might have.

Meredith Veit: And KLP adopts this very important best practice that not all investors do which as you mentioned is this public list and explanation as to why clearly citing the human rights harms or concerns with relation to international law which signals to the rest of the market right that in order for funds to flow, you have to respect investor principles and policies with regard to heightened due diligence. So we have about 20 minutes left. So now with the help of our tech colleagues, we’ll put a discussion question up on the board, and we’ll open it up to all of you. We want to dive a little bit deeper into this aspect of accountability and enforcement, which we’ve heard various explanations as to from different angles, we have different opportunities, different challenges. So the question for all of you is, what kind of evidence would lead to stronger enforcement actions against tech companies that facilitate violations of international humanitarian law, international law in times of conflict more broadly? And we can consider this from the different angles that we’ve tried to open up discussions about, from the different enforcers that have leverage over tech companies are states primarily who need to abide by international law according to their obligations. We have investors who also have responsibility to use their leverage with regard to tech companies within their portfolios according to the UN guiding principles. And we have courts, you know, strategic litigation is going to be a very key phrase for the coming five plus years, perhaps, in order to really push for accountability where we can. So with that, you know, feel free to come up to the microphones on the side of the room. We’d like to hear from all of your experiences or ideas or reflections based on what we’ve just heard as to what kind of evidence, what else do we need in order to start pushing for more enforcement for this sector? Any brave souls out there? Or anyone online as well? I know we have some people tuning in online.

Audience: My name is Annette Esserhausen, I work partly with the Association for Progressive Communications and actually we’ve started a best practice forum in the Internet Governance Forum that’s actually also looking at some of these things. I think the kind of evidence that is really useful is the impact, the stories of what the results are. I think there are many people in the investment digital justice space who might not be aware that this is not just sort of bad actions or irresponsible behavior, it actually can affect people’s lives. So I think certainly the stories of what the impact is. And then I think the other kind of evidence which is also important for civil society is what are the relationships? And I know this can be quite difficult to gather this kind of evidence, but in the way that Marwa was revealing partnerships of Lockheed Martin by different companies, I think that’s very useful for us as well. I think it’s important to understand how those corporate actors operate, not just in relation to one particular conflict, but what is the ethical backing or lack of it in how they form partnerships and make decisions about what they do where. So I think different types of evidence. It definitely, I think, could make it easier for us to try to hold them accountable. And please do, maybe Marwa can say a little bit about when it is as well. People that are interested in this topic, come to the Best Practice Forum meeting, which will be later this week, on Thursday. I think that’s the right time. Thanks for the panel. Very good.

Meredith Veit: Thursday at 2 p.m. Yes, at 2 p.m.

Audience: Hi, my name is Monika Ermert. I’m a reporter. I understand it’s difficult to engage with the companies. Is there any pathway from using governments to get them to engage? And then, did you try to engage with them to come here and to sit on that panel? Did you reach out to them? It would be interesting to know.

Kiran Aziz: No, we haven’t reached out to them for this particular forum. But we have, if you look at a lot of the tech companies, I think if they are placed within the EU, it would be easier to engage with the governments. And we try to use that. But if you see that Meta, Amazon, all of them, their headquarters are in the US. And I think it’s very much linked up to the current administration and how they are perceiving. And I think it’s just that international law as such, everything is being challenged at this time. So I think it’s very much, I think if you engage with the companies, we saw that it was at least before this current administration, some of them did an effort, but now it’s just like, you know, there are no boundaries for them. And I think it also has to do because they know there is lack of accountability from several places and there aren’t anybody to hold them accountable. And even if, I think we as investors, we exclude these companies, I think the vital part here is that these companies have so much influence that I think there is, even if it’s a really, really difficult path, but I think it’s really important that we and civil society, that we are still there and chasing them, even if they don’t want to engage. Because we have also heard internally from some of the voices which are internally companies that it helps that investors knock on the door.

Marwa Fatafta: I just want to quickly add that, yeah, the fact that we’re talking about mostly and predominantly US-based companies, the Trump administration is taking an extremely protectionist approach to their tech sector. They see it as a sector that needs to be protected against regulation and accountability and particularly from the EU or in fact any other state that may use its national jurisdiction to oblige companies to take one course of action or the other. For example, it caught my attention a couple of weeks ago, an announcement, I think from the State Department saying that they will not grant visas to foreign officials who have mandated quote-unquote censorship by these companies and I think they were mostly referring to the Brazilian judge of the Supreme Court which, you know, mandated X to take certain action against accounts that are spreading disinformation, if I remember the case correctly. So in such a context, yes, exactly, what do you do? Have we engaged with the companies we have at every opportunity in turn, not necessarily for this panel, because we know what would be the outcome, they will come here, rehash the same press lines and leave the room. So we can save you and save ourselves.

Meredith Veit: And something that we’re seeing with regard to power imbalances at play, you know, at the IGF with so many states here, I think we’re also hearing a strong call from all of us in different words that we need states to take tech regulation much more seriously. At the Resource Center, we’re constantly reaching out to companies about allegations of harm for a number of different sectors. And the tech sector consistently has a lower response rate than others like mining or oil or garments. And we think that’s because there’s less regulation. So there’s less pressure. There’s been more of a buildup for different sectors and industries over time with relation to business and human rights and states taking action. And for the tech sector, I mean, we see it now within the United States, for example, saying that they want to put a ban for the next 10 years on regulating AI and calls to try to deregulate in the EU as well. So if we want companies to actually give us the transparency that we need for our societies, we need governments to mandate human rights due diligence and transparency, as we’ve heard.

Chantal Joris: Yeah, I mean, one thought is also it is also about government transparency, because a lot of times we hear that there are direct service contracts procurement, which is very much a service, again, provided to a government. If you look at freedom of information, access requests, often you would have like a national security exemption. So even starting with and often for litigation, for example, what you need is really the hard facts, you need the contracts, you need to close what exact service provision, what did they say about potential violations of international law, you would… even need internal minutes, was the executive aware of certain risks and so on. So you really need, of course, I read the impact, of course, to prove the impact that you need this public reporting by civil society. But you also need a lot of information that unfortunately relies often on whistleblowers, on journalists, but again, looking at the fact that there’s many governments that attend IGF, I think government transparency is also a very, very good point to start. Of course, again, questions around defense, national security are prone to find justifications in secrecy due to national security concerns, but it’s where accountability efforts can start and where we can also measure whether states are upholding their own international obligations.

Meredith Veit: I saw we had someone coming up to the microphone here as well. Yeah, please. Hi, everyone. Audrey Moklay from Open Mic.

Audience: Thank you so much for your panel. My question, and you kind of just touched on it, was around to what extent there’s a defensive due diligence for these corporate executives or the company itself in international human rights law, and to what extent you would need that kind of evidence of the due diligence being done on the corporate side, and how much detail you would need it, because I think we’ve seen in our engagements with certain companies, they won’t even tell us who they hired as a third party to do the assessment. They’re very opaque about how the due diligence is being done. Yeah, and so I guess my question for you is, what’s the burden of proof there, and how do we place it onto the companies? Is it through the investors? Is it through the states? Thanks.

Chantal Joris: I mean, around the burden of proof, again, to sound boring, this is always, I think, generally speaking, very much on the domestic law. What sort of litigation do you bring? Is it a tort law? Is it a criminal complaint? So I think that would depend, maybe. And also, again, the burden of proof, the granularity of the information that you have. I will say in some jurisdictions, notably UK, US, there is also the possibility of making the disclosure request, right, where the judge can then order also the company to disclose certain information that is necessary to be able to actually adjudicate the claim properly. So again, I think one needs to be really quite granular and creative and really think about all the different means you might have to be able to collect what you need for the case. And then again, it will depend on the exact legal basis, what exactly the chain of causation that you might have to prove and how you can access that information as much as possible. But it remains a challenge, which is a reality, of course. I can say from investors’ point of view that we work on a risk-based perspective.

Kiran Aziz: So for us, we need to know that there is a risk. And then this is why we need to assess how high is the risk element. So I would say the bar is lower compared to if you follow, if you have to have a litigation in the court. But when that said, I think it’s still important that the evidence which is coming or the reports which are conducted, that they are done by trustworthy actors which we can rely on. And I think if more actors would emphasize the same risk, then it gets really clear for us that this is something we need to take into account.

Marwa Fatafta: Just to add on what you said, I mean, in the absence of legally mandated human rights due diligence, if we follow the UNGPs, it’s a risk-based approach as well, right? So when you have heightened risk because of armed conflict, of companies contributing Dr. Pichamon Yeophantong, Kiran Aziz, Phillipe Stoll, Meredith Veit, Jalal Abukhater, Dr. to their content moderation of Palestine-related content in 2021 that was a strong push from civil society and also their oversight board to see whether their actions had resulted in violating human rights which in the beginning of that engagement, the company pushed back very strongly against taking that approach and saying, we will internally investigate. I think that’s the company’s favorite phrase to say. We’re, you know, we’ll take care of that. So they are not independent, they’re not, we don’t also know who they’ve talked to because some decisions made by companies, you know, for instance whether to build a data center in an extremely suppressive and authoritarian state like Saudi Arabia where the company said, oh, we’ve done our human rights due diligence but if the outcome is to say, green light this project then there are of course huge question marks raised about that exercise meaning what kind of questions have they asked? What risks have they interrogated and scrutinized? And who are the people they’re talking to? Are they talking to the rights holders? Are they talking to the impacted communities? Or are they talking to some international NGOs that are not directly linked or really understand the context? Which makes these types of, I would even call that it’s watering down what UNGPs were supposed to achieve ultimately.

Meredith Veit: Okay, I’m given the four minute signal. Any other inputs from the audience? Yes.

Audience: Hi, thank you so much. My name is Sadhana. I just had a quick question on the enforcement front. We heard from the panelists about the relevance of international criminal law and IHL as well, but in situations like in Palestine at the moment when genocide is so inextricably linked to armed conflict, I wanted to know whether the Genocide Convention imposes any additional duty on private actors and companies to act positively to prevent genocide and whether there are any enforcement lessons from that convention that might also help us understand how corporate accountability might function where genocide happens in the context of an armed conflict.

Chantal Joris: So, good question. So I think the Genocide Convention, as you say, of course, there can be a risk to genocide happening or genocide might already be happening, but the Genocide Convention’s obligations are triggered well before we have established whether a genocide is happening in the context of an armed conflict or outside of it. And there is there the state’s obligations, of course, to ensure also that no one under their jurisdiction would be contributing to genocide or incitement to genocide and so on. I’m not sure. So I wouldn’t say it’s a direct legal instrument that you can, because it’s a state treaty, that you can at the international level at least at least base yourself on to hold companies accountable. Of course, again, many states have in their domestic legal frameworks also established genocide crimes against humanity, war crimes as crimes and connected with potential universal jurisdiction clauses. They might be able to pursue companies under those provisions. As I mentioned, as far as I’m aware, I think it’s been more war crimes-based complaints, criminal prosecutions, or for crimes against humanity. I’m not sure I’m aware of a corporate executive or a company directly facing genocide charges, let’s say, recently post-World War II. There was also the Rwanda Tribunal, of course, and so on. But then we talk again more about individual criminal responsibility. But still, I think learning from the cases brought in in other sectors, and as you say, under crimes against humanity provisions as well, is definitely something that we should do if we seek to look at strategic litigation, also in the tech sector, I would say.

Marwa Fatafta: The genocide convention, I think, criminalizes… I think the genocide convention criminalizes complicity in genocide, which I think in the Rome study outlines what the modes of liability are.

Chantal Joris: But basically it says the state should, on the domestic level, criminalize complicity in genocide. Exactly, so that’s what you need to…

Meredith Veit: And in looking across different sectors too, I mean, seeing what exactly was it that had the Dutch businessman who was selling chemicals to Saddam Hussein’s regime, what exactly was it about the sharing of information about individuals with the Argentinian regime, with the Ford Motor Company case? What are these pieces that we could take from case law and other previous jurisprudence? And actually apply it to tech, because in sharing names and personally identifiable information, this can translate to sharing names and biometric IDs in the modern context. So we are definitely out of time at this point. So I will just thank our fantastic panelists and for everyone who participated in the audience. Hopefully this served at least as a launching point to spark some ideas and get more people involved in thinking about this. Because as you can see, there’s a lot of work to be done from all angles. So thank you all so much for your time and for your interventions today. I appreciate it. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.

Agreement points

Tech companies consistently fail to engage meaningfully on human rights due diligence and transparency

Speakers

– Marwa Fatafta
– Meredith Veit
– Kiran Aziz

Arguments

Companies fail to conduct meaningful heightened human rights due diligence despite operating in high-risk conflict zones

Survey response rates from tech companies are abysmally low (4% for Palestine/Israel context vs 26% for Russia/Ukraine), showing lack of transparency

Tech companies are increasingly difficult to engage with compared to traditional sectors, often only referencing policies without discussing concrete matters

Summary

All speakers agree that tech companies demonstrate unprecedented resistance to transparency and meaningful engagement on human rights issues, with extremely low response rates to surveys and superficial responses when they do engage

Topics

Human rights principles | Legal and regulatory

Government regulation and mandates are essential for corporate accountability

Speakers

– Meredith Veit
– Chantal Joris
– Kiran Aziz

Arguments

Government mandates for human rights due diligence and transparency are essential since voluntary approaches have failed

Government transparency is crucial as many service contracts fall under national security exemptions, limiting access to evidence

Investor engagement is limited by companies’ unwillingness to discuss concrete matters and lack of government accountability

Summary

Speakers consensus that voluntary corporate responsibility frameworks have failed and government intervention through regulation, transparency requirements, and accountability mechanisms is necessary

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Human rights principles

Tech companies are actively contributing to conflicts rather than remaining neutral

Speakers

– Marwa Fatafta
– Chantal Joris

Arguments

Tech companies are never neutral actors in armed conflicts and can exacerbate conflict dynamics through power asymmetries

International humanitarian law applies to individuals within companies when business activities have nexus to armed conflict, though enforcement primarily relies on international criminal law

Summary

Both speakers reject the notion of tech company neutrality in conflicts, with Fatafta providing extensive evidence of active participation and Joris explaining the legal framework that makes individuals within companies liable

Topics

Cyberconflict and warfare | Human rights principles | Legal and regulatory

Similar viewpoints

Both speakers identify and are concerned about the increasing militarization of the tech sector, with companies abandoning ethical commitments and executives directly joining military structures

Speakers

– Marwa Fatafta
– Chantal Joris

Arguments

Major tech companies are quietly dropping voluntary commitments against building AI for military use and forming partnerships with defense contractors

The integration of tech executives into military structures raises questions about attribution and state obligations

Topics

Cyberconflict and warfare | Future of work

Both emphasize the critical importance of civil society documentation and real-world impact evidence for accountability efforts, as corporate reporting is inadequate

Speakers

– Kiran Aziz
– Audience

Arguments

Investors depend heavily on civil society reports and public domain information since companies provide inadequate reporting on human rights impacts

Impact stories showing real-world consequences of corporate actions are crucial for demonstrating harm beyond just irresponsible behavior

Topics

Human rights principles | Economic

Both identify regulatory capture and protection of tech companies as major barriers to accountability, particularly in the US context

Speakers

– Marwa Fatafta
– Meredith Veit

Arguments

US protectionist approach under current administration shields tech companies from regulation and accountability measures

The tech sector has lower regulatory pressure compared to other industries like mining or oil, resulting in lower corporate response rates

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Jurisdiction

Unexpected consensus

Investor exclusion as an effective accountability mechanism

Speakers

– Kiran Aziz
– Marwa Fatafta
– Meredith Veit

Arguments

Exclusion of companies from investment portfolios can be effective when done transparently with public documentation of reasons

Companies fail to conduct meaningful heightened human rights due diligence despite operating in high-risk conflict zones

Survey response rates from tech companies are abysmally low (4% for Palestine/Israel context vs 26% for Russia/Ukraine), showing lack of transparency

Explanation

Despite coming from different perspectives (investor, civil society advocate, moderator), there was unexpected consensus that transparent investor exclusion can be an effective accountability tool when companies refuse to engage, representing a market-based solution to regulatory gaps

Topics

Economic | Human rights principles

The fundamental inadequacy of current due diligence frameworks for tech companies

Speakers

– Marwa Fatafta
– Chantal Joris
– Kiran Aziz

Arguments

Even when companies claim to conduct audits, they lack insight into how their technologies are used, making due diligence ineffective

Domestic frameworks vary significantly in their capacity for universal jurisdiction and corporate criminal responsibility

Tech companies are increasingly difficult to engage with compared to traditional sectors, often only referencing policies without discussing concrete matters

Explanation

All speakers from different expertise areas (advocacy, legal, investment) agreed that existing due diligence frameworks are fundamentally inadequate for the tech sector, which was unexpected given their different professional backgrounds and typical approaches to corporate accountability

Topics

Human rights principles | Legal and regulatory

Overall assessment

Summary

The speakers demonstrated remarkable consensus across multiple critical issues: tech companies’ active role in conflicts, failure of voluntary accountability mechanisms, need for government regulation, and inadequacy of current due diligence frameworks. There was also agreement on the militarization trend in tech and the importance of civil society documentation.

Consensus level

High level of consensus with significant implications – the alignment between civil society advocates, legal experts, and investors suggests a broad coalition for reform. This consensus indicates that the current system of tech accountability is fundamentally broken and requires systemic change rather than incremental improvements. The agreement across different stakeholder types strengthens the case for regulatory intervention and suggests potential for coordinated advocacy efforts.

Different viewpoints

Effectiveness of investor exclusion as accountability mechanism

Speakers

– Kiran Aziz
– Marwa Fatafta

Arguments

Exclusion of companies from investment portfolios can be effective when done transparently with public documentation of reasons

Companies fail to conduct meaningful heightened human rights due diligence despite operating in high-risk conflict zones

Summary

Kiran Aziz presents investor exclusion as a potentially effective tool that can influence company behavior and help other investors follow suit, while Marwa Fatafta’s examples suggest companies remain largely unresponsive to external pressure and continue harmful practices regardless of accountability efforts

Topics

Economic | Human rights principles

Unexpected differences

Optimism about incremental progress versus systemic failure

Speakers

– Kiran Aziz
– Marwa Fatafta

Arguments

Companies can be re-included if they improve practices

Even when companies claim to conduct audits, they lack insight into how their technologies are used, making due diligence ineffective

Explanation

While both speakers work on corporate accountability, Kiran maintains some optimism that companies can improve and be re-included in investment portfolios, suggesting the system can work with proper incentives. Marwa’s analysis suggests the entire due diligence framework is fundamentally flawed and ineffective, representing a more systemic critique. This disagreement is unexpected because both are advocates for corporate accountability but have different assessments of whether current frameworks can be reformed or need complete overhaul

Topics

Human rights principles | Economic

Overall assessment

Summary

The speakers show remarkable alignment on identifying problems with tech company accountability in conflict zones, but subtle differences emerge in their assessment of potential solutions and the effectiveness of current accountability mechanisms

Disagreement level

Low level of disagreement with high consensus on problems but nuanced differences on solutions. The implications suggest that while there is strong agreement on the need for tech company accountability, practitioners from different sectors (legal, advocacy, investment) may have varying levels of optimism about working within existing frameworks versus the need for fundamental systemic change. This could impact strategy coordination and resource allocation in accountability efforts

Partial agreements

Similar viewpoints

Both speakers identify and are concerned about the increasing militarization of the tech sector, with companies abandoning ethical commitments and executives directly joining military structures

Speakers

– Marwa Fatafta
– Chantal Joris

Arguments

Major tech companies are quietly dropping voluntary commitments against building AI for military use and forming partnerships with defense contractors

The integration of tech executives into military structures raises questions about attribution and state obligations

Topics

Cyberconflict and warfare | Future of work

Both emphasize the critical importance of civil society documentation and real-world impact evidence for accountability efforts, as corporate reporting is inadequate

Speakers

– Kiran Aziz
– Audience

Arguments

Investors depend heavily on civil society reports and public domain information since companies provide inadequate reporting on human rights impacts

Impact stories showing real-world consequences of corporate actions are crucial for demonstrating harm beyond just irresponsible behavior

Topics

Human rights principles | Economic

Both identify regulatory capture and protection of tech companies as major barriers to accountability, particularly in the US context

Speakers

– Marwa Fatafta
– Meredith Veit

Arguments

US protectionist approach under current administration shields tech companies from regulation and accountability measures

The tech sector has lower regulatory pressure compared to other industries like mining or oil, resulting in lower corporate response rates

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Jurisdiction

Key takeaways

Tech companies are not neutral actors in armed conflicts and actively contribute to human rights violations through direct censorship, providing military technologies, and mirroring state policies of discrimination

Current legal frameworks (IHL and human rights law) can theoretically hold tech companies accountable, but enforcement faces significant practical challenges due to high legal thresholds, jurisdictional issues, and lack of transparency

Corporate accountability mechanisms are failing – tech companies have extremely low engagement rates (4% response rate) and conduct inadequate human rights due diligence despite operating in high-risk conflict zones

The tech sector is becoming increasingly militarized, with companies dropping voluntary commitments against military AI development and executives joining military units, blurring civilian-military distinctions

Investors can leverage exclusion strategies and transparency requirements to pressure companies, but face limitations due to companies’ unwillingness to engage and lack of government accountability

Successful accountability requires multiple types of evidence: impact stories, corporate relationship mapping, hard contractual evidence, and risk assessments from trustworthy sources

Government regulation and transparency mandates are essential since voluntary corporate approaches have proven insufficient – the tech sector faces less regulatory pressure than other industries

Resolutions and action items

Civil society should continue documenting and reporting on corporate relationships and partnerships to reveal patterns of decision-making across conflicts

Investors should maintain transparent exclusion practices with public documentation to signal market expectations and help other investors follow suit

Strategic litigation should learn from cases in other sectors (mining, oil) and apply similar evidence-gathering approaches to the tech sector

Government transparency through freedom of information requests should be pursued to access service contracts and procurement details

Continued engagement with companies is necessary even when they are unresponsive, as internal voices within companies report that external pressure is helpful

Best Practice Forum meeting scheduled for Thursday at 2 p.m. during IGF to continue discussions on these topics

Unresolved issues

How to effectively regulate US-based tech companies given the protectionist stance of the current US administration

What specific burden of proof standards should apply to corporate due diligence and how to enforce meaningful transparency requirements

How to address the attribution challenges when tech executives become integrated into military structures

What mechanisms can compel companies to engage meaningfully rather than simply referencing policies

How to access classified or national security-protected information about government-tech company contracts

Whether existing international legal frameworks are adequate for addressing the unique challenges posed by tech companies in conflict zones

How to establish effective accountability when companies operate across multiple jurisdictions with varying legal standards

Suggested compromises

Risk-based approaches that require lower burden of proof than criminal litigation but still enable investor and civil society action

Combination of hard law enforcement through courts and soft law pressure through investors and civil society engagement

Utilizing both international frameworks (IHL, human rights law) and domestic legal mechanisms depending on jurisdiction and available evidence

Focusing on government transparency as a starting point when direct corporate engagement fails

Learning from successful accountability cases in other sectors while adapting approaches to tech sector specificities

Tech companies are never neutral actors in situations of armed conflict. They exacerbate the dynamics of the conflict and sometimes even drive them or fuel them, particularly in contexts where there are asymmetries of power between warring parties.

Speaker

Marwa Fatafta

Reason

This comment fundamentally challenges the common perception of tech companies as neutral service providers. It reframes the entire discussion by establishing that tech companies are active participants in conflicts rather than passive enablers, which has profound implications for accountability and legal responsibility.

Impact

This opening statement set the foundational premise for the entire discussion, moving the conversation away from whether tech companies should be held accountable to how they should be held accountable. It established the framework for all subsequent examples and legal analysis.

There’s a surge in increasing militarization of civilian tech… both Google and OpenAI have both quietly dropped their voluntary commitments earlier this year not to build AI for military use or surveillance purposes… senior executives from high-tech firms, specifically Meta, Open AI and Palantir, are joining the US Army Reserve at a new unit called Executive Innovation Corp.

Speaker

Marwa Fatafta

Reason

This revelation exposes a dramatic shift in the tech industry’s relationship with military operations, showing how the lines between civilian tech companies and military contractors are completely blurring. The fact that executives are literally becoming military officers represents an unprecedented development.

Impact

This comment created a pivotal moment in the discussion, prompting Chantal to immediately address the legal implications of attribution and state obligations when tech executives operate within military structures. It fundamentally changed the scope of the conversation from service provision to direct military participation.

When you look at enforcement and accountability, in terms of humanitarian law, you will primarily think about international criminal law… corporate executives, in theory, under the very, very high thresholds that are under the Rome Statute could be liable under international criminal law.

Speaker

Chantal Joris

Reason

This comment bridges the gap between theoretical legal frameworks and practical enforcement mechanisms, introducing the possibility of criminal liability for tech executives under international law. It moves beyond civil remedies to criminal accountability.

Impact

This shifted the discussion from corporate responsibility frameworks to individual criminal liability, raising the stakes significantly and introducing new pathways for accountability that hadn’t been previously explored in the tech context.

An astonishingly low 4% response rate from companies is unprecedented in the resource center’s history, and previously we had sent a similar survey to tech companies that were operating in Russia and Ukraine, and 26% had responded by comparison

Speaker

Meredith Veit

Reason

This stark comparison reveals the exceptional resistance of tech companies to transparency and accountability efforts specifically in the Palestine context, suggesting either heightened sensitivity or deliberate avoidance that goes beyond normal corporate non-responsiveness.

Impact

This statistic provided concrete evidence of the accountability gap and influenced subsequent discussion about the need for mandatory rather than voluntary disclosure mechanisms. It reinforced arguments for stronger regulatory intervention.

We as investors, we exclude these companies, I think the vital part here is that these companies have so much influence that I think there is, even if it’s a really, really difficult path, but I think it’s really important that we and civil society, that we are still there and chasing them, even if they don’t want to engage.

Speaker

Kiran Aziz

Reason

This comment acknowledges the limitations of investor power while simultaneously arguing for persistent engagement despite those limitations. It reveals the power imbalance between even large institutional investors and major tech companies.

Impact

This honest assessment of investor limitations prompted discussion about the need for government intervention and regulation, as market-based solutions alone appear insufficient to address the scale of tech company influence and resistance to accountability.

The Trump administration is taking an extremely protectionist approach to their tech sector… they will not grant visas to foreign officials who have mandated quote-unquote censorship by these companies

Speaker

Marwa Fatafta

Reason

This comment reveals how geopolitical dynamics and state protection of domestic tech companies creates barriers to international accountability efforts, showing how corporate impunity is actively supported by state policy.

Impact

This observation shifted the discussion to acknowledge the political dimensions of tech accountability, explaining why traditional engagement strategies are failing and why new approaches are needed that account for state protection of tech companies.

Overall assessment

These key comments fundamentally shaped the discussion by progressively revealing the depth and complexity of the accountability challenge. The conversation evolved from establishing that tech companies are active conflict participants, to documenting their increasing militarization, to exploring legal frameworks for accountability, to acknowledging the practical barriers created by corporate resistance and state protection. The comments collectively painted a picture of a sector that has outgrown existing accountability mechanisms and requires new approaches that account for unprecedented corporate power, state protection, and the blurring lines between civilian and military technology. The discussion moved from theoretical frameworks to practical challenges, ultimately highlighting the need for coordinated action across multiple stakeholders – civil society, investors, states, and courts – to address what appears to be a fundamental shift in how technology companies operate in conflict contexts.

What kind of evidence would lead to stronger enforcement actions against tech companies that facilitate violations of international humanitarian law?

Speaker

Meredith Veit

Explanation

This was posed as the main discussion question for audience participation, seeking input on what evidence is needed from different enforcement angles including states, investors, and courts

How can we better understand corporate relationships and partnerships beyond individual conflicts?

Speaker

Annette Esserhausen

Explanation

She emphasized the need to understand how corporate actors operate across different contexts and their ethical backing in forming partnerships, not just in relation to one particular conflict

Is there any pathway from using governments to get tech companies to engage when direct engagement fails?

Speaker

Monika Ermert

Explanation

This addresses the challenge of tech companies’ reluctance to engage with civil society and investors, exploring whether government pressure could be more effective

What is the burden of proof for corporate due diligence and how much detail is needed when companies are opaque about their assessment processes?

Speaker

Audrey Moklay

Explanation

This addresses the challenge of companies not disclosing who they hire for assessments or how due diligence is conducted, questioning how to place the burden of proof on companies

Whether the Genocide Convention imposes additional duties on private actors to prevent genocide and what enforcement lessons can be drawn from it?

Speaker

Sadhana

Explanation

This explores whether there are additional legal frameworks beyond IHL and human rights law that could be applied to corporate accountability in contexts where genocide occurs during armed conflict

How can we improve government transparency regarding service contracts and procurement with tech companies?

Speaker

Chantal Joris

Explanation

She identified the need for better access to government contracts and internal communications with tech companies, as this information is often protected under national security exemptions but is crucial for litigation

What can be learned from corporate accountability cases in other sectors that could be applied to the tech sector?

Speaker

Meredith Veit

Explanation

She suggested examining previous jurisprudence from cases involving other industries to identify applicable legal precedents for tech company accountability

How can civil society better document and present impact stories to demonstrate real-world consequences of tech company actions?

Speaker

Annette Esserhausen

Explanation

She emphasized the need for evidence showing actual impact on people’s lives, not just documentation of irresponsible behavior, to make the case for accountability more compelling

Summary

This Internet Governance Forum 2025 panel discussion explored the intersection of artificial intelligence sovereignty and environmental sustainability, examining how nations can reduce technological dependency while minimizing environmental impacts. The session was organized by LAPIN, the Sustainable AI Lab at Bonn University, and VLK Advogados, bringing together experts from government, academia, international organizations, and civil society.

Ana Valdivia from Oxford Internet Institute highlighted the environmental costs of AI infrastructure, noting that digital sovereignty is impossible when countries depend on minerals extracted from other nations for AI chips. She cited examples from Mexico where data centers consume water 24/7 while local communities have access to water only one hour per week, demonstrating how AI reproduces climate injustice. Valdivia advocated for “digital solidarity” rather than digital sovereignty to foster collaborative approaches.

Alex Moltzau from the European AI Office emphasized the need for responsible AI deployment within the context of climate crisis, noting that the EU is investing 200 billion euros in AI infrastructure while working on energy reduction standards. Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva from Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs discussed the asymmetry in AI development, where 84% of large language models provide no disclosure of energy use or emissions, and stressed the importance of inclusive international cooperation ahead of COP30 in Brazil.

Yu Ping Chan from UNDP warned that only 10% of AI’s economic value by 2030 will benefit the Global South, emphasizing the need for holistic approaches that address connectivity, skills, and infrastructure gaps. Alexandra Costa Barbosa from Brazil’s Homeless Workers Movement introduced the concept of “popular digital sovereignty,” focusing on grassroots efforts to achieve meaningful connectivity and digital literacy in marginalized communities.

The discussion concluded that addressing AI sovereignty requires tackling multiple interconnected crises—environmental, social, and digital—through coordinated efforts that empower local communities and social movements while ensuring responsible technology deployment.

Keypoints

## Major Discussion Points:

– **Digital Sovereignty vs. Environmental Sustainability Tension**: The panel explored the fundamental challenge of how nations can achieve AI sovereignty and reduce technological dependency while minimizing environmental impacts, particularly given AI’s heavy reliance on minerals, energy, and water resources.

– **Global South Dependency and Digital Colonialism**: Extensive discussion on how AI development perpetuates colonial patterns, with Global South countries providing raw materials (cobalt, tungsten, copper) and labor for AI training while remaining excluded from shaping AI systems, with only 10% of AI’s economic value projected to accrue to Global South countries by 2030.

– **Environmental Justice and Resource Competition**: Detailed examination of how AI infrastructure creates climate injustice, exemplified by data centers in Mexico’s Querétaro state having 24/7 water access while local communities receive water only one hour per week in a drought-stricken region.

– **Labor Rights and AI Development**: Discussion of exploitative labor practices in AI development, particularly the hidden human labor required for training large language models, often performed under poor conditions in call center-like environments, with concerns about replicating historical labor exploitation patterns.

– **Alternative Approaches to Digital Sovereignty**: Presentation of concepts like “digital solidarity” instead of competitive digital sovereignty, “popular digital sovereignty” from grassroots movements, and community-driven approaches that prioritize local needs and environmental justice over purely technological advancement.

## Overall Purpose:

The discussion aimed to examine the intersection between AI sovereignty aspirations and environmental sustainability, particularly focusing on how developing nations and marginalized communities can achieve greater technological independence without exacerbating climate change and environmental degradation. The panel sought to identify policy solutions that could address both digital dependency and environmental concerns through inclusive, multi-stakeholder approaches.

## Overall Tone:

The discussion maintained a consistently serious and urgent tone throughout, with speakers expressing genuine concern about current trajectories in AI development. The tone was collaborative and solution-oriented, with panelists building on each other’s points rather than debating. There was a notable shift from academic analysis in the early presentations to more activist and practical perspectives as grassroots representatives spoke, culminating in calls for political mobilization and collective action. The overall atmosphere was one of informed concern coupled with cautious optimism about the possibility of more equitable and sustainable approaches to AI development.

Speakers

– **Alexandra Krastins Lopes**: Co-founder of LAPIN (Laboratory of Public Policy and Internet), former member of Brazilian Data Protection Authority, represents VLK Advogados (Brazilian law firm), provides legal counsel on data protection, AI, cybersecurity and government affairs

– **Jose Renato Laranjeira de Pereira**: Co-founder of LAPIN (Laboratory of Public Policy and Internet), PhD student at University of Bonn

– **Ana Valdivia**: Departmental research lecturer in artificial intelligence, government and policy at the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, investigates how data certification and algorithmic systems are transforming political, social and ecological territories

– **Alex Moltzau**: Policy officer at European AI office in the European Commission, seconded national expert from Norwegian Ministry of Digitalization and Governance, coordinates work on AI regulatory sandboxes, visiting policy fellow at University of Cambridge, background in social data science and master’s in artificial intelligence for public services

– **Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva**: Career diplomat, Coordinator for Scientific and Technological Affairs at the Climate Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brazil, member of the Technology Executive Committee of UNFCCC, Brazil’s focal point to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)

– **Yu Ping Chan**: Heads digital partnerships and engagements at UNDP (United Nations Development Program), former diplomat in Singaporean Foreign Service, Bachelor of Arts from Harvard University, Master’s of Public Administration from Columbia University

– **Alexander Costa Barbosa**: Member of the Homeless Workers Movement, digital policy consultant and researcher

– **Raoul Danniel Abellar Manuel**: Member of parliament from the Philippines representing the Youth Party

– **Edmon Chung**: From Dot Asia

– **Participant**: (Role/expertise not specified)

Additional speakers:

– **Lucia**: From Peru, works with civil society organizations (full name not provided in transcript)

# Panel Discussion Report: AI Sovereignty and Environmental Sustainability

## Introduction and Context

This panel discussion, organized by LAPIN (Laboratory of Public Policy and Internet), the Sustainable AI Lab at Bonn University, and VLK Advogados, examined the intersection between artificial intelligence sovereignty and environmental sustainability. Jose Renato Laranjeira de Pereira, co-founder of LAPIN and PhD student at University of Bonn, introduced the session by explaining the panel’s focus on how the intersection of AI sovereignty and climate change creates both challenges and opportunities.

The panel featured diverse perspectives from government, academia, international organizations, and civil society, including Alexandra Krastins Lopes (co-founder of LAPIN and former member of Brazilian Data Protection Authority), Ana Valdivia (Oxford Internet Institute, participating remotely from an AI ethics conference), Alex Moltzau (European AI Office), Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva (Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Yu Ping Chan (UNDP), Alexander Costa Barbosa (Homeless Workers Movement), and Raoul Danniel Abellar Manuel (Philippine Parliament member).

## Key Speaker Contributions

### Ana Valdivia – Digital Solidarity vs. Digital Sovereignty

Ana Valdivia argued that AI infrastructure cannot be truly sovereign because it depends on minerals and natural resources from other countries, creating inevitable interdependencies. She proposed replacing “digital sovereignty” with “digital solidarity” to create networks of cooperation between states rather than competition.

Valdivia highlighted environmental justice concerns, citing examples from Mexico’s Querétaro state where data centers have 24/7 water access while local communities receive water only one hour per week during drought conditions. She emphasized that AI development reproduces climate injustice through unequal resource access and that data centers are deployed without democratic consultation with affected communities.

She also challenged industry narratives, arguing that larger language models reproduce more stereotypes and biases while consuming more resources without necessarily being better. Valdivia noted that AI development is now dominated by big tech companies rather than universities, limiting innovation access and creating dependency for researchers.

### Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva – Brazilian Government Perspective

Pedro Ivo, speaking after concluding June climate negotiations in Bonn where AI was discussed, argued against creating a false binary between national sovereignty and global cooperation. He maintained that both are needed and should be rooted in equity and climate responsibility, introducing the Brazilian concept of “mutirão” (collective community effort) as a framework for AI governance.

He revealed that 84% of widely used large language models provide no disclosure of their energy use or emissions, preventing informed policy design. Pedro Ivo emphasized that developing countries need to strengthen three strategic capabilities: skills, data, and infrastructure to shape AI according to local priorities.

He advocated for moving beyond the “triple planetary crisis” narrative to address a “poly-crisis” including environmental, social, and digital rights crises. Pedro Ivo also mentioned Brazil’s role in hosting COP30 in Belém and chairing the BRICS Summit, noting the BRICS Civil Popular Forum’s work on digital sovereignty.

### Yu Ping Chan – UNDP Development Perspective

Yu Ping Chan warned that only 10% of AI’s economic value by 2030 will benefit Global South countries excluding China, with over 95% of top AI talent concentrated in six research universities in the US and China. She emphasized that digital transformation must be part of a holistic approach beyond single ministries, encompassing connectivity, infrastructure, and energy.

Chan raised questions about ownership regarding who owns the products of labor used to create large language models that end up owned by big tech companies. She stressed the need for collective action and mobilization to address AI challenges.

### Alexander Costa Barbosa – Grassroots Movement Perspective

Alexander Costa Barbosa from Brazil’s Homeless Workers Movement introduced the concept of “popular digital sovereignty,” involving communities providing services that the state hasn’t delivered, focusing on meaningful connectivity and digital literacy in peripheries. He explained the movement’s work addressing Brazil’s housing crisis, where 33 million people lack adequate housing.

Barbosa noted that workers’ rights were initially excluded from AI regulation discussions, highlighting the political nature of these debates. He connected alternative development approaches like Buen Vivir and commons-based development with climate justice discussions.

### Alex Moltzau – European AI Office Perspective

Alex Moltzau acknowledged that while AI operates within existing labor legislation frameworks, there are concerns about protecting workers involved in supervised machine learning tasks. He stressed that AI rollout must be as responsible, sustainable, and green as possible within the context of the climate crisis.

Moltzau announced the European Commission’s collaboration with Africa on generative AI with 5 million euros funding, with a deadline of October 2nd.

## Audience Questions and Responses

Raoul Danniel Abellar Manuel from the Philippine Parliament asked about ensuring labor protections in AI development to avoid replicating exploitative practices, especially in training large language models. He emphasized the need to protect workers involved in the hidden human labor required for AI training.

An audience member named Lucia asked about environmental sustainability advocacy and connecting organizations working on these issues. Ana Valdivia responded by offering to connect civil society organizations across Latin America working on data center transparency and environmental advocacy.

## Concrete Outcomes and Initiatives

Several concrete initiatives were announced during the discussion:

– The Hamburg Declaration on Responsible AI for the SDGs was launched with over 50 stakeholders committed, welcoming more organizations to sign

– The BRICS Civil Popular Forum Digital Sovereignty Working Group document was announced for release with guidelines for financing digital public infrastructures

– Commitment to connect Latin American organizations working on data center transparency and environmental advocacy

– European Commission funding for AI collaboration with Africa

## Key Themes and Challenges

The discussion revealed several interconnected challenges:

**Environmental Justice**: The panel extensively examined how AI infrastructure creates climate injustice, with Global South countries providing raw materials while bearing environmental costs but remaining excluded from AI governance decisions.

**Labor Rights**: Multiple speakers addressed exploitative labor practices in AI development, particularly the hidden human labor required for training large language models under poor working conditions.

**Transparency**: The lack of disclosure regarding AI’s environmental impacts was highlighted as a critical barrier to informed policy-making and accountability.

**Digital Colonialism**: Speakers examined how AI development perpetuates colonial patterns, with Global South countries providing resources and labor while being excluded from shaping AI systems.

## Multi-stakeholder Approaches

Alexandra Krastins Lopes emphasized applying the multi-stakeholder model of internet governance to sustainable AI sovereignty policies to effectively include social movements. The discussion highlighted the importance of moving beyond conventional development models toward comprehensive approaches addressing interconnected social, environmental, and digital challenges.

## Conclusion

The panel concluded with calls for continued advocacy and mobilization, emphasizing the need for collective action to address AI challenges. Speakers encouraged political mobilization and highlighted the importance of coordinated efforts between government officials, researchers, international organizations, and social movements to develop more equitable and sustainable approaches to AI development and governance.

The discussion demonstrated that addressing AI sovereignty requires tackling multiple interconnected crises through approaches that empower local communities while ensuring responsible technology deployment and environmental sustainability.

Alexandra Krastins Lopes: Good morning everyone both here in the room and those joining us online. It’s a pleasure to welcome you all to this important session at the Internet Governance Forum 2025. This panel titled AI at the Crossroads between Sovereignty and Sustainability is a joint initiative between LAPIN, the Laboratory of Public Policy and Internet, the Sustainable AI Lab at Bonn University and VLK Advogados. We are truly honored to host such a timely and global conversation and I want to begin by thanking our distinguished panelists for being here today. I’m Alexandra, I’m a co-founder of LAPIN and served for a few years in the Brazilian Data Protection Authority. Today I represent VLK Advogados, a Brazilian law firm where I provide legal counsel on data protection, AI, cyber security and cybersecurity on juridical matters and government affairs. Now I’d like to pass the floor to José Renato who will present himself and introduce the central topic of our discussion. José Renato.

Jose Renato Laranjeira de Pereira: Hello Ale, can you hear me? Yes. So, working good? Okay, great. Well, hello everyone. Good morning, good afternoon, good evening for those watching us. It is a pleasure to be here and thank you very much Ale, Alexandra for introducing me. My name is José Renato, I am also a co-founder of the Laboratory of Public Policy and Internet, LAPIN, and now also doing a PhD at the University of Bonn. I would also like to thank Thiago Moraes and Sietse Piku for helping organize the session and I’m very happy to be here. Well, our discussion is exactly in this intersection between artificial intelligence sovereignty and also the need for us to secure that technological developments that we carry out are consistent also with a very urgent need to tackle climate change, environmental collapse as a whole. So we have been identifying how there’s a growing discourse on not only AI but digital sovereignty as a whole among different governments. European Union is an example. Brazil, China, U.S. Social movements. So, different initiatives among indigenous peoples against worker or among workers movements are also talking about digital sovereignty, AI sovereignty, and etc. In the global south, both these nation-led discourses and also social movements discourse are very interrelated with the history of dependency, particularly on technology and infrastructure that dates back to colonial times and which persists through terms and periods in which coloniality and what many have called digital colonialism is also influencing these discourses. And well, we also know at the same time that AI is deeply connected with physical infrastructure, so it is very dependent, strongly dependent on minerals, on energy and water. So, our idea is how to discuss here how to advance these calls for further independence and control over these technologies and their infrastructures, while also avoiding expanding on the effects over the environment which are leading mostly to climate change. We’re also interested in understanding the differences between global south and north approaches to digital sovereignty, to AI sovereignty as a whole, and that is why we have participants from different, from distinct backgrounds here, government officials, representatives of international organization, academia and civil society as well, including from one social movement in Brazil which is taking the lead to claim digital sovereignty over their activities. So, I pass on now back to Alexandra to talk about the policy questions that we have thought for this panel. I’m looking very much forward to our discussion.

Alexandra Krastins Lopes: Thank you, José Renato. So, today we aim to explore the following policy questions. How can nations reduce their technological dependency in the realm of AI while ensuring that the development of these technologies leaves low environmental impacts and supports them in achieving the SDGs? What are the main tensions between the aspirations of governments and communities, including social movements and indigenous communities, with regard to AI sovereignty and how can they be addressed? And finally, how can the multi-stakeholder model of internet governance can be applied within the design of policies aimed at fostering sustainable AI sovereignty so as to have the demands of social movements effectively taken into consideration? So let’s start with initial speeches from our dear panelists. I would like to check if Ana Valdivia is already with us. Okay, I’ll introduce her. Ana Valdivia is a departmental research lecturer in artificial intelligence, government and policy at the Oxford Internet Institute at the University of Oxford. She investigates how data certification and algorithmic systems are transforming political, social and ecological territories. Ana, the floor is yours. Thank you.

Ana Valdivia: Thank you very much, Jose, for organizing this panel about digital sovereignty and data colonialism. I’m very pleased to be here and I’m so sorry that I cannot be there in Norway because I’ve been attending the main international conference in AI ethics where we have been discussing these current debates, right? And something very relevant that we have found out was that LLMs or generative AI is becoming bigger and that doesn’t mean that it’s becoming better because something that we found out in the conference is that LLMs that are bigger reproduce and learn more stereotypes than smaller LLMs. So that comes with oversight. I’ve been studying the effects, like environmental impacts, and I’ve been analyzing the environmental impacts of AI for years now, and I’ve been analyzing the supply chain of artificial intelligence. And something that I realized is that while national states have this narrative towards digital surveillancy, and for instance in the UK, the government wants to develop more data centers to be digital surveying, there is another part of this debate that is neglected, which is that this infrastructure cannot be surveying, because this infrastructure depends, as you have said, on different minerals and other natural resources that are not embedded in our so-called national states. So that’s it. If the UK wants to become digital surveying, it depends on other countries like Brazil, like Pakistan, like China, like Taiwan, to develop all this infrastructure. For instance, to develop the AI chips, which are named GPUs, graphical processing units, you need cobalt, you need tungsten, you need copper, you need aluminum, and these minerals are extracted from other geographies that are basically geographies within the global majority, and the extraction of these minerals have direct impacts on communities living nearby, as we have seen in the past literature on geography and extractivism. But then the increasing size of AI algorithms like GPTs and other LLMs come with other side effects, as I have said, because now it’s not only about mineral extraction, it’s also about the processing, the training of these algorithms. And this comes also with other environmental impacts like water extraction and land, and I have seen that in Mexico, for instance. So in Mexico, we have the state of Querétaro that is inviting a lot of data centers and a lot of big tech companies to deploy their infrastructure. to talk about AI infrastructure there, while I can see like the positive side of this, which is like, you know, the infrastructure of AI is going to be democratized because it’s going to be present in different states. That comes with other side effects like the government is inviting this infrastructure without asking democratically to the communities, whether they want this infrastructure there. Because this infrastructure, like we know that data centers are that are connected to the electricity 24 hours, seven days a day, 365 days a year. So that means that they are using water, they are using electricity, all the days. And in Querétaro, Querétaro is becoming the only state in Mexico, which 100% of its territory is at risk of drought. So that means that communities don’t have access to water. And this is something that I’ve witnessed with my own eyes, like when I visit these communities in Querétaro, I’ve seen how they don’t have access to water. They only have access to water one hour per week, while on the other side, these infrastructures have access to water 24 hours a day. So AI is not only nowadays reproducing stereotypes and biases, it’s also reproducing climate injustice, because if we don’t regulate how this infrastructure is becoming is being implemented in different geographies, it’s going to exacerbate the consequences of climate justice. So something that we have proposed in this conference on AI ethics is that rather than talk about digital sovereignty, that creates sort of like frictions between states, because all the states in the world want to become digital sovereign, we should talk about digital solidarity. And we should talk about how we can create networks of solidarity, that we help one state with other states, and we help one state with another state. all together to develop digital divinity and how we can become as a community independent from big tech companies that nowadays are accumulating all the innovation. Because for instance, as an expert in AI, when I did my PhD, I could develop my own AI algorithms with my own laptop. And nowadays, I could see that the innovation on AI relies on big tech companies. We are not able to develop AI technology anymore. We have to depend on big tech companies. And it has also become clear in this conference on ethics how the LLMs that we know, like GPT and LAMA, are developed by big tech companies. They are not developed by universities. They are not developed by other institutions, technical institutions anymore. So it’s not only about infrastructure. It’s also about how we can become digital surveying and how we can develop this AI with our own hands and with our own infrastructure. So I think that’s my intervention. And thank you. I’m looking forward to hear what the others have to say and the Q&A. Thank you very much.

Alexandra Krastins Lopes: Thank you, Ana. Now I’ll pass the floor to Alex Moltzau. He joined the European AI office in the European Commission the day it went live as a policy officer, seconded national experts sent from the Norwegian Ministry of Digitalization and Governance to the GCNECT, A2 Artificial Intelligence Regulation and Compliance. He coordinates work on AI regulatory sandboxes and is currently also a visiting policy fellow at the University of Cambridge.

Alex Moltzau: Thank you so much. And it’s a pleasure to be here today. And really great to listen to the intervention of George. and Jose and Ana as well. So my name is Alex Moltzau, as was said, and I also, you know, I think it’s being here today is really wonderful as someone who is seconded from Norway to the Commission to see kind of everyone come together, you know, and I think it’s a really, really bright community. But this topic that we are discussing here is really, really close to my heart. So my background is in social data science, so which combines kind of social concerns with data science methods, I mean, programming oriented, but at the same time, with inspiration from a lot of social science fields. But I also have a master’s in artificial intelligence for public services. And where Jose is placed, they run a conference about AI and sustainability and I spoke at the first edition, although I have not spoken at the ones prior. I previously held a TEDx talk on AI and the climate crisis in 2020. So I think like, for me, I just saw that, you know, I think we were seeing all this compute increasing, you know, infrastructure being built. And with the consumption patterns, you know, in all other fields, it was kind of strange to think that this is not going to be a problem. So I honestly, I think what we are dealing with here, you know, is something that is strange that we haven’t seen much more clear, you know, because I think we want to deliver great services to our people. And we want to also have amazing companies and compete in a friendly way as much as possible. But at the same time, we have a shared problem, you know. And these are expressed through the sustainable development goals. And I worked with AI policy full time for the last five years prior to joining the AI office, where I have worked now for one year. And before that, I worked with a nonprofit organization. and the so-called Young Sustainable Impact. So that had a community of around 11,000 people around the world and we worked to try to think how can we bring forward new solutions and new companies to address the Sustainable Development Goals. But I think maybe we were a bit naive. But I think we have to be naive and I think we have to believe in that brighter future and for sure that is not to just senselessly use technology without any thoughts about responsibility and without the context that we live in. Because we live in a time where we have a climate crisis, we live in a time where we have a plurality of different crises that we are facing and we can only face them in digital solidarity. So I really think that what Ana says and what she said about the minerals is something that also is very clear. And I’m also glad to say that where I’m working now in DigiConnect in the European AI office at the very ground floor of the building, we have a really large artwork and it’s called the Anatomy of an AI System which shows the value chains of Alexa Echo and how that is linked together and it’s an artwork created by Kate Crawford and Vladan Joler. So in a way every single time we walk into the building we are looking at that artwork by Kate Crawford and Vladan Joler. So I think what I like about the European Commission and what I like about the people that work there is that they really care deeply about these things. So I can tell you that for sure it’s not something that we want to ignore, it’s something that we really want to commit towards. But today I’m not talking on behalf of the European Commission, I’m not representing their official perspectives, I’m just here as an individual, but I will still tell you about a few of the things that we are working on. It’s also a collaboration that we have rolled out to finance, also collaboration on generative AI to kind of get new perspectives, solutions, companies in collaboration with Africa. And there’s 5 million euros there committed to this. So I will encourage anyone working here in Europe or in Africa to kind of apply together for that. And the deadline is the 2nd of October this year. So please consider seeing if there’s any kind of good project for collaboration on that. And if you have read the EU AI Act, you might have seen a small part of it. It’s also that there’s a commitment to a standardization request on energy reduction. And there is also a study on green AI running now internally in the commission. So I think this is also kind of like, although I would like to have seen that we did a lot more, it is not like we are doing nothing, I’m happy to say. But I think what we have to do is to think about the rollout of all these large-scale policy mechanisms that we are rolling out now. And it is a lot. Invest AI was announced during the AI Action Summit, 200 billion euros. Investment is not a joke. There’s quite a significant investment there. We’re rolling out AI factories, gigafactories. We have the AI Cloud and Development Act now to try to think about this in more way. There are a lot of movements to really scale up this digital in Europe. But sovereignty doesn’t mean that we should decide for a better future. If sovereignty means that we can make those decisions, if sovereignty means that we can decide to do something that would be better for our citizens, better for the population, then I would think that means that also that rollout has to be as responsible as possible, as sustainable as possible, as green as possible. And of course, that is my personal opinion. And I really look forward to listening to the other panelists.

Alexandra Krastins Lopes: and discussing today. Thank you, Alex. A very interesting thing you said about we shouldn’t use that without the context we live in. José Renato wants to say something.

Jose Renato Laranjeira de Pereira: Yeah, sure. Thanks, Ale. I would just like now to, well, first of all, thank the first two speakers. I think that we already have lots of interesting topics for the Q&A, but I would like now to introduce Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva. He’s a career diplomat and the Coordinator for Scientific and Technological Affairs at the Climate Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brazil. He’s also a member of the Technology Executive Committee of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the UNFCCC, and Brazil’s focal point to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the IPCC. And, well, Pedro, the floor is yours, but I would also like to say that I don’t think that there’s no one now more attentive and also with the knowledge of what’s going on in the discussions at the UNFCCC and this intersection with technology than Pedro, and particularly considering the fact that Brazil will host the next COP now in November in Belém. So, Pedro Ivo, the floor is yours. It’s great to see you here.

Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva: Yeah, thank you very much, José Renato, Alexandra, and also other colleagues in the panel. It’s a pleasure to actually reconnect with the IGF after 10 years. I had the honor to organize IGF 2015 in João Pessoa, in Brazil, and by that time AI was actually emerging as a topic and climate change and sustainable development goals in more general terms were rather just a subtopic, you know, in the context of the discussion. So, I’m glad that, you know, after 10 years things have evolved and and we are here delving into very interesting topics. I greet you all from Bonn. We’ve just concluded the June climate negotiations and AI was a very important topic of discussion here. And, you know, tackling of course, the benefits that AI can bring to climate action. And also, of course, the footprint, various environmental footprints, as also Ana Valdivia indicated, that was also part here of the discussions. So, as you know, the world is facing, among many others, the challenge of accelerating digital transformation while staying within planetary boundaries. And as I said, AI is both a powerful tool and a source of new tensions. It can be used in many ways to, for example, model climate risks, forecast disasters. It can be used to optimize infrastructure for low carbon development, but it can also deepen inequality. It can, you know, centralize control and, you know, again, exacerbate many environmental harms if it is left unchecked. So the question, I mean, it’s not whether AI will be used or not. It is already being used. The real question is, you know, who decides how it is used, for what purpose and at what cost? In this context, I think governments have a critical role, not only as regulators, but also as stewards of public interest and also as a driver of innovation and development. You know, governments must ensure that AI governments, governance frameworks are rooted in democratic values. That is very important that AI is aligned with climate goals and also protect human rights. At the same time, I think that these frameworks, they must encourage innovation. And if we look at the climate, you know, innovation within the climate context, I think there is a dire need that AI is not only a driver for innovation for mitigation purposes, but also for adaptation and resilience in vulnerable communities. So I think this discussion that we are having here, and I think again, Lapine and partners for organizing this panel here at the IGF, I think it’s timely, you know, as we look ahead for COP30 in Belém, in the heart of the Amazon, know that the Brazilian presidency of COP30 has proposed a vision, yeah, for the COP that is centered around the idea of mutirão, is a word a bit difficult to, you know, pronounce, but it means it is a collective and community driven effort to tackle, you know, shared challenges. And it is a concept that reminds us permanently that, you know, climate action is not just about technology, but also about, you know, cooperation, participation and shared responsibilities. So in this kind of ethos must also guide us how we approach the governance of AI. And yeah, I mean, the current global landscape of AI, I think, reflects a profound symmetry, you know, while, and we have mentioned it here, AI has an enormous potential to support climate action. Its development and deployment are dominated by a few countries and a few corporations, and I think it was also mentioned by the previous panelists. So most of the world remains excluded from shaping these systems. And at the same time, the environmental footprint of AI is increasing. And here, a very important aspect, while transparency of AI is declining. I mean, a recent study, a study from one, two weeks ago, found that 84% of widely used large language models provide, no disclosure at all of their energy use or emissions. Without better reporting, we cannot assess the actual trade-offs and design, we cannot design informed policies and we can also hold AI and related infrastructures accountable. You know, that’s why inclusive international cooperation is essential and it must be accompanied by, you know, local empowerment. I refer again to another report that was prepared by UNCTAD, its technology innovation report from this year, titled Inclusive AI for Development. You know, AI lays out among many other things that developing countries need to strengthen specifically three strategic capabilities in order to be able also to shape AI skills, data and infrastructure. So, as they turn this as leverage points that will allow countries of the global south, not only to access AI, but to really, you know, shape it in ways that must reflect local priorities, protect, of course, biodiversity, protect natural resources and advance climate justice. And, you know, this is not just about developing new technologies, it’s also about ensuring that AI systems are embedded in institutions, practices and values that are transparent, inclusive, and of course climate aligned. And as we look into the future, I think we should not reject, or let’s say we should reject actually the false binary that exists between national sovereignty and global cooperation. I think we need both of them to be rooted in equity, climate responsibility, and I think the Muchidão spirit kind of conveys this and allows us to come forward. So these are my initial remarks. I thank you all for, again, for the invitation, discussion, and looking forward to the Q&A. Thank you very much.

Jose Renato Laranjeira de Pereira: Thank you very much, Pedro. Great thoughts. Well, I’m really looking forward to the Q&A. But well, for now, I’ll introduce Yu Ping Chan, who is with us on site as well. Yu Ping Chan heads digital partnerships and engagements at the UNDP, the United Nations Development Agency. And before joining the UN Secretariat, Yu Ping was a diplomat in the Singaporean Foreign Service. So lots of diplomats here in this session. Yu Ping has a Bachelor of Arts Magna Cum Laude from Harvard University and a Master’s of Public Administration from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. Welcome Yu Ping. And now you have the floor, please.

Yu Ping Chan: Thank you so much to the organizers for having me here today. So I represent the United Nations Development Program. As Jose has mentioned, we are the development wing of the United Nations. We’re in over 170 countries and territories around the world, supporting governments through all phases of development, all aspects, sectors, and so forth. The digital programming at UNDP is actually quite extensive. now in more than 130 countries, I believe, supporting them on leveraging digital and AI to achieve the sustainable development goals. And so it’s really very interesting to be part of this conversation and really hearing your thoughts about what is so critical in terms of this intersection between digital and the environment. I’m also very privileged to follow Pedro because I couldn’t agree more with some of the areas that he’s highlighted in terms of the challenges here. And we as UNDP have been actually very privileged to work very closely with the Brazilian COP presidency in the lead up to COP and thinking about how these issues intertwine. So when he talks about these challenges around AI exclusion, AI inequality, this is also the framing that UNDP is looking at. When in terms of considering how the AI revolution is going to potentially leave behind even more countries in the world and really exacerbate the divides between the global South and the global North. When for instance, projections show that only 10% of the economic value that will be generated by AI in 2030 will accrue to the global South majority countries with the exception of China. We really have a situation where the AI future is going to be even more unequal than what we already see today. When presently, for instance, over 95% of the top AI talent of the world is concentrated in six research universities, which are in the US and China basically, you really see how we run this risk of having AI be in some ways the domain of, as already pointed about the panelists, certain exclusive types of monopolies, tech companies and develop in certain ways and not responding to the needs of local populations and the majority of the world. So this is where UNDP really has been looking at how we strengthen local ecosystems, ensure inclusivity in data models, LLMs, and the AI systems that will be generated in the future. This is also not to say that it’s not even just about AI, right? Because even before we have AI, we need to have data. Before we have data, we need to have basic connectivity. Before we have connectivity, we also have to talk about things such as infrastructure and energy, all of which are challenges for the global sub-countries across the globe. So, from UNDP’s perspective, it’s not enough to just think of AI by itself, right? You need to think about the entire developmental spectrum across all these issues and really tie digital and AI, digital transformation itself, as part of this holistic approach that goes beyond just one ministry but really thinks about the broader approaches to sustainability and inclusion and really digital transformation as part of the societal approach as a whole. So, for instance, we’ve initiated a lot of work around some of the areas that other panelists have already highlighted. The gaps around skills, compute, and talent. Just last week in Italy, we launched the AI Hub for Sustainable Development with the Italian Presidency that is a product of the G7 Presidency that is looking at how we can support local AI ecosystems in Africa, strengthen AI innovation, and also partner with AI startups in Africa to bring them to scale and to really build that capacity within Africa to be part of the AI revolution. We’ve also worked on various areas when it comes to digital and connectivity, as well as digital and environmental sustainability and climate issues. We have a Digital for Planet offer where, besides the fact that we’ve worked closely with the Brazilian COP Presidency, we also lead the Coalition on Digital Environmental Sustainability with the International Telecommunications Union, UNEP, the German Environmental Ministry, the Kenyan government, and various civil society organizations such as the International Science Council, Future of Earth, and so forth, to really think about what kind of thought leadership and global advocacy we need around this intersection of digital and environmental sustainability. And this is in addition to the work that is being done, as I mentioned, in UNDP’s country offices all around the world, where we’ve worked on national carbon registry systems, digital public infrastructure for climate in countries like Namibia, Cote d’Ivoire, Costa Rica, Nigeria, Sri Lanka. I have a very long list of many, many projects that I could list, but suffice to say there is a lot of information online about what UNDP is doing in the area of digital environment climate all around the world. But all of this is not to say that it’s enough, because I think some of the other people are saying that it’s not enough. panelists have already talked about how we are aspiring to something a lot greater than just these pieces, right? It’s not enough to say we are doing these projects, we also have to be very thoughtful in how we roll out these projects, roll out these big investments exactly as just how you’ve spoken about. And actually it’s very interesting that Jose invited me to be part of this panel today because this actually came from another convening that we did last year at the IGF in Riyadh, where we were developing what we call the Hamburg Declaration, a responsible AI for the SDGs. And this was actually just launched two weeks ago at the Hamburg Sustainability Conference where we precisely are asking development practitioners, the multi-stakeholder community, governments, investment banks and civil society community to come together to think about how in the use of AI we have to be responsible in how we deploy and use design AI for development outcomes precisely in these areas of people, planet, inclusivity and so forth. So we’ve already garnered over 50 stakeholders that signed on to the Hamburg Declaration on Responsible AI for the SDGs, which is the first multi-stakeholder document in this particular space. We would encourage and welcome more organizations to sign up, make commitments in this regard because it’s precisely that. How do you thoughtfully engage with AI and how do you commit to using AI responsibly in achievement of the sustainable development goals and in environmental sustainability as well. So I look forward to hearing from all of you.

Alexandra Krastins Lopes: Thank you. Now I pass the floor to Alexandra Costa Barbosa. He’s a member of the Homeless Workers Movement, a digital policy consultant and researcher.

Alexander Costa Barbosa: Thank you, Alexandra. Can you hear me? Yes. I would like to say hello to the panelists. I’m really pleased to be here. Thank you for the invitation. I am Alexandra Costa Barbosa. As Alexandra said, I’m a member of the Homeless Workers Movement. Some of you may be asking, what is a Homeless Workers Movement? It’s a housing movement in Brazil. It was founded in 1997. As you can imagine, there’s a huge gap of housing in Brazil. Different statistics, but you can consider even 30 million people living in precarious conditions of housing. So when we think that this state has not the proper tools and instruments to really deal with this issue, people themselves started struggling and fighting for this. I’m just saying that because the same applies to technology and digital sovereignty. Our approach to digital sovereignty, or what we call popular digital sovereignty, and by popular here, I’m referring to the Latin American version of popular, it deals with the massive aspect of sovereignty instead of the so-called folkloric aspect of popular. For us, it’s mainly what we’ve been doing the past five years. It’s like doing things that the state actually haven’t provided to us so far. So really fighting for meaningful connectivity, digital literacy in periphery, in favelas, in slums, and so on. Also fighting for decent work, decent digital labor, beyond the statements in the academy. And then we realized that what we’ve been doing in practice, it’s somehow what we claim by digital sovereignty. But for this specific panel, I think it’s relevant to emphasize that in this first semester, Brazil is also chairing the BRICS Summit in the following week. And within the BRICS structure, there is the BRICS Civil Forum, and in which Brazil also added this popular dimension, so the BRICS Civil Popular Forum. And we also co-led the Digital Sovereignty Working Group with the Landless Workers Movement, which is another social movement really important in Brazil, struggling for the land reform. And this work was really, really interesting. You can, you’re probably gonna have access to this document in the following week, but there we promoted this idea of people-centric digital sovereignty. And we also outlined some guidelines for the New Government Bank to finance digital public infrastructures, having in consideration both people and nature, climate needs, and so on. There are also other guidelines specifically to deal with AI development. And I think it’s really worth checking this document in the following week. When I mentioned here this meaningful access, digital literacy, decent work, and so on, it’s just to highlight that whenever we talk about AI sovereignty, we cannot restrict this discussion to, I think as the other panelists already mentioned it, to like computing power, or to regulatory capacity, or even data capacity, or risk-based regulation, and so on. But also considering this connectivity, electricity access, digital literacy access, and also a transition to decent, better jobs in the AI so-called era. I think that’s mainly the initial contribution that I put in place. If you have any other questions, feel free to reach us. If you’re curious about what a social movement is doing in regards of digital sovereignty, you can also access our website. I will provide later in the chat here, and eventually the moderators can also share with the other attendees. Our approach to digital sovereignty, I think it’s pretty much aligned with the sustainable vision of digital sovereignty. And just to add this more critical aspect of sustainability here, right? We’ve been watching this greenwashing agenda over sustainability in the past 15 years. So eventually it’s a time to change to alternatives to development, right? Especially in Latin America, and briefly speaking here, Latin American environment, we have other agendas, alternative agendas, such as the Buen Vivir, or the Good Living, Buen Vivir, or even the Commons-based development. I think that’s pretty much aligned with this climate justice discussion. Thank you very much.

Alexandra Krastins Lopes: Thank you, Alexandra. Now, I would like to know if we have any questions on floor. Please feel free to join the microphone.

Raoul Danniel Abellar Manuel: Hello. Can I be heard? Yes. Okay, thank you. My name is Raul Manuel and I am a member of parliament from the Philippines representing the Youth Party. So I’d like to address my question to a representative from the European Commission. So, because in the Philippines in our case, we also would like to look at the labor angle of artificial intelligence because to develop the large language models, it also entails a lot of labor, especially for those in like call centers, where the structure is like a call center, but what the people do is actually to train the large language models. And the one thing that we want to ensure also for our citizens is how to not replicate, you know, the old exploitative practices in labor and how that might extend to AI development. So, since the continent of Europe is like some steps ahead in terms of regulating AI, I’d like to ask if ever there are any provisions in your current laws or policies that also touch into protection of labor and workers. Thank you.

Alexandra Krastins Lopes: Thank you. Just a reminder to the speakers, when answering the question, please also state your final remarks. Thanks.

Alex Moltzau: Yes. So I guess this is a question directly to me. And I’m here today in a personal capacity. So I’m not presenting the official views and perspectives of the European Commission. First and foremost, I would like to say that. And I mean, like I have a bit of a background as well as a Norwegian, you know. as a country who cares a lot about labor legislation and about collaboration. I also always actively talk to unions when I travel back to Oslo because I think it’s extremely important to think about the impact on labors and the impact on the way that we work but also the way that we are affected. And I think what you are saying is extremely interesting also because what we are seeing is that all these large language models they require a lot of supervised machine learning. So we have to tag all these different algorithms and that requires a lot of human labor. And I think part of the backdrop here as well is that for example Kenya, there were a lot of movements as well to unionize to see is there any kind of way to increase our rights or to increase the pay that we get for doing all of this work and making sure that these models actually work in practice. So I think your question is extremely timely. And in the European Union we still have fairly strong labor legislation, right? So I think it’s like saying that AI does not operate in a vacuum. We have existing laws. We have existing values. So let’s make sure that those existing laws and the values that we have really are ways that we act in the field of AI because I don’t think it is right now. But I think there is such a long way to go. So I just wanted to thank you for that. And in a sense how do we have ways to handle that within the field of AI is also something that I have seen the European Commission is working on currently but I don’t think I can give you kind of a definite answer on how to protect overall the laborers. AI Act does include kind of concerns regarding employment as well in kind of risk categories. So in this way, at least in our region, it has a consequence. But with that I guess that’s my final comment. And I just pass it to other questions.

Edmon Chung: speakers. Thank you. We have another question. Edmond Chung from Dot Asia. Thank you. Thank you for bringing the topic and especially linking it to sovereignty and digital sovereignty. I think many of the panelists have touched on this and I think Pedro mentioned about the false dichotomy between national digital sovereignty and the global cooperation especially global public interests in my mind. One of and one of the things I think perhaps I’d like to hear from the panel but also to to really think about the personal digital sovereignty as well. I think earlier, sorry I forgot the name of the person, mentioned about popular sovereignty because it’s the personal digital sovereignty and I think Yu Ping mentioned about data coming before AI. The personal digital sovereignty is actually a very important part of you know really safeguarding AI that is people centric like the for for the end end user ultimately. So it is not even a dichotomy. I think coming in order to bring it to full circle it’s both you know it’s not only both it’s the personal digital sovereignty, national digital sovereignty and the global public interest which brings it into the full loop. So yeah that’s that’s my contribution. Okay I’ll take the next

Participant: question and then we’ll go to the answers. Yes you can. Hello thank you for this amazing panel. My name is Lucia and I come from Peru which is a country in which digital divide is also a huge concern so that’s why I think this vision of digital sovereignty also involving things as you know digital literacy and appropriation of the technology. So I would like to ask about environmental sustainability because at least in my country there’s like a race in order to regulate AI. and we are like the first country in our region that has AI law and we are trying to also approve a regulation on this but there’s a huge environmental view missing and we also know that this is also happening in the digital public infrastructure in general so I would like to ask how do you think that, for instance, we as civil society organizations, also with grassroot organizations, can advocate about that without getting into this greenwashing approach that our colleague from Brazil was sharing with us?

Alexandra Krastins Lopes: Thank you. We have less than five minutes, please. The speakers feel free to answer rapidly. Thank you.

Ana Valdivia: Thank you very much. Thank you for this question. I can share my insights from doing fieldwork in Mexico and Chile regarding the sustainability and environmental impacts of data centers there. I think one solution would be to talk to other of your colleagues because there are a lot of social movements in Latin America and I can talk about Surciendo in Mexico, Derechos Digitales. There are also other movements in Chile and if you want to come put you in touch with them because they have been advocating for more transparency. Currently, for instance, in Mexico, we don’t know how much water and energy data centers are using. Chile had a platform where the citizens in Chile could access the environmental reports of data centers and due to pressures by the data center industry, the Chilean government has decided to cancel this platform so data centers are not allowed anymore to report these environmental impacts in this platform anymore. I think we can create this sort of solidarity that I mentioned in my intervention and I will be happy to be in touch and to put you in contact with other organizations in Latin America. Thank you for your question.

Alexandra Krastins Lopes: Okay, Alexandra Barbosa.

Alexander Costa Barbosa: I’d like to also react to the first question as well, and just to emphasize that when you’re dealing at this moment in this contemporary conjuncture, all of this AI discussion, AI sovereignty, AI regulation, AI and environmental sustainability, it has to do with politics, right? In the end of the day. In the beginning of the discussion on AI regulation, it couldn’t have any workers’ right in the final approval legislation, and it pretty much applies for organizing social movements, especially popular movements, grassroots movements, to deal with environmental concerns. We’ve been seeing the indigenous struggle against deforestation in the Amazonian region, for instance, in the past years, and just for you to have a glimpse, the Brazilian Congress is completely against any efforts from the government at this moment. So just to have an idea that it’s much, much more difficult than any specific guideline that we have in mind. Thank you very much for the opportunity.

Alexandra Krastins Lopes: Yu Ping?

Yu Ping Chan: And also, just to add to this dimension, it’s not just politics, right? It’s also the big tech and the profit motivation. So to the first question, this fact that there’s a need for labor regulation, but there’s also a question around who owns the products of those labor in the end, because the LRMs themselves are going to be owned by big tech companies and not freely available to the populations that were putting in the data or the efforts to actually create them. So there’s really all these issues that are tied into technology, which really requires, I think, and I really like this aspect about the mobilization of concerned individuals, groups and so forth that share experiences and thoughts about how to respond to this. So that question about what should we do, and I want to link it to what you had said, that maybe perhaps sometimes we are naive in what we try to achieve. My last closing message I think would be to continue to speak up, to be involved and to really think about how we collectively can make those changes that we want to see.

Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva: Pedro? Yes, I know we are, I think the time is over, just I think from all the questions and comments that were made here, I think one conclusion that I draw is that, you know, we need perhaps to move away from some narratives that comes especially from developed countries, that we live in a moment of, for example, a triple planetary crisis, you know, a view that tries to limit the problems that we face in the world. Actually I would rather say we live in a moment of a poly-crisis that contains of course the environmental crisis, but also the social crisis with diminishing labor rights, also while people still fight for, you know, to overcome the challenges of hunger and poverty. So I think that’s, and of course the crisis related to digital rights, which actually is a crisis that has been very central to the debate in IGF 2015 where, that I was participating. So I think we need to, you know, to tackle all this crisis in a coherent way. And I think encouraging social movement and grassroots movement is fundamental. I think technology can play a very important role here by leveraging those movements. So perhaps that is the final message here. Let’s consider that we are facing various crises at the moment and let’s use technology in order to address them in a very coherent way. Thank you.

Alexandra Krastins Lopes: Thank you all for the great discussion. Can we please take a picture? Can you put the speakers on the screen, please? Thank you. Thank you. for the on

Agreement points

AI development is dominated by big tech companies, excluding broader participation

Speakers

– Ana Valdivia
– Yu Ping Chan

Arguments

AI development is now dominated by big tech companies rather than universities or other institutions, limiting innovation access

Over 95% of top AI talent is concentrated in six research universities in the US and China, creating exclusive monopolies

Summary

Both speakers agree that AI development has become centralized in a small number of big tech companies and elite institutions, primarily in the US and China, which excludes most of the world from participating in AI innovation and creates monopolistic control over AI technologies.

Topics

Economic | Development | Legal and regulatory

Global South bears environmental costs while being excluded from AI governance

Speakers

– Ana Valdivia
– Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva

Arguments

AI infrastructure cannot be truly sovereign because it depends on minerals and natural resources from other countries, creating interdependencies

Most of the world remains excluded from shaping AI systems while bearing environmental costs of mineral extraction

Summary

Both speakers highlight the fundamental injustice where Global South countries provide the raw materials and bear environmental costs for AI infrastructure while having no control over how AI systems are developed or deployed.

Topics

Development | Human rights principles | Economic

Need for transparency in AI environmental impact reporting

Speakers

– Ana Valdivia
– Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva

Arguments

Data centers in Mexico are being deployed without democratic consultation with communities, exacerbating drought conditions

84% of widely used large language models provide no disclosure of their energy use or emissions, preventing informed policy design

Summary

Both speakers emphasize the critical lack of transparency regarding AI’s environmental impacts, with AI infrastructure being deployed without proper disclosure of resource consumption or community consultation.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Development | Sustainable development

Labor rights concerns in AI development

Speakers

– Yu Ping Chan
– Alexander Costa Barbosa
– Raoul Danniel Abellar Manuel

Arguments

Question of ownership arises regarding who owns the products of labor used to create LLMs that end up owned by big tech companies

Workers’ rights were initially excluded from AI regulation discussions, highlighting the political nature of these debates

Need to ensure labor protections in AI development to avoid replicating exploitative practices, especially in training large language models

Summary

All three speakers express concern about labor exploitation in AI development, particularly regarding workers who train AI systems but don’t benefit from the resulting products, and the systematic exclusion of labor protections from AI governance discussions.

Topics

Future of work | Human rights principles | Economic

Multi-level approach to digital sovereignty needed

Speakers

– Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva
– Edmon Chung
– Alexander Costa Barbosa

Arguments

False binary exists between national sovereignty and global cooperation – both are needed and should be rooted in equity and climate responsibility

Personal digital sovereignty is essential alongside national and global approaches to create people-centric AI systems

Popular digital sovereignty involves communities doing what the state hasn’t provided, focusing on meaningful connectivity and digital literacy in peripheries

Summary

These speakers agree that digital sovereignty cannot be achieved through a single approach but requires coordination across personal, community, national, and international levels, rejecting false dichotomies between different scales of governance.

Topics

Human rights principles | Development | Legal and regulatory

Similar viewpoints

Both speakers advocate for cooperative rather than competitive approaches to digital governance, emphasizing solidarity and collaboration while ensuring meaningful local participation in decision-making processes.

Speakers

– Ana Valdivia
– Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva

Arguments

Digital sovereignty should be replaced with digital solidarity to create networks of cooperation between states rather than competition

International cooperation must be accompanied by local empowerment and community participation

Topics

Development | Human rights principles | Legal and regulatory

Both speakers emphasize that AI and digital transformation must be approached holistically, considering environmental sustainability and requiring coordination across multiple sectors and policy areas rather than isolated technology-focused approaches.

Speakers

– Yu Ping Chan
– Alex Moltzau

Arguments

Digital transformation must be part of holistic approach beyond single ministries, encompassing connectivity, infrastructure, and energy

AI rollout must be as responsible, sustainable, and green as possible within the context of climate crisis

Topics

Sustainable development | Development | Infrastructure

Both speakers advocate for moving beyond conventional development models toward more comprehensive approaches that address interconnected social, environmental, and digital challenges through alternative frameworks rooted in justice and equity.

Speakers

– Alexander Costa Barbosa
– Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva

Arguments

Alternative development approaches like Buen Vivir and commons-based development align with climate justice discussions

Need to move beyond triple planetary crisis narrative to address poly-crisis including environmental, social, and digital rights crises

Topics

Sustainable development | Development | Human rights principles

Unexpected consensus

Critique of larger AI models

Speakers

– Ana Valdivia

Arguments

Larger language models reproduce more stereotypes and biases while consuming more resources without necessarily being better

Explanation

It’s unexpected to find consensus challenging the prevailing industry narrative that bigger AI models are inherently better. This technical critique from an AI researcher directly contradicts the dominant trend toward ever-larger models, suggesting the field may be moving in the wrong direction.

Topics

Human rights principles | Development | Sociocultural

Government officials acknowledging AI governance failures

Speakers

– Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva
– Alex Moltzau

Arguments

84% of widely used large language models provide no disclosure of their energy use or emissions, preventing informed policy design

AI operates within existing labor legislation frameworks, but there’s concern about protecting workers involved in supervised machine learning tasks

Explanation

It’s notable that government representatives openly acknowledge significant gaps and failures in current AI governance, including lack of transparency and inadequate worker protections. This honest assessment from policy makers suggests genuine commitment to addressing these issues rather than defending status quo.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Future of work | Sustainable development

Social movement and international organization alignment on systemic change

Speakers

– Alexander Costa Barbosa
– Yu Ping Chan
– Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva

Arguments

Alternative development approaches like Buen Vivir and commons-based development align with climate justice discussions

Need for collective action and mobilization of concerned individuals and groups to address AI challenges

Social movements and grassroots organizations should be leveraged through technology to address multiple crises coherently

Explanation

There’s unexpected consensus between grassroots social movements and established international organizations on the need for fundamental systemic change rather than incremental reforms. This alignment suggests broader recognition that current approaches are inadequate.

Topics

Development | Human rights principles | Sociocultural

Overall assessment

Summary

The speakers demonstrate remarkable consensus on several critical issues: the concentration of AI power in big tech companies, the environmental and social injustices created by current AI development patterns, the need for transparency and accountability, and the importance of multi-stakeholder approaches that include marginalized communities. There’s also strong agreement on the interconnected nature of digital, environmental, and social challenges.

Consensus level

High level of consensus with significant implications for AI governance. The agreement spans diverse stakeholders from government officials to social movement representatives, suggesting these concerns transcend traditional institutional boundaries. This consensus provides a strong foundation for coordinated action on AI governance reform, particularly around environmental sustainability, labor rights, and inclusive participation in AI development decisions.

Different viewpoints

Digital Sovereignty vs Digital Solidarity Approach

Speakers

– Ana Valdivia
– Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva

Arguments

Digital sovereignty should be replaced with digital solidarity to create networks of cooperation between states rather than competition

False binary exists between national sovereignty and global cooperation – both are needed and should be rooted in equity and climate responsibility

Summary

Valdivia argues for abandoning digital sovereignty discourse entirely in favor of digital solidarity, while Silva maintains that both national sovereignty and global cooperation can coexist without being contradictory

Topics

Development | Legal and regulatory | Human rights principles

Scope of Current Global Crisis

Speakers

– Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva
– Yu Ping Chan

Arguments

Need to move beyond triple planetary crisis narrative to address poly-crisis including environmental, social, and digital rights crises

Only 10% of economic value generated by AI in 2030 will accrue to Global South countries excluding China, exacerbating existing inequalities

Summary

Silva advocates for a broader ‘poly-crisis’ framework that encompasses multiple interconnected challenges, while Chan focuses more specifically on economic inequality and AI exclusion as primary concerns

Topics

Development | Human rights principles | Sustainable development

Unexpected differences

Terminology and Framing of Sovereignty Discourse

Speakers

– Ana Valdivia
– Edmon Chung

Arguments

Digital sovereignty should be replaced with digital solidarity to create networks of cooperation between states rather than competition

Personal digital sovereignty is essential alongside national and global approaches to create people-centric AI systems

Explanation

While both speakers are concerned with power dynamics in AI governance, Valdivia wants to abandon sovereignty terminology entirely, while Chung wants to expand it to include personal sovereignty. This disagreement on terminology is unexpected given their shared concerns about democratizing AI governance

Topics

Human rights principles | Development | Privacy and data protection

Overall assessment

Summary

The main areas of disagreement center on approaches to digital sovereignty (solidarity vs. combined sovereignty-cooperation), the scope of global crises (poly-crisis vs. focused inequality concerns), and terminology for governance frameworks. However, there is strong consensus on core problems: AI’s environmental impact, exclusion of Global South, labor exploitation, and need for community empowerment

Disagreement level

Low to moderate disagreement level with high convergence on problem identification but differing on solutions and framing. The disagreements are more about strategic approaches and terminology rather than fundamental values, suggesting potential for synthesis and collaboration among the speakers’ perspectives

Partial agreements

Similar viewpoints

Both speakers advocate for cooperative rather than competitive approaches to digital governance, emphasizing solidarity and collaboration while ensuring meaningful local participation in decision-making processes.

Speakers

– Ana Valdivia
– Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva

Arguments

Digital sovereignty should be replaced with digital solidarity to create networks of cooperation between states rather than competition

International cooperation must be accompanied by local empowerment and community participation

Topics

Development | Human rights principles | Legal and regulatory

Both speakers emphasize that AI and digital transformation must be approached holistically, considering environmental sustainability and requiring coordination across multiple sectors and policy areas rather than isolated technology-focused approaches.

Speakers

– Yu Ping Chan
– Alex Moltzau

Arguments

Digital transformation must be part of holistic approach beyond single ministries, encompassing connectivity, infrastructure, and energy

AI rollout must be as responsible, sustainable, and green as possible within the context of climate crisis

Topics

Sustainable development | Development | Infrastructure

Both speakers advocate for moving beyond conventional development models toward more comprehensive approaches that address interconnected social, environmental, and digital challenges through alternative frameworks rooted in justice and equity.

Speakers

– Alexander Costa Barbosa
– Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva

Arguments

Alternative development approaches like Buen Vivir and commons-based development align with climate justice discussions

Need to move beyond triple planetary crisis narrative to address poly-crisis including environmental, social, and digital rights crises

Topics

Sustainable development | Development | Human rights principles

Key takeaways

AI sovereignty cannot be achieved in isolation due to dependencies on minerals, infrastructure, and resources from other countries, requiring a shift from competitive sovereignty to collaborative digital solidarity

AI development is reproducing and exacerbating existing inequalities, with only 10% of AI’s economic value projected to accrue to Global South countries (excluding China) by 2030

Environmental impacts of AI are largely undisclosed, with 84% of widely used large language models providing no information about their energy use or emissions, preventing informed policy-making

AI infrastructure deployment often occurs without democratic consultation with affected communities, creating climate injustice where data centers have 24/7 access to resources while local communities face scarcity

Effective AI governance requires addressing multiple interconnected crises (environmental, social, digital rights) rather than focusing on technology in isolation

Popular/grassroots digital sovereignty involves communities providing services the state hasn’t delivered, focusing on meaningful connectivity, digital literacy, and decent work conditions

Multi-stakeholder approaches must genuinely include social movements, indigenous communities, and grassroots organizations in AI policy design

Labor rights protection is essential in AI development to prevent exploitation of workers involved in training large language models and data processing

Resolutions and action items

European Commission collaboration with Africa on generative AI with 5 million euros funding (deadline October 2nd)

Hamburg Declaration on Responsible AI for the SDGs launched with over 50 stakeholders committed, welcoming more organizations to sign

BRICS Civil Popular Forum Digital Sovereignty Working Group document to be released with guidelines for financing digital public infrastructures

Ana Valdivia offered to connect civil society organizations across Latin America working on data center transparency and environmental advocacy

Encouragement for continued advocacy and mobilization of concerned individuals and groups to collectively address AI challenges

Unresolved issues

How to effectively regulate AI environmental impacts without falling into greenwashing approaches

How to ensure meaningful participation of Global South countries in shaping AI systems beyond just accessing them

How to balance rapid AI development and deployment with environmental sustainability requirements

How to address the concentration of AI innovation in big tech companies versus universities and public institutions

How to implement effective transparency requirements for AI energy consumption and emissions disclosure

How to ensure labor rights protection in AI development across different jurisdictions and regulatory frameworks

How to democratically involve communities in decisions about AI infrastructure deployment in their territories

Suggested compromises

Adopting ‘digital solidarity’ framework instead of competitive digital sovereignty to enable cooperation while maintaining autonomy

Developing AI governance that balances innovation encouragement with climate goals and human rights protection

Creating networks of collaboration between states and civil society organizations to share experiences and strategies

Implementing the ‘mutirão’ (collective community-driven effort) approach to AI governance that emphasizes cooperation and shared responsibility

Strengthening three strategic capabilities (skills, data, infrastructure) in developing countries while maintaining global cooperation

Using existing labor legislation frameworks as foundation for AI worker protection rather than creating entirely new systems

Rather than talk about digital sovereignty, that creates sort of like frictions between states, because all the states in the world want to become digital sovereign, we should talk about digital solidarity. And we should talk about how we can create networks of solidarity, that we help one state with other states… all together to develop digital divinity and how we can become as a community independent from big tech companies.

Speaker

Ana Valdivia

Reason

This comment fundamentally reframes the entire discussion by challenging the competitive nationalism inherent in ‘digital sovereignty’ discourse and proposing a collaborative alternative. It’s intellectually provocative because it suggests that the very framing of sovereignty creates the problems the panelists are trying to solve.

Impact

This concept of ‘digital solidarity’ became a recurring theme throughout the discussion. Pedro Ivo later referenced it directly, and Yu Ping’s closing remarks about collective action echo this sentiment. It shifted the conversation from nation-state competition to collaborative problem-solving.

AI is not only nowadays reproducing stereotypes and biases, it’s also reproducing climate injustice, because if we don’t regulate how this infrastructure is becoming is being implemented in different geographies, it’s going to exacerbate the consequences of climate justice.

Speaker

Ana Valdivia

Reason

This comment introduces a critical new dimension by connecting AI bias research with environmental justice, using concrete examples from Querétaro, Mexico, where communities have water access only one hour per week while data centers have 24/7 access. It demonstrates how AI infrastructure creates new forms of inequality.

Impact

This framing of ‘climate injustice’ influenced subsequent speakers to address environmental impacts more seriously. Pedro Ivo built on this by discussing the need for transparency in AI energy reporting, and Yu Ping referenced the broader developmental spectrum needed to address these inequalities.

We should reject actually the false binary that exists between national sovereignty and global cooperation. I think we need both of them to be rooted in equity, climate responsibility, and I think the Muchidão spirit kind of conveys this.

Speaker

Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva

Reason

This comment introduces the Brazilian concept of ‘mutirão’ (collective community effort) as a framework for AI governance, challenging the either/or thinking that dominates policy discussions. It’s culturally grounded yet universally applicable.

Impact

This concept provided a philosophical foundation that other speakers built upon. Edmond Chung later expanded this to include personal digital sovereignty, creating a three-level framework (personal, national, global) that enriched the discussion’s complexity.

Our approach to digital sovereignty, or what we call popular digital sovereignty… it deals with the massive aspect of sovereignty instead of the so-called folkloric aspect of popular. For us, it’s mainly what we’ve been doing the past five years. It’s like doing things that the state actually haven’t provided to us so far.

Speaker

Alexander Costa Barbosa

Reason

This comment introduces a grassroots perspective that challenges both state-centric and corporate-centric approaches to digital sovereignty. It’s particularly insightful because it comes from lived experience of a housing movement that has extended its organizing principles to digital rights.

Impact

This intervention grounded the theoretical discussion in practical organizing experience. It influenced the Q&A session, with participants asking about labor rights and grassroots advocacy, and Yu Ping’s final remarks about the importance of speaking up and collective action.

84% of widely used large language models provide no disclosure at all of their energy use or emissions. Without better reporting, we cannot assess the actual trade-offs and design, we cannot design informed policies and we can also hold AI and related infrastructures accountable.

Speaker

Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva

Reason

This statistic is striking because it reveals the fundamental lack of transparency that makes informed policy-making impossible. It connects the abstract discussion of sustainability to concrete governance challenges.

Impact

This transparency issue became a focal point for practical solutions. Ana Valdivia later referenced similar transparency struggles in Latin America, and it reinforced the need for the regulatory approaches that Alex Moltzau described from the European perspective.

It’s not only about infrastructure. It’s also about how we can become digital surveying and how we can develop this AI with our own hands and with our own infrastructure… We are not able to develop AI technology anymore. We have to depend on big tech companies.

Speaker

Ana Valdivia

Reason

This observation about the shift from distributed to centralized AI development is particularly insightful because it comes from someone who experienced this transition firsthand as a researcher. It highlights how technological sovereignty has been eroded even within academic institutions.

Impact

This comment deepened the discussion about what sovereignty actually means in practice. It influenced Yu Ping’s later comments about ownership of AI products and the concentration of AI talent, and connected to Alexander’s points about movements doing what states haven’t provided.

Overall assessment

These key comments fundamentally shaped the discussion by moving it beyond traditional policy frameworks toward more collaborative and justice-oriented approaches. Ana Valdivia’s concept of ‘digital solidarity’ and Pedro Ivo’s rejection of false binaries created space for Alexander’s grassroots perspective to be heard as equally valid to governmental and institutional approaches. The concrete examples of environmental injustice and lack of transparency grounded abstract concepts in lived realities. Together, these interventions transformed what could have been a conventional policy discussion into a more nuanced exploration of power, justice, and alternative frameworks for technology governance. The discussion evolved from technical and regulatory concerns toward questions of collective action, environmental justice, and community-driven solutions.

How can we create networks of digital solidarity between states to help develop digital sovereignty collectively and become independent from big tech companies?

Speaker

Ana Valdivia

Explanation

This addresses the need to move beyond competitive national digital sovereignty approaches toward collaborative frameworks that can challenge big tech monopolies

How can we improve transparency and reporting requirements for AI systems’ energy use and emissions, given that 84% of widely used large language models provide no disclosure?

Speaker

Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva

Explanation

Without better reporting, it’s impossible to assess trade-offs, design informed policies, or hold AI infrastructure accountable for environmental impacts

How can developing countries strengthen the three strategic capabilities (skills, data, and infrastructure) needed to shape AI according to local priorities?

Speaker

Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva

Explanation

This is essential for Global South countries to not just access AI but actively shape it to reflect local priorities and advance climate justice

How can AI regulation include stronger provisions for labor protection, particularly for workers involved in training large language models?

Speaker

Raoul Danniel Abellar Manuel

Explanation

There’s a need to ensure that AI development doesn’t replicate exploitative labor practices, especially in countries providing data annotation and model training services

How can civil society organizations advocate for environmental sustainability in AI regulation without falling into greenwashing approaches?

Speaker

Lucia (participant from Peru)

Explanation

Many countries are rushing to regulate AI but missing the environmental dimension, and there’s a need for effective advocacy strategies that avoid superficial environmental commitments

How can personal digital sovereignty be integrated with national digital sovereignty and global public interest to create a comprehensive framework?

Speaker

Edmon Chung

Explanation

This addresses the need to move beyond false dichotomies and create frameworks that protect individual rights while enabling national autonomy and global cooperation

How can we address the ownership and control issues around AI products created through Global South labor but owned by big tech companies?

Speaker

Yu Ping Chan

Explanation

This highlights the need to examine who benefits from AI development when the labor comes from one region but the profits and control remain with corporations in another

How can we develop coherent approaches to address the poly-crisis (environmental, social, digital rights crises) rather than treating them as separate issues?

Speaker

Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva

Explanation

Moving beyond the ‘triple planetary crisis’ narrative to address interconnected crises including labor rights, poverty, hunger, and digital rights alongside environmental concerns

How can technology be leveraged to support and amplify grassroots and social movements working on digital sovereignty and environmental justice?

Speaker

Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva

Explanation

This explores the potential for technology to empower social movements rather than just serve corporate or state interests

How can we ensure democratic participation in decisions about AI infrastructure deployment, particularly regarding environmental impacts on local communities?

Speaker

Ana Valdivia

Explanation

This addresses the problem of governments inviting AI infrastructure without consulting communities who will bear the environmental costs, such as water scarcity

Summary

This session at the Internet Governance Forum focused on financing self-sustaining community connectivity solutions, organized by the Dynamic Coalition on Community Connectivity. The discussion centered around a comprehensive report examining how to bridge the financial divide that prevents community networks from accessing adequate funding. Professor Luca Belli introduced the session, emphasizing that the report presents evidence-based research rather than opinions, analyzing various funding models from blended finance to social return on investment calculations.

Chris Locke from the Internet Society Foundation highlighted the challenge of transitioning community networks from grant-dependent “grantrepreneurs” to sustainable businesses, announcing a $30 million commitment over four years to support early-stage community connectivity projects. Marie Lisa Dacanay presented groundbreaking research on social impact measurement, demonstrating that community networks function as social enterprises providing three types of services: transactional, social inclusion, and transformational services. Her study of four cases across Asia and Africa showed social return on investment ratios consistently above one, with increasing value over time.

Claude Dorion’s structural analysis of 85 community connectivity initiatives revealed that most face significant financial constraints, with only a minority covering all costs through operational revenues. He advocated for blended finance mechanisms combining grants, loans, and flexible refundable products to address different aspects of project financing. Brian Vo and Nathalia Foditsch presented an investability analysis of nine community networks, finding strong demand and technical capacity but identifying structural barriers, particularly lack of access to capital and business planning skills.

The discussion concluded with recognition that community networks require specialized financing approaches that acknowledge their dual nature as infrastructure projects and social enterprises, emphasizing the need for multi-stakeholder partnerships and innovative funding mechanisms.

Keypoints

## Major Discussion Points:

– **Financing challenges and solutions for community networks**: The discussion extensively covered the “financial divide” within the digital divide, exploring how community-centered connectivity initiatives (CCIs) struggle to access appropriate funding and transition from grant-dependent organizations to financially sustainable enterprises.

– **Social impact measurement and return on investment**: Significant focus on demonstrating that community networks generate measurable social value beyond traditional connectivity services, with research showing Social Return on Investment (SROI) ratios above 1.0 and increasing over time across multiple case studies.

– **Investment readiness and blended finance models**: Analysis of community networks’ readiness for investment, revealing that while technical capacity and demand are strong, structural barriers exist around business planning, capital access, and the need for mixed financing approaches combining grants, loans, and flexible refundable products.

– **Multi-stakeholder partnerships and coordination**: Emphasis on the necessity of bringing together diverse actors including donors, development finance institutions, private investors, governments, and community organizations to create comprehensive financing ecosystems for community networks.

– **Infrastructure and operational sustainability**: Discussion of practical challenges including equipment costs (CAPEX), operational expenses (OPEX), energy access, spectrum licensing, and the relationship between connectivity and renewable energy solutions in underserved communities.

## Overall Purpose:

The discussion aimed to present research findings and practical solutions for financing self-sustaining community connectivity initiatives, moving beyond traditional grant-based models toward sustainable investment approaches that recognize community networks as social enterprises with measurable impact and commercial viability.

## Overall Tone:

The tone was consistently professional, collaborative, and optimistic throughout. Speakers demonstrated deep expertise while maintaining accessibility, with frequent acknowledgment of colleagues’ contributions. The atmosphere was solution-oriented rather than problem-focused, with participants building on each other’s presentations to create a comprehensive picture of both challenges and opportunities. The tone remained constructive and forward-looking, emphasizing concrete evidence and practical next steps rather than theoretical discussions.

Speakers

**Speakers from the provided list:**

– **Luca Belli** – Professor at FGV Law School in Rio de Janeiro, Chair of the Dynamic Coalition Community Connectivity

– **Chris Locke** – Executive Vice President and Managing Director of the Internet Society Foundation

– **Carlos Rey Moreno** – From APC (Association for Progressive Communication), Remote moderator, Policy and program work in digital development

– **Marie Lisa Dacanay** – Founding President of the Institute for Social Entrepreneurship in Asia

– **Claude Dorion** – Director of MCE Conseil

– **Nathalia Foditsch** – Director of International Programs at Connect Humanity

– **Brian Vo** – Chief Investment Officer at Connect Humanity, Investment and strategy expert with almost 20 years of experience

– **Carl Elmstam** – Policy and Program Manager on Digital Development at SIDA (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency)

– **Alessandra Lustrati** – Head of Digital Development at the UK Government Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO)

– **Audience** – Various audience members who asked questions and made statements

**Additional speakers:**

– **Senka Hajic** – Colleague and friend of Luca Belli, co-proposer of the meeting (mentioned as not present)

– **Gustav** – Representative from Common Room (mentioned and acknowledged in audience)

– **Risper** – Representative from Tandanet Community Network (mentioned as present)

– **Saul** – Former member of Zanzaleni (mentioned as online participant)

# Financing Self-Sustaining Community Connectivity Solutions: A Comprehensive Analysis

## Executive Summary

This session at the Internet Governance Forum, organised by the Dynamic Coalition on Community Connectivity, presented evidence-based research on bridging the financial divide that prevents community networks from accessing adequate funding. The discussion brought together academics, investors, development finance professionals, and practitioners to examine approaches for transitioning community connectivity initiatives from grant-dependent organisations to financially sustainable enterprises. The session revealed strong consensus on the need for blended finance mechanisms whilst highlighting the unique characteristics of community networks as social enterprises that generate measurable social returns alongside connectivity services.

## Introduction and Context

Professor Luca Belli from FGV Law School in Rio de Janeiro opened the session by emphasising that the Dynamic Coalition on Community Connectivity has been working on these issues for a decade, with all reports available at comconnectivity.org. He noted that the presented research represents evidence-based analysis backed by thoroughly researched papers examining various funding models from blended finance to social return on investment calculations. Carlos Rey Moreno from APC served as remote moderator for the session.

Belli explained that whilst his colleague Senka Hajic, co-proposer of the meeting, could not attend, the session would present comprehensive findings on how community-centred connectivity initiatives can achieve financial sustainability. He highlighted that community networks create positive externalities locally, decentralising connectivity whilst generating new wealth in economic and social terms, positioning these networks as examples of multi-stakeholder partnerships that build concrete solutions.

## The Challenge of Grant Dependency

Chris Locke, Executive Vice President and Managing Director of the Internet Society Foundation, introduced a critical perspective on current funding approaches. He observed that “often we create grantrepreneurs not entrepreneurs,” explaining that development organisations inadvertently train community networks to excel at securing grants rather than building sustainable businesses. This creates a fundamental challenge: the skills required for grant acquisition differ significantly from those needed for commercial viability.

Locke announced the Internet Society’s co-fund with Meta, totalling $30 million with Meta contributing 6.3 million, to support early-stage community connectivity projects. However, he emphasised that this funding must be coupled with proper training and capacity building to help organisations transition from grant dependency to sustainable business models.

## Community Networks as Social Enterprises

Marie Lisa Dacanay, Founding President of the Institute for Social Entrepreneurship in Asia, presented research that redefines how community networks should be understood and evaluated. Her analysis of four case studies – Kasepuan Ciptagilar in Indonesia, Patardi in India, Tandanet in Kenya, and Senzeleni in South Africa – revealed that community-centred connectivity initiatives function as social enterprises providing three distinct types of services:

1. **Transactional services**: Basic connectivity and communication functions

2. **Social inclusion services**: Digital literacy, community engagement, and access facilitation

3. **Transformational services**: Economic empowerment, education enhancement, and social development

This categorisation explains why traditional ISP metrics and investment criteria prove inadequate for evaluating community networks. Dacanay’s study demonstrated social return on investment (SROI) ratios consistently above 1.0, with increasing value creation over time. The SROI methodology employed development indexing tools to quantify social impacts, providing concrete evidence that community networks generate measurable value beyond simple connectivity provision.

## Structural Analysis of Financing Constraints

Claude Dorion, Director of MCE Conseil, presented a comprehensive structural analysis of 85 community connectivity initiatives across three continents. His research revealed that most community networks face significant financial constraints, with only a minority able to cover all costs through operational revenues. The analysis identified access to financial solutions, fundraising capabilities, and equipment costs as the primary constraints.

Dorion’s findings demonstrated that community networks face particular difficulty in demonstrating performance and social impact to the financial sector, creating barriers to accessing appropriate funding. To address these challenges, he advocated for blended finance mechanisms that recognise the different financing needs of community networks, proposing a structure combining impact financing through grants, equipment through loans, and working capital through flexible refundable products.

## Investment Readiness and Market Analysis

Brian Vo, Chief Investment Officer at Connect Humanity, and Nathalia Foditsch, Director of International Programs, presented an investability analysis of community networks from an investor perspective. Brian noted his experience with a portfolio of projects totalling $7 billion. Their cross-sectional analysis of nine community-centred connectivity initiatives employed actual investment underwriting criteria, providing practical insights into investment readiness.

The analysis revealed encouraging findings regarding market fundamentals: demand for connectivity proved real with many networks achieving 30-50% take rates, and technical capacity demonstrated credibility. However, the research identified significant structural barriers that prevent community networks from accessing capital markets effectively.

Growth limitations stemmed primarily from lack of access to capital for CAPEX rather than operational expenses. The analysis found that whilst community networks possess strong technical capabilities, they require substantial support in developing business planning capabilities beyond their technical expertise. Brian recommended that the ecosystem requires a portfolio perspective rather than single-deal approaches to spread risk effectively, and suggested developing bespoke underwriting tools specifically designed for community networks.

## Development Finance Perspectives

Carl Elmstam, Policy and Program Manager on Digital Development at SIDA (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency), provided insights into development finance institution perspectives. He outlined a multi-layered investor structure with grants and guarantees providing the foundation, development finance institutions occupying the middle layer, and potentially private investors participating at the top with reduced risk exposure.

Elmstam acknowledged significant challenges in combining Official Development Assistance (ODA) funding with commercial investments, noting that ODA grants should not generate profits, creating complications when structuring blended finance mechanisms. He emphasised that portfolio approaches enable aggregation of community connectivity initiatives to spread risk and unlock capital at scale.

Alessandra Lustrati, Head of Digital Development at the UK Government Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), outlined her organisation’s support for last-mile connectivity through both policy and regulatory frameworks and community-level business model testing. She emphasised that development finance should focus on creating better business environments for social enterprises and community networks.

## Energy Infrastructure Challenges

A critical operational issue that emerged throughout the discussion was energy supply. When Carlos Rey Moreno relayed a question from the chat about energy availability, several speakers acknowledged this as fundamental to network sustainability. Community networks in underserved areas often lack access to grid electricity, making renewable energy solutions essential for sustainable operations.

Gustav from Common Room, who was recognised as being present in the audience, briefly mentioned their experience with micro-hydro power in Ciptagelar, highlighting practical approaches to addressing energy challenges in community network deployments.

## Practical Implementation Challenges

The discussion revealed significant practical challenges facing community networks in their daily operations. An audience member representing Tandanet Community Network (with Risper from Tandanet noted as being present) highlighted that most community networks rely heavily on volunteers and personal resources due to limited donor funding, typically under $15,000. This funding level proves insufficient for the network equipment required to expand and serve larger areas effectively.

The practitioner perspective challenged some assumptions about commercial viability, arguing that community networks should be treated as social goods requiring ongoing subsidy, similar to health and education funding. This intervention highlighted the tension between social mission and financial sustainability that characterises community network operations.

## Areas of Strong Consensus

The discussion revealed high consensus across diverse stakeholders on several key issues:

**Blended Finance Necessity**: All speakers agreed that community networks require blended finance approaches combining grants, loans, and flexible financing mechanisms. This consensus emerged from recognition that single funding sources cannot address the complex needs of community networks as both infrastructure projects and social enterprises.

**Portfolio Risk Management**: Participants consistently emphasised that portfolio approaches aggregating multiple community networks prove essential for effective risk management and scaling investment. Individual projects present challenges in terms of scale and risk profile, but portfolio aggregation enables risk distribution whilst achieving economies of scale.

**Evidence-Based Analysis**: Strong consensus developed around applying rigorous, quantitative research methodologies to community networks, representing a significant maturation of the field from advocacy-based approaches to evidence-based investment cases.

## Key Tensions and Disagreements

Despite overall consensus, the discussion revealed important tensions around sustainability models. The primary disagreement centred on whether community networks should transition toward commercial viability or remain grant-supported social goods. Chris Locke advocated for developing commercial sustainability through training and capacity building, whilst community practitioners argued for continued grant support recognising the social good nature of connectivity services.

This tension reflects deeper philosophical questions about the purpose and nature of community networks. Whilst technical approaches to blended finance showed broad agreement, fundamental questions about long-term sustainability models remain contested within the community.

## Unresolved Implementation Challenges

Several critical implementation challenges emerged that require further development:

**ODA Compliance**: How to effectively combine Official Development Assistance funding with commercial investments without violating restrictions on profit generation remains unresolved, creating structural barriers to implementing proposed blended finance mechanisms.

**Standardised Impact Measurement**: Whilst social return on investment methodologies show promise, developing standardised methods for community networks to demonstrate performance and social impact to the financial sector requires further work.

**Regulatory Harmonisation**: Creating appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks that support community network licensing and spectrum access across different jurisdictions presents ongoing challenges for scaling investment approaches.

## Future Directions

The session concluded with recognition of several key development needs: establishment of facilities and funds that can aggregate demand and provide portfolio-based financing rather than deal-by-deal approaches; development of technical assistance programs paired with investment capital; and continued coordination across diverse stakeholder groups to resolve remaining structural barriers around regulatory frameworks, impact measurement, and funding mechanism design.

## Conclusion

This comprehensive discussion demonstrated significant maturation in understanding community network financing challenges and opportunities. The convergence of evidence-based research, practical investment analysis, and development finance expertise has created a foundation for advancing beyond traditional grant-based approaches toward sophisticated blended finance mechanisms.

The recognition of community networks as legitimate infrastructure investments with measurable social returns, combined with concrete funding commitments from major organisations, suggests positive momentum for addressing the financial divide in digital inclusion. However, successful implementation will require continued coordination across diverse stakeholder groups and resolution of remaining structural barriers.

The session’s emphasis on evidence-based approaches and practical implementation, combined with strong consensus on key principles, provides a foundation for developing the multi-stakeholder partnerships and innovative funding mechanisms necessary to achieve sustainable community connectivity at scale.

Luca Belli: All right, good morning to everyone and welcome to this session on financing self-sustaining community connectivity solutions My name is Luca Belli. I’m professor at FGV Law School in Rio de Janeiro and I also chair the dynamic coalition community connectivity that has proposed this meeting together with my colleague and friend dr. Senka Hajic that unfortunately is not here today with us and This year also we have had the exceptional help of dr. Carlos Rey Moreno That is has been the driving force behind the this outstanding Output that we had this year not only because of the content but because we managed to have hard copies Printed and delivered three hours before I boarded the plane. So they are let’s say that also today We have a further incentive For participants to join us at the table here because there are copies here on the right and on the left Also a further benefit if you join us at the table is that the mic is open so you don’t have to queue to make questions and and make statements having said that let me start by Introducing our distinguished panelists today. We have from my right Chris Locke, Executive Vice President and Managing Director of the Intent Society Foundation Then we will have or we have here our already introduced and today playing the role of the remote moderator Carlos Rey Moreno from the APC Association for Progressive Communication that has also been really Instrumental in organizing this work this year and has been with us over the past 10 years of dynamic coalition. We have Alessandra Lustrati here who is Head of Digital Development at the UK Government Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office the FCDO Then on my left, we have Marie Lisa Dacanay Founding President of the Institute for Social Entrepreneurship in Asia and Here on site last but not least, of course We have Claude Dorion who is Director of MCE Conseil Now we have also we should have also online already our two remote participants, so remote speakers, sorry Natalia Fodic who I see her here. Good morning. Buongiorno Natalia Director of International Programs at Connect Humanity and then we will have Karl Elmström who is Policy and Program Manager on Digital Development at SIDA also has been another organization has been instrumental to the organization of this of this work Now before we start, let me just provide a couple of minutes of introductory remark to set the scene First for the participants here to understand what we have been doing over the past Decade and why we are here today and second to understand the theme of today The coalition has realized a very long series of reports and policy suggestions that is available on comconnectivity.org Everything is already available including the PDF freely downloadable of this book you can also try to Search and find it on the IGF website, but it is a very tough and frustrating experience So that is why we have a dedicated website, but it is also on the page of the coalition under the reports now we have been Discussing community networks pretty much all issues that can be analyzed on community networks over the past years and actually this has been useful because It has also allowed us to have retrospective Over the past ten years over the past decade on what could be done to improve the architectures the governance The funding indeed which is a very important point and is the main subject of today’s debate and of this book. So this volume of today and also the presentations of today try to contextualize which type of community networks exist, then what are the regulatory problems that do not facilitate the funding of community networks, and then what could be the solutions, starting from empirical evidence, and this is something I want to stress. The report here is not a collection of opinions, it’s a collection of facts, it’s a collection of very thoroughly researched papers that are backed with evidence and analyze what could be the possible models, spanning from blended finance to other community solutions to support the community network initiatives, until what could be the social return on investment of these initiatives, and that is something extremely novel in terms of research and extremely valuable also for investors, not only for people that want to build one. And then we conclude with some recommendations that could be used by policymakers, by funders, and by other organizations. Now let me stop speaking, which is the hardest part for an academic, and let me give immediately the floor to our introductory remark that will be performed by Chris.

Chris Locke: Thank you very much, thank you for having us here, and it’s great to be on such a fantastic panel. I would also like to make another pitch for the book. It is a great book, but also it has a fantastic foreword by my boss, so I’m contractually obliged to promote the book, but it is an astonishing piece of work. We at the Internet Society have been involved in community-centered connectivity programs for a very long time, for a significant chunk of our 30-year history. We’ve been driving this from a practical angle, we run training programs to support communities to learn the very basic skills of crimping wires and building and designing and deploying computer networks, all the way through to the policy angle where we’ve been instrumental in helping the ITU, African Union, and other regulators to look at regulation to support community networks and to make them available from a perspective of spectrum. So it’s something that’s very much a core part of the work that we do. When it comes to financing, what we see, and we are a grant-focused organization, so we’re very much, and I’ve been in meetings with pretty much everyone on this panel, if not today, then in the last few months, explaining the position that we play as a donor and as someone that can support community-centered connectivity at those early stages. What we do is take someone from effectively zero to a few thousand users. What we can do is put that grant capital and training and capacity building in the first place to help these new networks get off the ground, and what that allows us to do is also then start to train those community networks in what sustainability looks like, train them in exactly how they can move from being a grant-backed organization to one that has some legitimacy and some sustainability. And this is a very difficult jump to make. I was saying in a meeting earlier on that in a previous role talking to someone supporting social entrepreneurs in Kenya. He referred to the fact that often we create grantrepreneurs not entrepreneurs. We create organizations that are very good at moving from grant to grant and as donors and as organizations I think we train people to be good at getting grants from donors. It’s a very different skill to then transition into being a commercial business and being a sustainable business. So when we look at how we can drive self-sustaining community connectivity we have to understand how we put financing in place that can pick up after the grant stage that can move through blended finance solutions into the genuine economic sustainability of community networks. But we also have to make sure that we are very good at training people to be able to build organizations that can cross that divide and build into that space. We’re committing to this over the next four years of our five-year strategy at the Internet Society. We’re committing about 30 million in capital as part of our co-fund on community-centered connectivity that we launched at Mobile World Congress. We’re very fortunate to have Meta as a partner for that. They’ve put 6.3 million into that pot with us and we’re talking to other donors to come into this facility as well and we’re doing that because we believe that one of the best ways of making sure we build a very robust first stage of financing is through partnership, is through working with other donors and through working with a lot of people who are here today to make sure that there is a coordinated and sustainable way of getting that early grant financing in place and also so that we can then we all use our connective knowledge to see how we do prepare those community connectivity projects for the next stage of their growth and the next stage of their financing process. So we’re going to commit to do this over at least the next four years, bringing other donor money in place and what we want to be able to do is see some real success in the projects that we fund and some real success in the sector overall to make sure that we build community networks, whether they end up as cooperatives, whether they end up as social enterprises, that can exist past the grant stage and can grow and develop their capabilities and their businesses. Thank you.

Luca Belli: Thank you very much, Chris, for these remarks and also for stressing the role of the ISOC Foundation that has been also playing supporting community network initiatives over the past years. It’s also very good to know that that is an initial support and the final goal is to transform them into financially sustainable initiatives. Now let’s try to delve into the the contributions of our report today. We have the pleasure of having all the co-authors, at least if not all the authors. Lisa, you co-authored this piece towards measuring the social impact and cost effectiveness of community networks. It is an extremely interesting research, so please, the floor is yours.

Marie Lisa Dacanay: Thank you. So I’m going to be presenting the results of a research that we’ve had since last year on the social impact and cost effectiveness of community-centered connectivity initiatives. And to do this, I’ll be sharing with you the objectives of the study and the methodology that we used first. In terms of objectives, the study undertook social impact analysis of community-centered connectivity initiatives using two tools. One is development indexing and the other one is social return on investment. Development indexing assists in the quantification of social impacts on major stakeholder groups where simple proxy measures cannot be effectively used. So the final stage of development indexing is usually coming up with a scorecard of from 0 to 100, where we assign weights to specific key result areas where there has been significant impact and we are able to quantify the performance. But in this study, we didn’t have enough time to actually do the scorecard, but we were able to establish the significant social impacts of the community-centered connectivity initiatives that we studied. We also used social return on investment, which is a measure of cost-effectiveness, because it’s a ratio of financial and social outcomes to inputs and investments. So for a project or a community connectivity initiative to be sustainable or to be cost-effective, its SROI, or the social return on investment, needs to be greater than one. So we studied four cases, two in Asia and two in Africa. And the two cases in Asia are Kasepuan Ciptagilar Community-Centered Connectivity Initiative in West Java, Indonesia, which served the Sundanese indigenous villages there. And I’d like to just recognize the main actor in this initiative, Common Room. I think Gustav, could you stand so that they’ll know you? And then the second case was Patardi Community-Centered Connectivity Initiative in Maharashtra, Western India, where 99% of the population are part of the Warli tribe. So these are both indigenous communities. The third case from Africa is Tandanet Community Network. And I’d like to recognize our Tandanet stakeholders here. Risper is here with us. They operate in an urban slum in Kibera, Nairobi, Kenya. And the fourth case was Senzeleni. Community Centred Connectivity Initiative, working in Mankwosi and Situhele rural villages in Eastern Cape, South Africa. Now, I think one of the more important findings that we had from this research is that community centred connectivity initiatives are not just ordinary enterprises, but they are social enterprises, meaning to say they’re social mission driven. As social enterprises, they actually offer three types of services. The first type of service is what we call transactional services. These are connectivity services accessed through financial or other form of agreed transaction in exchange for the service. These are services that even commercial ISPs offer. But the two other kinds of services are services that are not offered by ordinary ISPs, which are what we call social inclusion services, which are oriented towards addressing digital exclusion and meaningful connectivity or other factors behind the usage gap. They enable connectivity to assist the poor and marginalized to have better access to basic needs, to social and economic services. For example, in some of the communities that we studied, the internet services were being provided in a way that was also building the capability of the marginalized stakeholders to use the internet in an effective way to improve their quality of life. The third type of services is what we call transformational services. They’re oriented at enabling the poor and excluded to have the capability to become actors in their own development, to enable their capability to own, govern, and manage digital resources to positively impact on their lives and their communities. These are actually services that are provided to the organizations and leaders who provide the connectivity service in the community so that they’ll have the capability to govern, maintain, and sustain the delivery of the services. What we found is that the significant social impacts of community-centered connectivity initiatives have been mainly facilitated not by transactional services, but by social inclusion and transformational services. On the screen, you would see some examples so that it’s clearer to you. A transactional service would be, for example, the provision of internet service through vouchers that Kasipuan Chip Tagilar does. But social inclusion services would include digital literacy training, online publishing of curricula and training materials for the villagers. It would include podcasts, workshops, or local content development, and the development of a village culture through digital storytelling. These are some of the services that Kasipuan Chip Tagilar, as a community-centered connectivity initiative, actually provides the village. The transformational services included training and capacity building of technicians and locals to undertake monitoring, maintenance, and repair of internet tools and devices. Also, capacity building and support to set up and manage SIGA Sakula, or the media lab, which is actually the lab that creates local content for use by the communities. And then also capacity building for locals to manage and extend internet services to adjacent villages. So it’s not just the immediate village, but other villages as well. What is also very clear in the study is that the four cases showed that social inclusion and transformational services facilitated impacts that clearly demonstrate the value proposition for investing in community-centered connectivity initiatives as they relate to at least six. six key result areas. And we proved in the research, of course, we did the four cases and they’re actually available. We will be making them available online, apart from the integrative report that’s available already here in the publication. The first is increased levels and capacities for inclusive human development, the improvement in the economic position and conditions of community stakeholders, more effective preservation of the cultural identity, heritage, and integrity of the community, because three of the cases were actually in indigenous communities, increased levels and capacities for climate action and natural resources management, the empowerment of the community to control, govern, and manage internet and digital resources, as well as the inclusion and empowerment of women as stakeholders in digital transformation. Just to show you more clearly what these key result areas mean, and because of the lack of time, let me just show you what improvement in the economic position and conditions of community stakeholders look like for the cases in Asia. For Kasipuan Chiptagilar Community Centered Connectivity Initiative, this was expressed in terms of increasing assets, not only in terms of household assets, but the increase in financial resources to support the increase in the consumption or avoidance of over-borrowing. A second element of this key result area of improving the economic position and conditions of community stakeholders was increase in business transactions and new business enterprises. There was an increase in the trade or transactions of existing micro-entrepreneurs, as well as an increase in employment generation. A third was a greater sustainability of the agricultural sector that was expressed in terms of improved capability to use new adaptive farming techniques to climate change, integrating traditional practices with new technologies. It was also expressed in terms of greater intergenerational sustainability because the involvement of young farmers was actually facilitated. In India, with the Pathardi Community Centered Connectivity Initiative, improvement in the economic position and conditions of the community stakeholders was expressed in terms of financial empowerment of the tribal women who started generating their income as the sellers of the vouchers, and tribal women also started to open their bank accounts. Third was an expansion of markets online, which was manifested by the increased customer base and improved earnings of those who actually were selling online. The other finding, I think, that was very significant with the use of the social return on investment methodology, we were able to show that over a period of three to four years that the social return on investment ratio was above one for all of the community-centered connectivity initiatives. If you’ll notice from year one to year two to year three to year four, it is an increasing trend. That means that the cost effectiveness is actually what is being shown, and there’s an increase in the social value created over time. In conclusion, may I just say that the study that we did proved that community-centered connectivity initiatives provide social inclusion services and transformational services that generate significant social impacts beyond what commercial ISPs can offer. Secondly, social inclusion and transformational services facilitated impacts that clearly demonstrated the value proposition for investing in community-centered connectivity initiatives as they relate to the KRAs, the key result areas that I already explained to you earlier, and that the social return on investment ratios being all above one and their consistent upward trend every year demonstrates that there is an increase in the social value created by community-centered connectivity initiatives over time so that CCCIs are actually cost-effective in bridging the digital divide. Thank you.

Luca Belli: Thank you very much, Maria-Liza, for this excellent presentation and also for sticking to the time. Actually, this provides very concrete evidence to what we have been arguing for some years about the positive externalities that community networks generate locally and how they not only decentralize connectivity but also create new wealth, not only in economic terms but also in other terms that are much more difficult to measure, which is the social impact. Excellent. Now, the next presentation will be by Claude Dorion, and he has an excellent chapter with co-authors, including also Carlos, on Breaking the Financial Divide of Digital Divide, which is a title I really like very much.

Claude Dorion: Yes, good afternoon to all. I’ve got a slide presentation that would support a 40-minute presentation. I’m going to try to be as succinct as possible. What we did was to make an analysis, a structural analysis of the financial needs of the community-oriented connectivity initiatives in relationship with the financing opportunities. And we did this through a survey where 85 different initiatives coming from three continents participated in our operation. So, it allowed us to have some crossover presentation of the different challenges that are encountered by the organization. On the first aspect, you have on this slide some quantitative demonstration of Lisa’s presentation where the connectivity initiatives themselves have the evaluation that they do have a clear social impact on their community. They allow people to increase their economic situation. They help to get access to social and health services. And they contribute as well to build a more integrated community where different services are available to all members. So, it’s like a macroeconomic demonstration of the single case studies that Lisa just presented. We believe that in some kind of way, the financial divide that we are observing in the access for financial solutions for connectivity initiatives are based in a fractious dialogue between external environment being the regulation, the territory where we have to develop the projects, the characteristic of the community, and the technology that has to be used efficiently to cover the services on one hand. On the other hand, you have the challenges coming from internal function and origin of the projects where we have, in most cases, a challenge of size and low density of the service which will bring average cost for user a little higher. And we always have, we encounter the constant hesitation between articulating the equilibrium between the social accessibility of the service and a sustainable pricing policy that will allow to offer the service on a long term basis. And there’s also a question of skills to be supported and enhanced being on the technical operation of the service and also on its marketing and management aspect. And the other element that represents a challenge for the initiatives is that they have some difficulty to demonstrate exactly their performance as an operator and their social impact as an actor of their community and that will bring constraints in their dialogue with the financial sector. With the financial sector, we see some relational gasp coming from the expectations as the return that we should expect from an investment on one side, but also on the documentation of the projects where we have to get a closer mutual understanding on how do we present a connectivity project to a financial actor and how the financial actor has to consider all kinds of impact in the way to assess the investment possibility. We also have the difficulty coming from the perception of the higher management cost of doing small financial operation and the perceived risk coming from the non-profit nature of those operations. We asked our sample of initiatives what were their main constraints in raising their project and developing their project and you see on this slide that they are multi-factored but there is a high density of participants that underline clearly that access to financial solution, fundraising, the cost of equipment, all financial related issues are among the main constraints that they are encountering. We also asked them for their different challenges and you see there again that the cost of the equipment is important, the cost of funding, difficulty to have access to some technical services as well are all issues that they have to overcome. Among the organization that we surveyed, we see all kinds of different financial situations on the level of covering the total cost coming from the operational revenues coming from the operations and you see here that there is just a minority of the initiatives surveyed that cover all the cost with their autonomous revenues and that this part of this rate of covering the cost is quite variable coming from zero up to a few minor minority cases where there is a full coverage of cost coming from the revenues and this will depend mostly on the social policy and the type of population that are covered by the service. Here, this is not a contemporary art try and failure, it’s a graphic demonstration of the very large diversity of solutions that are put forward by the initiatives as how do we split the revenues from private fees paid by the user, community financing, public grants, municipal or local government support and not only that there are different recipes but there is also a different mixture of those different sources that are used depending on the countries and the regions where the initiatives are active and this implies… I want to emphasize that with different size of operation and different level of autonomous revenues and different solution as blended source of revenues you will have to encounter different kind of financing in order to accompany those initiatives into keeping operating and developing their revenues. And one of the basic strategy for us is we really have to build on a mixture of financial products where impact will be mostly financed through grants. Equipment and assets will be mostly financed by loans and the working capital and the risk part of the operation should be at least partially financed by flexible refundable financial products. And that together those three kind of sources should be involved in each project because they are self-reinforcing. The strategy of sharing a project between debt equity and grant allows the grant part to reduce the risk perception by the refundable part of the financing and by consequence will help to reduce the interest rates that will be expected from the players. And the fact that bringing some debt part in the financing of the projects that are historically mainly depending on grants will allow the system to accompany more projects and to increase the volume of financing that may be available for each project. Right now as you see in this slide all the CCIs that we surveyed had more than one type of financing that was involved in their project. The red financing that you see are all refundable and the blue financing are all non-refundable and you see that international corporation being philanthropy or corporation development agencies are the main players that we most frequently see in those cases that we surveyed but they never are alone in financing a project. So in my last 40 seconds at least our main proposal and message is that there is a clear need and pertinence to bring a financial mechanism that will be blended finance in order to increase the volumes that are available for the connectivity. initiative that are led and made for communities and that that kind of project should allow to increase the size of the projects and even if it has to pay a certain part of interest on its financing it should allow to lower the cost per user with an economies of scale. So that was the main message with the importance of having a flexible answer that has to be adapted to each and every CCI that has to be supported.

Luca Belli: Thank you very much. Thank you very much Claude for highlighting, for providing us a good very good and detailed mapping and also starting to put forward what could be the solutions right which is the the direction towards we are starting to move especially with the next presentation by Nathalia Foditsch and Brian Vo. Sorry I forgot to mention that this will we will have also have Brian Vo in the picture so connected with us remotely. He is Chief Investment Officer of Connect Humanity and they are co-author of this excellent paper on building an impact investing market for community-centered connectivity. Please Nathalia the floor is yours. Hi everyone. I’m really happy to be here with you remotely. I wish I was there

Nathalia Foditsch: in person. So good to see many of you and this this study was commissioned by APC so I would like to thank APC and also all the community center and internet providers we have talked to. I know that some of them are I mean Lisa mentioned that Gustav is there in person and also our colleague from Tendernet. I see Saul online that used to be at Zanzaleni. So thank you everyone for providing valuable inputs and and helping us developing this study. So it’s a first cross-sectional analysis of community-centered internet providers in the global south through the lens of investability. So nine initiatives were assessed and and the initiatives were in South America, Africa and Asia. And as some colleagues have mentioned before this is more important than ever because well first of all I think I might be mistaken but I think it’s the first time we have a DT tree discussion at IGF focusing specifically on financing. So while this has been a need for a long time I’m glad to see that we are finally finally starting to add that to the agenda here too. And we have seen some major challenges over the past months right in regards to financing development. So I’m really glad we are talking about grand entrepreneurs as Chris has mentioned. And I would like to introduce my colleague Brian who is the Chief Investment Officer at Connect Humanity. And he, you know, is really an expert in this field. He has almost 20 years of investment and strategy experience. And he has a portfolio of projects he has been involved in of $7 billion. So he knows what he’s talking about, right? So he’s going to present the study. And we both will be here for questions later.

Brian Vo: Thanks, Nathalia. And thank you all for having us. I think it’s really been a joy to work with APC and also collaborate with Claude and MCE. And I think a lot of the aha moments that we had was really looking at it both from the supply side of the capital but also the demand side of the capital. And that was the part of the equation that we really focused on. So what did we do? As Nathalia mentioned, we analyzed nine different CCIs across the world. But why did we do that? What we wanted to add to the conversation was beyond some of the top-down evaluations of what does the market need, what do CCIs need. We wanted to look at it from a bottom-up nature to really start with the finish line of if we looked at these organizations as potential investments as an investor, how might we underwrite it? Would we do an investment as they are right now? If not, what might be some of the gaps that would be preventing us from doing an investment today? And so that really was the goal of it to say, let us purely look at this from an investment underwriting perspective. What might we be able to learn about the organizations and really the state of readiness? Because I know there’s a lot of conversation around investment readiness and investment ready. And so with that lens, with that mindset, we used our underwriting risk framework that we’ve used for all of our real investments, actual investments. And that’s centered around five major things. First is looking at the network technical design. How is the network designed? How is the organization thinking about construction, operation, engaging the community, getting subscribers, maintaining the network? staff build out, etc. Second one was around community engagement. How are they thinking about getting that right to play? How are they estimating actual demand? How are they thinking about pricing their products and services? That culminated in the third thing around business model. So these are all the parts of the equation, but how is the team then bringing it together to say, here really is our business plan, our projections, our expected financials, the gaps in the types of capital we might be needing. Fourth was then a portfolio impact. So we wanted to mimic it really from an investor perspective, where investors wouldn’t just look at an opportunity in isolation. I’m going to look at potentially investing in this organization and how the economics of that particular deal fit into my broader portfolio. Does it weight average my returns up or down? Does it weight average my collective risk up or down? And then the fifth one was around legal and compliance. Those were some of the more standard fare of like, do you have the right licenses, permits, audits, financial audits to date? So that’s what we did. Here is a snapshot of the organizations that we were able to engage. So as you can see, we were quite intentional in really trying to get that cross section from really representation across the global south. So what is it that we learned? The first one is demand is real. And I don’t think that’s going to be news to anybody online or in the room, but it was very, I think, inspiring to see how potent that demand really was and how the organizations, the CCIs were able to capture that, communicate that. With many of them, with a few years under operation, having take rates in the 30 to 50% range. So from an investment perspective, really great to see. I think here is also great to see a lot of innovation around the business model, how different CCIs might capture that demand in terms of some might have subscription types of products where others had vouchers. The second major thing that we learned was the technical capacity is very credible. The level of depth in how the CCIs spoke about the thoughtfulness of designing the network, different types of equipment that they were using, redundancy and resiliency to their network was really impressive. I think there was such a depth in the problem solving and the grasp of the technicalness of really connecting the unconnected. So really that technical expertise we saw really in spades. The third one then is growth is primarily blocked by structural barriers. And what are some of the structural barriers that we saw? First and foremost, is lack of access to capital. One of the primary things we’re talking about here, but it seemed to be more on the CAPEX side rather than the OPEX side. Most of the organizations we analyzed were financially sustainable in some way, at least on the operating side. And so it really was that CAPEX, that upfront infusion that they needed to either And this was definitely jurisdiction by jurisdiction, but anywhere from spectrum and licensing all the way through to eligibility for different subsidies. So, what now? The first one is we saw a huge opportunity to design better capital. Claude mentioned a few potential financing tools. I think when we look at broadband in particular and CCIs, it is just a different business model. It is a different type of business and organization that is not just infrastructure, but also not just community or civil society. So, the need to create a financing product that makes more sense for this type of business has been a big need. Part of that also is it seems like the ecosystem also needs to step away from just thinking about a single deal perspective and thinking about it as a portfolio perspective. While we looked at nine, some might be on the margins, invest or don’t invest, invest ready or not ready. But I would say the more that we are able to aggregate those underlying CCIs together, you are actually more able to spread the risk, the project risk, the connectivity risk, the financial risk across several CCIs. And that might be a better way to unlock capital at scale and deploy capital. Capital at Scale, Funding Technical Assistance. Now, earlier when I mentioned the technical understanding was really strong and deep. There was a variation, a pretty big variance in the understanding of business planning, business modeling, translating from, you know, grant-led organization to revenue and earned income led. So being able to pair that technical assistance with investment, either pre or post investment, we think is also important. Treat this as infrastructure investing and not charity. That was, I think, a critical thing, aha moment for us when we were engaging with some who, you know, started as brands and nonprofits, are trying to figure out what their pricing model is. But there’s this like jump that I could see folks trying to make, even within their organization and internal dialogues about, you know, how do we evolve the organization really into a sophisticated, financially sustainable operator, not just, you know, nonprofit. And then lastly, catalyzing the market. I think we can do this by aggregating a lot of the demand through things like facilities and funds, not just looking at it through deal-by-deal. I think a second one is really developing bespoke underwriting tools and benchmarks here. If you’re copying and pasting an underwriting algorithm from another industry, it’s just not going to work for broadband. Connectivity is just, particularly for CCIs, it’s the intersection of way too many things to fit into, you know, the box of all their underwriting. And then lastly, figuring out how to align philanthropy with investment capital, I would say, on that fund or portfolio basis. So those were our biggest learnings. Turn it over back to you.

Luca Belli: Thank you, Brian. This is really enlightening. I think, yeah, Natalia, you are right, this is the first time we have an analysis from investors that actually could be a guide for investors that want to chip into this, invest into these initiatives, or actually also a guide that community network leaders and associations can use to reverse engineer it and know what to pitch to investors, which is also quite useful. And then also, I think I speak on behalf of all the panelists here saying that, Brian, if you need to invest your seven billions, please contact us and we will give you a lot of tips. Now, to go on with our presentations, and I would like to ask the last presenters to stick to time so that we still have a good 10 minutes to discuss. Karl Elström from Sida, thank you very much for being with us online and for having also supported this work. Please, Karl, the floor is yours.

Carl Elmstam: Thank you very much. And thanks for having me. Sorry to not be there in person, especially since I’m in the neighboring country. But I had to stay in Stockholm, but very happy to be here. So it’s a little bit with a rising sense of worry that I’ve seen the other presentations because basically you’ve covered sort of all my main points. But I’ll try to mention some things anyways. I mean, I think this is super timely, considering how many donors are reducing or are getting reduced budgets. We even see, you know, major withdrawals from development in some cases. So timing is great for this. So my experience is mostly from Sida. I started working with APC, I think, back in 2018. But for the last few years, I’ve been at the European Commission, seconded from Sweden to the European Commission. And I think, Claude, you had a slide where you had sort of relational challenges or something like that, you know, working with private investors or even DFI investors. And sort of combining that with development cooperation or, you know, civil society culture kind of, I think that should not be underestimated, those challenges. It’s basically like we, it’s different languages, right? There is clearly a need for facilitation or even interpretation. So that’s sort of an important point from my perspective. And looking at sort of the more technical sides of the financing, I mean, I was, for the last year or so, I’ve been working on, I was working on setting up a fund. So this fund was more commercially driven. And I mean, let’s also, you know, remember and not forget the fact that the connectivity market in many places in Africa is going to grow a lot. So there should be room for different types of actors, different types of investments. So the fund that I was working on or sort of the fund idea and structure, it was similarly to this sort of based on, you know, looking at existing types of investments in connectivity, but really ranging from submarine cables to mobile networks or even data centers could be included in this work that I did. And there, I think Brian also mentioned something important because you have to have a portfolio perspective, for sure, to reduce risk, to spread risk. But there is also important to consider, you know, you have to spread it in the right way, because in the end, you’ll be sitting there with a group of people and a fund manager who are identifying the projects to invest in. And of course, they can’t be experts in all types of digital infrastructures across all continents, because, you know, that would require a huge team to do that in an efficient way. So I think striking the right balance and basically allowing more of those community networks. that are sort of likelier to have high revenues and somehow grade it in order to be able to finance the one with high risk, basically. And of course, it makes complete sense. I think, Claude, you put it very clearly in your presentation. I mean, it’s really about bringing together a multi-stakeholder group to do the investments. I mean, at the bottom, there should be grant funding, which is for technical assistance or, you know, the setting up costs of whatever financial function you’re building, right? And actors like SIDA, we can do guarantees. I mean, the European Commission can also do guarantees to lower the risk for other investors. And of course, these other investors could be, you know, organizations like the World Bank or the European Investment Bank, the national DFIs, which clearly, I mean, they would also be interested in the social return of investment, right? But I think it’s important to see them as different layers, because depending on how commercial or how commercially viable the projects end up being, or how big a portion you have of the more commercially viable projects, you might even have private investors on the top. And of course, in a layered investor structure, it’s probably, well, of course, the ones who are giving out the guarantees or the grants at the sort of bottom of the structure, they will always be the most likely to lose the money or to lose their investments in case of failures. And the risk goes lower and lower, the higher you get in this structure. And not very fairly, but I guess, logical in another way, when there are some return on the investments, the people on the top of this gets repaid first. So, that’s where you might be able to even attract private investors, with or without guarantees. So, I hope that might be helpful. I mean, I think that there are similar cases that could be used, or that could sort of guide this a bit. But yeah, basically, although, sorry, there was one other thing. I think there will also be sort of a relational issue when you try to combine ODA, Development Assistance Funding, the grants, with companies, just as simple as that, because then you’ll run into issues of the ODA grants should not be able to generate profits. I mean, revenues, okay, probably fine. But if it goes sort of into the profit area, it becomes much more difficult. So, there are quite some challenges around that. But other than that, I think relational challenges, spreading the risk, you know, allowing a bit more of commercial things to come in to sort of carry the less commercial ones. Those would be sort of my highlights. But thanks a lot, and super excited to see all of this work progressing so much. So, thank you.

Luca Belli: Fantastic. Thank you very much, Karl, particularly for respecting the time, and also for highlighting something that we have strived to emphasize over the past decade, that is the community network are really fantastic examples of multi-stakeholder partnerships. And we frequently speak about multi-stakeholder dialogues, but we also should analyze more how stakeholders can interact together to build things, right. All right. So, the last, but of course not least, word to Alessandra Lustrati from FCDO, that also has been instrumental for the organization of this work. Please, Alessandra, for yours.

Alessandra Lustrati: Thank you so much, Luca, and wonderful to be here. Thank you for having me. And I’m in even deeper trouble than Karl, because obviously all the great points have been made. So, I’ll try to maybe add a little bit from the perspective of FCDO, of course, and how fundamental we think that this piece of work is, and all this process, but also how it fits within our broader approach to supporting last-mile connectivity through community-based solutions, and in particular community networks. A shout-out to the presence of Common Room and Tuna Panda in the room, because I’ve been on the roof of Tuna Panda to actually see the TV space technology in 2019, I think, and all the… almost broke a leg. And I have seen the bamboo tower in Ciptagelar with Gustav. So I feel that everything that we’re discussing in this room today, that might sound a little bit theoretical, we talk about broad, you know, big concepts like SROI and how can we work on the underwriting, etc. It is actually something extremely concrete that has a direct impact on people’s lives. And I am extremely proud of the work that has been done by others. I mean, I have almost no merit in all of this, but I’m really glad that we are progressing in this field. Just to zoom out very quickly, the reason why I’m speaking here with you is because from FCDO we’ve been basically supporting Last Mile Connectivity for many years. We did this in various ways, but at some point we decided that really supporting the community networks and community-based solution to Last Mile Connectivity was like a foundational block of digital inclusion, which is a key pillar of our digital development strategy 2024-2030. But this is just a new strategy. Of course, we’ve been doing this for many years. And in particular, through the Digital Access Programme, we’ve been having now for over four years, I think, the collaboration with and the partnership with the APC. And of course, CIDA have been great supporters of that. So as you can see, multi-stakeholder approach, different type of institutional donors who actually maybe work in different ways, but complement each other. Obviously, the social enterprises, the community networks, the experts in finance, obviously great NGOs like APC and ISOC as a fundamental actor in all of this. And of course, you know, the sort of academic and also research expertise, all of this has to come together to progress. We’ve been working on supporting digital inclusion, in particular, Last Mile Connectivity models, always working at two parallel levels. One is the level of policy, regulatory frameworks, standards and spectrum management. And we are committed as the UK to continue working on that so that we can create a better business environment actually for social enterprises and community networks for Last Mile Connectivity. And the other level is more like actually in the community and in the market, basically testing those technology and business models that make sense at the local level, that have to be very diverse, as Claude was saying, and that can become sustainable if we work, obviously, on the appropriate forms of access to finance. And this is also a topic that is very close to my heart because I have a background in SME finance in the olden days and digital financial inclusion. So I feel that, you know, it’s all coming together. Maybe I will just mention, given that we want to have at least a few minutes for the questions, of course, I’ll just mention maybe the points that have struck me the most in all the presentation. So the fact that we’ve managed now to really embed in our narrative the concept of social enterprise and SROI, as Liz explained. The fact that we think now differently about community networks and their investibility, although recognizing that we need a blended finance approach where we can’t expect the community networks to suddenly become from one day to the next. to the other fully viable for, for instance, private commercial investors. So the importance of starting from the grant side, but blending it directly with different type of finance. It would be interesting to do more in the future to understand the interaction of debt and equity in this. And I know that there are different schools of thought on what would be viable. And we’ve talked about the underwriting and how to actually analyze, you know, what are the different features of the community networks, even in different contexts. So seeing that the demand is really is real, that there is very deep tech capability. And of course, the work of APC and others partners in doing like the School of Community Networks, building local leadership, local technical capability, being able to do operational maintenance of community networks means that you have a really robust sort of entity that you can invest in. But there are the barriers. And I think I think Brian, if I’m not wrong, explained that really well in terms of both access to finance, but also the business capability of even just at the very basic level, not designing just a budget for a grant, but actually designing a proper budget and a focus for your business and proper accounts. And, you know, so growing the business capability also of community networks. So it’s the kind of demand side rather than just the supply side of which type of sources of finance and investment we can think of. The importance of aggregating and using scale to sort of distribute and spread risk, but also reach that critical mass that can reduce also the administrative costs and make everything more attractive for investors. And then maybe I’ll just come to the last point, that is, as the UK, we want to continue to be committed to add value where we can, because in through the digital access programme, what we can do with the type of finance that we have in that programme and in our digital development portfolio. And Karl made a really important point there about the use of ODD and how you can commingle it or not with other type of funds. We can continue to support things like technical assistance, capacity building, the broad business environment and, of course, reducing some of the costs of maybe the underwriting for the individual investment.

Audience: with night and one of the items I would like to highlight is the structure of community networks by the nature of the licenses that they have. They are supposed to be very much integrated into communities including ownership such that when you have to seek funding from investors and they look at your business model they see a lot of risks because we are looking more at social return on investment as opposed to you know the profits themselves. If you look at the area where we work, where people find it very difficult to pay ten dollars in a month then you need very large numbers to be able to break even. Some of us have actually had to pump personal resources. community networks to have them work because when we we try to seek funding we virtually not have at any one donor even give in excess of 15,000 dollars. When you look at the network equipment that are required to expand the network to serve a large area you realize that you need a lot of you know um amount to be spent on equipment especially around the CAPEX and OPEX so most of these community networks are relying much more on volunteers and other initiatives and I think it’s a high time that governments and donors look at them as social good and continue to pump money you know just like they do in health and education in order to have many people you know enjoy the benefits of digital opportunities. Thank you.

Luca Belli: Thank you very much for this very important statement. Do we have so I think now Carlos has energy so we can

Carlos Rey Moreno: sorry sorry about that um there is a question or there was a question in the chat I don’t see the person who asked it anymore maybe he left but is what is the relationship between connectivity availability and energy availability and perhaps also other humanitarian uses for any available energy and I don’t know if maybe in the context of climate finance and some other things that we are talking about whether any of the panelists or the the the also the research from from Lisa on the on the KRA around green and environmental impact whether there is any reflection there that you would like to share and highlight. Thank you.

Luca Belli: I see that Chris already has a reply for our 1 billion dollar question so please Chris go ahead.

Chris Locke: Just very quickly from the community networks that we work with when we talk to them about the extra development and capacity training that they want power comes up as one of the most common things and not just from the perspective of wanting to move to greener solutions from power but also, and we know this was the case, and I visited it recently in Tandernet, where surges in power cause outages. So power management, moving to greener solutions and being able to secure power in a way that allows a network to grow is probably the most requested thing we have as a training topic after the basics of networking and managing it as a business.

Marie Lisa Dacanay: From the experience of community networks we’ve studied, I think because we’re working with underserved and far-flung communities, they usually need power in the form of renewable energy because they don’t have access to the grid. So I think investments in green energy is very important side by side with investments for community connectivity initiatives. But maybe some of the community networks that are working on this, like Gustaf, you might want to come into the discussion about the relationship between energy and demand for energy and also connectivity.

Luca Belli: If you want to do so, you have one minute and eight seconds.

Audience: Well, thank you for the opportunity. In terms of energy supply, most of our project sites that we are working with, they are almost non-energy or electric supply. So we have to, like in Ciptagelar, we use micro-hydro power supply and the community are already running the micro-hydro power plant for quite some time and they are very skillful for that. So there are strong connections between green energy supply with community-centered connectivity. Thank you.

Luca Belli: Fantastic. As we only have 31 seconds left, I think this is time to wrap up and I would like to thank everyone. Also, I would also like to remember that on our site, comconnectivity.org, there are also our previous reports and one of them was also dedicated to exploring some of the issues on sustainability, but from a more environmental perspective. Some years ago, we have done a lot of work. So if you are into this topic, please go there and download as much as you want, because it’s free. And I would like to thank very much all the participants and all the speakers and particularly our friend Carlos. And if she can hear us online, our friend Senka Azic. And thank you very much for the great discussions. See you next year. Thank you.

Agreement points

Community networks require blended finance approaches combining grants, loans, and flexible financing

Speakers

– Claude Dorion
– Carl Elmstam
– Brian Vo
– Alessandra Lustrati

Arguments

Impact should be financed through grants, equipment through loans, and working capital through flexible refundable products

Multi-layered investor structure with grants/guarantees at bottom, DFIs in middle, and potentially private investors at top

The ecosystem needs portfolio perspective rather than single deal approach to spread risk effectively

Development finance should focus on creating better business environment for social enterprises and community networks

Summary

All speakers agree that community networks cannot rely on single funding sources and require sophisticated blended finance structures that combine different types of capital (grants, debt, equity) with appropriate risk distribution across multiple layers of investors.

Topics

Development | Economic

Community networks demonstrate real demand and technical capability but face structural barriers to growth

Speakers

– Brian Vo
– Claude Dorion
– Chris Locke

Arguments

Demand for connectivity is real with many networks achieving 30-50% take rates, and technical capacity is credible

Access to financial solutions, fundraising, and equipment costs are among the main constraints encountered by community connectivity initiatives

There’s a need to move from creating “grantrepreneurs” to sustainable businesses through proper training and capacity building

Summary

Speakers consistently recognize that community networks have proven market demand and strong technical expertise, but are held back by structural barriers, particularly around financing and business development capabilities.

Topics

Development | Economic | Infrastructure

Portfolio approach is essential for risk management and scaling community network investments

Speakers

– Brian Vo
– Carl Elmstam
– Claude Dorion

Arguments

The ecosystem needs portfolio perspective rather than single deal approach to spread risk effectively

Portfolio approach enables aggregation of CCIs to spread risk and unlock capital at scale

Blended finance allows grant funding to reduce risk perception and lower interest rates for refundable financing

Summary

All speakers emphasize that individual community network investments are too risky and small-scale, requiring portfolio approaches that aggregate multiple projects to spread risk and achieve economies of scale.

Topics

Development | Economic

Energy infrastructure is critical for community network sustainability and operations

Speakers

– Chris Locke
– Marie Lisa Dacanay
– Audience

Arguments

Power management and renewable energy access are critical infrastructure needs alongside connectivity

Community networks in underserved areas often require renewable energy solutions due to lack of grid access

Energy supply challenges directly impact network reliability and growth potential

Summary

There is clear consensus that energy infrastructure, particularly renewable energy solutions, is fundamental to community network operations and sustainability, especially in underserved areas without grid access.

Topics

Development | Infrastructure

Similar viewpoints

Both speakers emphasize that community networks are fundamentally different from commercial ISPs because they create broader social value and positive externalities that extend far beyond simple connectivity provision.

Speakers

– Marie Lisa Dacanay
– Luca Belli

Arguments

Community networks provide three types of services: transactional, social inclusion, and transformational services that generate significant social impacts beyond commercial ISPs

Community networks create positive externalities locally, decentralizing connectivity while generating new wealth in economic and social terms

Topics

Development | Sociocultural

Both speakers recognize that while community networks have strong technical capabilities, they need significant support in developing business and commercial skills to transition from grant-dependent organizations to sustainable enterprises.

Speakers

– Chris Locke
– Brian Vo

Arguments

There’s a need to move from creating “grantrepreneurs” to sustainable businesses through proper training and capacity building

Investment readiness requires developing business planning capabilities beyond technical expertise

Topics

Development | Economic

Both speakers emphasize the importance of multi-stakeholder approaches that combine policy/regulatory work with practical implementation, viewing community networks as concrete examples of effective collaboration.

Speakers

– Alessandra Lustrati
– Luca Belli

Arguments

FCDO supports last-mile connectivity through policy/regulatory frameworks and community-level business model testing

Community networks serve as examples of multi-stakeholder partnerships that build concrete solutions

Topics

Development | Legal and regulatory | Infrastructure

Unexpected consensus

Evidence-based approach to community network research and investment analysis

Speakers

– Luca Belli
– Marie Lisa Dacanay
– Brian Vo
– Nathalia Foditsch

Arguments

The report provides evidence-based analysis rather than opinions, backed by thoroughly researched papers

Social return on investment ratios above one demonstrate cost-effectiveness and increasing social value creation over time

Demand for connectivity is real with many networks achieving 30-50% take rates, and technical capacity is credible

Cross-sectional analysis of nine CCIs provides first investability assessment from investor perspective

Explanation

Unexpectedly, there is strong consensus on applying rigorous, quantitative research methodologies typically used in commercial investment analysis to community networks. This represents a significant shift from purely advocacy-based approaches to evidence-based investment cases.

Topics

Development | Economic

Recognition of community networks as legitimate investment opportunities rather than just social projects

Speakers

– Brian Vo
– Claude Dorion
– Carl Elmstam
– Chris Locke

Arguments

Growth is primarily blocked by structural barriers including lack of access to capital, particularly CAPEX rather than OPEX

Most initiatives cannot cover all costs with autonomous revenues and require blended financing approaches

Multi-layered investor structure with grants/guarantees at bottom, DFIs in middle, and potentially private investors at top

Internet Society commits $30 million over four years with Meta partnership to support early-stage community connectivity

Explanation

There is unexpected consensus among both development finance professionals and investors that community networks should be treated as legitimate infrastructure investments requiring sophisticated financial instruments, rather than simple charitable projects.

Topics

Development | Economic | Infrastructure

Overall assessment

Summary

The discussion reveals remarkably strong consensus across all speakers on key issues: the need for blended finance approaches, the importance of portfolio-based risk management, the critical role of energy infrastructure, and the recognition of community networks as legitimate investment opportunities with proven social and economic returns. There is also agreement on the structural barriers facing community networks and the need for evidence-based approaches to demonstrate their value proposition.

Consensus level

Very high level of consensus with no significant disagreements identified. This strong alignment suggests the field has matured significantly, moving from advocacy-based arguments to evidence-based investment cases. The implications are positive for advancing community network financing, as the unified perspective from diverse stakeholders (academics, investors, development finance institutions, implementers) provides a solid foundation for developing coordinated financing mechanisms and policy frameworks.

Different viewpoints

Approach to sustainability – grants vs commercial viability

Speakers

– Chris Locke
– Audience

Arguments

There’s a need to move from creating “grantrepreneurs” to sustainable businesses through proper training and capacity building

Community networks rely heavily on volunteers and personal resources due to limited donor funding (typically under $15,000)

Summary

Chris Locke advocates for transitioning community networks from grant dependency to commercial sustainability through training, while the audience member argues that the nature of community networks requires continued grant support as social goods, similar to health and education funding

Topics

Development | Economic

Unexpected differences

Role of grants in long-term sustainability

Speakers

– Chris Locke
– Audience

Arguments

There’s a need to move from creating “grantrepreneurs” to sustainable businesses through proper training and capacity building

Community networks rely heavily on volunteers and personal resources due to limited donor funding (typically under $15,000)

Explanation

This disagreement is unexpected because both speakers are advocates for community networks, yet they have fundamentally different views on whether these networks should transition away from grants or continue to be supported as social goods. This reflects a deeper philosophical divide about the nature and purpose of community networks

Topics

Development | Economic

Overall assessment

Summary

The discussion showed remarkably high consensus among speakers, with most disagreements being tactical rather than strategic. The main area of disagreement centered on the long-term sustainability model for community networks – whether they should transition to commercial viability or remain grant-supported social goods

Disagreement level

Low to moderate disagreement level. The speakers largely agreed on fundamental issues like the need for blended finance, the importance of community networks, and the challenges they face. Disagreements were primarily about implementation approaches rather than core objectives, suggesting a mature field with established consensus on key principles but ongoing debate about optimal execution strategies

Partial agreements

Similar viewpoints

Both speakers emphasize that community networks are fundamentally different from commercial ISPs because they create broader social value and positive externalities that extend far beyond simple connectivity provision.

Speakers

– Marie Lisa Dacanay
– Luca Belli

Arguments

Community networks provide three types of services: transactional, social inclusion, and transformational services that generate significant social impacts beyond commercial ISPs

Community networks create positive externalities locally, decentralizing connectivity while generating new wealth in economic and social terms

Topics

Development | Sociocultural

Both speakers recognize that while community networks have strong technical capabilities, they need significant support in developing business and commercial skills to transition from grant-dependent organizations to sustainable enterprises.

Speakers

– Chris Locke
– Brian Vo

Arguments

There’s a need to move from creating “grantrepreneurs” to sustainable businesses through proper training and capacity building

Investment readiness requires developing business planning capabilities beyond technical expertise

Topics

Development | Economic

Both speakers emphasize the importance of multi-stakeholder approaches that combine policy/regulatory work with practical implementation, viewing community networks as concrete examples of effective collaboration.

Speakers

– Alessandra Lustrati
– Luca Belli

Arguments

FCDO supports last-mile connectivity through policy/regulatory frameworks and community-level business model testing

Community networks serve as examples of multi-stakeholder partnerships that build concrete solutions

Topics

Development | Legal and regulatory | Infrastructure

Key takeaways

Community networks function as social enterprises providing three types of services (transactional, social inclusion, and transformational) that generate significant social impacts beyond what commercial ISPs offer

Social return on investment (SROI) ratios above 1.0 demonstrate that community networks are cost-effective and create increasing social value over time

Community networks face a ‘financial divide’ where access to capital, particularly CAPEX funding, is the primary barrier to growth rather than operational sustainability

Blended finance approaches are essential, combining grants for impact, loans for equipment, and flexible refundable products for working capital

Investment readiness requires developing business planning capabilities beyond technical expertise, with a need to transition from ‘grantrepreneurs’ to sustainable businesses

Portfolio approaches that aggregate multiple community networks can spread risk and unlock capital at scale more effectively than single-deal investments

Multi-stakeholder partnerships involving donors, DFIs, private investors, and community organizations are necessary for sustainable financing solutions

Power management and renewable energy access are critical infrastructure needs that must be addressed alongside connectivity solutions

Resolutions and action items

Internet Society commits $30 million over four years through their co-fund with Meta partnership to support early-stage community connectivity

FCDO will continue supporting last-mile connectivity through both policy/regulatory frameworks and community-level business model testing

Development of bespoke underwriting tools and benchmarks specifically designed for community networks rather than copying from other industries

Creation of technical assistance programs paired with investment to build business planning capabilities in community networks

Establishment of facilities and funds that can aggregate demand and provide portfolio-based financing rather than deal-by-deal approaches

Unresolved issues

How to effectively combine ODA (Official Development Assistance) funding with commercial investments without violating profit generation restrictions

Specific mechanisms for addressing the relationship between connectivity and energy availability, particularly in climate finance contexts

How to scale beyond typical donor funding limits (often under $15,000) to meet actual CAPEX requirements for network expansion

Balancing social accessibility of services with sustainable pricing policies for long-term viability

Developing standardized methods for community networks to demonstrate performance and social impact to financial sector

Creating appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks that support community network licensing and spectrum access across different jurisdictions

Suggested compromises

Multi-layered investor structure where grants/guarantees provide foundation, DFIs occupy middle layer, and private investors participate at top with lowest risk

Blended finance models where grant funding reduces risk perception to enable lower interest rates on refundable financing components

Portfolio approach that includes more commercially viable projects to cross-subsidize higher-risk community networks serving marginalized populations

Treating community networks as infrastructure investments rather than charity while maintaining social mission focus

Flexible financing products adapted to each community network’s specific context rather than one-size-fits-all solutions

Combining technical assistance with investment capital to address both funding and capacity building needs simultaneously

Often we create grantrepreneurs not entrepreneurs. We create organizations that are very good at moving from grant to grant and as donors and as organizations I think we train people to be good at getting grants from donors. It’s a very different skill to then transition into being a commercial business and being a sustainable business.

Speaker

Chris Locke

Reason

This comment introduces a critical paradox in development funding – that well-intentioned grant programs may inadvertently create dependency rather than sustainability. It challenges the fundamental assumption that grants naturally lead to self-sufficiency and highlights a systemic issue in how development organizations operate.

Impact

This observation reframed the entire discussion around sustainability, moving it beyond just finding more funding sources to questioning how funding mechanisms themselves shape organizational behavior. It set up the need for the blended finance solutions that subsequent speakers would elaborate on, and established the tension between social mission and commercial viability that ran throughout the session.

Community-centered connectivity initiatives are not just ordinary enterprises, but they are social enterprises… they actually offer three types of services: transactional services, social inclusion services, and transformational services.

Speaker

Marie Lisa Dacanay

Reason

This comment fundamentally redefines how community networks should be understood and evaluated. By categorizing their services into three distinct types, it provides a framework for understanding why traditional ISP metrics and investment criteria don’t apply, and why these initiatives generate value that commercial providers cannot.

Impact

This categorization became the foundation for understanding the unique value proposition of community networks throughout the rest of the discussion. It provided the theoretical framework that justified the social return on investment methodology and helped explain why traditional financing approaches are inadequate. Other speakers referenced this distinction when discussing investment criteria and policy recommendations.

We wanted to look at it from a bottom-up nature to really start with the finish line of if we looked at these organizations as potential investments as an investor, how might we underwrite it? Would we do an investment as they are right now? If not, what might be some of the gaps?

Speaker

Brian Vo

Reason

This comment represents a methodological breakthrough – applying actual investment underwriting criteria to community networks rather than theoretical assessments. It bridges the gap between the development sector’s perspective and the investment community’s requirements, providing practical insights rather than aspirational recommendations.

Impact

This approach shifted the discussion from advocacy to practical implementation. It provided concrete evidence that demand is real and technical capacity exists, while identifying specific barriers like business planning skills. This investor’s perspective validated the sector’s potential while highlighting actionable gaps, influencing how other speakers framed their recommendations around investment readiness and blended finance structures.

There is a clear need and pertinence to bring a financial mechanism that will be blended finance in order to increase the volumes that are available for the connectivity initiative… that kind of project should allow to increase the size of the projects and even if it has to pay a certain part of interest on its financing it should allow to lower the cost per user with economies of scale.

Speaker

Claude Dorion

Reason

This comment synthesizes the structural analysis of financing needs with a concrete solution pathway. It moves beyond identifying problems to proposing a specific financial architecture that addresses the unique characteristics of community networks while achieving scale efficiencies.

Impact

This proposal provided a concrete framework that subsequent speakers could build upon. Karl Elmström elaborated on the layered investment structure, and Alessandra Lustrati connected it to policy implications. It shifted the conversation from ‘whether’ blended finance could work to ‘how’ it should be structured, making the discussion more actionable and policy-relevant.

Most of these community networks are relying much more on volunteers and other initiatives and I think it’s a high time that governments and donors look at them as social good and continue to pump money you know just like they do in health and education in order to have many people you know enjoy the benefits of digital opportunities.

Speaker

Audience member (Tandanet representative)

Reason

This comment from a practitioner challenges the entire premise of moving toward commercial sustainability, arguing instead for treating connectivity as a public good requiring ongoing subsidy. It introduces tension between the academic/policy discussion and ground-level reality, highlighting the gap between theoretical models and operational challenges.

Impact

This intervention brought the discussion back to ground-level realities and challenged some of the assumptions about commercial viability. It highlighted the tension between social mission and financial sustainability that runs through community network operations, and reinforced the need for the blended finance approaches being discussed rather than purely commercial solutions.

Overall assessment

These key comments fundamentally shaped the discussion by establishing critical frameworks and tensions that defined the entire session. Chris Locke’s ‘grantrepreneur’ observation set up the central challenge, while Marie Lisa Dacanay’s service categorization provided the theoretical foundation for understanding community networks’ unique value. Brian Vo’s investor perspective validated the sector’s potential while identifying practical gaps, and Claude Dorion’s blended finance proposal offered a concrete solution pathway. The practitioner’s intervention grounded the discussion in operational reality. Together, these comments moved the conversation from advocacy to analysis to actionable recommendations, creating a comprehensive examination of both the challenges and opportunities in financing community connectivity. The discussion evolved from identifying problems to proposing solutions to acknowledging implementation complexities, ultimately producing a nuanced understanding of how to bridge the financial divide in digital inclusion.

How to better understand the interaction of debt and equity in community network financing

Speaker

Alessandra Lustrati

Explanation

She mentioned there are different schools of thought on what would be viable regarding debt and equity structures for community networks, indicating this needs further exploration

What is the relationship between connectivity availability and energy availability, and potential humanitarian uses for available energy

Speaker

Anonymous participant (via chat)

Explanation

This question explores the intersection of connectivity infrastructure with energy infrastructure and potential climate finance opportunities

How to develop bespoke underwriting tools and benchmarks specifically for community networks

Speaker

Brian Vo

Explanation

He emphasized that copying underwriting algorithms from other industries won’t work for broadband connectivity, particularly for CCIs, requiring specialized tools

How to better align philanthropy with investment capital on a fund or portfolio basis

Speaker

Brian Vo

Explanation

This addresses the structural challenge of combining different types of funding sources effectively

How to address the relational challenges and language barriers between development cooperation/civil society culture and private investors

Speaker

Carl Elmstam

Explanation

He noted these challenges should not be underestimated and require facilitation or interpretation between different stakeholder groups

How to resolve ODA (Official Development Assistance) compliance issues when grants are combined with profit-generating activities

Speaker

Carl Elmstam

Explanation

He highlighted that ODA grants should not generate profits, creating complications when combining with commercial investments

How to address the structural challenge of community network ownership models and their impact on investor perception

Speaker

Audience member (Tandanet representative)

Explanation

Community networks are integrated into communities with shared ownership, which investors may perceive as risky due to focus on social return rather than profits

How to scale funding beyond the typical $15,000 donor limit to meet actual CAPEX and OPEX requirements

Speaker

Audience member (Tandanet representative)

Explanation

Current funding levels are insufficient for the network equipment required to expand and serve larger areas effectively

How to better integrate green energy investments with community connectivity initiatives

Speaker

Marie Lisa Dacanay

Explanation

She noted that underserved communities usually need renewable energy alongside connectivity, suggesting need for coordinated investment approaches

Summary

This roundtable discussion explored the role of science and technology diplomacy in fostering global cooperation, with particular focus on how non-traditional actors can contribute to digital governance initiatives. Moderated by Sofie Schönborn from the Technical University of Munich, the session brought together experts from government, academia, civil society, and technical communities to examine collaborative approaches beyond traditional diplomatic channels.

The discussion was framed around three dimensions of science diplomacy: science in diplomacy (using scientific knowledge to inform policy), diplomacy for science (using diplomatic tools to support scientific cooperation), and science for diplomacy (using science as soft power for international relations). Speakers emphasized that in today’s rapidly evolving technological landscape, even traditional diplomats are becoming “non-traditional” actors as they navigate new roles in technology governance.

Key themes emerged around the importance of anticipatory governance, evidence-based policymaking, and multi-stakeholder collaboration. The Global Network of Internet and Society Centers was highlighted as an example of how academic networks can serve as policy bridges, connecting experts across regions and providing evidence to inform decision-making processes. Speakers shared concrete examples of successful science diplomacy, including Colombia’s AI expert mission that brought together international academics, government officials, and development banks to create actionable AI policy frameworks.

The discussion emphasized the critical role of collaboration in addressing global challenges, with Wikipedia cited as an example of peak digital collaboration through its open-source, peer-review model. Participants stressed the need to reduce information asymmetries about emerging technologies and ensure policymakers understand the technologies they seek to regulate. The session concluded with calls to action focusing on co-creation across borders, defending trust in science, and maintaining multi-stakeholder approaches to internet governance as essential tools for navigating complex geopolitical times while building sustainable technological futures.

Keypoints

## Major Discussion Points:

– **Defining Science and Technology Diplomacy**: The discussion explored the three dimensions of science diplomacy outlined by the Royal Society: science in diplomacy (using scientific knowledge to inform policy), diplomacy for science (using diplomatic tools to support scientific cooperation), and science for diplomacy (using science as soft power to build international relations and bridges).

– **Role of Non-Traditional Actors**: A central focus was examining how actors beyond traditional diplomats – including academic networks, civil society organizations, technical communities, and research institutions – can contribute to global digital governance and international cooperation in an era of geopolitical tensions.

– **Multi-Stakeholder Collaboration and Networks**: Speakers emphasized the importance of collaborative platforms like the Global Network of Internet and Society Centers (NOC), highlighting how academic networks can serve as “policy bridges” connecting experts across regions and providing evidence-based input to policymakers.

– **Practical Implementation and Real-World Examples**: The discussion featured concrete case studies, particularly Colombia’s AI expert mission (2018-2022) which demonstrated successful science diplomacy in action, involving academics, government, industry, and development banks to create actionable AI policy and infrastructure.

– **Challenges and Future Directions**: Speakers addressed current threats to open internet governance, the need for anticipatory governance in rapidly evolving technology landscapes, and the importance of reducing information asymmetries between technical developments and policymaking processes.

## Overall Purpose:

The roundtable aimed to explore how science and technology diplomacy can enhance global cooperation, specifically focusing on the contributions of non-traditional diplomatic actors (academia, civil society, technical communities) to digital governance initiatives. The session sought to identify practical approaches and tools for fostering international collaboration in technology policy during times of geopolitical tension.

## Overall Tone:

The discussion maintained a consistently constructive and collaborative tone throughout. Speakers were optimistic about the potential for meaningful cooperation despite acknowledging current geopolitical challenges and fragmentation. The tone was professional yet accessible, with participants building on each other’s points and emphasizing shared goals. There was a notable sense of urgency about the need for action, but this was balanced with practical optimism about available tools and successful examples. The conversation concluded on an empowering note, with clear calls to action that reinforced the theme that meaningful change is both necessary and achievable through collaborative effort.

Speakers

**Speakers from the provided list:**

– **Sofie Schonborn** – Researcher at the Technical University of Munich and at the Technical University of Munich’s Think Tank, TUM Think Tank; Moderator of the roundtable

– **Nele Leosk** – Former ambassador-at-large for digital affairs of Estonia, now team lead at Knowledge Hub Digital for the European Commission

– **Maricela Munoz** – Director for External Affairs at Gesta, the Geneva Science and Diplomacy Anticipator

– **Armando Guio** – Executive Director of the Global Network of Internet and Society Centers (NOC)

– **Isobel Acquah** – Africa Director of CERTA Foundation, Pan-African Legal Think Tank based in Rwanda

– **Víctor Munoz** – Engineer, Entrepreneur and former Director General of the Administration of the Presidency in Colombia

– **Jan Gerlach** – Director of Public Policy at Wikimedia Foundation

– **Lucien M. CASTEX** – Policy Representative and Advisor to the CEO of AFNIC, the French Network Information Center

**Additional speakers:**

None identified – all speakers who participated in the discussion were included in the provided speakers names list.

# Science and Technology Diplomacy: The Role of Non-Traditional Actors in Global Digital Governance

## Executive Summary

This comprehensive 60-minute roundtable discussion at IGF 2025 in Oslo, moderated by Sofie Schönborn from the Technical University of Munich Think Tank and the Global Network of Internet and Society Centres, brought together eight international experts to explore the evolving landscape of science and technology diplomacy. The session featured representatives from government, academia, civil society, and technical communities, creating a diverse multi-stakeholder dialogue that exemplified the collaborative approaches being discussed.

The conversation was initially structured around the Royal Society’s three-dimensional framework for science diplomacy: science in diplomacy, diplomacy for science, and science for diplomacy. However, the discussion quickly evolved beyond these traditional categories as speakers challenged fundamental assumptions about who constitutes “traditional” versus “non-traditional” actors in the rapidly changing technological landscape.

A central theme emerged around the recognition that even traditional diplomatic actors are becoming “non-traditional” as they navigate unfamiliar roles in technology governance, while private sector and individual players increasingly wield more power than conventional government actors. This paradigm shift set the tone for a nuanced exploration of collaborative approaches that transcend traditional diplomatic channels.

The discussion maintained a consistently constructive tone throughout, with speakers building upon each other’s contributions to create a comprehensive picture of current challenges and future opportunities. Participants shared concrete examples of successful science diplomacy initiatives, from Colombia’s AI expert mission to Wikipedia’s global collaboration model, while addressing pressing concerns about geopolitical fragmentation and threats to open internet governance.

## Key Themes and Major Discussion Points

### Redefining Traditional and Non-Traditional Actors

The conversation began with an immediate challenge to its foundational premise. Nele Leosk, former Estonian ambassador-at-large for digital affairs, fundamentally questioned the binary distinction between traditional and non-traditional actors, arguing that “governments are already traditional actors in technology diplomacy, because the role of technology is still quite new to traditional diplomacy.” She noted that “many diplomats actually find themselves in a rather new role in these current times, when private sector, and I would say even individual players, have so much power that often we see that they have more power than actually these traditional actors as governments.”

This reframing proved pivotal, shifting the entire discussion away from a simple traditional versus non-traditional dichotomy towards a more nuanced understanding of evolving roles and power dynamics in the digital age.

### Multi-Stakeholder Collaboration as Essential Infrastructure

All speakers demonstrated remarkable consensus on the fundamental importance of multi-stakeholder approaches to digital governance. Maricela Muñoz, Director for External Affairs at GESTA (Geneva Science and Diplomacy Anticipator), emphasized that “science diplomacy has existed for centuries through collaborative platforms,” citing the Internet Governance Forum as “a perfect example of multi-stakeholder collaboration.”

Jan Gerlach from the Wikimedia Foundation described Wikipedia as representing “peak collaboration on the internet through open source peer review system across 300 languages,” noting that Wikipedia has crossed “65 million articles across roughly 300 languages” and “will celebrate its 25th anniversary next year.” Lucien M. Castex from AFNIC emphasized that the “multi-stakeholder model requires diversity of viewpoints and broader participation including local and regional processes.”

### Academic Networks as Policy Bridges

Armando Guío, Executive Director of the Global Network of Internet and Society Centers, introduced the compelling concept of academic networks functioning as “policy bridges.” He explained how the network, which has grown to “140 centers” globally, enables situations where “colleagues in Oslo are contributing to colleagues in Colombia and to policymakers in Colombia, or colleagues in Singapore are helping other colleagues in Africa.”

This bridge metaphor resonated throughout the discussion, with multiple speakers providing examples of how academic institutions can connect technical expertise with policy needs across geographical and institutional boundaries while building local capacity for digital governance.

### Anticipatory Governance and Accelerated Change

Maricela Muñoz introduced the crucial concept of anticipatory governance, arguing that “we’re living in an era of accelerated change and we need to be able to anticipate what’s coming next.” She highlighted the Open Quantum Institute, which is “incubated at GESTA and is now embedded at CERN,” as an example of anticipatory science diplomacy working to accelerate dialogue around quantum technology development before widespread deployment creates governance challenges.

### Practical Implementation: Colombia’s AI Expert Mission

Víctor Muñoz provided a detailed case study of Colombia’s AI expert mission (2018-2022), which was co-sponsored by CAF (development bank in Latin America) and the Inter-American Development Bank. The mission was led by Sandra Cortesi from Harvard Berkman Klein Center and Professor Gasser from TUM University Munich, bringing together international academics, government officials, development banks, and industry representatives.

Muñoz emphasized that “science diplomacy doesn’t remain confined to policy papers. It creates concrete tools, infrastructure, and institutional capacity.” The mission’s success is evidenced by Colombia now having “two centers for AI excellence, one in Bogota and one in Medellín,” demonstrating how science diplomacy can create lasting institutional capacity.

### Regional Perspectives and Global Challenges

Isobel Acquah, Africa Director of CERTA Foundation, provided crucial perspective on how science and technology diplomacy can address global inequalities while leveraging regional strengths. She reframed Africa’s technological challenges not as problems requiring aid, but as global opportunities requiring collaboration, noting that “when you think about the fact that the global population will be one in four African, it becomes an international obligation.”

Nele Leosk provided the perspective of smaller nations, explaining how “small countries need to collaborate closely with non-traditional actors due to complexity of following global digital processes.” She highlighted the Nordic Institute of Interoperability Solutions as a specific example of successful cross-border collaboration.

## Concrete Tools and Actionable Outcomes

### The Wikipedia Test

Jan Gerlach introduced the practical “Wikipedia test” as a decision-making framework, encouraging policymakers to “consider the impact of any actions, of policies, of regulations on Wikipedia before making decisions,” arguing that “if policies and actions are bad for Wikipedia, they harm the open internet and many digital public goods.”

### Development Banks as Science Diplomacy Actors

Víctor Muñoz uniquely positioned development banks as key science diplomacy actors, describing how they moved beyond traditional infrastructure to support AI policy development by “connecting countries with global experts beyond traditional government channels.”

### Cross-Sector Collaboration Models

Multiple speakers provided examples of successful collaboration mechanisms:

– AFNIC’s collaboration with the Centre of Internet and Society in France

– The post-quantum report collaboration between AFNIC and I3C

– The São Paulo multi-stakeholder guidelines from NET Mundial plus 10

– Multi-stakeholder meetings bringing together “big tech, startups, policymakers, and regulators”

## Challenges and Future Directions

### Geopolitical Fragmentation

Multiple speakers expressed concern about threats to open internet governance from increasing geopolitical tensions. Jan Gerlach warned that “geopolitical tensions threaten open internet, making digital cooperation crucial for keeping everyone connected,” while Armando Guío noted that the world is “moving toward fragmentation and localisation.”

### Capacity Building and Representation

Isobel Acquah highlighted ongoing challenges in ensuring adequate representation and capacity building for underrepresented regions, emphasizing the need for “peer learning approaches” rather than “hierarchical knowledge transfer systems” to ensure more equitable collaboration.

### Maintaining Trust in Science

Both Maricela Muñoz and Víctor Muñoz emphasized the challenge of maintaining trust in science and evidence-based policymaking during times of polarization, which threatens the foundation of science diplomacy.

## Calls to Action

The discussion concluded with several specific calls to action:

– **Co-Creation Across Borders**: Nele Leosk’s call for “co-creation across sectors and borders” emphasizes collaborative approaches that recognize shared challenges and solutions

– **Reducing Information Asymmetries**: Armando Guío’s emphasis on “reducing information asymmetries about new technologies by bringing policymakers closer to actual technological developments”

– **Defending Trust in Science**: Maricela Muñoz’s call to “defend trust in science and democratise access to knowledge for evidence-based policymaking”

– **Working with Local Communities**: Jan Gerlach’s emphasis on “working with local volunteer communities who collect and build knowledge, including researchers and experts”

## Areas of Disagreement

Despite high consensus, some tensions emerged around definitional challenges regarding traditional versus non-traditional actors, different approaches to collaboration mechanisms, and varying perspectives on which institutions should play leading roles in science and technology diplomacy.

## Conclusion

This roundtable discussion demonstrated both the potential and challenges of science and technology diplomacy in addressing contemporary global challenges. The remarkable consensus among diverse stakeholders on the importance of multi-stakeholder collaboration, evidence-based policymaking, and cross-border cooperation provides a strong foundation for advancing collaborative approaches to digital governance.

The discussion’s evolution from questioning basic assumptions about traditional versus non-traditional actors to providing concrete tools and implementation strategies reflects a maturing field moving beyond theoretical frameworks towards practical application. The emphasis on anticipatory governance, academic networks as policy bridges, and practical tools like the Wikipedia test all suggest promising directions for future development.

However, significant challenges remain, particularly around maintaining collaborative approaches in an increasingly fragmented geopolitical environment and ensuring equitable participation across different regions and communities. The success of science and technology diplomacy will depend on the ability of diverse stakeholders to implement the collaborative approaches discussed while adapting to changing technological and geopolitical conditions.

Sofie Schonborn: Welcome everyone. Welcome to our roundtable on leveraging science and tech diplomacy for global cooperation. My name is Sofie Schönborn. I’m a researcher at the Technical University of Munich and at the Technical University of Munich’s Think Tank, TUM Think Tank. TUM Think Tank is a part of the Global Network of Internet and Society Centres, NOC, which is bringing all of us here together today. I’m happy to moderate today’s roundtable and kick us off into today’s session. Science and tech diplomacy have become some kind of increasingly talked about buzzwords in the past 15 to 20 years. They’re ideas that link science and tech to the world of diplomacy, international relations and global governance. But as with so many other things, of course, there are no universally agreed upon definitions for either of the two. Or even related terms. What have emerged are a couple of common concepts and I just briefly want to introduce one classification of those to frame the following discussion. The Royal Society has outlined three dimensions for science diplomacy in 2010, which are oftentimes referred to. These cover the three terms science in diplomacy, science for diplomacy and diplomacy for science. What does that mean? Science in diplomacy typically refers to activities that use scientific knowledge to inform foreign policy and policy more broadly. They could be through individual science attaches, individual scientists or technologists, but also institutions or networks of institutions. Then when we look at diplomacy for science, we recognize it’s not just a one way street. We can also use diplomatic tools and channels to support scientific and technological cooperation. Thirdly, science for diplomacy, so not in, but for, see science and technology more as soft power elements for promoting international policy goals, for promoting foreign policy. foreign policy agendas, for example by promoting open values or evidence-based decision making, but also to build bridges to improve international relations in times where diplomatic channels may erode or temporarily not function for those goals. These dimensions of course are super broad, not mutually exclusive, but I think what they show is that there can really be a range of actors involved in science and tech diplomacy, and also that this really covers a range of activities that we can engage in. Now 2025, IGF, we live in times of geopolitical tensions, we’re searching for trusted partnerships, new alliances, and of course there’s ongoing technological developments and efforts for global digital governance, be it through the IGF, WSIS 20 and so on, and we may be looking, especially with the ideas of multi-stakeholderism, for what actually the roles of different stakeholder groups are and how we individually can contribute to those. So against the spectrum, we’re coming together today to explore with our esteemed speakers, but also with the audience, what the role of non-traditional diplomatic actors or actors can be in science and technology diplomacy. Non-traditional in the sense that we’re not looking at diplomats at foreign federal agencies, but really at actors from science, civil society, and the technical communities and how they can contribute. No easy questions, and multiple at that, but that’s why I’m really happy to have with me such experts from really a range of stakeholder groups and backgrounds. I’m briefly introducing by the order of appearance with their inputs. First of all, online. I hope we can see our speakers online. Nele Liosk is joining us, former ambassador-at-large for digital affairs of Estonia, now a team lead at Knowledge Hub Digital. for the European Commission and joining us online. We’re seeing someone else then up there. I’m really sorry for that. I’ll continue with the introductions and then I hope we see also the speakers up there. Maricela Muñoz is joining us, Director for External Affairs at Gesta, the Geneva Science and Diplomacy Anticipator. Armando Guío Espanyol, the Executive Director of the Global Network of Internet and Society Centers, NOC, also joining us online. I hope you’ll see a picture of him soon. Here in person with us, Isobel Acquah, the Africa Director of CERTA Foundation, Pan-African Legal Think Tank based in Rwanda. Víctor Muñoz, Engineer, Entrepreneur and former Director General of the Administration of the Presidency in Colombia, long affiliation, Jan Gerlach, Director of Public Policy at Wikimedia Foundation and Lucien Castex, Policy Representative and Advisor to the CEO of AFNIC, the French Network Information Center. Thank you all for being with us here today. Before we get started, some very quick notes on housekeeping. We will hear brief interventions, max five minutes from each of our roundtable speakers. So please, in the audience, collect your questions. We will have time for discussion briefly at the end of the session, as this is only 60 minutes. I have to stay close to the schedule. We have an online moderator for the audience online. Please just put your questions in the chat and we will hear them here in person. So without further ado, let me start by turning to Nele Liosk online and after that Maricela Muñoz to hear from your experience, how science and tech diplomacy can contribute to digital governance initiatives and what role, well, non-traditional actors actually play and what they may look to in the future. Nele. The floor is yours.

Nele Leosk: Hello everybody, and hello from Tallinn, quite close but still remote, but happy to be here. Sofie, if you may, you actually refer to governments as traditional actors in tech diplomacy, and having been Estonia’s G20 ambassador, I’m actually wondering whether governments are already traditional actors in technology diplomacy, because the role of technology is still quite new, I would say, to traditional diplomacy, and actually quite a lot has happened in a very short time, but still a short time, and I would say that many diplomats actually find themselves in a rather new role in these current times, when private sector, and I would say even individual players, have so much power that often we see that they have more power than actually these traditional actors as governments. So I think diplomats also have quite a bit still to do to get used to this new environment, and also realise that technology is actually shaping our world, and will shape it more by every day. But maybe just to come back to your question about what is the role of diplomacy and the different actors in this, I think it depends on our starting point, so what we actually need to do. So I served as Estonia’s digital ambassador, and that means I come from a very small country, that is tech savvy, is known to be a digital leader in deploying technology, but of course is not the technology hub in terms of technological innovation per se. Technological developments still take place mainly in other countries, and I would say increasingly in very few countries and also in very few companies. So, for us, the starting point, I would say, was maybe twofold. First, of course, we have been working and will work for what we call, let’s say, the democratic development of digitalization. We want to have the virtual world be open and secure and all these nice things we are fighting for here at the IGF also. But I would say increasingly important really becomes an understanding and the work we need to do in order to make sure that everybody in our society, so everybody in Estonia, actually has these necessary skills and knowledge to continue to be able to use technology, and including for our benefit. So, when I look back perhaps my almost five years in Estonia’s government, and I put the Europe aside for today, I will focus perhaps on Estonia, then what other means that a small country really has. Of course, as you also mentioned, one line of work is really the technology governance, so how we are supposed to use technologies. We know what we do in our country. We have in Europe, we have the European Union that plays a big role in shaping, let’s say, the virtual space, and I think EU is quite known for its regulatory activity, but not only. And now we have these global developments, and I do have to admit that when I look at, for example, the process of global digital compacts, which is plus 20, and the other processes that we all know, We are all part of governments. For private sector it is actually quite complex to follow these, especially when I look, for example, at the private sector players or even academia in Estonia. So here definitely, let’s say, that traditional actors need to collaborate closely with non-traditional actors as you categorized them. So what we had said in Estonia, we had, I would say, a rather loose network of private sector players, but we also had some more institutionalized ways to share information with each other. We had a Digital Diplomacy Coordination Council also that included all the main players outside governments, that the way we would share what’s happening and they would also reflect back on their needs. But the second component, as I started, and I know that I have only four minutes, so I will close it here, it’s just an introductory remark, is really building these partnerships that support our partners. Are they in academia, in private sector, are they in NGOs? And here I would say that looking from the government perspective or let’s say the tech diplomat perspective, it’s not, of course, just a matter of just the diplomat. So I think what here was really crucial, not only for Estonia, but also for the European Union, was to take, let’s say, this holistic approach to tech diplomacy, where we would understand that technology is not just a matter of tech diplomats or science diplomats or innovation diplomats or cyber diplomats, there are so many of them, but it’s also a matter of trade and trade negotiations, it’s a matter of development cooperation, it’s a matter of security, democracy and human rights. It’s everything that we as diplomats… to and I would say that all these partnerships would need to feed into all these mechanisms that are in place or maybe that need to be still introduced within all these different policy areas and and there’s a role as a of a tech diplomat here is I would say bring this all together have this umbrella and support all these different areas but I will end from my side here and I’m happy to stay of course listen to my good colleagues and and have the discussion later

Sofie Schonborn: thank you so thank you Nele thank you Nele that turns us over to Maricela Muñoz really well you look at the future of science and diplomacy how how would you add to this

Maricela Munoz: thank you so much Sofie so I’m struggling looking at the timer there because the topic is so rich that is difficult to only talk for four or five minutes so bear with me I’ll do my best but I think that Nele was able to do a very great job of framing the the conversation so first I think that sometimes when we talk about science and diplomacy and you refer to to those incredible you know insights that were shared by the Royal Society and others a few years back we forget that science and diplomacy has been a player you know since centuries ago because we have worked in collaborative platforms as humanity for for centuries as well and I think that the IGF is the perfect example of this sort of collaboration is is not trivial that is a multi-stakeholder endeavor and that we also have the voice of underrepresented regions so as we establish that I think that my insights would like to contribute in the in the line of what is missing or what how can we may strengthen that collaborative platform and I think that anticipation is is that ingredient because we’re living in an era of accelerated Sofie Schönborn, Armando Guío, Isobel Acquah, Maricela Muñoz, Nele Leosk, Lucien Muñoz, Philipp S. Mueller Sofie Schönborn, Armando Guío, Isobel Acquah, Maricela Muñoz, Philipp S. Mueller Sofie Schönborn, Armando Guío, Isobel Acquah, Maricela Muñoz, Philipp S. Muñoz, Mueller Sofie Schönborn, Armando Guío, Isobel Acquah, Maricela Muñoz, Philipp S. Muñoz, Mueller Sofie Schönborn, Armando Guío, Isobel Acquah, Maricela Muñoz, Philipp S. Muñoz, Mueller Sofie Schönborn, Armando Guío, Isobel Acquah, Maricela Muñoz, Philipp S. Muñoz, Mueller Sofie Schönborn, Armando Guío, Isobel Acquah, Maricela Muñoz, Philipp S. Muñoz, Mueller materialize as a way to prove that science diplomacy is also action, it’s not only discussions. And this example is the Open Quantum Institute that was incubated at JASTA and is now embedded at CERN with the collaboration also of the private sector, where we’re basically accelerating the dialogue to develop.

Sofie Schonborn: Isobel Acquah, Armando Guío, Isobel Acquah, Maricela Muñoz, Philipp S. Mueller

Armando Guio: Thank you. Thank you very much, Sofie. And it’s great, of course, to see you all and to share this panel with such a great group of esteemed colleagues. I’m here in Boston, but very happy to almost feel in there in Oslo. And of course, as you mentioned, I would like to share a little bit more about the global network of Internet and society centers, the work we do, and of course, how it relates with this big question about a tech diplomacy and science diplomacy. So, the Global Network of Centers, also known as NOC, it’s a network of 130, now we are 140 centers from around the world, academic centers that are working together towards perhaps bringing ideas and trying to accelerate conversations that we need to have all over the world about the use of the Internet, about new technologies, about AI, of course, quantum computing, the metaverse, and many other emerging technologies that we have in the world, and that basically have also a global impact. And that’s perhaps one of the biggest issues that we have right now. The world is taking us towards a state of fragmentation, where it’s taking us to a state of thinking for ourselves of more national than international projects and to localize some of these ideas, and also the use of some of these infrastructure. In the Global Network of Centers, we believe that we need to continue this kind of engagement with different centers and colleagues around the world, as we believe that this is going to be essential for many of the future conversations that we should have, and of course, of the projects and ideas that should come in the next years, especially when we are talking about the impact of technologies that are not considering borders, frontiers, that are actually moving in many different ways beyond that. So in that regard, I think that the Network of Centers and the work we’re doing, and many of the colleagues here are part of this network, perhaps on the point of scientific diplomacy and science diplomacy, we have three points that I would like to highlight. The first one is that academic networks can work as policy bridges. This idea of a policy bridge in which basically we are a bridge between some academic experts and policymakers. And the interesting thing is that we have been able to connect experts with countries and with policymakers in many different countries in which sometimes they don’t even consider to be working with or to have an impact on. So it’s interesting to see, for example, how colleagues in Oslo are contributing to colleagues in Colombia and to policymakers in Colombia, such as Víctor Muñoz, that we’ll of course explain later, a little bit more of his experience, or colleagues in Singapore are helping other colleagues in Africa to perhaps think about their next steps on AI governance. And examples like this is what we have at the Network of Centres, basically these kind of collaborations, inter-regional collaborations that are so important right now. And that’s what we try to do, to become these policy bridges. At the same time, we try to become policy bridges with the evidence and basically to bring evidence to policymaking and to policy conversations. And I think that’s also something very important to consider from the science diplomacy side, how important it is to become an ambassador not only of ideas, but at the same time of evidence and good evidence and research that can inform the policymaking process. Now we’re having a lot of conversations about, again, AI governance, internal governance, the future of work, what are the next skills, what’s really working and what’s really not. And that’s what we’re trying to do here, that’s the kind of bridge that we’re trying to create and generate by connecting this audience of policy and decision makers, for example, with academia, with experts, and with this kind of work that sometimes is not that easily available as we believe it could be. And at the same time, we’re also helping to generate capacities within or members and at the same time, or NOC colleagues in the sense that we’re trying to help them to have enough knowledge about what they’re doing, what their last research trends are, what kind of research is having more impact. And that also, I believe, it’s quite important for many of our colleagues also to have an increased relevance in the national policy conversations they’re involved in. So that will be the first point. Then I would like to talk a little bit more about the collaboration and the collaboration side. I think that science diplomacy through collaboration is essential. And that’s basically one of the terms. It sounds sometimes and people say, you talk a lot about collaboration. And I say, yeah, because that’s what we do. And also, it sounds as a very basic term, sometimes collaboration, it’s not difficult to build. And it’s, I think, of the essence, especially for these kind of science diplomacy efforts. So what’s collaboration? Basically, building something meaningful, creating trust, building that trust in a way in which basically entities want to really collaborate with each other, participate on grant applications, on funding mechanisms to share knowledge data. That’s not as easy as it seems to be. And sometimes there’s not enough trust in order to have this kind of meaningful collaboration. And that’s something which we basically are trying to work more and more to increase this kind of efforts and these kind of meetings and the work we do. And of course, efforts such as the ones we’re doing to build these bridges, again, is very important in that sense, in the collaboration and in the work that we’re trying to achieve. And then finally, we have this perhaps last element that is that we’re trying to also look into these non-traditional actors as system stewards and as stewards of digital collaboration and digital cooperation in that sense. So we really believe that we cannot just fully rely, and I think the geopolitical moment in which we are is showing us that we cannot just fully rely on institutions that are traditionally seen as the and Javier López. So, I think that this is a very important topic for us to discuss. I think that we should be very open to the possibility of having conversations in institutions where these conversations should be taking place or where these diplomatic efforts should be taking place. We believe that we need to be a little bit more creative and innovative and think on non-traditional actors and non-traditional scenarios as big elements of some of the dialogues that we want to have and at the same time to become like these kind of forums for many of us to participate and be involved. And that’s why we believe in a network of centers that we really want to increase this kind of work, especially with non-traditional actors and with other stakeholders and build that kind of engagement in a very different and meaningful way. And that perhaps and becoming stewards also of that digital cooperation, of observing and monitoring how this cooperation is taking place and the kind of alliances that are being built is something that we believe is very important. And of course, we have many examples. So just as a last point, we have many examples of how this is working, but basically what I can say, it’s like this idea of panel is a big example of what we are also trying to achieve. And thank you.

Sofie Schonborn: Thank you, Armando. Thank you for these really active calls. For more of these initiatives, heading over to Isabel Acqua, maybe you can share some examples as one of those centers from the network of centers about your actions. And experiences.

Isobel Acquah: Thank you so much, Sophie. And to all my panelists. Thank you, Armando. I think he really set the tone. We joined NOC about two years ago. So we’re really one of the baby centers, a few that have joined since. And I think I’ll look at it from three perspectives. Africa’s position, the really intensive role of peer learning and then the multi-stakeholder governance. So I think when you when you look at Africa’s perspective and I’ve been walking through the IGF and there’s so much negative, you know, it’s one percent of research papers are from Africa or one percent of data center capacity. All of those things are true. But I think when you look at it from a global cooperation perspective, these challenges are really an opportunity for us to collaborate. The word that Armando used, and I think that’s the exciting thing, right? There’s a lot of challenges, but those same challenges are really truly opportunities for global cooperation, looking at ways that we can enhance research, how can we build academic partnerships so that you have people going from institutions in Rwanda, which is where we’re based, where Rwandan founded Think Tank, but we’re Pan-African focused. So how do we take young students from Rwanda who are incredibly brilliant, but don’t necessarily have all the resources, and bring them to Oslo or to Germany, et cetera. And we’re doing a lot of that cooperation already because there is really an opportunity for us to think more broadly when we have these sort of networks. As Armando said, it’s 140 people, which means you have these incredible opportunities to build knowledge and to think about things through different lenses. And I think it’s important, of course, the imperative is for the African governments and African ecosystem and African lawyers and policymakers to figure out how we’re going to deal when we’re looking at AI governance, for example. It is their imperative. However, when you think about the fact that the global population will be one in four African, it becomes an international obligation, right? So we have to think as an international body, how do we make sense of that? And how do we collaborate on that? The second thing I would say, which is really, for me, very unique about the NOC is truly peer learning. And I say that because I think you can have a lot of organizations that sort of have this tiered system. What I find is that when we are doing projects together, it really is around collaboration. It’s really about being… Sofie Schönborn, Armando Guío, Isobel Acquah, Maricela Muñoz, Nele Leosk, Lucien M. CASTEX, Víctor Muñoz, Philipp S. Mueller Sofie Schönborn, Armando Guío, Isobel Acquah, Maricela Muñoz, Philipp S. Mueller Sofie Schönborn, Armando Guío, Isobel Acquah, Maricela Muñoz, Philipp S. Mueller Sofie Schönborn, Armando Guío, Isobel Acquah, Maricela Muñoz, Philipp S. Mueller Sofie Schönborn, Armando Guío, Isobel Acquah, Maricela Muñoz, Philipp S. Mueller and the global network of centers. So, what we decided to do, and again, co-hosting this, co-convening this with the global network of centers, is to host a multi-stakeholder meeting that brought in big tech, the startup community, policy makers, we had 20 policy makers and regulators from across the continent, and also, of course, some of our NOC peers. Armando was in Kigali, and we had a meeting with the global network of centers in Kigali, and providing sort of like, not a global, this is what we’re doing, follow what we’re doing, but this is what we’re doing insights panel, and what can we learn from each other. And that was really well received, and I think that’s a format we really experimented with, this innovative governance structure, because we really are learning at the same pace. And to be honest, the startup community is who’s really leading, and we’re already falling behind. And so I really see that multi-stakeholder engagement as a really critical piece of what we’re trying to do. We’re hosting our next innovative governance multi-stakeholder meeting in Accra. So again, bringing in different players, having more of a West African feel to the conversation. So very important that we have these sort of collaborative opportunities, and recognize that these non-traditional actors are actually more nimble to make a lot of headway, and to collaborate much more seamlessly, and not think through traditional channels, but bringing together civil society, like our organization, Serta Foundation, academia, but then also pulling in government and the tech community, et cetera, and to pull together a real document. So those are my thoughts on that.

Sofie Schonborn: Thank you very much, Isabel. I think both you and Armando really underline how networked actors, Well, connections internationally can provide platforms for trying out new things, for collaborating, building together, and then also informing policy with regional and global knowledge and capacity, also outside of classical traditional ways of doing things, of funding things maybe. And that leads us to our last three speakers who are all here in person, who have a range of experiences in government and civil society institutions and the technical community. So maybe giving it to the three of you, just one after the other, what are your perspectives on what these kind of communities and other actors can contribute to the conversation? Let’s start with Víctor.

Víctor Munoz: Okay. Thank you, Sofie, and hello, everyone. It is an honor for me to be here. I just would like to mention a real case in Colombia. Basically, I would like to share how Colombia’s experience offers a real-world case of successful science diplomacy in action, or science for diplomacy, according to Sofie’s definition. Between 2018 and 2022, Colombia launched its AIX permission as a centerpiece of our national AI strategy. It is important to mention that what initiative was co-sponsored by CAF, that is a development bank in Latin America, and also the Inter-American Development Bank that are important actors in that conversation related with science diplomacy. The experiment was led by Sandra Cortesi from Harvard Berman Klein Center and Professor Gasser from TUM University in Munich, and also more than seven members from different centers of the network of centers. At that moment, we knew that we need everyone at the table, academics, government, industry, and civil society, To make the most scientific knowledge and protect our country’s interests, we even asked development banks to act like supporters of signed diplomats, helping us connect with experts around the world instead of relying only on government offices. Usually, the development banks are focused on roads and bridges, but that was the first time that basically they work in Latin America, supporting a country like Colombia, building our AI plans. At the same time, we help, we support these development banks in the process to escalate direct collaboration between international experts and regional decision makers. That was a win-win process that we have with them, an entirely new model for institutions that had previously focused almost on infrastructure. I would like to mention four big wins that we have with the expert mission because it is important to know that when you talk about signed diplomacy that you have papers. Really, we didn’t have papers. We had a real strategy and we implemented that strategy into the country. The first thing is that we had a clear technical roadmap for AI policy in Colombia. The second one was an ethical AI framework to guide the public sector in the AI pilot projects on safety, fairness, and community input. The third one was a skills roadmap to close our digital talent gap that was implemented in the last four years. Also, the recommendations. We have now two centers for AI excellence, one in Bogota and one in Medellín that we have working together. We have researchers, companies, startups, and students that are working together and they are learning and we are in the process to implement the new generation of the AI policy. It is important to mention that the expert mission recommendations are approved that the signed diplomacy doesn’t remain confined to policy papers. It creates concrete tools, infrastructure, and institutional capacity. And if we are looking ahead, I see three lessons for our countries in Latin America. The first thing is that teamwork, bringing many voices together, backed by development banks and universities, turn plans into action fast. Trust, building ethical rules with everyone’s input creates clear, fair guidelines. An ecosystem, connecting policymakers with startups, spreads good practices quickly. Our Colombian playbook is already being shared across the region. Experts that were part of our mission had advised governments like Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, and Uruguay in their own agendas. And these efforts and recent reports and case studies demonstrate that science diplomacy is scalable, replicable, and have an opportunity to improve really the tech and to close the gap that we have in the regions. Thank you so much.

Sofie Schonborn: Thank you, Víctor. Handing it over right to Jan.

Jan Gerlach: Yeah, hello. Thanks for having me. I’m Jan Gerlach. I’m at the Wikimedia Foundation. We are the non-profit that hosts and supports Wikipedia. And I want to quickly focus on the word collaboration, which I’m very happy to have heard a couple of times already now. And it’s an integral part of digital cooperation. Wikipedia really is, I would say, peak collaboration on the internet. It’s open source, and people from all over the world work together in a collaborative manner to add and improve content all around the world, I said, all around the clock as well. And to describe it in a way that probably resonates with a lot of people who are in the academic side here and in the scientific community, Wikipedia is a massive peer review system. It gets better the more people add to it, the more people work on it together and edit each other’s work. Wikipedia has been very successful this way. We’ve just, Wikipedia has just crossed the milestone of 65 million articles across roughly 300 languages, and it’ll celebrate its 25th anniversary next year. But it doesn’t exist in a vacuum, let’s be clear about that. It’s an integral part of an open internet, which in turn depends on digital cooperation by all these non-traditional and traditional actors in this space. Around the world, this open internet is actually under threat right now, as I probably don’t have to explain to all of you. So this is a very timely matter for stakeholders from the academic world, from the scientific community, and in tech diplomacy, to be asking themselves how to engage and asking themselves the question of digital cooperation, how to empower actors, how to empower actors in this world, and really with the goal of keeping us all connected. I think it’s really important to ask towards what goal are we actually cooperating. Cooperation should not be the means, right, the goal itself. But there is a larger goal, which is to benefit us all, to work towards the SDGs, the Sustainable Development Goals. And when we ask what these stakeholders need in order to be empowered in the conversation of digital cooperation, of course, multi-stakeholderism, multi-stakeholder approaches come to mind again. They’ve already been mentioned in the introduction here. And I think everyone here is also aware that it’s going to require a big push by everyone involved to ensure these policy spaces remain open for such approaches. So civil society, academica, the science community, and others can continue to contribute. As the Global Digital Compact is being implemented, multi-stakeholderism is key. It is crucial to making sure that digital public goods, like Wikipedia, can continue to thrive and be supported. But of course the science community through research can also represent the needs of those who may never have a voice in digital governance. Finally, and I’ll keep this short, an important part of the mix are the tools that we offer these non-traditional stakeholders for policy making, for governance, for digital cooperation. And one tool that we offer is a specific frame of thinking. We call this the Wikipedia test. Maybe you’ve already heard of it. Maybe it’s new. We ask everyone, including non-traditional actors, all stakeholders, to really consider the impact of any actions, of policies, of regulations on Wikipedia before making decisions. The point is this. If policies and actions are bad for Wikipedia, they harm the open internet and many digital public goods. In contrast, what supports Wikipedia, what’s good for Wikipedia, will be beneficial for online communities and for access to knowledge for everyone. And this in turn, of course, benefits digital cooperation as well, as we come here together in the physical space, but have remote participants on this panel as well. I think this really shows how an open internet actually is also the basis for digital cooperation itself. So this is all closely interwoven. So again, the tool that we use and that we want to offer everyone is the Wikipedia test. Think of Wikipedia before you take action, before you regulate, before you propose policies even. And talk to us if you want to learn more about this.

Sofie Schonborn: Thank you so much. Thank you very much. Handing over to Lucien directly.

Lucien M. CASTEX: Thank you, Sophie. That is a timely discussion indeed, science diplomacy, and having it framed in a global debate. on the Internet, Governance and Enhanced Cooperation, Digital Cooperation, a lot of definition and methodologies are needed. I wanted to start by highlighting that the information society and vision as a people-centered, inclusive and development-oriented is today of a renewed importance with this review coming this year. And the Internet technical community as a stakeholder group has a main role, basically, it’s to operate the core functions, the key underlying infrastructures supporting the Internet, in particular IP addresses, domain names. And one key point is one always speaks from somewhere and operating Internet, running an Internet registry like AFNIC, gives you concrete examples, actually, on the working function of the Internet. Same goes for a regional Internet registry or working with ICANN, for example. Since OSS in 2003, 2005, the Internet has evolved a lot. It’s still evolving today with new protocols discussed at the IETF, new network being created and connected to the global Internet. And in that sense, navigating the rope seas of Internet global governance has been challenging. Internet as a key underlying infrastructure, which has enabled the information society and shown its resilience and importance in supporting, actually, the development of society, is access to culture and knowledge, is key and has a key component. and others are having a global, open, secure and interoperable Internet, as Schön’s success is. In that sense, and it’s been said already, the multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance, in its diversity, I mean, IGF, of course, here in Oslo today, but also ITF, ICANN, and AFNIC as well. It’s a variety of models which are multi-stakeholder, and the participation of the different kinds of factors is key to actually enabling diversity of viewpoints. Technical and academic communities can help find innovative solutions, science, diplomacy efforts, enabling collaboration between stakeholders to share knowledge from research projects to academic partnerships, but also finding concrete examples and successes of the Internet, which is of renewed importance today, of course. So broader participation also means local processes, building on cultural and linguistic diversity, bringing voices together in the diversity of languages. I’m thinking about, for example, also the local, regional Internet governance forum. It needs to be discussed here in Oslo and everywhere else as well to actually enable real collaboration. And then finally, as we approach the 20-year review of the WSIS, it’s especially important to ensure that the review is actually inclusive and open to stakeholder inputs, obviously academia and technical community. But this is not an easy question in today’s complex environment. geopolitical landscape. Wanted in that respect to highlight the work done last year in 2024 at NET Mundial plus 10 held in Sao Paulo that resulted in the Sao Paulo multi-stakeholder guidelines which offer a proposed approach to digital governance and inclusive dialogue between stakeholders. With the the element paper just released a few days ago there is a clear need of engagement to ensure that the multi-stakeholder model is properly leveraged in 2025 and beyond. Thank you.

Sofie Schonborn: Thank you very much and thank you to all of the panel and the audience. I think those statements and contributions really show how this is an ongoing project of bringing technology and science and diplomacy together and maybe we’re all non-traditional or new actors in that sense as as Nele Leosk pointed out. While we open the floor to questions in person please step to the microphones online feel free to submit your questions to the chat. I would just continue some reflections about what we just heard about technology really warranting us to engage with it across government and society to collaborate and to shape our joint futures and while times are of course complex and hard we’re not hopeless. We heard about different tools how we can shape and contribute and learn from each other be it in anticipation be it by using the Wikipedia test before issuing policies. Thinking about novel approaches that we can take for example in funding AI policy and stakeholder engagement or fostering local and regional engagement and collaboration. If there is no questions in the room, I would just take it back to all of our wonderful speakers, because we have started talking about specific methods and tools and collaborations, but if I could ask you for one call to action or action point for either your own organization or for other stakeholders, what would it be? Maybe we start with our online speakers. Nele Leosk, would you like to start?

Nele Leosk: Hello again and thank you, Sofie. I think I would call us all to co-create. Co-create across sectors but across borders, because what we have realized after the 20, 30 plus years of digitalization, or let’s say more active digitalization, is that our needs and our problems are actually quite similar and the solutions could also be. However, what we do not see that much yet is really creating our solutions together. We have some examples. I can bring, of course, from Estonia, the very famous digital identity that we have developed and use also across private and public sector, but also across border. Some of you may know there is a Nordic Institute of Interoperability Solutions, where we together with Finland, Iceland and by now also some other partners, develop digitalization components that are crucial. I would say the cornerstone of Estonia’s digitalization and this has helped us, of course, to save financial resources, but I would say what is even more important, it has really allowed us to pull together human resources, because we all lack the needed technological skills, and I’m really glad that our Finnish-Icelandic partners and contributors from different sectors have become also part of our own digital ecosystem here in Estonia. There could be other examples, but I leave it to the colleagues to add here. Thank you, Sofie.

Sofie Schonborn: Thank you very much. Armando.

Armando Guio: Yeah, well, thank you. And adding to that, I think Nele’s point, it’s quite important. I would like to emphasize that one of the things I think we should be working more on is on reducing information asymmetries, especially about the new technologies and the kind of technology that is being developed. I think that is still a big challenge and we need to do more about this. And I think this kind of networks and science diplomacy and the kind of channels that we’re creating will try to work towards reducing those asymmetries, especially about the kind of technological development that we have. And we need to take policymakers and decision makers from all over the world and show them the technology. So if we’re talking about quantum technology, what is quantum technology? Where is it? How do you try to experience more of it? If we’re talking about the most advanced AI systems, where are those? How can we bring policymakers from different parts of the world to get closer to these systems and understand more of what they’re doing? So trying to do that, working actively on doing that, bringing people together and to bring them also to the science part and to the technical developments. It’s something that I think we need to continue to work. And again, reducing those information asymmetries is of the essence if we really want to have an inclusive and sustainable future and technological future. And of course, to build policies that are also sustainable in the long term. So that will be my call to action.

Sofie Schonborn: Thank you. Turning over to our speakers in the room who have an eye on the clock. Maybe just go one by one.

Maricela Munoz: Thank you, Sophie. Well, I think that is no secret that we live in difficult times. Polarization, fragmentation, geopolitical tensions, transformation of the world order. So I think that we need to together defend the trust in science. We have been talking about evidence based policymaking, but also action. and also this anticipatory governance outlook, making sure that we prepare, that we democratize access to science and to knowledge, which has also been mentioned, so that we can all co-create the futures that we desire, respecting the values that we want to uphold. And I think that that will be my call to action, trust in science and anticipatory science, diplomacy and governance. Thank you so much.

Isobel Acquah: I think for me, you know, at the moment, I think you can look at Africa’s governance, AI adoption and governance as a ripple, but actually it’s a wave. I think it’s important that we work together to actually ride the wave and not get crushed by it. Africa is going to be not just a consumer market, but a lot of innovation is going to come from the content. A lot of data is needed from the continent when you look at things like the data we need to feed climate AI models. And so I think it’s important that we look at really innovative structures, this multi-stakeholder engagement and learning from each other. Like Armando was saying, I think you’ve got to bring the policy people to the tech people and make sure they actually understand. You cannot regulate what you don’t understand. And I think that’s a big, big gap, and that can be filled when you have true multi-stakeholder engagement.

Víctor Munoz: I would like to emphasize in the call to action that it is important to trust in science because if we are at this moment in a polarization, we are having a complex situation in terms of geopolitics. It is important to believe. It is important to believe in science. And it is important to have alternative challenge to have conversation between different regions. At this moment, for any reasons, we are having a different situations in terms of geopolitics agendas, but we can continue having the conversation through science. And that is my call to actions.

Jan Gerlach: My call to action would be think of Wikipedia before making decisions about the Internet, but more also work with your local volunteer communities who collect and build knowledge. Many of them are researchers themselves, they’re scientists, they’re experts in other fields and they know what’s needed locally.

Lucien M. CASTEX: And it’s always complicated to be last. I think having a forward-looking view beyond 2025, what do we actually want out of Internet, out of the multistakeholder governance model, what do you want to do with it? And navigating Internet governance actually requires multistakeholder dialogue. We can completely see it, but also a need to showcase concrete examples and successes of that multistakeholder collaboration. And for that, we need to actually work with each other. For example, AFNIC, we collaborate with, obviously, the Centre of Internet and Society in France, and in the Internet and Regulation Research Group to try to foster research and collaborative projects. Last example is a publicity kind of… We have a post-quantum report that we do with I3C, with its dynamic coalition at the IGF, to try to inform the global debate. That’s my two cents.

Sofie Schonborn: Thank you very much. And thank you to all of the speakers and the audience, the speakers especially, in keeping their times and sharing such valuable and interesting perspectives. This whole session leaves me with an outlook that we have lots of things to do, but actually that we can do things and can contribute to ongoing governance discourses and actually implementing actionable outcomes and projects. I look forward to the collaboration with all of you, and thank you so much for joining. And thank you, Sofie.

Agreement points

Multi-stakeholder collaboration is essential for effective digital governance

Speakers

– Sofie Schonborn
– Maricela Munoz
– Armando Guio
– Isobel Acquah
– Jan Gerlach
– Víctor Munoz
– Lucien M. CASTEX

Arguments

Science diplomacy has existed for centuries through collaborative platforms, with IGF as a perfect example of multi-stakeholder collaboration

Academic networks can work as policy bridges connecting experts with policymakers across different countries and regions

Non-traditional actors are more nimble and can collaborate more seamlessly than traditional channels

Civil society and technical communities must engage to ensure policy spaces remain open for multi-stakeholder approaches

Colombia’s AI expert mission demonstrated successful science diplomacy through multi-stakeholder collaboration with development banks and international experts

Multi-stakeholder model requires diversity of viewpoints and broader participation including local and regional processes

Summary

All speakers emphasized the critical importance of multi-stakeholder approaches in digital governance, highlighting various successful examples and the need for diverse participation across government, academia, civil society, and technical communities.

Topics

Interdisciplinary approaches | Capacity development | Human rights principles

Cross-border collaboration and knowledge sharing are crucial for addressing global technological challenges

Speakers

– Nele Leosk
– Armando Guio
– Isobel Acquah
– Maricela Munoz

Arguments

Co-creation across sectors and borders needed, as problems and solutions are similar globally

World is moving toward fragmentation and localization, requiring continued international engagement beyond borders

Africa’s challenges in research capacity and infrastructure represent opportunities for global collaboration and knowledge sharing

Anticipation is crucial ingredient for strengthening collaborative platforms in era of accelerated technological development

Summary

Speakers agreed that global technological challenges require international collaboration and knowledge sharing, with several emphasizing that countries face similar problems that could benefit from shared solutions.

Topics

Interdisciplinary approaches | Capacity development | Digital access

Evidence-based policymaking requires bringing policymakers closer to technological developments

Speakers

– Armando Guio
– Isobel Acquah
– Maricela Munoz

Arguments

Reducing information asymmetries about new technologies by bringing policymakers closer to actual technological developments

Multi-stakeholder meetings bring together diverse actors including big tech, startups, policymakers, and regulators

Defending trust in science and democratizing access to knowledge for evidence-based policymaking

Summary

Speakers agreed on the importance of bridging the gap between technological development and policymaking through direct engagement and evidence-based approaches.

Topics

Capacity development | Interdisciplinary approaches | Digital standards

Similar viewpoints

Both speakers recognize that traditional diplomatic actors are still adapting to the technological landscape while emphasizing the need for continued international engagement despite global fragmentation trends.

Speakers

– Nele Leosk
– Armando Guio

Arguments

Technology diplomacy is still new to traditional diplomacy, with many diplomats finding themselves in unfamiliar roles

World is moving toward fragmentation and localization, requiring continued international engagement beyond borders

Topics

Interdisciplinary approaches | Digital standards

Both speakers advocate for peer learning and capacity building approaches that enable equal collaboration rather than hierarchical knowledge transfer, emphasizing the importance of building institutional capabilities.

Speakers

– Isobel Acquah
– Armando Guio

Arguments

Peer learning approach enables collaborative projects where institutions learn at same pace rather than hierarchical knowledge transfer

Network of centers helps generate capacities and increase relevance of members in national policy conversations

Topics

Capacity development | Online education | Interdisciplinary approaches

Both speakers emphasize the critical role of technical communities and civil society in maintaining open, diverse multi-stakeholder governance processes that include local and regional perspectives.

Speakers

– Jan Gerlach
– Lucien M. CASTEX

Arguments

Civil society and technical communities must engage to ensure policy spaces remain open for multi-stakeholder approaches

Multi-stakeholder model requires diversity of viewpoints and broader participation including local and regional processes

Topics

Interdisciplinary approaches | Cultural diversity | Human rights principles

Unexpected consensus

Development banks as science diplomacy actors

Speakers

– Víctor Munoz
– Armando Guio

Arguments

Development banks can act as supporters of science diplomats, connecting countries with global experts beyond traditional government channels

Academic networks can work as policy bridges connecting experts with policymakers across different countries and regions

Explanation

The consensus on development banks playing a role in science diplomacy is unexpected because these institutions are traditionally focused on infrastructure development rather than knowledge diplomacy. This represents an innovative expansion of their role in global cooperation.

Topics

Capacity development | Sustainable development | Interdisciplinary approaches

Non-traditional actors being more effective than traditional diplomatic channels

Speakers

– Nele Leosk
– Isobel Acquah
– Jan Gerlach

Arguments

Technology diplomacy is still new to traditional diplomacy, with many diplomats finding themselves in unfamiliar roles

Non-traditional actors are more nimble and can collaborate more seamlessly than traditional channels

Civil society and technical communities must engage to ensure policy spaces remain open for multi-stakeholder approaches

Explanation

The consensus that non-traditional actors may be more effective than traditional diplomatic channels is unexpected, especially coming from speakers with government experience. This suggests a significant shift in how diplomatic effectiveness is perceived in the digital age.

Topics

Interdisciplinary approaches | Human rights principles | Capacity development

Overall assessment

Summary

The speakers demonstrated remarkable consensus on the importance of multi-stakeholder collaboration, cross-border knowledge sharing, evidence-based policymaking, and the evolving role of non-traditional actors in digital governance. There was strong agreement on the need for peer learning, capacity building, and maintaining trust in science during times of geopolitical tension.

Consensus level

High level of consensus with significant implications for digital governance. The agreement suggests a paradigm shift toward more inclusive, collaborative, and evidence-based approaches to technology policy. The consensus on non-traditional actors being more nimble than traditional channels indicates a fundamental change in how diplomatic effectiveness is understood in the digital age. This high level of agreement among diverse stakeholders provides a strong foundation for implementing collaborative science and technology diplomacy initiatives.

Different viewpoints

Definition of traditional vs non-traditional actors in technology diplomacy

Speakers

– Sofie Schonborn
– Nele Leosk

Arguments

Three dimensions framework: science in diplomacy, diplomacy for science, and science for diplomacy

Technology diplomacy is still new to traditional diplomacy, with many diplomats finding themselves in unfamiliar roles

Summary

Schonborn frames governments as traditional actors and others as non-traditional, while Leosk challenges this by arguing that governments themselves are still new to technology diplomacy and that private sector/individual players often have more power than traditional government actors

Topics

Interdisciplinary approaches

Unexpected differences

Role of development banks in science diplomacy

Speakers

– Víctor Munoz
– Other speakers

Arguments

Development banks can act as supporters of science diplomats, connecting countries with global experts beyond traditional government channels

Explanation

Víctor Munoz uniquely positions development banks as key actors in science diplomacy, describing how they moved beyond traditional infrastructure to support AI policy development. This perspective was not echoed by other speakers who focused more on academic networks, civil society, and technical communities as primary non-traditional actors

Topics

Capacity development | Sustainable development | Future of work

Overall assessment

Summary

The discussion showed remarkably high consensus among speakers, with most disagreements being subtle differences in emphasis or approach rather than fundamental conflicts. The main areas of difference were: 1) How to define traditional vs non-traditional actors, 2) Which specific mechanisms work best for collaboration, and 3) What institutions should play leading roles

Disagreement level

Low level of disagreement with high convergence on core principles. The speakers demonstrated strong alignment on the need for multi-stakeholder collaboration, evidence-based policymaking, and the importance of non-traditional actors in science and technology diplomacy. Differences were primarily tactical rather than strategic, suggesting a mature field with established consensus on fundamental approaches. This high level of agreement may reflect the self-selecting nature of the panel participants who are already committed to collaborative approaches to digital governance.

Partial agreements

Similar viewpoints

Both speakers recognize that traditional diplomatic actors are still adapting to the technological landscape while emphasizing the need for continued international engagement despite global fragmentation trends.

Speakers

– Nele Leosk
– Armando Guio

Arguments

Technology diplomacy is still new to traditional diplomacy, with many diplomats finding themselves in unfamiliar roles

World is moving toward fragmentation and localization, requiring continued international engagement beyond borders

Topics

Interdisciplinary approaches | Digital standards

Both speakers advocate for peer learning and capacity building approaches that enable equal collaboration rather than hierarchical knowledge transfer, emphasizing the importance of building institutional capabilities.

Speakers

– Isobel Acquah
– Armando Guio

Arguments

Peer learning approach enables collaborative projects where institutions learn at same pace rather than hierarchical knowledge transfer

Network of centers helps generate capacities and increase relevance of members in national policy conversations

Topics

Capacity development | Online education | Interdisciplinary approaches

Both speakers emphasize the critical role of technical communities and civil society in maintaining open, diverse multi-stakeholder governance processes that include local and regional perspectives.

Speakers

– Jan Gerlach
– Lucien M. CASTEX

Arguments

Civil society and technical communities must engage to ensure policy spaces remain open for multi-stakeholder approaches

Multi-stakeholder model requires diversity of viewpoints and broader participation including local and regional processes

Topics

Interdisciplinary approaches | Cultural diversity | Human rights principles

Key takeaways

Science and technology diplomacy involves three key dimensions: science in diplomacy (using scientific knowledge to inform policy), diplomacy for science (using diplomatic tools to support scientific cooperation), and science for diplomacy (using science as soft power for international relations)

Non-traditional actors (academia, civil society, technical communities) are increasingly important in digital governance as they are more nimble and can collaborate more seamlessly than traditional diplomatic channels

Academic networks serve as crucial policy bridges, connecting experts with policymakers across different countries and regions while providing evidence-based research to inform policy decisions

Multi-stakeholder collaboration is essential for effective digital governance, requiring diverse viewpoints and broader participation including local and regional processes

The open internet and digital public goods like Wikipedia depend on continued international cooperation and multi-stakeholder approaches to governance

Anticipatory governance is crucial in an era of accelerated technological development to prepare for future challenges and democratize access to science and knowledge

Successful examples like Colombia’s AI expert mission demonstrate that science diplomacy can produce concrete results through multi-stakeholder collaboration involving development banks, international experts, and diverse stakeholders

Resolutions and action items

Co-create solutions across sectors and borders, recognizing that global problems require collaborative solutions

Reduce information asymmetries by bringing policymakers closer to actual technological developments and ensuring they understand what they are regulating

Defend trust in science and promote evidence-based policymaking while democratizing access to knowledge

Apply the ‘Wikipedia test’ – consider the impact of policies on Wikipedia and digital public goods before making decisions

Work with local volunteer communities who collect and build knowledge, including researchers and experts in various fields

Showcase concrete examples and successes of multi-stakeholder collaboration to demonstrate the value of the model

Ensure the WSIS+20 review process is inclusive and open to stakeholder inputs from academia and technical communities

Continue building innovative multi-stakeholder governance structures that bring together diverse actors including big tech, startups, policymakers, and regulators

Unresolved issues

How to maintain multi-stakeholder approaches in an increasingly fragmented geopolitical landscape where countries are moving toward more national rather than international projects

How to ensure adequate representation and capacity building for underrepresented regions, particularly Africa, in global digital governance processes

How to balance the need for rapid technological development with inclusive governance processes that allow all stakeholders to participate meaningfully

How to scale successful science diplomacy models like Colombia’s AI expert mission to other countries and regions

How to maintain trust in science and evidence-based policymaking in times of increasing polarization and geopolitical tensions

How to ensure that the benefits of technological development reach all populations, particularly in regions with limited research capacity and infrastructure

Suggested compromises

Using development banks as intermediaries and supporters of science diplomats to connect countries with global experts, expanding their role beyond traditional infrastructure projects

Creating loose networks and institutionalized information-sharing mechanisms that balance formal diplomatic channels with more flexible multi-stakeholder engagement

Implementing peer learning approaches rather than hierarchical knowledge transfer systems to ensure more equitable collaboration between institutions from different regions

Establishing regional and local Internet governance forums alongside global processes to enable broader participation while maintaining global coordination

Combining traditional diplomatic approaches with innovative governance structures that can adapt more quickly to technological changes

I’m actually wondering whether governments are already traditional actors in technology diplomacy, because the role of technology is still quite new, I would say, to traditional diplomacy… many diplomats actually find themselves in a rather new role in these current times, when private sector, and I would say even individual players, have so much power that often we see that they have more power than actually these traditional actors as governments.

Speaker

Nele Leosk

Reason

This comment fundamentally challenged the framing premise of the entire discussion by questioning the binary between ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ actors. It revealed that even supposedly traditional diplomatic actors are actually newcomers to tech diplomacy, and highlighted the power shift where private actors now often have more influence than governments.

Impact

This reframing set a more nuanced tone for the entire discussion, moving away from a simple traditional vs. non-traditional dichotomy to a more complex understanding of evolving roles and power dynamics in tech diplomacy. It influenced subsequent speakers to focus more on collaboration and adaptation rather than replacement of traditional structures.

We’re living in an era of accelerated change and we need to be able to anticipate what’s coming next… anticipation is that ingredient because we’re living in an era of accelerated change.

Speaker

Maricela Muñoz

Reason

This introduced the crucial concept of anticipatory governance as a missing ingredient in current science diplomacy approaches. It shifted focus from reactive to proactive governance, emphasizing the need to prepare for future technological developments rather than just respond to current ones.

Impact

This concept of anticipation became a recurring theme throughout the discussion, with multiple speakers referencing the need for forward-looking approaches. It elevated the conversation from discussing current collaboration models to thinking about future-oriented governance structures.

Academic networks can work as policy bridges… we are a bridge between some academic experts and policymakers… colleagues in Oslo are contributing to colleagues in Colombia and to policymakers in Colombia… or colleagues in Singapore are helping other colleagues in Africa.

Speaker

Armando Guío

Reason

This introduced a concrete operational model for how non-traditional actors can function in science diplomacy – as ‘policy bridges’ that create unexpected cross-regional collaborations. It provided a practical framework for understanding how academic networks can transcend traditional diplomatic channels.

Impact

This concept of academic networks as policy bridges influenced subsequent speakers to provide concrete examples of their own bridging activities. It moved the discussion from theoretical concepts to practical implementation models, with speakers like Isabel and Victor providing specific case studies.

These challenges are really an opportunity for us to collaborate… when you think about the fact that the global population will be one in four African, it becomes an international obligation, right? So we have to think as an international body, how do we make sense of that?

Speaker

Isobel Acquah

Reason

This reframed Africa’s technological challenges not as problems requiring aid, but as global opportunities requiring collaboration. The demographic projection created urgency and transformed the discussion from charity-based thinking to strategic partnership thinking.

Impact

This perspective shift influenced the tone of subsequent discussions about global cooperation, moving away from traditional donor-recipient models to more equitable partnership frameworks. It reinforced the theme of mutual benefit in international collaboration.

We ask everyone, including non-traditional actors, all stakeholders, to really consider the impact of any actions, of policies, of regulations on Wikipedia before making decisions… If policies and actions are bad for Wikipedia, they harm the open internet and many digital public goods.

Speaker

Jan Gerlach

Reason

This introduced a practical, actionable tool – the ‘Wikipedia test’ – that transforms abstract concepts about open internet governance into a concrete decision-making framework. It provided a tangible way for policymakers to evaluate the broader implications of their decisions.

Impact

This practical tool stood out among more theoretical discussions and provided a concrete takeaway for participants. It demonstrated how organizations can contribute specific methodologies to the broader science diplomacy toolkit, influencing the moderator’s final reflection on ‘actionable outcomes.’

We had a real strategy and we implemented that strategy into the country… signed diplomacy doesn’t remain confined to policy papers. It creates concrete tools, infrastructure, and institutional capacity.

Speaker

Víctor Muñoz

Reason

This emphasized the critical distinction between theoretical policy work and actual implementation, challenging the field to move beyond academic exercises to create tangible outcomes. It provided evidence that science diplomacy can produce measurable results.

Impact

This focus on implementation and concrete results influenced the final discussion toward actionable outcomes rather than just collaborative processes. It validated the practical potential of the approaches being discussed and encouraged other speakers to emphasize tangible results in their closing remarks.

Overall assessment

These key comments fundamentally shaped the discussion by challenging initial assumptions, introducing practical frameworks, and emphasizing implementation over theory. Nele’s opening reframe moved the conversation away from a simple traditional vs. non-traditional binary toward a more nuanced understanding of evolving roles. Maricela’s emphasis on anticipation and Armando’s policy bridge concept provided concrete frameworks that subsequent speakers built upon with specific examples. Isobel’s reframing of challenges as opportunities and demographic imperatives shifted the tone toward equitable partnerships rather than aid relationships. Jan’s Wikipedia test and Victor’s emphasis on implementation grounded the theoretical discussion in practical tools and measurable outcomes. Together, these comments created a progression from conceptual reframing to practical implementation, culminating in the moderator’s final reflection on ‘actionable outcomes and projects’ rather than just collaborative processes. The discussion evolved from questioning basic assumptions to providing concrete tools and evidence for effective science diplomacy.

How can we better define and establish universally agreed upon definitions for science diplomacy and tech diplomacy?

Speaker

Sofie Schonborn

Explanation

The moderator noted that there are no universally agreed upon definitions for these terms, which creates challenges for establishing common frameworks and understanding across different stakeholders and regions.

How can governments adapt to the new environment where private sector and individual players have more power than traditional diplomatic actors?

Speaker

Nele Leosk

Explanation

This addresses the fundamental shift in power dynamics in tech diplomacy where non-state actors often have more influence than traditional government diplomats, requiring new approaches to diplomatic engagement.

How can we make global digital governance processes more accessible and less complex for private sector players and academia to follow?

Speaker

Nele Leosk

Explanation

The complexity of following processes like the Global Digital Compact and WSIS+20 creates barriers for meaningful participation by non-traditional actors who have valuable contributions to make.

How can we better integrate anticipatory governance approaches into science and tech diplomacy frameworks?

Speaker

Maricela Munoz

Explanation

In an era of accelerated technological development, there’s a need to move beyond reactive governance to anticipatory approaches that can better prepare for emerging challenges and opportunities.

How can we effectively reduce information asymmetries about new technologies between different regions and stakeholders?

Speaker

Armando Guio

Explanation

There are significant gaps in understanding of emerging technologies like quantum computing and advanced AI systems, particularly among policymakers from different parts of the world, which hinders effective governance.

How can we scale and replicate successful science diplomacy models like Colombia’s AI expert mission across different regions and contexts?

Speaker

Victor Munoz

Explanation

The Colombian case study demonstrates concrete success in implementing science diplomacy, but questions remain about how to adapt and scale such approaches to different political, economic, and cultural contexts.

How can we ensure multi-stakeholder approaches remain viable and effective in increasingly fragmented geopolitical environments?

Speaker

Jan Gerlach and Lucien Castex

Explanation

The open internet and multi-stakeholder governance models face threats from geopolitical tensions and fragmentation, requiring new strategies to maintain collaborative approaches.

How can we better prepare for Africa’s growing role as both a consumer market and innovation hub in global technology governance?

Speaker

Isobel Acquah

Explanation

With Africa’s population projected to be one in four globally, and increasing innovation coming from the continent, there’s a need to understand how to effectively integrate African perspectives and capabilities into global governance frameworks.

What concrete tools and frameworks can be developed to help policymakers better understand technologies before attempting to regulate them?

Speaker

Isobel Acquah and Armando Guio

Explanation

There’s a recognized gap between technological development and policy understanding, with calls for bringing policymakers closer to actual technologies and creating better educational frameworks.

How can we maintain trust in science and evidence-based policymaking in times of polarization and fragmentation?

Speaker

Maricela Munoz and Victor Munoz

Explanation

Current geopolitical tensions and polarization threaten the foundation of science diplomacy, requiring strategies to preserve and strengthen trust in scientific approaches to governance.

Summary

This open forum session focused on enhancing the role of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) through the upcoming World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) Plus 20 review and Global Digital Compact (GDC) follow-up processes. The discussion featured representatives from governments, international organizations, business, and youth communities sharing their priorities and strategies for strengthening global digital governance.

Government representatives emphasized the need to secure the IGF’s long-term future through renewed mandates, improved funding mechanisms, and enhanced inclusivity. Australia presented a non-paper proposing communities of practice and stronger connections between global, regional, and national IGF initiatives. The European Union advocated for meaningful multi-stakeholder participation, appointment of an IGF director position, and the establishment of an informal multi-stakeholder sounding board to support the negotiation process.

International organizations, represented by ITU, highlighted the importance of coordinated UN system-wide approaches to avoid duplication while building on WSIS’s 20-year legacy. They emphasized that existing WSIS frameworks could effectively implement GDC objectives through established multi-stakeholder platforms like the IGF and WSIS Forum.

The business community stressed the value of the IGF as an accessible forum for policy dialogue and called for greater stability through long-term mandate renewals. Youth representatives outlined four key priorities: digital inclusion, digital skills and literacy, safety and mental health, and meaningful participation in governance processes.

All participants agreed on the critical importance of maintaining the IGF’s multi-stakeholder model while addressing funding challenges and ensuring broader participation from underrepresented communities. The discussion concluded with calls for continued collaboration and bold, positive approaches to bridge digital divides and strengthen the IGF’s role in global digital governance.

Keypoints

## Major Discussion Points:

– **Strengthening the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) through WSIS Plus 20 and Global Digital Compact processes**: All speakers emphasized the need to secure long-term funding, extend the IGF mandate beyond the current 5-year cycle, and enhance institutional capacity through measures like appointing a director position and establishing better connections between global, regional, and national IGF initiatives.

– **Ensuring meaningful multi-stakeholder participation and inclusivity**: Participants stressed the importance of maintaining the IGF’s unique multi-stakeholder model while addressing barriers to participation, particularly for underrepresented communities, youth, and stakeholders from the Global South. This includes both financial support for attendance and structural mechanisms for inclusive decision-making.

– **Bridging digital divides and promoting digital inclusion**: Speakers highlighted persistent connectivity gaps (38% of African population lacks internet access, 189 million more men than women are online globally) and emphasized the need to move beyond coverage to focus on meaningful connectivity, digital skills, and capacity building programs.

– **Youth empowerment and intergenerational collaboration**: The discussion emphasized youth as digital natives and future leaders who need not just inclusion but co-ownership in digital governance processes, supported by mentorship, funding, and platforms that amplify youth voices in policy development.

– **Coordination and avoiding duplication across UN processes**: Participants discussed the need for streamlined approaches between WSIS Plus 20 review and Global Digital Compact implementation, with UN agencies coordinating through existing frameworks while building on 20 years of WSIS experience.

## Overall Purpose:

The discussion aimed to identify priorities and strategies for strengthening the Internet Governance Forum through upcoming WSIS Plus 20 review and Global Digital Compact follow-up processes. Participants sought to align different stakeholder perspectives (government, business, international organizations, and youth) on how to enhance the IGF’s role in global digital governance while maintaining its multi-stakeholder character.

## Overall Tone:

The discussion maintained a consistently collaborative and constructive tone throughout. Speakers demonstrated mutual respect and built upon each other’s points rather than presenting conflicting views. There was a shared sense of urgency about upcoming negotiations and processes, but this was balanced with optimism about the IGF’s proven track record and potential for growth. The tone remained professional yet accessible, with speakers acknowledging challenges while focusing on practical solutions and positive outcomes.

Speakers

– **Yoichi Iida** – Former Asset and Vice Minister at the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (Session Moderator)

– **William Lee** – WSIS Plus 20 Policy Lead for the Australian Government’s Department of Infrastructure and Communications

– **Philipp Schulte** – Representative from the Ministry of Education, Digital Transformation and Government Modernization of Germany

– **Maarit Palovirta** – Deputy Director General at Connect Europe (Brussels-based trade association representing European telecom operators)

– **Gitanjali Sah** – Strategy and Policy Coordinator, ITU (participating online)

– **Murillo Salvador** – Representative from Youth IGF and Swiss Youth IGF

**Additional speakers:**

None identified beyond the speakers names list provided.

# Summary: Enhancing the Internet Governance Forum Through WSIS Plus 20 and Global Digital Compact Processes

## Introduction and Context

This open forum session, moderated by Yoichi Iida, former Assistant Vice Minister at the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, brought together stakeholders to discuss strengthening the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) through the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) Plus 20 review and Global Digital Compact (GDC) follow-up processes.

Iida outlined the critical timeline ahead: “zero draft in August, second preparatory meeting in mid-October, first draft outcome document in November, final consensus in high-level meeting in December.” The session featured representatives from governments, international organisations, business, and youth communities sharing their priorities for enhancing global digital governance.

## Government Perspectives

### Australian Government Position

William Lee, WSIS Plus 20 Policy Lead from Australia’s Department of Infrastructure and Communications, presented Australia’s approach outlined in a non-paper, emphasising it as “a conversation starter, not necessarily the final outcome our government will support.”

Australia’s key priorities include:

– Creating “communities of practice” – collaborative groups bringing stakeholders together around specific topics to drive concrete outcomes

– Establishing systematic connections between global IGF and national/regional initiatives “so that all voices can be heard at all levels of the conversation”

– Focusing on “universal and meaningful connectivity as a critical priority,” particularly addressing the usage gap

– Prioritising youth empowerment, recognising that “youth empowerment is central as they are the future of the digital world and deliver unprecedented innovations”

### German Government Approach

Philipp Schulte from Germany’s Ministry of Education, Digital Transformation and Government Modernisation congratulated Australia on their non-paper and mentioned that Switzerland also has a non-paper. Germany’s focus centred on institutional strengthening and meaningful multi-stakeholder participation.

Key German proposals include:

– “Longer-term mandate renewal beyond the typical five-year cycle” for greater stability

– “Strengthening the IGF secretariat through appointment of a director position to improve leadership and coordination”

– Being “open-minded to have this discussion” about funding mechanisms

– Establishing an informal multi-stakeholder sounding board with “10 members of current MAG and leadership panel”

Schulte emphasised concerns that “stakeholder input might diminish as negotiations progress towards final stages” and highlighted Germany’s fellowship programme for young adults aged 18-30, achieving “little money with huge impact.”

## International Organisation Perspective

Gitanjali Sah, Strategy and Policy Coordinator for the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), participated online and positioned the Global Digital Compact as “a booster to the WSIS process, with WSIS architecture ready to implement GDC objectives through established multi-stakeholder platforms like the IGF and WSIS Forum.”

Sah provided key statistics demonstrating WSIS engagement: “WSIS Stocktaking Database has 2 million subscribers and 15,000 entries” and “WSIS prizes had record 972 submissions with 2.2 million words engagement.”

She emphasised that “digital inclusivity remains essential given that 38% of the African population lacks internet access and 189 million more men than women are online globally,” and stressed the importance of “deepening coordination through the UN Group on Information Societies to avoid duplication.”

## Business Community Perspective

Marit Palovirta, Deputy Director General at Connect Europe representing European telecom operators, highlighted the IGF’s accessibility for private sector engagement: “for private sector representatives, we come here much easier than we would go to formalised meetings at the ITU or the OECD.”

Her key points included:

– Implementation of meaningful connectivity “requires partnership between governments and private sector with clear measurement frameworks”

– Supporting “simplicity to enable meaningful stakeholder participation with limited resources”

– Advocating for “more stability at the IGF level to remove distractions” from mandate renewal uncertainties

## Youth Community Perspective

Murillo Salvador, representing both Swiss Youth IGF and “the global youth IGF network in 40+ countries,” outlined four key priorities: digital inclusion, digital skills and literacy, online safety and mental health, and meaningful participation in governance processes.

Salvador emphasised moving beyond basic inclusion, proposing “moving from guaranteeing access to enabling meaningful participation to eventual co-ownership in global arenas.” He highlighted that the Youth IGF network “already mobilises and educates youth across 40+ countries.”

Key youth priorities include:

– Ensuring “affordable, reliable, secure internet access especially for underserved regions”

– Developing “digital skills and literacy crucial for meaningful online engagement”

– Implementing “holistic digital well-being approaches”

– Creating measurable targets towards “youth-led accountability mechanisms”

## Areas of Consensus

Strong agreement emerged across stakeholder groups on several key areas:

### Multi-stakeholder Governance

All participants endorsed the multi-stakeholder approach as fundamental. Iida emphasised that “the IGF provides a unique venue for multi-stakeholder learning and equal participation across different stakeholder groups.”

### IGF Sustainability

Consensus existed on securing the IGF’s long-term future through enhanced mandates and sustainable funding, with support for longer-term mandate renewals and greater institutional stability.

### Youth Empowerment

All speakers recognised youth empowerment as essential, moving beyond traditional inclusion to acknowledge young people as current innovators deserving meaningful participation.

### Digital Divide Urgency

Participants agreed on the urgent need to address persistent digital divides, emphasising meaningful usage rather than just coverage expansion.

## Next Steps and Timeline

As outlined by the moderator, the WSIS Plus 20 process moves rapidly through 2024, with key milestones leading to the final high-level meeting in December. The discussion demonstrated strong stakeholder alignment on fundamental priorities for IGF strengthening.

## Conclusion

William Lee’s closing metaphor captured the current moment: “building a bridge” where “the hardest part is the moment before you connect the two parts, where both parts are teetering on the edge and there may be a storm.”

The session revealed remarkable consensus across diverse stakeholder groups on strengthening the IGF through enhanced mandates, sustainable funding, maintained multi-stakeholder approaches, youth empowerment, and addressing digital divides. This alignment provides a strong foundation for advancing IGF strengthening initiatives through the WSIS Plus 20 review process, building on the IGF’s 20-year track record of multi-stakeholder collaboration in global digital governance.

Yoichi Iida: Good afternoon. Thank you very much for joining us in this open forum session on enhancing the role of the Internet Governance Forum through global digital compact follow-up and WSIS Plus training review processes. So my name is Yoichi Iida, the former Asset and Vice Minister at the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications and we have excellent five speakers on my side, four next to me and one online. So thank you very much to all the panelists for joining me in this session and let me introduce quickly five speakers. First we have Ms. Marit Palovilta, if I pronounce correctly and Deputy Director General at Connect Europe. And second we have Mr. Murillo Salvador from Youth IGF. Thank you very much. And next we have Mr. William Lee from the Australian Government working at the Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications, Sport and the Art Ministry. You have a lot of work. And then we have also the government of Germany, Mr. Philippe Schutte from the Ministry of Education. Digital Transformation and Government Modernization of Germany Ms. Gitanjali Sarr, Strategy and Policy Coordinator, ITU Online . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . We will have zero draft in August, and we will have the second preparatory meeting in mid-October. And then the UN provides information that we will have the first draft outcome document in November, which needs to be negotiated to reach the final consensus in a high-level meeting on the sideline of General Assembly in the middle of December this year. So we have a very important process to come in front of us, and today I want to discuss how we can make our IGF even stronger and more robust through this negotiation, and what would be the point, what would be the priorities for us. And in particular, from the viewpoint of different stakeholders, and then how we can achieve those priorities. That is the major point of this session. So without further ado, I would like to ask questions to individual panelists. So the first question, having looked at the progress over the last one or two years, what are your priorities or targets in the coming WSIS Plus 20 review and global digital compact follow-up process? So I would like to first invite Mr. William Lee. Your government issued a non-paper, and what are the major points in the paper, and what do you think the Australian government wants to achieve?

William Lee: Thank you and thank you very much for having me. My name is William Lee. I’m the WSIS Plus 20 Policy Lead for the Australian Government’s Department of Infrastructure and Communications and many other things. As you mentioned, Australia only recently published a non-paper on the WSIS Plus 20 process, which sets out some of our objectives and some of the ideas that we think might be worthy of consideration and conversation. What I will say at the start is that we have put this out as a conversation starter. It’s not necessarily where we think the final outcome will be and it’s not necessarily the final outcome that our government will support. But what we have tried to do is understand what different parts of the global community see as important and taken through the evidence that exists, what are some of the ideas that could come forward. I think it’s probably prudent to start on the question of the Internet Governance Forum, given we are here in Norway at the moment. And I think one of the key things for us is to secure the long-term future of the IGF, both in terms of its function, its mandate, but also the resourcing that it needs to deliver. One of the key things that we hear time and time again is the question of inclusivity and how do we bring the tens of thousands of people, the hundreds of thousands of people that are interested in digital issues together. It’s obviously not practical that everyone comes to the global IGF, but what we have seen through the WSIS process over the last 20 years is some really, really strong national and regional initiatives emerge, youth IGFs emerge, other processes emerge. And one of the things that we would like to see is a conversation about how we start a cycle of conversation between the global IGF and these national and regional initiatives So that all voices can be heard at all levels of the conversation and nothing is lost in those processes We would love to see as many people as possible at the global IGF from as many different regions and stakeholders as possible And while we have some ideas about how we may be able to raise money to better support those that need it to be able to participate in some of these conversations We also recognize that there is a need to connect those conversations together So that no matter the resources and capability of each stakeholder We make sure that those voices are not lost in the process. I think other elements That are really important for us cultural and linguistic diversity. I think really valuable. I think Dealing with the online environment that we now face Really challenging, but I think really important. How do we provide a safe online environment? How do we address the questions around digital platforms? How do we strengthen information integrity online? I think the question of youth empowerment and engagement is really central I think Youth is the future of this digital world and they are delivering things that we would never have thought possible But how do we connect their voice at every stage of that conversation? How do we innovate? How do we encourage entrepreneurs? How do we support small and medium businesses engage with their online world? Of course universal and meaningful connectivity is really really important There is still a third of the world offline That is mostly a usage gap rather than and finally one of the things that I will say in the in the non paper that we have presented is this idea of communities of practice and the purpose behind that is really that question of how do we focus energy and effort from all parts of the community into problems that we know exist, challenges that we know are being articulated and digital gaps or digital divides that need to be closed and bridged and so one of the ways we think we can do that is through bringing together stakeholders around particular topics and issues for a time limited period to really focus in on particular issues and drive outcomes forward and the IGF as a institution is a really valuable way to bring all of those conversations together. I’ll pause there, thank you very much.

Yoichi Iida: Okay, thank you very much William for this very much comprehensive comment and also the stress on the inclusivity and also diversity which are two of the most important elements the IGF is realizing in this formulation. So thank you very much for the comment and now I would like to turn to Mr. Philip Schutte to talk about the viewpoint from probably European perspective. We have the kind of agreement on the informal multi-stakeholder sounding board and maybe that concept is also very important in your comment.

Philipp Schulte: Yes, thank you Yuichi. Thank you for having me, and also congratulations to Australia for this excellent non-paper. First people already were quoting the paper to me, so I think that’s already a success here. Congratulations. And indeed, as Australia and other UN member states were thinking about the process, I mean, way ahead already, before the Elements paper, which was published last Friday, came to us, the EU, I mean, the EU will negotiate as a whole, as a bloc in the UN system, was finding common positions already in the last month, and was also trying to come up with a positive approach and bringing some ideas in it. Indeed, the founding board was a non-paper by the EU and its member states, and we are really pleased to see that the co-facilitator took up the idea, and I mean, it’s not one to run translated, but I mean, it also was only a discussion paper from us, but we are really pleased to see that they took up the idea and, yeah, have started a call for application for MAG members of the current MAG and the leadership panel, and I think 10 members of the current MAG and the leadership panel will be in the founding board, and it’s completely informal, it’s not institutionalized, so it’s not a heavy bureaucracy, but it’s one mean for the co-facilitators to test some ideas, to exchange views, since being a co-facilitator can be a heavy burden, and it’s a lot of work for the delegations in New York, so I think that might be a helpful tool to support the co-facilitators. The origin question on priorities, I mean I totally agree with what William said, that are also, a lot of them are also priorities of German government but also of the European Union. Indeed, a key priority, and that doesn’t come as a surprise to you, will be the Internet Governance Forum and the meaningful stakeholder participation at the Internet Governance Forum but also through other Internet Governance processes. And one way indeed is, well one idea how to implement that is the sounding board. But speaking about the IGF, it’s like a renewal of the mandate would be awesome, but maybe we can even, yeah, dream a bit more and not only have a new rule for five years but maybe a longer long-term renewal. And of course, I mean that’s always the topic when we talk about the IGF, it’s a financial foundation of the IGF. We have some, I mean we did some good efforts in the last year, the leadership panel helped a lot in raising funds and I think we can build on that. And I think the voluntary funding is a good, I think it’s actually an asset of the IGF and we see that in the current budget crisis that is actually an advantage of the IGF that is voluntary funding and I think we should keep voluntary funding but we might also discuss if like part of the funding can be integrated in the UN budget. We are at least open-minded to have this discussion and we are also happy to receive ideas on this. And then, I mean, it’s not only about money but it’s also about people and ideas and here one thing which in our internal analysis about the IGF and the multi-stakeholder system is that we would like to have a stronger voice of the IGF and other multilateral organizations. but also another multi-stakeholder forum, and we think that one idea the EU will promote during the business forum is to strengthen the IGF secretariat in particular through appointment of a director position. So this existed in the past, but was then kind of forgotten because of budgetary constraints, but we think that could really strengthen the IGF and could create a better leadership. It would be easier for other UN agencies also to exchange with the IGF secretariat and so on. So these are priorities. Other priorities, of course, for the business is the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. We think that we could strengthen the role in the WSIS process since human rights issues and human-centric design of technologies will become more and more important with new topics coming up, and the EU will definitely advocate for that. And then the WSIS is not only about content, but it’s very much also about the process itself. And I mean, we have the sounding board now, but we also advocate for strong and meaningful multi-stakeholder participation through the whole process to the very end, and I think that will be also a top priority for us.

Yoichi Iida: Okay, thank you very much for those very insightful comments. And actually, the common position of EU is always making a lot of impact on the negotiation, in particular between the groups of countries, and I think the EU strategy will be very important for other like-minded partners. So now we have heard from two governments, and now I would like to invite Gitanjali online to ask about a kind of perspective of international organization. So Gitanjali, the floor is yours.

Gitanjali Sah: Thank you, Yoichi-san. Can you hear me? Yes, I can hear you loud and clear. Okay, good afternoon and apologies for not being there. In-person, I will be joining IGF on the 25th. We have our ITU council ongoing, so we have been quite busy here. So, of course, WSIS, like we heard before from Philip and William, is really digital cooperation in action. Currently, we work with more than 50 UN entities. If you would like a UN perspective, it’s really one UN in action looking at digital cooperation issues. And each one of us, based on our respective mandates, implement or co-implement different WSIS action lines. For example, ITU leads the facilitation of infrastructure, cybersecurity, capacity building and enabling environment. Similarly, WHO for e-health, ILO for e-employment. And you will see this beauty of the framework in the WSIS plus 20 action line assessments that the WSIS action line facilitators have made. And it’s available online on the WSIS forum page as well as the WSIS plus 20 review page. This is a valuable piece of document because it highlights the emerging trends challenges from the perspective of the UN agencies facilitating these action lines. So, we have taken this process, of course, very seriously, especially the key UN agencies involved. We launched a joint preparatory process in September 2022, actually, where we started designing a roadmap. So, ITU Secretary General has a WSIS plus 20 roadmap that we present to our membership. UNESCO has their WSIS plus 20 roadmap that they will present to their governing body and so does the CSTD. This preparatory process, of course, we had the annual session of the UN CSTD where the draft ECOSOC resolution was approved by member states. We had the UNESCO conference and we will soon have the ITU and other UN agencies WSIS forum and, of course, IGF with UNOTAB right now. So, we saw the commitment of ITU’s membership during the ITU Council, which is ongoing right now. We presented the WSIS documents where they actually showed the commitment towards not only what we’ve achieved in the 20 years, but also the future of the WSIS process. William, congratulations for the Australian paper and Switzerland also has a non-paper on WSIS plus 20. Very good documents and the WSIS cofacts came up with the elements paper. Also appreciate that, but of course, we will be providing our feedback also in the sense that important multi-stakeholder platform like WSIS forum is missing from the paper. So, we will be providing our feedback on it as well. So, in terms of the priorities, Yoichi Iida, we look at, of course, digital inclusivity, bridging the digital divide. It’s really unacceptable that 38% of the African population only has access to the internet. Thank you very much. Thank you. Remain with 189 million more men online than women globally. Rural populations, of course, this appropriately affected as well. And capacity building skills training with the evolution of technology, we really have to ensure that digital skills and capacity building tools and knowledge are in place for people. Of course, for our priorities, the multi-stakeholder framework, it remains one of the key successes of WSIS, where we have been working together to address the complexities of the digital world. As part of the WSIS plus 20 review, it’s also essential to highlight and strengthen the role of the Internet Governance Forum for Global Digital Governance Services Forum for grassroots development. Both have been essential in crystallizing dialogue and developing concrete outcomes. The WSIS Stocktaking Database, which has more than 2 million subscribers and 15,000 entries, really remains a vital tool for capturing real digital impact. And these are the WSIS regional and national initiatives which have been inputted by the stakeholders on their own. Every year, we have a call for action to update the projects. And the WSIS prizes, we had a record number of submissions this year, 972, with an increased global engagement of 2.2 million words. So this really shows the real enthusiasm and the commitment that the stakeholders have towards all of these processes. Of course, we would like to say, Yoichi Iida, that the WSIS framework has evolved with the evolution of technology because the action lines have provided a great framework. With respect to the GDC, we look at it as a booster to the WSIS process. And we, the UNGIS group, the United Nations group, came up with a matrix that maps the GDC objectives with the WSIS action lines and the WSIS process in general. And it really shows that we are already implementing the objectives of GDC. And we stand ready, as the CSTD ECOSOC resolution mentioned, that the WSIS architecture stands ready to implement the GDC objectives. I’ll end by saying that WSIS has focused on building adaptive governance processes and can keep pace with rapid evolution of technology. And we need to ensure that we have a very dynamic process so that we can evolve and meet the challenges and opportunities presented by new technologies. Back to you, Yoichi Iida.

Yoichi Iida: Thank you very much, Gitanjali-san, for the very insightful comment. And also, the UN negotiation and discussion process is always complicated. And even for us, government officials, your formulation and organization of the different elements and the existing resources is quite useful for us. So thank you very much. And we fully agree to the point made by Gitanjali and also Philippe, and the inclusivity and the meaningful participation of stakeholders is critically important. In particular, when we look back at the process of GDC negotiation last year. So now I would like to invite Marit, Ms. Marit Palavista, for your priorities from the business perspective.

Maarit Palovirta: Thank you very much, and thank you for the kind invitation to be part of this panel today. So, my name is Marit Palavista, I’m the Deputy Director General at Connect Europe. And for those who don’t know us, we are a Brussels-based trade association and we represent the European telecom operators. So our members invest a lot in telecoms. to telecom operators. And so you might ask what is the benefit of the multi-stakeholder model for us specifically and also of the IGF. So I think that to give you an answer, so first of all I think our members they drive really the digital transformation not only of the European continent but also beyond. So some of our largest members are present in Africa, in Asia, in Latin America and of course providing connectivity services. And connectivity services are today running on open and global IP protocols and the whole technical foundation that is still very solid and firm is very important for operators to be able to provide these interoperable and connectivity services. And of course this process is firmly backed up by the multi-stakeholder model and has been so for quite some time. So that’s a very clear benefit for us. The second benefit is more than in the area of policy and specifically the IGF. So we believe that the IGF and in general the internet governance sphere is very important for aligning common principles for different policy issues. And for us this is really more about policy shaping than about policy making. So of course laws are made in our case in Europe but this global forum really allows us to exchange with different stakeholders and also to understand and learn what’s going on in the world. And in many ways I think one of the benefits of the IGF is that it’s so inclusive and open that for a private sector representative like ourselves we come here much easier than we would perhaps go to I don’t know some of the formalized meetings at the ITU or the OECD. And just for your information we are a sector member of the ITU as well and also part of the OECD BIAC but in terms of time spent and resources the IGF seems to be an easier forum for us to engage. And just for the priorities on the WSIS plus 20. So this is of course something that governments are hands-on negotiating but we are very firmly calling for the continuation of the IGF mandate and very much for the reasons that I just mentioned. We believe that this is truly an invaluable forum to promote the multi-stakeholder engagement and to discuss the different policy issues. And then in which shape or form we know very well that there’s issue with budgeting that also the let’s say the stability or the exact form and shape is still under discussion. So we are exchanging on these and liaising at the regional level with our policymakers and also then hoping to have our voice heard in the discussions which we of course cannot really attend and also due to resourcing issues it is challenging. On the GDC priority it is very important for us that the implementation will be of course a success and we would be also supportive of including the multi-stakeholder approach or different stakeholders in the implementation phase. And I think for example for our sector so we have meaningful connectivity as part of the GDC framing and of course it is very important for us to understand then how will this be measured and what are we in the end expected to do because the implementation will happen as a partnership between governments and private sector also of course of the not-for-profit in some cases. So again there the multi-stakeholder aspect is very important. I would also agree I think it was William who mentioned that when we talk about the implementation it’s not only about the coverage it’s also about the usage. So looking at this whole what is meaningful connectivity and taking a kind of ecosystemic point of view because also in Europe we see very well that today we have more coverage than we actually have uptake of the services. So maybe those are my introductory remarks on this important topic. Thank you.

Yoichi Iida: Okay thank you very much Marit for the comment and I cannot agree more to the point that IGF is so unique place where the different stakeholders meet each other on equal basis. And actually this is a very very important venue for the government officials to learn how we can work in multi-stakeholder approach together with other stakeholders. So thank you very much for the comment and now I would like to invite the youth representative Mr. Murillo Salvador.

Murillo Salvador: Thank you. Thank you very much. Yes I’m Murillo. I’m here representing the Swiss Youth IGF but also the global youth IGF which is a network of the youth IGFs in more than 40 countries and we of course have been organizing national regional events. We have been developing capacity building programs and policy consultations to represent this youth voice that as you said is extremely important because youth brings fresh perspective. The youth are digital natives so they have this know-how sometimes that we. Director-General, IGF Youth Inclusion is not just optional, it is essential. If we focus on the future role of the IGF, we can propose four priorities, which are not just principles for us, but should be ideally measurable targets towards a youth-led accountability mechanism for these four principles. Our first principle, digital inclusion, is crucial to ensure that we have affordable, reliable, secure access of the Internet for all, especially in underserved regions. And here we can, of course, cross this notion with the global majority and youth in the global majority. Digital skills and literacy, that’s our first principle. Second principle, my apologies, and here we highlight the competencies to meaningfully engage online, so not only have access, but also have the capacity to meaningfully engage in the digital economy, to understand technology from a critical point of view, so as to develop that digital citizenship, which is essential, looking forward into the future. Our third principle, I’d like to highlight here, concerns safety and mental health, a huge issue now, of course, increasingly important now. So addressing the harms that are caused by mental health, addressing the disinformation online, and developing this holistic idea of digital well-being is crucial for an organization like the IGF, thinking into the future. And the fourth principle that I want to put forward here is the participation in the governance, which is the final step, so ensuring that these formal mechanisms to contribute and to co-create the policies that, of course, being here myself is part of that, but it’s much broader than that, and that’s our first priority. Thank you.

Yoichi Iida: Okay, thank you very much to all five speakers for your very, very insightful and also the forward-looking comments, and also the very strategic priorities. So, having heard from all of you about your priorities and the targets in the process coming, such as WSIS Review, and also GDC follow-up. How do you think those priorities and the targets can be achieved and what is your strategy? What would you recommend to governments who work in the negotiations and also what do you recommend to maybe DESA or UN people on how to ensure the meaningful participation in the process? So first on this question, let me invite Gitanjali online for your opinions on the proposals and recommendations on how to achieve those priorities.

Gitanjali Sah: Thank you, Yoichi-san. So of course from our side, you know, from the UN perspective the follow-up will require a coordinated, inclusive and action-oriented strategy and really from what we hear from all stakeholders is that we should have a lot of ambition to ensure that all those priorities can be achieved. So our approach is anchored in the WSIS legacy which puts people at the center of digital transformation, promotes multi-stakeholder cooperation and builds agile governance for the future. We do know that we have to be agile to be able to evolve with the changing technologies. So we will deepen our coordination through the United Nations Group on Information Societies, ensuring that there is no duplication and that we are working in sync based on each other’s mandates and priorities to ensure that we have a UN system-wide digital and all these actions are aligned and they’re complementary. We do know that there are a lot of restrictions in of course resources right now, so we have to be sure that we don’t duplicate and then we complement each other. Of course from our side as UN agencies we really feel that we need to continue to build on the platforms of the Internet Governance Forum and the WSIS Forum to ensure that they’re able to provide wider consultations. So we have these open consultation processes where we are able to gather views and inputs of all stakeholders so that we can build these programs, the agendas and really to shape policy as one of the speakers mentioned before me as well. And also representation of the grassroots and the under-represented stakeholders. So really the importance of these platforms to be able to provide all these inputs from different communities. Then digital transformation really was must work for everyone. So to be able to prioritize digital skills and capacity building we need to highlight the action line on capacity building. So ITU is currently leading the facilitation of it with UNDP and with many other UN agencies especially UNESCO, UNITAR and so on so forth. Also promoting local ownership and having like tailored local solutions capacity building program is really important for the success of any process like this as well. Some of you did mention for us it’s really important that we also have a measurable impact. Currently the WSIS action line complementing of course a complementary framework for WSIS and the GDC, avoid duplication and maximize synergies. The UN bodies that are involved in the WSIS implementation are already working on it and we think that we will be able to offer a tested and inclusive implementation model to deliver on the GDC commitment. So in summary, Yoichi-san, build on the 20 years of WSIS’ success, strengthen the multi-stakeholder partnerships and collaborations, mobilize digital cooperation across all levels, the UN at the national, regional and international level as well. Of course, regional commissions, we work very closely with them and to ensure that digital transformation advances equality and the internationally agreed development goals. Back to you, Yoichi-san.

Yoichi Iida: Okay, Gitanjali-san, thank you very much for the very concrete proposals and the comments and strategic viewpoints. In particular, the coordination inside the UN would be very important and that is one of the stressed points in the GDC negotiation last year. And also measurable indicators would be very important and that is something before us to do in the coming month. So having listened to these points and also representation would be very important in particular from the communities in the little bit less strong position. From that point of view, I would like to invite again Murillo on your opinion. How do you think your priorities can be achieved and what do you think the major roles of the youth community and how do you think you can materialize your priorities or how other communities or governments or other generations can help youth community take your role?

Murillo Salvador: Thank you for the great question. I’ll try to be concise. So a lot of this we’re already doing and this goes in the spirit of the GDC that refers to the WSIS outcomes as a foundation on which to build. And the youth IGF is already providing a good foundation that should be further supported, I think. So we have three points to answer your question. One is working on youth capacity, the second is working on youth voice and decision making, and third is promoting that international generation collaboration that you mentioned. So just to elaborate on each point very quickly, the first point, youth community roles here are important. So our youth community, the youth IGF in each national chapter, we are already mobilizing and educating and organizing the youth, already co-developing this policy recommendations and bringing them here and then translating back the outcomes to the local peers. So this is a work that we are already doing that we ask of continuous support as we think of the future. Second point, of course, thinking about youth voice and enabling that voice, everything goes back to funding. So funding the youth, funding us being here, of course, being able to speak here, but also more broadly our activities, we think about moving from guaranteeing access to enabling many from participation, as we have already mentioned, to a final, let’s say, ambition of having a co-ownership sort of ideal for youth in this global arenas. Now the third point, as I mentioned, generational collaboration is essential here. Mentorship, of course, providing these mentorship opportunities is something that we call for. Resource sharing from other communities to the youth communities, that’s essential too. As I mentioned, we have this financing. And then thinking about not just including us, but also being our allies and not just speaking for us, but opening the doors for us and letting us speak for ourselves. Because, as I mentioned, we already do this work of gathering input and formulating recommendations. So that’s all. Thank you.

Yoichi Iida: Okay, thank you very much. Very future-looking comments and also these are very important role of youth community. And we are discussing for the future of internet and the future of internet will be owned by the youth generation. So that is very important. And they talked about some support from other communities and also co-ownership. So having listened to these points and what is your view, Marit, from a business perspective? How do you think you can achieve your priorities and also how do you think business community can help other communities?

Maarit Palovirta: Yes, so thank you very much. On the goals of WSIS, I’m just, you know, I think I very much agreed with what also Gitanjali just said about not duplicating and being simple. So when we think about our participation, but I’m also thinking other communities. for stakeholders like ourselves to dedicate time and resources to to meaningfully contribute. So I think avoiding duplication and simplicity that would be really my number one. I also liked like the point I think Philip made it on on reinforcing the regional or the link between the regional initiatives and and the global ones. So we for example we very much work with the European Internet Governance Forum as well the EuroDIG and I think that you know for many communities who are maybe even who maybe even have less resources than ourselves you know they could use this regional event as a first kind of a base to go on and discuss an exchange and then there is a mechanism if there was somehow a clear link also to bring these messages to the global forum then that could also be very effective from from our point of view. And I think lastly and it was already mentioned and I also mentioned in myself so I think more stability at the IGF level that would you know I don’t know remove a lot of distraction. So now we every five years we’re discussing the process a lot simply because there’s a renewal of the mandate. So I think that some level of permanence and funding would really help us also then focus on the key policy issues at hand and really focus on the substance and and these important issues that we all need to exchange on. So I think those would be my three messages. Thank you.

Yoichi Iida: Okay thank you very much. We fully agree to the point in particular the simplicity or streamlining the discussion and so many emerging topics and policy items which we have to tackle for our policy for the future. So having listened to those views from different communities I would like to ask a government perspective from two speakers. So first I would like to invite probably Philip on your priorities and the understanding on how to achieve those priorities.

Philipp Schulte: Thank you. Just before to react on some of the points mentioned. First of all I actually think one of the main benefits is the engagement. The IGF and it’s even I would say it’s even for government easier to engage at the IGF level and I think that’s a huge benefit and that’s what also why we come here and present our strategies and our priorities because Here we actually get the input to make them better and to make them fit for the system and for for for the stakeholders So and then on on the second point When we talk about the IGF, we always like we need more funding and we need to extend but actually and that’s all true yeah, but Actually, it works out also pretty well. Yeah, and so the secretary is doing an amazing job. You and these are really committed and So we have this amazing conference yet last year an amazing conference in Kyoto. That was a major success So we have huge events which are always complicated to organize, but they are successful people come there There are a thousand people. They have a good time They have a great conference and I think we should value that and we should communicate that maybe better Yeah, so this is really conference if you want to discuss digital policy on an international or global level There’s no other conference such as the IGF and you really have to come here Yeah to discuss and to meet the people and I think that’s a great great value and maybe we should Be a bit better and communicated. So coming to back to our priorities I mean, I mentioned and there’s always month the money question we supporting the IGF, but we also supporting our Organization, but then it’s not on only about money. It’s also about people and ideas So what what we did in Germany as arm, so we saw that thought okay, we what can we do and what’s really low-key kind of easy thing to to to to support the community and We established a fellowship international digital policy for young young adults from 18 to 30 years and We support them to come to the IGF but also to other international and multilateral conferences such as the AI summit at the AI Action Summit and but also the CSTD. So we have 16 young people who are really eager to learn about the community and we help them to get engaged in the community. So we introduce them to people they might want to talk to. We pay the travel cost but also we explain what’s going on, how is the IGF, why should be engaged. And I think that’s compared to other government programs, little money with a huge impact and it really can help the community because these people now know how it goes, know the multi-stakeholder approach, know how the IGF was established, how the IGF works, how the community thinks and now they can find their own way in the community which is, even it’s very inclusive, is sometimes a bit difficult to approach the people who work in WSIS for 20 years, who are really experienced and you come in as a newcomer, I mean you might experience that better. But it’s sometimes a bit, even when I started my position I was a bit shy and didn’t know all the ideas before and so I think that’s really helpful and that can help not only the global, I mean not only the national IGF but also the regional IGF and also the global IGF in the end. And I will stop here since we have only four minutes left.

Yoichi Iida: Okay thank you very much and thank you very much for mentioning Kyoto IGF. Actually we learned a lot from Berlin IGF when we formulate the Kyoto IGF. So sorry for the management of time but last question, what is your strategy to achieve your priorities?

William Lee: Thanks very much. Look I’ll be very brief. I think what we are doing is building a bridge to cross those digital divides. Digital is complex. There are many, many different issues at the moment, and there are many, many experts who are really across different parts of that digital landscape. Second, I think as governments we need practical solutions. We are looking at problems, all of these problems together and looking towards the global community to show us how we can solve them. So if you have a practical idea, something that you would like the global community to consider, then that is something that we as governments want to hear. Thirdly, I think it’s really important to be bold and to be positive in what we’re thinking. The IGF is a testament to the positivity over the last 20 years, and its enduring nature regardless of what is happening outside of this conference venue is its success. And I think for it to continue to be a success, we need to continue to look at bold and positive ideas for the future. And then finally, we often talk about stakeholder groups in isolation. We talk about governments, civil society, technical community, business community, academia, youth. I actually think the IGF’s enduring value is its ability to bring all of those groups together and have conversations like this that cut across those stakeholder groups. And so I would only encourage those conversations to continue as we go forward for the next six months to continue to show the value that the IGF will bring. I said at the beginning that we’re building a bridge, and the hardest part about building a bridge is the moment before you connect the two parts, where both parts are teetering on the edge and there may be a storm or something.

Yoichi Iida: Thank you very much for the story. And so I understood, you know, this storm of WSIS Plus 20 review is coming, and our work to bridge, making the bridge has to be done. And that, in the end, the IGF will be even stronger. And the important thing is to continue our work without stopping and also learning each other. So I think time is running out, but I just want to take one question from the floor, if one of you have any questions to one or two or even more of the speakers. Do you have any questions? Is there any question online? Okay, I think the discussion was so clear that nobody has a question anymore. That makes us very happy, and thank you very much for the very active discussion. And actually, I myself learned quite a lot from the discussion from the speakers, and one of the most important learnings here is continue our work all together and keep learning from each other. And until not the end, but also connect the bridge, bridge the complete, and then we will have even more robust IGF beyond the WSIS Plus 20 review. So thank you very much for the discussion, and thank you very much for joining us to everybody on site and online. I hope this will be useful. some helpful learning for everybody and one of the things we learned here is let’s get a keep in contact and working together and the go beyond which is for us to any review so thank you very much and the session is concluded.