Analysis

Over the past five years, the OEWG’s discussions on threats have really grown—not just in length, but in depth. As the threat landscape evolved, so did the conversations. What started as fairly general discussions have now become much more detailed and specific, with nearly a quarter of recent sessions focused on threats alone. That shift shows two things: first, how rapidly cyber risks like ransomware, state-sponsored attacks, and now even AI-driven threats are expanding; and second, that states are getting more comfortable talking openly about these issues.

One standout achievement is how much more states are leaning into cooperation. What’s interesting is that they’re not just naming threats anymore—they’re using just as much time to talk through how to tackle them together. That’s a big deal. We’ve seen more proposals for joint responses, support for capacity-building, and collective action than ever before. It’s a sign that this forum isn’t just about pointing out problems, but about working toward solutions.

There’s also been progress in how states describe and understand threats. In recent sessions, they flagged some new concerns—like the vulnerability of undersea cables and satellite communication networks. That’s a big leap in recognizing the physical infrastructure behind the internet and the risks we might not have talked about much before. States also raised alarms about cyber incidents targeting critical sectors like healthcare, aviation, and energy, and added AI to the mix, with specific concerns about the data used in machine learning and the misuse of AI to power more sophisticated attacks.

All of this points to a maturing conversation. We’re seeing a more layered understanding of threats, which makes space for more tailored, effective responses. And that’s exactly what global cooperation on cybersecurity should be aiming for: staying ahead of the curve, together.

What’s next?

As we head into the final session of the OEWG, expect threat discussions to stay front and centre—more detailed, more action-oriented, and more grounded in real-world risks. That momentum is set to carry into the UN’s future permanent mechanism, which will likely include a dedicated working group on threats. This won’t be just another talk shop. It’s being designed to take a cross-cutting, policy-driven approach—bringing in technical experts and other stakeholders to focus on concrete steps that boost resilience, protect critical infrastructure, and strengthen global stability in cyberspace.

The trend is clear: more specifics, more cooperation, more solutions. Future discussions will be about connecting policy and practice—turning shared concerns into collective action. So while the OEWG chapter might be closing, the real work on threat response is only just beginning.

Andrijana Gavrilovic
Head of Policy and Diplomatic Reporting, Diplo

The OEWG 2019-2025 established itself as the main space for open and inclusive talks about responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, despite a tough political environment marked by big power rivalries, ongoing conflicts, and deep divisions. One of the key achievements was reconfirming and reinforcing the existing normative framework. States didn’t just reaffirm the 11 voluntary, non-binding norms — they also moved the conversation forward on the Chair’s proposed voluntary Norms Implementation Checklist, This checklist breaks down each norm in more detail, pointing out specific actions countries can take both nationally and internationally. It’s now attached to the Zero Draft of the OEWG Final Report. 

This shift from just setting norms to focusing on how to actually put them into practice is an important step. While the OEWG helped make this shift happen, many countries have already started applying the norms on their own, which shows these principles are becoming more embedded in real-world policies compared to five years ago. Sharing experiences—especially around protecting critical infrastructure and supply chain security—is growing, showing a real push to turn these norms into action. Even though the checklist is still voluntary, most agree it’s a helpful tool for being more transparent, supporting self-checks, and boosting accountability among countries.

Another important role of the OEWG was as a place to openly discuss the future of the normative framework. The group provided a space for countries to talk about whether the current norms are enough or if new, possibly legally binding rules are needed to handle new cyber threats. Although they didn’t reach an agreement on this, the OEWG allowed different views to be shared in a fair and inclusive way, highlighting the need for ongoing dialogue and cooperation.

The OEWG also made progress in setting up a more permanent way to continue this work, while recognising the important role of regional organisations, civil society, and other non-governmental stakeholders. The Zero Draft highlights these contributions and stresses the value of consultations between meetings. Most importantly, it lays the groundwork for a permanent institutional mechanism, showing strong political will to keep international cooperation on cyber norms going beyond 2025.

What’s next?

Looking ahead, the Zero Draft notes that countries are still divided on whether new or legally binding norms are needed. While we don’t expect a final consensus at the closing session, there’s clear support for keeping the conversation going in a structured way. The Chair has suggested creating thematic working groups under a future permanent mechanism. This could be a practical way to move forward, focusing on putting norms into practice while also allowing room to revisit the rules debate in a more focused,  issue-specific context. These groups could be key to driving implementation at national, regional, and sector levels, while also making sure multiple stakeholders can stay involved.

However, in an era where military instruments increasingly shape the resolution of international disputes, to what extent can these peacetime-negotiated UN cyber norms remain relevant and applicable? How can voluntary norms—developed through consensus and intended to promote transparency, restraint, and responsible behaviour—be upheld when geopolitical tensions escalate into open conflict? And how might states, but also stakeholders, continue to apply and interpret these norms to distinguish responsible conduct from destabilising behaviour, even when trust and cooperation are under strain? These questions lie at the heart of ensuring that the normative framework remains a meaningful tool for promoting international stability and accountability—especially when the rules-based order itself is being tested. 

Anastasiya Kazakova
Cyber Diplomacy Knowledge Fellow, Diplo

Between 2021 and 2025, the OEWG continued to explore how international law—especially the UN Charter—applies to how states use ICTs. These discussions got more detailed over time, both in substantive and intersessional meetings. One positive trend has been the growing number of national statements on how international law applies in cyberspace. Over 100 countries have now shared their views, along with inputs from other organisations, which helped enrich the debate (see paragraph 40(f) of the Zero Draft). These contributions gave countries a chance to share understandings of how international law applies to cyberspace and of the state responsibilities in the use of ICTs.

States largely agreed on some key legal principles. They reaffirmed that state sovereignty and related international norms and principles still apply when it comes to ICT-related activities. They also confirmed that core principles from the UN Charter—the principle of non-intervention, the prohibition on the threat or use of force, and the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention—remain valid and relevant in cyberspace.

What’s next?

Looking ahead to the final session, we expect some countries to push for the inclusion of international human rights law (IHRL) and international humanitarian law (IHL) in the Final Report. Even though these two areas were discussed quite a bit during this OEWG cycle, they’re currently missing from the international law section of the Zero Draft. Including them would also help ensure they’re part of the list of issues to be explored in any future discussions under the new permanent mechanism.

That said, one major divide still hasn’t been resolved: should there be a new, legally binding agreement on how international law applies to ICTs? This question continues to split the group, and that’s unlikely to change anytime soon.The proposal to create a thematic group focused on international law within the future permanent mechanism comes with its own set of challenges. Some countries might try to use this group to start negotiating a binding legal instrument. Others will likely resist that idea, which could cause the group to stall. As with the other proposed thematic groups, it will also be important to sort out who gets to participate—technical experts, legal advisers, policy practitioners, and others. So far, it’s unclear how non-governmental stakeholders will be involved, and some states remain sceptical about their role. There’s also a risk that dividing the work into multiple thematic groups could fragment the conversation, leading to siloed discussions rather than a holistic approach. And for countries with fewer resources, it may be hard to keep up across multiple parallel discussions, potentially giving more influence to those with larger delegations and greater capacity.

Pavlina Ittelson
Executive Director, Diplo US

Cyber capacity-building has remained a cross-cutting pillar of the OEWG’s ICT-security agenda, sustaining momentum even as global tensions have made cooperation more difficult. Over the past five years, three key achievements stand out. 

First, the launch of the Global Roundtable on ICT Capacity-Building in New York in May 2024 marked a big step forward. It was the UN’s first-ever event focused solely on this topic, bringing together governments, industry, civil society, and academia to share experiences, highlight good practices, and discuss what’s still missing. The strong support for making this roundtable a regular fixture shows a real commitment to keeping everyone at the table and recognising the important role of non-state actors in strengthening capacity around the world. 

Second, countries have worked to set up practical tools to deliver on capacity-building. A key example is the Global ICT Security Cooperation and Capacity-Building Portal (GCSCP), which has received wide support as a neutral, government-led platform to coordinate capacity-building efforts. Alongside it, a needs-based capacity-building catalogue was also welcomed, provided both tools are connected with existing efforts to avoid duplication. Together, they’re meant to help match countries’ needs with available support.

Third, there’s been progress on the financing side. A voluntary UN trust fund was proposed to help finance projects and support participation from smaller delegations. It was broadly welcomed and is expected to complement other funding sources like the World Bank’s Cybersecurity Multi-Donor Trust Fund and ITU mechanisms.

What’s next? 

The OEWG’s final session needs to turn these ideas into something that works in practice. That includes agreeing on how often to hold the roundtables, how they’ll be run, and how they’ll connect to whatever permanent mechanism comes next. The goal is to make them more than just another meeting—to turn them into a space where real progress is made.

For the GCSCP and the capacity-building catalogue, a phased rollout is likely, starting with basic modules, a document repository, a Points of Contact directory, mapping of states’ needs, and a calendar of events. More sensitive features—like a norms-tracker proposed by Kuwait or an incident-reporting tool—are likely to be delayed, given concerns from some countries about data sharing and potential politicisation.

The trust fund will need clear criteria for who can access it, how it will be monitored, and how to avoid overlaps with existing efforts. There’s still uncertainty about whether it will attract enough consistent funding to meet the varied needs of developing countries.

Finally, there’s still no agreement on how the future permanent mechanism should handle capacity-building. Some countries want a dedicated working group, while others prefer to integrate it into all relevant discussions. The OEWG has built the basic framework—now the task is to finalise the details and make sure cyber capacity-building stays inclusive, focused on real needs, and able to adapt to future challenges.

Salome Petit-Siemens
Master’s Student in International Security, Sciences Po

The launch of the Points of Contact (PoC) Directory in May 2024 stands, without a doubt, as the flagship achievement of the OEWG’s current mandate. Although the concept was first introduced in the 2021 OEWG report as one of the confidence-building measures (CBMs), the PoC Directory began to see real-world use by the end of the year 2024. Its operationalisation required active investment by the UN Secretariat, which organised the first system-wide ping test in June 2024 to verify the accuracy and responsiveness of entries. This was followed by a tabletop exercise planned for March 2025.

Another important milestone—closely tied to the PoC’s rollout—was the growing agreement on the need for a standardised communication template. At first, some states were hesitant, worried that it might make using the Directory too rigid or formal. But over time, the idea gradually gained traction. By April 2025, the Secretariat had circulated a draft template—an important step toward making communications between PoCs more consistent and efficient.

While not as visible, the globalisation of CBM practices has been arguably just as significant. Traditionally, CBM implementation was driven by regional organisations. However, 2024 witnessed a notable increase in cross-regional and multilateral initiatives, including global workshops, seminars, and training programmes. These efforts have contributed to a broader diffusion of CBM norms and practices beyond regional silos.

Yet, as we take stock of the OEWG’s progress over the past five years, one cannot ignore the gradual erosion of multistakeholder engagement in CBM discussions. As the OEWG approaches its final session, it is crucial not only to celebrate achievements but also to acknowledge areas where inclusivity and innovation have lagged behind.

What’s next?

The standardised template for PoC communication is likely to dominate discussions during the OEWG’s concluding session, especially given the Chair’s stated intention to include it in the final report.

The idea of integrating CBMs into the different thematic groups—something that’s part of the vision for a future permanent mechanism—was introduced in the last session. But most delegations seemed to prefer holding off on deep discussions until that mechanism is actually up and running. While spreading CBMs across different topics sounds good in theory, it also comes with risks. Moving these conversations out of their dedicated agenda item might risk politicising what has so far remained one of the OEWG’s most consensus-driven domains.

Ultimately, despite notable advancements, especially since 2024, the future of CBMs lies in their effective implementation, not necessarily future discussions at a global level. The next phase of development for the PoC Directory, in particular, hinges on actual use by states. Some key questions, first raised back in 2022, are still up in the air, including the precise scope of PoC functions. Only practice will provide answers to those questions.

Jenne-Louise Roellinger
PhD student in International Relations, Sciences Po

One of the biggest achievements of the OEWG has been getting broad agreement that we need a regular, ongoing space to talk about international cybersecurity. Even with all the geopolitical tensions, countries have managed to keep talking about how a future mechanism could look. In fact, the OEWG has shown that dialogue—even between politically divided countries—is not just possible, but necessary, and increasingly seen as something that should be institutionalised.

Right now, there’s still no agreement on what this future mechanism should be. Some countries want to continue with the OEWG, while others are pushing for a Programme of Action (PoA). To find a middle ground, the Chair’s Zero Draft suggests setting up a permanent UN-backed body that would hold annual meetings and run several thematic working groups. It’s a compromise aimed at keeping everyone on board while ensuring the process keeps moving. This setup recognises the need for continuity, but its design must remain politically and procedurally neutral to secure broad support.

Still, it’s unclear whether this proposal addresses the concerns of non-governmental stakeholders, who were excluded from formal sessions, despite repeated calls for transparency and inclusion. Although intersessional consultations offered some space for engagement, many in the civil society, the private sector, and the technical community expressed concern that their expertise and operational relevance were not adequately reflected in the negotiation process. 

What’s next?

If countries can agree on a final report, and we shouldn’t rule that out—especially given recent signs of cooperation between Russia and the US at the UNGA—it will likely support the idea of a permanent institutional mechanism, though maybe without naming it outright. That would give the UNGA First Committee a chance to adopt a resolution during its 80th session later this year that formally launches the new framework. Such an outcome would mark a major step forward. We could see continued work starting in 2026 through annual meetings, thematic working groups, and inclusive consultations, as the Chair has proposed.

But if consensus doesn’t happen, the Chair might release a final report that lays out where countries agree and attaches statements from states on where they still disagree. At the moment, three main positions seem to be taking shape. One group of states backs the PoA model—basically a single-track, more inclusive process with full multistakeholder participation. Another group wants to stick with the OEWG as it is now, including the accreditation-based model for stakeholder participation agreed in 2022. A third group is pushing for a government-only, multilateral setup focused on five thematic pillars: threats, norms, international law, confidence-building, and capacity-building. These states also express strong reservations about continued stakeholder involvement in future UN cyber discussions.

These disagreements—about what the institutional setup should be, what issues to cover, and how stakeholders should be involved—highlight how politically tricky these negotiations are. And they’ll likely shape whatever comes next after the OEWG ends. If the divisions continue, we might see competing resolutions in the First Committee, which would mean a vote—and that increases the chance of fragmentation and less overall support for any future mechanism. Some delegations have already warned against this path, noting that splitting resources across multiple tracks could stretch everyone too thin. Yet in today’s fractured geopolitical landscape, the risk of a divided outcome in cyber diplomacy is not just possible—it’s increasingly likely.

Anastasiya Kazakova
Cyber Diplomacy Knowledge Fellow, Diplo