Platforms’ Accountability to Strengthen the Digital Public Sphere – MT 04 2026

27 May 2026 14:00h - 15:30h

Platforms’ Accountability to Strengthen the Digital Public Sphere – MT 04 2026

Session at a glanceSummary, keypoints, and speakers overview

Summary

The discussion focused on platform accountability as a core issue for trust, democratic participation, and the design of the digital public sphere.[4][7][14][16-19] Chloe McDowell framed platforms not as neutral channels but as part of the architecture of public debate, arguing that their design choices shape visibility, credibility, and users’ agency, while raising the broader question of how to move from attention-optimizing systems to democracy-strengthening environments.[16-24]


Ilkka Rasanen argued that the context includes global democratic decline, heavy social media use among young Europeans, and the fact that social media has become a primary news source despite being optimized for engagement rather than civic discourse.[41-45][47-52] He contended that major platforms are highly profitable and therefore lack incentives to change voluntarily, so stronger enforcement of the EU Digital Services Act is needed, including more dissuasive penalties.[60-75] At the same time, he argued that debate should shift toward alternatives, including alternative social media, participatory democracy mechanisms, and civic tech designed specifically for democratic engagement and user agency.[76-88]


Asha Allen emphasized that platform use has historically included active civic participation, but current engagement-based business models can work against democratic debate.[92] She described the DSA as a framework combining hard rules for illegal content with due-diligence duties for large platforms to assess and mitigate systemic risks to fundamental rights, while stressing that enforcement is still catching up.[92] Allen argued that civil society is essential to making this co-regulatory model work through research, trusted flagging, evidence-building, and accountability of both platforms and regulators.[97-112] She also rejected the claim that regulation inherently stifles innovation and warned that AI tools embedded into platforms should not be rapidly deployed without evidence, testing, and rights safeguards.[113-127]


Cesare Pitea presented the Council of Europe’s new recommendation on online safety and empowerment, stressing that platform regulation should not oppose safety to freedom but should expand transparency, accountability, and meaningful user agency.[142-149] He said the recommendation shifts attention from content regulation to systemic responsibilities, including human-rights-by-design, transparency around algorithms and moderation, due process, researcher access, and support for collective user action.[151-186] In the debate, participants reinforced calls for public-interest and open infrastructures, user choice over recommender systems, safeguards against addictive and AI-driven design, and stronger protection of cognitive autonomy, especially for young people.[198-203][215-219][290-301][399-415][439-449]


The session closed with a rough consensus that platforms now function as democratic infrastructure but were not built for civic purposes; that AI and recommender systems create growing risks to cognitive sovereignty; that stronger DSA enforcement and civil society participation are necessary; and that community-driven platforms and alternative democratic spaces should be supported alongside regulation.[493-512][515-518]


Keypoints

– Platforms were framed as core infrastructure of the digital public sphere, not neutral intermediaries: their design choices shape visibility, credibility, and democratic participation, while dominant platforms are optimized for engagement and profit rather than civic discourse. [16-19][49-52][201-208]


– A major theme was that regulation exists but enforcement is still weak and slow, especially under the EU Digital Services Act (DSA). Speakers argued that compliance must come before broader democratic aspirations, that sanctions need to be genuinely dissuasive, and that companies are actively resisting transparency and enforcement. [67-75][92-99][358-367]


– Civil society was presented as indispensable to platform accountability. Participants emphasized that civil society organizations help build evidence, act as trusted flaggers, support users in exercising their rights, and serve as co-regulatory actors alongside public authorities; multi-stakeholder cooperation was repeatedly described as essential for turning legal principles into practical governance. [97-112][175-179][239-257][425-436]


– The discussion highlighted user empowerment and cognitive autonomy as central concerns, especially in AI-driven environments. Participants warned that recommender systems, synthetic media, addictive design, and AI chatbots can narrow perception, manipulate behavior, and erode cognitive sovereignty; proposed safeguards included meaningful user control, provenance signals, algorithmic transparency, testing before deployment, and stronger protections for minors and vulnerable users. [20-23][122-127][149-174][217-219][290-301][399-415][440-449]


– Many speakers argued that accountability should not rely only on reforming dominant platforms; public-interest alternatives and democratic digital infrastructure are also needed. Suggestions included supporting alternative social media, civic tech, public-interest platforms, open-source and federated ecosystems, and other participatory democratic tools beyond commercial platforms. [76-88][202-203][211-213][353-358][427-436][510-512]


The overall purpose of the discussion was to examine how platform accountability can better support democracy, trust, user autonomy, and human rights-moving beyond narrow content moderation toward systemic responsibilities, effective enforcement, user empowerment, and viable alternatives to current dominant platform models. [4-7][16-19][24-34][138-149]


The overall tone was serious, analytical, and policy-oriented throughout, with a strong concern about democratic decline, platform power, and weak enforcement early in the session. It also became more constructive and solution-focused as speakers and participants highlighted civil society action, user rights under existing law, and alternative platform models; by the end, the tone was cautiously hopeful and consensus-seeking. [40-75][91][124-127][353-358][395-397][488-517]


Speakers

– Florence Ranson – session opener; introduced the final stretch of the day and handed moderation to Chloe McDowell.


– Chloe McDowell – moderator; from Reimagine Europe.


– Ilkka Rasanen – EU Operations Lead at Citra; spoke from the perspective of the Finnish Innovation Fund / public sector think tank.


– Asha Allen – Director for Europe and Secretary General of the Centre for Democracy and Technology.


– Cesare Pitea – Legal Advisor at the Council of Europe.


– Francesco Vecchi – CVK Coordinator at Humans; co-focal point for the session.


– Denys Nazarenko – speaker intervening online; spoke from a city/government perspective and referenced Kyiv/Cities.


– Lilia Simonyan – participant; commented on implementation of regulatory frameworks.


– Giacomo Mazzone – participant; raised concerns about AI, search engines, and impacts on the media ecosystem; co-chair of the Policy Network on Meaningful Access (PNMA) [S19].


– Pari Esfandiari – participant; spoke about cognitive autonomy, recommender systems, and safeguards in AI-driven environments.


– Vittorio Bertola – participant; reflected on DSA enforcement, social media regulation, and AI-related manipulation risks.


– Sumeja Huskic – participant; raised concerns about algorithmically narrowed viewpoints and freedom of thought.


– On-site participant – unidentified on-site speakers during open debate; included youth participants discussing safety by design, regulation, and AI chatbots.


– Online participant – unidentified online speaker; represented Fediveriety / a European collective of digital activism researchers promoting open-source software.


– Murillo Salvador – rapporteur/reporter for the session; summarized the discussion and drafted the session messages.


Additional speakers:


– Julie Lubkin – from the Centre for Countering Digital Hate; called by the moderator but did not speak.


– Jaska – on-site participant; part of YouthDIG; spoke on regulation, accountability, and safety by design.


– Inej Ruki – on-site participant; YouthDIG participant and .pt fellow; spoke on cognitive sovereignty and risks of young people relying on AI chatbots as therapists.


– Peter Rechels – online participant from Fediveriety; spoke about open-source infrastructure and a European social stack.


– Adam Lam – on-site participant; representative of the Advisory Council on Youth in the Council of Europe and YouthDIG participant; asked about regulating addictive design and democratic governance of private algorithms.


Full session reportComprehensive analysis and detailed insights

The session was introduced by Florence Ranson as the final stretch of the day and as part of a wider event thread on trustworthiness and democratic accountability, before moderation passed to Chloe McDowell.[3-12] McDowell framed platform accountability as a structural democratic issue rather than only a technical or content-moderation problem.[14-24] She argued that digital platforms now form part of the architecture of public debate itself, shaping what is visible, amplified, rewarded, and treated as credible, and therefore shaping individual and collective cognition, autonomy, and democratic participation.[16-19] She stressed that the digital public sphere is where meaning is constructed, contested, amplified, and sometimes distorted, and asked how societies can move from attention-optimizing environments toward ones that strengthen democratic capacity.[19-24] She also referred to existing legal frameworks, including the Digital Services Act and recent Council of Europe recommendations, while insisting that users should not be seen as merely passive consumers; the key question, she said, is whether platforms expand agency or exploit and narrow it.[19-24] She introduced the session as a working discussion rather than a conventional panel and noted that Ilkka Rasanen would need to leave around five, inviting participants to put questions to him early.[24-37]


Ilkka Rasanen began by identifying four broad facts that, in his view, define the present context.[40-52] First, he said democracy is in global decline, with more than 70 per cent of the world’s population now living in autocracies.[41-43] Second, he pointed to the intensity of social media use among young adults, citing research from Finland, France, and Romania showing average use close to six hours a day.[44-46] Third, he said social media has become the main source of news and information on political and social issues for this age group, overtaking print and linear television.[47-49] Fourth, he argued that dominant platforms were not built for democratic discourse but for engagement and profit, and are designed to be at least somewhat addictive because that is commercially rewarding.[49-52]


Rasanen then cited very large quarterly revenues and profits for Meta and Alphabet to argue that the dominant firms are highly profitable under the current model and therefore have little incentive to change voluntarily.[52-65] On that basis, he said the first priority should be compliance with existing regulation rather than assuming platforms will start fostering democracy on their own.[66-69] He stressed that the DSA is still young and that, in his account, the Commission had imposed only one non-compliance fine so far, against X for lack of transparency, and that even this was being challenged in court and was not economically dissuasive for a company of that size.[68-75] He concluded that regulation must have genuinely dissuasive force if it is to change platform behaviour.[74-75]


Rasanen also argued that the debate should not focus only on reforming dominant platforms but on building alternatives.[75-88] He mentioned experiments such as Bluesky and other alternative social media efforts, while acknowledging uncertainty about their long-term success.[77-80] He said public authorities and major institutions should help legitimate such alternatives by using them in parallel, because alternative platforms cannot grow without visible institutional participation.[81] He then broadened the idea of alternatives beyond social media, pointing to citizens’ panels, initiatives, and civic-tech tools designed from the outset for democratic participation.[82-88] Such tools, he suggested, may reach wider audiences than physical deliberative formats and could help restore agency, ownership, and “cognitive sovereignty” or sovereignty of the mind, especially for younger generations.[86-88]


In response, McDowell thanked Rasanen for starting on a constructive note, observing that it is easy to diagnose the problem without discussing solutions, and said that his point about better enforcement led well into Asha Allen’s intervention.[89-91]


Allen opened with a generational question about life with and without social media and used it to argue that platform forms are fluid and that current business models have not been fixed “since the beginning.”[92] Drawing on her own Brussels policy experience, she recalled periods when platforms such as Twitter played important roles in civic mobilization, including around Me Too, Black Lives Matter, and disability and accessibility rights.[92] Her point was that platforms had previously enabled meaningful civic participation, but that there had been a shift toward business models centered on maximizing engagement.[92] She therefore challenged the idea of users as simply passive consumers and suggested that passivity is partly produced by the way platforms now structure and imagine their users.[92]


Allen then turned to the DSA as the main current regulatory framework.[92-97] She described it as an attempt to place into hard law what had previously existed in a looser co-regulatory environment influenced by international human rights standards.[92] She emphasized that the DSA is content-agnostic: it does not regulate content as such, but instead creates obligations around illegal content and due-diligence duties for very large platforms to assess and mitigate systemic risks to fundamental rights, including civic participation.[92] She also set out several concrete user remedies already available under the DSA: users can flag content that violates platform rules even if it is not illegal; if the platform disagrees, users can go to out-of-court dispute-settlement bodies paid for by the company; users are entitled to greater transparency around takedowns; and vetted researchers should gain more algorithmic transparency and data access.[92-97] At the same time, she said companies are resisting these obligations in practice, especially around researcher access and transparency, so the challenge is not only having rules but making practical use of them.[93-97]


Allen placed particular emphasis on the role of civil society.[97-112] She said civil society organizations build evidence, conduct research, act as trusted flaggers, and alert enforcers to emerging risks.[99-105] She noted that the DSA repeatedly refers to civil society because legislators intentionally built a co-regulatory model in which such actors help enforce the rules while also checking regulators and guarding against overreach.[105-110] She added that platforms are also supposed to consult civil society organizations and researchers when carrying out risk assessments, but said this possibility has not been meaningfully used in practice.[110-112]


Allen also rejected the claim that regulation necessarily harms innovation.[113-121] She called that framing a false dichotomy, pointing out that platforms remain profitable and widely used despite regulation.[114-117] In her view, if companies want access to the single market, they must respect rights guaranteed by international human rights law and the EU Charter.[118-121] In the final part of her remarks, she extended the discussion to AI, noting that many of the same companies behind social media harms are now embedding AI systems into their services, including through tools such as AI summaries in Google Search.[122-126] She warned against narratives suggesting that AI must be deployed without evidence of safety or rights-respecting safeguards.[122-126] She concluded by arguing that, in the EU context, the conversation should move from “platform accountability” as a vague aspiration toward platform compliance with regulation, while applying the same scrutiny to AI deployment.[124-127]


McDowell briefly reinforced the practical point that reclaiming autonomy also requires knowing what remedies and tools are available to users.[129-130]


Cesare Pitea then spoke from the perspective of the Council of Europe.[136-144] He insisted that the issues under discussion are not primarily about technology but about democracy and society, and introduced the Council of Europe’s new recommendation on online safety and the empowerment of users and content creators, adopted in April for the organization’s 46 member states.[137-144] He stressed that societies committed to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law should not artificially oppose safety and freedoms.[145-149] Nor, he argued, should they respond to platform power by giving control over the information environment back to states.[146-149] Instead, he said, the way forward is to use law and regulation to strengthen platform accountability, transparency, and genuine user agency.[148-149]


Pitea explained that the recommendation shifts attention from content regulation toward systemic responsibilities.[151-157] While it includes safeguards requiring legality, proportionality, and evidence when restricting content, its broader focus is on how platforms integrate human-rights responsibilities into their design and operations.[152-156] He said platforms should assess and manage human-rights risks and take responsibility for how their systems shape public discourse.[155-156] He stated plainly that self-regulation has failed and that independent regulatory authorities with effective powers are needed.[157]


He then described user empowerment as a central pillar of accountability and grouped the relevant duties into four areas.[158-180] First, he emphasized design duties: platforms should offer users meaningful control over their online experience rather than leaving them as passive consumers, and he noted that many users who have tried to flag problematic content know from experience how difficult even basic processes can be.[159-162] Second, he highlighted transparency duties, covering algorithms, moderation, and monetization, but also researcher access not only to data but to platforms themselves so that independent investigations and experiments become possible.[163-170] He observed that platforms are currently moving backward rather than forward on this point.[170-171] Third, he pointed to due-process duties, including meaningful notice, follow-up on complaints and moderation decisions, protection against dark patterns, and both internal and external avenues of dispute resolution, ultimately including court access.[172-174] Fourth, he emphasized collective action, saying that accountability requires support for organized forms of user action, from fact-checking groups to users’ rights organizations, because power imbalances exist not just between platforms and users but often even between platforms and regulators.[175-180]


Pitea also introduced an idea that the recommendation, as he put it, “very, very quietly” invites member states to explore: opening platform environments to a plurality of recommender and moderation systems for lawful content.[181-183] In such a model, users could rely on third parties to fine-tune their online environment according to their own language, values, and preferences instead of leaving all ranking and moderation choices to the platform itself.[181-183] He reiterated that both states and platforms should involve stakeholders in rule-making, service design, risk assessment, and mitigation planning.[184-186] He also warned against isolating online harms from wider social inequalities and knowledge gaps, and closed by inviting participants to contribute to a Council of Europe survey under the New Democratic Pact for Europe.[186-188]


McDowell responded that platform regulation should not be seen as contrary to user autonomy, but as something that can help create a more vibrant public space when users have greater say over the environments they inhabit.[190-197]


The floor discussion then developed along several themes. On democratic infrastructure and alternatives, Francesco Vecchi argued that democracy cannot be left to algorithms designed for profit or surveillance and that public-interest platforms and AI should be developed as civic infrastructure under clear binding rules, whether provided publicly or privately.[200-203] Drawing on Lawrence Lessig’s idea that “code is law,” he said platform architecture regulates discourse in its own right, so systems that prioritize virality or engagement over deliberation actively distort democracy.[204-208] He added that institutions also bear responsibility when they fail to fund and scale democratic alternatives, and pointed to federated social networks and open-source civic tools as examples of options that already exist but lack political support.[209-213]


Denys Nazarenko brought in the perspective of cities and local institutions.[215-232] He said local authorities increasingly rely on digital platforms to communicate with residents, especially in emergencies, even though those platforms are built around attention capture rather than civic responsibility.[215] He argued that cities experience platform harms very concretely, including election disinformation, non-explicit hate speech affecting neighborhoods, synthetic content targeting institutions, and the erosion of local trust.[216] As practical responses, he proposed user choice over recommendation systems, provenance signals for synthetic media, and trusted public digital channels through which residents can verify official information.[217-219] He also said there remains a missing orchestration layer linking public communication systems and platforms.[230-232]


Lilia Simonyan emphasized implementation.[239-257] She said the DSA and Council of Europe standards are important starting points, but the key challenge is translating high-level principles into everyday platform practice.[239-245] That, she argued, requires enforceable oversight by public authorities, accountability and risk assessment embedded by design, and civil society input grounded in actual harms.[239-243] She called for practical governance mechanisms including co-regulation, independent algorithmic audits, transparent reporting obligations, structural controls, content labelling, accessible appeals, and intelligible explanations of algorithmic systems.[244-257]


A further cluster of interventions focused on AI, cognitive sovereignty, and behavioral influence. Giacomo Mazzone said that two recent U.S. tribunal decisions against social media platforms had changed the broader context and may have reduced attacks on EU regulation, but he warned that AI could create even deeper problems.[275-279] He argued that AI-driven changes in search are already damaging the media ecosystem, especially for local media, smaller countries, and minority languages.[279-281] In his view, AI may invert the relationship between user and device, with interfaces increasingly selecting and presenting information according to user history and platform priorities rather than simply answering user queries.[282-286]


Pari Esfandiari argued that the main concern is no longer just misinformation but the erosion of cognitive autonomy in systems optimized to predict and shape behavior.[289-294] She said recommender systems amplify outrage, emotional reaction, and confirmation bias, while generative AI makes persuasion scalable, personalized, and increasingly hard to distinguish from authentic human communication.[291-293] She therefore called for transparency around recommendation systems that goes beyond technical disclosure to meaningful explanation of why content is amplified and what incentives drive it.[294] She also called for meaningful user control over curation and personalization, digital literacy that addresses attention and emotion, and platform design that supports reflection, context, viewpoint diversity, and healthier democratic participation.[295-301]


Vittorio Bertola offered a more skeptical intervention.[305-319] Speaking personally, he said he had not noticed even minimal changes on Facebook since the DSA entered into force, which to him showed that enforcement remains the core unresolved issue.[305-309] He also argued that AI may be harder to govern than social media because, unlike recommendation systems, even developers may not fully understand how large models operate.[310-315] He added a provocative cultural point, saying that “most people want to be manipulated” in the sense that they seek confirmation bias and validation rather than truth.[316-319]


Sumeja Huskic expressed the narrowing effects of algorithmic curation in simple user-centered terms.[323-326] She said people following events online rarely receive a full picture; instead, they are shown one angle, one emotion, one narrative, and that partial view starts to feel like the whole story.[323-325] For her, the danger lies in the gradual shrinking of what people are shown without realizing it, which threatens whether thought remains free, critical, and genuinely their own.[325-326]


Youth interventions gave the discussion a particularly strong generational dimension. Jaska, speaking from YouthDIG in connection with EuroDIG, said her generation had effectively been the generation of unregulated social media and now wanted to become the generation of regulation.[399-405] She argued that regulation, especially safety by design, is needed to force accountability and strengthen the digital public sphere.[399-405] Referring to Article 28 DSA, she said platforms must take appropriate and proportionate measures to protect the safety, security, and privacy of minors, and that safety by design should be a guiding principle rather than an afterthought.[400-402] In her framing, regulation should realign digital markets with human rights so that trust, safety, rights, and economic value reinforce one another.[403-405] She concluded that children should be shaped by morals and values, not by platform profit goals.[406-407]


Inej Ruki focused on cognitive sovereignty in relation to generative AI and young people’s relationships with chatbots.[409-415] She warned that some users, especially young people, are forming quasi-personal ties with AI systems and in some cases using chatbots as therapists.[411-412] She argued that platforms need stronger ways to direct such users toward real help instead of simply keeping them engaged.[413-415]


An online intervention from Peter Rechels stressed that the question is now political as much as technical.[425-436] Speaking on behalf of a European collective promoting open-source and decentralized alternatives, he argued that regulation alone will not protect democratic debate without coordinated public investment and collective effort.[425-436] He called for a European “social stack” based on digital autonomy, decentralization, pluralism, diverse ownership, and algorithms treated as public-interest institutions.[427-436] He said the underlying technology already works and that what is missing is political choice and funding.[428-436]


Adam Lam returned to addictive design and asked what additional provisions under existing EU rules, or under a future Digital Fairness Act, could directly address engagement-driven addictive features.[439] He also asked whether democratic governance or civic participation can extend into the development of private algorithms despite claims of intellectual property and proprietary control.[439]


In the closing discussion, Allen and Pitea shifted from diagnosis to practical pathways. Allen reiterated that public-interest models already exist, citing Wikipedia’s community governance and platforms like Mastodon as evidence that alternatives are possible even if they need more investment.[353-358] She also clarified that DSA enforcement is a long legal process: companies litigate heavily, so the Commission must build especially robust cases, and enforcement has included not just fines but also requests for information and preliminary findings.[359-367] She pointed to a concrete example of private enforcement in the Netherlands, where Bits of Freedom successfully sued Meta over missing user-empowerment tools; Meta appealed and still lost, and the result was greater user control for users in the Netherlands.[369-375] She added that more than 30,000 people have already used out-of-court dispute-settlement bodies under the DSA, and that transparency libraries and statements of reasons, while enormous, can increasingly be examined more effectively.[376-384] She also highlighted the Commission’s preliminary findings on TikTok’s infinite scroll and addictive design as especially significant.[384-394] In response to questions on AI, she pushed back, “a little bit,” on claims that companies cannot understand or test the systems they build, arguing that they do have means to sandbox-test innovations and assess harms before deployment.[440] She linked this to both the AI Act and DSA duties to assess and mitigate AI-related risks.[440] On addictive design, she said this issue is likely to become central in future Digital Fairness Act debates and pointed to Article 40 DSA, on data access for vetted researchers, as one of the most powerful but underused tools for building evidence about recommender-system and addictive-design harms.[441-449]


Pitea, for his part, acknowledged that resources and enforcement capacity remain major obstacles for regulators and civil society.[333] He illustrated platform failure with two personal examples.[335-350] In one, he was shown paid content pushed by a foreign government entirely unrelated to his interests, and the platform told him this violated no rule.[335-347] In another, he had to go through repeated exchanges before a platform accepted that an advertisement falsely using the image of the President of the Italian Republic to promote financial services breached its own terms.[347-350] These cases, he argued, showed that users cannot realistically be expected to spend hours fighting with platforms over their own complaint systems.[347-350] On addictive design, he said law is always a compromise and may not directly answer whether current regulation fundamentally challenges dominant platform business models, but he argued that the recommendation at least creates space to raise the question and to build pressure through coalitions of social scientists, technologists, civil society actors, and digital-rights groups.[450-463] He also reminded participants that journalism is one of the main victims of the current system and referred to Council of Europe work on disinformation that includes infrastructure and public-good perspectives.[465-474] He ended with a sobering reality check by noting, in effect, that despite discussion of alternatives, most people still spend much more time on Instagram than on Bluesky-like alternatives.[476-478]


The session closed with a synthesis presented by Murillo Salvador, who explicitly noted that the notes involved choices about inclusion and exclusion and invited objections in order to reach rough consensus.[488-517] The first agreed point was that platforms now function as a form of social digital infrastructure of democracy, but were not designed to fulfil civic functions; instead, they optimize engagement, use dark patterns such as infinite scroll, are not neutral channels, and distort public debate, including through disinformation.[493-497] The second was that the loss of cognitive sovereignty is an emerging risk, especially as AI becomes embedded in recommender and moderation systems, making provenance and verification mechanisms crucial and making testing and sandboxing before deployment important for AI tools.[500-504] The third was that regulation does not inherently hamper innovation, but existing rules such as the DSA need stronger compliance and enforcement, with civil society acting as a key partner to public authorities and with Council of Europe frameworks and international human rights standards helping to expand user agency.[505-509] The fourth was that platform governance should move from treating users as consumers toward recognizing them as digital citizens, while incentivizing community-driven platforms and supporting democratic engagement beyond dominant commercial platforms.[510-512] No strong objections were raised to this synthesis, and McDowell closed by thanking the speakers and moderators.[515-518]


Session transcriptComplete transcript of the session
Florence Ranson

So, still trying to bring some people in from the coffee break, but I think it’s still time to network, still time to chat and exchange a few cards and remarks and so on. But we’ll start, we’ll kick off, and that will make everybody get back in once they realize we have started without them. So, let’s open the final stretch of our day. And we have been discussing since yesterday, actually, the fact that trustworthiness is of the essence and accountability is a clear element of trust, of course. And that’s also part of the things that we already discussed yesterday. But we’re going to go a little more in -depth into that particular aspect. And we’re going to talk about platforms accountability, another element that was discussed yesterday.

And if you remember. It also came out quite strongly in the outcomes from the youth dig discussions that we that we summarized yesterday. So I’m sure there’s going to be much more to be discussed on that particular issue. And to lead us through that session, I’m going to hand over moderation to Chloe McDowell from Reimagine Europe. Chloe, welcome.

Chloe McDowell

Thank you. Thank you. Yeah, thank you, everyone, for joining this final Eurodig session on platforms accountability. And I’m sorry to drag you away from your final coffee break. So the starting point for today’s discussion is the idea that digital platforms are no longer just channels through which public debate takes place. They’re actually part of the architecture of that debate. Their design choices shape what becomes visible, what spreads, what is rewarded. And what comes to feel credible or meaningful to us. and they also have the power to shape individual and collective cognition and autonomy and this really matters because the digital public sphere is not only a place where information circulates it’s a place where meaning is constructed and contested amplified and unfortunately sometimes distorted facts evidence and arguments are always interpreted through social emotional and cognitive frames so when we talk about platform accountability we’re not only talking about content moderation or compliance procedures we’re talking about the conditions under which people form opinions exercise judgment and fundamentally participate in democratic life and legal frameworks matter of course the dsa has created an important language around systemic risks and fundamental rights and the council of europe’s recent recommendations add a human rights foundation to the system and the dsa has created an important language around systemic risks and to this reminding us that online safety also means autonomy and participation But the deeper question is, how can we move from platforms that optimize attention and engagement to digital environments that strengthen democratic capacity?

And a point that I know will be raised during the discussion and something that we should be careful with is the idea of passive consumption. We’re not simply passive users. Our engagement and interpretation and participation are active processes. And the problem really then is whether the systems around us expand that agency or exploit and narrow it. So that is also why today’s session is not just a traditional panel. We will begin, of course, with the framing interventions from our three panelists. But the real core of the session is, of course, the open debate. So to set the scene, we’ll first hear from Ilka Rasanen, who is the EU operations lead at Citra. And Ilka will begin.

I’ll bring a somewhat provocative perspective on whether existing dominant platforms can realistically be made democratic or whether, in fact, we need stronger alternatives, including civic tech, more binding regulation. And then we will hear from Asha Allen, the Director and Secretary General of the Centre for Democracy and Technology. Asha will bring a civil society and digital rights perspective to the discussion, looking at user empowerment, human autonomy and the essential role that civil society plays in making frameworks like the DSA and AI Act work in practice. And then finally, we will hear from Cesare Pitea, a legal advisor at the Council of Europe. And Cesare will discuss the Council of Europe’s recommendation on online safety and the empowerment of users and content creators, focusing on user autonomy and platform responsibility and how accountability can be understood from the individual user up through wider governance structures.

And then after these remarks, I will invite everyone to treat this as a working session, the same as with the other sessions that took place today. And on a practical note as well, Ilka will leave. He will leave us slightly earlier at around five. So if you have any questions specifically for him, please do bring these up earlier in the debate. So thank you, Ilka.

Ilkka Rasanen

thank you chloe and thanks for the invitation to this very important event um my organization citra the finnish innovation fund is a public sector think tank and a fund in finland but we increasingly also want to contribute to european debates and safeguarding and renewing democracy is one of our strategic areas and therefore probably i’m here and mostly or maybe also because we published a recent study this year called um algorithms and democracy how does social media shape the world view of young europeans i will quote some figures from that study but i won’t focus on that i’d rather focus maybe on the guiding questions that have been given to the session too while as i won’t be talking about that i’ll just go ahead and start with chloe and then i’ll just go ahead and I may not stay on that script, but maybe talk a bit besides the questions, but on the broad topic of the questions as we go along here.

But I wanted to start with the four things, four things we know that form the context of this conversation today. The first thing we know is that democracy is in decline, globally speaking. If you look at the well -known indicators, for example, from the Institute of Gothenburg University, we’re back to the 70s in terms of population who lives in democratic societies versus autocratic societies. In autocratic societies, you have more than 70 percent of global population lives in autocracies, and that’s increasing year by year. Second thing we know is that social media has become a major force. In our lives, also in terms of how we spend our time. in this study that I mentioned we did a survey in three European countries actually Finland, France and Romania among younger Europeans from 18 to 28 years old and asked about their social media use and one of the questions was how many hours per day in average you use social media and the answers were very similar across the countries actually surprisingly similar but the average is close to six hours a day it’s quite staggering if you allow for some time sometimes sleeping in a day say eight hours you have you know 16 hours a day and then almost six hours of that is 37 percent of your awake in time is on social media and that was the respondents themselves who said that and typically you kind of underplay your vices when you answer such surveys so it’s a lot of time.

That was the second thing. Third thing we know from Eurobarometer studies for example that For this age group and maybe also others, social media is these days the main source of news, main source of political and social questions. It’s not print. It’s not linear TV. It’s social media. And then the fourth thing we know, social media platforms, the dominant ones, they’re not designed for democratic debates. They’re not designed for civic discourse. They are designed and optimized for engagement, and they’re designed and optimized, if you put it a bit more brutally, to be slightly addictive to their businesses, their big, very profitable businesses. I actually checked for this debate, the latest available financial information from some of the big platforms or the companies behind the Meta and Google Meta’s revenue in Q1.

I actually checked for this debate, the latest available financial information from some of the big platforms or the companies behind the Meta and Google Meta’s revenue in Q1. I actually checked for this debate, the latest available financial information from some of the big platforms or the companies behind the Meta and Google Meta’s revenue in Q1. I actually checked for this debate, the latest available financial information from some of the big platforms or the companies behind the Meta and Google Meta’s revenue in Q1. I actually checked for this debate, the latest available financial information from some of the big platforms or the companies behind the Meta and Google Meta’s revenue in Q1. I actually checked for this debate, the latest available financial information from some of the big platforms or the companies behind the Meta and Google Meta’s revenue in Q1.

I actually checked for this debate, the latest available financial information from some of the big platforms or the companies behind the Meta and Google Meta’s revenue in Q1. I actually checked for this debate, the latest available financial information from some of the big platforms or the companies behind the Meta and Google Meta’s revenue in Q1. Alphabet, Google’s mother company, $109 billion revenue in one quarter, $62 billion in profit in the same quarter. So big and profitable. Why am I saying this? I am not personally anti -capitalist. I think we need companies, big and small, to generate jobs and well -being and generate tax revenue, etc. But I’m saying this to say that these companies are doing extremely, extremely well.

They don’t have an incentive to change. Which brings me to the first guiding questions on how should we bring these platforms to act such that we move beyond regulatory compliance to platforms fostering democratic debate. Well, I would… submit that we first need to ensure the regulatory compliance before we talk about anything else. And here in the European Union, the regulation with the teeth, the Digital Services Act, is still quite young. It’s only a couple of years ago that it entered into force with all of its provisions. And so far, the Commission has imposed only one noncompliance fine against X, actually, on lack of transparency on several things, including that blue mark not being explained properly, etc.

And of course, X challenges this decision to the General Court of the European Union. It will take several years. The fine was $120 million, which in the empire of Elon Musk is unconsequential. It’s less than peanuts. So one of the points I’d like to make is that that we have those regulatory tools, but they should have real dissuasive deterrence behind them as well. So I don’t know that there would be, besides these regulatory sticks, any carrots that would be big enough for changing the behavior of this company because they’re doing so well in what they’re intended to do. Therefore, I think rather than speaking how those platforms should change their behavior, we should talk about alternatives to those platforms.

First of all, social media platforms, alternative social media platforms. There are some attempts out there, have been and are, W social media, Blue Sky, etc. Good luck to them. I don’t know if they will fare well in this. I don’t know if they will fare well in this competition, but at least… I think public authorities should somehow also show example and move some of their communications, maybe in parallel, and give them credence and visibility, etc. They will not succeed unless big institutions, public and private, move onto those platforms. Then the second set of alternatives is not the social media platforms themselves, but alternative means to engage in democratic processes that go beyond elections. So all forms of participatory democracy, citizens’ panels, initiatives, etc., etc., and I think the European Union has done an excellent job in launching those things.

It’s difficult to reach people, but they’re being good. Good initiatives and attempts. What is an interesting field where we’re also working quite a lot is so -called civic tech, which is a… platforms that are designed from the ground up for engaging people in democratic decision -making. They reach broader audiences than physical panels and deliberative formats of decision -making. So you can combine these two, maybe in hybrid forms, try to make it enough exciting, link it to actual decision -making, et cetera, and you provide an alternative, which we all need, and I would say younger generations especially need in order to be engaged, have agency, and have sense of ownership of their democracy, and that is that we need to work on, and maybe that way also that cognitive sovereignty or sovereignty of the mind can be reached when there’s engaged in platforms and means that are not the current ones.

I think I’ll just stop there. Looking at the time and pass it over to the next speaker.

Chloe McDowell

yes so wonderful thank you and thank you for starting us off on such a positive note as well i think uh sometimes that’s easy to it’s easy to diagnose the problem and maybe not look at the solution so uh thank you for that and uh definitely the point on better enforcement i think leads really well into uh what ash is going to to say about the role of civil society so i’ll uh i’ll leave the floor

Asha Allen

thank you uh and thank you so much for the invitation it’s it’s wonderful to be here i remember my first uh conference like this but i won’t say how many years ago it was um because then i will be on my age um so before i get started with my uh intervention i actually wanted to ask the audience a question um how many of us in the room remember growing up without social media or online platforms and how many of us grew up with social media platforms as just part of our okay so it’s good to know hi everyone um so i wanted to make that differentiation um because platforms are and always have been fluid the manner in which we see platforms engage now what their business models are now have not been set in stone since the beginning i vividly remember i entered into this policy space over 10 years ago now here in brussels and i vividly remember the power of communities using twitter as it was at the time for movements like me too like the black lives matter movement for raising awareness on disability and accessibility rights user preference at the time that was informing how platforms engaged with their users actually generated civic exchange it’s why we talk about platforms being the online democratic space there was there has and has been a very clear paradigm shift you so when we’re thinking about how we’re going to address the first question which is about platform design and moving users from passive consumption to active participation I want to kind of question the question itself because there has been active participation that has led to systemic change and there may even be a business reason or a business impetus to conceptualize the notion of passive consumption and how companies are seeing users as they are right now and so I think when you think about how the business models now that are focused on being engagement based and having the highest level of engagement we’ve seen from some documents that have been released in the US through litigation in terms of the business prioritization of keeping people on the platforms how this is intrinsically in contra to increasing democratic debate and active participation.

so mindful of time we could talk about this quite quite extensively but i want to move to what the dsa tries to do right because there are many jurisdictions not just the european union brazil india other countries have many different frameworks that they’ve put in place that have been informed by or influenced by the the digital services act and it actually tries to embed what was already there before right prior to having very hard concrete regulation what we had was an ecosystem a kind of co -regulatory regulatory ecosystem informed by the existing international human rights standards right so civil society like cdt europe and our sister organization cdt in the us could use the un guiding principles on businesses and human rights to say well actually yes there’s no regulatory framework but you have a legal obligation under international human rights norms to make sure that your products and services are not harming people or not harming society or not harming civic participation you so when you look at the dsa and the model of the dsa it actually tries to capture that right so it has very clear hard rules for illegal content it’s illegal there’s a judicial order you have to act expeditiously to to do something but it also recognizes that if you’re a company of a certain size like the ones that you looked into their their profit margins uh earlier today they have an extra due diligence responsibility um to ensure that because of their reach in the european union that they are not infringing on fundamental rights that are captured in the charter now the dsa is content agnostic rightly so it does not regulate content because we have to preserve freedom of expression and freedom of association which are the foundations of democratic and civic debate but it does say you need to assess as you mentioned before the risk that you might pose to civic participation and many other risks and you have to mitigate that risk and we’re going to hold you to account if you do not have a right to do that and we’re going to hold you to account if you don’t mitigate that risk now what we have is a regulatory framework that needs enforcement and enforcement takes time so yes we have the one decision on on x but essentially what the european commission has to do is to take clear scientific findings and turn and translate those into you know legally grounded and sound decisions in which they can hold these platforms to account and and that takes uh time but i think the other aspect is being able to socialize the rights that all of you now have now that we have the dsa in place right so even if a piece of content is not illegal but you think it violates a platform’s policies you can flag that content and say i think this is in violation of your policies and if the company doesn’t agree with you well you can take that now to an out of court dispute settlement body to say actually i’m going to push you on that and it’s up to the company to actually pay for that process it’s not on you There are other means in which you can access this transparency on the takedowns of different pieces of content.

And there’s supposed to be more algorithmic transparency, access to data for vetted researchers. So the provisions are there, but the companies are certainly pushing back on making sure that access is there. So what we need right now is this movement building to be able to have folks like you in the room and others to be able to use the rights that they now have. That’s embedded in the Digital Services Act. And it allows me to come to the third prompting question that we had around the co -regulatory framework, because the DSA tries to capture this, too. Now, I might be slightly biased because I’m a head of a civil society organisation, but I don’t think the DSA can fundamentally work without civil society participation in its enforcement.

Right. It’s civil society organisations who are doing the research. They’re building the evidence base. They are the trusted flaggers. They’re the ones alerting the enforcers to say there’s smoke over there. There might also be a fire. You need to go and have a look at what that fire might be. And that’s actually captured in the DSA itself. I’m also a bit of an EU law nerd. And the EU DSA actually mentions civil society more than any other regulation. That’s not actually addressed about civil society, which is pretty interesting. But that’s deliberate because they rely on civil society as these kind of co -regulatory accountability actors to be able to help with enforcement, but also to hold the enforcement bodies themselves to account to prevent any kind of any overreach.

There’s also provisions that companies should also be consulting with civil society organisations and researchers when they’re doing their assessments. But it might surprise you to know that that hasn’t been used and companies are not engaging with civil society organisations and researchers right now. But the provisions are there and we hope to make use of those. So this allows me to come to this debate and this question that we have about regulatory frameworks kind of diminishing what platforms can do. Clearly, they are still making their profit margins. Clearly, many of us in the room are still using these platforms and making the most of these platforms. So this idea that regulation is hampering innovation or hampering users engaging with platforms is just simply not true.

It’s also quite a false dichotomy and doesn’t make any business sense. You can’t be a company and think to yourself, I want to roll out a service or a product to users, but I might hurt those users. People will eventually stop using your product and your services. So from a business sense, it’s not quite clear. But quite essentially, there’s a simple fact that if you’re operating within the single market, operating within any community, there have to be rules and safeguards in place to make sure the rights that we all have embedded and bestowed to us by the International Human Rights, its framework and by the European Charter are respected. And those can’t be, let’s say, put a pin in them just to, you know, bolster innovation or to allow the companies to proliferate as they were.

so lastly this allows me to come into the conversation a little bit around the ai conversation because the responsibilities of platforms right now i think we’ve been having this conversation on say social media and online platforms for a while and the harms and and how they need to be mitigated but many of those same platforms are also driving the ai conversation right now they’re embedding those ai tools into the very social media platforms that we’re talking about and the very services i think many of you if you’ve used google search recently will know that you now have an ai summary before you have anything else and you can engage with that ai summary as an ai chatbot and so then i would also re -question the question around cognitive sovereignty right and this idea that our engagement is either passive or it presents a risk a kind of existential risk that can’t be mitigated because the technology is moving so fast and i think that’s a really important point and i think that’s a really important point and i think we can’t have a narrative where it’s a kind of okay to move fast and break things without respecting the rules and the rights that are in place and to have these technologies disseminated onto the market without having the evidence evidence base to know that they’re actually safe So this notion that these tools are incredibly powerful, which they can be and can be incredibly helpful for many other reasons, then shouldn’t be deployed without these frameworks in place.

And without us questioning this idea that they are inherently hugely powerful and have these this mandate that extends beyond what we are capable of being able to to question and put the rules and frameworks in place for. So when it comes to kind of platform accountability, I think we need to reshape the conversation around platform compliance with regulation, as all other industries should, and move away from platform accountability as a framework within the EU where hard regulation is in place. Embrace that kind of co -regulatory framework where due diligence is still relevant in some company areas, but also question the kind of rapid deployment of different systems and different technologies. Like AI and how they’re being embedded into different online frameworks.

without the respect for rights to move away for innovation. I think we should always fundamentally question that if we’re going to have a thriving democracy, we need to have a thriving civic space that’s safe for everybody to use. And

Chloe McDowell

Thank you, Asha. And yeah, I mean, you definitely raised my attention to several things that maybe I and other people in the room weren’t necessarily aware of before. And that’s essentially part, again, of reclaiming this autonomy is being aware of the tools that we have at our demand and what we can do as civil society to push back against the power of these big platforms. So, yeah, really inspiring. Thank you. And now we’ll have the public authority perspective from you, Cesare, and especially looking into these new Council of Europe recommendations and which I think are very interesting looking again, at the human rights side of these. recommendations and regulations and the idea of human autonomy and cognition as well.

So thank you.

Cesare Pitea

Thank you very much. Good afternoon, everyone. Thank you for having me here. This is my second Euroleague, the first as a speaker, and I come after very interesting and challenging presentations, so mine will be a little bit more institutional about this instrument that the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe just adopted last April. So before moving into that, it’s important to understand what is the perspective we as an organization come from. So the questions that we’re trying to answer or reason about today are not about technology. They’re about democracy and they’re about society. And we should always keep this in mind when we talk about digital rights, platform regulation, and all those apparently technical issues.

And this is also the approach of the recommendation. The recommendation deals mainly with online safety and online empowerment. The recommendation is number 20, 26, number 4, and it offers to the 46 member states of the Council of Europe, so well beyond the European Union member states, a shared framework and a policy compass to tackle some of the existing emergencies. And hopefully future challenges that we are and will be facing. So the recommendation makes one thing very clear that I think it’s important to underline. If we want to remain committed to the founding values of the Council of Europe, human rights, democracy and rule of law, the way forward is not to artificially oppose safety and freedoms. It is not to respond to the growing power of platforms by giving back control over the information environment to states or by weakening users’ safeguards on platforms and online.

It is rather to use the force of law and regulation to expand. Platform accountability, expand transparency around how platforms work and to require platforms environments to. effectively and genuinely enhance user agency. But how do we get there? So first of all, in line with approaches that are already there, the DSA, but also to some extent the Online Safety Act in the UK, the recommendation starts from moving the shift from content regulation to systemic responsibilities. So, of course, there is a whole section of the recommendation that calls for evidence-based proportionate limits as limits to content restrictions and stresses the importance of the principle of legality in the… what is allowed and what is not allowed online in line with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

But beyond content, the recommendation calls on states to set clear legal expectations for platforms, especially those that have significant influence over the information environment. The question is not just what contents platforms host, but how they exercise their human rights responsibilities that were mentioned earlier towards users and society at large. Platforms are therefore expected to integrate safety and human rights considerations directly into their design and their operations. This means that they have to assess and manage human rights risks. opposed by their systems, ensuring transparency around algorithms and content moderation, and taking responsibility for how they system -shape the public discourse. This is not new, but as Asha was telling before me, self -regulation has clearly failed to deliver human rights -driven platform environments, and therefore member states are encouraged to place those systemic duties under public scrutiny and under the oversight of independent regulatory authorities with effective powers.

In this framework, user empowerment is not presented as an alternative to platform regulation. It’s rather a core pillar of accountability, and platform accountability to those. the recommendation identifies four categories of empowerment duties design related duties are the first and states are called on requiring platforms to give more meaningful control to users over their online experience this cannot just be a and and here we go back to the issue of enforcement and implementation and the time and the process that is needed if any of you have tried to flag to any platform content know how difficult it is even for us people that are quite well placed to do so. And how many back and forth you have to go through before content that is actually illegal or against the terms and conditions of the platforms is removed or limited.

So this is precisely one of the most important indications. Indications, effective controls as users, we should be those who define our platform environment, not passive consumer of an environment that is there decided by other people. The second type of empowerment duties are transparency duties. Of course, transparency around algorithms, around content moderation, around monetization policies and practices. But we also know that this doesn’t work at the individual level. None of us has the time or the capacity to go through what we encounter online on a daily basis. This is why a fundamental aspect of transparency is researchers’ access. Access to data, but also access to platforms. The possibility to use platforms to carry out investigations, experiments, research.

And unfortunately, we know that on this very specific issue that is also covered by the DSA, platforms are not really going forward and rather are going backwards. And we should also ask ourselves why. The third type of research, empowerment duties are relating to threat process. So the recommendation has quite innovative provisions on notification, on content moderation, including dark patterns, including users that are affected indirectly from content moderation decisions, and also on how basically a follow -up should be there on both flagging and contestation of content moderation decisions. These include, of course, internal and external dispute settlements, but also the safeguards of ultimately direct, of users to go to court if they deem so necessary. The fourth type of empowerment duties are collective action.

This is very important because when we talk about reducing the unbalance in power, we have to recognize that civil society and organizations of civil society play a fundamental role. The imbalance is not just between the individual and the companies that provide the services, but sometimes and very often even between the state authorities, the regulators, and those companies. So it’s only by joining forces and harnessing this potential, democratic potential, of the communities of users that any of these platform accountability regulations can work. And therefore, the recommendation calls for support and recognition and affordances on platforms or, let’s say, collective forms of user action. This goes from fact -checking organizations to users’ rights organizations. One important point that I have to say initially was a little bit more promising in terms of how far this could go, is that the recommendation very, very quietly calls on member states to explore other ways of opening up platform environments.

We have discussed how the platform model has changed from a diffuse model to a top -down model where recommender system, content moderation algorithms owned by the platforms determine our experience online. We have said how us as individual users should be more able to fine -tune what we see and how we see it, but also maybe it’s time to explore how platforms should open up their systems, big platforms of course, to a plurality of recommender systems and content moderation systems for lawful content so that, for example, each user can rely on a third party to … fine -tune its experience online to its own preferences in terms of content, in terms of language, in terms of what we want to be exposed to.

As I mentioned earlier, the recommendation really supports a multi -stakeholder approach that is at the basis of EURDIC. Not only it recalls existing principles according to which rules and policies should be designed with the participation of all stakeholders by both states and platforms alike, that platforms need to involve stakeholders in the development of the content, in their design decisions. When they design the services, when they make the risk assessment, when they plan their mitigation measures, this should be done in cooperation with civil society. so this is very important and as important is as I mentioned before that the recommendation also support forms of collective action towards platforms so this is more or less what the recommendation is about but again one very important point that is at the beginning of the recommendation is that when we think about platform regulation we should so to speak look beyond and behind the screen the recommendation makes it very clear that in order to address these unbalances in powers that we find online states need to still address the structural issues and inequalities, the knowledge gaps that are out there in the real society, because those harmful things that we see online are sure probably amplified by systems, but also are a reflection and have their roots in the society around us, and the promotion and protection of human rights, human dignity and equality is still a priority beyond digital spaces.

And I finish this by inviting all of you to participate to the survey. I was supposed to screen a QR code, but you find it outside on the tables, that the Council of Europe is launching in the framework of the New Democratic Pact for Europe, where all of you can contribute to build better digital space. Thank you very much. t

Chloe McDowell

hank you very much and yeah I mean I think in particular your point that platform regulation is not in opposition to user autonomy in fact supports and helps create a more vibrant public space when users can have a say over the platforms that they use this was a really interesting intervention and with this I will open the floor to the general debate so I know as with the other sessions there’s a number of people who have asked to intervene so I will read out the names based on first come first serve basis you have two minutes per intervention and I’ll give a bit of time after calling your name but if you’re in the room please raise your hand and if you’re online the online moderator will We’ll call on you.

But if you don’t speak, I will move on to the next the next intervention. So starting with Kumhur Eir from the Brussels municipality. No. OK. Next, we have Adunga Necho Mulatu from Bahia Dar University online. No. And Adriana Rodriguez -Novo in the room. No. OK. And Julie Lubkin at the Centre for Countering Digital Hate. OK. And Francesco Vecchi, I know you’re here. Thank you. OK.

Francesco Vecchi

Thank you very much. Thank you very much, and thanks to all the speakers. I’m Francesco Vecchi, CVK coordinator at Humans, and I had the honor of being a co -facul point for this session. At Humans, we believe that democracy cannot be left to the mercy of algorithms designed for profit or surveillance. This is why, with the campaign I coordinate, we call for public interest platforms and AI, systems that prioritize civic empowerment, transparency, and accountability over extractive models, and we had the chance to discuss about that today. This is not at all about rejecting private innovation, which is paramount, but about ensuring that democracy and AI are treated as public services as they are, delivered under clear binding rules, whether by public or private actors.

Lawrence Lessig, 20 years ago, taught us that code is low. The architecture of digital platforms is regulation in its own. It shapes how we debate, decide, and even dissent. And if platforms design spaces that prioritize engagement over deliberation or vitality over truth, they’re not just hosting public discourse. They are distorting it. But accountability cannot stop at platforms. Institutions must also answer for failing to demand and fund and scale democratic alternatives. Well, thanks to ILCA, we have some good news because we know that alternatives exist. And from federated social networks such as the Fediverse to open source civic tools that we, of course, advocate for, we have the technology to build a favored digital public sphere. But what we lack is indeed the political will to adopt them at scale.

personally this is why we this is why humans civic campaign exists and why we’re supporting the european citizens action service to shape a blueprint for a techno -democracy coalition so a sort of new manifesto for a new way of democracy and in general we advocate for a new infrastructure of democracy where technology serves the people not the other way around thank you very much for listening

Chloe McDowell

thank you francesco and then uh we have uh denys nazarenko i believe i can see you online or dennis

Denys Nazarenko

yeah thank you thank you so from city ground perspective it’s a practical matter because public institution increasingly relied on digital platforms to reach residents and a particular human emergency so the operating logic of these platforms essentially is attention attention attention attention attention space has discussed and a civic responsibility to then see it’s a different point on design curve so Cities are where the consequences of their design and disinformation around elections will be experienced locally. Non -explicit hate speech affects specific neighborhoods for sure, but synthetic conduct we could monitor over recent months will target public institutions and they will erode local trust. So on a typical actions to shift user from audience to citizens, one would be the user choice of recommendation system so algorithm is something residents will configure rather than will receive.

Second one will be provenance signal for synthetic media. And last but not least, the trusted public digital channels through which residents can verify the data is official. In case of Key, we’ve done a lot of research. We’ve done a lot of research on the key of the key. We’ve done a lot of research on the key of the key. We’ve done a lot of research on the key of the key. We’ve done a lot of research on the key of the key. We’ve done a lot of research on the key of the key. We’ve done a lot of research on the key of the key. We’ve done a lot of research on the key of the key.

We’ve done a lot of research on the key of the key. We’ve done a lot of research on the key of the key. We’ve done a lot of research on the key of the key. for the solutions that we are pursuing, the orchestration layer that will connect different platforms is missing. So initiatives like FIWARA, or the local digital twins are working in that direction. It would be great to see SAMHSA working towards that for the digital platforms for communication. Thank you

Chloe McDowell

Thank you. And actually I didn’t read out the question last time, but maybe just the header this time. So governance in action, how can multi -stakeholder collaboration turn regulatory ideals into platform realities? So the first person we have for this question is Axel Mazolo. Jaroslaw Ponder from the International Telecommunication Union. Elonal Hikok . Lilia Simonian

Lilia Simonyan

Hello, hi Yes, it’s me First of all, I want to thank all of you for your very interesting presentations Distinguished colleagues Regulatory frameworks such as the Digital Service Act and the Standards of the Council of Europe provide a strong legal foundation for a safer and more transparent digital environment However, laws alone are not enough The real challenge lies in implementation how to translate high -level principles into everyday platform practices This is where multi -stakeholder collaboration becomes essential Public authorities must set clear enforceable rules and ensure oversight but they must also remain flexible and forward -looking, adapting regulation to rapidly evolve the system and the evolving technologies At the same time, platforms carry operational responsibility. They must integrate transparency, risk assessment, and accountability directly into their systems by design, not as an afterthought.

Civil society plays a critical bridging role. It represents users’ interests, identifies real -world harms, and ensures that governance remains grounded in human rights and democratic values. Without this input, regulation risks becoming disconnected from societal needs. To make this collaboration effective, we need practical mechanisms. This includes co -regulatory frameworks, independent audits of algorithms, transparent reporting obligations, and structural control. The framework is a key part of the regulatory framework. It is the most important part of the regulatory framework. It is the most important part of the regulatory framework. It is the most important part of the regulatory framework. It is the most important part of the regulatory framework. It is the most important part of the regulatory framework.

It is the most important part of the regulatory framework. It is the most important part of the regulatory framework. It is the most important part of the regulatory framework. It is the most important part of the regulatory framework. It is the most important part of the regulatory framework. like transparency and user empowerment must be translated into construct tools. Clear content labeling, accessible appeal systems and understandable algorithmic explanations. My time is over. So thank you.

Chloe McDowell

Thank you so much. And we have Sandra Matigue. Hi. No? Okay. I think hopefully we’ll have some time for spontaneous interventions at the end as well. Amath Ndiaye? No. Kamel L. Hilali? No. And online? No, we don’t have the last participant online. Okay. Moving to the final question then. So what safeguards are needed to protect cognitive and behavioral health? Sovereignty in an AI -driven public sphere. Ranjan Timil… Sorry, Timilicina? No? It’s the end of the day. Everyone’s outside enjoying the sun, I think. Giacomo Mazzone from

Giacomo Mazzone

Thank you for the floor. I want to add some elements to the reflection. One is that there is a new fact that we need to consider in the picture, and these are the two sentences of the U .S. tribunals against the social platforms, social media platforms. This is a new fact that changes definitely the setting, and in fact in the last months after that, weeks after that, the attack to DSA and to European legislation are less vocal than before. So I think that this opened a window of opportunity for us. The second is, there is another perspective that we need to consider. because what we have seen until now could be even worse in the future.

The current modification to the search engines that has been produced using the AI having devastating impact on the media ecosystem and throwing the fragile business model that has been built on electronic media. This is not only an economic problem but is also producing the certification of media environment especially for local media and for in small countries and minority languages. This reduces the diversity of the offer and the quality of the cognitive ecosystem that for Europe that’s very very dangerous. And on the top of this damage we have also the fact that we are moving with the introduction of AI in our devices to a situation where users will not ask anymore to the devices they want to look for.

But the contrary will happen. AI interface will select and decide which news to submit to our attention, at least in theory based on what had been your previous selection preferences. But if we look what happened recently, we are pretty sure that there will be decisions that will be taken by the platforms and not by the users. So this just to introduce a layer of complication more in your discussion. Thank you.

Chloe McDowell

Thank you. Next, we move to Pari Esfandiari.

Pari Esfandiari

Thank you for the floor. It’s clear that the concern today is no longer just misinformation, but the gradual erosion of cognitive autonomy in digital environments optimized to predict and shape behavior. Recommendations. systems driven by engagement tend to amplify outrage, emotional reaction, and confirmation biases. Generative AI intensifies this by making persuasion scalable, personalized, and increasingly difficult to distinguish from authentic human communication. So safeguarding cognitive sovereignty requires more than content moderation or transparency tables alone. Transparency around the recommender system should go beyond technical standards to include meaningful explanation of why certain content is amplified, how recommendation systems shape visibility, and what incentives, drive these architectures. Meaningful user control also matters. Users should have greater ability to choose how content is curated, whether algorithmic personalization is used, and what kind of recommendation systems influence their information environment.

Digital literacy goes beyond identifying false information. It must help people understand how algorithmic systems shape attention, emotion, and perception over time. And finally, platform design itself is important. We should also think about designs that encourage reflection, contextualization, exposure to diverse viewpoints, and healthier form of democratic participation. Because if AI systems increasingly shape, not only what we see, but how we think and perceive reality, then democratic debate risks becoming subtly ingenious rather than generally deliberated. Thank you.

Chloe McDowell

Thank you. Moving next to Vittorio Bertola.

Vittorio Bertola

Yes. Okay. So I’m Vittorio Bertola speaking personally on this. And first of all, since the answer to the questions up there might be regulation, and I’m actually not against this, I want to note that I’m a heavy Facebook user because I’m old. And I have not noticed any kind of even minimal change in how Facebook works after the DSA came into play or came into force. So I think it’s really a matter of enforcement, but also of understanding what enforcement of this kind of regulation means. And this is a matter we need to solve before working on new regulation on new media. Because, I mean, with AI, the problem with AI of potential manipulation, not just the effects, but with AI, it’s even of emotions.

And so I think it’s really important to understand that. important. But the problem is that at least for social media, we sort of understand how social media works. At least the people that make them understand the algorithm more or less. With AI, even the people that make the AI models don’t fully understand how they work in the end. So it’s even hard to understand what we would need to ask for these companies to do to prevent this kind of manipulation. But the real problem is that we now live in a society in which most people want to be manipulated. I mean, people are actually happy to look for confirmation biases and if you talk to people, even people from political views that used to be thinking of fact and logical, now just want to find someone who gives them reason and tells them they are right and feel right and intelligent.

So I think we really need to work on the cultural people and unfortunately this is extremely different and they have no idea what to do. So thanks for raising the problem, but I have no solutions to propose. Thank you.

Chloe McDowell

And sorry, I lost my spot. Sumeja, who’s speaking?

Sumeja Huskic

Hi. Hi. events appears online, you rarely get a full picture. You mostly get what the algorithm thinks you will engage with, one angle, one emotion, one narrative, and slowly it starts to feel like that is the whole story. And that’s what worries me the most, not what we are being told what to think, but that we are slowly being shown less and less without even realizing it. So maybe the real question is, how do we make sure that in all of this, our own thinking is still free, still critical, and still truly ours? Thank you.

Chloe McDowell

Thank you so much. And then we have Andrea Mialovic. No. And Parvin Jumshudu, no. Sophie Carr in the room. No. Okay. and Lilith Yezikia nope online the next Jeremy either as well online Nikita Danilov nope Florian Russel nope and Nadia Simeon okay well what I’ll do maybe is go back give the speakers the floor to answer the questions that we’ve had and then much and then we have andrea mil me and lovic no and uh parvin jim should you know uh sophie carr in the room no okay and lilith yes yes yeah nope uh online um okay uh the next jeremy either as well online nope um mikita danilov no florian russell nope and nadia simeon okay well oh well what i’ll do maybe is uh go back give the speakers the floor to answer the questions that we’ve had and then given this we have some time for some spontaneous interventions as well s

Cesare Pitea

o yes thank you uh for the floor the contributions uh i think were very interesting they really pointed at a growing consensus about what the problem what the problems are what is the what are the possible ways to find solutions but of course then um the the big elephant in the room is how do we get there how do we ensure enforcement how do we ensure that resources are out there for regulators or civil society organizations to play the role that is necessary in order to bring platform accountability into reality. But after having a presentation, very institutional presentation, I want to ask you a question. Do how many of you think that it is fair and acceptable that a paid content pushed by a government, a foreign government, is brought to your attention?

I would also say carrying, let’s say, information or not particularly accurate or a viewpoint on current events is brought to your attention? Is it a good thing to do? Is it a bad thing to do? Is it a good thing to do? Is it a good thing to do? Is it a good thing to do? Is it a good thing to do? Is it a good thing to do? Is it a good thing to do? Is it a good thing to do? Is it a good thing to do? Is it a good thing to do? so you like to watch videos of people cooking and all of a sudden a platform brings on your feed a paid content pushed by a foreign government paid by a foreign government on current events that have nothing to do with food and beverages well this happened to me uh i complained about this and the platform i will not name names here said that that was perfectly okay there was no breach of uh any uh any um terms of and conditions another example is uh well as you see i spent some time trying this these things some point i see the presidents of the italian republic advertising financial services and i think that’s what i was trying to do and i think that’s what i was trying to do and i think that’s what i was trying to do and i think that’s what i was trying to do after a moment of displacement because it seemed very real I realized that this could not have been possible it took me three rounds of back and forth with the platform to convince them that this was against their own rules so there’s clearly room for improvements on what we can do and this is and I see that the commission under DSA is really taking some action in this direction the meaningful nature the user -friendly nature of of user controls is one of the keys so we do now have the instruments to make sure that we cannot rely on us individually to go after you know to spend you know I did it because I had an interest you know intellectual professional interest to do that but people have lives to live and luckily so so They don’t go after, they can’t spend hours, you know, quarreling with the platform about their own terms and conditions.

They should know what their own terms and conditions are, not the user. The user should be able to flag it in simple terms. So this is evidence of something that is more structural, and these things need to be addressed.

Asha Allen

Thank you for all of the interventions that were really, really interesting. And I’m going to try and address only a few of them because there were quite a few. But I want to reiterate that public interest platforms do exist, right? I think many of us, especially in my time at university, which was many years ago, was told not to use Wikipedia for my references. Wikipedia still uses a community -based model for its content moderation and its platform, right? You have other platforms that are emerging, Mastodon and others. There are models that are there. Yeah, right. I think in terms of the narrative in which there are just dominant platforms. dominant platforms that we are only engaging in and there aren’t other models that could be invested in i think you know there are there but there is a need for more and i i think we can we can agree there um to come back to the reflections about the rules in place and enforcement rules have always accompanied innovation particularly in on this continent right back to the industrial revolution you don’t have the industrial revolution without there then being some sort of harm and then rules being put in place you’re in belgium where there’s some pretty strong unions here i think there’s a long history of kind of rules going uh aligned with um innovation so this isn’t anything new right and the argument that somehow rules are hampering innovation also isn’t new but we’ve also been able to overcome them for many other industries so i think we should always be mindful of that in particular now the last thing i want to want to focus on is that kind of why enforcement takes as long as it does but what you can actually do in the meantime right so So every decision that the European Commission has made, we’ve had one definitive decision on X under the DSA, but we’ve had requests for information, preliminary findings.

There’s a whole long process under the DSA. And every stage, the companies have sued or gone to court. There isn’t a moment where they’re not going to court to push back on elements of enforcement. Right. There isn’t a moment, for example, when the DSA came into force that all of a sudden public publicly available APIs for researchers were completely removed or suddenly you had to pay 45000 euros to be able to access those. Right. The pushback to compliance was there from the very beginning. But the enforcement bodies need to do what they need to do under the arm of the legal framework that they have. They need to make sure that their cases are watertight so that they don’t end up in front of the Europeans.

And then have a reversal in their decisions, because then everything under their enforcement arm is going to be questioned even further. So that’s one thing. However. the DSA and other regulatory frameworks and agreements provide other means, right? So private enforcement under the DSA exists. I will call out an incredible organization, Bits of Freedom, based in the Netherlands, who took Meta to court for not implementing the user empowerment tools on their platform, right? And they won and Meta appealed and they still won. So in the Netherlands, this tiny, you know, tiny but mighty civil society organization took on one of the biggest platforms and they won because they had the legal basis under the law. And it means in the Netherlands, users now have greater control under the DSA for what they’re engaging with when they’re on Facebook.

Now, unfortunately, that’s only in the Netherlands because that’s where the case is. But that’s inspiration for other areas, right? There are over 30 ,000 people who have used the out -of -court dispute settlement bodies already. And the out -of -court dispute settlement bodies also have transparency reports that show you the decisions that were reversed, how effective that they have been. There’s also this massive transparency library on statement of reasons. You don’t have to go through it. It’s something like five billion reasons. No one has time to go through that. However, you can probe it. And they are thinking about frameworks for you to be able to probe it in a much more efficient way. So it’s not just a case of relying on the enforcement bodies who would legally have the mandate to hold these companies to account.

And they are increasingly being bold. Right. The preliminary findings from the European Commission that TikTok’s entire platform and the infinite scroll is addictive design is actually quite huge. Right. Because it fundamentally questions whether a huge feature of that platform is compliant with mitigating risks of mental well -being, protection of minors and other fundamental rights harms. So we have to see where that takes us. But there are other tools that we can use in the meantime. So I actually think there’s a bit of a question. We hear about our enforcement bodies, the European Commission, others being able to bet. better convey, better communicate what you have at your disposal and how you can have these rights at your disposal.

And to be able to let you know that there are organizations like CDT, Bits of Freedom, a bunch of others who are all working for users empowerment, so actually taking these questions to court, who are publishing the evidence that’s needed for the investigations and who are interested in engaging with impacted communities. So there are multiple avenues. I think it’s just about making sure everybody knows what those avenues are.

Chloe McDowell

Wonderful. Once again, thank you for raising these points and at the risk of running a little bit over time. I know there’s two hands there and here as well. One online. So we’ll try and get through those and then wrap up the final messages of the session. So the two ladies there.

On-site participant

It’s not working. Hello, my name is Jaska and I’m a part of YouthDig and I wanted to speak to the value of regulation to force accountability in strengthening the digital public sphere My generation was a generation of unregulated social media but however, we’ve experienced the first hand the harm that this has caused us and our peers I aspire to be a part of a new movement a multi -stakeholder movement that will create the framework for a safer digital world We will instead become the generation of regulation This regulation, more specifically, needs to be safety by design Establishing guardrails and fences will not allow unsafe platforms to rule any future childhoods Regulation is a mechanism to realign markets with human rights It creates a level playing field in the digital world through clear enforceable standards In regulating platforms, we will establish the models of decency, care and humanity that we grant one another in the real world, in the digital space.

Article 28 of the Digital Services Act is the primary instrument in implementing this concept of safety by design. Under Article 28, all platforms must take appropriate and proportionate measures to protect the safety, security and privacy of miners. Safety by design must not just be a concept applied as an afterthought, but instead a guiding ethos that platforms fundamental designs. By regulating platforms with safety by design, we will change the narrative. We will shape platforms to shape our mutual future. A future where trust, safety, rights, protection and economic value are not trade -offs, but mutually reinforcing drivers of a healthy digital ecosystem. Children should not be shaped by morals and designs. Children should be shaped by morals and designs, not by platforms’ profit aspirations.

Thank you. Thank you. Good afternoon, everyone. My name is Inej Ruki. I’m also a youth digger, and I’m attending both events, Youth Dig and Eurodig, as a .pt fellow. And I wanted to make a note on the last topic of this conversation, which was on cognitive sovereignty, and especially in relation with generative AI and how young people are relating with chatbots, especially building relationships that they sometimes think are closer to personal relationships than what they really are. And I would say even in more dangerous cases, resorting to AI. chatbots as therapists, which I think is something that is really, really concerning. And I do believe that we need programs to counter that. And we also need these platforms to be stronger in allowing these people to find the help that they need instead of trying to keep people engaged in these platforms.

And so I do think we still have a path to take in this sense. Thank you.

Chloe McDowell

Thank you both. And we have another. Oh, we’ll go online and then back to you there. Peter, can you go?

Online participant

Okay. Hi there. Thank you. I’m Peter Rechels from Freddy Variety. We are an European collective of digital activism researchers actually promoting open source software. We studied actually the Freddy Variety integration public administration. We have this case on the EDPS and… their very first pilot project. I can tell you that no regulation alone will safeguard a democratic debate, that’s for sure. You know, it all depends on a collective, collaborative and coordinated effort as we just learned here. What Europe really needs is a social stack, a sovereign digital infrastructure built on the values we already share, digital autonomy, decentralization, diverse ownership, editorial pluralism, and algorithms treated as institutions that serve the public interests, like broadcasts and libraries.

The vision on this is actually already converging across the Fediverse, Eurosky, and private messaging ecosystems. The technology works, the EDPS pilot there that I referred to on the Fediverse proved that already. We at Fediveriety, we studied it. So this is no longer a technical question, it’s political choice. The math actually is simple. If you redirect even a modest share of public digital spending towards open alternatives, and you sustain local developers, break foreign dependency, and recirculate the billions Europe generates in social media back into European hands, then, you know, no single platform or protocol can match the scale of big tech alone here. But an ecosystem that can do that, shared infrastructure, open protocols, small builders, empowered to innovate, users free to move.

That’s why I look forward to something like the DC Etic as a coordination framework to sustainability fund the critical open source infrastructure that the European social stack actually demands. The tools exist. The political will is what is missing here. Thank you

Chloe McDowell

Thank you and over to you

On-site participant

Thank you very much my name is Adam Lam I am a representative with the Advisory Council on Youth in the Council of Europe and I’m also a youth digger here at the event I wanted to build on what Asha was saying about platforms large platforms, social media platforms being based on this passive engagement model as a core business and a profit driven algorithm I appreciate what Federico brought in about the alternative platforms that do exist that are more community driven and may have more public interests in mind but the core addictive element to the engagement based algorithms means that users are also more likely to stick to that because of that very addiction so I’m wondering what further provisions can be done to prevent addictive design specifically under the current EU regulations, but also the Digital Fairness Act and where do you guys see the opportunities to regulate addictive design and to what extent can we have this democratic governance or participation in the development of private algorithms because this is, again, maybe proprietary intellectual property, but how can we have community engagement or civic engagement in the development of this and the changing of these larger platforms and can the DFA have real power in that and maybe if there’s examples, Cesare, from the Council of Europe, if there’s any good principles to build on there or things that could be taken into account by the EU and drawn on from that.

Asha Allen

great i’m happy to go first uh and i’ll try and be brief there was a couple of great points uh that were made and thank you so much for the intervention i’ll start with the um intervention on kind of the the european stack right and this idea um that we should build our own infrastructure and i think there’s going to be a lot of um investment in that the current negotiations on the next multi -financial framework um is happening right now and i know that’s at the core of that too one thing that we always kind of convey as part of this discussion is that if we’re going to do this and build this new infrastructure and build different um opportunities and and choices for users and and communities it has to be grounded in the charter of fundamental rights but we also have to recognize that not everybody in the european union has been able to enjoy their fundamental rights and human rights right these are still ideals that we are pushing for there are a lot of communities who experience harm in the european union and so what this cannot be framed by is actually a kind of of competitive race to catch up or to be embedded in this wider geopolitical conversation that’s going to lead this to push for heavy investment in infrastructure that we’re not entirely aware of what those risks may be we’ve seen very clear cases of public authorities using systems that they did not know how they worked and it led to actual harm you have the benefit scandal in the netherlands where people were were mistakenly saying that they were fraudulently claiming benefits you had the post office case in the uk and many others but this i think also leads to the point on ai and that was made just here and also connects to the other point in regards to not under the companies themselves not understanding these systems i would also challenge that a little bit that notion that they don’t know the systems that they are developing they have the means to kind of sandbox test their their innovations right and actually that’s at the core of elements of the ai act it takes an entirely risk -based approach and if you’re also going to deploy an AI system under the DSA you have to assess and mitigate the potential risks of it before it’s deployed right and so we’re very lucky to have an AI governance lab in our US office with brilliant technologists who pose these precise questions how do you test an AI for specific harms and there are means to do it so I think we should just push back against the notion that something should be deployed on the market especially in the public sector before this testing has been done.

Then the last thing I’ll say about the addictive design I agree it’s going to be at the heart of the digital fairness act conversations because the DSA is actually quite ambiguous in what it says in regards to safety by design and addictive design this is also why I think the TikTok case is so important in regards to what the commission has actually said in their initial decisions. One thing I will say, though, is I personally think and again, I might be slightly biased. I’ve been working on the DSA since before the DSA was the DSA. So it’s somewhat etched into my brain at this point. I think Article 40 might be one of the most powerful things in the DSA.

And that’s data access for vetted researchers. Right. And I know the Council of Europe have put this in their framework, too. When we have interdisciplinary research, this is folks who are looking at recommender systems from a psychology perspective, from a harms mitigation perspective, from a community rights perspective, being able to test those systems, get access to the data in privacy respecting ways and to be able to develop the research, the evidence base that we need to definitively say the distinct harms that addictive design poses, is to all of us, but also to particularly vulnerable communities. That’s going to be a very powerful tool for enforcement bodies to be able to use to say, OK, now we’re going to ask you to fundamentally make some change if you want to operate in the single market.

but unfortunately from what we understand from our brilliant public interest uh researcher friends no one’s had access to data as of yet um and the pushback is immense i will tell you that during the negotiations of the dsa that was one of the maybe four or five articles that was being pushed back the hardest right down to the wire so we have to make use of it because that article not only allows vetted researchers to have access but public interest civil society organizations to also have access to data too right and to work collectively on that so it’s an extremely powerful tool that we need to make the use of so we can build that evidence base to say here is the impact of addictive design on multiple communities and here’s how we hold uh platforms to account under this cleared code regular framework so how to mitigate that risk.

Cesare Pitea

thank you very much and yes very fundamental questions and issues so first The question is, does regulation cause into question the business model of major platforms? That’s, of course, a very topical question. And, well, you should not expect the law to give you a very clear answer because the law is the product of a compromise, is always the product of a compromise. But we can talk about this and we can remind what Asha was saying before. It’s not always being like this. This was a very clear change in the business model that was driven by one competitor introducing certain features that were appealing. or addictive, that’s to be discussed to the public and everybody else followed after.

So that’s not the only model. The alternatives are possible even within mainstream platforms. Then the law is a process. So, for example, in the recommendation of, in the preamble to the recommendation, to our recommendation, there is language about the business model of platforms that gives a little bit of frame. Well, it’s a non -operative part of a non -binding instrument, sure, but it says something about that. And, again, this is a case to be built. And this is if what we… reproach to platforms is to be top -down, then here is the opportunity to be bottom -up, to build up this case through civil society coalitions, coalitions between scientists, social scientists, computer scientists, civil society organizations, digital rights advocacy organizations.

I think regulation like the DSA provides a framework to make these kinds of arguments and also to empower civil society to promote and to observe and to criticize and to point at possible capture interests and to keep up with the current situation. It’s very important to recognize on us on what we do and how we do it. Well, I institutionally have to say how important journalism is also in this respect, which is always forgotten. Journalism is one of the main victims of all we’re talking about today. Second, alternative infrastructures. Here I have to, again, have an institutional demeanor. I would just mention that there is another document that was adopted by the Steering Committee on Media and Information Society, which is called 10 Steps to Counter Disinformation, 10 Building Blocks, sorry, to Counter Disinformation.

And one of these 10 building blocks refers exactly to infrastructure. So we need to reduce dependency in our information, good information, and the use of public goods. And if it is a public good, it needs not only a European infrastructure, but an infrastructure that is built around the idea of public interest. As much as in the revolution in broadcasting and the opening up to private broadcasters, we have kept our public service broadcasters, we have kept our public service media, with the idea that they had a mission that went beyond the mission of broadcasters generally, of media generally. We can… We can build on this idea, and there are a lot of initiatives. EBU is promoting a platform for public service media content, a European platform for public service media content, and there are a lot of initiatives in this respect.

Then the problem… remains. So I’m asking you a question. Are you more, do you spend more time on Instagram or on Blue Sky? Exactly.

Chloe McDowell

Okay, at the risk of cutting short the conversation, I know we need to move on now to the final part of the session. So Murillo has been diligently taking notes throughout. And we’ll present now, there it is on the screen, a general formulation of what’s been discussed. So just to ask everybody if we’re all in agreement that this captures the essence of the discussion. The aim is to reach a consensus. I know that there will be a week following the event where this can be commented on as well. So the goal is not to go down to the wire on the specific wording. But if everyone’s in agreement, that this reflects accurately the main points that emerged from the debate, then…

So maybe, Mario, you want to read this out?

Murillo Salvador

okay thank you thank you for the discussion it was a pleasure to be the reporter for this and I am sorry for all of the sometimes choices of inclusion, exclusion that is part of the job. And so if there are any objections, please feel free to raise them in order to achieve a rough consensus. I will read the four points that I put together. Maybe there is some overlap here. Maybe I need to cut a few words, but here is what I put together. First, we consider platforms as a social digital infrastructure of democracy, yet these platforms were not designed to fulfill civic function. Instead, they optimize engagement, for instance, with the deployment of dark patterns like infinite scrolling.

They are not neutral communication and information channels. They distort the public debate by enabling the spread of disinformation. In this context, civil society acting within platform ecosystems such as fact -checking collectives and other actors should be supported as key partners of the digital world. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Secondly, we view the loss of cognitive sovereignty as an emerging risk linked to the embedding of AI into these platforms. Algorithmic management from the recommendation systems to automated moderation need to take into account. Democratic principles from the design stage are not as an afterthought. Here provenance and verification mechanisms are crucial as the AI -driven synthetic content and identities become more prominent in the digital public sphere faster than regulations can be deployed.

In this context, the deployment of AI tools themselves can go through preliminary steps of testing and sandboxing before reaching the market. Thirdly, the rules do not necessarily hamper innovation. In fact, existing regulation acts as a powerful deterrent for platforms’ worst outcomes in democracy. Participants called for a stronger DSA compliance. And here, civil society can play a key role as partners for public authorities. to make platform operators accountable with regards to the law. At the same time, the Council of Europe frameworks provide foundations to expand users’ agency and international human rights provide a universal basis for users seeking to make platforms take action where no regulation exists. And fourth and final point, the discussion invites us to move from a consumer perspective towards an understanding of digital citizenship as embedded in platforms.

Platform design is a fluid outcome of choices, and new business and engagement models should be incentivized, such as community -driven platforms that already exist and perform a civic function. At the same time, alternative forms of democratic engagement should be supported outside of platforms, including deliberative and multi -stakeholder formats. I’m sorry. That’s it. Many thanks. Thank you.

Chloe McDowell

And if we have no… No strong objections to those main messages, then… we will proceed. Okay. Wonderful. Thank you, Maria, and thank you to the online moderators and to the speakers as well.

Related ResourcesKnowledge base sources related to the discussion topics (18)
Factual NotesClaims verified against the Diplo knowledge base (5)
Confirmedmedium

“McDowell referred to existing legal frameworks including the Digital Services Act.”

The knowledge base confirms that the EU Digital Services Act is a relevant existing framework for platform accountability and content governance, including transparency duties, algorithmic risk assessments, and user controls over personalised recommendations [S78].

Additional Contextmedium

“Rasanen argued that dominant platforms were not built for democratic discourse but for engagement and profit.”

The knowledge base adds context by describing social media as an attention economy in which the most valued content is what attracts attention, reinforcing the report’s account that platform design incentives are geared toward engagement rather than democratic deliberation [S130].

Additional Contextmedium

“Rasanen said social media has become the main source of news and information on political and social issues for young people, overtaking print and linear television.”

The knowledge base provides partial supporting context: it reports that in the US 39% of children choose to get their news via social media, indicating the growing importance of social platforms as a news source for younger users, though it does not directly confirm the cross-country comparison or the claim that social media has overtaken all traditional media for the age group cited in the report [S130].

Confirmedmedium

“Rasanen said the first priority should be compliance with existing regulation rather than assuming platforms will start fostering democracy on their own.”

The knowledge base supports this framing by noting that there is growing consensus that stronger content governance is needed and that self-regulation by platforms may be insufficient, with the EU using the DSA to force greater accountability [S78].

Additional Contextlow

“Rasanen stressed that regulation must have genuinely dissuasive force if it is to change platform behaviour.”

The knowledge base adds relevant context by describing how governments have increasingly moved toward stronger enforcement tools, fines, and removal obligations in content policy, reflecting the broader logic that weak or non-dissuasive measures may fail to alter platform conduct [S129].

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Elizabeth McClintock — Elizabeth McClintock
S35
Florence N Bangalie — Florence N Bangalie
S36
Work for a brighter future — Professor General for Human Resources and Social Policy Chung has also served as Member of the UN …
S37
BREAK OUT ROOM 2: The Declaration for the Future of the Internet: Principles to Action — Catherine Townsend Speech speed 176 words per minute …
S38
Antti Kaski — Antti Kaski
S39
Ossi Piironen — Ossi Piironen
S40
Randriamiadana Zakasoa Arilova — https://diplo-media.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/2023/09/Zakasoa-Arilova-1.jpg Mr Randriamiadana Zakasoa Arilova has be…
S41
Oleksandr Pastukhov — Oleksandr Pastukhov
S42
Boris Begović — https://diplo-media.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/2021/10/2P2VffLn-Boris-Begovic.jpg Mr Boris Begović serves as the coor…
S43
World Economic Forum – Global Coalition for Digital Safety | IGF 2023 Side Event — https://www.intgovforum.org/en/content/enhancing-digital-safety-the-world-economic-forum-global-coalitions-collaborative…
S44
Online trust: between competences and intentions — This will help users to make more informed decisions on how they want to use Internet services and applications. Second,…
S45
In the Internet we trust: Is there a need for an Internet social contract? — The current trust deficit and ways to overcome it are the focus of a recent blog by Michael Moller, acting director of t…
S46
The Internet and trust — It looks promising. Stefan Bechtold focused on legal considerations of online trust. One of the main legal issues that c…
S47
Lightning Talk #22 Eurodig Inviting Global Stakeholders — He suggests that when governments are not constructive, other stakeholders like businesses and civil society can be more…
S48
Global Youth Summit: Too Young to Scroll? Age verification and social media regulation — Evidence Comparison to cigarettes and tobacco industry accountability, and the economic model of attention that is har…
S49
Information Integrity on Digital Platforms | Our Common Agenda Policy Brief 8 — Available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/mex_23_723. DIGITAL PLATFORM RESPONSES Digital…
S50
Digital democracy and future realities | IGF 2023 WS #476 — Who should be having these conversations about making these spaces? And yeah, that’s kind of why we’re all gathered here…
S51
The New Media landscape — New Media is a broad term that can refer to everything from interactive photo and video displays to social blogging plat…
S52
The fading of human agency in automated systems — How decision-making quietly shifts from judgment to supervision In many domains today, humans remain formally responsi…
S53
Main Topic 4: Transatlantic rift on Freedom of Expression — The system has created a system based on mutual distrust, a certain system of checks and balances. The actors mutually s…
S54
High Level Session 1: Losing the Information Space? Ensuring Human Rights and Resilient Societies in the Age of Big Tech — Speakers – Lucio Adrian Ruiz- Liisa Ly Pakosta Arguments Digital culture fundamentally changes human relationships, rea…
S55
Decolonise Digital Rights: For a Globally Inclusive Future | IGF 2023 WS #64 — Pedro, one of the individuals mentioned in the analysis, is portrayed as an advocate for the diversification of internet…
S56
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression (A/HRC/38/35) — 57. 139 Chinmayi Arun, “Rebalancing regulation of speech: hyper-local content on global web-based platforms”, Berkm…
S57
Fake news: what’s behind the media frenzy — Discussions about fake news, ignited right after the US Presidential election in November 2016, have continued to domi…
S58
To connect and disconnect: Unraveling the social fabric of the Internet — Digital technologies could have enabled social scientists and policymakers to reveal tenants in society that are problem…
S59
Lightning Talk #139 Including youth to the public discourse — So if I like football content I might have a lot of football content in my feed and if I like Andrew Tate well I might g…
S60
Do we really need specialised AI regulation? — Most likely not. Many existing laws are applicable to AI as well. This text aims to spark debate and bring greater clari…
S61
DW Weekly #125 – 28 August 2023 — Issue #125|Tuesday, 29 Aug 2023|Reading time:11 mins|Read online Dear readers, The EU’s Digital Services Ac…
S62
EU Cyber Resilience Act: Enforcing cyber norms far beyond Europe — The EU is drafting new cybersecurity rules, titled the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA), which have the potential to significa…
S63
WS #300 Information Integrity through Journalism & Alternative Platforms — It’s not about states talking to each other. It’s about everybody being involved. It’s inclusive, human rights-based, hu…
S64
How institutions can effectively use social media? — The destiny of ACTA (the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement) is an example of the limits of traditional diplomacy and t…
S65
(Re)-Building Trust Online: A Call to Action | IGF 2023 Launch / Award Event #144 — A speaker, Nick Beniquista, argued for major system-level interventions to address the challenges faced by the informati…
S66
‘Deplatforming’ Donald Trump was a necessary quick fix. What now? — In the twilight of a presidency characterised by 30,573 lies and constant misinformation, most social media platforms ha…
S67
Regulating social media: a multistakeholder ‘content congress’ — You do not have to be a fan of conspiracy theories to worry about the precedent that Apple, YouTube and Facebook set by …
S68
Day 0 Event #252 Editorial Media and Big Tech Dependency the Material Conditions for a Free and Resilient NeWS Media — But the thing I wanted to pick up on was what Pamela was talking about, because she gave a really good example about the…
S69
Internet Governance Forum 2025 — They’re choices.” Business Model Concerns Several sessions identified platforms’ advertising-driven business models as f…
S70
Digital services regulation: opportunities and challenges — Consequently, the implementation of the DSA could become problematic if the country of establishment of digital services…
S71
[Briefing #51] Internet governance forecast for 2019 — The size, market power, and influence of giant companies have made policymakers (especially in the EU) very uncomfortabl…
S72
Civil society — Civil society is increasingly important actor in multilateral diplomacy. Typically, it represents views and interest of …
S73
Ensuring that civil society’s voice is heard in ICANN — On 4 May, the Geneva Internet Platform and ICANN organised an open discussion on Ensuring Civil Society’s Voice is Heard…
S74
Balancing act: advocacy with big tech in restrictive regimes | IGF 2023 — It is crucial to consider the legal environment in which a company operates and engage with relevant departments, such a…
S75
[Webinar summary] What is the role of civil society and communities towards a peaceful cyberspace? — The Geneva Internet Platform (GIP) organised a webinar entitled ‘What is the role of civil society and communities towar…
S76
AI diplomacy — Privacy and data protection are particularly pertinent, given that AI systems often require massive datasets, which can …
S77
Human rights — Clear frameworks for accountability and oversight are necessary to address issues arising from AI’s use. 5. Legal and R…
S78
AI and Digital in 2023: From a winter of excitement to an autumn of clarity — It’s important to remember that AI also had an effect on the press in 2023. The 2023 World Press Freedom Index found tha…
S79
Workshop 7: Generative AI and Freedom of Expression: mutual reinforcement or forced exclusion? — Evidence Academic research showing collective AI-generated content becomes more similar across groups Major discussi…
S80
Towards a Resilient Information Ecosystem: Balancing Platform Governance and Technology — Speakers – Ingrid Volkmer- Tawfik Jelassi Arguments Crisis scenarios are increasing globally, requiring a shift from fo…
S81
Hey, Govs – leave those ISPs alone! (2) — Part II: What is the way to Internet regulation?   “In managing, promoting and protecting the Internet presence in our l…
S82
WEF Business Engagement Session: Safety in Innovation – Building Digital Trust and Resilience — focusing on content that poses real-world safety risks Speakers – Valiant Richey- Peter Stern Arguments Robust misinfo…
S83
Why is Shadow AI dangerous for diplomats? — In addition, visualisations can fix certain interpretations of data as “the” narrative, sometimes oversimplifying comple…
S84
AI diplomacy — Privacy and data protection are particularly pertinent, given that AI systems often require massive datasets, which can …
S85
Four seasons of AI:  From excitement to clarity in the first year of ChatGPT — How to address AI risks   There are three main types of AI risks that should shape AI regulations:  the immediate a…
S86
Review of AI and digital developments in 2024 — Existing risks are more specific and concrete affecting jobs, education, and media, among others. Exclusion risks are be…
S87
Information Integrity on Digital Platforms | Our Common Agenda Policy Brief 8 — Available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/mex_23_723. DIGITAL PLATFORM RESPONSES Digital…
S88
Ethics and AI | Part 6 — Mechanisms should be put in place afterwards to allow for external feedback on any potential infringement of fundamental…
S89
Navigating disinformation — Economic incentives and disinformation Disinformation often has financial, political, or social motives. Financial gains…
S90
Multistakeholder platform regulation and the Global South | IGF 2023 Town Hall #170 — This asymmetry can limit the effectiveness of stakeholder participation and influence policy outcomes. Topics: Polic…
S91
Balancing act: advocacy with big tech in restrictive regimes | IGF 2023 — It is crucial to consider the legal environment in which a company operates and engage with relevant departments, such a…
S92
WS #133 Platform Governance and Duty of Care — NGOs, and private actors, rather than relying solely on government regulation or platform self-regulation Topics Legal …
S93
Platform and data neutrality: Access to content — This session was moderated by Mr Vladimir Radunović (Cybersecurity and E-diplomacy Programmes Director, DiploFoundation)…
S94
High Level Session 1: Losing the Information Space? Ensuring Human Rights and Resilient Societies in the Age of Big Tech — Bruttin provided a more critical assessment, arguing that tech platforms have systematically weakened traditional news m…
S95
Digital democracy and future realities | IGF 2023 WS #476 — However, the introduction of alternative protocols such as ActivityPub offers the potential for innovation in online soc…
S96
Towards a Resilient Information Ecosystem: Balancing Platform Governance and Technology — Speakers – Ingrid Volkmer- Tawfik Jelassi Arguments Crisis scenarios are increasing globally, requiring a shift from fo…
S97
The fading of human agency in automated systems — How decision-making quietly shifts from judgment to supervision In many domains today, humans remain formally responsi…
S98
Protecting the Vulnerable Online — Furthermore, it is argued that platforms should prioritize user safety from the beginning by designing their products wi…
S99
Online Choice Architecture: How digital design can harm competition and consumers — While providing clear benefits, these seamless and expedient processes may induce more impulsive, and therefore ha…
S100
WS #152 a Competition Rights Approach to Digital Markets — Current theories of harm are insufficient to address the scale of platform dominance and its societal effects. Evidenc…
S101
[Parliamentary session 1] Digital deceit: The societal impact of online mis- and disinformation — This bias limits the comprehensiveness of solutions and understanding of information ecosystem challenges globally. Ev…
S102
Internet Governance Forum 2025 — They’re choices.” Business Model Concerns Several sessions identified platforms’ advertising-driven business models as f…
S103
Information Integrity on Digital Platforms | Our Common Agenda Policy Brief 8 — Available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/mex_23_723. DIGITAL PLATFORM RESPONSES Digital…
S104
High Level Session 1: Losing the Information Space? Ensuring Human Rights and Resilient Societies in the Age of Big Tech — Bruttin provided a more critical assessment, arguing that tech platforms have systematically weakened traditional news m…
S105
Digital services regulation: opportunities and challenges — Consequently, the implementation of the DSA could become problematic if the country of establishment of digital services…
S106
[Briefing #51] Internet governance forecast for 2019 — While parliamentarians in the EU suggested the creation of ‘a specific legal status for robots’, over 150 AI experts rai…
S107
Civil society — Civil society is increasingly important actor in multilateral diplomacy. Typically, it represents views and interest of …
S108
[Webinar summary] What is the role of civil society and communities towards a peaceful cyberspace? — The Geneva Internet Platform (GIP) organised a webinar entitled ‘What is the role of civil society and communities towar…
S109
WS #133 Platform Governance and Duty of Care — Evidence Trusted flaggers system under Article 22 DSA where organizations get certified by Digital Services Coordinato…
S110
Ensuring that civil society’s voice is heard in ICANN — On 4 May, the Geneva Internet Platform and ICANN organised an open discussion on Ensuring Civil Society’s Voice is Heard…
S111
Balancing act: advocacy with big tech in restrictive regimes | IGF 2023 — It is crucial to consider the legal environment in which a company operates and engage with relevant departments, such a…
S112
Human rights — Clear frameworks for accountability and oversight are necessary to address issues arising from AI’s use. 5. Legal and R…
S113
Certifying humanity: Labeling content amid AI flood — For much of the public debate around artificial intelligence, attention has been fixed on capability: how powerful model…
S114
The fading of human agency in automated systems — How decision-making quietly shifts from judgment to supervision In many domains today, humans remain formally responsi…
S115
AI and Digital in 2023: From a winter of excitement to an autumn of clarity — It’s important to remember that AI also had an effect on the press in 2023. The 2023 World Press Freedom Index found tha…
S116
AI and international peace and security: Key issues and relevance for Geneva — Indeed, even if the issue is not deciding on a target or whether to pull a trigger, questions remain around the extent t…
S117
WS #300 Information Integrity through Journalism & Alternative Platforms — This represents the most important current international framework process. Evidence Referenced that WSIS+20 documen…
S118
Towards a Resilient Information Ecosystem: Balancing Platform Governance and Technology — Speakers – Ingrid Volkmer- Tawfik Jelassi Arguments Crisis scenarios are increasing globally, requiring a shift from fo…
S119
Day 0 Event #252 Editorial Media and Big Tech Dependency the Material Conditions for a Free and Resilient NeWS Media — federated, and open-source solutions Establish regional press ethical systems similar to Nordic models to build trust …
S120
Tackling disinformation, protecting democratic governance: Challenges and opportunities — The mechanisms behind disinformation vary by context, therefore, addressing the problem requires not only reactive one-s…
S121
Main Session 3: Internet Governance and elections: maximising potential for trust and addressing risks — We want tech companies to adhere to full transparency and accountability and the proper content moderation and curatio…
S122
Online conference ‘The Future of Meetings’ — ), transparency (knowing what levels of security the platform guarantees), technology that ensures protection of data (s…
S123
AI, smart cities, and the surveillance trade-off — Without deliberate intervention, AI will reproduce and amplify those patterns at scale. As cities around the world rus…
S124
The right of consular access: Two recent examples — 36 acceptable or is the obligation under Art. 36 unconditional? https://www.diplomacy.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Ala…
S125
Gabriele Mazzini — Gabriele Mazzini is the architect and lead author of the proposal on the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) at the Eur…
S126
US pressures Italy to end web tax on tech giants — The United States has renewed pressure on Italy to scrap its domestic web tax, sources say, warning that ignoring the re…
S127
Giuseppe Mazziotti — Giuseppe Mazziotti
S128
The year of AI clarity: 10 AI Forecasts for 2025 — 9. Singapore Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA): IMDA regulates online content and enforces the Protection f…
S129
Mid-year review of digital policy: When technology meets humanity — Using AI to fight illegal content Companies have advanced the fight against the spread of fake news. They are experime…
S130
Youth and media literacy: EU – US lessons and practices — In Where policy and practice collide, Monica Bulger et al. point out that they thereby transcend the administrative and …
S131
Young people’s digital responsibility — What would you say if you had to read that on average, children in Europe start to go online at the age of seven? And ho…
Speakers Analysis
Detailed breakdown of each speaker’s arguments and positions
F
Florence Ranson
2 arguments134 words per minute192 words85 seconds
Argument 1
Trust and accountability frame the platform debate (Florence Ranson)
EXPLANATION
Florence Ranson opens the session by placing platform accountability within a broader discussion about trustworthiness in digital spaces. Her point is that accountability is a core ingredient of trust, so any serious conversation about platforms must be grounded in that relationship.
EVIDENCE
She explicitly says that trustworthiness is essential and that accountability is a clear element of trust, linking this framing to the discussions already held the previous day [4-5]. She also introduces the session as one that will go deeper into platform accountability as a continuation of that trust-centered agenda [6-7].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External sources reinforce the link between trust, accountability, and Internet governance. Online trust is described as dependent not only on technical competence but on the intentions and business models of Internet actors, with calls for transparency and a new digital social contract to rebuild trust [S44] [S45] [S46].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 1: Platforms as democratic infrastructure and sources of risk
Argument 2
Platform accountability was highlighted in prior youth discussions and remains a core concern for democratic trustworthiness (Florence Ranson)
EXPLANATION
Ranson argues that platform accountability is not only an institutional concern but also one already strongly raised by young participants. She presents it as a recurring issue tied to the trustworthiness of the digital environment and worthy of deeper collective discussion.
EVIDENCE
She notes that platform accountability had already been discussed the day before and says it came out quite strongly in the outcomes from the youth dig discussions summarized earlier [5][7][9-10].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 6: Youth, harm prevention, and safer digital environments
C
Chloe McDowell
4 arguments137 words per minute1608 words701 seconds
Argument 1
Platforms shape visibility, credibility, and democratic participation, not just communication (Chloe McDowell)
EXPLANATION
Chloe McDowell argues that digital platforms are not neutral pipes for speech but part of the architecture of public debate itself. Their design decisions affect what people see, what spreads, what feels credible, and ultimately how citizens participate in democratic life.
EVIDENCE
She states that platforms are no longer merely channels but part of the architecture of debate, and that their design choices shape visibility, spread, reward structures, and what comes to feel credible or meaningful [16-19]. She further explains that the digital public sphere is where meaning is constructed and contested, so platform accountability concerns the conditions under which people form opinions and exercise democratic judgment [19].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is supported by evidence that platform algorithms optimized for profit and engagement tend to push users toward polarizing or provocative content, shaping what gains attention and influence in public discourse [S49]. Additional context comes from analyses of fake news, microtargeting, and algorithmic prioritization of sensational content online [S57].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 1: Platforms as democratic infrastructure and sources of risk
AGREED WITH
Cesare Pitea, Asha Allen, On-site participant
Argument 2
The core question is whether platforms expand or narrow human agency, so the debate should focus on conditions for autonomous judgment (Chloe McDowell)
EXPLANATION
McDowell rejects a simplistic view of users as passive consumers and instead emphasizes that users actively interpret and participate online. The real issue, in her view, is whether platform systems support that agency and autonomous judgment or manipulate and constrain it.
EVIDENCE
She cautions against the idea of passive consumption, saying users are not simply passive and that engagement, interpretation, and participation are active processes [20-22]. She then frames the central problem as whether surrounding systems expand agency or exploit and narrow it, connecting platform accountability to the conditions for opinion formation, judgment, and democratic participation [23-24][19].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is strongly echoed in analysis of automated systems showing that recommendations and rankings increasingly function as defaults, shifting people from active decision-making to passive supervision and narrowing effective human agency [S52].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 3: User empowerment, civil society, and collective action
AGREED WITH
Cesare Pitea, Denys Nazarenko, Pari Esfandiari, Asha Allen, Murillo Salvador
DISAGREED WITH
Asha Allen, Vittorio Bertola, Pari Esfandiari, Sumeja Huskic
Argument 3
Platform accountability also concerns cognition and autonomy because digital systems influence how people form opinions and exercise judgment (Chloe McDowell)
EXPLANATION
McDowell argues that accountability is not limited to content moderation or formal compliance. It also involves how platforms shape cognition, autonomy, and the mental conditions under which people understand information and participate politically.
EVIDENCE
She says platforms have the power to shape individual and collective cognition and autonomy, and stresses that this matters because facts and arguments are always interpreted through social, emotional, and cognitive frames [19]. She adds that platform accountability is about the conditions under which people form opinions, exercise judgment, and participate in democratic life [19].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External sources support the claim that digital systems shape cognition and judgment. Recommendation systems and automated outputs increasingly become defaults that subtly steer perception and action, contributing to a gradual fading of human agency [S52]. Related discussion also warns that technology is not neutral and reshapes reality perception and ethical frameworks [S54].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 4: AI, cognitive sovereignty, and behavioral manipulation
AGREED WITH
Asha Allen, Cesare Pitea, Pari Esfandiari, Giacomo Mazzone, Sumeja Huskic, Murillo Salvador, On-site participant, Vittorio Bertola
DISAGREED WITH
Asha Allen, Vittorio Bertola, Pari Esfandiari, Sumeja Huskic
Argument 4
Better awareness of rights and remedies is part of reclaiming user autonomy from platform power (Chloe McDowell)
EXPLANATION
In responding to Asha Allen’s intervention, McDowell stresses that user autonomy depends not only on formal rights but on knowing those rights exist and can be used. Reclaiming autonomy therefore requires practical awareness of available tools and remedies against large platforms.
EVIDENCE
She says that part of reclaiming autonomy is being aware of the tools people have at their disposal and what civil society can do to push back against the power of big platforms [129-130].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is supported by calls for clearer terms of service, more transparency about data handling, and awareness-building so users can make informed decisions and better protect their interests online [S44] [S45] [S46].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 6: Youth, harm prevention, and safer digital environments
AGREED WITH
Asha Allen, Cesare Pitea, Lilia Simonyan, Online participant, Murillo Salvador
I
Ilkka Rasanen
4 arguments154 words per minute1394 words539 seconds
Argument 1
Democracy is declining while social media dominates young people’s time and news consumption, yet dominant platforms are built for engagement rather than civic discourse (Ilkka Rasanen)
EXPLANATION
Ilkka Rasanen argues that the democratic context is worsening at the same time as social media has become central to young people’s daily lives and political information diets. He contends that this is dangerous because the dominant platforms influencing public understanding were designed for engagement and profit, not democratic deliberation.
EVIDENCE
He says democracy is in global decline and cites indicators showing that more than 70 percent of the global population lives in autocracies, with the trend worsening over time [41-43]. He also cites a survey in Finland, France, and Romania showing young Europeans aged 18 to 28 reported close to six hours of daily social media use, or about 37 percent of waking time [45]. In addition, he points to Eurobarometer findings that social media is now the main source of news and political information for this age group [47-49], and argues that dominant platforms are optimized for engagement and slight addictiveness rather than civic discourse [49-51].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External sources support the concern that engagement-driven systems distort democratic discourse. UN policy analysis notes that platform algorithms are designed to maximize engagement and monopolize attention, often pushing users toward polarizing content [S49]. Additional context comes from discussion of fake news, echo chambers, and algorithmic prioritization of sensational content online [S57] [S59].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 1: Platforms as democratic infrastructure and sources of risk
AGREED WITH
Chloe McDowell, Cesare Pitea, Francesco Vecchi, Murillo Salvador, Denys Nazarenko
Argument 2
The priority should be real compliance with existing rules like the DSA, backed by genuinely dissuasive enforcement (Ilkka Rasanen)
EXPLANATION
Rasanen argues that before discussing higher aspirations for democratic platforms, regulators must first ensure that existing legal obligations are actually enforced. He believes current sanctions are too weak to change the behavior of highly profitable companies and that enforcement must become meaningfully deterrent.
EVIDENCE
He says the first task is to ensure regulatory compliance before talking about anything else, noting that the DSA is still young and that the Commission has so far imposed only one noncompliance fine against X [67-70]. He adds that the fine was 120 million dollars, which he describes as inconsequential in Elon Musk’s empire, and argues that regulatory tools need real dissuasive deterrence because these companies are doing extremely well and have no incentive to change voluntarily [72-75].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is corroborated by commentary that the DSA’s practical impact depends above all on enforcement, which remains the key challenge after the rules entered into force [S61]. Additional context notes that the DSA is built around transparency, auditing, expert scrutiny, and sanctions for failures of risk-management obligations rather than arbitrary speech control [S53].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 2: Regulation, enforcement, and multi-stakeholder accountability
AGREED WITH
Asha Allen, Cesare Pitea, Lilia Simonyan, Vittorio Bertola, Murillo Salvador, On-site participant
DISAGREED WITH
Asha Allen, Vittorio Bertola
Argument 3
Public institutions and large actors should help legitimate alternative platforms and participatory democratic tools, including civic tech (Ilkka Rasanen)
EXPLANATION
Rasanen argues that users need alternatives both to dominant social media platforms and to purely electoral forms of democratic participation. He sees a role for public institutions in giving credibility and visibility to alternative platforms and civic technologies designed specifically for democratic engagement.
EVIDENCE
He argues that public authorities should move some of their communications, at least in parallel, onto alternative social media and help give them credence and visibility because such alternatives will not succeed unless major institutions join them [76-81]. He also points to participatory democracy tools such as citizens’ panels and initiatives, and highlights civic tech platforms designed from the ground up for democratic decision-making that can reach broader audiences and foster agency and ownership, especially for younger generations [82-88].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External sources provide relevant support for public-interest and alternative infrastructures. Discussion of democratic digital spaces highlights citizen-generated and community platforms such as Indymedia and Wikipedia as precedents for non-corporate participation [S50]. Other sources argue for targeted support for alternative infrastructures and public-interest tech rather than allowing concentrated companies to dominate the information space [S63].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 3: User empowerment, civil society, and collective action
Argument 4
Because dominant platforms lack incentives to change, stronger alternatives are needed, including alternative social media and civic tech for democratic participation (Ilkka Rasanen)
EXPLANATION
Rasanen contends that dominant platforms are too profitable to reform themselves in ways that would support democracy. Because market incentives will not drive meaningful change, he argues that societies should invest in alternatives such as new social platforms and civic technologies.
EVIDENCE
He notes the enormous revenues and profits of Meta and Alphabet and says these companies are doing extremely well, which means they do not have an incentive to change [52-65]. Based on that, he concludes that discussion should shift toward alternatives, naming attempts such as BlueSky and wider forms of civic tech and participatory democracy as needed substitutes or complements [76-88].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is supported by sources arguing that large commercial platforms pose structural problems and that viable alternatives already exist in decentralized, federated, and open-source ecosystems such as the Fediverse, but require political will and investment to scale [S68]. Calls for open, interoperable, civic-oriented online spaces and concern about the trust breakdown around major platforms also reinforce this argument [S65].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 5: Alternative infrastructures, public-interest technology, and democratic design
AGREED WITH
Asha Allen, Francesco Vecchi, Online participant, Murillo Salvador, Cesare Pitea
DISAGREED WITH
Asha Allen, Francesco Vecchi, Online participant
A
Asha Allen
5 arguments181 words per minute3770 words1247 seconds
Argument 1
Platforms have shifted from earlier community-driven civic participation toward business models centered on engagement, which undermines democratic debate (Asha Allen)
EXPLANATION
Asha Allen argues that platforms were not always structured around the same extractive engagement incentives seen today. She says there has been a clear paradigm shift from user-driven civic exchange toward business models focused on maximizing time-on-platform, which works against meaningful democratic participation.
EVIDENCE
She recalls earlier uses of Twitter for movements such as MeToo, Black Lives Matter, and disability and accessibility advocacy, describing how user preferences at the time generated civic exchange and helped make platforms meaningful democratic spaces [92]. She contrasts that with the current engagement-based business model and references documents released through U.S. litigation showing platform prioritization of keeping people on the service, which she says is intrinsically contrary to increasing democratic debate and active participation [92].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External sources support the contrast between earlier participatory online spaces and current engagement-driven platforms. One source recalls open, citizen-generated models such as Indymedia and Wikipedia as precursors to today’s social media [S50], while UN analysis notes that current platform algorithms are designed to maximize engagement and attention, often at the expense of healthy discourse [S49].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 1: Platforms as democratic infrastructure and sources of risk
DISAGREED WITH
Chloe McDowell, Vittorio Bertola, Pari Esfandiari, Sumeja Huskic
Argument 2
The DSA embeds human-rights-based due diligence and needs strong enforcement, while users and civil society must actively use the rights it creates (Asha Allen)
EXPLANATION
Allen argues that the DSA translates earlier human-rights-based expectations for platforms into binding legal duties, especially for very large companies. But she stresses that the framework will only work if it is enforced and if users and civil society actively make use of the rights and remedies it provides.
EVIDENCE
She explains that before hard regulation, civil society relied on international human rights standards such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to argue that companies had obligations not to harm people, society, or civic participation, and says the DSA seeks to capture this logic through hard rules and due diligence duties [92]. She describes concrete user rights under the DSA, including the ability to flag non-illegal content that violates platform policies and escalate disputes to out-of-court settlement bodies paid for by the company [92]. She also mentions transparency obligations, algorithmic transparency, and data access for vetted researchers, while noting that companies are pushing back and that movement-building is needed so people use these rights in practice [93-97].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is supported by evidence that the DSA includes obligations such as easier user reporting, plain-language terms, ad transparency, the ability to turn off personalized recommendations, risk assessments, and transparency reporting [S61]. Additional context stresses that DSA enforcement is the decisive challenge and that the framework relies heavily on transparency and expert scrutiny [S53] [S61].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 2: Regulation, enforcement, and multi-stakeholder accountability
AGREED WITH
Cesare Pitea, On-site participant, Chloe McDowell
DISAGREED WITH
Ilkka Rasanen, Vittorio Bertola
Argument 3
Civil society is indispensable to enforcement because it researches harms, flags risks, represents users, and checks both platforms and regulators (Asha Allen)
EXPLANATION
Allen contends that platform regulation cannot function properly without civil society organizations acting as accountability partners. In her view, they are essential because they generate evidence, identify risks, help users, and also monitor public authorities to prevent overreach or inaction.
EVIDENCE
She says the DSA cannot fundamentally work without civil society participation in enforcement and lists the roles civil society plays: doing research, building the evidence base, serving as trusted flaggers, and alerting enforcers to possible problems [97-105]. She adds that this role is deliberately recognized in the DSA, which mentions civil society extensively and envisions it as a co-regulatory actor that helps with enforcement while also holding enforcement bodies themselves accountable [105-110]. She further notes that platforms are supposed to consult civil society and researchers in their assessments, but says that in practice companies are not engaging with them yet [110-112].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External sources strongly support this. UN guidance emphasizes bottom-up solutions, user empowerment, and the inclusion of users, marginalized groups, and youth in the policy space [S49]. Additional multistakeholder models for content governance also argue that civil society and user constituencies should help shape platform accountability rather than leaving decisions solely to companies or governments [S67].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 3: User empowerment, civil society, and collective action
AGREED WITH
Cesare Pitea, Chloe McDowell, Lilia Simonyan, Online participant, Murillo Salvador
Argument 4
AI tools are being embedded into platforms too quickly, and they should not be deployed without testing, safeguards, and respect for rights (Asha Allen)
EXPLANATION
Allen argues that many of the same platforms that shaped earlier social media harms are now rapidly embedding AI tools into core services. She warns against a “move fast and break things” mentality and insists that AI systems should be tested and constrained by rights-respecting frameworks before they reach the public.
EVIDENCE
She points out that major platforms are driving the AI conversation and embedding AI tools into services such as Google Search, where AI summaries and chatbot-style interactions now appear by default [122]. She argues that technologies should not be disseminated onto the market without an evidence base showing they are actually safe and says they should not be deployed without the necessary frameworks in place [122-123]. Later, she adds that companies have ways to sandbox and test systems, and that under both the AI Act and the DSA they should assess and mitigate potential risks before deployment [440].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is supported by broader calls for precaution and enforceable safeguards around AI deployment. External sources stress balancing innovation with safety-by-design and human-rights protections [S54], while legal analysis emphasizes that accountability and existing legal duties should apply to AI systems and their creators [S60].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 4: AI, cognitive sovereignty, and behavioral manipulation
AGREED WITH
Chloe McDowell, Cesare Pitea, Pari Esfandiari, Giacomo Mazzone, Sumeja Huskic, Murillo Salvador, On-site participant, Vittorio Bertola
DISAGREED WITH
Vittorio Bertola
Argument 5
There are already public-interest and community-based platform models, such as Wikipedia and Mastodon, that show different governance is possible (Asha Allen)
EXPLANATION
Allen argues that dominant commercial social media should not be treated as the only possible model for online platforms. She highlights existing examples of community-based and public-interest-oriented platforms to show that different governance structures are viable and can be built on.
EVIDENCE
She says public-interest platforms already exist and gives Wikipedia as an example of a platform that still uses a community-based model for moderation and governance [353-355]. She also mentions Mastodon and other emerging alternatives as evidence that there are other models besides dominant platforms, even if more investment and expansion are needed [356-358].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is directly supported by references to Wikipedia and other co-generated public-interest models as examples of participatory online spaces outside dominant commercial platform logic [S50]. Additional support comes from discussion of decentralized and federated alternatives such as the Fediverse and Mastodon as existing options that could be scaled with political backing [S68].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 5: Alternative infrastructures, public-interest technology, and democratic design
AGREED WITH
Ilkka Rasanen, Francesco Vecchi, Online participant, Murillo Salvador, Cesare Pitea
C
Cesare Pitea
5 arguments109 words per minute2690 words1468 seconds
Argument 1
Digital governance questions are fundamentally about democracy and society, not just technology (Cesare Pitea)
EXPLANATION
Cesare Pitea argues that platform regulation should be understood primarily as a democratic and social issue. He warns against treating digital rights and platform governance as merely technical matters, since the core concerns are human rights, democracy, and the structure of society.
EVIDENCE
He says the questions under discussion are not about technology but about democracy and society, and stresses that this should always be kept in mind when talking about digital rights, platform regulation, and other apparently technical issues [137-141].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External sources reinforce that digital governance is not merely technical. Discussions of public internet infrastructure ask ‘internet for what?’ and frame digital systems in terms of civic purpose and social organization rather than technology alone [S50]. Related analysis also states explicitly that technology is not neutral and reshapes human relationships, reality perception, and ethical frameworks [S54].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 1: Platforms as democratic infrastructure and sources of risk
AGREED WITH
Chloe McDowell, Ilkka Rasanen, Francesco Vecchi, Murillo Salvador, Denys Nazarenko
Argument 2
Platform accountability should rely on law, independent oversight, and systemic duties rather than self-regulation alone (Cesare Pitea)
EXPLANATION
Pitea argues that the answer to platform power is not weaker safeguards or greater state control over speech, but stronger legal obligations on platforms combined with independent oversight. He supports shifting from isolated content disputes toward systemic responsibilities embedded in platform design and operation.
EVIDENCE
He says the way forward is not to oppose safety and freedom or to hand control of the information environment back to states, but to use law and regulation to expand platform accountability, transparency, and user agency [145-149]. He explains that the recommendation shifts focus from content regulation to systemic responsibilities and calls on states to set clear legal expectations for platforms with significant influence over the information environment [151-156]. He also states that self-regulation has failed to deliver human-rights-driven platform environments and therefore systemic duties should be subject to public scrutiny and independent regulators with effective powers [157].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is supported by external analysis showing that self-regulation and moderation mechanisms on platforms remain opaque and uneven, with persistent gaps in transparency and implementation [S49]. Additional context from DSA commentary emphasizes structured transparency, auditing, expert review, and sanctions for systemic failures rather than relying on platforms’ voluntary choices [S53].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 2: Regulation, enforcement, and multi-stakeholder accountability
AGREED WITH
Ilkka Rasanen, Asha Allen, Lilia Simonyan, Vittorio Bertola, Murillo Salvador, On-site participant
Argument 3
User empowerment is a pillar of accountability and must include meaningful controls, transparency, due process, and collective forms of user action (Cesare Pitea)
EXPLANATION
Pitea argues that user empowerment is not a substitute for regulation but one of its central goals. He presents accountability as requiring practical user control, transparency that can be used collectively, procedural safeguards, and support for organized user action through civil society.
EVIDENCE
He identifies four categories of empowerment duties: design-related duties giving users meaningful control over their online experience, transparency duties including data and platform access for researchers, due process protections for content moderation and dispute settlement, and collective action support for civil society and user-rights organizations [158-180]. He also observes that many users know from experience how difficult it is to flag illegal or policy-violating content, which demonstrates the need for better and more usable controls [159-162].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is corroborated by sources calling for greater user control, transparency, and appeal mechanisms. The Special Rapporteur report highlights user autonomy tools, notice and appeal, and scalable remedies such as ombudsman-style mechanisms [S56]. The DSA also requires clearer terms, user reporting tools, and the option to turn off personalized recommendations [S61].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 3: User empowerment, civil society, and collective action
AGREED WITH
Chloe McDowell, Denys Nazarenko, Pari Esfandiari, Asha Allen, Murillo Salvador
Argument 4
The recommendation system should protect users against manipulation through stronger transparency, data access, and user-centered design (Cesare Pitea)
EXPLANATION
Pitea argues that recommendation and moderation systems should be structured to enhance user agency rather than manipulate attention. This requires transparency, access for researchers, and design approaches that let users shape their own information environments and resist coercive or opaque influence.
EVIDENCE
He says states should require platforms to enhance user agency and to integrate safety and human-rights considerations into design and operations, including transparency around algorithms and content moderation [149][153-156]. He emphasizes researcher access to data and platforms because individuals do not have the time or capacity to understand platform operations on their own [163-170]. He also proposes exploring a plurality of recommender and content moderation systems so users could rely on third parties to fine-tune lawful content exposure according to their own preferences [181-183].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External evidence supports all three elements. UN analysis calls researcher data access an urgent priority and argues for ‘disclosure by default’ so harms can be properly evaluated [S49]. Other sources propose transparency features explaining why content is shown and giving users more control over their feeds [S47], while analysis of automated defaults warns that recommender systems can quietly narrow agency and shape behavior [S52].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 4: AI, cognitive sovereignty, and behavioral manipulation
AGREED WITH
Chloe McDowell, Asha Allen, Pari Esfandiari, Giacomo Mazzone, Sumeja Huskic, Murillo Salvador, On-site participant, Vittorio Bertola
Argument 5
States should not oppose safety and freedom; they should require platforms to build environments that genuinely enhance user agency (Cesare Pitea)
EXPLANATION
Pitea argues against framing online safety and freedom as conflicting values. Instead, he says states should regulate platforms so that safety measures increase transparency and agency while preserving democratic freedoms and user safeguards.
EVIDENCE
He says the recommendation makes clear that the path forward is not to artificially oppose safety and freedoms, nor to weaken user safeguards or return control of the information environment to states [145-148]. He then says law and regulation should be used to expand platform accountability, transparency, and user agency, and that platforms should integrate safety and human-rights considerations into design and operation [148-156].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is supported by external discussions emphasizing that responses to online harms must protect freedom of expression while strengthening safety and rights-respecting design [S54]. UN analysis likewise argues for bottom-up approaches that empower users while addressing mis- and disinformation and hate speech [S49].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 5: Alternative infrastructures, public-interest technology, and democratic design
AGREED WITH
Asha Allen, On-site participant, Chloe McDowell
F
Francesco Vecchi
3 arguments146 words per minute332 words136 seconds
Argument 1
Democracy should not be left to profit- and surveillance-driven algorithms because platform architecture itself regulates public discourse (Francesco Vecchi)
EXPLANATION
Francesco Vecchi argues that the design of digital platforms functions as a form of regulation because it structures how people debate, decide, and dissent. For that reason, democracy should not be governed by systems optimized for profit or surveillance rather than civic values.
EVIDENCE
He says democracy cannot be left to the mercy of algorithms designed for profit or surveillance and argues that public-interest platforms and AI should prioritize civic empowerment, transparency, and accountability over extractive models [201-203]. Citing Lawrence Lessig’s idea that ‘code is law,’ he explains that platform architecture shapes public discourse and that designs prioritizing engagement over deliberation and virality over truth distort democratic discussion rather than merely host it [204-208].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is strongly supported by evidence that algorithms built around profit and engagement steer users toward polarizing or provocative content and thereby shape the information environment [S49]. Additional context from analyses of fake news and recommender systems shows that algorithmic curation can privilege sensational and confirmatory material over factual or deliberative content [S57] [S66].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 1: Platforms as democratic infrastructure and sources of risk
AGREED WITH
Chloe McDowell, Ilkka Rasanen, Cesare Pitea, Murillo Salvador, Denys Nazarenko
Argument 2
Public-interest platforms and AI should be treated as civic infrastructure under binding democratic rules (Francesco Vecchi)
EXPLANATION
Vecchi argues that democratic digital systems should be treated like public services rather than left entirely to commercial logic. He supports binding rules that ensure both public and private providers build AI and platforms around civic empowerment, transparency, and accountability.
EVIDENCE
He says his campaign calls for public-interest platforms and AI that prioritize civic empowerment, transparency, and accountability over extractive models [202]. He adds that this is not about rejecting private innovation but about ensuring democracy and AI are treated as public services delivered under clear binding rules, whether by public or private actors [203].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External sources provide supporting context by framing digital space and internet infrastructure in public-good terms rather than purely commercial ones [S50]. Related discussion also calls for binding legal frameworks that treat digital space as a public utility requiring democratic governance [S54].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 3: User empowerment, civil society, and collective action
Argument 3
Federated and open-source ecosystems already offer democratic alternatives, but institutions have failed to fund and scale them (Francesco Vecchi)
EXPLANATION
Vecchi argues that the technical basis for more democratic online spaces already exists. The real problem, in his view, is political: institutions have not committed the funding, adoption, and scale needed to make those alternatives viable competitors to dominant platforms.
EVIDENCE
He says alternatives already exist, pointing specifically to federated social networks such as the Fediverse and to open-source civic tools [211-212]. He then argues that what is missing is political will to adopt them at scale and says institutions must answer for failing to demand, fund, and scale democratic alternatives [209-213].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is corroborated by discussion of decentralized, federated, and open-source alternatives such as the Fediverse, which are described as existing but insufficiently pursued by those in power [S68]. Further support comes from calls for open, interoperable civic online spaces and concern that regulation can unintentionally burden nonprofit alternatives if not carefully designed [S65].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 5: Alternative infrastructures, public-interest technology, and democratic design
AGREED WITH
Ilkka Rasanen, Asha Allen, Online participant, Murillo Salvador, Cesare Pitea
DISAGREED WITH
Ilkka Rasanen, Asha Allen, Online participant
D
Denys Nazarenko
3 arguments188 words per minute345 words109 seconds
Argument 1
Cities experience the local consequences of platform design, including disinformation, hate speech, and erosion of trust in institutions (Denys Nazarenko)
EXPLANATION
Denys Nazarenko argues that platform governance is not abstract because local governments and communities directly bear the consequences of platform design choices. He highlights the local impact of disinformation, hate speech, synthetic content, and declining trust in public institutions.
EVIDENCE
He says public institutions increasingly rely on digital platforms to reach residents, especially in emergencies, but these platforms operate according to an attention-driven logic rather than civic responsibility [215]. He adds that cities are where consequences are felt locally: election-related disinformation, non-explicit hate speech affecting neighborhoods, and synthetic content targeting public institutions and eroding local trust [215-216].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External sources support the broader claim that platform dynamics affect social cohesion and trust. Analyses of fake news and echo chambers describe how digital platforms can reinforce distorted narratives and fragment public discourse [S57]. Related high-level discussion frames disinformation as a threat to democracy and resilient societies, not just an abstract online problem [S54].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 1: Platforms as democratic infrastructure and sources of risk
AGREED WITH
Chloe McDowell, Ilkka Rasanen, Cesare Pitea, Francesco Vecchi, Murillo Salvador
Argument 2
Users need choice over recommendation systems, provenance signals, and trusted public digital channels to act as citizens rather than audiences (Denys Nazarenko)
EXPLANATION
Nazarenko argues that people should be treated as active civic participants, not just passive recipients of content. To do that, they need control over how recommendations are configured, ways to verify synthetic media, and trustworthy official digital channels.
EVIDENCE
He proposes practical actions including user choice of recommendation systems so algorithms become something residents configure rather than merely receive [217]. He also calls for provenance signals for synthetic media and trusted public digital channels through which residents can verify that information is official [218-219].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is supported by calls for user choice over algorithmic curation and greater transparency about why content is shown [S47]. Additional context comes from proposals for user control mechanisms and plain-language transparency in algorithmic systems [S54], as well as DSA provisions allowing users to turn off personalized recommendations [S61].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 3: User empowerment, civil society, and collective action
AGREED WITH
Chloe McDowell, Cesare Pitea, Pari Esfandiari, Asha Allen, Murillo Salvador
Argument 3
Europe needs interoperable public digital infrastructure to support trustworthy communication and public-service interaction (Denys Nazarenko)
EXPLANATION
Nazarenko argues that stronger public-interest communications infrastructure is needed to connect services and platforms in trustworthy ways. He suggests that current efforts are incomplete because an orchestration layer linking different platforms is still missing.
EVIDENCE
He says that, in Kyiv’s work, the orchestration layer connecting different platforms is missing [220-230]. He then points to initiatives such as FIWARA and local digital twins as moving in that direction and says it would be valuable to see similar work for digital communication platforms [231-232].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 5: Alternative infrastructures, public-interest technology, and democratic design
M
Murillo Salvador
4 arguments149 words per minute450 words180 seconds
Argument 1
Platforms are a social digital infrastructure of democracy but were not designed to fulfill civic functions and instead distort public debate (Murillo Salvador)
EXPLANATION
In summarizing the session, Murillo Salvador argues that platforms now function as core democratic infrastructure even though they were not designed for civic purposes. Because they optimize engagement rather than public reason, they can distort debate and facilitate disinformation.
EVIDENCE
He summarizes the discussion by stating that platforms are a social digital infrastructure of democracy, yet were not designed to fulfill civic function [493]. He adds that they optimize engagement, for example through dark patterns such as infinite scrolling, are not neutral channels, and distort public debate by enabling the spread of disinformation [494-496].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External sources support this framing by describing platform algorithms as profit-driven systems that maximize engagement and attention, often amplifying polarizing content rather than deliberation [S49]. Additional context from public-infrastructure discussions contrasts civic-oriented internet uses with the later dominance of corporate platforms [S50].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 1: Platforms as democratic infrastructure and sources of risk
AGREED WITH
Chloe McDowell, Ilkka Rasanen, Cesare Pitea, Francesco Vecchi, Denys Nazarenko
Argument 2
Stronger DSA compliance and civil-society partnership with authorities are necessary to make platforms accountable in practice (Murillo Salvador)
EXPLANATION
Salvador’s synthesis presents regulation as valuable but insufficient unless compliance is actively enforced. He also emphasizes that civil society must work alongside public authorities to translate legal frameworks into real accountability.
EVIDENCE
He says participants called for stronger DSA compliance and that existing regulation acts as a deterrent to platforms’ worst democratic harms [505-508]. He further states that civil society can play a key role as a partner to public authorities in making platform operators accountable under the law [508-509].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is supported by evidence that DSA enforcement is the decisive unresolved issue in whether the law changes platform behavior [S61]. External sources also stress that user and civil-society participation is essential to tackling online harms and decentralizing power away from platforms [S49].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 2: Regulation, enforcement, and multi-stakeholder accountability
AGREED WITH
Asha Allen, Cesare Pitea, Chloe McDowell, Lilia Simonyan, Online participant
Argument 3
Platform design should move away from a consumer model toward digital citizenship, with support for community-driven platforms and democratic alternatives (Murillo Salvador)
EXPLANATION
Salvador argues that the discussion pointed toward a redefinition of people online as digital citizens rather than mere consumers. This implies encouraging different business and governance models, including community-driven platforms and democratic engagement formats beyond mainstream social media.
EVIDENCE
He states that the discussion invites a move from a consumer perspective toward understanding digital citizenship as embedded in platforms [510]. He adds that platform design is a fluid outcome of choices and that new business and engagement models should be incentivized, including community-driven platforms and alternative democratic formats outside platforms such as deliberative and multi-stakeholder processes [511-512].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External sources support the move toward participatory and civic models. They point to community-generated platforms such as Wikipedia and Indymedia as alternatives to purely consumer-oriented digital spaces [S50], and advocate open, interoperable, civic-oriented online spaces with stronger user agency [S65].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 3: User empowerment, civil society, and collective action
AGREED WITH
Ilkka Rasanen, Asha Allen, Francesco Vecchi, Online participant, Cesare Pitea
Argument 4
The spread of AI-generated content and identities creates new risks to cognitive sovereignty, making verification and pre-deployment testing essential (Murillo Salvador)
EXPLANATION
Salvador’s synthesis frames cognitive sovereignty as a growing democratic risk linked to AI integration into platforms. He argues that synthetic content and automated systems require stronger verification mechanisms and testing before deployment.
EVIDENCE
He says participants viewed the loss of cognitive sovereignty as an emerging risk tied to the embedding of AI into platforms and to algorithmic management through recommendation systems and automated moderation [500-502]. He also notes that provenance and verification mechanisms are crucial as AI-driven synthetic content and identities become more prominent faster than regulation can respond, and that AI tools should undergo testing and sandboxing before reaching the market [503-504].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External sources reinforce the need for safeguards around AI-mediated information. High-level discussion highlights AI-enhanced disinformation threats and calls for transparency, user control, and verification-related responses [S54]. Legal and governance analysis also supports precaution, accountability, and stronger oversight before harms materialize [S60].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 4: AI, cognitive sovereignty, and behavioral manipulation
AGREED WITH
Chloe McDowell, Asha Allen, Cesare Pitea, Pari Esfandiari, Giacomo Mazzone, Sumeja Huskic, On-site participant, Vittorio Bertola
L
Lilia Simonyan
1 argument155 words per minute336 words129 seconds
Argument 1
Legal frameworks are strong on paper, but implementation requires practical collaboration among authorities, platforms, and civil society (Lilia Simonyan)
EXPLANATION
Lilia Simonyan argues that laws such as the DSA and Council of Europe standards provide an important normative base, but the real challenge is implementation. She says translating principles into everyday platform practice requires coordinated collaboration among regulators, companies, and civil society.
EVIDENCE
She says regulatory frameworks provide a strong legal foundation for a safer and more transparent digital environment, but that laws alone are not enough because the real challenge lies in implementation [239]. She then outlines the roles of public authorities, platforms, and civil society, and calls for practical mechanisms such as co-regulatory frameworks, independent algorithmic audits, transparent reporting obligations, content labeling, appeal systems, and understandable algorithmic explanations [239-257].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is supported by DSA commentary noting that the law’s impact depends on implementation capacity, staffing, and practical enforcement mechanisms rather than legal text alone [S61]. Additional multistakeholder proposals argue that sustainable platform governance requires structured involvement of companies, civil society, users, and public authorities [S67].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 2: Regulation, enforcement, and multi-stakeholder accountability
AGREED WITH
Asha Allen, Cesare Pitea, Chloe McDowell, Online participant, Murillo Salvador
V
Vittorio Bertola
2 arguments181 words per minute327 words108 seconds
Argument 1
Existing regulation has produced little visible change on major platforms so far, showing that enforcement remains the key unresolved issue (Vittorio Bertola)
EXPLANATION
Vittorio Bertola argues that regulation may be necessary, but its effect will remain limited unless enforcement becomes more meaningful and visible. He uses his own continued experience of unchanged platform behavior to suggest that implementation is still the major weak point.
EVIDENCE
He says he is a heavy Facebook user and has not noticed any even minimal change in how Facebook works after the DSA came into force [306-307]. From this, he concludes that the issue is enforcement and also understanding what enforcement of this kind of regulation should actually mean before moving on to regulate newer technologies [308-309].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is directly corroborated by commentary stating that the DSA’s significance will depend on enforcement and that, after entry into force, the main challenge remains implementation and monitoring compliance in practice [S61].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 2: Regulation, enforcement, and multi-stakeholder accountability
AGREED WITH
Ilkka Rasanen, Asha Allen, Cesare Pitea, Lilia Simonyan, Murillo Salvador, On-site participant
DISAGREED WITH
Asha Allen, Ilkka Rasanen
Argument 2
AI intensifies manipulation risks because even developers do not fully understand model behavior, while many users actively seek confirmation rather than truth (Vittorio Bertola)
EXPLANATION
Bertola argues that AI raises manipulation concerns beyond those already present in social media because even system creators may not fully understand model behavior. He also adds a cultural warning: many users seek affirmation and bias confirmation, making them more vulnerable to manipulation.
EVIDENCE
He says that while social media algorithms are at least somewhat understandable to their creators, with AI even the people who make the models do not fully understand how they work in the end [312-315]. He also argues that many people now actively want to be manipulated in the sense that they seek confirmation bias and prefer content that tells them they are right rather than content grounded in facts or logic [316-318].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External sources provide partial support and context. Analysis of cognitive autonomy and recommendation systems notes that digital systems can amplify outrage, confirmation bias, and engineered persuasion [S57] [S59]. High-level discussion also warns that AI-enhanced information manipulation is becoming faster and more sophisticated [S54].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 4: AI, cognitive sovereignty, and behavioral manipulation
AGREED WITH
Chloe McDowell, Asha Allen, Cesare Pitea, Pari Esfandiari, Giacomo Mazzone, Sumeja Huskic, Murillo Salvador, On-site participant
DISAGREED WITH
Chloe McDowell, Asha Allen, Pari Esfandiari, Sumeja Huskic
O
Online participant
2 arguments121 words per minute290 words143 seconds
Argument 1
The most effective path is a collective, coordinated effort rather than regulation alone (Online participant)
EXPLANATION
The online participant argues that regulation by itself cannot secure democratic debate. Instead, success depends on coordinated action across institutions, researchers, public administrations, and open-source communities.
EVIDENCE
He states directly that no regulation alone will safeguard democratic debate and says everything depends on a collective, collaborative, and coordinated effort [425-426]. He supports this by referring to research on Fediverse integration in public administration and an EDPS pilot project as evidence that practical collaborative alternatives are already being explored [423-430].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is supported by several external sources emphasizing multi-stakeholder approaches. Discussions of platform governance call for inclusive, human rights-based cooperation rather than state-only solutions [S63], while proposals for a multistakeholder ‘content congress’ argue that neither simple government regulation nor company self-regulation is sufficient on its own [S67].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 2: Regulation, enforcement, and multi-stakeholder accountability
AGREED WITH
Asha Allen, Cesare Pitea, Chloe McDowell, Lilia Simonyan, Murillo Salvador
Argument 2
Europe needs a sovereign “social stack” based on open standards, decentralization, pluralism, and public-interest algorithms (Online participant)
EXPLANATION
The online participant argues that Europe should build a sovereign digital communications infrastructure rooted in open and decentralized principles. He presents this as a political and investment choice, not a technical impossibility, and as a way to reduce foreign dependency while supporting pluralism.
EVIDENCE
He calls for a sovereign digital infrastructure or ‘social stack’ built on digital autonomy, decentralization, diverse ownership, editorial pluralism, and algorithms treated as public-interest institutions like broadcasters and libraries [427]. He says the vision is already converging across the Fediverse, Eurosky, and private messaging ecosystems, that the technology works, and that the EDPS pilot proved this [428-430]. He further argues that redirecting even a modest share of public digital spending toward open alternatives would sustain local developers, break foreign dependency, and recirculate social media value back into Europe [432-436].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is supported by arguments for open, interoperable online spaces and user agency as foundations of a trustworthy information ecosystem [S65]. Additional context comes from discussion of decentralized, federated, and open-source alternatives like the Fediverse as available options that could be pursued at regional scale [S68].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 5: Alternative infrastructures, public-interest technology, and democratic design
AGREED WITH
Ilkka Rasanen, Asha Allen, Francesco Vecchi, Murillo Salvador, Cesare Pitea
DISAGREED WITH
Ilkka Rasanen, Asha Allen, Francesco Vecchi
O
On-site participant
4 arguments148 words per minute704 words284 seconds
Argument 1
Young people need regulation, especially safety by design, to realign digital markets with human rights and protect minors (On-site participant)
EXPLANATION
The first on-site youth participant argues that her generation has directly experienced the harms of unregulated social media and therefore should champion stronger regulation. She emphasizes safety by design, especially for children, as a way to align platform markets with human rights and basic standards of care.
EVIDENCE
She says her generation grew up with unregulated social media and experienced firsthand the harm it caused to them and their peers, and that they should become the generation of regulation [399]. She argues that regulation needs to be safety by design, refers specifically to Article 28 of the DSA requiring platforms to take appropriate and proportionate measures to protect the safety, security, and privacy of minors, and says such design should be a guiding ethos rather than an afterthought [400-405].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External sources strongly support this position. Youth-focused discussions compare platform accountability to tobacco regulation and argue that regulation should target platform business models and harmful attention design rather than primarily restricting users [S48]. High-level policy discussion also endorses safety-by-design principles and youth advisory structures [S54].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 2: Regulation, enforcement, and multi-stakeholder accountability
AGREED WITH
Cesare Pitea, Asha Allen, Chloe McDowell
Argument 2
Today’s younger generation has lived through harms from unregulated social media and should become the generation that advances regulation (On-site participant)
EXPLANATION
The youth participant frames regulation as a generational response to lived harm. She argues that young people have a special stake in building a safer digital future because they grew up inside the very systems now being criticized.
EVIDENCE
She says, ‘My generation was a generation of unregulated social media’ and that they experienced the harms directly [399]. She then says she aspires to be part of a new multi-stakeholder movement that will create the framework for a safer digital world and that ‘we will instead become the generation of regulation’ [399].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is reinforced by external sources emphasizing that youth are directly affected by online harms and should be meaningfully included in shaping policy responses [S48] [S49]. Additional youth-oriented discussions stress that young people can speak from lived experience about the flaws and consequences of platform governance proposals [S49].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 6: Youth, harm prevention, and safer digital environments
Argument 3
Young people’s emotional reliance on AI chatbots, including using them as therapists, is a serious emerging risk requiring stronger intervention by platforms (On-site participant)
EXPLANATION
The second youth participant argues that generative AI poses a specific danger when young people begin treating chatbots like intimate or therapeutic companions. She believes platforms need to do more to guide vulnerable users toward real help rather than maximizing engagement.
EVIDENCE
She says young people are building relationships with chatbots that they sometimes perceive as closer to personal relationships than they really are [411]. She adds that in more dangerous cases people resort to AI chatbots as therapists, which she finds deeply concerning, and argues that programs are needed to counter this and that platforms should do more to help such users find actual support instead of keeping them engaged [412-415].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External sources provide partial contextual support by noting broader youth vulnerability in digital environments and the need for age-appropriate safeguards, digital literacy, and stronger protection measures for children and young people online [S48] [S49].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 6: Youth, harm prevention, and safer digital environments
AGREED WITH
Chloe McDowell, Asha Allen, Cesare Pitea, Pari Esfandiari, Giacomo Mazzone, Sumeja Huskic, Murillo Salvador, Vittorio Bertola
Argument 4
Addictive design locks users into dominant platforms, so stronger rules are needed to curb such design and open space for democratic participation in platform governance (On-site participant)
EXPLANATION
A later on-site participant argues that dominant platforms retain users not only because of network effects but because addictive design is central to their business model. He asks for stronger legal tools to regulate addictive features and for ways to introduce community participation into the governance of private algorithmic systems.
EVIDENCE
He says the core addictive element of engagement-based algorithms makes users more likely to stick to dominant platforms even when more community-driven alternatives exist [439]. He then asks what further provisions could prevent addictive design under current EU regulation and the Digital Fairness Act, and how democratic or civic participation might be introduced into the development and governance of private algorithms despite intellectual property claims [439].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is supported by external discussion of the harmful ‘economic model of attention’ and the argument that regulation should focus on platform business models rather than only user behavior [S48]. Related sources also note that engagement-maximizing algorithms and recommendation systems are central to the spread of harmful and manipulative content [S49] [S66].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 5: Alternative infrastructures, public-interest technology, and democratic design
DISAGREED WITH
Chloe McDowell, Asha Allen
P
Pari Esfandiari
2 arguments91 words per minute219 words143 seconds
Argument 1
Users need meaningful control over personalization and curation, along with designs that support reflection and democratic participation (Pari Esfandiari)
EXPLANATION
Pari Esfandiari argues that safeguarding users requires more than removing harmful content. People need meaningful control over how content is curated and platforms should be intentionally designed to encourage reflection, contextual understanding, and democratic participation.
EVIDENCE
She says users should have greater ability to choose how content is curated, whether algorithmic personalization is used, and what kind of recommendation systems influence their information environment [295-296]. She also argues that platform design should encourage reflection, contextualization, exposure to diverse viewpoints, and healthier forms of democratic participation [299-300].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is supported by proposals for transparency features explaining why content is shown and allowing users to request different kinds of content exposure [S47]. Further support comes from DSA obligations allowing users to turn off personalized recommendations and from broader calls for user control and accessible algorithmic explanations [S61] [S54].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 3: User empowerment, civil society, and collective action
AGREED WITH
Chloe McDowell, Cesare Pitea, Denys Nazarenko, Asha Allen, Murillo Salvador
Argument 2
Cognitive sovereignty is threatened by recommender systems and generative AI that amplify emotional reaction, persuasion, and confirmation bias (Pari Esfandiari)
EXPLANATION
Esfandiari argues that the central issue is no longer only misinformation but the erosion of cognitive autonomy in environments built to predict and shape behavior. She warns that recommendation systems and generative AI can scale persuasive manipulation in ways that distort democratic deliberation.
EVIDENCE
She says the concern today is the gradual erosion of cognitive autonomy in digital environments optimized to predict and shape behavior [290]. She explains that engagement-driven recommendation systems amplify outrage, emotional reaction, and confirmation bias, while generative AI makes persuasion scalable, personalized, and increasingly hard to distinguish from authentic human communication [291-292]. She concludes that if AI systems shape not only what people see but how they think and perceive reality, democratic debate risks becoming subtly engineered rather than genuinely deliberated [301].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External sources strongly support this. Analysis of automated systems shows how recommendations become defaults that subtly narrow human agency [S52]. Other sources describe how fake news, microtargeting, influencer dynamics, and algorithmic curation play into emotion and pre-existing beliefs [S57] [S59], while high-level discussion warns that AI-enhanced disinformation is becoming faster and more sophisticated [S54].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 4: AI, cognitive sovereignty, and behavioral manipulation
AGREED WITH
Chloe McDowell, Asha Allen, Cesare Pitea, Giacomo Mazzone, Sumeja Huskic, Murillo Salvador, On-site participant, Vittorio Bertola
DISAGREED WITH
Chloe McDowell, Asha Allen, Vittorio Bertola, Sumeja Huskic
G
Giacomo Mazzone
1 argument136 words per minute319 words140 seconds
Argument 1
AI-driven search and device interfaces may further centralize control over what information reaches users, harming media diversity and the broader information ecosystem (Giacomo Mazzone)
EXPLANATION
Giacomo Mazzone argues that AI integration into search and device interfaces could deepen existing concentration problems by determining what information reaches users. He warns this will damage media business models, reduce diversity, and weaken the overall cognitive ecosystem, especially for local and minority-language media.
EVIDENCE
He says AI-driven changes to search engines are already having a devastating impact on the media ecosystem and undermining the fragile business model of electronic media [279]. He adds that this is producing desertification of the media environment, particularly for local media, small countries, and minority languages, reducing diversity and quality in the cognitive ecosystem [280-281]. He further warns that AI interfaces may soon decide which news to present to users based on inferred preferences, with platforms rather than users making the real decisions [282-285].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External sources provide supporting context that platform and algorithmic concentration can damage journalism and information diversity. Discussion of media viability and alternative platforms stresses the need to prevent big concentrated companies from taking over the information space [S63], while high-level policy discussion identifies the economic disruption of traditional media by tech platforms as a major unresolved issue [S54].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 4: AI, cognitive sovereignty, and behavioral manipulation
AGREED WITH
Chloe McDowell, Asha Allen, Cesare Pitea, Pari Esfandiari, Sumeja Huskic, Murillo Salvador, On-site participant, Vittorio Bertola
S
Sumeja Huskic
1 argument61 words per minute100 words96 seconds
Argument 1
Algorithmic filtering narrows what people see until partial narratives feel complete, threatening independent critical thought (Sumeja Huskic)
EXPLANATION
Sumeja Huskic argues that the problem with online information is not only overt manipulation but the subtle narrowing of what people are shown. When users repeatedly receive only one angle or emotional framing, they may mistake a partial narrative for the whole reality, weakening critical and independent thought.
EVIDENCE
She says that when an event appears online, users rarely get a full picture and instead mostly receive what the algorithm expects they will engage with-one angle, one emotion, one narrative [323-324]. She warns that over time this makes it feel like that is the whole story, meaning people are shown less and less without realizing it, which raises the question of how to keep thinking free, critical, and truly one’s own [325-326].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is supported by analyses of fake news and echo chambers showing that online environments can reinforce one worldview and filter out alternatives [S57]. Additional context from studies of automated systems explains how ranking and pre-selection quietly become defaults that shape what users encounter and how they judge it [S52].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 4: AI, cognitive sovereignty, and behavioral manipulation
AGREED WITH
Chloe McDowell, Asha Allen, Cesare Pitea, Pari Esfandiari, Giacomo Mazzone, Murillo Salvador, On-site participant, Vittorio Bertola
DISAGREED WITH
Chloe McDowell, Asha Allen, Vittorio Bertola, Pari Esfandiari
Agreements
Agreement Points
Platforms are not neutral intermediaries but key parts of democratic infrastructure whose design shapes public debate and can distort it.
Speakers: Chloe McDowell, Ilkka Rasanen, Cesare Pitea, Francesco Vecchi, Murillo Salvador, Denys Nazarenko
Platforms shape visibility, credibility, and democratic participation, not just communication (Chloe McDowell) Democracy is declining while social media dominates young people’s time and news consumption, yet dominant platforms are built for engagement rather than civic discourse (Ilkka Rasanen) Digital governance questions are fundamentally about democracy and society, not just technology (Cesare Pitea) Democracy should not be left to profit- and surveillance-driven algorithms because platform architecture itself regulates public discourse (Francesco Vecchi) Platforms are a social digital infrastructure of democracy but were not designed to fulfill civic functions and instead distort public debate (Murillo Salvador) Cities experience the local consequences of platform design, including disinformation, hate speech, and erosion of trust in institutions (Denys Nazarenko)
Multiple speakers converged on the idea that platforms are now part of the architecture of public debate rather than mere channels. McDowell said platforms shape what is visible, what spreads, and what feels credible or meaningful in democratic life [16-19]. Rasanen likewise argued that dominant platforms are not designed for civic discourse but for engagement and profit [47-52]. Pitea reframed the discussion as one about democracy and society, not technology alone [137-141]. Vecchi argued that platform architecture itself regulates debate and can distort discourse when optimized for engagement over deliberation [201-208]. Nazarenko emphasized that these design choices have concrete local consequences for trust, elections, and public institutions [215-216]. Murillo’s session synthesis echoed this consensus by describing platforms as democratic infrastructure that distort debate through engagement-driven design and disinformation dynamics [493-497].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This aligns with prior policy and governance discussions rejecting platform neutrality and emphasizing that platform design, algorithms, and business models shape public discourse and democratic outcomes [S87][S89][S93][S94].
Existing regulation is necessary, but the central challenge is stronger enforcement and practical implementation rather than the absence of rules.
Speakers: Ilkka Rasanen, Asha Allen, Cesare Pitea, Lilia Simonyan, Vittorio Bertola, Murillo Salvador, On-site participant
The priority should be real compliance with existing rules like the DSA, backed by genuinely dissuasive enforcement (Ilkka Rasanen) The DSA embeds human-rights-based due diligence and needs strong enforcement, while users and civil society must actively use the rights it creates (Asha Allen) Platform accountability should rely on law, independent oversight, and systemic duties rather than self-regulation alone (Cesare Pitea) Legal frameworks are strong on paper, but implementation requires practical collaboration among authorities, platforms, and civil society (Lilia Simonyan) Existing regulation has produced little visible change on major platforms so far, showing that enforcement remains the key unresolved issue (Vittorio Bertola) Stronger DSA compliance and civil-society partnership with authorities are necessary to make platforms accountable in practice (Murillo Salvador) Young people need regulation, especially safety by design, to realign digital markets with human rights and protect minors (On-site participant)
A broad agreement emerged that legal frameworks such as the DSA matter, but that their effectiveness depends on enforcement, implementation capacity, and compliance. Rasanen said the first priority is ensuring regulatory compliance and argued current penalties are not yet sufficiently deterrent [67-75]. Allen agreed that the DSA creates important rights and duties, but stressed that companies are pushing back and that enforcement takes time because cases must be legally robust [92-99][358-366]. Pitea similarly said self-regulation has failed and systemic duties need public scrutiny and independent regulators with effective powers [151-157]. Simonyan explicitly stated that laws alone are not enough and that the real challenge lies in translating principles into daily platform practice [239-257]. Bertola observed that he had seen little visible change on Facebook after the DSA, concluding that enforcement remains the unresolved issue [306-309]. The youth intervention reinforced support for regulation, especially safety by design under Article 28 of the DSA [399-405]. Murillo’s summary captured the room’s call for stronger DSA compliance and practical accountability [505-509].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is reinforced by discussions stressing that many existing tools already exist but are weakly implemented, including calls for national implementation of frameworks such as the DSA and for more concerted use of existing regulatory tools on AI and platform harms [S85][S87][S101].
Civil society, researchers, and collective user action are indispensable to platform accountability and to making regulation work in practice.
Speakers: Asha Allen, Cesare Pitea, Chloe McDowell, Lilia Simonyan, Online participant, Murillo Salvador
Civil society is indispensable to enforcement because it researches harms, flags risks, represents users, and checks both platforms and regulators (Asha Allen) User empowerment is a pillar of accountability and must include meaningful controls, transparency, due process, and collective forms of user action (Cesare Pitea) Better awareness of rights and remedies is part of reclaiming user autonomy from platform power (Chloe McDowell) Legal frameworks are strong on paper, but implementation requires practical collaboration among authorities, platforms, and civil society (Lilia Simonyan) The most effective path is a collective, coordinated effort rather than regulation alone (Online participant) Stronger DSA compliance and civil-society partnership with authorities are necessary to make platforms accountable in practice (Murillo Salvador)
Speakers strongly agreed that accountability cannot be delivered by regulators alone. Allen argued that the DSA fundamentally depends on civil society because such organizations research harms, build evidence, act as trusted flaggers, and hold both platforms and enforcers to account [97-112]. Pitea likewise described collective action as one of the four empowerment duties and stressed that civil society is needed to reduce the imbalance of power between users, regulators, and platforms [175-180]. McDowell added that reclaiming autonomy requires awareness of the tools available to users and to civil society [129-130]. Simonyan called for practical multi-stakeholder collaboration among authorities, platforms, and civil society [239-245]. The online participant said democratic debate cannot be safeguarded by regulation alone but requires coordinated collective effort [425-426]. Murillo’s final synthesis also emphasized civil society as a necessary partner to public authorities in holding platforms accountable [497][505-509].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This reflects established multistakeholder governance thinking: UN and IGF sources stress researcher data access, civil society participation, trusted flaggers, and collaborative oversight as necessary complements to formal regulation [S87][S90][S91][S92][S101].
User empowerment should be built into platform design through meaningful control, transparency, due process, and the ability to shape recommendation systems rather than merely receive them.
Speakers: Chloe McDowell, Cesare Pitea, Denys Nazarenko, Pari Esfandiari, Asha Allen, Murillo Salvador
The core question is whether platforms expand or narrow human agency, so the debate should focus on conditions for autonomous judgment (Chloe McDowell) User empowerment is a pillar of accountability and must include meaningful controls, transparency, due process, and collective forms of user action (Cesare Pitea) Users need choice over recommendation systems, provenance signals, and trusted public digital channels to act as citizens rather than audiences (Denys Nazarenko) Users need meaningful control over personalization and curation, along with designs that support reflection and democratic participation (Pari Esfandiari) The DSA embeds human-rights-based due diligence and needs strong enforcement, while users and civil society must actively use the rights it creates (Asha Allen) Platform design should move away from a consumer model toward digital citizenship, with support for community-driven platforms and democratic alternatives (Murillo Salvador)
A strong shared view was that users should not be treated as passive consumers but should have real agency over their online environments. McDowell said the key issue is whether systems expand or narrow human agency, since users are active participants rather than merely passive recipients [20-24]. Pitea developed this into a framework of empowerment duties including meaningful user control, transparency, due process, and collective action [158-180]. Nazarenko called specifically for user choice over recommendation systems, provenance signals, and trusted public channels [217-219]. Esfandiari similarly argued that users need control over personalization and curation and that platforms should support reflection, context, and diverse viewpoints [293-300]. Allen pointed to practical DSA rights such as flagging, dispute settlement, transparency, and algorithmic information as tools of empowerment [92-97]. Murillo summarized the discussion as a move away from a consumer perspective toward digital citizenship embedded in platform design [510-512].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This aligns with rights-based and design-based approaches emphasizing user agency, explainability, transparency, human oversight, and informed control over algorithmic systems rather than passive exposure to defaults [S88][S94][S97][S100].
AI integration into platforms creates growing risks to cognitive autonomy or sovereignty, including manipulation, synthetic content, and behavioral shaping, and therefore requires safeguards before and during deployment.
Speakers: Chloe McDowell, Asha Allen, Cesare Pitea, Pari Esfandiari, Giacomo Mazzone, Sumeja Huskic, Murillo Salvador, On-site participant, Vittorio Bertola
Platform accountability also concerns cognition and autonomy because digital systems influence how people form opinions and exercise judgment (Chloe McDowell) AI tools are being embedded into platforms too quickly, and they should not be deployed without testing, safeguards, and respect for rights (Asha Allen) The recommendation system should protect users against manipulation through stronger transparency, data access, and user-centered design (Cesare Pitea) Cognitive sovereignty is threatened by recommender systems and generative AI that amplify emotional reaction, persuasion, and confirmation bias (Pari Esfandiari) AI-driven search and device interfaces may further centralize control over what information reaches users, harming media diversity and the broader information ecosystem (Giacomo Mazzone) Algorithmic filtering narrows what people see until partial narratives feel complete, threatening independent critical thought (Sumeja Huskic) The spread of AI-generated content and identities creates new risks to cognitive sovereignty, making verification and pre-deployment testing essential (Murillo Salvador) Young people’s emotional reliance on AI chatbots, including using them as therapists, is a serious emerging risk requiring stronger intervention by platforms (On-site participant) AI intensifies manipulation risks because even developers do not fully understand model behavior, while many users actively seek confirmation rather than truth (Vittorio Bertola)
There was wide agreement that AI intensifies existing platform risks by shaping perception, judgment, and behavior. McDowell had already framed accountability as involving cognition and autonomy, not just moderation [19]. Allen warned that major platforms are rapidly embedding AI into core services and argued these systems should not be deployed without evidence of safety, risk assessment, and rights-respecting safeguards [122-126][440-449]. Pitea emphasized that recommendation and moderation systems need stronger transparency, researcher access, and user-centered design to resist manipulation [163-170][181-183]. Esfandiari described cognitive sovereignty as threatened by recommender systems and generative AI that amplify outrage, confirmation bias, and scalable persuasion [289-301]. Mazzone warned that AI-driven search and interfaces may increasingly decide what information users receive, harming diversity and media ecosystems [279-286]. Huskic similarly worried that algorithmic filtering narrows the picture people see until partial narratives feel complete [323-326]. Youth participants added concerns about chatbot dependency and therapeutic substitution [411-415]. Murillo’s consensus text reflected this shared concern by naming cognitive sovereignty, synthetic content, provenance, verification, and testing before deployment [500-504].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is strongly supported by sources highlighting short-term AI harms such as fake content, loss of human agency, manipulative techniques, and behavioral influence, alongside calls for precaution, safety-by-design, and transparency before and during deployment [S84][S85][S86][S88][S99][S101].
Alternative public-interest, community-driven, federated, or civic-tech infrastructures are needed because dominant commercial platforms have weak incentives to change.
Speakers: Ilkka Rasanen, Asha Allen, Francesco Vecchi, Online participant, Murillo Salvador, Cesare Pitea
Because dominant platforms lack incentives to change, stronger alternatives are needed, including alternative social media and civic tech for democratic participation (Ilkka Rasanen) There are already public-interest and community-based platform models, such as Wikipedia and Mastodon, that show different governance is possible (Asha Allen) Federated and open-source ecosystems already offer democratic alternatives, but institutions have failed to fund and scale them (Francesco Vecchi) Europe needs a sovereign “social stack” based on open standards, decentralization, pluralism, and public-interest algorithms (Online participant) Platform design should move away from a consumer model toward digital citizenship, with support for community-driven platforms and democratic alternatives (Murillo Salvador) States should not oppose safety and freedom; they should require platforms to build environments that genuinely enhance user agency (Cesare Pitea)
A notable area of agreement was that societies should invest in alternatives rather than assume dominant platforms will self-reform. Rasanen argued that the largest platforms are too profitable to have incentives to change and that attention should turn to alternatives such as BlueSky, participatory democracy tools, and civic tech [52-65][76-88]. Allen reinforced this by pointing to existing public-interest models such as Wikipedia and Mastodon as proof that other governance arrangements are possible [353-358]. Vecchi said federated networks and open-source civic tools already exist, but institutions have failed to fund and scale them [209-213]. The online participant similarly called for a sovereign European social stack based on decentralization, pluralism, and public-interest algorithms, arguing the barrier is political rather than technical [425-436]. Murillo’s synthesis likewise called for new business and engagement models, including community-driven platforms and democratic alternatives outside mainstream platforms [510-512].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This has clear historical and policy grounding in discussions of public-interest internet models, ActivityPub and federated alternatives, community networks, and ethical recommendation systems that require public or regulatory support because dominant platform incentives remain misaligned [S95][S98][S100].
Safety and freedom should not be treated as opposing goals; rights-based regulation should strengthen both user protection and democratic participation.
Speakers: Cesare Pitea, Asha Allen, On-site participant, Chloe McDowell
States should not oppose safety and freedom; they should require platforms to build environments that genuinely enhance user agency (Cesare Pitea) The DSA embeds human-rights-based due diligence and needs strong enforcement, while users and civil society must actively use the rights it creates (Asha Allen) Young people need regulation, especially safety by design, to realign digital markets with human rights and protect minors (On-site participant) Platforms shape visibility, credibility, and democratic participation, not just communication (Chloe McDowell)
Several speakers aligned around a rights-based understanding in which safety-enhancing regulation should support, not undermine, freedom and participation. Pitea explicitly said the path forward is not to oppose safety and freedoms but to use law to expand accountability, transparency, and user agency [145-149]. Allen argued that the DSA is content-agnostic precisely because freedom of expression and association must be preserved, while still requiring platforms to assess and mitigate risks to civic participation and fundamental rights [92]. The youth speaker framed safety by design as a means to realign markets with human rights, not as a trade-off against democratic values [399-405]. McDowell’s framing also linked accountability to the democratic conditions under which people form opinions and participate in public life [16-19].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This matches authoritative framings that platform and AI governance must balance safety with freedom of expression and due process, rejecting simplistic trade-offs and favoring rights-based safeguards against both harm and overreach [S82][S89][S92].
Similar Viewpoints
These speakers shared the view that the main bottleneck is not the lack of norms but weak or incomplete implementation. Rasanen called for real compliance and deterrent enforcement [67-75]. Bertola said he had not seen meaningful changes on Facebook post-DSA and therefore sees enforcement as the real issue [306-309]. Simonyan said laws provide a strong basis, but implementation is the real challenge [239-245]. Allen agreed that the framework exists but that enforcement is slow, contested, and depends on building legally solid cases and active use of available rights [92-97][358-366].
Speakers: Ilkka Rasanen, Vittorio Bertola, Lilia Simonyan, Asha Allen
The priority should be real compliance with existing rules like the DSA, backed by genuinely dissuasive enforcement (Ilkka Rasanen) Existing regulation has produced little visible change on major platforms so far, showing that enforcement remains the key unresolved issue (Vittorio Bertola) Legal frameworks are strong on paper, but implementation requires practical collaboration among authorities, platforms, and civil society (Lilia Simonyan) The DSA embeds human-rights-based due diligence and needs strong enforcement, while users and civil society must actively use the rights it creates (Asha Allen)
These speakers agreed that users and civil society must be equipped and organized if accountability is to become real. Allen stressed civil society’s roles in research, trusted flagging, and oversight of both companies and regulators [97-112]. Pitea emphasized collective action and practical user empowerment through controls, due process, and support for civil society organizations [158-180]. McDowell highlighted awareness of tools and remedies as part of reclaiming autonomy [129-130]. Murillo’s synthesis reflected the same approach by identifying civil society as a key partner in making law operational [497][505-509].
Speakers: Asha Allen, Cesare Pitea, Murillo Salvador, Chloe McDowell
Civil society is indispensable to enforcement because it researches harms, flags risks, represents users, and checks both platforms and regulators (Asha Allen) User empowerment is a pillar of accountability and must include meaningful controls, transparency, due process, and collective forms of user action (Cesare Pitea) Stronger DSA compliance and civil-society partnership with authorities are necessary to make platforms accountable in practice (Murillo Salvador) Better awareness of rights and remedies is part of reclaiming user autonomy from platform power (Chloe McDowell)
These participants converged around the idea that alternative infrastructures already exist or are possible, but need backing, legitimacy, and scale. Rasanen called for public institutions to help legitimate alternative platforms and civic tech [76-88]. Vecchi argued that the technical alternatives exist in federated and open-source ecosystems, while political will is lacking [209-213]. The online participant proposed a sovereign European social stack based on decentralization and open standards [427-436]. Allen grounded the point in existing examples such as Wikipedia and Mastodon [353-358].
Speakers: Ilkka Rasanen, Francesco Vecchi, Online participant, Asha Allen
Because dominant platforms lack incentives to change, stronger alternatives are needed, including alternative social media and civic tech for democratic participation (Ilkka Rasanen) Federated and open-source ecosystems already offer democratic alternatives, but institutions have failed to fund and scale them (Francesco Vecchi) Europe needs a sovereign “social stack” based on open standards, decentralization, pluralism, and public-interest algorithms (Online participant) There are already public-interest and community-based platform models, such as Wikipedia and Mastodon, that show different governance is possible (Asha Allen)
All four speakers focused on subtler forms of influence over thought and judgment, not only overt misinformation. McDowell argued that platforms shape cognition and the conditions of judgment [19]. Esfandiari said recommender systems and generative AI gradually erode cognitive autonomy through emotional amplification and scalable persuasion [290-301]. Huskic explained how users are repeatedly shown one angle until it feels like the whole story [323-326]. Pitea linked this to the need for transparency, researcher access, and user-centered design of recommender systems [163-170][181-183].
Speakers: Pari Esfandiari, Sumeja Huskic, Chloe McDowell, Cesare Pitea
Cognitive sovereignty is threatened by recommender systems and generative AI that amplify emotional reaction, persuasion, and confirmation bias (Pari Esfandiari) Algorithmic filtering narrows what people see until partial narratives feel complete, threatening independent critical thought (Sumeja Huskic) Platform accountability also concerns cognition and autonomy because digital systems influence how people form opinions and exercise judgment (Chloe McDowell) The recommendation system should protect users against manipulation through stronger transparency, data access, and user-centered design (Cesare Pitea)
These speakers shared concern that design choices themselves can be harmful and should be regulated or redesigned. The youth participant explicitly raised addictive design as a business-model feature that traps users and asked about stronger legal responses [439]. Allen responded that addictive design is likely to be central in ongoing regulatory debates and stressed the need for evidence, data access, and safety-oriented assessment before deployment [441-449]. Pitea’s framework also treated design duties and genuine enhancement of user agency as central to accountability [149][158-162].
Speakers: On-site participant, Asha Allen, Cesare Pitea
Addictive design locks users into dominant platforms, so stronger rules are needed to curb such design and open space for democratic participation in platform governance (On-site participant) AI tools are being embedded into platforms too quickly, and they should not be deployed without testing, safeguards, and respect for rights (Asha Allen) States should not oppose safety and freedom; they should require platforms to build environments that genuinely enhance user agency (Cesare Pitea)
Unexpected Consensus
Support for alternatives to dominant platforms extended across institutional, civil society, and youth-oriented perspectives, not just activist or technical voices.
Speakers: Ilkka Rasanen, Asha Allen, Francesco Vecchi, Online participant, Cesare Pitea
Because dominant platforms lack incentives to change, stronger alternatives are needed, including alternative social media and civic tech for democratic participation (Ilkka Rasanen) There are already public-interest and community-based platform models, such as Wikipedia and Mastodon, that show different governance is possible (Asha Allen) Federated and open-source ecosystems already offer democratic alternatives, but institutions have failed to fund and scale them (Francesco Vecchi) Europe needs a sovereign “social stack” based on open standards, decentralization, pluralism, and public-interest algorithms (Online participant) States should not oppose safety and freedom; they should require platforms to build environments that genuinely enhance user agency (Cesare Pitea)
It was notable that calls for alternatives were not confined to civil society advocates. A public-sector think tank representative, a digital-rights leader, an activist, an online open-source advocate, and a Council of Europe official all endorsed in different ways the need for public-interest, user-oriented, or decentralized alternatives to current dominant models [76-88][353-358][209-213][427-436]. Even where Pitea remained more institutional, he supported opening platforms to plural recommender systems and stronger user agency, which aligns with the broader alternative-infrastructure logic [181-183].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is consistent with broader multistakeholder and public-interest governance discussions in which alternatives, community infrastructures, and co-created internet models are supported across institutional, civil society, and youth-participation settings [S87][S95].
There was broad consensus that safety-enhancing regulation should not be seen as anti-innovation or anti-freedom.
Speakers: Asha Allen, Cesare Pitea, On-site participant, Ilkka Rasanen
The DSA embeds human-rights-based due diligence and needs strong enforcement, while users and civil society must actively use the rights it creates (Asha Allen) States should not oppose safety and freedom; they should require platforms to build environments that genuinely enhance user agency (Cesare Pitea) Young people need regulation, especially safety by design, to realign digital markets with human rights and protect minors (On-site participant) The priority should be real compliance with existing rules like the DSA, backed by genuinely dissuasive enforcement (Ilkka Rasanen)
A potentially surprising consensus emerged against the common framing of regulation as a brake on innovation or expression. Allen directly rejected the claim that regulation hampers innovation and called it a false dichotomy [113-127]. Pitea similarly argued against opposing safety and freedoms [145-149]. The youth speaker presented regulation and safety by design as a way to embed decency, care, and rights in the digital environment [399-405]. Rasanen also treated stronger enforcement as necessary because dominant firms otherwise lack incentives to change [65-75].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is directly echoed in sources arguing that regulation can enable innovation when properly designed and implemented, and that safety-by-design and risk assessment can strengthen trust rather than suppress innovation [S82][S84].
Youth voices aligned strongly with institutional and civil society speakers on the need for stronger regulation and design-based safeguards.
Speakers: On-site participant, Asha Allen, Cesare Pitea, Murillo Salvador, Florence Ranson
Young people need regulation, especially safety by design, to realign digital markets with human rights and protect minors (On-site participant) Young people’s emotional reliance on AI chatbots, including using them as therapists, is a serious emerging risk requiring stronger intervention by platforms (On-site participant) AI tools are being embedded into platforms too quickly, and they should not be deployed without testing, safeguards, and respect for rights (Asha Allen) Platform accountability should rely on law, independent oversight, and systemic duties rather than self-regulation alone (Cesare Pitea) The spread of AI-generated content and identities creates new risks to cognitive sovereignty, making verification and pre-deployment testing essential (Murillo Salvador) Platform accountability was highlighted in prior youth discussions and remains a core concern for democratic trustworthiness (Florence Ranson)
Another noteworthy area of consensus was the close alignment between youth interventions and the panel’s institutional analysis. Florence had already noted that platform accountability was strongly raised in YouthDIG discussions [7][9-10]. During the session, youth participants called for safety by design, stronger regulation, and intervention around harmful AI chatbot dependence [399-415]. These concerns closely matched Allen’s warning against rapid AI deployment without safeguards [122-126][440-449], Pitea’s call for law-based systemic duties [151-157], and Murillo’s summary highlighting cognitive sovereignty, synthetic content, and pre-deployment testing [500-504].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External discussions support this by emphasizing youth expertise in platform governance and documenting young people’s explicit demand to participate in governance and shape safer digital environments [S87][S95].
Overall Assessment

The discussion showed strong convergence around several core propositions: platforms are now democratic infrastructure rather than neutral channels; their engagement-driven design creates risks for public debate, autonomy, and trust; regulation such as the DSA is necessary but only meaningful if enforced; civil society and researchers are essential accountability actors; user empowerment must be practical and design-based; and AI intensifies risks to cognition, manipulation, and democratic participation [16-24][49-52][67-75][97-112][158-180][289-301][500-509].

High consensus. There was little visible disagreement on diagnosis and broad agreement on the need for rights-based regulation, stronger enforcement, civil-society participation, and safeguards against manipulative design and AI-related harms. The main variation was one of emphasis—some stressed enforcement, others alternatives, and others user empowerment—but these were complementary rather than conflicting positions. This implies a mature debate moving beyond whether platforms should be accountable toward how to operationalize accountability through law, enforcement, design change, and public-interest alternatives.

Differences
Different Viewpoints
Whether the main strategic response should prioritize forcing dominant platforms into compliance or shifting energy toward building and scaling alternatives to them
Speakers: Ilkka Rasanen, Asha Allen, Francesco Vecchi, Online participant
The priority should be real compliance with existing rules like the DSA, backed by genuinely dissuasive enforcement (Ilkka Rasanen) Because dominant platforms lack incentives to change, stronger alternatives are needed, including alternative social media and civic tech for democratic participation (Ilkka Rasanen) The DSA embeds human-rights-based due diligence and needs strong enforcement, while users and civil society must actively use the rights it creates (Asha Allen) Federated and open-source ecosystems already offer democratic alternatives, but institutions have failed to fund and scale them (Francesco Vecchi) Europe needs a sovereign “social stack” based on open standards, decentralization, pluralism, and public-interest algorithms (Online participant)
Ilkka Rasanen presents a mixed but ultimately more skeptical view of reforming dominant platforms: he says compliance must come first, but also argues these companies are too profitable to have incentives to change and therefore discussion should shift toward alternatives such as alternative social media and civic tech [67-77]. By contrast, Asha Allen emphasizes making the existing regulatory framework work through enforcement, user rights, and civil society action under the DSA rather than shifting the center of gravity away from current platforms [92-99][105-112][124-127]. Francesco Vecchi and the online participant push more strongly toward building public-interest or sovereign alternatives at scale, arguing that the technology already exists and the missing ingredient is political will and investment [209-213][425-436].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This disagreement mirrors an established policy divide between reforming dominant platforms through regulation and accountability, versus investing in public-interest, federated, or ethical alternatives that can reduce dependence on incumbent business models [S95][S98][S100].
How much confidence to place in current regulation as an effective tool versus seeing it as insufficiently impactful so far
Speakers: Asha Allen, Ilkka Rasanen, Vittorio Bertola
The DSA embeds human-rights-based due diligence and needs strong enforcement, while users and civil society must actively use the rights it creates (Asha Allen) The priority should be real compliance with existing rules like the DSA, backed by genuinely dissuasive enforcement (Ilkka Rasanen) Existing regulation has produced little visible change on major platforms so far, showing that enforcement remains the key unresolved issue (Vittorio Bertola)
All three support enforcement, but they differ in how effective the present framework appears. Asha Allen portrays the DSA as already providing substantial tools, remedies, and legal bases that can be used now by users, researchers, and civil society, even if enforcement takes time [92-99][368-394]. Ilkka Rasanen is more doubtful about current deterrence, stressing that only one fine has been imposed, that it is economically trivial for major platforms, and that regulation needs much more real dissuasive force [68-75]. Vittorio Bertola is even more skeptical in experiential terms, saying he has noticed no meaningful change in Facebook since the DSA entered into force and concluding that enforcement remains the unresolved issue before moving to new regulation [306-309].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This reflects a long-running tension: some sources argue existing tools are largely sufficient if enforced better, while others describe current frameworks as inadequate, fragmented, or vulnerable to abuse and in need of deeper reform [S85][S92][S101].
Whether platform users should mainly be understood as already active participants whose agency is being undermined, or as subjects currently trapped in passive/addictive consumption models that must be structurally redirected
Speakers: Chloe McDowell, Asha Allen, On-site participant
The core question is whether platforms expand or narrow human agency, so the debate should focus on conditions for autonomous judgment (Chloe McDowell) Platforms have shifted from earlier community-driven civic participation toward business models centered on engagement, which undermines democratic debate (Asha Allen) Addictive design locks users into dominant platforms, so stronger rules are needed to curb such design and open space for democratic participation in platform governance (On-site participant)
Chloe McDowell explicitly cautions against the idea of users as merely passive consumers and says the real issue is whether systems expand or narrow agency [20-24]. Asha Allen goes further in challenging the framing of the question itself, arguing there has been active participation on platforms in the past and that the notion of passive consumption partly reflects current business incentives rather than user nature [92]. The later on-site participant, however, stresses that addictive design is a core business feature that keeps users on dominant platforms and asks for stronger rules specifically targeting that design logic [439]. The disagreement is not over whether agency matters, but over how accurately ‘passive consumption’ describes users’ present condition and therefore what kind of intervention should be emphasized.
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
Relevant sources frame this tension by contrasting user empowerment and bottom-up participation with analyses of addictive design, automated defaults, and attention-maximizing architectures that reduce meaningful agency and push users toward passive consumption [S87][S92][S97][S99].
How far AI risks are primarily a governance-and-testing problem versus a deeper epistemic problem because even developers may not fully understand the systems
Speakers: Asha Allen, Vittorio Bertola
AI tools are being embedded into platforms too quickly, and they should not be deployed without testing, safeguards, and respect for rights (Asha Allen) AI intensifies manipulation risks because even developers do not fully understand model behavior, while many users actively seek confirmation rather than truth (Vittorio Bertola)
Asha Allen argues that AI systems should not be deployed without proper testing, sandboxing, and rights-based safeguards, and she pushes back against the notion that companies cannot assess these systems because they do have ways to test for harms [122-127][440-449]. Vittorio Bertola, by contrast, argues that AI is harder to govern than social media because even the people who build the models do not fully understand how they work in the end, making it difficult to know what exactly regulators should ask companies to do [310-315]. This is a substantive disagreement over the tractability of AI governance, not over whether AI poses risks.
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is enriched by sources that on one hand promote testing, sandboxes, and safety-by-design as governance tools, while on the other emphasize the black-box problem, opacity, and the need for explainability because system reasoning may not be fully understandable [S82][S84][S85].
Whether the core obstacle is mainly platform design and regulation, or equally a broader cultural problem in which users actively seek manipulation and confirmation bias
Speakers: Chloe McDowell, Asha Allen, Vittorio Bertola, Pari Esfandiari, Sumeja Huskic
The core question is whether platforms expand or narrow human agency, so the debate should focus on conditions for autonomous judgment (Chloe McDowell) Platform accountability also concerns cognition and autonomy because digital systems influence how people form opinions and exercise judgment (Chloe McDowell) Platforms have shifted from earlier community-driven civic participation toward business models centered on engagement, which undermines democratic debate (Asha Allen) AI intensifies manipulation risks because even developers do not fully understand model behavior, while many users actively seek confirmation rather than truth (Vittorio Bertola) Cognitive sovereignty is threatened by recommender systems and generative AI that amplify emotional reaction, persuasion, and confirmation bias (Pari Esfandiari) Algorithmic filtering narrows what people see until partial narratives feel complete, threatening independent critical thought (Sumeja Huskic)
Most speakers frame the problem primarily as structural: platforms shape visibility, cognition, and democratic participation through design choices and recommendation systems [16-24][92][289-301][323-326]. Vittorio Bertola introduces a notably different emphasis, arguing that ‘most people want to be manipulated’ in the sense that they actively seek confirmation and affirmation, and that the cultural problem is therefore central even if he does not offer a solution [316-319]. This shifts responsibility partly from platform architecture toward user attitudes and social culture, diverging from the stronger structural emphasis of the other speakers.
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External context supports both sides: some sources stress platform incentives, amplification, and choice architecture as central drivers, while others note echo chambers, confirmation bias, and the limits of law without broader ethical and educational change [S89][S88][S99].
Unexpected Differences
Disagreement over whether AI systems are governable through rigorous testing and sandboxing, or inherently too opaque for even their creators to fully understand
Speakers: Asha Allen, Vittorio Bertola
AI tools are being embedded into platforms too quickly, and they should not be deployed without testing, safeguards, and respect for rights (Asha Allen) AI intensifies manipulation risks because even developers do not fully understand model behavior, while many users actively seek confirmation rather than truth (Vittorio Bertola)
This disagreement is unexpected because both speakers are critical of AI risks, yet they part ways on whether governance tools can realistically keep up. Asha explicitly challenges the notion that companies do not know how their systems work enough to test them and argues that sandboxing and risk assessment are possible and required [440-449]. Vittorio, however, says that with AI even the makers do not fully understand the models, making it hard to know what regulators should demand [312-315]. The surprise lies in the split not over the existence of risk, but over the feasibility of control.
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This closely tracks existing AI governance debates between confidence in precautionary tools such as sandboxes and risk assessment, and concern over black-box opacity that makes even well-intentioned oversight incomplete without stronger explainability and accountability mechanisms [S82][S84][S85].
Disagreement over whether users are primarily constrained by platform systems or whether many actively desire manipulative, confirmatory content
Speakers: Chloe McDowell, Asha Allen, Vittorio Bertola
The core question is whether platforms expand or narrow human agency, so the debate should focus on conditions for autonomous judgment (Chloe McDowell) Platforms have shifted from earlier community-driven civic participation toward business models centered on engagement, which undermines democratic debate (Asha Allen) AI intensifies manipulation risks because even developers do not fully understand model behavior, while many users actively seek confirmation rather than truth (Vittorio Bertola)
Most of the session frames harms structurally, with Chloe and Asha emphasizing how platform environments shape agency and democratic participation [16-24][92]. Vittorio introduces a less expected cultural disagreement by arguing that many people actually want to be manipulated in the sense of seeking confirmation bias and emotional validation [316-318]. This is unexpected because it shifts explanatory weight away from platform architecture toward user desire and social culture, diverging from the dominant framing of the panel.
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is reflected in prior discussions of algorithmic amplification and addictive design that steer users, alongside research on filter bubbles and confirmation-seeking behavior that suggests user preferences also play a role in the spread of manipulative content [S89][S92][S99].
Overall Assessment

The discussion showed broad consensus on the diagnosis: dominant platforms shape democratic life, optimize engagement rather than civic discourse, create risks to autonomy and cognition, and require stronger accountability [16-24][49-52][145-157][493-504]. Most disagreement centered not on ends but on means: whether to prioritize enforcement of existing rules or build alternatives, how much faith to place in current regulation, how to conceptualize user passivity and addiction, and whether AI risks are tractable through governance or fundamentally harder to control [67-88][92-127][306-319][425-436].

Low to moderate. The speakers largely shared the same normative goals—democratic integrity, user autonomy, human-rights-based regulation, and safer digital environments—but diverged on strategy and feasibility. This level of disagreement is constructive rather than polarizing: it suggests a mature policy field with convergence on values but ongoing contestation over implementation pathways.

Partial Agreements
There is broad agreement that enforcement matters and that self-regulation is inadequate. Ilkka calls for real compliance backed by dissuasive deterrence [67-75]. Asha says the DSA contains meaningful rights and duties but requires enforcement and active use by civil society and users [92-99][368-394]. Cesare argues self-regulation has failed and calls for law plus independent oversight [151-157]. Lilia says the challenge is implementation through practical multi-stakeholder mechanisms [239-257]. Vittorio agrees enforcement is the key unresolved problem, though from a more skeptical angle based on limited visible platform change [306-309]. Murillo’s synthesis also reflects the consensus on stronger DSA compliance and civil-society partnership [505-509]. The shared goal is accountability; the disagreement is over whether existing mechanisms are already sufficiently usable, how far they have worked, and whether enforcement should be the main focus or accompanied by a stronger pivot to alternatives.
Speakers: Ilkka Rasanen, Asha Allen, Cesare Pitea, Lilia Simonyan, Vittorio Bertola, Murillo Salvador
The priority should be real compliance with existing rules like the DSA, backed by genuinely dissuasive enforcement (Ilkka Rasanen) The DSA embeds human-rights-based due diligence and needs strong enforcement, while users and civil society must actively use the rights it creates (Asha Allen) Platform accountability should rely on law, independent oversight, and systemic duties rather than self-regulation alone (Cesare Pitea) Legal frameworks are strong on paper, but implementation requires practical collaboration among authorities, platforms, and civil society (Lilia Simonyan) Existing regulation has produced little visible change on major platforms so far, showing that enforcement remains the key unresolved issue (Vittorio Bertola) Stronger DSA compliance and civil-society partnership with authorities are necessary to make platforms accountable in practice (Murillo Salvador)
These speakers agree on the goal of strengthening user agency and autonomy, but differ on the main route. Chloe frames the issue conceptually as whether systems expand or narrow agency [20-24]. Asha stresses legal rights and civil-society enforcement capacities [97-112][368-394]. Cesare focuses on empowerment duties such as meaningful controls, transparency, due process, and collective action [158-180]. Denys emphasizes practical civic tools like user-configurable recommendation systems, provenance signals, and trusted official channels [217-219]. Pari focuses on meaningful user control over personalization and design for reflection and diverse viewpoints [293-301]. The shared goal is empowered digital citizenship; the difference lies in whether law, interface design, public channels, or user-choice tools should take the lead.
Speakers: Chloe McDowell, Asha Allen, Cesare Pitea, Denys Nazarenko, Pari Esfandiari
The core question is whether platforms expand or narrow human agency, so the debate should focus on conditions for autonomous judgment (Chloe McDowell) Platform accountability also concerns cognition and autonomy because digital systems influence how people form opinions and exercise judgment (Chloe McDowell) Civil society is indispensable to enforcement because it researches harms, flags risks, represents users, and checks both platforms and regulators (Asha Allen) User empowerment is a pillar of accountability and must include meaningful controls, transparency, due process, and collective forms of user action (Cesare Pitea) Users need choice over recommendation systems, provenance signals, and trusted public digital channels to act as citizens rather than audiences (Denys Nazarenko) Users need meaningful control over personalization and curation, along with designs that support reflection and democratic participation (Pari Esfandiari)
There is shared support for alternatives and public-interest models, but disagreement about whether this should supplement or displace reform of existing platforms. Ilkka argues for alternatives because dominant platforms lack incentives to change and says public authorities should give such alternatives legitimacy [76-88]. Asha says alternatives already exist, such as Wikipedia and Mastodon, but presents them more as proof of possibility than as the sole strategic answer [353-358]. Francesco and the online participant strongly emphasize scaling federated, open-source, and sovereign infrastructure through political investment [209-213][427-436]. Cesare is more cautious and institutional, emphasizing user agency and public-interest framing without abandoning regulation of existing platforms [145-157][467-477]. Murillo’s synthesis supports incentivizing community-driven platforms and democratic formats [510-512]. The common goal is a healthier digital public sphere; the disagreement concerns whether to prioritize reforming mainstream platforms, building substitutes, or doing both in parallel.
Speakers: Ilkka Rasanen, Asha Allen, Francesco Vecchi, Online participant, Cesare Pitea, Murillo Salvador
Public institutions and large actors should help legitimate alternative platforms and participatory democratic tools, including civic tech (Ilkka Rasanen) There are already public-interest and community-based platform models, such as Wikipedia and Mastodon, that show different governance is possible (Asha Allen) Federated and open-source ecosystems already offer democratic alternatives, but institutions have failed to fund and scale them (Francesco Vecchi) Europe needs a sovereign “social stack” based on open standards, decentralization, pluralism, and public-interest algorithms (Online participant) States should not oppose safety and freedom; they should require platforms to build environments that genuinely enhance user agency (Cesare Pitea) Platform design should move away from a consumer model toward digital citizenship, with support for community-driven platforms and democratic alternatives (Murillo Salvador)
Speakers strongly agree that AI raises new risks to cognition, autonomy, and democratic judgment. Asha calls for testing, sandboxing, and rights-based safeguards before deployment [122-127][440-449]. Pari emphasizes scalable persuasion, emotional amplification, and cognitive autonomy risks [289-301]. The youth participant highlights harmful emotional dependence on chatbots and the need for stronger platform intervention [411-415]. Murillo’s summary captures support for verification and pre-deployment testing [500-504]. Vittorio agrees on heightened AI manipulation risks but diverges by stressing the opacity of the systems and the cultural willingness of users to seek manipulation [310-319]. The shared goal is safeguarding cognitive sovereignty; disagreement concerns whether the main solution is technical testing and regulation, user protection measures, or deeper cultural change.
Speakers: Asha Allen, Vittorio Bertola, Pari Esfandiari, On-site participant, Murillo Salvador
AI tools are being embedded into platforms too quickly, and they should not be deployed without testing, safeguards, and respect for rights (Asha Allen) AI intensifies manipulation risks because even developers do not fully understand model behavior, while many users actively seek confirmation rather than truth (Vittorio Bertola) Cognitive sovereignty is threatened by recommender systems and generative AI that amplify emotional reaction, persuasion, and confirmation bias (Pari Esfandiari) Young people’s emotional reliance on AI chatbots, including using them as therapists, is a serious emerging risk requiring stronger intervention by platforms (On-site participant) The spread of AI-generated content and identities creates new risks to cognitive sovereignty, making verification and pre-deployment testing essential (Murillo Salvador)
Takeaways
Key takeaways
Platforms were framed as part of the democratic public infrastructure, not merely neutral channels, because their design choices shape visibility, credibility, participation, and public discourse. Speakers broadly agreed that dominant platforms are optimized for engagement and profit rather than civic deliberation, which creates systemic risks for democracy, autonomy, and trust. There was strong consensus that existing regulation, especially the EU Digital Services Act, should be enforced more effectively before expecting major behavioral change from large platforms. Self-regulation was viewed as insufficient; platform accountability should rest on binding law, independent oversight, systemic duties, and human-rights-based governance. Civil society was repeatedly identified as essential to effective accountability: it researches harms, flags violations, supports users, pressures regulators, and helps make enforcement work in practice. User empowerment was treated as a core pillar of accountability and should include meaningful control over recommender systems and personalization, stronger transparency, due process, access to remedies, and collective forms of user action. AI intensifies existing platform risks by scaling persuasion, amplification, and synthetic content, raising concerns about cognitive sovereignty, behavioral manipulation, and the narrowing of independent critical thought. Participants emphasized that AI systems embedded in platforms should undergo testing, risk assessment, and safeguards before deployment, rather than being released first and addressed later. Alternative models are possible: speakers pointed to public-interest, community-based, federated, and open-source platforms, along with civic tech and participatory democratic tools, as viable democratic complements or alternatives to dominant platforms. Youth perspectives highlighted the harms of unregulated social media, the need for safety by design, and the emerging risks of young people developing emotional reliance on AI chatbots. The session concluded with rough consensus around four summary points: platforms function as democratic infrastructure but distort debate; AI and recommender systems threaten cognitive sovereignty; regulation does not inherently hinder innovation and needs stronger enforcement; and platform governance should move from a consumer model toward digital citizenship and support for democratic alternatives.
Resolutions and action items
A rough consensus was reached on the four summary points presented at the end of the session, with no strong objections raised. Participants called for stronger enforcement of the DSA, including more meaningful compliance and dissuasive enforcement against major platforms. Participants urged greater use of existing user rights and remedies under the DSA, including flagging content, out-of-court dispute settlement, and private enforcement actions. Civil society, researchers, and public-interest actors were encouraged to continue building evidence on platform harms and to use available legal tools to support enforcement. Speakers proposed expanding access to platform data for vetted researchers and public-interest organizations in order to study harms such as addictive design and algorithmic manipulation. Public institutions and large actors were encouraged to support and help legitimize alternative platforms, civic tech, and public-interest digital infrastructure. States and regulators were encouraged to require safety by design, transparency, and user agency by design rather than as afterthoughts. The Council of Europe invited participants to contribute to its survey under the New Democratic Pact for Europe. A follow-up process was noted in which the wording of the session outcomes could still be commented on during the week after the event.
Unresolved issues
How to secure genuinely effective and timely enforcement of the DSA and similar rules remains unresolved, especially given platform resistance and litigation. Whether dominant commercial platforms can realistically be transformed into democratic spaces, or whether meaningful change requires migration toward alternatives, was raised but not settled. How to regulate addictive design features such as infinite scroll, and whether current EU rules are sufficient for doing so, remained an open question. How far regulation should go in challenging or reshaping the underlying business models of major platforms was discussed but not resolved. Access to platform data for vetted researchers and civil society remains a major unresolved implementation issue, despite its importance for accountability. How to govern AI systems whose behavior may be difficult to interpret, and how to prove and mitigate their harms in practice, was identified as a continuing challenge. The tension between building European digital sovereignty and ensuring that new infrastructure remains grounded in fundamental rights and does not reproduce harm was raised but not fully answered. How to scale public-interest, federated, and open-source alternatives so they can compete with dominant platforms remains unresolved and was linked to missing political will and funding. The growing issue of young people relying on AI chatbots for emotional support or therapy was identified as serious, but no concrete policy solution was fully developed. Broader cultural and societal drivers of manipulation, confirmation bias, and democratic decline were recognized as extending beyond platform regulation alone and remained unresolved.
Suggested compromises
A recurring compromise was to focus first on enforcing existing regulatory frameworks, especially the DSA, before pursuing new rules or more ambitious structural reforms. Rather than framing safety and freedom as opposing goals, speakers suggested a balanced approach in which regulation expands user agency and rights while preserving freedom of expression and association. Instead of relying only on direct content regulation, participants favored a compromise centered on systemic duties, transparency, risk mitigation, and user empowerment. Several interventions suggested not abandoning major platforms outright, but developing alternatives in parallel and encouraging public institutions to support them while existing platforms are regulated. A balanced governance model was proposed in which accountability is shared among regulators, platforms, civil society, researchers, and users through multi-stakeholder collaboration. On AI deployment, a compromise position emerged around allowing innovation to continue but requiring prior testing, sandboxing, and rights-based safeguards before systems are widely deployed.
Thought Provoking Comments
Chloe McDowell framed platforms not as neutral channels but as part of ‘the architecture’ of public debate, arguing that platform design shapes what becomes visible, credible, and meaningful, and therefore affects how people form opinions and participate in democratic life.
This was a strong conceptual reframing. Rather than treating platform accountability as a narrow issue of moderation or compliance, she elevated it to a question about the conditions of democratic judgment, cognition, and autonomy. That made the conversation more philosophical and systemic from the outset.
It set the tone for the entire session and gave later speakers a shared vocabulary: design, agency, cognition, democratic capacity, and systemic responsibility. It also widened the debate beyond technical regulation into deeper questions about democracy, meaning-making, and public life.
Speaker: Chloe McDowell
Ilkka Rasanen laid out four contextual facts: democracy is in global decline, young Europeans spend nearly six hours a day on social media, social media is their main source of news, and dominant platforms are optimized for engagement rather than democratic discourse.
This was insightful because it connected democratic decline, media consumption, and platform economics into one coherent diagnosis. The six-hours-a-day figure in particular gave empirical weight to the claim that platform governance is no longer marginal but central to democratic life.
It grounded the discussion in urgency and evidence. By tying social media use to democratic conditions, it moved the panel from abstract concern to structural critique. It also prepared the ground for later interventions about addictive design, cognitive sovereignty, and stronger enforcement.
Speaker: Ilkka Rasanen
Ilkka argued that before expecting platforms to foster democracy, regulators must first ensure real compliance, and that current fines are too weak to be meaningful for highly profitable companies. He then pivoted to a more provocative claim: rather than asking dominant platforms to change, we should build alternatives such as civic tech and public-interest platforms.
This challenged an implicit assumption running through many policy discussions: that reforming existing dominant platforms is enough. His suggestion that the real conversation should be about alternatives, not just better behavior from incumbents, introduced a more transformative perspective.
This became one of the session’s major turning points. It shifted the conversation from compliance-only thinking toward institutional and infrastructural alternatives. Later interventions by Francesco Vecchi, Peter Rechels, and others on public-interest platforms, open infrastructure, and a European social stack clearly built on this opening.
Speaker: Ilkka Rasanen
Asha Allen questioned the framing of users as passive consumers, arguing that platforms historically enabled active civic participation, as seen in movements like Me Too and Black Lives Matter, and that the real issue is how business-model changes now work against democratic exchange.
This was thought-provoking because it corrected an oversimplified narrative. Rather than portraying users as merely manipulated, she emphasized that platform participation has been politically generative in the past. This added nuance and resisted paternalistic assumptions about users.
Her intervention complicated the discussion in a productive way. It redirected focus from blaming user passivity to analyzing platform incentives and design choices. That helped preserve room for user agency while still criticizing exploitative architectures, a theme later echoed by several participants.
Speaker: Asha Allen
Asha argued that the DSA cannot fundamentally work without civil society, noting that civil society organizations build evidence, act as trusted flaggers, support enforcement, and hold both platforms and regulators accountable.
This was insightful because it reframed regulation as a co-regulatory ecosystem rather than a state-versus-platform model. It highlighted implementation as a social and institutional process requiring intermediaries, not just legal texts.
It shifted the discussion toward governance in practice. Later comments from Lilia Simonyan, the session prompts on multi-stakeholder governance, and the final consensus text all reflected this emphasis on civil society as a central accountability actor rather than a peripheral stakeholder.
Speaker: Asha Allen
Cesare Pitea argued that the way forward is not to oppose safety and freedom, nor to hand control of the information environment back to states, but to use law to expand platform accountability, transparency, and genuine user agency.
This was important because it cut through a common false binary in digital policy debates. He presented regulation not as censorship or state control, but as a means to strengthen user autonomy and democratic freedom.
It gave the discussion a human-rights-centered normative anchor. This framing helped reconcile some tension between regulation and liberty, and it was later reinforced in comments about safety by design, user control, and democratic participation in platform governance.
Speaker: Cesare Pitea
Cesare proposed that big platforms might need to open up their systems to a plurality of recommender and moderation systems, so that users could rely on third parties to shape their online experience according to their own values and preferences.
This introduced a more radical and concrete design-governance idea than simple transparency or appeals. It imagines platform architecture itself becoming pluralized and less centralized, which goes beyond common accountability proposals.
It deepened the conversation from oversight to structural redesign. This fed into later interventions about user choice of recommendation systems, open infrastructure, and alternative digital public spheres. It made the discussion less about patching harms and more about redistributing power within platform ecosystems.
Speaker: Cesare Pitea
Francesco Vecchi argued that democracy cannot be left to algorithms designed for profit or surveillance, invoking Lawrence Lessig’s idea that ‘code is law’ and calling for public-interest platforms and AI as democratic infrastructure.
This comment was compelling because it linked classic digital governance theory to current democratic concerns. By treating platform architecture as a form of governance, it reinforced the idea that technical systems are political institutions.
It pushed the conversation further toward institutional alternatives and public-interest design. It validated Ilkka’s earlier call for alternatives and kept the debate focused not just on restraining harms but on actively building democratic infrastructures.
Speaker: Francesco Vecchi
Giacomo Mazzone warned that AI integration into search and interfaces could be even more damaging than current social media dynamics, because users may stop seeking information themselves and instead receive preselected information chosen by AI systems and platform priorities.
This was thought-provoking because it extended the debate from current platform harms to an emerging future in which agency itself is further displaced. He also linked this to media certification, diversity loss, and the weakening of local and minority-language media ecosystems.
This intervention raised the stakes and introduced a new layer of complexity. It broadened the discussion from social media accountability to AI-mediated epistemic dependency. Later comments on cognitive sovereignty, provenance, and synthetic media clearly reflected this widening of scope.
Speaker: Giacomo Mazzone
Pari Esfandiari said that the central problem is no longer just misinformation but the gradual erosion of cognitive autonomy in digital environments optimized to predict and shape behavior, with generative AI making persuasion scalable and personalized.
This was one of the clearest formulations of the session’s deepest concern. She moved beyond content-level harms to the level of mental and perceptual conditions under which democratic judgment takes place.
Her comment sharpened the ‘cognitive sovereignty’ thread and gave it conceptual precision. It helped bridge earlier concerns about engagement models, recommender systems, and AI into one coherent line of analysis, which then appeared prominently in the final session summary.
Speaker: Pari Esfandiari
Vittorio Bertola observed that despite the DSA, he had seen almost no change in how Facebook works, and then made the unsettling remark that ‘most people want to be manipulated’ because they seek confirmation and emotional validation rather than facts.
This was provocative because it challenged the tendency to locate the whole problem in platforms or regulators. By pointing to cultural demand for manipulation, he introduced an uncomfortable but important social dimension to the problem.
It shifted the discussion briefly from institutional fixes to cultural and psychological conditions. While no one fully endorsed the claim, it deepened the analysis by suggesting that regulation alone may be insufficient if public appetite for bias-confirming content remains strong.
Speaker: Vittorio Bertola
Sumeja Huskic reflected that the greatest danger is not being told what to think, but being shown less and less without realizing it, until one angle, emotion, or narrative feels like the whole story.
This was especially insightful because it expressed algorithmic narrowing in simple, powerful human terms. It captured the subtlety of platform influence: not overt indoctrination, but silent constriction of perspective.
Her intervention distilled a complex issue into a memorable democratic concern and reinforced the cognitive sovereignty thread. It helped translate technical discussion about curation and recommender systems into an experiential account of how citizens lose epistemic freedom.
Speaker: Sumeja Huskic
Jaska, speaking from YouthDig, said her generation had been ‘the generation of unregulated social media’ and aspired to become ‘the generation of regulation,’ emphasizing safety by design and arguing that children should be shaped by morals and values, not by platforms’ profit aspirations.
This was powerful because it gave the discussion an intergenerational and moral dimension. It reframed regulation not as bureaucracy but as a corrective response to a lived social experiment imposed on young people.
It brought emotional force and clarity to the debate and strengthened the legitimacy of stronger regulatory action. It also connected abstract governance principles to childhood, safety, and long-term social consequences, reinforcing support for safety-by-design approaches.
Speaker: Jaska
The second youth intervention highlighted that young people are increasingly forming quasi-personal or therapeutic relationships with generative AI chatbots, and that platforms need stronger measures to direct vulnerable users toward real help instead of keeping them engaged.
This was thought-provoking because it moved the AI discussion from information quality to emotional dependency and mental health. It identified a particularly contemporary and under-discussed risk: AI systems occupying intimate human roles.
It broadened the meaning of cognitive sovereignty to include relational and psychological vulnerability. This deepened the discussion of behavioral harm and gave urgency to calls for safeguards beyond content moderation, especially in relation to young users.
Speaker: Inej Ruki
Asha Allen responded to concerns about weak enforcement by arguing that there are already actionable tools within the DSA, including private enforcement, out-of-court dispute settlement, and data access rights for vetted researchers, even if access is still being resisted by platforms.
This was insightful because it moved the discussion from diagnosis to strategy. Rather than simply repeating that enforcement is slow, she showed that there are intermediate levers available to civil society and users right now.
This intervention shifted the mood from frustration to practical possibility. It reinforced her earlier co-regulatory argument and gave the session a more action-oriented conclusion, balancing the many structural critiques with examples of how accountability can already be pursued.
Speaker: Asha Allen
Cesare Pitea used two concrete personal examples: being served paid content from a foreign government unrelated to his interests, and struggling through multiple rounds with a platform to remove a fake ad showing the Italian president promoting financial services.
These examples were effective because they translated abstract discussions of user control, harmful design, and procedural weakness into vivid real-world failures. They showed how even informed users face unreasonable burdens in contesting harmful content.
His anecdotes reinforced the argument that existing user controls are often not meaningful in practice. They helped move the discussion from institutional principles back to user experience, underlining the urgency of making accountability mechanisms genuinely accessible and usable.
Speaker: Cesare Pitea
Overall Assessment

The most important comments collectively transformed the session from a standard discussion of platform regulation into a layered debate about democracy, infrastructure, cognition, and power. Chloe’s opening established a broad democratic frame; Ilkka introduced urgency and the possibility of alternatives; Asha complicated the user-passivity narrative while making civil society central to enforcement; Cesare grounded the debate in human rights and user agency; and later participants pushed the conversation toward cognitive sovereignty, AI-mediated influence, addictive design, and public-interest digital infrastructure. Several interventions served as turning points: Ilkka’s move from compliance to alternatives, Asha’s reframing of agency and co-regulation, and Giacomo’s and Pari’s expansion into AI and cognitive autonomy. Youth interventions added moral clarity and generational urgency. As a whole, these comments pushed the discussion beyond narrow compliance questions toward a richer understanding of platforms as democratic institutions that require not only rules and enforcement, but redesign, public-interest alternatives, and deeper protections for human autonomy.

Follow-up Questions
How can platforms be moved beyond optimizing attention and engagement toward strengthening democratic capacity and civic participation?
This is the core unresolved policy question of the session. It matters because platform design now shapes public debate, opinion formation, and democratic participation, so identifying governance and design approaches that promote democratic agency is essential.
Speaker: Chloe McDowell, Ilkka Rasanen, Asha Allen, Pari Esfandiari, Sumeja Huskic
Can dominant platforms realistically be made democratic, or are stronger alternatives such as civic tech, federated/public-interest platforms, and new democratic infrastructures necessary?
This question goes to the heart of whether reform of existing commercial platforms is sufficient or whether democratic societies need alternative digital infrastructures. It is important for deciding where public funding, regulation, and institutional support should be directed.
Speaker: Ilkka Rasanen, Francesco Vecchi, Asha Allen, Peter Rechels, Cesare Pitea
How can enforcement of the Digital Services Act and similar frameworks be made genuinely effective and dissuasive, including meaningful penalties and practical compliance?
Multiple speakers noted that regulation exists but visible platform change remains limited. This is important because weak or delayed enforcement undermines public trust, allows harmful business practices to continue, and reduces the credibility of democratic regulation.
Speaker: Ilkka Rasanen, Asha Allen, Vittorio Bertola, Cesare Pitea, Lilia Simonyan
What practical mechanisms can turn multi-stakeholder collaboration into real platform accountability in practice?
The discussion repeatedly endorsed multi-stakeholder governance, but how this works operationally remains open. It is important because cooperation among regulators, civil society, researchers, and platforms is necessary to implement transparency, auditing, and rights protections.
Speaker: Chloe McDowell, Lilia Simonyan, Asha Allen, Cesare Pitea
Why are platforms not providing meaningful access to data and platform systems for vetted researchers, and how can Article 40 DSA-style access be made real?
Both speakers highlighted that research access is crucial yet still blocked in practice. This matters because independent evidence on recommender systems, moderation, and harms is needed for enforcement, public scrutiny, and informed policymaking.
Speaker: Cesare Pitea, Asha Allen
What are the concrete harms of addictive design features such as infinite scroll, and how can they be regulated under existing and future EU rules, including the Digital Fairness Act?
Addictive design was identified as central to platform business models and potentially incompatible with democratic and mental well-being goals. Further work is important to define harms, establish evidence, and determine which legal tools can require redesign.
Speaker: Adam Lam, Asha Allen, Murillo Salvador
How can users be given real choice over recommendation systems and content curation, rather than default platform-controlled feeds?
Several participants suggested user-configurable recommender systems or third-party curation. This matters because meaningful user control could reduce manipulation, improve autonomy, and rebalance power between users and platforms.
Speaker: Denys Nazarenko, Pari Esfandiari, Cesare Pitea
How should transparency obligations evolve so that users can meaningfully understand why content is shown or amplified, rather than receiving only formal or technical disclosures?
Transparency was repeatedly described as necessary but insufficient in its current form. It is important because democratic accountability depends on explanations that are understandable and actionable for users, researchers, and regulators.
Speaker: Lilia Simonyan, Pari Esfandiari, Asha Allen
What safeguards are needed to protect cognitive sovereignty and behavioral autonomy in an AI-driven public sphere?
This was a major unresolved theme of the session, especially as AI becomes embedded in search, recommendations, moderation, and synthetic media. It is important because these systems may shape perception, judgment, and behavior at scale.
Speaker: Chloe McDowell, Giacomo Mazzone, Pari Esfandiari, Sumeja Huskic, Inej Ruki
How should generative AI and synthetic media be tested, sandboxed, labeled, and verified before deployment into public-facing platforms?
Participants stressed that AI tools are being deployed faster than safeguards are established. This is important because pre-deployment testing and provenance measures may reduce manipulation, fraud, and erosion of trust in digital public spaces.
Speaker: Asha Allen, Denys Nazarenko, Pari Esfandiari, Murillo Salvador
How can platforms and policymakers address the growing use of AI chatbots as substitutes for personal relationships or therapy, especially among young people?
This raised a specific emerging risk around vulnerable users and mental health. It is important because chatbot dependency may create new forms of harm and requires both platform responsibility and supportive public-interest interventions.
Speaker: Inej Ruki
How can public institutions and cities create trusted official digital channels and orchestration layers so residents can verify authoritative information across platforms?
This question links platform governance to local public administration and crisis communication. It is important because misinformation and synthetic content can undermine trust in institutions, especially during emergencies and elections.
Speaker: Denys Nazarenko
What are the impacts of AI-enabled search and interface changes on the media ecosystem, especially local media, small countries, and minority languages?
Mazzone identified this as a worsening structural issue beyond social media alone. It is important because reduced media diversity and weakened local journalism can damage democratic pluralism and the broader information environment.
Speaker: Giacomo Mazzone
How can democratic governance, civic participation, or public-interest oversight be introduced into the development of private platform algorithms despite proprietary and intellectual-property claims?
This question highlights a tension between private ownership and public democratic impact. It is important because major algorithms function like governance systems for public discourse, yet currently lack meaningful democratic input.
Speaker: Adam Lam, Cesare Pitea
How do algorithmic systems narrow what people see over time, and what design interventions can preserve exposure to fuller context and diverse viewpoints?
Participants described a gradual, often invisible narrowing of information environments. This matters because democratic deliberation depends on exposure to context and diversity rather than only high-engagement narratives.
Speaker: Sumeja Huskic, Pari Esfandiari
How can legal and policy frameworks better support collective forms of user action, such as fact-checking groups, user-rights organizations, and civil society coalitions, in holding platforms accountable?
Collective action was presented as essential to address the power imbalance between users and platforms. It is important because individuals alone often lack the time, expertise, and leverage needed to challenge harmful platform practices.
Speaker: Cesare Pitea, Asha Allen, Murillo Salvador
What public investment and political choices are needed to build a European or public-interest digital social stack based on open protocols, decentralization, and diverse ownership?
Several participants argued that the technical means already exist but political support is missing. This is important because infrastructure choices will shape long-term digital sovereignty, pluralism, and democratic resilience.
Speaker: Peter Rechels, Francesco Vecchi, Cesare Pitea
How can platform safety-by-design obligations, especially for minors, be made a guiding design principle rather than an afterthought?
Youth participants emphasized that an unregulated platform environment has harmed their generation. This is important because embedding safety-by-design into core architecture is key to protecting children and aligning markets with rights.
Speaker: Jaska, Asha Allen
What evidence and methods are needed to assess platform and AI harms scientifically, including psychological, civic, and rights impacts across different communities?
Speakers noted that robust evidence is essential both for legal enforcement and for understanding opaque systems. This matters because regulation, litigation, and safer design all depend on credible interdisciplinary research.
Speaker: Asha Allen, Vittorio Bertola, Adam Lam
How can platform complaint, flagging, appeal, and dispute-settlement systems be made actually usable, accessible, and effective for ordinary users?
Current redress systems were described as cumbersome even for experts. It is important because rights on paper do not translate into accountability unless ordinary users can exercise them in practice.
Speaker: Cesare Pitea, Asha Allen, Lilia Simonyan

Disclaimer: This is not an official session record. DiploAI generates these resources from audiovisual recordings, and they are presented as-is, including potential errors. Due to logistical challenges, such as discrepancies in audio/video or transcripts, names may be misspelled. We strive for accuracy to the best of our ability.