Platforms’ Accountability to Strengthen the Digital Public Sphere – MT 04 2026
27 May 2026 14:00h - 15:30h
Platforms’ Accountability to Strengthen the Digital Public Sphere – MT 04 2026
Summary
The discussion focused on platform accountability as a core issue for trust, democratic participation, and the design of the digital public sphere.[4][7][14][16-19] Chloe McDowell framed platforms not as neutral channels but as part of the architecture of public debate, arguing that their design choices shape visibility, credibility, and users’ agency, while raising the broader question of how to move from attention-optimizing systems to democracy-strengthening environments.[16-24]
Ilkka Rasanen argued that the context includes global democratic decline, heavy social media use among young Europeans, and the fact that social media has become a primary news source despite being optimized for engagement rather than civic discourse.[41-45][47-52] He contended that major platforms are highly profitable and therefore lack incentives to change voluntarily, so stronger enforcement of the EU Digital Services Act is needed, including more dissuasive penalties.[60-75] At the same time, he argued that debate should shift toward alternatives, including alternative social media, participatory democracy mechanisms, and civic tech designed specifically for democratic engagement and user agency.[76-88]
Asha Allen emphasized that platform use has historically included active civic participation, but current engagement-based business models can work against democratic debate.[92] She described the DSA as a framework combining hard rules for illegal content with due-diligence duties for large platforms to assess and mitigate systemic risks to fundamental rights, while stressing that enforcement is still catching up.[92] Allen argued that civil society is essential to making this co-regulatory model work through research, trusted flagging, evidence-building, and accountability of both platforms and regulators.[97-112] She also rejected the claim that regulation inherently stifles innovation and warned that AI tools embedded into platforms should not be rapidly deployed without evidence, testing, and rights safeguards.[113-127]
Cesare Pitea presented the Council of Europe’s new recommendation on online safety and empowerment, stressing that platform regulation should not oppose safety to freedom but should expand transparency, accountability, and meaningful user agency.[142-149] He said the recommendation shifts attention from content regulation to systemic responsibilities, including human-rights-by-design, transparency around algorithms and moderation, due process, researcher access, and support for collective user action.[151-186] In the debate, participants reinforced calls for public-interest and open infrastructures, user choice over recommender systems, safeguards against addictive and AI-driven design, and stronger protection of cognitive autonomy, especially for young people.[198-203][215-219][290-301][399-415][439-449]
The session closed with a rough consensus that platforms now function as democratic infrastructure but were not built for civic purposes; that AI and recommender systems create growing risks to cognitive sovereignty; that stronger DSA enforcement and civil society participation are necessary; and that community-driven platforms and alternative democratic spaces should be supported alongside regulation.[493-512][515-518]
Keypoints
– Platforms were framed as core infrastructure of the digital public sphere, not neutral intermediaries: their design choices shape visibility, credibility, and democratic participation, while dominant platforms are optimized for engagement and profit rather than civic discourse. [16-19][49-52][201-208]
– A major theme was that regulation exists but enforcement is still weak and slow, especially under the EU Digital Services Act (DSA). Speakers argued that compliance must come before broader democratic aspirations, that sanctions need to be genuinely dissuasive, and that companies are actively resisting transparency and enforcement. [67-75][92-99][358-367]
– Civil society was presented as indispensable to platform accountability. Participants emphasized that civil society organizations help build evidence, act as trusted flaggers, support users in exercising their rights, and serve as co-regulatory actors alongside public authorities; multi-stakeholder cooperation was repeatedly described as essential for turning legal principles into practical governance. [97-112][175-179][239-257][425-436]
– The discussion highlighted user empowerment and cognitive autonomy as central concerns, especially in AI-driven environments. Participants warned that recommender systems, synthetic media, addictive design, and AI chatbots can narrow perception, manipulate behavior, and erode cognitive sovereignty; proposed safeguards included meaningful user control, provenance signals, algorithmic transparency, testing before deployment, and stronger protections for minors and vulnerable users. [20-23][122-127][149-174][217-219][290-301][399-415][440-449]
– Many speakers argued that accountability should not rely only on reforming dominant platforms; public-interest alternatives and democratic digital infrastructure are also needed. Suggestions included supporting alternative social media, civic tech, public-interest platforms, open-source and federated ecosystems, and other participatory democratic tools beyond commercial platforms. [76-88][202-203][211-213][353-358][427-436][510-512]
The overall purpose of the discussion was to examine how platform accountability can better support democracy, trust, user autonomy, and human rights-moving beyond narrow content moderation toward systemic responsibilities, effective enforcement, user empowerment, and viable alternatives to current dominant platform models. [4-7][16-19][24-34][138-149]
The overall tone was serious, analytical, and policy-oriented throughout, with a strong concern about democratic decline, platform power, and weak enforcement early in the session. It also became more constructive and solution-focused as speakers and participants highlighted civil society action, user rights under existing law, and alternative platform models; by the end, the tone was cautiously hopeful and consensus-seeking. [40-75][91][124-127][353-358][395-397][488-517]
Speakers
– Florence Ranson – session opener; introduced the final stretch of the day and handed moderation to Chloe McDowell.
– Chloe McDowell – moderator; from Reimagine Europe.
– Ilkka Rasanen – EU Operations Lead at Citra; spoke from the perspective of the Finnish Innovation Fund / public sector think tank.
– Asha Allen – Director for Europe and Secretary General of the Centre for Democracy and Technology.
– Cesare Pitea – Legal Advisor at the Council of Europe.
– Francesco Vecchi – CVK Coordinator at Humans; co-focal point for the session.
– Denys Nazarenko – speaker intervening online; spoke from a city/government perspective and referenced Kyiv/Cities.
– Lilia Simonyan – participant; commented on implementation of regulatory frameworks.
– Giacomo Mazzone – participant; raised concerns about AI, search engines, and impacts on the media ecosystem; co-chair of the Policy Network on Meaningful Access (PNMA) [S19].
– Pari Esfandiari – participant; spoke about cognitive autonomy, recommender systems, and safeguards in AI-driven environments.
– Vittorio Bertola – participant; reflected on DSA enforcement, social media regulation, and AI-related manipulation risks.
– Sumeja Huskic – participant; raised concerns about algorithmically narrowed viewpoints and freedom of thought.
– On-site participant – unidentified on-site speakers during open debate; included youth participants discussing safety by design, regulation, and AI chatbots.
– Online participant – unidentified online speaker; represented Fediveriety / a European collective of digital activism researchers promoting open-source software.
– Murillo Salvador – rapporteur/reporter for the session; summarized the discussion and drafted the session messages.
Additional speakers:
– Julie Lubkin – from the Centre for Countering Digital Hate; called by the moderator but did not speak.
– Jaska – on-site participant; part of YouthDIG; spoke on regulation, accountability, and safety by design.
– Inej Ruki – on-site participant; YouthDIG participant and .pt fellow; spoke on cognitive sovereignty and risks of young people relying on AI chatbots as therapists.
– Peter Rechels – online participant from Fediveriety; spoke about open-source infrastructure and a European social stack.
– Adam Lam – on-site participant; representative of the Advisory Council on Youth in the Council of Europe and YouthDIG participant; asked about regulating addictive design and democratic governance of private algorithms.
The session was introduced by Florence Ranson as the final stretch of the day and as part of a wider event thread on trustworthiness and democratic accountability, before moderation passed to Chloe McDowell.[3-12] McDowell framed platform accountability as a structural democratic issue rather than only a technical or content-moderation problem.[14-24] She argued that digital platforms now form part of the architecture of public debate itself, shaping what is visible, amplified, rewarded, and treated as credible, and therefore shaping individual and collective cognition, autonomy, and democratic participation.[16-19] She stressed that the digital public sphere is where meaning is constructed, contested, amplified, and sometimes distorted, and asked how societies can move from attention-optimizing environments toward ones that strengthen democratic capacity.[19-24] She also referred to existing legal frameworks, including the Digital Services Act and recent Council of Europe recommendations, while insisting that users should not be seen as merely passive consumers; the key question, she said, is whether platforms expand agency or exploit and narrow it.[19-24] She introduced the session as a working discussion rather than a conventional panel and noted that Ilkka Rasanen would need to leave around five, inviting participants to put questions to him early.[24-37]
Ilkka Rasanen began by identifying four broad facts that, in his view, define the present context.[40-52] First, he said democracy is in global decline, with more than 70 per cent of the world’s population now living in autocracies.[41-43] Second, he pointed to the intensity of social media use among young adults, citing research from Finland, France, and Romania showing average use close to six hours a day.[44-46] Third, he said social media has become the main source of news and information on political and social issues for this age group, overtaking print and linear television.[47-49] Fourth, he argued that dominant platforms were not built for democratic discourse but for engagement and profit, and are designed to be at least somewhat addictive because that is commercially rewarding.[49-52]
Rasanen then cited very large quarterly revenues and profits for Meta and Alphabet to argue that the dominant firms are highly profitable under the current model and therefore have little incentive to change voluntarily.[52-65] On that basis, he said the first priority should be compliance with existing regulation rather than assuming platforms will start fostering democracy on their own.[66-69] He stressed that the DSA is still young and that, in his account, the Commission had imposed only one non-compliance fine so far, against X for lack of transparency, and that even this was being challenged in court and was not economically dissuasive for a company of that size.[68-75] He concluded that regulation must have genuinely dissuasive force if it is to change platform behaviour.[74-75]
Rasanen also argued that the debate should not focus only on reforming dominant platforms but on building alternatives.[75-88] He mentioned experiments such as Bluesky and other alternative social media efforts, while acknowledging uncertainty about their long-term success.[77-80] He said public authorities and major institutions should help legitimate such alternatives by using them in parallel, because alternative platforms cannot grow without visible institutional participation.[81] He then broadened the idea of alternatives beyond social media, pointing to citizens’ panels, initiatives, and civic-tech tools designed from the outset for democratic participation.[82-88] Such tools, he suggested, may reach wider audiences than physical deliberative formats and could help restore agency, ownership, and “cognitive sovereignty” or sovereignty of the mind, especially for younger generations.[86-88]
In response, McDowell thanked Rasanen for starting on a constructive note, observing that it is easy to diagnose the problem without discussing solutions, and said that his point about better enforcement led well into Asha Allen’s intervention.[89-91]
Allen opened with a generational question about life with and without social media and used it to argue that platform forms are fluid and that current business models have not been fixed “since the beginning.”[92] Drawing on her own Brussels policy experience, she recalled periods when platforms such as Twitter played important roles in civic mobilization, including around Me Too, Black Lives Matter, and disability and accessibility rights.[92] Her point was that platforms had previously enabled meaningful civic participation, but that there had been a shift toward business models centered on maximizing engagement.[92] She therefore challenged the idea of users as simply passive consumers and suggested that passivity is partly produced by the way platforms now structure and imagine their users.[92]
Allen then turned to the DSA as the main current regulatory framework.[92-97] She described it as an attempt to place into hard law what had previously existed in a looser co-regulatory environment influenced by international human rights standards.[92] She emphasized that the DSA is content-agnostic: it does not regulate content as such, but instead creates obligations around illegal content and due-diligence duties for very large platforms to assess and mitigate systemic risks to fundamental rights, including civic participation.[92] She also set out several concrete user remedies already available under the DSA: users can flag content that violates platform rules even if it is not illegal; if the platform disagrees, users can go to out-of-court dispute-settlement bodies paid for by the company; users are entitled to greater transparency around takedowns; and vetted researchers should gain more algorithmic transparency and data access.[92-97] At the same time, she said companies are resisting these obligations in practice, especially around researcher access and transparency, so the challenge is not only having rules but making practical use of them.[93-97]
Allen placed particular emphasis on the role of civil society.[97-112] She said civil society organizations build evidence, conduct research, act as trusted flaggers, and alert enforcers to emerging risks.[99-105] She noted that the DSA repeatedly refers to civil society because legislators intentionally built a co-regulatory model in which such actors help enforce the rules while also checking regulators and guarding against overreach.[105-110] She added that platforms are also supposed to consult civil society organizations and researchers when carrying out risk assessments, but said this possibility has not been meaningfully used in practice.[110-112]
Allen also rejected the claim that regulation necessarily harms innovation.[113-121] She called that framing a false dichotomy, pointing out that platforms remain profitable and widely used despite regulation.[114-117] In her view, if companies want access to the single market, they must respect rights guaranteed by international human rights law and the EU Charter.[118-121] In the final part of her remarks, she extended the discussion to AI, noting that many of the same companies behind social media harms are now embedding AI systems into their services, including through tools such as AI summaries in Google Search.[122-126] She warned against narratives suggesting that AI must be deployed without evidence of safety or rights-respecting safeguards.[122-126] She concluded by arguing that, in the EU context, the conversation should move from “platform accountability” as a vague aspiration toward platform compliance with regulation, while applying the same scrutiny to AI deployment.[124-127]
McDowell briefly reinforced the practical point that reclaiming autonomy also requires knowing what remedies and tools are available to users.[129-130]
Cesare Pitea then spoke from the perspective of the Council of Europe.[136-144] He insisted that the issues under discussion are not primarily about technology but about democracy and society, and introduced the Council of Europe’s new recommendation on online safety and the empowerment of users and content creators, adopted in April for the organization’s 46 member states.[137-144] He stressed that societies committed to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law should not artificially oppose safety and freedoms.[145-149] Nor, he argued, should they respond to platform power by giving control over the information environment back to states.[146-149] Instead, he said, the way forward is to use law and regulation to strengthen platform accountability, transparency, and genuine user agency.[148-149]
Pitea explained that the recommendation shifts attention from content regulation toward systemic responsibilities.[151-157] While it includes safeguards requiring legality, proportionality, and evidence when restricting content, its broader focus is on how platforms integrate human-rights responsibilities into their design and operations.[152-156] He said platforms should assess and manage human-rights risks and take responsibility for how their systems shape public discourse.[155-156] He stated plainly that self-regulation has failed and that independent regulatory authorities with effective powers are needed.[157]
He then described user empowerment as a central pillar of accountability and grouped the relevant duties into four areas.[158-180] First, he emphasized design duties: platforms should offer users meaningful control over their online experience rather than leaving them as passive consumers, and he noted that many users who have tried to flag problematic content know from experience how difficult even basic processes can be.[159-162] Second, he highlighted transparency duties, covering algorithms, moderation, and monetization, but also researcher access not only to data but to platforms themselves so that independent investigations and experiments become possible.[163-170] He observed that platforms are currently moving backward rather than forward on this point.[170-171] Third, he pointed to due-process duties, including meaningful notice, follow-up on complaints and moderation decisions, protection against dark patterns, and both internal and external avenues of dispute resolution, ultimately including court access.[172-174] Fourth, he emphasized collective action, saying that accountability requires support for organized forms of user action, from fact-checking groups to users’ rights organizations, because power imbalances exist not just between platforms and users but often even between platforms and regulators.[175-180]
Pitea also introduced an idea that the recommendation, as he put it, “very, very quietly” invites member states to explore: opening platform environments to a plurality of recommender and moderation systems for lawful content.[181-183] In such a model, users could rely on third parties to fine-tune their online environment according to their own language, values, and preferences instead of leaving all ranking and moderation choices to the platform itself.[181-183] He reiterated that both states and platforms should involve stakeholders in rule-making, service design, risk assessment, and mitigation planning.[184-186] He also warned against isolating online harms from wider social inequalities and knowledge gaps, and closed by inviting participants to contribute to a Council of Europe survey under the New Democratic Pact for Europe.[186-188]
McDowell responded that platform regulation should not be seen as contrary to user autonomy, but as something that can help create a more vibrant public space when users have greater say over the environments they inhabit.[190-197]
The floor discussion then developed along several themes. On democratic infrastructure and alternatives, Francesco Vecchi argued that democracy cannot be left to algorithms designed for profit or surveillance and that public-interest platforms and AI should be developed as civic infrastructure under clear binding rules, whether provided publicly or privately.[200-203] Drawing on Lawrence Lessig’s idea that “code is law,” he said platform architecture regulates discourse in its own right, so systems that prioritize virality or engagement over deliberation actively distort democracy.[204-208] He added that institutions also bear responsibility when they fail to fund and scale democratic alternatives, and pointed to federated social networks and open-source civic tools as examples of options that already exist but lack political support.[209-213]
Denys Nazarenko brought in the perspective of cities and local institutions.[215-232] He said local authorities increasingly rely on digital platforms to communicate with residents, especially in emergencies, even though those platforms are built around attention capture rather than civic responsibility.[215] He argued that cities experience platform harms very concretely, including election disinformation, non-explicit hate speech affecting neighborhoods, synthetic content targeting institutions, and the erosion of local trust.[216] As practical responses, he proposed user choice over recommendation systems, provenance signals for synthetic media, and trusted public digital channels through which residents can verify official information.[217-219] He also said there remains a missing orchestration layer linking public communication systems and platforms.[230-232]
Lilia Simonyan emphasized implementation.[239-257] She said the DSA and Council of Europe standards are important starting points, but the key challenge is translating high-level principles into everyday platform practice.[239-245] That, she argued, requires enforceable oversight by public authorities, accountability and risk assessment embedded by design, and civil society input grounded in actual harms.[239-243] She called for practical governance mechanisms including co-regulation, independent algorithmic audits, transparent reporting obligations, structural controls, content labelling, accessible appeals, and intelligible explanations of algorithmic systems.[244-257]
A further cluster of interventions focused on AI, cognitive sovereignty, and behavioral influence. Giacomo Mazzone said that two recent U.S. tribunal decisions against social media platforms had changed the broader context and may have reduced attacks on EU regulation, but he warned that AI could create even deeper problems.[275-279] He argued that AI-driven changes in search are already damaging the media ecosystem, especially for local media, smaller countries, and minority languages.[279-281] In his view, AI may invert the relationship between user and device, with interfaces increasingly selecting and presenting information according to user history and platform priorities rather than simply answering user queries.[282-286]
Pari Esfandiari argued that the main concern is no longer just misinformation but the erosion of cognitive autonomy in systems optimized to predict and shape behavior.[289-294] She said recommender systems amplify outrage, emotional reaction, and confirmation bias, while generative AI makes persuasion scalable, personalized, and increasingly hard to distinguish from authentic human communication.[291-293] She therefore called for transparency around recommendation systems that goes beyond technical disclosure to meaningful explanation of why content is amplified and what incentives drive it.[294] She also called for meaningful user control over curation and personalization, digital literacy that addresses attention and emotion, and platform design that supports reflection, context, viewpoint diversity, and healthier democratic participation.[295-301]
Vittorio Bertola offered a more skeptical intervention.[305-319] Speaking personally, he said he had not noticed even minimal changes on Facebook since the DSA entered into force, which to him showed that enforcement remains the core unresolved issue.[305-309] He also argued that AI may be harder to govern than social media because, unlike recommendation systems, even developers may not fully understand how large models operate.[310-315] He added a provocative cultural point, saying that “most people want to be manipulated” in the sense that they seek confirmation bias and validation rather than truth.[316-319]
Sumeja Huskic expressed the narrowing effects of algorithmic curation in simple user-centered terms.[323-326] She said people following events online rarely receive a full picture; instead, they are shown one angle, one emotion, one narrative, and that partial view starts to feel like the whole story.[323-325] For her, the danger lies in the gradual shrinking of what people are shown without realizing it, which threatens whether thought remains free, critical, and genuinely their own.[325-326]
Youth interventions gave the discussion a particularly strong generational dimension. Jaska, speaking from YouthDIG in connection with EuroDIG, said her generation had effectively been the generation of unregulated social media and now wanted to become the generation of regulation.[399-405] She argued that regulation, especially safety by design, is needed to force accountability and strengthen the digital public sphere.[399-405] Referring to Article 28 DSA, she said platforms must take appropriate and proportionate measures to protect the safety, security, and privacy of minors, and that safety by design should be a guiding principle rather than an afterthought.[400-402] In her framing, regulation should realign digital markets with human rights so that trust, safety, rights, and economic value reinforce one another.[403-405] She concluded that children should be shaped by morals and values, not by platform profit goals.[406-407]
Inej Ruki focused on cognitive sovereignty in relation to generative AI and young people’s relationships with chatbots.[409-415] She warned that some users, especially young people, are forming quasi-personal ties with AI systems and in some cases using chatbots as therapists.[411-412] She argued that platforms need stronger ways to direct such users toward real help instead of simply keeping them engaged.[413-415]
An online intervention from Peter Rechels stressed that the question is now political as much as technical.[425-436] Speaking on behalf of a European collective promoting open-source and decentralized alternatives, he argued that regulation alone will not protect democratic debate without coordinated public investment and collective effort.[425-436] He called for a European “social stack” based on digital autonomy, decentralization, pluralism, diverse ownership, and algorithms treated as public-interest institutions.[427-436] He said the underlying technology already works and that what is missing is political choice and funding.[428-436]
Adam Lam returned to addictive design and asked what additional provisions under existing EU rules, or under a future Digital Fairness Act, could directly address engagement-driven addictive features.[439] He also asked whether democratic governance or civic participation can extend into the development of private algorithms despite claims of intellectual property and proprietary control.[439]
In the closing discussion, Allen and Pitea shifted from diagnosis to practical pathways. Allen reiterated that public-interest models already exist, citing Wikipedia’s community governance and platforms like Mastodon as evidence that alternatives are possible even if they need more investment.[353-358] She also clarified that DSA enforcement is a long legal process: companies litigate heavily, so the Commission must build especially robust cases, and enforcement has included not just fines but also requests for information and preliminary findings.[359-367] She pointed to a concrete example of private enforcement in the Netherlands, where Bits of Freedom successfully sued Meta over missing user-empowerment tools; Meta appealed and still lost, and the result was greater user control for users in the Netherlands.[369-375] She added that more than 30,000 people have already used out-of-court dispute-settlement bodies under the DSA, and that transparency libraries and statements of reasons, while enormous, can increasingly be examined more effectively.[376-384] She also highlighted the Commission’s preliminary findings on TikTok’s infinite scroll and addictive design as especially significant.[384-394] In response to questions on AI, she pushed back, “a little bit,” on claims that companies cannot understand or test the systems they build, arguing that they do have means to sandbox-test innovations and assess harms before deployment.[440] She linked this to both the AI Act and DSA duties to assess and mitigate AI-related risks.[440] On addictive design, she said this issue is likely to become central in future Digital Fairness Act debates and pointed to Article 40 DSA, on data access for vetted researchers, as one of the most powerful but underused tools for building evidence about recommender-system and addictive-design harms.[441-449]
Pitea, for his part, acknowledged that resources and enforcement capacity remain major obstacles for regulators and civil society.[333] He illustrated platform failure with two personal examples.[335-350] In one, he was shown paid content pushed by a foreign government entirely unrelated to his interests, and the platform told him this violated no rule.[335-347] In another, he had to go through repeated exchanges before a platform accepted that an advertisement falsely using the image of the President of the Italian Republic to promote financial services breached its own terms.[347-350] These cases, he argued, showed that users cannot realistically be expected to spend hours fighting with platforms over their own complaint systems.[347-350] On addictive design, he said law is always a compromise and may not directly answer whether current regulation fundamentally challenges dominant platform business models, but he argued that the recommendation at least creates space to raise the question and to build pressure through coalitions of social scientists, technologists, civil society actors, and digital-rights groups.[450-463] He also reminded participants that journalism is one of the main victims of the current system and referred to Council of Europe work on disinformation that includes infrastructure and public-good perspectives.[465-474] He ended with a sobering reality check by noting, in effect, that despite discussion of alternatives, most people still spend much more time on Instagram than on Bluesky-like alternatives.[476-478]
The session closed with a synthesis presented by Murillo Salvador, who explicitly noted that the notes involved choices about inclusion and exclusion and invited objections in order to reach rough consensus.[488-517] The first agreed point was that platforms now function as a form of social digital infrastructure of democracy, but were not designed to fulfil civic functions; instead, they optimize engagement, use dark patterns such as infinite scroll, are not neutral channels, and distort public debate, including through disinformation.[493-497] The second was that the loss of cognitive sovereignty is an emerging risk, especially as AI becomes embedded in recommender and moderation systems, making provenance and verification mechanisms crucial and making testing and sandboxing before deployment important for AI tools.[500-504] The third was that regulation does not inherently hamper innovation, but existing rules such as the DSA need stronger compliance and enforcement, with civil society acting as a key partner to public authorities and with Council of Europe frameworks and international human rights standards helping to expand user agency.[505-509] The fourth was that platform governance should move from treating users as consumers toward recognizing them as digital citizens, while incentivizing community-driven platforms and supporting democratic engagement beyond dominant commercial platforms.[510-512] No strong objections were raised to this synthesis, and McDowell closed by thanking the speakers and moderators.[515-518]
So, still trying to bring some people in from the coffee break, but I think it’s still time to network, still time to chat and exchange a few cards and remarks and so on. But we’ll start, we’ll kick off, and that will make everybody get back in once they realize we have started without them. So, let’s open the final stretch of our day. And we have been discussing since yesterday, actually, the fact that trustworthiness is of the essence and accountability is a clear element of trust, of course. And that’s also part of the things that we already discussed yesterday. But we’re going to go a little more in -depth into that particular aspect. And we’re going to talk about platforms accountability, another element that was discussed yesterday.
And if you remember. It also came out quite strongly in the outcomes from the youth dig discussions that we that we summarized yesterday. So I’m sure there’s going to be much more to be discussed on that particular issue. And to lead us through that session, I’m going to hand over moderation to Chloe McDowell from Reimagine Europe. Chloe, welcome.
Thank you. Thank you. Yeah, thank you, everyone, for joining this final Eurodig session on platforms accountability. And I’m sorry to drag you away from your final coffee break. So the starting point for today’s discussion is the idea that digital platforms are no longer just channels through which public debate takes place. They’re actually part of the architecture of that debate. Their design choices shape what becomes visible, what spreads, what is rewarded. And what comes to feel credible or meaningful to us. and they also have the power to shape individual and collective cognition and autonomy and this really matters because the digital public sphere is not only a place where information circulates it’s a place where meaning is constructed and contested amplified and unfortunately sometimes distorted facts evidence and arguments are always interpreted through social emotional and cognitive frames so when we talk about platform accountability we’re not only talking about content moderation or compliance procedures we’re talking about the conditions under which people form opinions exercise judgment and fundamentally participate in democratic life and legal frameworks matter of course the dsa has created an important language around systemic risks and fundamental rights and the council of europe’s recent recommendations add a human rights foundation to the system and the dsa has created an important language around systemic risks and to this reminding us that online safety also means autonomy and participation But the deeper question is, how can we move from platforms that optimize attention and engagement to digital environments that strengthen democratic capacity?
And a point that I know will be raised during the discussion and something that we should be careful with is the idea of passive consumption. We’re not simply passive users. Our engagement and interpretation and participation are active processes. And the problem really then is whether the systems around us expand that agency or exploit and narrow it. So that is also why today’s session is not just a traditional panel. We will begin, of course, with the framing interventions from our three panelists. But the real core of the session is, of course, the open debate. So to set the scene, we’ll first hear from Ilka Rasanen, who is the EU operations lead at Citra. And Ilka will begin.
I’ll bring a somewhat provocative perspective on whether existing dominant platforms can realistically be made democratic or whether, in fact, we need stronger alternatives, including civic tech, more binding regulation. And then we will hear from Asha Allen, the Director and Secretary General of the Centre for Democracy and Technology. Asha will bring a civil society and digital rights perspective to the discussion, looking at user empowerment, human autonomy and the essential role that civil society plays in making frameworks like the DSA and AI Act work in practice. And then finally, we will hear from Cesare Pitea, a legal advisor at the Council of Europe. And Cesare will discuss the Council of Europe’s recommendation on online safety and the empowerment of users and content creators, focusing on user autonomy and platform responsibility and how accountability can be understood from the individual user up through wider governance structures.
And then after these remarks, I will invite everyone to treat this as a working session, the same as with the other sessions that took place today. And on a practical note as well, Ilka will leave. He will leave us slightly earlier at around five. So if you have any questions specifically for him, please do bring these up earlier in the debate. So thank you, Ilka.
thank you chloe and thanks for the invitation to this very important event um my organization citra the finnish innovation fund is a public sector think tank and a fund in finland but we increasingly also want to contribute to european debates and safeguarding and renewing democracy is one of our strategic areas and therefore probably i’m here and mostly or maybe also because we published a recent study this year called um algorithms and democracy how does social media shape the world view of young europeans i will quote some figures from that study but i won’t focus on that i’d rather focus maybe on the guiding questions that have been given to the session too while as i won’t be talking about that i’ll just go ahead and start with chloe and then i’ll just go ahead and I may not stay on that script, but maybe talk a bit besides the questions, but on the broad topic of the questions as we go along here.
But I wanted to start with the four things, four things we know that form the context of this conversation today. The first thing we know is that democracy is in decline, globally speaking. If you look at the well -known indicators, for example, from the Institute of Gothenburg University, we’re back to the 70s in terms of population who lives in democratic societies versus autocratic societies. In autocratic societies, you have more than 70 percent of global population lives in autocracies, and that’s increasing year by year. Second thing we know is that social media has become a major force. In our lives, also in terms of how we spend our time. in this study that I mentioned we did a survey in three European countries actually Finland, France and Romania among younger Europeans from 18 to 28 years old and asked about their social media use and one of the questions was how many hours per day in average you use social media and the answers were very similar across the countries actually surprisingly similar but the average is close to six hours a day it’s quite staggering if you allow for some time sometimes sleeping in a day say eight hours you have you know 16 hours a day and then almost six hours of that is 37 percent of your awake in time is on social media and that was the respondents themselves who said that and typically you kind of underplay your vices when you answer such surveys so it’s a lot of time.
That was the second thing. Third thing we know from Eurobarometer studies for example that For this age group and maybe also others, social media is these days the main source of news, main source of political and social questions. It’s not print. It’s not linear TV. It’s social media. And then the fourth thing we know, social media platforms, the dominant ones, they’re not designed for democratic debates. They’re not designed for civic discourse. They are designed and optimized for engagement, and they’re designed and optimized, if you put it a bit more brutally, to be slightly addictive to their businesses, their big, very profitable businesses. I actually checked for this debate, the latest available financial information from some of the big platforms or the companies behind the Meta and Google Meta’s revenue in Q1.
I actually checked for this debate, the latest available financial information from some of the big platforms or the companies behind the Meta and Google Meta’s revenue in Q1. I actually checked for this debate, the latest available financial information from some of the big platforms or the companies behind the Meta and Google Meta’s revenue in Q1. I actually checked for this debate, the latest available financial information from some of the big platforms or the companies behind the Meta and Google Meta’s revenue in Q1. I actually checked for this debate, the latest available financial information from some of the big platforms or the companies behind the Meta and Google Meta’s revenue in Q1. I actually checked for this debate, the latest available financial information from some of the big platforms or the companies behind the Meta and Google Meta’s revenue in Q1.
I actually checked for this debate, the latest available financial information from some of the big platforms or the companies behind the Meta and Google Meta’s revenue in Q1. I actually checked for this debate, the latest available financial information from some of the big platforms or the companies behind the Meta and Google Meta’s revenue in Q1. Alphabet, Google’s mother company, $109 billion revenue in one quarter, $62 billion in profit in the same quarter. So big and profitable. Why am I saying this? I am not personally anti -capitalist. I think we need companies, big and small, to generate jobs and well -being and generate tax revenue, etc. But I’m saying this to say that these companies are doing extremely, extremely well.
They don’t have an incentive to change. Which brings me to the first guiding questions on how should we bring these platforms to act such that we move beyond regulatory compliance to platforms fostering democratic debate. Well, I would… submit that we first need to ensure the regulatory compliance before we talk about anything else. And here in the European Union, the regulation with the teeth, the Digital Services Act, is still quite young. It’s only a couple of years ago that it entered into force with all of its provisions. And so far, the Commission has imposed only one noncompliance fine against X, actually, on lack of transparency on several things, including that blue mark not being explained properly, etc.
And of course, X challenges this decision to the General Court of the European Union. It will take several years. The fine was $120 million, which in the empire of Elon Musk is unconsequential. It’s less than peanuts. So one of the points I’d like to make is that that we have those regulatory tools, but they should have real dissuasive deterrence behind them as well. So I don’t know that there would be, besides these regulatory sticks, any carrots that would be big enough for changing the behavior of this company because they’re doing so well in what they’re intended to do. Therefore, I think rather than speaking how those platforms should change their behavior, we should talk about alternatives to those platforms.
First of all, social media platforms, alternative social media platforms. There are some attempts out there, have been and are, W social media, Blue Sky, etc. Good luck to them. I don’t know if they will fare well in this. I don’t know if they will fare well in this competition, but at least… I think public authorities should somehow also show example and move some of their communications, maybe in parallel, and give them credence and visibility, etc. They will not succeed unless big institutions, public and private, move onto those platforms. Then the second set of alternatives is not the social media platforms themselves, but alternative means to engage in democratic processes that go beyond elections. So all forms of participatory democracy, citizens’ panels, initiatives, etc., etc., and I think the European Union has done an excellent job in launching those things.
It’s difficult to reach people, but they’re being good. Good initiatives and attempts. What is an interesting field where we’re also working quite a lot is so -called civic tech, which is a… platforms that are designed from the ground up for engaging people in democratic decision -making. They reach broader audiences than physical panels and deliberative formats of decision -making. So you can combine these two, maybe in hybrid forms, try to make it enough exciting, link it to actual decision -making, et cetera, and you provide an alternative, which we all need, and I would say younger generations especially need in order to be engaged, have agency, and have sense of ownership of their democracy, and that is that we need to work on, and maybe that way also that cognitive sovereignty or sovereignty of the mind can be reached when there’s engaged in platforms and means that are not the current ones.
I think I’ll just stop there. Looking at the time and pass it over to the next speaker.
yes so wonderful thank you and thank you for starting us off on such a positive note as well i think uh sometimes that’s easy to it’s easy to diagnose the problem and maybe not look at the solution so uh thank you for that and uh definitely the point on better enforcement i think leads really well into uh what ash is going to to say about the role of civil society so i’ll uh i’ll leave the floor
thank you uh and thank you so much for the invitation it’s it’s wonderful to be here i remember my first uh conference like this but i won’t say how many years ago it was um because then i will be on my age um so before i get started with my uh intervention i actually wanted to ask the audience a question um how many of us in the room remember growing up without social media or online platforms and how many of us grew up with social media platforms as just part of our okay so it’s good to know hi everyone um so i wanted to make that differentiation um because platforms are and always have been fluid the manner in which we see platforms engage now what their business models are now have not been set in stone since the beginning i vividly remember i entered into this policy space over 10 years ago now here in brussels and i vividly remember the power of communities using twitter as it was at the time for movements like me too like the black lives matter movement for raising awareness on disability and accessibility rights user preference at the time that was informing how platforms engaged with their users actually generated civic exchange it’s why we talk about platforms being the online democratic space there was there has and has been a very clear paradigm shift you so when we’re thinking about how we’re going to address the first question which is about platform design and moving users from passive consumption to active participation I want to kind of question the question itself because there has been active participation that has led to systemic change and there may even be a business reason or a business impetus to conceptualize the notion of passive consumption and how companies are seeing users as they are right now and so I think when you think about how the business models now that are focused on being engagement based and having the highest level of engagement we’ve seen from some documents that have been released in the US through litigation in terms of the business prioritization of keeping people on the platforms how this is intrinsically in contra to increasing democratic debate and active participation.
so mindful of time we could talk about this quite quite extensively but i want to move to what the dsa tries to do right because there are many jurisdictions not just the european union brazil india other countries have many different frameworks that they’ve put in place that have been informed by or influenced by the the digital services act and it actually tries to embed what was already there before right prior to having very hard concrete regulation what we had was an ecosystem a kind of co -regulatory regulatory ecosystem informed by the existing international human rights standards right so civil society like cdt europe and our sister organization cdt in the us could use the un guiding principles on businesses and human rights to say well actually yes there’s no regulatory framework but you have a legal obligation under international human rights norms to make sure that your products and services are not harming people or not harming society or not harming civic participation you so when you look at the dsa and the model of the dsa it actually tries to capture that right so it has very clear hard rules for illegal content it’s illegal there’s a judicial order you have to act expeditiously to to do something but it also recognizes that if you’re a company of a certain size like the ones that you looked into their their profit margins uh earlier today they have an extra due diligence responsibility um to ensure that because of their reach in the european union that they are not infringing on fundamental rights that are captured in the charter now the dsa is content agnostic rightly so it does not regulate content because we have to preserve freedom of expression and freedom of association which are the foundations of democratic and civic debate but it does say you need to assess as you mentioned before the risk that you might pose to civic participation and many other risks and you have to mitigate that risk and we’re going to hold you to account if you do not have a right to do that and we’re going to hold you to account if you don’t mitigate that risk now what we have is a regulatory framework that needs enforcement and enforcement takes time so yes we have the one decision on on x but essentially what the european commission has to do is to take clear scientific findings and turn and translate those into you know legally grounded and sound decisions in which they can hold these platforms to account and and that takes uh time but i think the other aspect is being able to socialize the rights that all of you now have now that we have the dsa in place right so even if a piece of content is not illegal but you think it violates a platform’s policies you can flag that content and say i think this is in violation of your policies and if the company doesn’t agree with you well you can take that now to an out of court dispute settlement body to say actually i’m going to push you on that and it’s up to the company to actually pay for that process it’s not on you There are other means in which you can access this transparency on the takedowns of different pieces of content.
And there’s supposed to be more algorithmic transparency, access to data for vetted researchers. So the provisions are there, but the companies are certainly pushing back on making sure that access is there. So what we need right now is this movement building to be able to have folks like you in the room and others to be able to use the rights that they now have. That’s embedded in the Digital Services Act. And it allows me to come to the third prompting question that we had around the co -regulatory framework, because the DSA tries to capture this, too. Now, I might be slightly biased because I’m a head of a civil society organisation, but I don’t think the DSA can fundamentally work without civil society participation in its enforcement.
Right. It’s civil society organisations who are doing the research. They’re building the evidence base. They are the trusted flaggers. They’re the ones alerting the enforcers to say there’s smoke over there. There might also be a fire. You need to go and have a look at what that fire might be. And that’s actually captured in the DSA itself. I’m also a bit of an EU law nerd. And the EU DSA actually mentions civil society more than any other regulation. That’s not actually addressed about civil society, which is pretty interesting. But that’s deliberate because they rely on civil society as these kind of co -regulatory accountability actors to be able to help with enforcement, but also to hold the enforcement bodies themselves to account to prevent any kind of any overreach.
There’s also provisions that companies should also be consulting with civil society organisations and researchers when they’re doing their assessments. But it might surprise you to know that that hasn’t been used and companies are not engaging with civil society organisations and researchers right now. But the provisions are there and we hope to make use of those. So this allows me to come to this debate and this question that we have about regulatory frameworks kind of diminishing what platforms can do. Clearly, they are still making their profit margins. Clearly, many of us in the room are still using these platforms and making the most of these platforms. So this idea that regulation is hampering innovation or hampering users engaging with platforms is just simply not true.
It’s also quite a false dichotomy and doesn’t make any business sense. You can’t be a company and think to yourself, I want to roll out a service or a product to users, but I might hurt those users. People will eventually stop using your product and your services. So from a business sense, it’s not quite clear. But quite essentially, there’s a simple fact that if you’re operating within the single market, operating within any community, there have to be rules and safeguards in place to make sure the rights that we all have embedded and bestowed to us by the International Human Rights, its framework and by the European Charter are respected. And those can’t be, let’s say, put a pin in them just to, you know, bolster innovation or to allow the companies to proliferate as they were.
so lastly this allows me to come into the conversation a little bit around the ai conversation because the responsibilities of platforms right now i think we’ve been having this conversation on say social media and online platforms for a while and the harms and and how they need to be mitigated but many of those same platforms are also driving the ai conversation right now they’re embedding those ai tools into the very social media platforms that we’re talking about and the very services i think many of you if you’ve used google search recently will know that you now have an ai summary before you have anything else and you can engage with that ai summary as an ai chatbot and so then i would also re -question the question around cognitive sovereignty right and this idea that our engagement is either passive or it presents a risk a kind of existential risk that can’t be mitigated because the technology is moving so fast and i think that’s a really important point and i think that’s a really important point and i think we can’t have a narrative where it’s a kind of okay to move fast and break things without respecting the rules and the rights that are in place and to have these technologies disseminated onto the market without having the evidence evidence base to know that they’re actually safe So this notion that these tools are incredibly powerful, which they can be and can be incredibly helpful for many other reasons, then shouldn’t be deployed without these frameworks in place.
And without us questioning this idea that they are inherently hugely powerful and have these this mandate that extends beyond what we are capable of being able to to question and put the rules and frameworks in place for. So when it comes to kind of platform accountability, I think we need to reshape the conversation around platform compliance with regulation, as all other industries should, and move away from platform accountability as a framework within the EU where hard regulation is in place. Embrace that kind of co -regulatory framework where due diligence is still relevant in some company areas, but also question the kind of rapid deployment of different systems and different technologies. Like AI and how they’re being embedded into different online frameworks.
without the respect for rights to move away for innovation. I think we should always fundamentally question that if we’re going to have a thriving democracy, we need to have a thriving civic space that’s safe for everybody to use. And
Thank you, Asha. And yeah, I mean, you definitely raised my attention to several things that maybe I and other people in the room weren’t necessarily aware of before. And that’s essentially part, again, of reclaiming this autonomy is being aware of the tools that we have at our demand and what we can do as civil society to push back against the power of these big platforms. So, yeah, really inspiring. Thank you. And now we’ll have the public authority perspective from you, Cesare, and especially looking into these new Council of Europe recommendations and which I think are very interesting looking again, at the human rights side of these. recommendations and regulations and the idea of human autonomy and cognition as well.
So thank you.
Thank you very much. Good afternoon, everyone. Thank you for having me here. This is my second Euroleague, the first as a speaker, and I come after very interesting and challenging presentations, so mine will be a little bit more institutional about this instrument that the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe just adopted last April. So before moving into that, it’s important to understand what is the perspective we as an organization come from. So the questions that we’re trying to answer or reason about today are not about technology. They’re about democracy and they’re about society. And we should always keep this in mind when we talk about digital rights, platform regulation, and all those apparently technical issues.
And this is also the approach of the recommendation. The recommendation deals mainly with online safety and online empowerment. The recommendation is number 20, 26, number 4, and it offers to the 46 member states of the Council of Europe, so well beyond the European Union member states, a shared framework and a policy compass to tackle some of the existing emergencies. And hopefully future challenges that we are and will be facing. So the recommendation makes one thing very clear that I think it’s important to underline. If we want to remain committed to the founding values of the Council of Europe, human rights, democracy and rule of law, the way forward is not to artificially oppose safety and freedoms. It is not to respond to the growing power of platforms by giving back control over the information environment to states or by weakening users’ safeguards on platforms and online.
It is rather to use the force of law and regulation to expand. Platform accountability, expand transparency around how platforms work and to require platforms environments to. effectively and genuinely enhance user agency. But how do we get there? So first of all, in line with approaches that are already there, the DSA, but also to some extent the Online Safety Act in the UK, the recommendation starts from moving the shift from content regulation to systemic responsibilities. So, of course, there is a whole section of the recommendation that calls for evidence-based proportionate limits as limits to content restrictions and stresses the importance of the principle of legality in the… what is allowed and what is not allowed online in line with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
But beyond content, the recommendation calls on states to set clear legal expectations for platforms, especially those that have significant influence over the information environment. The question is not just what contents platforms host, but how they exercise their human rights responsibilities that were mentioned earlier towards users and society at large. Platforms are therefore expected to integrate safety and human rights considerations directly into their design and their operations. This means that they have to assess and manage human rights risks. opposed by their systems, ensuring transparency around algorithms and content moderation, and taking responsibility for how they system -shape the public discourse. This is not new, but as Asha was telling before me, self -regulation has clearly failed to deliver human rights -driven platform environments, and therefore member states are encouraged to place those systemic duties under public scrutiny and under the oversight of independent regulatory authorities with effective powers.
In this framework, user empowerment is not presented as an alternative to platform regulation. It’s rather a core pillar of accountability, and platform accountability to those. the recommendation identifies four categories of empowerment duties design related duties are the first and states are called on requiring platforms to give more meaningful control to users over their online experience this cannot just be a and and here we go back to the issue of enforcement and implementation and the time and the process that is needed if any of you have tried to flag to any platform content know how difficult it is even for us people that are quite well placed to do so. And how many back and forth you have to go through before content that is actually illegal or against the terms and conditions of the platforms is removed or limited.
So this is precisely one of the most important indications. Indications, effective controls as users, we should be those who define our platform environment, not passive consumer of an environment that is there decided by other people. The second type of empowerment duties are transparency duties. Of course, transparency around algorithms, around content moderation, around monetization policies and practices. But we also know that this doesn’t work at the individual level. None of us has the time or the capacity to go through what we encounter online on a daily basis. This is why a fundamental aspect of transparency is researchers’ access. Access to data, but also access to platforms. The possibility to use platforms to carry out investigations, experiments, research.
And unfortunately, we know that on this very specific issue that is also covered by the DSA, platforms are not really going forward and rather are going backwards. And we should also ask ourselves why. The third type of research, empowerment duties are relating to threat process. So the recommendation has quite innovative provisions on notification, on content moderation, including dark patterns, including users that are affected indirectly from content moderation decisions, and also on how basically a follow -up should be there on both flagging and contestation of content moderation decisions. These include, of course, internal and external dispute settlements, but also the safeguards of ultimately direct, of users to go to court if they deem so necessary. The fourth type of empowerment duties are collective action.
This is very important because when we talk about reducing the unbalance in power, we have to recognize that civil society and organizations of civil society play a fundamental role. The imbalance is not just between the individual and the companies that provide the services, but sometimes and very often even between the state authorities, the regulators, and those companies. So it’s only by joining forces and harnessing this potential, democratic potential, of the communities of users that any of these platform accountability regulations can work. And therefore, the recommendation calls for support and recognition and affordances on platforms or, let’s say, collective forms of user action. This goes from fact -checking organizations to users’ rights organizations. One important point that I have to say initially was a little bit more promising in terms of how far this could go, is that the recommendation very, very quietly calls on member states to explore other ways of opening up platform environments.
We have discussed how the platform model has changed from a diffuse model to a top -down model where recommender system, content moderation algorithms owned by the platforms determine our experience online. We have said how us as individual users should be more able to fine -tune what we see and how we see it, but also maybe it’s time to explore how platforms should open up their systems, big platforms of course, to a plurality of recommender systems and content moderation systems for lawful content so that, for example, each user can rely on a third party to … fine -tune its experience online to its own preferences in terms of content, in terms of language, in terms of what we want to be exposed to.
As I mentioned earlier, the recommendation really supports a multi -stakeholder approach that is at the basis of EURDIC. Not only it recalls existing principles according to which rules and policies should be designed with the participation of all stakeholders by both states and platforms alike, that platforms need to involve stakeholders in the development of the content, in their design decisions. When they design the services, when they make the risk assessment, when they plan their mitigation measures, this should be done in cooperation with civil society. so this is very important and as important is as I mentioned before that the recommendation also support forms of collective action towards platforms so this is more or less what the recommendation is about but again one very important point that is at the beginning of the recommendation is that when we think about platform regulation we should so to speak look beyond and behind the screen the recommendation makes it very clear that in order to address these unbalances in powers that we find online states need to still address the structural issues and inequalities, the knowledge gaps that are out there in the real society, because those harmful things that we see online are sure probably amplified by systems, but also are a reflection and have their roots in the society around us, and the promotion and protection of human rights, human dignity and equality is still a priority beyond digital spaces.
And I finish this by inviting all of you to participate to the survey. I was supposed to screen a QR code, but you find it outside on the tables, that the Council of Europe is launching in the framework of the New Democratic Pact for Europe, where all of you can contribute to build better digital space. Thank you very much. t
hank you very much and yeah I mean I think in particular your point that platform regulation is not in opposition to user autonomy in fact supports and helps create a more vibrant public space when users can have a say over the platforms that they use this was a really interesting intervention and with this I will open the floor to the general debate so I know as with the other sessions there’s a number of people who have asked to intervene so I will read out the names based on first come first serve basis you have two minutes per intervention and I’ll give a bit of time after calling your name but if you’re in the room please raise your hand and if you’re online the online moderator will We’ll call on you.
But if you don’t speak, I will move on to the next the next intervention. So starting with Kumhur Eir from the Brussels municipality. No. OK. Next, we have Adunga Necho Mulatu from Bahia Dar University online. No. And Adriana Rodriguez -Novo in the room. No. OK. And Julie Lubkin at the Centre for Countering Digital Hate. OK. And Francesco Vecchi, I know you’re here. Thank you. OK.
Thank you very much. Thank you very much, and thanks to all the speakers. I’m Francesco Vecchi, CVK coordinator at Humans, and I had the honor of being a co -facul point for this session. At Humans, we believe that democracy cannot be left to the mercy of algorithms designed for profit or surveillance. This is why, with the campaign I coordinate, we call for public interest platforms and AI, systems that prioritize civic empowerment, transparency, and accountability over extractive models, and we had the chance to discuss about that today. This is not at all about rejecting private innovation, which is paramount, but about ensuring that democracy and AI are treated as public services as they are, delivered under clear binding rules, whether by public or private actors.
Lawrence Lessig, 20 years ago, taught us that code is low. The architecture of digital platforms is regulation in its own. It shapes how we debate, decide, and even dissent. And if platforms design spaces that prioritize engagement over deliberation or vitality over truth, they’re not just hosting public discourse. They are distorting it. But accountability cannot stop at platforms. Institutions must also answer for failing to demand and fund and scale democratic alternatives. Well, thanks to ILCA, we have some good news because we know that alternatives exist. And from federated social networks such as the Fediverse to open source civic tools that we, of course, advocate for, we have the technology to build a favored digital public sphere. But what we lack is indeed the political will to adopt them at scale.
personally this is why we this is why humans civic campaign exists and why we’re supporting the european citizens action service to shape a blueprint for a techno -democracy coalition so a sort of new manifesto for a new way of democracy and in general we advocate for a new infrastructure of democracy where technology serves the people not the other way around thank you very much for listening
thank you francesco and then uh we have uh denys nazarenko i believe i can see you online or dennis
yeah thank you thank you so from city ground perspective it’s a practical matter because public institution increasingly relied on digital platforms to reach residents and a particular human emergency so the operating logic of these platforms essentially is attention attention attention attention attention space has discussed and a civic responsibility to then see it’s a different point on design curve so Cities are where the consequences of their design and disinformation around elections will be experienced locally. Non -explicit hate speech affects specific neighborhoods for sure, but synthetic conduct we could monitor over recent months will target public institutions and they will erode local trust. So on a typical actions to shift user from audience to citizens, one would be the user choice of recommendation system so algorithm is something residents will configure rather than will receive.
Second one will be provenance signal for synthetic media. And last but not least, the trusted public digital channels through which residents can verify the data is official. In case of Key, we’ve done a lot of research. We’ve done a lot of research on the key of the key. We’ve done a lot of research on the key of the key. We’ve done a lot of research on the key of the key. We’ve done a lot of research on the key of the key. We’ve done a lot of research on the key of the key. We’ve done a lot of research on the key of the key. We’ve done a lot of research on the key of the key.
We’ve done a lot of research on the key of the key. We’ve done a lot of research on the key of the key. We’ve done a lot of research on the key of the key. for the solutions that we are pursuing, the orchestration layer that will connect different platforms is missing. So initiatives like FIWARA, or the local digital twins are working in that direction. It would be great to see SAMHSA working towards that for the digital platforms for communication. Thank you
Thank you. And actually I didn’t read out the question last time, but maybe just the header this time. So governance in action, how can multi -stakeholder collaboration turn regulatory ideals into platform realities? So the first person we have for this question is Axel Mazolo. Jaroslaw Ponder from the International Telecommunication Union. Elonal Hikok . Lilia Simonian
Hello, hi Yes, it’s me First of all, I want to thank all of you for your very interesting presentations Distinguished colleagues Regulatory frameworks such as the Digital Service Act and the Standards of the Council of Europe provide a strong legal foundation for a safer and more transparent digital environment However, laws alone are not enough The real challenge lies in implementation how to translate high -level principles into everyday platform practices This is where multi -stakeholder collaboration becomes essential Public authorities must set clear enforceable rules and ensure oversight but they must also remain flexible and forward -looking, adapting regulation to rapidly evolve the system and the evolving technologies At the same time, platforms carry operational responsibility. They must integrate transparency, risk assessment, and accountability directly into their systems by design, not as an afterthought.
Civil society plays a critical bridging role. It represents users’ interests, identifies real -world harms, and ensures that governance remains grounded in human rights and democratic values. Without this input, regulation risks becoming disconnected from societal needs. To make this collaboration effective, we need practical mechanisms. This includes co -regulatory frameworks, independent audits of algorithms, transparent reporting obligations, and structural control. The framework is a key part of the regulatory framework. It is the most important part of the regulatory framework. It is the most important part of the regulatory framework. It is the most important part of the regulatory framework. It is the most important part of the regulatory framework. It is the most important part of the regulatory framework.
It is the most important part of the regulatory framework. It is the most important part of the regulatory framework. It is the most important part of the regulatory framework. It is the most important part of the regulatory framework. It is the most important part of the regulatory framework. like transparency and user empowerment must be translated into construct tools. Clear content labeling, accessible appeal systems and understandable algorithmic explanations. My time is over. So thank you.
Thank you so much. And we have Sandra Matigue. Hi. No? Okay. I think hopefully we’ll have some time for spontaneous interventions at the end as well. Amath Ndiaye? No. Kamel L. Hilali? No. And online? No, we don’t have the last participant online. Okay. Moving to the final question then. So what safeguards are needed to protect cognitive and behavioral health? Sovereignty in an AI -driven public sphere. Ranjan Timil… Sorry, Timilicina? No? It’s the end of the day. Everyone’s outside enjoying the sun, I think. Giacomo Mazzone from
Thank you for the floor. I want to add some elements to the reflection. One is that there is a new fact that we need to consider in the picture, and these are the two sentences of the U .S. tribunals against the social platforms, social media platforms. This is a new fact that changes definitely the setting, and in fact in the last months after that, weeks after that, the attack to DSA and to European legislation are less vocal than before. So I think that this opened a window of opportunity for us. The second is, there is another perspective that we need to consider. because what we have seen until now could be even worse in the future.
The current modification to the search engines that has been produced using the AI having devastating impact on the media ecosystem and throwing the fragile business model that has been built on electronic media. This is not only an economic problem but is also producing the certification of media environment especially for local media and for in small countries and minority languages. This reduces the diversity of the offer and the quality of the cognitive ecosystem that for Europe that’s very very dangerous. And on the top of this damage we have also the fact that we are moving with the introduction of AI in our devices to a situation where users will not ask anymore to the devices they want to look for.
But the contrary will happen. AI interface will select and decide which news to submit to our attention, at least in theory based on what had been your previous selection preferences. But if we look what happened recently, we are pretty sure that there will be decisions that will be taken by the platforms and not by the users. So this just to introduce a layer of complication more in your discussion. Thank you.
Thank you. Next, we move to Pari Esfandiari.
Thank you for the floor. It’s clear that the concern today is no longer just misinformation, but the gradual erosion of cognitive autonomy in digital environments optimized to predict and shape behavior. Recommendations. systems driven by engagement tend to amplify outrage, emotional reaction, and confirmation biases. Generative AI intensifies this by making persuasion scalable, personalized, and increasingly difficult to distinguish from authentic human communication. So safeguarding cognitive sovereignty requires more than content moderation or transparency tables alone. Transparency around the recommender system should go beyond technical standards to include meaningful explanation of why certain content is amplified, how recommendation systems shape visibility, and what incentives, drive these architectures. Meaningful user control also matters. Users should have greater ability to choose how content is curated, whether algorithmic personalization is used, and what kind of recommendation systems influence their information environment.
Digital literacy goes beyond identifying false information. It must help people understand how algorithmic systems shape attention, emotion, and perception over time. And finally, platform design itself is important. We should also think about designs that encourage reflection, contextualization, exposure to diverse viewpoints, and healthier form of democratic participation. Because if AI systems increasingly shape, not only what we see, but how we think and perceive reality, then democratic debate risks becoming subtly ingenious rather than generally deliberated. Thank you.
Thank you. Moving next to Vittorio Bertola.
Yes. Okay. So I’m Vittorio Bertola speaking personally on this. And first of all, since the answer to the questions up there might be regulation, and I’m actually not against this, I want to note that I’m a heavy Facebook user because I’m old. And I have not noticed any kind of even minimal change in how Facebook works after the DSA came into play or came into force. So I think it’s really a matter of enforcement, but also of understanding what enforcement of this kind of regulation means. And this is a matter we need to solve before working on new regulation on new media. Because, I mean, with AI, the problem with AI of potential manipulation, not just the effects, but with AI, it’s even of emotions.
And so I think it’s really important to understand that. important. But the problem is that at least for social media, we sort of understand how social media works. At least the people that make them understand the algorithm more or less. With AI, even the people that make the AI models don’t fully understand how they work in the end. So it’s even hard to understand what we would need to ask for these companies to do to prevent this kind of manipulation. But the real problem is that we now live in a society in which most people want to be manipulated. I mean, people are actually happy to look for confirmation biases and if you talk to people, even people from political views that used to be thinking of fact and logical, now just want to find someone who gives them reason and tells them they are right and feel right and intelligent.
So I think we really need to work on the cultural people and unfortunately this is extremely different and they have no idea what to do. So thanks for raising the problem, but I have no solutions to propose. Thank you.
And sorry, I lost my spot. Sumeja, who’s speaking?
Hi. Hi. events appears online, you rarely get a full picture. You mostly get what the algorithm thinks you will engage with, one angle, one emotion, one narrative, and slowly it starts to feel like that is the whole story. And that’s what worries me the most, not what we are being told what to think, but that we are slowly being shown less and less without even realizing it. So maybe the real question is, how do we make sure that in all of this, our own thinking is still free, still critical, and still truly ours? Thank you.
Thank you so much. And then we have Andrea Mialovic. No. And Parvin Jumshudu, no. Sophie Carr in the room. No. Okay. and Lilith Yezikia nope online the next Jeremy either as well online Nikita Danilov nope Florian Russel nope and Nadia Simeon okay well what I’ll do maybe is go back give the speakers the floor to answer the questions that we’ve had and then much and then we have andrea mil me and lovic no and uh parvin jim should you know uh sophie carr in the room no okay and lilith yes yes yeah nope uh online um okay uh the next jeremy either as well online nope um mikita danilov no florian russell nope and nadia simeon okay well oh well what i’ll do maybe is uh go back give the speakers the floor to answer the questions that we’ve had and then given this we have some time for some spontaneous interventions as well s
o yes thank you uh for the floor the contributions uh i think were very interesting they really pointed at a growing consensus about what the problem what the problems are what is the what are the possible ways to find solutions but of course then um the the big elephant in the room is how do we get there how do we ensure enforcement how do we ensure that resources are out there for regulators or civil society organizations to play the role that is necessary in order to bring platform accountability into reality. But after having a presentation, very institutional presentation, I want to ask you a question. Do how many of you think that it is fair and acceptable that a paid content pushed by a government, a foreign government, is brought to your attention?
I would also say carrying, let’s say, information or not particularly accurate or a viewpoint on current events is brought to your attention? Is it a good thing to do? Is it a bad thing to do? Is it a good thing to do? Is it a good thing to do? Is it a good thing to do? Is it a good thing to do? Is it a good thing to do? Is it a good thing to do? Is it a good thing to do? Is it a good thing to do? Is it a good thing to do? so you like to watch videos of people cooking and all of a sudden a platform brings on your feed a paid content pushed by a foreign government paid by a foreign government on current events that have nothing to do with food and beverages well this happened to me uh i complained about this and the platform i will not name names here said that that was perfectly okay there was no breach of uh any uh any um terms of and conditions another example is uh well as you see i spent some time trying this these things some point i see the presidents of the italian republic advertising financial services and i think that’s what i was trying to do and i think that’s what i was trying to do and i think that’s what i was trying to do and i think that’s what i was trying to do after a moment of displacement because it seemed very real I realized that this could not have been possible it took me three rounds of back and forth with the platform to convince them that this was against their own rules so there’s clearly room for improvements on what we can do and this is and I see that the commission under DSA is really taking some action in this direction the meaningful nature the user -friendly nature of of user controls is one of the keys so we do now have the instruments to make sure that we cannot rely on us individually to go after you know to spend you know I did it because I had an interest you know intellectual professional interest to do that but people have lives to live and luckily so so They don’t go after, they can’t spend hours, you know, quarreling with the platform about their own terms and conditions.
They should know what their own terms and conditions are, not the user. The user should be able to flag it in simple terms. So this is evidence of something that is more structural, and these things need to be addressed.
Thank you for all of the interventions that were really, really interesting. And I’m going to try and address only a few of them because there were quite a few. But I want to reiterate that public interest platforms do exist, right? I think many of us, especially in my time at university, which was many years ago, was told not to use Wikipedia for my references. Wikipedia still uses a community -based model for its content moderation and its platform, right? You have other platforms that are emerging, Mastodon and others. There are models that are there. Yeah, right. I think in terms of the narrative in which there are just dominant platforms. dominant platforms that we are only engaging in and there aren’t other models that could be invested in i think you know there are there but there is a need for more and i i think we can we can agree there um to come back to the reflections about the rules in place and enforcement rules have always accompanied innovation particularly in on this continent right back to the industrial revolution you don’t have the industrial revolution without there then being some sort of harm and then rules being put in place you’re in belgium where there’s some pretty strong unions here i think there’s a long history of kind of rules going uh aligned with um innovation so this isn’t anything new right and the argument that somehow rules are hampering innovation also isn’t new but we’ve also been able to overcome them for many other industries so i think we should always be mindful of that in particular now the last thing i want to want to focus on is that kind of why enforcement takes as long as it does but what you can actually do in the meantime right so So every decision that the European Commission has made, we’ve had one definitive decision on X under the DSA, but we’ve had requests for information, preliminary findings.
There’s a whole long process under the DSA. And every stage, the companies have sued or gone to court. There isn’t a moment where they’re not going to court to push back on elements of enforcement. Right. There isn’t a moment, for example, when the DSA came into force that all of a sudden public publicly available APIs for researchers were completely removed or suddenly you had to pay 45000 euros to be able to access those. Right. The pushback to compliance was there from the very beginning. But the enforcement bodies need to do what they need to do under the arm of the legal framework that they have. They need to make sure that their cases are watertight so that they don’t end up in front of the Europeans.
And then have a reversal in their decisions, because then everything under their enforcement arm is going to be questioned even further. So that’s one thing. However. the DSA and other regulatory frameworks and agreements provide other means, right? So private enforcement under the DSA exists. I will call out an incredible organization, Bits of Freedom, based in the Netherlands, who took Meta to court for not implementing the user empowerment tools on their platform, right? And they won and Meta appealed and they still won. So in the Netherlands, this tiny, you know, tiny but mighty civil society organization took on one of the biggest platforms and they won because they had the legal basis under the law. And it means in the Netherlands, users now have greater control under the DSA for what they’re engaging with when they’re on Facebook.
Now, unfortunately, that’s only in the Netherlands because that’s where the case is. But that’s inspiration for other areas, right? There are over 30 ,000 people who have used the out -of -court dispute settlement bodies already. And the out -of -court dispute settlement bodies also have transparency reports that show you the decisions that were reversed, how effective that they have been. There’s also this massive transparency library on statement of reasons. You don’t have to go through it. It’s something like five billion reasons. No one has time to go through that. However, you can probe it. And they are thinking about frameworks for you to be able to probe it in a much more efficient way. So it’s not just a case of relying on the enforcement bodies who would legally have the mandate to hold these companies to account.
And they are increasingly being bold. Right. The preliminary findings from the European Commission that TikTok’s entire platform and the infinite scroll is addictive design is actually quite huge. Right. Because it fundamentally questions whether a huge feature of that platform is compliant with mitigating risks of mental well -being, protection of minors and other fundamental rights harms. So we have to see where that takes us. But there are other tools that we can use in the meantime. So I actually think there’s a bit of a question. We hear about our enforcement bodies, the European Commission, others being able to bet. better convey, better communicate what you have at your disposal and how you can have these rights at your disposal.
And to be able to let you know that there are organizations like CDT, Bits of Freedom, a bunch of others who are all working for users empowerment, so actually taking these questions to court, who are publishing the evidence that’s needed for the investigations and who are interested in engaging with impacted communities. So there are multiple avenues. I think it’s just about making sure everybody knows what those avenues are.
Wonderful. Once again, thank you for raising these points and at the risk of running a little bit over time. I know there’s two hands there and here as well. One online. So we’ll try and get through those and then wrap up the final messages of the session. So the two ladies there.
It’s not working. Hello, my name is Jaska and I’m a part of YouthDig and I wanted to speak to the value of regulation to force accountability in strengthening the digital public sphere My generation was a generation of unregulated social media but however, we’ve experienced the first hand the harm that this has caused us and our peers I aspire to be a part of a new movement a multi -stakeholder movement that will create the framework for a safer digital world We will instead become the generation of regulation This regulation, more specifically, needs to be safety by design Establishing guardrails and fences will not allow unsafe platforms to rule any future childhoods Regulation is a mechanism to realign markets with human rights It creates a level playing field in the digital world through clear enforceable standards In regulating platforms, we will establish the models of decency, care and humanity that we grant one another in the real world, in the digital space.
Article 28 of the Digital Services Act is the primary instrument in implementing this concept of safety by design. Under Article 28, all platforms must take appropriate and proportionate measures to protect the safety, security and privacy of miners. Safety by design must not just be a concept applied as an afterthought, but instead a guiding ethos that platforms fundamental designs. By regulating platforms with safety by design, we will change the narrative. We will shape platforms to shape our mutual future. A future where trust, safety, rights, protection and economic value are not trade -offs, but mutually reinforcing drivers of a healthy digital ecosystem. Children should not be shaped by morals and designs. Children should be shaped by morals and designs, not by platforms’ profit aspirations.
Thank you. Thank you. Good afternoon, everyone. My name is Inej Ruki. I’m also a youth digger, and I’m attending both events, Youth Dig and Eurodig, as a .pt fellow. And I wanted to make a note on the last topic of this conversation, which was on cognitive sovereignty, and especially in relation with generative AI and how young people are relating with chatbots, especially building relationships that they sometimes think are closer to personal relationships than what they really are. And I would say even in more dangerous cases, resorting to AI. chatbots as therapists, which I think is something that is really, really concerning. And I do believe that we need programs to counter that. And we also need these platforms to be stronger in allowing these people to find the help that they need instead of trying to keep people engaged in these platforms.
And so I do think we still have a path to take in this sense. Thank you.
Thank you both. And we have another. Oh, we’ll go online and then back to you there. Peter, can you go?
Okay. Hi there. Thank you. I’m Peter Rechels from Freddy Variety. We are an European collective of digital activism researchers actually promoting open source software. We studied actually the Freddy Variety integration public administration. We have this case on the EDPS and… their very first pilot project. I can tell you that no regulation alone will safeguard a democratic debate, that’s for sure. You know, it all depends on a collective, collaborative and coordinated effort as we just learned here. What Europe really needs is a social stack, a sovereign digital infrastructure built on the values we already share, digital autonomy, decentralization, diverse ownership, editorial pluralism, and algorithms treated as institutions that serve the public interests, like broadcasts and libraries.
The vision on this is actually already converging across the Fediverse, Eurosky, and private messaging ecosystems. The technology works, the EDPS pilot there that I referred to on the Fediverse proved that already. We at Fediveriety, we studied it. So this is no longer a technical question, it’s political choice. The math actually is simple. If you redirect even a modest share of public digital spending towards open alternatives, and you sustain local developers, break foreign dependency, and recirculate the billions Europe generates in social media back into European hands, then, you know, no single platform or protocol can match the scale of big tech alone here. But an ecosystem that can do that, shared infrastructure, open protocols, small builders, empowered to innovate, users free to move.
That’s why I look forward to something like the DC Etic as a coordination framework to sustainability fund the critical open source infrastructure that the European social stack actually demands. The tools exist. The political will is what is missing here. Thank you
Thank you and over to you
Thank you very much my name is Adam Lam I am a representative with the Advisory Council on Youth in the Council of Europe and I’m also a youth digger here at the event I wanted to build on what Asha was saying about platforms large platforms, social media platforms being based on this passive engagement model as a core business and a profit driven algorithm I appreciate what Federico brought in about the alternative platforms that do exist that are more community driven and may have more public interests in mind but the core addictive element to the engagement based algorithms means that users are also more likely to stick to that because of that very addiction so I’m wondering what further provisions can be done to prevent addictive design specifically under the current EU regulations, but also the Digital Fairness Act and where do you guys see the opportunities to regulate addictive design and to what extent can we have this democratic governance or participation in the development of private algorithms because this is, again, maybe proprietary intellectual property, but how can we have community engagement or civic engagement in the development of this and the changing of these larger platforms and can the DFA have real power in that and maybe if there’s examples, Cesare, from the Council of Europe, if there’s any good principles to build on there or things that could be taken into account by the EU and drawn on from that.
great i’m happy to go first uh and i’ll try and be brief there was a couple of great points uh that were made and thank you so much for the intervention i’ll start with the um intervention on kind of the the european stack right and this idea um that we should build our own infrastructure and i think there’s going to be a lot of um investment in that the current negotiations on the next multi -financial framework um is happening right now and i know that’s at the core of that too one thing that we always kind of convey as part of this discussion is that if we’re going to do this and build this new infrastructure and build different um opportunities and and choices for users and and communities it has to be grounded in the charter of fundamental rights but we also have to recognize that not everybody in the european union has been able to enjoy their fundamental rights and human rights right these are still ideals that we are pushing for there are a lot of communities who experience harm in the european union and so what this cannot be framed by is actually a kind of of competitive race to catch up or to be embedded in this wider geopolitical conversation that’s going to lead this to push for heavy investment in infrastructure that we’re not entirely aware of what those risks may be we’ve seen very clear cases of public authorities using systems that they did not know how they worked and it led to actual harm you have the benefit scandal in the netherlands where people were were mistakenly saying that they were fraudulently claiming benefits you had the post office case in the uk and many others but this i think also leads to the point on ai and that was made just here and also connects to the other point in regards to not under the companies themselves not understanding these systems i would also challenge that a little bit that notion that they don’t know the systems that they are developing they have the means to kind of sandbox test their their innovations right and actually that’s at the core of elements of the ai act it takes an entirely risk -based approach and if you’re also going to deploy an AI system under the DSA you have to assess and mitigate the potential risks of it before it’s deployed right and so we’re very lucky to have an AI governance lab in our US office with brilliant technologists who pose these precise questions how do you test an AI for specific harms and there are means to do it so I think we should just push back against the notion that something should be deployed on the market especially in the public sector before this testing has been done.
Then the last thing I’ll say about the addictive design I agree it’s going to be at the heart of the digital fairness act conversations because the DSA is actually quite ambiguous in what it says in regards to safety by design and addictive design this is also why I think the TikTok case is so important in regards to what the commission has actually said in their initial decisions. One thing I will say, though, is I personally think and again, I might be slightly biased. I’ve been working on the DSA since before the DSA was the DSA. So it’s somewhat etched into my brain at this point. I think Article 40 might be one of the most powerful things in the DSA.
And that’s data access for vetted researchers. Right. And I know the Council of Europe have put this in their framework, too. When we have interdisciplinary research, this is folks who are looking at recommender systems from a psychology perspective, from a harms mitigation perspective, from a community rights perspective, being able to test those systems, get access to the data in privacy respecting ways and to be able to develop the research, the evidence base that we need to definitively say the distinct harms that addictive design poses, is to all of us, but also to particularly vulnerable communities. That’s going to be a very powerful tool for enforcement bodies to be able to use to say, OK, now we’re going to ask you to fundamentally make some change if you want to operate in the single market.
but unfortunately from what we understand from our brilliant public interest uh researcher friends no one’s had access to data as of yet um and the pushback is immense i will tell you that during the negotiations of the dsa that was one of the maybe four or five articles that was being pushed back the hardest right down to the wire so we have to make use of it because that article not only allows vetted researchers to have access but public interest civil society organizations to also have access to data too right and to work collectively on that so it’s an extremely powerful tool that we need to make the use of so we can build that evidence base to say here is the impact of addictive design on multiple communities and here’s how we hold uh platforms to account under this cleared code regular framework so how to mitigate that risk.
thank you very much and yes very fundamental questions and issues so first The question is, does regulation cause into question the business model of major platforms? That’s, of course, a very topical question. And, well, you should not expect the law to give you a very clear answer because the law is the product of a compromise, is always the product of a compromise. But we can talk about this and we can remind what Asha was saying before. It’s not always being like this. This was a very clear change in the business model that was driven by one competitor introducing certain features that were appealing. or addictive, that’s to be discussed to the public and everybody else followed after.
So that’s not the only model. The alternatives are possible even within mainstream platforms. Then the law is a process. So, for example, in the recommendation of, in the preamble to the recommendation, to our recommendation, there is language about the business model of platforms that gives a little bit of frame. Well, it’s a non -operative part of a non -binding instrument, sure, but it says something about that. And, again, this is a case to be built. And this is if what we… reproach to platforms is to be top -down, then here is the opportunity to be bottom -up, to build up this case through civil society coalitions, coalitions between scientists, social scientists, computer scientists, civil society organizations, digital rights advocacy organizations.
I think regulation like the DSA provides a framework to make these kinds of arguments and also to empower civil society to promote and to observe and to criticize and to point at possible capture interests and to keep up with the current situation. It’s very important to recognize on us on what we do and how we do it. Well, I institutionally have to say how important journalism is also in this respect, which is always forgotten. Journalism is one of the main victims of all we’re talking about today. Second, alternative infrastructures. Here I have to, again, have an institutional demeanor. I would just mention that there is another document that was adopted by the Steering Committee on Media and Information Society, which is called 10 Steps to Counter Disinformation, 10 Building Blocks, sorry, to Counter Disinformation.
And one of these 10 building blocks refers exactly to infrastructure. So we need to reduce dependency in our information, good information, and the use of public goods. And if it is a public good, it needs not only a European infrastructure, but an infrastructure that is built around the idea of public interest. As much as in the revolution in broadcasting and the opening up to private broadcasters, we have kept our public service broadcasters, we have kept our public service media, with the idea that they had a mission that went beyond the mission of broadcasters generally, of media generally. We can… We can build on this idea, and there are a lot of initiatives. EBU is promoting a platform for public service media content, a European platform for public service media content, and there are a lot of initiatives in this respect.
Then the problem… remains. So I’m asking you a question. Are you more, do you spend more time on Instagram or on Blue Sky? Exactly.
Okay, at the risk of cutting short the conversation, I know we need to move on now to the final part of the session. So Murillo has been diligently taking notes throughout. And we’ll present now, there it is on the screen, a general formulation of what’s been discussed. So just to ask everybody if we’re all in agreement that this captures the essence of the discussion. The aim is to reach a consensus. I know that there will be a week following the event where this can be commented on as well. So the goal is not to go down to the wire on the specific wording. But if everyone’s in agreement, that this reflects accurately the main points that emerged from the debate, then…
So maybe, Mario, you want to read this out?
okay thank you thank you for the discussion it was a pleasure to be the reporter for this and I am sorry for all of the sometimes choices of inclusion, exclusion that is part of the job. And so if there are any objections, please feel free to raise them in order to achieve a rough consensus. I will read the four points that I put together. Maybe there is some overlap here. Maybe I need to cut a few words, but here is what I put together. First, we consider platforms as a social digital infrastructure of democracy, yet these platforms were not designed to fulfill civic function. Instead, they optimize engagement, for instance, with the deployment of dark patterns like infinite scrolling.
They are not neutral communication and information channels. They distort the public debate by enabling the spread of disinformation. In this context, civil society acting within platform ecosystems such as fact -checking collectives and other actors should be supported as key partners of the digital world. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Secondly, we view the loss of cognitive sovereignty as an emerging risk linked to the embedding of AI into these platforms. Algorithmic management from the recommendation systems to automated moderation need to take into account. Democratic principles from the design stage are not as an afterthought. Here provenance and verification mechanisms are crucial as the AI -driven synthetic content and identities become more prominent in the digital public sphere faster than regulations can be deployed.
In this context, the deployment of AI tools themselves can go through preliminary steps of testing and sandboxing before reaching the market. Thirdly, the rules do not necessarily hamper innovation. In fact, existing regulation acts as a powerful deterrent for platforms’ worst outcomes in democracy. Participants called for a stronger DSA compliance. And here, civil society can play a key role as partners for public authorities. to make platform operators accountable with regards to the law. At the same time, the Council of Europe frameworks provide foundations to expand users’ agency and international human rights provide a universal basis for users seeking to make platforms take action where no regulation exists. And fourth and final point, the discussion invites us to move from a consumer perspective towards an understanding of digital citizenship as embedded in platforms.
Platform design is a fluid outcome of choices, and new business and engagement models should be incentivized, such as community -driven platforms that already exist and perform a civic function. At the same time, alternative forms of democratic engagement should be supported outside of platforms, including deliberative and multi -stakeholder formats. I’m sorry. That’s it. Many thanks. Thank you.
And if we have no… No strong objections to those main messages, then… we will proceed. Okay. Wonderful. Thank you, Maria, and thank you to the online moderators and to the speakers as well.
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“McDowell referred to existing legal frameworks including the Digital Services Act.”
The knowledge base confirms that the EU Digital Services Act is a relevant existing framework for platform accountability and content governance, including transparency duties, algorithmic risk assessments, and user controls over personalised recommendations [S78].
“Rasanen argued that dominant platforms were not built for democratic discourse but for engagement and profit.”
The knowledge base adds context by describing social media as an attention economy in which the most valued content is what attracts attention, reinforcing the report’s account that platform design incentives are geared toward engagement rather than democratic deliberation [S130].
“Rasanen said social media has become the main source of news and information on political and social issues for young people, overtaking print and linear television.”
The knowledge base provides partial supporting context: it reports that in the US 39% of children choose to get their news via social media, indicating the growing importance of social platforms as a news source for younger users, though it does not directly confirm the cross-country comparison or the claim that social media has overtaken all traditional media for the age group cited in the report [S130].
“Rasanen said the first priority should be compliance with existing regulation rather than assuming platforms will start fostering democracy on their own.”
The knowledge base supports this framing by noting that there is growing consensus that stronger content governance is needed and that self-regulation by platforms may be insufficient, with the EU using the DSA to force greater accountability [S78].
“Rasanen stressed that regulation must have genuinely dissuasive force if it is to change platform behaviour.”
The knowledge base adds relevant context by describing how governments have increasingly moved toward stronger enforcement tools, fines, and removal obligations in content policy, reflecting the broader logic that weak or non-dissuasive measures may fail to alter platform conduct [S129].
The discussion showed strong convergence around several core propositions: platforms are now democratic infrastructure rather than neutral channels; their engagement-driven design creates risks for public debate, autonomy, and trust; regulation such as the DSA is necessary but only meaningful if enforced; civil society and researchers are essential accountability actors; user empowerment must be practical and design-based; and AI intensifies risks to cognition, manipulation, and democratic participation [16-24][49-52][67-75][97-112][158-180][289-301][500-509].
High consensus. There was little visible disagreement on diagnosis and broad agreement on the need for rights-based regulation, stronger enforcement, civil-society participation, and safeguards against manipulative design and AI-related harms. The main variation was one of emphasis—some stressed enforcement, others alternatives, and others user empowerment—but these were complementary rather than conflicting positions. This implies a mature debate moving beyond whether platforms should be accountable toward how to operationalize accountability through law, enforcement, design change, and public-interest alternatives.
The discussion showed broad consensus on the diagnosis: dominant platforms shape democratic life, optimize engagement rather than civic discourse, create risks to autonomy and cognition, and require stronger accountability [16-24][49-52][145-157][493-504]. Most disagreement centered not on ends but on means: whether to prioritize enforcement of existing rules or build alternatives, how much faith to place in current regulation, how to conceptualize user passivity and addiction, and whether AI risks are tractable through governance or fundamentally harder to control [67-88][92-127][306-319][425-436].
Low to moderate. The speakers largely shared the same normative goals—democratic integrity, user autonomy, human-rights-based regulation, and safer digital environments—but diverged on strategy and feasibility. This level of disagreement is constructive rather than polarizing: it suggests a mature policy field with convergence on values but ongoing contestation over implementation pathways.
The most important comments collectively transformed the session from a standard discussion of platform regulation into a layered debate about democracy, infrastructure, cognition, and power. Chloe’s opening established a broad democratic frame; Ilkka introduced urgency and the possibility of alternatives; Asha complicated the user-passivity narrative while making civil society central to enforcement; Cesare grounded the debate in human rights and user agency; and later participants pushed the conversation toward cognitive sovereignty, AI-mediated influence, addictive design, and public-interest digital infrastructure. Several interventions served as turning points: Ilkka’s move from compliance to alternatives, Asha’s reframing of agency and co-regulation, and Giacomo’s and Pari’s expansion into AI and cognitive autonomy. Youth interventions added moral clarity and generational urgency. As a whole, these comments pushed the discussion beyond narrow compliance questions toward a richer understanding of platforms as democratic institutions that require not only rules and enforcement, but redesign, public-interest alternatives, and deeper protections for human autonomy.
Disclaimer: This is not an official session record. DiploAI generates these resources from audiovisual recordings, and they are presented as-is, including potential errors. Due to logistical challenges, such as discrepancies in audio/video or transcripts, names may be misspelled. We strive for accuracy to the best of our ability.
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