European Approaches to Digital Sovereignty – MT 02 2026

27 May 2026 09:00h - 10:30h

European Approaches to Digital Sovereignty – MT 02 2026

Session at a glanceSummary, keypoints, and speakers overview

Summary

The session focused on European approaches to digital sovereignty, framed as a longstanding EuroDIG topic that has gained renewed urgency because of the current geopolitical context and debates over Europe’s ability to act independently in the digital sphere.[3][26-32] Jamal Shahin introduced the discussion as one that must bring structure to a concept that means different things to different people, while also connecting it to earlier exchanges at the conference.[19-21][16-18]


Fabrizia Benini argued that Europe has become dangerously dependent on non-European digital technologies across the internet stack, from cloud infrastructure to AI models and platforms, and that these accumulated dependencies now create strategic vulnerabilities affecting the economy, democracy, and European values.[54-57][67-71] She said Europe’s response should remain rooted in democratic principles, human-centric digital transformation, and commitment to an open, global, secure internet, while managing interdependencies through partnerships with trusted countries.[76-82][85-88] Benini emphasized “choice” as the core objective of European digital sovereignty, meaning citizens and businesses should be able to choose providers, control where data is kept, and switch services through portability, supported by a strong rulebook and the forthcoming Sovereign Tech Package including chips, cloud/AI, and open-source measures.[89-105]


Peter Janssen described digital sovereignty in terms of choice and control, using the .eu domain as an example of how European users can control their digital identity, hosting, and providers while relying on infrastructure physically located in the EU and managed by a wholly European entity.[124-155] Frank Kruger likewise stressed open standards, trusted infrastructure, and collaborative innovation, arguing that Germany’s support for open-source infrastructure and the DC EDIC framework should strengthen Europe’s resilience and innovative capacity while benefiting the global digital ecosystem.[166-183] He concluded that digital sovereignty is a direction rather than an endpoint and cannot be achieved by regulation alone or by acting alone, but through democratic investment, openness, and cooperation with partners.[185-188]


Several participants questioned the term “digital sovereignty,” preferring “strategic autonomy” or “digital autonomy” to avoid connotations of isolation and nationalism, while others insisted the European dimension and democratic stakes justified the stronger term.[216-224][232-243][251-258][452-456] Many speakers agreed that regulation such as the GDPR, DMA, DSA, and AI Act is important but insufficient without industrial policy, infrastructure, digital skills, procurement choices, and investment in European alternatives, including open source and interoperable systems.[263-275][308-319][325-343][348-358][383-387] Participants also repeatedly warned that Europe should pursue resilience without fragmenting the open internet, stressing interoperability, global coordination, human rights, and avoidance of protectionism or state overreach.[288-293][381-390][411-415]


In the closing phase, Benini defended “digital sovereignty” as the right term because it concerns democratic self-determination, while reiterating that Europe does not support a fragmented internet and wants openness and interoperability preserved.[452-476] Paulo Glowacki then presented draft messages stating that Europe’s external digital dependencies create strategic vulnerabilities, that digital sovereignty is a cumulative and transformative process requiring industrial policy, open source, interoperability, and citizen empowerment, and that it should ultimately mean resilient openness and strategic autonomy rather than isolation or protectionism.[507-519] The overall outcome was broad agreement that Europe needs a long-term, multi-stakeholder effort combining regulation, investment, open standards, and democratic values to reduce dependency while keeping the internet open.[509-519][572-582]


Keypoints

– A central discussion point was how Europe should define and pursue “digital sovereignty,” including whether “sovereignty” is the right term or whether “strategic autonomy” is better. Several speakers argued that sovereignty is necessary because it concerns democratic self-determination and Europe’s collective ability to shape its digital future, while others warned the term sounds exclusionary or nation-centric and preferred autonomy instead. [52][81-90][216-224][232-243][451-456]


– Participants broadly agreed that Europe faces deep technological dependencies on non-European providers across the digital stack, creating strategic vulnerabilities for the economy, democracy, and values. These dependencies were described as the result of long-term choices to buy rather than build, and several interventions stressed that Europe regulates digital systems heavily while still relying on foreign cloud, software, chips, and platforms. [54-71][103-106][150-161][308-316][348-358]


– Another major theme was that regulation alone cannot deliver digital sovereignty; it must be paired with investment, industrial policy, infrastructure, procurement, and innovation capacity. While speakers defended regulation as an indispensable long-term guide, many argued that laws such as the DMA, DSA, GDPR, and AI Act are insufficient unless Europe also scales startups, supports open source, builds trusted infrastructure, and develops competitive European providers. [92-99][166-177][185-188][263-275][312-316][383-387][456-459][497-505]


– Open standards, open source, interoperability, and trusted infrastructure were repeatedly presented as the practical foundations of a European approach that avoids simple dependence or protectionist closure. Germany highlighted support for open source and digital commons through its sovereign tech agency and the European Digital Infrastructure Consortium, while others emphasized interoperability, portability, and open standards as ways to preserve choice, resilience, and user control. [103-106][166-183][288-293][411-416][474-475][509-518][536-542]


– A key tension throughout the discussion was how Europe can strengthen its digital position without fragmenting the open internet or reproducing U.S. or Chinese models. Speakers stressed that Europe should remain committed to an open, global, secure, and interoperable internet, build resilience without digital nationalism, and root its approach in human rights, multistakeholder governance, and democratic values. At the same time, some participants pressed for faster, more assertive action even if critics label it protectionist. [79-90][115-116][172-175][286-293][381-390][396-409][465-475][517-519]


The overall purpose of the discussion was to examine European approaches to digital sovereignty: what the concept should mean, whether it is the right framing, what policy and technical tools Europe needs, and how Europe can reduce strategic digital dependencies while staying aligned with openness, interoperability, democracy, and multistakeholder internet governance. The session also aimed to generate concrete takeaway messages from the panel and audience discussion. [3][26-33][39-45][41-44][507-520]


The overall tone was serious, policy-focused, and urgent from the start, shaped by concern over geopolitics, war, dependency, and democratic vulnerability. [31-32][49-51][67-77] It remained constructive and collaborative, with speakers often building on one another’s points about choice, openness, and implementation. [115-116][164][190-198] As the discussion opened to the floor, the tone became more contested and energetic, especially around terminology, Europe’s lack of industrial capacity, and whether the EU is acting boldly enough. [216-224][348-358][396-409] By the end, it shifted toward synthesis and pragmatic consensus-building as participants reviewed draft messages and proposed amendments. [446-446][507-523][570-582]


Speakers

– Florence Ranson – session chair/host; opened and closed the session.


– Jamal Shahin – moderator; senior lecturer at the University of Amsterdam and Vrije Universiteit Brussel; principal investigator of the research project “Digital Sovereigns in a Non-Sovereign Internet.” [S39]


– Fabrizia Benini – speaker; head of unit for the Future Internet at DG Connect, European Commission; policymaker on digital sovereignty and open source strategy.


– Peter Janssen – speaker; general manager for EURid; spoke about .eu, registry operations, and European digital sovereignty through choice and control.


– Frank Kruger – speaker; director of the Directorate Digital Policy at the Federal Ministry for Digital Transformation and Government Modernization in Germany.


– Anna Neves – participant from Portugal; said she works for the government; chair of the UNCTAD Commission on Science and Technology for Development (CSTD). [S69] [S71]


– Francesco Vecchi – participant; Civic Care Coordinator at Humans.


– Vincent Tadday – participant.


– Giacomo Mazzone – participant; mentioned as EuroDIG board member and EDMO advisory board member; co-chair of the IGF Policy Network on Meaningful Access (PNMA). [S62]


– Valentina Stadnic – participant; representing the ITU.


– Lea Rovcanin – participant; from Montenegro.


– Denis Nazarenko – online participant.


– Joao Gomes – participant; from the University of Minho and YouthDIG.


– Eric Pol – participant.


– Pari Esfandiari – online participant.


– Vittorio Bertola – participant; from Open-Xchange; noted as an open source partner of the German OpenDesk project.


– Elonnai Hickok – participant.


– Arnaud Wittersheim – participant; represents a sovereign corporate registrar and DNS provider that develops proprietary solutions for clients.


– Catalin Marinescu – participant; works in the private sector.


– Paulo Glowacki – message rapporteur/reader; co-drafted the session messages.


– Alexander Pitch – participant; from the Internet Society, Switzerland Chapter.


– Miguel Vidal – participant.


– Belen Luna – participant.


– Audience – generic audience interventions, including unnamed participants such as Caroline from Germany speaking for the fact-checking community.


Additional speakers:


– Fabrizia Benigni – named by the moderator in one place, but appears to be the same person as Fabrizia Benini; introduced as head of unit for the Future Internet at DG Connect, European Commission.


– Fidan Ahmadi – listed by the moderator as a possible intervenor; no spoken intervention captured.


– Aduna Netsomulatu – listed by the moderator as an online possible intervenor; no spoken intervention captured.


– Kamal El-Hilali – listed by the moderator as a possible intervenor; no spoken intervention captured.


– Mikita Danilov – listed by the moderator as a possible intervenor; no spoken intervention captured.


– Andrea Mihailovich – listed by the moderator as a possible intervenor; no spoken intervention captured.


– Lilith – listed by the moderator as a possible intervenor; no spoken intervention captured.


– Sandra Patige – listed by the moderator as a possible intervenor; no spoken intervention captured.


– Moyo Sorororeula Adiemi – listed by the moderator as an online possible intervenor; no spoken intervention captured.


– Jeremy Jaffe – listed by the moderator as a possible intervenor; no spoken intervention captured.


– Ramjan Timilsina – listed by the moderator as a possible intervenor; no spoken intervention captured.


– Adriana Rodriguez-Novo – listed by the moderator as a possible intervenor; no spoken intervention captured.


– Parvin Jimshiddo – listed by the moderator as an online possible intervenor; no spoken intervention captured.


– Nadia Simeon – listed by the moderator as a possible intervenor; no spoken intervention captured.


– Caroline – audience participant from Germany; spoke for the fact-checking community about repositories, AI development, scraping, and sustainability models.


Full session reportComprehensive analysis and detailed insights

Jamal Shahin introduced European digital sovereignty as the session’s second main topic and as an issue that has recurred across EuroDIG over many years, including in discussion the previous day with the Executive Vice President.[1-5][26-33] He noted that sovereignty kept resurfacing even in internet governance discussions where it was not meant to be the main focus, and said one practical goal of the session was to bring more structure to a term that different people used in different ways.[14-21][39-45] He also opened on a lighter note by saying one of his goals was simply to get people to pronounce “sovereignty” correctly, before stressing the more serious task of “squaring the circle” between an open internet and a sovereign internet and of reserving the last 15 minutes to produce messages from what he expected would be a productive but not fully consensual discussion.[26-45][115-123]


Shahin framed the debate as both familiar and newly urgent. He said the topic was not new, but that the current geopolitical moment had given it a sharper framing around Europe’s role, dependencies, and capacity to act.[27-33] From the outset, he pointed to two tensions that would shape the exchange: how to reconcile sovereignty with the open internet, and how to move from broad principles toward concrete messages and interventions.[39-45][115-123]


Fabrizia Benini argued that the debate had become unavoidable because war, geopolitical tensions, and the “weaponization of dependencies” are now central features of international relations, including in digital affairs.[48-52] She said Europe’s problem is that the digital technologies underpinning its economy, society, and democracy are to a “significant and dangerous degree” not made in Europe, creating dependencies across the entire internet stack, from cloud infrastructure to AI models to platforms.[53-57] In her account, this was the cumulative result of long-term choices: it was easier to buy rather than build, more convenient to adopt rather than develop, and simpler to react than to lead.[58-66] Because of that, she argued, dependencies and digital sovereignty are no longer only matters of growth or convenience, but questions that reach into political life, democratic values, and the survival of democratic institutions.[67-77]


Benini therefore defined European digital sovereignty primarily in democratic terms. She tied it to democratic principles and values for a human-centric digital transition and asked how Europe could pursue sovereignty while remaining committed to an open, global, secure internet.[78-83] Her answer was not autarky, but the management of interdependencies through cooperation with trusted partner countries that share Europe’s commitment to that human-centric approach.[84-88] She condensed the goal into one word: “choice”, meaning that citizens and businesses should be able to decide where to keep their data, which providers to use, and to change those choices through portability.[89-91]


On policy instruments, Benini described Europe’s “very strong rulebook” as a strategic asset because sovereignty, like dependency, accumulates over time and therefore requires a stable long-term path anchored in principles and values.[92-100] She also stressed that Europe has substantial technical and research capacity.[100] Looking ahead, she said the coming Sovereign Tech Package would include a CHIPS Act, a Cloud and AI Development Act to define and support “sovereign cloud,” and an open source strategy managed by her team.[101-106] On open source, she said Europe has a vibrant developer community aligned in many respects with European digital values, but added that innovation by itself is not enough unless Europe can scale it with trust and confidence.[108-114]


Peter Janssen translated the debate into a concrete internet-governance example through EURid and the .eu domain.[124-126] Echoing Benini’s language of choice and control, he argued that owning a domain name gives users control not only over a website name but over their broader online identity, including the full email address after the “@” sign rather than only the part before it, as is often the case with addresses tied to ISPs or large providers.[133-145] He stressed that this matters because a domain can move with the user across providers and technical setups, and if a user makes the wrong choice, they retain the power to move away.[142-145] In that sense, he framed digital sovereignty as a practical issue of user control over digital presence and identity.[124-145]


Janssen then shifted to infrastructure. He argued that if .eu is to represent a form of European digital sovereignty, then the infrastructure behind it must also reflect that claim.[146-155] He said the European Commission had insisted from the beginning that the infrastructure be located on European soil and controlled by a wholly European entity, which he said EURid fulfills as a Belgian organisation operating .eu under Commission contract.[150-155] He described sovereignty here as a journey of evaluating the infrastructure stack, costs, risks, and alternatives so as to move in a controlled way toward open standards, interchangeability, and reduced dependency.[156-161] Later in the session he returned to the same theme from the user side, warning that many people choose services like Gmail or WhatsApp for convenience without reflecting on the consequences, and arguing that Europe needs to do much more to explain what users give up when they default to dominant foreign platforms.[479-495]


Frank Kruger added a German policy perspective centred on open-source maintenance, trusted infrastructure, and collaborative innovation.[166-167] He stressed that much of the open internet’s infrastructure is built and maintained by contributors around the world, often voluntarily, and said Germany’s sovereign tech agency tries to support “the people behind the code.”[168-171] He argued that maintaining key open source components is essential for security, stability, competitiveness, and innovation, and that strengthening those components benefits not only Germany and Europe but the wider digital ecosystem.[171-175] He welcomed the European open source strategy and presented open source and digital commons as core building blocks of European digital sovereignty, resilience, and innovation.[173-175]


Kruger also highlighted “the DC EDIC, the European Digital Infrastructure Consortium” as a permanent European framework for supporting strategic digital commons and open-source infrastructure.[176-183] He said it could improve coordination, maintenance, scaling, and long-term support for critical technologies, and added that Germany saw strong synergies with its sovereign tech agency, whose operational expertise could help scale to the European level.[177-183] He concluded that digital sovereignty is not a final destination but a direction of travel, and that Europe would not achieve it with regulation alone or by acting alone, but through cooperation within Europe and with global partners.[184-188]


As the discussion opened to the floor, the first major theme was terminology. Anna Neves said she did not like the term “digital sovereignty” and preferred “strategic autonomy,” describing sovereignty as a strong word linked to a nation, its values, its flag, and what makes a nation.[216-224] Francesco Vecchi broadly shared that view, preferring “digital autonomy” and insisting that Europe had to define the term more clearly.[230-235] He argued that autonomy is not isolation but the ability to identify and build on Europe’s strengths, especially democracy, and he added a “cognitive” dimension: Europe should protect against manipulative algorithms, support a genuine digital public sphere, and develop non-extractive alternatives to big tech, such as the Fediverse.[236-243]


Others defended the sovereignty framing more directly. Vincent Tadday argued that the key issue was how far Europe was willing to stress the “Europe” in European digital sovereignty, and described the EU as “the most schizophrenic power on the global stage”: a power capable of acting strongly, but often unwilling to behave like one.[251-258] He pointed especially to the gap between national investment preferences and genuinely European resource allocation.[257-258] Benini later responded explicitly that “sovereignty” was the right word because the issue touches democracy itself and Europe’s collective ability to preserve democratic self-government.[452-456]


A second major theme was that regulation is necessary but not sufficient. Giacomo Mazzone said EU regulation has made the digital world safer, but that sanctions under the DSA and DMA cannot by themselves transform platform business models, while rights like portability mean little if users have no credible European alternatives to move to.[260-269] He therefore argued for active industrial policy and proposed “Trusted European Platforms” as a practical way to create alternatives aligned with European values and human rights.[270-275] Valentina Stadnic of the ITU widened the discussion by arguing that open, internationally agreed standards help enable sovereignty rather than weaken it, because they provide the common technical language needed for cross-border connectivity.[285-289] She pointed in particular to spectrum management as one of the clearest demonstrations that sovereignty and cooperation are not contradictory, and added disaster response and cybersecurity coordination as similar examples.[290-293]


Several participants sharpened the critique of Europe’s current capacity. Speaking from Montenegro as a candidate country observing Europe’s digital ambition from the outside, Lea Rovcanin asked whether digital sovereignty can be meaningful if not all European countries are equally included in the digital transition.[306-318] She warned that without infrastructure, investment, innovation capacity, and digital skills, smaller and candidate countries risk becoming mere consumers of technologies built elsewhere, producing a two-speed digital Europe.[312-318] Denis Nazarenko, speaking online and apologising for his absence due to recent attacks, defined sovereignty less as a legal status than as a practical capacity: the ability of public institutions to keep operating under pressure, protect data, communicate with residents, and make decisions during crises.[325-343] He proposed a layered approach built around regulation, capability, and resilience, including semiconductors, procurement, sovereign infrastructure, and system design for disruption.[331-342]


João Gomes delivered one of the sharpest interventions. He argued that Europe has become the world’s most sophisticated regulator while still depending on foreign-built laptops, software, servers, cloud services, AI models, and fabrication capacity.[348-355] He criticised a Europe that imagines its role as governing technologies built elsewhere instead of building its own, and, speaking explicitly as someone in his twenties, urged older policymakers to stop framing the issue as protecting younger Europeans from American technology and instead explain how Europe will give them a real opportunity to build European technology.[356-358] His remarks foregrounded a generational perspective and stressed building, scaling, and opportunity for younger Europeans.[356-358]


A third major theme concerned how to pursue sovereignty without fragmenting the open internet. Eric Pol argued that citizens do not think in terms of digital sovereignty or privacy; what they want are better services, an easier digital life, and safety.[367-375] He suggested that personal digital sovereignty at scale could build trust across the ecosystem and become part of a distinct European approach.[371-375] Pari Esfandiari stated the tension even more directly, saying that “digital sovereignty” already contains a contradiction because sovereignty implies control and borders, while the internet was built on openness and interdependence.[380-382] She therefore reframed the question as how Europe could become more resilient without contributing to fragmentation, and warned that regulation without infrastructure and industrial capacity could amount only to “managed dependency.”[382-390]


Vittorio Bertola took a more confrontational line. He said it was striking that in 2026 Europe was still splitting hairs over sovereignty and autonomy when the issue was central to Europe’s independence.[396-397] He argued that Europe now needs all available tools at once: investment, regulation, procurement, industrial policy, and preference for European and open-source suppliers in areas such as defence and public administration.[396-400] He also rejected repeated warnings about protectionism or fragmentation, saying he would rather avoid “self-harm” than remain paralysed by those accusations.[402-409] Bertola’s intervention contrasted sharply with earlier cautions against protectionism and fragmentation.[396-409]


Elonnai Hickok offered the strongest rights-based warning against letting sovereignty slide into state-centric control. She agreed on the need for interoperability and argued that Europe should build around open standards, shared protocols, portability, and interconnection.[410-411] At the same time, she warned against a race to the bottom in which Europe, reacting to geopolitical competition, adopts overreach, surveillance, or excessive state control.[411-415] She stressed that implementation matters as much as language, because other actors also use terms like user control and multistakeholderism while meaning something very different in practice.[411-415] She also urged Europe to think holistically about how it behaves in international arenas, citing the UN Cybercrime Treaty as an example where external positions can have major implications for sovereignty and rights.[412-416]


Arnaud Wittersheim added a business implementation perspective. He said European providers generally welcome data protection and cybersecurity legislation, but that the transposition of EU rules into national law often creates divergent operational requirements across member states.[421-427] Referring to NIS2, he argued that if Europe wants to strengthen sovereignty, it also needs a more convergent operational framework and perhaps stronger certification mechanisms or schemes so that compliance becomes a business asset rather than a source of internal fragmentation and disadvantage for European operators.[423-427] Catalin Marinescu similarly stressed that while businesses are moving quickly, especially under the influence of AI and the search for greater platform independence, public administrations appear far slower to adapt.[434-444] She argued for stronger relationships between policymakers and the private sector and for better uptake of European alternatives where those already exist.[440-444]


Before inviting the panel to respond, Shahin briefly synthesised what he had heard: debates about digital sovereignty as a specific form and as a process, about rules and norms, and about where Europe’s comparative advantages might lie.[446-450] In reply, Benini defended “sovereignty” as the right term because it captures democratic choice and the ability to elect leaders freely; weaker terms, in her view, did not convey the seriousness of the issue.[452-456] She also reiterated that regulation is never sufficient on its own but remains indispensable because it provides a long-term path anchored in shared values and principles.[456-459] On fragmentation, she insisted that Europe is not acting against China or the United States as such, but out of concern for its own self-determination, while remaining opposed to internet shutdowns and committed to openness, interoperability, and instruments such as the Interoperability Act.[465-476]


Kruger answered the recurring question of alternatives by focusing on talent and scaling. He argued that Europe already has excellent researchers, innovators, and young people, and that innovation itself is not the main weakness.[497-503] The real problem comes when businesses need to scale and large amounts of capital are required, at which point foreign investors often step in.[501-505] Europe therefore needs to improve its ability to scale ideas and startups into competitive European providers, not just national ones, if it wants affordable and convenient European solutions that people will actually use.[502-505]


The final part of the session turned to synthesis and message-drafting. Shahin observed that the discussion had shown digital sovereignty to be not only a legal condition but also a mindset and relational concept tied to self-determination, resilience, and values.[506] Paulo Glowacki then presented four draft messages. The first said that Europe’s dependencies on external digital technologies and infrastructures had created strategic vulnerabilities, including for democratic values, and that Europe must shape and self-determine a human-centric digital future while preserving internet openness, choice of technologies and providers, open standards, interoperability, multistakeholder values, and human rights.[507-508] The second said digital sovereignty is a cumulative and transformative process requiring action by all stakeholders and investment in trusted European capacities, including chips, semiconductors, cloud, AI, open data, and open-source infrastructure.[509-512] The third added the need for a holistic European approach linking national policy and multistakeholder cooperation, with special attention to empowering citizens and youth, and included cognitive sovereignty and a reference to the Cannes Declaration on the Sovereignty of the Mind.[513-515] The fourth defined digital sovereignty as “resilient openness and strategic autonomy,” explicitly rejecting isolation, withdrawal from global digital cooperation, protectionism for its own sake, and fragmentation through digital walls.[517-519]


A few final interventions proposed amendments before closure. One audience member argued that the messages should include analogue fallback solutions for cyber resilience and democratic participation, especially where digitalisation cannot be imposed on everyone.[528-533] Miguel Vidal objected to the ordering of priorities, saying Europe should not treat open source as something merely to maintain while prioritising commercial champions; public investment, he argued, should first go into the commons, from which champions may later emerge.[536-542] Mazzone repeated his earlier call for trusted European platforms to be reflected more explicitly.[547-549] Caroline, speaking for the fact-checking community, raised the sustainability problem of repositories and AI development, arguing that organisations contributing data into shared repositories need a viable funding model.[557-569] Belen Luna then warned that digital sovereignty must also examine the business models Europe is promoting and avoid drifting either toward data-harvesting European big tech or toward rhetoric “very, very close” to far-right rhetoric.[577-580]


Shahin closed by saying he was satisfied with how the messages had emerged from the dialogue among organisers, panelists, and participants.[570-573] He noted that the conversation would continue beyond the session, and Florence Ranson formally ended the meeting and sent participants to lunch.[581-583]


Overall, the session produced a strong shared diagnosis and a narrower but still meaningful consensus on direction. Speakers broadly agreed that Europe is deeply dependent on non-European digital technologies and infrastructures across the entire internet stack, from cloud infrastructure to AI models to platforms, and that these dependencies now create strategic vulnerabilities for the economy, public institutions, democratic values, and political self-determination.[53-77][306-318][348-358][507-508] There was also wide agreement that regulation matters but is not enough on its own: it must be paired with industrial policy, procurement, trusted infrastructure, standards, open-source support, resilience planning, and the ability to scale European alternatives.[92-100][176-188][260-275][331-342][456-459][509-512] At the same time, most participants insisted that Europe’s path should preserve an open, global, interoperable internet and remain grounded in human rights and multistakeholder governance rather than closure or digital nationalism.[81-88][287-293][410-416][465-476][517-519]


The clearest unresolved disagreements concerned terminology and emphasis. Some participants saw “digital sovereignty” as the right democratic language for a serious geopolitical challenge, while others preferred “strategic autonomy” or “digital autonomy” to avoid nation-centred connotations.[216-243][452-456] Some pressed for stronger preference for European suppliers and more urgent action even at the risk of protectionist criticism, while others warned that Europe must avoid reproducing the state-centric or extractive tendencies associated with rival models.[396-409][410-416][577-580] There was also debate over whether Europe should prioritise open-source commons, trusted platforms, commercial champions, or some combination of all three.[101-106][176-183][236-243][270-275][536-542] Even so, the final messages captured a workable common position: digital sovereignty should be understood not as isolation or absolute control, but as a long-term European project of resilient openness, strategic autonomy, democratic choice, and reduced dependency.[507-519]


Session transcriptComplete transcript of the session
Florence Ranson

Hello. Yes. Sounds back on. So welcome back. And the time has come to move on to the second main topic of the day and consider European approaches to digital sovereignty, a topic on which we already exchanged yesterday in particular with the executive vice president. So let’s step on from this. And to lead this particular session, I’m going to hand over moderation to Jamal Shaheen from Vrije Universiteit, Brussels. Please, Jamal.

Jamal Shahin

Welcome to everybody. It’s quite energizing to see a number of familiar faces, but also quite a lot of new faces. For me, at least a lot of young faces and even younger faces in the room. I’m very happy to be moderating this session, which will be an exciting one. My name is Jamal Shaheen. As I was introduced, I’m a senior lecturer at the University of Amsterdam, as well as the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, where I’m also a principal investigator of a research project called Digital Sovereigns in a Non -Sovereign Internet, which means that I guess I might be able to moderate this session. Thank you very much to the organisers of the conference who’ve brought this discussion up and have been framing, and particularly the org team who’ve been working on this topic, who’ve been framing the reflections on digital sovereignty.

I want to also thank Hadis, the focal point for this, for bringing the panel together and getting us and giving us the opportunity to share some thoughts on this talk. My job as a moderator… is both easy and difficult today. It’s easy because this is a topic that flows. We’ve had discussions on digital sovereignty yesterday. Even when sovereignty is not supposed to be discussed, it is being discussed. So we will be having quite an easy flow of conversation, I think. But sovereignty also means many different things to many different people. And it’s my job as the moderator to try and bring some structure to that. Luckily, we have guiding questions which will help stimulate the conversation after we’ve had our interventions.

The second and possibly most important part of my job is to keep to time. And I’m aware that I will be eating into our lunch if I do not finish on time. And that is possibly, in these meetings, one of the most important, most important moments in time. So I will be… a kind but strict moderator, I believe, and I have told my speakers that I will start huffing and puffing, which is very British for saying that I will try and kick them off of the microphone once they exceed their time limit. We are here to discuss European digital sovereignty. It’s not necessarily a new topic. It’s been discussed at Eurodig many times before. We’ve seen the topic come up.

We’ve seen messages that have been delivered about European digital sovereignty in previous Eurodigs. But there is recently a new framing for the debate, and I think that the framing of the debate right now captures a lot of the political moment. We’re talking a lot about the contemporary geopolitical situation, which has been raised by many of the speakers also yesterday, and it reflects a lot on Europe’s, on a set of debates that Europe has about how to act. I’m really excited to be digging into these topics and I really honestly can’t believe that nobody else has been playing with the metaphor of digging around the Eurodig but anyway I’m really excited to be digging into these topics with our three distinguished guests but before I do that I did just want to say there’s one thing as somebody who’s been working on digital sovereignty for quite a while my main ambition is to get everybody to say the word correctly and it’s sovereignty not sovereignty we keep it simple, we keep it more efficient and there are less syllables in it than some people use so if we can use the word digital sovereignty to discuss this, I’ve already briefed our speakers on that, they will be doing that I am very excited to welcome everyone to our three speakers I will give an introduction to all three, and then I will let them take the floor later on.

First of all, we have Fabrizia Benigni, who is the head of unit for the Future Internet at DG Connect in the European Commission. We have Peter Janssen, who is the general manager for EURID, who has spoken to you yesterday. EURID is one of the hosts of EURIDIG, as you know. Also, last night, they showed us that there are no limits to Internet governance dialoguing. And finally, we have Frank Kruger, who is the director of the Directorate Digital Policy at the Federal Ministry for Digital Transformation and Government Modernization in Germany. So our three speakers will be starting with interventions that are quite short. We will then move on to the leading discussion. Questions that will appear on the screen and have your intervention.

and your conversation points, which we hope will make this a true dialogue with everybody. And I would like to reserve the last 15 minutes to produce the messages. I’m pretty certain that we won’t initially have agreement on these messages. Sorry, Paolo. But I’m pretty certain that we will have quite an interesting conversation that will cover a lot of different topics in the next hour and a half. So without further ado, I’d like to pass the floor to Fabrizia. If you want, you can take the microphone in front of you and I’ll come and join you at this stage.

Fabrizia Benini

Thank you very much, Jamal. We are very happy to be digging with you on European sovereignty and the path towards it. And obviously, this is a very timely moment, because the geopolitical question, tensions are unfortunately something that we cannot. forget. There are physical confrontations, there is war in many parts of the world, and in others, there is the weaponization of dependencies, be they physical or digital. And of course, this is a new way of international relations and one that we need to face in a multi -stakeholder framework where we are. Now, the European way, the European voices towards how is it that we attain digital sovereignty are many, but I think we, and I hope very much that today we will come out with one good consensus approach as it befits all internet governance activities.

I think we can all agree that the technology, the technology is the technology of the future. The digital technologies that underpin our economy, our society, our democracies. are very much, and to a significant and dangerous degree, not European -made. They are made elsewhere. So therefore, in terms of Europe, from Europe’s perspectives, we are dependent on others. We have dependencies. And these dependencies, of course, go across the entire Internet stack, from cloud infrastructure to AI models to platforms. And these dependencies didn’t come overnight. They were the result of the choices that we made over the years. It was, of course, easier to buy rather than to build. It was more convenient to adopt. Rather than develop, and so on and so forth.

Until we got to a point where we are, in fact, tied hand and foot. to those that build, offer, and deploy those technologies. We need to recognize that others were very good at doing that. They were quicker. They sensed what the market would buy. They sensed whether customers were able and willing to pay for it or to give up for it, and they moved on, and we reacted. Now, the problem is that the accumulation of those dependencies results in a strategic vulnerability, and a strategic vulnerability that touches every aspect of our lives. It’s not only about economy. This is about our democracies and our values. And today, unfortunately, dependencies or digital sovereigns are not just a matter of growth, convenience, economics.

It is a matter of survival of democracies. And those amongst us that might come from countries that have undergone political campaigns recently have probably experienced that firsthand. Now, this was one of the reasons why this question became at the center of the European political debate. Yesterday, the Executive Vice President, Ena Virkunen, reminded us of that. Our own President of the Commission, Ms. von der Leyen, has said over and over again that Europe must be able to shape its digital future. And the mission of our EVP is exactly to do that on the basis, and I repeat, on the basis of our principles and values. Democracy. Democratic principles and values for a human -centric digital transition.

I will lose my voice over repeating these words, but it is important because it’s not just what we do inside Europe. It is also how we project ourselves outside, how we do it in the global stage through the Internet governance, for instance. And here at Eurodig, we have a multi -stakeholder forum. So the question that is important for me as a policymaker is how is it that we achieve this whilst remaining open? Because one of our commitments, and it is a decade -long commitment to the international arena and to our partners, is that we believe, strongly believe, in an open global secure Internet. So how is it that we do this? Well, in fact, the answer has already been given in some commission papers.

For those that read that morning, afternoon, and night, and very attentive to every line we read, we write, it is about the management of our interdependencies. So what does that mean? It means that we will, and the EVP mentioned that yesterday, We will continue to partner with trusted countries, with partner countries, i .e. those that share our very strong belief in human -centric approach to digital transformation. And with them, we will develop the tools that will allow us to continue in our mission. And that mission can be, in my view, summed up in one word, choice. Choice. Our objective, our duty, I would say, is to make sure that in every act, in every provision, in every project that we support, we make sure that our business and our citizens are given the choice of where they keep their data, what they do with it, what provider they choose, and that they can, on top of it, change their minds and move from one to the other with a sense of portability.

choice underpins a human -centric approach to the digital transformation because it underpins the notion of self -determination. So this is, I would say, one of the very strong characteristics of the digital transformation and digital sovereignty in Europe. Now, we have a very strong rulebook, and I think, and it’s not ironic on my part, this is a strategic asset. And the reason for that is that a rulebook allows you to develop the same idea over time. It gives you a path. It gives you a guidance because digital sovereignty, just as the growth of dependencies, is not something that happens overnight. It’s a cumulative process. So whatever it is that we want to do in order to get out of dependencies and to more digital sovereignty in European terms, and we hope.

Not only European, but shared with all of those that believe in self -determination and in choice. We need to do that, indeed, with having in mind a guiding light, a guiding rule, a guiding principle. Now, Europe has fantastic capacities in terms of researchers, thinkers, as Jamal has just shown us, on all matters digital, both in terms of concepts and in terms of technical development. And on the 3rd of June, there will be the adoption of the Sovereign Tech Package. And the Sovereign Tech Package, as you heard yesterday, will be composed of a series of instruments. There will be a CHIPS Act that will tie the production of chips we need to the exact users of it, so a matching, so increase of production, but increase of production that is targeted to our needs.

A Cloud and AI Development Act. talks about sovereign cloud, what is sovereign cloud, how can you procure sovereign cloud, and how can you facilitate the uptake of a sovereign cloud. Again, this is something that will take time but it will be very important. And there will be an open source strategy for which my team is directly responsible. And just a few words on that. An open source strategy is important because we have a very vibrant community of developers in Europe. These developers are fantastic people that have their, for the most part, aligned their work with the values and principles of the digital transformation in Europe. And that’s quite, you know, a gift. An unexpected gift.

We didn’t realize it until we really studied it in detail. Of course, those that were in the community knew very well. Should I say communities, plural, because it’s not one block. It’s a series. It’s a series of blocks. so just to cut it short because I see you’re looking at your watch innovation is not enough what we need to do now is scale up we have the talent we have the raw materials so it’s up to us to make sure that we go into that path with confidence and trust yes

Jamal Shahin

thank you for but it’s yeah and for mentioning a number of key issues I think that that leads very well into a discussion for later and responds very well already in advance to some of the guiding questions that will will come so I’d like to thank you also for talking specifically about questions around the open internet that was if I may that was one of the things that was quite important on the discussion list that led up to the creation of this meeting and so we’ve had quite some discussions about squaring the circle between the open internet and a sovereign internet and you’ve started to address those points. Another thing that you mentioned was this question of choice or this aspect of choice and I think that leads very much into what or some of the things that we will discuss when we talk about EURID and EURID’s role in providing a European approach to digital sovereignty.

So Peter, if I could pass the floor to you.

Peter Janssen

Thank you, Jamal. Yeah, I’m very much in danger of repeating a lot of the points that Fabrizio brought to the table so I’ll try to be brief but first on thank you, Jamal, for the kind words on our little intervention yesterday evening but I truly believe that, you know, by working together the powers that we bring together it’s truly unlimited what we can achieve so in that sense I I , I think it was very apt for the choice that we made yesterday. For those that weren’t there yesterday, too unlimited. Sure you should have seen it but, you know, too late. Maybe next time. Okay, about the pronunciation of the word. I’m a native Dutch person, or Flemish, actually, I’m Belgian, but in English I agree with Jamal at sovereignty.

But, you know, I could say it in Dutch, souverainiteit, which sounds much nicer than the English version, but it is what it is. Anyway, for URID, the digital sovereignty is actually about choice, we heard that word already several times, and control. As a registry operator of .eu, there are two aspects that are really going into that digital sovereignty aspect. First is, you know, the product that URID provides, the .eu domain name, allows citizens, organizations, SMEs, it doesn’t matter, to have free choice with what they do with their domain name. They have free choice in what the name of their website should be. They can, you know, choose whatever. Like, you know, if you have a website that you want to use, you can choose what you want We think if you’re European, it should end on .eu, but that, I think, stands for itself.

But also, you can choose freely what your email address looks like, not just before the ad, which any provider will allow you to do. If you go to your ISP, your home internet, they will allow you probably to get an email address. But what is after the ad sign is mostly bound to either the ISP or American or not big tech provider. Your own domain name allows you to actually have that free choice and that control on the full aspect of your email address. And that email address, as we all know, represents your identity on the internet in one way or the other. And with that choice comes control. You can choose where you host your domain name.

You can choose your domain name. You can self -host your domain name if you’re technically inclined to do so. But at the very least, it gives you the power and the control to choose a provider. That actually cares about you. your privacy and your data. So you have that control, you have that choice, and that domain name is yours. You can do with it whatever you like, as long as it’s legal. But it also allows you to grow with you, to move with you, and to go wherever you want. You want it to go independent of the technical choices that you make at a certain moment in time. And if you think you made the wrong choice, you have that power to actually move away and go somewhere else.

But on the other hand, if we’re talking about a domain name as a European digital sovereign identity, we as the registry operator have to make sure that that is actually true also at the basis of that domain name. So we as Europe, we have to make the right choices in terms of how the digital .eu domain space is actually happening or appearing on the internet. So that second aspect is really, what choices we as a registry. have to make. We have to make the right choices in that respect. And actually, you know, from the very beginning, over 20 years ago, the European Commission already had that insight and said, you know, W should be on European soil.

What I mean with that is the infrastructure, the physical infrastructure should reside physically within the European Union, and it should be controlled by a wholly European entity. In this case, it’s Europe. We are a Belgian organization and we host or we manage .eu under contact with the European Commission, and we are a wholly European entity. So the control of the .eu domain namespace is fully European and fully hosted on the European infrastructure, let’s call it like that. So the core services provided by Europe are actually on European soil. And lastly, to briefly, to cut it up really short, so that Frank also has a little bit of time left, there is a choice of infrastructure.

That might be both hardware as well as software. But, you know, EURID is continuously evaluating every aspect of the infrastructure stack. And, you know, that analysis takes into account, obviously, costs, possible alternatives, risks. And it’s all about a journey to make every part of that infrastructure stack adhere to open standards and make them interchangeable. So it’s not about here and now we have to be fully European sovereign, if that even would be a word, but it’s about where do we want to go and how will we go there by reducing the risks as much as possible and actually making sure that we get there in a controlled way and that we go where we want and need to go.

And I’ll stop there for the moment. Thank you.

Jamal Shahin

Thank you very much. thank you very much Peter I was on mute thank you very much Peter for that contribution which raised a number of important points I think sovereignty as control over the infrastructure and the regulatory control over that but also raising the first part of your intervention the idea of sovereignty as a form of self determination so enhancing the idea of choice and I think these are very different aspects of the digital sovereignty debate that we’re all contributing to here Frank is going to contribute yet another angle to this I believe Frank in your position in terms of the federal ministry working towards digital transformation you’re going to tell us a bit about how that’s actually working in in Germany, I guess, and how this is actually leading from the discussions that we’re already working into with the contributions from Fabrizio and Peter already.

So thanks, Frank.

Frank Kruger

Open standards, trusted infrastructure and collaborative innovation are essential for Europe long -term technological resilience. This is why Germany is engaged in the open Internet infrastructure. This infrastructure is built and maintained by contributors all over the world, very often and on a voluntary basis. Germany supports the people behind the code. Our sovereign tech agency is an instrument for that. It maintains key open source components, and these components underpin security, stability, competitiveness and innovation. By strengthening essential elements of the global digital infrastructure, we aim to improve security and resilience not only for Germany, not only for Europe, but globally. That is why Germany welcomes the fact of the open source. The European strategy and open source and digital commons are key building blocks of European digital sovereignty, resilience and innovative capacity.

And this goes hand in hand. The DC EDIC, the European Digital Infrastructure Consortium, creates a permanent European framework for supporting strategic digital commons and open source infrastructure. It can strengthen coordination, maintenance, scaling, and long -term support for the critical open source technologies that Europe depends on. We therefore welcome the operational progress already made. This includes the appointment of its director and the ongoing institutional setup. And we see strong synergies here with the Southern Tech Agency in Germany. The agency already has practical experience in supporting security -critical open source infrastructure, and that operational expertise can scale to the European level automatically. And that’s why the DC EDIC framework. For us, these are two practical instruments to implement the future of open source strategy, and they belong together.

Let me close with this thought. Digital sovereignty is not the final destination. It’s a direction where we are going to, and it’s a question of democracy, of investment, of openness all at once. We will not get there with regulation alone. We will not get there by going it alone, but we can get there together in Europe and with our partners around the world. Thank you.

Jamal Shahin

Thank you, Frank. A round of applause for all of our speakers. Thank you very much. I think you’ve raised some very important points there, but thanks also for showing us how you are living. And to all our panelists, thank you for showing us how you’re living these debates and implementing them. Thank you for demonstrating European digital sovereignty in your own ways. I think it’s very important, Frank, that you raise this question of resilience, again, which ties into many of the points that were raised by previous speakers about the control over infrastructure. I think it’s also nice to hear you say where the red line is in terms of digital sovereignty, what it’s not. So the questions of is digital sovereignty about promoting protectionism, and protectionism, and so on.

So I think that was very important to actually have as part of the conversation. We now have the responsibility of moving towards the three questions that we have, and I’m looking on our screens to see whether the questions, we will put the questions in order. We have a number of people who would like to comment. If you want to contribute, the order is determined by how quickly you signed up. to submit an intervention to the group. So I would like maybe to start with Ramjan Timilsina. Where is Ramjan? Is Ramjan here? No? Okay. I’ve been informed that there is a strict rule. If you don’t respond within seven seconds, I am to remove you from the record.

So we will now move to Fidan Ahmadi. No? Okay. Then we go to Aduna Netsomulatu. Online. Online. There will be an opportunity for people who are not on the list to intervene afterwards. Please. Bear that in mind. But I would like to go through the three questions before we do that. Okay? So Anna Nivis. Yes. Anna oh no that’s not I don’t know but Anna is there Anna please turn on your mic thank you

Anna Neves

thank you very much I’m Anna Neves I’m from Portugal I work for the government but of course this is my own comments in 2003 it would have been impossible to have such a session with such a name it’s incredible so after 30 years we are talking about maybe not close but to really to live in a world where we as European Union we have to have this theme on sovereignty it’s really weird I don’t like it I think we are talking about strategic autonomy I think we are talking about strategic autonomy it’s really weird I think we are talking about it’s really weird I think it’s a very strong word for a Europe that is open to digital cooperation, to international cooperation, to the digital world, to the world itself without being only digital.

So for Portuguese, it’s a very, well, it’s a strong name because we talk about sovereignty when we are talking about a nation, about its own values, about its flag, about what is a nation and what it makes a nation. So here I think that we are not really talking about sovereignty because it really puts us apart from the others. And I totally agree with what Fabricio said. It’s about who does the choice and who controls and to whom. And we know that, well, in France and in Germany, so you already have. your own software and for the public administration, so as far as I understood. And I think it’s very interesting, and we have to invest a lot on that, and we have to have a really strong industry.

And so it’s a pity that we are in digital sovereignty nowadays, and we should be discussing about autonomy. Thank you.

Jamal Shahin

Thank you. Thank you for addressing the question, which I did not actually vocalize, but I hope everybody can see it on the screen. Is digital sovereignty the right term for Europe’s goals? So thanks for that contribution that brings that together. Panelists, I will go through all of the speakers who are listed, and then we can have a chance to respond. Francesco Vecchi, the floor is yours.

Francesco Vecchi

Okay. Hello. Hi. Francesco Vecchi, Civic Care Coordinator at Humans. I do agree that it should not be that term. It’s digital autonomy, but I also think that we have to agree on what it means. And we at Humans believe that digital autonomy is not about isolation. It’s about identifying and leveraging Europe’s strengths. And we believe that democracy is definitely one of them and should not be overlooked. In fact, autonomy is not only technological, but it’s also cognitive. And I didn’t hear many people speaking about that today. And we believe that true autonomy means protecting citizens from manipulative algorithms and ensuring that digital spaces serve the public interest and not the other way around. This is why digital autonomies must pass through the creation of a truly European digital public sphere, one that empowers citizens and fosters civic agency.

There are already non -extractive alternatives to big tech, like open source and free software and interoperable platforms such as the Fediverse. let’s use them and I’m speaking first and foremost to representatives from public authorities. Finally, we believe that Europe’s sovereignty or autonomy, if we want to call it that way, will be measured by how well we build a new infrastructure for democracy, an infrastructure that is based first and foremost on open, resilient and fair digital ecosystems. We believe that this only will be the true foundation of a citizen -centered digital future and these points have been widely addressed by the Cannes Declaration on the Sovereignty of Mind and we would like that to be mentioned in the messages if possible.

Thank you very much.

Jamal Shahin

Thank you, Francesco. A very valuable contribution there, referring to the issue, the definitional nature of the topic, but also then echoing some of the conversation points here that we had on democracy and on awareness, which we’ll get to, I think, in the second round of questions as well. Plenty of food for thought and thanks for the link. Thank you. which I guess the message takers have noted. Okay, perfect. Kamal El -Hilali from UNESCO. No. Six, seven. There you go. Vincent Taddei. Vincent, the

Vincent Tadday

Thank you very much. I believe that an important part is how much are we willing to underline the Europe in European digital sovereignty. Europe is in some ways the most schizophrenic power on the global stage. It is powerful when it wants to be powerful, and it is weak when it does not want to act like a power. So I think in the debate of European digital sovereignty, we often talk about it. It’s used. It’s used historically a lot. But when it comes to the hard decisions, when it comes to the allocation of financial resources, for example, Germans want to found… German research and Italians want in the end to buy Italian infrastructure and it’s so important to link it back to the idea of European integration and really to stress the Europe in European digital sovereignty when we talk about it here like this thank you very much

Jamal Shahin

thank you very much Vincent for highlighting the the European focus on European approaches to digital sovereignty which which leads to a number of questions obviously about the way in which we think about European digital sovereignty I think many of our panelists would be able to react to some of the issues about legal constructs or non -legal constructs that actually build you already mentioned the edict for example telecoms regulation in the past is also a field that might help us respond to that Mikita Danilov okay right so um i think we’re through the first set of guiding questions lots of food for thought right but what i would like to do is maybe i’ll go to the next set of questions just to make sure that we do get all the interventions in before we turn to making the messages so can we go to the second question and closely related can european regulation alone for example the dma deliver digital sovereignty or parallel investments in infrastructure innovation and industrial capacity essential to avoid falling short it’s a leading question but i think that there’s quite a lot we can talk about in this field from the brussels municipality okay i’ve seen giacomo mazzone in the room

Giacomo Mazzone

Yes, thank you. My more than a question is a reflection. Of course, we are fully supportive of the regulation that the EU has built over the years to make the digital world a safer place and as Eurodigma board member, as Edmo advisory board member and my personal capacity try to contribute to its implementation in day -by -day activities. But regulation has a limit as has been told very correctly by the German representative. In order to fully implement the regulation, we need to complement it with active industrial policies. Let’s think about some delimited regulations. BSA and DMA sanctions to internet platform when they create systemic risk to society cannot change the business model of the platform and their activity.

The EMFA introduced the freedom of choice about the information individual diet from the next year. But platform and device manufacturers are not preparing them for making this possible. The portability rights has been introduced by EU regulation, but if I want to migrate my data, let’s say from Meta or Alphabet or TikTok or LinkedIn, what does change? We need an alternative that is respectful of the European values. The only viable alternative that could create a EU alternative to the non -EU -based platforms and AI application is, in my opinion, the concept of TEP, the Trusted European Platform, that has been mentioned in the Berlin Digital Sovereignty Summit in November last year. Creating EU champions that are respectful of EU principles and human rights that are not an addictive and not toxic business model based on open sources is inevitable.

This is an essential part of the EU strategy for digital transition. I hope that the support for the TEPs in the announced next week’s Sovereignty Tech Package will not be symbolic but substantial. We need long -term investment and three criteria need to apply to recognize what will be at that. Thank you.

Jamal Shahin

Thank you very much, Giacomo. Interesting, actually, then really looking at the practical implications of what does a move beyond European regulation mean. Valentina Stadnik from the ITU. Valentina, the floor is yours.

Valentina Stadnic

Thank you. Make it work? Okay. Now I’m connected. So, yeah, thank you so much. I believe my answer will be more indirect to the question than direct, but I feel like our speakers have done the same, actually, in all of their interventions. They did answer this question already. So, representing the ITU, which is the UN specialized agency for the ICTs, and having this multi -stakeholder approach as the core, in all of our operations and values, at the same time being driven by the goal of connecting the whole world and ensuring the meaningful connectivity for the whole world. I think I would like to step a little bit aside and provide a little bit more of the reflections on the global stage and the global commitments that were mentioned before and a little bit of a management of the interdependencies that were also referenced.

So as you probably know, ITU has been always committed to create the common technical language, enabling countries to connect across borders. So we are strong believers in the fact that the open and internationally agreed standards are an enabler of sovereignty. So from that perspective, we can take this point as a whole separate conversation, but I believe we already heard some of the voices from the stage that I can echo from their perspective. But also the other angle, that I would like to bring is… also the resilience angle. And here, the cross -border coordination in our perspective is indispensable. And whether we look at the angles of the spectrum management, of the disaster management, of the cybersecurity incident response, all of those aspects have no borders, and it requires the cooperation.

And, yeah, and I believe when it comes to the spectrum management, it perhaps is one of the clearest demonstrations of the sovereignty and cooperation, which are not contradictory to the cooperation scopes, as well as the early warning response and the cybersecurity national capabilities strengthening while ensuring the cooperation. So, yeah, I’ll stop here, but I would be happy to continue the conversation further. Thank you.

Jamal Shahin

Thank you, Valentina. I think many of us would be happy to continue that conversation that covers issues. The global nature of the Internet, the requirements for… global coordination and the way that europe actually positions itself in that um in that debate so hopefully we can have some discussion about that later on in the in the panel uh andrea mihailovich who is mentioned as the president of civil society but uh uh is probably busy um solving some problem somewhere uh lilith yes who is the ceo of civil society no not ceo of civil society ceo lilith neither probably solving the same problem um sandra patige no okay you see this topic um evokes many emotions and gets lots of people to want to react um and then leads to a kind of uh tip.

Amath, NDA. Nope, not yet. Okay. Moyo soro ro reula adiemi. Online. Okay. But I think Jeremy was also in the last session, right? So Jeremy Jaffe. No, he’s not here either. Okay. Now I’m pretty certain that Lea is in the room. Hi, Lea. Lea Ravchanin. The floor is

Lea Rovcanin

Thank you. Good afternoon, everyone. My name is Lea, and I have to say that it’s a pleasure to be here and, of course, to be part of the UTIG. So the European Union has become a global leader in digital regulation through initiatives like the GDPR, the Digital Markets Act, and the AI Act. Yet an important question remains. Can digital sovereignty exist if not all European countries are equally included in digital transition? I’m from Antenengro, a candidate country observing Europe’s digital ambition from the outside, hoping one day to be fully part of them. From this perspective, digital sovereignty cannot rely on regulation alone. Without infrastructure, investment, innovation capacity, and digital skills, smaller countries risk remaining only consumers of technologies developed elsewhere.

If candidate countries are not included in Europe’s digital investment and innovation ecosystem now, not after association, we risk creating a two -speed digital Europe. We risk creating a two -speed digital Europe where some countries shape the future while others struggle to keep up. So digital sovereignty should not only mean like reducing dependence outside of Europe, but also ensuring that no part of Europe is left behind the digital transition. And I would like to close with a question. How can Europe claim digital sovereignty if parts of Europe remain digitally dependent with Europe itself? Thank you.

Jamal Shahin

Thank you for the question, Leah. Very stimulating. And thank you also for reminding us Eurodig is bigger than just the EU itself. Even though we’re being graciously hosted by the European Commission right now as one of the partners, Eurodig does go broader. Dennis, you are online. Thank you. The screen is yours.

Denis Nazarenko

Yeah, apologies for not being in person due to recent attacks. So on the point of question, from our perspective, the honest, balanced evaluation is necessary. And then our experience suggests it works best alongside capability and resilience. So sovereignty in our practical experience is less a status than a capacity. The capacity of public institutions to continue operating, to protect data, to communicate to residents, and to make decisions under pressure. So it is shaped not only by who owns the infrastructure, but where the government has real governance capacity of the systems that it depends on. And with that in mind, I would suggest three leaders, which are worth holding together. First, obviously the government. Second, the government.

on a competition, rights, interoperability, transparency, and accountability. So, DMA, DSA, Forced Common Clause and the AI Development Act, all that sits in this layer. Second, capability of sovereign and trust infrastructure, including what was mentioned several times, sovereignty over semiconductors and cheap supply chains, which sits upstream of almost every other digital sovereignty question. So, alongside public sector data capacity, cybersecurity, procurement, the European public authorities collectively procure tens of billions in digital services each year. When that procurement will converge on shared standard supply chain instruments, have more work to do with digital public infrastructure framing as useful. And a third one. Resilience. System design for disruption, not only for efficiency. So, Ukraine recent experience offers one data point.

Dependence tends to become visible. when systems are attacked and supply chains are interrupted or public communication contested. And last point, super briefly, of all the layers of sovereignty under discussion, the most important is data sovereignty, and in our reading, it’s the final destination, and it is more strong to exercise the level close to residence. Thank you.

Jamal Shahin

Thank you, Denis. I have to say, maybe it’s on this part of the stage it was a bit difficult to hear, but we’ll try and touch base on many of your points. I mean, we heard you referring to resilience, data sovereignty, and interoperability as some of the key concerns, I think. But thank you very much for your contribution. João. João Gomes, University of Minho, and UD.

Joao Gomes

Europe is the world’s most sophisticated regulator of security. If an infrastructure, it is not on. We have spent two days discussing sovereignty on laptops we did not build, in software we did not write, connected to servers we cannot find. This is Europe I will inherit. We have the DSA, the DMA, the EACT, the GDPR, but we do not have the cloud, we do not have the models, we do not have the fabs. 70 % of the European cloud market belongs to Amazon, Microsoft and Google. This is not an accident, this is a habit. Europe has stopped imagining itself as a place where things are actually built. We have started to imagine ourselves as a place whose job is to govern things created by people who will never come to a conference like this one.

I am in my 20s, in 10, maybe 20 years I will probably be the age many of you are. So I do have one request, not for these panels, but for everyone in this room. Me. stop telling my generation that you are protecting us from American technology and start telling us how we actually build our own technology because we can write a hundred more regulations hold a hundred more erotics and Europe will eventually become a museum of its own ambition my generation does not need protection we need an actual chance thank you

Jamal Shahin

thank you thank you very much Yao I see we have a sort of different applause policy around the room but anyway I think that there were some very important points that you’ve raised there that also touch on many of the things that our speakers have said about implementation, development, awareness and actual the role then of and scope of regulation and what needs to be done beyond that so these are the things that I would like to say and these are the really interesting and important points that I hope will be brought out in the messages we will go to the third Next question, I will read out the baseline of the question. So how can Europe assert its digital sovereignty against the U .S.

and China without fragmenting the open Internet? And what technical and political solutions are most urgently needed now? If I may, I think this also relates to many of the themes we’ve been discussing in the previous two questions as well. So provides us with an opportunity to think about how we fit that round peg in that square hole or how we move beyond that. We have Axel Mazolo, who will not be raising their question, but maybe we have Kamran Karimov. Or Eric Poll. Thank you. Thank you. sorry eric yes

Eric Pol

concepts of digital sovereignty or privacy. What they want are better services, easier management of their lives, and a sense of safety, much like we don’t need to understand anti -lock braking systems to trust a car. Citizens shouldn’t need to be experts in data infrastructure to feel secure in their digital lives. The main point is this. Personal digital sovereignty at scale strengthens the entire ecosystem. It builds the systemic trust necessary for markets to thrive and empower digital citizens. It is technically feasible, politically sound, and the only way to ensure a resilient digital future. Since it is also a universal concept, as we experience with our membership spanning 45 countries on all continents, by applying it, the EU can give birth to a strong global alternative to the US and Chinese model, thus strengthening the Brussels effect.

Thank you.

Jamal Shahin

Thank you, Eric, for re -emphasizing the role of the personal, but also then emphasizing that this does not mean that we all need to become our own developers in that way. Padi Esfandiari. Padi is online, right?

Pari Esfandiari

Thank you very much. Yes, I’m online. So I will be very short on this. What I want to emphasize is that I see some contradiction. I think that digital sovereignty already reveals a kind of contradiction because sovereignty implies control, borders, while the Internet was built on openness and interdependence. So perhaps the real question is not how Europe becomes sovereign, but how it becomes resilient without contributing to fragmentation. I also think that regulation alone is not enough. Europe is becoming very powerful at regulating technologies largely developed elsewhere. The DMA and AI Act matter, but regulation without infrastructure, innovation, and industrial capacity risks becoming a form of managed dependency. I also believe that Europe should avoid simply reproducing either the U .S.

platform model or the Chinese state -centric model. Its real contribution could be strategic resilience without digital nationalism. But if every major power increasingly frames digital policy through security and geopolitical competition, then perhaps the deeper question is this. Are we still trying to preserve a global Internet or are we already moving towards competing geopolitical Internet? So I stop here and thank you again for the opportunity. Thank you

Jamal Shahin

very much, Paddy, also for raising many points that I think will come up in the following discussion. Thinking about whether the geopolitical moves are actually justifying a different type of Internet than the one we have, but also focusing on the role of Europe’s citizens and users of these services. We move now to Vittorio Bertola. Hi, Vittorio. okay so

Vittorio Bertola

hi i’m vittorio bertola from open exchange which is one of the open source partners of the german open desk project and first let me say that it’s 2026 and we’re still splitting hairs on which words to use whether it’s sovereignty or autonomy or well i i mean this thing is vital it’s vital for the survival of europe not just in the digital sector but as an independent and sovereign power so let’s stop arguing on words and let’s start acting immediately and which solutions would we need i mean we need all of them we need the investments we need regulation we need public procurement policies and industrial policy we need regulation that puts the european solutions first and open source first and is not afraid to require european suppliers at least when key key sectors like defense and european citizens processing data processing and we need a solution to this problem and we need a solution to this problem and we need a solution to this problem and we need a solution to this problem and we need a solution to this problem and we need to think that public administrations and public money is spent to us European solutions.

It’s not that hard, but we have to do it, not just talk about it. And I thank the German government for leading this. I see movement in France, in Denmark, but most European states are still not doing anything. And what is the Commission doing to push them and the other institutions? What are they waiting for? At the same time, I’m also a bit fed up that every time we try to do something, there’s someone complaining about fragmenting the Internet or protectionism. And I honestly don’t care. I don’t know if protecting Europe and developing the European sector is fragmenting the Internet or is it protectionism. But I know that if we don’t do it, we are doing ourselves harm.

We are self -harm. So, I mean, I don’t want to be self -harm. I think there are actors outside of Europe that would like us to be self -harmful, other countries, other companies. But we should not be continuing to harm ourselves by not acting and just talking about it and being afraid of doing what is

Jamal Shahin

the policy is working but thanks Vittorio for telling us to move on and get to the next speaker very important points that I think we can cover later on Adriana Rodriguez -Novo perfect Elona Hickok hi can you hear me?

Elonnai Hickok

in the context of this question I would want to agree with a lot of what I’ve heard in terms of the importance of interoperability when we’re thinking about how Europe can assert its digital sovereignty against the US and China without fragmenting the open internet and that includes open standards shared protocols portability, interconnection so it’s really important to look for spaces to build this interoperability including oversight, certification procurement guidelines etc and i also think that it’s important when implementing this to resist the temptation for a race to the bottom to not take a state control approach or a state -centric approach to avoid government overreach undermining of the multi -stakeholder model this means centering international human rights frameworks and legislation and regulation focusing on user control limiting surveillance powers by judicial oversight and the principles and necessity proportionality and legality but i think it also really means thinking carefully about what it what the translation of paper to practice looks like if you look at the terms and the values put forward by countries like china they also talk about multi -stakeholderism the national cyber security standard committee in china just issued non -minding ethics guidelines which are very important to us and i think that’s a very important part of the process that emphasizes user control so we’re all starting to talk about and use the same bag but how we actually get there, I think is very different and needs to be paid attention to.

I also wanted to pick up on what was said in the opening panel about the need to focus on how the EU is showing up in international spaces that have implications for sovereignty. The UN Cybercrime Treaty is an example of this, where provisions can potentially allow foreign governments to gain access to national data with weaker protections. Yet this proposal was supported by the EU based on arguments that an alternative could be worse. So all to say, I think when we’re thinking about sovereignty, it’s very important to take a holistic approach and avoid a race to the bottom. Thank you. Thank

Jamal Shahin

you. Thank you, Elona, for the holistic approach. Parvin, Jim, should do online. Parvin, I see you online, but please unmute yourself. Thank you. 6, 7 that’s where it comes from actually 6, counting up the seconds until we move to the next speaker Maciek yeah I see Maciek online so I would ask him to unmute 5, 6 7, I feel cruel but we have time limitations Arnaud Arnaud which is home please hello

Arnaud Wittersheim

hello well I’m not sure if it’s relevant what I’m going to say I represent a sovereign corporate registrar and DNS provider that develops proprietary solutions for its clients so we’re happy to be here in this space for dialogue And we welcome the European legislative efforts in the fields of data protection and cybersecurity. But what we notice is that regulations such as GDPR or NISTU and even others are pushing our ecosystem into significant policy changes. And on a local perspective, as a European provider, we see that transpositions of EU regulations into national laws result in as many disparities as there are member states, especially in the case of the NISTU directive regarding the expected operational measures and impacts.

And so, if I could make a wish. in terms of sovereignty is that these aspects be taken into account by the legislators to push for a convergent operational framework. Because legislation should bring benefits for users, but not create excessive disparities between European and non -European operators, as this could be detrimental for European operators. And this also requires more dialogue, and maybe there could be also more certification champs to help businesses stand out and showcase compliance and expertise. So bring improvements to users and also business value for stakeholders.

Jamal Shahin

Thank you, Agno, for this contribution. which I’m sure we will be able to respond to in the chat, in the conversation. Nadia Simeon. No. Or Katalin Marinescu. Thank you. Sorry. There’s a big poll in the way. Katalin?

Catalin Marinescu

Okay, I think I can speak now. Hello, thank you. And parts of what I wanted to say have already been mentioned, so I’ll try not to repeat too much. As someone who works in the private sector, I can see that business models are changing faster than ever, and companies need to adapt if they want to survive. AI is the focus to increase productivity, and everyone in the software world has on their mind two things. The EU Cyber Resilience Act and asking themselves, is my application platform independent? Never before was this question more relevant than it is now. And it is to date. Unfortunately, public administrations look slower in adapting and implementing the latest trends and technologies.

I think we have quite a way to go to achieve digital sovereignty, but the regulation is taking shape with the tech sovereignty package, and we are moving in the right direction. We need European alternatives, and I think we have the technical capabilities to build them, or if those alternatives are already available, we need to make them popular and use them. About incorporating open source, we have to keep in mind that it could be privatized in the future. My final statement is that we need to build a stronger relationship between the private sector and the policy makers if we want to achieve our goals. Thank you.

Jamal Shahin

Thank you, Katalin. Okay, we’ve gone through all the questions. there are many points that need to be raised but it would be remiss of me if I please don’t warn the speakers that we do not have that much time because we need to agree on some minutes and the food will get cold so first maybe just a quick summary from my side I hear people talking about achieving a specific form of digital sovereignty I hear people talking about digital sovereignty as a process as a transformation in a broader sense I also hear people talking about rules the challenges around implementing or developing rules but then also the norms and the global values that go around that I hear people talking about what would be Europe’s specific advantage in this space and many others and other of the issues that have been raised by our interventions.

Before we open up the floor to other interventions, I would like to just go back. Are there comments that you would have on certain points for Fabrizio? I see you’ve been desperately writing things down. Maybe you have some specific comments.

Fabrizia Benini

Thank you, Jamal. I’ve been desperately writing down the names of the people that intervene and making sure that I remember what it is the points that they raise. So on the three questions, on the sovereignty question, is sovereignty the right word? My personal opinion is that, yes, it is the right word. I was struck by Anna Neve’s relation of the word sovereign to being specific to nation building and reflecting a territorial national approach. And I was also taken by Vicente Day’s emphasis on the word European. And in fact, European digital sovereignty encapsulates all of that. why does it need to be sovereignty because it touches on the very choices as regards the way we elect our leaders i .e it touches on democracy which is the underpinning of our nation states in europe and without that we can’t have the other and again european because it is a collective effort so i don’t think all the other words make the cut the the the situation is serious enough to say that if we don’t get it right we might not have european democracies to protect next time around on the um is it regulation sufficient of course not regulation is never sufficient in anything we do it’s not only digital it needs to be implemented it needs to be funded it needs to be followed believed and adopted by the people that are its direct beneficiaries so we all agree that it is not um Yes, it is not the only solution.

However, I would say, I would argue, it is an indispensable solution because given that it’s a long -term process, if we don’t have regulation, it gives you the path over decades of what is it that you want to achieve. Building on the values and principles you share, you might lose your way. And so, therefore, that is why it is important to have it. Now, on the last point, of course, on this regulation, there were several important points made by Valentina on the cross -border cooperation essential layer mentioned. How is it that we can claim digital sovereignty? And Joan Gomes was very good at listing the dependencies we have. Thank you. And calling us to stand on our toes in relation to the next generation.

Yes, we hope. to be able to deliver to your expectations, or at least to try and do so. On the last point, are we trying to do something versus China and the U .S., or are we what we’re doing? Well, I don’t think if you’re thinking about self -determination, you should start thinking about others. You should start thinking about what is it that you want yourself? What are your values? What are your principles? What do you want to do? We do know one thing. We do not want and we do not support a fragmented Internet. We are for and we combat very much Internet shutdowns. This is a principle throughout our Internet governance policy, and so therefore it is very clear for us that it must remain open and it must remain interoperable.

We even have a regulation that’s called the Interoperability Act, so I hope you believe me. I hope you follow that score. Thank you.

Jamal Shahin

Please, Peter.

Peter Janssen

Okay. I’ll try to be brief. I would just like to point out one thing that was also pointed out by many of you, which is awareness or maybe lack of awareness or rather the consequences of not caring. And I’m sorry, I forgot your name. The person from Uthik who is right in front of me, I’m like, yes, you. Thank you. Sorry to mispronounce your name. Maybe a cheeky question to you would be, are you a user of Gmail? Yes. Do you realize the consequences of that choice? That, I think, would be the major important aspect, that people that now take a convenience choice, Gmail is easy, Gmail is free of charge. Gmail is everywhere. So, you know, if Google is good at one thing, and I’m not picking on Google here just by itself, but Google is good at making it convenient for you, and that is what people then at that moment in time take as their decision power.

You were talking about younger people versus older people. I would say myself maybe in the older group then, but I do have a daughter who is 25, so I guess that is more or less in the neighborhood that you were thinking about. She is using an email address that sits on a European TLD that is hosted in a European data center by a European entity, and that is completely European. Why is that? Because I enforced it up in her. I tried to explain that to her, and then her response is, yeah, but Gmail is being used by everybody else I know, and it’s easy, and I’m using WhatsApp, and it’s easy, and so on and so on.

So I think awareness and, most importantly, the consequence of what people are saying is that they are not using Gmail. The choice you make is the most important aspect here, and I think we need to get better in… showing to the world what the consequence is of taking the easy choice, which is what the Americans in this case are very good at. I’ll stop there. Thank you.

Jamal Shahin

Thank you, Peter. Frank?

Frank Kruger

Yes, I would like to pick out one question, which was raised by several of you, and that was how do we come to European alternatives? And how, yes, to become active and to build whatever is needed to have European solutions. And I think we have a lot of young people ahead of us and a lot of talents, young talents. And I think we have a very good landscape in research across Europe, a very good research landscape, very good innovative people. And I think… I think that’s where innovation comes from, from the young people, from the young innovators. of people and once you scale your business and I think that’s something which is lacking in Europe to scale and when it comes to whatever billions of euro you need, then often American investors jump in.

But I think that’s something we need to scale ideas of young talents of universities and such. I think we have a lot of very good startups in Europe already in the AI landscape. I don’t want to mention one of this but we have some in Germany, we have some in France, we have some in all the other countries across Europe and I think that’s what we need to scale our business and to have competitive enterprises at the end because people will buy what is cheap and what is convenient to use. And I think that we must strengthen our efforts to come to more European solutions but we have the talents, we have the potential, we have the good people here.

anywhere else and I think yes we need to strengthen our efforts to scale this and then it’s not only in Italian service or not only in German service or in France service but then it can become a European provider that is competitive

Jamal Shahin

okay thank you very much Frank the organizers are looking at me very nervously because the salad is getting cold but but I did have just and I and I know there were people that wanted to raise their voice but unfortunately we have to go through the messages so please do use the lunch space to actually vote vocalize your opinions and maybe talk to the people who are writing the messages as well for that just one from my side because I’m the moderator and I can just to say that you know we’ve been covering a lot of different issues here I think that some of the things we’ve talked about show that European digital sovereignty is not about a legal form of digital sovereignty what we often think about in terms but it’s about mindsets it’s about thinking about sovereignty as a set of relations as well as a form of determinacy right self -determination in that sense i think there are a lot of other european values that we need to allocate to this um i would have loved to have had a broader discussion on those kinds of things but this discussion was happening in euridic previously will happen in euridic uh in the future and will be continue to be a part of the global internet governance discourses for a long time at least i hope so because i’ve a career on it um so but now i would like to pass the floor to paulo who’s going to read the messages and then we can have a fight over the food uh about whether we agree with them or not thanks paulo

Paulo Glowacki

yes thank you jamal um and thank you also to izan who worked with me in this effort so it’s not an individual effort but a collective effort we have four messages for you to reflect on this discussion um to briefly give you a rationale behind it in the first one it’s kind of an opening paragraph the second one is what digital sovereignty is for us the third one looks at what we need to achieve this and then the last one reflects a little bit on the meaning of digital sovereignty let me read them out to you so everybody gets an understanding first one eurodig recognizes that europe’s dependencies on external digital technologies and infrastructures have created strategic vulnerabilities including for democratic values Europe must shape and self -determine its human -centric digital future while maintaining internet openness, preserving choice of technologies and providers that adhere to open standards and interoperability, while remaining grounded in multi -stakeholder values and human rights.

Somewhat lengthy statement, but we wanted to reflect everything in there. Secondly, digital sovereignty is a cumulative transformative process that requires action by all stakeholders. This effort should consist of active industrial policies such as investment in and the development and scaling up of trusted European players in chips, semiconductors, cloud, AI, open data, supporting the maintenance of open source infrastructure, interoperability, and alignment of values. This should encourage innovation while retaining balanced regulatory approaches to key issues like procurement, competition, privacy, and cybersecurity. Lastly, digital sovereignty is a cumulative transformative process that requires action by all stakeholders. To achieve European digital sovereignty, we must take a holistic approach, bringing together national policy, multi -stakeholder efforts under a common European dimension to empower citizens, especially youth.

Further, the importance of cognitive sovereignty and ensuring that European residents are afforded the ability to have a digital public sphere should be encompassed by this topic. We note the Cannes Declaration on the Sovereignty of the Mind in this regard. And lastly, the last paragraph about meaning. Digital sovereignty should ultimately be interpreted to mean resilient openness and strategic autonomy, leveraging Europe’s strengths. Digital sovereignty should not mean isolation, stepping away from global digital cooperation, protectionism, or the creation of walls. That leads to fragmentation. You see, we have a fifth point, but we wanted to keep it brief and action -oriented. Thank you.

Jamal Shahin

Thank you very much. I would now open up the floor to ask if there are any violent, vicious, strong disagreements with that. Bear in mind that the conversation can continue for the next few days on the document. So if people have comments that they really would like to make right now, maybe we can just take note of who you are and what your comment is. I’m going to go in the order that I saw the hands being raised. Okay, so the gentleman there, Michiel at the front, then Giacomo at the back, and then yourself.

Alexander Pitch

Hello, everyone. Very quick. Alexander Pitch from the Internet Society, the Switzerland chapter. One aspect which has been totally absent in the discussion is the importance of analog solutions from the perspective of a cyber resilience point of view and a democratic point of view. We as democratic societies cannot force digitalization upon…

Jamal Shahin

Sorry, excuse me. The point that we have to do here is just do you have an agreement or a disagreement with the messages?

Alexander Pitch

It’s a severe missing point.

Jamal Shahin

Michiel? No? Yes.

Miguel Vidal

So the point I was making that when open source is seen as the thing that you need to maintain and you invest in champions, you’re doing it exactly the wrong way around. So you need to invest in the open source and then tolerate champions in that sense. Because if we’re doing ourselves short… So the prioritization of saying we need… We need to invest in lots of startups and those will save the day. No, it’s the commons that will save the day. So the relationship between champions and open source.

Jamal Shahin

Thank you. We’ll note and think about that. Jack, come at the back. Mike. No, I cannot hear you. Yes. Now, yes.

Giacomo Mazzone

Sorry. On point two, we are mentioning things that need to be promoted. And I think that the concept of trusted European platforms need to be included. Thank you.

Jamal Shahin

Okay. Thank you. Good. Wait until you read. There you go. Okay, thank you.

Audience

I’m Caroline from Germany, and I’m talking for the fact -checking community because we’re talking about open source, which is very much in our mind. But, Mr. Kruger, you were also talking about repositories, and especially when it comes to AI development, repositories are super important because we need data to develop tools. But what is important also from our perspective, we are often victim to scraping from a lot of different corners. And when we’re building repositories or when you’re incentivizing to build repositories, I would be very happy if there was also a sustainability model behind that.

Giacomo Mazzone

I cannot hear you. Yes. Now, yes. Sorry. On point two, we are mentioning things that need to be promoted, and I think that the concept of trusted European platforms need to be included. Thank you.

Jamal Shahin

Okay. Thank you. Good. Wait until you read. There you go. Okay. Thank you.

Audience

I’m Caroline from Germany, and I’m talking for the fact -checking community because we’re talking about open source, which is very much in our mind. But, Mr. Kruger, you were also talking about repositories, and especially when it comes to AI development, repositories are super important because we need data to develop tools. But what is important also from our perspective, we are often victim to scraping from a lot of different corners. And when we’re building repositories or when you’re incentivizing to build repositories, I would be very happy. I would be very happy if there was also a sustainability model behind that because the organizations that are feeding data into these repositories need to be funded to do their work and to generate the very data.

Jamal Shahin

Okay, thank you very much. We will see how we are able to integrate that into the messages that come out. I must say that I’m quite satisfied and very pleased with the way that these messages have come out. This is thanks to the contributions that have come from the panel, from you, and from the org team that organized this debate. Oh, we have, is that one hand or two? We have one more contribution. Belen Luna.

Belen Luna

I want to add also that when we are talking about digital sovereignty, for sure we need to be questioning what are the business models that we are supporting. Do we really want to have European big tech that is going to harvest our data, violate our privacy, and that is going to put the wrong principles and values in our society? And also I want to raise a very important point, is that we need to be very careful Okay. in this conversation because we are very, very close to far -right rhetoric. Thank you very much.

Jamal Shahin

Thank you so much. Right. The dialogue, as I said, will continue over lunch. the dialogue will continue over the next weeks and we look forward to continuing this i would like to say thank you to our panelists and thank you to everybody in the room for a constructive debate thanks a lot

Florence Ranson

thank you very much tamal and thank you all before we break for lunch somebody lost their bag at the party last night so if anybody saw a bag found the bag gave it to whoever was uh at the train world please let us know you can let me know you can let sandra know or any of our colleagues uh joan or nadia at the front desk here um that would be very helpful for that person now let’s break for lunch back here at two o ‘clock thank you

Related ResourcesKnowledge base sources related to the discussion topics (16)
Factual NotesClaims verified against the Diplo knowledge base (10)
Confirmedmedium

“European digital sovereignty has been a recurring topic across EuroDIG for many years, not just a new issue in this session.”

The knowledge base supports this characterization. EuroDIG materials from 2019 already discuss tensions around EU regulation, openness, governance models, and the need for cooperation in the digital ecosystem [S118]. A later EuroDIG session summary explicitly says use of the term ‘digital sovereignty’ is gaining ground and that the EU approach has been debated in terms of infrastructure, dependency, and openness [S98].

Confirmedhigh

“One core tension in the session was how to reconcile sovereignty with an open internet.”

This is directly corroborated by knowledge-base materials framing the issue as whether digital sovereignty and the open internet can coexist [S72] and [S122]. EuroDIG reporting also notes concern that the concept should be defined carefully ‘to avoid harming the development of the internet’ [S98].

Confirmedhigh

“The discussion aimed to bring more structure to a term that different people use in different ways.”

The knowledge base confirms that ‘digital sovereignty’ is used in multiple ways and with different intentions, and that defining the concept and its objectives is important [S98]. It also notes that the definition of sovereignty remains vague and is interpreted differently by EU member states [S126].

Confirmedhigh

“The current geopolitical moment has made the issue more urgent, especially around Europe’s role, dependencies, and ability to act.”

This is consistent with recent knowledge-base material describing a shift in EU digital diplomacy toward economic security, resilience, trusted suppliers, dual-use technologies, and infrastructure security [S89]. Another source links EU digital policy coherence to sovereignty, resilience, and Europe’s strategic capacity to act [S121].

Additional Contextmedium

“War, geopolitical tensions, and the ‘weaponization of dependencies’ have made the debate unavoidable.”

While the exact phrase is not reproduced, the knowledge base provides strong context for this framing: recent EU digital strategy discussions emphasise economic and supply-chain security, trusted suppliers, resilience, and defence-linked technologies [S89]. Broader geopolitical commentary in the knowledge base also reflects Europe’s concern with strategic autonomy and dependency in a changing international environment [S123].

Confirmedhigh

“Europe is dangerously dependent on non-European digital technologies across the stack, from cloud to AI to platforms.”

The knowledge base supports the broader factual premise of heavy dependency. It notes that most online services and major cloud/platform ecosystems are dominated by US firms, and that big tech increasingly controls infrastructure, services, data centres, and AI models [S74]. EuroDIG reporting likewise says the EU approach to digital sovereignty seeks to decrease reliance on third-country suppliers and fill technological infrastructure gaps [S98].

Additional Contextmedium

“These dependencies are no longer just about growth or convenience, but affect democracy, values, and institutions.”

The knowledge base adds important nuance by showing that EU debates on digital sovereignty and digital foreign policy are often tied to fundamental values, self-determination, rights protection, and concerns about the social and political influence of non-EU technology companies [S121] and [S98].

Confirmedhigh

“European digital sovereignty was defined in democratic and human-centric terms.”

This aligns with the knowledge base, which describes the EU approach as developing a ‘human-centric digital policy’ rather than treating sovereignty as an end in itself [S126]. EuroDIG reporting also says one EU concern is protecting the integrity of European rules and fundamental values in the face of non-EU tech influence [S98].

Confirmedhigh

“The goal is not autarky, but managing interdependence through cooperation with trusted partner countries.”

The knowledge base strongly supports this. It explicitly raises the tension between digital sovereignty and digital interdependence in EU policy [S121], and states that the European approach should decrease reliance on third-country suppliers while building strategic partnerships, including with foreign players [S98]. Recent EU strategy summaries also stress trusted suppliers and international cooperation [S89].

Additional Contextmedium

“A key practical meaning of sovereignty is ‘choice’ for citizens and businesses, including where to keep data, which providers to use, and the ability to switch through portability.”

The knowledge base does not quote this exact formulation, but it provides supporting context. It identifies informational self-determination and ownership over personal data as important EU objectives [S121], and notes that the DMA/DSA aim to increase consumer choice and competition in digital markets [S129]. This supports the broader framing of sovereignty as enabling meaningful user and business choice.

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DC-3 & DC-DDHT: Cybersecurity in Community Networks and digital health technologies: Securing the Commons — Luca Belli: Thank you for this talent. Now, I think I’m mindful of time and we still have 40 minutes and we have now t…
S38
Communications and competition law: Key issues in the telecoms, media and technology sectors — Mr. Moura holds a BA degree in Economics and an MBA from COPPEAD – Rio de Janeiro Federal University. Prior to joining T…
S39
Network Session: Digital Sovereignty and Global Cooperation | IGF 2023 Networking Session #170 — It was noted that power distribution in a dictatorship may be more top-down, with a strong central authority controlling…
S40
Jamalul Izza — Jamalul Izza
S41
Day 0 Event #174 Giganet Annual Academic Symposium – Afternoon session — My question is relatively short, I was wondering when listening to your presentation whether your definition of enforcea…
S42
Florence N Bangalie — Florence N Bangalie
S43
Work for a brighter future — Professor General for Human Resources and Social Policy Chung has also served as Member of the UN …
S44
BREAK OUT ROOM 2: The Declaration for the Future of the Internet: Principles to Action — Catherine Townsend Speech speed 176 words per minute …
S45
Peter A. G. van Bergeijk — Peter A. G. van Bergeijk
S46
Peter van Ham — Peter van Ham
S47
Peter M. Haas — Peter M. Haas
S48
Valentin Katrandjiev — Valentin Katrandjiev
S49
Valeriu Nicolae — Mr Valeriu Nicolae is a human rights activist and communications trainer with extensive experience in Europe and worldwi…
S50
Ilona Stadnik — Ilona Stadnik PhD candidate, St Petersburg State University https://dig.watch/wp-content/uploads/Ilona-Stadnik.jpg Ms Il…
S52
Bojana Kovač — https://diplo-media.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/2024/03/Bojana_Kovac-1.jpg Ms Bojana Kovač holds an LLM in Public Inte…
S53
Teodora Marković — https://diplo-media.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/2023/02/Teodora-Markovic-1.jpg Ms Teodora Marković is an assistant for…
S54
Miguel Candia Ibarra — Miguel Candia Ibarra
S55
[Online Event] Cables, Novels and Nobels: The Journey of Diplomacy and Literature  — And OK, maybe I should explain why I would choose Octavio Paz and Yorgos Seferis as the ones that I felt closer for my p…
S56
Radical Imaginings-Fellowships for NextGen digital activists | IGF 2023 Networking Session #80 — Necessity of skill development like project management and grant application in youth programmes. Furthermore, the analy…
S57
Maria Belovas — Maria Belovas
S58
Isabella Bassani — https://diplo-media.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/2023/09/Isabella-Bassani.jpeg Ms Isabella Bassani is a Law and Technol…
S59
Luca Belli — Luca Belli is a professor at FGV Law School, head of the Center for Technology and Society at FGV, and director of Cyber…
S60
Radical Imaginings-Fellowships for NextGen digital activists | IGF 2023 Networking Session #80 — Necessity of skill development like project management and grant application in youth programmes. Furthermore, the analy…
S61
Work for a brighter future — Professor General for Human Resources and Social Policy Chung has also served as Member of the UN …
S62
Policy Network on Meaningful Access: Meaningful access to include and connect | IGF 2023 — Vint Cerf, a member of the Panel for a New Multilingualism in the Americas (PNMA), highlighted the importance of these t…
S63
Pierre Pahlavi — Pierre Pahlavi
S64
Pavlina Ittelson — https://diplo-media.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/Itlelson-Pavlina_square.jpg Ms Pavlina Ittelson joined Diplo in …
S65
Encieh Erfani — Encieh Erfani is an Assistant Professor of Physics in Iran. She obtained her PhD from Germany in 2012. She is a Junior A…
S66
Fabian Lucchi — Fabian Lucchi
S67
Isabella Bassani — https://diplo-media.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/2023/09/Isabella-Bassani.jpeg Ms Isabella Bassani is a Law and Technol…
S68
Digital Cooperation and Empowerment: Insights and Best Practices for Strengthening Multistakeholder and Inclusive Participation — Differences Different viewpoints Scope and approach to capacity building Speakers – Amrita Choudhury- Yu Ping Chan…
S69
The Declaration for the Future of the Internet: Principles to Action — Anna Neves Speech speed 132 words per minute …
S70
Anna P. Schreiber — Anna P. Schreiber
S71
NRIs Coordination Session | IGF 2023 — So just for the record, my name is Anya Gengo. I work at the IGF Secretariat, and one of my core responsibilities is to …
S72
Digital sovereignty: The end of the open internet as we know it? (Part 1) — In the context of an offensive and chauvinist turn in US policy, the popular magazine The Economist suggested a range of…
S73
EspriTech de Genève: Nexus between technology and humanity — Sallie McFague and an ecotheological response to artificial intelligence. The Ecumenical Review, 72(2), 183–196. doi:10….
S74
Digital sovereignty stack: Infrastructure, services, data, and AI knowledge — However, the less national governments have authority over the digital realm, the more digital sovereignty shifts to tec…
S75
EC proposes Chips Act to strengthen EU’s tech sovereignty — The EC has proposed a package of measures under the umbrella term ‘European Chips Act’ ‘to ensure the EU’s security of s…
S76
IPR regime: a barrier to innovation? — She mentioned the African Declaration on Internet Rights and Freedom that emerged as a result of a convergence of variou…
S77
The strategic imperative of open source AI — 1995: TCP/IP emerges as the de facto global standard, having won the “Protocol Wars” through widespread, bottom-up adopt…
S78
Digital sovereignty: From users’ empowerment to technological leadership — Moderated by Mr Olivier Bringer (Head of Unit, Next Generation Internet, Directorate-General for Communications Networks…
S79
 Network Evolution: Challenges and Solutions  — The sector’s path forward relies on strategic financial and policy planning, underscored by interventions and recommenda…
S80
ccTLD registries in the battle over the Internet: from ‘putting to sleep’ to ‘waking up’ — From the CENTR meeting, Brussels, 4 October 2012 The 48th General Assembly of CENTR, the European association of ccTLD r…
S81
Main Topic 3: Europe at the Crossroads: Digital and Cyber Strategy 2030 — So one of the issues we have currently is that we have too many of my colleagues from T-Security spend too much of their…
S82
Searching for a European model for net neutrality — In between the two “Dutch extremes” Europe is a leader when it comes to debating about net neutrality and proposing ways…
S83
What aspects of the Internet can be considered global public resources? — Report from the second panel of the conference The Internet as a Global Public Resource (29‒30 April 2015), which tackle…
S84
Procuring modern security standards by governments&industry | IGF 2023 Open Forum #57 — They actively encourage other governments to embrace these standards for procurement and promote global collaboration. A…
S85
Can free choice hurt open Internet markets? — Regulation by states, or self-regulation by companies themselves? There is almost no field of Internet governance that d…
S86
Gmail accounts at risk as attacks rise — Google has urged Gmail users to upgrade their account security after revealing that over 60% have been targeted by cyber…
S87
Workshop 2: The Interplay Between Digital Sovereignty and Development — Speakers – Sofie Schönborn- Karen Mulberry Arguments Digital sovereignty requires balancing openness with security and …
S88
Day 0 Event #270 Everything in the Cloud How to Remain Digital Autonomous — This dependency raises concerns about national security and the ability to protect critical information. Evidence Re…
S89
EU Digital Diplomacy: Geopolitical shift from focus on values to economic security  — This signals a shift in the EU’s approach to ‘regulatory diplomacy,’ reflecting a broader reassessment of its approach t…
S90
German Strategy for International Digital Policy — At the same time, we protect intellectual property and trade secrets as the foundations of our prosperity. We also take …
S91
New Germany’s digital foreign policy strategy: Between continuity and change — Digital is a strategic priority for Germany. It is the key message of Germany’s Strategy for International Digital Forei…
S92
German Strategy for International Digital Policy — Different national regulations can present obstacles to cross-border data flows. The Federal Government therefore advoca…
S93
Creating digital public infrastructure that empowers people | IGF 2023 Open Forum #168 — It highlights the importance of the DPI mindset, learning from past experiences, mitigating harm and exclusion, involvin…
S94
Digital sovereignty: The end of the open internet as we know it? (Part 1) — In the context of an offensive and chauvinist turn in US policy, the popular magazine The Economist suggested a range of…
S95
Workshop 2: The Interplay Between Digital Sovereignty and Development — Differences Different viewpoints Approach to international partnerships and dependencies Speakers – Constantinos B…
S96
Europe’s rush to innovate — Most scientific or innovative products require experiments, and the majority of them fail. The US and some Asian countri…
S97
UN 2.0 | Our Common Agenda | Policy Brief 11 — Using hydroponics to grow food in order to improve food security where fertile soil is scarce. WHY WE NEED TO SHIF…
S98
Digital sovereignty – is Europe going in the right direction to keep Internet infrastructure secure and open? — The session discussed the different ways in which ‘digital sovereignty’ has been embodied by governments and the intenti…
S99
The EU on Internet governance: Strong on description – Weak on prescription — Last week,  the EC Communication on Internet Policy and Governance brought the long awaited EU approach to Internet gove…
S101
The new European toolbox for cybersecurity regulation — Yeah, what were like the basic methods used in those regulations, like to give you like a very brief and high-level over…
S102
[Panel Discussion] Policy in a Decentralised World: Building Digital Resilience — Bowman also noted differences in risk appetite between Europe and America when building advanced technologies. The Swi…
S103
USA tech diplomacy and the San Francisco Bay Area — In 2020, UN member states recognised the importance of technology as a fundamental global issue and pledged to improve d…
S104
EU Digital Diplomacy: Geopolitical shift from focus on values to economic security  — This signals a shift in the EU’s approach to ‘regulatory diplomacy,’ reflecting a broader reassessment of its approach t…
S105
Digital sovereignty: The end of the open internet as we know it? (Part 1) — In the context of an offensive and chauvinist turn in US policy, the popular magazine The Economist suggested a range of…
S106
Workshop 2: The Interplay Between Digital Sovereignty and Development — Speakers – Sofie Schönborn- Karen Mulberry Arguments Digital sovereignty requires balancing openness with security and …
S107
Digital sovereignty – is Europe going in the right direction to keep Internet infrastructure secure and open? — The session discussed the different ways in which ‘digital sovereignty’ has been embodied by governments and the intenti…
S108
Digital sovereignty stack: Infrastructure, services, data, and AI knowledge — However, the less national governments have authority over the digital realm, the more digital sovereignty shifts to tec…
S109
Day 0 Event #270 Everything in the Cloud How to Remain Digital Autonomous — This dependency raises concerns about national security and the ability to protect critical information. Evidence Re…
S110
Main Topic 3: Europe at the Crossroads: Digital and Cyber Strategy 2030 — He characterized Europe’s position in global technology as: “Usually we say that, or we were saying until recently, that…
S111
EU Digital Diplomacy: Geopolitical shift from focus on values to economic security  — Table 1: Key shifts in EU digital diplomacy (2023 vs. 2025) Criterion2023 Conclusions 2025 Strategy Primary focusValue…
S112
Better governance for fairer digital markets: unlocking the innovation potential and leveling the playing field (UNCTAD) — This positive sentiment implies that adherence to data protection regulations is crucial for safeguarding user data and …
S113
German Strategy for International Digital Policy — At the same time, we protect intellectual property and trade secrets as the foundations of our prosperity. We also take …
S114
German Strategy for International Digital Policy — Different national regulations can present obstacles to cross-border data flows. The Federal Government therefore advoca…
S115
The Pact for the Future (Final text) — Digital public goods and digital public infrastructure 14. We recognize that digital public goods, which include open-…
S116
Creating digital public infrastructure that empowers people | IGF 2023 Open Forum #168 — It highlights the importance of the DPI mindset, learning from past experiences, mitigating harm and exclusion, involvin…
S117
German state pushes digital sovereignty — The northern German state of Schleswig-Holstein is pushing ahead with an ambitious plan to replace Microsoft software in…
S118
EuroDIG 2019: Highlights from The Hague — The challenges in the digital sphere are met with a multitude of calls for action and declarations worldwide. In this sp…
S119
Europe’s role in shaping the future of the Internet — The European Commission is undoubtedly a very active player in the Internet governance (IG) process. One of the most rec…
S120
WS #75 An Open and Democratic Internet in the Digitization Era WS #75 An Open and Democratic Internet in the Digitization Era Session …
S121
[WebDebate #46 summary] Unpacking the EU’s digital diplomacy and foreign policy — Foreign policies have for many years served as countries’ compass in their relations with each other. With the fast digi…
S122
Digital Sovereignty and the open internet: Can they coexist? — The Internet Governance Project (IGP) in collaboration with the Quello Center will gather scholars of differing views to…
S123
US-EU-China Triangle — Jamil Edmond Anderlini: Certainly many people in Europe, including the President of France, agree with you. This is t…
S124
Europe’s bold strategies to reclaim geopolitical influence amidst declining role — The article explores Europe’s diminishing geopolitical influence amid the second Trump administration, proposing three b…
S125
Hedgehog Diplomacy — Hedgehog diplomacy is used to describe New Zealand’s diplomacy in an increasingly militarised world. New Zealand is gene…
S126
The European vision of digital sovereignty: From principles to action — Second, significant geographical limitations are apparent in the state of the internet infrastructure across EU member s…
S127
10 points for the EU’s future digital policy — But, at the same time, he makes a strong and clear request to the USA that European data must be protected in accordance…
S128
A digital rEUnion for Europe — A European rEUnion is the concept under which Malta’s EU presidency took off on January 1. The smallest EU country will …
S129
Digital services regulation: opportunities and challenges — The Digital Services Package is an initiative that seeks to establish a single set of rules regarding the digital provis…
S130
WS #152 a Competition Rights Approach to Digital Markets — But still, I think today it’s not enough. and as long as the model will be relying on advertising, it will be very compl…
Speakers Analysis
Detailed breakdown of each speaker’s arguments and positions
F
Fabrizia Benini
5 arguments136 words per minute1854 words813 seconds
Argument 1
Digital sovereignty as democratic self-determination and choice, not just technology control (Fabrizia Benini)
EXPLANATION
Benini argues that European digital sovereignty is fundamentally about democratic self-determination and preserving the ability of citizens and businesses to choose providers, data locations, and digital tools. In her framing, sovereignty is not merely technical control over infrastructure; it is tied to democracy, values, and human-centric digital transformation.
EVIDENCE
She says Europe’s dependencies are not only economic but affect democracies and values, and even frames the issue as one of democratic survival [67-72]. She then defines Europe’s mission in one word-“choice”-explaining that citizens and businesses should be able to decide where data is kept, which provider they use, and be able to switch through portability, linking this directly to self-determination and a human-centric approach [89-91].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is supported by discussion of digital self-determination and the right of choice as central to human dignity and digital governance in [S73]. Related EuroDIG reporting also frames EU digital sovereignty around end-user empowerment, control, trust, and citizens’ capacity to shape the digital society [S78].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 1: Meaning and framing of European digital sovereignty
AGREED WITH
Peter Janssen, Francesco Vecchi, Eric Pol, Belen Luna, Paulo Glowacki, Jamal Shahin
DISAGREED WITH
Anna Neves, Francesco Vecchi, Pari Esfandiari, Paulo Glowacki, Vittorio Bertola, Belen Luna
Argument 2
Europe’s strategic vulnerability comes from long-built dependencies across cloud, AI, platforms, and chips; regulation gives long-term direction but must be backed by instruments like the Sovereign Tech Package (Fabrizia Benini)
EXPLANATION
Benini argues that Europe’s current vulnerability is the result of accumulated dependence on non-European digital technologies across the full stack. She sees regulation as necessary because it provides a long-term path, but insists that practical instruments and industrial measures are also required to reduce those dependencies.
EVIDENCE
She identifies dependencies across cloud infrastructure, AI models, and platforms, explaining that these did not emerge overnight but resulted from years of choosing to buy rather than build, leaving Europe strategically vulnerable [57-67]. She also describes the rulebook as a strategic asset that gives continuity over time [92-99], and points to the upcoming Sovereign Tech Package, including a CHIPS Act, a Cloud and AI Development Act, and an open source strategy, as concrete instruments to support sovereignty in practice [101-106].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External sources reinforce the diagnosis of dependence on foreign cloud, platforms, and AI providers, noting that most states cannot achieve full-stack sovereignty and must manage interdependence with dominant tech firms [S74]. They also support the need for concrete industrial instruments beyond regulation, including the European Chips Act and large-scale investment in semiconductor capacity and resilience [S75].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 2: Regulation versus investment, industrial policy, and implementation
AGREED WITH
Frank Kruger, Giacomo Mazzone, Denis Nazarenko, Joao Gomes, Catalin Marinescu, Vittorio Bertola, Paulo Glowacki, Lea Rovcanin
DISAGREED WITH
Frank Kruger, Joao Gomes, Giacomo Mazzone, Arnaud Wittersheim, Catalin Marinescu
Argument 3
Europe seeks digital sovereignty while remaining committed to an open, global, secure internet and to managing interdependencies with trusted partners (Fabrizia Benini)
EXPLANATION
Benini stresses that Europe’s pursuit of digital sovereignty is not meant to close Europe off from the world. Instead, she argues for managing interdependencies through cooperation with trusted partners while preserving commitment to an open, global, and secure internet.
EVIDENCE
She explicitly asks how Europe can achieve sovereignty while remaining open, reaffirming Europe’s long-standing commitment to an open global secure Internet [81-83]. She answers that this requires the management of interdependencies and continued partnership with trusted countries that share Europe’s human-centric digital values [84-88].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is echoed by sources stressing that sovereignty is a delicate balancing act because countries remain dependent on global digital networks and interdependence [S74]. The Chips Act context also explicitly includes partnerships with like-minded countries to secure supply continuity, showing sovereignty pursued through trusted cooperation rather than isolation [S75].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 3: Open internet, interoperability, and avoiding fragmentation
AGREED WITH
Frank Kruger, Valentina Stadnic, Pari Esfandiari, Elonnai Hickok, Paulo Glowacki
DISAGREED WITH
Paulo Glowacki, Elonnai Hickok, Valentina Stadnic, Vittorio Bertola
Argument 4
Europe has strong research and developer communities; the open source strategy is a major asset but innovation must scale (Fabrizia Benini)
EXPLANATION
Benini presents Europe as having the talent and community base needed for greater digital sovereignty, especially in research and open source development. However, she argues that innovation alone is insufficient unless Europe can scale what it already has.
EVIDENCE
She highlights Europe’s strong capacities in research, thinking, and technical development [100], and says Europe has a vibrant open source developer community whose work is largely aligned with European digital values [106-113]. She closes by saying plainly that innovation is not enough and that what Europe now needs is to scale up, since it already has the talent and raw materials [114].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 4: Open source, digital commons, and European innovation capacity
AGREED WITH
Frank Kruger, Joao Gomes, Catalin Marinescu, Paulo Glowacki, Peter Janssen
DISAGREED WITH
Frank Kruger, Giacomo Mazzone, Miguel Vidal, Francesco Vecchi
Argument 5
Dependencies now threaten democracies and values, so digital sovereignty is also about democratic survival (Fabrizia Benini)
EXPLANATION
Benini argues that digital dependence has become more than an economic issue and now poses direct risks to democracy and core societal values. In her view, digital sovereignty is necessary because digital vulnerabilities can be weaponized in ways that threaten the survival of democratic systems.
EVIDENCE
She connects the topic to geopolitical tensions, war, and the weaponization of physical and digital dependencies [49-51]. She then states that strategic vulnerability affects every aspect of life, not just the economy, and explicitly says digital sovereignty is now a matter of the survival of democracies, pointing to recent political campaigns as evidence of this firsthand experience [67-72].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External analysis notes that digital value chains can be weaponised in geopolitical conflict, making dependencies politically coercive rather than merely economic [S72]. It also distinguishes threats to classic state sovereignty through information operations and extraterritorial pressure, showing how digital dependence can affect democratic systems and governance directly [S72].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 5: Citizens, awareness, democracy, and public interest
AGREED WITH
Paulo Glowacki, Joao Gomes, Denis Nazarenko, Lea Rovcanin, Vincent Tadday
P
Peter Janssen
5 arguments170 words per minute1273 words447 seconds
Argument 1
Digital sovereignty means user choice and control over digital identity through European domain infrastructure (.eu) (Peter Janssen)
EXPLANATION
Janssen frames digital sovereignty as the ability of users to exercise real choice and control over their digital identity, particularly through ownership of a domain name. He argues that .eu domains provide a practical way for individuals and organizations to control naming, email identity, hosting, and provider selection within a European context.
EVIDENCE
He says that for EURid, digital sovereignty is about “choice and control” [124], and explains that a .eu domain lets users choose their website name and the full structure of their email address, including what comes after the @ sign, rather than being tied to an ISP or large foreign provider [126-134]. He adds that domain ownership enables control over hosting, privacy-conscious provider choice, self-hosting if desired, and the ability to move providers if a prior choice proves wrong [135-145].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This aligns with wider discussion of digital sovereignty as end-user empowerment and control [S78], and with broader arguments that digital self-determination is grounded in the right of choice in personal and economic life [S73]. Domain registries are also described as institutions whose technical and policy decisions directly affect end-user experience, branding, resilience, and the digital environment [S80].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 1: Meaning and framing of European digital sovereignty
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Francesco Vecchi, Eric Pol, Belen Luna, Paulo Glowacki, Jamal Shahin
Argument 2
Registry infrastructure should be physically and institutionally European, while infrastructure choices should remain open and interchangeable (Peter Janssen)
EXPLANATION
Janssen argues that digital sovereignty requires core infrastructure to be located in Europe and controlled by European entities, especially for critical services like the .eu namespace. At the same time, he emphasizes that infrastructure choices should remain flexible, standards-based, and interchangeable rather than locked in.
EVIDENCE
He notes that from the beginning the European Commission insisted that the .eu infrastructure should be on European soil and controlled by a wholly European entity, explaining that EURid is a Belgian organization managing .eu under contract with the Commission and that the core services are hosted within European infrastructure [150-155]. He then says EURid continuously evaluates hardware and software choices with attention to cost, alternatives, and risk, and seeks adherence to open standards and interchangeability across the infrastructure stack [156-161].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External reporting supports the importance of managing critical internet infrastructure within European capacity and jurisdiction, including the need for countries to manage critical parts of internet infrastructure themselves [S78]. At the same time, technical reporting stresses that internet infrastructure depends on modularity, decentralisation, and interoperability through shared standards rather than rigidly closed architectures [S79].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 2: Regulation versus investment, industrial policy, and implementation
Argument 3
Infrastructure should adhere to open standards and be designed for portability and provider choice (Peter Janssen)
EXPLANATION
Janssen argues that sovereignty should not result in rigid lock-in but in systems built on open standards, portability, and real provider choice. He sees interoperability and the ability to switch providers as central to user control and long-term resilience.
EVIDENCE
He explains that a user-owned domain can move with the user and remain independent of earlier technical decisions, allowing people to leave a provider if they made the wrong choice [143-145]. He also says EURid’s infrastructure journey is about making every layer adhere to open standards and remain interchangeable rather than forcing an immediate and absolute model of sovereignty [158-161].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is strongly corroborated by evidence that open standards improve interoperability, security, accessibility, and vendor neutrality in government IT and procurement [S84]. Technical reporting on internet architecture likewise emphasises decentralisation, modularity, and interoperability based on shared standards [S79].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 3: Open internet, interoperability, and avoiding fragmentation
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Francesco Vecchi, Valentina Stadnic, Elonnai Hickok, Miguel Vidal, Audience, Paulo Glowacki
Argument 4
Open standards and interchangeable infrastructure are part of a long-term journey toward more sovereign digital systems (Peter Janssen)
EXPLANATION
Janssen presents sovereignty as an incremental process rather than a fixed status that can be achieved instantly. He argues that building more sovereign digital systems means steadily reducing risks and increasing interoperability over time.
EVIDENCE
He says that EURid is continuously evaluating all parts of its hardware and software stack and that the objective is a journey in which all elements become standards-based and interchangeable [156-161]. He explicitly says the goal is not to be “fully European sovereign” immediately, but to move in a controlled way toward where Europe wants and needs to go [160-161].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 4: Open source, digital commons, and European innovation capacity
Argument 5
Users need awareness of the consequences of convenience choices like Gmail; lack of awareness reinforces dependency (Peter Janssen)
EXPLANATION
Janssen argues that one of the biggest barriers to digital sovereignty is user preference for convenient mainstream services without understanding the trade-offs. He believes awareness of the consequences of such convenience-based decisions is crucial if Europe wants people to make more sovereign digital choices.
EVIDENCE
In his response, he says awareness-or the lack of it-is a key issue and uses Gmail as an example of a convenient, free, and ubiquitous service that people choose because it is easy [480-487]. He illustrates this with a personal example about his daughter, who prefers Gmail and WhatsApp because everyone uses them, even though he set up a fully European email solution for her; he concludes that Europe must do better at showing the consequences of choosing the easy option [489-495].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External sources directly support the point that user choice is often not truly informed because digital services are complex and require time, literacy, and awareness to evaluate properly [S82] [S85]. Additional context comes from reporting that Gmail users face significant security risks and often rely on weak practices, showing how convenience can coexist with dependency and vulnerability [S86].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 5: Citizens, awareness, democracy, and public interest
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Joao Gomes, Catalin Marinescu, Paulo Glowacki
DISAGREED WITH
Eric Pol
F
Frank Kruger
5 arguments132 words per minute641 words289 seconds
Argument 1
Digital sovereignty is a direction tied to democracy, investment, and openness rather than an end-state (Frank Kruger)
EXPLANATION
Kruger argues that digital sovereignty should be understood as an ongoing direction of travel rather than a final destination Europe will simply reach one day. In his view, it combines democratic values, investment, and openness, and cannot be achieved either through regulation alone or through isolated national action.
EVIDENCE
He says directly that digital sovereignty is not the final destination but a direction, and describes it as a question of democracy, investment, and openness all at once [184-186]. He also states that Europe will not get there with regulation alone or by going it alone, but can get there together with partners around the world [187-188].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is closely matched by the view that sovereignty for most countries is not a final destination but a dynamic equilibrium to be maintained amid external interdependence and internal reliance on foreign platforms [S74].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 1: Meaning and framing of European digital sovereignty
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Valentina Stadnic, Pari Esfandiari, Elonnai Hickok, Paulo Glowacki
Argument 2
Regulation alone is insufficient; Europe needs open standards, trusted infrastructure, support for open source, and practical instruments like the sovereign tech agency and DC EDIC (Frank Kruger)
EXPLANATION
Kruger argues that Europe must complement its regulatory efforts with practical support for digital infrastructure and open source maintenance. He highlights institutional tools that can strengthen Europe’s resilience, innovation, and long-term technological capacity.
EVIDENCE
He says open standards, trusted infrastructure, and collaborative innovation are essential to Europe’s long-term resilience [166-167]. He points to Germany’s sovereign tech agency as a practical instrument that maintains key open source components [169-171], and describes the European Digital Infrastructure Consortium (DC EDIC) as a framework that can support strategic digital commons, open source infrastructure, coordination, maintenance, and scaling at the European level [176-183].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External material supports the broader claim that regulation must be complemented by infrastructure building, open standards, and investment. Open standards are described as crucial for interoperability, security, and vendor neutrality in public systems [S84], while EU industrial initiatives such as the Chips Act show the use of practical instruments beyond regulation [S75].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 2: Regulation versus investment, industrial policy, and implementation
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Giacomo Mazzone, Denis Nazarenko, Joao Gomes, Catalin Marinescu, Vittorio Bertola, Paulo Glowacki, Lea Rovcanin
DISAGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Joao Gomes, Giacomo Mazzone, Arnaud Wittersheim, Catalin Marinescu
Argument 3
Strengthening open source and digital commons can improve resilience globally, not only within Europe (Frank Kruger)
EXPLANATION
Kruger argues that support for open source and digital commons should not be understood as a narrow European project. He presents these efforts as strengthening the global digital infrastructure and making systems more resilient worldwide.
EVIDENCE
He notes that open internet infrastructure is built and maintained by contributors from around the world, often on a voluntary basis [167-169]. He adds that by strengthening essential elements of global digital infrastructure, Germany aims to improve security and resilience not only for Germany and Europe but globally, and says that open source and digital commons are key building blocks of European sovereignty and resilience [172-175].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is supported by arguments that open-source paradigms deliver interoperability, resilience, and innovation at scale beyond any one jurisdiction, with open-source AI framed as strategically superior because of its distributed improvement and integration advantages [S77]. Broader open-source discussions also stress its role in innovation and sustainable value creation [S76].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 3: Open internet, interoperability, and avoiding fragmentation
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Peter Janssen, Francesco Vecchi, Valentina Stadnic, Elonnai Hickok, Miguel Vidal, Audience, Paulo Glowacki
Argument 4
Germany’s sovereign tech agency supports the maintainers of critical open source components, and this model should scale through European frameworks (Frank Kruger)
EXPLANATION
Kruger emphasizes that open source sovereignty depends on supporting the people who maintain critical code, not just talking about open source abstractly. He argues that Germany’s sovereign tech agency offers an operational model that should be expanded through European mechanisms like DC EDIC.
EVIDENCE
He says Germany supports the people behind the code and identifies the sovereign tech agency as the instrument for doing so [169-170]. He explains that the agency maintains key open source components underpinning security, stability, competitiveness, and innovation [171], and says its practical experience can scale to the European level through synergies with DC EDIC [180-183].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 4: Open source, digital commons, and European innovation capacity
Argument 5
Europe needs to scale its startups and research talent into competitive continental providers rather than losing them to foreign capital (Frank Kruger)
EXPLANATION
Kruger argues that Europe already has the talent and research strength to produce digital innovation, but struggles to scale promising ideas into large competitive providers. He sees this failure to scale as a structural weakness that leaves Europe dependent on external investors and firms.
EVIDENCE
He says Europe has many young talents, a strong research landscape, and innovative people across universities and countries [497-503]. He then identifies scaling as the missing piece, noting that once businesses need billions to grow, American investors often step in, and argues Europe must strengthen efforts so startups can become competitive European providers rather than merely national ones [501-505].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is consistent with external calls for Europe to move from user empowerment to technological leadership and ensure it has the knowledge, capacity, competences, and software strength needed for full participation in the digital economy [S78].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 4: Open source, digital commons, and European innovation capacity
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Joao Gomes, Catalin Marinescu, Paulo Glowacki, Peter Janssen
DISAGREED WITH
Giacomo Mazzone, Belen Luna, Francesco Vecchi
A
Anna Neves
1 argument132 words per minute294 words133 seconds
Argument 1
The term “sovereignty” is too strong; “strategic autonomy” better fits an open Europe (Anna Neves)
EXPLANATION
Neves argues that “digital sovereignty” is conceptually too strong and carries nation-state implications that do not fit Europe’s open and cooperative identity. She prefers “strategic autonomy,” which she sees as better reflecting Europe’s need for control and capacity without implying separation from others.
EVIDENCE
She says that in 2003 it would have been impossible to imagine such a session and describes the current need to discuss sovereignty as strange and regrettable [216]. She explicitly says she does not like the term, prefers “strategic autonomy,” and explains that for Portuguese speakers sovereignty is tied to nationhood, flags, and what makes a nation, making it a poor fit for an open Europe [216-223].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External analysis provides a relevant counterpoint and context by noting that EU discourse has increasingly shifted from individual digital sovereignty toward the defence-inflected language of ‘strategic autonomy’ focused on vulnerabilities and dependencies [S72]. The same source also warns that sovereignty language can be appropriated by securitising state agendas, which helps explain resistance to the term [S72].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 1: Meaning and framing of European digital sovereignty
DISAGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Francesco Vecchi, Pari Esfandiari, Paulo Glowacki, Vittorio Bertola, Belen Luna
F
Francesco Vecchi
3 arguments161 words per minute272 words101 seconds
Argument 1
Digital autonomy should include cognitive autonomy and protection from manipulative algorithms through a European digital public sphere (Francesco Vecchi)
EXPLANATION
Vecchi argues that digital autonomy is not just about technology or industrial capacity but also about citizens’ mental and civic autonomy. He believes Europe should build a digital public sphere that protects people from manipulation, strengthens democratic agency, and serves the public interest.
EVIDENCE
He says digital autonomy is not about isolation but about identifying Europe’s strengths, especially democracy [233-236]. He adds that autonomy is not only technological but cognitive, and says true autonomy means protecting citizens from manipulative algorithms, ensuring digital spaces serve the public interest, and creating a European digital public sphere that empowers citizens and fosters civic agency [237-243].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is supported by discussion of how digitalisation and AI-based recommendation systems can limit human choice and decision-making autonomy, including UNESCO’s warning about the sociological and psychological effects of such systems [S73]. The same source also notes shrinking civic space, platform-driven bubbles, and the need for free, neutral discussion spaces, which enriches the idea of a European digital public sphere [S73].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 1: Meaning and framing of European digital sovereignty
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Peter Janssen, Eric Pol, Belen Luna, Paulo Glowacki, Jamal Shahin
DISAGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Anna Neves, Pari Esfandiari, Paulo Glowacki, Vittorio Bertola, Belen Luna
Argument 2
Open source, free software, and interoperable platforms like the Fediverse already offer democratic, non-extractive alternatives to big tech (Francesco Vecchi)
EXPLANATION
Vecchi argues that Europe does not need to start from zero because non-extractive digital alternatives already exist. He presents open source, free software, and interoperable platforms as practical democratic tools that public authorities should actively adopt.
EVIDENCE
He explicitly mentions non-extractive alternatives to big tech, including open source, free software, and interoperable platforms such as the Fediverse, and calls on public authorities to use them [241]. He further argues that Europe’s future should be built on open, resilient, and fair digital ecosystems as the foundation of a citizen-centered digital future [242-243].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External sources support the importance of open source as a stronger foundation for digital infrastructure and applications [S73]. They also describe free software and open-source ecosystems as proven bases for innovation, sustainable business, interoperability, and resilience at scale [S76] [S77].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 4: Open source, digital commons, and European innovation capacity
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Peter Janssen, Valentina Stadnic, Elonnai Hickok, Miguel Vidal, Audience, Paulo Glowacki
DISAGREED WITH
Frank Kruger, Giacomo Mazzone, Belen Luna
Argument 3
Digital autonomy is cognitive as well as technical, requiring safeguards against manipulation and support for democratic civic agency (Francesco Vecchi)
EXPLANATION
Vecchi expands the idea of autonomy beyond technical systems to include the ability of citizens to think and act freely in digital environments. He argues that autonomy requires reducing manipulative design and building institutions and spaces that support civic participation and democratic agency.
EVIDENCE
He says explicitly that autonomy is also cognitive and notes that too little attention has been paid to this dimension [237-238]. He links this to protection from manipulative algorithms and the need for a European digital public sphere that empowers citizens and fosters civic agency [239-240].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is corroborated by analysis of how AI optimisation, filtering, and recommendation systems can constrain autonomy and shape choices, as well as by concerns about civic discourse being narrowed by platform bubbles and binary debate dynamics [S73].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 5: Citizens, awareness, democracy, and public interest
V
Vincent Tadday
2 arguments129 words per minute153 words70 seconds
Argument 1
European digital sovereignty must genuinely be European, not fragmented into national interests (Vincent Tadday)
EXPLANATION
Tadday argues that European digital sovereignty only makes sense if Europe acts collectively rather than through competing national agendas. He criticizes the tendency of member states to talk about Europe rhetorically while still prioritizing national funding and national infrastructure purchases.
EVIDENCE
He says Europe is powerful when it wants to be powerful and weak when it does not want to act like a power [252-254]. He then gives the example that Germans want to fund German research while Italians want to buy Italian infrastructure, and concludes that the debate must be linked back to European integration by stressing the “Europe” in European digital sovereignty [255-258].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 1: Meaning and framing of European digital sovereignty
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Paulo Glowacki, Joao Gomes, Denis Nazarenko, Lea Rovcanin
Argument 2
Europe should avoid becoming powerful only rhetorically; genuine European coordination is needed to act coherently on the global stage (Vincent Tadday)
EXPLANATION
Tadday argues that Europe often uses the language of power and sovereignty without making the hard decisions needed to act effectively. He suggests that only stronger coordination and a real European approach can make Europe coherent and credible internationally.
EVIDENCE
He describes Europe as “schizophrenic” on the global stage because it is powerful only when it chooses to be and weak when it refuses to act like a power [252-254]. He supports this by pointing to failures in collective financial and industrial decision-making, where national preferences override European coordination [257-258].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 3: Open internet, interoperability, and avoiding fragmentation
L
Lea Rovcanin
1 argument134 words per minute224 words100 seconds
Argument 1
Digital sovereignty should include candidate countries; otherwise Europe risks a two-speed digital future (Lea Rovcanin)
EXPLANATION
Rovcanin argues that Europe cannot credibly pursue digital sovereignty if candidate countries remain excluded from its digital transformation and investment ecosystem. She warns that without inclusion, Europe will create a divided digital future in which some countries shape technology while others remain dependent consumers.
EVIDENCE
She notes that while the EU leads in regulation through the GDPR, DMA, and AI Act, an important question remains about whether sovereignty is possible if not all European countries are equally included [308-310]. Speaking from Montenegro as a candidate country, she says regulation alone is not enough and warns that if candidate countries are not included in Europe’s investment and innovation ecosystem now, Europe risks becoming a two-speed digital space where some shape the future and others are left behind [311-318].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External context supports this concern by emphasising openness and inclusion as essential to digital development, including the need to pair connectivity with skills, enabling environments, and broad participation by youth and other groups left behind [S73]. Another source explicitly notes that countries still developing their infrastructure have the same right to sovereignty as others, reinforcing the inclusion argument [S72].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 1: Meaning and framing of European digital sovereignty
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Paulo Glowacki, Joao Gomes, Denis Nazarenko, Vincent Tadday
D
Denis Nazarenko
2 arguments126 words per minute300 words142 seconds
Argument 1
Sovereignty should be understood as governance capacity under pressure, especially for public institutions and data systems (Denis Nazarenko)
EXPLANATION
Nazarenko argues that sovereignty is less a static legal status than a practical capacity to keep governing during crisis. He frames it as the ability of public institutions to continue operating, protect data, communicate with residents, and make decisions under conditions of attack or disruption.
EVIDENCE
He says sovereignty in practical experience is “less a status than a capacity” [328], specifically the capacity of public institutions to continue operating, protect data, communicate with residents, and make decisions under pressure [329]. He adds that sovereignty depends not only on who owns infrastructure but on whether government has real governance capacity over the systems it relies on [330].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is enriched by external discussion of how governments often rely on digital tools beyond their jurisdiction while still carrying responsibility for citizens’ security and welfare, making practical governing capacity central to sovereignty [S74].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 1: Meaning and framing of European digital sovereignty
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Paulo Glowacki, Joao Gomes, Lea Rovcanin, Vincent Tadday
Argument 2
Europe needs procurement convergence, sovereign infrastructure, semiconductor capacity, and resilient system design, not just legal frameworks (Denis Nazarenko)
EXPLANATION
Nazarenko argues that digital sovereignty requires coordinated practical capabilities alongside legal rules. He highlights procurement, upstream semiconductor capacity, public-sector data capacity, cybersecurity, and resilience-focused system design as key pillars that Europe must build together.
EVIDENCE
He proposes three layers: governance through instruments like competition, transparency, and accountability; capability through sovereign and trusted infrastructure, semiconductors, public-sector data capacity, cybersecurity, and procurement; and resilience through systems designed for disruption rather than just efficiency [331-342]. He also notes that European public authorities collectively procure tens of billions in digital services each year and suggests convergence on shared standards and supply-chain instruments [336-337].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External sources support this policy mix. The European Chips Act is presented as a concrete effort to build semiconductor capacity, resilience, supply security, and coordination mechanisms [S75]. Procurement and open standards are also highlighted as strategic tools for interoperability, security, and vendor neutrality in public systems [S84].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 2: Regulation versus investment, industrial policy, and implementation
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Giacomo Mazzone, Joao Gomes, Catalin Marinescu, Vittorio Bertola, Paulo Glowacki, Lea Rovcanin
E
Eric Pol
2 arguments163 words per minute142 words52 seconds
Argument 1
Citizens need secure, trustworthy services more than abstract sovereignty concepts; personal digital sovereignty can strengthen the wider ecosystem (Eric Pol)
EXPLANATION
Pol argues that ordinary people care less about abstract policy terms like sovereignty or privacy and more about whether digital services are easy, safe, and reliable. He believes that if individuals have meaningful personal digital sovereignty, that trust can scale up and strengthen the broader digital ecosystem.
EVIDENCE
He says citizens do not want abstract concepts like digital sovereignty or privacy, but instead want better services, easier management of their lives, and a sense of safety [367-369]. He then argues that personal digital sovereignty at scale builds the systemic trust needed for markets to thrive, is technically and politically feasible, and can help the EU offer a global alternative to U.S. and Chinese models [370-375].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 1: Meaning and framing of European digital sovereignty
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Peter Janssen, Francesco Vecchi, Belen Luna, Paulo Glowacki, Jamal Shahin
Argument 2
Citizens should not have to understand technical infrastructure to be secure; trust and usability are central (Eric Pol)
EXPLANATION
Pol argues that digital sovereignty should not require every citizen to become an expert in data infrastructure. For him, the real test is whether people can trust digital systems and use them safely and easily without needing specialist knowledge.
EVIDENCE
He compares digital services to anti-lock braking systems in cars, saying people do not need to understand the underlying technology in order to trust it [368-369]. He also emphasizes that personal digital sovereignty at scale creates the systemic trust necessary for a resilient digital future [371-373].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External discussion of digital choice supports this by showing that informed choice in digital markets is often unrealistic because it demands high literacy, technical understanding, time, and legal awareness from users [S82] [S85].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 5: Citizens, awareness, democracy, and public interest
DISAGREED WITH
Peter Janssen
P
Pari Esfandiari
2 arguments97 words per minute195 words120 seconds
Argument 1
Sovereignty contains a contradiction with the internet’s openness; Europe should focus on resilience without fragmentation (Pari Esfandiari)
EXPLANATION
Esfandiari argues that the concept of digital sovereignty carries an internal tension because sovereignty implies control and borders, while the internet was built around openness and interdependence. She suggests that Europe should therefore prioritize resilience in a way that does not contribute to fragmentation.
EVIDENCE
She says digital sovereignty already reveals a contradiction because sovereignty implies control and borders while the internet was built on openness and interdependence [380-382]. She therefore reframes the issue as how Europe can become resilient without contributing to fragmentation [382].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is directly supported by analysis stating that digital sovereignty contains a tension between sovereignty’s logic of control and borders and the internet’s foundations in openness and interdependence [S72]. Additional context comes from the view that sovereignty for most countries is a balancing act within global digital interdependence, not a path to isolation [S74].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 1: Meaning and framing of European digital sovereignty
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Valentina Stadnic, Elonnai Hickok, Paulo Glowacki
DISAGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Anna Neves, Francesco Vecchi, Paulo Glowacki, Vittorio Bertola, Belen Luna
Argument 2
The key challenge is how Europe can become resilient and sovereign without accelerating a shift toward competing geopolitical internets (Pari Esfandiari)
EXPLANATION
Esfandiari argues that Europe must avoid sliding into a world of rival geopolitical internets as states increasingly frame digital policy through security and competition. She sees Europe’s distinctive role as building strategic resilience without copying either U.S. platform dominance or the Chinese state-centric model.
EVIDENCE
She says regulation alone is not enough and warns that regulating technologies developed elsewhere can become a form of “managed dependency” if infrastructure and industrial capacity are missing [383-385]. She then argues Europe should avoid reproducing the U.S. or Chinese model and asks whether the world is still trying to preserve a global internet or has already begun moving toward competing geopolitical internets [386-389].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External sources provide clear context here: one warns that digital sovereignty can be folded into neo-mercantilist and securitising logics that weaponise interdependence and push adversarial geopolitics [S72]. Another notes that sovereignty must be managed as a balance within global networks rather than as closed self-sufficiency [S74].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 3: Open internet, interoperability, and avoiding fragmentation
V
Vittorio Bertola
3 arguments214 words per minute385 words107 seconds
Argument 1
Europe should stop debating wording and act, because sovereignty/autonomy is vital for Europe’s independence (Vittorio Bertola)
EXPLANATION
Bertola argues that Europe is wasting time arguing over whether to call the issue sovereignty or autonomy when the underlying challenge is urgent and existential. He believes decisive action is needed because Europe’s independent future depends on addressing digital dependence now.
EVIDENCE
He says it is 2026 and Europe is still “splitting hairs” over wording, while the issue is vital for the survival of Europe not only in digital matters but as an independent and sovereign power [396]. He urges participants to stop arguing over words and start acting immediately [396-397].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 1: Meaning and framing of European digital sovereignty
DISAGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Anna Neves, Francesco Vecchi, Pari Esfandiari, Paulo Glowacki, Belen Luna
Argument 2
Europe needs investments, regulation, public procurement, industrial policy, and preference for European and open-source suppliers in key sectors (Vittorio Bertola)
EXPLANATION
Bertola argues that sovereignty requires a full policy mix, not just debate or narrow regulation. He calls for investment, procurement reform, industrial policy, and explicit preference for European and open-source suppliers in strategically important sectors.
EVIDENCE
He states that Europe needs all available tools: investment, regulation, public procurement policies, industrial policy, and rules that put European solutions and open source first [396]. He specifically says Europe should not be afraid to require European suppliers in key sectors like defense and citizen data processing, and that public administrations should use public money for European solutions [396-399].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is supported by external evidence on the need for strategic investment and industrial measures such as the Chips Act [S75], and by procurement-focused work showing that governments can use open standards mandates to promote interoperability, security, and vendor neutrality [S84].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 2: Regulation versus investment, industrial policy, and implementation
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Giacomo Mazzone, Denis Nazarenko, Joao Gomes, Catalin Marinescu, Paulo Glowacki, Lea Rovcanin
Argument 3
Warnings about fragmentation should not block Europe from protecting itself and building its own digital sector (Vittorio Bertola)
EXPLANATION
Bertola argues that concerns about fragmentation or protectionism are often used to discourage Europe from taking necessary protective and developmental measures. He believes Europe must prioritize its own resilience and stop fearing criticism when acting in its own strategic interest.
EVIDENCE
He says he is tired of hearing complaints that attempts to strengthen Europe are fragmenting the internet or amount to protectionism [402-404]. He adds that he does not know whether such measures count as protectionism, but he does know that failing to act harms Europe and amounts to self-harm [404-409].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 3: Open internet, interoperability, and avoiding fragmentation
DISAGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Paulo Glowacki, Elonnai Hickok, Valentina Stadnic
B
Belen Luna
2 arguments186 words per minute98 words31 seconds
Argument 1
Digital sovereignty should not reproduce extractive big-tech models or slide into far-right rhetoric (Belen Luna)
EXPLANATION
Luna argues that Europe must not use digital sovereignty to justify building its own version of exploitative surveillance capitalism. She also warns that the language and politics of sovereignty can drift toward far-right rhetoric if not handled carefully.
EVIDENCE
She asks whether Europe really wants to support European big tech that harvests data, violates privacy, and embeds the wrong principles and values in society [577-578]. She then warns that the conversation requires caution because it is getting very close to far-right rhetoric [579].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External analysis provides a strong cautionary context, warning that sovereignty claims can be appropriated by securitising bureaucracies and used to prioritise state power over individual rights and social goals [S72]. It also warns against policies that benefit only the state and domestic champions or replicate existing inequalities [S72].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 1: Meaning and framing of European digital sovereignty
DISAGREED WITH
Frank Kruger, Giacomo Mazzone, Francesco Vecchi
Argument 2
Europe must question which business models it supports and reject surveillance-based or extractive European alternatives (Belen Luna)
EXPLANATION
Luna argues that sovereignty should not be measured simply by whether firms are European, but by whether their business models align with democratic values and privacy. She urges scrutiny of the kinds of platforms and incentives Europe may be empowering.
EVIDENCE
She explicitly says that when discussing digital sovereignty, Europe must question what business models it is supporting [577]. She then gives the example of European big tech that could still harvest data and violate privacy, making clear that European ownership alone is not enough [578].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is supported by external warnings that digital sovereignty governance should not simply empower domestic ‘champions’ or replicate unequal and rights-harming models [S72]. Additional context comes from criticism of the commercial internet’s data-extractive business model and dependence on free services built around personal data collection [S83].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 5: Citizens, awareness, democracy, and public interest
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Peter Janssen, Francesco Vecchi, Eric Pol, Paulo Glowacki, Jamal Shahin
P
Paulo Glowacki
5 arguments137 words per minute396 words173 seconds
Argument 1
Digital sovereignty should ultimately mean resilient openness and strategic autonomy, not isolation (Paulo Glowacki)
EXPLANATION
Glowacki’s summary message frames digital sovereignty as compatible with openness rather than closure. He defines it as a form of resilient openness and strategic autonomy that rejects isolation, protectionism, and walls that fragment the internet.
EVIDENCE
In the final draft messages, he says digital sovereignty should ultimately be interpreted to mean resilient openness and strategic autonomy that leverages Europe’s strengths [517]. He then explicitly states that it should not mean isolation, stepping away from global digital cooperation, protectionism, or the creation of walls that lead to fragmentation [518-519].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is directly aligned with external analysis that most countries cannot achieve full-stack sovereignty and must instead maintain a dynamic equilibrium within digital interdependence [S74]. Another source explicitly frames the key challenge as preserving openness while building autonomy and resilience [S72].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 1: Meaning and framing of European digital sovereignty
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Valentina Stadnic, Pari Esfandiari, Elonnai Hickok
DISAGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Elonnai Hickok, Valentina Stadnic, Vittorio Bertola
Argument 2
Europe’s dependencies create strategic vulnerabilities, so digital sovereignty requires industrial policy, scaling trusted European players, and balanced regulation on procurement, competition, privacy, and cybersecurity (Paulo Glowacki)
EXPLANATION
Glowacki summarizes the session’s consensus that Europe’s dependence on external digital technologies creates strategic vulnerabilities and that addressing them requires more than rhetoric. He argues for industrial policy, scaling trusted European actors, and a balanced mix of regulation across key areas like procurement, competition, privacy, and cybersecurity.
EVIDENCE
He reads a message recognizing that Europe’s dependencies on external digital technologies and infrastructures have created strategic vulnerabilities, including for democratic values [507]. He also states that digital sovereignty requires active industrial policies such as investment in trusted European players in chips, semiconductors, cloud, AI, and open data, along with balanced regulatory approaches to procurement, competition, privacy, and cybersecurity [509-511].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External sources support both the dependency diagnosis and the policy response. Dependence on foreign cloud, platform, and AI ecosystems is described as a structural constraint on most governments [S74]. The Chips Act and related semiconductor strategy illustrate industrial policy responses to resilience and security concerns [S75], while procurement and standards are highlighted as practical levers for policy implementation [S84].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 2: Regulation versus investment, industrial policy, and implementation
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Joao Gomes, Denis Nazarenko, Lea Rovcanin, Vincent Tadday
Argument 3
Sovereignty should preserve internet openness, open standards, interoperability, and multi-stakeholder values while avoiding walls and fragmentation (Paulo Glowacki)
EXPLANATION
Glowacki frames digital sovereignty as something that must be pursued in a way that preserves the basic architecture and governance values of the internet. His message emphasizes openness, interoperability, open standards, and a multi-stakeholder, human-rights-based approach.
EVIDENCE
In the first draft message, he says Europe must shape its digital future while maintaining internet openness, preserving choice of technologies and providers that adhere to open standards and interoperability, and remaining grounded in multi-stakeholder values and human rights [507]. He later adds that digital sovereignty should not result in walls or fragmentation [518-519].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is corroborated by strong support for open standards as enablers of interoperability, security, and vendor neutrality [S84], and by broader technical accounts of the internet as a decentralised system built on shared standards and interoperability [S79].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 3: Open internet, interoperability, and avoiding fragmentation
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Peter Janssen, Francesco Vecchi, Valentina Stadnic, Elonnai Hickok, Miguel Vidal, Audience
Argument 4
Europe should empower youth and build a digital public sphere as part of sovereignty (Paulo Glowacki)
EXPLANATION
Glowacki includes in the final messages a broader social and democratic dimension of sovereignty. He argues that sovereignty should empower citizens, especially young people, and should include cognitive sovereignty and the creation of a digital public sphere for European residents.
EVIDENCE
He states that achieving European digital sovereignty requires a holistic approach under a common European dimension to empower citizens, especially youth [513]. He also says that the importance of cognitive sovereignty and the ability for European residents to have a digital public sphere should be encompassed by the topic, referencing the Cannes Declaration on the Sovereignty of the Mind [514-515].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 5: Citizens, awareness, democracy, and public interest
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Joao Gomes, Catalin Marinescu, Peter Janssen
Argument 5
The session produced draft messages recognizing vulnerabilities, defining sovereignty as transformative, calling for holistic European action, and rejecting isolationism (Paulo Glowacki)
EXPLANATION
Glowacki’s role was to synthesize the discussion into a set of draft messages that captured the session’s main points. These messages defined digital sovereignty as a transformative process, identified strategic vulnerabilities, called for broad European action, and stressed that sovereignty should not mean isolation.
EVIDENCE
He introduces four messages: an opening message on strategic vulnerabilities and self-determination [507-508], a message defining digital sovereignty as a cumulative transformative process requiring active industrial policy and balanced regulation [509-512], a message calling for a holistic European approach that empowers citizens and includes cognitive sovereignty [512-515], and a final message saying sovereignty should mean resilient openness and strategic autonomy rather than isolation [516-519].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 6: Session framing, moderation, and outcomes
G
Giacomo Mazzone
1 argument145 words per minute385 words159 seconds
Argument 1
Regulation must be complemented by active industrial policy and trusted European alternatives, including platforms aligned with European values (Giacomo Mazzone)
EXPLANATION
Mazzone argues that regulation is necessary but inherently limited if Europe does not also build practical alternatives that embody its values. He calls for active industrial policy and specifically for trusted European platforms as viable substitutes for dominant non-European services.
EVIDENCE
He says that while he supports EU regulation, regulation has limits and must be complemented by active industrial policies [260-263]. He gives examples including the DSA, DMA, EMFA, and data portability rights, arguing that sanctions and formal rights cannot change platform business models or help users migrate unless real alternatives exist [264-269]. He then identifies trusted European platforms as the only viable way to create alternatives aligned with European principles and human rights, and calls for substantial-not symbolic-support in the Sovereignty Tech Package [270-275].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External evidence supports the argument that regulation alone does not solve dependence. One source notes that the EU has relied heavily on regulation while still facing platform and infrastructure dependence [S74]. Another provides industrial-policy context through the Chips Act and investment in technological capacity [S75].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 2: Regulation versus investment, industrial policy, and implementation
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Denis Nazarenko, Joao Gomes, Catalin Marinescu, Vittorio Bertola, Paulo Glowacki, Lea Rovcanin
DISAGREED WITH
Frank Kruger, Belen Luna, Francesco Vecchi
V
Valentina Stadnic
2 arguments157 words per minute350 words133 seconds
Argument 1
Open international standards and cross-border coordination are essential enablers of sovereignty and resilience (Valentina Stadnic)
EXPLANATION
Stadnic argues that sovereignty does not conflict with international coordination; rather, it depends on it in many technical domains. She emphasizes that common standards and cross-border cooperation are necessary to ensure both connectivity and resilience.
EVIDENCE
Speaking from the ITU perspective, she says the organization has long worked to create a common technical language that enables countries to connect across borders [285-287]. She then argues that open and internationally agreed standards are an enabler of sovereignty [288-289], and adds that resilience issues such as spectrum management, disaster management, and cybersecurity incident response have no borders and therefore require cooperation [290-293].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is strongly supported by evidence that open standards improve interoperability, security, accessibility, and vendor neutrality and can be embedded through procurement and cooperation [S84]. Technical reporting also emphasises that the internet’s decentralised architecture relies on interoperability through shared standards [S79].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 2: Regulation versus investment, industrial policy, and implementation
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Pari Esfandiari, Elonnai Hickok, Paulo Glowacki
DISAGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Paulo Glowacki, Elonnai Hickok, Vittorio Bertola
Argument 2
Open standards are a basis for both sovereignty and global connectivity; resilience issues like spectrum, disasters, and cybersecurity require cross-border cooperation (Valentina Stadnic)
EXPLANATION
Stadnic argues that open standards are not a threat to sovereignty but one of its foundations because they enable countries to connect and cooperate while retaining agency. She also stresses that many resilience challenges transcend borders and must be handled through international coordination.
EVIDENCE
She states that ITU has always been committed to a common technical language that enables countries to connect across borders and that open internationally agreed standards are an enabler of sovereignty [287-289]. She supports this by pointing to spectrum management, disaster management, and cybersecurity incident response as examples of fields where cross-border coordination is indispensable because these issues have no borders [290-293].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External sources support the standards component through discussion of open standards as foundations of interoperability and resilient digital infrastructure [S84]. Broader context on the internet’s decentralised, interconnected architecture also reinforces the need for cross-border coordination rather than isolated national systems [S79].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 3: Open internet, interoperability, and avoiding fragmentation
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Peter Janssen, Francesco Vecchi, Elonnai Hickok, Miguel Vidal, Audience, Paulo Glowacki
J
Joao Gomes
1 argument149 words per minute236 words94 seconds
Argument 1
Europe regulates well but still depends on foreign hardware, software, cloud, and AI; younger generations need a chance to build, not only be protected (Joao Gomes)
EXPLANATION
Gomes argues that Europe has become highly capable at regulation but has failed to build the underlying technologies on which it depends. He frames this as a generational issue, saying younger Europeans need real opportunities to create and scale technology rather than being told that regulation alone is protecting them.
EVIDENCE
He says Europe is the world’s most sophisticated regulator, yet participants are discussing sovereignty on laptops they did not build, software they did not write, and servers they cannot locate [348-351]. He lists Europe’s lack of its own cloud, models, and fabs, noting that 70% of the European cloud market belongs to Amazon, Microsoft, and Google [352]. He then says Europe has stopped imagining itself as a place where things are built [354-355] and urges people to stop telling his generation they are being protected from American technology and instead show them how to build their own [356-358].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External sources clearly support the dependence claim, noting that most online services, cloud ecosystems, and AI capacity are dominated by non-European firms even as the EU advances regulation [S74]. Additional context from EuroDIG reporting stresses that Europe needs knowledge, capacity, competences, and software strength, not only rules, to secure full participation in the digital economy [S78].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 2: Regulation versus investment, industrial policy, and implementation
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Catalin Marinescu, Paulo Glowacki, Peter Janssen
DISAGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Giacomo Mazzone, Arnaud Wittersheim, Catalin Marinescu
A
Arnaud Wittersheim
1 argument91 words per minute214 words139 seconds
Argument 1
EU rules often create uneven national implementations; Europe needs more convergent operational frameworks and certification to avoid disadvantaging European operators (Arnaud Wittersheim)
EXPLANATION
Wittersheim argues that although EU regulation in areas like data protection and cybersecurity is valuable, differences in national implementation can create fragmentation inside Europe itself. He calls for more operational convergence and stronger certification mechanisms so European providers are not put at a disadvantage.
EVIDENCE
He says his company welcomes European legislative efforts in data protection and cybersecurity [421-422], but observes that regulations such as GDPR and NIS2 push the ecosystem into major policy changes while transposition into national laws produces significant disparities across member states [422-423]. He therefore asks legislators to pursue a convergent operational framework and suggests more certification schemes to help businesses demonstrate compliance and expertise without suffering unfair disparities vis-à-vis non-European operators [424-427].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External context supports the implementation problem by noting that security and telecom regulation in Europe is often layered between EU and national competences, creating divergence and compliance burdens [S81]. Standards-based procurement and validation frameworks also provide relevant examples of convergence tools [S84].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 2: Regulation versus investment, industrial policy, and implementation
DISAGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Joao Gomes, Giacomo Mazzone, Catalin Marinescu
C
Catalin Marinescu
1 argument176 words per minute231 words78 seconds
Argument 1
Public administrations lag behind; stronger links between policymakers and the private sector are needed to make European alternatives viable (Catalin Marinescu)
EXPLANATION
Marinescu argues that companies are already adapting quickly to new business conditions, especially around AI and platform-independence, but public administrations are moving more slowly. He believes stronger cooperation between private-sector actors and policymakers is necessary if European alternatives are to become both usable and popular.
EVIDENCE
He says business models are changing faster than ever, that AI is now central to productivity, and that software companies are focused on questions such as platform independence and the EU Cyber Resilience Act [435-439]. He contrasts this with public administrations, which he says look slower in adapting and implementing new trends [440], then argues that Europe needs alternatives, must popularize and use the ones that already exist, and should build a stronger relationship between the private sector and policymakers to achieve its goals [441-444].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 2: Regulation versus investment, industrial policy, and implementation
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Joao Gomes, Paulo Glowacki, Peter Janssen
DISAGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Joao Gomes, Giacomo Mazzone, Arnaud Wittersheim
M
Miguel Vidal
2 arguments189 words per minute93 words29 seconds
Argument 1
Open source should be treated as the foundation to invest in, with champions growing from the commons rather than replacing it (Miguel Vidal)
EXPLANATION
Vidal argues that Europe’s policy priorities are backwards if they focus first on creating commercial champions and only secondarily on maintaining open source. He sees the commons as the real foundation that must be funded first, with successful firms emerging from that base rather than substituting for it.
EVIDENCE
In reacting to the messages, he says that if open source is treated merely as something to maintain while investment goes primarily into champions, Europe is doing things “exactly the wrong way around” [536]. He argues instead that Europe needs to invest in open source first and only then tolerate champions, because it is “the commons” that will save the day [537-541].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is supported by external sources arguing that open-source ecosystems are strategic foundations for interoperability, resilience, and innovation, much as Linux and TCP/IP became foundational internet layers [S77]. Earlier open-source discussions also stress that sustainable business can be built on top of free software and that policy should free people to innovate [S76].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 2: Regulation versus investment, industrial policy, and implementation
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Peter Janssen, Francesco Vecchi, Valentina Stadnic, Elonnai Hickok, Audience, Paulo Glowacki
DISAGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Giacomo Mazzone, Francesco Vecchi
Argument 2
The practical path to sovereignty is to invest in open source commons first, not merely in commercial champions (Miguel Vidal)
EXPLANATION
Vidal’s argument is that open source commons are not a side issue but the core practical infrastructure on which sovereign digital capacity should rest. He rejects an approach centered mainly on startup or champion creation if it neglects the shared digital commons underneath.
EVIDENCE
He explicitly contrasts investment in startups or champions with investment in the commons, saying Europe should prioritize open source and that the commons-not champions-will “save the day” [536-541]. This directly frames open source as the primary path rather than an auxiliary support measure [537-541].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External material reinforces this by describing open-source AI and earlier open-source infrastructure as strategically superior because they scale innovation, resilience, and interoperability through the commons [S77]. Broader open-software evidence also shows that innovation ecosystems and sustainable business models can emerge from free software foundations [S76].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 4: Open source, digital commons, and European innovation capacity
A
Audience
2 arguments172 words per minute227 words78 seconds
Argument 1
Repositories and shared data for AI must include sustainable funding models for those producing and maintaining the data (Audience)
EXPLANATION
The audience intervention argues that repositories and data infrastructures are crucial for AI development, but they cannot be sustainable if the organizations supplying and maintaining the data are not financially supported. The point is that data contributors should not be treated as invisible inputs to AI systems; they need explicit sustainability mechanisms.
EVIDENCE
Caroline from Germany says that repositories are super important, especially for AI development, because data is needed to build tools [565-566]. She adds that fact-checking organizations are often victims of scraping and argues that if repositories are being built or incentivized, there should also be a sustainability model because the organizations feeding data into them need funding to do their work and generate the data in the first place [567-569].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is enriched by open-innovation discussions showing that open data and commons require viable revenue and support models for the organisations that manage them [S76].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 2: Regulation versus investment, industrial policy, and implementation
Argument 2
Open source repositories and shared data infrastructures need sustainability and protection for contributing organizations (Audience)
EXPLANATION
This intervention stresses that digital commons like repositories cannot function if contributing organizations are exposed to exploitation and underfunding. Sustainable support and protection mechanisms are needed so contributors can keep generating and curating valuable shared resources.
EVIDENCE
Caroline links repositories to open source concerns and says that for AI development they are essential because they provide the needed data [565-566]. She also notes that contributing organizations are often subject to scraping and therefore need funding and sustainability models if they are to continue producing and maintaining data for such repositories [567-569].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External context from open knowledge and open innovation discussions supports the need for sustainable funding and organisational models around shared resources rather than assuming contributors can operate indefinitely without support [S76].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 4: Open source, digital commons, and European innovation capacity
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Peter Janssen, Francesco Vecchi, Valentina Stadnic, Elonnai Hickok, Miguel Vidal, Paulo Glowacki
E
Elonnai Hickok
1 argument159 words per minute356 words134 seconds
Argument 1
Europe should preserve interoperability through open standards, portability, and interconnection while avoiding state-centric overreach and rights erosion (Elonnai Hickok)
EXPLANATION
Hickok argues that Europe can pursue digital sovereignty without fragmenting the open internet only if it prioritizes interoperability and avoids over-centralized state control. She stresses that implementation matters, and that sovereignty should be grounded in human rights, portability, open standards, and oversight rather than surveillance or government overreach.
EVIDENCE
She says interoperability is crucial and lists open standards, shared protocols, portability, and interconnection as the practical foundations for avoiding fragmentation [411]. She then warns against a race to the bottom, rejects a state-centric model, and calls for centering international human rights frameworks, user control, judicial oversight, and principles of necessity, proportionality, and legality [411]. She also uses the example of the UN Cybercrime Treaty to show why Europe must think holistically about how it acts in international spaces that affect sovereignty and rights [412-415].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is supported by external evidence that open standards promote interoperability, security, accessibility, and vendor neutrality in public systems [S84], and by warnings that digital sovereignty can slide into securitising state control that sidelines individual rights and social goals if not socially anchored [S72].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 3: Open internet, interoperability, and avoiding fragmentation
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Peter Janssen, Francesco Vecchi, Valentina Stadnic, Miguel Vidal, Audience, Paulo Glowacki
DISAGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Paulo Glowacki, Valentina Stadnic, Vittorio Bertola
A
Alexander Pitch
2 arguments126 words per minute58 words27 seconds
Argument 1
Analog options remain important for cyber resilience and democracy; societies should not force total digitalization (Alexander Pitch)
EXPLANATION
Pitch argues that any serious discussion of digital sovereignty and resilience must also preserve non-digital alternatives. He suggests that fully digitized systems without analog fallback options can undermine both democratic inclusion and cyber resilience.
EVIDENCE
When responding to the draft messages, he says a major missing point is the importance of analog solutions from both a cyber resilience and democratic perspective [528-530]. He adds that democratic societies cannot force digitalization on everyone, although he is cut off before expanding further [530-533].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 5: Citizens, awareness, democracy, and public interest
Argument 2
The conversation highlighted practical additions to the messages, including analog resilience, trusted European platforms, sustainability for repositories, and scrutiny of business models (Alexander Pitch)
EXPLANATION
This argument refers to the final message-review phase, where participants proposed concrete additions or corrections to the draft outcomes. Pitch’s own intervention was one of several that broadened the draft messages with practical concerns not fully captured in the initial summary.
EVIDENCE
Pitch specifically raised analog solutions as a severe missing point in the messages, linking them to cyber resilience and democracy [528-533]. In the same final exchange, other interventions added trusted European platforms [547-549], sustainability for repositories and data contributors [565-569], and concerns about harmful business models and far-right rhetoric [577-579], showing how the message process incorporated practical refinements.
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 6: Session framing, moderation, and outcomes
J
Jamal Shahin
2 arguments127 words per minute3502 words1651 seconds
Argument 1
The session builds on prior EuroDIG discussions and seeks structured dialogue on a politically urgent topic shaped by geopolitics (Jamal Shahin)
EXPLANATION
Shahin frames the session as part of an ongoing EuroDIG conversation about digital sovereignty, while noting that current geopolitical conditions have made the topic more urgent and politically salient. As moderator, he presents his role as creating structure around a concept that means different things to different people.
EVIDENCE
He says digital sovereignty is not a new topic and has been discussed at EuroDIG many times before [26-30], but adds that it is now being discussed in a new framing that reflects the contemporary geopolitical situation and Europe’s debates about how to act [31-32]. He also notes that sovereignty means many different things to many different people and says his role is to bring structure to that discussion [19-21].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 6: Session framing, moderation, and outcomes
Argument 2
The discussion should distinguish different dimensions of sovereignty, including control, self-determination, resilience, and mindset (Jamal Shahin)
EXPLANATION
Shahin repeatedly synthesizes the discussion by distinguishing between multiple dimensions of sovereignty rather than treating it as a single idea. He highlights control over infrastructure, self-determination, resilience, and later mindset and relational understandings of sovereignty as distinct but connected strands of the debate.
EVIDENCE
After Peter’s intervention, he explicitly identifies sovereignty as control over infrastructure and regulatory control, but also as a form of self-determination that enhances choice [164]. Later, in his summary, he says he hears digital sovereignty discussed as a specific form, as a process or transformation, and in relation to rules, norms, and values [446]. In his final moderator reflection, he adds that European digital sovereignty is not just a legal form but also about mindsets and sovereignty as a set of relations and self-determination [506].
EXTERNAL EVIDENCE (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
External sources enrich this multidimensional framing by distinguishing between digital self-determination and user choice [S73], industrial and political sovereignty alongside citizen empowerment [S78], and infrastructure/services/data/AI as separate vectors of digital sovereignty [S74].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 6: Session framing, moderation, and outcomes
AGREED WITH
Fabrizia Benini, Peter Janssen, Francesco Vecchi, Eric Pol, Belen Luna, Paulo Glowacki
F
Florence Ranson
1 argument125 words per minute165 words79 seconds
Argument 1
The organizers closed the session and moved participants toward lunch after the message-reading process (Florence Ranson)
EXPLANATION
Ranson’s role at the end of the session was procedural and organizational. She thanked participants, handled a practical housekeeping issue, and formally moved the event into the lunch break before the afternoon programme resumed.
EVIDENCE
At the end, she thanks Jamal and all participants [583]. She then makes a logistical announcement about a lost bag from the previous night’s party and directs people to contact staff at the front desk, before telling participants to break for lunch and return at two o’clock [583].
MAJOR DISCUSSION POINT
Major discussion point 6: Session framing, moderation, and outcomes
Agreements
Agreement Points
European digital sovereignty should not mean isolation or a fragmented internet; it should be pursued alongside openness, interoperability, and cooperation.
Speakers: Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Valentina Stadnic, Pari Esfandiari, Elonnai Hickok, Paulo Glowacki
Europe seeks digital sovereignty while remaining committed to an open, global, secure internet and to managing interdependencies with trusted partners (Fabrizia Benini) Digital sovereignty is a direction tied to democracy, investment, and openness rather than an end-state (Frank Kruger) Open international standards and cross-border coordination are essential enablers of sovereignty and resilience (Valentina Stadnic) Sovereignty contains a contradiction with the internet’s openness; Europe should focus on resilience without fragmentation (Pari Esfandiari) Europe should preserve interoperability through open standards, portability, and interconnection while avoiding state-centric overreach and rights erosion (Elonnai Hickok) Digital sovereignty should ultimately mean resilient openness and strategic autonomy, not isolation (Paulo Glowacki)
Multiple speakers converged on the idea that European digital sovereignty must be compatible with an open global internet. Benini explicitly asked how Europe can achieve sovereignty while remaining open and reaffirmed commitment to an open, global, secure internet and cooperation with trusted partners [81-88]. Kruger said sovereignty is a direction combining democracy, investment, and openness, and that Europe will not get there by going it alone [184-188]. Stadnic argued that open international standards and cross-border coordination are indispensable for sovereignty and resilience [287-293]. Esfandiari warned that sovereignty language can contradict the internet’s openness and reframed the challenge as resilience without fragmentation [380-389]. Hickok stressed interoperability through open standards, shared protocols, portability, and interconnection while avoiding state-centric overreach [411-415]. Glowacki’s final messages codified this consensus by defining sovereignty as ‘resilient openness and strategic autonomy’ rather than isolation or walls [507][517-519].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This aligns with prior discussions warning that EU digital sovereignty should avoid harming the open internet or separating Europe from the rest of the world, while instead combining reduced dependency with strategic partnerships and bridge-building across borders [S98]. It also matches broader critiques that economic security and digital autonomy should be framed cooperatively rather than through zero-sum securitisation [S94].
Regulation alone is not sufficient; Europe also needs investment, industrial policy, infrastructure, implementation, and scaling capacity.
Speakers: Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Giacomo Mazzone, Denis Nazarenko, Joao Gomes, Catalin Marinescu, Vittorio Bertola, Paulo Glowacki, Lea Rovcanin
Europe’s strategic vulnerability comes from long-built dependencies across cloud, AI, platforms, and chips; regulation gives long-term direction but must be backed by instruments like the Sovereign Tech Package (Fabrizia Benini) Regulation alone is insufficient; Europe needs open standards, trusted infrastructure, support for open source, and practical instruments like the sovereign tech agency and DC EDIC (Frank Kruger) Regulation must be complemented by active industrial policy and trusted European alternatives, including platforms aligned with European values (Giacomo Mazzone) Europe needs procurement convergence, sovereign infrastructure, semiconductor capacity, and resilient system design, not just legal frameworks (Denis Nazarenko) Europe regulates well but still depends on foreign hardware, software, cloud, and AI; younger generations need a chance to build, not only be protected (Joao Gomes) Public administrations lag behind; stronger links between policymakers and the private sector are needed to make European alternatives viable (Catalin Marinescu) Europe needs investments, regulation, public procurement, industrial policy, and preference for European and open-source suppliers in key sectors (Vittorio Bertola) Europe’s dependencies create strategic vulnerabilities, so digital sovereignty requires industrial policy, scaling trusted European players, and balanced regulation on procurement, competition, privacy, and cybersecurity (Paulo Glowacki) Digital sovereignty should include candidate countries; otherwise Europe risks a two-speed digital future (Lea Rovcanin)
A strong agreement emerged that regulation is necessary but insufficient on its own. Benini described Europe’s accumulated dependence across the stack and defended regulation as a guiding path, while also pointing to concrete measures such as the Sovereign Tech Package, CHIPS Act, Cloud and AI Development Act, and open source strategy [57-67][92-106]. Kruger explicitly said Europe will not get there with regulation alone and called for open standards, trusted infrastructure, and practical instruments such as Germany’s sovereign tech agency and the DC EDIC [166-183][187-188]. Mazzone argued that regulation has limits and must be complemented by active industrial policy and trusted European platforms [260-275]. Nazarenko laid out layers of governance, capability, and resilience including semiconductor capacity, procurement, and infrastructure [326-342]. Gomes sharply criticized Europe for regulating on foreign-built devices and services rather than building its own cloud, models, and fabs [348-358]. Marinescu said public administrations lag and that viable alternatives require stronger policymaker-private sector links [435-444]. Bertola called for all instruments at once: investment, procurement, industrial policy, and regulation [396-399]. Rovcanin added that without infrastructure, investment, and skills, smaller and candidate countries remain dependent [312-318]. Glowacki’s synthesis reflected this broad agreement [507][509-513].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This reflects repeated policy assessments that Europe needs more than rules: stronger investment, infrastructure, access to finance, deployment, and scaling are all identified as necessary complements to regulation [S96]. It also fits recent EU digital diplomacy analysis suggesting a shift from regulation-first approaches toward competitiveness, infrastructure, innovation, and economic security [S104].
Open source, digital commons, open standards, and interoperability are central building blocks of Europe’s digital sovereignty and resilience.
Speakers: Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Peter Janssen, Francesco Vecchi, Valentina Stadnic, Elonnai Hickok, Miguel Vidal, Audience, Paulo Glowacki
Europe has strong research and developer communities; the open source strategy is a major asset but innovation must scale (Fabrizia Benini) Strengthening open source and digital commons can improve resilience globally, not only within Europe (Frank Kruger) Infrastructure should adhere to open standards and be designed for portability and provider choice (Peter Janssen) Open source, free software, and interoperable platforms like the Fediverse already offer democratic, non-extractive alternatives to big tech (Francesco Vecchi) Open standards are a basis for both sovereignty and global connectivity; resilience issues like spectrum, disasters, and cybersecurity require cross-border cooperation (Valentina Stadnic) Europe should preserve interoperability through open standards, portability, and interconnection while avoiding state-centric overreach and rights erosion (Elonnai Hickok) Open source should be treated as the foundation to invest in, with champions growing from the commons rather than replacing it (Miguel Vidal) Open source repositories and shared data infrastructures need sustainability and protection for contributing organizations (Audience) Sovereignty should preserve internet openness, open standards, interoperability, and multi-stakeholder values while avoiding walls and fragmentation (Paulo Glowacki)
Speakers from different sectors agreed that open source and standards-based interoperability are not peripheral but foundational. Benini highlighted Europe’s vibrant open source developer communities and made the open source strategy part of the upcoming sovereignty package, while insisting Europe must scale innovation [101-114]. Kruger emphasized support for the people behind critical open source code and described open source and digital commons as key building blocks of sovereignty and resilience [167-183]. Janssen said EURid’s infrastructure journey is about open standards, interchangeability, portability, and provider choice [135-145][156-161]. Vecchi named open source, free software, and interoperable platforms like the Fediverse as existing democratic alternatives to big tech [241-243]. Stadnic linked open internationally agreed standards to both sovereignty and connectivity [287-293]. Hickok likewise stressed interoperability through open standards, portability, and interconnection [411-415]. Vidal pushed this further by arguing that the commons should be funded first and champions should grow from it [536-541]. Caroline from the audience added that repositories and shared data infrastructures need sustainability models for contributors [565-569]. Glowacki’s messages folded open standards and interoperability into the agreed framing [507][510-511][517-519].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is reinforced by wider digital-cooperation frameworks that emphasize digital public goods, inclusive innovation ecosystems, and multi-stakeholder scaling of widely accessible solutions [S103] [S97]. It also fits earlier EU-oriented internet governance thinking that prioritised public-interest architecture and enabling environments over narrow industrial protection [S99].
Digital sovereignty is fundamentally about democratic self-determination, user choice, public interest, and protecting European values.
Speakers: Fabrizia Benini, Peter Janssen, Francesco Vecchi, Eric Pol, Belen Luna, Paulo Glowacki, Jamal Shahin
Digital sovereignty as democratic self-determination and choice, not just technology control (Fabrizia Benini) Digital sovereignty means user choice and control over digital identity through European domain infrastructure (.eu) (Peter Janssen) Digital autonomy should include cognitive autonomy and protection from manipulative algorithms through a European digital public sphere (Francesco Vecchi) Citizens need secure, trustworthy services more than abstract sovereignty concepts; personal digital sovereignty can strengthen the wider ecosystem (Eric Pol) Europe must question which business models it supports and reject surveillance-based or extractive European alternatives (Belen Luna) Europe should empower youth and build a digital public sphere as part of sovereignty (Paulo Glowacki) The discussion should distinguish different dimensions of sovereignty, including control, self-determination, resilience, and mindset (Jamal Shahin)
Another major area of agreement was that sovereignty is not only about controlling infrastructure, but about preserving democratic agency and meaningful choice. Benini defined Europe’s mission in one word-‘choice’-and linked portability, provider choice, and control over data to self-determination and a human-centric digital transformation grounded in democratic values [75-91]. Janssen similarly framed sovereignty as ‘choice and control,’ especially over identity, email, hosting, and provider selection through ownership of a .eu domain [124-145]. Vecchi expanded the concept to cognitive autonomy, warning against manipulative algorithms and calling for a European digital public sphere serving the public interest [233-243]. Pol argued that citizens mainly want safe, trustworthy, easy services and that personal digital sovereignty at scale can strengthen the whole ecosystem [367-375]. Belen Luna cautioned that Europe must scrutinize the business models it supports and not simply recreate data-harvesting big tech under a European label [577-580]. Glowacki’s messages included empowering citizens, especially youth, and recognized cognitive sovereignty and a digital public sphere [513-515]. Shahin’s synthesis also explicitly grouped self-determination and mindset among the core dimensions of the debate [164][446][506].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This matches authoritative framings that cast EU digital sovereignty as a response to threats to fundamental values and undue external influence, while emphasizing public interest and rights [S98]. It is also strongly supported by critiques arguing that digital sovereignty policy must be socially anchored and democratically governed rather than reduced to state control or domestic champion-building [S94] [S95].
Europe’s current dependencies on non-European technologies create strategic vulnerabilities affecting resilience, security, and democracy.
Speakers: Fabrizia Benini, Paulo Glowacki, Joao Gomes, Denis Nazarenko, Lea Rovcanin, Vincent Tadday
Dependencies now threaten democracies and values, so digital sovereignty is also about democratic survival (Fabrizia Benini) Europe’s dependencies create strategic vulnerabilities, so digital sovereignty requires industrial policy, scaling trusted European players, and balanced regulation on procurement, competition, privacy, and cybersecurity (Paulo Glowacki) Europe regulates well but still depends on foreign hardware, software, cloud, and AI; younger generations need a chance to build, not only be protected (Joao Gomes) Sovereignty should be understood as governance capacity under pressure, especially for public institutions and data systems (Denis Nazarenko) Digital sovereignty should include candidate countries; otherwise Europe risks a two-speed digital future (Lea Rovcanin) European digital sovereignty must genuinely be European, not fragmented into national interests (Vincent Tadday)
There was broad recognition that dependency is the core problem driving the sovereignty debate. Benini connected geopolitical tensions, war, and the weaponization of dependencies to Europe’s digital vulnerabilities and argued that these now threaten democracy itself [49-51][67-72]. Gomes echoed this diagnosis in generational terms, pointing out that Europe debates sovereignty on foreign-built laptops, software, servers, cloud, and AI [348-355]. Nazarenko tied sovereignty to the practical ability of institutions to continue operating under attack and disruption, stressing infrastructure, data, and resilience capacity [328-342]. Rovcanin highlighted that unequal inclusion of candidate countries would leave parts of Europe as dependent consumers [310-318]. Tadday stressed that this must be genuinely European rather than split into national approaches [252-258]. Glowacki’s final messages opened by explicitly recognizing that Europe’s dependencies on external technologies and infrastructures have created strategic vulnerabilities, including for democratic values [507].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is directly supported by prior discussion of Europe’s dependence on overseas data storage and foreign advanced technologies, which were framed as strategic weaknesses requiring mitigation [S95] [S98]. External analysis also notes that deeply interdependent digital value chains can become geopolitical choke points, heightening vulnerability in periods of conflict or retaliation [S94].
Europe needs stronger support for innovation, scaling, talent, and youth so that European alternatives can actually be built and adopted.
Speakers: Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Joao Gomes, Catalin Marinescu, Paulo Glowacki, Peter Janssen
Europe has strong research and developer communities; the open source strategy is a major asset but innovation must scale (Fabrizia Benini) Europe needs to scale its startups and research talent into competitive continental providers rather than losing them to foreign capital (Frank Kruger) Europe regulates well but still depends on foreign hardware, software, cloud, and AI; younger generations need a chance to build, not only be protected (Joao Gomes) Public administrations lag behind; stronger links between policymakers and the private sector are needed to make European alternatives viable (Catalin Marinescu) Europe should empower youth and build a digital public sphere as part of sovereignty (Paulo Glowacki) Users need awareness of the consequences of convenience choices like Gmail; lack of awareness reinforces dependency (Peter Janssen)
A further convergence concerned the need to convert talent into scaled European capacity. Benini said Europe already has excellent researchers, thinkers, developers, and raw materials, but innovation alone is not enough unless it scales [100-114]. Kruger emphasized Europe’s strong research landscape and startups, but warned that once scaling requires major capital, foreign investors often take over; Europe must help startups become competitive European providers [497-505]. Gomes demanded that younger generations be given a real chance to build technology rather than merely be ‘protected’ by regulation [356-358]. Marinescu said alternatives must not only exist but be made popular and connected to faster-moving private-sector realities [440-444]. Peter Janssen added that awareness and user behavior matter because people default to convenient foreign services like Gmail unless they understand the consequences [480-495]. Glowacki included citizen empowerment, especially of youth, in the final messages [513-515].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This aligns with repeated findings that Europe underperforms not in research strength but in retaining talent, funding scale-up, supporting startups and SMEs, and turning research into market deployment [S96]. Broader innovation policy sources likewise stress culture change, partnerships, experimentation, and sustainable scale-up as prerequisites for successful innovation ecosystems [S97].
Similar Viewpoints
Both speakers grounded sovereignty in user agency rather than in abstract state control. Benini framed sovereignty around ‘choice’ over data location, providers, and portability as an expression of self-determination [89-91]. Janssen used the .eu domain example to show how users can control naming, email identity, hosting, and provider choice in practice [124-145].
Speakers: Fabrizia Benini, Peter Janssen
Digital sovereignty as democratic self-determination and choice, not just technology control (Fabrizia Benini) Digital sovereignty means user choice and control over digital identity through European domain infrastructure (.eu) (Peter Janssen)
These speakers shared a policy-mix perspective: regulation matters, but without industrial policy, infrastructure, procurement, and investment, Europe will remain dependent. Benini defended regulation as a strategic guide while presenting concrete instruments [92-106]. Kruger said directly that regulation alone will not suffice [184-188]. Mazzone, Nazarenko, and Bertola each argued for practical alternatives, procurement, infrastructure, semiconductors, and active industrial measures [260-275][331-342][396-399].
Speakers: Frank Kruger, Fabrizia Benini, Giacomo Mazzone, Denis Nazarenko, Vittorio Bertola
Regulation alone is insufficient; Europe needs open standards, trusted infrastructure, support for open source, and practical instruments like the sovereign tech agency and DC EDIC (Frank Kruger) Europe’s strategic vulnerability comes from long-built dependencies across cloud, AI, platforms, and chips; regulation gives long-term direction but must be backed by instruments like the Sovereign Tech Package (Fabrizia Benini) Regulation must be complemented by active industrial policy and trusted European alternatives, including platforms aligned with European values (Giacomo Mazzone) Europe needs procurement convergence, sovereign infrastructure, semiconductor capacity, and resilient system design, not just legal frameworks (Denis Nazarenko) Europe needs investments, regulation, public procurement, industrial policy, and preference for European and open-source suppliers in key sectors (Vittorio Bertola)
Across institutional, civil society, and technical perspectives, these speakers viewed open source and open standards as the practical architecture of sovereignty. Kruger highlighted support for open source maintainers and digital commons [169-183]. Vecchi and Vidal stressed that democratic alternatives already exist in open source and that the commons should be prioritized [241-243][536-541]. Stadnic, Hickok, and Janssen all emphasized open standards, interoperability, portability, and interconnection as essential to both sovereignty and openness [156-161][287-293][411-415].
Speakers: Frank Kruger, Francesco Vecchi, Miguel Vidal, Valentina Stadnic, Elonnai Hickok, Peter Janssen
Strengthening open source and digital commons can improve resilience globally, not only within Europe (Frank Kruger) Open source, free software, and interoperable platforms like the Fediverse already offer democratic, non-extractive alternatives to big tech (Francesco Vecchi) The practical path to sovereignty is to invest in open source commons first, not merely in commercial champions (Miguel Vidal) Open standards are a basis for both sovereignty and global connectivity; resilience issues like spectrum, disasters, and cybersecurity require cross-border cooperation (Valentina Stadnic) Europe should preserve interoperability through open standards, portability, and interconnection while avoiding state-centric overreach and rights erosion (Elonnai Hickok) Infrastructure should adhere to open standards and be designed for portability and provider choice (Peter Janssen)
Although they did not fully agree on terminology, these speakers converged in softening sovereignty toward strategic autonomy and resilient openness. Neves explicitly preferred ‘strategic autonomy’ because sovereignty sounded too nation-state centered and exclusionary [216-223]. Esfandiari said sovereignty carries an inherent contradiction with the internet’s openness and proposed resilience without fragmentation [380-389]. Glowacki’s final message bridged these concerns by saying digital sovereignty should be interpreted as resilient openness and strategic autonomy, not isolation [517-519].
Speakers: Anna Neves, Pari Esfandiari, Paulo Glowacki
The term “sovereignty” is too strong; “strategic autonomy” better fits an open Europe (Anna Neves) Sovereignty contains a contradiction with the internet’s openness; Europe should focus on resilience without fragmentation (Pari Esfandiari) Digital sovereignty should ultimately mean resilient openness and strategic autonomy, not isolation (Paulo Glowacki)
These speakers shared a future-oriented concern that Europe’s capacity gap is as much about scaling and inclusion as about regulation. Gomes called for real chances to build [356-358]. Kruger and Benini both said Europe has talent but lacks scaling [100-114][497-505]. Marinescu argued that institutions need to adapt faster and connect with the private sector [440-444]. Rovcanin added that if candidate countries are excluded from investment and innovation ecosystems, Europe will reproduce dependence internally [312-318].
Speakers: Joao Gomes, Frank Kruger, Fabrizia Benini, Catalin Marinescu, Lea Rovcanin
Europe regulates well but still depends on foreign hardware, software, cloud, and AI; younger generations need a chance to build, not only be protected (Joao Gomes) Europe needs to scale its startups and research talent into competitive continental providers rather than losing them to foreign capital (Frank Kruger) Europe has strong research and developer communities; the open source strategy is a major asset but innovation must scale (Fabrizia Benini) Public administrations lag behind; stronger links between policymakers and the private sector are needed to make European alternatives viable (Catalin Marinescu) Digital sovereignty should include candidate countries; otherwise Europe risks a two-speed digital future (Lea Rovcanin)
These speakers shared a citizen-centered critique of any narrow industrial reading of sovereignty. Vecchi emphasized cognitive autonomy and a democratic digital public sphere [237-243]. Pol argued that citizens need trustworthy services rather than abstract slogans [367-373]. Belen Luna warned against reproducing data-extractive, privacy-violating business models under a European label [577-580]. Glowacki’s synthesis incorporated youth empowerment and cognitive sovereignty into the final messages [513-515].
Speakers: Belen Luna, Francesco Vecchi, Eric Pol, Paulo Glowacki
Europe must question which business models it supports and reject surveillance-based or extractive European alternatives (Belen Luna) Digital autonomy is cognitive as well as technical, requiring safeguards against manipulation and support for democratic civic agency (Francesco Vecchi) Citizens should not have to understand technical infrastructure to be secure; trust and usability are central (Eric Pol) Europe should empower youth and build a digital public sphere as part of sovereignty (Paulo Glowacki)
Unexpected Consensus
Open source and digital commons received support from government officials, technical operators, civil society, and audience members alike.
Speakers: Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Peter Janssen, Francesco Vecchi, Miguel Vidal, Audience
Europe has strong research and developer communities; the open source strategy is a major asset but innovation must scale (Fabrizia Benini) Germany’s sovereign tech agency supports the maintainers of critical open source components, and this model should scale through European frameworks (Frank Kruger) Open standards and interchangeable infrastructure are part of a long-term journey toward more sovereign digital systems (Peter Janssen) Open source, free software, and interoperable platforms like the Fediverse already offer democratic, non-extractive alternatives to big tech (Francesco Vecchi) Open source should be treated as the foundation to invest in, with champions growing from the commons rather than replacing it (Miguel Vidal) Open source repositories and shared data infrastructures need sustainability and protection for contributing organizations (Audience)
This consensus was notable because it bridged institutional and ideological lines. A European Commission official promoted an open source strategy [106-114], a national government representative described concrete public funding for open source maintainers [169-183], a registry operator stressed standards-based interchangeability [156-161], civil society pointed to open source and the Fediverse as democratic alternatives [241-243], Miguel Vidal argued the commons should come before champions [536-541], and the audience raised the need to sustain repositories and data contributors [565-569].
Even speakers who disagreed on the term ‘sovereignty’ broadly agreed on the substance: resilience, strategic autonomy, openness, and democratic control.
Speakers: Anna Neves, Pari Esfandiari, Fabrizia Benini, Paulo Glowacki
The term “sovereignty” is too strong; “strategic autonomy” better fits an open Europe (Anna Neves) Sovereignty contains a contradiction with the internet’s openness; Europe should focus on resilience without fragmentation (Pari Esfandiari) Digital sovereignty as democratic self-determination and choice, not just technology control (Fabrizia Benini) Digital sovereignty should ultimately mean resilient openness and strategic autonomy, not isolation (Paulo Glowacki)
A surprising convergence emerged beneath the semantic dispute. Neves rejected the word ‘sovereignty’ in favor of strategic autonomy [216-223], while Esfandiari emphasized resilience without fragmentation [380-389]. Benini defended the word sovereignty but defined it in democratic, choice-based, non-isolationist terms [81-91][452-476]. Glowacki’s final message effectively reconciled these positions by describing digital sovereignty as resilient openness and strategic autonomy, not isolation [517-519].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This mirrors earlier workshop findings that speakers differed on emphasis and terminology but converged on a balanced approach combining openness, resilience, reduced strategic weakness, and democratic participation [S95]. It also reflects prior session framing that definitional clarity matters because ‘digital sovereignty’ is used differently across contexts, even when underlying goals overlap [S98].
There was cross-sector agreement that Europe’s main weakness is not lack of talent or rules, but failure to scale and deploy European alternatives.
Speakers: Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Joao Gomes, Catalin Marinescu, Lea Rovcanin
Europe has strong research and developer communities; the open source strategy is a major asset but innovation must scale (Fabrizia Benini) Europe needs to scale its startups and research talent into competitive continental providers rather than losing them to foreign capital (Frank Kruger) Europe regulates well but still depends on foreign hardware, software, cloud, and AI; younger generations need a chance to build, not only be protected (Joao Gomes) Public administrations lag behind; stronger links between policymakers and the private sector are needed to make European alternatives viable (Catalin Marinescu) Digital sovereignty should include candidate countries; otherwise Europe risks a two-speed digital future (Lea Rovcanin)
This consensus was unexpected because it united Commission, national government, private sector, youth, and candidate-country perspectives. Benini and Kruger both said Europe has talent and innovation but needs scaling [100-114][497-505]. Gomes voiced the same concern in more confrontational terms, criticizing Europe for regulating instead of building [348-358]. Marinescu highlighted slow public administration uptake [440-444], while Rovcanin warned that unequal inclusion will leave some countries stuck as users rather than builders [312-318].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is consistent with external assessments highlighting Europe’s funding gap, weak venture capital environment, and difficulty scaling innovation despite strong research capacity and talent [S96]. Recent strategic commentary also suggests the EU is reassessing whether regulation-heavy approaches have come at the expense of competitiveness, deployment, and industrial growth [S104].
Overall Assessment

The main areas of agreement were that Europe faces real strategic vulnerabilities from dependence on non-European technologies; that digital sovereignty should be compatible with an open, interoperable internet; that regulation is necessary but insufficient without investment, infrastructure, procurement, and scaling; and that open source, standards, and user choice are central to any credible European approach [57-67][81-91][166-188][241-243][507-519].

High on substance, moderate on framing. Speakers strongly agreed on the diagnosis of dependency and on the need for a broad policy mix, but disagreed somewhat on language, especially whether ‘sovereignty’ or ‘strategic autonomy’ is the better label [216-223][380-389][452-456]. The implication is that Europe has a fairly coherent agenda for action even if its political vocabulary remains contested.

Differences
Different Viewpoints
Whether “digital sovereignty” is the right term for Europe’s goals
Speakers: Fabrizia Benini, Anna Neves, Francesco Vecchi, Pari Esfandiari, Paulo Glowacki, Vittorio Bertola, Belen Luna
Digital sovereignty as democratic self-determination and choice, not just technology control (Fabrizia Benini) The term “sovereignty” is too strong; “strategic autonomy” better fits an open Europe (Anna Neves) Digital autonomy should include cognitive autonomy and protection from manipulative algorithms through a European digital public sphere (Francesco Vecchi) Sovereignty contains a contradiction with the internet’s openness; Europe should focus on resilience without fragmentation (Pari Esfandiari) Digital sovereignty should ultimately mean resilient openness and strategic autonomy, not isolation (Paulo Glowacki) Europe should stop debating wording and act, because sovereignty/autonomy is vital for Europe’s independence (Vittorio Bertola) Digital sovereignty should not reproduce extractive big-tech models or slide into far-right rhetoric (Belen Luna)
A clear disagreement emerged over framing. Fabrizia Benini defended “digital sovereignty” as the correct term because it concerns democracy, self-determination, and collective European action [456-459]. Anna Neves rejected the term as too nation-state centric and preferred “strategic autonomy” for an open Europe [216-224]. Francesco Vecchi also preferred “digital autonomy” and broadened it to include cognitive autonomy and a democratic digital public sphere [232-243]. Pari Esfandiari argued the very concept of sovereignty contains a contradiction because it implies borders and control while the internet is based on openness and interdependence [380-389]. By contrast, Paulo Glowacki tried to reconcile the camps by defining digital sovereignty as “resilient openness and strategic autonomy,” not isolation [517-519]. Vittorio Bertola dismissed the wording dispute as a distraction and urged action regardless of whether the term is sovereignty or autonomy [396-397]. Belen Luna added a warning that sovereignty language can drift toward problematic business models and even far-right rhetoric [577-580].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This disagreement has strong historical grounding: previous sessions stressed that ‘digital sovereignty’ carries multiple meanings-state authority, technological independence, and data jurisdiction-and warned that unclear use of the term can damage the open internet [S98]. Scholarly critique also argues that sovereignty language is politically powerful but risks securitisation and bureaucratic overreach unless carefully reframed and democratically anchored [S94].
How far Europe should go in prioritizing European suppliers and whether fears of protectionism/fragmentation should constrain action
Speakers: Fabrizia Benini, Paulo Glowacki, Elonnai Hickok, Valentina Stadnic, Vittorio Bertola
Europe seeks digital sovereignty while remaining committed to an open, global, secure internet and to managing interdependencies with trusted partners (Fabrizia Benini) Digital sovereignty should ultimately mean resilient openness and strategic autonomy, not isolation (Paulo Glowacki) Europe should preserve interoperability through open standards, portability, and interconnection while avoiding state-centric overreach and rights erosion (Elonnai Hickok) Open international standards and cross-border coordination are essential enablers of sovereignty and resilience (Valentina Stadnic) Warnings about fragmentation should not block Europe from protecting itself and building its own digital sector (Vittorio Bertola)
Most speakers stressed that European digital sovereignty should preserve an open, interoperable internet. Benini explicitly asked how Europe can achieve sovereignty while remaining open and reaffirmed commitment to an open, global, secure internet through managed interdependence with trusted partners [81-88]. Glowacki’s messages similarly said sovereignty should mean resilient openness, not isolation, protectionism, or walls [507][517-519]. Hickok emphasized interoperability, portability, interconnection, human rights, and avoiding state-centric overreach [411-415]. Stadnic likewise argued that open international standards and cross-border coordination are indispensable to sovereignty and resilience [287-293]. Vittorio Bertola took a sharper line, arguing Europe should put European and open-source solutions first, require European suppliers in key sectors, and stop worrying that such action might be called protectionist or fragmenting [396-409]. The disagreement was therefore over limits: open-cooperation advocates wanted sovereignty carefully bounded by interoperability and rights, while Bertola argued those concerns should not inhibit stronger European preference policies [396-409][411-415].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This debate aligns with prior policy discussions that Europe should reduce reliance on third-country suppliers and secure critical infrastructure, while avoiding closed-door protectionism or fragmentation from the wider internet economy [S98]. Related analysis also warns that sovereignty agendas can slide into securitised, zero-sum economic nationalism if not tempered by cooperative framing and social oversight [S94].
Whether Europe should prioritize commercial ‘champions’ or open source commons as the main path to sovereignty
Speakers: Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Giacomo Mazzone, Miguel Vidal, Francesco Vecchi
Europe has strong research and developer communities; the open source strategy is a major asset but innovation must scale (Fabrizia Benini) Europe needs to scale its startups and research talent into competitive continental providers rather than losing them to foreign capital (Frank Kruger) Regulation must be complemented by active industrial policy and trusted European alternatives, including platforms aligned with European values (Giacomo Mazzone) Open source should be treated as the foundation to invest in, with champions growing from the commons rather than replacing it (Miguel Vidal) Open source, free software, and interoperable platforms like the Fediverse already offer democratic, non-extractive alternatives to big tech (Francesco Vecchi)
There was agreement that Europe must build alternatives, but disagreement about what should come first. Benini highlighted Europe’s strong research and open source communities but concluded that innovation is not enough unless Europe scales up [100-114]. Kruger similarly stressed scaling startups, research talent, and European firms so they become competitive providers rather than falling to foreign investors [497-505]. Mazzone called for active industrial policy and specifically trusted European platforms as viable alternatives to dominant non-European services [260-275]. By contrast, Miguel Vidal objected to any framework that treats open source as secondary to champions, arguing this gets priorities “exactly the wrong way around” and that Europe should invest in open source commons first because “the commons” will save the day [536-542]. Francesco Vecchi also emphasized that non-extractive alternatives already exist in open source, free software, and interoperable platforms like the Fediverse, suggesting public authorities should build from these rather than mainly from corporate champions [241-243].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is enriched by external critiques warning that digital sovereignty policies should not end up benefiting only the state or a handful of domestic ‘champions,’ and should instead be socially anchored and broadly beneficial [S94] [S95]. Parallel global innovation frameworks also support multi-stakeholder and public-interest approaches rather than relying exclusively on large firms [S97].
Whether regulation’s main weakness is insufficiency in itself or inconsistent implementation across Europe
Speakers: Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Joao Gomes, Giacomo Mazzone, Arnaud Wittersheim, Catalin Marinescu
Europe’s strategic vulnerability comes from long-built dependencies across cloud, AI, platforms, and chips; regulation gives long-term direction but must be backed by instruments like the Sovereign Tech Package (Fabrizia Benini) Regulation alone is insufficient; Europe needs open standards, trusted infrastructure, support for open source, and practical instruments like the sovereign tech agency and DC EDIC (Frank Kruger) Europe regulates well but still depends on foreign hardware, software, cloud, and AI; younger generations need a chance to build, not only be protected (Joao Gomes) Regulation must be complemented by active industrial policy and trusted European alternatives, including platforms aligned with European values (Giacomo Mazzone) EU rules often create uneven national implementations; Europe needs more convergent operational frameworks and certification to avoid disadvantaging European operators (Arnaud Wittersheim) Public administrations lag behind; stronger links between policymakers and the private sector are needed to make European alternatives viable (Catalin Marinescu)
Speakers broadly agreed regulation alone is not enough, but differed over what the core problem is. Benini argued regulation is indispensable because it gives a long-term path, but must be matched with funding, implementation, and instruments such as the Sovereign Tech Package [92-106][456-460]. Kruger similarly said Europe will not get there with regulation alone and needs practical support through open standards, trusted infrastructure, open source maintenance, the sovereign tech agency, and DC EDIC [166-183][187-188]. Gomes sharpened the critique by saying Europe has become the world’s most sophisticated regulator while still relying on foreign laptops, software, cloud, and fabs; he argued Europe must build, not just regulate [348-358]. Mazzone likewise said laws such as the DSA, DMA, EMFA, and portability rights cannot change business models unless Europe builds real alternatives [260-275]. Wittersheim introduced a different concern: even good EU rules can create harmful disparities when implemented differently by member states, so Europe also needs a convergent operational framework and certification [421-427]. Marinescu added that public administrations are lagging and that stronger public-private cooperation is necessary to make alternatives viable [435-444].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This closely matches prior workshop disagreement: one side emphasized that the problem is not lack of rules but weak implementation and enforcement across member states, while another stressed that governance design and social anchoring matter as much as enforcement [S95]. Recent EU analysis on the AI Act similarly argues that the central challenge has shifted from adopting rules to implementing them effectively under changing technological conditions [S104].
Whether users mainly need awareness and behavior change or whether systems should make sovereignty/trust invisible and easy
Speakers: Peter Janssen, Eric Pol
Users need awareness of the consequences of convenience choices like Gmail; lack of awareness reinforces dependency (Peter Janssen) Citizens should not have to understand technical infrastructure to be secure; trust and usability are central (Eric Pol)
A more focused disagreement appeared over the role of user awareness. Peter Janssen argued that convenience choices such as Gmail and WhatsApp reinforce dependency, and that Europe must do better at making people understand the consequences of choosing the easy option [480-495]. Eric Pol took a different angle, saying citizens do not care about abstract sovereignty concepts and should not have to understand technical infrastructure any more than drivers need to understand anti-lock brakes; what they need are safe, easy, trustworthy services [367-374]. Both support stronger user agency, but Janssen emphasized awareness and informed choice while Pol emphasized usable systems that do not require technical literacy [367-374][480-495].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This can be contextualized by broader public-interest innovation thinking that emphasizes sharper user focus and designing systems that work effectively for end users rather than placing excessive burdens on them [S97]. It also resonates with arguments for building trustworthy and privacy-respecting tools ‘by design’ so that trust is embedded in systems, not dependent only on user vigilance [S102].
Whether Europe should emulate ‘big tech’-style scale or reject extractive business models even when European
Speakers: Frank Kruger, Giacomo Mazzone, Belen Luna, Francesco Vecchi
Europe needs to scale its startups and research talent into competitive continental providers rather than losing them to foreign capital (Frank Kruger) Regulation must be complemented by active industrial policy and trusted European alternatives, including platforms aligned with European values (Giacomo Mazzone) Digital sovereignty should not reproduce extractive big-tech models or slide into far-right rhetoric (Belen Luna) Open source, free software, and interoperable platforms like the Fediverse already offer democratic, non-extractive alternatives to big tech (Francesco Vecchi)
Some speakers focused on building European-scale providers, while others warned scale alone is not enough if business models remain harmful. Kruger stressed scaling startups and turning them into competitive European providers [497-505]. Mazzone similarly called for trusted European platforms and champions aligned with EU values [270-275]. But Belen Luna cautioned that Europe must question the business models it is supporting and should not create European big tech that harvests data, violates privacy, or reproduces the wrong principles and values [577-580]. Vecchi also pushed toward non-extractive alternatives such as open source, free software, and the Fediverse rather than simply European versions of dominant platform models [239-243]. The disagreement here was not over building alternatives, but over whether success should be measured by scale and competitiveness or by fundamentally different, non-extractive institutional models [239-243][497-505][577-580].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This reflects a longstanding policy tension. Earlier EU internet governance analysis suggested Europe’s lack of dominant internet firms could be turned into a strength, allowing it to prioritise user rights and public interest rather than protecting platform incumbents [S99]. At the same time, recent competitiveness debates stress Europe’s need for greater scale, finance, and innovation capacity, making the trade-off between scale and values a live policy question [S96] [S104].
Unexpected Differences
Disagreement over terminology persisted even though multiple speakers portrayed the issue as urgent and practical
Speakers: Anna Neves, Francesco Vecchi, Fabrizia Benini, Vittorio Bertola
The term “sovereignty” is too strong; “strategic autonomy” better fits an open Europe (Anna Neves) Digital autonomy should include cognitive autonomy and protection from manipulative algorithms through a European digital public sphere (Francesco Vecchi) Digital sovereignty as democratic self-determination and choice, not just technology control (Fabrizia Benini) Europe should stop debating wording and act, because sovereignty/autonomy is vital for Europe’s independence (Vittorio Bertola)
An unexpected feature of the session was how much disagreement remained over naming, despite repeated claims that Europe faces urgent dependency and democratic risks. Neves and Vecchi objected to the term sovereignty and preferred autonomy [216-224][232-243], while Benini explicitly defended sovereignty as the right word because of its democratic stakes [452-456]. Bertola then criticized the whole terminology dispute as wasted time, saying Europe should stop splitting hairs and act [396-397]. The persistence of this semantic divide was notable because the substantive goals overlapped much more than the labels did [216-224][396-397][452-456].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is consistent with previous discussion showing that urgency around digital sovereignty often coexists with unresolved terminological disputes, because the term is politically mobilizing yet conceptually unstable [S94] [S98]. Workshop reporting likewise found moderate but consequential disagreement over scope and framing even where practical concerns were widely shared [S95].
Disagreement emerged not just about building European alternatives, but about whether European ‘big tech’ would itself be undesirable
Speakers: Frank Kruger, Giacomo Mazzone, Belen Luna, Francesco Vecchi
Europe needs to scale its startups and research talent into competitive continental providers rather than losing them to foreign capital (Frank Kruger) Regulation must be complemented by active industrial policy and trusted European alternatives, including platforms aligned with European values (Giacomo Mazzone) Digital sovereignty should not reproduce extractive big-tech models or slide into far-right rhetoric (Belen Luna) Open source, free software, and interoperable platforms like the Fediverse already offer democratic, non-extractive alternatives to big tech (Francesco Vecchi)
A less obvious disagreement concerned the end-state Europe should seek. Kruger and Mazzone argued for scaling startups, trusted European providers, and European alternatives at platform level [270-275][497-505]. Luna unexpectedly challenged the assumption that European scale is inherently good, asking whether Europe really wants its own big tech if it harvests data and violates privacy [577-580]. Vecchi likewise pointed toward non-extractive, interoperable alternatives rather than reproducing dominant platform models [239-243]. This was unexpected because the session often treated ‘European alternatives’ as a shared objective, but some speakers questioned whether that objective is acceptable if it reproduces harmful business logics [239-243][497-505][577-580].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This is illuminated by earlier EU internet-governance commentary arguing that Europe’s comparative advantage may lie in defending users and public interest precisely because it lacks large incumbent internet firms to protect [S99]. It is also relevant to critiques of sovereignty projects that warn against reproducing unequal or extractive models through domestic champions alone [S94].
A subtle but important disagreement appeared over whether the burden should fall on users to make better choices or on institutions to make trustworthy systems effortless
Speakers: Peter Janssen, Eric Pol
Users need awareness of the consequences of convenience choices like Gmail; lack of awareness reinforces dependency (Peter Janssen) Citizens should not have to understand technical infrastructure to be secure; trust and usability are central (Eric Pol)
This disagreement was unexpected because both positions were citizen-centered, yet they imply different policy strategies. Janssen stressed awareness and the consequences of choosing convenient non-European services like Gmail and WhatsApp [480-495]. Pol argued citizens should not need to understand infrastructure at all, and that trustworthy systems should work for them without expert knowledge [367-374]. The divergence matters because one approach emphasizes digital literacy and conscious behavior change, while the other emphasizes design, usability, and invisible trust [367-374][480-495].
POLICY CONTEXT (KNOWLEDGE BASE)
This maps onto broader innovation and governance debates that prioritize user-centered design, inclusive delivery, and institutional responsibility for making beneficial systems accessible and safe [S97]. It is also reinforced by arguments that resilient and privacy-respecting digital tools should be built by design, reducing reliance on constant user self-protection [S102].
Overall Assessment

The main disagreements were about framing rather than the existence of a problem. Speakers largely agreed that Europe faces serious dependencies in cloud, AI, platforms, and infrastructure and that this creates vulnerabilities for democracy, resilience, and public choice [57-72][166-188][348-358][507-519]. The strongest divisions concerned terminology (sovereignty vs autonomy), the acceptable degree of European preference or protection, and whether Europe should prioritize commercial champions, open source commons, or both [216-224][380-389][396-409][452-456][536-542].

Moderate. The debate showed substantial convergence on goals but meaningful disagreement on language, policy emphasis, and implementation pathways. This suggests the topic is politically actionable, but coalition-building will depend on framing sovereignty in a way that can accommodate both openness-oriented and strategic-industry camps.

Partial Agreements
These speakers agreed on the same goal: Europe cannot rely on regulation alone and must build real capability. Benini said regulation is indispensable but insufficient without funding, implementation, and concrete instruments [456-460]. Kruger agreed Europe will not get there with regulation alone [187-188]. Mazzone said regulation has limits and needs industrial policy and alternatives [260-275]. Gomes argued regulation without building technology leaves Europe dependent [348-358]. Nazarenko proposed capability, procurement, semiconductors, and resilience as additional layers [331-342]. Marinescu stressed faster adaptation and stronger policymaker-private sector links [440-444]. Wittersheim agreed on the value of rules but argued the key implementation problem is divergent national transposition and the need for convergence tools [421-427]. So they shared the goal of reducing dependency, but differed on whether the main route is industrial policy, infrastructure, procurement, scaling firms, administrative modernization, or harmonized implementation [260-275][331-342][421-427][440-444][456-460].
Speakers: Fabrizia Benini, Frank Kruger, Giacomo Mazzone, Joao Gomes, Denis Nazarenko, Catalin Marinescu, Arnaud Wittersheim
Europe’s strategic vulnerability comes from long-built dependencies across cloud, AI, platforms, and chips; regulation gives long-term direction but must be backed by instruments like the Sovereign Tech Package (Fabrizia Benini) Regulation alone is insufficient; Europe needs open standards, trusted infrastructure, support for open source, and practical instruments like the sovereign tech agency and DC EDIC (Frank Kruger) Regulation must be complemented by active industrial policy and trusted European alternatives, including platforms aligned with European values (Giacomo Mazzone) Europe regulates well but still depends on foreign hardware, software, cloud, and AI; younger generations need a chance to build, not only be protected (Joao Gomes) Europe needs procurement convergence, sovereign infrastructure, semiconductor capacity, and resilient system design, not just legal frameworks (Denis Nazarenko) Public administrations lag behind; stronger links between policymakers and the private sector are needed to make European alternatives viable (Catalin Marinescu) EU rules often create uneven national implementations; Europe needs more convergent operational frameworks and certification to avoid disadvantaging European operators (Arnaud Wittersheim)
These speakers broadly agreed on the goal of preserving openness while strengthening Europe’s resilience and agency. Benini reaffirmed commitment to an open global secure internet [81-88]. Stadnic emphasized international standards and cross-border coordination [287-293]. Hickok focused on interoperability, portability, and rights-based safeguards [411-415]. Glowacki’s summary defined sovereignty as resilient openness rather than isolation [517-519]. Esfandiari also wanted resilience without fragmentation [380-389]. The disagreement concerned how much Europe should worry about fragmentation constraints when acting: Bertola argued Europe should not let accusations of protectionism or fragmentation block stronger European preference policies [402-409], whereas the others placed greater emphasis on avoiding overreach and preserving interoperability and rights [287-293][380-389][411-415][517-519].
Speakers: Fabrizia Benini, Valentina Stadnic, Elonnai Hickok, Paulo Glowacki, Vittorio Bertola, Pari Esfandiari
Europe seeks digital sovereignty while remaining committed to an open, global, secure internet and to managing interdependencies with trusted partners (Fabrizia Benini) Open international standards and cross-border coordination are essential enablers of sovereignty and resilience (Valentina Stadnic) Europe should preserve interoperability through open standards, portability, and interconnection while avoiding state-centric overreach and rights erosion (Elonnai Hickok) Digital sovereignty should ultimately mean resilient openness and strategic autonomy, not isolation (Paulo Glowacki) Warnings about fragmentation should not block Europe from protecting itself and building its own digital sector (Vittorio Bertola) The key challenge is how Europe can become resilient and sovereign without accelerating a shift toward competing geopolitical internets (Pari Esfandiari)
These speakers shared a goal of empowering citizens, but differed on the mechanism. Benini framed sovereignty around choice, portability, and self-determination [89-91]. Janssen translated that into practical user control through domains and provider choice, but also stressed awareness of the consequences of convenience choices [124-145][480-495]. Pol argued citizens should not need to understand the underlying infrastructure and instead need simple, trustworthy services [367-374]. Vecchi emphasized cognitive autonomy, protection from manipulative algorithms, and a democratic digital public sphere [237-243]. Glowacki’s messages incorporated empowerment of citizens, especially youth, and cognitive sovereignty [513-515]. Thus, they agreed on citizen-centered sovereignty, but disagreed on whether to prioritize informed user choice, practical control tools, system usability, or civic-democratic redesign of digital spaces [89-91][237-243][367-374][480-495][513-515].
Speakers: Fabrizia Benini, Peter Janssen, Eric Pol, Francesco Vecchi, Paulo Glowacki
Digital sovereignty as democratic self-determination and choice, not just technology control (Fabrizia Benini) Digital sovereignty means user choice and control over digital identity through European domain infrastructure (.eu) (Peter Janssen) Citizens need secure, trustworthy services more than abstract sovereignty concepts; personal digital sovereignty can strengthen the wider ecosystem (Eric Pol) Digital autonomy is cognitive as well as technical, requiring safeguards against manipulation and support for democratic civic agency (Francesco Vecchi) Europe should empower youth and build a digital public sphere as part of sovereignty (Paulo Glowacki)
A broad coalition agreed that open source and digital commons matter for Europe’s future. Kruger stressed support for maintainers through Germany’s sovereign tech agency and European frameworks [169-183]. Benini announced an EU open source strategy and praised Europe’s vibrant developer communities, though she stressed scaling [106-114]. Vecchi saw open source and interoperable platforms as existing democratic alternatives [241-243]. Miguel Vidal agreed on the importance of open source but disputed the ordering of priorities, arguing the commons should come first rather than being secondary to champions [536-542]. Caroline from the audience added that repositories and shared data infrastructures also require sustainability models and funding for contributors [565-569]. So the common goal was support for open source, but the disagreement was over whether it is a foundational priority, a complementary tool, or a commons that must be directly financed and protected [106-114][169-183][241-243][536-542][565-569].
Speakers: Frank Kruger, Fabrizia Benini, Francesco Vecchi, Miguel Vidal, Audience
Germany’s sovereign tech agency supports the maintainers of critical open source components, and this model should scale through European frameworks (Frank Kruger) Europe has strong research and developer communities; the open source strategy is a major asset but innovation must scale (Fabrizia Benini) Open source, free software, and interoperable platforms like the Fediverse already offer democratic, non-extractive alternatives to big tech (Francesco Vecchi) The practical path to sovereignty is to invest in open source commons first, not merely in commercial champions (Miguel Vidal) Open source repositories and shared data infrastructures need sustainability and protection for contributing organizations (Audience)
Takeaways
Key takeaways
European digital sovereignty was broadly framed as democratic self-determination, resilience, and meaningful choice for citizens, businesses, and public institutions, not merely state control over technology. A central tension in the discussion was terminology: some participants defended ‘digital sovereignty’ as the right term because it reflects democratic survival and collective European agency, while others argued ‘strategic autonomy’ is more appropriate for an open and cooperative Europe. There was broad agreement that Europe faces serious strategic vulnerabilities due to long-standing dependencies on non-European cloud, AI, platforms, chips, and other parts of the digital stack. Regulation alone was seen as necessary but insufficient. Participants repeatedly stressed that legal instruments such as the GDPR, DMA, DSA, AI Act, and future Sovereign Tech Package must be matched by investment, implementation, procurement reform, industrial policy, and scaling of European capacity. Open standards, interoperability, portability, and provider choice were treated as core conditions for a European approach that strengthens sovereignty without fragmenting the open internet. Open source and digital commons were identified as foundational building blocks for European resilience, security, innovation, and democratic alternatives to extractive platform models. Several speakers emphasized that digital sovereignty should not mean isolation, protectionism for its own sake, internet fragmentation, or a retreat from global cooperation; instead it should mean resilient openness and managed interdependence with trusted partners. The debate highlighted the importance of building genuinely European rather than fragmented national solutions, with concern that national funding and procurement patterns still often privilege national over European approaches. Participants stressed that Europe must improve its ability to scale research, startups, and innovation into competitive continental providers, rather than losing promising initiatives to foreign capital or remaining dependent on foreign suppliers. Citizens’ interests were framed in practical terms: people want secure, trustworthy, usable services, and should not need technical expertise to benefit from digital sovereignty. However, greater public awareness is needed about the consequences of convenience-driven choices that reinforce dependency. Digital sovereignty was also discussed as including cognitive and societal dimensions, such as protecting people from manipulative algorithms, supporting a European digital public sphere, and preserving democratic civic agency. Inclusion was raised as a major concern: if candidate countries and smaller European states are not included in infrastructure, investment, and innovation efforts, Europe risks creating a two-speed digital future. Resilience was a recurring theme, including governance capacity under crisis, cybersecurity, cross-border coordination, data sovereignty, semiconductor supply, and the value of retaining analog options for democratic and cyber resilience. Participants cautioned that European alternatives should not simply reproduce surveillance-based or extractive big-tech business models under a European label. The session concluded with draft messages capturing a shared direction: Europe should address digital dependencies through a holistic, multi-stakeholder, rights-based approach combining regulation, industrial policy, open source, and democratic values while preserving internet openness.
Resolutions and action items
Draft EuroDIG messages were presented summarizing the discussion, including recognition of Europe’s strategic digital dependencies, the need for human-centric and open digital sovereignty, and the importance of interoperability, open standards, and human rights. A draft message proposed that digital sovereignty be understood as a cumulative, transformative process requiring action by all stakeholders rather than a fixed end-state. The messages called for active industrial policy, including investment in trusted European capacity in chips, semiconductors, cloud, AI, open data, and open source infrastructure. The messages called for a holistic European approach combining national policy and multi-stakeholder efforts under a common European dimension, with emphasis on empowering citizens and youth. The messages stated that digital sovereignty should be interpreted as resilient openness and strategic autonomy, not isolation, protectionism, or internet fragmentation. Participants proposed refinements to the draft messages, including adding analog resilience, trusted European platforms, sustainability models for repositories and shared data resources, and scrutiny of the business models being promoted. No binding policy decision was taken in the session, but the discussion identified practical areas for follow-up in policy and implementation: procurement, scaling European providers, open source support, cross-border coordination, and awareness-raising. It was noted that the draft messages could continue to be discussed and refined after the session.
Unresolved issues
No consensus was reached on whether ‘digital sovereignty’ is the right term, or whether ‘strategic autonomy’ or ‘digital autonomy’ would better describe Europe’s goals. The balance between sovereignty and openness remained unresolved: participants agreed on preserving the open internet, but there was no definitive answer on how Europe should assert itself geopolitically without contributing to fragmentation. The extent to which Europe should prioritize European suppliers in procurement and key sectors, and where that becomes protectionism, remained contested. How to translate regulation into practical implementation across member states remains unresolved, especially given uneven national transposition and divergent operational requirements. The relationship between building European champions and prioritizing investment in open source commons was not settled. How to ensure candidate countries and smaller European states are fully included in Europe’s digital transition and investment ecosystem remains an open question. No clear solution emerged for overcoming Europe’s structural weakness in scaling startups and retaining innovative firms within a truly European ecosystem. The discussion raised but did not fully resolve how to avoid reproducing extractive or surveillance-based business models in European alternatives. Questions about sustainable funding for repositories, shared data resources, and the organizations that maintain or contribute to them remained open. The concern that digital sovereignty rhetoric could drift toward far-right or exclusionary narratives was raised but not fully addressed. The role of analog alternatives in resilience and democratic participation was introduced late and not substantively integrated into the main discussion.
Suggested compromises
A recurring compromise framing was that Europe should pursue digital sovereignty as ‘resilient openness’ or ‘strategic autonomy’ rather than as isolation or closed digital nationalism. Participants converged around the idea that sovereignty should mean managing interdependence with trusted partners, not pursuing absolute self-sufficiency. Another implicit compromise was that regulation should remain a core tool, but be complemented by investment, industrial policy, procurement reform, and support for innovation rather than treated as sufficient on its own. There was broad support for combining stronger European capacity-building with continued commitment to open standards, interoperability, portability, and the multi-stakeholder model. The draft messages reflected a compromise between those focused on sovereignty and those wary of the term by defining the concept in practice as openness, resilience, rights, choice, and strategic autonomy rather than control for its own sake. An emerging compromise position held that Europe should support trusted European providers and infrastructure while ensuring these remain aligned with open source, digital commons, and non-extractive public-interest values.
Thought Provoking Comments
Fabrizia Benini argued that Europe’s digital dependencies are no longer just an economic issue but ‘a matter of survival of democracies,’ and framed the European response around ‘choice’—the ability for citizens and businesses to decide where data is kept, which providers they use, and to move between them.
This was insightful because it elevated digital sovereignty from a technical or industrial policy debate to a democratic and societal one. By centering ‘choice’ and self-determination, she offered a normative definition of sovereignty that avoided reducing it to simple state control or protectionism.
This set the conceptual baseline for the whole session. Later speakers repeatedly returned to choice, control, self-determination, openness, and democracy. Her framing also helped the moderator connect later interventions to core tensions in the debate, especially the balance between sovereignty and an open Internet.
Speaker: Fabrizia Benini
Peter Janssen described digital sovereignty as ‘choice and control,’ using the .eu domain as an example of how users can control identity, hosting, and movement between providers, while also stressing that sovereignty exists at the infrastructure layer and depends on European control of core systems.
This was thought-provoking because it translated an abstract political idea into a concrete, everyday Internet object: the domain name. He showed how sovereignty can operate both at the level of the individual user and at the level of underlying infrastructure.
His intervention grounded the conversation in practical Internet governance realities. It deepened the discussion by adding an operational dimension—how sovereignty is implemented through registries, hosting choices, and infrastructure location—rather than discussed only in legal or geopolitical terms.
Speaker: Peter Janssen
Frank Kruger said, ‘Digital sovereignty is not the final destination. It’s a direction,’ and stressed that Europe will not get there ‘with regulation alone’ or ‘by going it alone,’ but through open standards, trusted infrastructure, open source, and collaboration.
This was insightful because it reframed sovereignty as a process rather than a fixed end-state. It also challenged simplistic narratives by insisting that openness and cooperation are not contrary to sovereignty.
This became an important reference point in the discussion. Multiple later interventions engaged the same theme: regulation versus investment, resilience versus isolation, and sovereignty as capacity-building rather than closure. It helped keep the debate from collapsing into a binary of openness versus autonomy.
Speaker: Frank Kruger
Anna Neves objected to the term itself, saying sovereignty is ‘a very strong word’ tied to nationhood and that what Europe is really discussing is ‘strategic autonomy,’ not sovereignty.
This was thought-provoking because it directly challenged the premise of the panel. Rather than debating only policy tools, she questioned whether the language being used was conceptually and politically appropriate for Europe.
Her intervention triggered one of the clearest turning points in the session: a definitional debate. After this, several participants explicitly contrasted ‘sovereignty’ and ‘autonomy,’ and the final messages reflected this tension by combining ‘digital sovereignty’ with ‘strategic autonomy’ and ‘resilient openness.’
Speaker: Anna Neves
Francesco Vecchi argued that autonomy is ‘not only technological, but also cognitive,’ and that Europe needs a ‘European digital public sphere’ that protects citizens from manipulative algorithms and supports democratic participation.
This comment was insightful because it expanded the debate beyond infrastructure, cloud, and chips into the realm of public discourse, democratic agency, and algorithmic influence. It introduced the idea that sovereignty includes the capacity to think, deliberate, and form opinions free from manipulation.
It widened the discussion significantly by adding the dimension of ‘cognitive sovereignty.’ This idea later appeared in the summary messages, which explicitly referred to cognitive sovereignty and the need for a digital public sphere. It pushed the conversation beyond industrial policy into democratic theory.
Speaker: Francesco Vecchi
Vincent Tadday said Europe is ‘the most schizophrenic power on the global stage’ because it is powerful when it chooses to be but weak when it refuses to act like a power, especially when member states prioritize national interests over genuinely European investment.
This was provocative and insightful because it named a structural contradiction in European governance: the gap between rhetorical ambition and political willingness to pool resources and act collectively.
It sharpened the conversation around the ‘European’ in European digital sovereignty. Rather than treating Europe as a unified actor, it drew attention to internal fragmentation and undercut assumptions that policy coherence can be taken for granted. This added political realism to the debate.
Speaker: Vincent Tadday
Giacomo Mazzone argued that regulation has limits: sanctions and rights like portability do not matter if users have no European alternatives. He called for active industrial policy and ‘trusted European platforms’ as real substitutes for dominant non-European services.
This was insightful because it exposed a practical weakness in the EU approach: rights on paper are hollow without viable market alternatives. He connected legal design with industrial capacity in a very direct way.
This intervention pushed the discussion from principles to implementation. It reinforced Frank Kruger’s point that regulation is insufficient by itself and added urgency around investment, alternatives, and procurement. The idea of trusted European platforms was later raised again during comments on the draft messages.
Speaker: Giacomo Mazzone
Lea Rovcanin asked, in effect, how Europe can claim digital sovereignty if candidate countries and smaller states remain digitally dependent within Europe itself, warning of a ‘two-speed digital Europe.’
This was thought-provoking because it challenged the implicit assumption that Europe is a single, evenly situated digital space. It introduced an internal equity dimension and reminded the room that inclusion within Europe is also a sovereignty issue.
Her comment broadened the scope of the discussion beyond the EU core. It prompted the moderator to explicitly note that EuroDIG is broader than the EU and added a geopolitical-peripheral perspective that complicated the panel’s earlier focus on Europe versus the US and China.
Speaker: Lea Rovcanin
Denis Nazarenko argued that sovereignty is ‘less a status than a capacity’—the capacity of public institutions to keep operating under pressure, protect data, communicate with residents, and make decisions during attacks or disruption.
This was insightful because it transformed sovereignty from an abstract legal concept into an operational resilience concept. It was especially powerful because it came from a context shaped by real attacks and disruption.
His intervention deepened the conversation by foregrounding resilience, crisis governance, procurement, and system design for disruption. It reinforced earlier themes while making them more concrete and urgent, particularly around security and institutional capacity.
Speaker: Denis Nazarenko
João Gomes said, ‘We have spent two days discussing sovereignty on laptops we did not build, in software we did not write, connected to servers we cannot find,’ and warned that Europe risks becoming ‘a museum of its own ambition.’
This was one of the sharpest and most memorable comments because it condensed Europe’s dependency problem into a vivid image. It also brought a generational critique: younger Europeans do not just want protection from foreign technology, they want the chance to build their own.
This was a major rhetorical turning point. It drew visible reaction in the room and forced the debate to confront the gap between regulatory sophistication and technological production. Panelists later responded directly to his challenge, especially on scaling startups, talent, and European industrial capacity.
Speaker: João Gomes
Pari Esfandiari highlighted a contradiction in the very idea of digital sovereignty: sovereignty implies control and borders, while the Internet was built on openness and interdependence. She suggested the real question may be how Europe becomes resilient without contributing to fragmentation.
This was thought-provoking because it captured the central conceptual tension of the session in one clear formulation. It also warned that regulation without infrastructure and innovation can become merely ‘managed dependency.’
Her comment tied together the panel’s three guiding questions and gave coherence to the debate. It reinforced the need to distinguish resilience from digital nationalism and helped frame the later message that sovereignty should not mean isolation or fragmentation.
Speaker: Pari Esfandiari
Vittorio Bertola said it was time to ‘stop arguing on words and start acting immediately,’ insisting that Europe needs all tools—investment, procurement, industrial policy, regulation, and preference for European and open-source solutions in key sectors.
This was insightful because it challenged the discussion’s tendency to remain conceptual. His frustration exposed a recurring problem in policy forums: definitional debate can delay practical action.
This intervention shifted the tone from analytical to urgent and action-oriented. It pressured the room to think about implementation, not just framing, and resonated with the broader impatience voiced by younger and technically minded participants.
Speaker: Vittorio Bertola
Elonnai Hickok stressed that interoperability is essential, but warned against translating sovereignty into state control, overreach, or a ‘race to the bottom.’ She argued that Europe must center human rights not just in rhetoric but in how laws are implemented domestically and internationally.
This was insightful because it added a rights-based caution to a discussion that could easily drift toward strategic competition. She also usefully pointed out that different political systems can use similar language—such as user control or multi-stakeholderism—while meaning very different things in practice.
Her intervention added nuance and caution, pushing the conversation to distinguish Europe’s model not just by goals but by implementation and safeguards. It reinforced the need for a holistic approach and informed the final emphasis on human rights and avoiding fragmentation.
Speaker: Elonnai Hickok
Fabrizia Benini later responded that sovereignty is in fact the right word because the issue reaches into democracy itself: ‘if we don’t get it right we might not have European democracies to protect next time around.’
This was thought-provoking because it directly answered the autonomy-versus-sovereignty challenge with a forceful democratic justification. It made clear that, in her view, the severity of the political context requires stronger language.
This response helped close the definitional loop opened by Anna Neves and others. It clarified the Commission perspective and shaped the final synthesis, where sovereignty was retained but interpreted in a way that also accommodated openness, resilience, and autonomy.
Speaker: Fabrizia Benini
Peter Janssen, responding to João Gomes, pointed to everyday dependency choices like Gmail and argued that the real issue is awareness: people choose convenience without understanding the consequences, and Europe must get better at showing what those choices mean.
This was insightful because it brought the debate back from grand strategy to behavioral reality. It suggested that sovereignty is not only built by institutions but also undermined by millions of small consumer decisions shaped by convenience.
This comment deepened the discussion by linking structural dependency to user habits and market design. It complemented the industrial-policy discussion with a cultural and educational dimension: awareness, adoption, and willingness to choose European alternatives.
Speaker: Peter Janssen
Belen Luna warned that in talking about digital sovereignty, Europe must also question the business models it wants to support and be careful because the conversation can come ‘very, very close to far-right rhetoric.’
This was a striking late intervention because it introduced a political and ethical warning that had mostly remained implicit. She challenged the assumption that any European alternative is automatically desirable and insisted that values must shape not just ownership but business models.
Although brief, it complicated the closing phase of the discussion by reminding participants that sovereignty discourse can slide into exclusionary or nationalist politics. It reinforced the final message that digital sovereignty should not mean isolation, walls, or protectionism.
Speaker: Belen Luna
Overall Assessment

The discussion evolved from an institutional framing of digital sovereignty as a democratic necessity into a much richer and more contested conversation about language, power, implementation, and values. Early comments from Fabrizia Benini, Peter Janssen, and Frank Kruger established the main architecture of the debate: sovereignty as choice, control, resilience, open standards, and long-term capacity building rather than isolation. Anna Neves then triggered a major conceptual turn by challenging the word ‘sovereignty’ itself, which opened space for deeper reflection on whether Europe’s aim is sovereignty, autonomy, resilience, or some combination. Subsequent interventions significantly broadened the agenda: Francesco Vecchi introduced cognitive sovereignty and the digital public sphere; Vincent Tadday exposed the contradiction between European rhetoric and member-state behavior; Giacomo Mazzone and João Gomes forcefully argued that regulation without industrial alternatives is inadequate; Lea Rovcanin and Denis Nazarenko highlighted internal European inequality and sovereignty as institutional capacity under stress; and Pari Esfandiari and Elonnai Hickok clarified the tension between resilience and fragmentation. By the end, the conversation had moved far beyond a narrow policy discussion and became a multi-layered reflection on democracy, infrastructure, industrial policy, user behavior, openness, and geopolitical identity. The final messages clearly bore the imprint of these interventions, especially in their emphasis on resilience, strategic autonomy, cognitive sovereignty, open standards, human rights, and the rejection of isolationist interpretations of sovereignty.

Follow-up Questions
Is “digital sovereignty” the right term for Europe’s goals, or is “strategic autonomy”/“digital autonomy” more accurate?
Several participants challenged or defended the terminology itself. Clarifying the concept matters because the chosen term shapes policy framing, public legitimacy, and whether Europe’s approach is understood as openness with self-determination or as nationalism/protectionism.
Speaker: Anna Neves; Francesco Vecchi; Fabrizia Benini; Vittorio Bertola
How can Europe achieve digital sovereignty while preserving an open, global, interoperable internet and avoiding fragmentation?
This was a central unresolved tension in the session. It is important because Europe wants greater control and resilience without undermining open standards, cross-border coordination, multistakeholder governance, and the global nature of the internet.
Speaker: Fabrizia Benini; Valentina Stadnic; Pari Esfandiari; Elonnai Hickok; Jamal Shahin
Can European regulation alone deliver digital sovereignty, or what mix of regulation, industrial policy, procurement, infrastructure investment, and innovation support is actually needed?
Many speakers agreed regulation is necessary but insufficient. Further work is needed to determine the right policy mix so Europe does not remain dependent on foreign platforms, cloud, chips, and AI systems.
Speaker: Jamal Shahin; Giacomo Mazzone; Lea Rovcanin; Denis Nazarenko; Joao Gomes; Vittorio Bertola; Catalin Marinescu; Fabrizia Benini
How can Europe build and scale competitive European alternatives in cloud, AI, semiconductors, platforms, and digital infrastructure?
Participants repeatedly noted Europe’s weakness in scaling innovation and deploying domestic alternatives. This is important because without viable European options, sovereignty remains rhetorical and citizens and governments remain locked into non-European providers.
Speaker: Fabrizia Benini; Frank Kruger; Giacomo Mazzone; Joao Gomes; Catalin Marinescu
How should Europe define, procure, and facilitate uptake of a ‘sovereign cloud’?
Benini referenced the upcoming Cloud and AI Development Act and explicitly raised questions about what sovereign cloud means and how it can be procured. This is important because cloud dependence is a core strategic vulnerability for European public and private sectors.
Speaker: Fabrizia Benini
What role should open source and digital commons play in European digital sovereignty, and how should they be funded and maintained long term?
Open source was presented as a major European strength, but questions remain about governance, sustainability, maintenance, and whether policy should prioritize commons over ‘champions.’ This matters because critical infrastructure increasingly depends on underfunded open-source components and repositories.
Speaker: Frank Kruger; Fabrizia Benini; Francesco Vecchi; Miguel Vidal; Caroline (audience)
How can Europe create sustainable funding models for repositories and data resources used in AI and public-interest tools, especially for organizations contributing data?
Caroline highlighted that repositories are essential for AI development, but contributors such as fact-checkers are vulnerable to scraping and underfunded. Research is needed on sustainability and incentives so data ecosystems can support trustworthy European innovation.
Speaker: Caroline (audience)
What are the consequences of citizens’ convenience-driven choices—such as using Gmail and other dominant services—for European digital sovereignty, and how can awareness be improved?
Janssen stressed that people often choose convenience without understanding dependency costs. This is important because individual adoption patterns shape market power, data control, and whether European alternatives can survive.
Speaker: Peter Janssen
How can Europe include candidate countries and avoid creating a ‘two-speed digital Europe’ in which some countries shape the future while others remain dependent?
Rovcanin raised the explicit question of how Europe can claim digital sovereignty if parts of Europe remain digitally dependent within Europe itself. This matters for cohesion, enlargement policy, and the credibility of European digital ambitions beyond EU member states.
Speaker: Lea Rovcanin
How can Europe strengthen governments’ real governance capacity over digital systems—especially under crisis conditions—and what lessons can be drawn from Ukraine on resilience, interoperability, and continuity?
Nazarenko emphasized sovereignty as practical capacity under pressure rather than a formal status. This is important because attacks, supply disruptions, and crises expose whether public institutions can actually function securely and autonomously.
Speaker: Denis Nazarenko
How can Europe translate its strong research base and young talent into scaled European businesses instead of losing them to foreign investors?
Kruger and Gomes pointed to Europe’s innovation-to-scale gap. This is important because retaining and scaling talent is central to building competitive European providers rather than remaining a regulator of technologies built elsewhere.
Speaker: Frank Kruger; Joao Gomes
How can Europe support a truly European digital public sphere that protects citizens from manipulative algorithms and strengthens democracy and ‘cognitive sovereignty’?
Vecchi argued that autonomy is also cognitive, not only technological, and Paulo later reflected this in the draft messages. This matters because platform design, recommender systems, and information environments affect democratic agency and public discourse.
Speaker: Francesco Vecchi; Paulo Glowacki
What practical policy value does the Cannes Declaration on the Sovereignty of the Mind have for Europe’s digital sovereignty agenda?
Vecchi asked for the declaration to be reflected in the messages, indicating it as a basis for future work. This is important because it may provide a normative framework for addressing cognitive sovereignty and democratic resilience.
Speaker: Francesco Vecchi; Paulo Glowacki
How can cross-border coordination on standards, spectrum, disaster response, and cybersecurity be designed so that sovereignty and international cooperation reinforce each other rather than conflict?
Stadnic suggested this as a distinct conversation. It is important because many critical digital functions are inherently transnational, and Europe’s sovereignty depends on coordination mechanisms that do not weaken national or regional control.
Speaker: Valentina Stadnic
Are we still trying to preserve one global internet, or are we already moving toward competing geopolitical internets?
Esfandiari framed a deeper strategic question left unresolved by the panel. It is important because Europe’s policy choices may need to adapt depending on whether fragmentation is a risk to avoid or an emerging reality to manage.
Speaker: Pari Esfandiari
How should Europe define and support ‘Trusted European Platforms’ as alternatives to dominant non-European platforms?
Mazzone argued that regulation and portability rights require viable European alternatives and explicitly called for Trusted European Platforms to be included in the messages. This matters because citizens cannot meaningfully exercise choice without trustworthy substitutes.
Speaker: Giacomo Mazzone
How can Europe ensure that legal transposition and implementation across member states are operationally convergent rather than fragmented, especially under directives like NIS2?
Wittersheim pointed to disparities in national implementation that can disadvantage European operators. Research and policy follow-up are needed because internal fragmentation can undermine the very sovereignty Europe is trying to build.
Speaker: Arnaud Wittersheim
Would additional certification schemes help European businesses demonstrate compliance, trustworthiness, and sovereignty-related value?
Both touched on certification and oversight mechanisms as practical tools. This is important because clearer certification could help public procurement, market trust, and the visibility of providers aligned with European values and rules.
Speaker: Arnaud Wittersheim; Elonnai Hickok
How can Europe avoid reproducing harmful extractive business models in the name of sovereignty—for example creating ‘European big tech’ that still exploits data and privacy?
Luna warned that sovereignty should not simply mean building local equivalents of problematic platforms. This matters because the legitimacy of Europe’s model depends on aligning business models with democratic values, privacy, and human rights.
Speaker: Belen Luna
How can policymakers ensure that digital sovereignty narratives do not slide into far-right rhetoric or exclusionary nationalism?
Luna explicitly warned about the political risks of the discourse. This is important because the framing of sovereignty can affect democratic norms, inclusion, and whether the agenda remains grounded in rights and multistakeholder values.
Speaker: Belen Luna
What role should analog or non-digital fallback solutions play in cyber resilience and democratic inclusion?
Pitch noted this as a major missing point from the messages. It is important because resilience and democratic access may require non-digital alternatives when digital systems fail or when forced digitalization excludes some citizens.
Speaker: Alexander Pitch
How can Europe better connect policymakers and the private sector in order to implement sovereignty goals effectively?
Marinescu concluded that stronger links between business and policymakers are needed. This matters because implementation depends on the firms building, deploying, and operating the technologies that sovereignty policies target.
Speaker: Catalin Marinescu
How should Europe approach procurement so that public spending strengthens European, interoperable, rights-respecting solutions rather than deepening dependency?
Procurement emerged repeatedly as a practical lever. It is important because public authorities spend heavily on digital services and can use that demand to shape markets, standards, and the viability of European alternatives.
Speaker: Fabrizia Benini; Denis Nazarenko; Vittorio Bertola; Giacomo Mazzone
What should be the balance between supporting European ‘champions’ and investing directly in shared commons/open-source infrastructure?
Vidal directly challenged a champions-first framing, while others emphasized scale and trusted players. This is important because the answer affects industrial strategy, resilience, market structure, and whether public investment creates open ecosystems or concentrated power.
Speaker: Miguel Vidal; Frank Kruger; Giacomo Mazzone
How can Europe ensure platform independence and reduce lock-in in software and public administration systems?
Several participants highlighted interoperability, portability, and platform independence as urgent. This is important because lock-in weakens choice, raises switching costs, and undermines both public-sector autonomy and private-sector competitiveness.
Speaker: Catalin Marinescu; Fabrizia Benini; Peter Janssen
How can Europe act consistently in international negotiations and institutions so that external agreements do not undermine its own sovereignty objectives?
Hickok cited the UN Cybercrime Treaty as an example where EU positions may have implications for sovereignty and rights. This matters because Europe’s external posture can either reinforce or undercut its domestic digital sovereignty agenda.
Speaker: Elonnai Hickok

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