Meaningful Connectivity by Design - The Role of Technical Standards in Connecting the Unconnected

Dorothy Stanley argues that connectivity only matters if people can actually use it effectively, safely and affordably; simple access to a network is not enough. She presents technical standards as a practical foundation that converts high-level policy ambitions into interoperable systems and helps prevent dependence on a single vendor.

She explicitly says that a wireless, Wi-Fi or Ethernet connection alone is insufficient, and that connectivity must be usable, reliable, secure and affordable for participants . She ties this to real-world needs such as education, health care, business growth and participation in the digital economy . She then states that standards translate policy aspirations into implementable and interoperable technical solutions, provide common performance metrics, and enable systems from different vendors to work together, which is especially important to avoid vendor lock-in when connecting underserved communities .

Dorothy Stanley argues that exclusion from connectivity is driven by practical deployment barriers, not just by a lack of interest or demand. She highlights infrastructure shortages and affordability problems as key reasons why many communities remain unconnected or underserved.

She says too many people remain unconnected or underserved today . She identifies infrastructure gaps, specifically backhaul and power availability, as limiting deployment, and adds that affordability constraints slow adoption .

Dorothy Stanley argues that security must be built into connectivity planning from the outset. In her view, the right moment to think about protection is during initial network design, not after systems are already deployed.

When asked when to integrate security measures, she responds that security should be considered at the very beginning, specifically when the network is being designed .

Dorothy Stanley argues that connecting underserved communities should not rely on obsolete equipment, because old devices may function but are not secure against modern threats. She frames up-to-date hardware as part of maintaining a proper security posture.

She refers to studies showing that newer generations of home routers and similar equipment have stronger security capabilities than older generations . She warns that 20-year-old equipment may still work but cannot be expected to withstand current threats, and therefore recommends deploying new, up-to-date routers with firewalls and other modern protections .

Dr. Carl Gahnberg argues that open standards are essential because they bridge the gap between technical design and public policy aims such as bringing more people online. He presents standards as a core part of the open Internet model that allows varied technologies and networks to participate in a broader interoperable system.

He explains that the Internet Society’s mission remains rooted in open standards and in supporting the IETF, which develops much of the open Internet’s standards, while working with bodies such as IEEE . He says the key issue is connecting technical specifications to policy goals for bringing people online . He also notes that the Internet supports a broad range of connectivity technologies and business models because many different kinds of networks can become part of the broader Internet .

Dr. Carl Gahnberg offers a framework for understanding why people remain offline, arguing that barriers should be seen as interconnected rather than isolated. He groups them into regulation, infrastructure, affordability, and digital literacy or trust, and suggests that meaningful solutions must account for how these factors depend on one another.

He says the barriers are interconnected and have dependencies across them rather than being clear-cut categories . He then explicitly lists four areas: regulatory barriers, infrastructure barriers, affordability, and digital literacy and empowerment .

Dr. Carl Gahnberg argues that many regulatory systems are still designed around large telecom operators and therefore fail to accommodate smaller or community-based providers. This can unintentionally exclude non-profit and local connectivity models through licensing and spectrum rules that were not designed with them in mind.

He says regulators often still assume connectivity is provided by large traditional telecom operators, which causes smaller providers to be overlooked . He gives examples of barriers such as licensing regimes, requirements for becoming an ISP, spectrum allocation and auction costs . He also points to community-centred connectivity and notes that in some countries non-profit networks cannot get operating licences because there is no suitable licensing model for them .

Dr. Carl Gahnberg argues that one practical measure regulators can take is to ensure licence-free or flexible spectrum access for Wi-Fi and community networks. This would allow communities to deploy local mesh networks using open standards without being blocked by outdated spectrum and usage rules.

In response to what regulators should do first, he says a concrete example is to ensure there is licence-free spectrum for Wi-Fi and related connectivity models . He explains the difference between licensed and unlicensed spectrum and describes Wi-Fi as a short-range, ‘polite’ technology well suited to community mesh deployment . He then notes that in some places certain bands are not licence-free, or are licence-free only for private rather than public or cost-recovery use, which prevents small community NGOs from legally using Wi-Fi to provide connectivity .

Dr. Carl Gahnberg argues that connectivity depends not just on access networks but also on broader interconnection infrastructure. He highlights Internet exchange points as a cost-saving and efficiency-improving mechanism because they let local networks exchange traffic directly instead of routing it internationally.

He says infrastructure should be understood as an ecosystem that includes access networks, backhaul and interconnection between networks . He identifies Internet exchange points as neutral physical locations where operators can interconnect . As an example, he describes cases in which an email sent across town had to cross national borders and even route through Europe before returning to an African country because local interconnection was absent, showing how local exchange points reduce unnecessary cost and inefficiency .

Dr. Carl Gahnberg argues that community-based models can provide an important first stage of access where commercial operators do not see a profitable case. He also suggests these models can create proof of demand that eventually attracts larger infrastructure investment.

He says the Internet Society advocates community-centred connectivity in which local communities build their own networks and connect them to the broader Internet . He later explains that Wi-Fi mesh networks may not be the end state for a community, but can serve as an entry point . He adds that once a community demonstrates internet use through such a network, larger operators may see a viable business case and decide to invest in more extensive infrastructure there .

Dr. Carl Gahnberg argues that online safety requires both secure technologies and users who understand the environment they are entering. He links cyber resilience to digital literacy, trust and the ability to identify manipulation and fraud.

He says digital literacy includes not only practical skills but also trust and understanding, especially for people whose first online experiences may involve scams or harm . In answering the cyber resilience question, he points to cryptographic methods for authenticating websites and encryption for communications as important technical protections . He also stresses that local capacity building and training are needed so communities can engage safely online and build confidence in using the internet .

Dr. Carl Gahnberg argues that even strong technical security will never be enough on its own, because many attacks target people rather than systems. He therefore emphasises ongoing user education and sceptical judgement as a necessary part of safe connectivity.

He says no system can ever be 100% secure and that this makes user capacity building essential . He explains that some attacks rely on social manipulation rather than technical weakness, noting that strong encryption cannot help if someone is tricked into handing over their keys . He concludes that users should continuously question whether something online is trustworthy rather than assuming that up-to-date technology alone guarantees safety .

Purva Rajkotia argues that standards matter not only because they define how technologies work, but because they enable technologies to be deployed widely and interoperate across contexts. He contrasts this with fragmented proprietary systems, which he says cannot achieve comparable global scale.

He says IEEE SA not only defines how technology works but also how it scales, and argues that technology is only useful if it is actually deployed rather than remaining on paper . He supports this with deployment figures for IEEE standards, citing 20 billion Wi-Fi 6/6E devices, around 7 billion Ethernet devices, 1.5 billion fixed wireless devices using 802.16, and close to 400 million time-sensitive networking devices . He then explicitly states that fragmented proprietary solutions will not achieve this kind of scale deployment and highlights the importance of consensus-driven standards .

Purva Rajkotia argues that the persistence of large-scale disconnection shows how severe digital exclusion remains. He frames this as especially troubling because connectivity is often treated as a fundamental human right, yet billions of those who would benefit most still lack access.

He says that 2.9 billion people, about one-third of the world’s population, are still without connectivity . He adds that these are often the people who would benefit the most from connectivity, underscoring the scale and injustice of the exclusion .

Purva Rajkotia presents CR Bolo as a practical model for connecting underserved populations through community-based design rather than top-down infrastructure roll-out. He argues that the model works because it reuses available infrastructure, supports local language access, enables two-way communication and builds local ownership so the network can be maintained and replicated.

He says CR Bolo combines community-based networks with affordable digital technologies such as Wi-Fi to deliver information and services to people with limited or no internet access . He explains that the project first assesses each region and leverages existing local infrastructure rather than relying solely on large new deployments . He also says the model enables two-way communication, allows users to ask questions and access services in local languages, and seeks to train communities so they ultimately own, run and maintain the network themselves .

Purva Rajkotia argues that remote connectivity solutions must be designed around local realities, especially low population density, limited finances and weak or absent energy infrastructure. He suggests that solutions which ignore these conditions will fail in the places that most need connectivity.

He says the project in Odisha tried to use as much existing infrastructure as possible because meaningful connectivity is constrained by financial limitations . He notes that large operators often lack an economic incentive to deploy advanced mobile technologies in villages with only around 100 residents, because the return on investment is too low . He therefore argues for low-cost, community-led and replicable solutions, and later adds that some CR Bolo deployment areas do not even have electricity, making energy efficiency and adaptation to a greenfield environment essential .

Purva Rajkotia argues that standards-based technologies improve cyber resilience because they come with established security features. At the same time, he recognises that these features are only a starting point and cannot guarantee total protection against every threat.

He says standards-based solutions should be deployed because technologies such as Wi-Fi already include security features including authentication, encryption and network resilience . He then cautions that this does not provide 100% reliability, but it does create a foundation on which additional protections can be built as new threats emerge .

Karen Mulberry argues that standards are important, but they are only one part of what is needed to connect underserved communities. She places them within a wider toolkit of approaches that must work together to make local connectivity possible.

She says open standards should be viewed as an implementation pathway and only part of a broader toolkit needed to enable local connectivity . She explicitly links this to Carl’s point that many different aspects need to work together to make connectivity happen .

Karen Mulberry argues that the connectivity debate should remain grounded in the actual conditions communities face and in practical responses to those conditions. She frames the panel as an effort to identify useful tools, toolkits and approaches rather than abstract principles alone.

After Carl’s intervention, she says he has described the environment and landscape faced in trying to develop tools, toolkits and approaches to connect the unconnected . This framing shows her emphasis on practical responses to the existing barrier landscape .

Karen Mulberry argues that regulators should approach standards not as abstract technical matters but as practical tools for enabling deployment. Her question to the panel frames regulation as a concrete starting point for turning standards into action.

She asks how a regulator should take a concrete step to enable connectivity and what they should do to get started . This question follows her earlier point that open standards are an implementation pathway within a broader toolkit , showing that she sees standards as something regulators can use practically.

Karen Mulberry argues that demonstration initiatives such as CR Bolo are useful because they show how standards can be applied in real deployment settings. She also links these projects to broader development aims, including infrastructure-related sustainable development goals.

She describes CR Bolo as demonstrating a pathway and the application of a standard . She says it provides a roadmap to implement connectivity and create an opportunity to show progress on a sustainable development goal related to infrastructure by 2030 .

The audience member argues that extending connectivity also enlarges the attack surface for cybercrime and cyber threats. The point is that connectivity programmes should not treat access and cyber resilience as separate issues, because newly connected communities and institutions may become vulnerable immediately.

The audience member says that once communities are connected and their connectivity improves, this creates a new playing field for cybercrime and cyber threats .

The audience member frames cybersecurity not only as a risk but also as an area where technical standards might help improve resilience. The concern is especially focused on community institutions such as health and financial services, which may become exposed once connectivity expands.

The audience member asks Carl and Purva to identify one opportunity and one challenge that technical standards provide for improving cyber resilience in newly connected communities and local institutions, specifically naming health and financial services .

The audience member asks at what stage security should be introduced in the connectivity process, acknowledging a perceived tension between protection and rapid expansion. The concern is to ensure that security-by-design supports inclusion rather than delaying or obstructing access.

The audience member asks at what moment in connecting the unconnected it becomes appropriate to start thinking about security measures, noting the clash between security and advancement without obstacles . The question also explicitly asks how to ensure that security does not keep people unconnected, even if protection must be part of a process .