AI Algorithms and the Future of Global Diplomacy

Institute. Then we have Raphael Leuner, Data Scientist at the German Federal Foreign Office. We have Dr. Shahani Yaktiyami, Senior Officer, Technology Program at the German Marshall Fund. And we have Norman Schulz, Consulate at the Coordination Staff, AI and Digital Technologies at the German Foreign Office. And to kick off the conversation today, so we will cover both AI as a topic and as a tool, I would like to first start with a tool. So going to Raphael, who is a Data Scientist, how do you use AI in the Foreign Office? And I also know that you have data labs, data and AI labs in the Foreign Office. So could you maybe share a little bit of your day -to -day work?

And yeah, actually, how could AI be used in diplomacy?

Yeah, thanks so much. Yeah, maybe to get to take a step back and answer the question, how like someone like me as a as a data scientist by training ends up in a foreign ministry. I think that’s something that at least when we talk to colleagues around the world is still rather rare. We had kind of the lucky coincidence that I think in 2021, the German government decided to start data labs in all of its federal ministries. And so in the coming years since then, 2022 or until 2022, kind of 16 data labs have been founded in the German federal government. And I was lucky enough to be part of the one in the German federal foreign office. Yeah.

And I was working on AI ever since we started more on traditional data science, I would say. So tearing down data silos between governments or government institutions, in Germany and, of course… And ever since JetGPT and the AI revolution, we have been working mostly on AI tools. And I think the big advantage that we see is that we are in the ministry itself and have very, very short contacts and short paths to our colleagues who are working in Berlin and, of course, all around the world. And I believe in a field that is as fast moving as AI, that is so important because it doesn’t really work to develop these tools in sort of a traditional IT way of doing things, right?

We used to have IT development projects that take two years, have huge teams, cost a lot of money, but that are just not fast enough to deliver on an AI solution that our colleagues, our colleagues are experiencing themselves in their private lives, right? And some of them even… some official aspects. So what we think is the big advantage that we have and what we kind of from our experience would always advertise for is kind of this fast co -creation from within an organization. And I think that is for a topic like diplomacy that is the best way of leveraging AI. And I’m happy to go into more detail about that.

Thank you. And I will later ask you more on concrete use cases. But first, I would like to switch to the geopolitical dimension. So Sharini, switching over to you. Taking a step back, AI is now in the political landscape more or less present everywhere. From the Arctis, but also here at the Summit. Can you give us a broader picture? How is AI shaping diplomacy or foreign policy in general? What is the debate and where are we at the moment?

Thank you. Thank you for the question and also the invitation to be here, which is actually also me being in my home country. So you’ve invited me to my home country, which is an interesting space to be in. But at the broader sort of geopolitical level, AI is shaping not only sort of how we use technology in our strategic communication as countries as well, but as a tool of technology diplomacy. And I don’t necessarily think this is particularly new. Throughout the history of international relations and foreign policy, technology has always shaped our foreign policy. So this is the AI revolution. But if we take it back to the Industrial Revolution, if we take it back to the nuclear revolution, if we take it back to the space race, technology has always informed diplomacy.

And today it is artificial intelligence. So the technology is not new. Yes. But the tactics aren’t. And today we are here at the AI Summit, and this is also India’s way of communicating that it is being a part of a particular technological revolution, which in its previous histories, because of colonial encounters and things, we’ve been excluded. So in this space, this is a way in which countries from our parts of the world are also trying to kind of claim a space in global technology diplomacy. And this is through AI. And what I would also kind of want to just qualify is what we’re seeing in this particular sort of AI race is narratives of competition.

So if you look at sort of policy documents coming out of the United States, coming out of China, there’s a clear connection between kind of winning an AI race or securing leadership in artificial intelligence. And if you are a country of that size and you are the country that has, invented the frontier technology and you’ve been sort of the first movers in that. if a kind of geopolitical leverage which countries like Germany and India perhaps don’t have because we aren’t at that frontier capability but that being said we’re not powerless we just have a different form of power expressing power and that is when the entire middle power conversation comes into play both India and Germany can see themselves are in fact arguably middle powers and they have different ways of using their specific leverage on an AI value chain as geopolitical leverage so for Germany historically this has been through rules and through regulation and regulatory power for India now it is making a case for applications so India and we’ve seen the fact that the summit has changed from the AI action summit which was the French presidency now is seeing India framing it as the impact summit the slogans of the summit are very very much to do with aspirations to deployment or aspirations to impact.

So that is really a way in which a middle power like India is also trying to kind of claim its position on the stack. So what you’re seeing are the great powers who are competing at the frontier level, and then there are middle powers who are claiming their specific power on the value chain in different ways. And I’ll stop there for a second.

Thank you very much. And I would like to pick up this statement that you said. But the tech is new, but the tactics aren’t. So I have here a diplomat sitting next to me. Would you agree with the statement? And how do you govern AI in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? And would you say, is this still the right approach to AI?

Oh, well, the short answer would be no. But the topic is so broad that obviously I could give you a four -hour talk about it. But as a diplomat, as you said, one has to start by saying that the AI Impact Summit here in Delhi, where we are all gathered, showcases the broad variety of AI and the broad picture that AI is now part of every day’s life, of all strands of life. That it is a tool in communication. It is a tool in agriculture, in industrial entrepreneurship, in finance, and also in diplomacy and foreign policy. So I find that very interesting what you alluded to, that we have these revolutions all the time. like the Industrial Revolution, like the nuclear revolution after the Second World War?

And where do the foreign ministries, where do foreign policy comes in? I mean, the technological revolution created frontrunners like the UK, maybe a little bit like France. But there was a point in time when people saw that only being at the front and adapting the frontier models is not the way to success. But we have to find a way to regulate things because otherwise people will lose their lives. It’s not work safe. It’s polluting the environment. Even back then, there was a problem. Nuclear power, the same thing. There was a race in the 50s. And the Cuba crisis beginning at the 60s showed to the world that the nuclear race could not go on like it was.

But we need international cooperation to mitigate somehow the risks of it. And I think AI is at a similar point. Maybe it needs a couple of more years when the U .S. and China will actively come together and work out what limitations and regulations we have to put on the technology because the risks in the end are outweighing possible and potential benefits. And the other great question is where do the middle powers come in? And this is what India and Germany are talking about. Well, we had the speech of Mark Carney, the Canadian Prime Minister in Davos, where he actively called for the middle power cooperation. And he said, well, we don’t have the power to do that.

I think India is at a one. wonderful place because you are a digital powerhouse and you have all the structures and all the workforce to also become an AI powerhouse. I would also make the case that Germany has also some advantages. We have infrastructure, we have the money to invest into AI, and we also have industrial data to be a frontrunner. Even if we didn’t succeed at the stage of large language models, maybe when it comes to robotics and embodied AI, Germany will still have a role to play. And obviously we at the Foreign Office are there to accompany the development of this and to prepare. Prepare the ground for international cooperation. And I believe it at that because others…

thank you thank you i would like to turn now to the printing perspective um the pranav institute works at the intersection of emerging technology public policy and society from an india first perspective um how do you see um how do you see potential room for cooperation between india and germany like we hear now the middle power those are middle power i hear a lot at the summit that india is leading in a ai adoption um i wouldn’t say so maybe in germany maybe my german colleagues would agree or disagree with me but from your perspective where do you see cooperation like potential cooperation could you also go a step back and um explain to the audience where you see india at the moment maybe also in light of the ai summit

yeah can you hear me i think that’s a very challenging question to answer. Where is India at? India is at a very interesting place, certainly. India is not lagging behind. India is not yet at a place where we can build frontier models. I think the infrastructure capacity for that is very high. I do see some interesting innovation coming out of India. When we saw those 14 models that was released over 14 days and very, very interesting in the sense that this is innovation which is grounded, contextual. It is coming from the grassroots. You are able to find native language use cases. You are able to do inference at scale at much an order of magnitude cheaper costs.

So, you are seeing technical innovation which is more context appropriate coming from India. There is, of course, a large workforce which is talented in technology and there is an upscaling possibility that certainly exists when into AI and that is a very large pipeline. So I think India is a very interesting place. India is adopting, India is innovating, India is building applications and use cases, which is a very useful way to think about the technology in its early stages, right? Because there is a huge possibility of investment booms and busts that can come in when you go in a technologically challenging direction without being adaptive. So I think the focus on saying what can we solve is a very useful way to think.

I think the counselor did allude to industrial AI. That’s a fantastic use case of cooperation where you and India could possibly, Indo -German cooperation would certainly work out in that sense because there is industrial expertise, there is automation expertise in Germany, there is industrial data. India has the capability to build technology, build models. So I think if we were to identify and not worry about the race for frontier models, because transformers are not going to be the same. They’re not going to be the only technology paradigm out there and not play the game that leading powers are, but to really think as middle powers do as Sharon said and say that can we focus on sectoral expertise?

For example, AI in healthcare is a fantastic opportunity for. Indo -German cooperation, there is fantastic data available. India performs 10 times the number of surgeries that other countries do. So there’s very interesting data available. Germany has the capacity to invest. Can we cooperate? Germany has expertise in automation. India has, you know, people who can build AI models. Can we cooperate? So I think there is possibility for bilateral cooperation that, you know, gives an argument that is more than one plus one in the case of some of these. And I don’t think it’s a zero -sum game that U .S. is winning or China is winning and they’re all left behind. I think the focus on applications is really where a differentiator is possible, and that need not come at frontier -level costs.

Thank you. And I would like to focus now on this application side because this is maybe the way to react to big tech or like us as a country being in the middle between these mentioned countries. Rafa, can I hand over to you to share a little bit how you have the foreign office approach? I know that you are working on it. It’s a negotiation tool. And to what extent can open source also be a solution or might be a solution? to the situation where we are at the moment.

Sure. Yeah, so I think it’s exactly as you said, that the focus is on application. We have made a consequential, but I think important decision at the beginning that when we are implementing AI, we are focusing for most of what we do on open source technologies, not just the models themselves, but also a lot of the kind of scaffolding and applications around it. So on the one hand, for example, we are reusing applications that, for example, come from one of our state governments who have done like kind of a general chat and knowledge -based application that we are reusing. But of course, we have specific applications in the foreign office like supporting negotiations. A lot of what diplomats nowadays do is not necessarily sitting in rooms and negotiating face -to -face, but actually digging through huge piles of documents and…

trying to understand the positions of other countries, the impact that NGOs, academia, corporations bring into huge negotiation processes. And, of course, that’s, as we probably all know, is a great chance for artificial intelligence to leverage. I think one important point when we’re talking about AI and open source AI in governments is that we have seen a big trend shift or a shift in the trend last year where we have seen that a lot of the kind of leading open source AI models and actually also the ones that have been adopted in many parts of the world are coming from China nowadays. I think that’s an interesting intersection between my position as a technical observer here where we are looking at the numbers and seeing that really, like, you know, the world is adopting Chinese AI models at the moment.

And, of course, the consequences that that might bring for a country like Germany or a country like Europe. Like India on a global scale, if maybe… some of our partners are implementing Chinese AI models. So that is something that when it comes to open source, I think it’s really important that countries like India, and I think India is at a great position, and I’m super excited to see these new Indian AI models as well, these Indian LLMs, to see if there can be pushes that offer alternatives to these Chinese models.

Thank you. I would like to come back to this impact aspect. Now we heard impact in the public sector, but maybe also reflecting on the summit, AI Impact Summit. What are your thoughts on how will we now continue the conversation regarding impact, regarding really being concrete and not only writing governance formats or governance frameworks, so how can we make this cooperation very concrete and also continue where we are and face this geopolitical challenge

Shoni, yeah I like that all the geopolitical questions then somehow come back to me but I don’t blame you because my background is in international relations so that serves very well this purpose but I want to kind of also connect your point to what you just said about open source and the China connection I think we’re reaching a stage in international relations in which geopolitics and technology can’t be separated when we are integrating artificial intelligence into our daily life and into our government systems we can’t really separate the security risks that come with it And I think every country has a unique security situation. For Germany, obviously, there is the concern with Ukraine. With India, we have border security challenges as well.

We have territorial disputes that are very significant and have very serious national security implications. So the kind of technology we deploy into our systems, and if it’s open source Chinese models or any other form where we perceive or any country would perceive a national security risk, that needs to be factored in. And that is why even in our technology decisions, they have to factor geopolitical risk, which back in the day was not something that, say, companies would have to do. But now every single company that I see has now a position for a geopolitical risk advisor. And that really comes from the fact that we are living in a world in which if we are using technologies so seriously in our lives, lives, we do need to factor in how those technologies can be weaponized in a particular geopolitical situation.

And then that kind of brings me back to also some of the points that were on, you said, you know, where we, you, foreign office would like find it helpful for reports to be kind of processed to AI. As a think tank, I think I’m a little bit hurt, I have to say, because a lot of our work is producing a lot of those reports, but we will force you to read them. We’re very persistent at the German Marshall Fund. We will reach out and invite you and make you read them. But jokes aside, it is really, we’re aware also that our ability to consume information as well is kind of becoming shorter, but the world is getting more complex.

And therefore, we are also kind of preparing, even in the think tanking that we do, even in the way in which we kind of do our daily jobs, to factor in that. There will be an AI in this system, and we kind of need to put that into consideration as well.

and since there will be an AI in the system we have to make sure that we can trust this AI and that it’s also inclusive and that it’s yeah ethical in a sense or trustworthy regarding to standards so how do you and the government react to this could you also share more about the global digital compact and what is this panel about this scientific panel I think it’s called and how do we make sure that from this governance it goes to the system to the AI system like how do we make sure that the systems are aligned with our values

well that’s big question the best way to align the systems with our values is to develop to develop them ourselves right and not just procure them from from outside and I couldn’t agree more with the point that you made about the Chinese models, that even if it is open source, even if it runs on our servers, there are still Chinese models. They still have the Chinese ways and the Chinese ways of thinking, which comes through maybe not all the time. So using AI to do diplomatic work will not be the way because then every report will be the same, right? So I hope that Germany will not go the way to write the diplomatic reports now only using AI or summarizing it.

But we need our diplomats to insert that innovative thinking. And innovative thinking does not come from AI. Because AI… AI is much rather replicating, summarizing, in my understanding. The new ideas still come from the human side. As far as I make it out. Global digital compact. Thanks for the question. The Foreign Office was the lead in Germany to negotiate the global digital compact. And obviously you can make a point that this is a UN compact and the UN system is under immense pressure at the moment. So what does it achieve? And I would make the point that despite all that, it has at least produced two valuable avenues for future cooperation and discussion, two platforms.

The first is the AI panel. I think it’s called Independent Scientific International Panel on AI, but I could be wrong with the two I’s. It’s rather complicated. But it was just yesterday that the UN Secretary General made the point that the AI panel and the second one, the dialogue I will come to in a second, are the two major things where the UN is coming into the picture. And the panel has the task to put our discussions that we have on a global level about AI on a scientific basis. So those are experts, and I’m happy that there are two experts from Germany on the panel. Only the U .S. and China have also two experts.

I’m terribly sorry. I don’t know how many Indian experts are on the panel. But we’ll find. We’ll find that out. True. So they will produce a first report, a summary of where the AI science is now standing in time for the first global dialogue on AI governance, which will happen in July in Geneva in the margins or back to back with the AI for Good Summit at the International Telecommunications Union. And this dialogue serves the other big purpose of the Global Digital Compact, which is to make the AI discussion inclusive. And so it’s also the UN Secretary General nonetheless that said that AI cannot be a discussion among the few, the ones that are the front runners like the US and China.

They should not be the one to they should not. Not be the only one to set the rules, but it has to be a truly inclusive discussion about the AI. Up until now, more than 100 countries were not part of this discussion because they were not members of the European Union, not members of the Council of Europe, not members of the G7 or the G20. But they are the ones that will use AI, that will adapt AI, and they will also feel the bad results if AI is not doing what it is supposed to do. So it’s good that they have a voice at the table, that all UN member states will in July come together and talk about AI on the scientific base that the panel has provided.

So that is something that the Global Literature Compact is doing. And, of course, we can talk about geopolitics all the time, but I think that’s a way forward. And it’s to make a point. And I stop here and make a point.

Thank you. Thank you. And, Jian, let me turn to you now. And the fact that there is not a zero -sum game in a lot of this. I think the idea that we can work together to bring a larger voice beyond the worries of two countries or three countries which are able to compete at the top. I think that’s something that they shared. And I think the role of middle powers in bringing a more inclusive conversation is really important. And I think Indo -German cooperation is an opportunity for that. Including, for example, industrial AI that the counsellor mentioned or other opportunities where we can practically create tools like what Rafael is also talking about. Where we can practically create tools that are beneficial and maybe open source.

Why should open source models only come from strategically challenging sources? There could be Indo -German open source models, smaller models, not frontier models that could be beneficial.

Yeah, I can maybe react to that directly because I think it’s super critical. I don’t think some people believe or make us believe that the AI race is already over or kind of only being decided between the US and China. I don’t believe that. I think we’re more at the start of what’s going to come. And I think we can feel this at the summit. And Gunda, you asked the question, what comes next? I think next comes building and implementing AI in all these kind of fields that we have. I think we see so many ideas around here and first steps towards that. But we don’t really see widespread AI adoption in every field, in every kind of part of life.

I do think this is going to happen over the next five years. And I don’t believe for a second that this is only going to be done by the U .S. or China. And, yeah, I think that when it comes to middle powers, Germany, India, I think we are going to see much closer collaboration in like smaller groups that don’t try to kind of, you know, build dependence, right, making you dependent on us, making us dependent on you, but rather ensure that every country can bring to the table what they are particularly good at and make the results kind of improve the application of AI for everybody involved. I do think there is a strategy for that.

And I think, yeah, the way forward you have asked is to start with it and to build AI together. I think this is a great, you know, a great rally cry for

Yeah, yeah, please.

Rafal, you led me on to a very interesting trail, so I had to intervene. I think one of the interesting moments, if you think about technology again, in the 1990s was the open source revolution, right? And when you really saw operating systems, consider the frontier technology of that time being built by volunteers at a fraction of the cost. diffuse the race in a certain way or diffuse the dominance in a certain way, but also enabled accessibility across the world. So I think even coming together as middle powers, the power of open source and democratizing and reducing the factor costs of access to AI, it becomes very powerful if you draw from it. And now you led me on to a trail as well.

I just want to kind of contextualize the sovereignty thing as well.

And I do think that when we talk about artificial intelligence, it’s not just one application that we see when we use our phones or interact with a particular model, right? It’s an entire stack. And the question of sovereignty or the concerns vis -a -vis the sovereignty debate is also born out of geopolitics, right? So we don’t want to be as a particular country in which suddenly one day we wake up and our technology is not available to us because, because of something else that happened in another country. corner of the world. So the sovereignty debate is coming out of geopolitics as well. That being said, we don’t need to be beholden to it. I fully agree.

And I really like the point on us understanding what our strengths are. I mean, Germany had a high -tech strategy that came out last year. There’s also an emphasis on Germany being a space for data as a data hub. And India is trying to do that as well. Germany already has that. One of the things China is really good at actually is industrial data, because they have been collecting this data for a very long time because they automated quicker than a lot of us. And that’s something where we can collectively build competitiveness. So I do think we need to reset some of the inequalities in the AI stack and that sovereignty, as much as I kind of understand where that comes from, I don’t always think that that’s the…

best language to talk about where we are at. I do think we need more sophisticated and nuanced ways of kind of talking about a managed interdependence where I have a certain value on an AI stack. That is my strength. And the likelihood of you weaponizing that makes it very limited. So that’s why I have leverage. And I do think leveraging a country’s strength on a specific AI stack is a prominent and powerful middle power strategy.

Thank you. These are all beautiful closing remarks, but I would like to open the floor to the audience. Are there any questions? Yes, everyone around.

Hi, I’m Sreeni. I’m a student at Ashoka University. I have a question for everyone in the panel. Feel free to. answer. The question is, what are some parts of foreign policy research, decision making and implementation which can be automated by AI or that will use a significant uses of AI to sort of do your day -to -day tasks?

Maybe I can quickly answer this question. Well, I certainly don’t think that AI will make any decision in any time soon. So there’s always going to be the human that is making the decision. And it’s not going to be me. It’s not going to be my boss. It’s going to be a collaborative decision by the government and the legislature and all of that. But our job will also not go away. We will use AI to make our job easier to consume data, to consume, I would like to say information, but it’s nothing. Consuming information easier, quicker and which in turn will free diplomats to do the other time, which is connecting, which is connecting the dots, which is thinking out innovative ways of cooperation, which is, it’s basically like drinking coffee and shaking hands.

These start traveling to India and learn a lot about the situation here. So, AI will free us from tedious tasks of skipping through these very valuable documents written by not only NGOs, but also governments, and will make our lives easier, but our work will not go away. Thank you.

Okay, one more question. The lady maybe in the back.

Hi, I’m Sanjeevni, and I work in radio journalism in the UK. And my question was for you, Norman. So, specifically, So, Norman and Sharini, both of you, actually. So, you guys are doing your Masters in Journalism. I was studying about how journalists were framing the Russia -Ukraine war. And we were observing how the narratives were changing based on different outlets. But something when we were talking about how AI is coming into play, do you think AI will help change narratives for the better? And I’m not speaking from journalism point of view. In general, geopolitically, do you think the narratives will be framed in a way that’s unbiased? Or how do you think it will help in that?

I don’t take a stab. I’d be very curious to point a question, actually, to you, because one of the things I’ve been really intrigued in in my line of work is how AI has been being deployed in the media and newsrooms. And I’d be very interested to have a chat after to learn how you’re doing that in terms of methodology. But to your question on AI shaping, I think it’s a great question. narratives, I would not let AI shape narratives. I would hope we shape narratives as human beings, depending on sort of what we think and feel and analyze through empirical evidence about the world. And I would be very worried in a world in which AI, we allow AI the space to shape narratives, especially on geopolitics, because then that would depend upon what that particular AI model that is doing the narrative shaping has been trained on.

But that being said, I would also see how AI can do the harm in terms of amplifying incorrect narratives or geopolitically challenging narratives. And that’s when we know that AI cannot replace society and it cannot do. So I do think that we are in a world in which if AI, we allow AI to shape narratives, that’s not a world we want to live in. Thank you. but at the same time, if it is a world in which that can happen, we need to find the right mitigation strategies to do that. One thing that I know India is doing, Shyam, we talked about it earlier, which is these bias detection technologies that are critical. AI is a technology that, on one hand, we do need strong regulation to make sure that we can prevent the harms from doing what they can, but at the same time, we need also technological tools to deal with some of those harms and push a democratic innovation as well in AI for exactly these harms.

And I’ll stop there.

Just one sentence. If you let AI write the newspapers, they are becoming incredibly dull because it’s going to be repetitive all the time. But I agree with your point about bias. This is something that we all have to challenge and to face. And AI is helping us. That’s a good thing. AI is not only a risk, it’s also the opportunity, helping us detect bias and then contravene it. Thank you.

Just one sentence I want to add because I found your point so important. I don’t see any risk that AI is going to shape the narratives itself somehow, but of course it’s an incredible tool for actors trying to shape narratives. And we have seen this on so many fronts already. We have colleagues in the foreign office who are actually monitoring this and seeing that it’s, for example, used to amplify certain messages across social media, increasingly now across faked websites that, with the help of AI, you can pull up in seconds and suddenly you don’t have one of them or two of them, but you have thousands of them. And that is something that AI has already used quite heavily as a tool of certain actors who are trying to influence geopolitical discussions in exactly that way.

Sorry, we are running out of time, but I’m sure that the speakers stay here a little bit. So thank you for listening to our panel discussion. Maybe a big applause. Thank you.