From Negotiation to Implementation: Reimagining the IGF in the WSIS+20 Era

Anriette Esterhuysen argues that stronger government participation in the IGF is necessary if multistakeholder policymaking is to have real effect at national level, particularly in Global South contexts. She stresses that this should not mean symbolic appearances by officials, but practical engagement on concrete policy challenges in an open and multidisciplinary setting.

She explicitly says that, from a Global South perspective, government presence in the IGF is "absolutely essential" because without meaningful government participation it will be impossible to achieve multistakeholder engagement at national level . She also warns against reducing this to a high-level display of officials "boasting" about national achievements, and instead calls for open, honest, multidisciplinary and multistakeholder engagement on specific government challenges .

Anriette Esterhuysen argues that the IGF should not become a negotiating forum and should continue valuing dialogue as its core function. However, she says that more meaningful policy outputs will only emerge if the forum changes its structure and works through more in-depth, longitudinal and synthesised processes rather than relying mainly on conventional session formats.

She states that outcomes will not improve unless the format changes, and criticises the continued reliance on open forums, workshops and main sessions because it is difficult to extract meaningful messages from such a large set of reports . She further explains that the resulting outputs are too general for real policymakers, and proposes longer-term work, deeper research through intersessional modalities, and synthesis sessions around priority topics instead of negotiated outcomes .

Anriette Esterhuysen proposes a more structured exchange between the global IGF and NRIs, where the global level formulates concrete policy questions and regional and national processes help develop responses. She emphasises that the value of this process lies in surfacing different policy options from across stakeholder groups rather than manufacturing artificial agreement.

She gives a concrete example of a policy question: how a small and relatively disempowered country can regulate large corporations operating in its jurisdiction with little leverage . She suggests sending such a question to NRIs and policy networks, gathering input from researchers, advocates, regulators and companies, and then having the secretariat synthesise the resulting diverse perspectives into proposals without creating false consensus .

Anriette Esterhuysen argues that stronger IGF outcomes depend not only on process design but also on institutional capacity. In her view, the secretariat must be better resourced so it can process and synthesise inputs from across the IGF ecosystem into useful policy options.

When describing how issue-specific input could flow from NRIs and policy networks back to the global IGF, she says this requires a secretariat with the capacity to do the synthesis and explicitly adds that it needs more staff to perform that role . She also earlier identified secretariat sustainability, institutional management and capacity as one of the four central issues in reimagining the IGF after WSIS+20 .

Anriette Esterhuysen argues that the IGF should use its permanent status to become bolder and address politically difficult questions rather than avoid them. She particularly highlights the challenge faced by smaller states in governing powerful technology firms as exactly the sort of issue the IGF should examine.

She says the IGF has sometimes been too reluctant to discuss risky topics even though it was created for that purpose, and argues that now, with a permanent mandate, it can be braver . As an example, she poses the question of how a small country with limited leverage can regulate mega-corporations operating within its jurisdiction .

Anriette Esterhuysen argues that the IGF’s comparative strength is its ability to gather conflicting stakeholder views on complex policy issues. Rather than forcing consensus, it should present the richness of those differences as a menu of policy options for decision-makers.

She explains that on difficult questions, private sector actors, governments, civil society and the technical community may all have different positions, and that this diversity is the strength of the IGF . She therefore argues that the forum should communicate outcomes as a selection of policy options and avoid manufacturing false consensus , a point she reiterates in closing by calling for reporting that presents different perspectives rather than consensus messages .

Janis Karklins argues that governments will only invest attention and resources in the IGF if it clearly helps them with actual policy problems. He suggests that the Nairobi meeting should be designed around issues African governments genuinely face so they see practical value in attending and participating.

He says that to attract government attention, the IGF must be made relevant to governments and useful to them, not limited to speeches by "talking heads" at openings . He gives the example of Nairobi, suggesting that organisers should identify what African governments really need and shape workshop proposals accordingly, so governments can recognise their own problems and come to learn how others addressed them .

Janis Karklins takes a pragmatic view that the immediate focus should be on making the next IGF meeting work well. At the same time, he says there should be parallel planning for more ambitious reforms that can be introduced in the following cycle rather than trying to overhaul everything at once.

In his closing intervention, he says that because little time remains, the priority is to deliver on the programme of the IGF and make sure Nairobi is successful . He then adds that improvements should be thought through in parallel for implementation in 2027 .

Jennifer Chung argues that the proposed government component should not be treated as a separate government-only space. Instead, it should be explicitly designed as a dialogue with stakeholders that fits with existing institutional tracks and reinforces, rather than weakens, the multistakeholder character of the IGF.

She reports that the MAG and community discussions in Nairobi strongly supported not calling it a "government track" but a dialogue rooted firmly in the multistakeholder nature of the IGF . She also notes that the IGF already has parliamentary and judiciary tracks, and says the new mechanism should harmonise with these rather than reinvent the wheel, drawing encouragement from Kenya’s support and Ambassador Lokale’s insistence that it remain grounded in the multistakeholder process .

Jennifer Chung argues that national, regional, subregional and youth IGFs are not merely ceremonial appendages to the global forum. She says they should be engaged continuously and substantively throughout the year so that they shape agenda-setting, implementation and mutual learning rather than only contributing to one annual meeting.

She describes the NRI network as "real" and notes that it now includes over 180 initiatives of different types and sizes, with youth initiatives growing especially fast in Africa and Asia and seeking genuine co-creation rather than token participation . She also explains that current interaction tends to be limited to collaborative sessions and main-session planning for a single event, and argues that the relationship should instead become substantive throughout the year and include thematic learning across the network and with the global IGF .

Jennifer Chung argues that the first cycle under the IGF’s permanent mandate should demonstrate practical impact rather than wait for larger reforms. At the same time, she supports a phased strategy in which immediate gains are paired with medium- and long-term improvements.

She says that the MAG and broader community are focusing, within the limited time available, on how to create impact in the current cycle across intersessional work and workshop preparation . She frames this as the first year of the permanent mandate and says the goal is to start a strong forward-looking direction while also planning incremental improvements for later periods .

Andrea Calderaro argues that experiences from other UN cyber and digital cooperation settings show a useful model for the IGF. Governments participate more seriously when processes are tied to concrete tasks, and those tasks can create a practical basis for integrating multistakeholder contributions.

He refers to the UN Open-Ended Working Group and the emerging global permanent mechanism as parallel processes where the same debate is taking place about integrating stakeholders into government-centred processes . He explains that governments need specific tasks and targets, and that once those are defined, the multistakeholder community can be brought in to help solve them; he also notes that when all UN member states were drawn into the OEWG, governments had to learn how to engage with stakeholders .

Andrea Calderaro argues that the annual meeting should not be viewed as the centre of IGF work. Instead, impact should come from sustained activity throughout the year, with the annual forum serving as the moment when that work is gathered, showcased and advanced.

He says directly that what matters is what happens between IGFs, not only at the IGF itself . He adds that the annual IGF should be a celebratory moment at the end of a process that runs throughout the twelve months, and links this to government participation by saying countries need to do homework and sustain contact with multistakeholder communities at national level before attending the global forum .

Andrea Calderaro argues that the IGF should become a more intentional convening hub for related governance processes rather than simply a venue where participants happen to submit sessions on outside developments. He sees this as a way to make the IGF more coherent, connected and relevant across the wider digital governance landscape.

He says he would like to see the "new IGF" continue as a platform and become the hub of complementary processes happening elsewhere . As a concrete example, he says that if something relevant is happening in New York, such as cyber discussions, it should be integrated into the IGF by design so that the forum truly connects conversations currently scattered across different places .

Chengetai Masango argues that the new governmental element should not simply be added onto the IGF as an isolated extra. He proposes redesigning it together with the existing high-level track, preparing it through intersessional work, and structuring it across the week to support continuity and stronger participation.

He notes that Kenya’s 2011 ministerial track later evolved into the high-level track, and says the new government dialogue should not just be an addition but should be merged with or reimagined alongside that existing structure . He also argues that it should not start only on day zero, but should be prepared in advance through intersessional work like the judicial and legislative tracks, and he suggests placing significant elements on both Tuesday and Friday to sustain attendance through the week .

Chengetai Masango argues that calling the IGF a ‘talk shop’ should not be treated as a criticism in itself because dialogue is foundational to progress. In his view, the task is not to abandon talking but to complement it with clearer mechanisms for implementation, condensation of knowledge and year-to-year follow-up.

He says there is nothing wrong with being a talk shop because talking is important and is the basis for progress . He then argues that the key is to add implementation, pointing to best practice forums, principles and an experiment with commitments, while acknowledging that follow-up on those commitments in the next year had not been done well and should be improved .

Desiree Miloshevic Evans argues that terminology is not trivial because labels influence institutional behaviour and stakeholder expectations. She therefore supports calling the new mechanism a governmental dialogue rather than a governmental track in order to reinforce openness and exchange rather than separation.

She says directly that what people name things becomes what they are, and warns that if it is called a governmental track it will become a track rather than a dialogue . She then explicitly asks participants to use the term "governmental dialogue" because the goal is dialogue with governments .

Desiree Miloshevic Evans argues that net neutrality still matters as a practical governance principle for preserving an open internet. She links it to preventing dominant firms from creating privileged pathways or dependency, and says this is especially important for media plurality and developing-country users.

Responding to an online question, she refers to her work chairing a cooperation working group with over 20,000 ISP members that has supported open networking and net neutrality values . She explains that the principle means there should be no priority lane for moving bits across the network, and argues that this benefits developing countries by preventing a large player from offering zero-rated access that locks users into its services; she also points to IGF dynamic coalition findings on net neutrality as a resource .

Konstantinos Komaitis argues that the IGF already has a comparative advantage in enabling collaboration across stakeholders. He suggests that the new governmental component should draw on this collaborative experience and be designed as a modern, interactive mechanism rather than reverting to older top-down governmental practices.

He remarks that in a context of widespread lack of collaboration, the IGF actually knows how to collaborate and can use that space to reimagine collaboration . He later adds that some people may hear "government tracks" and think back to how governments operated twenty years ago, but says the past two decades have shown there are better ways for dialogue and interaction .

Konstantinos Komaitis suggests that the IGF can become more useful by incorporating insights from broader educational and research communities already producing relevant knowledge. He sees these external resources as a way to strengthen synthesis, deepen discussion and make outputs more substantive.

Building on a discussion of research and synthesis, he says the IGF could tap into many resources around the world, specifically mentioning summer schools on internet governance and the work they have been doing . He proposes integrating relevant work from those communities into IGF conversations to support richer discussion .

Konstantinos Komaitis frames the growth of national and regional IGFs as one of the clearest successes of the overall IGF model. He argues that the next challenge is to create stronger linkages between these locally grounded processes and the global IGF so that their policy relevance is better reflected at the international level.

He describes the spread of regional and national IGFs as a "huge, massive success" because they have generated interest across regions and countries . He adds that these initiatives produce success stories in which communities come together to discuss critical issues and even help governments find solutions, before asking how to strengthen the currently weak connection between them and the global forum .

Konstantinos Komaitis argues that securing a permanent mandate is only part of the institutional challenge facing the IGF. He highlights that funding, management and secretariat capacity still need to be addressed if the institution is to function effectively in the long term.

At the beginning of the session, he frames the discussion as being about what the IGF should look like now that it has acquired permanence and what steps are needed to make it more valuable and effective . Later, when turning to what he calls the elephant in the room, he says plainly that permanent status does not guarantee money and raises the question of financing and sustainability .

Sorene Assefa argues that the IGF should make its practical and intersessional work more visible within the annual meeting. He believes this would help participants leave with usable ideas and examples, rather than only having broad discussion without clear takeaways.

He says he agrees that most of the important work happens before the annual global IGF and gives the example of an "IGF lab" as a practical mechanism worth discussing . He also argues that dynamic coalitions and policy networks should present their outcomes directly in the forum so that there is "something to take home", because intersessional work currently exists but is too or disconnected from the main event .

Sorene Assefa argues that regions need stronger institutional continuity and more opportunities to learn from one another’s experiences. He sees the sharing of practical models across regional IGF ecosystems as a way to spread workable approaches and strengthen regional implementation.

Speaking from an African regional perspective, he says his interest in the IGF’s permanent mechanism is how that permanent status can be cascaded to the regional level . He gives the example that if the Asian region has succeeded in creating a permanent mechanism, the African region should be able to learn from it, and he links this to the role of dynamic coalitions and policy networks in sharing outcomes and practices across the forum .

The audience contribution argues for a more continuous and better organised relationship between NRIs and the main IGF. It suggests engagement should start before the annual event and continue iteratively so that ideas can be developed and connected over time rather than only during the meeting itself.

Anriette Esterhuysen reads an online comment from Kiki proposing pre-event propositions for participants to consider in advance and an area where participants can meet and chat prior to the event . The same comment also explicitly calls for better synthesis between NRIs and the main IGF as an iterative process .

The audience intervention argues that the IGF should address how internet-based firms operate across borders without necessarily following national corporate rules. It frames this as a regulatory concern particularly relevant to Global South countries and suggests such governance questions deserve more attention than older debates alone.

Konstantinos Komaitis relays an online question from a South African communications regulator asking whether the IGF can start discussing governance of operations on the internet in an age when almost all businesses are internet-based and can operate in different countries without following those countries’ companies acts . The same question adds a Global South perspective by arguing that older debates such as net neutrality may be disadvantaging Global South countries and should be reconsidered in light of broader governance concerns .