Debrief of the exercise and open discussion

African Delegates Reflect on Cyber Diplomacy and Cybersecurity Challenges Following Simulation Exercise

**Extended Summary:**

The debriefing session following a simulation exercise on cyber diplomacy and cybersecurity provided a platform for participants from various African nations and organisations to reflect on their experiences and discuss the intricacies of international negotiations in the cyber realm. The exercise aimed to prepare delegates for upcoming real-world events, such as the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) meetings scheduled later in the year.

**Key Discussions and Recommendations:**

1. **Human Rights and Data Protection**: The integration of human rights language into diplomatic documents was a focal point of discussion. Delegates acknowledged the universal importance of human rights and data protection but recognised the challenges posed by varying state positions on these issues. The debate highlighted the need for nuanced negotiation to reconcile different perspectives and sensitivities regarding domestic governance.

2. **Accountability Framework**: Establishing an accountability framework through international humanitarian law was identified as a contentious issue. While state accountability is an established obligation, not all states are willing to accept the scrutiny such frameworks entail. This reflects the tension between international norms and national sovereignty.

3. **Binding Instruments**: There was a divide among participants regarding the development of additional binding instruments for cybersecurity. Some countries, particularly China and Russia, advocated for binding commitments, while others favoured a more cautious, non-binding approach. This division underscores the political complexities and strategic interests involved in forming international cybersecurity agreements.

4. **Stakeholder Participation**: The modalities of stakeholder participation in cybersecurity discussions were debated, with a general agreement on the necessity of inclusive participation. However, the extent and limitations of this involvement remain a subject of debate, reflecting concerns over representation, influence, and the potential for certain stakeholders to dominate the discourse.

5. **International Law Applicability**: The applicability of international law to cybercrime was a major debate area, with the failure of the 2017 GGE to reach a consensus illustrating the ongoing struggle to define how established legal principles apply to the cyber domain.

6. **Cybersecurity Standards and Technology**: The establishment of common standards for cybersecurity and the promotion of reliable cybersecurity technology were discussed. The political battle over standards and the definition of “reliable” technology points to underlying geopolitical tensions and the strategic importance of technological dominance.

7. **National and International Cybersecurity Infrastructure**: Proposals for establishing national security operations centres and a common UN repository for cyber threats were put forward. The engagement with regional and sub-regional organisations was also discussed, highlighting the potential for leveraging regional power in negotiations.

8. **Future of the OEWG**: The future direction of the OEWG was debated, with discussions on whether it should continue, its focus areas, and whether it should develop new norms or concentrate on implementation. The political battle over these questions reflects the diverse interests and strategic objectives of different countries.

9. **Capacity Building**: The need for capacity building in developing countries was recognised, but there was a call for a two-way exchange where African countries can also contribute to the capacity building of other regions. This reflects a desire for a more balanced and reciprocal approach to international cooperation.

10. **Funding**: The establishment of a UN Trust Fund for Cyber Capacity Building was mentioned, with potential pushback from donor countries and others. This indicates the complexities of securing funding for global initiatives and the competing interests at play.

**Conclusions and Further Actions:**

The participants concluded that the simulation exercise was beneficial, providing a deeper understanding of the complexities of cyber diplomacy. They called for more frequent and practical exercises to familiarise participants with diplomatic negotiations on various topics. There was a consensus on the need for continued training and the establishment of mechanisms for collaboration among trained individuals. The session ended with a call for African countries to be more assertive in international negotiations, reflecting a desire for leadership in areas important to the region.

**Noteworthy Observations:**

– The simulation exercise was seen as a valuable tool for moving beyond theory to practical, hands-on experience. – There was a clear recognition of the evolving digital landscape and its implications for diplomacy. – Participants expressed a desire for the training to focus more on critical thinking development and less on theoretical aspects. – The need for ECOWAS to support such training and establish ongoing collaboration mechanisms was emphasised. – The discussion reflected a broader theme of the importance of African unity and assertiveness on the global stage, particularly in the context of cyber diplomacy. – There was a sense of optimism about the role of young people in shaping the future of cyber diplomacy in the region.

The extended summary encapsulates the depth and breadth of the discussions, capturing the essence of the challenges, opportunities, and strategic considerations in cyber diplomacy as articulated by the participants. The summary is coherent, detailed, and aligned with the transcript text, providing a comprehensive overview of the session’s outcomes.

Vladimir Radunovic:
Okay, let’s do the fun part. So before handing over to Babatunde for your reflections on what’s next, I wanted to just spend a few minutes to run through some of the findings in terms of substance, and you’ll see that we marked with different colors. So we start with the human rights question, which some of you managed to put in the language, preservation of human rights and protection of data. There is typically a lot of discussion when the human rights pop up, obviously, because there are different positions with states. Some of your states probably wouldn’t be happy with that wording, but yet again, everyone recognizes this is something that has to find a place in the documents, more a question of the wording. Now, the more interesting one is establishing an accountability framework through international humanitarian law and so on. Accountability of states is something that’s an obligation, not all states are happy about that. So again, depending on positions, you would have to double check whether your country would actually be happy with that wording. Then you have, let me see if I can, can you move the bell? I don’t know why I have high time, but it’s okay. Yeah. Now, E number two was initially wrote as a possibility to develop additional binding instruments, which is a clear position of some countries, particularly in the real world and with China, Russia and partners. They request, they fight for a binding instrument, yet it was watered down by another, I think it was yellow or whoever it was, delegation, urgent engagement and upgrading the CBM, this complement. and three, and so on. So it was watered down. And in reality, you would have a huge backlash. And there is a huge fight about the language when it comes to binding commitments and possible convention, pros and cons, and so on. So that’s something that definitely wouldn’t pass in the open entity group as it is, but probably some sort of a compromising language. Open to all stakeholders, we discussed that. The stumbling stone of the modality of participation of all stakeholders, everyone recognizes that’s something to have. But how and what are the limitations of that is another battle. Then we have, OK, the need for the CBM that we set. The delegations recognize the applicability of international law. This is a huge part of debate. And as we’ve heard, the GGE in 2017, among other, didn’t manage to reach a consensus because they were diving deeper into the international law and applicability and international humanitarian law. This is something that will wait for you at the agenda if you get more active. Because that’s where really the battle is on understanding the international law, the principles, and how that applies to cybercrime. Now, the yellow ones are interesting proposals coming from you, from your discussions, which are already effectively in part of the framework and part of the agreement, or at least the report. Many points of contacts. That’s most likely the clearest outcome of this kind of open-ended working group is the establishment of the point of contacts and testing them. And so there will be a practical result, it already is, of the open-ended working group. The green ones are your proposals, which are not in the open-ended working group currently. And they are very interesting. So establishment of common standards to ensure the security and stability of cyber. Standards are extremely important, yet they’re under-discussed, unfortunately. And there seems to be lack of understanding or disinterest of states in common standards. And there is a political battle over standards. That’s a different topic, but it’s a very important topic. Promoting the use of reliable cybersecurity technology. It’s also a very interesting one. It goes a little bit in line with some parts of supply chain security and reducing vulnerabilities, but promoting the use of reliable, yet the question would be what is reliable. And the battle can be really, you know, I guess the U.S. wouldn’t think that Huawei is reliable and vice versa. Then you have establishment of national security operations centers, which is not the same, but similar to national certs, which is something that comes as part of the CPN. Establishment of a common UN repository of cyber threats. There is a tendency for UN to host a portal where various information will be shared, including point of contacts and threats and vulnerabilities and so on. A lot of discussions about what to disclose, how far to go with the information sharing, particularly through the portal. But this is realistically going to happen, some sort of a common portal. So that’s, let’s say, a common ground. Engagement with regional and sub-regional organizations. That has been in the forefront of the open-ended working group in the previous iteration. And even now, the regional organizations and sub-regional organizations have quite a visible space in negotiations. And they have a potential to use the power of negotiations and gathering state. So I guess the power of ECOWAS and certainly the AU is something that you should be using more and more and there is a space in the open-ended working group on that level. And then the regular institutional dialogue, which was a very interesting proposal by Orange. I was really wondering whether that’s gonna get in. Certainly, this is part of the agenda of the Open Ended Working Group. We have cut it for a matter of practicality, so we couldn’t span to six topics, that would be too much. In reality, this is a separate issue, and it is a stumbling stone. As I mentioned in the first presentation, whether we are going to see the next Open Ended Working Group again, and whether that OEWG would be developing new norms, or maybe even a conventional binding rules, or would be focused on implementation, or instead of the Open Ended Working Group, you might see the program of action, which is in a way already recognized and will be established in one way or another. Whether that program of action will be multi-stakeholder, whether it’s going to be without a time limit, whether it will have a review process, most importantly, whether its mandate would be implementation of what we had, or development of new instruments, or both. And lastly, whether we are going to see both, the Open Ended Working Group and the program of action, or something different, which is possible. We have seen in the past having DG, an Open Ended Working Group, and luckily, working together. So, this is also a huge political battle of what we are going to see. We need the components of both. So, you can either take sides of big parties, like US, Europe, and quite a number of other also African countries are in favor of the program of action, as something which is continuous practical focus and capacity building on implementation. You also have a push by mainly Russia and China and partners to have binding mechanisms. Some countries are in between. They say both are important, we also need some more rules, more norms, maybe some binding, but the implementation is important. It’s critical that you understand, as Zuchoff said, what are your national interests and the region, after all. So, this is a huge battle, and the program of action, I think, found a way in the resolution. We have a gender balance, gender perspective, very present on the agenda. probably could be even more prominent in practice. And we see here as an example, we only have one lady with us. So that’s something that we probably need more practical moving from words to deeds. Then you have identified the deficit in qualified subsequent laborer basically and needs to train more people and have more labor. And that’s a globally recognized thing, but it’s not so clear in current open-ended working group. Probably that is a good proposal. UN Trust Fund for Cyber Capacity Building. In a way, I’ve inserted that as a civil society and I’ve managed to get support by one of the states. And I did expect the pushback. Even without your instructions, a reason that we’re thinking many countries would be the Western ones, or let’s say mainly the donor countries, would avoid that because they lose control over how they can use their money. The other countries would avoid it because they’re committing to giving money. But some would be, some developing countries would definitely say, we need some sort of a fund. So this can be a battleground, it passed smoothly, but obviously in reality, it would be a big battleground. So think about the nuances of the proposal. Proposal as such, it makes sense, but the nuances are very, there is in details. Cybersecurity simulation exercises that found place in the document. It is on the agenda of the Open-Ended Working Group and more and more people talk about exercises like this, that we need to walk the talk, that we need to be in the shoes of others. So you will see that popping up more and more also in negotiation. Program of action, yeah, the need to prevent duplication of the work of the Open-Ended Working Group. But then again, we have the JG and the Open-Ended Working Group. It ended up not being necessarily full duplication, but more processes makes it harder for you to follow because you need more people to follow that. That’s a very practical aspect. of negotiations. And I think lastly, yeah, UN Trust Fund and security of the supply chain and responsible disclosure of vulnerabilities, which is already on the agenda, but you managed to mention it as an important part, which is I think recognized.Kate pass it over to you with any reflections, if you wish.

Dr Katherine Getao:
Thank you. Good afternoon once again. I’m very conscious of your requests to be let out of the dark room into the light. So I’ll just say three things. One of them is that the controversy on human rights, I think it came about because of there’s a suspicion between countries that the human rights clause is being used to influence either cultural issues or it’s being used to prevent countries from raining down on their dissidents and others who are putting all kinds of news and criticisms against the governments in that nation on the internet. So I think maybe what I’ve mentioned there is that you need to understand the nuances and the situation, which is behind the concern. So if you’re just thinking straight, it’s human rights, everybody has agreed to human rights, so why are people so reluctant to have the human rights word mentioned? Usually it’s now the nuances behind what are these people really trying to achieve when they put the word human rights. Secondly, on the issue I raised as private sector on the customary law of reparations, and I think also the grouping raised the issue of international humanity. law. I want to say that I believe that Africa needs to be more assertive. It is true that it may be very difficult to get some of this wording and to influence the rest of the world, but personally I’m very passionate that Africa with a big block of 55 countries starts to be a leader rather than a follower of what other regions and groups have decided. So if you’re really passionate as an issue and you’re able to get a coalition of a large number of African countries behind you, then take that wording and fight it out rather than editing and saying this is not acceptable, this is not acceptable. We can have enough of a big and powerful block that can begin to take things which are important to us. As African delegates, there are many things we took to the UNGV which were never included in the documents because we were weak. We were only two or three at most. Sometimes we didn’t go there as a coalition. We went there as individuals. So even if you mention something that is so important to the region, basically everybody will clap for you and say this is a very good idea, but no, it’s not coming in. But I think if you go there together strongly, then you can begin to bring the issues which are of importance to the region even if they’re not important to other regions. The last thing I’ll say is that capacity building of course is very important, but I always feel that it has to be two-way and that’s an issue I kept raising. at the UNGD and say it’s not only about the capacity of developing countries being built. There are ways that we are using the technology. There are ways that our context is different and we can also build the capacity of other regions to understand certain matters. So let us not always be presented. I remember when I first joined the UNGD, people thought that the only issue I could talk about is capacity building because that’s all that’s needed by developing countries and that’s not true. I made sure I contributed in all areas as an eco and in the area of capacity building, I insist that Africa can also build the capacity of other regions. I’ll stop there because of the time. There are many things we could say and I hope we’ll continue discussing online or in other forums so that we continue to mutually build each other’s capacity in these areas.

Vladimir Radunovic:
Thank you, Kate. Thank you for all the contributions. I think it was really beneficial. Your positions, your instructions were built on the positions of real countries. And I guess it would be fair to tell you now which countries those were. And I’m pretty sure you will see the instructions in a different light once you hear which country you actually played. So the country green was China. So that’s closest possible positions to what China would stand for. Country yellow was basically France, position of France, Europe, let’s say. Country purple was Ghana. That was closest to the Ghana position. Country gray was Japan or the position was built on the positions of Japan. Country pink was Russia. So the positions of Russia, blue, Kenya. So the Kenyan position and orange was Cote d’Ivoire. So we did have a number of African countries that you can see. Don’t take them verbatim, but that’s the closest to the positions they would take. Now you can read again your instructions and think through the different light. And you can imagine if you would really be playing those countries, you have all the political context and many other leverage that you have to put in the game, which makes the game completely different. But for us, the purpose of the exercise, we purposely stripped out this context, the political context, so that you can focus on the instructions. Now, lastly, from our side, you have the Google folder, which we shared with you. All the documents that we prepared for this two days, three days are in the folder. I think everything is now in French as well. If there is anything missing in French, please let us know. We’ll make sure that we have the French version. The AI tools, the activation intelligence tools, I don’t know to what extent you managed to play. I know some did. I encourage you to try, play with that, particularly the chatbot. We’ll be improving that. And then let us know if it is useful, if we can make it better. This is a trend. It’s not gonna go away. We’ll put efforts on the people’s side to strengthen this AI tool, particularly for Africa. So let us know how it works. In terms of the program, this event is only one part of the program that we developed jointly or implemented together with the German and GIZ and ECOWAS. There is an online course. Some of you are part of that course and you know. So I encourage those of you that are part of that course to stay active because that’s where we dig deeper in all these substances. We have two more weeks to go, so we have time to make sure when you come back tomorrow to dive deep back into the online. course, and I hope we’ll have chances to repeat the online course for other diplomats in future. I know there were questions about certificates. Let me just quickly clarify, because this program consists of a number of elements. One was the three days event before this week, then two and a half, and then two and a half days of this event, and then the online course. And there are a couple of components of that. For each component, in a way, we have a certificate, but then, because some people are attending different components, we said, let’s do it when we finish everything, so that we can simply issue the certificates to all participants that were present in one or another part of the program. That means we’re not giving you certificates today, and ultimately that would take more time, but we will send the certificates to you, so you will receive them. Probably, they’ll be sent out next week. I don’t know when the post will arrive, how we’re going to arrange it, we’ll discuss it, but you will get the certificates, both the online version as a PDF and the printed one, most likely, so you can expect that. And finally, on our part, as part of Diplo, it was a pleasure, so we remain available not only within this program, which will certainly continue and expand, and we’ll hear from you now, but also various other online courses and programs. We do AI tools and stuff, so feel free to reach out to us whenever you have ideas or needs. Now, with this, I thank you and I pass back to the ECOWAS friends to basically drive you to tell, okay, how did you find this or the exercise of the program, whether you would improve anything and so on, but I think most importantly, what you expect from ECOWAS, how ECOWAS can help you in the next steps. But I pass the floor to the other side of the table to take over the chain machine. Thank you.

Panelists:
Thank you very much, Mayor. and it’s great in absence, or in absentia is any more diplomatically correct. This next session might fill up the time and the request of member states in terms of the time to leave the conflict, so to speak, just need to kind of, as Vladimir has said, what do you think ECOWAS can do moving forward from here? And just a bit of background information. Although this is considered as a simulation exercise, you can see that some of our member states’ positions are clearly reflected as part of the exercise. There is going to be an actual open-ended working group on the 8th and 12th of July. Okay, 8th to 12th July, and then 2nd to 6th of December. So this is more or less like a building block to those two new events. In this regard, I would like to invite each and every one of our member states. I’m not a good timekeeper, but in some cases you have to be a dictator in order to get out of this conflict in good time. So in two minutes, to kind of give us an idea, one minute on your reflections about the exercise, and one minute on the next step to take what you expressed from ECOWAS. Yeah, it’s going to be country by country, because you have to see individually. Let each country harmonize position first, and then we’re ready to listen to each of those countries. So the last time I started on my right, but this time around I’m minded to start on my left. So I think Togo, Benin, I mean, it’s like the name tag has been changed. Well, let me start from the countries on my far right. One minute in terms of reflection of the exercise and one minute in terms of what you think and let’s get started. Mindful that we are not going to solve the problem of the world here today. So I just kind of reflecting back. So two minutes starts now. I don’t know whether the timekeeper is still around or alive, but I will try to see. Merci beaucoup. From the town of Saint-Denis-le-Fouge, I will say a few words about the organization. I must admit that I am here in the shoes of a student, in the shoes of a delegate. For my country, I think that these kinds of exercises must be a bit frequent and allow us to familiarize ourselves with diplomatic exercises on several topics. So, in this regard, I take this opportunity to renew my sincere thanks to the Commission of the CDAO and to all the delegates present here for their participation. Thank you. I learned that the second to go next is on the other side of my hand, so you still have one minute and 30 seconds to play with. Thank you very much. I am not an eco-dafter with the Togo Econetes, I am an eco-dafter with the Senegal. Thank you for giving us this opportunity. I agree with what my compatriot said. I don’t think there is much to say, except to once again salute this intellectual and professional journey that we have had here. And I admit that, whether it was the first part, the two days, or the three other days, it really allowed us to get out of the theory and to touch the finger. I, who deal with political affairs, I was able to truly understand when a situation arises, we don’t want it, but to be able to find the necessary elements to be able to respond to such a situation. I admit that it was a life-saving exercise that allowed us to learn a lot of things. And as my compatriot said, our wish is that such exercises can be repeated. Thank you once again. Thank you very much, Togo. If I can just use my chair’s expression. You know, sometimes when you go home like this, it’s easier for everybody to stay acclimated, and I think we should kind of, we already know who turned us. So if you can just go to the basics in terms of what your expectations are, what the next steps are, the lesson learned. Thank you. I think the next country is, you know, I can’t see the flag, so I’m struggling. Bené, Bené, you have too many slides now. Thank you very much. For me, who has been at the Nomé session, I would like to first point out that there has been improvement. And especially that the recommendations that we had made during the session today, I saw some of them taken into account, especially in terms of logistics, but also in our agenda yesterday, we had the opportunity to be able to visit a few places here in Canada. This is a positive point that we will have to keep in the future. I believe that the analysis that we have done in this world, in fact, more and more, we have a lot of digital that is injected into all areas, including diplomacy. This analysis really helps us to develop our critical thinking. And I believe that this is the part that I really appreciate in this training. And if there is something that needs to be focused on even more, it is how we develop our critical thinking beyond the use of tools such as artificial intelligence. And at some point, you have to say it, without wanting to make it sometimes a bit biased. Thank you very much and see you soon. Thank you very much. I’m going to rely on our very own, the next delegate, because I can’t see very clearly. Senegal. Merci beaucoup. First of all, it should be said, as everyone recognized, that the training was really interesting and that it allowed us to put ourselves in a real negotiation situation. We were able to see that the essential elements of the negotiation were included, more or less, the formal and informal sciences, the list of schedules, etc., the adoption of reports, etc. The only remark I would like to make is on the practical part, because there was, above all, a theoretical part. I think that next time we could reduce the theoretical part to focus more on the practical part, that is, on the simulation. So this is the only remark, the only suggestion I would like to make in relation to the training. So I’ll leave my colleague Ndur, he’s the one at the bottom. I will simply thank the CDAO for having associated us with this exercise, thank the host country and support the delegation of my friend. If we can, in other initiatives, renew this kind of training, this kind of exercise, it would be beneficial for us, for the staff of the member countries of the CDAO. So it is desirable that it be renewed in other areas. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. And the next country, Guinea. Guinea. Guinea. Thank you. I would like to say that soon, before we come to the other countries, when you see the TV, to be able to prepare something, elements to be able to send under which you can work. And because countries also have news that are different from each other. So it would be good for us if we have the theme in advance, we can propose something and then send it so that it can be part of the agenda. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you. As my compatriot said, my grandfather, this is my first time participating in such an exercise. I am a network and system engineer, but I found myself among the diplomats, exchanging and seeing also during real sessions in the United Nations how it is done. It has served me. And really, I tell myself that if such an exercise should continue, it would be necessary to share with the engineers, whether they are technicians or others, the technical departments. I congratulate you on the quality of the organization of this training during these five days. Because I have been here since the 3rd and I will continue. I will stay here until the 9th. So this is a chance for me. I thank the organizers and thank you. Thank you very much. Now to my right. I’m so sorry. You will not punish me for not giving the answer. No, not at all. The Ivory Coast is also in the same spirit as our predecessors, all those who have just said, to address the thanks and warm congratulations to the organizers of this session on cyber security and cyber diplomacy. My participation, it is the first time that I have participated in this at the level of the CDAO, has allowed me to receive a lot of teaching. And I want to assure you that these teachings will mark the ecosystem of my country’s policy on cyber security and cyber diplomacy. I would also like to express my gratitude and congratulations to all the experts in the private sector and civil society, to the government and non-governmental organizers, regional, sub-regional, African and extra-African, for their valuable contributions, enlightenment and appreciation. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude and congratulations for their active participation, their efficient contribution to the various discussions of all the delegations that were present. Of course, as I said, the teaching that I draw from will be the personal policy of the ecosystem of our country. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Hello, good afternoon. Let me join my colleagues to express our sincere thanks and appreciation. This session has been really informative and insightful, providing valuable skills here. But what I recommend, maybe someone has already mentioned it, is to increase the duration of the training for more in-depth coverage. And also, I think incorporating more practical, like we were introduced to AI tools, but we are not sure how to play around with them. I think that will help, maybe guide us how to use the tool. And finally, to facilitate more interactive sessions with experts from diverse backgrounds, like I remember the madam, it really helped us once we were having our discussion in group. So, I would say thank you once again for this valuable opportunity. I don’t know if my colleague has anything to add to that. Good, okay. Is there any contributions or we shall allocate your 47 minutes to another member state? Oh, seconds. So we’re good. Thank you very much, Liberianess. Once again, let me use this time to say thank you for such an opportunity. Once again, to be in Ghana. And it is a good opportunity and we can have some great privilege. So if you’re coming from a technical background and not being transformed to diplomatic technicians, I would like to say thank you. And my recommendations to ECOWAS committee is to currently put technical cybersecurity experts on the team next time, so that at least we can understand how cybersecurity, I mean, how cyber crime occurs and how to prevent it. And for the rest, I would also like to recommend that ECOWAS at least establish a desk for everyone that will be trained for this bureau and in programs that can be used as a point of contact in case of tomorrow, that is ECOWAS should be making and have a discussion. You can refer those who you have already trained to build upon them for further ideas and implementation. Because training new people all of the time, it costs intensive, but we can build upon those who have already learned and have been trained. And then we can build, like for example, an ECOWAS desk that we can collaborate, have a WhatsApp group, that can share ideas and be dropping, be sharing different ideas to help us to keep learning. I think I’m putting it to ask something. Thank you, I think you’ve said everything. The only thing I want to add is my excitement, looking in the room and seeing a lot of young people, and I believe that this is a step in the right direction for us as ECWAS member states to be placing such responsibilities on the shoulders of the next generation. And so as a young man, I take pride in all of the time we spend together, and I also appreciate the ideas we all share. Thank you. Thank you very much, Nigeria. Nigeria is next in line, Nigeria. Good afternoon, distinguished ladies and gentlemen, I would like to thank the organizers across the mission, GIKAIPTC, but I would also like to thank my fellow Orange Country members for their various contributions. However, I have a senior colleague here, so I will defer to him for any other statement. Thank you. Thank you very much. Though we have greeted, we have to greet again the ECWAS Commission, thank you. GIZ, thank you. Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center, thank you. DIPLU, thank you. The German Foreign Office, thank you. And we wish to include that the program is perfect, it’s informative, very scholarly. It’s something that needs to be sustained, continued. Thank you very much for the engagement with member states to the permanent representatives in ECWAS should they consider it on the way forward. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Nigeria. Piana. Thank you so much, so it’s been a wonderful time, I have learned a lot. particularly as the research ex-officer for the UNO-EWG for Ghana. The knowledge I have acquired will assist me in.