UN OEWG 2021-2025 9th substantive session

The discussions on potential cooperative measures to address the various cyber threats identified by the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) were primarily conducted during Agenda Item 5, Part 1 and the Opening of the Session.

During the discussion in Agenda Item 5, Part 1, several speakers highlighted measures to mitigate threats. Malaysia emphasized the need to operationalize Voluntary Non-Binding Norms and strengthen the Global POC Directory. Albania highlighted the importance of international cooperation to promote cybersecurity and operationalize norms. Brazil suggested a dedicated space for sharing threats and successful policies in future mechanisms. Vanuatu and Kiribati emphasized the importance of international cooperation and capacity building.

During the Opening of the Session, additional cooperative measures were discussed. Singapore highlighted the importance of timely and relevant CERT-related information sharing and capacity building. Nigeria suggested the creation of a comprehensive international framework for harmonizing existing and potential cyber threats. The Republic of Korea emphasized the responsible use of AI to counter cyber threats. Germany highlighted the need for joint engagement to prevent combined cyber and information manipulation operations. El Salvador proposed the implementation of security and privacy by design in systems development.

These discussions and proposals reflect a diverse array of cooperative measures that can be pursued to address the cyber threats identified by the OEWG.

During the sessions of the UN OEWG 2021-2025, several potential initiatives were discussed to address the need for raising awareness and deepening understanding of cyber threats. During the opening of the session, South Africa suggested utilizing the Global POC Directory for regular cybersecurity training, Sri Lanka proposed establishing a global cyber threat intelligence platform for real-time data sharing, and Ghana highlighted the need for public-private sector collaboration in combating threats. Singapore pointed to the ASEAN Regional CERT as a regional initiative to understand the threat landscape.

Malaysia, in Agenda Item 5 Part 1, recommended embedding security and privacy by design in early development stages to align cybersecurity policies with digital development strategies. Albania proposed real-time information sharing, awareness-raising campaigns, and capacity-building initiatives. Bangladesh emphasized the necessity of safe communication channels and a global information repository. Indonesia recommended creating a global platform for sharing ICT threat information.

These discussions highlight the importance of international cooperation and the sharing of resources and information to effectively address and mitigate cybersecurity threats. The initiatives proposed during the sessions emphasize the need for a proactive and collaborative approach to enhancing global cybersecurity resilience.

Throughout the discussions in the 9th substantive session of the UN OEWG, several key cyber threats to states were identified. These include ransomware attacks, which were notably emphasized by countries such as Switzerland, highlighting the increasing frequency, scale, and severity of such threats.

Ransomware, alongside cryptocurrency theft and malicious ICT activities targeting critical infrastructure, such as healthcare and financial sectors, were highlighted during the opening of the session by the United States and Germany as key threats.

Additionally, the intersection of AI and cyber threats was noted by Egypt and France, acknowledging the evolving threat landscape where AI-driven attacks and misinformation campaigns are increasingly prevalent. Iran also pointed out the weaponization of ICT and disinformation campaigns as significant threats.

Further, the increase in cyber incidents and threat actors was highlighted by Estonia, and the rise in cyberattacks on critical infrastructures was noted by Albania. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea mentioned the use of ICT tools for military purposes as a threat, reflecting concerns about the militarization of cyberspace.

Lastly, during the discussions of other matters, Iraq and Malaysia highlighted the malicious use of ICTs by terrorist and criminal groups, adding another layer of complexity to the cybersecurity challenges faced by states.

During the opening of the session, Mexico emphasized that states can address threats in the future mechanism by ensuring a robust deliberative space that includes all relevant stakeholders. Canada suggested that the future mechanism should prioritize policy-oriented and cross-cutting thematic groups to discuss real-world solutions. The Netherlands proposed focusing on specific cyber challenges and capacity-building initiatives.

In agenda item 6: other matters, it was discussed that states could address threats by ensuring capacity-building initiatives are tailored to specific needs. There was a focus on enhancing international cooperation to assist states during cyber incidents and through targeted capacity-building initiatives, as mentioned by Canada and France.

Under agenda item 5: discussions on substantive issues contained in paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 75/240, Brazil suggested the future mechanism should include a dedicated space for sharing threats and vulnerabilities. Argentina supported the establishment of a threat repository, while Malaysia emphasized the importance of integrating the Global POC Directory into the future mechanism for action-oriented discussions.

During the Agenda item 5: discussions on substantive issues contained in paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 75/240 part 2, several states expressed their views regarding proposals for new norms. Notably, Pakistan, Cuba, and the Russian Federation highlighted the need for legally binding norms or new norms to address emerging threats. The Russian Federation emphasized the importance of a transition from political agreements to a legally binding framework, stating that “the need for a transition from political agreements to a legally binding framework.” This underscores the ongoing debate between focusing on implementing existing norms and the necessity for new ones, which the Chair highlighted as a significant divide.

In other sessions such as Agenda item 5: discussions on substantive issues contained in paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 75/240 part 4 and Opening of the session, the meeting did not specifically discuss additional views on the proposals for new norms in the context of paragraph 31k) of the third APR.

Furthermore, the Dedicated stakeholder session (in accordance with agreed modalities for the participation of stakeholders of 22 April 2022) did not directly address this topic.

Overall, the discussions highlighted the need for ongoing debate and dialogue among states to reach a consensus on the development of new norms, considering the divided opinions on whether to strengthen existing norms or to establish new legally binding ones.

The discussions on whether the Voluntary Checklist of Practical Actions needs further improvement to facilitate reaching a consensus recommendation by July 2025 were addressed in various sessions of the 9th substantive session of the UN OEWG 2021-2025.

During the Agenda Item 5: Part 2, it was noted that some states, including the United Kingdom, suggested the addition of new actions such as addressing the proliferation of commercially available ICT capabilities. Japan and Singapore emphasized that the checklist should be a living document, allowing it to evolve over time.

In Agenda Item 5: Part 3, the United States highlighted that more efforts could be made to enhance the checklist by drawing from the 2021 UN GGE report and initiatives such as the ASEAN checklist. Both Australia and Malaysia supported the notion of the checklist being a dynamic document subject to continuous improvement.

Overall, the discussions suggest a consensus that while the checklist serves as a valuable tool, it should remain adaptable and open to enhancements to ensure its relevance and efficacy in achieving consensus by the target date in 2025.

The discussions on whether norms should be voluntary or legally binding during the 9th substantive session of the UN Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) reflect a diverse range of opinions among member states.

In the dedicated stakeholder session, Israel expressed their preference for a cautious approach, stating, “Chair, while answering your guiding question at this point in time, there is no need in our opinion to develop or elaborate any new norms, nor do we see a need for developing any legally binding instruments.”

On the other hand, some states, like Cuba and the Islamic Republic of Iran, during the discussions on substantive issues part 2, advocated for legally binding norms. In contrast, other countries like the United Kingdom and Canada highlighted the importance of the existing voluntary norms.

Further discussions in part 3 saw Belarus advocating for universal legally binding norms, while the United States emphasized the importance of existing voluntary norms and their implementation. Brazil shared a perspective that voluntary norms could shape state behavior and build state practice towards customary international law.

Overall, there is no consensus among the states involved, as discussions remain ongoing with divided opinions on whether norms should be voluntary or legally binding, as noted in the agenda item 6.

The discussions around additional layers of understanding related to the topics identified for focused discussion in paragraph 39 of the third APR were not specifically addressed in most of the sessions of the UN OEWG 2021-2025 9th substantive session. Various agenda items were covered, but the specific focus on further understanding of these topics did not prominently feature in the meeting summaries provided.

During the Agenda item 5: discussions on substantive issues contained in paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 75/240 part 4, multiple countries, including Indonesia, Poland, and Japan, highlighted areas such as state sovereignty, state responsibility, dispute resolution mechanisms, gaps in legal application, and the non-intervention principle. However, no direct quotes or specific additional layers of understanding were detailed in the summaries.

The Opening of the session did not delve into additional layers of understanding related to paragraph 39 of the third APR, and neither did the Dedicated stakeholder session.

Similarly, other agenda items such as Agenda item 5 part 2, Agenda item 6: other matters, and the closure of the session did not address these additional layers.

In conclusion, while the discussions touched on various critical themes, there was a lack of detailed exploration into additional layers of understanding as outlined in paragraph 39 of the third APR. Future discussions might benefit from a more focused approach to addressing these nuances to enhance the depth of the dialogue.

The discussions from various sessions of the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) highlight several promising areas of progress in international law discussions across various fora. Notably, Poland, the Netherlands, and others referenced events such as the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, UNIDIR workshops, and various regional initiatives which foster progress in international law discussions.

Additionally, during the opening of the session, Canada highlighted the ongoing work of the Counter Ransomware Initiative and the Palmal process as collaborative forums demonstrating collective efforts to mitigate cyber threats.

In the dedicated stakeholder session, the Centre for International Law mentioned initiatives such as the 3rd Annual Symposium on Cyber and International Law and a workshop with the University of Exeter, which help states understand international law implications in cyberspace.

Moreover, in another discussion under Agenda item 5, the European Union announced a declaration on a common understanding of the application of international law to cyberspace. Additionally, Austria and Finland emphasized the importance of position papers and declarations from various states and regional organizations.

During the discussions on capacity building in international law, various countries and stakeholders emphasized the importance of enhancing access to capacity building initiatives. A consistent theme was the promotion of regional cooperation and the organization of international law workshops.

In Agenda Item 5: Discussions on Substantive Issues – Part 4, Estonia, the Republic of Korea, and Canada highlighted the need for robust capacity building programs. They stressed the importance of regional cooperation and the organization of international law workshops to enhance understanding and implementation of international legal frameworks.

In the Dedicated Stakeholder Session, Ghana advocated for promoting south-to-south cooperation and suggested organizing regional workshops in collaboration with entities such as the African Union. This approach aims to leverage regional expertise and resources to support capacity building in international law.

Additionally, in Agenda Item 5: Discussions on Substantive Issues – Part 3, Austria and Singapore proposed the use of scenario-based discussions and exercises to enhance practical understanding. The United States also recommended increased support for capacity building initiatives, particularly those offered by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).

Overall, the discussions underscored the importance of collaborative efforts, regional partnerships, and the adoption of innovative training methodologies to strengthen capacity building in international law. These initiatives aim to equip stakeholders with the knowledge and skills needed to effectively engage with international legal issues.

The discussions at the 9th Substantive Session of the UN OEWG 2021-2025 highlighted the diverse opinions among member states regarding the need for new legally binding instruments specific to cyberspace.

Countries like Cuba and the Russian Federation were vocal in advocating for the establishment of such instruments. In the opening of the session, Cuba stressed the necessity of a legally binding international instrument to set obligations for all states to address threats to peace and cooperation in cyberspace. Similarly, during Agenda Item 5, Part 2, they argued that voluntary norms are limited and a legally binding framework is essential to tackle emerging threats.

Conversely, some countries, including Israel, expressed skepticism about the necessity for new legal instruments. During the Dedicated Stakeholder Session, Israel advocated for a cautious approach, underscoring that new legally binding instruments might not be necessary.

Moreover, during Agenda Item 5, Part 3, Belarus and Burkina Faso joined the call for legally binding instruments. In contrast, the United States emphasized the importance of implementing existing norms rather than creating new ones.

The applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL) to cyber operations in armed conflicts was a significant topic of discussion in various sessions of the UN OEWG 2021-2025 9th substantive session. Several countries and stakeholders actively participated in affirming the relevance of IHL in cyberspace.

During the Agenda Item 5, Part 4, countries such as Sweden, the Netherlands, and Chile extensively discussed and affirmed the applicability of international humanitarian law in cyberspace.

In the Dedicated Stakeholder Session, France and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reiterated that international humanitarian law applies to cyber operations in armed conflicts. France emphasized the importance of including this point in the OEWG’s report.

Additionally, in Agenda Item 5, Part 3, several states, including the European Union, Austria, and the United States, affirmed the applicability of international humanitarian law to cyber operations in armed conflicts.

These discussions highlight a growing consensus among nations and stakeholders on the necessity of applying international humanitarian law to cyber operations during armed conflicts, ensuring that such activities are conducted within the established legal and ethical frameworks.

Throughout the sessions of the United Nations Open-ended Working Group’s 9th substantive session from 2021-2025, the structuring of future discussions on international law was addressed by various countries with a focus on thematic discussions and scenario-based exercises.

During Agenda Item 5, countries like Ireland and Canada suggested employing thematic discussions, scenario-based exercises, and engaging legal experts to enhance the understanding of international law issues. Similarly, France proposed forming thematic groups centered around concrete challenges and organizing discussions around scenarios, an approach also supported by New Zealand, as mentioned in the Dedicated Stakeholder Session.

Moreover, in Agenda Item 6, Egypt emphasized the need for a separate thematic group focused on international law to develop a normative framework and conduct detailed theoretical discussions.

These discussions underscore the importance of structured, thematic, and scenario-based approaches to effectively address international law topics, engaging diverse stakeholders and experts to provide comprehensive insights and solutions.

The discussions at the 9th substantive session of the UN OEWG 2021-2025 on the operationalization of the eight agreed Global Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) were limited. However, some relevant points were made during Agenda Item 5, part 5.

Several countries shared their insights and initiatives regarding the operationalization of the Global CBMs. Paraguay stressed the importance of the Global Directory of Focal Points, highlighting its role in enhancing communication and cooperation among states. Thailand emphasized strengthening capacity building for Points of Contact (POCs), which is crucial for effective implementation of CBMs.

Furthermore, Canada noted progress on CBMs, suggesting that ongoing efforts have been fruitful. Germany shared best practices from regional exchanges, which could serve as a model for broader implementation strategies.

During the dedicated stakeholder session, the Russian Federation emphasized the importance of testing the POC Directory and resolving issues such as contact details and scope. The EU highlighted the importance of integrating CBMs into thematic working groups to ensure systematic and coherent implementation across different domains.

Overall, while discussions on this topic were not extensively covered across all sessions, the contributions made underscore the need for continued collaboration and exchange of best practices to fully operationalize the agreed Global CBMs.

During the 9th substantive session of the UN Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) 2021-2025, there were limited discussions on best practices, lessons learned, and success stories related to the implementation of Global Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs). The Dedicated Stakeholder Session highlighted the establishment of an ASEAN regional CERT as a successful implementation effort, as mentioned by the European Union.

In Agenda Item 5: Part 5, Germany shared their experience with cross-regional dialogue efforts and study trips with ECOWAS. Ghana highlighted their participation in a study visit to learn from regional organizations, while North Macedonia shared its participation in a PING test and regional cooperation activities.

The 9th substantive session of the UN OEWG 2021-2025 discussed various challenges that states have faced in implementing the Global Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs). While many sessions did not specifically address these challenges, some insights were shared during the discussions.

In the Dedicated Stakeholder Session, the Russian Federation highlighted issues with “non-functional contacts and limited powers of technical POCs within the POC Directory.”

During Agenda Item 5, Part 5, it was noted that some nations face “challenges such as limited resources and capacity.” Specifically, North Macedonia pointed out a “shortage of human resources,” while Peru emphasized the “need to improve organizational measures and capacity building.”

These discussions underscore the operational and resource-related challenges that states encounter in implementing Global CBMs, highlighting the need for enhanced capacity building and effective communication channels.

During the 9th substantive session of the UN OEWG 2021-2025, various discussions were held regarding the enhancement of participation in the Global POC Directory. These discussions were documented in multiple agenda items and sessions.

In the Dedicated Stakeholder Session, the Chair emphasized the importance of widening participation and encouraged those with the capacity and commitment to actively reach out to countries that have not yet joined.

Further, during Agenda Item 5 (Part 1), Malaysia highlighted the necessity of encouraging states to nominate and actively participate in the Global POC Directory, proposing activities like the Ping Test to foster engagement.

In Agenda Item 5 (Part 5), various suggestions were made to enhance participation, such as organizing workshops and awareness-raising activities. Thailand suggested regular meetings for Points of Contact (POCs), while Germany emphasized the importance of conducting ping tests and simulation exercises.

Overall, the discussions revolved around proactive outreach, the importance of simulation exercises, and the organization of regular meetings and workshops as key strategies to boost participation in the Global POC Directory.

The discussions on improving the Global POC Directory were highlighted in several sessions of the UN OEWG 2021-2025 9th substantive session. Key contributions and suggestions from various countries were noted, focusing on enhancing communication and functionality within the directory.

During the Opening of the Session, Kazakhstan proposed the introduction of a “standardized communication template for classification of cyber threats and post-incident communication” as a means to enhance the directory’s effectiveness.

In the Dedicated Stakeholder Session, the Russian Federation emphasized the importance of “developing a common understanding of the functionality of technical POCs and standardizing communication templates,” aligning with Kazakhstan’s earlier suggestion.

Malaysia, during Agenda Item 5 Part 1, advocated for the Global POC’s role in facilitating “timely and relevant information sharing,” underscoring its potential as a communication tool.

In Agenda Item 5 Part 5, there were discussions on “developing standardized templates and increasing participation.” Indonesia proposed using the POC Directory as a preventive tool, while Kazakhstan suggested “tailored templates for various scenarios,” showcasing a proactive approach to cyber threat management.

Overall, these discussions reflect a collective emphasis on standardization, improved communication, and proactive use of the Global POC Directory to address cybersecurity challenges effectively.

During the 9th substantive session of the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) 2021-2025, discussions focused on optimizing communication through the Global POC Directory by developing standardized templates for use by States. This topic was notably addressed in several sessions.

In the Opening of the session, Kazakhstan suggested the creation of standardized communication templates, specifically mentioning the classification of cyber threats and post-incident communication to enhance the effectiveness of the Global POC Directory.

Similarly, during the Dedicated Stakeholder Session, South Africa proposed that these templates should encompass a brief description of the nature of assistance sought, details of the cyber incident, acknowledgment of receipt, and indicative response timeframes.

Further elaboration on the development of standardized templates was provided in Agenda item 5: Part 5, where several countries, including Kazakhstan and Indonesia, suggested that templates should include specific fields for incident details and response actions.

These discussions highlight the importance of having a unified approach to communication in cyber incident management, emphasizing the need for clear, structured, and standardized templates that can be adapted by States to suit their unique needs and contexts.

The capacity-building mapping exercise conducted by the UN Secretariat, as contained in document A/AC.292/2024/2 dated 22 January 2024, was not extensively discussed during the opening of the session or under Agenda Item 5, Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 5, or the closure of the session. However, some significant points emerged in other discussions.

During Agenda Item 6: Other Matters, some states acknowledged gaps in the mapping report and the need for future mapping exercises to ensure comprehensive coverage of all countries. They emphasized the importance of progressing without waiting for perfect mapping.

In Agenda Item 5, Part 6, the conversation centered around the necessity for follow-up on the capacity-building mapping exercise. It was recognized that the landscape is evolving, necessitating sustainable, long-term efforts. There was broad consensus on avoiding duplication and leveraging existing initiatives, although no specific follow-up measures were outlined.

While the exercise has highlighted areas that are functioning well, such as leveraging existing initiatives, it also underscored the presence of gaps that need addressing. The emphasis on future mapping exercises suggests a need for ongoing evaluation and adjustment to ensure comprehensive and effective capacity-building efforts across all regions.

During the 9th substantive session of the UN Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) 2021-2025, various aspects of the proposal for a Global ICT Security Cooperation and Capacity-Building Portal were discussed. The discussions highlighted several key criteria for the development and operationalization of this platform.

In Agenda Item 6: Other Matters, it was emphasized that the portal should be practical, neutral, modular, and member state-driven. It should serve as a centralized resource for sharing information, best practices, and supporting direct communication between member states, as discussed by India.

Furthermore, in Agenda Item 5: Discussions on Substantive Issues, Part 6, the proposal was discussed with an emphasis on avoiding duplication and leveraging existing initiatives. It was highlighted that the portal should be a member State-driven, modular ‘one-stop shop’. The need for agreement on parameters and the importance of taking a step forward by July were also underlined.

Additionally, Agenda Item 5: Discussions on Substantive Issues, Part 5 included Kuwait’s presentation of a proposal for a digital tool and portal to facilitate the implementation of norms and confidence-building measures (CBMs), emphasizing integration and collaboration.

Overall, the discussions underscored the importance of developing a practical, member State-driven platform under the auspices of the UN that avoids redundancy, integrates existing resources, and fosters international cooperation in ICT security.

The concept of the Needs-Based ICT Security Capacity Building Catalogue was not extensively discussed in most of the sessions of the UN OEWG 2021-2025 9th Substantive Session. However, there was some discussion on the integration of the catalogue into the proposed Global ICT Security Cooperation and Capacity-Building Portal and leveraging existing portals.

During Agenda Item 6: Other Matters, it was noted that the catalogue should leverage existing work and be part of the portal to ensure it aligns with current initiatives and avoids duplication. This was discussed by India and others, indicating a need to integrate existing efforts into the new framework.

In Agenda Item 5: Discussions on Substantive Issues Contained in Paragraph 1 of General Assembly Resolution 75/240 Part 6, there was a mention of the catalogue with suggestions to integrate it into the proposed Global ICT Security Cooperation and Capacity-Building Portal and leverage work done in existing portals. However, no specific elaboration details were provided.

Overall, while there is a recognition of the need for the catalogue to build upon existing work and align with global efforts, specific details on how this integration and leveraging would take place were not thoroughly discussed during these sessions.

The discussions on the establishment of a United Nations voluntary fund, as recommended in paragraph 54 of the Third APR, emphasize the importance of practicality and effectiveness in supporting the capacity building of States on security in the use of ICTs. However, specific elements needed for the fund’s success were not comprehensively detailed during the sessions.

In Agenda Item 6: Other Matters, several states, including Kiribati and Vanuatu, mentioned that the fund should be needs-based, focusing on the most vulnerable states, maximizing existing initiatives, and ensuring inclusivity and accessibility.

Furthermore, in Agenda Item 5, Part 6, the discussion highlighted the need to study the establishment of a United Nations voluntary fund, with broad convergence on leveraging existing initiatives and avoiding duplication. The importance of practical and effective implementation was emphasized, but specific elements were not detailed.

Other sessions, such as Opening of the Session, Dedicated Stakeholder Session, and various parts of Agenda Item 5 did not directly discuss the specific elements needed for the fund.

Overall, while there is a consensus on the need for a fund that is inclusive, needs-based, and leverages existing initiatives, the specific elements required to ensure its practicality and effectiveness require further deliberation.

The Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on security of and in the use of information and communications technologies (ICTs) held its 9th substantive session to discuss various issues, including the mainstreaming of capacity-building principles across the ICT security capacity building landscape. However, the specific question of how to further support and facilitate this mainstreaming was not extensively discussed in most sessions.

During Agenda item 5, part 5, Argentina, on behalf of a group of Latin American and Caribbean states, emphasized the importance of international and regional cooperation, technology transfer, and collaboration with stakeholders to mainstream capacity-building principles. This highlights the need for collective efforts and partnerships to enhance the integration of these principles across various ICT security initiatives.

Despite the recognized importance of mainstreaming these principles, the session did not delve into specific additional measures or actions to achieve this goal. The discussion remains at a high-level agreement on the necessity but lacks concrete steps for implementation.

Overall, while the importance of mainstreaming capacity-building principles was acknowledged, the OEWG session did not offer detailed strategies or actions to advance this agenda, leaving room for further exploration and development of concrete measures in future discussions.

The question of whether there are examples of concrete, action-oriented capacity-building initiatives established in other areas of the UN system that might offer useful lessons for efforts to advance international cooperation in the area of ICT security capacity-building was not specifically addressed in any of the sessions of the UN OEWG 2021-2025 9th substantive session. The summaries of all the sessions, including Agenda item 5: discussions on substantive issues contained in paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 75/240 part 4, Opening of the session, Dedicated stakeholder session, and others, indicate that the topic was not directly discussed. Therefore, no quotes or specific references to capacity-building initiatives from other areas of the UN system were included in the session discussions to offer lessons for ICT security capacity-building.

The discussions during the 9th substantive session of the UN Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on security of and in the use of ICTs (2021-2025) did not reach a consensus on the exact timing for the next High-level Global Roundtable on ICT security capacity building. The subject was not directly addressed in most agenda items, including Agenda Item 5, Part 4, Opening of the Session, and in the Dedicated Stakeholder Session.

However, there was a suggestion during Agenda Item 6 that the roundtable could be held in 2026. This would allow for ample preparatory work by the Secretariat and avoid competition with other events. Furthermore, discussions in Agenda Item 5, Part 6 reflected a similar viewpoint, emphasizing the need to avoid clashing with existing initiatives and to continue discussions under the future permanent mechanism.

Overall, while there was acknowledgment of the need to strategically schedule the next roundtable, no definitive decision was reached during this session. The future permanent mechanism will likely continue to deliberate on this matter to ensure a well-coordinated and effective approach.

The discussions on the participation of other interested parties and stakeholders in the UN OEWG sessions highlighted several key areas for improvement and innovation. The central concern raised by multiple delegations is the current modality that allows a single state to veto stakeholder participation, which is broadly deemed untenable. Canada pointed out the issue of some states vetoing stakeholder participation and suggested that the modality for stakeholder participation needs improvement. Meanwhile, Mexico and Colombia emphasized the importance of stakeholder participation in the future mechanism.

The Centre for International Law supported the idea of stakeholders being permitted to intervene in a thematic manner in line with the permanent mechanism. Additionally, several sessions proposed enhanced accreditation modalities for stakeholders. Canada and Chile proposed enhanced accreditation modalities for stakeholders, including transparent processes for objections and renewals every five years, maintaining a voice but not a vote for stakeholders.

In the Closure of the session, several delegations, including Canada, Chile, and Australia, called for the adoption of multi-stakeholder modalities similar to those used in the ad hoc committee on cybercrime negotiations. There was a strong push for a more transparent and inclusive accreditation process, with suggestions to consider the UN Gold Standard for stakeholder modalities.

During the Agenda Item 6: Other Matters, various proposals for specific dedicated thematic groups were discussed. France proposed the establishment of three cross-cutting thematic groups focused on resilience, cooperation, and stability. Additionally, Egypt suggested a structure akin to the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, featuring technical and legal subcommittees.

In the Closure of the Session, further proposals were made, including thematic groups on the protection of critical infrastructure, existing and potential threats, international law, norms, rules, and principles. However, some delegations, including Australia, expressed a preference for integrated discussions rather than siloed thematic groups.

These discussions highlight the importance of considering various organizational structures for future mechanisms, balancing the need for focused thematic exploration with the benefits of integrated dialogue.

During the discussions at the session on other matters, it was emphasized that there is a preference for a limited number of thematic groups to avoid overburdening delegations. France and other delegations suggested establishing three thematic groups, whereas Egypt proposed the formation of two groups. The consensus points towards a balanced approach that considers the resource constraints of delegations while ensuring comprehensive discourse.

Further support for limiting the number of thematic groups was evident in the closure of the session, where it was acknowledged that a consensus exists to limit the number of thematic groups to manage workload effectively. Several delegations, including France, Germany, and Ireland, view three thematic groups as a practical number. This approach aims to balance a manageable workload with the necessity for comprehensive discussions, taking into account the resource constraints faced by delegations.

The discussions on managing the number of thematic groups in the future permanent mechanism were not extensively covered in most sessions of the UN OEWG 2021-2025 9th Substantive Session. However, in the Agenda Item 6: Other Matters, Brazil and others suggested the introduction of rotational mechanisms and focusing on a limited number of thematic groups to alleviate the burden on delegations.

During the Closure of the Session, proposals were made to consolidate thematic groups and consider a rotational mechanism where different groups are active during various cycles. This approach aims to permit more focused and manageable discussions while considering the resource constraints of delegations.

The discussions during the opening of the session highlighted the importance of reaching consensus on transitioning to the future permanent mechanism. The Chair advised against postponing consideration of difficult issues, stressing the need for agreement to ensure a seamless transition.

In the discussion on other matters, Uganda raised concerns regarding the term and responsibilities of chairmanship and vice-chairmanship. They suggested adopting a flexible approach in light of resource constraints, a consideration that could influence the structure and functioning of the future permanent mechanism.

While specific discussions on elements related to the future permanent mechanism were not directly covered in the dedicated stakeholder session and various parts of Agenda Item 5 discussions, the necessity of addressing the structure, number of meetings, and stakeholder participation were implicitly part of broader considerations, as noted during the closure of the session.

Overall, while the direct elements relating to the future permanent mechanism were not extensively covered, the sessions emphasized the importance of consensus, flexibility in leadership roles, and the broader structural considerations that will influence the transition to a permanent mechanism.

The topic of stakeholder participation in future mechanisms was a significant area of discussion across various sessions. During the opening of the session, Mexico and Colombia emphasized the importance of including stakeholders to ensure comprehensive cybersecurity strategies. Canada criticized the existing practice of vetoing stakeholder participation and advocated for improved modalities to facilitate stakeholder involvement.

In the dedicated stakeholder session, the Chair highlighted the importance of stakeholder engagement and the value of their input, while acknowledging the state-led nature of the process.

During Agenda Item 5 discussions, Czechia and Chile stressed the need for the involvement of multi-stakeholder communities and expressed regret over the veto of some stakeholders. They underscored the necessity for participation of relevant stakeholders in future mechanisms.

In the Agenda Item 6 discussions, stakeholders were suggested to have a consultative role, with a voice but not a vote. Canada proposed transparent accreditation processes, which was echoed by other participants.

In the closure of the session, the call for meaningful stakeholder participation that is integrated into the process was reiterated, while maintaining the state-led nature of the mechanism. There was a consensus that the current modalities were insufficient, as they allowed a single state to veto stakeholders. Suggestions included adopting a more transparent and inclusive accreditation process, considering the UN Gold Standard for stakeholder modalities, and learning from the ad hoc committee on cybercrime negotiations.