Agenda item 6: other matters/OEWG 2025

Summary

This transcript covers discussions at the 9th meeting of the 10th Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and Use of ICTs, focusing on establishing a future permanent mechanism for regular institutional dialogue on cybersecurity. Delegates debated the structure and modalities of this mechanism, including the number and focus of thematic groups, stakeholder participation, and decision-making processes. Many supported having 3-5 cross-cutting thematic groups on topics like resilience, cooperation, and stability, while others preferred maintaining the current pillar structure. There was broad agreement on the need for action-oriented discussions and integrating capacity building across all areas.

Stakeholder participation emerged as a contentious issue, with some advocating for expanded involvement and others insisting on maintaining strict state control. Several delegates supported the Canada-Chile proposal for more inclusive stakeholder modalities, while others emphasized preserving the current consensus-based approach. The importance of ensuring developing country participation was highlighted repeatedly. Delegates also discussed the need to balance in-person and virtual meetings, consider time zone differences, and maintain multilingualism.

Overall, while there was general support for establishing a permanent mechanism, significant differences remained on its exact structure and processes. Many delegates expressed willingness to compromise and called for flexibility to reach consensus by the July deadline. The Chair emphasized that the review process built into the mechanism would allow for future adjustments based on experience.

Keypoints

Major discussion points:

– Structure and number of thematic groups for the future permanent mechanism

– Modalities for stakeholder participation

– Importance of capacity building as a cross-cutting issue

– Need for inclusivity and consideration of resource constraints for smaller delegations

– Role of consensus in decision-making

Overall purpose/goal:

The purpose of this discussion was to gather input from member states on the structure and modalities of a future permanent mechanism for discussing cybersecurity issues at the UN, to succeed the current Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) when its mandate ends in July.

Tone:

The overall tone was constructive and diplomatic, with most delegations expressing willingness to compromise and find common ground. There was a sense of urgency to reach agreement, given the approaching deadline. While some disagreements emerged on specific issues like stakeholder participation, the Chair repeatedly encouraged flexibility and emphasized areas of potential consensus. The tone remained largely collaborative throughout, focused on problem-solving rather than confrontation.

Speakers

– Chair

– Pacific Islands Forum – Tonga: Speaking on behalf of Pacific Islands Forum member states

– Canada

– Estonia

– Senegal

– Islamic Republic of Iran

– El Salvador

– South Africa

– Cameroon

– Italy

– Japan

– Republic of Moldova

– Kenya

– Albania

– Republic of Korea

– Ecuador

– Indonesia

– Pakistan

– Malaysia

– Kingdom of the Netherlands

– United Kingdom

– Belarus

– Guatemala

– Russian Federation

– New Zealand

– Denmark

– Brazil

– Slovakia

– Cuba

– Czechia

– Chile

– Israel

– Thailand

Additional speakers:

– Nicaragua: Mentioned as speaking on behalf of like-minded countries

– France: Mentioned as proposing ideas for thematic groups

– China: Mentioned as making proposals

– Mexico: Mentioned as making suggestions

– Australia: Mentioned as co-sponsoring a working paper

– Colombia: Mentioned as co-sponsoring a working paper

– Fiji: Mentioned as co-sponsoring a working paper

– Switzerland: Mentioned as making proposals on international humanitarian law

– United States: Mentioned as expressing concerns over certain proposals

Expanded Summary of the 9th Meeting of the 10th Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and Use of ICTs

Introduction:

The 9th meeting of the 10th Substantive Session focused on establishing a future permanent mechanism for regular institutional dialogue on cybersecurity at the United Nations. Delegates from numerous countries engaged in discussions about the structure, modalities, and key priorities for this mechanism, which is set to succeed the current Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) when its mandate concludes in July.

Structure and Function of the Future Permanent Mechanism:

A significant portion of the debate centred on the organisation and focus of thematic groups within the new mechanism. While there was broad agreement on the need for action-oriented discussions, opinions diverged on the specific structure:

1. Cross-cutting Thematic Groups:

– Canada advocated for action-oriented, cross-cutting thematic groups.

– France and Italy proposed three thematic groups focusing on resilience, cooperation, and stability.

– Brazil suggested rotating agendas within thematic groups to address a wider range of topics and proposed a biannual program with thematic groups meeting annually or twice a year, followed by plenary sessions to incorporate their feedback.

2. Maintaining Current Structure:

– The Islamic Republic of Iran supported preserving the current five-pillar structure in the future mechanism.

3. Limited Number of Groups:

– The Pacific Islands Forum, represented by Tonga, emphasised the need for a limited number of thematic groups to enable participation of smaller delegations.

– Israel echoed this sentiment, supporting only 2-3 thematic groups to avoid overburdening delegations.

– South Africa, Kenya, and Slovakia also expressed support for a limited number of thematic groups.

4. Dedicated Focus Areas:

– Ecuador called for a dedicated group on capacity building.

– Thailand and Pakistan supported a dedicated group on international law.

The Chair and some member states, including Malaysia and Thailand, emphasised the importance of maintaining flexibility in the structure to allow for future adjustments based on experience and evolving needs. Thailand suggested that the establishment of thematic groups should remain flexible, allowing for periodic assessment and changes in response to evolving dynamics.

Stakeholder Participation:

The issue of stakeholder participation emerged as a contentious point, with delegates expressing divergent views:

1. Enhanced Participation:

– The United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Republic of Korea, Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Denmark, and Czechia supported enhanced stakeholder participation, emphasising the value of external expertise while maintaining the state-led nature of the process.

– The United Kingdom proposed safeguards to ensure appropriate stakeholder involvement.

– Japan suggested a transparent process to facilitate valuable stakeholder contributions.

– The Republic of Korea advocated for a “voice not vote” principle in stakeholder participation.

– Canada and Chile presented a proposal, co-sponsored by 25 countries, for practical modalities of stakeholder participation. The proposal aims to enhance transparency and inclusivity while maintaining the state-led nature of the process.

2. Maintaining Current Modalities:

– The Russian Federation, Cuba, and Senegal opposed changes to the current stakeholder modalities, emphasising the need to preserve the intergovernmental nature of the process.

– The Russian Federation specifically opposed the idea of starting consultations on NGO accreditation requests that have been objected to, and called for adherence to the current OEWG modalities.

3. Compromise Proposals:

– The Kingdom of the Netherlands expressed support for the Canada-Chile proposal on stakeholder modalities, which aimed to strike a balance between inclusivity and state control.

Decision-Making and Consensus:

Delegates also debated the decision-making processes for the future mechanism, particularly regarding the role of consensus:

1. Preserving Consensus:

– Belarus stressed the importance of preserving consensus-based decision making.

2. Flexibility in Consensus:

– Chile suggested that consensus should be a means to achieve broad common understanding and not an end in itself.

Capacity Building:

The importance of capacity building was widely recognised, with several delegates emphasising its cross-cutting nature:

1. Cross-cutting Approach:

– South Africa called for capacity building to be integrated across all areas of the mechanism.

– The Kingdom of the Netherlands proposed a cyclical approach to capacity building.

2. Focused Efforts:

– Brazil emphasised the importance of demand-driven, politically neutral capacity building.

– Cameroon highlighted the need for capacity building to enable participation of developing countries.

– Ecuador suggested a dedicated group on capacity building.

International Law Discussions:

Several delegates addressed the need for focused discussions on international law in cyberspace:

1. Dedicated Focus:

– Thailand and Pakistan supported a dedicated group on international law.

– Brazil called for deeper discussions between legal experts.

2. Practical Approaches:

– Estonia suggested scenario-based exercises on international law.

3. Structural Considerations:

– Israel opposed merging international law and norms discussions, highlighting the complexity of balancing different aspects of cyber discussions within the new structure.

– Chile expressed support for continued discussions on international law, either in a specific thematic group or in another mandated forum.

Additional Considerations:

1. Gender Perspective:

– Chile highlighted the importance of incorporating gender perspectives in future discussions on ICTs, referencing a document supported by over 30 delegations on this topic.

2. Time Zone Considerations:

– Several delegations, including New Zealand and the Pacific Islands Forum, raised concerns about scheduling meetings in consideration of different time zones to ensure equitable participation.

3. Nature of the Framework:

– Israel emphasized that the framework for dialogue on ICT security should be of a voluntary and non-legally binding nature.

Conclusion:

While there was general support for establishing a permanent mechanism, significant differences remained on its exact structure and processes. Many delegates expressed willingness to compromise and called for flexibility to reach consensus by the July deadline. The Chair emphasised that the review process built into the mechanism would allow for future adjustments based on experience.

Key challenges moving forward include:

1. Balancing the need for focused discussions with the resource constraints of smaller delegations.

2. Integrating capacity building effectively across all aspects of the mechanism.

3. Structuring stakeholder participation to enhance discussions while maintaining the intergovernmental nature of the process.

4. Designing a flexible mechanism that can adapt to evolving cyber threats and technologies.

5. Advancing common understandings on the application of international law to cyberspace.

6. Incorporating gender perspectives and ensuring equitable participation across time zones.

The discussions highlighted the complex task ahead in designing a mechanism that can effectively address global cybersecurity challenges while accommodating the diverse needs and perspectives of UN member states.

Chair: Good morning, distinguished delegates. The ninth meeting of the 10th Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and the Use of ICTs is now called to order. Distinguished delegates, we will now continue our discussions on the agenda item relating to regular institutional dialogue. We began this discussion yesterday with 10 speakers, and I have on my list 50 other delegations who have registered to speak today. It’s of course my intention to give everyone the opportunity to give their views on this important topic. It’s important that we listen to each other, because this is an issue on which we need new ideas to find the middle ground and to build consensus. So I welcome very much all the delegations that have already spoken and the delegations that have inscribed to speak, and I invite all of them to put forward new ideas, demonstrate flexibility, all with a view to finding a middle ground approach to building consensus. I would also be happy to give delegations that have already spoken yesterday and who wish to come back with additional comments, reactions, suggestions, new ideas. new expressions of flexibility that might not have previously occurred to them, but having heard other delegations and having been inspired by the comments and ideas of other delegations, perhaps we might also be able to hear shifts in position and demonstrations of flexibility from all sides and from all delegations. That’s the intention this morning, and it’s my intention to take this meeting all the way to 6 p.m. We need to spend every minute we have today to talk to each other, understand each other, and to see what would be a viable path forward. So with those comments, I’ll start with the first speaker, which is Tonga speaking on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum, to be followed by Canada. Tonga, you have the floor, please.

Pacific Islands Forum – Tonga: Thank you, Chair. I have the honor of speaking on behalf of the member states of the Pacific Islands Forum with our presence here in New York. Pacific Islands Forum members reaffirm the importance of continued discussions to support the creation of a permanent U.N. mechanism to advance regular institutional dialogue on responsible state behavior in cyberspace. The future mechanism should be inclusive, promote transparency, exchange of best practices with relevant and geographically diverse stakeholders in support of cybercapacity building, and be consensus-based and not be duplicative of existing initiatives across the U.N. system. To ensure that members of our Pacific family can effectively contribute to our future process, we emphasize the need for the future mechanism. to be inclusive and enable participation by all states, regardless of size or resources. We would welcome further discussions on how best to achieve this through manageable modalities. With this chair, some practical considerations include leveraging technology to support virtual and hybrid attendance options, taking into account equitable geographical time zones for delegates and experts should be considered. Such meeting modalities are important to enhance efficiency and reduce financial burden in relation to travel costs. Balance, however, must also be struck, and in our understanding, virtual informals are not a replacement for in-person attendance. It is important to remember that a 10 a.m. meeting in New York occurs in the early hours of the morning for many Pacific Island Forum capitals, ranging from 1 a.m. to 5 a.m. These time differences create barriers to meaningful participation, particularly for smaller delegations with limited resources. We also consider that keeping semantic groups limited in number will not overburden smaller delegations, while still allowing space and time for rich discussion on key topics of interest. Bringing relevant experts for inclusive dialogue is essential for the effectiveness of the practical, action-oriented work of the future mechanism. We draw particular importance to the discussions on how cybercapacity building can effectively be facilitated within a future permanent mechanism across all working groups. We want to ensure that capacity building discussions are not sidelined or siloed, but rather must form a go-about of the discussion in all working groups. We recognize the role that cybercapacity building has had and will continue. to play to strengthen our region’s resilience. However, there is more work to be done. Noting the varying levels of capacities and national contexts, there is an opportunity for the future mechanism to play a role in facilitating member states in identifying their needs, as well as in matching these with appropriate resources and technical assistance. Additionally, cyber capacity building is also necessary to enable states to participate in the future permanent mechanism in an inclusive manner and on equal footing, including through encouraging states to fund the participation of delegations from developing countries to attend meetings. Capacity building in this area is a critical enabler which strengthens cyber resilience and the ability of states to detect, defend against, and respond to malicious cyber activities. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you, Tonga. Canada to be followed by Estonia.

Canada: Thank you, Mr. Chair. We are fortunate to be slightly ahead of schedule this week, thus allowing for a bit more time to discuss what must be our top priority for the remainder of this process, which is to agree on how we will continue to work together within a future mechanism. There remains much to discuss, but we are not starting from scratch. Rather, we must build upon the starting point of last year’s consensus APR and, as you note, the mandate of this OEWG. We appreciate, Mr. Chair, that your efforts and constructive engagement from delegations of all sizes has helped us get this far. Some of what we agree is worth reiterating to ground ourselves as we move forward. We agreed there will be review conferences, plenary sessions, and thematic groups. The town hall two weeks ago and over the course of this week… has confirmed that the plenaries will address each of the pillars of the current OEWG. Each element of the framework will be addressed in plenaries, as it is now, and in a way that is well understood by all. The OEWG process has allowed for important state-led dialogue, and we would keep this process. But as Canada has indicated many times, we need more. Indeed, my Chinese colleagues spoke to the need for step-by-step progress, as did you, Mr. Chair. It is a time for this body to take the next step. Action-oriented, cross-cutting thematic groups are that next step. We must future-proof a permanent mechanism. It needs to be allowed to grow beyond the OEW conversations, as I’m quite sure none of us see us holding this same conversation 10 to 20 years from now. This is recognized in our consensus APR. We agreed that the future mechanism will include discussions of an integrated, policy-oriented, and cross-cutting nature, and that plenary meetings will consider the work and recommendations of dedicated thematic groups. We agreed that this year’s OEWG should focus on the thematic groups and on stakeholder participation. We thank the French delegation for its dedicated efforts to hold countless bilateral and group meetings, to listen to diverse points of view, and consolidating them into a paper that sets out how thematic groups could function from a practical perspective. The paper makes sense and shows how integrated, policy-oriented, and cross-cutting can work, starting with expert briefings that set the stage on the needs and solutions to further implement our common framework, including on international law and on capacity building. This sequence, Mr. Chair, is different from the sequence of plenaries, and that matters. One must admit, after many years of discussing in pillars, they are at risk of becoming silos. As we have highlighted throughout the week, we need to go deeper. Very rarely do we talk about what to do about threats, as this would require that we also speak to the pillars of capacity building, confidence building, norms implementation, and the implementation of existing law. This conversation is not happening in the pillars. More focus is necessary to take the next step in making our discussion more action-oriented. We think that the OEWG is ready to move a bit further into practical issues, and this is another way that the thematic groups would be different from plenaries and complement the broader discussions that would continue to take place there. We recognize that this is a careful balance. We want to get more out of the process, and we want everyone to get more from it. We think it would be prudent to avoid being overly prescriptive in sub-themes or plans for the next two years. These two elements, having more specific theme as a conversation starter, and the sequence of briefings, needs, and solutions, will create the space to dive deeper into common priorities. And for the deep dive to be useful, it needs to allow for full participation of stakeholders, meaning they need to be in the room and have the time to speak on each topic in the dedicated thematic groups so that their contributions are on point and respond directly to the needs of our intergovernmental community. On stakeholder participation, again, we agreed by consensus last July to build on the OEWG experience. Building on something means improving it, not keeping it exactly the same. We note that the discussion paper of January 27th explored some ideas on how to build on the OEWG experience. Yet, as Canada stated during the town hall, the ideas in this discussion paper are, unfortunately, largely insufficient. As you know, Mr. Chair, Canada and Chile have been working hard to put ideas on paper. We’ve held over dozens of hours of virtual consultations and like you I am sure we cannot count anymore the number of bilateral discussions we have had with both states and stakeholders on this important issue. That work was all worth it because we managed to consolidate concrete clear proposals in the paper that we recirculated today, this time with a list of co-sponsors. At its core states that co-sponsor our practical modalities paper care about inclusivity and transparency in all and each meeting of the future mechanism. Your guiding questions Mr. Chair ask about how to accommodate genuine concerns to ensure that stakeholders contributions remain non-political. The fact is we have yet to hear states articulate the basis of their objections or vetoes. This makes it difficult to assess that nor would I note have we heard any stakeholder make political statements in either plenaries or side events thus far. Our paper acknowledges that states may feel they have legitimate concerns with regard to certain stakeholders. We do not want to prevent them from objecting. We do not want to prevent them from making their case that their concerns are genuine or that they have they see a stakeholder behaving in a way that is inappropriate or raises particular concerns. However this needs to be transparent. We want the occasion to hear them out, to hear their reasoning. This is a constructive approach for a healthy and necessary discussion. On the other hand many of us may have a different point of view and we really care about the inclusion of those objected stakeholders and we should also have the chance to explain why we want to include them in our discussion. Holding this very conversation on exclusion and inclusion of specific stakeholders would allow us to address concerns transparently. By the end of such discussions we are hopeful that we could agree together and decide by consensus. However, if we cannot find consensus, we should be able to use our existing and impartial tool to carry on. For procedural issue of stakeholder participation, that tool is Majority Vote. It relies on precedents such as those allowed by the adoption of the Cybercrime Convention, a convention we have heard lauded in this room this week. Another way to promote inclusion of diverse expert perspectives and transparency on how the framework is applied is to give more space for stakeholders for their contributions. We think stakeholders should be able to speak every day of the meeting, likely for an hour, and to submit written documents for our consideration. Our paper also invites briefings and presentations by experts, in a way that is similar to what we did during the intersessionals in May that was viewed as valuable by many participants. These ideas are supported by 25 states that co-sponsor the proposal, namely Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Japan, Kiribati, Latvia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. We are, of course, open and willing to consider other creative ideas to achieve our objectives of more meaningful stakeholder participation. Mr. Chair, I would be remiss if I did not conclude today by noting the victory of Canada’s men’s national hockey team last night. Our team won because it had all the pieces it needed to put a win together in the right way. Our goal as Team OEWG must be to do the same. We need to ensure we have our plenary, our dedicated thematic groups, and our stakeholder modalities designed in such a way as they work together to create a workable future mechanism. We’ve heard some members of our team suggest that one piece of this mechanism, stakeholder modalities, should be a part of the future. might be left for later, or not optimized for maximum success. We disagree. This would be equivalent to Canada’s coach leaving behind our defence, or, God forbid, our goalie. This is not a winning strategy, and like Team Canada hockey, this piece of Team OEWG is committed to working for a shared OEWG win. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Canada. Congratulations on the hockey game win, and I agree with you that we must all collectively work as a team, because winning this challenge that is before us, winning this challenge in July, will be a win for all of us. And I hope that that will motivate us in the time that we have left to work much harder to get to the finish line. Thank you very much for that, Canada. Estonia, to be followed by Senegal.

Estonia: Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor. Estonia aligns itself with the statement by the European Union and adds the following. We are at a crossroads as the open-ended working group entering its final phase, with key decisions ahead on how to advance international cooperation in cyberspace. The program of action offers a clear path forward, providing action-oriented and sustainable framework to ensure concrete progress for international cooperation on cybersecurity. Regarding dedicated thematic groups, we view that the recent French paper, with a proposal for free action-oriented and cross-cutting thematic groups on resilience, cooperation, and stability as an effective way to structure our discussions. It indicates that all five pillars are fully integrated to the dedicated… thematic groups. Therefore, discussions on international law should take place within the cross-cutting thematic groups, not in a separate thematic group together with non-binding norms, to maintain a strong link between legal considerations and real policy challenges. Addressing legal aspects separately risks creating a legal silo, which we should avoid. It is also important that legal principles shape debate from the start. We support scenario-based discussions and Estonia, along with many other countries, has benefited a lot from it. On stakeholder modalities, the paper put forward by a cross-regional group of Canada and Chile and co-sponsored by 25 states, including Estonia, provide a solid foundation. It is evident that governments alone do not have full expertise in the cyber field and stakeholders provide essential knowledge on cyber discussions. Therefore, ensuring meaningful stakeholder inclusion in cyber discussions is of key importance. With this greater inclusion, we would like to emphasize that the question is not about shifting responsibilities from the governments nor about giving the stakeholders decision power in the context of RID. The guiding principle here is to benefit from the voice, without a vote. Additionally, we must address the issue of a single state having a veto power, as this negatively impacts the effectiveness, transparency and inclusivity of global cyber governance. Mr. Chair, we appreciate your leadership and valuable contributions of all delegations. We remain committed to constructive dialogue and collaborative efforts to achieve meaningful outcome. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Estonia. Senegal, to be followed by Islamic Republic of Iran, please.

Senegal: Thank you very much, Chair. Senegal aligns itself with the statement by Nigeria on behalf of the African group, and would like to add the following in our national capacity. Chair, at the outset, my delegation aligns itself with what was shared by Madam Izumi Nakamitsu, USG for Disarmament Affairs, on the unique opportunity that we have to define together the outlines of a permanent mechanism to discuss questions of cyber security at a time where the impact of cyber activities on international peace and security needs no further proof. This is why Senegal would like to urge its peers to demonstrate a high level of compromises as we seek consensus at the end of the cycle. In particular, on the modalities for this permanent mechanism, which is planned for as early as 2026, as well as on substantial questions where substantive discussions will be expected. Chair, Senegal takes due note of the working document of the Chair on the participation of stakeholders and thematic groups. My delegation believes that this is an excellent starting point for substantive discussions with a view to ensuring a smooth transition from the current OEWG towards a permanent mechanism. My delegation would like to take this opportunity of this general discussion to share its views on these two aspects. Firstly, Senegal welcomes the highly valuable contribution made by stakeholders in our work. They continue to enrich our deliberations and they provide enlightenment and they share the information too. However, in line with the African position, would advocate for keeping current modalities for their participation in the future mechanism. Indeed, the need to guarantee the exclusively intergovernmental nature of this process and also the need to prevent any skewing of any objectives of the involvement of these partners show that we should be prudent regarding the introducing new procedures for their participation. Secondly, while we do recognize the equal relevance and importance of the five pillars, my country would like to underscore the need to ensure adaptations could be made to allow for substantive and inclusive discussions on each and every one of these pillars. To this end, it would be more a question of accommodating these pillars based on the nature of these pillars and on the mandates. That’s the idea behind the African proposal for three thematic groups. The first on purely technical aspects. This includes the definition of threats, countermeasures in response to cyber attacks and confidence building measures. The second would cover all legal issues, covering both the application of international law and the questions of norms for responsible behavior. The last would focus exclusively on capacity building and international cooperation, which while this is, of course, cross-cutting across all pillars, requires particular attention within the future mechanism to bridge development gaps and foster better harmonization of practices in this field. Thirdly, on the question of suspending modalities of organization and functioning, my country welcomes the proposals made by the chair, which again are an excellent starting point. However, bearing in mind the timeframes that stand between us and the end of our mandate, it would be wise for some questions to be. postpone for the future mechanism, particularly the first organization conference on all substantive discussions. Fourthly and finally, Chair, my delegation agrees with you on the need to conclude the mandate of our group on a good note, particularly through a consensus-based adoption and an adoption of the final report that enjoys full support and also transition to the future permanent mechanism. Senegal would call on all states to show greater political will as well as determination to propose compromise as a key framework for negotiation to make real progress on unresolved issues regarding the mechanism. To conclude, Chair, Senegal would believe that we are able to implement in intentions and are looking forward to working as part of the future mechanism. Thank you very much.

Chair: Thank you very much, Senegal, for your contribution. Islamic Republic of Iran, to be followed by El Salvador.

Islamic Republic of Iran: Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation fully aligns itself with the statement made by Nicaragua on behalf of like-minded countries and wishes to offer the following comments in its national capacity. Mr. Chair, we appreciate your dedication and tireless efforts in building consensus and addressing the outstanding issues related to the future permanent mechanism. We have reviewed the proposal outlined in your letter and would like to highlight the following points. Regarding the modalities for stakeholders’ participation, our comments are as follows. First, it is essential to emphasize that the group has already agreed in its third APR on the fundamental and overarching principle that, and I quote, the future permanent mechanism is a state-led process where negotiations and decisions on ICT security. remain the prerogative of states, end of quote. This agreement clearly pertains to both the negotiation and decision-making procedures. Second, regarding proposals to apply similar modalities of stakeholders’ participation as were adopted for the Ad Hoc Committee on Cybercrimes or the so-called Golden Standard, as previously mentioned, we believe that this modality was only applicable with the context of the Ad Hoc Committee as its name indicates the Ad Hoc Committee was a temporary body with a specific mandate and limited working period. Furthermore, its work and the stakeholders involved were focused on legal issues which differ in nature and sensitivity from the information security agenda. Third, when defining the modalities for stakeholder participation, it is crucial to take into account the unique nature and specific complexity of engaging with ICT security issues, which differ significantly from other international processes. The political sensitivities surrounding ICT security for states are unparalleled and cannot be compared to those of other issues. Efforts to involve non-governmental stakeholders in areas that are politically sensitive or contentious may risk exacerbating disagreements and creating division among governments. We agree with giving stakeholders a voice, but this voice should be informal, consultative, and limited to technical matters. Fourth, we firmly believe that the current modalities for the participation of other interested parties are both effective and sufficient. These modalities strike a dedicated balance in addressing the concerns of all member states. We would like to recall that this approach results from extensive and complex discussions among member states. Fifth, the accreditation of 100 stakeholders to date, as you, Mr. Chair, referred to in your opening remarks, stands as a testament to the success of the current modalities. Therefore, rather than altering the current modalities, we believe the focus should be on ensuring equitable geographical presentation of stakeholders and supporting the active engagement of stakeholders from developing countries. Meanwhile, regarding the proposed arrangement by the Chair, we would like to emphasize the following points. The future mechanism must uphold the principle of non-objection. The Chair’s paper is based on assumptions that have resulted in legal deficiencies. We cannot agree with the concept of provisional participation for stakeholders who have faced objection during the accreditation process. This proposal undermines the intergovernmental nature of UN bodies and disrespects the prerogative and sovereign rights of Member States. The Chair’s engagement in informal consultations regarding the objections expressed should not be perceived as an attempt to exert pressure on Member States. Regarding the dissemination of information, we fully agree with you on the importance of upholding the principle of transparency. However, this must be done in a way that avoids giving the impression of attempting to single out or pressure specific States through naming and shaming. In our view, providing information only to the requesting countries would be adequate. Following informal consultation and achievement of actual agreements, the Chair could then inform Member States of any emerging consensus, eliminating the need for further decisions to be presented at the plenary session. The Chair’s proposed document includes a paragraph on stakeholder participation urging them to engage in a technical and objective manner. and refrain from politicizing issues. However, it does not provide a mechanism to ensure the implementation of these principles by stakeholders. Oral statement by stakeholders should be restricted to dedicated stakeholder sessions during planning sessions and review conferences while allowing them to attend all other meetings. Turning to the proposal for establishing dedicated thematic groups, our comments are as follows. First, Iran supports the idea of preserving the pillar of the current OEWG while creating thematic groups. We also note the proposal for a limited number of thematic groups, which would enable smaller delegations to participate and contribute meaningfully to discussions on an equal footing. We remain flexible regarding the merging of current items. Member states, through consensus, may consider rotational arrangements for convening meetings on each subject during the biannual two-year cycle. Second, prioritizing the interests of a specific group of countries by emphasizing critical infrastructure would not be appropriate. We believe that the priorities of all countries should be considered in a balanced manner. Establishing a dedicated thematic group to address existing and emerging threats in line with the OEWG’s pillar-based approach will more effectively address concerns related to protection of critical infrastructure. Third, the proposal for a dedicated thematic group on preventing conflicts overlaps with the discussion on CBMs and can therefore be addressed within the future thematic group on CBM, which could be established under the permanent mechanism in alignment with the OEWG pillars-based approach. Fourth, regarding the sequencing of meetings, we agree with the chair’s proposal to hold thematic group meetings within a consolidated time window alongside plenary sessions. This approach will allow smaller delegations to participate and contribute meaningfully to discussions on an equal footing, while also reducing administrative and logistical burdens. Finally, we would like to emphasize the language in paragraph 9 of Annex C of the third APR regarding the functions of the future mechanism. It specifies that the mechanism will further explore the development of additional legally binding obligations. This issue should be given priority when defining the working structure of the mechanism, including through the establishment of a dedicated thematic group. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you, Islamic Republic of Iran, for your contribution. El Salvador to be followed by South Africa.

El Salvador: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My country aligns itself with the statement on capacity building made by Argentina on behalf of a group of countries from Latin America and the Caribbean. In line with that statement, I wish to state that El Salvador revised its statement in light of that statement. We will not repeat our national position, rather we will make suggestions to narrow gaps and build common ground regarding modalities for participation for stakeholders and thematic groups within the future permanent mechanism. With a view to the final report of July 2025, in terms of modalities for stakeholder participation, El Salvador is of the view that the Chair’s proposal reflects an inclusive approach and we support the general direction thereof. However, in order to guarantee that the modalities work smoothly, we suggest a number of thoughts be considered. We are one cognizant of the need. of the fact that reaching consensus could be a challenge to the functioning of the mechanism and create an excessive burden for the future chair. As such, we fully support the spirit of paragraph 17 of annex C of the third version, but we suggest viewing consensus as a guiding principle instead of an absolute sine qua non. With that in mind, we are of the view that it would be useful to explore how we might apply the non-objection mechanism in a fair and constructive way, guaranteeing that the future chair has the support they require to manage objections in such a way as to facilitate timely decision-making, guaranteeing equity and transparency. Measures need to be implemented which avoid excessive consultations regarding the participation of stakeholders. We need to avoid such discussions unduly delaying the work of the mechanism. In that vein, we propose that we establish specific timeframes and we’re flexible on how long they should be, but we do believe that it is necessary to ensure a specific timeframe for consultations to avoid them dragging out indefinitely. The Mexican delegation made suggestions for time limits yesterday that would merit consideration. We need to adopt a balanced approach which preserves the integrity of the process and which at the same time allows the meaningful participation of all stakeholders. Moreover, we are of the view that the proposal to allow the provisional participation of stakeholders until a final decision is made on their accreditation is a worthy one. However, we’d like clarification around whether this status would apply throughout the whole session because the lack of predictability there could create resource loss. and waste time, and that would deter participation. So we need clarity on that procedure if we are to properly build the trust we need. Regarding dedicated thematic groups, we’re worried about the establishment of five thematic groups in addition to intersessional meetings, substantive sessions, and preparatory work for the review conference. We’re worried about the idea that five thematic groups could be an unnecessary excessive burden, particularly for small delegations. We understand that these groups will not sit in parallel, but we already have a hectic calendar when it comes to matters of international security, and this could weigh us down. We need a more manageable structure where the thematic groups are concerned, and that could foster more effective participation without overly burdening our resources. There needs to be clear distinctions between thematic groups and the plenary sessions, and a clear reporting procedure, this in order to avoid duplication of mandates. And all of this has to include clear rules of procedure, particularly when we’re talking about groups that sit informally. In our view, we should ensure that we preserve the principle of multilingualism in future thematic groups in order to ensure that participation is truly inclusive, particularly that of developing countries. With that in mind, we would also suggest that one of the thematic groups proposed focuses on analyzing the evolving threat landscape. That would allow us to broach new trends in terms of attacks and looking at how ITCs intersect with other emerging technologies and other trends. There is a proposal for a thematic group on international law and ITCs. That’s particularly relevant for El Salvador. That should be retained in any future working document. However, we are flexible regarding how the groups are appointed and what form they take, provided that substantive issues are adequately tackled. In connection to that last point, we agree with the need to drill down into thematic issues that are proposed, in terms of how they shape the structure of groups, because this will give us information about whether priorities are or are not being tackled properly, whatever the general name of the group. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, El Salvador. South Africa to be followed by Cameroon.

South Africa: Thank you, Chairperson. We thank you and your team for preparing the paper on regular institutional dialogue and the guiding questions. With regards to safeguards that could be put in place to accommodate genuine concerns regarding the participation of specific stakeholders, South Africa supports the proposal in your discussion paper to allow stakeholders to engage in a technical and objective manner. The process of developing common understandings and sharing information should be inclusive without allowing stakeholders decision-making powers over member states. Global society, academia, and business have expertise and knowledge that would assist member states develop their understanding of the fast-developing ICT security environment. It would therefore be prudent to engage them in an informal consultative manner that is acceptable to all member states. We underscore that the permanent mechanism is a member state-led process that allows for engagement with relevant stakeholders. All member state meetings of thematic groups would include decisions by member states on which actions could be referred to plenary for adoption in the permanent mechanism. This would maintain the apparatus of the mechanism as an unbiased and apolitical forum. Chairperson, we have also studied your proposals on thematic groups, and we can support three permanent thematic groups. Additional matters could be discussed in ad hoc thematic groups agreed upon in plenary sessions. Our rationale is to limit the amount of meetings that experts from developing countries are required to participate in, and to ensure that all ICT-related meetings in various other forums outside the UN are equally attended to within current national capacities. Having considered the proposed thematic groups in the discussion paper, we can support the following three broad thematic groups. A dedicated thematic group on building the resilience of ICT ecosystems and critical infrastructure. This group could also include discussion on threats and capacity building. A dedicated thematic group on cooperation in the management of ICT incidents. This group could include discussion on operationalization of the POC directory, implementation of norms and capacity building. A dedicated thematic group on confidence building measures to foster stability and reduce misunderstandings. This group could discuss implementation of the eight CBMs, international law, and capacity building. We are open to discussions by Member States on a rotational mechanism to ease the burden on cybersecurity experts from developing countries. We believe that there is a creative solution to accommodate the various discussions on ICT security, including through the review cycles, without establishing several thematic structures that can call meetings simply because of a schedule that compels them to. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, South Africa, for your contribution. Cameroon, to be followed by Italy.

Cameroon: Mr. Chair, distinguished delegates, my delegation welcomes the continued discussions on the establishment of a regular institutional dialogue under the auspices of the United Nations, ensuring the broad participation of states in addressing issues related to cyber security, responsible state behavior in space, and the application of international law to high cities. In today’s interconnected world, cyber threats transcend national borders, affecting governments, economies, and societies globally. An inclusive, structured, and institutionalized dialogue under the UN framework is essential to fostering trust, cooperation, and collective resilience in cyberspace. My country is in favor of establishing regular institutional dialogue. The need for a permanent UN-led cyber security forum is paramount. My delegation supports the creation of a UN-led, multilateral institutional mechanism dedicated to cyber diplomacy, cyber governance, and international cooperation on ICT security. This forum should serve as a platform for continuous dialogue, exchange of best practices, and policy coordination on cyber-related matters. An institutional framework would prevent cyber conflicts, promote responsible state behavior, and facilitate the peaceful use of cyberspace. Concerning the broad and equitable participation of states, my delegation thinks that, for this dialogue to be truly effective, it must include all states, regardless of their level of technological development. Cameroon advocates for a fair and inclusive approach that ensures the active participation of developing countries, particularly those in Africa, so that their concerns and priorities are adequately addressed. The process must also be transparent and consensus-driven, ensuring that all states contribute to shaping the rules and norms that govern the cyberspace. Bridging the digital divide and ensuring cyber resilience is very necessary. A key component of this dialogue must be addressing the global digital divide to ensure that all nations can benefit from a secure and reliable ICT infrastructure. Cameroon supports initiatives aimed at enhancing the resilience of critical digital infrastructure, improving cyber incident response, and fostering cooperation in shared intelligence sharing. Concerning promoting confidence-building measures and cyber norms, institutionalized dialogue should also serve as a mechanism for advancing confidence-building measures, such as voluntary transparency measures on national cybersecurity policies, regular exchanges between states on cyber threat assessment and risk mitigation strategies, development of shared norms and best practices to prevent misinterpretation of cyber incidents. The harmonization with existing UN processes is also very paramount. Cameroon emphasizes the importance of harmonizing this new institutional dialogue with existing UN initiatives, including the UN Open-Ended Working Group on ICTs, the Group of Governmental Experts, GGE, on cybersecurity, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs on cyber threats. The objective should be to create a structured and permanent platform that complements ongoing UN efforts rather than duplicating them. Mr. Chair, my delegation firmly believes that a regular institutional dialogue under the UN With a broad and equitable participation of all states, we enhance global cybersecurity governance. Such a mechanism will strengthen international trust, reduce cyber risk, and contribute to a stable and secure cyberspace. We look forward to working with all member states to establish a structured, inclusive, and action-oriented framework for international cyber cooperation. Thank you, Mr. President.

Chair: Thank you very much, Cameroon, for your contribution. Italy to be followed by Japan.

Italy: Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor. Italy fully aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union. As the conclusion of this OEWG is rapidly approaching, we are all called to join efforts and identify a new mechanism that allows us to enhance our long-lasting changes on cybersecurity. Over the past years, we had significant opportunities to meet and share our thoughts on some of the most pressing issues affecting cyberspace. Thanks to the OEWG, some significant outcomes have been achieved, as clearly underlined by the annual progress reports. Since the international framework is evolving in a dramatic way, we believe that a change of pace is needed so as to effectively dive into concrete challenges our countries are confronted with. This is why we fully support France’s proposal for a program of action that manages to consistently address the five pillars of the OEWG across cost-cutting dedicated thematic groups, namely building resilience in national cybersecurity ecosystems and critical infrastructures, fostering cooperation to manage ICT-related incidents, and promoting stability in cyberspace. Thanks to such a concrete and flexible mechanism, also characterized by more balanced numbers of meetings, we will be able to streamline our processes and deliver actionable outcomes that would support a meaningful process in advancing responsible state behavior and strengthening global cybersecurity. Recognizing the importance of gender inclusion in cybersecurity policy, Italy welcomes the OEWG’s ongoing efforts to mainstream gender equality in the future mechanism and co-sponsored the Working Paper on Gender and the Future Permanent Mechanism drafted by Australia, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Finally, Italy places great importance on inclusive dialogue and the meaningful involvement of all relevant stakeholders. Governments, businesses, academia and civil society each bring unique perspectives essential for crafting effective and comprehensive outcomes. We support mechanisms like remote participation to assure broad and equitable engagement, Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Italy, for your contribution. Japan, to be followed by Republic of Moldova.

Japan: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Japan strongly supports the value of a future mechanism that is action-oriented to implement existing international law and norms. It is crucial to continue such discussions at the UN OEWG to date and Japan sincerely respects the Chair’s tireless efforts and contributions on this issue. With regard to the multi-stakeholder modalities in the future mechanism, I would like to reiterate the value of technical contributions from organizations with technical advantages, including the private sector, if they are allowed to participate in the future mechanism. To realize such benefits, we need an open and transparent process to facilitate such valuable multi-stakeholder participation. With regards to the dedicated thematic groups in the future mechanism, Japan respects the need to take into account the limited resources of member states, while there are critical values for the establishment of additional groups focused on action-oriented, scenario-based technical discussions. Therefore, Japan supports the proposal by France on the action-oriented thematic groups. Such scenario-based thematic groups will add great value to what we are doing now in a complementary way. Simulating responses to cybersecurity incidents and threats will include aspects such as the use of various policy tools, laws and regulations, capacity building, public-private partnerships, and international cooperation. Such groups can also discuss the needs and solutions associated with these tools to improve cybersecurity. Meanwhile, plenary sessions in the future mechanism should continue to have policy-oriented discussions on such topics as international law, norms, confidence-building measures, and capacity building, as we are doing this week. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Republic of Moldova: Esteemed Chair, distinguished colleagues, on behalf of my delegation, I would like to share our view on this important matter, the future regular institutional dialogue on cybersecurity at the United Nations. We recognize the constructive efforts made thus far and look forward to further collaboration and consensus. We warmly welcome the work of Canada and Chile on the non-paper enabling stakeholders to add value to state-led discussions in the future UN mechanism for security in cyberspace. We strongly believe in the undeniable expertise. stakeholders, academia, the technical community, civil society, and the private sector, who bring essential knowledge on cyber threats because their impact and solutions are of great value. Their professional capacity building and the research they provide are also invaluable in addressing the technical realities of cyberspace. We urge that their contributions continue to be promoted and integrated in the future UN mechanism. We also appreciate our French colleagues’ proposal for the structure of the future mechanism, which emphasizes a balanced, dynamic, and evolving process. These efforts are critical to ensure that the stakeholder community continues to play an integral role in shaping cyber security governance. Moldova supports France’s proposal to reduce the burden on small delegations and developing states by limiting formal meetings to less days annually, as my distinguished colleague from South Africa also mentioned. This approach will ensure accessibility for all while maintaining meaningful dialogue. Furthermore, the five-year review cycle will allow for continuous improvement addressing gaps, challenges, and best practices in the framework’s implementation. The future permanent mechanism should prioritize building resilience, enhancing cross-border cooperation, and ensuring stability in cyberspace. The thematic groups should focus on actionable recommendations to advance these goals, leveraging norms, confidence-building measures, and capacity-building initiatives. The thematic groups should be inclusive with participation open to all UN member states and stakeholders through both in-person and remote formats. This will ensure broad engagement and meaningful contributions from all sectors. The thematic groups must facilitate needs-based cybersecurity capacity building, ensuring that resources and expertise are effectively shared to address state-specific challenges. This will help align efforts with the evolving needs of states. Finally, Chair, the Republic of Moldova is committed to work, thus bringing its own contribution to ensure that future regular institutional dialogue is effective, inclusive and action-oriented, strengthening the global security and stability in cyberspace. That’s all for now. Thank you very much, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Republic of Moldova, for your contribution. I give the floor now to Kenya, to be followed by Albania.

Kenya: Thank you, Chair. My delegation believes that future permanent mechanism should, as OEWG, be designed in line with the principles of equitable, inclusive and effective participation of all states. Kenya, therefore, submits the following six points. First, the design of future permanent mechanism must ensure comprehensive representation and active participation of all member states. It should also consider the existing digital divide between member states, which influences member states’ ability to implement the Framework for Responsible State Behaviour. Second, the future permanent mechanism should continue to discuss existing and potential threats and focus on capacity-building aimed at building member states’ ability to implement the Framework for Responsible State Behaviour. Third, the establishment of a mechanism for the exchange of information on best practices on implementation of the Framework for Responsible State Behaviour can also be considered under the permanent mechanism building on the proposals already discussed at the OEWG. Fourth, the future permanent mechanism should not be more bothersome on the delegates. Therefore, the proposed meetings of the thematic groups should be no more than five. The plenary sessions should be held back to back with those of the dedicated thematic groups. This will ensure that even small delegations like ours are able to effectively participate. Fifth, the proposed thematic groups should build on the work already done under the OEWG. Whatever number of groups we adopt, our ultimate aim should be to build confidence, grow members’ capacity, enable states to implement the voluntary non-binding norms and develop a common understanding of applicability of international law. Sixth, the collaboration approach should be holistic, incorporating both public and private sectors, academia and civil societies to strengthen cyber security initiatives. Therefore, the participation of stakeholders in the future permanent mechanism is most welcome. I affirm Kenya’s continued constructive engagement to contribute to enhanced global efforts, legal frameworks and norms that will promote a free, peaceful and stable cyber domain and at the same time cooperatively work to mitigate the existing and potential threats. I thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Kenya, for your contribution. Albania, to be followed by Republic of Korea.

Albania: Mr. Chair, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, since in the last year and particularly over the past weeks, extensive discussions and dedicated efforts have been undertaken by countries worldwide to collectively advocate towards a safer and more resilient cyberspace. Drawing from our experience of significant state-sponsored cyber attacks, Albania has been committed to sharing its experience on responding to and mitigating the efforts of such attacks with numerous countries in our region and beyond, including this honored audience of the United Nations. By fostering a culture of cooperation and mutual support, we aim to enhance our collective ability to prevent, detect and respond to cyber threats. thereby contributing to global cyber stability and security. We have carefully examined our state stance on the future mechanism of regular institutional dialogue, recognizing the importance of a collaborative approach in addressing cyber security challenges. Albania aligns with the position of EU on establishing a regular institutional dialogue and in the capacity of the country-states. Albania welcomes the discussion on establishing a regular institutional dialogue under the auspices of the United Nations, recognizing the importance of structures and inclusive engagement in addressing cyber security challenges. An ongoing and substantial dialogue would enhance cooperation, improve information sharing and strengthen cyber capabilities and resilience. The program of action will integrate the reflection of the five pillars with cross-cutting and action-driven discussions. Albania believes that maintaining the status quo or putting forward divisive proposals will not advance progress in this area, which is essential to ensure a cyberspace for our citizens. In addition, we find the proposal of POA as flexible enough to accommodate all of us. As an example regarding the proposals for dedicated discussions on international law, both plenary and specialized working group discussions will offer a platform for dialogue on how international law applies and gaps to be addressed. And these discussions can complement each other and in addition, we also believe that the proposal for a global portal and the POC directory can be linked to the permanent structure. With regards to the question to how we can ensure the discussion in the dedicated thematic groups delver deeper into the issues raising during the substantial plenary sessions. This can be achieved by guiding the discussions around some key topics while ensuring it builds upon the plenary discussions. We should focus on the challenges, implementation of all pillars of the UN framework and best practices, as well as building global capacities to tackle cyber threats. In this way, we can ensure our discussions explore thoroughly and lead to the meaningful progress in addressing the issues raised. To implement the UN framework for responsible state behavior in a coherent manner and identify potential gaps, including in international law, an increased shared understanding of the threats and challenges is needed. We also should bring all the pillars together to address threats effectively and identify the needs and solutions for capacity building in this context, as we can ensure a more unified response. In this case, conducting a scenario-based exercise can enhance our understanding on how the UN framework is applied and help identify areas where additional efforts are required. Discussing international law will have a key role in the future’s substantive plenary discussions and will be relevant across several thematic groups, as it provides the legal framework linked to and for advancing many of the issues addressing in these groups. For example, international law can be included in discussing challenges of the critical infrastructures within a resilient group, as well as being included when discussing capacity building, where the cross-cutting groups help to identify threat-related needs. Thus, this approach supports more than one discussing on those issues, demonstrating the nexus between the pillars. Albania supports transparent, inclusive and action-oriented discussions by also including stakeholders. Regarding stakeholders’ participation, the status quo will not support meaningful stakeholder engagement, we need to ensure that contributions of stakeholders are not limited so that UN member states have unrestricted access to knowledge and capacity building. With a veto modality remaining, this is not possible. Albania supports the non-paper put forward by Canada and Chile on how to overcome the veto. We believe it provides a fair, inclusive, and transparent approach and constitutes a constructive effort towards compromise. Thus we believe it should be further discussed during the session. We would also like to underline that POA proposal is an inclusive proposal that lays a strong foundation within the UN to address the relevant issues as it aims to driving tangible progress, tackle the challenge we face in the action-driven manner, and empower the UN’s role. Albania would like to thank you, Chair, and the Secretariat for all the intensive work. I underline that Albania remains dedicated to promoting inclusive, transparent, and action-driven approach for strengthening collaboration and advancing dialogue on cybersecurity issues. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Albania, for your contribution. Republic of Korea to be followed by Ecuador.

Republic of Korea: Thank you, Mr. Chair. At the outset, we appreciate the Chair’s efforts in circulating the discussion paper on the regular consultative mechanism. We hope that this discussion will contribute to the establishment of a single-track, action-oriented, and permanent mechanism. We affirm our position that multi-stakeholder participation makes a cross-cutting contribution within the OEWG and emphasize the importance of ensuring inclusive and integrated engagement of these stakeholders. From this perspective, we believe there is no need to restrict multi-stakeholders from sharing their relevant expertise. within the OEWG. We appreciate the chaired discussion paper also reflects efforts to enhance the participation of multi-stakeholders in the process. As national positions may vary regarding the participation of a certain multi-stakeholders in the OEWG process, we believe it would be worthwhile to discuss effective ways to reconcile the differences referring to the working paper that we co-sponsored with Canada and Chile. Meanwhile, we welcome the chaired discussion paper which proposes operating thematic groups in a hybrid format to minimize the time and financial burden on states. We believe this approach would promote greater inclusivity and flexibility. In addition, given that the need for cross-cutting discussions has been consistently emphasized in OEWG, it may be worth considering adjusting current five separate groups into more streamlined and integrated groups. For example, during the ninth substantive session, France proposed structuring the thematic groups around three key areas, resilience, cooperation, and stability. We believe that if each group appropriately adjust its program agenda based on state consensus, this approach could effectively enhance cross-cutting discussions within the OEWG. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Republic of Korea. Ecuador, to be followed by Indonesia.

Ecuador: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Once again, I reiterate Ecuador’s support for the document presented by Argentina on behalf of a group of countries on capacity building. We are also grateful for the Chair’s document on the future permanent mechanism. My delegation supports the proposals presented on the participation of stakeholders and the creation of thematic groups. Particularly, Mr. Chairman, I would underscore the need to create and maintain a specific group on capacity building, because this is an issue which cuts across every issue discussed in this working group. As regards the participation of stakeholders in the Future Permanent Mechanism, my country recognizes the experience that these stakeholders have, and that could produce great value for our discussions in this process. Consequently, we are open to continuing to discuss modalities for their participation. Mr. Chairman, there will be no perfect proposal that will satisfy everyone’s needs when it comes to the structure of the Future Permanent Mechanism. However, the Chair’s proposal is a good basis upon which to achieve the consensus we so desire. You have my delegation’s full support in finding ways forward that will allow us to successfully create the Future Permanent Mechanism. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Ecuador, for your contribution. Indonesia, to be followed by Pakistan.

Indonesia: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Indonesia welcomes the consensus and shared views among Member States on the establishment of a single-track and state-led Future Permanent Mechanism on cybersecurity. We encourage active participation from all Member States in shaping the structure of this mechanism to ensure it is effective, inclusive, and sustainable. Ensuring inclusivity is vital to the success of this strategy. Excuse me. Excuse me, Chair. Sorry. Wait. We would like to continue the statement later.

Chair: Sure, Indonesia, no problem. Pakistan to be followed by Malaysia.

Pakistan: Thank you, Mr. Chair. We appreciate your efforts for guiding discussions on the Institutional Regular Dialogue and thank you for formulation of Che’s discussion paper. We view these as important contributions in shaping the structure and focus of the future mechanism. As we continue to undertake a careful review of your proposal, we do recognize it as a basis for our further deliberations. Let me offer specific comments starting with stakeholders’ participation. First, Pakistan has consistently supported the engagement of stakeholders such as private sector, industry, academia, civil society and NGOs in the work of the permanent mechanism. Their expertise and insights are invaluable in addressing the multifaceted challenges in cyberspace. Second, we support efforts to bring more transparency to the existing accreditation process to allow inclusive and equitable participation from a broad range of stakeholders. Third, stakeholder contributions should remain consultative in nature, providing technical and objective input without politicizing discussions. With respect to dedicated thematic groups, I would make three additional points. First, Pakistan’s post holding focused discussions on various critical aspects of global cyber security in a single track process. These include securing critical infrastructure, building norms for responsible state behavior in cyberspace, application of international law in cyberspace, including advancing discussions on a legally binding instrument, capacity building initiatives, and confidence building measures. Such thematic groups should ensure that all dimensions of cyber security are addressed comprehensively and systematically. Secondly, we see some overlap between first and third proposed thematic groups which could be addressed. We prefer a dedicated thematic group on application of international law, which remains a key area of work for future deliberations. Therefore, urge revision in the third proposed thematic group. And finally, key principles should continue to underpin the future permanent mechanism with inclusive, open, and universal representation. State-led discussions, consensus-driven decision-making, multi-stakeholder participation. and global collaboration must be integral to future mechanism. Chair, we look forward to working constructively to refine these proposals and ensure that the future mechanism reflects our shared commitments. I thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Pakistan, for your contribution. I give the floor now to Malaysia, to be followed by the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Malaysia: Thank you, Mr. Chair. We appreciate your initiative in preparing a paper that has provided a good basis for our discussions on regular institutional dialogue. Building on the hard-won deliverables of the present OEWG, Malaysia looks forward to a permanent mechanism which enables deeper consideration of contemporary challenges in the cyber domain and solutions thereto, underpinned by the cumulative and evolving framework of responsible state behaviour. Among the salient features of the current OEWG, which we hope to see retained in the future mechanism, is the active engagement of a broad range of states, reflecting diverse viewpoints and national and regional experiences. It is therefore essential that the structure of the mechanism facilitates the regular participation of developing countries which may face particular resource constraints in covering multiple workstreams. My delegation recognises that the delineation of the substantive areas of work for the dedicated thematic groups remains challenging, given the different views expressed to date. We are keeping an open mind to possible compromise solutions in this regard, recognising also that the structure may be refined by states over time through periodic assessment at review conferences. Ensuring clarity in the scope of each of the thematic groups, avoiding overlap as far as possible, and optimizing the use of scarce resources are key. This would enable delegations to determine agencies and officials best suited to participating in the more detailed discourse under the thematic groups, which would report to the plenary for political-level deliberations and decision-making. We also welcome continued discussions on how best to accommodate the perspectives of non-governmental stakeholders whose input and expertise have made valuable contributions to our work in this OEWG. As you have recognized, Mr. Chair, there is but a narrow path forward, and maximum flexibility will be required to ensure the establishment of the new Permanent Mechanism by consensus. Let us redouble our efforts to realize this common objective in the months ahead. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Malaysia, for your contribution and for indicating that you are keeping an open mind. I think that is very good. I hope that all of you are keeping an open mind. I think that will be helpful. The other point that you made, which I think is also worth for all of us to reflect, is that because we have a built-in review process at the end of two biennial cycles, so the fifth year is a review process, so in a sense, while the mechanism is permanent, the dedicated arithmetic group structure can be reviewed, potentially. So keep that in mind. The review process gives everyone, all of you, the chance to look at that. And then we have also agreed that there could be additional thematic groups that could be established based on consensus, of course. So if we establish X number of thematic groups, say, starting with the first biannual cycle and second biannual cycle, you could establish additional ad hoc ones or even additional mechanisms. So there’s actually some degree of modularity and flexibility built into the architecture. And that’s good so that all of you can review the architecture and you may decide after two years of discussing a certain issue that you have resolved the problem and you want to address another thematic area. So keep that in mind. I think that flexibility of a structure that is flexible but not cast in stone is a good way of thinking about it. The permanent mechanism is permanent. Well, nothing is permanent in life, not even permanent representatives. But the mechanism and institution, of course, is designed to be permanent in terms of having a very long duration. But the dedicated thematic groups can be thought of as modular. So keep that in mind. Hopefully, that will open up new vistas for flexibility and compromise for us. The other point that some of you have mentioned is that, yes, we need to distinguish between the substantive plenary sessions and the dedicated thematic groups. So how do we make sure that the work is complementary, complements? But you are not repeating the same thing in the plenary and in the dedicated thematic groups. And therefore, the question arises, when do you want to have that dedicated thematic group meetings? Some of you have said that if the substantive plenary session is, say, held for one week, let’s say next year in July, for example. And we then have back-to-back dedicated thematic group meetings the following week, which means that delegations who are already funded, for example, can stay on and attend these meetings back-to-back. Because if you have it, say, in October, then you need to bring back delegates. But of course, you can have it as hybrid meeting. But some of you have also said that it’s not a substitute for in-person meetings. So that is also an issue, the sequencing issue, that we need to keep in mind. So I’d like to get more reactions to some of the different points that has been raised and some of the points that I’ve highlighted. But thank you for all the statements so far. I give the floor now to Netherlands. Are you ready to take the floor? To be followed by the United Kingdom.

Kingdom of the Netherlands: Thank you, Chair. Please allow our delegates to take the floor later, because then our Deputy Ambassador is very keen to join our discussions and deliver the statement. Thank you.

Chair: Sure. No problem, Kingdom of Netherlands. United Kingdom, to be followed by Belarus.

United Kingdom: Thank you, Chair. We would like to begin by thanking you for your paper, which we found to be a valuable tool to stimulate further debate. My delegation remains committed… to working with you and other delegations here to land on a consensus outcome on regular institutional dialogue in July. As you said yesterday, the question before us is not whether to have thematic groups, but the scope and function of those groups. This week, the United Kingdom’s statements provided some illustrations demonstrating how the consensus UN framework on responsible state behavior in cyberspace could be applied to the three themes of cooperation, resilience, and stability. We said existing and potential threats informed and underpinned cooperation, resilience, and stability in cyberspace. We gave one possible example of how the consideration of norms might lead states to discuss the challenges and solutions of cybersecurity information sharing to respond to incidents. We gave examples of how the principles of international law can be considered under the themes of cooperation, resilience, and stability. We also outlined a vision for what we called a golden thread connecting discussions of capacity building in dedicated thematic groups and plenary sessions with the global multi-stakeholder cybersecurity ecosystem in order to improve capacity building outcomes in practice. My delegation considers that the thematic groups of the future mechanism should provide a different type of discussion to the plenary session. This can be done whilst maintaining full respect for the consensus framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace. We agree with the large number of states that have argued that the thematic groups should focus discussions on identifying challenges and developing solutions to those challenges. Capacity building is needed to deliver those solutions. In this context, we fully agree with the call by the Pacific Island Forum and others. for capacity building to be a core consideration of each thematic group. A deeper focus on shared solutions will not be possible if we duplicate the familiar pillar by pillar discussions within the thematic groups themselves. At the same time, we do recognize and appreciate your reminder that the review conferences already contained in Annex C of the third APR will provide a flexible platform. Returning to stakeholders, it is well known that one state in particular has routinely vetoed a large number of capacity building and research organizations from participating at the OEWG, and we must repeat our position that a single state veto on stakeholder participation is not appropriate for an international cyberspace governance process. As we have said before, it deprives states of the contributions of non-governmental entities, harms the effectiveness of state-led discussions, and prevents access to knowledge and capacity building. How can we expect to have a holistic discussion on cyber security without cyber security providers? Conversations on cyber threats from artificial intelligence without AI developers? Or the consequences of cyber incidents without incident response organizations? Before continuing, the modality of the current OEWG would be a serious concern for my delegation given the permanent nature of the future mechanism. The solution is for the UN membership to decide collectively on whether stakeholders may participate. Following consultations with other delegations, the UK has decided to support the modality contained in the paper on practical modalities for stakeholder participation coordinated by Canada and Chile. This modality provides a balanced way forward based on the principle of a voice. not a vote. It maintains the ability of states to object to stakeholders whilst incorporating a reasonable expectation that states should justify their objection and that UN members themselves should then decide collectively on the participation of stakeholders, drawing on the rules and procedure of the UN General Assembly. Such a modality is needed to ensure the foundations of the future mechanism can support a free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you, United Kingdom. Guatemala to be followed by the Russian Federation. Sorry, I think I left out Belarus. Belarus, you have the floor to be followed by Guatemala.

Belarus: Thank you, Chair. We fully support your efforts and the work you’ve been undertaking, the working group. It is a key negotiation platform for international information security. As discussions in the OEWG have shown, all delegations have shown a general understanding of the crucial importance of creating a future permanent mechanism. However, a lot remains to be done to find common ground on the specific structural and operational issues for the further work of this mechanism. In addition to the joint statement of the group of friends which was delivered yesterday, and Belarus was one of the sponsors of it, allow us to set forth some thoughts that we had that we think are important in the context of the creation and the functioning of this mechanism. We see the current OEWG as the only legitimate platform to discuss all aspects of the work of the future mechanism. We believe that the cornerstone of decision-making as part of the future mechanism should be consensus. Bearing in mind the views of all states is critically important in the process of decision-making, both on substantive issues and procedural ones. The same principle should be complied with when identifying the parameters for creating the thematic groups of the mechanism. We believe that it is necessary to create a limited number of working groups with this body corresponding to the thematic clusters as identified in the third annual report of the OEWG which was adopted by GA Resolution 79-237. Other more general questions should be considered as part of these thematic groups. In the context of discussions of the details of these thematic groups, in our view, it is important to strike a balance between the efforts on the one hand to ensure the broadest possible scope of its activity and, on the other, preserve its unique specialised nature. We support your view, Chair, that the proposal to modify the number of themes of these groups could be considered as part of the permanent mechanism itself in line with its mandate and, of course, bearing in mind the principle of taking into account the views of all member states. And finally, no less important is the question of the conditions for participation of stakeholders in the work of the future mechanism. Here, our priority is the principle of national sovereignty of states. The work of the mechanism is a state-driven and state-led process. I recognise the importance of the contribution. made by NGOs, business, academia, we do believe that any decisions about NGO participation in the sessions should be underpinned by the no objection principle on the part of member states. Participation of these kind of organizations in the work of the mechanism should not interfere in areas that are the exclusive competence prerogative of states. This is, of course, a primarily intergovernmental process that we have here, which should be in line with its status and mandate, which was stood upon it by states. Chair, allow me to reiterate that Belarus is ready to engage in constructive discussions and is open to cooperation with all states without exception. Thank you very much.

Chair: Thank you very much, Belarus, for your contribution. Guatemala to be followed by the Russian Federation.

Guatemala: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As we have previously stated for my delegation, it is fundamental to establish a future mechanism which is permanent in nature and which guarantees a smooth transition. It’s also important to avoid duplication of efforts in that process. We trust that the creation of this mechanism will make it possible to, in a feasible and effective way, join up norms and rules for responsible state behavior in cyberspace and ensure synergies across them. However, we are one session away from concluding the mandate of this OEWG and we still face significant uncertainty. Regarding the concerns expressed in connection with modalities and particularly those in connection with thematic groups, Guatemala believes that the proliferation of such thematic groups could hinder the participation of all members. As such, we believe that the effort to merge a few groups whose work could be complementary so that we can focus our work would be a better alternative. In this same vein, we would opt to have a specific group on capacity building, bearing in mind that for some countries this issue is a priority and encompasses a series of needs which underpin this whole problem as a whole. These concerns prompted our delegation to put forward a document that covers these concerns but we are concerned that there is no cross-cutting approach to concerns that we have expressed. Mexico quite rightly said it’s important to guarantee the participation and inclusion of delegations with limited capacity building capabilities. The hybrid modality is a good opportunity to achieve that goal. We should also guarantee multilingualism, inclusive participation, transparent and active participation. Regarding the importance of inter-sectoral cooperation, Guatemala firmly believes that it is necessary to increase cooperation and dialogue between stakeholders such as governments, private sector stakeholders, academia and civil society in order to guarantee the collaborative development of initiatives. For this reason, we should agree upon transparent, effective methods to ensure that this participation is not affected without proper grounding. We favourably view the working document presented by Chile and Canada. Chairman, my country will continue to be committed to this process and we hope that together with your efforts we will lay the crucial foundations for the building of a safe and resilient cyberspace through the future mechanism. It’s vital that we continue to work together in a flexible way to find solutions without building more barriers. Thank you.

Russian Federation: We align ourselves with the concept paper of the Group of Like-Minded States on the parameters of the successor body to the OEWG made by the Distinguished Representative of the Republic of Nicaragua. We expect that its provisions will be taken into consideration by the Chair when he updates his discussion paper on this topic. The Russian Federation also aligns itself with the statement made by the Chinese delegation regarding the Permanent Negotiation Mechanism. In our national capacity, we would like to thank you, Chair, and your team for your tireless efforts to fulfil the mandate of the OEWG and to find consensus on the future mechanism. The Russian Federation has considered the discussion paper on the modalities of NGO participation and the thematic groups. Unfortunately, in the current version, we cannot support this document. To serve as a starting point of discussion, it should be significantly improved. We are concerned, first of all, about the proposed principles for the participation of non-state actors. In our view, this would undermine the no-objection procedure that is tried and tested at the OEWG and, consequently, it would limit the so-called veto power of member states. We strongly oppose the idea of starting consultations on the NGO accreditation requests that have been objected to, not to mention some limited participation in the blocked organisations. We call for the adherence to the modalities of the OEWG’s mandate, which were adopted after difficult negotiations, and represent a delicate balance of interests for all parties. The principle of consensus must remain at its core. It is crucial to prevent automatically accredited NGOs at the successor body, which is to inherit the sensitive international information security agenda from the OEWG. This mainly happens through ECOSOC. We assume that all NGOs should undergo the accreditation procedure on equal footing without any privileges or exceptions. The Russian Federation has no objection to the disclosure of the reasons for the refusal of NGO applications. However, the idea of making such information public without the consent of the state objecting to the applications is counterproductive and this will result in even greater politicisation. We propose that such information could be disclosed only on a voluntary basis. We believe the idea of borrowing the models from other UN platforms is not a reasonable one, including the possibility of giving NGOs the floor at the plenary meetings at the discretion of the chair. We draw the attention of those who advocate for following the example of the Ad Hoc Committee. To one thing, its mandate and the mandate of the future mechanism on ICT security are not comparable. The Ad Hoc Committee deals with anti-fraud issues, while the agenda of the OEWG and the successor body covers aspects of international and national security, which are the exclusive prerogative of states. Additionally, the Ad Hoc Committee modalities cannot be portrayed as some kind of gold standard as NGOs did not make any meaningful contributions to the negotiations on this. As for the thematic discussions, the OEWG has shown how effective it can be in fulfilling its mandate. Member states have managed to reach an agreement on establishing the first universal confidence-building measure in the field of international information security, the Points of Contact Directory. more future practical results in other areas of the group’s work. That said, we propose building the work of the thematic groups of the future mechanism strictly in accordance with the five pillars of the mandate. We don’t see any point in reinventing the wheel when a smooth and reliable mechanism is already there. In concrete terms, we oppose the idea of combining voluntary rules and international law within one thematic group. The discussions on legally binding norms and voluntary rules of behaviour require completely different expertise and therefore should be conducted within the relevant specialised discussion platforms. We do not see any logic in establishing a separate group on preventing conflicts. This issue is a cross-cutting one. It could be totally discussed along with international law, norms and confidence building measures. We also cannot support a separate group on such a narrow topic as critical information infrastructure. It is not clear what the results of this discussion would look like, particularly since the criteria for designating this infrastructure is different in different countries. This topic could be considered within the groups on confidence building measures and capacity building. Furthermore, Russia opposes the expansion of the chair’s powers by providing the right to convene ad hoc groups. Such important decisions should be made strictly by consensus by member states. We would also like to respond to the statement made by some delegations who are trying to distract attention from our general consensus decisions to their own initiatives that are not inclusive. We would recall here we’re talking about creating a future permanent mechanism that will inherit from the mandate from this group of the OEWG as set forth in its third annual report. Attempts to change these understandings are unacceptable. In conclusion, we would like to emphasize that the Russian Federation stands ready for constructive work. We are committed to finding a balanced and fair compromise. Thank you for your attention.

Chair: Thank you, Russian Federation, for your contribution. New Zealand to be followed by Denmark.

New Zealand: Thank you, Chair. Listening throughout this week and indeed over many past sessions, there are two themes that stand out in terms of the vision states have for a future mechanism. Many states have expressed a desire for a future mechanism that would be action-orientated, that would include the establishment of dynamic thematic groups. Others have expressed a preference for maintaining a structure that closely resembles the current pillar approach we use in the OEWG to organize our work. In our view, these two positions are not mutually exclusive, as you well noted yesterday afternoon, Chair. We find that encouraging. In fact, we would suggest they are not only compatible, but rather they complement each other. There is perhaps more common ground than we all realize. If carefully crafted, we can ensure the future mechanism provides for both, and in a way that will build on and enhance the fruitful discussions we’ve had within the OEWG. In that regard, we have considered and are supportive of France’s proposal for three thematic groups on resilience, cooperation, and stability. Three groups that were also included in your proposal, Chair. In our view, this proposal continues and builds on the traditional pillared approach. The central plenary discussions would remain organised around those traditional pillars and the introduction of the thematic working groups would enhance our consideration of the pillars by situating them within practical context, where, for example, we can have deeper scenario-based discussions than we would have in a plenary meeting. France provided some very useful examples of how this would work in practice and how the groups would link to the plenary, which we appreciate very much. We appreciate your proposal, Chair, for two additional groups on norms and international law and capacity building. In our view, however, five working groups alongside the plenary meetings would risk creating a burdensome workload, particularly on smaller states, as Tonga noted on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum. Further, we think we can have more effective consideration of those issues if we weave them into the other three groups on resilience, cooperation and stability. There is detail to be worked through, including how many meetings should we have and how long should they run, but if we can start from this principle that these visions are complementary, then we believe there is capacity to make progress. As we consider modalities and timing, I would endorse Tonga’s remarks on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum regarding resource limitations for many smaller states. We support initiatives to reduce logistical burdens, for example, having the working groups run back-to-back with the plenary. We also support Tonga’s remarks that if hybrid or virtual meetings are considered for aspects of the future mechanism, there is a need to consider different time zones. We do love discussing cyber security in our region, but not necessarily at 2 a.m. every single time an international meeting is held, Chair. On stakeholder participation, we would firstly underscore the value that relevant stakeholders would bring to a future mechanism. This point has been made many times during the week, including by yourself, Chair. The future mechanism will be state-led. There is really no debate on this central point. I don’t think anybody is making that point. but we also must find a way to ensure we have stakeholder participation and perspectives integrated into our process. We thank you, Chair, for your detailed proposal on stakeholder modalities. We do believe, however, that the proposal does not overcome a central weakness of the current process in that a veto would effectively remain, though we do appreciate your efforts, Chair, to look at ways to manage objections. Further, for stakeholder participation to be truly meaningful in a future process, we need to ensure stakeholders are also able to participate in the thematic working groups. That’s where we will be getting into a lot more specific detail, and that’s where stakeholder expertise would be very valuable. In terms of your guiding questions, Chair, we think we can take inspiration from the recent ad hoc committee negotiations toward a cybercrime convention, not necessarily to clone those modalities, but it certainly can provide us useful guidance as we try to find a balance. Some states have sought to differentiate the AHC process from our future mechanism based on the subject matter and issues of sensitivity around security, but there is a central point of commonality in both processes, and that is we can enrich our discussions as states with the technical, real-world expertise and experience of stakeholders who are often at the cutting edge of the technologies we are considering. I was involved in the AHC negotiations, and I can indeed confirm stakeholders made useful and, in fact, vital contributions. We thank Chile and Canada for their work on developing a proposal for stakeholder participation, which we have co-sponsored alongside a number of other states. In our view, this proposal overcomes the challenges identified in the current process while maintaining the central role of states in the process. We would encourage all participants to study the proposal and engage constructively with it as we could collectively consider how best to use the expertise stakeholders can bring to a future mechanism. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, New Zealand, for your contribution. Denmark, to be followed by Brazil.

Denmark: Thank you, Chair. And first, let me thank you for your tireless efforts in guiding this process. To say it shortly, you are doing a great job. Now, Denmark fully aligns with the EU statement made yesterday. At the same time, Denmark fully supports your call for a constructive approach as we work towards achieving meaningful results by our July deadline. And we remain open to dialogue and compromise. Finding common ground is essential for success, and I do believe, actually, that we have heard a lot of common ground this morning. Clearly, certain principles must guide our efforts. Any future UN permanent mechanism should be action-oriented, inclusive, and firmly rooted in consensus. Frankly, it’s difficult to see why anyone would oppose the establishment of a stable and cooperative permanent mechanism under the UN as proposed in the Programme of Action, particularly at a time when global cyber security challenges are growing ever more urgent and complex. In our view, the establishment of a small number of dedicated working groups offers a practical means of fostering focused, in-depth discussions while remaining aligned with the broader UN framework. As you have said, Chair, these groups should complement, not replace, plenary sessions and provide a space for developing concrete, solution-driven outcomes. Of course, different models can be considered when setting up these groups. Hardly surprising, we are supportive of the model outlined in the joint French paper, which we have joined, but we remain open to dialogue on how to best structure these groups with a view to achieving meaningful and inclusive outcomes. And I think, importantly, taking into consideration the very real issue… of Member States’ resources. As highlighted by you, Mr. Chair, we should also all remember that we are not setting things in stone. We do have the option to adapt along the way, and there will be a review process. Regarding participation, Denmark strongly believes that meaningful contributions from relevant stakeholders are essential to the legitimacy and success of this process. Those who operate, secure, and are directly affected by cyberspace must have the opportunity to contribute. While states should retain leadership over decision-making, stakeholder engagement must be open, transparent, and inclusive to reflect the truly global nature of the threats we face. We therefore also believe that we must move beyond the current veto-based approach. As you rightly emphasized, Mr. Chair, we need to recognize the seriousness of the moment. Failing to advance this process would not merely represent a diplomatic shortcoming. It would amount to a serious setback for global cybersecurity. As threats continue to escalate in both scale and complexity, inaction or deadlock will leave us more exposed and less prepared for the challenges ahead. We therefore urge all delegations to engage with a spirit of compromise, cooperation, and shared responsibility. We for certain are ready to listen, adapt, and contribute. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Denmark, for your contribution. Brazil to be followed by Slovakia.

Brazil: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Brazil aligns itself as a statement delivered by Argentina on behalf of a number of Latin American countries and would like to make additional remarks in its national capacity. My delegation reiterates its appreciation to you and your team for your efforts to help advance our deliberations on regular institutional dialogue. We made relevant progress from the second to the third APR in outlining the elements of the mechanism, which shows our capacity of reaching important agreements within this group. We thank you for presenting your discussion paper and guiding questions, as well as the delegations which submitted specific proposals, which set the stage to advance our negotiations on a single permanent mechanism to be established by consensus in July. My delegation made some considerations on elements for the future mechanism in the town hall on February 6th and in its other statements this week, which I will avoid repeating for the sake of brevity, but remain part of our position. We agree that the regular institutional dialogue mechanism must be action-oriented and integrate all key aspects to a secure ICT environment, such as confidence building and capacity building, and also allow for in-depth discussions on areas where common understandings still eludes. This is why we support the combination of a yearly one-week plenary with thematic groups. The groups should be structured in a way that allows smaller delegations to have a meaningful participation. In this regard, we would propose a number of three such groups, with no simultaneous meetings. We recognize, of course, that there are more than three issues in ICT security that require and would benefit from in-depth discussions. This is, however, the reality of nearly all topics in the UN agenda. To reconcile this with a large number of important topics that merit more in-depth discussions, we reiterate our proposal to, in line with the practice in other UN bodies, have rotating agendas mandated by the plenary or review conference, which could match the biannual cycles proposed. To ensure that the debates in those groups are dynamic and interactive, while also producing tangible results, we believe that they should be mostly informal with some formal sessions to allow for the adoption of agreed outcomes on the topics under discussion, which should be elevated to the plenary. Much has been said about the importance of discussing many issues in a cross-cutting manner in different groups instead of a dedicated group. In our view those options will not be necessarily mutually exclusive and some issues such as international law or capacity building might require both. While international law underpins all our discussions at the United Nations and will be relevant in any working group discussion, our debates throughout the OEWG process have shown the need for deeper discussions between our legal experts to advance our quest for common understandings in this area. Capacity building, likewise, must be cross-cutting to all issues debated in the future mechanism but must also be the subject of targeted discussion with the adoption of tangible outcomes so as to address its effectiveness and ensure that resources are adequately allocated and that initiatives remain demand-driven, politically neutral and duly incorporate our capacity building principles. The effectiveness of our future mechanism will be directly related to its inclusivity. Judicious use of remote meeting options as a complement to in- person meetings is one tool to make that happen. Nevertheless, given the challenges presented to delegations in distant time zones from New York and the importance of in-person contact to build the necessary trusting relationships in this area, it will also be key to promote in-person participation of delegates from developing countries. This is why funding to facilitate participation must be a permanent fixture of your future mechanism and we support its inclusion in the report on the voluntary fund prepared by the Secretariat. The contributions of a wide range of views from other stakeholders will be positive to our debates. given their expertise, and the role of many of them in helping states implement elements of the UN Framework for Responsible State Behaviour. We thank Canada and Chile for their working paper, as well as the Chair’s proposal, and believe both contain elements that could help us reach a solution that builds upon the current modalities while preserving the intergovernmental nature of the process. We must take into account that inclusivity in this case entails a balance in that participation in terms of both geographic and sectoral representation. Funding options to facilitate the participation of stakeholders with fewer financial resources, especially from the developing world, will be necessary. Mr. Chair, we have heard many different and detailed proposals on the specifics of the future mechanism this week. While we, of course, have a lot of work ahead of us to find a balanced compromise among them, we nevertheless see room for optimism, as it means that there is broad consensus on the main structure and key elements of our mechanism. We remain ready to engage in further negotiations between now and our next session to ensure the adoption of a consensus outcome in July. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Brazil, for your contribution. Slovakia, to be followed by Egypt.

Slovakia: Mr. Chair, distinguished delegates, we are approaching the final phase of the open-ended working group. It is therefore not surprising that the question of the future continuation of the discussions on ICT security has become much more important. Slovakia identifies with the statement of the European Union and specifically the esteemed delegate of France. Many years this group and all GGs have discussed the theoretical application of norms, rules and principles, as well as international law in cyberspace. During the discussion on the structure and content of the future permanent mechanism, we have unique opportunity to translate these past discussions into practical results. The Chair has made every effort since 2021 within OEWG to accommodate the diverse views of national delegations and various stakeholders, whose contribution and real-world data proved invaluable during the process of discussing the goal, content, and structure of the future mechanism. Therefore, Slovakia co-sponsored the non-paper on stakeholder modalities presented by Canada and Chile together with other supporting countries. My delegation also appreciates the vision of thematic groups as included in the Chairman’s discussion paper. However, the list of groups still needs more negotiation to reach a reasonable consensus. Cross-cutting thematic groups as proposed in the model introduced by France and other states will offer a broad space for discussion on how international law and non-binding norms apply in cyberspace and how they can be applied to specific policy issues. We therefore fully support the idea of bringing together various vital topics such as promoting resilience, protecting critical infrastructure, and international law as we have witnessed how these areas intersect in practice. Please keep in mind that in cybersecurity all topics are interconnected and it is practically impossible to select a topic for a dedicated working group since this topic is certainly one of the properties of another topic. For example, everything we do in cybersecurity takes place in an environment where it is influenced by international and national legislations and norms, and for everything we need resources, capacities. Therefore, it is not entirely possible to single out legislation and capacity building to separate discussion groups. If one of the aims is not to burden smaller delegations with limited resources, which is why the program of action proposed reduction in formal meetings and back-to-back meetings of the dedicated thematic groups. We consider it important to establish only a limited number of cross-cutting thematic groups, probably not more than three. Finally, given the ambition of this room to arrive at a useful and action-oriented future mechanism, program of action, which emphasize regular review conferences, plenary sessions, and institutional continuity in the form of thematic groups as described in several of the interventions above, in line with urgent need for a stable, responsive, and forward-looking framework. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Slovakia, for your contribution. Cuba now, to be followed by Czechia. Cuba, please, you have the floor.

Cuba: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We align ourselves with the statement made by the delegation of Nicaragua. It is vital that the future institutional mechanism for regular dialogue preserve its intergovernmental nature. This will guarantee the full participation of all states on an equal footing. This should be maintained as the method for decision-making. That is the only way that we will ensure that the concerns of all countries are given due consideration. Regarding the structure and functioning of the future mechanism, we agree with the delegations that underscore the importance of avoiding duplication of efforts and that we avoid prioritizing some issues over others in an imbalanced way. The organization of meetings, as proposed by China, could serve as a good basis to guarantee that we avoid those things. At the same time, whilst ultimately consensus overall may emerge on the creation of specific thematic groups, we must be very careful in ensuring that we design those thematic groups with stringent adherence to the five pillars of the mechanism’s mandate. This will ensure that discussions do not overlap and will guarantee that each topic receives the attention it deserves in order to ultimately produce added value in terms of presenting things to plenary sessions and in order to avoid additional burdens for delegations. Any decision taken about the formation of new groups or merging certain topics should be taken by Member States. We emphasise that we do not support the creation of a group on conflict prevention that could introduce into the future mechanism concepts that do not enjoy consensus. On the contrary, we should focus on how to guarantee the safe and exclusively peaceful use of ICTs in the peaceful resolution of any dispute which may arise. Whilst the pillars on capacity building and confidence building measures could be merged into one thematic group, due attention must be paid to capacity building without that topic being watered down and spread across the various areas of work of any future mechanism. Bearing in mind paragraph 9 of annex C of the third annual progress report on the functions of the future institutional dialogue mechanism, that mechanism should consider establishing legally binding obligations in the sphere of international information security. That must be borne in mind as we establish the details of the structures of the mechanism. including its possible specific thematic groups. Regarding the participation of stakeholders, we insist that we should maintain the delicate balance achieved in this regard within the current OEWG that was already the result of a compromise previously made. We oppose attempts to bypass the OEWG in order to impose changes in current modalities for participation. Doing that would undermine trust in the process and would set a very negative precedent for other issues which themselves may produce difficulties in the future mechanism for regular institutional dialogue. We are in favor of preserving consensus in the design and establishment of the future mechanism, such as to guarantee the continuation of periodic institutional dialogue on the security of ICTs and their use. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you, Cuba, for your contribution. Check here to be followed by the Netherlands.

Czechia: So, thank you, Mr. Chair. Czechia aligns itself with the statement of the European Union on regular institution dialogue made yesterday and would like to offer the following remarks in its national capacity. First, we strongly support reaching a consensus on the security of ICTs and their use. Second, we strongly support maintaining First, we strongly support reaching a consensus on establishing a future permanent mechanism within the current open-ended working group. A successful outcome will provide a solid foundation for implementing the agreed framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. and contribute to upholding a peaceful, secure, stable, and accessible ICT environment. From our perspective, the future mechanism should reduce the burden on delegation compared to the current OEWG. In this regard, we have consistently supported the proposal for a cyber program of action, POA. We welcome the proposal on the establishment of three thematic groups that would be cross-cutting and action-oriented. This approach will streamline our efforts, reduce the number of meetings, and ensure a more efficient use of resources. These groups should integrate all pillars of the current OEWG framework, allowing us to move beyond conceptual discussion and focus on concrete actions, such as strengthening resilience, improving cooperation in cyber incident management, and enhancing stability in cyberspace. Furthermore, Czechia supports efforts to make these thematic groups meeting more accessible and inclusive, including the possibility of holding them outside New York or in a hybrid format, allowing broader participation from all regions. Cybercapacitybuilding must be a core component of the future mechanism. In this regard, again, we strongly support the POA proposal, as it provides a structured, action-oriented, and inclusive approach. It ensures that cybercapacitybuilding efforts are demand-driven, tailored to national needs, and can effectively link to other key areas, such as international law and confidence-building measures. We also support the inclusion of expert briefings as an integral part of each thematic group. as they provide valuable insights and technical expertise to enrich our discussions. Last year’s informal OEWG session in May demonstrated the benefits of such an approach, with experts from diverse regions contributing to the dialogue. To facilitate expert briefings from the private sector, academia, and the expert community, we must establish clear modalities for the participation of non-governmental stakeholders. Therefore, and I mentioned it already in our previous statement, we strongly support the Canada-Chile proposal, which offers a transparent and balanced framework for stakeholders’ engagement. At the same time, Czechia emphasizes that stakeholders’ participation must be diverse and inclusive, ensuring representation from all regions and perspectives. While we appreciate the Chair’s discussion paper as an important step toward compromise, we remain concerned that it retains the existing veto mechanism, which continues to limit stakeholders’ participation. Czechia firmly believes that no veto rights should exist in this process. If consensus cannot be reached on the inclusion or exclusion of a specific stakeholder, the decision should be made through a vote to ensure transparency and fairness. In conclusion, Czechia remains committed to constructive dialogue, consensus building, and international cooperation to advance global cybersecurity. We look forward to working with all Member States to establish an effective, inclusive and action-oriented future mechanism. I thank you.

Kingdom of the Netherlands: Thank you, Mr. Chair, and sorry that I took the floor a little bit too early earlier on. The Kingdom of the Netherlands aligns itself with the European Union and I would like to make the following remarks in my national capacity. Mr. Chair, as the OEWG concludes, the Netherlands stresses the need to continue our fruitful discussions in the future mechanism, drawing on lessons learned from this OEWG to establish an effective permanent framework. In this regard, we are a supporter of the program of action and welcome the three dedicated working groups that France has proposed and shared in their working papers. The Kingdom of the Netherlands is of the view that cross-cutting and policy-goal-oriented thematic working groups would allow for deeper, concrete and action-oriented discussions. The three proposed working groups would enable us to tackle the contemporary cyber-challenges of today while also being flexible enough to discuss the emerging threats of the future. However, we agree that having cross-cutting thematic groups or having a pillar structure is not mutually exclusive. We believe that replicating the OEWG pillars in the plenary and having cross-cutting thematic discussions actually complement each other very well. This would strike a good balance between nurturing what we have while also giving room for innovation. Mr. Chair, specifically on capacity building, the Kingdom of the Netherlands agrees that it should be an essential element of the future mechanism. We believe integrating capacity building as a core element that cuts across the mandate will support implementation of the UN Framework and actionable recommendations. We specifically propose a cyclical approach consisting of several steps. as we have presented last December. We also note a call for a dedicated space for capacity building alongside the thematic group and plenary discussions. We believe that the high-level roundtable for cyber capacity building could be an option to provide that stage. Here states could exchange information on programs and initiatives, share experiences and explore new sources of financing and training. This will enable the UN to effectively complement, support and enhance the work of other existing cyber security capacity building initiatives. Mr. Chair, on stakeholder modalities, we agreed to the current modalities of the OEWG in the hope that more transparency, including a justification for an objection of a stakeholder, would lead to more judicious use. Unfortunately, this has not been the case. Therefore, the future mechanism must have robust stakeholder modalities. This is crucial for their meaningful contribution to the discussion. In this regard, the Kingdom of the Netherlands has joined the group of co-sponsors of the paper of Canada and Chile that outlines proposals on stakeholder modalities in a future discussion. We as states cannot counter the international cyber challenges alone. These challenges are simply complex, so we need to work together and make use of each other’s expertise and insights. This is also why we believe it is essential that stakeholders can meaningfully engage in both the thematic groups and the plenary on issues within their area of expertise. Apart from an open exchange and discussions with stakeholders in the thematic groups, we propose allocating dedicated time for oral statements. under each agenda item in the plenary. This approach would allow relevant stakeholders to come in on the subject of their expertise and enable us to benefit from their specialized knowledge and enriching our discussions. Mr. Chair, in conclusion, in the final period of the OEWG, my delegation stands ready to work together with you and other delegations to ensure a smooth transition into the future mechanisms. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Kingdom of the Netherlands, for your contribution. Chile, to be followed by Israel.

Chile: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I apologize at the outset, given that my delegation only planned to make a statement in this segment. This will be a longer statement because it will cover multiple areas. We think it’s the most productive way to proceed at this stage of our discussions. Chair, yesterday we closed meetings with the task of reassessing our work, thinking about pillars and the very roof of our future house. In this regard, my delegation can be flexible, including in terms of furnishings of our house. But we do think we need to build this house on solid foundations, such as to allow us to keep pace with emerging threats, technological change and other political matters. Chile reiterates its readiness to work constructively and together with others to build a permanent future mechanism which harmoniously integrates capacity building, the respect for international law, the inclusion of a gender perspective and the effective participation of a multi-stakeholder community. With a structure rooted in principles focusing on people, as well as the defense of human rights, neutrality and transparency, we are convinced that the future of Chile will be a better place. that that is the structure that will allow us to move towards a more safe, resilient and equitable digital environment for all. These are principles which should govern our laying the foundations of our house. Regarding regular institutional dialogue, we hope that the future permanent mechanism will be a body in which we will be able to make concrete progress on issues that have been under discussion regarding the responsible behavior of states in cyberspace. A action-oriented mechanism, as my delegation has previously stated, should serve as a body which will allow us to make concrete progress with the effective implementation of recommendations that have arisen in recent years. At the same time, a permanent mechanism should be an effective body within which to hold constructive dialogue, dialogue which allows us to produce concrete measures to tackle threats in cyberspace. Cyberattacks and malicious activities in cyberspace are dynamic and ever-changing. As we noted during our session specifically devoted to emerging threats, given the high number of delegations that took the floor, these changes we have seen are evolving at a pace which affects our discussions and agreements. As such, we should ensure that our future mechanism is effective and issues recommendations which can really assist states in tackling threats, so that our multilateral future discussions cannot become discussions in and of themselves. They need to offer plausible concrete solutions. We attach particular importance to the establishment of thematic groups in the future mechanism, because these should allow more detailed discussions. That is how we see their function. They should dwell on problems, but also concrete solutions. Consequently, we need to have a number of clear definitions regarding the functioning, the role of our mechanism, as well as its future cycles. As such, we are grateful for the proposals made by the Chair. We are flexible and we are ready to have more detailed discussions on the number of thematic groups. We do think that the structuring of them should allow the active participation of all stakeholders. As such, in our view, it would be possible to establish a smaller number of thematic groups. As other delegations have stated, we might look at the possibility of merging themes under discussion in these thematic groups. It is very important for us to ensure that capacity building gives rise to a specific focus discussion. So we echo the working group recently presented by a group of Latin American countries. We have to have a thematic group to talk about this very important issue that is capacity building. If it is not the focus of a specific group, we need to know that it will be discussed in depth and in such a way that allows our work on it to evolve. In the previous session and the previous OEDWG, we saw that capacity building was a strategic issue. So, the way it is discussed and the way recommendations are implemented should ultimately strengthen the resilience of states and persons in the face of existing and future threats. It is not possible to build a safe and efficient cyberspace if we cannot guarantee the safety of all of those that form part of ICTs, and we need to know that all our voices will be heard. As such, capacity building continues to be a priority of our international digital agenda. Allow me briefly to talk about the ideas that are contained in the Canada-Chile document, supported by 25 delegations. The document is on practical modalities for stakeholder participation. We firmly believe that significantly involving the multi-stakeholder community, including the academia, experts, civil society and the private sector, is vital to enrich our discussions. and bolster our collective response to threats in cyberspace. The proposal, based on the principle of a voice, not a vote, guarantees that while final decisions might be intergovernmental, the contributions made by stakeholders, non-state stakeholders, provide critical information and a technical perspective that would otherwise be lacking in this debate. We believe that it’s only in that way that our dialogue will really be able to encompass the full breadth of issues that we need to tackle and ensure that we’re relevant in terms of coming up with real situations when the threats to cyber security arise. Moreover, we are establishing practical modalities for the accreditation and participation of civil society in our document. That will lend transparency and predictability to our work, and that will ensure that the mechanism remains inclusive and effective throughout its existence. This is particularly important in an environment in which the pace of technological change and cyber threats require agile and properly informed evidence-based results. To give certainty to the stakeholder community, that is also important. That certainty means that they can properly schedule their contributions and contribute properly. In the segment devoted to them, we saw how they too create networks and mutually support each other. That means that they are a community that provides contributions not only in the room but outside of it. We saw that one person had to give three statements on three different issues, so you can see how they all work together. Ultimately, our proposal does not only complement the intergovernmental process, but it also paves the way for a broader dialogue, a richer dialogue that can produce CBMs and bolster our collective ability to tackle cyber security challenges and threats. Moreover, we believe that the discussion on international law is so crucially important when it comes to the responsible behaviour of states in cyberspace that it is, in our view, relevant and necessary to continue our discussions. and allow them to evolve. We’re flexible in terms of the best way to achieve that goal. That could be in a specific thematic group or having a mandated other forum for dialogue within Cleanery, of course. My delegation does want to note that in terms of allowing our dialogue to mature, there need to be common definitions that can be reflected in the outcomes of our group. These will stand as a basis for work for the future mechanism. Our goal is to find common ground. With that in mind, we joined a collective endeavour and backed a proposal presented by a number of delegations from different regions. That was a declaration on this area of work. That document says that we should have continued discussion and build shared understanding because that reduces the risk of misunderstandings and ultimately prevent inappropriate behaviour on the part of states. That document also recommends the need to build capacity so that national positions can be robust and best practices can be shared. That will facilitate broader participation of all in international debate. We believe that’s appropriate as a way to continue dialogue and tackle the needs that arise in this area in the best possible way. My delegation does want to point out that we would have liked to see more specific developed language, particularly regarding the application of international humanitarian law in cyberspace. So, we staunchly support the proposal of language made by Switzerland on this matter during this segment. In sum, we believe that championing these ideas means plumping for a safe cyberspace where adherence to international law and cooperation between states are fundamental pillars to address current and future challenges in the face of ICTs. Chair, at the beginning of this week, we shared that in our view this group was one of the best-kept secrets of the United Nations. We believe that to a large extent or rather, as the speaker says, this is due to the equal participation of women delegates. We wish to underscore the importance of incorporating gender perspectives as a cross-cutting focus in future discussions on the ICTs. The document drawn up by Australia, Colombia, Fiji, the United Kingdom, and also Chile, that is currently supported by more than 30 delegations, demonstrates that gender equality is not only a human rights imperative, but also decisive in guaranteeing international peace and security. In addition to the document, the document elsewhere says that civil society working on gender equality and cyber security have an essential role to play. We are grateful to the contributions made by women representatives in cyber security in the Middle East, WriterPilot, and other groups that talked about this issue. This not only strengthens capacity-building efforts, but also helps to narrow the gender-digital divide. Ultimately, adopting such an approach allows us to have mechanisms which not only address technical and security challenges, but also which promote equality, inclusion, and the protection of the fundamental rights of all persons. This is a step in the right direction. In addition to all of the above, we value the Chair’s proposals, those of France and China. We would like to share a number of concrete proposals elsewhere in terms of creative ways to ensure the participation of stakeholders. We could look at the possibility of access to platforms which allow the real-time presentation of written contributions, supplemented by periodic information sessions such as those already held by the Chair prior to every session. That should be established as a practice and not something that can be used at the whim of a future Chair. Rotating accreditation processes and allowing new people to come in is also important. To safeguard and pay attention to a number of security concerns expressed by states, perhaps we could develop a practical guide to support the participation of stakeholders in terms of the contributions they make. Those contributions have to be safe and secure, but we could guide them about how to improve their contributions to discussions on the future mechanism and its ultimate structure.

Cuba: We also value the proposal made by the Chair about having a mechanism so that states can publicly present objections, accompanied by detailed justifications that could also be extended as something we discuss in the plenary. These objections could be discussed in plenary and evaluated. In terms of the thematic groups presented by the delegation of France, we believe that these could be a basis and allow us to have action-orientated work. However, we believe that we could also explore including additional thematic groups, such as those on capacity building and legally binding aspects or humanitarian law as applied to the ICTs. This work should be focused without duplicating what is done in plenary. We agree that all of this should be evaluated and its relevance should also be tackled during the various cycles of the OEWG. To guarantee the success of these thematic groups, we believe that we must ensure that each group clearly defines what their areas of focus and themes of work will be. That is something that should be tackled in the run-up to the July session and the outcome document to be adopted by plenary. Thematic groups should focus on technical discussions and in-depth discussions that are guided towards concrete results. Plenary sessions will evaluate the recommendations suggested by these thematic groups. This is all part of our overarching policy. Having feedback sessions where we present the results and recommendations of thematic groups is important so that they can be discussed and endorsed by the plenary. We need to foster the exchange of written documents by thematic groups before the plenary sessions and in a timely way. We have listened to the myriad points of view expressed by delegations, particularly the contributions from developing countries, and we have borne in mind limited resources. Therefore, having three and no more than five simultaneous thematic groups could be the most appropriate way forward. We could also implement a rotating mechanism so that various groups can be active in various cycles, avoiding the overburdening of delegations. We always need to bear in mind whether we are going to work in biannual or five-year periods. Regarding sequencing and programming, we think a biannual programme is appropriate with thematic groups that would meet annually or twice a year. We should have plenary sessions to incorporate their feedback. We should align our scheduling with that of thematic groups and align that with annual planning cycles for the permanent mechanism to ensure coherence and the timely integration of recommendations into our work. On the nature of thematic groups, we should design them to encourage proper full participation, and that scheduling will be important. We should have formal in-person meetings for these working groups to allow us to record what we are doing and effectively transmit the results of our discussions to those who require them. However, that does not stop us from having the possibility of some types of hybrid meetings so that we can properly include delegations with limited capacity and so that we can have the contributions of experts from capital and specialists. Here, in these meetings, we should always bear in mind the importance of having multilingualism and respecting time differences. We need to explore additional initiatives to build capacity. and how these might work and mutually enrich each other within the future mechanism.

Chile: We have the plenary and high-level discussion groups, for example. All of these could coexist if they effectively reconcile their work. We do need to respond to needs that have been expressed here and any future needs that may arise. We need to bear in mind realities and priorities. We need to discuss how the future mechanism can be agile and ever-evolving in the face of cyber threats and how they evolve. That is vital. Finally, in terms of consensus, and this is in a vein to what was said by Mexico and El Salvador, consensus should be a means to achieve broad common understanding and not as an end in itself. The abuse of consensus can paralyze action and allow one state to impose their interests on the collective. In terms of procedure, when it is clear that consensus is not achievable, a quick resolution should be found to not hinder constructive dialogue on areas that are substantive. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Israel: Thank you, Chair, for giving us the floor. As we approach the conclusion of the current open-ended working group, Israel welcomes this opportunity to contribute to the discussions on the future mechanism that will succeed it. We recognize the importance of ensuring continuity, inclusivity, and effectiveness in global discussions on international cyber security. However, the design of this future mechanism must reflect lessons learned from past processes and safeguard core principles that ensure practical outcomes. Chair, we listened to your remarks yesterday very carefully. We found your suggestion to all of us to avoid the tendency to simply copy-paste everything that we had now. in our current process to the new mechanism. We found that suggestion to be very useful, and we would like to encourage all Member States to refrain from it, as it will not contribute to our future work and will not be best use of our time and resources. Mr. Chair, Israel is in the view that for the sake of inclusiveness and effectiveness of such a dialogue, the framework for such a dialogue on ICT security should be of a voluntary and non-legally binding nature. Any other type of framework carries the risk of alienating and driving away some of the relevant actors. In this context, we also believe that cyber security and cyber resilience are key elements of states’ national security. It is essential that any future framework will be consensus-based. Mr. Chair, in our view, the chosen institutional dialogue should be a single track and avoid duplications or for-fragmentations, and it should optimize the use of resources and maintain a process which will be practical and action-oriented in nature. Like many other Member States, we also anticipate that we might encounter difficulties equally contributing and fully engaging with parallel and multiple processes. In the same way, we advocate to minimize the number of thematic working groups, allowing size, distance, or resource-challenged delegations to equally participate. We wish to thank France for a very thoughtful working paper presented to us on the future mechanism structure and modalities of the cross-cutting thematic working groups. In this regard, Israel also believes that there are several potential advantages in creating two or three dedicated thematic groups to deal with cross-cutting challenges or problems like ransomware, national or global resilience, security by design, supply chain security, to name a few. And through these issues, we can continue also to elaborate and use The five pillars and relevant issues pertaining to the framework we have created in previous work of the open-ended working groups and GGEs. Using a rotating agenda item in a yearly cycle of the new mechanism can be one of the ways to address the concerns of creating an excessive work burden as flagged by some Member States. We wish to join the U.S. as they have presented some grave concerns over the suggestions by some to conflate and merge our pillars of voluntary norms and international law into one working group, as these issues are very different in nature and might create ambiguity and confusion. The same goes for the suggestions to pick one or two of our pillars and make them the titles of the new thematic working groups. That will be a contradiction to the whole idea of having cross-cutting working groups. Chair, any future mechanism should place stronger emphasis on regional cooperation and technical capacity building. Israel will continue to support initiatives that strengthen national and global cyber resilience, particularly in developing states, while ensuring that such programs remain free from political influence. The role of private sector, academia and civil society is indispensable in ensuring a secure and resilient cyberspace. The future mechanism must facilitate structured engagement with these sectors, recognizing their role in cybersecurity policy, incident response and innovation. We have noted the Canadian-Chilean working paper that brings a fresh look and offers revised modalities on the participation of relevant stakeholders in our future mechanism and wish to thank them for their initiatives and ideas. We will further learn this paper and consider it. We are also open to consider suggestions as made by a few Member States. to adopt the multi-stakeholder modalities that guided the ad-hoc cyber crime treaty negotiations. They have proved to be very practical and useful, and we all know they brought a very successful result. In addition, Chair, we have persistently made clear that it is imperative in our view that all decisions on substantial matters in the new mechanism be taken based on the principle of consensus. This principle should apply both to the negotiation processes itself, leading to the creation of this mechanism, as well as to the decision-making process once the future mechanism is in place. Chair, in conclusion, Israel continues to support the creation of a state-led, single-track, practical, inclusive, and permanent UN mechanism, and we are ready to continue our constructive engagement, aiming to find the needed consensus on all matters vis-à-vis the modality, structure, scope, and function of this future mechanism. I thank you.

Thailand: We support the participation of multi-stakeholders, including NGOs and academia, in the process of the future permanent mechanism. As guided by you yesterday, Mr. Chair, and today as well, Thailand wishes to show our flexibility regarding the modalities proposed by you, and wishes that states reach a consensus on this matter. We support the establishment of dedicated thematic groups to facilitate in-depth dialogue on various topics. We would like to share our views on this issue as follows. First, as a principle, Thailand is of the view that the establishment of these groups should be structured in a way that ensures equal participation by all states, including developing countries, with limited resources. Therefore, we will support prioritizing topics that require urgent attention and merging interconnected issues where appropriate. While we remain flexible with the proposals put forward by certain Member States and by you, Mr. Chair, we support the establishment of the following thematic groups. First, a dedicated thematic group on international law. We are of the view that how international law applies in cyberspace remains a topic on which states need to develop a common understanding. Establishing a dedicated thematic group which incorporates scenario-based exercises on international law issues would provide a useful action-oriented platform to facilitate substantive exchanges on international law as well as capacity building. Second, a thematic group that will allow our technical experts to discuss existing and future threats for emerging technologies, in particular to critical infrastructure, and how such threats can be mitigated. While Thailand remains flexible with the name and the grouping of certain purpose groups, we also support the proposal by certain states to create a clear link between the threats we identify and discussing recommendations and proposals for responsible conduct of states as well as threat prevention, confidence-building measures, and capacity building. This leads to my second point, Mr. Chair. I would like to reiterate that capacity building efforts should be systematically integrated into discussions across all thematic groups and plenary sessions. We also reaffirm the importance of integrating gender equality into the new permanent mechanism. both as a core component of capacity building efforts and as a guiding principle. Thirdly, with regard to the format of the meetings, while we see merit in having hybrid meetings, we also see the need for in-person meetings, given the difference in time zones, which may not be practical for certain states. We also see merit in having in-person interaction among experts to promote better understanding and cooperation. Lastly, while it is important that member states engage in the current discussion on the establishment of dedicated thematic groups under the new mechanism, Thailand is of the view that the establishment of such groups should remain flexible. As rightly pointed out by you, Mr. Chair, that we are mandated to establish thematic groups as necessary and that we should allow for future mechanisms to periodically assess the necessity to establish or make changes to these groups to evolving dynamics in future, perhaps at the review conferences or, if the rules permit, even earlier. Mr. Chair, let me reiterate once again Thailand’s support for the establishment of the future permanent mechanism under the auspices of the UN that will allow for the continuation of dialogue among states on cybersecurity after the OEWG’s mandate ends this July. The new mechanism will serve as important CBM in itself and will be crucial to promote an open, secure, stable, accessible, interoperable and peaceful cyberspace. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Thailand, for your contribution. It’s exactly 1 p.m. We have about 25 speakers left. We have gone through the list halfway, so we’ll resume at 3 o’clock to continue with the rest of the speakers’ list. I wish you a pleasant lunch. The meeting is adjourned. . .

Agreement points

Need for limited number of thematic groups

Speakers

– Pacific Islands Forum – Tonga
– Israel
– South Africa
– Kenya
– Slovakia

Arguments

Need for limited number of thematic groups to enable participation of smaller delegations

Support for only 2-3 thematic groups to avoid overburdening delegations

Support for limited number of thematic groups

Support for limited number of thematic groups

Support for limited number of thematic groups

Summary

Multiple speakers agreed on the need for a limited number of thematic groups to ensure effective participation, especially for smaller delegations with limited resources.

Importance of capacity building

Speakers

– South Africa
– Brazil
– Cameroon
– Kingdom of the Netherlands
– Ecuador

Arguments

Need for capacity building to be cross-cutting across all areas

Importance of demand-driven, politically neutral capacity building

Support for capacity building to enable participation of developing countries

Proposal for cyclical approach to capacity building

Need for dedicated group on capacity building

Summary

Several speakers emphasized the importance of capacity building, suggesting it should be a cross-cutting theme or have a dedicated focus in the future mechanism.

Similar viewpoints

These speakers all supported enhanced stakeholder participation in the future mechanism, emphasizing the value of stakeholder expertise while maintaining the state-led nature of the process.

Speakers

– Canada
– United Kingdom
– Japan
– Republic of Korea
– Kingdom of the Netherlands
– New Zealand
– Denmark
– Czechia

Arguments

Support for enhanced stakeholder participation with safeguards

Support for enhanced stakeholder participation with safeguards

Proposal for transparent process to facilitate valuable stakeholder contributions

Support for stakeholder participation guided by “voice not vote” principle

Support for Canada-Chile proposal on stakeholder modalities

Support for enhanced stakeholder participation

Support for meaningful stakeholder contributions

Support for enhanced stakeholder participation

These speakers advocated for maintaining the current modalities for stakeholder participation, emphasizing the need to preserve the intergovernmental nature of the process.

Speakers

– Russian Federation
– Cuba
– Senegal

Arguments

Opposition to changing current stakeholder modalities

Need to maintain intergovernmental nature of process

Support for current stakeholder participation modalities

Unexpected consensus

Flexibility in structure of future mechanism

Speakers

– Chair
– Malaysia
– Thailand

Arguments

Flexibility in structure of future mechanism

Support for flexible approach to thematic groups

Lastly, while it is important that member states engage in the current discussion on the establishment of dedicated thematic groups under the new mechanism, Thailand is of the view that the establishment of such groups should remain flexible.

Explanation

There was an unexpected consensus on the need for flexibility in the structure of the future mechanism, with both the Chair and some member states recognizing the potential need for adjustments over time.

Overall assessment

Summary

The main areas of agreement included the need for a limited number of thematic groups, the importance of capacity building, and the value of stakeholder participation (though with disagreement on the extent). There was also broad support for an action-oriented and inclusive permanent mechanism, though views differed on the specific structure.

Consensus level

Moderate consensus on general principles, but significant disagreement on specific modalities. This suggests that while there is a shared desire for a permanent mechanism, negotiating its exact structure and functions may be challenging. The divergent views on stakeholder participation, in particular, may require careful compromise to reach a final agreement.

Different viewpoints

Structure of thematic groups

Speakers

– Islamic Republic of Iran
– Italy
– Canada
– France

Arguments

Support for preserving current five pillars in future mechanism

Proposal for three thematic groups on resilience, cooperation, and stability

Support for action-oriented, cross-cutting thematic groups

Proposal for three thematic groups on resilience, cooperation, and stability

Summary

There is disagreement on how to structure the thematic groups. Iran supports maintaining the current five-pillar structure, while Italy, Canada, and France propose a new structure with three cross-cutting thematic groups.

Stakeholder participation

Speakers

– United Kingdom
– Russian Federation
– Cuba
– Canada

Arguments

Support for enhanced stakeholder participation with safeguards

Opposition to changing current stakeholder modalities

Need to maintain intergovernmental nature of process

Support for majority voting on procedural issues like stakeholder participation

Summary

There is significant disagreement on the level and nature of stakeholder participation. The UK and Canada support enhanced participation, while Russia and Cuba advocate for maintaining strict intergovernmental control.

Decision-making process

Speakers

– Belarus
– Chile
– Canada
– El Salvador

Arguments

Importance of preserving consensus-based decision making

Need for flexibility on consensus to avoid paralysis

Support for majority voting on procedural issues like stakeholder participation

Consensus should be guiding principle but not absolute requirement

Summary

There is disagreement on the decision-making process, particularly regarding the role of consensus. Belarus strongly supports consensus-based decision making, while Chile, Canada, and El Salvador argue for more flexibility to avoid paralysis.

Unexpected differences

Merging international law and norms discussions

Speakers

– Israel
– Islamic Republic of Iran

Arguments

Opposition to merging international law and norms discussions

Support for preserving current five pillars in future mechanism

Explanation

While many countries focused on restructuring the thematic groups, Israel specifically opposed merging international law and norms discussions, which was an unexpected point of contention. This highlights the complexity of balancing different aspects of cyber discussions within the new structure.

Overall assessment

summary

The main areas of disagreement revolve around the structure of thematic groups, the level of stakeholder participation, and the decision-making process, particularly the role of consensus.

difference_level

The level of disagreement is significant, with fundamental differences in approach to the future mechanism’s structure and functioning. This high level of disagreement could potentially hinder progress in establishing an effective permanent mechanism for cybersecurity discussions. Bridging these gaps will require extensive negotiation and compromise from all parties involved.

Partial agreements

These speakers agree on the need for a limited number of thematic groups to ensure participation of smaller delegations, but they differ on the exact number and structure of these groups. They also emphasize the importance of capacity building, but have different views on how to integrate it into the structure.

Speakers

– Pacific Islands Forum – Tonga
– Israel
– South Africa
– Kenya

Arguments

Need for limited number of thematic groups to enable participation of smaller delegations

Support for only 2-3 thematic groups to avoid overburdening delegations

Need for capacity building to be cross-cutting across all areas

Support for limited number of thematic groups

Similar viewpoints

These speakers all supported enhanced stakeholder participation in the future mechanism, emphasizing the value of stakeholder expertise while maintaining the state-led nature of the process.

Speakers

– Canada
– United Kingdom
– Japan
– Republic of Korea
– Kingdom of the Netherlands
– New Zealand
– Denmark
– Czechia

Arguments

Support for enhanced stakeholder participation with safeguards

Support for enhanced stakeholder participation with safeguards

Proposal for transparent process to facilitate valuable stakeholder contributions

Support for stakeholder participation guided by “voice not vote” principle

Support for Canada-Chile proposal on stakeholder modalities

Support for enhanced stakeholder participation

Support for meaningful stakeholder contributions

Support for enhanced stakeholder participation

These speakers advocated for maintaining the current modalities for stakeholder participation, emphasizing the need to preserve the intergovernmental nature of the process.

Speakers

– Russian Federation
– Cuba
– Senegal

Arguments

Opposition to changing current stakeholder modalities

Need to maintain intergovernmental nature of process

Support for current stakeholder participation modalities

Key takeaways

Resolutions and action items

Unresolved issues

Suggested compromises

We need to drill down into thematic issues that are proposed, in terms of how they shape the structure of groups, because this will give us information about whether priorities are or are not being tackled properly, whatever the general name of the group.

Speaker

El Salvador

Reason

This comment highlights the importance of focusing on substantive issues rather than just structural labels, encouraging a more nuanced approach to designing the thematic groups.

Impact

It shifted the discussion towards considering the actual content and priorities that should be addressed within thematic groups, rather than just debating their names or broad categories.

The future permanent mechanism should prioritize building resilience, enhancing cross-border cooperation, and ensuring stability in cyberspace. The thematic groups should focus on actionable recommendations to advance these goals, leveraging norms, confidence-building measures, and capacity-building initiatives.

Speaker

Republic of Moldova

Reason

This comment provides a clear, action-oriented vision for the future mechanism, integrating multiple aspects of cybersecurity.

Impact

It helped focus the discussion on concrete outcomes and practical measures, encouraging other delegations to think in terms of actionable goals rather than abstract concepts.

We propose a cyclical approach consisting of several steps… We also note a call for a dedicated space for capacity building alongside the thematic group and plenary discussions. We believe that the high-level roundtable for cyber capacity building could be an option to provide that stage.

Speaker

Kingdom of the Netherlands

Reason

This comment introduces a structured approach to capacity building and suggests a specific format for addressing it, showing innovative thinking about the mechanism’s structure.

Impact

It sparked more detailed discussion about how capacity building could be integrated into the future mechanism, encouraging other delegations to consider specific formats and approaches.

Consensus should be a means to achieve broad common understanding and not as an end in itself. The abuse of consensus can paralyze action and allow one state to impose their interests on the collective.

Speaker

Chile

Reason

This comment challenges the conventional approach to consensus, highlighting potential drawbacks and encouraging a more nuanced view of decision-making processes.

Impact

It prompted reflection on the balance between inclusivity and effectiveness in the mechanism’s decision-making processes, leading to discussions about alternative approaches.

We think it would be prudent to avoid being overly prescriptive in sub-themes or plans for the next two years. These two elements, having more specific theme as a conversation starter, and the sequence of briefings, needs, and solutions, will create the space to dive deeper into common priorities.

Speaker

Canada

Reason

This comment advocates for flexibility and adaptability in the mechanism’s structure, recognizing the evolving nature of cybersecurity challenges.

Impact

It encouraged delegations to consider a more dynamic and responsive approach to structuring the mechanism, moving away from rigid, pre-defined categories.

Overall assessment

These key comments collectively shaped the discussion by encouraging a more nuanced, flexible, and action-oriented approach to designing the future mechanism. They shifted the focus from debating abstract structures to considering how the mechanism could effectively address evolving cybersecurity challenges. The comments also prompted deeper reflection on decision-making processes, the integration of capacity building, and the need for adaptability in the mechanism’s design. This led to a more sophisticated and practical dialogue about the future of international cybersecurity cooperation.

How can the future mechanism be designed to ensure meaningful participation from developing countries and smaller delegations with limited resources?

Speaker

Multiple speakers including Tonga, Senegal, Malaysia

Explanation

This was raised as a key concern to ensure inclusivity and equal participation for all states

What are the most effective ways to integrate capacity building across all aspects of the future mechanism?

Speaker

Multiple speakers including Pacific Islands Forum, Brazil, Thailand

Explanation

Many delegates emphasized the need for capacity building to be a core cross-cutting element

How can stakeholder participation be structured to balance inclusivity with the intergovernmental nature of the process?

Speaker

Multiple speakers with differing views

Explanation

This was a major point of debate, with some calling for expanded stakeholder roles and others wanting to limit participation

What is the optimal number and structure of thematic groups to allow for focused discussion without overburdening delegations?

Speaker

Multiple speakers including France, Brazil, Thailand

Explanation

Finding the right balance for thematic groups was seen as crucial for an effective mechanism

How can the mechanism be designed to be flexible and adaptable to evolving cyber threats and technologies?

Speaker

Multiple speakers including New Zealand, Chile

Explanation

The need for a dynamic mechanism that can address emerging issues was emphasized

What are the best practices for incorporating gender perspectives and promoting gender equality in the future mechanism?

Speaker

Chile and others

Explanation

Several delegates called for gender to be integrated as a key consideration

How can international law discussions be structured to advance common understandings of its application to cyberspace?

Speaker

Multiple speakers including Estonia, Thailand

Explanation

The need for dedicated focus on international law issues was highlighted by many