UN OEWG 2021-2025 10th substantive session

States across the globe are confronting a myriad of cyber threats that challenge both national security and global stability. These threats were extensively discussed during the 10th substantive session of the OEWG 2025. The discussions highlighted the diverse and sophisticated nature of cyber threats, emphasizing the risks posed by ransomware, state-sponsored cyber activities, phishing, malware, and advanced persistent threats (APTs). Additionally, Japan and Australia expressed specific concerns regarding attacks on critical infrastructure and electoral systems.

The evolution of cyber threats and technologies, particularly artificial intelligence (AI), was a recurring theme. The potential for misunderstandings and conflicts between nations due to malicious cyber activities was another critical point of discussion. The Islamic Republic of Iran highlighted the risks from exploiting ICT products’ vulnerabilities and hidden functions, which threaten supply chain integrity.

The stakeholder session further underscored the involvement of non-state actors and criminal groups in cyber threats, alongside concerns about the malicious use of emerging technologies. The African Group, represented by Nigeria, stressed the extraterritorial nature of cyber-attacks and the importance of national sovereignty in addressing these threats.

Technological advancements, including AI and quantum computing, were highlighted as contributing to the evolving threat landscape. These developments pose significant risks to critical infrastructure and national security.

The sessions also addressed the challenges posed by ransomware, AI-enabled phishing, and the misuse of ICTs for political purposes, as mentioned by Djibouti and South Africa.

Overall, the discussions reveal a complex and rapidly evolving cyber threat landscape, necessitating comprehensive and coordinated international responses. States are urged to enhance capacity building and maintain vigilance in the face of these dynamic challenges.

The discussions across various sessions of the OEWG 2025 emphasize the need for a multi-faceted approach to addressing cyber threats in future mechanisms. Key themes include enhancing international cooperation, capacity building, and the application of international law.

Japan and France both stressed the importance of action-oriented, scenario-based discussions. Similarly, Australia called for an agility and a risk-based approach to cyber threats, emphasizing the application of international law.

Several sessions, including the Opening of the session and Agenda Item 5, underscored the necessity of enhancing international cooperation and developing a comprehensive international framework for cyberspace security. Mauritius proposed a structured voluntary reporting mechanism for cyber incidents to ensure timely information sharing.

Capacity building is consistently highlighted across discussions. The Dedicated Stakeholder Session and Agenda Item 5 discussions suggest integrating capacity building into the future mechanism. The African Group emphasized the need for robust international cooperation to ensure access to necessary know-how and technology transfer.

The importance of thematic groups for in-depth dialogue on existing and future threats is supported by several states, including Thailand. Sessions such as Agenda Item 5 and Agenda Item 6 highlight the need for establishing dedicated thematic groups to address threats comprehensively.

Finally, the Closure of the session reiterated the significance of capacity building, technical assistance, and international cooperation. Antigua and Barbuda proposed a Global POC and ICT Security Cooperation and Capacity Building Portal as a valuable tool for addressing cyberspace threats.

The Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on cybersecurity has discussed a range of cooperative measures to address various threats, as highlighted in multiple sessions. These measures are designed to strengthen international cybersecurity frameworks and promote global resilience.

One of the key cooperative measures discussed is the establishment of a Global POC Mechanism for real-time threat information sharing. This mechanism aims to facilitate communication during cyber incidents, enhancing the speed and efficiency of responses.

Public-private partnerships have been repeatedly emphasized as crucial for building cybersecurity capacity. Hitachi America highlighted their importance in fostering resilience and developing best practices.

Regional and international cooperation are key themes, with the EU and its member states supporting regional confidence-building processes and capacity-building programs. Similarly, Kazakhstan advocated for regional coordination centers to integrate national CERTs and C-CERT teams.

Capacity-building initiatives were widely discussed, with emphasis on global ICT security cooperation portals as a means to facilitate capacity building and cooperation.

Information sharing and scenario-based exercises are considered essential for enhancing collective understanding and response capabilities. Canada and Estonia emphasized the importance of these exercises for enhancing cooperation.

Lastly, adherence to international norms and engagement with multiple stakeholders, including industry and academia, were recognized as vital for building a comprehensive cybersecurity framework. The EU Institute for Security Studies noted that multi-stakeholder cooperation acts as a force multiplier in decision-making processes.

The discussions on the development of new or additional norms during the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) 2025 sessions reveal a divergence of views among states. While there is a consensus on the importance of international law and existing norms, states differ on the need for new norms.

Some states, such as Argentina, emphasized the importance of prudent interpretations of ICT activities by states, focusing on the application and adherence to existing norms and international law (source).

During the continued discussions, some states advocated for the development of additional norms to address emerging threats, although opinions differ on whether these norms should be voluntary or legally binding (source).

In the opening session, discussions highlighted the need for further deliberations on possible additional norms, with some states advocating for voluntary norms and others suggesting legally binding measures, particularly to address emerging technologies like AI and quantum computing (source).

Varied perspectives were also present during the dedicated stakeholder session, where inclusivity and transparency in developing norms were emphasized. The EU Institute for Security Studies highlighted the importance of ensuring that all voices are heard, while the German Council on Foreign Relations stressed the need to accelerate the rollout of quantum cryptographic algorithms (source).

During other discussions, some states, including Russia, Cuba, and Nicaragua, advocated for new legally binding norms, while others like the United States, Switzerland, and Israel believed the current norms are sufficient and focus should be on implementation. Switzerland stated, “in our view, many of the proposed new norms can be subsumed under the existing ones.“

In the closure session, Vietnam and China discussed the need for possible new legally binding norms, while others like Finland emphasized the importance of continuing discussions on how existing international law applies to cyberspace (source).

Overall, the discussions reflect a complex landscape of differing opinions on the necessity and nature of new norms, underscoring the ongoing debate between strengthening existing frameworks and developing new measures to address evolving technological challenges.

The question of whether norms should be voluntary or legally binding was a key point of discussion during the UN OEWG 2025 sessions. There is a clear division among states, with differing perspectives regarding the best approach to ensure compliance and accountability in the realm of international information security.

Some states, such as Algeria, emphasized the need for binding legal instruments, particularly for oversight in cyberspace. Similarly, Cuba argued for legally binding norms to ensure the peaceful and safe use of ICTs. Vietnam and China also advocated for the development of new legally binding norms.

Conversely, other states, including Ireland, emphasized the importance of voluntary norms, noting the significant convergence of views on areas such as international humanitarian law. The United States and the United Kingdom also supported voluntary norms, with the UK noting their role as voluntary and non-binding.

In stakeholder sessions, the emphasis on inclusivity, transparency, and stakeholder participation suggested a preference for voluntary norms that can be agreed upon by consensus. Israel also supported a voluntary and non-legally binding framework.

The discussions highlighted the lack of consensus on the issue, with states diverging on whether norms should be voluntary or legally binding. The debates reflect the complexity of achieving international agreement in the rapidly evolving field of ICTs, where flexibility and adaptability are often weighed against the need for accountability and compliance.

The question of whether the Voluntary Checklist of Practical Actions needs further improvement to facilitate reaching a consensus recommendation by July 2025 was not directly discussed in most sessions of the OEWG 2025 meeting. However, some relevant points were noted in certain discussions.

During the session on Agenda item 5: discussions on substantive issues contained in paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 75/240 (continued)/OEWG 2025, it was highlighted that many states consider the checklist a living document that can be improved over time. Specifically, Malaysia expressed that it “serves as a strong foundation and a good starting point.” Meanwhile, the Netherlands suggested that the checklist “could be updated periodically.”

Furthermore, in another session on Agenda item 5: discussions on substantive issues contained in paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 75/240 (continued)/4/OEWG 2025, the Islamic Republic of Iran noted that “the checklist is not yet finalized and remains open for discussion,” indicating the need for further improvement.

The discussions on the need for new legally binding instruments specific to cyberspace during the 10th substantive session of the UN OEWG 2025 highlighted divergent views among participating states. Some states, such as Algeria, believe in the need for binding legal instruments to address the specific challenges posed by cyberspace. Iran and Russia also argued that existing frameworks have gaps, advocating for new legally binding instruments.

Conversely, states like the UK and Republic of Korea maintain that existing laws are sufficient and suggest focusing on the implementation of these norms. Similarly, the United States and Israel prefer focusing on implementing existing norms and international law rather than developing new legally binding instruments.

States like Cuba and Venezuela have voiced their support for the development of legally binding instruments, emphasizing that these are necessary to ensure international information security. Meanwhile, other nations like China and Vietnam also support the development of new legally binding tools to address cyberspace threats, as discussed during the closure of the session.

The ongoing debate highlights a division between those advocating for new legally binding measures and those who believe in enhancing existing frameworks and voluntary norms to address cyber threats. The topic remains a significant point of contention within international discussions on cyberspace governance.

During the 10th substantive session of the UN OEWG 2021-2025, the applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL) to cyber operations in armed conflicts was a topic of discussion. A broad consensus emerged among participating states that IHL does apply to such operations. This consensus was echoed by several countries, including Switzerland, Israel, Germany, Austria, and Finland.

In Agenda Item 5: Discussions on Substantive Issues, states like Switzerland and Israel emphasized the importance of applying international law, including IHL, in cyberspace. Similarly, in Agenda Item 5: Continued Discussions, Germany and Austria asserted that IHL applies to cyber operations in armed conflicts, with Germany referencing a resolution by the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent.

Furthermore, in the Agenda Item 5: Continued Discussions (2), there was a broad consensus that IHL applies to cyber operations, with many states supporting its inclusion in the final report, emphasizing that this does not legitimize or encourage conflict.

The Closure of the Session saw several countries, including Switzerland and Finland, affirm that IHL applies to cyber operations in armed conflicts, emphasizing the need for further discussion on its application.

In the Other Matters session, Chile expressed the need for continued discussion and development of a common understanding regarding the application of IHL in cyberspace.

The discussions underscore a significant recognition among states of the importance of applying IHL to cyber operations, though there is a call for deeper engagement on its parameters.

The ongoing discussions in the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) 2021-2025 have revealed varied perspectives on how states should structure future discussions on international law, particularly in relation to cyber threats. A recurring theme is the need for a cross-cutting, action-oriented approach with a focus on resilience and effective responses to cyber threats, as suggested by Germany.

There is a divergence in opinion on how best to organize these discussions. Some states, such as Egypt, advocate for a dedicated platform for international law discussions, emphasizing the importance of a multilateral dialogue. Others, like Ireland, support the idea of incorporating international law discussions into cross-cutting thematic groups to foster practical understanding and collaboration.

Switzerland has suggested structuring discussions through thematic working groups and possibly ad hoc groups to address specific international law questions. Finland and Germany support the integration of international law discussions across all thematic groups, aligning with the view that these discussions should be distinct, yet complementary to norms discussions.

The Centre for International Law suggested that the proposed dedicated thematic group discussions offer a valuable platform for practical dialogue on cyber threats in relation to international law. In support of this approach, Thailand supports a dedicated thematic group on international law with scenario-based exercises, highlighting the need for practical engagement.

In summary, the discussions underscore a consensus on the necessity of integrating international law within the broader context of cyberspace governance, while also recognizing the need for dedicated platforms to address specific legal challenges. The integration of scenario-based exercises and expert briefings is proposed to enhance understanding and applicability of international law in cyberspace.

The discussions across various sessions of the UN OEWG 2025 10th Substantive Session highlighted several key areas for improvement in the Global Point of Contact (POC) Directory. These can be categorized into enhancing communication, expanding participation, ensuring active engagement, and leveraging technology.

In the session on agenda item 5, South Africa and Indonesia emphasized the importance of “regular exchanges of information and enhancing real-time communication and response capabilities.” This reflects a broader consensus on the necessity of improving the operational readiness and responsiveness of the directory.

The Russian Federation suggested “conducting regular ping tests, simulation exercises, and expanding participation,” while also addressing “inactive contacts and developing guidelines for setting up UN technical POCs.”

During the dedicated stakeholder session, the need to “expand participation in the POC Directory and build capacity, especially for developing countries” was highlighted. Germany and France emphasized the “responsible use of the POC Directory” and suggested “learning from regional examples to ensure its credibility.”

Furthermore, Kazakhstan supported a “structured real-time incident response mechanism,” although detailed suggestions on how to achieve this were not provided.

The Republic of Korea proposed “integrating the Global POC into a new portal to establish a single platform,” suggesting a need for a technical review to streamline operations.

This comprehensive approach, incorporating regular testing, expansion of participation, technical improvements, and responsible use, could significantly enhance the effectiveness and reliability of the Global POC Directory.

The Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) 2021-2025 has seen discussions around the development of standardized templates for communication between points of contact. This topic was addressed in several sessions, where different states provided their suggestions and proposals.

During one of the sessions, Mauritius suggested developing standardized templates for incident reporting to create consistency in how cyber incidents are communicated. This suggestion was echoed by South Africa, which supported developing templates to assist communication between member states on a voluntary basis.

In another session, Fiji supported the development of standardized templates to provide clear and efficient communication between states, elaborating on procedures for inquiry and response.

These discussions indicate a shared understanding among participating states of the need for standardized templates to enhance communication and coordination in dealing with cyber incidents. However, the implementation of such templates may vary, as seen in the emphasis on voluntary adoption by some states.

The discussions within the OEWG 2025 sessions significantly highlighted the importance of capacity building and international cooperation as fundamental components in supporting the full operationalisation of the eight agreed Global Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs). States are encouraged to actively participate in the Points of Contact (POC) Directory, share best practices, and engage in scenario-based exercises to enhance their readiness and collaboration.

In particular, Canada emphasized the role of thematic groups to facilitate practical discussions on CBMs, as noted in the opening of the session, where the necessity of active participation, enhanced capacity building efforts, and adherence to established norms and frameworks was underscored.

Additionally, the dedicated stakeholder session highlighted the need for raising awareness, expanding participation, building capacity, and fostering partnerships. The Chair noted the importance of nurturing the POC Directory as a living organism that needs constant adaptation and support.

Overall, the sessions reinforced that the full operationalisation of CBMs is contingent upon robust capacity building and international cooperation, as emphasized across various discussions. While the topic was not explicitly addressed in every session, the foundational elements of capacity-building and cooperation were recurrent themes, as seen in the sessions.

During the 10th substantive session of the UN OEWG 2025, various aspects of the capacity-building landscape were discussed across multiple sessions. The discussions highlighted both successful initiatives and existing gaps that need to be addressed.

Successful aspects of capacity-building efforts include regional cooperation and training programs (Agenda Item 5), international cooperation (Dedicated Stakeholder Session), and initiatives like the Women in Cyber Fellowship (Agenda Item 5, continued/4). These initiatives have been recognized for fostering knowledge sharing and technical cooperation (Agenda Item 5, continued/3).

However, several gaps were identified that require attention. A predominant concern is the need for more tailored and region-specific initiatives (Opening of the Session). There is a call for increased support for developing countries, and addressing the digital divide (Agenda Item 5, continued/5). Additionally, there is a significant need for targeted leadership-level programs (Dedicated Stakeholder Session).

Moreover, there is a need for focused discussions on capacity building to ensure resources are allocated effectively, as noted by Brazil (Agenda Item 6: Other Matters). Ecuador also emphasized the necessity for a specific group on capacity building (Agenda Item 6: Other Matters).

In conclusion, while there are successful capacity-building initiatives, addressing the gaps, particularly in equitable access, tailored programs, and sustainable funding, remains crucial to enhancing global participation and bridging the digital divide.

The discussions at the UN OEWG 2025 sessions highlighted several key elements necessary to ensure the practicality and effectiveness of the UN voluntary fund to support capacity building. While not all sessions discussed this specific question, insights were drawn from various discussions and stakeholder inputs.

During the dedicated stakeholder session, it was suggested that the fund should be inclusive and non-discriminatory, with a focus on supporting the specific needs of developing countries. Cuba highlighted the importance of the fund in facilitating technology transfer, access to financial resources, and providing technical support.

In the session on substantive issues contained in paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 75/240, it was stressed that the fund should have clear links to existing initiatives, prioritize support for developing countries, and be managed efficiently. The focus should be on specific areas such as enhancing participation in meetings and capacity-building activities.

In the closure of the session, Argentina and Vanuatu emphasized the need for efficient allocation, monitoring, and improvement of the Voluntary Contributions Fund to support capacity building effectively.

Moreover, during another session on substantive issues, states like Ghana and Australia stressed the importance of transparency, accountability, and cost-effectiveness in the administration of the fund. Australia raised concerns about current cost estimates being too high.

Lastly, Brazil, in other matters, highlighted the importance of funding to facilitate participation from developing countries in future mechanisms and supported its inclusion in the report on the voluntary fund.

In summary, for the UN voluntary fund to be practical and effective, it must be inclusive, prioritize developing countries, ensure transparency, accountability, and cost-effectiveness, and be efficiently managed with clear links to existing initiatives.

The development and operation of a neutral, state-driven, and modular UN-backed ICT security cooperation and capacity-building portal were discussed in various sessions of the OEWG 2025. A recurring theme across these discussions was the importance of ensuring mutual trust and commitment as emphasized by Indonesia, positioning the portal as a secure channel for sharing threat information.

Singapore highlighted the necessity for the portal’s design to prioritize practicality and usefulness, aligning with the Secretariat’s report that outlines five proposed modules to guide its development. El Salvador stressed the importance of usability, simplicity, accessibility, and functionality, advocating for the integration of existing platforms to streamline resources and minimize costs.

The Netherlands and the Republic of Korea emphasized the necessity of avoiding duplication, ensuring complementarity with existing resources, and being publicly accessible. This was echoed in a session where the portal was described as needing to be inclusive and neutral, leveraging existing resources, and having clear scoping and parameters to facilitate information sharing accessible to all states.

Lastly, Egypt and the Democratic Republic of the Congo underlined the portal’s foundation on trust, mutual support, and collaboration in capacity-building initiatives.

The discussions on addressing capacity building within the context of the future mechanism at the UN OEWG 2025 sessions have highlighted several key strategies and approaches. Capacity building is recognized as a critical component, with a consensus on integrating it into thematic groups and ensuring it is a core part of the future mechanism’s work.

During the agenda item 5, it was emphasized by South Africa and Indonesia that capacity building should include technical support, knowledge sharing, regional cooperation, and leveraging existing mechanisms like the Global POC Directory.

The opening of the session suggested focusing on enhancing technical skills, sharing best practices, and providing resources for developing countries, ensuring equitable access to capacity building initiatives.

In the dedicated stakeholder session, Colombia and Singapore highlighted the importance of sustainable efforts and leadership-level programs, suggesting capacity building should be addressed through dedicated thematic groups, integrated into ICT security discussions, and supported by a UN Voluntary Fund.

Canada and Fiji, during another agenda item 5 session, emphasized the importance of regional cooperation and sharing best practices through dedicated thematic groups.

The closure of the session reinforced that capacity building should be a cross-cutting issue, discussed in all thematic groups, and closely linked to the Voluntary Contributions Fund, as suggested by Vanuatu and Argentina.

Brazil, as mentioned in the discussion on other matters, suggested targeted discussions with tangible outcomes to ensure capacity building is effective and resources are adequately allocated.

Overall, the sessions underscore the importance of making capacity building a continuous, inclusive, and well-integrated effort across all discussions and mechanisms to support developing countries effectively.

The discussions during the OEWG 2025 sessions centered around the challenge of balancing inclusive stakeholder participation with state concerns. Participants emphasized the importance of involving various stakeholders, including the private sector, academia, and civil society, while ensuring that state control over the process is maintained.

During the session on substantive issues, Canada expressed regret over excluded stakeholders, highlighting their value in understanding threats. However, the balance between participation and state concerns was not explicitly addressed.

In another session, states emphasized the need for inclusive participation while maintaining state control. They proposed establishing guidelines for stakeholder engagement to ensure contributions are structured and relevant.

At the opening of the session, states suggested drawing on best practices from other UN processes to ensure effective stakeholder participation. They acknowledged the importance of maintaining the intergovernmental nature of the process.

In a dedicated stakeholder session, the EU Institute for Security Studies suggested balancing participation by ensuring structured and meaningful roles for all actors. The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue emphasized tolerance for diverse views while maintaining state responsibility.

In another session, states recommended establishing clear guidelines and considering practical modalities. They also suggested drawing from successful practices in other UN processes to structure stakeholder participation aligned with UN principles.

Canada and Chile proposed practical modalities for stakeholder participation, emphasizing transparency in handling objections. Many states, including the UK, supported moving beyond a veto-based approach to ensure meaningful stakeholder contributions.

In the closure of the session, several states, including Australia and Switzerland, emphasized the need for structured stakeholder participation, using a voice-not-vote approach, to improve transparency and inclusivity while maintaining state-led decision-making.

During the tenth substantive session of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) 2025, various delegations discussed the establishment of specific dedicated thematic groups as part of a future permanent mechanism. The discussions covered a range of topics, with a recurring focus on resilience, cooperation, stability, and addressing emerging threats such as ransomware, artificial intelligence (AI), and quantum computing.

In the first session, France and other states suggested thematic groups focusing on resilience, cooperation, stability, and addressing threats like ransomware and emerging technologies such as AI and quantum computing.

The second session included proposals for thematic groups on international law, confidence-building measures (CBMs), and incident management, with Ireland and Canada emphasizing the importance of cross-cutting thematic groups for practical discussions and building common understandings.

During the opening of the session, there were proposals for thematic groups aimed at enhancing cyber resilience, protecting critical infrastructure, and addressing emerging technologies like AI and quantum computing.

In the dedicated stakeholder session, suggestions were made for thematic groups focusing on enhancing diversity, critical infrastructure resilience, incident management, capacity building, and emerging threats, with specific suggestions from Right Pilot and Crest International.

According to the third session, proposals also included thematic groups on resilience, cooperation, and stability, with a focus on applying international law to specific challenges such as critical infrastructure protection and conflict prevention.

During the fourth session, there were proposals for thematic groups on resilience, cooperation, stability, capacity building, and international law, reflecting the priorities and concerns of different states.

In the fifth session, France and Canada mentioned discussions on resilience, cooperation, stability, and specific norms implementation.

At the closure of the session, the thematic group proposals included resilience, cooperation, stability, international law, and capacity building, with significant discussion on France’s proposal for a cross-cutting thematic group approach.

In the sixth session, France’s proposal for three thematic groups on resilience, cooperation, and stability received support from countries including New Zealand and Slovakia, while Thailand suggested a dedicated group on international law.

Finally, in the seventh session, countries like Poland and Argentina proposed dedicated thematic groups focusing on capacity building, critical infrastructure, and cybersecurity resilience.

Overall, the discussions underscored the importance of resilience, cooperation, stability, and the application of international law, with a strong focus on addressing emerging technological threats and enhancing cybersecurity capabilities.

To ensure that discussions in the dedicated thematic groups delve deeper into issues raised during substantive plenary sessions, several strategies have been suggested across various sessions. France proposed that meetings of the Resilience, Cooperation, and Stability Working Groups should start with expert briefings on threats to ground technical discussions in real challenges and feed into plenary discussions.

States have also suggested that thematic groups focus on action-oriented and practical applications of issues discussed in plenary sessions, including scenario-based exercises and expert briefings to deepen understanding and build capacity.

There is an emphasis on ensuring that thematic groups have clear objectives and responsibilities, as highlighted in the opening session, to facilitate in-depth discussions and expert input for addressing complex issues substantively.

In the dedicated stakeholder session, the establishment of clear mandates for thematic groups and encouraging expert participation based on subject expertise were suggested. Structured discussions and shared best practices were also emphasized.

To enhance discussions, thematic groups should include expert briefings, scenario-based exercises, and focus on practical applications of international law and norms to real-world challenges.

Ensuring deeper discussions can be achieved by framing them around common challenges, cross-cutting issues, and linking thematic group outcomes to plenary sessions.

The UK suggested using thematic groups to focus on specific topics like information sharing, starting with expert briefings, then moving to state-led discussions for deeper dives into issues.

During the closure of the session, Australia and other countries suggested integrating cross-cutting issues like international law and capacity building into thematic group discussions to ensure a deeper exploration of issues.

Brazil and the UK highlighted the need for thematic groups to be action-oriented, scenario-based discussions that complement plenary sessions. Thematic groups should focus on identifying challenges and developing solutions.

Argentina and Indonesia suggested using thematic groups to focus on technical recommendations and capacity building needs, with reports brought to plenary sessions for broader discussion.

During the sessions of the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) 2025, the discussions on the realistic number of dedicated thematic groups to be established within the future permanent mechanism were approached with diverse perspectives. Although there was no specific consensus reached, several suggestions emerged from the discussions.

In the opening of the session, it was noted that there was a need for a rational and manageable number of thematic groups to ensure effective discussions and outcomes. The emphasis was on manageability and efficiency.

In discussions around substantive issues, Argentina and Vanuatu suggested limiting the number of thematic groups to three to ensure manageability and inclusiveness, while France proposed a flexible number depending on the issues.

At the discussion on other matters, New Zealand and Slovakia proposed three groups, highlighting the importance of not overburdening smaller states. Brazil also supported the idea of three groups but suggested a rotating agenda to address more issues over time.

Overall, the discussions highlighted a common theme of maintaining a balance between manageability and the need to cover essential topics. Suggestions ranged from three to five thematic groups, with an emphasis on streamlining and focusing on key areas like resilience, cooperation, and stability.