High Level Dialogue: Strengthening the Resilience of Telecommunication Submarine Cables
9 Jul 2025 16:45h - 17:45h
High Level Dialogue: Strengthening the Resilience of Telecommunication Submarine Cables
Session at a glance
Summary
This discussion focused on submarine cable resilience, examining the critical infrastructure that carries 99% of international communications traffic through approximately 500 cables spanning 1.7 million kilometers worldwide. The panel was moderated by Tomas Lamanauskas, Deputy Secretary General of ITU, and featured representatives from Portugal’s telecom regulator ANACOM, Estonia’s Ministry of Justice and Digital Affairs, Singapore’s IMDA, and China Telecom Europe. The conversation centered around the International Advisory Body of Submarine Cable Resilience, established by ITU in partnership with the International Cable Protection Committee, which now includes 40 members working to develop global best practices.
Key challenges identified included both intentional and unintentional cable disruptions, with human activities such as anchoring and fishing accounting for over 85% of cable cuts according to industry data. Estonia’s minister highlighted the particular threat of intentional cable cuts by hostile actors, while Singapore’s representative emphasized the economic importance of submarine cables, noting they account for 18% of Singapore’s GDP. The discussion revealed that natural disasters and human interference remain the primary causes of cable damage, necessitating comprehensive protection strategies.
Solutions proposed included building redundancy through diverse routing, implementing predictive maintenance systems, establishing protection zones, and developing rapid repair capabilities. Participants stressed the importance of international cooperation, particularly in supporting small island states and developing countries that lack repair resources. The advisory body has established three working groups focusing on resilience by design, timely deployment and repair, and risk identification and mitigation. The panel concluded with plans for a second National Submarine Cable Resilience Summit, emphasizing the need for continued multilateral cooperation to protect this critical global infrastructure.
Keypoints
## Major Discussion Points:
– **Submarine Cable Vulnerability and Protection**: The discussion emphasized that submarine cables carry 99% of international communications but are surprisingly fragile (demonstrated with a physical cable sample). The main causes of disruption are human activities like anchoring and fishing (85%+ of incidents), with some intentional damage from hostile actors, particularly in regions like the Baltic Sea.
– **International Cooperation and Governance**: Panelists highlighted the need for multilateral approaches through organizations like ITU and IMO, drawing parallels to the original 1865 telegraph cable protection challenges. The International Advisory Body on Submarine Cable Resilience was established with 40+ members to develop best practices and coordinate global responses.
– **Resilience Through Design and Redundancy**: Key strategies discussed included building redundancy into cable systems, route diversity, predictive maintenance, protection zones, and rapid repair capacity. Singapore’s approach of scaling from 10 to 50+ cables by 2035 was cited as an example of creating resilience through quantity and diversity.
– **Economic and Capacity Building Challenges**: The discussion addressed the economic realities of cable deployment and repair, particularly for small island states and developing countries. Issues included limited repair ship availability (only one for all of Africa), the need for simplified licensing procedures, and the importance of making digital infrastructure economically viable.
– **Stakeholder Engagement and Education**: Panelists emphasized the need to involve diverse stakeholders including maritime authorities, fishing communities, consumers, and academia. There was discussion about the lack of submarine cable expertise in younger generations and the need for better public awareness about this critical infrastructure.
## Overall Purpose:
The discussion aimed to address submarine cable resilience as critical global infrastructure, sharing best practices among government officials, regulators, and industry representatives while promoting the work of the International Advisory Body on Submarine Cable Resilience and building momentum for continued international cooperation.
## Overall Tone:
The tone was professional and collaborative throughout, with a sense of urgency about protecting critical infrastructure. Panelists demonstrated mutual respect and shared commitment to the cause. The atmosphere became more interactive and engaged during the Q&A session, with audience members from various countries and organizations contributing diverse perspectives. There was an underlying current of concern about intentional cable damage, but the overall approach remained constructive and solution-focused.
Speakers
– **Tomas Lamanauskas** – Deputy Secretary General of RTU, moderator of the panel on submarine cable resilience
– **Sandra Maximiano** – Professor, Chairperson of ANACOM (telecom regulator in Portugal), Co-chair of the International Advisory Body of Submarine Cable Resilience
– **Liisa Ly Pakosta** – Minister of Justice and Digital Affairs of Estonia
– **Lew Chuen Hong** – CEO of IMDA Singapore (Infocomm and Media Development Authority)
– **Athena Jun Xian** – Managing Director from China Telecom Europe, Executive General Manager of China Telecom on the Promenade-Folokom Global
– **Audience** – Various audience members including:
– Sabine Jones – European government representative and international expert
– Nisa Purcell – Regulator from Samoa
– Katrin Stuber – Works for GEANT, represents science innovation research organizations in Europe
– Abdi Jilir – Civil society representative from Chad
– Isaac Boateng – Head of standardization for the African Telecommunication Union
– Volodymyr Matyushko – EU digital and green transition expert
**Additional speakers:**
– **Bosun Tijani** – Mentioned as an announced panelist who was unable to attend (was on a plane)
Full session report
# Comprehensive Report: Panel Discussion on Submarine Cable Resilience
## Introduction and Context
This comprehensive panel discussion on submarine cable resilience was moderated by Tomas Lamanauskas, Deputy Secretary General of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and formed part of broader discussions surrounding the ITU’s 159th anniversary celebrations. The timing proved particularly significant, as Lamanauskas noted that the original 1865 ITU founding addressed precisely the same challenge: protecting undersea telegraphic cables from intentional damage by hostile actors.
Lamanauskas opened the discussion with a compelling physical demonstration, showing participants an actual submarine cable sample to illustrate the surprising thinness and vulnerability of infrastructure carrying 99% of global communications. This tangible demonstration effectively conveyed the paradox of critical global infrastructure that appears deceptively fragile.
The panel brought together distinguished representatives from regulatory bodies, government ministries, and industry leaders to examine the critical infrastructure that underpins global digital communications. With around 500 submarine cables spanning 1.7 million kilometres worldwide and carrying 99% of international communications traffic, the discussion addressed both the fundamental importance and surprising vulnerability of this infrastructure.
## Panel Composition and Expertise
The discussion featured Sandra Maximiano, Professor and Chairperson of ANACOM (Portugal’s telecommunications regulator) and Co-chair of the International Advisory Body of Submarine Cable Resilience; Liisa Ly Pakosta, Minister of Justice and Digital Affairs of Estonia; Lew Chuen Hong, CEO of Singapore’s Infocomm and Media Development Authority (IMDA); and Athena Jun Xian, Managing Director from China Telecom Europe. The panel was notably missing Bosun Tijani, who was unable to attend due to travel commitments.
The audience participation proved equally valuable, with contributions from diverse stakeholders including representatives from European governments, regulators from Samoa, GEANT representatives, civil society representatives from Chad, the African Telecommunication Union, and EU digital transition experts.
## The Critical Infrastructure Challenge
### Physical Vulnerability and Global Dependence
The economic significance became clear through regional examples. Lew Chuen Hong emphasised that Singapore’s digital economy accounts for about 18% of the nation’s GDP, making submarine cables foundational infrastructure rather than merely technical equipment. Similarly, Liisa Ly Pakosta highlighted Estonia’s complete digitalisation, with all government services dependent on internet connectivity, making cable resilience a matter of national functionality.
Sandra Maximiano provided the broader context, explaining that whilst there are around 500 cables globally, this relatively small number supports the entire international digital economy. The concentration of such critical functionality in limited physical infrastructure creates systemic vulnerabilities that require coordinated international response.
### Threat Landscape and Causation Analysis
The discussion revealed a complex threat environment with both traditional and emerging challenges. Athena Jun Xian presented industry data showing that human activities, particularly anchoring and fishing operations, account for the vast majority of cable cuts. These incidents range from purely accidental damage during legitimate maritime activities to intentional cuts by fishing vessels.
Natural disasters, including earthquakes and undersea landslides, represent another significant category of threats. However, the most concerning development emerged through Minister Pakosta’s revelation of intentional cable cuts by hostile state actors. She specifically described incidents involving Russian shuttle fleet vessels deliberately targeting cables in designated protection zones.
This intelligence fundamentally shifted the discussion’s scope from technical infrastructure management to hybrid warfare considerations. The moderator acknowledged that such state-level threats were “above his pay grade,” highlighting how submarine cable protection intersects with broader geopolitical security concerns.
## International Cooperation Framework
### The International Advisory Body on Submarine Cable Resilience
Sandra Maximiano detailed the establishment and operation of the International Advisory Body on Submarine Cable Resilience, created through ITU partnership with the International Cable Protection Committee. The body now includes over 40 members from both public and private sectors, representing a significant achievement in multi-stakeholder coordination.
The advisory body has established three working groups addressing distinct aspects of resilience: “resilience by design,” “timely deployment and repair,” and “risk identification, monitoring and mitigation.” This structure reflects a comprehensive approach moving beyond reactive crisis management to proactive system design and threat assessment.
The body’s work builds upon historical precedent, with Minister Pakosta noting that the 1865 ITU founding addressed identical challenges of protecting undersea telegraphic cables from hostile actors. This historical continuity validates the ITU’s role whilst demonstrating that submarine cable protection represents an enduring challenge requiring institutional responses.
### Regional Cooperation Mechanisms
Lew Chuen Hong described Singapore’s leadership of an ASEAN working group developing regional guidelines and best practices for submarine cable resilience. This regional approach complements global ITU efforts whilst addressing specific geographical and political contexts within Southeast Asia.
The regional framework allows for more detailed coordination on practical matters such as repair ship positioning, emergency response protocols, and information sharing arrangements. Singapore’s experience scaling from 10 to about 28 or 29 cables today, with plans to double that to about 50 by about 2035, provides a model for other regions seeking to build resilience through redundancy and diversity.
Portugal’s approach, as described by Sandra Maximiano, involves developing national best practices that replicate the international advisory body’s multi-stakeholder approach at the domestic level. This creates nested coordination mechanisms from local to regional to global levels.
## Resilience Strategies and Technical Solutions
### Design-Based Resilience Principles
Sandra Maximiano articulated a fundamental principle that became a recurring theme: “Resilience must be designed into cable systems, so must be built into design and not improvised in crisis.” This philosophy of “resilience by design” represents a shift from reactive crisis management to proactive system architecture.
The design-based approach encompasses multiple elements: redundancy through multiple cable connections, route diversity to avoid single points of failure, predictive maintenance systems for early problem detection, protection zones around critical infrastructure, and rapid repair capacity for quick restoration. These elements must be integrated from the initial planning stages rather than added retrospectively.
Singapore’s strategy exemplifies this approach, with Lew Chuen Hong explaining how the country uses quantity to create quality and diversity. By scaling to 50+ cables by 2035, Singapore creates mesh network architecture that can withstand multiple simultaneous failures whilst avoiding strategic choke points.
### Technical Implementation Measures
The discussion revealed various technical measures for enhancing cable resilience. Sandra Maximiano described deploying armoured cables and burying them deeper in high-risk areas, whilst Athena Jun Xian detailed China Telecom’s operation of submarine repair ships and management of submarine cable landings in China.
Predictive maintenance emerged as a critical capability, with audience members asking specifically about AI-powered infrastructure for real-time monitoring and early detection. This represents a shift from reactive repair to proactive maintenance that could prevent many disruptions.
The concept of hybrid power-telecom cable systems was introduced by audience members, suggesting that combining power and telecommunications cables could provide mutual resilience benefits through guard zones and optical monitoring capabilities.
## Economic and Development Challenges
### Investment Drivers and Economic Realities
Lew Chuen Hong emphasised that economics fundamentally drives cable deployment decisions, requiring growth in digital economy to attract private sector investment in cable infrastructure. This economic reality creates particular challenges for regions with limited digital economic activity, as cable operators require sufficient traffic and revenue to justify new deployments.
The economic dimension extends to repair capabilities, with Sandra Maximiano noting that collective mechanisms are needed to support repair capacity for regions lacking resources. Small island states face particular vulnerabilities due to limited cable connections and repair capabilities.
### Capacity Building and Skills Development
The discussion highlighted significant capacity building challenges, particularly regarding workforce development. Athena Jun Xian noted the lack of submarine cable expertise among younger generations and called for industry programmes to train youth for sustainability of the sector.
Sandra Maximiano advocated for expanded academic research programmes focused on submarine cable issues, noting the current lack of dedicated research in this critical area. This academic gap limits innovation and understanding of emerging challenges.
The skills challenge extends beyond technical expertise to regulatory and policy capabilities. Audience members from smaller countries highlighted the difficulty regulators face in collecting and verifying accurate data from submarine cable companies when they lack independent monitoring capabilities.
## Regional Vulnerabilities and Specific Challenges
### Small Island States and Landlocked Countries
The discussion revealed particular vulnerabilities facing small island states and landlocked countries. Audience members from Chad highlighted how landlocked countries depend entirely on cable connections through neighbouring countries, creating dependencies that extend beyond technical infrastructure to diplomatic and economic relationships.
Route diversity challenges became apparent through observations that African traffic must be rerouted through other continents during cable cuts, creating inefficient routing patterns that affect entire regions. This geographical reality demonstrates how cable cuts in one location can have cascading effects across continents.
Questions from regulators in smaller countries highlighted how these nations often lack the resources and expertise to develop comprehensive cable cut response policies. This creates a two-tier system where larger countries with multiple cables and repair capabilities maintain connectivity whilst smaller countries face extended outages.
### Sovereignty Versus Resilience Tensions
Audience members posed fundamental questions about balancing increased resilience requirements with sovereignty concerns and affordability constraints. This tension reflects broader geopolitical trends towards digital sovereignty whilst recognising that resilience often requires international cooperation and shared infrastructure.
The sovereignty challenge extends to data transparency, with regulators needing access to cable performance data for oversight whilst companies maintaining commercial confidentiality. This creates information asymmetries that complicate effective governance and emergency response.
## Stakeholder Engagement and Multi-Stakeholder Coordination
The discussion emphasised the need for comprehensive stakeholder engagement extending beyond traditional telecommunications actors. Athena Jun Xian described education programmes targeting fishermen, shipping companies, and local communities about cable protection and legal consequences of damage.
Sandra Maximiano advocated for digital literacy programmes that include education about submarine cable importance, helping consumers understand the costs and importance of building redundancy and resilience. This public awareness component addresses the disconnect between visible internet services and invisible submarine infrastructure.
The multi-stakeholder approach requires coordination between telecommunications regulators, maritime authorities, environmental agencies, and international organisations. This complexity necessitates clear coordination mechanisms and shared understanding of roles and responsibilities.
## Emerging Threats and Security Considerations
### State-Level Threats and Hybrid Warfare
Minister Pakosta’s revelation of intentional cable cuts by Russian shuttle fleet vessels represented the most significant security development discussed. These incidents involve deliberate targeting of cables in protected zones, representing a new category of hybrid warfare that traditional industry protection measures cannot address.
The intentional threat category requires different response mechanisms compared to accidental damage. Whilst industry can address fishing and anchoring accidents through education and technical measures, state-level sabotage requires diplomatic, legal, and potentially military responses that exceed industry capabilities.
The discussion revealed the challenge of distinguishing between accidental and intentional damage, particularly when hostile actors use methods that mimic accidental incidents. This ambiguity complicates both response and deterrence strategies.
### Environmental and Regulatory Challenges
The discussion touched on environmental considerations, with audience members noting potential impacts from environmental regulations on submarine cable resilience. This highlights the intersection between environmental protection and critical infrastructure that requires careful balance.
Regulatory challenges include the need for simplified repair permitting procedures whilst maintaining environmental and security oversight. Sandra Maximiano emphasised that emergency repair situations require flexible regulatory responses that balance speed with appropriate controls.
## Solutions and Best Practices
### Redundancy and Route Diversity
The discussion consistently emphasised redundancy as the fundamental resilience strategy. Singapore’s approach of scaling to 50+ cables by 2035 exemplifies using quantity to create quality and diversity. This strategy recognises that individual cables will inevitably fail, making system-level redundancy essential.
Route diversity emerged as equally important, with speakers advocating for geographically diverse cable routes that avoid strategic choke points. This requires international coordination to ensure that multiple cables don’t follow identical paths that could be simultaneously disrupted.
### Rapid Response and Repair Capabilities
The discussion highlighted the critical importance of rapid repair capabilities, with particular attention to regions lacking adequate repair ship coverage. The need for collective mechanisms for supporting repair capacity emerged as a key solution, recognising that cable cuts anywhere affect global connectivity.
Collective mechanisms for supporting repair capacity require burden-sharing arrangements and pre-positioned resources for rapid response. This approach recognises that cable cuts affect international traffic requiring coordinated response.
### Predictive Maintenance and Monitoring
The discussion emphasised the potential for AI-powered monitoring systems to enable predictive maintenance and real-time threat detection. This represents a shift from reactive repair to proactive prevention that could significantly reduce disruption frequency and duration.
Real-time monitoring systems could provide early warning of potential failures, allowing preventive maintenance before complete cable failure. Lew Chuen Hong emphasised that “what gets seen then gets acted on,” suggesting that improved data collection and transparency could drive more effective responses.
## Key Outcomes and Future Directions
### Institutional Developments
The discussion resulted in several concrete outcomes, including Sandra Maximiano’s announcement of plans for a second summit in Lisbon. This event will build upon the momentum generated by the current discussion and provide opportunities for deeper technical and policy coordination.
The three working groups under the International Advisory Body will continue their focused work on resilience by design, timely deployment and repair, and risk identification and monitoring. These groups provide structured mechanisms for translating discussion outcomes into practical recommendations.
ASEAN guidelines for submarine cable best practices are being developed under Singapore’s leadership, providing a regional model that could be replicated in other geographical areas.
### Policy and Regulatory Developments
Sandra Maximiano mentioned that the Abuja Declaration was approved at a recent summit in Nigeria, representing a key milestone for submarine cable resilience and international cooperation.
The discussion of classifying submarine cables as critical infrastructure with specific regulatory frameworks represents an important policy development that could influence national approaches to cable protection.
## Conclusion
This comprehensive discussion on submarine cable resilience revealed both the critical importance of this infrastructure and the complex challenges involved in protecting it. The remarkable consensus among participants from diverse backgrounds and regions provides a strong foundation for continued international cooperation through the ITU’s International Advisory Body and related mechanisms.
The historical context provided by the reference to the 1865 ITU founding demonstrates that submarine cable protection represents an enduring challenge requiring institutional responses rather than ad hoc solutions. This continuity validates the ITU’s role whilst highlighting the persistent nature of threats to undersea communications infrastructure.
The emergence of intentional sabotage as a threat category represents a significant escalation that requires responses extending beyond traditional industry capabilities. The intersection between technical infrastructure protection and broader security policy creates new challenges for international cooperation and governance.
The discussion’s emphasis on “resilience by design” rather than crisis improvisation provides a constructive framework for moving forward. This philosophy, combined with the multi-stakeholder approach embodied in the International Advisory Body, offers a pathway for addressing the complex technical, economic, and political challenges involved in protecting critical submarine cable infrastructure.
The planned follow-up activities, including the second summit in Lisbon and continued working group activities, provide mechanisms for translating discussion outcomes into practical improvements in submarine cable protection. The success of these initiatives will depend on sustained commitment from all stakeholders and continued recognition of submarine cables as critical global infrastructure requiring coordinated international protection.
Session transcript
Tomas Lamanauskas: Hello. So it’s still sharp and bright and able to digest all this information. It’s only third day, by the way. It’s two more to go. So thank you very much for being here with us today and for my recently probably favorite topic, submarine cables. So I’m Tomas Lamanauskas. I’m Deputy Secretary General of RTU. And today I’ll be moderating a panel on submarine cable resilience. And we shall in a minute talk that where is a lot of activities in RTU about. But first, let me introduce me who I have here, this table, you know, as well. So we have Prof. Sandra Maximiano, who’s a chairperson ANACOM, so a regulator, a telecom regulator in Portugal. But it’s important for us is also she’s also co-chair of the International Advisory Body of Submarine Cable Resilience. And this is the body that we established November last year to really progress the work on the submarine cables. And I’ll speak to that in a little bit of a minute. So we have also Minister Lisa Lipakosta from Minister of Justice and Digital Affairs of Estonia. So again, Estonia has a strong interest in submarine cables, you know, and definitely has shown leadership in RTU in this regard. So then we have going further, you know, and geographically east, we have Luchuan Kong, CEO of IMDA Singapore. So thank you very much for joining us. And of course, Singapore is a major submarine cable hub, you know, so of course, you know, it will be very great to hear your experience, you know, how do you manage that very dense network of cables coming sometimes in a very narrow straits, you know, so indeed will be interesting to hear. And of course, we need to complete that with the private sector participation, you know, so that we have really, not only government speaking, but in the spirit of WSIS, in the spirit of this room, so that we have all the stakeholders. So Mr. Lew Chuen Hong, Managing Director from China Telecom Europe, and an Executive General Manager of China Telecom. on the Promenade-Folokom Global, which will bring to us the private sector perspective on that. And, of course, we have one more panelist, I think announced, Mr. Bosun Tijani, regrettably he is, I think, on a plane right now. So I don’t think even with all the communications in the plane’s connectivity these days, I think it’s still challenging to connect, so I apologize for that. Before we start, I think it’s always useful to show what you’re talking about, so I thank my colleague Andres for always delivering us the props. So this is a submarine cable, no? And because people sometimes when they speak about that, about the infrastructure, that basically makes sure that 99% of traffic around the world is carried, and 1.7 million kilometers, if I recall correctly. And we think, okay, this should be something thick and difficult to cut and kind of… But this is it, you know? This is actual submarine cable. This is not like a part of it. It’s not like additional casing around that. This is a submarine cable that lies under the sea, you know? And that, you know, this is the whole casing here. So think of this, and it’s only, you know, it’s a lot of kilometers, but in terms of submarine cable, this is around 500 of them around the world that ensure that our digital economy breathes, that our digital economy can function, that the blood of digital economy can flow, you know? So in every… It’s like with the human body, you know? Like every time you something cut yourself, you know, that’s not great. So today we’ll be discussing how we make sure that indeed this infrastructure remains resilient. And we’re building that in the great work that I’m pretty sure Sandra will talk to us about from International Advisory Body on Submarine Cable Resilience, where we now have 40 members plus two co-chairs leading us to the great work on delivering recommendations. So without further ado, maybe I’ll ask Sandra to kick us off exactly for your opening remarks, especially as a co-chair of our Submarine Cable Advisory Body. Thank you.
Sandra Maximiano: Thanks a lot, Thomas, and thanks a lot for… boasting this initiative and putting so much effort into it and bringing all us here together today. So as a co-host of High-Level Dialogue, Strengthening the Resilience of Telecommunication Submarine Cables, and as president of HANA.com and co-chair of the advisory body of the International Telecommunications Union, it is truly an honor to welcome you all to this session, which is part of this remarkable UISES Plus 20 High-Level event. The topic we address today aligns both with numerous WISES Action Lines and UN Sustainable Development Goals. It is crucial to discuss the resilience of submarine cables within the scope of this event. The unseen arteries carry about 99% of all international communications, including intercontinental internet traffic, enabling global communication and the development of markets, science, education, and diplomacy. These systems are also vital for underpinning critical functions related to peace, development, and emergency response. Without them, the world would fall silent with tragic consequences for social and economic development. As digital and technological innovation accelerates, it is imperative that the international community deepens its understanding of the technology security nexus, contributing meaningfully to the discussions, sharing best practices, and promoting the protection and resilience of the underwater digital infrastructure as a key element of global security. A multilateral and cooperative approach in this regard is particularly relevant. That is why Portugal is strongly committed to this agenda and stands ready to engage constructively in relevant and key multilateral fora. including as a candidate for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council for the 2027-2028 term. This commitment also extends to capacity-building efforts which are essential to ensuring that all countries can benefit from the digital transition. Promoting universal and meaningful connectivity is central to enabling access to digital markets and the opportunities brought by emerging technologies. As part of our 2030 Development Cooperation Strategy which prioritized digital transformation for inclusive and sustainable development, Portugal proudly hosted the second edition of the UN Portugal Digital Fellowship in May 2025. This initiative supported least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing states in hearsening digital innovation for inclusive growth. Last but not least, I’m proud to co-chair the International Advisory Group for Submarine Cable Resilience launched by the International Telecommunication Union in partnership with the International Cable Protection Committee. In addition, 40 outstanding personalities from both the public and private sectors across the world are part of the advisory body. This ensures a diversity of knowledge and experience, including contributions from countries ranging from large economies to small island states. The advisory body provides a unique global platform of collaboration, promotes open conversations and builds trust for the benefit of global community. And I will give you some further more details of our work later on during our discussion.
Tomas Lamanauskas: Great, great, great. Thank you very much, Sandra. Thank you very much, your great leadership for this work. You know, we have an amazing international, we have an amazing first summit international.
Liisa Ly Pakosta: Thank you so much, and thank you for organizing this discussion here. So I see from the audience also that this is really a burning topic for many. This is interesting to think that 1865, the anniversary we are celebrating now, the topic was exactly the same, how to protect the undersea telegraphic cables. Because when you have connections between the countries and when you connect countries with a cable, which is undersea, there always comes somebody who is a bad guy and wants to cut down this cable. So the international cooperation that we are now having here is mentally going back to the birth of ITU and to the year 1865 when absolutely the same questions were addressed. And where it was decided that this is an organization to protect the member countries and the undersea cables in the way that is needed for the economy, for the safety of people and for the safe exchange of information. So Estonia very strongly believes in a rule-based world. We believe that a multi-stakeholder approach that is generally here, very importantly here, should lead us all together. to rules that we all obey for the good of our people. And we really see that ITU and also the IMO should very much now turn attention to the actual plan, maybe also regulations, maybe exchanging best practices, maybe there is some standards that need to be updated, maybe there is something that, for example, IMO should do with shadow fleet flags, etc. So there is a bunch of problems that we have to solve now, 160 years later, again, because we see that this is really an issue that is emerging throughout the world, that there are some countries that actually work actively to cut down the cables that are connecting other countries. And this is a real global issue, meaningful to gather and find good solutions for. So we very much believe that there is a lot of opportunities that ITU, together with IMO, should implement. We should study these opportunities together and find good solutions. This is the reason why we have gathered here. Thank you so much.
Tomas Lamanauskas: Thank you very much. Thank you very much. And a great call for action, you know, so like that, you know, so it’s something definitely to take away from this. And indeed, you are talking about submarine cables. So actually, they were telegraph cables were deployed just before ITU was established, you know, so 1850, the first cable, you know, like, and then, you know, and actually the first transatlantic 58. So we’ve just a few years before ITU was established, and we’re still working on 65 plus plus, you know, years later, you know, seem to be really talking about it. So now turning to Singapore, you know, and indeed, you know, wanted to hear from Singapore, an example, you know, as, you know, Singapore is really a hub of submarine cables. I think the homework that colleagues did says around 30 submarine cables are coming to Singapore. Indeed, in this context, how do you keep Singapore both resilient and available in terms of submarine cable resilience? How do you keep deploying the cables? What are the challenges you are facing in that? And what are the challenging opportunities you see in attracting further investments in submarine cable economy?
Lew Chuen Hong: Thank you so much, Tomas, and again, great to see everybody here. Maybe I’ll just share thoughts along two big buckets. The first, taking a step back, Singapore. Singapore, we are a very small and open economy in the physical world. We’re highly dependent on external trade. And similarly, we’re a very small and open economy. Sandra just now talked about small island states. Singapore is a small island state. Those of you who have been to Singapore, we’re about 40 kilometres breadth and 30 kilometres width, and that’s about as small as it gets. And therefore, we’re also a very small digital economy. So I think at the very core of it, digital economy today accounts for about 18% of our GDP. So if you look in your wallet, about one in every $5, give or take, has some component as far as digital. So for us, from that perspective, having a hub of submarine cables is a no-brainer. It’s at the core foundation of that openness to the rest of the world. And as Sandra just now said, the reason why it’s submarine cables is because there is no real alternative. It’s a law of physics. The ability for optics and fibre to carry that sheer volume cannot be duplicated through radio frequencies and satellites. It’s just fundamentally not possible. And therefore, because of both of these two pillars, the fact that it is critical for the economy, and at the same time that there’s no real alternative, I think that’s why it’s extremely important. And I’m very glad that the ITU has convened this IAB to place some attention on subcables. I always like to say, what is often unseen then it’s often not paid attention to. And some re-cables do suffer a little bit about that, just because it’s buried. Most people think when you enter the internet, it’s from your mobile phone and it’s sort of through some airwaves, but really the core backbone is that little fibre that happens. So I think as far as we’re concerned, that is the reason. And just to give you a sense of magnitude, over the past 15 years, we’ve grown from about 10 to about 28 or 29 today. And we intend to continue to double that to about 50 by about 2035. So if the world has about 500, about 10% will actually come through Singapore directly. And I think within here, and something to consider is that in quantity, there is quality in and of itself, not just because of the sheer capacity, but also the diversity and that resilience and forts should any one of these be cut for any reason. But maybe then very quickly on the second half, how do you think about resilience? First, it starts at home. And the way we think about it is that you need to design it well, because it’s not just about the cable, it’s about the armouring, it’s about the channels, the burying. And for us, I think we pay a lot of attention to operational cooperation for maritime port authority, to just make sure that there is surveillance and just to make sure that if there are any cuts, the repairs happen very quickly. But we also think about it as concentric rings, because it’s multi layers of defence. So by nature, submarine cables are transboundary. So therefore working very closely with ASEAN, we lead the ASEAN or Association of Southeast Asian Nations working group as far as submarine cables are concerned. We actually have guidelines that aim to set out best practices and we’re upgrading these guidelines as we speak, in Singapore’s position as chair of the ASEAN working group. And then again, very happy to be part of the IAB, where we hope to also bring that from a cross-regional perspective, so that these are enhanced and consistent across many different parts of the world. Then maybe the last bit is, I think, working with the industry is extremely key. The ICPC held their plenary in Singapore last year. And having big tech companies, as well as cable-laying companies, as well as telecoms be part of this, because very often they have a huge weight as far as convincing other governments are concerned that this is actually a critical investment to be made. And actually working very closely with our tech, as well as telecom partners, we also do a lot of capacity building as far as regional countries are concerned. So I think through sort of these different layers, I think these are worth thinking about if we’re really after overall resilience as a submarine cable. And I guess to the extent that a small country like Singapore can help shape those global rules and norms, I think it’s very, very important for the broader common good.
Tomas Lamanauskas: Thank you. Thank you very much. You make it sound very easy, you know, but like you’re going from 10 to 30 to 50, you know, and still finding place in the seabed, you know, and the port is probably not that easy indeed, you know, but great to hear about collaboration, you know, great to hear about industry engagement and indeed regional approaches. And I think these are important takeaways. And thank you very much for your strong input into the submarine cable resilience advisory body. Indeed. And, you know, as you talk to industry, you know, you spoke about industry. Indeed, you know, International Cable Protection Committee is also, you know, a very strong partner there. And I think the whole idea to kick, to set out on submarine cable resilience was with this understanding, we need everyone around the table who knows what they’re talking about, you know, so we need industry, we need those people in the companies that actually deploy and repair every day. And we, of course, need the governments who can enable, could allow things to happen as well. And I think this is really so far proving a very successful model, you know, we’ll see, of course, in the result. But now also talking about industry, now I’ll turn to Athena, you know, so indeed, you know, in China Telecom also, we have a representative from China Telecom in the advisory body as well. So, but from your perspective now, like to understand better from industry, so what do you see as the biggest causes of submarine cable disruptions? and then how do you do as a company to make sure that there are fewer of them or they repair faster? All right.
Athena Jun Xian: Thank you, Tomas. Thank you for your questions. Actually, China Telecom has been committed to the submarine cable accessibility and resilience for a long time. As a pioneer, we already have six submarine repair ships and two spare parts deports, and also we already laid more than 70,000 kilometers submarine cables as well. And also our submarine cable company has been active in the rotational duty in Yokohama maintenance zone for a long time, and we actually just work very hard to, how to say, to ensure the submarine cable resilience. According to China Telecom’s data, the most common cause of submarine cable damage is anchoring or fishing activities, which can accidentally or intentionally damage the cables. I think this aligns with the findings of ICPC as well. Natural disasters like earthquakes or undersea landslides are also key causes, but human activities remain the main cause of the damage. As a major submarine cable landing operator in China, we are managing more than 70 percent of submarine cable landing, and also the protections in China maritime areas. So we just tried – just dedicated to preventing such activities from damaging submarine cables, and has seen some success with the number of submarine cable force along Circuit breaker violation prevention and interpersonal viewpoints collection. Thank you so much. Improves the ability to detect and address the risks. And also we run a lot of programs to educate the fishermen, shipping companies, and also local communities about protecting submarine cables and also the legal consequences of the damage. And we also collaborate very closely with the maritime and port authorities to regulate vessel activity, ensure proper anchoring zones, and we check the fishing patterns around cable routes. Of course, when cable faults happened, we just deployed some very detailed, quick response plans to make sure everybody, every role, every team to coordinate together. I think that’s what we did a lot to make sure the resilience of the submarine cables.
Tomas Lamanauskas: Thank you very much. It’s super comprehensive. So I think we definitely need to make sure this lands in our best practice guidelines when the submarine cable advisory body is developing them in all these different areas that could be covered. But I think one thing is really stands out, this coordination between the different communities. I think Minister spoke about that, we spoke about RMO, about the fishing, about the port authority, about others. So we really need to bring those stakeholders together. They’re not always our traditional stakeholders. So that’s why we sometimes think in the beginning struggle, but we really now seeing the very good response also from other parts of the United Nations and other parts of the industry that when we see when we’re trying to engage that as well, because that’s the only way it can happen if we coordinate well. So now with this, I’ll come back to Sandra now. So, and indeed, from our perspective now, from ANACOM perspective and your personal perspective, which measures and best practices have you seen the most useful ones, the most effective ones? I know Portugal has a very strong coordination mechanisms, long-standing practices, you know, you know, also the, a lot of cables coming in, so plenty of experience to draw upon. So what, what we should do?
Sandra Maximiano: So as we actually just listen here, many accidents happen by human cause and some natural causes as well. And as we know, these incidents are inevitable. So what really matters is preparation and rapid response. So resilience must be designed into cable systems, so must be built into design and not improvised in crisis. And this is our lemma, and I think we should always have that in mind. So I would say that, I’ll point out really five main ways. So building redundancy, route diversity, predictive maintenance, protection zones, and rapid repair capacity. We should always be aware of these points. And I would say, first, the planning and implementation of undersea cable networks should promote this redundancy as a crucial strategy for enhancing security and resilience to ensure continuity of service in case of disruptions. And this will probably involve establishing multiple geographically diverse cable routes and mesh network architecture, deploying alternative routes, including satellite backups and terrestrial connections whenever possible, which we know that is not always possible, but avoiding also strategic choke points to minimize congestion and high risk areas, which are more susceptible to sabotage or accidents, and deploying armored cables and burying cables deeper, as it was mentioned here, in high-risk areas. So these are all, I would say, good, very important measures to build these. as well. Another point that is very relevant, is that we need collective mechanisms to support repair capacity, especially for regions and countries that lack the resources to respond on their own. This is particularly important for island states and remote regions. I would say that it’s in all our interests, even if we are a big country, it is not the case of Portugal, by the way. But it’s in all our interests that we all, as different countries, have the means to respond to incidents. Because we all suffer from any cuts in the submarine cables. So I think in that sense, if we think, incentives are more aligned than we actually think that sometimes they are. So we should be aware of that. And so this cooperation with small island states and small countries is really needed. And it’s not only needed for these countries, but it’s for the benefit of all. It’s also particularly important, the licensing and permitting procedures for repairs that must be simplified and more flexible, which is something that we are also working in our country as well, and I think discussions in that direction. Implementing repair vessels and joint capacity must be promoted as well, and we cannot postpone these priorities. Equally important is having clear plans for incident response, settings to And by being more aware of that, that this implies a cost, we are more able to also support that cost. So I think it’s really important to extend this sort of partnership to consumers’ organizations as well. Over the past year, ENACOM has deepened our partnerships, recognizing that the challenge is ensuring these diverse players speak the same language and align their efforts to heart our common goals. Firstly, as mentioned in my initial remarks, I am very, very proud to co-chair the International Advisory Group for Submarine Cable Resilience, which provides a unique global platform for collaboration. I think the work of this international advisory body must give special attention to regions, countries and remote islands, as I said, where economic incentives for prompt response are lower. And the advisory body has been making decisive progress. In particular, as Tomas mentioned before, our summit in 2025, so this year held in Abuja, Nigeria, the body approved the Abuja Declaration, marking a key milestone for submarine cable resilience and paving the way for greater international cooperation. Secondly, the body established clear priorities for 2025-2026 and decided to form three thematic working groups responsible for delivering concrete outcomes. So let me say that these groups will address submarine cable resilience from multiple complementary perspectives. By combining this approach, we aim to develop a comprehensive strategy to enhance resilience. One of the working groups will focus on resilience by design. As I mentioned, it’s extremely important to have this resilience by design, examining the importance of ensuring service continuity through redundant and diverse communication routes. The second working group will focus on timely deployment and repair of submarine cable systems, exploring how regulatory measures can expedite this process. And the third working group will be dedicated to risk identification, monitoring and mitigation. Within this framework, we’ll assess the application of new technologies and monitoring systems. And like the advisory body itself, the supporting working groups are composed of experts from different regions and stakeholders, so extremely diverse. The Advisory Board is really committed with the work of the three Working Groups. We are represented in all the three Working Groups, putting our effort and also putting our compromise into this mission. So given the progress made so far, I’m really confident that the Advisory Body will remain committed to ensuring that submarine cables are safe and resilient, and it will continue to support global connectivity and deliver high-quality outputs, grounding technical merit and best practices. So basically, this is about our commitment with the Advisory Body, but at the European level, through BEREC, the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications, and in collaboration with the European Commission, we are also taking this mission as well. We are also active on European Union Agents for Cybersecurity. So for us, international cooperation is of crucial importance, and we are delighted to know that industry also sees Portugal as a reliable and relevant partner as well. So preparing the future is very important, it’s not a task that should be done alone, and it’s a shared responsibility among regulators, as I said, industry, academia, and international communities. So I’m very pleased that all of these stakeholders are here today, and keep working together. Thanks.
Tomas Lamanauskas: So thank you very much, Sandra, it was a very comprehensive review, and I think for me what is super important, your highlight about this global solidarity and global issue, looking at the submarine cable infrastructure as a global infrastructure, because I think for a while, at least from the government’s perspective, and myself being in the regulator’s seat quite a bit, we looked at that from our own national perspective, how we protect it for ourselves. With actually submarine cable going through your territorial waters, and when it’s cut, a lot of other people can be impacted, you know, we’ve seen that when it happens in the Red Sea, or Mediterranean, and on. how you know 30% sometimes of the global traffic between Europe and Asia gets really impacted. And so it’s not only our own issue. You know, it’s an issue that everyone needs to deal with. And the same with the repair capabilities, you know, both the remote islands, but even though need to look to remote islands. I think the summit showed us that even for Africa, you know, I think there was number like, scary number like one ship that services the whole Africa, you know, so one cable repair ship. And that of course, that needs to be summoned, you know, that it really takes time just for the ship to come to the place and deliver. And of course, every day that ship goes there is always the cost that increases repair capability as well. So indeed, so now in a minute, I’ll actually open the floor. So start thinking of questions and being active on this. But before I do that, just offering ability for my panelists to react and we’ll start first with the minister.
Liisa Ly Pakosta: Thank you so much. I was thrilled to hear the fantastic work that has already been done. There is one aspect I would like to add. We have very much talked here about unintentional cable cuts. But at the same time, the issue that we are facing in Estonia, Estonia is a fully digital state. All the hospital services, the lives of the people depend on the internet service availability. All the government databases are interconnected and all the government services are based on internet. And now we have seen throughout two last years, which didn’t happen throughout the 30 years we have had our digital society. But now throughout the two last years, we have seen very many intentional cable cuts by the Russian shuttle fleet. So dropping an anchor and then pulling it through the cables in the zones that are marked as a protected zones. And we have fulfilled all the other recommendations that are here. So one of the issues we have to have the protection regulations and good.
Tomas Lamanauskas: Thank you very much, broadening our perspective to, I mean, even more deeper things, you know, not, of course, the challenges that those things might need, like even, you know, it could even be above what we call a 2-pay grade, you know, like in terms of, to use a very colloquial term, but indeed this is a very complicated matter indeed. So any other panelists would like to react to anything you’ve heard, you know, so far, so, no? If not, please.
Lew Chuen Hong: Well I think maybe one perspective that I’ll add, I think building off Sandra’s comments is transparency around the data around submarine cables is probably going to be key. What gets seen then gets acted on, and this would cover both intentional as well as unintentional. Some data that should worry us is that the number of submarine cables are going to go up, and by definition, perito, it means the number of absolute cable cuts is going to go up. And based on current design, the ICPC data is that in excess of 85% it’s actually human cost, and therefore I think the ambition to watch the data must be that, despite the increasing number, we should actually aim to reduce the absolute number of cable cuts. And actually we can put a number on it, and we can actually get transparency around it. And you know, one of ITU’s greatest strengths, historically, has been to get data transparency around everything from connectivity to coverage, and so on and so forth. So I think this is one of those key elements that I thought is worth considering, and I think is worth thinking about as we put that sort of into work group one, because that provides a basis for how do you drive towards…
Athena Jun Xian: Actually, as a member in the institute, we all see that submarine cable is a very small circle. And you can see in the submarine events always the familiar faces and also the old faces. So I think from the government point of view, we should establish more programs to train the youth to jump into the submarine cable area to make it all sustainability. I think that’s all my point. Thank you.
Tomas Lamanauskas: Yes, please.
Sandra Maximiano: Sorry, just a quick point to that. I think this is extremely important when I mention like more consumers organizations and so much. But in academia, as I’ve been realizing that if you look about research programs that are really focused on submarine cable research and into these problems are really, really few. So I think we should bring more.
Audience: The previous universal exhibition in 98 it was organised in Portugal and the topic it was about oceans and there are many publications, many films, many documentaries on that, Oceanograph Museum, there is a museum? Yes, there is and it may be the only one in that planet. It’s located in Monaco, yes, and last June the conference on oceans in this city. and here also they have important data. But what I want to share, yes, I want to raise a question. Maybe I have my own answer to my question, Tomas. But my answer could be elaborated. Because we are in dialogue and it is high-level dialogue. And shrinking the resilience. Yes, how we can shrink the resilience? By plastic. Because international negotiation on plastic, we are at the end of the step. We negotiate since a while. I think, yes, since the beginning, also in the same time more like with this process started. And the international legal treaty on plastic will be adopted soon. And last meeting it was also in Asia. But we can also shrink resilience on submarine and carbon by plastic. Because negotiation, the current international negotiation on plastic trading, various type, we can, yes, improve on that. And this is a kind of reflection. Great.
Tomas Lamanauskas: Thank you very much. Different areas, indeed. So I’ll take a few questions. Then we’ll reflect everything at the end just to give time. So first lady here. I think, Andres, you have a microphone here? Does it work?
Audience: Yeah, OK. Yes. Three things. First, I was in this conference on the ocean. And I was in the rooms of all the ministers of the planet and the first minister. And regarding plastic, there are a lot still to be done. And I would say industrial should be more invited in. Thank you for all the panelists. It was very interesting. I wanted just to add for you a comment about the consumer organization who should react. They can’t do themselves something. So, react means that they have the information from the government, from the medias, and then they have a floor to express themselves, which means by petitions or by organization, and there are different means of expressing. But they can’t do otherwise than putting a pressure, let’s put it like that. I have also a question, very fast question. I was in Estonia one month ago, invited by your government because I’m part of the Intergovernmental Baltic Sea Organization. And thank you very much to be here and to speak to the stakeholders. It’s very important that ministers are doing also this exchange. Just one question. You’ve seen the Russian minister. Did you have a word about that? You don’t have to answer, but it’s a question.
Tomas Lamanauskas: All the responses will be at the end, okay? So, because we want to give, because otherwise we’ll have a bit of a… Okay, so thank you. Could you introduce yourself just very quickly because of the time? Could you introduce yourself?
Audience: Yes, I’m Sabine Jones, part of the European government and also international expert. Thank you, thank you Sabine. First, I think Nisa was here from Samoa, and then I think… Thank you very much, Tomas, and your panel. Very exciting panel, excellent, lots to learn. My name is Nisa Purcell. I’m the regulator from Samoa. We do have a submarine cable, and I’ve learned myself. I’ve taught myself about submarine cable, and these are the main issues, and I just need to know what can the regulator do to ensure that we have a policy or something like that to prepare the country and the submarine cable on issues like the cable is cut, what will be the next. I have something in mind, but I just need an example of the best practice. And then, secondly, is about data and also the tariff. So how can I collect the data? How can I make sure that the data, the submarine cable company that’s giving me is correct? I don’t have anything to monitor. Thank you very much.
Tomas Lamanauskas: Thank you very much. I think someone was there and probably will take – I’ll disappoint some people, I’m sure, because I’ll take one and then two more questions, so it’ll be a lottery.
Audience: Thank you very much. My name is Katrin Stuber. I work for GEANT. We represent the science innovation research organizations in Europe. GEANT interconnects 43 national research and education networks in Europe. FCCN is our partner in Portugal, and we connect 110 research and education networks worldwide. We are implementing partner of the European Union’s Global Gateway Project, such as BELA, the MEDUSA program, and the Blue Raman program, which goes to India. We are a not-for-profit in this environment and therefore one more element here that we can bring to the table. We protect our submarine cable systems through backup with our partners globally because we are in a not-for-profit environment, we are not competing. We have around the world global protection. But what we also see in the Baltic Sea specifically is that we used to have just two redundant resilience links between our Baltic countries and now we need to have three. So rather than looking for other measures, we’re just increasing the amount of cable systems that we’re actually having in the regions. Across the transatlantic, we have now eight cable systems running because one of the things we’re running experiments for CERN, all science globally runs on our network. We cannot afford any cuts and therefore the need for resilience is absolutely necessary. But it makes running backbones much more expensive, it makes science and cooperation more expensive. And here’s my question. How do we deal with the need for increased resilience across the globe in our cable systems in a world where everybody keeps talking sovereignty? And cable systems need to be sovereign. How do I increase resilience, ensuring that the internet remains affordable? Thank you.
Tomas Lamanauskas: Thank you. One more here, and then after that I’ll take one more question here, and then I’ll take after that one more question, and then I’ll give you a solution if you want to have more discussion later on.
Audience: Okay, thank you so much. My name is Abdi Jilir. I’m coming from Chad. I represent civil society here, so I need to thank the professor here for putting in place also the issues of consumer is very important to have access to data. And as I’m coming from Chad, it’s land countries, we don’t have access to the sea. So the only cable that we have is from China. Cameroon, but always since that is one week, we don’t have internet one day in Chad. So what is the other alternative? We know that people have a lot of cable, but we don’t have only one. When it’s cut, the country is down. So what’s your advice about users, how we can process going to the cable submarine to have the data, is it real data, or going to the regulatory? Thank you so much.
Tomas Lamanauskas: I’ll give you the choice of the last 20 minutes. OK. Sorry, we’ll move. OK, like I said, I think someone was there. Yeah, please. All right. So good evening.
Audience: My name is Isaac Boateng. I’m the head of standardization for the African Telecommunication Union. Interesting discussions here, but I’m just thinking out loud, because from where we sit, what we have also seen is the issues that is actually related to the fiber or submarine cable disruption as a result of lack of strategies, just as has been alluded by a lot of people. And also, clearly, some real-time detection control mechanisms that are actually deployed on the links or even from the design stage. We are discussing about the issue of AI, so I’m trying to think aloud. What can we maybe at the design stage or even at the implementation stage, can there be a situation where we can deploy an AI-powered infrastructure to monitor these links, I mean, for prediction ahead of time? And also, the issue about the route diversity. I think it’s something that we have to look at it very well, because where we sit, again, if you look at the route from Africa, some part of Africa, traffic will have to be re-routed all the way to Portugal, to US, before it’s come back. When there’s a cut somewhere, the whole place is actually affected. So I’m thinking that Lady Anacom, you talked about the route diversity and the fact that we have to do something about it. What is your working group, what are you doing about this from the perspective of the African challenges that we do have? Thank you.
Tomas Lamanauskas: Thank you. I’ll give one gentleman, sorry, 30 seconds, but before that, for the panelists to know what is waiting for them.
Audience: Dear high-level panelists for your insightful speech, my name Volodymyr Matyushko. I am EU digital and green transition expert. What high-level panelists’ opinion about built submarine hybrid power telecom cable system regarding resilience. As a rule, a power cable have guard zones that increase the resilience of data transition. The mutual resilience benefit is digital technology allows status monitoring of hybrid cable via optical cable. Thank you for your answer.
Tomas Lamanauskas: Thank you very much. And now, actually, the solution is the plug here. So, actually, we’ll have a second National Submarine Cable Resilience Summit early next year. I mean, I’m not sure. I’m looking at Sandra, I’m not sure I can disclose the location yet, you know, like location, I can’t know. So, probably, yeah. So, we’re working to have that in one place that the gentleman mentioned in Lisbon. So, I think, and everyone who wants to be on our mailing list, you know, to get all the news, this gentleman here called Andres, you know, who is now standing, is the one to talk to, give you a business card, he’ll put you on the mailing list, and they’ll be engaged in that. And then, hopefully, we’ll have the not one-hour conversation, but we’ll have at least two-day conversation on submarine cables then later on. So, now, with that, and I warned you, it’s like one minute, you know. So, now, to simplify that, we’ll start with the minister, and we’ll go like that. Okay, so, minister first.
Liisa Ly Pakosta: Thank you. The answer about negotiations with Russia, we have had a lot, starting from asking them to draw back their aggression forces from Ukraine up to the massive GPS interferences that we have in Estonia. Estonia has eight cables, so the answer is to support the private sector to, I think we have here the general view, so private sector is able to, when there is low bureaucracy, when there is openness for investments, then there is a lot of interest to build submarine cables, because this is the future, as our Singapore colleague very many times has pointed out, it is a growing business.
Athena Jun Xian: From my point of view, actually I think the regulators should do more. From the industry point of view, I think during the last maybe 30 years, industries make more efforts than the regulators or than the government. But I’m really happy to see more governments set up or establish some agencies or special funds or coordinations for the submarine cable resilience. So I think this is very important. And also I think there’s a lot of collaboration between the systems or between carriers. I think now this is really, really good to make everything.
Lew Chuen Hong: I thought these are really wonderful questions, and it’s probably not possible to cover every single one. But I’m maybe going to just cover one area, and it is one work called economics. And it covers everything from whether it is going to be deployed in countries that have less cables, and therefore may have only one or two, all the way to the issue of what is it about sovereign cables. The majority of cables actually are run by consortias, and a lot of these consortias are actually private sector companies. And therefore that continues and that is the vast majority. And therefore when you think about how to both build your resilience, your capacity, as well as how do you have a boardwalk as far as sovereignty is concerned, it boils down fundamentally to economics. In Singapore, we’re a little bit unique in that I’m not actually just a regulator. As the Infocomm and Media Development Authority, I actually have a huge role, everything from the front end, as far as driving AI adoption is concerned, building out data centres, bringing in GPUs, digitalisation of companies, bringing in big tech, growing start-ups. So my encouragement would actually be that. How do you grow that part of the house? For us, we’re unique in that sort of both the regulatory and the economic promotion is under one hat. But I think in your own jurisdictions, how do you bring that up? Because then that ultimately is the driver for why somebody or some company will want to invest. And that brings you both the diversity as well as capacity that’s required. And I think that ultimately is at the core. Why do you want a cable in the first place? It is to drive that digital economy and to drive that digital society. Thank you.
Sandra Maximiano: There’s lots of interesting questions, but let me just talk in the perspective of a regulator. and thinking about what’s happening in Portugal. So I think we should all, and we are all, let’s say, different countries and different organizations, regulators with different competencies as well. But we should try to replicate what this advisory body does at the national level. And this is a big challenge, because then it means that we have to bring to the same table different stakeholders, different organizations. And in Portugal, we do that. We try to work with security entities or the Navy, of course. And so we are trying to replicate these practices and write a booklet of the best practices and what we should do to Portugal. So that should be done for each country. And also, I must say, when I was talking about these consumer organizations, I was more thinking about, when we talk about digital literacy, we should also include in this digital literacy the importance of submarine cables. Because then we are all aware of the costs of building this redundancy and resilience. And that, I think, is an important point. And at last, just not forgetting, I think it’s extremely, extremely important to classify submarine cables as critical infrastructure. And that is also one of our main goals in Portugal as well. And as I said, defining clear priorities within each cable, but defining submarine cables as critical infrastructure. And then for this critical infrastructure, have a specific regulatory framework. And that’s what we should work. But the definition of a critical infrastructure is very important.
Tomas Lamanauskas: So thank you very much, Sandra. So indeed, a great discussion here, amazing. Thank you very much, it just shows that it’s really an amazing topic for all of us to engage in, on which we all depend. So again, a reminder is, you know, give your card to undress, sorry, you know, so, and then if you need to be connected, you know, be ready for the next year’s summit and be engaged in our activities in the meantime, and let’s build this digital resilient infrastructure together. So a big hand of applause to the panelists, and to all of you. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Sandra Maximiano
Speech speed
132 words per minute
Speech length
1785 words
Speech time
806 seconds
Submarine cables carry 99% of international communications and are critical digital infrastructure
Explanation
Sandra Maximiano emphasized that submarine cables are the unseen arteries that carry about 99% of all international communications, including intercontinental internet traffic. These systems enable global communication and development of markets, science, education, and diplomacy, and are vital for critical functions related to peace, development, and emergency response.
Evidence
99% of all international communications including intercontinental internet traffic flows through submarine cables
Major discussion point
Submarine Cable Infrastructure Importance and Vulnerability
Topics
Infrastructure | Cybersecurity
Agreed with
– Tomas Lamanauskas
– Lew Chuen Hong
– Liisa Ly Pakosta
Agreed on
Submarine cables are critical infrastructure carrying 99% of global communications
Resilience must be designed into cable systems through redundancy, route diversity, predictive maintenance, protection zones, and rapid repair capacity
Explanation
Sandra argued that resilience must be built into design and not improvised in crisis, identifying five main strategies. She emphasized that preparation and rapid response are crucial since incidents are inevitable, and that resilience should be a fundamental design principle.
Evidence
Five specific strategies: building redundancy, route diversity, predictive maintenance, protection zones, and rapid repair capacity
Major discussion point
Resilience Strategies and Best Practices
Topics
Infrastructure | Cybersecurity
Agreed with
– Lew Chuen Hong
Agreed on
Resilience requires redundancy and diverse routing strategies
ITU’s International Advisory Body on Submarine Cable Resilience provides a global platform with 40 members from public and private sectors
Explanation
Sandra highlighted her role as co-chair of this advisory body launched by ITU in partnership with the International Cable Protection Committee. The body ensures diversity of knowledge and experience from countries ranging from large economies to small island states, providing a unique global collaboration platform.
Evidence
40 outstanding personalities from both public and private sectors across the world, including contributions from large economies to small island states
Major discussion point
International Cooperation and Governance
Topics
Infrastructure | Development
Agreed with
– Liisa Ly Pakosta
– Lew Chuen Hong
Agreed on
Multi-stakeholder international cooperation is essential for submarine cable resilience
Building multiple geographically diverse cable routes and mesh network architecture while avoiding strategic choke points
Explanation
Sandra explained that planning and implementation should promote redundancy as a crucial strategy for enhancing security and resilience. This involves establishing multiple geographically diverse routes and avoiding high-risk areas more susceptible to sabotage or accidents.
Evidence
Establishing multiple geographically diverse cable routes, mesh network architecture, deploying alternative routes including satellite backups, avoiding strategic choke points
Major discussion point
Resilience Strategies and Best Practices
Topics
Infrastructure | Cybersecurity
Agreed with
– Lew Chuen Hong
Agreed on
Resilience requires redundancy and diverse routing strategies
Deploying armored cables and burying them deeper in high-risk areas
Explanation
Sandra recommended deploying armored cables and burying cables deeper in high-risk areas as part of building redundancy strategies. This physical protection measure helps minimize risks in areas more susceptible to sabotage or accidents.
Evidence
Deploying armored cables and burying cables deeper in high-risk areas to minimize congestion and risks
Major discussion point
Resilience Strategies and Best Practices
Topics
Infrastructure | Cybersecurity
Collective mechanisms needed to support repair capacity, especially for regions lacking resources like small island states
Explanation
Sandra emphasized that collective mechanisms are needed to support repair capacity, particularly for regions and countries that lack resources to respond on their own. She argued it’s in everyone’s interest that all countries have means to respond to incidents since everyone suffers from cable cuts.
Evidence
Particularly important for island states and remote regions; incentives are more aligned than sometimes thought
Major discussion point
Industry Response and Repair Capabilities
Topics
Infrastructure | Development
Three working groups focus on resilience by design, timely deployment/repair, and risk identification/monitoring
Explanation
Sandra described how the advisory body established three thematic working groups to deliver concrete outcomes from multiple complementary perspectives. These groups address different aspects of submarine cable resilience to develop a comprehensive strategy.
Evidence
Working group 1: resilience by design; Working group 2: timely deployment and repair; Working group 3: risk identification, monitoring and mitigation with new technologies
Major discussion point
International Cooperation and Governance
Topics
Infrastructure | Development
Licensing and permitting procedures for repairs must be simplified and more flexible
Explanation
Sandra argued that licensing and permitting procedures for repairs must be simplified and made more flexible, which is something Portugal is working on. This is part of ensuring rapid response capabilities when incidents occur.
Evidence
Portugal is working on this and having discussions in that direction
Major discussion point
Regulatory and Policy Framework
Topics
Legal and regulatory | Infrastructure
Disagreed with
– Athena Jun Xian
– Liisa Ly Pakosta
Disagreed on
Role and responsibility balance between government and industry in submarine cable protection
Submarine cables should be classified as critical infrastructure with specific regulatory frameworks
Explanation
Sandra emphasized the importance of classifying submarine cables as critical infrastructure, which is one of Portugal’s main goals. She argued that once classified as critical infrastructure, there should be a specific regulatory framework developed for this infrastructure.
Evidence
This is one of Portugal’s main goals; defining clear priorities within each cable system
Major discussion point
Regulatory and Policy Framework
Topics
Legal and regulatory | Infrastructure
National coordination mechanisms should replicate international advisory body approach with diverse stakeholders
Explanation
Sandra recommended that countries should replicate what the advisory body does at the national level, bringing different stakeholders and organizations to the same table. In Portugal, they work with security entities and the Navy to develop best practices.
Evidence
Portugal works with security entities and the Navy, writing a booklet of best practices
Major discussion point
Regulatory and Policy Framework
Topics
Legal and regulatory | Infrastructure
Digital literacy programs should include education about submarine cable importance to build public awareness of costs and resilience needs
Explanation
Sandra argued that digital literacy should include education about the importance of submarine cables so that everyone becomes aware of the costs of building redundancy and resilience. This public awareness is important for supporting the investments needed for cable infrastructure.
Evidence
When people are more aware of costs, they are more able to support those costs
Major discussion point
Regulatory and Policy Framework
Topics
Sociocultural | Development
Tomas Lamanauskas
Speech speed
188 words per minute
Speech length
2329 words
Speech time
742 seconds
Physical cables are surprisingly thin and vulnerable, with only 500 cables globally supporting the digital economy
Explanation
Tomas demonstrated the physical vulnerability of submarine cables by showing an actual cable sample, emphasizing how thin and seemingly fragile this critical infrastructure is. He highlighted that only around 500 cables globally ensure that the digital economy can function, comparing cable cuts to injuries in the human body.
Evidence
Showed actual submarine cable sample; 1.7 million kilometers of cables; around 500 cables globally
Major discussion point
Submarine Cable Infrastructure Importance and Vulnerability
Topics
Infrastructure | Cybersecurity
Agreed with
– Sandra Maximiano
– Lew Chuen Hong
– Liisa Ly Pakosta
Agreed on
Submarine cables are critical infrastructure carrying 99% of global communications
Lew Chuen Hong
Speech speed
179 words per minute
Speech length
1329 words
Speech time
445 seconds
Digital economy accounts for 18% of Singapore’s GDP, making submarine cables foundational infrastructure
Explanation
Lew Chuen Hong explained that Singapore’s digital economy represents about 18% of GDP, meaning about one in every $5 has some digital component. As a small and open economy highly dependent on external trade, submarine cables are foundational to Singapore’s economic model and there is no real alternative due to the laws of physics.
Evidence
Digital economy accounts for 18% of Singapore’s GDP; about one in every $5 has digital component; Singapore is 40km breadth and 30km width
Major discussion point
Submarine Cable Infrastructure Importance and Vulnerability
Topics
Economic | Infrastructure
Agreed with
– Sandra Maximiano
– Tomas Lamanauskas
– Liisa Ly Pakosta
Agreed on
Submarine cables are critical infrastructure carrying 99% of global communications
Singapore has grown from 10 to 29 cables and plans to reach 50 by 2035, using quantity to create quality and diversity
Explanation
Lew Chuen Hong described Singapore’s strategic approach to submarine cable infrastructure, growing from 10 cables to 28-29 currently with plans to double to 50 by 2035. He emphasized that in quantity there is quality, providing not just capacity but also diversity and resilience should any cable be cut.
Evidence
Grown from 10 to 28-29 cables over 15 years; plan to reach 50 by 2035; if world has 500 cables, 10% will come through Singapore
Major discussion point
Resilience Strategies and Best Practices
Topics
Infrastructure | Economic
Agreed with
– Sandra Maximiano
Agreed on
Resilience requires redundancy and diverse routing strategies
ASEAN working group led by Singapore develops guidelines and best practices for regional submarine cable resilience
Explanation
Lew Chuen Hong explained Singapore’s leadership role in the ASEAN working group for submarine cables, where they are developing and upgrading guidelines that set out best practices. This represents a regional approach to submarine cable resilience through multi-layered defense strategies.
Evidence
Singapore leads ASEAN working group; guidelines aim to set out best practices; upgrading guidelines as Singapore chairs the working group
Major discussion point
International Cooperation and Governance
Topics
Infrastructure | Legal and regulatory
Agreed with
– Sandra Maximiano
– Liisa Ly Pakosta
Agreed on
Multi-stakeholder international cooperation is essential for submarine cable resilience
Need for transparency in submarine cable data to drive action and reduce absolute number of cable cuts despite increasing cable numbers
Explanation
Lew Chuen Hong argued that transparency around submarine cable data is key because what gets seen gets acted upon. He emphasized that while the number of cables will increase, the goal should be to reduce the absolute number of cable cuts, and ITU’s strength in data transparency should be applied to this area.
Evidence
ICPC data shows 85% of cuts are human-caused; ITU’s historical strength in data transparency around connectivity and coverage
Major discussion point
Regional and Economic Challenges
Topics
Infrastructure | Development
Agreed with
– Sandra Maximiano
– Athena Jun Xian
Agreed on
Human activities are the primary cause of submarine cable disruptions
Economics fundamentally drives cable deployment decisions, requiring growth in digital economy to attract investment
Explanation
Lew Chuen Hong emphasized that economics is fundamental to cable deployment, covering everything from deployment in countries with fewer cables to sovereignty issues. He explained that most cables are run by private sector consortiums, so growing the digital economy is essential to attract investment for both resilience and capacity.
Evidence
Majority of cables run by private sector consortiums; Singapore combines regulatory and economic promotion under one authority
Major discussion point
Regional and Economic Challenges
Topics
Economic | Infrastructure
Liisa Ly Pakosta
Speech speed
119 words per minute
Speech length
638 words
Speech time
321 seconds
Estonia is fully digital with all government services dependent on internet connectivity
Explanation
Minister Pakosta explained that Estonia is a fully digital state where all hospital services and people’s lives depend on internet service availability. All government databases are interconnected and all government services are based on internet, making submarine cable resilience critical for the country’s functioning.
Evidence
All hospital services, government databases are interconnected, all government services based on internet
Major discussion point
Submarine Cable Infrastructure Importance and Vulnerability
Topics
Infrastructure | Development
Agreed with
– Sandra Maximiano
– Tomas Lamanauskas
– Lew Chuen Hong
Agreed on
Submarine cables are critical infrastructure carrying 99% of global communications
Multi-stakeholder approach involving ITU and IMO is needed to develop rules and regulations for cable protection
Explanation
Minister Pakosta emphasized Estonia’s belief in a rule-based world and multi-stakeholder approach to develop rules that all countries obey for the good of their people. She called for ITU and IMO to develop actual plans, regulations, best practices, and updated standards to address submarine cable protection issues.
Evidence
Need for plans, regulations, best practices, updated standards; IMO should address shadow fleet flags
Major discussion point
International Cooperation and Governance
Topics
Legal and regulatory | Infrastructure
Agreed with
– Sandra Maximiano
– Lew Chuen Hong
Agreed on
Multi-stakeholder international cooperation is essential for submarine cable resilience
Disagreed with
– Athena Jun Xian
– Sandra Maximiano
Disagreed on
Role and responsibility balance between government and industry in submarine cable protection
Intentional cable cuts by Russian shadow fleet using anchors in protected zones represent new security threats
Explanation
Minister Pakosta revealed that Estonia has experienced intentional cable cuts by Russian shadow fleet over the past two years, which hadn’t happened during the previous 30 years of their digital society. These involve dropping anchors and pulling them through cables in zones marked as protected areas.
Evidence
Didn’t happen throughout 30 years of digital society but occurred in last two years; Russian shadow fleet dropping anchors in protected zones
Major discussion point
Causes and Types of Cable Disruptions
Topics
Cybersecurity | Infrastructure
Athena Jun Xian
Speech speed
109 words per minute
Speech length
496 words
Speech time
271 seconds
Most common cause is anchoring or fishing activities, both accidental and intentional, with human activities being the main cause
Explanation
Athena Jun Xian reported that according to China Telecom’s data, the most common cause of submarine cable damage is anchoring or fishing activities, which can be either accidental or intentional. She noted this aligns with ICPC findings and that human activities remain the primary cause of cable damage.
Evidence
China Telecom’s data; aligns with ICPC findings; human activities remain main cause
Major discussion point
Causes and Types of Cable Disruptions
Topics
Infrastructure | Cybersecurity
Agreed with
– Sandra Maximiano
– Lew Chuen Hong
Agreed on
Human activities are the primary cause of submarine cable disruptions
Natural disasters like earthquakes and undersea landslides are also key causes
Explanation
Athena Jun Xian identified natural disasters including earthquakes and undersea landslides as key causes of submarine cable damage, though she emphasized that human activities remain the main cause overall.
Evidence
Earthquakes and undersea landslides specifically mentioned as natural disaster causes
Major discussion point
Causes and Types of Cable Disruptions
Topics
Infrastructure | Cybersecurity
China Telecom operates six submarine repair ships and manages 70% of submarine cable landings in China
Explanation
Athena Jun Xian detailed China Telecom’s extensive submarine cable infrastructure, including six repair ships, two spare parts depots, and over 70,000 kilometers of laid cables. As a major operator managing over 70% of submarine cable landings in China, they have significant experience in cable protection and repair.
Evidence
Six submarine repair ships, two spare parts depots, 70,000+ kilometers of cables laid, manages 70% of cable landings in China
Major discussion point
Industry Response and Repair Capabilities
Topics
Infrastructure | Economic
Education programs for fishermen, shipping companies, and local communities about cable protection and legal consequences
Explanation
Athena Jun Xian described China Telecom’s comprehensive education programs targeting fishermen, shipping companies, and local communities to raise awareness about protecting submarine cables and the legal consequences of damaging them. This represents a proactive approach to preventing human-caused cable damage.
Evidence
Programs targeting fishermen, shipping companies, and local communities; focus on legal consequences of damage
Major discussion point
Industry Response and Repair Capabilities
Topics
Infrastructure | Legal and regulatory
Industry should establish more programs to train youth in submarine cable expertise for sustainability
Explanation
Athena Jun Xian observed that the submarine cable industry is a very small circle with familiar and aging faces at submarine cable events. She recommended that governments should establish more programs to train youth to enter the submarine cable field to ensure sustainability of expertise.
Evidence
Submarine cable events always have familiar faces and old faces; small circle of experts
Major discussion point
Industry Response and Repair Capabilities
Topics
Development | Infrastructure
Disagreed with
– Sandra Maximiano
– Liisa Ly Pakosta
Disagreed on
Role and responsibility balance between government and industry in submarine cable protection
Audience
Speech speed
134 words per minute
Speech length
1349 words
Speech time
600 seconds
Plastic pollution from international negotiations could impact submarine cable resilience
Explanation
An audience member raised the connection between ongoing international plastic treaty negotiations and submarine cable resilience, suggesting that plastic pollution could shrink resilience of submarine cables. They referenced the ocean conference and negotiations on plastic trading as relevant to cable infrastructure protection.
Evidence
International negotiation on plastic treaty nearing completion; last meeting was in Asia; various types of plastic trading being negotiated
Major discussion point
Causes and Types of Cable Disruptions
Topics
Infrastructure | Development
Small island states and landlocked countries face particular vulnerabilities with limited cable connections
Explanation
Audience members from Samoa and Chad highlighted the specific challenges faced by small island states and landlocked countries that have limited submarine cable connections. When their single cable connection is cut, entire countries can lose internet access for extended periods.
Evidence
Samoa regulator seeking best practices for cable cuts; Chad has only one cable from Cameroon, country goes down when cut
Major discussion point
Regional and Economic Challenges
Topics
Infrastructure | Development
Route diversity issues where African traffic must be rerouted through Portugal and US, affecting entire regions during cuts
Explanation
An audience member from the African Telecommunication Union highlighted route diversity challenges where African traffic must be rerouted through Portugal to the US before returning, meaning that cuts in one location affect entire regions. This demonstrates the need for better route diversity planning.
Evidence
Traffic from parts of Africa must route through Portugal to US before coming back; whole regions affected by single cuts
Major discussion point
Regional and Economic Challenges
Topics
Infrastructure | Development
Agreements
Agreement points
Submarine cables are critical infrastructure carrying 99% of global communications
Speakers
– Sandra Maximiano
– Tomas Lamanauskas
– Lew Chuen Hong
– Liisa Ly Pakosta
Arguments
Submarine cables carry 99% of international communications and are critical digital infrastructure
Physical cables are surprisingly thin and vulnerable, with only 500 cables globally supporting the digital economy
Digital economy accounts for 18% of Singapore’s GDP, making submarine cables foundational infrastructure
Estonia is fully digital with all government services dependent on internet connectivity
Summary
All speakers agreed that submarine cables are absolutely critical infrastructure that underpins the global digital economy and national digital services, with 99% of international communications flowing through these vulnerable physical systems.
Topics
Infrastructure | Cybersecurity
Human activities are the primary cause of submarine cable disruptions
Speakers
– Sandra Maximiano
– Athena Jun Xian
– Lew Chuen Hong
Arguments
Most common cause is anchoring or fishing activities, both accidental and intentional, with human activities being the main cause
Need for transparency in submarine cable data to drive action and reduce absolute number of cable cuts despite increasing cable numbers
Building multiple geographically diverse cable routes and mesh network architecture while avoiding strategic choke points
Summary
Speakers consistently identified human activities, particularly anchoring and fishing, as the predominant cause of cable damage, with ICPC data showing 85% of cuts are human-caused.
Topics
Infrastructure | Cybersecurity
Multi-stakeholder international cooperation is essential for submarine cable resilience
Speakers
– Sandra Maximiano
– Liisa Ly Pakosta
– Lew Chuen Hong
Arguments
ITU’s International Advisory Body on Submarine Cable Resilience provides a global platform with 40 members from public and private sectors
Multi-stakeholder approach involving ITU and IMO is needed to develop rules and regulations for cable protection
ASEAN working group led by Singapore develops guidelines and best practices for regional submarine cable resilience
Summary
All speakers emphasized the critical need for coordinated international cooperation involving multiple stakeholders including governments, industry, and international organizations to address submarine cable resilience challenges.
Topics
Infrastructure | Legal and regulatory
Resilience requires redundancy and diverse routing strategies
Speakers
– Sandra Maximiano
– Lew Chuen Hong
Arguments
Resilience must be designed into cable systems through redundancy, route diversity, predictive maintenance, protection zones, and rapid repair capacity
Singapore has grown from 10 to 29 cables and plans to reach 50 by 2035, using quantity to create quality and diversity
Building multiple geographically diverse cable routes and mesh network architecture while avoiding strategic choke points
Summary
Speakers agreed that resilience cannot be improvised during crises but must be built into system design through redundant connections, diverse routing, and strategic planning.
Topics
Infrastructure | Cybersecurity
Similar viewpoints
Both speakers emphasized the importance of education and awareness programs targeting different stakeholder groups to prevent cable damage and build public understanding of submarine cable importance.
Speakers
– Sandra Maximiano
– Athena Jun Xian
Arguments
Education programs for fishermen, shipping companies, and local communities about cable protection and legal consequences
Digital literacy programs should include education about submarine cable importance to build public awareness of costs and resilience needs
Topics
Infrastructure | Development
Both speakers advocated for formal recognition of submarine cables as critical infrastructure requiring specific regulatory frameworks and coordinated international governance mechanisms.
Speakers
– Sandra Maximiano
– Liisa Ly Pakosta
Arguments
Submarine cables should be classified as critical infrastructure with specific regulatory frameworks
Multi-stakeholder approach involving ITU and IMO is needed to develop rules and regulations for cable protection
Topics
Legal and regulatory | Infrastructure
Both speakers from the industry/government implementation side emphasized the practical aspects of cable deployment, including economic drivers and the need for substantial infrastructure investment and maintenance capabilities.
Speakers
– Lew Chuen Hong
– Athena Jun Xian
Arguments
Economics fundamentally drives cable deployment decisions, requiring growth in digital economy to attract investment
China Telecom operates six submarine repair ships and manages 70% of submarine cable landings in China
Topics
Economic | Infrastructure
Unexpected consensus
Small countries and regions require collective support mechanisms
Speakers
– Sandra Maximiano
– Lew Chuen Hong
– Audience
Arguments
Collective mechanisms needed to support repair capacity, especially for regions lacking resources like small island states
Economics fundamentally drives cable deployment decisions, requiring growth in digital economy to attract investment
Small island states and landlocked countries face particular vulnerabilities with limited cable connections
Explanation
Unexpectedly, both large hub countries (Singapore) and regulatory bodies agreed that supporting smaller, less economically viable regions is in everyone’s interest, recognizing that cable cuts anywhere affect global connectivity.
Topics
Infrastructure | Development
Industry should take more responsibility for training and capacity building
Speakers
– Athena Jun Xian
– Sandra Maximiano
Arguments
Industry should establish more programs to train youth in submarine cable expertise for sustainability
Three working groups focus on resilience by design, timely deployment/repair, and risk identification/monitoring
Explanation
There was unexpected consensus that the traditionally technical industry should expand its role into education and capacity building, with both industry and regulatory representatives agreeing on this broader responsibility.
Topics
Development | Infrastructure
Overall assessment
Summary
The discussion revealed remarkably high consensus across all speakers on fundamental issues: the critical importance of submarine cables, human activities as primary threat, need for international cooperation, and resilience through redundancy. Even speakers from different sectors (government, industry, regulatory) and regions (Europe, Asia, Africa) shared similar perspectives on solutions.
Consensus level
Very high consensus with strong implications for effective policy coordination. The alignment suggests that the ITU’s International Advisory Body approach is working well to build shared understanding across diverse stakeholders. The consensus provides a solid foundation for developing unified global standards and best practices, though implementation challenges remain for resource-constrained regions.
Differences
Different viewpoints
Role and responsibility balance between government and industry in submarine cable protection
Speakers
– Athena Jun Xian
– Sandra Maximiano
– Liisa Ly Pakosta
Arguments
Industry should establish more programs to train youth in submarine cable expertise for sustainability
Licensing and permitting procedures for repairs must be simplified and more flexible
Multi-stakeholder approach involving ITU and IMO is needed to develop rules and regulations for cable protection
Summary
Athena argues that regulators should do more since industry has made more efforts over 30 years, while Sandra focuses on regulatory framework improvements, and Minister Pakosta emphasizes government-led international coordination through ITU and IMO
Topics
Legal and regulatory | Infrastructure | Development
Unexpected differences
Scope of threats to submarine cables
Speakers
– Liisa Ly Pakosta
– Athena Jun Xian
Arguments
Intentional cable cuts by Russian shadow fleet using anchors in protected zones represent new security threats
Most common cause is anchoring or fishing activities, both accidental and intentional, with human activities being the main cause
Explanation
While both acknowledge human activities as causes, Minister Pakosta specifically highlights intentional state-level threats that represent a new category of security challenge, whereas Athena focuses on traditional accidental/fishing-related causes. This reveals different threat perceptions between countries
Topics
Cybersecurity | Infrastructure
Overall assessment
Summary
The discussion showed remarkably high consensus on the importance of submarine cable resilience and the need for international cooperation. The main disagreements were subtle and centered on emphasis and approach rather than fundamental principles – specifically the balance of responsibility between government and industry, and different threat perceptions based on geographic and geopolitical contexts.
Disagreement level
Low level of disagreement with high implications – while speakers largely agreed on goals and strategies, the subtle differences in approach (regulatory vs. economic, collective vs. market-driven solutions) and threat perception (traditional vs. state-level threats) reflect deeper questions about governance models and security frameworks that could significantly impact policy implementation and international cooperation effectiveness.
Partial agreements
Partial agreements
Similar viewpoints
Both speakers emphasized the importance of education and awareness programs targeting different stakeholder groups to prevent cable damage and build public understanding of submarine cable importance.
Speakers
– Sandra Maximiano
– Athena Jun Xian
Arguments
Education programs for fishermen, shipping companies, and local communities about cable protection and legal consequences
Digital literacy programs should include education about submarine cable importance to build public awareness of costs and resilience needs
Topics
Infrastructure | Development
Both speakers advocated for formal recognition of submarine cables as critical infrastructure requiring specific regulatory frameworks and coordinated international governance mechanisms.
Speakers
– Sandra Maximiano
– Liisa Ly Pakosta
Arguments
Submarine cables should be classified as critical infrastructure with specific regulatory frameworks
Multi-stakeholder approach involving ITU and IMO is needed to develop rules and regulations for cable protection
Topics
Legal and regulatory | Infrastructure
Both speakers from the industry/government implementation side emphasized the practical aspects of cable deployment, including economic drivers and the need for substantial infrastructure investment and maintenance capabilities.
Speakers
– Lew Chuen Hong
– Athena Jun Xian
Arguments
Economics fundamentally drives cable deployment decisions, requiring growth in digital economy to attract investment
China Telecom operates six submarine repair ships and manages 70% of submarine cable landings in China
Topics
Economic | Infrastructure
Takeaways
Key takeaways
Submarine cables are critical infrastructure carrying 99% of international communications but are surprisingly vulnerable, with only 500 cables globally supporting the digital economy
Human activities (anchoring, fishing) are the primary cause of cable disruptions, with intentional cuts by hostile actors representing an emerging security threat
Resilience must be designed into cable systems from the start through redundancy, route diversity, predictive maintenance, protection zones, and rapid repair capacity
International cooperation through multi-stakeholder approaches is essential, with the ITU’s International Advisory Body providing a global platform for collaboration
Small island states and landlocked countries face particular vulnerabilities due to limited cable connections and repair capabilities
Economics fundamentally drives cable deployment decisions – growing the digital economy is necessary to attract investment in cable infrastructure
Submarine cables should be classified as critical infrastructure with specific regulatory frameworks and simplified repair permitting procedures
Resolutions and action items
Three working groups established under the International Advisory Body focusing on: resilience by design, timely deployment/repair, and risk identification/monitoring
Second National Submarine Cable Resilience Summit planned for early next year in Lisbon
ASEAN guidelines for submarine cable best practices being upgraded under Singapore’s leadership
Portugal developing national best practices booklet replicating international advisory body approach
Mailing list established for ongoing engagement (contact Andres for inclusion)
Abuja Declaration approved as key milestone for submarine cable resilience and international cooperation
Unresolved issues
How to address intentional cable cuts by hostile state actors using shadow fleets
Insufficient repair capacity globally, particularly for Africa (only one repair ship for entire continent)
Route diversity challenges where traffic must be rerouted through distant locations during cuts
Balancing sovereignty concerns with need for international cooperation and shared infrastructure
Making internet connectivity affordable while increasing resilience requirements
Lack of real-time detection and AI-powered monitoring systems for predictive maintenance
Limited youth training programs and academic research focused on submarine cable expertise
Data transparency and verification challenges for regulators monitoring cable performance
Suggested compromises
Collective mechanisms to support repair capacity for regions lacking resources, recognizing that cable cuts affect everyone globally
Hybrid power-telecom cable systems that provide mutual resilience benefits through guard zones and optical monitoring
Consortium-based cable ownership models that balance private sector efficiency with public interest needs
Regional cooperation frameworks (like ASEAN working group) that respect sovereignty while enabling coordinated responses
Multi-layered defense approach with concentric rings of protection from national to regional to global levels
Industry-government partnerships for capacity building and technology transfer to developing regions
Thought provoking comments
It’s interesting to think that 1865, the anniversary we are celebrating now, the topic was exactly the same, how to protect the undersea telegraphic cables. Because when you have connections between the countries and when you connect countries with a cable, which is undersea, there always comes somebody who is a bad guy and wants to cut down this cable.
Speaker
Liisa Ly Pakosta (Minister from Estonia)
Reason
This comment provided crucial historical context that reframed the entire discussion, showing that submarine cable protection isn’t a new challenge but one that has persisted since the birth of the ITU. It elevated the conversation from a technical discussion to one about enduring geopolitical realities.
Impact
This historical perspective shifted the discussion tone from treating cable cuts as modern anomalies to understanding them as persistent challenges requiring institutional responses. It validated the ITU’s role and provided gravitas to the discussion by connecting current challenges to the organization’s founding purpose.
We have seen throughout two last years, which didn’t happen throughout the 30 years we have had our digital society. But now throughout the two last years, we have seen very many intentional cable cuts by the Russian shuttle fleet. So dropping an anchor and then pulling it through the cables in the zones that are marked as a protected zones.
Speaker
Liisa Ly Pakosta (Minister from Estonia)
Reason
This comment dramatically shifted the discussion from accidental damage to intentional sabotage, introducing the reality of state-level threats to critical infrastructure. It brought geopolitical tensions directly into what had been a largely technical discussion.
Impact
This revelation fundamentally changed the conversation’s scope and urgency. It moved beyond technical solutions to acknowledge that some cable cuts may be acts of hybrid warfare, requiring different types of responses and international cooperation. The moderator even acknowledged this was ‘above their pay grade,’ showing how it elevated the discussion’s complexity.
What gets seen then gets acted on, and this would cover both intentional as well as unintentional… the ambition to watch the data must be that, despite the increasing number, we should actually aim to reduce the absolute number of cable cuts. And actually we can put a number on it, and we can actually get transparency around it.
Speaker
Lew Chuen Hong (CEO of IMDA Singapore)
Reason
This comment introduced the critical concept that transparency and data visibility are prerequisites for effective action. It provided a concrete, measurable approach to what had been discussed in more abstract terms.
Impact
This shifted the discussion toward practical, measurable solutions and accountability mechanisms. It connected the ITU’s historical strength in data transparency to this new challenge, providing a concrete pathway forward that other participants could build upon.
Resilience must be designed into cable systems, so must be built into design and not improvised in crisis. And this is our lemma, and I think we should always have that in mind.
Speaker
Sandra Maximiano (ANACOM Chairperson)
Reason
This comment crystallized a fundamental principle that shifted thinking from reactive to proactive approaches. It established ‘resilience by design’ as a core philosophy rather than treating resilience as an afterthought.
Impact
This principle became a organizing framework for the discussion, influencing how other participants discussed solutions. It elevated the conversation from crisis management to systematic prevention and preparation, and was later reflected in the working group structure she described.
It’s in all our interests, even if we are a big country… that we all, as different countries, have the means to respond to incidents. Because we all suffer from any cuts in the submarine cables… this cooperation with small island states and small countries is really needed. And it’s not only needed for these countries, but it’s for the benefit of all.
Speaker
Sandra Maximiano (ANACOM Chairperson)
Reason
This comment reframed submarine cable resilience from a national security issue to a global solidarity issue, emphasizing interdependence rather than individual national interests.
Impact
This perspective shift was crucial in moving the discussion toward collaborative solutions rather than competitive approaches. It provided moral and practical justification for international cooperation and resource sharing, influencing how other participants discussed regional and global responses.
How do we deal with the need for increased resilience across the globe in our cable systems in a world where everybody keeps talking sovereignty? And cable systems need to be sovereign. How do I increase resilience, ensuring that the internet remains affordable?
Speaker
Katrin Stuber (GEANT representative)
Reason
This question exposed a fundamental tension between the push for sovereign infrastructure and the economic and technical realities of building resilient global networks. It highlighted the cost implications of geopolitical fragmentation.
Impact
This question crystallized one of the core dilemmas facing the international community and forced participants to grapple with the practical implications of political rhetoric about sovereignty. It added economic considerations to what had been primarily a technical and security discussion.
Overall assessment
These key comments fundamentally shaped the discussion by expanding its scope from a technical infrastructure conversation to a multifaceted examination of geopolitical, economic, and governance challenges. The historical framing established continuity with ITU’s founding mission, while the revelation of intentional sabotage introduced urgent security dimensions. The emphasis on ‘resilience by design’ and global solidarity provided constructive frameworks for moving forward, while the sovereignty-versus-resilience tension highlighted the complex trade-offs involved. Together, these comments elevated the discussion from operational concerns to strategic policy considerations, demonstrating why submarine cable resilience requires coordinated international response rather than purely technical solutions.
Follow-up questions
How can AI-powered infrastructure be deployed at the design and implementation stages to monitor submarine cable links for predictive maintenance and real-time detection?
Speaker
Isaac Boateng (African Telecommunication Union)
Explanation
This addresses the need for proactive monitoring systems that could prevent cable disruptions through early detection and prediction, potentially reducing the high percentage of human-caused cable cuts.
What specific actions are the working groups taking to address route diversity challenges, particularly for African traffic routing through distant locations like Portugal and the US?
Speaker
Isaac Boateng (African Telecommunication Union)
Explanation
This highlights the inefficient routing patterns that create vulnerabilities when cables are cut, requiring traffic to take extremely long detours, and seeks concrete solutions from the advisory body’s working groups.
What are the panelists’ opinions on building submarine hybrid power-telecom cable systems for enhanced resilience?
Speaker
Volodymyr Matyushko (EU digital and green transition expert)
Explanation
This explores whether combining power and telecom cables could improve resilience through guard zones and mutual monitoring capabilities via optical technology.
What can regulators do to ensure proper policies are in place for cable cut preparedness, and what are best practices for this?
Speaker
Nisa Purcell (regulator from Samoa)
Explanation
This addresses the need for regulatory frameworks and emergency response policies, particularly important for small island states with limited cable infrastructure.
How can regulators collect and verify accurate data from submarine cable companies when they lack monitoring capabilities?
Speaker
Nisa Purcell (regulator from Samoa)
Explanation
This highlights the challenge regulators face in obtaining reliable data for oversight and decision-making when they don’t have independent monitoring systems.
What alternatives exist for landlocked countries dependent on single cable connections, and how can they access reliable data about cable performance?
Speaker
Abdi Jilir (civil society representative from Chad)
Explanation
This addresses the vulnerability of landlocked countries that depend entirely on single cable connections through neighboring countries, seeking solutions for redundancy and data transparency.
How can the need for increased resilience be balanced with affordability in a world focused on cable sovereignty?
Speaker
Katrin Stuber (GEANT)
Explanation
This addresses the economic challenge of maintaining affordable internet services while increasing the number of cable systems needed for resilience, particularly in the context of sovereignty requirements.
How can more youth be trained and attracted to enter the submarine cable industry for sustainability?
Speaker
Athena Jun Xian (China Telecom)
Explanation
This addresses the aging workforce in the submarine cable industry and the need for succession planning and skills development for future sustainability.
How can more academic research programs focused on submarine cable research and related problems be established?
Speaker
Sandra Maximiano
Explanation
This highlights the lack of dedicated research programs in academia focusing on submarine cable issues, which could contribute to better solutions and understanding.
How can transparency around submarine cable data be improved to better track and reduce cable cuts despite increasing cable numbers?
Speaker
Lew Chuen Hong (IMDA Singapore)
Explanation
This addresses the need for better data collection and transparency to monitor trends and effectiveness of resilience measures, building on ITU’s historical strength in data transparency.
How can digital literacy programs be expanded to include education about the importance of submarine cables?
Speaker
Sandra Maximiano
Explanation
This would help consumers understand the costs and importance of building redundancy and resilience in submarine cable infrastructure.
How can submarine cables be classified as critical infrastructure with specific regulatory frameworks?
Speaker
Sandra Maximiano
Explanation
This addresses the need for formal recognition of submarine cables’ critical importance and the development of appropriate regulatory frameworks to protect them.
Disclaimer: This is not an official session record. DiploAI generates these resources from audiovisual recordings, and they are presented as-is, including potential errors. Due to logistical challenges, such as discrepancies in audio/video or transcripts, names may be misspelled. We strive for accuracy to the best of our ability.