Enhanced Cooperation in the Digital Age: From Concept to Commitment at WSIS+20

Summary

This panel discussion focused on the concept of “enhanced cooperation” in internet governance as part of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) 20-year review process. The moderator, Konstantinos Komaitis from the Atlantic Council, guided four experts through an examination of this controversial topic that has persisted for two decades since the 2005 Tunis Agenda.

Dr. David Souter provided historical context, explaining that enhanced cooperation emerged from contentious negotiations at WSIS sessions in Geneva and Tunis, particularly around the governance of critical internet resources and the relationship between ICANN and the U.S. government. The Tunis Agenda defined it as enabling governments “on an equal footing to carry out their roles and responsibilities in international public policy issues pertaining to the Internet.” Dr. Peter Major, who chaired the first UN Commission on Science and Technology for Development (CSTD) working group on enhanced cooperation, noted that consensus proved elusive, with working groups in 2013-14 and 2016-18 unable to finalize recommendations due to persistent disagreements about scope and objectives.

Jimson Olufuye, representing the private sector perspective, argued that the 2016 IANA transition largely resolved the original concerns and that CSTD already provides an adequate forum for discussing internet-related public policy issues. He emphasized the private sector’s preference for using existing structures rather than creating new institutions. Anriette Esterhuysen from the Association for Progressive Communications acknowledged that while the original ICANN oversight concerns have diminished, new issues like artificial intelligence governance have emerged, and power asymmetries between nations remain significant.

The discussion revealed ongoing disagreements about implementation, with some participants advocating for CSTD as the appropriate venue while others called for enhanced mandates or new mechanisms. Despite two decades of debate, the concept remains contested, though panelists suggested focusing on the original Tunis Agenda definition and working within existing multilateral frameworks rather than creating separate institutions.

Keypoints

## Overall Purpose/Goal

This panel discussion was part of the WSIS (World Summit on the Information Society) 20-year review process, aimed at examining the concept of “enhanced cooperation” in internet governance – a controversial topic that has persisted for two decades since the 2005 Tunis Agenda. The goal was to reflect on lessons learned and determine how to move forward with this concept in today’s digital landscape.

## Major Discussion Points

– **Historical Context and Definition Challenges**: Enhanced cooperation emerged from the 2005 Tunis Agenda as a compromise solution to address governments’ desire for equal participation in international public policy issues related to the internet, while excluding day-to-day technical operations. Despite being defined in the Tunis Agenda, the concept has remained contested and poorly understood for 20 years.

– **Failed Consensus-Building Efforts**: Two UN working groups (2013-2014 and 2016-2018) under the Commission on Science and Technology for Development (CSTD) attempted to operationalize enhanced cooperation but failed to reach consensus due to persistent disagreements about scope, objectives, and institutional arrangements, with some requiring 100% consensus blocking progress.

– **Impact of IANA Transition**: The 2016 IANA transition, which ended U.S. government oversight of critical internet resources, significantly changed the enhanced cooperation landscape. While some argued this resolved the main issue that sparked enhanced cooperation, others maintained that many international public policy issues still require governmental coordination.

– **Institutional Framework Debates**: There’s ongoing disagreement about whether enhanced cooperation needs new institutions or can work within existing frameworks like CSTD. The private sector and some stakeholders prefer using existing structures to minimize costs and complexity, while others argue for enhanced mandates or new mechanisms.

– **Evolving Stakeholder Perspectives**: The discussion revealed shifting attitudes over time, with greater acceptance of multi-stakeholder approaches even among governments that initially opposed them, and recognition that enhanced cooperation and multi-stakeholder governance can be complementary rather than competing approaches.

## Overall Tone

The discussion began with a scholarly, historical tone as panelists provided background context. The tone became more animated and sometimes contentious when participants shared personal experiences from the original negotiations and disagreed about interpretations. Toward the end, the tone shifted to be more pragmatic and forward-looking, with participants seeking practical solutions for the WSIS+20 process, though underlying tensions about power dynamics and institutional arrangements remained evident throughout.

Speakers

**Speakers from the provided list:**

– **Konstantinos Komaitis** – Senior Resident Fellow with the Atlantic Council, Panel Moderator

– **David Souter** – Managing Director of ICT Development Associates Limited, Dr.

– **Peter Major** – Chair of the UN Commission on Science and Technology for Development, Dr., Former chair of the first working group on Enhanced Cooperation within CSTD

– **Jimson Olufuye** – Principal Consultant and Founder and Chair of Afikta Advisory Council in Nigeria, Private sector representative

– **Anriette Esterhuysen** – Senior Advisor on Global and Regional Internet Governance for the Association for Progressive Communications, Ms.

– **Audience** – Various audience members who asked questions and made comments during the session

**Additional speakers:**

– **Vladimir Minkin** – Representative from Russia, participated in previous Enhanced Cooperation meetings

– **Juan** (mentioned by other speakers) – Appears to be a participant who was present during the Tunis negotiations and WGIG group

# Enhanced Cooperation in Internet Governance: A Comprehensive Analysis from the WSIS+20 Review Process

## Introduction and Context

This panel discussion, moderated by Konstantinos Komaitis from the Atlantic Council, formed part of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) 20-year review process, focusing specifically on the contentious concept of “enhanced cooperation” in internet governance. The session brought together panelists to examine this controversial topic that has persisted for two decades since the 2005 Tunis Agenda, with the overarching goal of determining how to move forward with enhanced cooperation in today’s rapidly evolving digital landscape.

The discussion was structured around three guiding questions: what enhanced cooperation means in the current context and how this should be reflected in the WSIS+20 outcome; how existing mechanisms facilitate enhanced cooperation in practice; and what gaps or opportunities exist for improvement.

## Historical Context and Definitional Challenges

Dr. David Souter, Managing Director of ICT Development Associates Limited, provided comprehensive historical context, explaining that enhanced cooperation emerged from highly contentious negotiations during the WSIS sessions in Geneva and Tunis. The concept arose particularly from disputes around the governance of critical internet resources and the relationship between ICANN and the U.S. government. The Tunis Agenda ultimately defined enhanced cooperation as enabling governments “on an equal footing to carry out their roles and responsibilities in international public policy issues pertaining to the Internet,” whilst explicitly excluding day-to-day technical coordination.

However, this definition has proven insufficient to resolve underlying disagreements. As Dr. Souter noted, the concept has remained contested and poorly understood throughout its 20-year existence, with fundamental questions about scope, objectives, and implementation mechanisms continuing to divide stakeholders.

Dr. Souter’s historical account was notably challenged by a Cuban audience member who claimed to have been present during the actual Tunis negotiations. The Cuban representative provided specific details about how the concept was created by UK diplomat David Hendon as a compromise solution to resolve deadlock between different governmental positions. According to this account, “David Hendon from the UK came up with this concept of enhanced cooperation” as a way to bridge the gap between those wanting intergovernmental control and those supporting the existing multistakeholder model.

This historical disagreement highlighted the persistent ambiguity surrounding enhanced cooperation’s origins and intentions. The Cuban intervention suggested that enhanced cooperation was fundamentally a political compromise rather than a well-defined governance concept, which may explain why it has remained so difficult to operationalise over the subsequent two decades.

## Working Group Experiences and Lessons Learned

Dr. Peter Major, who chaired the first UN Commission on Science and Technology for Development (CSTD) working group on enhanced cooperation, provided detailed insights into the attempts to operationalise the concept. The first working group (2013-2014) successfully identified seven clusters of international public policy issues but ultimately could not reach full consensus on recommendations. The second working group (2016-2018) similarly failed to finalise recommendations due to persistent differences about scope and objectives.

Dr. Major’s analysis revealed a crucial insight about the consensus-seeking approach itself. He argued that “we cannot work in a consensus way” and suggested that working groups should instead “reflect different opinions, different options, and without making a ranking among the recommendations.” This represented a fundamental challenge to traditional international negotiation approaches, suggesting that the pursuit of consensus may actually be counterproductive when dealing with such politically sensitive issues.

The working group experiences demonstrated that whilst technical discussions could proceed productively—with the first group successfully mapping international public policy issues—political disagreements about institutional arrangements and power distribution remained intractable. Dr. Major noted that some participants required 100% consensus, effectively giving veto power to any single stakeholder and blocking progress on recommendations that had broad but not universal support.

## Impact of the IANA Transition

A significant development that changed the enhanced cooperation landscape was the 2016 IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority) transition, which ended U.S. government oversight of critical internet resources. Both Dr. Major and Jimson Olufuye acknowledged that this transition addressed one of the primary concerns that originally motivated enhanced cooperation discussions.

However, speakers disagreed about the implications of this change. Olufuye argued that the IANA transition largely resolved the main issue and that enhanced cooperation now simply means “improving cooperation regarding management of critical internet resources, which is already being done well.” In contrast, other speakers maintained that whilst the ICANN oversight issue had diminished in importance, many other international public policy issues still required governmental coordination.

Anriette Esterhuysen from the Association for Progressive Communications noted that whilst the original ICANN concerns had become less pressing, new challenges had emerged: “What has changed is what the priority issues or what the concerns are… At the time in 2005, ICANN and the oversight of ICANN by the U.S. government was a major concern. That is not as major a concern… But for example, what is done about AI and decisions about how governments and intergovernmental processes and decisions should impact on AI, that is a major concern.”

## Divergent Stakeholder Perspectives

### Private Sector Optimism

Jimson Olufuye, representing the private sector viewpoint, presented an optimistic assessment of current progress. He argued that “previous opposition to CSTD as the venue has largely evaporated, with near-consensus (99.9%) supporting this approach.” From his perspective, CSTD already possesses the mandate to handle international public policy issues related to the internet and should serve as the natural home for enhanced cooperation.

The private sector position emphasised pragmatism and resource efficiency. Olufuye stressed that “the private sector opposes creating new structures due to limited resources and prefers working within existing frameworks.” This perspective reflected broader private sector concerns about the proliferation of governance mechanisms and the associated costs and complexity of participating in multiple forums.

### Civil Society Concerns About Power Asymmetries

Ms. Esterhuysen provided a more critical analysis that directly challenged the optimistic assessments. She recognised that the original ICANN oversight concerns had diminished but emphasised that “power asymmetries remain at the root of enhanced cooperation needs and cannot be ignored.” Her perspective highlighted that enhanced cooperation fundamentally addresses “the need for governments with fewer resources to participate more equally in internet governance decisions.”

Esterhuysen’s contribution was particularly significant in refusing to allow the discussion to become depoliticised. She argued that ignoring power asymmetries was “either naive or Machiavellian or some kind of very unhelpful combination of both.” This intervention prevented the conversation from becoming overly technical or procedural, keeping focus on the underlying political dynamics that make enhanced cooperation both necessary and difficult to implement.

She also provided a constructive framework for moving forward, suggesting that “enhanced cooperation and multistakeholder approaches should be viewed as separate but complementary legitimate processes that can reinforce each other.”

## Institutional Framework and CSTD’s Role

There was broad agreement that CSTD should serve as the institutional home for enhanced cooperation rather than creating new structures. However, speakers disagreed about whether CSTD’s current mandate was sufficient or required enhancement.

Olufuye argued that CSTD already possessed adequate authority, whilst others suggested that a resolution might be needed to formally expand CSTD’s mandate beyond WSIS follow-up and review to explicitly include enhanced cooperation responsibilities. This disagreement reflected deeper questions about whether enhanced cooperation required new formal mechanisms or could be achieved through existing processes.

## Constructive Suggestions for Moving Forward

### Utilising Previous Work

An important intervention came from Vladimir Minkin, who questioned why 12 recommendations from previous enhanced cooperation meetings had been forgotten and not utilised. He specifically asked: “Why these 12 recommendations are forgotten? Why we don’t use them?” This highlighted a recurring problem in international processes where valuable preparatory work is abandoned when consensus cannot be achieved, rather than being built upon in subsequent efforts.

### Reframing the Concept

Wolfgang, an audience member, offered a constructive reframing of enhanced cooperation as “enhanced communication, collaboration, coordination between state and non-state actors.” This definition moved away from the historical baggage associated with the concept towards a more practical, operational understanding focused on improving cooperation rather than resolving political disputes.

This reframing suggested using “enhanced cooperation as a positive concept to enhance communication, to enhance coordination… and not to go back to the battles of the past.” Such an approach could potentially break the cycle of historical grievances that had prevented progress on implementation.

### Practical Implementation Approaches

Esterhuysen proposed that “UN agencies, General Assembly, and other multilateral bodies should report on how they enable government participation on equal footing in internet-related public policy,” with these reports being integrated into the CSTD review process. This approach would create a systematic record of enhanced cooperation activities without requiring new institutions.

## Persistent Disagreements and Fundamental Tensions

Despite two decades of discussion, fundamental disagreements persisted throughout the panel. Olufuye’s optimistic assessment of near-consensus was directly challenged by the continued contestation evident in the discussion itself. His narrow technical interpretation of enhanced cooperation contrasted sharply with Esterhuysen’s broader focus on power asymmetries and equal participation.

The discussion also revealed disagreement about how to proceed with implementation. Major advocated for abandoning consensus-seeking and presenting multiple viewpoints equally, whilst Olufuye claimed consensus had been achieved, and others suggested utilising previously agreed recommendations rather than starting over.

Perhaps most fundamentally, speakers disagreed about whether enhanced cooperation should acknowledge and address power asymmetries (Esterhuysen’s position) or focus on technical coordination mechanisms (Olufuye’s approach). This disagreement reflected deeper tensions about the political versus technical nature of internet governance.

## Questions About WSIS Efficacy

An important question was raised by Chris about whether the contested nature of enhanced cooperation has undermined the overall efficacy of WSIS. This question highlighted concerns that the inability to resolve enhanced cooperation debates may have broader implications for the WSIS process and its credibility as a framework for addressing digital governance issues.

## Implications for the WSIS+20 Process

The discussion revealed both opportunities and challenges for addressing enhanced cooperation in the WSIS+20 review. On the positive side, there appeared to be some convergence on institutional arrangements, with broad acceptance of CSTD as the primary venue. The recognition that multistakeholder approaches had gained broader governmental acceptance also created new possibilities for progress.

However, the persistence of fundamental disagreements about scope, implementation status, and approaches to power asymmetries suggested that enhanced cooperation remained as politically contentious as ever. The optimistic assessment that consensus had been achieved was directly contradicted by the persistent disagreements evident in the discussion itself.

## Conclusion

After 20 years of debate, enhanced cooperation remains a contested concept that reflects deeper tensions in global internet governance. Whilst the IANA transition addressed one major original concern, new challenges such as artificial intelligence governance have emerged, and fundamental power asymmetries between nations persist.

The discussion demonstrated that whilst some progress has been made—particularly in terms of institutional arrangements and the evolution of governmental attitudes towards multistakeholder processes—core political disagreements remain unresolved. The concept’s origins as a political compromise may inherently limit its effectiveness as a governance mechanism.

The most constructive path forward may involve building on previous work rather than starting from scratch, utilising existing institutional frameworks like CSTD, and potentially reframing enhanced cooperation as a positive concept focused on improving communication and coordination among all stakeholders. However, success will require acknowledging both the political realities that gave rise to enhanced cooperation and the persistent power asymmetries that continue to drive the need for more equitable participation in internet governance decisions.

The WSIS+20 process provides an opportunity to move beyond historical debates towards more practical approaches, but the discussion revealed that fundamental tensions about power, participation, and governance in the global digital ecosystem remain as relevant today as they were two decades ago.

Konstantinos Komaitis: Good morning, everyone, and welcome. It’s great to see so many of you waking up for this exciting topic of enhanced cooperation. My name is Konstantinos Koumaitis. I am a senior resident fellow with the Atlantic Council, and I will be moderating this excellent panel. So we are here to, of course, discuss… We are here because the WSIS is the 20-year review, and as part of this review, we are thinking of different things, and one of those things is this concept of enhanced cooperation, which has stayed with us for 20 years through thick and thin, and it has been a bit controversial. However, here we are discussing it, and we have an opportunity right now to actually go back and reflect and think what we have learned from those past 20 years of conversations and how we can move forward. And in order to do that, we have an excellent panel, which I’m going to introduce right now. So to my right, further right, Dr. David Souter. He is the Managing Director of ICT Development, Associates Limited. Then to my left, Dr. Peter Major. He is the Chair of the UN Commission on Science and Technology for Development. Right to my left, Dr. Jim Sun. I’m sorry for mispronouncing your surname, Olufoye. He is the Principal Consultant and Founder and Chair of Afikta Advisory Council in Nigeria, and of course, last but not least, Ms. Henriette Esterhuizen. She’s the Senior Advisor on Global and Regional Internet Governance for the Association for Progressive Communications. So before we go and we hear their interventions, which I will please ask all of you to keep them short, six, seven minutes max, I would like to pose three guiding questions that I would like our panelists and you to think as we keep discussing this issue for the next 40 minutes approximately. The first one is, what does enhanced cooperation mean today in a rapidly evolving digital landscape, and how should this be reflected in the WSIS Plus 20 outcome? How do existing mechanisms such as forums, partnerships, or policy platforms facilitate enhanced cooperation in practice? And what are the gaps or opportunities for improvement in the WSIS Plus 20 process? And finally, how can the WSIS 20 review process foster a shared understanding of enhanced cooperation among diverse stakeholders? And with that in mind, David, I will turn first to you. If you can please give us a little bit

David Souter: of a historical context of enhanced cooperation. Thank you. So that is indeed what I’ve been asked to do, Konstantinos. So I’ll give a historical account of the enhanced cooperation in the WSIS process, and I’ll quote from relevant documents in doing so. As we all know, internet governance was a subject of contention at both WSIS sessions in Geneva and Tunis. And as everyone here will know, the Tunis agenda, which concluded the second session in 2005, addressed the subject at considerable length. So I’ll begin with that context. First, the agenda adopted a working definition of internet governance, and I’ll quote that. The development and application by governments, the private sector, and civil society in their respective roles. of Shared Principles, Norms, Rules, Decision Making, Procedures and Programs that shape the evolution and use of the Internet. And it recognized that that includes, again I’m quoting, both technical and public policy issues and that it should involve all stakeholders and relevant intergovernmental and international organizations. It recognized, quoting again, the need to maximize the participation of developing countries in decisions regarding Internet governance as well as in development and capacity building. And it pointed out the importance of national, regional and international dimensions. It recognized the multi-stakeholder character of Internet governance and the various responsibilities of different stakeholder groups, including governments. It recognized that the Internet is a highly dynamic medium and that Internet governance framework should be inclusive and responsive to its rapid evolution. And it recognized that there were, and here again I’ll quote directly, many cross-cutting international public policy issues that require attention and are not adequately addressed by the current mechanisms. So the significant and public policy issues that were identified in paragraph 58 of the agenda include, again I’m quoting, inter alia critical Internet resources, the security and safety of the Internet and developmental aspects and issues pertaining to the use of the Internet. And others were identified in the report of the Working Group on Internet Governance, which met between the two sessions. So to paragraph 68, 69, sorry, of the Tunis agenda, which reads as follows. We recognize the need for enhanced cooperation in the future to enable governments on an equal footing to carry out their roles and responsibilities in international public policy issues pertaining to the Internet, but not in the day-to-day technical and operational matters that do not impact on international public policy issues. I’m quoting these things because I think it is useful to have them directly in mind in a discussion around this. The agenda did not define Enhanced Cooperation further, but paragraph 70 added that it should include, again, a quote, the development of globally applicable principles on public policy issues associated with the coordination and management of critical internet resources. So the management of critical internet resources, especially the relationship between Ayanna, ICANN and the U.S. government, had been a particular point of contention during the summit. So that’s at the summit start, and I’ll move on to subsequently. Over the years since the summit, there have been a number of initiatives that have sought to interpret and develop the concept of Enhanced Cooperation, while the range of issues affected by the internet and the number of international organizations and fora that are concerned with those issues has multiplied. The UN Secretary General carried out informal consultations in 2006 with internet-related organizations, including those established internet governance bodies, and that was followed by an open consultation in 2010 and an open meeting at the UN itself. And the subject was extensively discussed during that period in other fora, including the IGF. I think it was clear from the consultations and discussions around those initial processes that there were divergent views about two broad issues. The first about the range of international public policy issues pertaining to the internet, which was referred to in the Tunis agenda, and second about the nature and modalities of the Enhanced Cooperation that might be appropriate. So some contributions to discussions then and since have considered broad themes of digital development and the relationship between multilateral and multi-stakeholder dimensions of internet governance, and others have understood the concept more narrowly, concerned in particular with the governance of critical internet resources and ways in which these were addressed by the IANA transition in 2016. A consultation was held by the UN Commission The Commission on Science and Technology for Development, CSTD, in 2012, and that was followed by two working groups of the Commission. The first of those in 2013-14, and Peter Major will be talking about these in a moment. The first in 2013-14 sought to identify international public policy issues on the Internet and classified those in seven clusters, which were concerned with infrastructure and standardization, security, human rights, legal economic development, and sociocultural themes, sought to do that classification. Although consensus was reached in some areas, its report concluded, I’m quoting again here, there was significant divergence of views in a number of other issues. The complexity and the political sensitivity of the topic did not allow the group to finalize a set of recommendations on fully operationalizing enhanced cooperation. So that outcome was noted in the WSIS Plus 10 report adopted by the General Assembly in 2015. And the General Assembly in that WSIS Plus 10 agreement called on CSTD to organize a further working group, which was convened between 2016 and 2018. That discussed a number of proposed guiding principles to be considered when developing international Internet-related public policy, and some potential modalities and institutional arrangements concerned with those. But it also concluded that it could not finalize a set of recommendations. I’ll quote from that, in the light of persistent differences, including in regard to what should be the nature of the objectives and the scope of the process towards enhanced cooperation. So the concept and approaches to enabling enhanced cooperation have had diverse interpretations in terms of their scope, in terms of potential modalities, and the extent to which they have been implemented since the summit. Finally, and I’ll end with this, the resolution adopted by the CSTD in April this year, and forwarded to to the Echo Sock where it is at present, reaffirmed the Secretary General’s role to pursue the outcomes of the World Summit related to internet governance, including both Enhanced Cooperation and the IGF, recognizing that these may be complementary, and noted the outcomes from the working groups that I’ve just mentioned, that is the consensus was reached in some areas, but it was not possible to achieve it in others. So I hope that helps to frame the discussion.

Konstantinos Komaitis: Thank you very much, David. Peter, we heard from David, there were two working groups on Enhanced Cooperation within the CSTD. You were the chair of the first working group, but you also followed the conversations on the second one. What lessons have we learned? What was, what, take us a little bit back in time and tell us what happened during those times.

Peter Major: Thank you. Thank you, Konstantinos. David gave a very good background with full of references to the Tunis agenda. I’m not going to do that. Well, the first working group was set up in a multi-stakeholder format, the second one as well. Basically, what I learned from that, that we cannot work in a consensus way. So a working group should work in the way the WGIC used to work. It should reflect different opinions, different options, and without making a ranking among the recommendations, or making ranking among the different opinions. The first working group did a very good job. We had a questioner concerning enhanced cooperation. We received a lot of responses to the questioner. We have. H.E. Mr. Ekitela Lokaale, Dr. David Souter H.E. Mr. Ekitela Lokaale, Dr. David Souter H.E. Mr. Ekitela Lokaale, Dr. David Souter H.E. Mr. Ekitela Lokaale, Dr. David Souter H.E. Mr. Ekitela Lokaale, Dr. David Souter H.E. Ms. Suela Janina, H.E. Mr. Ekitela Lokaale, Dr. David Souter and that is the lesson I learned. We agreed not to shoot for consensus but to reflect every opinion, every approach on an equal footing. So basically to answer your question, to me that was the main important thing. However, as it was mentioned by David, in 2016 we had the IANA transition concerning the enhanced cooperation, which was one of the main reasons of enhanced cooperation. And with the IANA transition, this reason just kind of disappeared. And people said, OK, let’s do away with the enhanced cooperation. We don’t need it anymore. Other people said, no, no, no, we do need it. And there are a lot of issues which we should discuss and the governments should have a say and they should have a forum where they can sit down and discuss it on an equal footing. Yes, there are a lot of issues. We have the cybersecurity issues. We have the autonomous weapon issues. We have e-commerce issues naturally. And there are four of our governments can discuss it. Whether this is enough or not, I’m not to judge it. In my mind, it may be enough. We have a lot of places where you can discuss it, including the ITU Council. and Dr. David Souter, H.E. Mr. Ekitela Lokaale, Dr. David Souter, H.E. Mr. Ekitela Lokaale, so probably not in a complex way but separately different issues. So probably it may be desirable to have some kind of coordination, what’s going on. So I’ll stop here, thank you.

Konstantinos Komaitis: Thank you, Peter. Jimson, may I just turn to you please? You’ve been in this space for quite a long time, representing the private sector as part of the private sector community. How do you understand the concept of enhanced cooperation? What does it mean, you think, for the private sector?

Jimson Olufuye: Thank you very much. Okay, thank you very much, Constantino, and greetings everyone. Let me begin by appreciating DESA for this program, this session. In fact, I’ve heard before that don’t discuss enhanced cooperation anymore, we don’t want to go to that. So I was wondering why. So when I saw that we’re going to have a discussion, I said, yes, why not? Let’s discuss it. Because from our perspective, enhanced cooperation, so just look at the definition, enhanced, to improve on cooperation, just improve on the cooperation. Simply improve on the cooperation with regard to management of the critical internet resources, which is being done pretty well. At least as Dr. Peter Major mentioned, the IANA transition settled that October 1st, 2016. and H.E. Mr. Ekitela Lokaale, Dr. David Souter Because that time, there was a proposal on the table that, okay, since internet public policy issue is a subset of international public policy issue, then whichever organization is already handling international public policy issue should be responsible for enhanced cooperation as defined in paragraph 68 to 71 of the Tunis Agenda, and looking critically, CSTD already has that mandate. CSTD already has mandate to have purview over international public policy issue. Are you talking about cyber security? Is it about development issue, intellectual property? Whatever it is that is connected to the issue of internet matters pertaining to the internet can be discussed at CSTD. It’s still part of science and development issue. As a majority of us agreed, and I can see some of us that were in opposition before, we all agreed, majority, and only one country said no, unless we have a new organization set up, maybe with its own building, to discuss this issue. And we don’t want the new structure. In the private sector, we have little resources. We don’t have all unlimited resources. We have limited resources, and we want to be able to minimize expenses. And so, it is not in our interest to begin the new setting of structure for enhanced cooperation. We agree that CSTD is the home for and Dr. David Souter. They are the founders of the A.N.C.E. Corporation. That is from private sector perspective, at least from Africa. And the opposition was there because we were looking for 100% consensus, so people said it did not work, it did not succeed. I didn’t agree with that. The working group succeeded. The first working group chair did very well. So, intelligently and wisely, and the majority agreed, 99.9% that we should move forward with CSTD as the home of enhanced cooperation. But one person objected. But I could see since 2018, January 2018 when we concluded, that same country has now embraced the multi-stakeholder engagements and equal footing for all stakeholders and even hosted IGF. To the surprise of many, I was shocked when the country hosted us and we all did very well. They did an excellent job of hosting all stakeholders. I was really impressed. And I made sure that I was there to see, to witness it. And I witnessed it. So, the point is, from 2018 to now, the opposition to 100% consensus, I think has evaporated. So, I could take it that we already have the consensus that the enhanced cooperation should work within the framework of CSTD, even though the chair said, yes, it’s happening elsewhere. In April, I also did my best to attend CSTD, the last session, just to see what is going on. And then, I was impressed to see that the government on equal footing, they are debating and they are doing exactly what is there in Paragraph 68 to 71. They even had to vote on an issue, which I never witnessed before. So, they voted and they agreed that this is the resolution. Why didn’t we do this that time, 2018?

Anriette Esterhuysen: They will vote and then we will have this stuff. But we have learned. But the private sector, too, we are giving free hands. H.E. Mr. Ekitela Lokaale, Dr. David Souter What has changed is what the priority issues or what the concerns are. Or how governments feel about the institutional mechanisms that are needed to facilitate that. I think that has changed dramatically. As David has said, at the time in 2005, ICANN and the oversight of ICANN by the U.S. government was a major concern. That is not as major a concern. Maybe it should become one again because governments change, but that has stopped being a priority concern. But for example, what is done about AI and decisions about how governments and intergovernmental processes and decisions should impact on AI, that is a major concern. But that ability for governments who have fewer resources, the ability to not participate in multiple spaces at the same time, to feel more empowered, it’s never going to go away. Not unless we wake up tomorrow and the world is not one that is primarily defined by massive power asymmetries. I think it still excludes technical coordination. I think that is in the Tunis agenda. I think that is good. I think there is so much fear about what this means that I think the fear by particularly global north governments and by private sector actors and technical community actors that enhanced cooperation is going to open up governmental destruction of the multistakeholder. At the beginning of the session, several governments who demanded enhanced cooperation were also very ambivalent about the multistakeholder approach. I think that has shifted. I think there’s much more acceptance of the multistakeholder approach as a viable and valuable way of working in Internet governance. There’s much more understanding that one can in fact even strengthen multilateral decision making processes through building multistakeholder participation in. In fact, that can be enhanced. The cybercrime treaty, for example, I see as an illustration of enhanced cooperation, but it could have had much more multistakeholder engagement even if it was an intergovernmental process. So I think that has shifted as well. And I think for me, the opportunity at the moment is to be able to talk about enhanced cooperation and the multistakeholder approach, but separately as two legitimate processes that actually can really reinforce and strengthen one another and help facilitate digital cooperation at a geopolitical moment when we need it more than we’ve needed it for a very long time.

Konstantinos Komaitis: Thank you, Henriette, and thank you all for your interventions. We have around 17 minutes for questions and or comments. Please, may I just ask you, because I see a lot of you wanting to speak, be short and crisp. And yeah, I’m going to take two, three questions right now. President of the Cuban Government. How many of you were in Tunis in the room where this

Audience: was discussed and enhanced cooperation created? In the room in Tunis, in the negotiation? You were during the negotiation? I doubt it, because that was only governmental, what we’re doing here. So for you, if you really want to know what enhanced cooperation and how it came out, I’m sorry, David, it has nothing to do with Geneva. In Tunis, that was the day before the summit began, and it was in the negotiation in a drafting group that was headed by the Pakistani Human Rights Council. Well, I don’t want to make it short. There’s an excellent book that was published by the APC, and the responsible of that was the diplomat David Hendon of the UK, who was the president of the European Union in that day. He explained how he came with that concept. He’s the real intellectual author. Read the article, page 184 of the APC book. Read it. It’s interesting. It’s like a detective novel, because you see how it is. Just in a nutshell, Henriette was totally right. Enhanced cooperation was a result of a very hard bargain compromise in the negotiations, because there was a group that was coordinated by Benedito Fonseca from Brazil of like-minded groups that wanted what is written in Article 35 of the Tunis agenda in the subsection A. that government has, I will try to read it, sovereign rights over international policy issues pertaining to the internet. So the question is, how are we going to implement this? And the basis is from the WIEGE group, that by the way, I was also in the WIEGE group, in which we defined, as you say, the internet governance, the principle, all the agreement, but the institutional arrangements were always the contentious. And as Peter said, very wisely in the WIEGE group, we didn’t go for one, we got four proposals, or three, because two are very similar. So that came to Tunis. And so we have the principles that government need to have exert that sovereign right. We also acknowledge the multistakeholder nature, that’s what was the proposition of internet governance. But then there was the problem of how to implement this right that government had. There was no consensus, it was impossible to get a consensus. And that is very written here. So the solution is to recognize the right of governments, and to say, and in the other hand, to create this multistakeholder IGF, and that the implementation of that right in the mechanism will be this enhanced cooperation that will be open for the next six months to that. So I’m sorry, Jim, so this has not happened. But what you said, it has some merit. And also what H.E. Ms. Suela Janina says, the nutshell of enhanced cooperation now is the need for an intergovernmental space in the architecture of WSIS. And it could be a new thing. We don’t believe that we create a new thing. But it may be the CSTD. But the mandate of CSTD, then we have to be enhanced. Because nowadays, the mandate of the CSTD is only follow up and review of WSIS.

Konstantinos Komaitis: Thank you. I’m sorry. You need to wrap up because really we have, we’re running out of time. To do, as Handiet very rightly said about intergovernmental space. And second, that’s the truth without discussion.

Audience: You can check the people that were there, who was there, that’s the truth. I was also seeing the documents of Tunis agenda. And the second truth, that that has not been implemented. As many have said, the geopolitical conditions have tried to say that implemented. Of course, it may be in the IP, in the internet critical resources, but the definition of internet government says that it’s a wide one. Sorry to, thank you. Chris and Wolfgang, and then we can just react. Chris, Wolfgang, please be sure. Thank you. Sorry, okay, thank you. I’ll be brief here. So thank you to all of you for the insights on this. And with all respect to Jimson’s optimism about how close we are to consensus on this, I think it’s clear that it’s at the very least a contested idea and has been for two decades now. So staring down the barrel of the WSIS 20 year review, I guess the question I have is to any and all of you, what do you think has been the impact on the efficacy of the WSIS project in having such an ill-defined or contested concept at its very heart? Has that undermined the work that we’ve actually been trying to do and achieve with the WSIS? Thanks, Chris. Wolfgang, please. We all know that David Hinton tried to bring. fire and water under one umbrella. And it worked for the moment, but we should not forget this has a, I would call it, a rather destructive political component and a constructive component to enhance cooperation is a good thing. You know, a couple of years after Tunis, we used an academic gathering in one of the schools of internet governance and tried to define what enhanced cooperation could be from an academic point of view. And we said, you know, enhanced cooperation is enhanced communication, collaboration, coordination between state and non-state actors. So, and I think this is really covers everything, including what Juan just said. So that certainly the governance need a space where they can communicate among each other on equal footing, but this is embedded in a multi-stakeholder environment. And I think we should really use the enhanced cooperation as a positive concept to enhance communication, to enhance coordination. So, and not to go back to the battles of the past, which is over with this leads us to nowhere. But unfortunately, I heard yesterday from some governments, they want to go back and oversight and control will surveillance is on the agenda also for the coming negotiation versus plus 10. We should be prepared for this. Thank you.

Konstantinos Komaitis: Thank you. Quick reflections. I know, Andreette, you want to say something and then I will go to a second round of questions, but please, Andreette, why don’t you start? Um, thanks. I think, I think we already, it’s so fascinating how in the responses,

Anriette Esterhuysen: people are already not actually willing to accept that there is actually quite a clear definition for the people that put that on the table in the first place. It’s like, and depoliticizing the root of enhanced cooperation, which is and Dr. David Souter. Thank you. So, let’s start with the question of multistakeholder spaces. You know, in the way that ICANN has created the GAC to create a space for governments to have a particular voice and influence, can we also create spaces in other multilateral or multistakeholder processes? And then, similarly, where we have these multilateral decision-making processes, can we use multistakeholder approach, the Net Mundial guidelines, for example, to make sure that there’s more equal participation among governments in those spaces? But ignoring that… There are power asymmetries at the root of this is, it’s, I don’t know, it’s either naive or Machiavellian or some kind of very unhelpful combination of both.

Konstantinos Komaitis: Thank you. Thank you, H.E. Ms. Suela Janina. Jameson, can you, please.

Jimson Olufuye: Yeah, just very quickly to Joanne. You said CSC, they only have the mandate for follow-up. I think to tackle that, it should be easy. It’s just, I think a resolution can handle that. If there is a resolution proposed that CSC which also handles the enhanced cooperation stuff, would that not happen? And you can put it to a vote. And I believe many will, to scale through this time around because it is not 100% consensus we’re looking for. So, and that can be scaled to ECOSOC and to GA. And that is a good issue. Thank you. Okay, so we literally have six minutes. It’s the last round of questions. I want you to be very brief in your interventions. Anna, we go first, then to the gentleman and then back there. Please, Anna, go ahead.

Audience: Thank you. Thank you, Konstantinos. And thank you, sir. I fully appreciate the history of all of this. I was not there in Tunis or Geneva, but I’m very keen in terms of the forward-looking aspect because we’re going into this, we are in the WSIS plus 20 review. So I would like to understand what in the panel’s view, what can we make of this today that is workable within the institutions that are already there? Because I think with everything going on, there’s not gonna be any new institutions happening. And to actually make this work positively also through the perspective of the net mondial guidelines as Henriette referenced. So what is the way forward? Thank you, Anna. Please be brief because we also have some… Yes, thank you. Thank you very much, Vladimir Minkin, Russia. Could I ask you who participated in the last nine sessions from the Benedictine for Enhanced Cooperation meeting? Yes. If you remember, we practically agreed 12 recommendations. The only point was when we proposed in the beginning, say, a reaffirmed conforming Tunis agenda, especially 35, it was not disagree with that. And what is pity? Not only that we did not have agreement in spite of the very close, but these 12 recommendations everybody forget. But they exist. Why not to use them? And the other important point, what happened? It was intention not to take into account the role and especially obligations of states, of governments. Only governments have responsibility under their citizens. Don’t forget that, please. When we fully agree, multi-stakeholder, but in our right and obligations. That taken into account, I think we should consider that in December. Thank you very much, sir. Please be brief. You can come in front and use one of the microphones. Good morning, colleagues, and thank you all panelists. Actually, briefly, we cannot say, it’s not a good reason we say we have open-ended working group or something like that, so we don’t need an institution or a special framework for enhanced cooperation.

Jimson Olufuye: to undo that. And CSTD is a home I’ve seen where all the stakeholders can participate freely and the mechanism can be set up there to ensure it works smoothly. Thank you.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Thank you, Gibson. Henriette? Thanks. I think there’s some consensus here. I think firstly we need to acknowledge it and agree on, instead of fighting about what it means, just use the Tunis agenda because I think the Tunis agenda is pretty clear, which is not everyone wants to read the words in the language that they intended. So I think agree on that definition and affirm that it does not include technical coordination, the day-to-day technical coordination. That language is there in the Tunis agenda. It needs to be emphasized and stressed. And secondly, I think I agree with Peter, no separate body, but let’s create it. The thing is once we’ve acknowledged that we agree on the definition, that it is about governments being able to participate on a more equal footing and public policy related to the internet, then we can actually start inviting UN agencies, the General Assembly, other bodies, regional bodies within the multilateral system to report on how they are actually enabling it. That can go into the CSTD review process. It will give us a record of what is happening and governments will be able to comment on whether they feel it’s efficient or not. I would use that as a starting point. And I think that’s very doable once we actually get over that inability to actually agree on what its intention and definition

Konstantinos Komaitis: is. Thank you very much. I would like to thank all four of you for making your interventions and all of you for waking up in the morning and coming to this session. Thank you so much. Bye. © 2012 University of Georgia College of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences UGA Extension Office of Communications and Creative Services

Agreement points

Enhanced cooperation should not include day-to-day technical coordination

Speakers

– David Souter
– Anriette Esterhuysen

Arguments

The Tunis Agenda defined enhanced cooperation as enabling governments on equal footing to carry out roles in international public policy issues pertaining to the Internet, excluding day-to-day technical matters

Implementation should involve UN agencies and other bodies reporting on how they enable government participation on equal footing

Summary

Both speakers emphasized that enhanced cooperation explicitly excludes technical coordination and day-to-day operational matters, as clearly stated in the Tunis Agenda

Topics

Infrastructure | Legal and regulatory

CSTD should be the institutional home for enhanced cooperation rather than creating new structures

Speakers

– Peter Major
– Jimson Olufuye
– Anriette Esterhuysen
– Audience

Arguments

Working groups should reflect different opinions equally rather than seeking consensus, similar to how the WGIG operated

CSTD already has the mandate to handle international public policy issues related to the internet and should be the home for enhanced cooperation

Implementation should involve UN agencies and other bodies reporting on how they enable government participation on equal footing

Governments need an intergovernmental space within the WSIS architecture, which could be CSTD with enhanced mandate

Summary

Multiple speakers agreed that CSTD provides the appropriate institutional framework for enhanced cooperation, avoiding the need for new structures while potentially requiring mandate enhancement

Topics

Legal and regulatory

The IANA transition in 2016 resolved a major original concern driving enhanced cooperation

Speakers

– Peter Major
– Jimson Olufuye

Arguments

The IANA transition in 2016 addressed one major concern that originally drove enhanced cooperation discussions

Enhanced cooperation simply means improving cooperation regarding management of critical internet resources, which is already being done well

Summary

Both speakers acknowledged that the IANA transition significantly addressed one of the primary concerns that originally motivated enhanced cooperation discussions

Topics

Infrastructure

Similar viewpoints

Both speakers support working within existing institutional frameworks rather than creating new structures, though from different perspectives – resource efficiency for private sector and institutional complementarity for civil society

Speakers

– Jimson Olufuye
– Anriette Esterhuysen

Arguments

The private sector opposes creating new structures due to limited resources and prefers working within existing frameworks

The concept should be separated from but complementary to multistakeholder approaches, with both being legitimate processes

Topics

Economic | Legal and regulatory

Both emphasized the value of previous working group efforts and the importance of reflecting diverse opinions rather than forcing consensus, suggesting that valuable work has been done that shouldn’t be discarded

Speakers

– Peter Major
– Audience

Arguments

Working groups should reflect different opinions equally rather than seeking consensus, similar to how the WGIG operated

The 12 recommendations from previous working groups should be revisited and utilized rather than forgotten

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Unexpected consensus

Multistakeholder approach acceptance by governments

Speakers

– Anriette Esterhuysen
– Jimson Olufuye

Arguments

The concept should be separated from but complementary to multistakeholder approaches, with both being legitimate processes

Previous opposition to CSTD as the venue has largely evaporated, with near-consensus (99.9%) supporting this approach

Explanation

There was unexpected consensus that governments who previously opposed multistakeholder approaches have become more accepting of them, with even countries that initially objected now embracing multistakeholder engagement and hosting IGFs

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Practical definition clarity despite historical contention

Speakers

– David Souter
– Anriette Esterhuysen
– Audience

Arguments

The Tunis Agenda defined enhanced cooperation as enabling governments on equal footing to carry out roles in international public policy issues pertaining to the Internet, excluding day-to-day technical matters

Implementation should involve UN agencies and other bodies reporting on how they enable government participation on equal footing

Enhanced cooperation should be defined as enhanced communication, collaboration, and coordination between state and non-state actors in a multistakeholder environment

Explanation

Despite 20 years of contention, there was unexpected consensus that the Tunis Agenda actually provides a clear enough definition that can be operationalized, with speakers agreeing to use existing language rather than continuing definitional debates

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Overall assessment

Summary

The discussion revealed significant convergence around using existing institutional frameworks (particularly CSTD), accepting the Tunis Agenda definition, excluding technical coordination, and recognizing that multistakeholder approaches have gained broader acceptance even among previously skeptical governments

Consensus level

Moderate to high consensus on institutional mechanisms and definitional clarity, with implications that enhanced cooperation may be more implementable now than in previous decades due to reduced opposition and clearer understanding of scope and limitations

Different viewpoints

Definition and scope of enhanced cooperation

Speakers

– Jimson Olufuye
– Anriette Esterhuysen
– Audience

Arguments

Enhanced cooperation simply means improving cooperation regarding management of critical internet resources, which is already being done well

Enhanced cooperation addresses the need for governments with fewer resources to participate more equally in internet governance decisions

Enhanced cooperation should be defined as enhanced communication, collaboration, and coordination between state and non-state actors in a multistakeholder environment

Summary

Olufuye views enhanced cooperation narrowly as technical cooperation on critical internet resources that is already functioning well, while Esterhuysen sees it as addressing broader power asymmetries and enabling equal government participation. An audience member proposed a more comprehensive definition encompassing all stakeholder coordination.

Topics

Infrastructure | Legal and regulatory

Whether enhanced cooperation has been successfully implemented

Speakers

– Jimson Olufuye
– David Souter
– Audience

Arguments

Previous opposition to CSTD as the venue has largely evaporated, with near-consensus (99.9%) supporting this approach

The second working group (2016-18) also failed to finalize recommendations due to persistent differences about scope and objectives

The concept has remained contested and ill-defined for 20 years, potentially undermining the efficacy of the WSIS project

Summary

Olufuye claims near-consensus has been achieved and implementation is proceeding through CSTD, while Souter’s historical account shows persistent failures to reach agreement, and audience members note the concept remains contested after 20 years.

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Approach to achieving consensus in working groups

Speakers

– Peter Major
– Jimson Olufuye
– Audience

Arguments

Working groups should reflect different opinions equally rather than seeking consensus, similar to how the WGIG operated

Previous opposition to CSTD as the venue has largely evaporated, with near-consensus (99.9%) supporting this approach

The 12 recommendations from previous working groups should be revisited and utilized rather than forgotten

Summary

Major advocates for abandoning consensus-seeking and presenting multiple viewpoints equally, while Olufuye claims consensus has been achieved, and audience members suggest utilizing previously agreed recommendations rather than starting over.

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Unexpected differences

Historical accuracy and interpretation of Tunis negotiations

Speakers

– David Souter
– Audience

Arguments

Enhanced cooperation emerged from contentious negotiations at WSIS Tunis in 2005, particularly around internet governance and ICANN oversight

Enhanced cooperation was a compromise solution created by UK diplomat David Hendon to resolve deadlock between different governmental positions on internet governance

Explanation

An audience member who claimed to be present during the Tunis negotiations challenged David Souter’s historical account, arguing that Souter was not in the actual negotiation room and providing specific details about how the concept was created by David Hendon as a compromise. This disagreement over historical facts was unexpected as it questioned the credibility of the expert panel’s historical narrative.

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Optimism versus realism about current consensus

Speakers

– Jimson Olufuye
– Audience

Arguments

Previous opposition to CSTD as the venue has largely evaporated, with near-consensus (99.9%) supporting this approach

The concept has remained contested and ill-defined for 20 years, potentially undermining the efficacy of the WSIS project

Explanation

Olufuye’s optimistic assessment of near-consensus was directly challenged by an audience member who questioned whether such optimism was realistic given the 20-year history of contestation. This disagreement was unexpected because it directly contradicted the private sector representative’s positive outlook with a more skeptical assessment of progress.

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Overall assessment

Summary

The discussion revealed fundamental disagreements about the definition, scope, implementation status, and future direction of enhanced cooperation. Key areas of disagreement included whether enhanced cooperation should be understood narrowly (technical coordination) or broadly (addressing power asymmetries), whether consensus has been achieved or remains elusive, and what institutional mechanisms are needed.

Disagreement level

Moderate to high level of disagreement with significant implications. While speakers agreed on using existing institutions rather than creating new ones, they fundamentally disagreed on the nature of the problem enhanced cooperation is meant to solve and whether progress has been made. This suggests that after 20 years, the concept remains as contested as ever, potentially undermining efforts to implement it effectively in the WSIS+20 process. The disagreements reflect deeper tensions between different stakeholder groups and their varying perspectives on internet governance power structures.

Partial agreements

Similar viewpoints

Both speakers support working within existing institutional frameworks rather than creating new structures, though from different perspectives – resource efficiency for private sector and institutional complementarity for civil society

Speakers

– Jimson Olufuye
– Anriette Esterhuysen

Arguments

The private sector opposes creating new structures due to limited resources and prefers working within existing frameworks

The concept should be separated from but complementary to multistakeholder approaches, with both being legitimate processes

Topics

Economic | Legal and regulatory

Both emphasized the value of previous working group efforts and the importance of reflecting diverse opinions rather than forcing consensus, suggesting that valuable work has been done that shouldn’t be discarded

Speakers

– Peter Major
– Audience

Arguments

Working groups should reflect different opinions equally rather than seeking consensus, similar to how the WGIG operated

The 12 recommendations from previous working groups should be revisited and utilized rather than forgotten

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Key takeaways

Enhanced cooperation emerged from 2005 WSIS Tunis negotiations as a compromise solution to enable governments to participate on equal footing in international public policy issues pertaining to the Internet, excluding day-to-day technical matters

The concept has remained contested and ill-defined for 20 years, with two CSTD working groups (2013-14 and 2016-18) failing to reach full consensus on implementation recommendations

The IANA transition in 2016 addressed one major original concern driving enhanced cooperation discussions, changing the landscape of the debate

There is growing acceptance that CSTD should serve as the institutional home for enhanced cooperation rather than creating new structures

Enhanced cooperation and multistakeholder approaches should be viewed as separate but complementary legitimate processes that can reinforce each other

Power asymmetries between governments remain at the root of enhanced cooperation needs and cannot be ignored in discussions

The private sector generally opposes creating new institutional structures due to resource constraints and prefers working within existing frameworks

Resolutions and action items

Use the existing Tunis Agenda definition of enhanced cooperation rather than continuing to debate what it means

Emphasize that enhanced cooperation excludes day-to-day technical coordination as specified in the Tunis Agenda

Invite UN agencies, General Assembly, and other multilateral bodies to report on how they enable government participation on equal footing in internet-related public policy

Integrate these reports into the CSTD review process to create a record of enhanced cooperation activities

Consider enhancing CSTD’s mandate through resolution if needed to formally include enhanced cooperation responsibilities

Revisit and utilize the 12 recommendations from previous working groups rather than abandoning them

Unresolved issues

Whether CSTD’s current mandate is sufficient or needs formal enhancement to handle enhanced cooperation

How to achieve consensus on enhanced cooperation implementation given persistent disagreements over scope and objectives

The specific mechanisms and procedures for operationalizing enhanced cooperation within existing institutions

How to balance intergovernmental spaces for enhanced cooperation with multistakeholder participation

Whether the changing geopolitical landscape and new issues like AI governance require different approaches to enhanced cooperation

How to address the fundamental power asymmetries that drive the need for enhanced cooperation

Suggested compromises

Accept CSTD as the institutional home for enhanced cooperation while allowing for multistakeholder participation

Focus on enhancing existing institutions rather than creating new ones to address resource constraints

Separate enhanced cooperation from multistakeholder approaches while recognizing both as legitimate and complementary processes

Use working group approaches that reflect different opinions equally rather than seeking full consensus

Create spaces within multilateral processes for more equal government participation similar to ICANN’s GAC model

Apply multistakeholder guidelines to multilateral decision-making processes to ensure more equal participation among governments

We cannot work in a consensus way. So a working group should work in the way the WGIC used to work. It should reflect different opinions, different options, and without making a ranking among the recommendations, or making ranking among the different opinions.

Speaker

Peter Major

Reason

This comment fundamentally challenges the traditional approach to international negotiations by suggesting that seeking consensus may actually be counterproductive. It introduces a paradigm shift from trying to find common ground to accepting and documenting diverse viewpoints equally.

Impact

This insight reframed the entire discussion about why enhanced cooperation efforts have stalled. It moved the conversation from ‘how to achieve consensus’ to ‘how to work productively without consensus,’ influencing subsequent speakers to consider alternative approaches to the deadlock.

Enhanced cooperation was a result of a very hard bargain compromise in the negotiations… So the solution is to recognize the right of governments, and to say, and in the other hand, to create this multistakeholder IGF, and that the implementation of that right in the mechanism will be this enhanced cooperation that will be open for the next six months to that.

Speaker

Juan (Audience member)

Reason

This comment provides crucial historical context that reveals enhanced cooperation as a political compromise rather than a well-defined concept. It exposes the fundamental tension between governmental sovereignty and multistakeholder governance that has persisted for 20 years.

Impact

This intervention significantly shifted the discussion by grounding it in historical reality rather than theoretical interpretations. It forced other panelists to acknowledge the political origins of the concept and influenced the conversation toward more pragmatic solutions.

What has changed is what the priority issues or what the concerns are… At the time in 2005, ICANN and the oversight of ICANN by the U.S. government was a major concern. That is not as major a concern… But for example, what is done about AI and decisions about how governments and intergovernmental processes and decisions should impact on AI, that is a major concern.

Speaker

Anriette Esterhuysen

Reason

This comment brilliantly illustrates how the digital landscape has evolved, making the original concerns about enhanced cooperation less relevant while new challenges have emerged. It demonstrates the dynamic nature of internet governance issues.

Impact

This observation redirected the discussion from historical debates to contemporary relevance, helping participants understand why enhanced cooperation discussions have felt stagnant and what new directions might be more productive.

Enhanced cooperation is enhanced communication, collaboration, coordination between state and non-state actors… And I think we should really use the enhanced cooperation as a positive concept to enhance communication, to enhance coordination… and not to go back to the battles of the past.

Speaker

Wolfgang (Audience member)

Reason

This comment offers a constructive reframing of enhanced cooperation from a contentious political concept to a practical operational approach. It suggests moving beyond historical grievances to focus on functional cooperation.

Impact

This intervention helped shift the tone of the discussion from defensive positions to collaborative possibilities, influencing the final exchanges toward more solution-oriented thinking.

There are power asymmetries at the root of this… ignoring that… There are power asymmetries at the root of this is, it’s, I don’t know, it’s either naive or Machiavellian or some kind of very unhelpful combination of both.

Speaker

Anriette Esterhuysen

Reason

This comment cuts through diplomatic language to identify the core issue that enhanced cooperation was designed to address – fundamental power imbalances in global internet governance. It challenges attempts to depoliticize what is inherently a political issue.

Impact

This stark assessment prevented the discussion from becoming too sanitized or academic, keeping the focus on the real-world political dynamics that make enhanced cooperation both necessary and difficult to implement.

Overall assessment

These key comments fundamentally shaped the discussion by moving it through several important phases: from historical analysis to practical lessons learned, from theoretical definitions to political realities, and from past grievances to future possibilities. Peter Major’s insight about abandoning consensus-seeking provided a methodological breakthrough, while Juan’s historical intervention grounded the discussion in political reality. Anriette’s observations about changing priorities and persistent power asymmetries kept the conversation relevant and honest, while Wolfgang’s reframing toward positive cooperation offered a constructive path forward. Together, these comments transformed what could have been a repetitive rehashing of old debates into a more nuanced exploration of how to make progress on a persistently challenging issue. The discussion evolved from explaining why enhanced cooperation has failed to identifying practical ways it might succeed in the current context.

What does enhanced cooperation mean today in a rapidly evolving digital landscape, and how should this be reflected in the WSIS Plus 20 outcome?

Speaker

Konstantinos Komaitis

Explanation

This was posed as one of three guiding questions for the panel discussion to frame the conversation about enhanced cooperation in the current context

How do existing mechanisms such as forums, partnerships, or policy platforms facilitate enhanced cooperation in practice?

Speaker

Konstantinos Komaitis

Explanation

This was the second guiding question to understand how current structures support enhanced cooperation

What are the gaps or opportunities for improvement in the WSIS Plus 20 process?

Speaker

Konstantinos Komaitis

Explanation

This was part of the third guiding question to identify areas needing attention in the review process

How can the WSIS 20 review process foster a shared understanding of enhanced cooperation among diverse stakeholders?

Speaker

Konstantinos Komaitis

Explanation

This was the final guiding question focused on building consensus among different stakeholder groups

What has been the impact on the efficacy of the WSIS project in having such an ill-defined or contested concept at its very heart?

Speaker

Chris

Explanation

Chris questioned whether having enhanced cooperation as a contested concept has undermined the overall WSIS project effectiveness

Has that undermined the work that we’ve actually been trying to do and achieve with the WSIS?

Speaker

Chris

Explanation

This follows up on whether the contested nature of enhanced cooperation has been detrimental to WSIS goals

What can we make of this today that is workable within the institutions that are already there?

Speaker

Anna

Explanation

Anna sought practical solutions for implementing enhanced cooperation within existing institutional frameworks for the WSIS plus 20 review

Could I ask you who participated in the last nine sessions from the Benedictine for Enhanced Cooperation meeting?

Speaker

Vladimir Minkin

Explanation

Vladimir sought clarification about participation in recent enhanced cooperation meetings and questioned why 12 agreed recommendations were forgotten

Why not to use them [the 12 recommendations]?

Speaker

Vladimir Minkin

Explanation

Vladimir questioned why previously agreed recommendations from enhanced cooperation meetings were not being utilized

How can spaces be created in multilateral or multistakeholder processes similar to how ICANN created the GAC for governments?

Speaker

Anriette Esterhuysen

Explanation

Anriette suggested exploring how to create dedicated government spaces in other governance processes, using ICANN’s Government Advisory Committee as a model

How can multistakeholder approaches be used to ensure more equal participation among governments in multilateral decision-making processes?

Speaker

Anriette Esterhuysen

Explanation

This explores how to address power asymmetries in international governance processes through multistakeholder mechanisms

Can a resolution be proposed to expand CSTD’s mandate beyond just follow-up to also handle enhanced cooperation?

Speaker

Jimson Olufuye

Explanation

Jimson suggested this as a practical solution to address the limitation that CSTD currently only has a mandate for WSIS follow-up and review