Rubik’s Cube of Global Security / DAVOS 2025

Summary

This panel discussion at the World Economic Forum focused on the complex global security landscape and its future prospects. Participants examined various conflicts and geopolitical tensions, including the situations in Ukraine, the Middle East, and Libya. They discussed the potential impacts of Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency, particularly on international relations and conflict resolution efforts.

The panelists highlighted concerns about the erosion of the post-Cold War security order and the rise of great power rivalries. They noted increased global unpredictability and lawlessness, with particular emphasis on nuclear proliferation risks. The discussion touched on the changing dynamics of alliances, especially within NATO and transatlantic relations.

Regarding specific conflicts, the panel explored potential scenarios for Ukraine, considering both optimistic and pessimistic outcomes. They also addressed the ongoing situation in Gaza and broader Middle East dynamics, including the possibility of Saudi-Israeli normalization. The Libyan representative emphasized the need for a multifaceted approach to stability, beyond just security measures.

The conversation highlighted the critical role of U.S.-China relations in shaping global security. Panelists noted both challenges and potential opportunities in this relationship under a potential Trump administration. Despite the complex issues discussed, some participants expressed cautious optimism about certain aspects of future global security dynamics, particularly regarding conflict resolution possibilities.

Keypoints

Major discussion points:

– The current global security landscape is more dire and complicated than it has been in decades, with multiple ongoing conflicts and threats of great power war

– The future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is under serious pressure, with increased interest in nuclear weapons in various regions

– The role Donald Trump may play in global conflicts and negotiations if he returns to office in 2025

– The complex situation in Libya and challenges to establishing stability and democracy there

– US-China relations and how they impact global conflict resolution efforts

Overall purpose:

The goal of this panel discussion was to examine the current state of global security, analyze key conflicts and challenges, and consider how leadership changes (particularly a potential Trump presidency) may impact these issues in the coming years.

Tone:

The tone was primarily serious and concerned given the gravity of the topics discussed. However, there were also notes of cautious optimism, particularly toward the end when some panelists expressed hope that even difficult situations could potentially be managed or improved with the right approach. The tone shifted slightly from more pessimistic at the start to somewhat more optimistic by the conclusion.

Speakers

– Daniel Kurtz Phelan: Editor of Foreign Affairs magazine

– Comfort Ero: President and CEO of the International Crisis Group

– Alexander Stubb: President of Finland

– Rafael Mariano Grossi: Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency

– Abdulhamid Al Dabiba: Prime Minister of Libya’s government of national unity in Tripoli

– Meghan O’Sullivan: Director of the Belfer Center at Harvard, former Deputy National Security Advisor

Additional speakers:

– None identified

Global Security Landscape: A Complex and Dire Situation

A panel discussion at the World Economic Forum in Davos brought together experts to examine the multifaceted challenges facing global security. The conversation painted a picture of a world at a critical juncture, reminiscent of pivotal historical moments like 1918, 1944, or 1989.

Comfort Ero, President and CEO of the International Crisis Group, emphasized the unpredictability and increasing lawlessness in global affairs, noting that the current security situation is more dire than it has been in decades. This sentiment was echoed by other panelists, who highlighted the erosion of the post-Cold War security order and the rise of great power rivalries.

Nuclear Proliferation and Non-Proliferation Challenges

Rafael Mariano Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, warned that the nuclear non-proliferation situation is “getting really worse.” He pointed out that the common ground on nuclear weapons and non-proliferation among major powers is “simply no longer there.” Grossi cited specific concerns about North Korea’s nuclear program, potential nuclear ambitions in South Korea and Japan, and Iran’s nuclear ambiguity. He also noted that the longstanding consensus on the nuclear test moratorium is being questioned, further complicating non-proliferation efforts.

Ukraine Conflict and Peace Prospects

Alexander Stubb, President of Finland, identified the next three to six months as a critical window for a potential peace deal in Ukraine. He stressed that any agreement must respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The panel considered both optimistic and pessimistic scenarios for the conflict’s resolution, including the potential impact of a possible return of Donald Trump to the US presidency in 2025.

Middle East Dynamics and US Foreign Policy

Meghan O’Sullivan, Director of the Belfer Center at Harvard, provided insights into potential US foreign policy priorities in the Middle East under a second Trump administration. She suggested that Trump’s biggest priority would likely be normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel, viewing this as “unfinished business” from his first term following the Abraham Accords. O’Sullivan also noted the possibility of a Trump administration pursuing a deal with Iran, potentially combining a more robust threat of force with deal-making efforts.

Libya: A Case Study in Post-Conflict Challenges

Abdulhamid Al Dbeibeh, Prime Minister of Libya’s government of national unity in Tripoli, offered a perspective on the challenges faced by countries dealing with internal conflicts. He emphasized the need for a multifaceted approach to stability, including democratic institutions, economic development, and a constitution that reflects Libyan society, highlighting the complexities of state-building in post-conflict environments.

US-China Relations: A Defining Factor in Global Security

The panel identified US-China relations as a critical element shaping global security dynamics. O’Sullivan noted that structural issues, such as technological competition, limit the scope for quick resolutions in this relationship. She emphasized the need for sustained diplomatic dialogues to manage US-China interactions effectively, regardless of who is in power in the United States.

The Trump Factor in Global Politics

The potential return of Donald Trump to the US presidency emerged as a significant factor in discussions about future global security dynamics. Panelists considered how a second Trump term might affect various international issues, from the Ukraine conflict to Middle East policy and US-China relations.

Cautious Optimism Amidst Challenges

Despite the gravity of the issues discussed, some panelists expressed cautious optimism about certain aspects of future global security dynamics. There was a recognition that even difficult situations could potentially be managed or improved with the right diplomatic approaches and international cooperation.

Conclusion

The discussion underscored the interconnected nature of global security challenges, from regional conflicts and nuclear proliferation to great power competition. As the international community navigates this complex landscape, the insights provided by these experts highlight the importance of sustained engagement, careful negotiation, and a commitment to international norms and institutions in addressing the security challenges of our time.

Daniel Kurtz Phelan: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to this discussion. I’m Dan Kurtz-Phalen. I’m the editor of Foreign Affairs magazine. Thanks so much to WEF and the WEF team for the chance to partner on this discussion. We really have an embarrassment of riches when it comes to the experience and expertise and perspective up here. And we also have what I think it’s safe to say is the most complicated global security landscape in decades. I think Rubik’s Cube, the title of this panel, is probably an understatement. So I’m going to get right into this with no real preface. You have bios for all of our five speakers. I should also say we’re at, I think at the moment, at three of five who have written really fantastic pieces in foreign affairs over the last several months and will hopefully add to those in the months to come. So I don’t want to neglect to mention that. Let me start with Comfort Arrow. Comfort is the president and CEO of the International Crisis Group, which really for every conflict or potential conflict on Earth, both those in the headlines and those not in the headlines, does some of the most incisive analysis and provides some of the smartest, most constructive recommendations on what should be done. And so Comfort, I want to go to you to give us a sense of whether the kind of broad impression we have of the security landscape really being more dire than it’s been in decades, probably in our professional lives, looking at Sudan and Gaza in the Middle East and Ukraine and the kind of threat of great power war in ways that we really wouldn’t have contemplated not long ago have become front of mind. Just to step back and really give us a sense of how we’ve gotten here, when you look at the kind of post-Cold War security order and the hopes of that moment, Crisis Group was so central to those hopes in that sense that peacemaking could really be a central part of the international system and a source of cooperation among powers. Why at this moment have we gone from those hopes to this landscape that’s characterized by a number of really terrible wars and the threat of even more?

Comfort Ero: a pertinent question and really good that we’re able to discuss this at the start of the year with Davos. I mean as most of you in the audience will know every year Crisis Group issues what it calls ten conflicts to watch in association with foreign policy and since I became president, Dan, but even I looked back at what my predecessors did and never in the life of Crisis Group, our bread and butter is the off-the-radar conflicts, the ones that are not often in the headlines. So you’ve mentioned some of them, you know, the Sudan’s, the Haiti’s, the Myanmar, although credit to Davos for holding consistently the last few years a focus on on Myanmar. But I’ve never, this is the first time that we’ve got a ten conflicts to watch that really is being shaped by two factors, in fact one is a symptom of it. So the big shaper of our ten conflicts to watch this year is about big power rivalry, major power tensions and how global politics itself is going in the wrong direction. I see Trump as a symptom of that and it’s also not a surprise that the Trump factor is really what has shaped our ten conflicts, for example, this year and in every single conflict that we’ve got on that list, bar Sudan and Myanmar, we expect to see a real shift in policy from Biden to Trump as well. You know, the US may have a role in Sudan, given that it’s often been a penholder, but we have serious question marks about that. So that’s just one thing to say and I think the headline for us this year is unpredictable, although which year wasn’t unpredictable, but more unpredictable this year. We also said that it was a year of more lawlessness and that international law itself has already been battered in the last decade or so, but expect to see more lawlessness and if you wanted an indication of that, Panama and Greenland, you can wake up in the morning and say, well, I want to take over your country, raises questions about where, then, stands international law. I think the other concern is just that we are seeing a paradigm shift. The question is, which way is it going to go? Which way is the arc going to bend, as well? There is a rest of the world out there that is not necessarily catastrophizing about this moment, that they see opportunity in transactionalism, that they see opportunity in a sense in that we’re in it together now, that the US, we’re one amongst equals in this sense, as well. I think the three things that keep me and worry me now, Dan, in terms of the future of the security order, is a sense in which there’s a shock therapy for allies who are used to a collective deterrence architecture, what is going to happen to that deterrent structure. I think the other thing that worries me, and it’s good to have Mr. Grossi on here, is the future of the nuclear proliferation, particularly when you look at it from the context of Russia, Ukraine. I think there may be opportunities vis-a-vis Iran. And I do think for an organization that worries about conflict prevention, suddenly I’m asking myself whether trade and tariff talks can help lower the temperature. Can you use that as a negotiating bargaining chip? Or will it unravel and lead to miscalculations on the high seas, as well? So lots to worry about. But I would also say that there are opportunities and innovations. The question is whether as you’re striking a grand deal, that there is somebody in the room that enables it to stick, because it’s OK to strike a deal for today. But as we all know, the art of deal making requires you to also make sure that you keep an eye on the deal that you strike, that it actually yields the dividends that you want, as well.

Daniel Kurtz Phelan: Can I ask you to just say a bit more about the Trump factor here? We’re only two days into the administration, so all of this is a matter of reading tea leaves. But he, on the one hand, talks about himself. as a peacemaker, you saw kind of extraordinary cooperation between the outgoing Biden team and the incoming Trump team on getting to at least the first phase of the ceasefire in Gaza. On the other hand, he has disregarded some of the, at least rhetorically, the core principles of the rules-based order in talking about Panama and Greenland and embracing this sort of might is right principle. How do you see those dynamics playing out in Trump too? I mean, look, at one level, Trump is erratic, throws things, throws bombshells on the table. And the question is whether you’re ready to adjust to those bombshells and whether you can negotiate. What I’ve understood, and people like Meghan will have a better sense of this,

Comfort Ero: is that he will go in with the highest sort of demand, so the 60% on China. But as we talked this week, Dan, he’s already lowered the threshold as well. So thinking about what he can get, only a Trump could have invited a Xi Jinping to inauguration and he sent somebody else. So again, I think there’s opportunities if you can make a compelling case. The era of sovereignty is back. We are all sovereign. We are all going to be thinking from our own national interest, for narrow national interest. And every country has a clear view on understanding of their national interest. The other thing that is very clear to me is that it doesn’t enable your cause to be weak in front of a wheeler dealer. You’re better off coming to the table with a clear sense of who you are, what you want. And anyway, these countries also have agency. I think the one thing that the other side always has to remember, a Trumpian kind of figure also needs to recognize that there are agents on the other side who have also a very clear sense of their national interest. There was an excellent article written in your magazine that Asia is not necessarily worried or catastrophizing. And there’s a clear sense of what their national security… looks like. So I think there is something to take away about the art of deal-making

Daniel Kurtz Phelan: from the other side of the table as well. Let me go to Alexander Studd. He’s of course the president of Finland, a job you’ve held for a little more than a year. Finland is today really central to these questions in a way it would not have been just a few years ago. I imagine that’s not a status you’re particularly happy to have, but as a country with a very long border with Russia and also as a new member of NATO, has become a very interesting player in a lot of these dynamics. If we’ve gone back even five years ago or something before Trump’s first term and you looked at the transatlantic relationship and NATO, I mean that seemed like such a kind of solid pillar of the post-Cold War order. That is no longer the case. We can get into some of those specifics, but I think it’s worth stepping back to to get a sense of from where you sit what this changing order looks like. You’re a student of world order as well as of

Alexander Stubb: course a head of state. How do you see this shift? Yeah well I kind of, thanks and I kind of hope that it’s not a Rubik’s Cube because what it has four colors, four different sides, nine squares, 43 billion different possibilities and only one solution. So you know it shouldn’t be that complicated, but I think you know Finnish, Finland’s predicament is pretty much part of a bigger change in the world order. You know my argument is that this is the 1918, 1944 or 1989 moment of our generation without catastrophizing it. It’s one of these moments when there’s a big shift in in world politics and of course after World War I League of Nations wasn’t strong enough so they got it wrong. After World War II the current liberal order, especially the creation of the UN, you could argue that they got it more or less right from some perspectives. And of course in 1989 a lot of people in the West got a little bit lazy. You know history didn’t end and then you can always you know have an argument about what was the date in the shift. Was it 9-11? Was it Li-Ming? Brothers, you know, was it Brexit, was it Trump 1.0, but in my mind as a Finn it was definitely the 24th of February 2022. Now of course I could argue that well Russia did the same thing in Georgia and did the same thing in the Crimean Peninsula, but the bottom line is that the shift started at that stage and if you really really want to simplify things, which I think in international relations sometimes is useful, you could say that on one side you have a choice of, you know, multilateral order, a liberal order where you believe in international institutions norms and rules, and on the other side you have multipolar transactionalism where, you know, the rule of the might is. And I don’t say this only because I come from Finland, but I guess the choice at the end of the day is between Yalta and Helsinki. In Yalta it was the big powers, the victors of World War One that carved up not only Europe and European security but the world, whereas in Helsinki it was a new European security structure with three key principles including independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. And this is sort of the tension that we’re dealing with right now, so a very complex world but I still think manageable.

Daniel Kurtz Phelan: Let me drill down on the Ukraine dimension of this because that has of course been one of the central questions about what happens in Trump’s second term given what he said and what J.D. Vance and others in the administration have said, and it’s been obviously a central topic of conversation over the last couple of days here in Davos. What, as you look at the next year or so in Ukraine, do you see as a plausible optimistic scenario given the state of the battlefield and given the key players? And then if we look at, you know, what I think most Ukrainians would consider a more, a less positive scenario. area, where you have some kind of peace forced on them by Trump and Putin and other great powers.

Alexander Stubb: What would that mean for European security and for Finland, given where you sit? Well, first of all, I think the timeline is that 24 hours has become somewhere between three to six months. That’s probably the window of opportunity that we are dealing with. I think on the optimistic and positive side is that Trump is very adamant about achieving peace. And obviously, he takes a lot of credit, and I would argue rightly so, for the situation in the Middle East. And he’s probably looking to find some kind of a deal which is similar to that. The other positive side is that I don’t think the American administration wants to lose this one. It’s very important to point out that this should not be an Afghanistan 2.0. And you don’t want to be in a situation whereby after six months when the deal has been done, the ones who were the deal makers are accused of basically selling out on Ukraine. So the starting point for us is no peace in Ukraine without Ukraine, and no peace in Ukraine without Europe. Because essentially, it’s also about the European security structure. I hasten to add, I actually think it’s about the global security structure as well. Because if you’re able to do territorial acquisition and power grabs like Russia is trying to do in Russia, that will happen everywhere. So then we are going to go really into a chaotic world. I still think that the situation on the ground is actually much better than we think. It’s a war of attrition. Russians are not moving as far as they are. The collateral damage, of course, is huge. I also think that the Russian economy is in much, much, much worse shape than some pundits claim. And from this starting point, I think it’s important to install into the thinking of Donald Trump and his administration, who are going to do the deal, and also to China, who can influence Russia, that the three key principles are still there. Independence, sovereignty, and territory. territorial integrity. Independence, no one should ever question the independent state of Ukraine. Sovereignty, I don’t think anyone should question the sovereignty of Ukraine to decide about NATO membership or about EU membership. Territorial integrity, I admit, more complicated, but I don’t think we should give in on that either. So it’s a complex package. I don’t envy the Trump administration if and when they want to do a deal within three to six months, but I’m actually quite hopeful because Trump needs to come out of

Daniel Kurtz Phelan: this one a winner, and I think he will. Rafael Grossi, let me go to you to pick up on some of the points that I think Comfort started with. You are, of course, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency. I’d say both halves of your mandate, both nuclear energy and nuclear weapons, are matters of extreme urgency at this particular moment, but I want to focus on the nuclear weapons have to start. There are so many signs that the nonproliferation order, again, another kind of central pillar of the post-Cold War and even before, the kind of global security order, so much to think that that order is starting to fray. If you look at North Korea, you look at debates over nuclear weapons in South Korea and Japan, risks in Iran, everything that has happened in Ukraine and Russia, the threats from Russia about nuclear use. As you look at nonproliferation order more generally, what are the fears that you’re looking at?

Rafael Mariano Grossi: What are the dynamics that you see as a real threat to that order over the next few years? Thank you, Don. It’s getting worse. It’s getting really worse. Some of the common denominators that even at times of conflict used to exist among, for example, the five permanent members of the Security Council and other major European countries in terms of nuclear weapons and nuclear nonproliferation is simply no longer there. Times of increased geostrategic tension, unfortunately like this, are increasing the attraction of nuclear weapons. We need to admit that that is the case. Even in Ukraine, where all debates about the wisdom of the system of having relinquished nuclear weapons have been heard. Of course, wrong. I think it’s very good that Ukraine joined the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state, but some have said, well, maybe had we had nuclear weapons, which we know was technically impossible and politically even more impossible, that would have been the case. We see the same in, of course, when it comes to the perennial, I would dare to say now, situation in the Middle East, and in particular with regards to Iran, where the continuation of this ambiguity and this status of presumed latency that Iran may have reached already, although of course they do not have nuclear weapons at the moment. They have a number of pieces of the jigsaw puzzle already, while at the same time showing continuous willingness to continue talking, although not getting or ever getting into a more stable place. So this also adds to the fact that while the Iran situation simmers and it continues to remain unresolved, other countries in the region, including a NATO ally, are saying if they get a nuclear weapon, we are going to get a nuclear weapon as well, or important countries. And they say it openly. I mean, it’s not something that, I’m not sharing any secret that I have because of my position. This has been said very clearly in the open. The consensus on the nuclear test moratorium is also being questioned now, with Russia de-ratifying the CTBT, and discussions in the United States and elsewhere about perhaps the need to resume nuclear testing. And the same thing we see in Asia. There is an open discussion in the Republic of Korea about the possibility of having nuclear weapons and the same applies to Japan. Not officially and not from the government, but many people discuss this with me when I go to Japan. The press come to me and they say, shouldn’t we have nuclear weapons? Couldn’t the current situation be expanded by adding two or three more countries? Wouldn’t that add to global stability? So what we see, of course, is that adding to what has been described by my co-panelists as a situation of great concern, we have to add this enormous real pressure on one of the basic tenets of international life, I would say, which is the non-proliferation norm and the non-proliferation regime, which warps and all, has been serving us well. You were saying you are following ten conflicts now. Imagine if all those ten you had to add the nuclear weapon factor, as we see it in other places. So for us it’s a matter of, first of all, re-commitment, strong re-commitment, especially of the big players, to the non-proliferation regime, strengthening the arm of the IAEA as the instrument that guarantees that that actually is the case.

Daniel Kurtz Phelan: Let me just linger before moving on to other speakers on the Iran piece of this, because I think that’s probably the issue most urgently and the one on which you’re spending the most time these days. Iran is in an incredibly weakened state. Its missile capacity, its proxies have been degraded significantly over the past year or so. That has led to two, I think, somewhat conflicting ways of seeing the situation, or two tensions and two dynamics that are in tension. On the one hand, you could understand what why Iran would want to rush towards a nuclear weapons capability, given where it is. It’s much closer to that point than it was in the Obama administration when JCPOA was signed or in the first Trump administration when the US withdrew from JCPOA. On the other hand, there seems to be interest, at least so far as Iran is signaling it, in a deal. There could be a chance for Trump to come in and do something that he can sell as bigger and better and more beautiful than the original Iran deal. How close is Iran to moving towards that point? What signs do you see that it may be doing so? And what possibility do you see for a deal that would really stabilize us for the time being? Indeed, well, they don’t have nuclear weapons. This is very clear, and we should not confuse people.

Rafael Mariano Grossi: At the same time, if we take as a line of departure, let’s say 2018, when the JCPOA starts unraveling, and you compare 2018 with 2025, the nuclear program in Iran has spawned in every possible direction. So it is obvious that something like the JCPOA would no longer be fit for purpose, and you would have to think about something else. Of course, the principle, and this is something I discussed in Tehran with President Pesashkian and Foreign Minister Raqji, of course, the principle of the transactional nature, the philosophy behind JCPOA still would apply to an agreement inspired by President Trump, maybe, with the accompaniment of the European E3 that have been engaging with Iran, even this month, a few days ago. But in any case, what we see is that we would have to move into a different kind of thing. The complicating factor, not an impossible factor, as President Stubbe was saying, can be managed, but it’s enormously difficult. It’s going back to my initial point about the lack of common denominators. In the past, when you were dealing with these issues, you would, albeit the great difference that might exist among the P5 plus Germany maybe, or the EU, or whomever actors you could have vis-a-vis Iran, there was a basic understanding. Not anymore. So this is a sea change that we have. So you’re not going to be seeing all those on one side of the table, negotiating some with more understanding and sympathy for the other guy. You’re not going to be seeing that anymore. So we have to think about a different architecture, a different shape of the table. And in this, of course, we will have to, I think, as the guarantors of any agreement, have to be or should be playing a very indispensable role as the, you know, guardians of the NPT.

Daniel Kurtz Phelan: As we shift to the Prime Minister, let me just say that for those of you who need simultaneous translation, this is the moment to put your headsets on. Prime Minister, of course, of Libya’s government of national unity in Tripoli, your country has, for years now, exemplified as much as any other the challenge of both local actors and external actors trying to find some path to stability in a very complicated situation. I want to start with what is a fairly straightforward question, but one that hasn’t had a very straightforward answer for many years. And that’s the simple matter of what Libya’s prospects are for moving past both its political stalemate, which has characterized the country for the last several years, and the economic effects, especially the central bank crisis that has made it so much harder to resolve. What is the state of the negotiations, the state of process for resolving that? To begin with, I would very much like to thank you for the kind invitation.

Abdulhamid Al Dabiba: Libya, since its inception as a state, has always been a country without any democratic institutions, unfortunately, since its independence. Post-independence, we had the royal monarchy for 17 years in Libya, and then, from then, they moved to a regime that cannot be defined. Even the Libyans themselves, they don’t know the type of regime that has governed them for the last 40-plus years. At times it was democratic, at times it was autocratic, it was socialist, it was a blend. Since the 17th of February, Libya moved to a different state, different situation, and therefore we realized that our country was absolutely geographically pivotal, important. It has a geostrategic situation, which is very important, but we did not have any laws, any legal frameworks, no institutions, and therefore we had these conflicts, whether internal or external. Many external actors intervened, especially neighboring countries, and even countries that are very far also intervened in our internal affairs, and therefore we went through conflicting situations that literally devastated and caused the collapse of what was in Libya. So all the problems were there. At the same time, I mean, you can think of any problem. And then we had it, and we have it still. We had polarization, military polarization, and today, for the last three years, we started work and we focused on one thing, which is the services for the population and stability. As a motto for our political stability, we said, no more wars. We want stability and we have to provide services, for example, electricity. We had blackouts for about 22 hours, hospitals were closed, schools were literally not operational, but today, thanks God, little by little, through the national unity government, we managed to re-establish these institutions, these services, and the exchange rate between the DNR and the dollar has been more balanced. But today, the situation is not perfect. I have to tell you, the things are not rosy, but we managed to recover normal life somehow in Libya and the challenge today in Libya, and I would very much like to thank the international community for backing us up. We have three, I would say, pillars that are important. Obviously, the challenges are very, very important. We have a military regime that wants to impose itself by arms, by weapons, and There is an ideological regime which makes of religion the motto to intervene, and we have the previous regime for 40 years who wants to come back to life, resuscitate somehow and be in power again in different ways. And today we have, after having the security prevailing, we have to work on democratizing the society because I believe that democracy is the only solution, which is the respect of the different components in our society. There are powers who want to intervene. They want to impose their agenda for many reasons, obviously interests of some external actors that want to impose their agenda on us. We cannot solve the problem of Libya only from a security point of view. This is not the only intervention, I would say, process. We need to have different processes. We need to have democratic institutions. We need to have a true constitution that reflects our society. We need to have a referendum to have that democratically set up a constitution. We have enough of weapons. We need stability. To begin with, we need to support the economy because the stabilizing economy is the way to stabilizing the political situation. We have oil, we have – and therefore we want foreign companies to come to invest in a win-win situation. The more the economy is stable, the more we have a stable country.

Daniel Kurtz Phelan: Just one more minute, if I could, before we go to Megan, on Donald Trump and what role he may play in resolving some of these during his first term. It’s a rather complicating factor from your predecessor’s perspective in his tacit support for some of the forces that were coming from eastern Libya. What do you worry about as you see Trump returning, and what do you think he may contribute to a solution? But again, just 60 seconds on this.

Abdulhamid Al Dabiba: I believe that not only Libya fears the return of Trump, many, including Europeans, are somehow having reservations and different views about how to perceive the return of Trump. We are somehow a weak country, vulnerable country. Our institutions are still weak. I mean, whether we talk about Trump or any other personalities, if we only focus on security, this is not the best recipe to solve the problems we have. We have many examples, I mean, in Syria lately and Afghanistan. And we reject the idea that the only solution is security solution in our country. I mean, there are alternatives. We need to look into our revive, our heritage. our economic fabric, this is precisely what is going to be the building blocks leading to a long-lasting stability. If Mr. Trump or American administration or whoever is in charge, if they really genuinely want Libya to be stable, then they have to find other ways to help us, and not only the security path. Otherwise, we are going back to square one, unfortunately, and we have many, many examples. But when the diagnosis is wrong, then the result is wrong.

Daniel Kurtz Phelan: If we focus on the security only, this is going to backfire at the end of the day. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister. That’s a good segue to Megan on Trump in the Middle East. Megan O’Sullivan is Director of the Belfer Center at Harvard, was Deputy National Security Advisor on the National Security Council in the Bush administration, has done a ton of other jobs in the U.S. government. Megan, looking at both the kind of urgent question of what happens with the ceasefire in Gaza, we’re in the first few days of phase one, but the path to getting to phase two and a real sustainable peace are very complicated, and that intersecting with Trump’s priorities in the region, the set of challenges that Trump is facing, how do you see both that urgent question of what happens in Gaza and the war between Israel and Hamas going forward, and how that fits with Trump’s priorities and likely actions in the region more broadly? Sure.

Meghan O’Sullivan: Thank you, Dan, and thanks for bringing this panel all together. I would say one of my takeaways from Davos, we’re a day and a half into it, is how much optimism I have heard from many Middle Eastern leaders about President Trump coming into office. And I think that’s great. really attributed to two things. First is the sense that President Trump does not make it hard to understand his intentions so there’s a lot of clarity and what is being said and what has been said by President Trump and also a willingness to use American leverage to try to get to those outcomes. I also think there’s a sense that there’s almost like a reset moment for many leaders not just in the Middle East but elsewhere that there’s an opportunity to recalibrate their positions on certain things and be able to attribute it to greater pressure from the Trump administration to do so. So there’s kind of a sense of opportunity. When it comes to Gaza in particular I think as President Strude mentioned that the Trump administration or the incoming President Trump does deserve some credit for this ceasefire that was achieved even before inauguration. I would point out what what was proven was that President Trump was able to use leverage and his his envoy Steve Whitkoff was in a good position and did a good job of you know saying to Prime Minister Netanyahu now is the time to make the deal. That’s very different than negotiating the ins and outs and all the minutiae of the deal that that was done over the course of a long period of time so that will be another challenge there. In terms of the longevity of the ceasefire you pointed out Dan that there are a lot of complex steps and really the next step is that within the first 16 days of this phase one there needs to start negotiations about phase two and that is going to be complex because I think the Israelis understand that part of phase two would involve having a different governing structure in Gaza than Hamas and if that’s the case the real question remains well who is going to be governing and that will require some really intense negotiations and a lot of the use of leverage to get a particular outcome. Now how can I be optimistic about this? given the given the challenges. I would say that one point of optimism is that as President Trump has taken a lot of credit for the ceasefire, he owns it now, which is a good thing. He’s very invested in this being a successful outcome. There’s also another component, and this gets the part of your question about priorities. Of course a Trump administration will have several priorities in the Middle East, but I would say President Trump’s biggest priority for the Middle East is normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel. This he sees as unfinished business from his first administration when you had the Abraham Accords bring about a stabilization of relations between several Arab countries and Israel. And so this is really the big enchilada, the Saudi-Israeli normalization, and he is determined that that is realized on his watch. Obviously Gaza is now an important component of that. It’ll be extremely hard to have that normalization without a better outcome in Gaza, and that’s good for the Palestinian people. And I think that’s going to be another reason why there will be focus on Gaza by the Trump administration. The other priority, and I know we’re short on time so just briefly, of course, is Iran, and we talked about that. And there I think there it’s going to be a challenge for the Trump administration to reconcile a variety of views within the administration. Some people very hawkish on Iran, seeing this moment of weakness as an opportunity to really press Tehran hard, and others, probably including President Trump, more desirous of a deal. But not anything that would resemble the JCPOA. As you said, it’s not fit for purpose now, but I think the ambitions would be much larger, that this would be a deal that would span Iran’s behavior in the region much more broadly. And one thing I think will be different about this negotiation, if it does occur, there will be a much more, a much stronger, and I would say more credible threat of the use of force, which was, of course, part of President Obama’s negotiation, but it wasn’t a very robust component. It’ll be much more robust this time.

Daniel Kurtz Phelan: Megan, to close, I want to go to something that I think has been looming over this entire conversation, but we’ve referred to explicitly only a couple of times, and that’s the US-China dynamic. US-China competition has been sharpening really over the last three or four administrations, probably ever since you left government, relations has been getting worse almost 20 years ago. So much of the ability of the various powerful actors in the world to resolve any one of these conflicts requires some degree of cooperation between the US and China. And of course, the greatest fears we would all have of a truly catastrophic great power war are really about US-China tensions. As you look at the Trump policy and the US-China relationship, as it has evolved and deteriorated over the last several years, how do you see that playing out, both with regard to conflict resolution more broadly and in the US-China context? I know it’s a big question for three minutes.

Meghan O’Sullivan: Yes, that’s true. One of the things, in terms of understanding President Trump, is just to look at the issues that he has repeatedly talked about for decades. And these are the issues that are going to animate his presidency in the second term. China is one of those issues, in the sense that China has, in his own words, taken advantage, and actually in the words of many others, of its invitation into the global economy. And so I think that is, again, a preoccupation of President Trump. However, he is someone who likes to take on problems that the perception is that no one else has been capable of fixing. And so I think there’s at least a possibility that he looks at the US-China relationship, and he says, well, there’s one thing everybody agrees on, and that’s the US should be tougher on China. And I’m going to show everybody that that’s not the case. And I’m going to take my personal relationship with Xi Jinping and try to change it into something that’s not. different. And here, I would say there’s definitely scope for a better US-China relationship, and that would behoove the world, and it would be helpful in so many of these conflicts. I would say Ukraine, maybe more so even than the Middle East. However, I think there are structural issues in the US-China relationship that don’t lend itself to a tactical negotiation. These are issues like the technological competition, the race around AI, Taiwan. These are issues that will need to be managed, and for that to be done successfully is going to require the kind of really embedded, very hard slog kind of diplomatic relationships that the Biden administration achieved over time with the Chinese government. And that’s extremely hard work and pretty unrewarding in some respects, but it’s those kinds of dialogues that will keep this relationship more stable through the management of these structural challenges that don’t lend themselves to negotiation. So I think we’ll get a chance to see if the Trump cabinet is interested in making those kinds of relationships and able to maintain them, and if President Trump is interested in owning the whole US-China relationship himself, trying to manage it just through a Xi-Trump relationship, which is more characteristic of his approach, or if we can have kind of a more multifaceted dialogue

Daniel Kurtz Phelan: between the US and China. I have to say, I’m surprised that I’m leaving this panel with a little bit more optimism than I came in with, not what I expected. But please thank our five speakers for that. This is one of the WEF panels that I wish were about four times longer, but I know 45 minutes is all we’ve got. So thank you, all five. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Amazing.

Agreement Points

Current global security situation is dire

speakers

– Comfort Ero
– Alexander Stubb

arguments

Current security situation is more dire than in decades

We are in a 1918/1944/1989 moment of major shift in world politics

summary

Both speakers agree that the current global security landscape is in a critical state, comparable to major historical shifts.

Nuclear non-proliferation regime under pressure

speakers

– Comfort Ero
– Rafael Mariano Grossi

arguments

Current security situation is more dire than in decades

Nuclear non-proliferation regime is under increasing pressure

summary

Both speakers highlight the increasing challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime in the current global context.

Similar Viewpoints

Both speakers see potential for diplomatic progress in conflict resolution under the Trump administration, particularly in the short term.

speakers

– Alexander Stubb
– Meghan O’Sullivan

arguments

Next 3-6 months are a critical window for potential peace deal

Gaza ceasefire shows Trump’s ability to use leverage

Both speakers recognize the complexity of the Iran nuclear issue and its impact on regional dynamics.

speakers

– Rafael Mariano Grossi
– Meghan O’Sullivan

arguments

Iran’s nuclear ambiguity creating proliferation pressures in Middle East

Iran policy will need to balance hawkish and deal-seeking views

Unexpected Consensus

Potential for positive outcomes under Trump administration

speakers

– Alexander Stubb
– Meghan O’Sullivan
– Abdulhamid Al Dabiba

arguments

Trump administration likely to pursue peace deal, but needs to avoid “selling out” Ukraine

Gaza ceasefire shows Trump’s ability to use leverage

Libya exemplifies challenges of local and external actors seeking stability

explanation

Despite concerns about Trump’s approach, there’s an unexpected consensus that his administration might achieve some positive outcomes in conflict resolution, particularly through leveraging relationships and clear intentions.

Overall Assessment

Summary

The speakers generally agree on the severity of the current global security situation, the challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the potential for diplomatic progress in conflict resolution. There’s also a shared recognition of the complexities in managing relationships with major powers like China and addressing regional issues like Iran’s nuclear program.

Consensus level

Moderate consensus on the overall global security landscape and key challenges. The implications suggest a need for innovative diplomatic approaches and careful management of great power relationships to address current security issues.

Different Viewpoints

Approach to resolving conflicts

speakers

– Abdulhamid Al Dabiba
– Meghan O’Sullivan

arguments

Libya exemplifies challenges of local and external actors seeking stability

Gaza ceasefire shows Trump’s ability to use leverage

summary

Al Dabiba emphasizes the need for internal democratic development and economic stability in Libya, while O’Sullivan highlights the effectiveness of external pressure and leverage in achieving outcomes like the Gaza ceasefire.

Unexpected Differences

Optimism about Trump’s return

speakers

– Abdulhamid Al Dabiba
– Meghan O’Sullivan

arguments

I believe that not only Libya fears the return of Trump, many, including Europeans, are somehow having reservations and different views about how to perceive the return of Trump

I would say one of my takeaways from Davos, we’re a day and a half into it, is how much optimism I have heard from many Middle Eastern leaders about President Trump coming into office

explanation

While Al Dabiba expresses concern about Trump’s return, O’Sullivan notes unexpected optimism from Middle Eastern leaders, highlighting a divergence in regional perspectives on Trump’s potential impact.

Overall Assessment

summary

The main areas of disagreement revolve around approaches to conflict resolution, the role of external actors in regional stability, and perspectives on Trump’s potential impact on global affairs.

difference_level

The level of disagreement among speakers is moderate. While there are differing views on specific issues, there is a general consensus on the complexity of the global security landscape and the need for multilateral approaches to address challenges. These differences reflect the diverse perspectives and experiences of the speakers, which can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of global security issues.

Partial Agreements

Both agree on the need for a peace deal in Ukraine, but Stubb emphasizes strict adherence to Ukraine’s sovereignty, while O’Sullivan suggests Trump may be more flexible in negotiations.

speakers

– Alexander Stubb
– Meghan O’Sullivan

arguments

Any deal must respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity

Trump administration likely to pursue peace deal, but needs to avoid “selling out” Ukraine

Similar Viewpoints

Both speakers see potential for diplomatic progress in conflict resolution under the Trump administration, particularly in the short term.

speakers

– Alexander Stubb
– Meghan O’Sullivan

arguments

Next 3-6 months are a critical window for potential peace deal

Gaza ceasefire shows Trump’s ability to use leverage

Both speakers recognize the complexity of the Iran nuclear issue and its impact on regional dynamics.

speakers

– Rafael Mariano Grossi
– Meghan O’Sullivan

arguments

Iran’s nuclear ambiguity creating proliferation pressures in Middle East

Iran policy will need to balance hawkish and deal-seeking views

Key Takeaways

The current global security landscape is more complex and dire than in decades, with major shifts occurring comparable to 1918/1944/1989

The Ukraine conflict remains a critical issue, with the next 3-6 months seen as a key window for a potential peace deal

Nuclear non-proliferation efforts are under increasing pressure globally

The Middle East faces ongoing challenges, particularly regarding the Gaza conflict and Iran’s nuclear ambitions

US-China relations will be a defining factor in global security, with structural issues limiting quick resolutions

Resolutions and Action Items

Strengthen commitment to the non-proliferation regime, especially from major powers

Pursue a peace deal for Ukraine that respects its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity

Work towards Saudi-Israel normalization as a priority for Middle East stability

Develop sustained diplomatic dialogues to manage US-China relationship

Unresolved Issues

How to effectively counter the increasing attraction of nuclear weapons in times of tension

The future governance structure of Gaza post-ceasefire

Balancing hawkish views and deal-seeking approaches in US policy towards Iran

How to address structural issues in US-China relations like technological competition and Taiwan

Suggested Compromises

Potential for a Trump-brokered deal on Ukraine, balancing peace efforts with avoiding perceptions of ‘selling out’ Ukraine

Exploring a new framework for Iran nuclear negotiations that goes beyond the JCPOA but includes regional behavior

Finding a middle ground in US-China relations between personal leader-to-leader engagement and broader institutional dialogues

I think the headline for us this year is unpredictable, although which year wasn’t unpredictable, but more unpredictable this year. We also said that it was a year of more lawlessness and that international law itself has already been battered in the last decade or so, but expect to see more lawlessness

speaker

Comfort Ero

reason

This comment sets the tone for the discussion by highlighting the increasing unpredictability and lawlessness in global affairs. It challenges the notion of a stable international order.

impact

It led to a deeper exploration of the changing global security landscape and how different actors are responding to this uncertainty.

You know my argument is that this is the 1918, 1944 or 1989 moment of our generation without catastrophizing it. It’s one of these moments when there’s a big shift in in world politics

speaker

Alexander Stubb

reason

This comment provides a historical perspective on the current global situation, framing it as a pivotal moment comparable to major shifts in the 20th century.

impact

It encouraged participants to think about the long-term implications of current events and how they might reshape the global order.

It’s getting worse. It’s getting really worse. Some of the common denominators that even at times of conflict used to exist among, for example, the five permanent members of the Security Council and other major European countries in terms of nuclear weapons and nuclear nonproliferation is simply no longer there.

speaker

Rafael Mariano Grossi

reason

This comment starkly highlights the deterioration of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, which has been a cornerstone of global security for decades.

impact

It shifted the discussion towards the specific challenges in nuclear non-proliferation and the risks of a new nuclear arms race.

We need to have democratic institutions. We need to have a true constitution that reflects our society. We need to have a referendum to have that democratically set up a constitution. We have enough of weapons. We need stability.

speaker

Abdulhamid Al Dabiba

reason

This comment provides insight into the challenges of state-building in a post-conflict society, emphasizing the importance of democratic institutions over military solutions.

impact

It broadened the discussion to include perspectives from countries dealing with internal conflicts and the complexities of establishing stable governance.

President Trump’s biggest priority for the Middle East is normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel. This he sees as unfinished business from his first administration when you had the Abraham Accords bring about a stabilization of relations between several Arab countries and Israel.

speaker

Meghan O’Sullivan

reason

This comment offers insight into potential future US foreign policy priorities in the Middle East under a second Trump administration.

impact

It led to a discussion of how US priorities might shift under different administrations and the potential implications for regional stability.

Overall Assessment

These key comments shaped the discussion by highlighting the multifaceted nature of global security challenges. They moved the conversation from broad geopolitical shifts to specific issues like nuclear proliferation, state-building in conflict zones, and regional diplomacy. The comments collectively painted a picture of a world in flux, with traditional norms and institutions under strain, while also pointing to potential areas for diplomatic engagement and conflict resolution. The diversity of perspectives – from international organizations, national leaders, and policy experts – provided a comprehensive view of the complex ‘Rubik’s Cube’ of global security.

How will the nuclear proliferation order evolve given current global tensions?

speaker

Rafael Mariano Grossi

explanation

Grossi highlighted increasing pressures on the non-proliferation regime and the need to re-commit to it, suggesting this is a critical area for ongoing monitoring and research.

What are the prospects for a new Iran nuclear deal under a Trump administration?

speaker

Rafael Mariano Grossi

explanation

Grossi indicated that the JCPOA is no longer fit for purpose and a new agreement would be needed, making this an important area for further exploration.

How can Libya move beyond security-focused solutions to achieve lasting stability?

speaker

Abdulhamid Al Dabiba

explanation

Al Dabiba emphasized the need for economic development and democratic institutions in addition to security measures, suggesting a need for research into comprehensive stabilization strategies.

What are the prospects for Saudi-Israeli normalization and how does it relate to the Gaza situation?

speaker

Meghan O’Sullivan

explanation

O’Sullivan identified this as a key priority for a potential Trump administration, indicating it’s an important area for ongoing analysis.

How might the US-China relationship evolve under a second Trump administration?

speaker

Meghan O’Sullivan

explanation

O’Sullivan highlighted the structural challenges in US-China relations and the potential for different approaches under Trump, suggesting this as a critical area for further study.