Agenda item 5: discussions on substantive issues contained inparagraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 75/240 (continued)/ part 4

Summary

This transcript captures the sixth meeting of the 11th Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICT Technologies, focused on the second reading of negotiations for a Draft Final Report. The Chair opened by apologizing for the late circulation of the revised draft report (REV-2), which was streamlined from 45 to 28 pages to address delegates’ requests for a more concise document. He emphasized that this final report should be viewed as part of a package including three previously adopted annual progress reports, and stressed that it represents the beginning of a new process rather than an end.

Multiple delegations provided preliminary reactions to REV-2, with several common themes emerging. Many countries, including the African Group and Arab Group, expressed disappointment over the removal of a dedicated thematic group on international law from the proposed future permanent mechanism structure. They argued this deletion undermines years of discussion on critical issues like sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. Several delegations also raised concerns about the threat section, arguing it overemphasizes critical infrastructure threats while neglecting other security concerns identified during the OEWG process.

Capacity building emerged as a widely supported priority, with many delegations welcoming the dedicated thematic group on this topic. However, concerns were raised about the lack of concrete steps to operationalize the UN voluntary trust fund for capacity building initiatives. Regarding stakeholder participation modalities, several countries expressed caution about proposed changes to the current non-objection procedure, preferring to maintain existing mechanisms.

The Chair acknowledged the various concerns raised, taking responsibility for deletions and additions made to achieve overall balance. He emphasized the need for pragmatism and prioritization to reach consensus by Friday’s deadline, noting that some organizational details could be addressed by the future permanent mechanism itself. The Chair concluded by appealing for constructive solutions and flexibility from all delegations to ensure a successful transition to the permanent mechanism.

Keypoints

## Major Discussion Points:

– **Streamlining and Balance of the Draft Final Report**: The Chair explained significant cuts from 45 to 28 pages while attempting to balance diverse viewpoints and expectations from member states, acknowledging that not all delegations’ priorities could be fully addressed.

– **Structure of the Future Permanent Mechanism**: Extensive debate over the number and focus of dedicated thematic groups, with particular concern about reducing from three to two groups and the removal of a dedicated group on international law, which disappointed African and Arab groups.

– **Capacity Building Priorities**: Strong support from multiple delegations for enhanced capacity building mechanisms, including calls for operationalizing a UN voluntary trust fund and ensuring adequate resources for developing countries’ ICT security capabilities.

– **Stakeholder Participation Modalities**: Significant disagreement over NGO participation procedures, with some delegations (like China) expressing concerns about politicized NGOs, while others sought more inclusive participation mechanisms beyond the current non-objection basis.

– **International Law Application in Cyberspace**: Multiple delegations, particularly from African and Arab groups, expressed disappointment over the removal of dedicated discussions on international law application, citing ongoing regional conflicts and the need for clarity on sovereignty and non-interference principles.

## Overall Purpose:

The discussion aimed to review and negotiate the second revision of a draft final report for transitioning from the current Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on ICT security to a future permanent mechanism under the UN framework, with the goal of achieving consensus adoption by the end of the week.

## Overall Tone:

The discussion maintained a diplomatic and constructive tone throughout, despite underlying tensions. The Chair set an optimistic yet pragmatic tone, acknowledging disappointments while emphasizing the need for consensus and compromise. Delegations expressed appreciation for the Chair’s efforts while firmly stating their positions and concerns. The tone remained professional and collaborative, with delegates showing flexibility and willingness to engage constructively, even when expressing significant reservations about specific elements of the draft.

Speakers

**Speakers from the provided list:**

– **Chair** – Chairperson of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICT Technologies

– **China** – Country representative/delegate

– **Viet Nam** – Country representative/delegate

– **Indonesia** – Country representative/delegate

– **Turkey** – Country representative/delegate

– **Thailand** – Country representative/delegate

– **Nigeria** – Country representative/delegate, speaking on behalf of the African group

– **Egypt** – Country representative/delegate

– **Mexico** – Country representative/delegate, speaking on behalf of a group of Latin American countries

– **Malaysia** – Country representative/delegate

– **Colombia** – Country representative/delegate

– **Islamic Republic of Iran** – Country representative/delegate

– **Tunisia** – Country representative/delegate, speaking on behalf of the Arab group

– **Ghana** – Country representative/delegate

– **Republic of Korea** – Country representative/delegate

**Additional speakers:**

None – all speakers who participated in the discussion were included in the provided speakers names list.

# Comprehensive Summary: Sixth Meeting of the 11th Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICT Technologies

## Introduction and Context

The sixth meeting of the 11th Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICT Technologies convened to conduct a second reading of negotiations for the Draft Final Report, marking a critical juncture in the transition from the current OEWG framework to a future permanent mechanism under the United Nations umbrella. The session was characterised by intensive diplomatic negotiations aimed at achieving consensus adoption by the end of the week, with significant time constraints and financial austerity measures preventing any extensions beyond Friday at 6 PM.

The Chair opened the proceedings with an apology for the late circulation of the revised draft report (REV-2), which had been substantially streamlined from 45 to 28 pages in response to delegates’ requests for a more concise document. This dramatic reduction represented a strategic attempt to balance diverse viewpoints and expectations from member states whilst maintaining the essential elements necessary for consensus-building.

## Chair’s Strategic Approach and Philosophical Framework

The Chair’s opening remarks established both the practical constraints and philosophical context for the negotiations. In a particularly thought-provoking reflection, the Chair positioned the current discussions within the broader historical trajectory of international cooperation, describing the process as part of “a journey of 1,000 miles, which began in San Francisco in 1945, when representatives of 50 countries gathered to sign a document called the U.N. Charter.”

The Chair acknowledged the inherent challenges in achieving perfect balance, stating candidly that “not all aspirations can be met” and emphasising the need for pragmatism and prioritisation. The Chair explained that the document had evolved from five to four to three to two dedicated thematic groups due to “red line objections” from various delegations, and that certain elements were deleted due to “very specific objections.” The Chair stressed that the final report should be viewed as part of a comprehensive package including three previously adopted annual progress reports, representing the beginning of a new process rather than an endpoint.

## Structure of the Future Permanent Mechanism: Core Disagreements

### Reduction of Dedicated Thematic Groups

The most contentious issue emerged around the structural organisation of the future permanent mechanism, particularly the reduction from three to two dedicated thematic groups and the removal of a dedicated group on international law. This decision prompted strong opposition from multiple regional groups.

Nigeria, representing the African Group, expressed regret over the removal of the international law group, characterising it as a loss of four years of substantive discussions. The delegation argued that this change undermines the interests and national priorities of African states, particularly given their trajectory of digitalisation in support of sustainable development aspirations.

Tunisia, speaking for the Arab Group, called for the restoration of three thematic groups including international law, expressing firm support for an independent thematic group on international law applicability. The delegation emphasised that this represented a fundamental principle that could not be compromised.

Egypt articulated concerns about the reduction from three to two dedicated thematic groups, particularly emphasising the removal of the international law group. The delegation argued that this deletion undermines years of substantive discussions on critical issues including sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs, and proposed an alternative formulation for the dropped international law group to read “follow up to matters related to section C and D of the fourth report.”

### Alternative Structural Proposals and Clarifications

Several delegations sought clarification on operational aspects of the proposed structure. Malaysia requested clarity on the scope of specific challenges for DTG1 and the role of facilitators, seeking to understand how states would prepare substantively for dedicated thematic group meetings. The delegation also questioned whether the preparation of guiding questions should be done by the Chair of the Global or Permanent Mechanism to avoid ambiguity regarding facilitators’ roles.

Ghana suggested the need for a clearer framework for time distribution among focus areas or restoration of previous groupings, expressing concern about insufficient clarity on how various focus areas would be discussed within the allocated timeframe.

Colombia demonstrated flexibility whilst expressing regret over the removal of certain elements including the checklist as an important outcome, suggesting a pragmatic approach to achieving consensus whilst preserving essential elements for future consideration.

## Capacity Building: Broad Consensus with Implementation Concerns

### Strong Support Across Regional Groups

Capacity building emerged as an area of remarkable consensus across diverse regional groups. Multiple delegations expressed strong support for establishing a dedicated thematic group focused on capacity building, viewing it as a cross-cutting foundational element essential for effective implementation of the cybersecurity framework.

Malaysia supported the dedicated thematic group on capacity building as a cross-cutting element, whilst Indonesia welcomed both the dedicated thematic group and the retention of the global ICT security cooperation portal. Mexico supported a comprehensive approach encompassing identification, planning, delivery, and operationalisation of capacity building initiatives.

Nigeria, representing the African Group, emphasised support for UN voluntary fund operationalisation and concrete steps for implementation, viewing this as crucial for addressing capacity gaps faced by developing countries. Colombia welcomed the roundtable on capacity building whilst calling for reincorporation of mapping exercises.

### Operationalisation and Implementation Details

Despite broad support for capacity building principles, significant concerns emerged regarding implementation mechanisms. Tunisia, speaking for the Arab Group, expressed worry about the lack of clear procedures to operationalise the trust fund, viewing this absence as potentially impactful for effective implementation.

Egypt called for a UN-led capacity building vehicle with sufficient resources, emphasising the need for concrete mechanisms rather than aspirational language. Vietnam requested reinstatement of the Latvia-Vietnam-Philippines initiative on a dedicated platform, demonstrating the importance of specific regional initiatives within the broader framework.

Ghana supported the inclusion of scenario-based exercises in capacity building activities and emphasised the need for recognition of women in cyber fellowship programmes, whilst Mexico requested simultaneous interpretation in all UN official languages for thematic group meetings to ensure linguistic accessibility.

## Stakeholder Participation: Fundamental Disagreements on Modalities

### China’s Geopolitical Critique

The discussion on stakeholder participation revealed fundamental disagreements about the role of non-governmental actors in international cyber governance. China introduced a particularly provocative dimension by challenging the assumed legitimacy of civil society participation, arguing that “some NGOs actually have become tools for governments in spreading disinformation so as to achieve their geopolitical objectives.”

China’s intervention went further, stating that “some multi-stakeholder groups even have been receiving direct funding from foreign governments,” and concluding that “treating NGO participation as a matter of political correctness is a baseless bubble. Now it is time for us to burst this bubble.” This stark warning fundamentally reframed NGO participation from a capacity-building tool to a potential security threat.

### Preference for Existing Modalities

In response to these concerns, several delegations expressed preference for maintaining existing stakeholder participation modalities. Tunisia, representing the Arab Group, supported maintaining current no-objection modalities rather than adopting new proceedings, arguing that established mechanisms had proven effective.

Nigeria, speaking for the African Group, expressed caution against new proposals that might be counterproductive to the intergovernmental nature of the process. Indonesia supported stakeholder participation in conformity with established mechanisms, whilst Turkey emphasised voluntary, non-binding participation without compromising intergovernmental decision-making.

### Chair’s Proposed Solutions

The Chair acknowledged the complexity of stakeholder participation issues and explained three different First Committee precedents for NGO participation: the UK outer space working group approach, the Russian outer space working group approach, and the Egyptian working group approach. The Chair suggested that Egypt, the UK, Russia, Canada, and Chile could collaborate on creative proposals for NGO modalities based on these precedents.

The Chair proposed a middle-of-the-road approach on NGO modalities that would retain objection rights whilst adding a consultation step, attempting to address both inclusivity and sovereignty concerns.

## International Law Application: Regional Perspectives and Development Concerns

### Developing Country Priorities

The removal of the dedicated international law thematic group prompted particularly strong reactions from developing countries who viewed this change as undermining their core interests. Egypt’s critique was particularly pointed, arguing that “developing countries, without reservoirs of guidance, consultants, advisors, partnerships, and working papers, might be being drawn into a track where they are inherently disadvantaged and lagging behind.”

This intervention exposed structural inequalities in international negotiations, revealing how technical decisions about working group structures can perpetuate existing power dynamics. Egypt connected procedural choices to substantive outcomes, highlighting how “questioning any unfavourable aspects of the status quo or application of some of the most basic principles could be very challenging” for developing countries.

### Regional Security Experiences

Tunisia’s position on behalf of the Arab Group was influenced by regional security experiences, with the delegation arguing for equitable consideration of different regional threats including misinformation. The emphasis on international law reflected concerns about sovereignty and non-interference principles.

Indonesia supported further deliberations on international law including legally binding instruments, demonstrating that the issue extended beyond immediate regional concerns to broader questions about the legal framework governing cyberspace.

Malaysia demonstrated flexibility on international law group placement in the spirit of consensus whilst maintaining that the topic merits focused discussion, suggesting potential pathways for compromise.

## Threat Assessment and Security Concerns

### Scope and Balance Issues

The threat assessment section generated significant debate regarding scope and emphasis. The Islamic Republic of Iran, aligning with the Like-Minded Group, expressed concern that the threat section failed to capture the full range of the threat landscape, particularly regarding “security in use of ICTs” rather than focusing primarily on “security of ICT” infrastructure.

Iran argued that the current approach was incomplete and biased toward critical infrastructure protection whilst neglecting other security concerns identified during the OEWG process. The delegation called for a comprehensive list of threats identified by states during the OEWG process to serve as a useful reference for the future permanent mechanism, and raised concerns about safeguards and oversight language.

Nigeria, representing the African Group, requested balanced treatment of threats beyond just critical infrastructure, arguing that the current focus did not adequately reflect the diverse security challenges faced by different regions.

### Language and Technical Concerns

The Republic of Korea requested deletion of “could potentially” language from paragraph 16 on threats, seeking stronger and more definitive language regarding threat impacts. China made a specific reference to paragraph 17, last sentence, expressing concerns about particular formulations.

Tunisia, speaking for the Arab Group, emphasised the need for equitable consideration of different regional threats including misinformation, demonstrating how regional experiences shape threat perceptions and priorities.

### Positive Developments

Despite concerns about scope and balance, several delegations welcomed specific elements of the threat assessment approach. Ghana supported the inclusion of the security by design concept, viewing this as an important proactive approach to cybersecurity. Colombia supported the incorporation of security by design principles and welcomed references to AI security systems.

## Technical and Procedural Considerations

### Implementation and Operational Details

Several delegations sought clarity on operational aspects of the future permanent mechanism. The Islamic Republic of Iran questioned how decision-making processes in the future permanent mechanism should be explicitly specified to avoid undermining effectiveness, arguing that vague procedures could compromise functionality.

Malaysia questioned whether the terms “Global Mechanism” and “Permanent Mechanism” should be standardised throughout the document, seeking consistency in terminology. Vietnam made a specific request regarding paragraph 35G, seeking reinstatement of certain language.

### Timeline and Next Steps

The Chair outlined the immediate next steps, indicating that the draft final report would be transformed into a Conference Room Paper (CRP) that evening, with the intention of putting it forward for adoption the following morning. This timeline reflected the significant time pressure facing the negotiations, with financial austerity measures and interpreter availability constraining the schedule.

Delegations were requested to provide specific language proposals for consideration by the Chair’s team, with any alternative language proposals needed by the afternoon for inclusion in the conference room paper.

## Chair’s Response and Strategic Considerations

### Acknowledgement of Difficult Choices

The Chair responded to the various concerns with a candid admission of responsibility, stating “mea maxima culpa. But I did that… in order for us collectively to achieve an overall balance that will get us to consensus tomorrow. We need to be focused. We need to be pragmatic. We need to prioritise.”

This acknowledgment of the strategic calculations behind seemingly technical choices revealed the inherent trade-offs in consensus-building and shifted the discussion toward collaborative problem-solving.

### Pragmatic Approach to Unresolved Issues

The Chair emphasised that some organisational details could be addressed by the future permanent mechanism itself rather than requiring resolution in the current negotiations. The Chair suggested that the organisational session of the new mechanism could address sequencing, specific challenges, and operational details, providing a pathway for addressing concerns that could not be fully resolved within current timeframes.

## Regional Group Positions and Dynamics

### African Group Perspectives

Nigeria’s intervention on behalf of the African Group connected cyber governance to broader development goals, arguing for “securing a safe cyber space, bearing in mind the trajectory of digitalisation that several African states are pursuing in support of their sustainable development aspiration.” This framing broadened the discussion beyond traditional security concerns to encompass economic and social dimensions.

### Arab Group Concerns

Tunisia’s representation of the Arab Group consistently emphasised sovereignty and legal framework issues, reflecting regional experiences with conflict and external interference. The group’s positions on international law, stakeholder participation, and threat assessment all reflected concerns about maintaining state control over cyber governance processes.

### Flexibility and Compromise Efforts

Several delegations demonstrated willingness to be flexible for consensus achievement. Thailand expressed appreciation for the Chair’s efforts whilst indicating flexibility for consensus-based outcomes. Indonesia supported the proposed structure guided by the spirit of consensus, whilst Colombia offered specific language proposals whilst maintaining substantive priorities.

## Assessment and Conclusion

The sixth meeting revealed both the possibilities and limitations of multilateral cyber governance negotiations. Whilst significant progress was achieved in identifying areas of consensus, particularly around capacity building and the basic structure of a permanent mechanism, fundamental disagreements on international law, stakeholder participation, and threat assessment approaches remained unresolved.

The discussion demonstrated the complex interplay between technical governance questions and broader geopolitical considerations, with regional security experiences, development priorities, and sovereignty concerns all influencing positions on seemingly procedural issues. The Chair’s philosophical framing of the negotiations as part of a longer journey toward international cooperation provided important context for understanding both the achievements and limitations of the current process.

The intensive negotiations scheduled for the following day would determine whether the flexibility demonstrated by several delegations could overcome the fundamental disagreements expressed by key regional groups. The success or failure of achieving consensus would have significant implications not only for cyber governance but for broader questions about the effectiveness of multilateral diplomacy in addressing complex global challenges.

The meeting ultimately highlighted both the necessity and difficulty of achieving inclusive global governance frameworks that can accommodate diverse national interests, regional experiences, and development priorities whilst maintaining effectiveness in addressing shared security challenges in cyberspace.

Chair: Good morning, Distinguished Delegates. The sixth meeting of the 11th Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICT Technologies is now called to order. Distinguished Delegates, dear friends, we’ll continue our discussion under Agenda Item 5, and in accordance with our program of work, we will begin the second reading of Negotiations on the Draft Final Report. Now, before we proceed, I wanted to make some comments of a general nature. First of all, I want to extend my sincere apologies to all of you for having circulated the Draft Final Report much later than I had anticipated and hoped. I know that the email with my letter and the Draft Final Report went out quite late, and I hope that this has not disrupted your normal sleep patterns. And I hope also that you’ve had some time to look at it, albeit very quickly, given that we are meeting this morning. I don’t intend to present to you or explain to you in detail the Draft Final Report by explaining each and every revision that has been made. But I do want to make some general comments. First of all, having listened to all of you, many of you have said that it is important to streamline the report. And so that is what I’ve tried to do. We’ve cut… down the draft final report from about 45 pages to 28 pages, which is a streamlining of more than one-third of the original Web 1 document, not only in terms of pages but also in terms of words and text. Second, the streamlining is just one aspect of this draft final report. The most important aspect is striking and overall balance of elements. This has been one of the most challenging reports to prepare, much more challenging than the previous annual progress reports because of, first of all, the differences of views but also the differences in the levels of expectations of what each one of you wanted to see in the draft final report. I’ve done my best to capture as many different ideas as possible in a most factual way possible without prejudice to the position of any state. I’ve also tried to include all the elements needed in my view to achieve an overall text that is balanced. Over the last few days, I’ve listened very carefully to the statements that have been made here, the inputs that have been submitted to me in writing and to the Secretariat. I’ve also spoken to many of you. formally in the corridors, over coffee, over sandwiches, informal consultations. And I’ve done my best to reflect as many elements as possible that you have given me while attempting to maintain an overall balance of elements. The third thing I wanted to say is that in looking at this final report, I would urge you to look at it in totality in the sense that this final report is not the ultimate outcome of this OEWG. This report builds on three annual progress reports which were adopted by consensus. So the three annual progress reports that we have adopted in the past three years also represent outcomes, captured in different ways. And it’s there, it’s there for posterity, it’s there as a package. So as we seek to make this smooth and seamless transition to the future permanent mechanism, we are not just moving forward with one final report, but we are moving forward with a package of reports. So that is my plea to you to also look at this final report in the totality of all the outcomes that has been achieved in this process. Now, having said that, this is my next point. I know that quite a number of you will be disappointed that we have not gone far enough in certain areas. Let me say that I share your disappointment as someone who has been involved in this process for some time. I, too, had hopes and aspirations for this process to go as far as possible. I did my best to push and encourage each one of you to push each other, but to collectively push forward. But we have to push in a balanced way. So I, too, have some disappointment that we could not go far in every aspect where I thought it was possible and feasible. But for the sake of balance and producing a balanced outcome, we have to streamline the text, and we have to prioritize, and we have to be pragmatic, knowing that this process will continue, and knowing, most importantly, that the final outcome document will lay the foundation for a smooth and seamless transition that opens the pathway ahead for all of us to continue this incredibly important process of conversation, building trust, building confidence. So this final report should not be seen as the end of a process, but rather as the beginning of a whole new process. And in order to begin a whole new process, we need this draft final report. So much as you may be disappointed, take heart in the fact that we have a long pathway ahead, but in order to walk that long pathway ahead, we need to take a single step forward. We had our first meeting, I think it was the district representative of China who said that a journey of 1,000 miles begins with a single step. I’m not suggesting by any means that we have made a journey of 1,000 miles, but what we have done is thicken several steps, and each step takes us forward to that destination which we aspire to go to. And incidentally, I would say, this journey of 1,000 miles, which began in San Francisco in 1945, when representatives of 50 countries gathered to sign a document called the U.N. Charter, is a journey that still goes on after 80 years. So the OEWG’s process over the last five years is a very, very small journey. It’s part of a larger journey that we make as nations, as we, the people, to go to a better future, to a better place for our people and for our countries. So the point that I’m trying to make is that we have made some important steps. We may not have gone as far as we would like collectively, or we may not have gone as far as each of you would have liked to see, but we are making a step forward. And I think we will make a step forward if we are able to adopt a report this week. So look at this report as laying the foundation to continue this journey of 1,000 miles. for which many more steps remain. The other important point that I think is we need to keep in mind, as you look at the report, and as you look at whether the report accords with your national positions, your instructions from capital, what your bosses have told you must be there. Otherwise, you cannot return to capital, for example. I mean, all those are important. But keep also in mind that everyone needs to go back to their capitals. Have empathy for your neighbors and friends in this process, because they, too, have concerns. They, too, have aspirations. And everyone needs to have a sense of ownership, a sense of collective ownership of the text. So if there are some things that you see that you do not like, perhaps what you do not like is possibly the element that is very critical for another delegation or group of delegation. So through these mosaic of paragraphs and text, we are trying to give everyone a sense of ownership, a collective sense of ownership in the text and in the outcome document. Because ultimately, this outcome document, draft final report, is something that has come out of this process, that needs to be owned by this process, and that needs to be taken forward by all of you. The next point I’ll make is that this draft final report that I’ve prepared, in my assessment, offers us a pathway towards consensus adoption. And I think a consensus adoption of the draft. final report is not only visible, it is possible, it is feasible, it is eminently achievable. My intention is to listen to you today, hear your reactions to this draft final report, hear your views. I know you may not have had the time to have thorough internal discussions or cross-regional discussions or group coordinations, so I concede that. So any views expressed at this stage is probably preliminary in nature, that is entirely reasonable, but I will open the floor after my general remarks to hear any reactions there might be, even if it is of a preliminary nature. But if your views are more than preliminary and you love the text and you would like to proceed to adoption, let me know too. Don’t conceal your affection for what you see. And of course, if you don’t like what you see, then say so as well. Don’t suppress your feelings either, because we are looking for something that is collectively owned, collectively understood, understood in terms of its imperfections, but also understood in terms of what gives each one of you the sense that perhaps you can live with this. Now, after having heard from you this morning, we will of course resume. this afternoon at 3 p.m. to continue hearing views, but we need to keep in mind the fact that our schedule of work will have to be completed tomorrow. That is not in doubt. And because of the financial austerity measures taken by the UN, there will be no possibility to meet beyond 6 p.m. So the curtain will have to come down tomorrow. In fact, this week we had to cut down meeting times. One session had to be given up because of financial austerity measures. So I wanted to make that also clear that the reality of not just the microphone being cut off, but also the meeting as a whole being cut off by Friday 6 p.m. is a very real one. But my own sense is that we don’t need to go to the wire, I hope, but that depends on you. And so my intention is to put forward a CRP conference room paper. That’s the UN terminology for a document that is circulated for the purposes of a specific meeting. So what I have circulated yesterday evening is a draft final report issued by me in my capacity as chair with a cover letter from me. But this evening, it is my intention to transform that document, that revised draft, into a conference room paper this evening. And then tomorrow morning, it’s my intention to intention to put forward the CRP for adoption at the meeting of the Open-Ended Working Group. And then we’ll take it from there. So my friends, thank you very much for your time. I wanted to make these general remarks at this stage. If delegations are ready to speak at this point, fine, but I don’t want to coerce anyone into making statements. If you think you’re not ready to speak yet, fine. We can adjourn and we can meet again this afternoon. I give the floor to Egypt.

Egypt: Thank you, Chairperson. We’re not taking the floor yet to comment on the report. We will do that later this morning or in the afternoon. It’s rather a point of clarification than a point of order. We know that you had a busier and more eventful night than anyone in this room. We commend you for the efforts you do. Our trust in your leadership continues to be unwavering, and for these reasons we never took the liberty to discuss any aspects related to the organization of work. However, since we are at the beginning of the final stretch, and particularly due to the austerity considerations that Your Excellency spoke about at 6 p.m. tomorrow, the microphone will be cut off on both the Chair and the Member States. We are wondering whether the Chair has the intention or the openness to shift into a more informal and or closed mood of discussion. In our view, we believe that would be very useful at this stage while we continue to have trust in your wise discretion. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Egypt. The comments are pertinent but premature. It’s premature in the sense that we have more than a day ahead of us. And this working group has, over the last three years, adopted a report within the allocated time. In the first year, we adopted the annual progress report in the morning at 11 a.m. on a Friday. The afternoon was free for delegations to experience the joys of New York City. So, it’s entirely possible and feasible. My intention is very clear. I intend to put forward the document for adoption tomorrow morning. And we’ll take it from there. We have the time needed to complete our work, in my view. Thank you, Egypt. I give the floor to Egypt. I give the floor to Malaysia to be followed by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Malaysia: Mr. Chair, Malaysia’s statement will focus on the revised version of Annex I. We are grateful for the Chair’s tireless efforts to ensure a permanent mechanism that is fit for purpose, seeking to reconcile divergent views on particular issues. While we are still reviewing the draft, allow us to share some preliminary views. With regard to the new proposed dedicated thematic group, DTG 1, we would like to better understand the scope of the specific challenges referred to, and how such challenges would be determined. by states ahead of the DTG’s meetings. This will be important in facilitating states’ substantive preparations, including the designation of relevant officials and experts. As to DTG 2, we appreciate the focus of this group on the important subject of capacity building, which many delegations have stressed as a cross-cutting element in ensuring the effective implementation of the framework of responsible state behavior, as well as appropriate balance in the overall structure of the Permanent Mechanism. We welcome the retention of language on the preparation of guiding questions for the DTG’s in paragraph 8. It may, however, be helpful to state that this would be done by the Chair of the Global or Permanent Mechanism, so as to avoid ambiguity vis-à-vis the facilitators of the DTG’s. Further, we recognize the value of the earlier paragraph 9, which has now been deleted, in our view the previous formulation provided a useful measure of clarity with regard to the selection and role of the facilitators of the DTG’s. In addition, as the terms Global Mechanism and Permanent Mechanism are used interchangeably in different sections of the Annex, we would recommend standardization in this regard. Mr. Chair, at this critical phase in our process, rest assured that Malaysia will continue to engage constructively with all delegations to achieve our shared goal of a single-track Permanent Mechanism. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Malaysia, for your statement. I won’t respond to the very specific questions addressed by each of the speakers. Perhaps I’ll listen to a few and then respond at a later stage. I give the floor now to the Islamic Republic of Iran, to be followed by China.

Islamic Republic of Iran: Thank you, Mr. Chair. We would like to express our sincere appreciation to you, your team, and the Secretariat for your efforts in preparing REV-2 of the final… report. We welcome the positive improvements introduced in various parts of the draft and recognize the progress made. In the interest of time, I will not elaborate on the positive points for now and concentrate on the main concerns of my delegation, which we believe should be reflected in the final report. The document is under consideration in my capital, and these are our preliminary comments on REV2. And Mr. Chair, I would like to mention that my delegation aligns itself with the statement that will be delivered later in the session on behalf of LMG. On the threat section, we are concerned that the current threat section does not fully capture the entire range of the threat landscape. As it overlooks a number of threats identified by a group of countries during the OEWG deliberations, the threat currently reflect relate primarily to one aspect of the group mandate, namely the security of ICT, while largely omitting the equally important dimension of security in the use of ICTs. In order to address this significant gap and to ensure a more balanced and comprehensive reflection of the OEWG mandate, our delegation has put forward a specific proposal, which is, I quote, to compile a list of threats identified by states during the OEWG process, which could serve as a useful reference for the work of the future permanent mechanism, end of quote. We strongly encourage that this proposal and the broader concern it seeks to address be appropriately reflected in the final report. With regard to paragraph 25 and 34F, we recommend the deletion of the reference to safeguards and oversight related to ICT intrusion capabilities. These specific measures have not been the subject of focused or inclusive discussion within the OEWG, and their inclusion. at this stage may therefore be considered premature. We believe that any such references should be based on thorough deliberation and broad consensus. On norm section, the development of new norms was explicitly identified as a priority in the mandate of the open-ended working group and set up in the resolution establishing the OEWG. In this context, the deletion of paragraphs 34R and 36 represents in our view a departure from the group’s agreed mandate. This is a matter of serious concern for our delegation. We therefore strongly urge that these two paragraphs be retained in the final report to ensure alignment with the OEWG mandate. On international law, since the outset of the open-ended working group, a group of countries and stakeholders have consistently advocated for the broad participation of stakeholders in both the OEWG and the future permanent mechanism, often underscoring that stakeholders are the owners and operators of the ICT environment. If stakeholders are to play such a central role in this space, it is important that their responsibilities also match the role. In this regard, our delegation has over the years repeatedly highlighted the lack of clarity regarding a stakeholder’s responsibility and has called for consideration for their role. The zero draft contained language addressing this point and we strongly encourage its inclusion once again in the final report. On capacity building, Mr. Chair, we are concerned about the revision to the capacity building section and request the retention of the language used in REV1 regarding the sponsorship program and UN voluntary fund. On future permanent mechanism, you rightly emphasized this week that the elements of the future mechanism should be determined by consensus within the OEWG by the end of this week. And the deferring these decisions to the future permanent mechanism. mechanism itself is not an option. We share this view and therefore believe that the decision-making process being the most critical element of the future mechanism should not be left vague as this could significantly undermine its effectiveness. In this regard, we strongly encourage that Annex I explicitly specify that decision within the future mechanism will be taken by consensus. The principle is especially important concerning the establishment of the ad hoc thematic groups referenced in Paragraph 11. Accordingly, we urge that the final report as reflected in Ramp 1 clearly state that such groups will be established by consensus. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you, Islamic Republic of Iran. China to be followed by Vietnam.

China: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you and your team for the hard work for preparing the latest version of the text. To be honest, we received the text way earlier than I expected. So, Mr. Chair, your work is hard, but also your work has been very efficient. I have noticed that your team are wearing very nice traditional costume. You know, in China, the color of red represents party elements, happiness. I thought probably you would be in such costume tomorrow, but you are wearing this costume today. That shows to me your confidence about the prospect of the process. in the future. I hope that optimism manifested on the podium can also be reflected and also encouraging all the participants in the meeting room. Our negotiation is in the last stretch. Right now, I only want to focus on the most critical topics to China. First of all, paragraph 17 of the current text, the last sentence. China recommends to delete this sentence. If you took part in the meeting in February this year and if you listened to the conversation, very intensive conversation between me and the representative from the U.S., then you would understand how much this matter matters to China. As you said that if this sentence exists in the text, then it’s very difficult for me to go back and report to my capital. So my recommendation is to delete this sentence. And the second topic, which is my priority for today, is about the modalities for the participation of NGOs. When we discuss, or rather before that, before we discuss about that, we have to clarify some very basic but very important facts. First of all, NGO participation to us is an important supplement, but it is not something necessary or it is not a must. History has proven that even without NGO participation, we can still achieve important results. Previous GGE sessions did not have the participation of NGOs, but because of the collective efforts of the member states, we achieved the well-known 11 norms and they have shaped the current framework for responsible behavior. Secondly, besides the OEWG, NGOs have many platforms to discuss cyber and digital issues, such as the UN IGF. However, for member states, we only have OEWG. Having the issue of multi-stakeholder participation to hijack or even obstruct OEWG discussions is extremely unfair to member states. Thirdly, we believe that the vast majority of NGOs or multi-stakeholder groups are non-political professional organizations. However, it is regrettable that we have noticed that some NGOs actually have become tools for governments in spreading disinformation so as to achieve their geopolitical objectives. This year, news reports shown that some multi-stakeholder groups even have been receiving direct funding from foreign governments. And helping serve their political interests. And some of these NGOs have also applied to participate in OEWG discussions. So as a principle, China welcomes the participation of multi-stakeholder groups. However, such participation is not unconditional. It must be premised on not undermining the rights of member states and must adhere to the rules jointly agreed upon by member states. Treating NGO participation as a matter of political correctness is a baseless bubble. Now it is time for us to burst this bubble. Mr. Chair, I want to make it clear that China cannot support the procedure in the current text. The essence is that after expressing objection, member states are not obliged to participate in the subsequent informal consultations. At the same time, I want to reiterate that China is willing to discuss with all parties in good faith and on the basis of safeguarding the rights and interests of member states so as to make appropriate revisions to the text in order to have a fairer resolution or rather solution. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, China, for your statement. Let me hear the views from others before I respond to any particular comment. But thank you for noticing that I’m wearing something bright. I thought no one might notice. Yeah, I’ll have to look for something brighter to wear tomorrow then. But yes, I do firmly believe that there’s no reason to be pessimistic about an outcome. But we cannot be naively optimistic either. At the UN, and I say this from experience and pardon the digression, we are all cautiously hopeful optimist, because if we are not cautiously hopeful optimists, we have no business to be here at the UN, which is an enterprise in bringing together 193 countries with very divergent viewpoints and instructions, not to mention officials in capital sometimes not entirely understanding what we do here. So we deal with capitals, we deal with our colleagues, and we deal with other delegations. One has to be optimistic, but the deep Singapore DNA in me also has trained me to be pragmatic, to be realistic, to focus on priorities. So not everything can be done in a single leap, and that probably is the reason for some of the streamlining, but we’ll come to that at the end after hearing all the comments. Let’s move to Vietnam to be followed by Thailand. Vietnam, please.

Viet Nam: Thank you, Mr. Chair. We would like to express our deep appreciation for the tireless efforts of you and your team in producing RAP2. The current draft, in our view, does try to reflect the discussion we have had so far. We would like to reiterate that Vietnam supports the adoption of the final report by consensus. While we reserve the right to have further comments on other parts of the report, at this stage, we would like to focus on one of the priorities of the future permanent mechanisms, that is capacity building. Mr. Chair, as highlighted in the intervention by member states, capacity building is a fundamental pillar for achieving an open, safe, secure, stable, accessible, peaceful, and interoperable ICT environment. This priority has received broad support from all member states. In this context, We believe the report should continue to reference all proposals and initiatives put forward by Member States on ICT capacity building. In particular, Vietnam would like to see the initiative co-sponsored by Latvia, Vietnam and the Philippines on establishing a dedicated, impartial and solution-oriented platform to conduct research and capacity building activities on ICT security and resilience, especially in support of UN members with limited ICT security capabilities, reintroduced in paragraph 35, subparagraph G of the report. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you, Vietnam. I was just looking at the paragraph that you referred to, 35 G. Are you suggesting a modification by including an addition to your proposal? Is that correct?

Viet Nam: Yes, Mr. Chair. Basically, we just reinstated this paragraph from the language that we have from the RAP1.

Chair: Thank you, Vietnam. Thailand to be followed by Nigeria speaking on behalf of the African group. Thailand, please.

Thailand: Thank you, Mr. Chair. The Thai delegation wishes to express our sincere appreciation to you and your team for the preparation of RAP2 and for your continued dedication throughout the OEWG process. Thailand has consistently underscored the importance of establishing a new permanent mechanism. that serves to foster trust and confidence among states, strengthen resilience against evolving cyber threats, and provide needs-based capacity building, particularly on the effective implementation of norms and facilitate common understandings on how international law applies in cyberspace. We also believe that it is important to have dedicated thematic groups that will address our key priorities that require in-depth and inclusive dialogue. While we are pleased to see a focus on accelerating the delivery of ICT security capacity building, the issue of international law, given its technical and specialized nature, clearly merits such focused discussion. Throughout the whole EWG process, states have significantly deepened and developed their positions on the application of international law in cyberspace. We should continue our momentum to build common understandings in this area, which is essential for fostering trust and confidence and for upholding international peace and security. Having said that, we recognize the complexity of achieving consensus on a text that reflects the diverse views held by member states. While we wish to include certain elements, such as the areas of convergence of views on international law in paragraph 41 and threats from advanced persistent threats in paragraph 24, in the spirit of consensus, Chair, Thailand can exercise flexibility and is prepared to support the current draft. We hope that other member states will also exercise utmost flexibility for us to transition smoothly into the future permanent mechanism. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Thailand, for your statement. And thank you very much for demonstrating flexibility as well. I appreciate your contribution. I give the floor now to Nigeria, speaking for the African group, to be followed by Tunisia, speaking for the Arab group. Nigeria, please.

Nigeria: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I wish to deliver this statement on behalf of the African group. The African group wishes to express its continued support for the ongoing process and keen interest to conclude with the successful adoption of a fourth annual progress report that brings us closer to a seamless transition for the current open-ended working group to the future permanent mechanism. As for the review of the report, the African group wishes to share the following observations. First, the group underscores the importance of addressing the risk and threat associated with the malicious use of ICT in a manner that equally treats the interests and national priority of all involved states with the aim of securing a safe interperambular cyber space, bearing in mind the trajectory of digitalization that several African states are pursuing in support of their sustainable development aspiration. We are concerned with the overemphasis of threats to critical infrastructure and CII throughout the report and would like to reiterate that the discussion on threats should be balanced to take into consideration other threats to ICT security as expressed by various delegations. Second, the group supports the proposed dedicated thematic group on capacity building. We wish to also express our support to paragraph 15. 68 for the future permanent mechanism to continue discussions on the initial report prepared by the UN Secretariat, outline a proposal for the development and operationalization of a UN voluntary fund to support capacity building, and we request concrete steps to be taken for its operationalization. Third, the position of the African group has been steadfast and clear on the priority it directs to the issue related to the application of international law on cyberspace. Accordingly, the group is truly disappointed from the removal of the dedicated thematic group on international law and the proposed structure of the future permanent mechanism. This not only risks the loss of more than four years of discussion on issues of such importance, but it also risks tampering with elements and pillars of utmost importance for the African state as sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs. Accordingly, the African group steadfastly calls for the restitution of the dedicated thematic group of international law for the future permanent mechanism to be faithfully reflective of the voices in this open-ended working group over the past years. Fourth, the African group believes that inputs from various stakeholders, including civil society, academia, and the private sector, will know that had value to the discussion. As such, their engagement with the work of future permanent mechanism will not only enhance the discussion, but provide additional impetus. That said, the African group reiterates the intergovernmental and state-led nature of the current process as well. well as a prospective permanent mechanism, and thus cautious against the new proposal on BREF II, which might be counterproductive and have a detrimental impetus on the proceedings of such an important mechanism. In conclusion, and accordingly, it is most advisable to continue applying the current modality based on the non-objection basis solely that I’ve been successfully working on the open-ended working group process, while continuing discussion on possible options to enhance the participation of stakeholders in our proceedings, as well as on the satellite of the formal convening and during the intersessional periods. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Nigeria, for your statement on behalf of the African group. And please do share with me the text of your very important statement. Tunisia, to be followed by Indonesia.

Tunisia: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the floor. At the outset, the Arab group, who expresses its appreciation for your efforts and the efforts of your team during the previous years, and specifically during the current session, we look forward to a successful conclusion with the consensus and the seamless transformation to the permanent future mechanism. This is because the Arab group attaches high importance to ICT security, and especially to achieve SDGs. In this context, we would like to mention the establishment of the ministerial council for security. for cyber security in the Arab League and the current work to operationalize this council in full. With regards to REV2, the Arab group would like to mention the following points. First, the group supports the fact that the future mechanism would be a single track under the umbrella of the United Nations, with the importance that the decision-making would be consensus-based and would be built on the work of the current OEWG. Second, the Arab group appreciates the value of the participation of stakeholders in the discussions on ICT security because of their expertise in the realm of multilateralism. However, we find that it is appropriate to maintain the current modalities based on the no-objection procedure. And we are cautious about the new proceedings proposed. And we should provide the space for the future chair of the mechanism to allow stakeholders to participate in this connection. We reiterate the need to commit to only the no-objection rule for the participation of stakeholders and to guarantee the participation of parties that enjoy consultative status with the ECOSOC. Next, we believe we should address the threats in a balanced manner, taking into consideration the different threats that face different regions. be equitable in this manner and give due consideration to threats facing critical infrastructure and address issues such as ransomware and the attacks that target institutions and national bodies as well as misinformation and targeting of individuals, et cetera. The group dedicated to this topic must be inclusive and must guarantee respect of states and their sovereignty and non-interference. Fourth, the priority of capacity building enjoys our endorsement and it must continue and must be cross-cutting with all other dedicated thematic groups and discuss knowledge transfer as well and here we welcome the dedicated group for this manner within the future mechanism. However, we find it strange that there are no clear procedures to operationalize the trust fund and we warn of the impact of this and we call here to add specific text on this topic. Fifth and finally, the issue of the applicability of international law in cyberspace enjoys importance and agreement in the Arab group, especially in light of the developments in our region which add an additional important dimension to the issue of the applicability of law in cyberspace, especially as regards to sovereignty and the applicability of the issue of the use of force and the non-interference in state domain. domestic affairs, and states’ right to defend their territory against cyber attacks. In this connection, the Arab Group position is firm in this regard, that an independent thematic group must be dedicated to the applicability of international law in cyberspace without committing to a specific product or predetermined results. and to base such a group on the framework for state responsibility. Accordingly, the Rev. 2, as it currently has deleted this part, does not give due consideration to our group’s position, and therefore we call for a return to the original text which has provided for three thematic groups. Thank you very much.

Chair: Thank you very much Tunisia, speaking on behalf of the Arab Group. Thank you for your statement and I hope you can also share with me the English text if you have one with my delegation. Indonesia to be followed by Mexico.

Indonesia: Thank you, Mr. Chair. First and foremost, Mr. Chair, Indonesia would like to extend our highest appreciation to you and your team for your hard work in producing the Rev. 2 within a very brief time frame. For our delegation, the Rev. 2 represents a constructive middle ground, one that serves as a solid basis for moving forward. Mr. Chair, in this regard, allow us to offer our brief reflections on Rev. 2. First, Indonesia appreciates the retention of key elements that reinforce capacity building as a foundational pillar of our cooperation, including but not limited to the recommendation to establish a dedicated global ICT security cooperation and capacity building portal, as outlined in paragraph 56. The stand-alone dedicated thematic group, too, on the five pillars of the framework to accelerate the delivery of ICT security capacity building will pave the way for fostering more tailored, demand-driven, and result-oriented capacity building efforts, which in turn will bridge existing digital divides. Second, Indonesia welcomes further deliberations on international law, including the possibility of developing a legally binding instrument. We appreciate the Chair’s wisdom in navigating various proposals to produce a balanced outcome, including on this matter. Guided by the spirit of consensus, our delegation is willing to exercise our flexibility to the proposed dedicated thematic groups, as outlined in URF 2. Third, the last one, Indonesia values stakeholders’ participation in the future permanent mechanism. Their perspective can provide better insights on the current cyber landscape. In this regard, we are of the view that the participation of any stakeholders in the future permanent mechanism should be in conformity with existing established mechanism and the spirit, purposes, and the principles of the UN Charter. Mr. Chair, we view that the URF 2.0 is not an overnight work, but as a culmination of our collective dedication. dialogue, and hard work over the past five years. Therefore, rest assured of Indonesia’s continued commitment towards a consensus-based outcome that reflects our shared principles and aspiration. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Indonesia, for your statement and also your willingness to look at the document in a constructive way. I give the floor to Mexico, to be followed by Ghana.

Mexico: Thank you, Chair. This statement is being delivered on behalf of a group of countries of Latin America who are committed to a constructive outcome from this OEWG. We appreciate this opportunity to present our considerations and reflections on the draft final report, and we reiterate our willingness to continue contributing to the negotiating process with a view to achieving a mechanism that reflects the interests and concerns of all member states. We are pleased to see the maintenance of Cluster 2 regarding accelerating the delivery of ICT security capacity building. We believe that this approach should not be limited solely to delivery of capacity. Rather, it is essential that the approach be complete and comprehensive, encompassing the stages of identification, planning, delivery, and operationalization of capacities. In this way, it will be possible to ensure that the assistance provided is sustainable and effective over the long term, tailored to the specific needs of the countries, and associated with continuous monitoring to ensure its real impact. In paragraph 8, section B. We consider it relevant not to limit the discussions focused on building capacities only to needs. The exercise must be broader than this and allow for a real process of much matchmaking, which loops in not only the needs of the countries, but also involves the country’s available capacity and available resources. This will ensure that assistance is better aligned with national and regional contexts, enabling more effective and sustainable cooperation. As regards the modalities of the dedicated thematic groups that are mentioned in paragraph 10, and considering also the need to ensure the full inclusion of delegations not only to attend the deliberations, but to actively participate in them, we reiterate that it should be specified that all meetings should have simultaneous interpretation services in all of the official languages of the United Nations. This is essential to ensure that all delegations can participate equitably regardless of their proficiency in the official languages of the United Nations. At the end of the paragraph it states that hybrid meetings shall be considered informal meetings and this actually could lead to a misinterpretation, namely the notion that the Secretariat does not need to include this requirement in programme planning, but actually this would impact the inclusivity of the process. And we reiterate our commitment to continue contributing to the process constructively. In this regard, we will send a concrete language proposal to you shortly for consideration by your team chair. We thank you for your attention and we look forward to continuing to work together. towards a truly effective and inclusive mechanism. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much Mexico for your comments and your willingness to look at the text constructively. Ghana to be followed by Egypt.

Ghana: Thank you Mr Chair. We would first like to express our sincere appreciation to you and your team for your tireless efforts in preparing the second revised draft. Ghana aligns itself with the statements delivered on behalf of the African group and we wish to make the following remarks in our national capacity. Mr Chair, we welcome and truly appreciate the inclusion of the concept of security by design as highlighted in paragraph 23. We also take note of its further reinforcement in paragraph 34G which we view as a positive step in mainstreaming this approach. In addition, we commend the emphasis placed on strengthening cooperation between computer emergency response teams and computer security incidents response teams as reflected in paragraph 29. With respect to section D on international law, my delegation has observed that paragraph 43 does not include scenario-based discussions. We wish to reiterate the value of such exercises which foster practical learning and promote the effective application of legal and normative frameworks and in this regard, we propose the inclusion of scenario-based exercises as a core element in capacity building activities and encourage its reflection in paragraph 43 subparagraph DI. In paragraph 53, we also see merit in recognizing the women in cyber fellowship as a meaningful initiative for capacity building and we would support its integration into the text to highlight the importance of inclusivity and gender responsive approaches in our work. Mr Chair, regarding the section on regular institutional dialogue, my delegation has noted with some concern the reduction in the number of dedicated thematic groupings. The current draft does not appear to provide sufficient clarity on how the various focus areas will be discussed and effectively distributed within the allocated time frame, nor does it clearly outline how each thematic pillar would be given adequate attention and priority. As a possible way forward and in the spirit of constructing engagement, we would propose considering either a clearer framework for the internal distribution of time among the focus areas or the restoration of the previously proposed groupings in the earlier drafts in order to ensure that all substantive pillars receive the depth of discussion they require. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much. Before we go to the next speakers, I was just looking at the time, yeah, but thank you very much Gana for your statement. We have a few more speakers and of course I intend to wrap up at one o’clock so that you can go back and continue your internal discussions, but I’m very happy to take preliminary views as they come. Egypt to be followed by Turkey. Egypt, please.

Egypt: Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. Egypt is taking the floor to share its reaction to RAF 2 of the draft final report as circulated last night, and we align with the African and Arab group statements delivered earlier by Tunisia, by Nigeria and Tunisia. We recognize your efforts in producing the revised version, and we maintain our commitment of your constantly diligent and serious leadership. This delegation, similar to numerous other developing countries, has consistently been vocal in supporting your efforts and reiterating confidence in your leadership, and consequently has lent its broad support to your zero draft as well as the RAF 1. On this basis, and with a spirit of mutual respect and candor, we will not shy away from expressing our serious disappointment with the number of alterations that were introduced to the version at hand. Egypt deeply regrets the omission of a dedicated thematic group for discussions on the application of international law. We were disconcerted by the proposal to block this avenue and disappointed by the favorable response to it. The removal of a dedicated space for international law application deepens our fears of the mindset with which some states and groups approach the future permit mechanism with. And the interest to maintain and reinforce ambiguities and uncertainties that may make the cyber arena even less safe. Our experience with the systematic and repeated violations of international law, including international humanitarian law, in the Middle East, including through the use of ICT capabilities, naturally informs our views in this domain. The group on international law, along with the group on alleviating capacity building, were the source of balance vis-a-vis DTG1 and its everything, everywhere, all at once approach. With the balance tilted, we are deeply concerned that developing countries, without reservoirs of guidance, consultants, advisors, partnerships, and working papers, might be being drawn into a track where they are inherently disadvantaged and lagging behind. A situation where questioning any unfavorable aspects of the status quo or application of some of the most basic principles could be very challenging. The initial configuration adopted by the chair, and to which we contributed significantly, provided a balanced comfort zone and allowed us to deprioritize support to a pillars approach that mirrors the agenda items of the plenary. We urge you, Mr. Chairperson, to continue your efforts to address this gap. We are open to a free formulation of the dropped group to read, follow up to matters related to section C and D of the fourth report of the 2021-2025 open-ended working group as a possible compromise. Finally, on the modalities of stakeholders engagement, we maintain our conviction of the sufficiency of the existing modalities under the current OEWG and we do not see merits in the additional consultative layers that will overload the chairperson of the future payment mechanism without necessarily resolving any potential divergence of views. Chairperson, moving to the report itself, this delegation had minimal observations on REV.1 and thanks you for partially accommodating the few suggestions we put forward, particularly in paragraphs 14 and 22. We welcome the useful clarification at paragraph 33 under section C on the relationship between the respective obligations and existing or future norms. On the other hand, there are a number of revisions in this version that we are not in a position to support. The pervasive deletions in paragraph 38, which dismiss the simplest step of circulation of a non-exhaustive list of proposals comprised of four categories of proposals. The deletions in the chapel of paragraph 42 as they suppress factual capturing of actual discussions that took place on matters including state responsibility, due diligence, international humanitarian law and the possibility of additional legally binding obligations. The deletion of the former paragraph 43B that suggested how international law applies in the use of ICTs as it’s related to the specificities of the ICT environment could be discussed in the future payment mechanism. Finally, under the recommendations portion of section F on capacity building, we regret that the draft report is not taking concrete steps to operationalize the Voluntary Trust Fund. Without the UN Trust Fund and with their portal… Only confined to a modular approach that supports the FPM, developing countries are entering the post-OEWG era without meaningful and specific commitments to usher in transformative change in capacity building. The report needs, as a bare minimum, to recognize the need for a UN-led capacity building vehicle which is supported with sufficient, adequate, and predictable resources. In conclusion, we remain committed to constructively engage with a view of arriving at a reasonable, fair, and balanced landing zone, a future pyramid mechanism that does not lean again as the less advantaged and inherently more vulnerable. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Egypt, for your important statement and also for your very constructive approach. Please do share your statement not only with me but with all the delegations. Turkey to be followed by Republic of Korea.

Turkey: Thank you for your tireless and dedicated work for the preparation of the revised text. I would like to briefly express our views on the new version. Chair, Turkey supports the establishment of dedicated thematic groups as outlined in the final draft. We recognize the value of such cross-cutting, multi-actor mechanisms in advancing structured cooperation across the five established pillars, namely international law, norms, confidence building measures, capacity building, and regular institutional dialogue. However, Turkey underlines that the leadership and primacy of states must be preserved throughout these processes. Participation of non-governmental stakeholders should remain as appropriate on a voluntary and non-binding basis. and guided by principles of transparency and inclusivity, without compromising intergovernmental decision-making. We further stress that the thematic areas of focus for DTGs must remain aligned with the existing OEWG pillars. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you. Thank you very much, Turkey, for your statement and important contribution. Republic of Korea to be followed by Colombia.

Republic of Korea: Thank you, Chair. I would like to join other speakers in thanking you for your dedication. Chair, I mean, I understand your job is very difficult. No one, I think, in this room would envy your position right now. Chair, but regarding Paragraph 16 of Dress Section, you know, we note that you added could potentially to revise one. Chair, we’ve been very consistent in explaining the argument why we need, you know, the revised Version 1 language at least. I am compelled to request that could potentially should be deleted. Chair, I must say that this Dress Section is a very important part. In fact, this is the substance of our negotiation and this is the very reason why we are here and discussing the report. So, you know, as I said, we’ve been so consistent about rationale and I don’t see you and other member states want to hear the rationale again here. We’re such a, I mean, we do not have plenty of time for that. So I am just simply asking you to, you and other members to think about this part again because just one more thing, this part reads, you know, without could potentially, it only reads impact international peace and security. If I want the best for this part, it shouldn’t be just impact. It’s not just the impacting. It is a threat to international security and peace. So I think impact has already a various level, various degree of influence in it. So I think impact should at least, you know, reflect our government’s position and other members that I remember argument as well. So I would like to politely request again that could potentially should be deleted and at least we should go back to revised version one. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Republic of Korea. Your comments are well noted. Let’s continue to hear the views of other delegations as well, especially with regard to this specific point. Colombia, please.

Colombia: Thank you, Chair. In relation to the revised version of the final draft, we have the following remarks to share in relation to this section B, existing and potential threats. We welcome the incorporation of security by design paragraph three. We note the elimination. of the paragraph on AI security systems and on the importance of using ICTs in accordance with the framework of responsible behavior. These are important references, and so we suggest the following constructed language. Use of ICTs by states in a matter consistent with the framework of responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs, which includes voluntary norms, obligations under international law, and CBMs, fosters international peace and security, trust, and stability between states. In relation to norms, rules, and principles, we regret the removal of the checklist. This was an important outcome of this working group. However, we can be flexible with your proposal of considering it under a future mechanism. On the section on international law, we welcome paragraph 42 and the working group documents from the interregional working groups and their inclusion. On the section on capacity building, we note the removal of the paragraph on the mapping exercise on capacity building. We felt that this was fundamental and would contribute to the work of the future mechanism. We call for it to be reincorporated. In line with the proposal made yesterday by Brazil, we welcome the inclusion of the roundtable on capacity building. And finally, on the section on RID, regular institution dialogue, we note the elimination of the paragraph on the future mechanism and how this would facilitate operationalization and future development of all existing processes and previous processes. This reincorporating this is essential to ensure the sustainability and an adequate and smooth transition between the OEWG and the future mechanism. We call for it to be reincorporated as well. Chair, as regards the annex on the future mechanism, we wish to make the following brief remarks. On the thematic groups, we especially highlight and welcome the group on capacity building. As we have said numerous times, this is a priority for us and a future mechanism. Like the African and Arab groups and other delegations, we regret the removal of the group on international law. As we have stated, the applicability of international law to cyberspace considers to be a matter where we need to make progress in terms of common understanding. Including a group on this would help us apply the UN structure to these issues. As indicated by the delegation of Mexico on behalf of a group of countries, it’s fundamental for the thematic groups’ meetings to have simultaneous interpretation to facilitate an inclusive service, and so we view this inclusion favorably. Also, the changes to the periodicity of the meetings and the plenaries is understanding, but we should also include the fact that the regional group meetings can also add additional meetings as necessary. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Colombia, for your contribution and also for your very constructive approach. Friends, it’s almost 12.50 and I intend to adjourn at one o’clock so that we do not impose on the interpreters again. We might need their flexibility much later and the speakers list has grown to about more than 10 speakers, which is a good sign that people are ready to take the floor. But before we adjourn for this morning, I wanted to share some comments and also give some comments by way of reaction. First of all, thank you all very much for your very constructive tone, and your very constructive approach. As Chair, I would say mea culpa. All the errors of sins of commission and omission are entirely mine. Everything that you have seen in the text that has been deleted, but you wanted to retain it, those are errors of my omission. I’ve added elements in order to attain a balance. Those are errors of my commission. So mea maxima culpa. But I did that, as I explained, in order for us collectively to achieve an overall balance that will get us to consensus tomorrow. We need to be focused. We need to be pragmatic. We need to prioritize. That’s point number one. Number two, I think the series of comments that have been made so far relate to different specific paragraphs in the text. If it’s a question of a minor tweak that we can make as a way to adjust the balance and maintain consensus, I think that’s the kind of solutions we need to be looking at. In the context of the text, some of you have also asked for reinstating what has been deleted. And the reasons for the deletion of some of these proposals or wordings or errors of omission on my part are the result of very specific objections that have been conveyed to me. me. So in my judgment, and I’m willing to explain these to the delegations concerned, as to why a reinstatement of some of these very specific elements in the main part of the final report will meet with objection and may hinder consensus. But if there are fixes and improvements we can make, I’m open to it. I am not fixated with any particular crafting or wording. What I’m fixated is a consensus outcome tomorrow. That’s my single-minded focus at this point. So if you have solutions to suggest or fixes to suggest, better still, if you’re able to work out fixes that you think will not meet any objection, then please share them with me. Then cluster of comments relate to the annex, which is regular institution dialogue. And here the question of dedicated thematic groups has been mentioned by many of you. And of course, there’s no perfect solution. We started with five dedicated thematic groups. Then we went to four. Then we went to three. But there were so many different proposals and requests in terms of how we should slice and dice the dedicated thematic groups. The three that I put forward in the Rev. 1, not last night but before that, out of the three there were very strong red line objections to one of them. What am I to do with that? So we ended up with two, and for me too that has been a source of disappointment. And so I hear Egypt very well, I think they articulated their points very well, African group as well made this point. But the fact that we now have two dedicated thematic groups in the context of Annex C of the Future Permanent Mechanism, which would allow for a discussion on the different issues, gives us hope that all issues in the five pillars will be covered. I think there was a question from Malaysia right at the outset with regard to the first dedicated thematic group. And I wanted to explain first that the two dedicated thematic groups are crafted to make sure that they are cross-cutting and policy-oriented. That idea of cross-cutting and policy-oriented comes from Annex C of the last report. And Malaysia’s question was to address specific challenges, but what are these specific challenges? That’s a very good question and a fair question. But I would humbly submit that this opens the door to another conversation for you, all members. And each one of you and groups within this process can say that, for me, this is my specific challenge. But the question is, is that something that we need to address now before Friday, or is this something that the new mechanism can take up, maybe at the organizational session? And so I would humbly submit that the idea of a specific challenge has a focusing element so that we are differentiating the dedicated thematic group from the substantive plenary sessions, which will be of a general nature. And the idea of the dedicated thematic group is to go deeper, focusing on specific issues and specific challenges. So I see this as an opportunity for delegations to come before the new mechanism at the organizational session and to say, look, these are specific challenges for my group. It needs to be addressed. So it doesn’t prejudice anyone’s position, but it opens the door to a conversation. I welcome your desire for me to resolve all your problems, but I’m incapable of addressing all the issues that have been identified, let alone the issues that need to be identified for us to attain consensus. So I’m trying to disentangle the issues such that we focus on what we need to do now this week on Friday to attain consensus. Issues of sequencing, the number of meetings, all of that can be taken up in the new mechanism at the organizational session. And that will require some robust discussions as to how you sequence the discussions and what are the different issues or what might be the specific challenges, et cetera. So I wanted you to keep that in mind. And there were also quite a number of comments about the integrated policy and cross-cutting dedicated thematic group on capacity building. Again, this is an overarching title. And my understanding would be that every aspect of capacity building can be discussed in that dedicated thematic group. So if delegations feel that aspect A versus aspect X has not been addressed in this report, my sense is that the door is not closed to any issue. Likewise, for sequencing, whether it’s held which time of the year, when, et cetera, these are organizational issues for the global mechanism to address. And then finally, the cluster of issues relating to capacity building. I think quite a number of you are African group, Arab group. Again, I share the disappointment. There were a range of capacity building proposals. But also, many have said that we need to proceed in an incremental and step-by-step manner. And for those of you who have followed this process, you know that from day one, I’ve been the biggest advocate of capacity building. And I remain so. But we need to move in a way that brings everyone together. So from the main section. Several aspects were deleted, errors of omission on my part, but again with the aim to attain consensus. The last thing I wanted to address was NGO modalities. And perhaps at this point I’d like to ask the Secretary to plead with the interpreters to give me five more minutes, even though I hadn’t intended to do this. The NGO modalities is up to us to decide here in this working group. And I wanted to share with you that in the First Committee there are precedents where there are working groups with a range of modalities. There’s an open-ended working group on outer space put forward by the United Kingdom, Resolution 7820, which calls for a final decision to be made by the open-ended working group on participation. There was a Russian-proposed open-ended working group on outer space, which was silent on the question of modalities, thereby adhering to existing mechanisms in the UN system. And then there was also a decision put forward by Egypt, which convened a new open-ended working group, in which the decision was made, consideration on a non-objection basis, and to bring the list to the attention of the working group for a final decision. So we have three different options for a working group. that was set up by the first committee. And in some instances in the past, delegations, but these decisions were adopted by a vote. So I share with you the frustrations that have been expressed by you. I think China mentioned this, African group, Egypt, and a few others. I’m ready for anything that you can agree by consensus. And perhaps the delegations of Egypt, UK, and Russia could come together and think of some creative proposals on these modalities, learning from the experience of the previous example. But the modalities in this final report, I wanted to say, was the middle-of-the-road attempt on my part, given the views expressed by two very different viewpoints. On the one hand, Canada and Chile had put forward a proposal essentially calling for a decision by majority voting and rules of procedure of the General Assembly. This, too, has been adopted in different committees and by the General Assembly. On the other hand, we have the existing practice of the NGO committee that takes its decisions. But the proposal that I had put forward in the draft final report retains the right of countries to express an objection. It retains that. It is a modification of the modalities we adopted in April 2022. But it provides for that additional step of consultations by the chair. But the chair is obliged to do so. to bring it back if there is no consensus, but then it comes back to the working group for to the future permanent mechanism for a decision and we have decided on the decision-making modalities of the future permanent mechanism. In NXC, decision-making in the future permanent mechanism has been agreed as a modality. How that modality is going to be operationalized is something that has to be dealt with in the future permanent mechanism. So my dear friends, I appeal to you. The NGO issue or stakeholder issue has been on my shoulders for five years and for five years I’ve been cracking my head. If there’s a possibility to vote in this working group, let’s do it. Let’s vote on it. That has been the UN practice. But all of you and all of us have decided that we will work on a consensus basis. That’s the mandate of this working group 75-240, of this working group, of which I’m the chair. So I have to abide by consensus basis. And precisely because we are trying to establish consensus around modalities for stakeholder participation, we have to accept a modality that everyone can accept. So for some of you, what I have proposed in the draft final report is not adequate because other working groups in the first committee have gone further. So I’ll just leave you with this thought. Think about it over lunch and if you can reach out to each other and maybe Canada and Chile can also contribute to the discussion by talking to Egypt as well as the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom. And if you’re able to… suggest some very specific language. I’m happy to look at it, but I will need it this afternoon for the conference room paper. So thank you very much, my friends, for your patience. We have a list of speakers. We will continue with that. I wish you a pleasant lunch. The meeting is adjourned. Thank you.

Agreement points

Support for dedicated thematic group on capacity building

Speakers

– Malaysia
– Nigeria
– Mexico
– Indonesia
– Colombia

Arguments

Support for dedicated thematic group on capacity building as cross-cutting element

Support for UN voluntary fund operationalization and concrete steps for implementation

Support for comprehensive approach encompassing identification, planning, delivery, and operationalization

Welcome for dedicated thematic group on capacity building and retention of global ICT security cooperation portal

Welcome for roundtable on capacity building and call for reincorporation of mapping exercise

Summary

Multiple speakers expressed strong support for establishing a dedicated thematic group focused on capacity building, viewing it as a cross-cutting element essential for effective implementation of the cybersecurity framework

Topics

Development

Disappointment with removal of dedicated thematic group on international law

Speakers

– Tunisia
– Egypt
– Nigeria
– Colombia

Arguments

Call for restoration of three thematic groups including international law

Disappointment with removal of dedicated thematic group on international law

Disappointment with removal of dedicated thematic group on international law

Regret over removal of checklist as important outcome, though flexible on future consideration

Summary

Several speakers, particularly from African and Arab groups, expressed significant disappointment with the removal of the dedicated thematic group on international law, viewing it as essential for addressing sovereignty and legal framework issues

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Preference for maintaining current stakeholder participation modalities

Speakers

– Tunisia
– Nigeria
– China

Arguments

Support for maintaining current no-objection modalities rather than new proceedings

Caution against new proposal that might be counterproductive to intergovernmental nature

Cannot support current procedure and preference for safeguarding member state rights

Summary

Multiple speakers expressed preference for maintaining existing stakeholder participation modalities based on no-objection procedures rather than adopting new, potentially more complex mechanisms

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Support for single-track permanent mechanism under UN umbrella

Speakers

– Tunisia
– Turkey
– Indonesia

Arguments

Support for single-track permanent mechanism under UN umbrella with consensus-based decision-making

Support for proposed dedicated thematic groups while preserving state leadership

Support for stakeholder participation in conformity with established mechanisms

Summary

Speakers agreed on the importance of establishing a single-track permanent mechanism under the UN umbrella while maintaining state leadership and consensus-based decision-making

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Similar viewpoints

African and Arab group representatives shared strong concerns about the structural changes to the permanent mechanism, particularly the removal of the international law thematic group, which they viewed as essential for addressing regional security concerns and sovereignty issues

Speakers

– Egypt
– Nigeria
– Tunisia

Arguments

Concern about reduction from three to two dedicated thematic groups, particularly removal of international law group

Disappointment with removal of dedicated thematic group on international law

Call for restoration of three thematic groups including international law

Topics

Legal and regulatory

These speakers shared concerns about procedural and organizational aspects of the future mechanism, seeking greater clarity on implementation details and ensuring inclusive participation through proper language support and clear frameworks

Speakers

– Malaysia
– Ghana
– Mexico

Arguments

Request for clarity on scope of specific challenges for DTG1 and role of facilitators

Need for clearer framework for time distribution among focus areas or restoration of previous groupings

Request for simultaneous interpretation in all UN official languages for thematic group meetings

Topics

Legal and regulatory

These speakers demonstrated a balanced approach, supporting stakeholder participation while emphasizing the primacy of state-led processes and showing flexibility to achieve consensus

Speakers

– Indonesia
– Turkey
– Thailand

Arguments

Support for stakeholder participation in conformity with established mechanisms

Emphasis on voluntary, non-binding participation without compromising intergovernmental decision-making

Appreciation for Chair’s efforts while expressing flexibility for consensus-based outcome

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Unexpected consensus

Flexibility for consensus achievement despite specific concerns

Speakers

– Thailand
– Indonesia
– Colombia

Arguments

Appreciation for Chair’s efforts while expressing flexibility for consensus-based outcome

Support for further deliberations on international law including legally binding instruments

Regret over removal of checklist as important outcome, though flexible on future consideration

Explanation

Despite having specific concerns about various elements being removed or modified, these speakers unexpectedly showed willingness to be flexible and support the current draft for the sake of achieving consensus, demonstrating pragmatic diplomacy over rigid positions

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Broad support for capacity building despite other disagreements

Speakers

– Malaysia
– Nigeria
– Mexico
– Indonesia
– Colombia
– Vietnam
– Ghana

Arguments

Support for dedicated thematic group on capacity building as cross-cutting element

Support for UN voluntary fund operationalization and concrete steps for implementation

Support for comprehensive approach encompassing identification, planning, delivery, and operationalization

Welcome for dedicated thematic group on capacity building and retention of global ICT security cooperation portal

Welcome for roundtable on capacity building and call for reincorporation of mapping exercise

Request for reinstatement of Latvia-Vietnam-Philippines initiative on dedicated platform

Need for recognition of women in cyber fellowship in capacity building initiatives

Explanation

Despite significant disagreements on other structural issues, there was unexpected unanimous support for capacity building initiatives across diverse regional groups, suggesting this could serve as a unifying foundation for future cooperation

Topics

Development

Overall assessment

Summary

The discussion revealed strong consensus on capacity building as a priority, broad support for a UN-based single-track mechanism, and preference for maintaining existing stakeholder participation modalities. However, significant divisions emerged over the structure of thematic groups, particularly regarding international law discussions.

Consensus level

Moderate consensus with significant structural disagreements. While there is agreement on fundamental principles and capacity building priorities, the removal of the international law thematic group created substantial opposition from African and Arab groups. The willingness of several speakers to show flexibility for consensus achievement suggests potential for resolution, but core structural issues remain contentious and may require further negotiation to achieve the Chair’s goal of consensus adoption.

Different viewpoints

Number and structure of dedicated thematic groups

Speakers

– Chair
– Egypt
– Nigeria
– Tunisia
– Colombia
– Ghana

Arguments

Need for streamlined report while maintaining balance of elements

Concern about reduction from three to two dedicated thematic groups, particularly removal of international law group

Disappointment with removal of dedicated thematic group on international law

Call for restoration of three thematic groups including international law

Regret over removal of checklist as important outcome, though flexible on future consideration

Need for clearer framework for time distribution among focus areas or restoration of previous groupings

Summary

The Chair streamlined from multiple thematic groups to two for consensus, while Egypt, Nigeria, Tunisia, Colombia, and Ghana strongly opposed the removal of the dedicated international law thematic group, arguing it undermines years of work and creates imbalance

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Stakeholder participation modalities

Speakers

– China
– Tunisia
– Nigeria
– Indonesia
– Turkey

Arguments

Cannot support current procedure and preference for safeguarding member state rights

Support for maintaining current no-objection modalities rather than new proceedings

Caution against new proposal that might be counterproductive to intergovernmental nature

Support for stakeholder participation in conformity with established mechanisms

Emphasis on voluntary, non-binding participation without compromising intergovernmental decision-making

Summary

China strongly opposes current stakeholder participation procedures citing concerns about foreign government funding of NGOs, while Tunisia and Nigeria prefer maintaining existing no-objection modalities. Indonesia and Turkey support stakeholder participation but emphasize state primacy

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Threat assessment scope and language

Speakers

– Islamic Republic of Iran
– Republic of Korea
– Nigeria
– Colombia

Arguments

Concern that threat section doesn’t capture full range of landscape, particularly security in use of ICTs

Request to delete ‘could potentially’ language from paragraph 16 on threats

Request for balanced treatment of threats beyond just critical infrastructure

Support for incorporation of security by design and welcome for AI security systems reference

Summary

Iran argues threats section is incomplete and biased toward ‘security of ICT’ rather than ‘security in use of ICTs’, Korea wants stronger language on threat impacts, Nigeria seeks balanced treatment beyond critical infrastructure focus, while Colombia supports security by design approaches

Topics

Cybersecurity

Capacity building operationalization mechanisms

Speakers

– Egypt
– Nigeria
– Tunisia
– Vietnam
– Mexico
– Colombia

Arguments

Need for UN-led capacity building vehicle with sufficient resources

Support for UN voluntary fund operationalization and concrete steps for implementation

Concern about lack of clear procedures to operationalize trust fund

Request for reinstatement of Latvia-Vietnam-Philippines initiative on dedicated platform

Support for comprehensive approach encompassing identification, planning, delivery, and operationalization

Welcome for roundtable on capacity building and call for reincorporation of mapping exercise

Summary

Multiple speakers express disappointment with lack of concrete operationalization mechanisms for capacity building, particularly the UN voluntary trust fund, with different countries proposing various specific initiatives and approaches

Topics

Development

Unexpected differences

Chair’s streamlining approach versus member state expectations

Speakers

– Chair
– Egypt
– Nigeria
– Tunisia

Arguments

Need for streamlined report while maintaining balance of elements

Concern about reduction from three to two dedicated thematic groups, particularly removal of international law group

Disappointment with removal of dedicated thematic group on international law

Call for restoration of three thematic groups including international law

Explanation

Unexpected that the Chair’s attempt to achieve consensus through streamlining would face such strong opposition from multiple regional groups, suggesting a miscalculation of what compromises would be acceptable to achieve balance

Topics

Legal and regulatory

NGO funding and political influence concerns

Speakers

– China

Arguments

Cannot support current procedure and preference for safeguarding member state rights

Explanation

China’s specific concern about NGOs receiving foreign government funding and serving political interests introduces a new dimension to stakeholder participation debates that goes beyond traditional sovereignty concerns

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Regional security experiences influencing international law positions

Speakers

– Egypt
– Tunisia

Arguments

Disappointment with removal of dedicated thematic group on international law

Call for restoration of three thematic groups including international law

Explanation

Egypt’s explicit reference to ‘systematic and repeated violations of international law, including international humanitarian law, in the Middle East, including through the use of ICT capabilities’ shows how regional conflicts are directly shaping positions on cyber governance structures

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Overall assessment

Summary

The discussion reveals significant disagreements on four main areas: the structure of dedicated thematic groups (particularly international law), stakeholder participation modalities, threat assessment approaches, and capacity building operationalization. The strongest opposition comes from developing countries and regional groups who feel the Chair’s streamlining approach disadvantages their priorities.

Disagreement level

High level of disagreement with serious implications for consensus achievement. The Chair’s attempt to streamline for consensus has paradoxically created more resistance, particularly from African and Arab groups who view the changes as undermining their core interests in international law and capacity building. The disagreements suggest fundamental differences in priorities between developed and developing countries, and between those favoring state-centric versus multi-stakeholder approaches.

Partial agreements

Similar viewpoints

African and Arab group representatives shared strong concerns about the structural changes to the permanent mechanism, particularly the removal of the international law thematic group, which they viewed as essential for addressing regional security concerns and sovereignty issues

Speakers

– Egypt
– Nigeria
– Tunisia

Arguments

Concern about reduction from three to two dedicated thematic groups, particularly removal of international law group

Disappointment with removal of dedicated thematic group on international law

Call for restoration of three thematic groups including international law

Topics

Legal and regulatory

These speakers shared concerns about procedural and organizational aspects of the future mechanism, seeking greater clarity on implementation details and ensuring inclusive participation through proper language support and clear frameworks

Speakers

– Malaysia
– Ghana
– Mexico

Arguments

Request for clarity on scope of specific challenges for DTG1 and role of facilitators

Need for clearer framework for time distribution among focus areas or restoration of previous groupings

Request for simultaneous interpretation in all UN official languages for thematic group meetings

Topics

Legal and regulatory

These speakers demonstrated a balanced approach, supporting stakeholder participation while emphasizing the primacy of state-led processes and showing flexibility to achieve consensus

Speakers

– Indonesia
– Turkey
– Thailand

Arguments

Support for stakeholder participation in conformity with established mechanisms

Emphasis on voluntary, non-binding participation without compromising intergovernmental decision-making

Appreciation for Chair’s efforts while expressing flexibility for consensus-based outcome

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Key takeaways

The Chair streamlined the draft final report from 45 to 28 pages to achieve balance while acknowledging disappointment that not all aspirations could be met

Strong consensus emerged for a single-track permanent mechanism under UN umbrella with consensus-based decision-making

Significant disagreement exists over the reduction from three to two dedicated thematic groups, particularly the removal of the international law group

Broad support was expressed for the dedicated thematic group on capacity building as a cross-cutting foundational element

Major divisions remain on stakeholder participation modalities, with some delegations opposing new procedures beyond current no-objection basis

The Chair emphasized this report should be seen as beginning of new process rather than end, part of larger journey requiring pragmatic steps forward

Time pressure is significant with financial austerity measures requiring completion by Friday 6 PM with no extensions possible

Resolutions and action items

Chair will transform the draft final report into a Conference Room Paper (CRP) this evening

Chair intends to put forward the CRP for adoption tomorrow morning at the OEWG meeting

Delegations requested to provide specific language proposals for consideration by Chair’s team

Chair suggested Egypt, UK, and Russia could collaborate on creative proposals for NGO modalities based on First Committee precedents

Canada and Chile encouraged to contribute to stakeholder participation discussions with other delegations

Delegations must provide any alternative language proposals by this afternoon for inclusion in conference room paper

Unresolved issues

Fundamental disagreement on number and focus of dedicated thematic groups, particularly inclusion of international law group

Stakeholder participation modalities remain contentious with no consensus on procedures beyond current no-objection basis

Specific scope and challenges for DTG1 undefined, with Chair suggesting this be addressed in organizational session of new mechanism

Operationalization details for UN voluntary trust fund for capacity building lack concrete implementation steps

Decision-making procedures for future permanent mechanism need clarification on consensus operationalization

Threat section balance concerns regarding emphasis on critical infrastructure versus other regional security concerns

Several deleted paragraphs and elements that delegations want reinstated but face objections from other parties

Suggested compromises

Egypt proposed alternative formulation for dropped international law group to read ‘follow up to matters related to section C and D of the fourth report’

Chair suggested organizational session of new mechanism could address sequencing, specific challenges, and operational details rather than resolving everything now

Malaysia’s flexibility on international law group placement in spirit of consensus while maintaining it merits focused discussion

Thailand’s willingness to exercise flexibility on certain elements like international law convergence areas and APT threats for sake of consensus

Indonesia’s flexibility on proposed dedicated thematic groups guided by spirit of consensus

Colombia’s constructive approach offering specific language while calling for reincorporation of certain elements

Chair’s middle-of-the-road approach on NGO modalities retaining objection rights while adding consultation step

The Chair’s opening philosophical reflection: ‘this journey of 1,000 miles, which began in San Francisco in 1945, when representatives of 50 countries gathered to sign a document called the U.N. Charter, is a journey that still goes on after 80 years. So the OEWG’s process over the last five years is a very, very small journey. It’s part of a larger journey that we make as nations’

Speaker

Chair

Reason

This comment reframes the entire discussion by placing the current negotiations within the broader historical context of international cooperation. It transforms what could be seen as a technical failure (not achieving all goals) into a meaningful step in humanity’s ongoing journey toward better governance.

Impact

This philosophical framing set a constructive tone for the entire session, encouraging delegates to view compromises not as defeats but as necessary steps forward. It influenced subsequent speakers to adopt more flexible positions, with several explicitly acknowledging the need for pragmatism and compromise.

China’s stark warning about NGO participation: ‘some NGOs actually have become tools for governments in spreading disinformation so as to achieve their geopolitical objectives… some multi-stakeholder groups even have been receiving direct funding from foreign governments… Treating NGO participation as a matter of political correctness is a baseless bubble. Now it is time for us to burst this bubble.’

Speaker

China

Reason

This comment fundamentally challenges the assumed legitimacy of civil society participation in international governance, introducing a geopolitical dimension that goes beyond technical considerations. It reframes NGO participation from a capacity-building tool to a potential security threat.

Impact

This intervention shifted the discussion from technical modalities to fundamental questions about legitimacy and sovereignty. It prompted the Chair to provide detailed historical precedents and forced other delegations to address the underlying tension between inclusivity and state sovereignty, making this one of the most contentious issues in the negotiations.

Egypt’s pointed critique of power imbalances: ‘developing countries, without reservoirs of guidance, consultants, advisors, partnerships, and working papers, might be being drawn into a track where they are inherently disadvantaged and lagging behind. A situation where questioning any unfavorable aspects of the status quo or application of some of the most basic principles could be very challenging.’

Speaker

Egypt

Reason

This comment exposes the structural inequalities in international negotiations, revealing how technical decisions about working group structures can perpetuate or challenge existing power dynamics. It connects procedural choices to substantive outcomes in a way that highlights systemic disadvantages.

Impact

This intervention reframed the debate about thematic groups from a technical organizational issue to a question of equity and representation. It prompted other developing country delegations to voice similar concerns and forced the Chair to acknowledge these structural challenges, adding a justice dimension to what had been primarily a procedural discussion.

The Chair’s candid admission of responsibility and strategic thinking: ‘mea maxima culpa. But I did that… in order for us collectively to achieve an overall balance that will get us to consensus tomorrow. We need to be focused. We need to be pragmatic. We need to prioritize.’

Speaker

Chair

Reason

This moment of vulnerability and transparency about the chair’s decision-making process is remarkable in diplomatic settings. It reveals the strategic calculations behind seemingly technical choices and acknowledges the inherent trade-offs in consensus-building.

Impact

This honest acknowledgment shifted the dynamic from delegates criticizing the text to understanding the constraints the Chair faced. It transformed the discussion from adversarial to collaborative, with delegates beginning to offer constructive solutions rather than just complaints. It also established a more human connection that facilitated compromise.

Nigeria (for African Group) connecting cyber governance to development: ‘addressing the risk and threat associated with the malicious use of ICT in a manner that equally treats the interests and national priority of all involved states with the aim of securing a safe interperambular cyber space, bearing in mind the trajectory of digitalization that several African states are pursuing in support of their sustainable development aspiration.’

Speaker

Nigeria (African Group)

Reason

This comment brilliantly connects cybersecurity governance to broader development goals, showing how technical cyber discussions are inseparable from economic development and social progress. It challenges the tendency to treat cybersecurity as a purely technical or security issue.

Impact

This framing influenced subsequent speakers to consider the development implications of their positions and helped justify the emphasis on capacity building. It broadened the discussion beyond traditional security concerns to encompass economic and social dimensions, making the negotiations more holistic.

Overall assessment

These key comments fundamentally shaped the discussion by introducing multiple analytical frameworks that went beyond technical negotiations. The Chair’s historical contextualization created space for compromise, while China’s geopolitical critique and Egypt’s equity concerns forced delegates to grapple with underlying power dynamics. The Chair’s candid admission of strategic trade-offs transformed the dynamic from adversarial to collaborative. Together, these interventions elevated the discussion from procedural haggling to a more sophisticated dialogue about sovereignty, equity, development, and the future of international cooperation in cyberspace. The result was a more nuanced negotiation that acknowledged both the technical complexities and the broader political implications of cyber governance.

What is the scope of the specific challenges referred to in DTG 1, and how would such challenges be determined by states ahead of the DTG’s meetings?

Speaker

Malaysia

Explanation

This clarification is important for facilitating states’ substantive preparations, including the designation of relevant officials and experts for the dedicated thematic group meetings.

Should the preparation of guiding questions for the DTGs be done by the Chair of the Global or Permanent Mechanism to avoid ambiguity vis-à-vis the facilitators of the DTGs?

Speaker

Malaysia

Explanation

This seeks to clarify roles and responsibilities in the future permanent mechanism structure to avoid operational confusion.

Should the terms ‘Global Mechanism’ and ‘Permanent Mechanism’ be standardized throughout the document?

Speaker

Malaysia

Explanation

Consistency in terminology is important for clarity and avoiding confusion in the final report.

How can a comprehensive list of threats identified by states during the OEWG process be compiled to serve as a useful reference for the future permanent mechanism?

Speaker

Islamic Republic of Iran

Explanation

This addresses the concern that the current threat section does not fully capture the entire range of the threat landscape and overlooks threats identified by various countries.

What are the responsibilities of stakeholders in the ICT environment, given their central role as owners and operators?

Speaker

Islamic Republic of Iran

Explanation

There is a lack of clarity regarding stakeholder responsibilities despite their emphasized importance in the process.

How should decision-making processes in the future permanent mechanism be explicitly specified to avoid undermining its effectiveness?

Speaker

Islamic Republic of Iran

Explanation

The delegation believes that leaving decision-making processes vague could significantly undermine the mechanism’s effectiveness.

How can concrete steps be taken for the operationalization of the UN voluntary fund to support capacity building?

Speaker

Nigeria (African Group)

Explanation

The group seeks practical implementation measures for capacity building funding mechanisms.

What are the clear procedures to operationalize the trust fund for capacity building?

Speaker

Tunisia (Arab Group)

Explanation

The absence of clear operationalization procedures is seen as potentially impactful and concerning.

How can the internal distribution of time among focus areas be clearly outlined, or should the previously proposed groupings be restored to ensure adequate attention to all substantive pillars?

Speaker

Ghana

Explanation

There is concern about insufficient clarity on how various focus areas will be discussed and distributed within the allocated timeframe.

How can creative proposals for NGO participation modalities be developed, learning from previous examples of different working groups?

Speaker

Chair (suggesting collaboration between Egypt, UK, Russia, Canada, and Chile)

Explanation

The Chair identified this as a persistent challenge requiring innovative solutions based on precedents from other UN working groups.

How will organizational issues such as sequencing, number of meetings, and timing be addressed in the new mechanism?

Speaker

Chair

Explanation

These operational details need to be resolved at the organizational session of the future permanent mechanism.