Agenda item 5: discussions on substantive issues contained inparagraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 75/240 (continued)/ part 5

Summary

This transcript documents the Seventh Meeting of the Eleventh Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICTs, focusing on the second reading of a draft final report for establishing a future permanent mechanism. The Chair opened by noting 22 speakers were scheduled to provide feedback on the revised document (REV2) that was circulated the previous evening, emphasizing the need for focused, surgical comments at this critical stage of the five-year process.

Multiple delegations expressed appreciation for the Chair’s efforts while raising specific concerns about various sections of the draft. A significant point of contention emerged around the international law chapter, with many countries including the EU, Switzerland, Canada, and others expressing disappointment that substantive discussions on international humanitarian law, state responsibility, and due diligence were not adequately reflected in the text. Several delegations called for reinstating language from cross-regional working papers, particularly those presented by Vietnam on behalf of multiple regions.

The structure of dedicated thematic groups (DTGs) generated considerable debate, with some delegations supporting the proposed two-group structure while others, including a like-minded group led by Nicaragua, opposed certain aspects and called for maintaining current NGO participation modalities. France proposed a compromise title for the future mechanism: “Global Mechanism to Advance Responsible State Behavior in the Use of ICTs,” which gained support from multiple delegations.

Capacity building remained a priority for many developing nations, with several African and Latin American countries emphasizing the importance of technical assistance and the need for inclusive participation mechanisms. The removal of the voluntary checklist from the main report disappointed numerous delegations who viewed it as a practical implementation tool.

Throughout the session, the Chair emphasized the collective commitment to reaching consensus and achieving a smooth transition to a single-track permanent mechanism. Despite various concerns and proposed amendments, most delegations expressed flexibility and willingness to compromise to achieve a consensus outcome. The Chair concluded by promising to prepare a conference room paper by 9 PM that evening, incorporating surgical fixes based on the feedback received, with final adoption scheduled for the following morning.

Keypoints

## Major Discussion Points:

– **International Law Application in Cyberspace**: Significant debate over how to reflect discussions on international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights law, and state responsibility in the final report. Many delegations expressed disappointment that substantive discussions from the past five years were not adequately captured, with particular concern about references to IHL being removed while minority proposals for new legally binding conventions remained.

– **Future Permanent Mechanism Structure**: Extensive discussion about the proposed dedicated thematic groups (DTGs), with disagreement over whether there should be separate groups for international law versus the proposed cross-cutting approach. Concerns were raised about DTG1 being too broad and potentially duplicating plenary sessions, while DTG2 on capacity building received broader support.

– **Stakeholder Participation Modalities**: Ongoing tension between delegations wanting more inclusive and transparent participation for non-governmental organizations versus those insisting on maintaining current restrictive modalities. Several delegations opposed the “no-objection procedure” that allows single states to block stakeholder participation without explanation.

– **Voluntary Norms Implementation Checklist**: Disappointment from many delegations about the removal of the voluntary checklist from the final report, which they viewed as an important practical tool for helping states implement the framework of responsible behavior in cyberspace.

– **Capacity Building Mechanisms**: Discussion of various capacity building initiatives, including support for a UN Cyber Resilience Academy, global roundtables, and concerns about ensuring adequate technical and financial assistance for developing countries.

## Overall Purpose:

The discussion aimed to finalize the report of the Open-Ended Working Group on ICT security and establish modalities for transitioning to a permanent mechanism. The goal was to reach consensus on a framework that would continue multilateral dialogue on responsible state behavior in cyberspace while addressing cybersecurity threats, international law application, norms implementation, confidence-building measures, and capacity building.

## Overall Tone:

The tone began constructively but became increasingly tense as delegations expressed significant concerns about the revised draft. While many speakers emphasized their commitment to reaching consensus and demonstrated flexibility, there was notable frustration about key elements being removed or inadequately addressed. The Chair maintained an encouraging tone throughout, acknowledging concerns while emphasizing the need for compromise. By the end, the tone shifted back toward cautious optimism, with the Chair expressing confidence that consensus was achievable despite the challenges, and delegations generally reaffirming their commitment to finding a path forward.

Speakers

**Speakers from the provided list:**

– Chair – Chairperson of the Seventh Meeting of the Eleventh Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICTs

– Burkina Faso – National delegation representative

– Argentina – National delegation representative

– Nicaragua – Speaking on behalf of a group of like-minded states (Republic of Belarus, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, People’s Republic of China, Republic of Cuba, State of Eritrea, Islamic Republic of Iran, Republic of the Niger, Russian Federation, and Republic of Nicaragua)

– Morocco – National delegation representative

– El Salvador – National delegation representative

– Switzerland – National delegation representative

– European Union – EU delegation representative

– France – National delegation representative

– Japan – National delegation representative

– Russian Federation – National delegation representative

– Cuba – National delegation representative

– South Africa – National delegation representative, aligned with African group statement

– Mexico – National delegation representative

– United States – National delegation representative

– Latvia – National delegation representative

– Brazil – National delegation representative

– Canada – National delegation representative

– Ukraine – National delegation representative, aligned with European Union statement

– Australia – National delegation representative

– Kingdom of the Netherlands – National delegation representative, aligned with European Union statement

– Israel – National delegation representative

– Ireland – National delegation representative, aligned with European Union statement

– Finland – National delegation representative, aligned with European Union statement

– United Kingdom – National delegation representative

– Mauritius – National delegation representative

– Philippines – National delegation representative

– Germany – National delegation representative

– Saudi Arabia – National delegation representative, aligned with Arab Group statement

– Poland – National delegation representative, aligned with European Union statement

– Malawi – National delegation representative

– New Zealand – National delegation representative

– Estonia – National delegation representative, aligned with European Union statement

– Pakistan – National delegation representative

– Costa Rica – National delegation representative

– Chile – National delegation representative

– Papua New Guinea – National delegation representative

– Islamic Republic of Iran – National delegation representative

**Additional speakers:**

None – all speakers mentioned in the transcript are included in the provided speakers names list.

# Report: Seventh Meeting of the Eleventh Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICTs

## Executive Summary

The Seventh Meeting of the Eleventh Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICTs focused on the second reading of the revised draft final report (REV2). The Chair opened the session noting 22 speakers on the list to provide feedback on REV2, which had been circulated the previous evening. The meeting revealed significant disagreements on key issues including the application of international law in cyberspace, the structure of the future permanent mechanism, stakeholder participation procedures, and implementation tools. Despite these disagreements, most delegations expressed willingness to compromise to achieve consensus. The Chair committed to preparing a conference room paper by 9 PM that evening incorporating feedback, with final adoption scheduled for 10 AM the following morning.

## Opening Remarks and Process Context

The Chair began by noting that delegations were continuing the second reading of the revised draft final report (REV2), which had been circulated the previous evening. The Chair emphasized that this represented the final stage of the five-year process to establish a permanent mechanism for international cyber security cooperation. With 22 speakers on the list, the Chair requested focused, surgical comments rather than comprehensive reviews given the advanced stage of negotiations.

The Chair stressed the goal of achieving a “smooth and seamless transition to the new mechanism” and maintaining a “single-track state-led process.” The Chair noted that the following day would provide the opportunity to begin this transition and emphasized the need for consensus within the remaining time.

## International Law Application in Cyberspace

The application of international law to cyberspace, particularly international humanitarian law (IHL), generated the most contentious debate, revealing sharp disagreements between different groups of countries.

### Concerns About Inadequate Reflection of Discussions

The European Union expressed strong disappointment that the revised draft failed to adequately reflect the extensive discussions on international law that had occurred over the five-year process. The EU representative stated that “four years of work cannot be lost with this,” emphasizing that discussions on international humanitarian law, state responsibility, and due diligence represented significant multilateral achievements that should be factually reflected in the final report.

Switzerland proposed specific language to address what it saw as an imbalance, suggesting that the document should include factual statements about the discussions that had taken place, even without consensus on all points. Switzerland argued for reinstating language on ICT operations constituting use of force when comparable to non-ICT operations, and proposed replacing “attacks” with “operations” for greater legal accuracy.

Germany, Poland, Finland, Estonia, and New Zealand echoed these concerns. Germany noted disappointment that “rich discussions on international law are not reflected in the final draft.” The United States expressed concern about the “imbalanced treatment giving equal footing to minority proposals versus consensus documents,” referring to the treatment of the ICRC consensus resolution alongside minority proposals for new legally binding conventions.

### Opposition to International Humanitarian Law References

Nicaragua, speaking on behalf of ten like-minded countries including Russia, China, Cuba, and others, took a different position, arguing for “ensuring a stable balance between voluntary and legally binding norms” and demanding “equal emphasis on both implementing existing voluntary non-binding norms and developing new legally binding instruments.”

Cuba explicitly requested “to delete references to international humanitarian law applicability due to lack of consensus.” The Russian Federation similarly insisted on “the exclusion of any hints or references to the non-consensus controversial ideas about the applicability of international humanitarian law to ICTs.”

This disagreement extended beyond IHL to broader questions about the nature of international law in cyberspace, with the like-minded states advocating for new legally binding instruments while other countries emphasized the application of existing international law frameworks.

## Future Permanent Mechanism Structure

The structure of the future permanent mechanism, particularly the proposed dedicated thematic groups (DTGs), generated considerable debate.

### Dedicated Thematic Groups Controversy

The revised draft proposed two dedicated thematic groups with a cross-cutting approach, but this structure faced criticism from multiple directions. Nicaragua, speaking for the like-minded group, expressed concern that “DTG1 scope is overstretched and unclear, risking duplication of plenary sessions.” They argued that the broad mandate covering multiple pillars could lead to ineffective discussions.

The Russian Federation supported a more limited approach, advocating for “establishing only DTG on capacity building and deferring other DTGs to organizational session.” However, other delegations had different preferences. Mauritius expressed a “preference for dedicated thematic group on international law to provide focused discussions,” while El Salvador voiced “concern over elimination of dedicated thematic group on international law.”

The United States stated they “cannot agree to a report that contains such a DTG [dedicated thematic group on international law]” because “certain states would seek to exploit conversations… to advance new, legally binding obligations.”

### Support for Capacity Building Focus

Despite disagreements about other aspects of the mechanism’s structure, there was broad consensus on the importance of capacity building. Morocco provided “strong support for dedicated thematic group on capacity building as cross-cutting lever,” a position echoed by South Africa, Papua New Guinea, and Argentina.

## Stakeholder Participation Procedures

The question of how non-governmental stakeholders should participate in the future mechanism revealed another area of disagreement.

### Calls for Transparency in Participation

Canada supported a “transparent objection process where decisions reflect majority will if objections persist,” challenging the existing “no-objection procedure” that allowed single states to block stakeholder participation. Australia expressed concern that “single state veto undermines participation of other stakeholders.” Chile called for “meaningful stakeholder participation with transparency and certainty in accreditation,” while the European Union supported “balanced stakeholder participation modalities covering various concerns.”

### Resistance to Changes in Participation

The like-minded states took a different approach, with Nicaragua expressing “strong opposition to restrictions on no-objection procedure and NGO participation in thematic groups.” The Russian Federation opposed “consultations on NGO participation being imposed on states,” while Cuba emphasized “maintaining intergovernmental nature and current OEWG modalities.”

## Capacity Building Initiatives

Capacity building emerged as an area of substantial agreement across different groups of countries.

### Support for Specific Programs

Multiple delegations called for reinstating references to the UN Cyber Resilience Academy within UNIDIR. Latvia made this call explicitly, supported by the Philippines and Pakistan. Brazil, Mexico, and Costa Rica expressed regret over the removal of the mapping exercise for capacity building programmes. Switzerland supported moving ICT tools and products access from confidence-building measures to the capacity building section.

### Developing Country Priorities

Burkina Faso raised specific concerns about mobile money vulnerabilities and the need for international assistance during major cyber attacks. South Africa, speaking in alignment with the African group, emphasized the importance of needs-based, inclusive capacity building. Mauritius called for “needs-based, inclusive capacity building especially for developing countries,” while Mexico supported a “UN-administered sponsorship program to ensure impartiality and transparency.”

## Implementation Tools and Norms

The removal of the voluntary checklist from the final report generated widespread disappointment.

### Regret Over Checklist Removal

The United States expressed “disappointment over removal of voluntary checklist as important implementation guidance,” a position supported by the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Chile, Malawi, and the Philippines. Chile called for “reincorporation of operational aspects and voluntary checklist for real-world implementation,” while Malawi supported the “checklist as tool to help operationalise norms and bridge implementation gap.”

## Emerging Threats and Technical Issues

Several delegations raised concerns about emerging threats and technical challenges.

### Specific Threat Concerns

Burkina Faso called for explicitly including “threats from terrorist groups using encrypted platforms for propaganda and recruitment” and raised concerns about “mobile money and financial services vulnerabilities in developing countries.” Pakistan requested adding “references to disinformation and fake news as emerging threats,” while Japan supported “maintaining language on cryptocurrency theft and its impact on international peace and security.”

### Technical Distinctions

Argentina raised specific technical concerns, emphasizing “technology neutrality and responsibility lying with users, not vulnerability identifiers” and noting that “IoT vs AI distinctions matter” and that “firewall references are becoming obsolete.” Cuba expressed “concern about technology neutrality language being included without proper discussion.”

## Compromise Efforts and Flexibility

Despite significant disagreements, several delegations demonstrated flexibility and offered compromise solutions.

### France’s Naming Proposal

France proposed a compromise name for the future mechanism: “Global Mechanism to Advance Responsible State Behavior in the Use of ICTs.” The French representative stated that “in the spirit of compromise necessary for consensus, my delegation… could consider accepting the following name,” abandoning their preferred “Programme of Action” terminology. This proposal gained immediate support from Latvia, Estonia, the Netherlands, Israel, and Switzerland.

### Other Compromise Suggestions

Canada suggested compromise language for promoting ICT use “in accordance with international law” rather than for “peaceful purposes.” Several delegations emphasized their willingness to be flexible on various issues to achieve consensus.

## Chair’s Concluding Remarks and Next Steps

The Chair concluded the session by acknowledging the feedback received and committing to preparing a conference room paper by 9 PM that evening, incorporating “surgical fixes” based on the comments. The Chair emphasized making changes that would make the consensus “workable through future work programs rather than perfect structure now.”

The Chair noted that the final adoption meeting was scheduled for 10 AM the following morning and that delegations would have the opportunity to make statements for the record to provide context for joining consensus. The Chair observed that “at the UN, there’s no such thing as a perfect document that is to be adopted by consensus,” emphasizing the need for compromise while maintaining functionality.

The Chair’s approach focused on addressing specific concerns through targeted revisions rather than comprehensive rewrites, recognizing the delicate balance required to maintain the possibility of consensus while addressing legitimate concerns raised by delegations.

## Conclusion

The Seventh Meeting highlighted both the challenges and possibilities of achieving consensus on international cybersecurity governance. While significant disagreements remained on fundamental issues such as international law application, stakeholder participation, and implementation tools, most delegations expressed willingness to compromise. The Chair’s commitment to incorporating feedback through surgical fixes, combined with expressions of flexibility from various delegations, maintained the possibility of consensus despite the challenges. The final outcome would depend on the ability to craft a document that acknowledged different perspectives while providing a workable foundation for the permanent mechanism.

Chair: The Seventh Meeting of the Eleventh Substantive Session of the Open-Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICTs is now called to order. Members, we will continue our discussions under agenda item 5 and we will continue our second reading of the draft final report, looking at the document that was made available late yesterday evening. We began the discussions this morning with some opening general remarks on my part as Chair to provide some context and general overview of the document that was circulated. And I also addressed some comments and questions that were raised towards the end of our morning session after having heard a list of speakers. I’d like to inform you that I have a list of about 22 speakers and I’d like to, of course, give everyone the chance to intervene. And we are at a stage in our process where we need to focus on the essentials and to be very, very surgical in our comments. So with these remarks, I continue with the speakers list where we left off this afternoon, starting with Burkina Faso, to be followed by Argentina. Burkina Faso, you have the floor.

Burkina Faso: Mr. Chair, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen. Burkina Faso is taking the floor for the first time, and thus I would like to thank you and your team for your skilled leadership of our work in this OEWG on security and in the use of ICTs, as well as the proposed draft report. Chair, we align ourselves with the statement of the African group at the same time. We reaffirm our commitment to a peaceful, secure, stable, and open cyberspace in line with the goals of the UN Charter and international law. Burkina Faso commends the efforts of the group from 2021-2025, which took place in a complex international context marked by multiplication of cybernetic threats, and we greatly appreciate the inclusiveness, transparency, and multilateral approach that our discussions were based on. We would like to make the following comments. In terms of threats, we would like to add threats such as the use of encrypted platforms by terrorist groups for propaganda and recruitment purposes. This should not simply be implied in other paragraphs, but should be made explicit. The adoption of mobile money and financial services on mobile platforms is very widespread in our country. There are inadequate partnerships that lead to difficulties when it comes to mobile wallets. We also support having the Future Permanent Mechanism establishing – having it establish a oversight carried out by all states that would help to map the risks and provide targeted technical assistance where it is most needed. When it comes to international – law, Burkina Faso reaffirms its commitment to the fundamental principles of international law and cyberspace, and we affirm that digital sovereignty is an extension of national sovereignty. Burkina Faso is open to discussions on potential changes to international law and believes that topics such as law for international assistance in the event of a major cyber attack ought to be further explored to strengthen solidarity between states when they are faced with serious incidents. In addition, the question of reparations due to victims of transborder cyberattacks ought to be addressed to protect states. When it comes to confidence-building measures between states, Burkina Faso fully supports the promotion of confidence-building measures in cybersecurity, especially with regard to transparency and international cooperation. We support the Directory of Global Points of Contact, which lets us test our national measures, and our experience with this directory has revealed, however, practical challenges such as language and technical barriers. With regard to capacity-building, we are aware that the implementation of standards depends on available capacity. Burkina Faso therefore calls for the adoption of support measures. We support the voluntary checklist and supports its distribution. We commend the initiatives that have been proposed for capacity-building on the state level, and we align ourselves with the African Union’s position on the recent decisions made in this regard. We strongly encourage the operationalization of the national portals for cooperation and capacity-building in digital security, which will contribute. to better opportunities within member states and developing countries. Mr. Chair, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, in closing, Burkina Faso remains fully committed to the constructive work of this OEWG and calls on all states to demonstrate flexibility and a willingness to compromise in order to arrive at consensus-based results that strengthen digital security for all of us while strictly abiding by international law and the principle of sovereign equality. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Burkina Faso, for your contribution. Argentina, to be followed by Nicaragua.

Argentina: Mr. President, Chair, we value your efforts and those of the Secretariat in producing a rev to move closer to consensus. We wish to highlight a few technical considerations that we hope will contribute to strengthening the document. As regards the new wording of Section B, existing and emerging threats, on paragraph 25, it’s important to avoid a negative presentation of capacity-building and identifying vulnerabilities. Technologies themselves are neutral. The potentially negative aspect is the potential use of them. This is a technical reality that must be recognized in order to strengthen digital security systems. Responsibility does not lie on those who identify the faults, but on those using them. On paragraph 27, there could be a conceptual confusion that arises between the IoT and AI. These are different problems. In the case of the Internet of Things, the debate should be around the cycle of development and implementation of confidentiality, whereas in AI… the issues relate to training and consultation, so we should introduce language on this. On paragraph 18, the confusion between CI and CII could affect public information, whether they are state institutions or otherwise, and so it’s important to distinguish between the two. On paragraph 20, we wish to indicate that a few technical references in this paragraph could quickly become obsolete. So, for instance, firewalls have already almost been replaced, and so we suggest more general wording that would better resist the passage of time. We will submit suggestions in writing. As regards the future permanent mechanism, now called global mechanism, my delegation wishes to express our recognition for the efforts deployed in producing this revised text, which reflects clear will to find convergent positions across the different positions expressed by delegations. Specifically, we value the fact that there has been a thematic group dedicated to capacity building in the area of ICT security. This has now been formulated cross-cuttingly and integrated into the five pillars. While we would have preferred the previous wording that was more focused on the needs that my delegation has been expressing over these five years of the OEWG’s mandate, we hope that the creation of this group will continue to reflect the draft because without sufficient capacity, states will not have the tools to implement the existing framework or to maintain open, peaceful, secure, and interoperable cyberspace. We continue to support the modalities for participation proposed by the stakeholders. We believe that this is balanced and this covers the concerns expressed by various delegations in the room. And at the same time, it guarantees inclusion. of voices that continue to be relevant from civil society, academia, and the private sector. Chair, we are going to submit this proposal in writing together with suggested language. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Argentina. Nicaragua, to be followed by Morocco. Nicaragua, I believe, is speaking on behalf of a like-minded group.

Nicaragua: Thank you, Chair. I am honored to speak on behalf of a group of like-minded states, the Republic of Belarus, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Cuba, the State of Eritrea, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Republic of the Niger, the Russian Federation, and my own country, the Republic of Nicaragua. We appreciate the efforts made by you and your team in preparing the Rev. 2 of the draft final report of the OEWG, which might serve as the basis for further discussions. We recognize some positive changes in the text, including the removal of the Annex 1 on the Voluntary Checklist. At the same time, certain elements of the document remain concerning to our group of states. With a view to contributing to achieving consensus, we propose the following adjustments. It is essential to align the terminology throughout the entire text with the mandate of the Future Permanent Mechanism, as agreed in July 2024, security of and in the use of ICTs. We insist on including this language in the title of the Future Permanent Mechanism. As for modalities for NGOs’ participation, we insist on adhering to those approved in April 2022. We urge to delete any conditions or unnecessary ambiguity with regard to the non-objection procedure. NGOs’ participation in DTGs remains unacceptable. The thematic groups should serve as a platform for in-depth and detailed discussions among government experts only. We cannot support the creation of DTG 1 since its scope is overstretched and unclear in its focus and functionality. Furthermore, DTG 1 bears risks of duplication of the plenary sessions. At this stage, it seems reasonable to establish the DTG on capacity building and defer the decision on other possible DTGs to the organizational session of the future permitting mechanism in March 2026. We advocate for ensuring a stable balance between voluntary and legally binding norms. In particular, the document must reflect an equal emphasis on both implementing existing voluntary non-binding norms and developing new legally binding instruments in the use of ICTs. References to the perspectives of elaboration of new legally binding agreements in this regard should be included in the text, building on previous reports. To avoid undermining consensus, topics where significant disagreement persists should be removed, for example, the applicability of IHL and references to related documents that have not been submitted for the consideration within the OEWG and do not enjoy universal acceptance. Mr. Chair, our group remains committed to working constructively with you, your team, and all national delegations to achieve a balanced and consensus-based outcome. We believe that addressing the above-mentioned concerns will strengthen the report and pave the way to finding and reaching consensus. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Nicaragua, speaking on behalf of the like-minded group, and I thank you and members of your group for your commitment to maintaining your constructive approach and to looking for a consensus outcome tomorrow. Morocco to be followed by El Salvador.

Morocco: Extending our prior intervention, we wish to express our appreciation for your efforts in updating the final draft report which reflects your desire to make progress with our discussion. We wish to take note of the following priorities. As regards the structure of the Future Permanent Mechanism, we reiterate our attachment and we support the creation of a dedicated thematic group on capacity building. This we believe is a cross-cutting lever essential to the effective implementation of commitments, especially for developing countries. My delegation remains firmly convinced that capacity building must be at the heart of our future action. Secondly, we note that the first thematic group proposed covers several topics and could be a simple extension of the plenary, and so we do not understand the extension of the number of thematic groups, whereas their relevance has already been established. Thirdly, on the legal section, we would have appreciated a deeper approach on international law. It still remains to be clarified exactly how international law can be applied, especially in the context of growing threats. Over five years, we have seen our discussions get deeper on international law, but this progress risks being diluted if we do not give international law the place that it deserves at the heart of the Future Mechanism. Fourthly, as we recognize all of the threats and risks identified, we particularly welcome the emphasis placed on critical infrastructure. This is the heart of our digital ecosystems, and also the emphasis on the vulnerabilities to which these are exposed. This aligns perfectly with the concerns expressed by a number of delegations, including my own. Finally, on cyber security in the future depends on our ability to build a robust framework where every state can contribute fully. It is therefore down to us to work together to ensure that this shared ambition is realized. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Morocco, for your contribution. El Salvador to be followed by Switzerland.

El Salvador: Thank you, Chair. El Salvador thanks you for your efforts to bring us to this final stage of the process. We have a few remarks that we would like to share with you for consideration. On the section on threats, in paragraph 17 we are concerned that the specific reference to critical infrastructure and others that have been eliminated, health, maritime, aeronautic, financial and other sectors, this was previously agreed language in the APRs and represents an important step towards identifying vulnerable sectors. In paragraph 24, the human-centered approach has been removed, whereas we need to recognize there is a real impact on people, especially in the area of health, and we regret this. On the question of international law, we are concerned by the reformulation of paragraph 42, specifically how international law may apply to cyberspace, including state responsibility, right to life, international humanitarian law, and we regret the removal of the reference to international law, and especially the Charter of the United Nations, and how this should apply and is essential to maintaining. peace and security in cyberspace. This is the framework of responsible behaviour and should be reincorporated. On the section on capacity building, we note with concern the removal of the reference to essential mechanisms for the operationalisation of this area. While we understand that not all proposals could be discussed in detail and that it was necessary to reduce the scale of some initiatives, we believe that this edit undermines the future permanent mechanism. On annex 1, El Salvador expressed its concern regarding the elimination of the thematic group dedicated to continuing discussions on the applicability of international law in cyberspace. We furthermore consider that a single thematic group covering all of the pillars may lead to excessive generalisation. One of the reasons why we have made such progress is because we have clearly eliminated thematics. The absence of a clearly defined thematic structure could prevent future discussions from being effective. Chairperson, we reiterate El Salvador’s commitment to building a consensual solution for the establishment of a single track permanent mechanism under the auspices of the United Nations. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, El Salvador, for your contribution. Switzerland to be followed by the European Union.

Switzerland: Thank you, Mr Chair. I will right go into the topics. On paragraph 15, we welcome the deletion of exclusively in this paragraph as it does not reflect today’s reality. However, we would like to add at the end of the sentence consistent with international law. In paragraph 16, we are disappointed that the sentence mentioning the blurring of the lines has not been reintroduced as we asked for. In our view, it is negligent of this group to turn a blind eye to this worrying development. We’d like to see this reflected in the report. This could be done by introducing, as well as the blurring of the line between criminal activities and malicious ICT incidents. In paragraph 17, we would like to replace the last sentence, in the last sentence, attack with operation, given the legal implications of the word attack. Also in paragraph 17, we note that the delegation has asked for the deletion of the sectors mentioned but we’d like to see them reintroduced because this is mostly consensus language taken from paragraph 14 of the Third Annual Progress Report. We just would have to replace water by energy. Paragraph 23, we would like to propose the following change in line with our understanding of secure development practices and language in paragraph 34G. Start quote. States highlighted the critical importance of security by design as a key principle applied at the early stages of development by also recognizing the need to maintain security throughout the life cycle of ICT products and services as a fundamental measure to mitigate such risks, end quote. Paragraph 27, we would like to add at the end of the paragraph and also keeping in mind respect for human rights. International law. We have two points. First, in our view, it is regrettable that the rich discussions on international law are not reflected in the final draft. Specifically, the final draft no longer includes any topics that have been discussed in depth over the past five years. This we find incomprehensible and not acceptable. Specifically, we would like to suggest adding the following subparagraph to paragraph 42 which reflects the individual issues in a factual manner. Quote, states discussed and debated how international law applies to the use of ICTs including issues such as state responsibility, due diligence, international humanitarian law and international human rights law. The second point, in paragraph 41C, the sentence, an ICT operation may constitute the use of force when its scale and effects are comparable to non-ICT operations rising in the level of a use of force, end quote, that has been deleted in REV1, is still missing, and we would strongly recommend its reinstation. On CBMs, paragraph 47K, access to ICT products and tools do not belong under this section, is our view. We think we would like to propose to delete it, or if it remains in the report, it should be moved to the capacity building section, where states can voluntarily provide other states with ICT tools to build capacity. On capacity building, in paragraph 55, there is stated that global roundtables could include technical-level discussions. We’d like to replace this with practical-oriented discussions to not eliminate other dimensions than just technical ones to be discussed. In paragraph 58, a phrase should be added stating that existing tools or measures should be used and not duplicated. Coming back to paragraph 52H, we also, like Columbia, wonder why the MAC exercise has been deleted and think it could be reinstated there. Waiting for further instructions, I will come back later on the regular institutional dialogue and the Annex I. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: European Union, to be followed by France.

European Union: Chair, let me, considering the limited time we have, dive right into our assessment and the comments by the EU and its member states to the REF II, acknowledging the hard work by you and your team in a run-up to this version. We recognize elements into the draft, such as the rebalancing of the norms section, as well as the DTGs being cross-cutting and drawing upon all the five pillars. We would like to see the language from the French proposal to further detail the cross-cutting nature of the discussions. included, which also details how the DTG would create space for all the pillars, including international law. We regret that the document still lacks the reference to the POA resolutions adopted by a large majority in 2022 and 2023. And in addition, we regret that the checklist is no longer included, considering the value for building capacities of states in the implementation of the UN framework. We are, however, particularly concerned about the international law chapter that has suffered significantly from the change to REF1 to REF2. While there is a clear call in the room throughout the open-ended working group, including during the last three days, for appropriately reflecting the substantial discussions on international law, particularly on IHL, into the final report, we note that the REF2 does not include the additional language on international law, particularly noting the bodies of law as also outlined in the cross-regional working paper that includes proposed text for the final open-ended working group report 2025, presented also by Vietnam yesterday. It, secondly, does also not reinstall the language that was deleted from the zero draft and the REF1, as requested by many. Moreover, with serious concern, we have to further note that the language on how international law applies has even further deleted in the REF2, particularly when it comes to 43b and parts of 42. Yet, at the same time, the reference to the draft convention remains and is even put at an equal footing to the consensus resolution by the ICRC. This balance does not work for us, and it also does not reflect a significant contribution by member states in the open-ended working group. We therefore oppose to these changes in the REF2 as they walk back to consensus and international law and do not acknowledge the work by cross-regional groups delivering multiple working papers on this issue since 2022. Four years of work cannot be lost with this. Work that is also needed for the global mechanism to advance responsible state behavior and the use of ICTs to continue on a solid ground, ground created by this open-ended working group, ground that is used both in the plenary discussion as well as cross-cutting TTG discussions. And we request for the factual statement of the open-ended working group discussion in the final report. Finally, while we understand that you’ve made no changes to the modality for the multi-stakeholder participations, this does not mean that our position has changed. The EU and its member states reiterate our call to allow for firm transparency. Any objectives should be subject to open discussions, and if they persist, decisions should ultimately be guided by the will of the majority. We look forward, Chair, to work with you and other delegations today and tomorrow in view of a final open-ended working group report. Thank you very much.

Chair: Thank you very much, European Union, for your statement and contribution. France, to be followed by Japan.

France: Mr. President, Mr. Chair, the delegation aligns itself with the statement of the European Union. At the national level, we believe that this draft report provides a basis for structuring our future action-oriented work under the global mechanism. For example, we are satisfied with the substance of the section on threats, which highlights in a relevant manner the worrying trends that will need to continue to be discussed. Nevertheless, it is precisely because this final report will guide our future discussions that it is important to point out the persistent and emerging issues that it contains. I will make three remarks in this regard. First of all, we regret that in paragraph 31 of Rev. 1, there is the deletion of the affirmation that non-compliance with the framework of responsible behavior of states undermines international peace and security, trust between states, as well as stability. This is likely to permanently weaken the normative framework. We are also concerned about the significant imbalance in the section on international law because of, on one hand, a lack of recognition of discussions on international humanitarian law, and on the other hand, due to the inclusion of a proposal raised by a very small number of states. Secondly, I’d like to focus on the RID section and the future mechanism. Mr. Chair, we welcome the fact that the proposal contained in Rev. 2 for dedicated thematic groups creates a complementarity between, on one hand, pillar-by-pillar plenary discussions, and, on the other hand, thematic discussions that are policy-oriented to solve specific challenges of common interest. This may help to bridge the implementation gap. For DTG 1, however, it is regrettable that the agreed language on specific challenges of cooperation, resilience, and stability that we had proposed and which has been broadly supported was not retained. We consider that three broad categories are relevant to guide discussions without prejudice to the national priorities of each and every state. We also believe that the activities of DTG 2 could contribute to bringing about a capacity building that is more effective and efficient. To further improve it, we suggest that this thematic group be responsible for organizing the global roundtable on capacity building as well as its follow-up. To ensure that all parts of the future mechanism work in complementarity to bridge the digital divide and the capacity building gap. Third, as you know, for the past five years we have together with cross-regional partners in putting forward the proposal of the Program of Action, or POA. This name, although it is common in the UN system and is absolutely fit for the purpose of our work, has generated a strong resistance, which I still don’t quite understand, on the part of a small number of delegations. This controversy, Mr. Chair, is something that my delegation has chosen not to feed because we are fighting for ideas aiming to make multilateralism stronger and more effective, that we fight not for labels. For France, the objective of the POA has always been substance. As I recall during my presentation on Tuesday, the international community needs a single-track multilateral mechanism for peace and security in cyberspace. This mechanism must continue to host discussions on our normative framework while promoting action for its implementation. Supporting the capacities of all states to implement the framework is indeed our first line of defense, collectively speaking, against cyber threats. In this regard, we regret the deletion of the voluntary checklist, which would have been a concrete contribution to help guide states in the implementation of this framework. Mr. Chair, in the spirit of compromise necessary for consensus, my delegation, based on the title of the Consensus Resolution 76-19 of the General Assembly of 2021, could consider accepting the following name for our future framework for our work, Global Mechanism to Advance Responsible State Behavior in the Use of ICTs. We hope that this neutral proposal will contribute to achieving consensus by tomorrow, and my delegation remains available to exchange views with all delegations in this spirit. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, France, for your contribution and for your very constructive approach and your proposals as well. I give the floor now to Japan to be followed by the Russian Federation.

Japan: Thank you, Mr. Chair. First, Japan would like to thank you and your team again for your efforts and the draft final report, and we continue to agree with you about the importance of reaching consensus this week. Mr. Chair, Japan appreciates the latest draft incorporates, if not all, but some of our comments or the spirit of our comments. Nevertheless, allow me to stress a few points. Using the threat section, Japan values the maintaining of the text on cryptocurrency theft and financing of malicious ICT activity using cryptocurrency in Para 24. However, Japan continues to support the previous language on the REV-1, which clearly referred to the impact on the international peace and security, rather than limiting it only to a possibility of potential impact, as it is proposed in the REV-2. Concerns on malicious activities involving cryptocurrency, similar to ransomware, and commercially available ICT intrusion capabilities is a common issue for the entire international community. This issue should continue to be addressed to promote further collective efforts, and Japan strongly requests this sentence to go back to the previous version in the REV-1, just like our ROK colleague did this morning. Regarding the DTGs, Japan recognizes improvements in language. We believe the content of the DTGs should be cross-cutting and action-oriented, including scenario-based approach as well as avoiding duplication. And the further inclusion of words from French proposal would be pertinent. What you proposed in the annex of the REV2 would also allow us to consider an effective combination of various tools, including capacity-building assistance. Finally, regarding the modalities of multistakeholder participation, there’s no change from the previous version. Further languages to secure their participation to the future permanent mechanism would be appreciated from my delegation’s point of view. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much. Japan, Russian Federation, to be followed by Cuba.

Russian Federation: Distinguished Chair, my delegation links itself with the joint statement delivered on behalf of the like-minded states by Nicaragua in our national capacity. We’d like to say the following. We thank you, Mr. Chair, for your efforts to prepare the new version of the final report. Some of our proposals were taken into account. However, many were still not reflected. I will focus on the most important ones. Starting with the future mechanism, we are pleased that the position of Russia and like-minded states as well as many other countries had been, they had not fully been reflected. We don’t see the point in the so-called consultations on launching NGOs in the work of the future mechanism. In addition, we believe that these consultations are not able to be imposed on states, should not be imposed on states. We categorically oppose any restrictions to the no-objection procedure, and we cannot support allowing NGOs to take part in the work of the thematic groups or giving them the floor after national delegations during plenary sessions. In the context of the modalities for NGO participation, we fully support our Chinese colleague as well as the African group, the Arab group, and Chair – I’m not going to go into the list of all the states that supported maintaining the current modalities of the OEWG when it comes to NGO participation. As for the working group, we cannot support the establishment of a thematic group number one in the current format. In our view, while it’s not clear to us what exactly it will work on, we’re seeing obvious duplication of the plenary sessions from the point of view of its functioning. We continue to support the establishment of a separate group on international law norms and confidence-building measures. In addition, we believe that the working group ought to work not on political issues but rather legal and technical issues. Lastly, we continue to insist on correcting the terminology. Here in the OEWG and in the future mechanism, we are considering a broad range of issues related to security of and in the use of ICTs. This phrase has long been used in the UN and many other international organizations. But in the text, we see many references to ICT security, which we believe undermines and distorts the mandate of the OEWG and the future mechanism. Our absolute priority is to enshrine this term not only throughout the text, but in the name of the future mechanism in Annex 1. We hope this will not be a problem for other delegations because we’re talking not about a continuation of political approaches of a certain number of countries, but rather ensuring clarity and precision on what is being examined by the future mechanism. Overall, in the report, we’ll send our proposals by text, but I’d like to comment on some of these points in particular. We insist on the exclusion of any hints or references to the non-consensus controversial ideas about the applicability of international humanitarian law to ICTs. Therefore, we propose deleting from paragraph 22 the mention of armed conflict, or leave only the last sentence in paragraph 22. We also propose deleting paragraph 19, which wrongly distinguishes certain concrete technologies to the detriment of others. We insist on the correct reflection of the position of a number of states regarding the importance of discussing a legally binding agreement, first and foremost in the recommendation section for the section on international law. We also cannot support the excessive focus on critical information infrastructure. The risks of this kind of approach was explained by Russia in its position statement distributed on the website of the OEWG. The excessive focus in the text is also maintained on the issue of gender balance. Mr. Chair, we assure you that we are willing to work constructively in the interests of a consensus-based decision tomorrow, as long as our principal concerns are taken into account. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Russian Federation, for your contribution. Cuba to be followed by South Africa.

Cuba: Thank you, Mr. Chair. We are also grateful to you for your hard work and that of your team in moving us closer to the necessary consensus outcome for the OEWG, with a view to guaranteeing a smooth transition to the future mechanism, which will continue the regular institutional dialogue in the area of security of and in the use of ICT. We support the statement by Nicaragua on behalf of a group of countries, a group of like-minded countries. Furthermore, we wish to emphasize the following three points. Firstly, in the section on international law, we appreciate the inclusion of efforts to address the concerns of all delegations. However, we still insist on the deletion, in paragraph 42, of the international law. of the references linked in some way to the notion of the applicability of international humanitarian law to cyberspace, there is still clear disagreement about this matter. In this regard, we request the deletion of references to documents that have been formulated outside the framework of the OEWG, which were not submitted for consideration by the group and therefore do not enjoy universal acceptance. In paragraph 40, section B2, there is the inclusion of language in this regard for group of delegations. My delegation cannot accept that new language be added to the final report of the OEWG. In no way can we accept cyberattacks to be set on an equivalent basis with armed attacks. Similarly, we also cannot accept Switzerland’s proposal. It is precisely because we believe in multilateralism that we do not favour the imposition of specific questions without taking into account the concerns of each and every one of the delegations, regardless of their size or independently of the size of groups of delegations. We constructively request that all take into account our sensitivities with regards to the spirit of consensus. If this were to apply to other bodies in the First Committee, instance, for the elimination of nuclear weapons, whereas the vast majority of the international community was calling for the total elimination of these weapons, other considerations would no doubt prevail. Secondly, with a view to the future mechanism, we firmly advocate for the maintenance of the principle of intervention. We highlight that the participation of NGOs in this OEWG reflects a delicate balance that was the outcome of a compromise in and of itself. And finally, in paragraph 25 on the section on threats, in reference to the question of neutrality of technologies, it should be made clear that there are varying approaches across the delegations in relation to this. This is a notion that we do not share, and this reflects consultations that have not actually taken place. We feel that this reference was included for the first time in the third APR of the OEWG in 2024 without prior discussion, and this is why it was rejected by our delegation at that time in our explanation of vote. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you, Cuba, for your statement. South Africa, to be followed by Mexico.

South Africa: Thank you, Chair. South Africa aligns with the statement delivered by Nigeria on behalf of the African group. We express our appreciation to you, Chair, your team, and the Secretariat for your tireless efforts in preparing REF2. of the draft final report of the OEWG. We would like to emphasize that failing to reach a consensus on the permanent mechanism in the final report would undermine the progress we have made thus far. We are disappointed that we could not find consensus on the operationalization of the voluntary checklist. However, we agree with the proposal that this can be subject to further discussion in the future permanent mechanism. We also regret that we could not reach an agreement on the common template for requesting assistance. The South African delegation would like to join those who have expressed their flexibility on the establishment of the two dedicated thematic groups with the understanding that ad hoc dedicated thematic groups will be established with a fixed duration to engage in focused discussions without prejudging the discussions and outcomes of plenary meetings. We believe that enough has been said on the importance of maintaining the dedicated thematic group on capacity building, which this delegation supports. We also support retention of the women in international security and cyberspace fellowship. We have overcome grave circumstances over the last five years and reached this point where we can achieve consensus on the outcome of this OEWG by addressing important challenges facing the international community towards the building of an open, safe, secure, stable, accessible, peaceful, and interoperable ICT environment. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: flexibility. Mexico, to be followed by the United States.

Mexico: Thank you, Chair. Mexico, thanks to you and your team for presenting a revised draft of the final report in such a short space of time. We recognize your efforts in trying to reconcile the divergent positions that we have heard this week. While we will continue to review the changes that have been introduced, we would like to share the following preliminary remarks. We note with concern that agreed language on commitments and previously agreed wording has been either watered down or eliminated, which could undermine the progress that has been made in recent years or lead to a misinterpretation of the annual progress report. The lack of a reference in paragraph 43 to the applicability of international law and to the Charter of the United Nations is to us perplexing. We consider it essential that the final report maintain consistency in terms of terminology. For instance, global mechanism and permanent mechanism are used interchangeably, which may give rise to inaccurate interpretations about the nature and objectives of this new body. Given that our discussions have been focused on establishing a permanent mechanism, we suggest that this term be used both in the report and in the annexes. We are also concerned about the reinsertion of language that had previously been identified as problematic, such as references to non-state actors on the same level as states and the illegitimate malicious use of ICTs. This generates confusion regarding the obligations and responsibilities of states, especially we regret the deletion of the reference in paragraph 57 to the UN-administered sponsorship programme. We reiterate that Impartiality, transparency, and the scope of these programs hinges specifically on their being managed by a neutral entity subject to criteria that guarantees the inclusion of all delegates from all countries without discrimination arising from possible national policies of third states. Regarding Annex I, we express our deep dismay, as was expressed in a statement delivered by us on behalf of a group of countries of Latin America. We express our profound consternation in the elimination of a thematic group on international law. Discussions on this topic have been repeatedly highlighted as being priorities by various states, including Mexico, and there should be a dedicated structure within the mechanism for this. We can support Egypt’s proposal to move to a more informal setting that would allow us to have a more interactive discussion, if this can help us bring together our positions with a view to achieving agreement before circulation of the conference room paper. I thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Mexico, for your statement. United States, to be followed by Latvia.

United States: Chair, thank you to you and your team for the effort you have undertaken to further revise the draft final report. We appreciate this revised version attempts to find areas of convergence and does so in some ways, for instance, by removing a dedicated thematic group on international law. But the United States has significant outstanding concerns with this revised draft. We remain focused on achieving consensus in this process, however, work remains in order to arrive at that outcome. That calls from a wide range of cross-regional states to streamline the report. The body of the report itself remains quite long and detailed. The United States continues to be of the view that it would be more effective to remove details unnecessary to the priority item of establishing the future mechanism. Additionally, as a general matter, while the United States strongly supports protecting women and girls, defending their rights, and promoting women’s empowerment, and promotes the ability of women and girls to engage in all aspects of social, civic, political, and economic life, we are displeased by references in the final report to gender. Similarly, we remain displeased by the references to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals, or SDGs, which advance a program of soft global governance that is inconsistent with U.N. sovereignty and adverse to the rights and interests of Americans. Chair, on threats, we appreciate the improvements made in paragraph 15, including the additional language on civilian objects. The removal exclusively from the last sentence of that paragraph is important, and this deletion must be maintained. We also welcome the additional text in paragraph 17, recognizing that the United States has highlighted this as a highly concerning threat in several sessions. At the same time, we see the additional language in paragraph 26 related to artificial intelligence and deep fakes as unnecessary and out of scope for this process, and request its removal. On norms, we appreciate the removal of text throughout the section that referenced proposals for new norms. The deleted text did not reflect the consensus in the OEWG, and its removal was an important step in the right direction that must not be reversed. On the other hand, we regret the removal. of the norms implementation checklist. This is an important tool to assist states in implementing the framework, which is one of the action-oriented objectives the mechanism is being stood up to achieve. We would like to see the voluntary checklist reinserted to reflect states’ recognition of the need to implement the existing norms and the progress made during the OEWG in this regard. The checklist was also the only reference in the report to the full list of 11 consensus norms. Earlier this week, the United States supported a request to add a reference to Consensus Resolution 70-237, in which the General Assembly called upon member states to be guided in their use of ICTs by the 2015 report of the GGE, which included 11 voluntary nonbinding norms of responsible state behavior. We reiterate our support for this language. If the checklist is not restored, we also strongly support a footnote referencing the norms section of the 2021 GGE report, which contains useful language for implementing the 11 consensus norms. Regarding international law, we appreciate the Chair’s efforts to improve the international law section. We echo the comments from the EU and others that this section remains unbalanced and does not accurately reflect the robust conversations, including on international humanitarian law that we have had in the OEWG. We remain concerned that paragraph 42 puts documents of varying status on equal footing and highlights one minority proposal over others that have more widespread support. For example, the ICRC resolution on IHL and the use of ICTs was adopted by consensus at the 34th International Conference of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent. It was endorsed. enthusiastically by states across all regions. Similarly, the multiple papers on international law have garnered extensive cross-regional support in the Open-Ended Working Group and have continued to gain traction with new states over time. These documents represent real achievements in reaching common understandings on how international law applies in cyberspace, the development of which is a core element of the mandate of this group set forth in Resolution 75-240. By contrast, the proposal for a convention in Paragraph 42 has never garnered the level of support from states that the cross-regional papers mentioned have, despite frequent mentions by the same small group of states, and it should be removed. The proposal for new legally binding obligations in Paragraph 43E should be deleted, as it selectively elevates language in the third APR, upsetting the careful balance that is achieved in the original document. As you said this morning, Chair, that language is already part of the package that is being transmitted to the future mechanism and should not be repeated out of context. On CBMs, we regret that the references in Paragraph 47F to the UNIDIR assimilation exercise have been weakened. The report should reflect the value of this exercise to states’ efforts to build confidence. While we acknowledge edits to attempt to address the problematic language on the facilitation of access proposal in Paragraph 47K, we regret that this proposal remains at all. Elevating this single proposal above others is unnecessary and does not accurately reflect the OEWG’s decisions, and accordingly, this single example should be deleted. Thank you. The United States strongly supports capacity-building discussions, and we see this section as significantly improved. We also hear calls from many states for additional capacity-building in their efforts toward implementation. implementation of the framework, and we support those calls, including through our own funding. We see a focused and scoped section as this report as setting the future mechanism up for success in its efforts to advance capacity building in the future. We appreciate the Chair’s efforts to better focus the scope of the global ICT security cooperation and capacity building portal. We think taking a step-by-step approach will ensure that it does not duplicate existing tools. We also appreciate the revisions intended to recognize existing capacity building work and avoid duplicative processes and unnecessary overhead, for instance, in paragraph 57. We urge the Chair to retain these changes that help ensure that capacity building discussions and efforts are scoped and organized to deliver meaningful results. Chair, on the topic of institutional dialogue and Annex I, we very much appreciate your work to simplify the description of the DTGs in pursuit of consensus and, in particular, your deletion of the International Law Working Group. As we have made clear, the United States cannot agree to a report that contains such a DTG. As we explained earlier in the week, we are fully in support of continued discussion of international law in the plenary and the cross-cutting DTG. However, we have heard both in prior sessions and this week that certain states would seek to exploit conversations in any dedicated group on international law to advance new, legally binding obligations that could potentially undermine existing international law. This could have negative ramifications even outside the cyber context. We are deeply disappointed that the language for DTG 1 has lost its focus on the challenges of resilience, stability, and cooperation as proposed by the French delegation and supported by so many states in this room. However, we are encouraged that the cross-cutting policy-oriented model has been preserved in DTG 1 and would like to ensure that it is retained and implemented as intended. As you observed yesterday, the five pillars are foundational and mutually reinforcing. They were never intended to be hermetically sealed silos. With respect to DTG 2, we think it is essential to include language scoping the discussion to the implementation of the framework. As laid out in Annex C, the foundation of the future mechanism is the framework of responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs. That framework, and particularly implementation of the 11 norms, already allows for a wide range of potential capacity-building efforts. To ensure that capacity-building discussion and recommendations in the future mechanism remain true to the mandate, including the international security context, we suggest adding a scoping reference to, quote, implementing the framework, unquote, after the phrase, quote, ICT security capacity-building, end quote. The United States very much supports capacity-building in this space, but the OEWG is not a venue to address cyber-assistance matters writ large. With regard to the title of the future mechanism, we strongly support the French proposal, heard just now, to include, to advance responsible state behavior in the title of the mechanism. Finally, we continue to regret that the modalities for stakeholder participation in the future mechanism have not been improved. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you, United States, for your statement. Latvia, to be followed by Brazil.

Latvia: Thank you, Chair. I was asking the floor to support the intervention of the Vietnamese delegation at the beginning of this debate. We appreciate, Chair, your efforts in searching for balance. in the text when it comes to recommendations of the Open-Ended Working Group on the modalities of work of the UN Future Permanent Mechanism. But we were somehow surprised to see that part of Para 51-I in Rev. 1 of Capacity Building Section, which was devoted to the joint initiative of our countries to establish the UN Cyber Resilience Academy within UNIDIR was deleted. After deletion of the 51-I sub-point B of Rev. 1, the report no longer represents accurate reflection of a wealth of ideas presented during the liberation of the Working Group. The idea of UN Cyber Resilience Academy was launched in December 2024, discussed further in two subsequent Open-Ended Working Group sessions. The non-paper was circulated to all member states earlier this year, and the proposal gathers support from a considerable number of states from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and only one state voiced opposition to the idea. Based on the above, and in order to improve accuracy of the report, we encourage you to reinstate the deleted text from 51-I sub-point B of Rev. 1 to the CPR document for final adoption by consensus. On other topics, Mr. Chair, my delegation supports the remarks of the EU delegation as well as French delegation specifically about the title of the Future Permanent Mechanism that should put emphasis on advancement of responsible state behavior in cyberspace. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Latvia, for your statement. Brazil to be followed by Canada.

Brazil: Mr. Chair, we thank you and your team for your tireless efforts in the elaboration of Rev. 2 in your quest to bring us closer to consensus. We recognize the complexity of the task of bridging positions which are in some areas diametrically opposed, and value your determination in finding a fair balance among them. We acknowledge the streamlining of Ref 2 as a necessary byproduct of that attempt. It is, overall, a text which we could support, though it falls short of our ambitions in some sections, and we do have some tweaks to propose still. On threats, we support Switzerland’s proposal on paragraph 17 to replace attacks with operations, which is more legally accurate. On international law, we regret that the report does not capture the breadth and depth of our discussions. We support Switzerland’s proposal of a short factual reference of issues debated as a compromise. On the issue of capacity building, we would first like to express our appreciation for the flexibility incorporated to the level of representation at the Global Roundtable. Nevertheless, we join Colombia and Switzerland in regretting the deletion of the reference to the mapping exercise, and would like to see it reinstated. We also regret the weakening of paragraphs 56 and 57 of Ref 1 on the Sponsorship Programme and the Capacity Building Fund, which would constitute important tools to enable the UN to play a larger role in capacity building efforts, thus rendering those initiatives more accessible, transparent, and politically neutral. Turning to the future mechanism on Annex 1 of Ref 2, we welcome the change in paragraph 14 to meetings twice a year. One for plenary and one for DTGs. In the interest of brevity, I will not repeat the proposals made by Mexico on behalf of a group of Latin American countries on DTG 2 on capacity building, which we fully align with. My delegation must also register its disappointment at the elimination of the DTG on international law. While we of course recognize the cross-cutting nature of the issue for countries with limited resources and personnel, it will be difficult to ensure the meaningful participation of legal experts when the issue is so diluted in DTG 1’s overly broad mandate, which will have a negative impact in the quality of our discussions. In this regard, we could support Egypt’s latest proposal if that can bring us to a consensus while still preserving a space to discuss the subject. Finally, we reiterate our request to see the third APR’s Annex C and REF2’s Annex I integrated for clearer understanding of all elements of the future mechanism. It is our sincere belief that consensus is within reach, though it will require significant flexibility and goodwill from us all. You can count on Brazil to continue to engage constructively to get us across the finish line tomorrow. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Brazil, for your statement and for your expressions of constructive engagement. Canada to be followed by Ukraine.

Canada: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Canada sincerely thanks you and your team for your tireless efforts towards identifying outcomes in this multilateral process to promote responsible state behavior in cyberspace. We have long felt that there is a clear spectrum of consensus amongst the vast majority of states in this room. This draft brings us closer to a balance that reflects this space of consensus, but it is not quite there yet. First on threats. The current wording on paragraph 15 fails to recognize the reality, including that ICTs are used in ways that facilitate compliance with international humanitarian law. We suggest the following compromise language. States highlighted the need to promote the responsible use of ICTs by states in accordance with international law. We support paragraphs 16 and 17, but regret the change to the language on cryptocurrency theft in paragraph 24. On norms, we are disappointed that the voluntary checklist has been removed. Your checklist should be adopted. We welcome the change on para 34F. We deeply regret the removal of reference in the chapeau of now paragraph 42 to the topics we discussed pertaining how international law applies. to the use of ICTs, namely state responsibility, due diligence, and international humanitarian law. This is important language to show our progress in fulfilling our mandate. We also deeply regret the important substantive language proposals showing convergence on international law are not integrated. I refer here to language of para 44C from draft zero on the use of force, and different proposals made during this session by Brazil, Vietnam, Canada, and others on international humanitarian law. Still on international law, we have concerns with the reference to the document on a convention. On CBMs, we call for increased focus on consensus priority, which is to implement and operationalize existing CBMs before beginning new ones. We oppose the recommendation to work on standardized terminology. We welcome incapacity building the recognition of the important programs that are in place by states, including the Women in Cyber Fellowship. On the permanent mechanism, we support France’s proposal on the name. We suggest that the language describing the cross-cutting dedicated thematic groups should be clearer, and highlight the need to address the protection of critical infrastructure. We can accept your proposed compromise on capacity building. We call for a clear link and no duplication between the round table on capacity building and that DTG. We oppose the idea of additional round tables at the discretion of the chair, and request that in line with the NXC, such decisions be made by consensus. Lastly, with regard to stakeholder involvement, we continue to maintain that the proposal we have put forward, and that is co-sponsored by 42 states, is not maximalist. It is a sovereign right of states to express concerns about a stakeholder, but this must be transparent. Additionally, maintaining the one state veto, ruling over all member states, is fundamentally unfair to all other states. Further, we recall the UN practices for informal groups to be more inclusive than formal meetings. and include all stakeholders, providing them more meaningful opportunities to contribute. This needs to be recorded explicitly, for instance, by way of a For Greater Clarity footnote under paragraph 10 of Annex 1. Finally, Mr. Chair, we must be clear that the future mechanism will be single-track. This should be explicitly reflected in Annex 1 to support seamless transition. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Canada, for your statement. Ukraine, to be followed by Australia.

Ukraine: Thank you, Chair. We acknowledge the efforts of you and your team that resulted in compiling the ref2 of the final report of this OEWG, and thank you for that. Ukraine aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union, particularly on the issues of stakeholder participation modalities, the use of the ICTs in accordance with the existing provisions of international law, paragraph 15 and others, and excluding the Annex with the Voluntary Checklist of Practical Actions for the Implementation of Voluntary Non-Binding Norms of Responsible State Behavior in the Use of the ICTs. Referring to the latter, in our view, the very fact of unreadiness of the states to give support to the possibility of a voluntary self-check can serve as a practical illustration of the level of global readiness to implement a legally binding document within the scope of the use of ICTs. And on top of that, we observe the ongoing unjustified and unprovoked aggression against Ukraine by one of the current UN Security Council members in full disrespect of the already existing international law provisions, which proves that the existence of a convention does not at all guarantee its implementation. Having said that, we consider as premature the mention of some kind of convention in the list of the documents, the reference to which is given in paragraph 42, and suggest deleting the currently third bullet point from the final draft. In terms of the modalities of the future permanent mechanism, We see that now the DTGs are organized in a different logic, which relates to political DTG1 and technical DTG2 dimensions of the regular institutional dialogue and mentions the relevant development goals. In a way, this aligns with the logic of the POC directory and creates a structure that practically enables the states, particularly to consider how international law applies to the use of information and communication technologies within both these dimensions, which is a way to address the concerns of the proponents of the separate DTG on international law. We see that some progress in reaching the consensus has been made in these past days of discussion, and we would like to underline again the importance of the adoption of the report that would not be detrimental to our work in this OEWG. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Ukraine, for your statement. Australia to be followed by the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Australia: Thank you, Chair, for your continued leadership and for the hard work that has gone into this current draft, which is a more balanced reflection of our discussions. However, we still hold some serious concerns with key elements of the text. In relation to threats, we support Canada’s textual proposal for paragraph 15. On international law, we continue to be concerned about including a minority proposal in paragraph 42, placing it on an equal footing with other documents that have attracted far greater levels of support. We do not support the inclusion of this document. By contrast, the resolution of the 34th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent ICT was adopted by consensus. We would therefore prefer it to be placed in a standalone paragraph. However, in the spirit of compromise and at a minimum, we call for the report to be explicitly reflected with the consensus status of the 34 IC resolution in the body of the text. We join Brazil, El Salvador, Switzerland and others in expressing disappointment that after more than than four years of discussions, international law language is not reflected in the text. References in former paragraph 41 to topics that have been discussed, including IHL and state responsibility, have been omitted, and language appearing in the zero draft on the use of force has not been reinstated. The application of international law is an integral element of our framework. We cannot have nothing to show for our efforts within this OEWG, and reiterate the call made yesterday by the cross-regional group for language on international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and the law of state responsibility to be added in paragraph 41. In relation to norms, we continue to support the adoption of the voluntary checklist of practical actions, and regret its deletion in paragraph 37. On confidence-building measures, we continue to consider it inappropriate to include a reference in paragraph 45K to a proposal made by a single state without broad support. On the future permanent mechanism, we support the proposal made by France to include a reference to advancing responsible state behaviour in the title of the mechanism. In relation to paragraph 12, we continue to strongly recommend that recommendations of dedicated thematic groups are agreed by consensus, and to make this reference explicit in the document. We note reporting is missing from the draft, and will need to be discussed at the organisational session. Otherwise, a simple solution would be to draw on the UNGA resolution 75-240, calling for the mechanism to produce a progress report at the three-year mark, and a final report after five years. The proposed DTG on capacity building would be the most appropriate place to host the global roundtable on ICT security capacity building. On stakeholders, Australia remains deeply concerned by the lack of inclusiveness and transparency in the modalities, including allowing a single state to veto without explanation. Finally, Australia is a long-standing advocate for gender and STGs. supports the retention of references to them in the final report. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you Australia for your statement. Netherlands to be followed by Israel.

Kingdom of the Netherlands: Thank you Chair. The Kingdom of the Netherlands aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union and would like to make some additional remarks in a national capacity. At the outset we would like to thank you and your team for your work on this draft final report and we commend your efforts in guiding us towards a consensus outcome. Chair allow me to share some of our reflections on the report. On threats we recognized the threats included in this final report however the Netherlands regrets the lesion in paragraph 24 to a human centric approach to ransomware as we believe this is crucial to understand and mitigate the impact of ransomware attacks for different groups and individuals in society. In paragraph 15 we welcome the reference to civilian objects but propose to replace peaceful purposes with states highlighted the need to promote the use of ICTs in a manner consistent with the framework. Lastly we echo the remarks of El Salvador and Switzerland on paragraph 17 that the specific sectors now deleted were based on consensus language. Moving to the norm section we welcome the paragraphs 31 to 33 as well as 34 that are now accurately captured as introductory and substantive paragraphs rather than proposals with varying levels of support. My delegation further supports the lesion of the proposal for the UN Secretary to compile a list of norms proposals which was not sufficiently discussed. However concerning the norms implementation checklist in paragraph 36a we regret that a reference to the adoption of checklist has been deleted including the annex. We heard some delegations mention that adoption of a checklist would be premature, but we believe that the recommendation should at least reflect our willingness to work towards a consensual adoption of a checklist in a future permanent mechanism. Turning to international law, the Netherlands is disappointed that the clear convergence on how international law applies remains unaffected in the report. And in particular, we regret the references to discussions on international humanitarian law, due diligence and state responsibility that have been deleted. Without clear language on these topics, the reference to the letter proposing a convention in paragraph 42 creates a clear imbalance, and we therefore join Australia, Switzerland, El Salvador, Canada, Brazil and others in urging the inclusion of references to factual discussions on international humanitarian law, international human rights law and the law of state responsibility, as presented yesterday by Vietnam on behalf of a cross-regional group of states. We further propose to move the reference to the ICRC resolution into the chapeau of paragraph 42 to clearly reflect its status as a consensus document, as also just mentioned by Australia. Then on regular institutional dialogue, on the title of the future mechanism, we support Malaysia to use one title throughout the report, and in that regard we want to state our support for the title that France just proposed. On the modalities of stakeholders, we continue to support the proposal made by Canada and Chile. Then we support the inclusion of the new paragraph 14 in Annex 1, that the future mechanism would meet twice per year, with one week of dedicated thematic group meetings and one week of plenary sessions, allowing for flexibility on when they are specifically organised. Lastly, Chair, for the Kingdom of the Netherlands it is essential that this open-ended working group enables the smooth transition to a single track process after we conclude. Therefore, although we are supportive of the three policy-oriented dedicated working groups as proposed by France, we note the need of having a flexible approach in the spirit of consensus. I thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you, Kingdom of the Netherlands, for your statement. Israel to be followed by Ireland.

Israel: Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving Israel the floor once again. We would like to commend you and your team once again on the tireless efforts and trusting stewardship. REV2 is a significant step in the right direction, and we are committed to take the next steps necessary to cross the finish line of adopting a final report of our working group by consensus. In this spirit, I will limit my intervention to three outstanding issues in the text. First, we note with great appreciation the improvement of the language of paragraph 15. However, as many have noted in the discussion this week, it would be much more precise and consistent with reality to replace the language of promote the use of ICTs for peaceful purposes with promote the use of ICTs in accordance with international law, as suggested by Canada. This is not the exact wording that we have suggested, but in the spirit of compromise, we are willing to accept this good suggestion made by other delegations as well. Second, paragraph 42 mentions in the same breath different texts that are simply incomparable. For example, mentioning the ICT resolution adopted by consensus at the 2024 ICRC International Conference together with a letter dated 15th of May 2023, which was supported by a small number of states. and has time and again proven polarizing in our discussions, creates a misleading impression which we believe should be avoided. We therefore request the deletion of the dash point that makes reference to this letter. Third, Mr. Chair, it is Israel’s view that paragraph 42E must be revised in order to avoid prejudging future discussions in the permanent mechanism. Although the consistent view of many states has been that international law generally applies to cyberspace, we recognize that other states still wish to discuss the possibility of identifying gaps, if there are any, yet we cannot note the need to have this discussion and at the same time allude to a result, let alone to the conclusion of developing new obligations, which clearly is not shared by a large number of states. We therefore suggest revising paragraph 42E to read as follows, and I quote, noting the need to consider whether any gaps exist in how existing international law applies to the use of ICTs. And finally, Mr. Chair, like many others, I wish to add Israel’s support for the French suggestion on the title of the future permanent mechanism. Mr. Chair, we remain committed to work constructively with all Member States and wish to assure you our availability and willingness to work towards a consensual final report. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you, Israel, for your statement. Ireland, to be followed by Finland.

Ireland: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Firstly, as others, we want to thank you and your team for the enormous amount of hard work that has gone into preparing this version of the text and your efforts to take account of the many interventions that have been made this week. We align with the EU intervention, but would also like to make A few points in our national capacity. As others, we recognize some improved elements in the draft, but have some suggestions to improve the balance of the text and move closer to our common goal of consensus. We support the proposals from Switzerland on paragraphs 15 and 17, and the point made by El Salvador on reversing the deletion of details on critical infrastructure on paragraph 17. We also regret the deletion of the human-centric approach to ransomware in paragraph 24, particularly given the widespread support for stronger language on this topic during our debates earlier in the week. As with others, we are concerned about the international law chapter. It has suffered significantly from the change from Rev. 1 to Rev. 2, and had significant issues previously. While there has been a clear call in the room throughout the OEWG, including during the last three days, for appropriately reflecting the discussions on international law, particularly IHL and IHRL, into the final report, we note that Rev. 2 does not include the additional language on international law, particularly noting the bodies of law as outlined in the cross-regional working paper which was presented by Vietnam yesterday, which we strongly support. Unfortunately, Rev. 2 has seen further reductions in the text on international law, particularly 43b and parts of 42, yet at the same time the reference to the draft Convention remains and is put at an equal footing to the consensus resolution by the ICRC, as many others have mentioned previously. We do not feel this reflects the contributions by Member States in the OEWG. These changes walk back the consensus on international law, and do not acknowledge the work by cross-regional groups delivering multiple working parties on this issue since 2021. On Annex 1, we welcome that the DTGs will be cross-cutting and draw upon all of the five pillars, and would also support the proposal made by France on the future title for our new future mechanism to include to advance responsible state behaviour. On stakeholders, we continue to look for a more positive outcome, drawing on the paper of Chile and Canada. We look forward, Chair, to working with you and other delegations today to reaching consensus and ensuring the smooth transition to the future permanent mechanism we all hope and look for. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Ireland, for your statement. Finland, followed by United Kingdom.

Finland: Thank you, Chair. Finland aligns itself with the statement of the European Union and wishes to make some additional remarks in its national capacity. We appreciate all your efforts and hard work for the newly revised draft. In our view, the international law chapter as it now stands does not properly reflect the discussions on international law during the OEWG and the progress made. In particular, we have called for a clear reference to IHL’s applicability in cyberspace, as well as a standalone reference to the landmark ICT resolution adopted at the 34th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, which was adopted by consensus. Paragraph 42 as it now stands does not answer this call. There have also been repeated calls for the language of OP4 of said resolution to be included to explicitly acknowledge that in situations of armed conflict, IHL rules and principles serve to protect civilian populations and other protected persons and objects, including against the risks arising from ICT activities. Cyber capabilities have changed the way in which armed conflicts are conducted, and there is reason to expect that cyber means and methods will continue to be used also in the future. It is pertinent that there remains no ambiguity in the final report on this. IHL fully applies to cyberspace. Regarding the chapter on norms, we particularly regret the deletion of paragraph 31. We have, however, taken note of the constructive proposal by Colombia earlier today on including language recalling that the use of ICTs by states in a manner consistent with the framework of responsible state behavior in the use of ICTs, which includes voluntary norms, obligations under international law, and CBMs, fosters international peace and security, trust, and stability between states. On modalities for the multistakeholder participation, we regret that no changes have been made to the revised draft. The paper on practical modalities to enable meaningful stakeholder participation by Canada and Chile and co-sponsored by several states, including Finland, received wide support also in the room these past days, and this should be reflected in the final report. Lastly, we support comments made by France regarding the name of the new permanent mechanism. I thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Finland, for your statement. UK, to be followed by Mauritius.

United Kingdom: Chair, we’d like to begin by recognizing your considerable efforts to achieve consensus this week. On threats, we are grateful for your amendments to paragraph 15, but the UK shares the continuing concerns already expressed this afternoon. On norms, whilst we consider this section has a better balance, we are disappointed that the voluntary norms checklist has been deleted. This is an important piece of guidance for states. We’re also surprised that the consensus reference to CII has been removed. CII has been a natural part of our consensus discussions for many years. Having noted this, in the spirit of consensus, we would be in a position to accept this section if the existing balance is retained. On international law, the UK continues to be deeply disappointed that we have failed to include any new substantive content. despite the convergence that exists. The UK echoes and supports the statement made by Vietnam on behalf of a cross-regional group of states yesterday, which identified modest text proposals on the discussions that we have had in this OEWG on important international law topics. The UK joins others in reiterating our continued profound concern with paragraph 42. The UK cannot support the inclusion of the proposal for new legally binding obligations in this way. Existing international law applies in cyberspace, as it does to all other aspects of states’ international relations. The UK cannot support referring to a proposal that would risk undermining the application of core, foundational rules of international law, including the UN Charter. On regular institutional dialogue and the associated annex, the UK acknowledges the Chair’s efforts to identify an integrated, policy-oriented and cross-cutting approach to the dedicated thematic groups. Regarding the revised DTG1, we regret the removal of the content on resilience and threats, which we feel provided a valuable focus for cross-cutting discussions. To ensure a consistent approach, we urge that recommendations from the DTGs, referenced in paragraph 12, be agreed by consensus and that this be explicitly reflected in the text. On stakeholder modalities, our position remains unchanged. We deeply regret that the current text fails to reflect the demands of at least 42 states. This is in contrast to the prominence given to proposals supported by just a handful of delegations elsewhere in the report. We reiterate firmly the UK position that a single state veto is detrimental to our discussions. Finally, regarding the title of the future mechanism, we find ICT security to be a much simpler and easier to understand term, which does not discriminate against the various priorities of states. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you, UK, for your statement. Mauritius to be followed by the Philippines.

Mauritius: Thank you, Chair. Chair, distinguished delegates, good afternoon. The Mauritian delegation would like to express our deep appreciation to you, Chair, your team and the Secretariat for their tireless efforts to produce the REV2 report. We approach the report with a spirit of flexibility and constructive engagement. We are encouraged by the progress made across the full scope of the OEWG’s agenda and wish to highlight the following areas in particular. Number one, recognition of the evolving threat landscape, including malicious ICT activities targeting critical infrastructure and the need for cooperative risk-based responses. Number two, continued advancement of the framework of voluntary non-binding norms with space for both implementation and further development under the future permanent mechanism. Number three, operational progress on confidence-building measures, including the global POC directory and practical simulation exercises that build trust and readiness. Number four, strong emphasis on inclusive and needs-based capacity building, including support for developing countries, gender-responsive approaches and regional cooperation. Following the successful transition to the future permanent mechanism, we support the idea that the substantive plenary sessions will be organised in accordance with the five pillars of the Framework of Responsible State Behaviour, as stated in Annex 1 in paragraph 5. Furthermore, the DTGs are aimed at building on and complementing the discussions in the substantive plenary sessions by paving the way for more in-depth and action-oriented discussions. However, echoing the views expressed by many other delegations, we support the re-inclusion of a dedicated thematic group on international law. We believe this will provide a valuable platform to advance discussions on this important pillar and will be beneficial to states that are still developing their national expertise and involvement in this area. In conclusion, we reiterate our support for the consensus adoption of the final report and reaffirm our commitment to continued co-operation in the formalisation of the new mechanism. We also commend the dedication of all delegations and recognise the significant progress made over the past five years in this process. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Mauritius, for your statement. Philippines to be followed by Germany.

Philippines: Chair, the Philippines expresses its sincere appreciation to you and your team for your tireless efforts in guiding this process and your commitment to reconciling the views, preferences and positions of all delegations. Mr. Chair, we take note of the key refinements introduced in this final draft. However, we observe with some concern the removal of Annex I, Annex I rather, and the associated language in Rev. I, referring to the voluntary checklist. While we understand the sensitivities around prescriptive instruments at this stage, we believe these practical tools, if appropriately managed, could have supported a more tangible and structured implementation track. We welcome, however, the continued references to the checklist as a living document and urge its further refinement. under the incoming mechanism. On the matter of the dedicated thematic groups, the Philippines notes that the final draft continues to reflect the strong interest expressed by many delegations in exploring the utility such groups under the future mechanism. While we regret that the more detailed framework could not be established at this stage, welcome recognition of the two DTGs’ potential to improve focus, deepen technical exchanges, and contribute to more substantive discussions of issues within the five pillars. In particular, we support future exploration of thematic work streams and capacity building, responsible state behavior, international law, and emerging technologies. These areas offer opportunities to build consensus and bridge divergent positions through sustained inclusive engagement. We also emphasize the importance of ensuring that these DTGs are conducted in a manner that is inclusive, transparent, and guided by the principle of state sovereignty with meaningful contributions from technical experts, regional organizations, and other stakeholders as appropriate. In this regard, the Philippines believes that the structured thematic work under a formal or hybrid intergovernmental mechanism could significantly enhance the effectiveness of future deliberations and allow for the integration of the growing body of national and regional experiences in capacity building efforts. Mr. Chair, the Philippines joins Vietnam and Indonesia in welcoming the strengthened language in capacity building in the final draft, particularly its reaffirmation of the principle of inclusivity, demand drivenness, and sustainability. We support the recognition of practical tools such as the needs-based ICT security capacity building catalog. And at the same time, we echo the call made by Vietnam and Latvia for the reinstatement of language in paragraph 53G on the establishment of a UN Cyber Resilience Academy within UNIDIR. We believe such an academy would provide a dedicated, impartial, and solution-focused platform to conduct research and implement capacity building activities, particularly for member states with limited ICT security capabilities. We also encourage the continued development of tailored regionally relevant. training, and knowledge-sharing platforms, as they support the needs of countries with limited institutional and technical resources. Mr. Chair, the Philippines underscores the importance of ensuring the meaningful and structured participation of non-governmental stakeholders, including civil society, academia, and technical experts. The insights and practical knowledge are critical to enriching and complementing state-led processes, the rapidly-evolving challenges of emerging technologies and capacity-building. The inclusion will help ensure that the mechanism remains responsive, transparent, and grounded in diverse realities. In this context, the Philippines supports the Chair’s call and urges all delegations to exercise flexibility and constructive engagement during this 11th and final session. In order to reach consensus in the final report, we recognize that convergence will require compromise, mutual respect, and a spirit of collaboration. Our delegation remains committed to working with all delegations in this final stage to deliver a forward-looking, inclusive, and balanced outcome. Mr. Chair, lastly, we recognize the complexity of the task and once again commend your efforts to reflect an overall balance of perspectives in this final draft of the report. We appreciate the inclusive and transparent manner in which the process has been conducted, which has contributed to a text that, while not capturing every national position in full, lays a constructive and credible foundation for consensus. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Philippines, for your statement. And I underline the point you made about the need for flexibility on the part of everyone. Germany, to be followed by Saudi Arabia.

Germany: consensus and non-consensus elements throughout the text. However, we still have some substantial remaining concerns. The suppression of the norms checklist deprives us of the well-worn action-oriented implementation guidance to move us collectively forward on the implementation of the framework. Furthermore, and this I want to stress, yesterday we heard from a large number of member states that already REF1 did not accurately reflect the richness of our discussion over the last five years on how international law applies. We believe that one modest option to improve the current text in this regard would be to incorporate the modest and descriptive elements of the statement made by Vietnam on behalf of the cross-regional group, also in line with the proposal made by Switzerland. Finally, we note that the stakeholder modalities remained unchanged, which would mean that we will not be able to truly benefit from the depth and richness of their knowledge, and refer to both the statement made yesterday by Chile, as well as the joint paper of over 20 stakeholders delivered yesterday. Some states also have asked for more clarity on the DTGs. We believe the proposal made by France would provide additional guidance on the working of the first DTG, clarifying that by allowing states to bring their respective topics of importance to the CTG, by discussing them in an integrated policy-oriented and cross-cutting manner, and by applying the framework to them, we’re actually allowing more time and could dive deeper on the crucial subjects of capacity building, confidence building, norms, and international law. In this sense, we are ready to work constructively with your compromise proposal and DTGs in REV2. To conclude, Germany wants to reiterate our central points that are, first, the future permanent mechanism must implement, strengthen, and promote a framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace with all its five pillars. We support the proposal made by France with regard to the title, focusing on advancing responsible state behavior. And we deplore the deletion of paragraph 31 that reiterates that any behavior inconsistent with the framework undermines international peace

Chair: and security.

Germany: trust and stability between states, and call for a stronger reaffirmation of the framework. Equally important, there seems to be very strong support for a single-track consensus-based mechanism. As Inter-A expressed in a joint statement of Tunisia on behalf of the Group of Arab States this morning, Germany believes, like Canada, that Annex I should contain an explicit reiteration of the single-track principle in order to ensure a smooth transition. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Germany, for your statement. Saudi Arabia, to be followed by Poland.

Saudi Arabia: Thank you, Chair. Given that this is the first time we are taking the floor at this meeting, allow us to take this opportunity to thank you, Chair. We thank you for your efforts and also your team for their efforts to allow us to make progress and also in preparing this draft final report, this REV2. We hope to make progress on the basis of the hard-won gains of this group to achieve a future mechanism from next year. Chair, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia aligns itself with the statement delivered by the Republic of Tunisia on behalf of the Arab Group, and I wish to make the following remarks in our national capacity. Firstly, we affirm the applicability of international law to cyberspace as stated by the Arab Group. We also highlight the need to respect the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states in matters relating to cyberspace. We highlight the importance of strengthening action, regional and collective international action to deal with cyber threats, especially in the area of capacity building. In this context and following on from paragraph 59, we are attached to the idea of achieving regional forums and global fora that will discuss matters of cybersecurity in a general sense. We do so through our support to the work of the Arab Cybersecurity Ministers Council and through our commitment as the hosts of this council based in Riyadh. We support their work and we will ensure that they make progress. We also annually host the Global Cybersecurity Forum. More than 120 states participate in this forum. The aim is to root the principles of dialogue in discussing matters. We thank you once again for your work and we stand ready to continue contributing to this group and to discussions as part of the Arab group to achieve a consensus. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Saudi Arabia, for your statement and also for your commitment to working with others to reach consensus. It’s much appreciated. Poland to be followed by Malawi.

Poland: Mr. Chair, Poland aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union. We thank you for the revised draft and appreciate the visible efforts made to move us closer to consensus. Now we would like to offer some preliminary remarks in our national capacity. From our perspective, there is one section that requires significant improvement, the part addressing international law. The language concerning international humanitarian law and international human rights law should be notably strengthened. We must underline our concern that references to human rights included previously in the Voluntary Checklist were removed without any compensatory language included elsewhere in the report. While we would prefer the more ambitious approach to international human rights law and IHL throughout the text, we believe that the language proposed earlier by Vietnam on behalf of the cross-regional group offers a factual and balanced basis for addressing the current shortcomings in this section. Regarding the paragraph 42, we regret that the consensual ICRC resolution continues to be listed alongside national and regional initiatives. In our view, it warrants a stand-alone paragraph reflecting its unique and universally agreed-upon character. Furthermore, we suggest the removal of General Assembly document A-77-984 from the list as it does not address the issue of application of international law to ICT activities. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Malawi: Our states express regret over the removal of the Voluntary Checklist of practical actions from the body of the report. We fear this may make it less prioritized in our future discussions, which dilutes its current weight and visibility. Chair, throughout this process, Malawi has consistently supported practical and inclusive mechanisms that enhance the implementation of norms. The Voluntary Checklist was one such tool, non-prescriptive. adaptable to national context, and valuable, particularly for developing countries seeking to operationalize the framework for responsible state behavior. If we are to adapt going forward the norms for responsible state behavior, it is important to understand that the voluntary checklist will help us operationalize the norms, bridge the implementation gap, as well as foster consistency and accountability. Intermission from the main report risks diminishing the utility of the outcome for capacity-constrained states. While we welcome the reference to continue discussions on checklists under the future permitting mechanism, its absence from this milestone report is a missed opportunity to mainstream practical guidance at this critical juncture. Chair, on the matter of international law, Malawi reiterates that international law, including the UN Charter, remains applicable and essential in the ICT environment. We emphasize the importance of continued, focused discussions on how existing international law applies, and where necessary, identifying potential gaps. We also strongly support further voluntary sharing of national positions to foster convergence and understanding. Finally, Malawi remains flexible and committed to consensus. We urge the progress made be preserved and not diluted, and that practical tools, such as the voluntary checklist, be carried forward with strong institutional support in the next phase. I thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Malawi, for your statement and for your commitment to working towards consensus. New Zealand, to be followed by Estonia.

New Zealand: Thank you, Chair. We’ve heard a range of views about the best way to discuss international law in the future permitting mechanism. I can assure you that New Zealand is deeply committed to international law, and we think continuing to discuss how it applies in the use of ICTs is vital to international peace and security. We have regularly spoken about international law in the OEWG. We will want to continue to have this dialogue and the new permanent mechanism, recognizing that international law will continue to be one of its pillars. We will continue to share our perspectives and will listen with interest to the perspectives of all others. As in the past, we will continue to want to discuss how international humanitarian law applies to cyber activities during armed conflict. We will want to continue to talk about how international human rights law applies to cyber activities. We will want to continue to reflect on the context in which state cyber activity may amount to the use of force for the purposes of international law. We’re disappointed that our previous discussions on these and other questions of how international law applies to the use of ICTs have not been appropriately reflected in the annual report. We’re unable to reconcile the apparently widespread desire to promote discussions on the application of international law and permanent mechanism with the report’s silence on key aspects of the subject. It is not unreasonable to expect that robust discussions on these subjects are reflected accordingly. We encourage you to reconsider the balance of this section. In a similar vein, we’re troubled by the report’s treatment of the existing normative framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace, and even more so, why there would be any resistance to strong references to this fundamental framework and to the principle of advancing responsible state behavior. We encourage you to reflect on this further. On stakeholder modalities, for New Zealand, as a smaller and geographically isolated country, we do not always have the ready access to the expertise and insights of international representatives from academia, civil society, and industry. It can therefore be frustrating and disappointing when we deny the ability to benefit from their participation when they are blocked, with no transparency, let alone recourse. We support the approach put forward by Chile and Canada, not because we want to somehow change the intergovernmental nature of this process. We support stakeholder involvement because, in our view, it supports a state-led process by levelling the information playing field for states like mine. Their inputs support us in developing practical, human rights-respecting and technically viable solutions to global cybersecurity challenges. Chair, we know you will continue to listen carefully to the feedback you hear today, and we strongly support your careful leadership in finding a path towards consensus. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, New Zealand, for your statement and also for your expression of support for the Chair. I’m looking for every ounce of support I can get, so I’m listening very attentively to all the statements. I give the floor now to Estonia, to be followed by Nicaragua.

Estonia: Thank you, Mr Chair. Estonia aligns itself with the statement by the European Union, and that’s the following on its national capacity. We would like the Chair and its team for putting together REV2. We have noted some improvement compared to REV1. However, we regret that the IHL language in the international law chapter has regressed compared to the previous version. We believe that there have been deepening discussions on international law, particularly IHL, throughout Open-Ended Working Group, but we note that there is no additional language on IHL in this current proposal. The final report reaffirms the prohibition of the threat of use of force, a well-known fundamental rule formulated in the UN Charter. However, unlike the Zero Draft, REV2 does not highlight that an ICT operation may constitute use of force when its scale and effects are comparable to use of force. by a non-ICT operation. To add value, a link to ICT is necessary. We remain concerned about the reference to a convention. We believe that there were no substantial discussions and support on that proposal to add it to paragraph 42 of the core text. We believe that reference should be deleted. Moreover, on stakeholder modalities, we noted that no amendments were made. We are still in a position that any objections should be openly discussed and if they remain unresolved, decisions should reflect the will of the majority. Last but not least, we support French proposal advancing responsible state behavior in the title of the mechanism. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Nicaragua: Our responsibility is to guarantee an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful environment for ICT. We support capacity building in the sphere of ICT, supporting the obligation of developed countries to increase technological and financial support and capacity for developing states. It’s important to recognize the historic responsibility of developed countries in the provision of resources, including technological and scientific resources, in light of the low level of production. preparedness and capacity in developing countries in relation to undue use of ICTs against our countries. We highlight that this cooperation should take the form of the establishment and promotion of mechanisms for participation of developing countries in the meetings of the future permanent mechanism. Also, by promoting sponsorships and other forms of exchanges of views. We hope that this will not be excluded from the final report. Chair, we reiterate our call for maintaining current modalities in relation to participation of interested non-governmental actors in the future permanent mechanism in order to maintain the intergovernmental nature both of the United Nations and the process itself. It’s necessary to recall, and this is known to all, that the vast majority of the interested NGOs are funded by or have their origins in developed countries. There is no need to say that obviously the interest of such organizations is to promote, project, and justify the agendas of Western countries rather than promoting cooperation with developing countries. Finally, we reiterate the request from a group of delegations that the terminology of this process be in line with the OEWG security of and in the use of ICTs. So we request that in the future permanent mechanism this be reflected according to the same rationale. Once again, please be assured of the availability of our country in helping to achieve a successful outcome. this process. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Nicaragua, for your statement and also expression of support. Pakistan, to be followed by Costa Rica.

Pakistan: Mr. Chair, I am taking the floor to share a few points. First, of course, we would like to convey our appreciation to you and your team for hard work and stewardship of the OEWG. Chair, although we wished interested delegations were better involved in informal consultations to bridge gaps and support shared objectives, we offer our flexibility on CHAIRS REV2 to be a basis to achieve our shared objectives. Without reiterating our proposals made earlier, I would like to highlight that our suggestions in Para 15 have not been taken on board. We also regret that despite our repeated requests in this and earlier sessions, a reference to disinformation and fake news has not been reflected in the final report. The threat and implications of disinformation and fake news are emerging as a major area of international concern, and we did not hear any views contrary to it. Therefore, we would urge appropriate reflection in Para 16 of the final report. In Para 25 on intrusion capabilities, we had requested the addition of an I-code within the United Nations after appropriate safeguards and oversight efforts. It is important that such work is done under the UN auspices for the sake of legitimacy, universality, and inclusivity. Chair, on capacity building, we reiterate our support to various initiatives and proposals, including discussions or in a dedicated thematic group. We also echo comments made in support of UNIDIR Cyber Resilience Academy. Lastly, there are certain questions around the one dedicated thematic group that has now been asked to consider everything. From the process perspective, we are not sure how this will work practically. But having said this, we would look forward to continuing our detailed discussions on five pillars in the future forum. And I thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Pakistan, for your statement. Costa Rica to be followed by Chile.

Costa Rica: Senor Presidente. Chairman, we are grateful for your efforts in introducing a new version of the text that seeks to reflect a balance of the substantive discussions we have had and the political will in this final stretch of the process. We appreciate your commitment to bringing positions closer together and in listening to all delegations. For Costa Rica, achieving a consensus report to facilitate our work in the subsequent process continues to be a priority. This consensus should reflect what we have built together collectively, an ambitious, cooperative, and inclusive vision of international security and cyberspace rooted in international law and equity. We regret that in the quest for consensus, some language that had been incorporated into previous versions on international law, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law has been discarded. On the other hand, we welcome the fact that important elements have been maintained, such as the enabling role of capacity building. We reiterate the call of other delegations to reincorporate some elements that have been removed, including the mapping exercise of capacity building programmes. As regards the thematic group on this topic, which was including the annex, we consider that it is necessary to add some details that have been expressed by other delegations from the region, for instance incorporating the identification, planning and operationalisation of capacity building, and also the connection between providers and those in need of capacity building. This mobilises expertise and the available resources, and this better fits national and regional contexts. Still on the annex, we support the creation of a more inclusive stakeholder participation mechanism in line with what has been highlighted by other delegations. We also would call for the thematic groups to have interpretation in the six official languages in order to guarantee effective participation by our delegations and experts. Finally, we reiterate that the success of this process hinges on our collective will to defend what is essential, to adjust what needs to be adjusted, and to project a process that is inclusive and ambitious. I thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much, Costa Rica, for your statement. Chile, to be followed by Papua New Guinea.

Chile: draft. We recognise the substantive efforts towards a consensus text and we wish to assure you of our full support as we advance to this goal. We wish to make some constructive remarks to ensure that the text reflects in a balanced way the discussions that we’ve had in the last five years in the area of human rights. We welcome the fact that the text reaffirms that human rights should be respected online and offline. However, the current wording omits agreed language in this area. We suggest inclusion of references to the resolutions as in the first version and in line with the mandate of the OEWG and existing framework. In the same vein and as regards the norms of responsible behaviour in relation to the voluntary norms, we see that there is more detailed development of required actions in the previous version. We suggest that these operation aspects on norms be reincorporated including the voluntary checklist. Chile considers that these actions would contribute to adding real actions to the voluntary norms and ensure that this can be implemented in the real world. IHL and international law, respect for international law and the Charter of the United Nations is essential for stability and peace in cyberspace. In this regard, we consider that there is a significant omission, namely the withdrawal of the reference to international humanitarian law. We suggest going back to the earlier formulation in the one, that addresses respect for IHL. Also, incorporating references to the efforts of a group with substantive support from a significant group of countries, this would more accurately reflect the discussions that have been held. Incorporating the language suggested by Vietnam yesterday in their statement on behalf of all regions would be a good idea, and we support this. Also, references in the area of IHL by Brazil, Switzerland, and others. As regards participation of stakeholders, a multi-actor approach is, in our view, necessary to address digital security. Civil society, technical experts, and others contribute with legitimacy and capacity and will enrich this process. We suggest recovering language from the first version that encourages meaningful participation by other interested parties seeking to ensure transparency and certainty in the accreditation process. We’re also especially grateful to you, Chair, for the inclusion of references to other interested parties in the work of the thematic groups. Given the practical nature of this group and action-oriented nature of this, the involvement of other interested parties will certainly be fundamental. On the digital divide and the gender gap, we suggest incorporating language on the gender gap in the digital divide and an intersectional approach. Finally, on capacity building, the strengthening of capacity building is a key pillar of responsible behaviour. The earlier version of text had… key practical suggestions, including mapping and others, and so we see value in the convening of a global roundtable being based on the work of the group on capacity building, as suggested by France, and this should be considered as a suggestion in this regard. We align with the statement delivered by Mexico on behalf of a group of countries in Latin America. Thank you.

Chair: Papua New Guinea, to be followed by Switzerland.

Papua New Guinea: Mr. Chair, Papua New Guinea wishes to express its support for the ongoing process towards the successful adoption of a fourth annual progress report that would bring us closer to transitioning from the current open-ended working group to the future permanent mechanism. We highlight the focus of DTG2 on the subject of capacity building. We emphasize the importance of capacity building, including for small island developing states, as an enabler across all areas of this framework. We also support Malaysia’s proposal on Annex I, paragraph eight, for the chair of the permanent mechanism to prepare guiding questions to foster a more focused DTG dialogue. At this juncture, Papua New Guinea remains committed to engaging constructively with all delegations towards our shared goal of a single-track permanent mechanism. Thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Papua New Guinea, for your statement, as well as your expression of support. Switzerland, please.

Switzerland: Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor again. As I mentioned earlier, I will come back to two topics, norms and regular institutional dialogue. On the norms section, we would like to echo the statement made by the United Kingdom. We regret that the Annex I containing the voluntary checklist has been deleted. However, we can support this section if it is retained in its current form. On Irregular Institutional Dialogue and Annex I, we welcome that the dedicated thematic working groups proposed shall be cross-cutting in their nature. Like other delegations, we regret that there is no dedicated space for focused, in-depth discussions on the application of existing international law. But in the spirit of compromise, we acknowledge the need for flexibility. Throughout this open-ended working group, Switzerland has consistently advocated in-depth, scenario-based and focused discussions on the application of existing international law, particularly IHL, to the use of ICTs, submitted relevant proposals and, together with other delegations, drafted and presented working papers. Switzerland will continue this work within the Future Permanent Mechanism in the framework to be agreed jointly by consensus. On the name of the Future Mechanism, we support the proposal by the French delegation. On modalities, we continue to believe that the proposed modalities do not reflect what the overwhelming majorities of states here in this room expect from them – transparency. In our view, all states must be able to discuss and decide on the participation of stakeholders. We cannot accept that a single state can reject their participation to the detriment of all others. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Switzerland, for your statement and also for your expressions of flexibility. Islamic Republic of Iran, please.

Islamic Republic of Iran: Thank you, Mr. Chair, and sorry for taking the floor again. I would like to briefly respond to one of the proposals made by some delegations regarding the title of Future Permanent Mechanism as a global mechanism to advance responsible state behavior. I would like to underscore that my delegation cannot support this proposal, and we wish to reiterate the earlier suggestion made by LMG Group to retain the terminology used by the open-ended working group, namely security of and in the use of ICT as the foundation for the title of the future permanent mechanism. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chair: Thank you very much, Islamic Republic of Iran, for your statement. Friends, I have no more speakers at this point, and it’s close to 6 or 5.30, and we need to wrap up. And first of all, I want to thank all of you. I have been encouraged by the statements and the tone of the discussions throughout today, starting this morning and this afternoon as well. I want to thank you for that. In essence, this series of statements was a conversation, not with me, but between yourselves. And this conversation between yourselves is an important exercise for each one of you to understand where you stand and where you’re coming from. From where I am on the podium, I am encouraged by the discussions. And this discussion throughout the day reinforces my view that there is a pathway forward to have an outcome tomorrow. And I wanted to thank you for that. Second, throughout the day, the reactions to the final draft that I put forward yesterday evening, I sense… that there was considerable expressions of a commitment to reach consensus. Many of you said this. Many of you also said that you are flexible. Some of you said that you want to cross the finish line. But overall, whatever the vocabulary of your statements, I sense a very strong collective commitment to reach an outcome tomorrow and to have it adopted by consensus. This too, I think, is encouraging for me and I hope is also encouraging to all of you. Tomorrow is when we will have the opportunity to begin the smooth and seamless transition to the new mechanism. And tomorrow is when we will be able to demonstrate that we are committed to a single-track process. So the smooth and seamless transition and a single-track state-led process requires that we adopt an outcome tomorrow. Many of you said you are committed to a single-track process and you want to see a smooth and seamless transition. And if we are to achieve that, we need a consensus outcome tomorrow for which, as I said, I sense considerable, considerable commitment together with expressions of flexibility. Now I also heard throughout the day expressions of disappointment, expressions of regret, expressions of consternation, as some of you put it. expressions of concern as to why the final draft had omitted references or adjusted formulations which does not satisfy your point of view or which does not satisfy your instructions. Now these expressions of regret are also in my view important to hear, for me to hear certainly as the chair of the process. But these expressions of disappointment are also important for each one of you to listen and understand because in a UN process we need to understand what others are seeking, what others are happy or not happy about. And it is that intersection of all the different requirements, concerns, consternations, satisfaction that we have to find and chart a narrow path forward. I’m still of the view that it’s eminently doable. And this discussion has encouraged me. I’ve listened very carefully to all your statements. And it seems that there are some issues we will need to address. But we also need to keep in mind that we are at a stage of a very lengthy process which has lasted nearly five years and which is now coming to its final 24 hours. And so what we need to be looking at is surgical fixes and tweaks, not an attempt to rewrite or make extensive changes. So, having listened to your comments, I will give some very careful thought as to what are the sort of surgical fixes or tweaks or adjustments that will help all of us cross the finish line and leave tomorrow with a consensus document. But it is also clear that whatever we do, or whatever I do, that tomorrow we will not be in a position where people can say this is a perfect document. In fact, even after 80 years, there is continuing debate about the UN Charter, about some of the missing elements, and some of the elements that were put in there. So the point I’m making is that at the UN, there’s no such thing as a perfect document that is to be adopted by consensus. So we will minimize the imperfections. We need to do that. We need to make some adjustments to this final draft. But I also want to tell you that when you look at the conference room paper, keep in mind that this is a process that is going to continue. Keep in mind all the previous agreements that have been adopted. And therefore, look at it in its totality. And if you still think that there are issues that have been left out and you need to register them, you would have the option, of course, as in any UN process, to make your own statements, to put on record statements that provide the context for you to join consensus. And I also want to say that in keeping with the tradition of this working group, we do compile these statements, and these statements are circulated in an informal document, sorry, information document, as a UN information document. So I just wanted to say that I’ve listened carefully to both your expressions of satisfaction as well as deep dissatisfaction, but if you wish to register them, you will also have that possibility in a more formal way. Now, the other point I wanted to make is, of course, the question of flexibility. I mean, it is very clear that many of you were not happy with what has been taken out, so there are calls for, there were calls to bring back elements that were removed or deleted. There are also calls to add additional elements, even at this stage of the process. So I would urge all of you to look at it also from the point of view of showing flexibility. And in that context, please also help us to explain to your capitals as to why flexibility will be needed in order to attain consensus. I think it’s incumbent upon all of us. to explain the stakes to our capitals so that our capitals are in a position to join consensus and it need be with appropriate statements to be placed on record. Now the other thing that I wanted to say was that with regard to Annex I, there was a comment about the future permanent mechanism and of course if all goes well, tomorrow we may well be able to take the first step into the future if we are able to adopt it by consensus. So the reference to the word future would become redundant if we have a mechanism and a consensus outcome. I think some of you made the point that the name needs to be streamlined, references to global mechanism and permanent mechanism, I have taken note of that. There was also a discussion about the name of the mechanism, there are some proposals put forward, you heard the views, let me reflect on that. I think at this stage of the process we should not allow a discussion on the title to open another avenue for negotiations or renegotiations. So I think we need something simple and neutral because we have the modalities in Annex C of last year and we are discussing additional modalities to be adopted by consensus this year. Those are the constitutional documents. if you like. So the title would be important, the name of the mechanism, but we need a solution that is simple and neutral. I think the comment was also made that with the two dedicated thematic groups in the structure as it is, there’s a lack of clarity as to what the first dedicated thematic group would do because it is all a combination of various issues. And I think this is where, you know, I asked my team to look at the evolution of the discussion on the RID question. So when we started the discussion on RID, we started with three dedicated thematic groups. Then it became four. That was last year. Then it became five. Then in April, it went to four. The zero draft was three, REV1 was three, and now we are in two. So this debate is something that we have had for nearly two years. And you can cut and slice it and dice it in many different ways. And it’s very difficult to say what would be the best way to do it. And so my advice would be to work with the consensus that is attainable and then make that consensus workable. So, first, we need a consensus on the elements. And then we need to make the best of it. So, for example, with the DTGs, there’s no doubt that the chair of the global mechanism will have to put forward a work program at the organizational session. You will need an agenda. And those of you who have been in this process would remember the bitter battles on agenda and work programs. And by the way, for those of you who have not been involved, the work program of this working group has been blocked from time to time. So we have spent days discussing the work program. But my point is that we should avoid these kinds of things. But at the same time, we need to do what we can now and leave some of the discussions on work program as a way to organize the discussions of the dedicated thematic groups to the global mechanism and the chair of the global mechanism to consult and discuss with members. So, my friends, if we have a consensus outcome tomorrow, it is going to be the beginning of a new chapter of intense conversations and dialogue leading to cooperation, leading to greater confidence, and leading to greater trust among countries, which is precisely the idea of creating this mechanism, the global mechanism for ICT security. So, these are some of my reflections. And I want to end by saying that I will go back and review all the notes, will discuss with my team. And as I said earlier this morning, it’s my intention to… Prepare the conference room paper and make it available this evening around 9 p.m. It seems like you have a keen sense of humor about my sense of timing. Yes, ish. 9 p.m. ish. But I wanted to explain to you, for those who may be new to the process, the reason why we need this conference room paper. This is the final document that will be put forward for adoption. And it is important that the document be made available the day prior to adoption. So that’s why it’s my goal to make it available today, so that each one of you can take it back to capitals and their time zones and differences involved. So we want to give people adequate time. It’s going to be limited time, but adequate time, so that you can, tomorrow morning, come back with instructions on the positions that you would take on the adoption of the conference room paper tomorrow. I’m very clear in my mind that it’s my intention to put forward the adoption of the conference room paper tomorrow morning. And that is what we have done over the last three years. We’ve always started the very last day, Friday morning, with the chair putting forward the conference room paper for adoption. And that is what I intend to do tomorrow. And then we’ll take it from there. The best scenario is that we are done by 11am, and that gives you the whole day free. And that I hope will incentivize you to cross the finish line. But we’re not going to rush this. We are going to do it in a way that all of you can say, this is ours. The collective sense of ownership must be there as we adopt the document. Because ultimately, that is the way to ensure that the outcome document will be operationalized and implemented in a meaningful way. So friends, please do look out for the conference room paper this evening. Look out for an email. And tomorrow morning, we will meet at 10am here in the same room. The meeting is adjourned. I wish you a pleasant evening.

Agreement points

Support for dedicated thematic group on capacity building

Speakers

– Morocco
– Russian Federation
– South Africa
– Papua New Guinea
– Argentina

Arguments

Strong support for dedicated thematic group on capacity building as cross-cutting lever

Support for establishing only DTG on capacity building and deferring other DTGs to organizational session

Support for ad hoc dedicated thematic groups with fixed duration

Support for DTG2 focus on capacity building as enabler across all framework areas

Support for cross-cutting integration of capacity building across five pillars

Summary

Multiple speakers from different regions strongly supported establishing a dedicated thematic group focused on capacity building, viewing it as essential for developing countries and as a cross-cutting enabler across all framework areas

Topics

Capacity development | Cybersecurity | Development

Opposition to single state veto in stakeholder participation

Speakers

– Canada
– Australia
– Switzerland
– New Zealand

Arguments

Support for transparent objection process where decisions reflect majority will if objections persist

Concern that single state veto undermines participation of other stakeholders

Opposition to convention reference due to lack of substantial discussions and support

Support for stakeholder involvement to level information playing field for smaller states

Summary

Several developed countries opposed the single state veto mechanism for stakeholder participation, arguing it undermines transparency and fairness while disadvantaging states that rely on external expertise

Topics

Human rights principles | Legal and regulatory

Regret over removal of voluntary checklist

Speakers

– United States
– United Kingdom
– Switzerland
– Chile
– Malawi
– Philippines

Arguments

Disappointment over removal of voluntary checklist as important implementation guidance

Support for maintaining current balance in norms section if existing framework is retained

Regret that the Annex I containing the voluntary checklist has been deleted

Call for reincorporation of operational aspects and voluntary checklist for real-world implementation

Support for checklist as tool to help operationalize norms and bridge implementation gap

Regret over removal of voluntary checklist but support for continued refinement

Summary

A diverse group of countries expressed disappointment over the removal of the voluntary checklist, viewing it as an important practical tool for implementing cybersecurity norms, particularly valuable for developing countries

Topics

Cybersecurity | Cyber norms | Capacity development

Call for reinstatement of UN Cyber Resilience Academy within UNIDIR

Speakers

– Latvia
– Philippines
– Pakistan

Arguments

Call for reinstatement of UN Cyber Resilience Academy within UNIDIR reference

Call for reinstatement of UN Cyber Resilience Academy within UNIDIR

Echo comments made in support of UNIDIR Cyber Resilience Academy

Summary

Multiple countries supported reinstating references to establishing a UN Cyber Resilience Academy within UNIDIR, viewing it as an important capacity building initiative with broad international support

Topics

Capacity development | Online education | Cybersecurity

Support for stronger international humanitarian law language

Speakers

– European Union
– Germany
– Poland
– Finland
– Estonia
– New Zealand

Arguments

Strong support for factual reflection of discussions on international humanitarian law, state responsibility, and due diligence

Disappointment that rich discussions on international law are not reflected in the final draft

Call for stronger references to international humanitarian law and human rights law

Call for clear reference to IHL applicability and standalone ICRC resolution reference

Concern about regression in international humanitarian law language

Disappointment that robust international law discussions are not appropriately reflected

Summary

European and allied countries consistently called for stronger language on international humanitarian law, expressing disappointment that extensive discussions on IHL application to cyberspace were not adequately reflected in the final report

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cyberconflict and warfare | Human rights principles

Similar viewpoints

Like-minded states consistently opposed expanded stakeholder participation, restrictions on the no-objection procedure, and certain terminology changes, preferring to maintain existing modalities and traditional intergovernmental approaches

Speakers

– Nicaragua
– Russian Federation
– Cuba
– Islamic Republic of Iran

Arguments

Strong opposition to restrictions on no-objection procedure and NGO participation in thematic groups

Opposition to consultations on NGO participation being imposed on states

Concern about technology neutrality language being included without proper discussion

Opposition to ‘advance responsible state behavior’ in mechanism title

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Human rights principles | Cybersecurity

Latin American countries shared concerns about the removal of specific capacity building tools and mechanisms, particularly the mapping exercise and UN-administered programs that would ensure neutral and inclusive participation

Speakers

– Brazil
– Mexico
– Costa Rica

Arguments

Regret over removal of mapping exercise for capacity building programs

Support for UN-administered sponsorship program to ensure impartiality and transparency

Regret over deletion of mapping exercise for capacity building programmes

Topics

Capacity development | Cybersecurity | Legal and regulatory

These countries shared concern about the deletion of specific critical infrastructure sectors from the document, arguing that this represented previously agreed consensus language that should be maintained

Speakers

– El Salvador
– Ireland
– Kingdom of the Netherlands

Arguments

Concern over removal of specific critical infrastructure sectors from agreed language

Support for proposals to improve balance and reverse deletions on critical infrastructure

Support for reinstating consensus language on specific critical infrastructure sectors

Topics

Cybersecurity | Critical infrastructure

These countries advocated for more inclusive and transparent stakeholder participation mechanisms, supporting proposals that would reduce barriers to civil society and private sector engagement

Speakers

– Chile
– Canada
– Finland

Arguments

Call for meaningful stakeholder participation with transparency and certainty in accreditation

Support for transparent objection process where decisions reflect majority will if objections persist

Support for practical modalities to enable meaningful stakeholder participation

Topics

Human rights principles | Legal and regulatory

Unexpected consensus

Support for French proposal on mechanism naming

Speakers

– France
– Latvia
– Estonia
– Kingdom of the Netherlands
– Israel
– Switzerland

Arguments

Support for French proposal to name mechanism ‘Global Mechanism to Advance Responsible State Behavior’

Support for French proposal advancing responsible state behavior in the title of the mechanism

Support French proposal advancing responsible state behavior in the title of the mechanism

Support for Malaysia to use one title throughout the report, and support for the title that France proposed

Support for the French suggestion on the title of the future permanent mechanism

Support for the proposal by the French delegation

Explanation

Despite significant disagreements on many issues, there was unexpected broad support for France’s compromise proposal on the mechanism’s name, suggesting willingness to find middle ground on procedural matters even when substantive disagreements persist

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Concern about imbalanced treatment of consensus vs minority proposals

Speakers

– United States
– Israel
– Australia
– Estonia

Arguments

Concern about imbalanced treatment giving equal footing to minority proposals versus consensus documents

Opposition to equal treatment of consensus documents with minority proposals

Concern that single state veto undermines participation of other stakeholders

Opposition to convention reference due to lack of substantial discussions and support

Explanation

Countries from different regions shared concerns about giving equal weight to documents with varying levels of support, particularly regarding the ICRC consensus resolution versus minority proposals for new conventions

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cyberconflict and warfare

Overall assessment

Summary

The discussion revealed significant consensus on capacity building as a priority, broad agreement on the importance of practical implementation tools like the voluntary checklist, and shared concerns about stakeholder participation modalities. However, deep divisions remain on international law language, particularly regarding international humanitarian law, and on the balance between intergovernmental control and multi-stakeholder participation.

Consensus level

Moderate consensus exists on technical and capacity building issues, but fundamental disagreements persist on governance structures and legal frameworks. The Chair’s assessment that consensus is achievable appears optimistic given the procedural flexibility shown by many delegations, though substantive compromises will be necessary on contentious issues like stakeholder participation and international law language.

Different viewpoints

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) applicability in cyberspace

Speakers

– European Union
– United States
– Switzerland
– Finland
– Estonia
– Germany
– Poland
– Cuba
– Russian Federation
– Nicaragua

Arguments

Strong support for factual reflection of discussions on international humanitarian law, state responsibility, and due diligence

Concern about imbalanced treatment giving equal footing to minority proposals versus consensus documents

Support for reinstating language on ICT operations constituting use of force when comparable to non-ICT operations

Call for clear reference to IHL applicability and standalone ICRC resolution reference

Concern about regression in international humanitarian law language

Disappointment that rich discussions on international law are not reflected in the final draft

Call for stronger references to international humanitarian law and human rights law

Request to delete references to international humanitarian law applicability due to lack of consensus

Insistence on the exclusion of any hints or references to the non-consensus controversial ideas about the applicability of international humanitarian law to ICTs

Support for establishing only DTG on capacity building and deferring other DTGs to organizational session

Summary

Western countries and allies strongly support explicit recognition of IHL applicability in cyberspace and factual reflection of discussions, while Russia, Cuba, Nicaragua and like-minded states oppose any references to IHL applicability, arguing there is no consensus and such references should be deleted entirely.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cyberconflict and warfare | Human rights principles

Stakeholder participation modalities and transparency

Speakers

– Canada
– Chile
– Australia
– European Union
– Nicaragua
– Russian Federation
– Cuba
– Argentina

Arguments

Support for transparent objection process where decisions reflect majority will if objections persist

Call for meaningful stakeholder participation with transparency and certainty in accreditation

Concern that single state veto undermines participation of other stakeholders

Strong opposition to restrictions on no-objection procedure and NGO participation in thematic groups

Opposition to consultations on NGO participation being imposed on states

Concern about technology neutrality language being included without proper discussion

Support for balanced stakeholder participation modalities covering various concerns

Summary

Western countries advocate for transparent stakeholder participation with majority decision-making when objections persist, while Russia, Cuba, Nicaragua and like-minded states insist on maintaining current restrictive modalities with single-state veto power and oppose NGO participation in thematic groups.

Topics

Human rights principles | Legal and regulatory

Future mechanism structure and dedicated thematic groups

Speakers

– Nicaragua
– Russian Federation
– Mauritius
– El Salvador
– Brazil
– United States
– Morocco

Arguments

Concern that DTG1 scope is overstretched and unclear, risking duplication of plenary sessions

Support for establishing only DTG on capacity building and deferring other DTGs to organizational session

Preference for dedicated thematic group on international law to provide focused discussions

Concern over elimination of dedicated thematic group on international law

Strong support for dedicated thematic group on capacity building as cross-cutting lever

Summary

There is disagreement on the number and focus of dedicated thematic groups, with some countries preferring separate groups for international law and capacity building, while others support only a capacity building group or oppose DTG1’s broad mandate.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity | Capacity development

Voluntary checklist inclusion and implementation guidance

Speakers

– United States
– United Kingdom
– Malawi
– Chile
– Philippines
– South Africa
– Switzerland

Arguments

Disappointment over removal of voluntary checklist as important implementation guidance

Support for maintaining current balance in norms section if existing framework is retained

Support for checklist as tool to help operationalize norms and bridge implementation gap

Call for reincorporation of operational aspects and voluntary checklist for real-world implementation

Regret over removal of voluntary checklist but support for continued refinement

Disappointment over lack of consensus on voluntary checklist operationalization

Summary

Multiple countries express disappointment over the removal of the voluntary checklist, viewing it as an important practical tool for implementation, while the Chair’s decision to remove it suggests lack of consensus among all parties.

Topics

Cybersecurity | Cyber norms | Capacity development

Mechanism naming and terminology

Speakers

– France
– Russian Federation
– Islamic Republic of Iran
– Nicaragua
– Chair

Arguments

Support for French proposal to name mechanism ‘Global Mechanism to Advance Responsible State Behavior’

Insistence on using ‘security of and in the use of ICTs’ terminology throughout

Opposition to ‘advance responsible state behavior’ in mechanism title

Need for simple and neutral mechanism name to avoid opening new negotiations

Summary

France proposes including ‘advance responsible state behavior’ in the mechanism name, while Russia, Iran and like-minded states insist on maintaining ‘security of and in the use of ICTs’ terminology, with the Chair seeking a simple, neutral solution.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Unexpected differences

Technology neutrality principle

Speakers

– Argentina
– Cuba

Arguments

Emphasis on technology neutrality and responsibility lying with users, not vulnerability identifiers

Concern about technology neutrality language being included without proper discussion

Explanation

This disagreement is unexpected because both countries are from the Global South and might be expected to have similar positions, yet Argentina strongly supports technology neutrality while Cuba opposes the inclusion of this language, arguing it was added without proper consultation.

Topics

Cybersecurity | Digital standards | Legal and regulatory

Human-centric approach to ransomware

Speakers

– Kingdom of the Netherlands
– Ireland
– El Salvador

Arguments

Regret over deletion of human-centric approach to ransomware

Regret over deletion of human-centric approach to ransomware despite widespread support

Regret over removal of human-centered approach recognizing real impact on people

Explanation

It’s unexpected that there would be resistance to including human-centric language for ransomware, as this seems like a non-controversial humanitarian concern that should have broad support across different political blocs.

Topics

Human rights principles | Cybersecurity

Convention proposal treatment versus consensus documents

Speakers

– United States
– Israel
– Estonia
– Ukraine

Arguments

Concern about imbalanced treatment giving equal footing to minority proposals versus consensus documents

Opposition to equal treatment of consensus documents with minority proposals

Opposition to convention reference due to lack of substantial discussions and support

Opposition to convention reference as premature given current implementation challenges

Explanation

The strong opposition to treating a minority convention proposal equally with consensus documents is unexpected given the UN’s typical approach of acknowledging all member state proposals, suggesting deeper concerns about the substance and implications of the convention proposal.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Cyberconflict and warfare

Overall assessment

Summary

The main areas of disagreement center on: (1) International humanitarian law applicability in cyberspace, with Western countries supporting explicit recognition while Russia and allies oppose any references; (2) Stakeholder participation modalities, with Western countries advocating transparency and majority decision-making while Russia/China bloc insists on restrictive single-state veto; (3) Future mechanism structure regarding dedicated thematic groups; (4) Inclusion of practical implementation tools like voluntary checklists; and (5) Mechanism naming and terminology preferences.

Disagreement level

High level of disagreement along geopolitical lines, particularly between Western countries and the Russia/China-led bloc, with fundamental differences on international law application, stakeholder participation, and governance approaches. These disagreements reflect broader tensions about multilateral governance, sovereignty, and the role of non-state actors in international processes. The Chair’s emphasis on ‘surgical fixes’ and the need for consensus suggests these disagreements pose significant challenges to reaching a final agreement, requiring substantial compromise from all parties.

Partial agreements

Similar viewpoints

Like-minded states consistently opposed expanded stakeholder participation, restrictions on the no-objection procedure, and certain terminology changes, preferring to maintain existing modalities and traditional intergovernmental approaches

Speakers

– Nicaragua
– Russian Federation
– Cuba
– Islamic Republic of Iran

Arguments

Strong opposition to restrictions on no-objection procedure and NGO participation in thematic groups

Opposition to consultations on NGO participation being imposed on states

Concern about technology neutrality language being included without proper discussion

Opposition to ‘advance responsible state behavior’ in mechanism title

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Human rights principles | Cybersecurity

Latin American countries shared concerns about the removal of specific capacity building tools and mechanisms, particularly the mapping exercise and UN-administered programs that would ensure neutral and inclusive participation

Speakers

– Brazil
– Mexico
– Costa Rica

Arguments

Regret over removal of mapping exercise for capacity building programs

Support for UN-administered sponsorship program to ensure impartiality and transparency

Regret over deletion of mapping exercise for capacity building programmes

Topics

Capacity development | Cybersecurity | Legal and regulatory

These countries shared concern about the deletion of specific critical infrastructure sectors from the document, arguing that this represented previously agreed consensus language that should be maintained

Speakers

– El Salvador
– Ireland
– Kingdom of the Netherlands

Arguments

Concern over removal of specific critical infrastructure sectors from agreed language

Support for proposals to improve balance and reverse deletions on critical infrastructure

Support for reinstating consensus language on specific critical infrastructure sectors

Topics

Cybersecurity | Critical infrastructure

These countries advocated for more inclusive and transparent stakeholder participation mechanisms, supporting proposals that would reduce barriers to civil society and private sector engagement

Speakers

– Chile
– Canada
– Finland

Arguments

Call for meaningful stakeholder participation with transparency and certainty in accreditation

Support for transparent objection process where decisions reflect majority will if objections persist

Support for practical modalities to enable meaningful stakeholder participation

Topics

Human rights principles | Legal and regulatory

Key takeaways

Strong collective commitment from delegations to reach consensus on the final report by the next day, with many expressing flexibility and willingness to compromise

Chair expressed encouragement about finding a pathway forward despite various expressions of disappointment and concern from delegations

Need for surgical fixes and tweaks rather than extensive rewrites, given the process is in its final 24 hours after nearly five years

Recognition that no UN consensus document is perfect, and delegations will have opportunity to make statements for the record to provide context for joining consensus

Future permanent mechanism structure will include two dedicated thematic groups (DTGs) with cross-cutting approach, though concerns remain about DTG1’s broad scope

Significant disagreement on international law section, with many calling for better reflection of discussions on IHL, state responsibility, and due diligence

Widespread regret over removal of voluntary checklist for norms implementation, seen as important practical guidance tool

Ongoing tensions over stakeholder participation modalities, particularly regarding transparency and single-state veto power

Strong support for capacity building initiatives, especially for developing countries, with calls to reinstate various programs and mechanisms

Resolutions and action items

Chair committed to preparing and circulating a conference room paper by 9 PM that evening for final adoption consideration

Final adoption meeting scheduled for 10 AM the following morning in the same room

Chair will review all statements and notes to make surgical adjustments to address key concerns while maintaining consensus viability

Delegations instructed to consult with capitals overnight on the conference room paper to come with final positions

Chair emphasized the document will be put forward for adoption the next morning, following the tradition of previous years

Future mechanism chair will need to develop work program and agenda at organizational session to clarify DTG operations

Unresolved issues

Title/name of the future permanent mechanism – multiple proposals on the table including French suggestion to ‘advance responsible state behavior’

International law section balance – widespread calls to better reflect discussions on IHL, state responsibility, and due diligence versus minority proposals

Stakeholder participation modalities – fundamental disagreement between transparency advocates and those supporting current restrictive approach

Scope and clarity of DTG1 operations – concerns about overly broad mandate that could duplicate plenary sessions

Whether to reinstate voluntary checklist for norms implementation – strong support from many but resistance from others

Terminology consistency throughout document – calls to standardize references to ‘security of and in the use of ICTs’

Specific language on threats section – various proposals for additions and modifications not yet resolved

References to capacity building initiatives like UN Cyber Resilience Academy and mapping exercises

Suggested compromises

Chair suggested using simple and neutral title for mechanism to avoid opening new negotiation avenues

France proposed ‘Global Mechanism to Advance Responsible State Behavior in the Use of ICTs’ as compromise title

Switzerland proposed factual statement approach for international law discussions as middle ground

Canada suggested compromise language for paragraph 15 on promoting ICT use ‘in accordance with international law’

Chair emphasized making consensus workable through future work programs rather than perfect structure now

Various delegations suggested moving certain elements between sections (e.g., ICT tools from CBMs to capacity building)

Proposal to defer some DTG decisions to organizational session of future mechanism rather than resolving all now

Chair noted delegations can make statements for the record to provide context while still joining consensus

Several delegations expressed willingness to accept current structure if certain balance elements are maintained

We advocate for ensuring a stable balance between voluntary and legally binding norms. In particular, the document must reflect an equal emphasis on both implementing existing voluntary non-binding norms and developing new legally binding instruments in the use of ICTs.

Speaker

Nicaragua (on behalf of like-minded group)

Reason

This comment crystallized one of the fundamental tensions in the entire process – the divide between those favoring voluntary frameworks versus legally binding obligations. It directly challenged the prevailing emphasis on voluntary norms and demanded equal treatment for binding instruments.

Impact

This statement set the tone for much of the subsequent discussion, with multiple delegations either supporting or opposing this balance. It forced other speakers to clarify their positions on the voluntary vs. binding framework debate, making this a central thread throughout the session.

Four years of work cannot be lost with this. Work that is also needed for the global mechanism to advance responsible state behavior and the use of ICTs to continue on a solid ground, ground created by this open-ended working group.

Speaker

European Union

Reason

This comment powerfully framed the stakes of the discussion – that years of multilateral work and consensus-building were at risk of being lost. It elevated the conversation from technical details to the broader question of preserving multilateral achievements.

Impact

This framing was picked up by numerous subsequent speakers who echoed concerns about ‘walking back consensus’ and losing progress. It shifted the discussion from individual country positions to a collective responsibility to preserve multilateral achievements.

This controversy, Mr. Chair, is something that my delegation has chosen not to feed because we are fighting for ideas aiming to make multilateralism stronger and more effective, that we fight not for labels… In the spirit of compromise necessary for consensus, my delegation… could consider accepting the following name for our future framework… Global Mechanism to Advance Responsible State Behavior in the Use of ICTs.

Speaker

France

Reason

This was a pivotal moment of diplomatic flexibility where France offered to abandon their preferred ‘Program of Action’ terminology in favor of compromise language. It demonstrated how substantive concessions could be made while preserving core objectives.

Impact

This proposal was immediately picked up by multiple delegations and became a focal point for consensus-building. It showed other delegations that significant compromises were possible and encouraged similar flexibility from others. The Chair specifically noted this as a ‘constructive approach.’

The United States cannot agree to a report that contains such a DTG [dedicated thematic group on international law]… we have heard both in prior sessions and this week that certain states would seek to exploit conversations in any dedicated group on international law to advance new, legally binding obligations that could potentially undermine existing international law.

Speaker

United States

Reason

This comment revealed the deep strategic concerns behind seemingly technical organizational decisions. It exposed how institutional design choices were actually about preventing certain types of legal developments, adding a layer of complexity to the discussion.

Impact

This stark position forced other delegations to respond to the underlying concern about legal obligations, not just the organizational structure. It clarified why the international law working group had been removed and prompted several delegations to propose alternative solutions.

Tomorrow is when we will have the opportunity to begin the smooth and seamless transition to the new mechanism… So the smooth and seamless transition and a single-track state-led process requires that we adopt an outcome tomorrow.

Speaker

Chair

Reason

This comment reframed the entire discussion by emphasizing the temporal urgency and the binary nature of the choice facing delegations – consensus tomorrow or no mechanism at all. It shifted focus from perfect solutions to workable compromises.

Impact

This intervention fundamentally changed the dynamic of the discussion. After this point, more delegations began emphasizing flexibility and compromise rather than specific demands. It created a sense of collective responsibility for the success of the process.

At the UN, there’s no such thing as a perfect document that is to be adopted by consensus. So we will minimize the imperfections… But I also want to tell you that when you look at the conference room paper, keep in mind that this is a process that is going to continue.

Speaker

Chair

Reason

This philosophical observation about the nature of multilateral consensus-building provided crucial perspective on the limitations and expectations of the process. It acknowledged imperfection while emphasizing continuity.

Impact

This comment helped delegations recalibrate their expectations and approach the final negotiations with more realistic goals. It provided intellectual framework for accepting an imperfect but workable outcome.

Overall assessment

These key comments fundamentally shaped the discussion by establishing the major fault lines (voluntary vs. binding norms), raising the stakes (preserving multilateral achievements), demonstrating the possibility of compromise (France’s proposal), revealing underlying strategic concerns (US on international law), and providing crucial perspective on the nature of consensus-building. The Chair’s interventions were particularly impactful in shifting the discussion from position-taking to problem-solving, creating urgency around reaching consensus, and providing a philosophical framework for accepting imperfection. The combination of these comments created a dynamic where delegations moved from stating positions to seeking workable compromises, ultimately setting the stage for the final negotiations.

How can international law for international assistance in the event of a major cyber attack be further explored to strengthen solidarity between states when they are faced with serious incidents?

Speaker

Burkina Faso

Explanation

This is important for developing frameworks for mutual support and cooperation during major cyber incidents that could overwhelm individual state capabilities

How should the question of reparations due to victims of transborder cyberattacks be addressed to protect states?

Speaker

Burkina Faso

Explanation

This addresses accountability and compensation mechanisms for cross-border cyber incidents, which is crucial for establishing legal frameworks for cyber harm

How can practical challenges such as language and technical barriers in the Directory of Global Points of Contact be addressed?

Speaker

Burkina Faso

Explanation

This is important for improving the effectiveness of international cyber incident response coordination mechanisms

How can the confusion between IoT and AI issues be clarified, particularly regarding development cycles, confidentiality for IoT versus training and consultation issues for AI?

Speaker

Argentina

Explanation

This is important for developing appropriate technical standards and security measures for different types of emerging technologies

How can the distinction between CI (Critical Infrastructure) and CII (Critical Information Infrastructure) be better clarified to avoid affecting public information?

Speaker

Argentina

Explanation

This is important for developing appropriate protection measures and avoiding confusion in policy implementation

How can more general wording be developed for technical references that would better resist the passage of time, given that specific technologies like firewalls become obsolete?

Speaker

Argentina

Explanation

This is important for creating durable policy frameworks that don’t become outdated as technology evolves

How can international law be applied more clearly, especially in the context of growing threats, and what specific mechanisms are needed?

Speaker

Morocco

Explanation

This is important for operationalizing international law in cyberspace and addressing the implementation gap between legal principles and practical application

How can the blurring of lines between criminal activities and malicious ICT incidents be better addressed and reflected in policy frameworks?

Speaker

Switzerland

Explanation

This is important for developing appropriate response mechanisms and legal frameworks that can address the hybrid nature of modern cyber threats

How can standardized terminology for confidence-building measures be developed, and is this approach appropriate?

Speaker

Canada (opposing this approach)

Explanation

This raises questions about whether standardization might limit flexibility in international cooperation or create barriers to participation

How can the mapping exercise for capacity building programs be effectively reinstated and operationalized?

Speaker

Colombia, Switzerland, Brazil

Explanation

This is important for avoiding duplication of efforts and ensuring efficient allocation of capacity building resources globally

How can the UN Cyber Resilience Academy within UNIDIR be established and operationalized effectively?

Speaker

Latvia, Vietnam, Philippines

Explanation

This is important for creating a dedicated, impartial platform for cyber capacity building research and implementation, particularly for states with limited capabilities

How can the practical operationalization of dedicated thematic groups be clarified, particularly for DTG1 which covers multiple broad topics?

Speaker

Pakistan, Morocco, Russian Federation

Explanation

This is important for ensuring the future mechanism can function effectively without duplicating plenary discussions or becoming too diffuse in focus

How can disinformation and fake news threats be appropriately reflected and addressed in international cyber security frameworks?

Speaker

Pakistan

Explanation

This is important as disinformation represents an emerging area of international concern that intersects with cyber security and information integrity

How can intrusion capabilities be developed within the United Nations framework with appropriate safeguards and oversight?

Speaker

Pakistan

Explanation

This is important for ensuring legitimacy, universality, and inclusivity in developing cyber capabilities while maintaining appropriate controls