(4th meeting) Reconvened concluding session of the Ad Hoc Committee to Elaborate a Comprehensive International Convention on Countering the Use of Information and Communications Technologies for Criminal Purposes

International convention on ICT crime faces debate over human rights and terminology at ad hoc committee meeting

The ad hoc committee meeting focused on progressing the development of a comprehensive international convention to counter the use of ICTs for criminal purposes. The chairperson, maintaining a neutral stance, urged participants to resume discussions and highlighted the need to listen to all speakers on the list, emphasizing the goal of reaching a consensus by the deadline.

A significant debate centered on the transparency of finalizing the convention text. The Russian Federation insisted on displaying all text proposals on-screen to ensure transparent and effective discussions. They also demanded the inclusion of all delegations with text amendments in the working groups finalizing the text.

Human rights provisions in the convention text were contentious. Some delegations, including the Russian Federation, argued that the convention was oversaturated with human rights-related provisions, which could be exploited to refuse international cooperation. They aligned with a joint statement by Egypt, supported by other delegations, advocating for a reduction in human rights provisions to prevent the abuse of rejecting mutual legal assistance requests.

The convention’s title and terminology were also points of contention, with disagreement over the use of “cybercrime” versus “ICTs for criminal purposes.” The Russian Federation and other delegations insisted on a name aligned with foundational General Assembly resolutions and including the term “crimes committed with the use of ICTs.”

The need for an additional protocol on criminalization was discussed, with some delegations advocating for its immediate development to ensure the convention’s applicability to emerging crimes. The Russian Federation highlighted the importance of comprehensive terminology to avoid frequent amendments to the convention with new technological advancements.

The chairperson acknowledged contributions from Morocco, Montenegro, Tunisia, Lao PDR, the United Arab Emirates, Vietnam, Burundi, and other partners, including civil society and academia. The chair emphasized the need for consensus and the urgency of concluding the text by the deadline.

The meeting concluded that significant disagreements remained on key provisions of the convention, particularly around human rights, the title and scope of the convention, and the ratification threshold. The chairperson encouraged member states to engage in bilateral discussions to resolve outstanding issues and indicated that some topics would be addressed in informal consultations, while others, including the title and preamble, would be discussed in plenary sessions. The chairperson is determined to finalize the convention text by the set deadline and urges the committee to work constructively towards this goal.

Noteworthy observations included the chairperson’s commitment to neutrality and inclusivity, the active participation of the League of Arab States in the committee sessions, and the emphasis on the importance of technology transfer and capacity building for developing countries. The complexities of international negotiations were evident, with various delegations expressing concerns and seeking clarifications on the negotiation methodology and process.

Chair:
Ladies and gentlemen, please, we will now be resuming our proceedings. Please, let us resume. If you want to have discussions to find solutions, I can give you the time necessary, but for the time being, we still have a number of outstanding speakers on the list. They listened to your statements, and now it’s time for you to listen to their statements as well. Please, everyone, please close the doors as well. Good afternoon, everyone. I was informed that unfortunately we were unable to conclude this morning. There are still a number of speakers remaining on the list, and we will give them the floor. This is the fourth meeting of the reconvene concluding session of our ad hoc committee for the development of a comprehensive international convention on countering the use of ICTs for criminal purposes. Without further ado, on my list I have Russia, Morocco, Montenegro, Tunisia, and Tunisia. Laos. Russian Federation, you have the floor.

Russian Federation:
Thank you, Madam Chair. I will begin by saying that the Russian Federation would like to see that the process of finalizing the text of the Convention to be truly transparent. We would like and we in fact insist that all text proposals and language proposals of which there have been quite a large number over the last one and a half days and which were quite specific to be displayed on the screen. In our view, that is the only way to ensure a constructive and effective discussion and we are convinced that all views that were expressed need to be taken into account. Second, within the small working groups that will be working on finalizing the text, these groups should include representatives from all delegations that have submitted amendments to the text. Dear colleagues, the purpose of the Convention elaborated by member states is to create a solid foundation for international law enforcement cooperation. In the context of a global convention, this foundation must be backed with unequivocal, clear provisions that leave no room for different interpretations. In practice, we have often seen unjustified refusals to engage in international cooperation and assistance. Some of the human rights provisions introduced into the text are essentially a legalized form of such a rejection of cooperation. We are in full solidarity with the joint statement submitted by the Distinguished Delegation of Egypt and endorsed by dozens of other delegations. Human rights are already enshrined in Articles 21, 23, 24, 36, and 37. However, whereas Article 24 lists standard restrictions aimed at preventing law enforcement abuse, Paragraph 4 of Article 23 complicates the future documents because it’s introduced in certain conditions and guarantees in carrying out procedural measures in the context of international cooperation, and we support the very clear and vivid argumentation provided by our colleagues from Venezuela and Syria in this regard. Paragraph 2 of Article 6 is also restrictive. What is at stake here is not the intention of certain states to safeguard human rights values. Largely, those who support such provision are trying to ensure the best conditions for themselves in order to reject cooperation in the future. We note the particularly provocative nature of the so-called Costa Rican proposal. I think everyone in this room understands full well what the source of this idea is, including politically motivated language into the Convention, and the clear goal of this is to use improvised attributive mechanisms to make it impossible to cooperate within the framework of the Convention, and now we turn to the Chair to ask that – to confirm that in accordance with your new methodology, there can be no new proposals in this regard, and Iran has also previously indicated this. We fully agree with the position of the Egyptian, Iranian, Pakistani, Indian, and Mauritanian delegations regarding the fact that that the convention is oversaturated with human rights-related provisions. This will lead to certain states abusing the opportunity to reject mutual legal assistance requests. In the worst case, it could undermine the efforts of the international community to develop a foundation for law enforcement cooperation. This is nothing if not a deal-breaker. We’re full aware of what the response will be. And I will say right away, no one present here in this room is opposing human rights. The problem is that in this specific case, certain states are seeking their own selfish interests under the guise of democratic values, or pseudo-democratic values, I would say. Are there any universal criteria for defining these values? And what is the criteria for the freedoms listed in Article 6, Paragraph 2? When upset electors take over a building, is that freedom of expression? Does freedom of expression mean coercing children to suicide? In this regard, we support the statement by the representative of Pakistan regarding the fact that no freedoms can be used as an excuse for moral degradation. What is freedom of speech, for example? How do we define its limits? Do we understand it in absolute terms? This is something that could eradicate cooperation at its core within the framework of our convention. We draw attention to the fact that the cyber terminology promoted by certain delegations is in direct violation of the committee’s mandate, which is enshrined in Resolutions 74-247 and 75-282 of the General Assembly. This was clearly explained by our Cuban colleagues. Essentially, what is being offered is in this case, is to work on a document that has not been mandated by the GA. And we have not yet heard any convincing arguments to explain the opposite position. One delegation, Cabo Verde, I believe, said that the shortened title is in line with the purposes of the Convention. Well, it seems that we have diverging understandings of the purposes of the Convention, but we do have a single common mandate endorsed by the General Assembly in Resolution 74-247 and reaffirmed in Resolution 75-282. In previous sessions, some delegations already said that Resolution 74-247 was put to a vote, which means that there are certain states that did not endorse that resolution. But allow me to remind you, colleagues, and we’ve already discussed this, that Resolution 75-282 was adopted by consensus. So even those countries that voted against 74-247 agreed with the mandate of the ad hoc committee contained and clearly laid out in Resolution 75-282, which refers to Resolution 74-247. And by the way, recalling the vagaries of adopting that resolution, I would like to remind you that some parts of Resolution 75-282 were put to a vote, and countries that during the work of the ad hoc committee argued against this mandate and demanded that this be a cybercrime convention rather than a convention on countering the use of ICTs for criminal purposes had every opportunity to put the mandate, i.e. the title of the convention, to a vote and attempt to amend it. However, they did not do that. endorse the foundational mandates and the title of our convention. Member states that are pursuing this line of thinking – well, I did in fact already mention this – let me also note that Russia has repeatedly, when it comes to states that endorse cyber terminology, has repeatedly asked to define that term in letter and spirit, define the term cyber, and in our statement during the third session we proposed listening to one another and perhaps then the division, the gap between cyber and ICT would be clarified and would not be as wide as we understood it to be. We wanted to hear those who advocate for the cyber approach. We wanted to know whether cyber applies only to hardware or is it software, hardware, and the information that is being processed, et cetera. Unfortunately, even though we made this request at the very least twice in this room during our meetings asking to define that term, we never received a definition or an answer. So the terminology in Article 2 omits this term entirely. Essentially those countries that advocate the implementation of the mandate are in fact being imposed a convention whose mandate isn’t even being fully disclosed, and the future is clear in that case. It would seem that countries who possess this secret information on the nature and content of what cybercrime is would be defining the scope of the convention to decide what offenses fall under its scope or not. This would lead to very arbitrary interpretations of the provision of the convention, and it would ultimately irreversibly narrow the scope of the convention and limit future opportunities for developing additional protocols. I also want to highlight this. The Russian Federation insists that the name be corrected to be in line with the foundational resolutions of the GEA that I already mentioned. We also advocate the inclusion of the term crimes committed with the use of ICTs or offenses in Article 2 on terminology. We support the proposal made by a number of terms to bring back Article 2, Paragraph 2. In Article 3, we also propose a correction. Instead of any public or private entity, it should be natural and legal persons when it comes to those who provide such services. After information, communication, and technology systems, add, process, or store electronic data, and accordingly, Paragraph II would be deleted entirely. We support the approach proposed by our Vietnamese colleagues in this regard. Regarding Paragraph 2, Article 4, offenses established in other UN conventions and protocols, I want to note that Paragraph 2, Article 4 runs counter to the section on criminalization which establishes obligations for member states to ensure that their national legislation recognizes and contains the offenses in Article 7, Paragraph 7 to 17. Counter to those obligations, Article 4, Paragraph 2 says nothing in this article shall be interpreted as establishing criminal offenses in accordance with this convention,” end of quote. So there’s a clear contradiction. One of these excludes the other. At the very least, Article 4, Paragraph 2 can be interpreted in different ways, which could lead to contradiction between various parts of the convention. So we propose deleting it. We share the position of China and others regarding the need to immediately develop an additional protocol on criminalization. That is the only way, in our view, to ensure the convention’s applicability not only to existing but future emerging crimes. At the last session, we tried to explain to colleagues that we are on the threshold of 5G technologies and other new types of ICTs that will not be covered by the convention as such. And in order to avoid having to rework the convention every time new technologies are used to commit ICT crimes, I also mentioned quantum communications and other aspects, because we will have to amend the convention or adopt additional protocols. And we have indicated that the use of this ICT technology and terminology is truly comprehensive and will help us avoid a situation where we’ll have to consider new technologies as they emerge. And there is no doubt that criminals will keep coming up with new technology to commit crimes. And the use of this ICT terminology will help avoid having to go back and change the convention every time we see these new kinds of crimes. The efficiency of law enforcement is determined by their ability to prevent and suppress crimes at the planning and preparation stage in order to prevent any damage from being caused by these unlawful activities. Therefore, as our Indian colleagues noted, international conventions in the sphere of countering crimes, including the convention currently being elaborated, should cover all aspects of international law enforcement cooperation, identification, detection, prevention, suppression, and investigation. These mechanisms, I refer to deterrence mechanisms, are provided for by the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. And generally speaking, dear colleagues, we have not only representatives of the diplomatic community in the room, but also the law enforcement community, and if we follow basic common sense and simple logic, it is easier and ultimately cheaper to suppress crimes when they have not yet been committed, but when we have data that they are about to be committed, thus law enforcement systems are able to be efficient and save time and money. We are avoiding situations where a crime has already been committed and then effort needs to go into its investigation, lengthy adjudication, sentencing, and then restitution for the victims. It is simply more efficient and effective from an economic standpoint for our citizens and our voters, and from the point of view of domestic policy this would be more effective and advisable because we, the law enforcement community and the diplomatic community, would be protecting our citizens and our voters. So I want to specifically highlight this deterrence aspect because it is quite important. In this regard we are somewhat perplexed by the approach of many of the technologically developed countries who have their own regulations when it comes to prevention and deterrence. And I can provide a host of examples about how the legislation in a number of Western states, the legislation has clear deterrence and prevention provisions. These same countries are blocking attempts to reflect the same concepts in the draft convention and the Russian Federation insists on including these terms in Article 3, 23, 35, and 42. The Russian delegation is also concerned that Article 27a, which relates to disclosure of information, still carries certain risks that these could be used for unilateral cross-border access by the authorities of one state to data being stored on the territory of another state without engaging mutual legal assistance procedures or requests to the individual in whose possession that data may be and whose nature, possession, and lawlessness is not limited in any way. This is Article 27 production order. In this regard the Russian Federation proposes adding clarifications to Article 27, namely adding to paragraph 8 after the words Data storage, medium, adding the words on its territory. In English, after medium, it would say located in its territory. On the article on international cooperation, in order to avoid arbitrary interpretation of various norms, we insist on changes to Article 36, Paragraph 3 on protection of personal data in accordance with the first draft of the Convention, namely, given Paragraph 2 of this article, states parties can transmit transfer personal data obtained in accordance with this Convention to a third country or an international organization only with the prior, we propose adding written authorization of the original transferring state party and accordingly we could delete after the comma, which may require that the authorization be provided in written form. So in other words, make it clear that the authorization must be a written authorization. And finally, the Russian Federation would like to point delegation’s attention to the mechanism for the entry into force of the Convention. In its current wording, this, there are conflicts with the spirits and purpose of the Convention and there are certain risks, and we propose making the following adjustments. The Convention is open to signing by all member states at UN headquarters in New York, starting with our goal, as we see, is to prevent a scenario where, because of procedural delays associated with the specificities of national legislations of member states, which can be possible, the Convention would essentially remain frozen. And on Article 64, I already addressed this in detail yesterday, we decisively oppose increasing the ratification threshold for its entry into force to 60 states. In order to avoid artificial barriers to the functioning of the Convention, we believe 30 to be the optimal number, we will send all of our text amendments to the Secretariat to disseminate to delegations. And finally, briefly, I would like to respond to the comment made by the Distinguished Representative of the United States on the visa issue. Indeed, there is the Committee for Relations with the Host Country. However, attempts to address the issue of obtaining U.S. entry visas by heads of Russian delegations in the Ad Hoc Committee led to nothing, which is why time after time we have been forced to bring this issue up here in the Ad Hoc Committee. And once again, I stress, it is the head of the Russian delegation that has not been able to obtain a visa. Time after time, this is very important and very seriously, and throughout the Ad Hoc Committee’s work, the head of the delegation, there were two different people occupying that position. So this testifies to a systemic problem and indicates that this practice is in fact aimed at complicating the work of one of the delegations in the Ad Hoc Committee. I thank you.

Chair:
Thank you. We have Morocco to be followed by Montenegro.

Morocco:
Thank you, Madam Chair. At the outset, since this is the first time we’re taking the floor, we would like to welcome the reconvening of this resumed session and extend our sincere thanks to all members of the Bureau and the Secretariat on their continued efforts throughout this process. We believe that the revised DTC offers a good basis for negotiation and coming to a comfortable lending zones for all member states. Morocco looks forward to reaching a consensual outcome that addresses, of course, the need, the priorities, and the concerns of all member states on an equal footage. I’ll be specific on our remarks on the text, and let me start with the title. Throughout this process, Morocco has been keen on the usage of the reference and terminology of cybercrime. It is more specific and more precise and in line with our national legislation. So we would like to repeat that our preference would be UN Convention on Cybercrime, given its wider significance and understanding. Now moving to the preamble, first one is para 4, and on that paragraph, as has been indicated in previous sessions, we would like to request the retention of the word cybercrime instead of the formulation that has been newly added to the text. On para 6, we object to the addition of a new caveat where possible when referring to technical assistance and capacity building. Again, Morocco, as a developing country, is keen and eager on this particular paragraph and also the cluster on capacity building and tech transfer. So we believe that this paragraph has been drafted in a balanced way in the previous formulation, especially that we have the caveat of mutually agreed terms. Usually we say the consensual outcome we find between partners. So again, we reiterate our request for the deletion of where possible. This takes me to para 7, the needs of persons in vulnerable situations. This is not a language that is found in UNEDC-related conventions. If the Bureau and wider membership is keen on keeping this terminology, we would like it to be reflected as we have it in the SDG agenda, which is those who are vulnerable or in vulnerable situations, because per nature there are those who are vulnerable because of their vulnerability, like people with disabilities, senior people, and those who are vulnerable situations because of a context like a humanitarian context. So we would like to have a comprehensive language in that regard. Moving now to the body of the text, we’ll start with Article 4, which is of concern to our delegation. It hasn’t shown in previous texts, and as we have reached this final stage of negotiation, we have the belief that we should focus on elements that guide us together, not apart. Article 4 is formulated in an unclear and ambiguous manner, given that the existing UN Convention, namely UNTAC and UNCAC, do not refer to crimes committed with the use of ICTs. So given that Morocco is a state party to the majority of UN Convention and aligned with national legislation, which is closely aligned with this UN instrument, this means that the addition of such an article will make the future Convention simply not implementable, and neither appropriate to the majority of state parties of UNCAC and UNTAC. Additionally, as has been indicated by several delegations, we note the contradictory nature between Para 1 and Para 2. in Article 4. Basically, the first para excludes the others. So we request the deletion of Article 4 in its entirety. Moving to Article 14, Morocco attaches great importance to the protection of children, especially against online sexual exploitation. Does my delegation request the deletion of the term without right? Again, this reference is not agreed in CRC and it’s not agreed as a parameter of protection. Morocco also requests the deletion of paras 3 and 4 of Article 14, so as this convention is in full conformity with international legal instruments on protection of children. On Article 16, along the same line, we would like to request the deletion of non-consensual from the title as well as para 3 and 4 to ensure full protection of children. On Article 23, we request the deletion of para 4 and we are surprised that at this final stage of negotiation this para has been added. We believe that we should focus on what brings us together and not apart and we believe that para 4 is not adding anything to this process if we want to really land on consensus and have a consensual adoption of this future convention. I’ll move way forward to Article 57, in particular para 4. Morocco welcomes of course the participation and full engagement of all relevant stakeholders. Thus, their participation should be in line with well-established practices and we request the verbatim language. used in UNCAC to aim to consensus. This is concerning the text. Now I have final remarks on two aspects. The first one is on interpretive notes. We have been listening carefully to all the clarification made by the chair throughout these two days, and also we have benefited as a member of the African group for the explanation provided by your experts. So we thank you for that insight. Our question is beyond the nature or the annexation of the note, but rather on the legal status of this interpretive note. So we would appreciate if we could have some more explanation insights to report them back to capital since this is a new exercise that we have had this session. So this is an element that provides or needs further explanation. And my last element will be on the additional protocol. Morocco has been really stable in its position regarding the additional protocol. We believe that what we have in hand is majorly the convention, and we have to lend on a safe and comfortable and a solid action-oriented convention in this regard. The additional protocol, as it is the practice across the board in all UN processes, is something that we agree on once the need arises and after the ratification and also the signature of the convention by the majority of the member states. So we should give time to convention and reconsider and revisit the possibility of an additional protocol. when it’s needed. I thank you, Madam Chair, and I’ll stop here.

Chair:
Thank you very much. Montenegro, then Tunisia.

Montenegro:
Thank you, Madam Chair. First of all, we would like to join other delegations in appreciation of your efforts and the work of the whole Secretariat so far. As an EU candidate country, Montenegro aligns itself with the European Union position. We believe that the current draft text represents a quality basis and opens the way to the consensus for adoption of the Convention. Regarding some of the specific points, we want to give strong support for keeping an Article 6.2 in its current form. We are also in favour of Articles 14 to 16 related to the criminalization to remain in its current form, as well as Article 24.2 concerning necessary safeguards. We also support increasing the number of the ratifications required for entering into force of the Convention, as it stands in the proposal of the Delegation of Mexico, as well as inclusion of political offence as a ground for refusal that is subject to the proposal of Costa Rica, and supported by a high number of Member States, as it represents a widely existing standard in the mutual legal assistance. As for the issue of the main title of the Convention, we would like also to support statements of the Member States that propose shortening and rationalizing of the title of the Convention by using worldwide accepted term cybercrime, which would reflect the content and the purpose of the Convention. In addition, as for the Protocol, we join concerns expressed by the Member States that it would be premature and not adequate to initiate Protocol discussions. before necessary ratifications of the Convention and its implementation. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Chair:
Thank you very much. Tunis.

Tunisia:
Thank you very much, Madam. I endorse the statements made by other delegations in thanking you and your team for your efforts over the past three-plus years on such an extremely important item. My delegation would also like to thank the coordinator of the African Group for efforts carried out as well in order to facilitate discussions among members of the African Group. Madam, my delegation welcomes this revised text, which was put to us by the Chair. This is a basis on which we can move forward so that we can come up with a final convention within the next two weeks. My delegation also believes that we need to give necessary importance to international cooperation and to the transfer of technology as well as capacity building. We need to do this in order to optimize benefits for developing countries in their efforts to combat the use of ICT for criminal purposes. We also need to take account of a gradual approach adopted by criminals who use ICT for criminal purposes. In conclusion, Madam, we believe that our work will be crowned with success thanks to you and that we will arrive at a consensus on this text. so that the text can be implemented and we will then be able to combat cyber crime. Thank you very much.

Chair:
I thank Tunisia.

Lao PDR:
Madam Chair, at the outset I would like to join other delegations to congratulate you, your bureau, and secretarials for the hard work and tireless efforts to elaborate the new Levi draft convention. We also commend the constructive and fruitful commitments by the member states, aiming to finalize this draft convention. My delegation assure you our full support and cooperation in this process and hope that finally we will be able to adopt the draft convention with the consensus. Madam Chair, we are currently approaching to the adoption of the draft convention after it has been long negotiation for more than two and a half years. My delegation is pleased to note the current draft that you have shared mostly already reflects the concern expressed by the member states. However, it seems that there are many points that we need to negotiate more to find a balanced ground. For our delegation, although we tried to compromise in many points, however, we still want to have some observation, particularly on the safeguard on human rights in Article 6, Paragraph 2, since my delegation is of the view that the term on promotion and protection of human rights provided in Article 6.1 is already sufficient. We also would like to emphasize about the issues on technical assistance and capacity building, including transfer of technology to developing countries to prevent and combat cyber crimes. Madam Chair, my delegation would like to. We will work closely with you and other delegations and we believe that through the compromise negotiation we will be able to adopt the drop convention with the consensus. I thank you. Thank you.

Chair:
United Arab Emirates.

United Arab Emirates:
We thank you and your team for your efforts and for the revisions made to this convention so that we can reach consensus and have convergent views on the text. We would like to endorse the joint statement made by Egypt and the positions expressed therein. Article 6, paragraph 1, is sufficient. We believe that we do not need the second paragraph of Article 6. This convention deals with cybercrime and therefore we do not need to speak of human rights in this convention as is referred to in paragraph 2. On Article 13, paragraph 4, there is a contradiction with our national legislation. Article 15 on intimate pictures, images, we need to review and revise that paragraph. Madam Chairman, we are prepared. to cooperate in order to adopt this convention but the convention must align with national legislation. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you.

Vietnam:
Thank you, Madam Chair, for giving me the floor. Regarding Article 2, Vietnam supports the proposal by the delegation of the Russian Federation on the definition of service provider. Additionally, we support reinstating paragraph 2 of this article. Regarding Article 64, Vietnam supports the convention coming into force after 40 ratification as proposed by the Chair. This approach aligns with the precedent set by the UN TOC. We believe that increasing the number of ratifications to 60 is unprecedented and risk hindering efforts to bring this convention into force at the earliest possible time. Lastly, we urge colleagues from all delegations to demonstrate flexibility and the spirit of compromise to achieve consensus on the draft convention. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Chair:
Thank you. So, we have now come to the end of the list of speakers among member states and observer states. I now I give the floor. I’m sorry, says the Chair, I see that you doubted. Your name, Burundi, please.

Burundi:
Merci beaucoup, Madame. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. Since this is the first time I’m taking the floor, let me begin by congratulating you on the way in which you are guiding our debate, and in particular I’d like to express the full support of my delegation to you for your work. Madam Chairman. My delegation endorses the joint statement made yesterday by Egypt, and we believe that it reflects the serious concerns of our part of the world with regard to the current revised text. And we also support the position expressed therein to delete paragraph 2 of Article 6. We believe it’s somewhat excessive, taking into account the various statements that have been made here earlier and the provisions that already exist elsewhere in the text. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you, says the chair. I do not see any other delegation wishing to take the floor. Very well. Then we will close the list of member states. I will immediately give the floor to the representatives of other partners on our list. We have the European Institute for Multidisciplinary Studies on Human Rights and Science, International Chamber of Commerce, Microsoft, Cybersecurity, Tech Accord, Human Rights Watch, REDD, Defensa de los Derechos Digitales, Access Now, League of Arab States, Cyber Society Foundation. So let me say that we only have a half-hour time slot, and you must respect the three-minute time limit, please. The member states are really making every effort to make sure that you can share your views and speak, so please don’t abuse this kindness. Let me give the floor immediately to the European Institute for Multidisciplinary Studies on Human Rights and Science.

Knowmad Institute:
Thank you very much. On behalf of the Institute, the Foundation, and the International Chamber of Commerce, I would like to thank you all for being here today. for Recover were honored on behalf of the NOMAD Institute C for Recovery Foundation, the Sase-Dodo Mission, to present this joint statement. Our recommendations bring forth the voices of the most vulnerable populations to ensure that the International Convention on ICT balances the fight against cybercrime with fundamental principles of human rights, international cooperation, sustainable development. The convention must prioritize human rights and dignity, protect the right to privacy, freedom of expression, and access to public information. To this end, we urge the committee to integrate explicit references to international frameworks such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to ensure that actions against cybercrime align with established human rights standards. We also suggest clarifying the scope of the definition of offenses, specifying that these can be committed by individuals, legal entities, state, and parastatal entities. Additionally, it is crucial to include espionage perpetrated by these entities against activist journalists and other civil society actors. The convention must protect the most vulnerable groups, including those affected by political, ethnic, religious, or migratory conflicts, adopting an intersectional and gender approach. This inclusivity will promote international cooperation and ensure equitable and non-discriminatory measures. We highlight the growing concern shared by various sectors of civil society, academia, and industry that the convention’s approach could be interpreted and used to justify mass surveillance that undermines fundamental rights to privacy and freedom of movement. This concern is particularly relevant in the Global North, where migrant and displaced populations could be disproportionately affected. It is paramount that clear and strict safeguards be established to prevent the misuse of these measures against vulnerable groups. Any action taken under this convention must be carried out with full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the principles established in the UN Charter. The rapid evolution of cyberspace requires continuous updates to the Convention. Definitions and measures must be regularly reviewed to avoid ambiguous terms and ensure clarity and relevance. The Convention should promote educational and awareness programs on information and communication technology, security and cybercrime prevention. Today is the day to combat trafficking of human beings. We need to preserve our future and include clear-cut definitions in Article 14.

Chair:
Thank you very much. You exceeded the three minutes and so your microphone was cut off. I apologize for that. South Africa has asked for the floor and since South Africa is a member state, so that country will speak before the multi-stakeholder. South Africa has the floor.

South Africa:
And I sincerely apologize to the multi-stakeholders for taking the floor so late. I’m taking the floor on behalf of the Africa Group. So Madam Chair, the Africa Group expresses its sincere appreciation to you, Madam Chair, and your team for the updated draft Convention text, Rev. 3. Madam Chair, the group has consistently emphasized the importance of international cooperation in meaningfully combating evolving cybercrime committed either through the use of ICTs for criminal purposes. The group has highlighted the significance of technical assistance, capacity building, including through the transfer of technology to assist countries, particularly developing countries, in the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of offenses covered by the Convention. Madam Chair, the group is pleased to note that Rev. 3 maintains references to technical assistance and capacity building in the preamble, Article 1 and Article 54. to strengthen cooperation and coordination. The group has called for strong language without caveats to ensure that technical assistance and capacity building are conducted without conditionalities. The group thus calls for the removal of where possible in the preamble. We would also prefer to see the transfer of technology retained alongside capacity building and technical assistance in Article 1C to maintain consistency of the language as well as ensure that developing countries are fully capacitated to meet the technological requirements for the collection, preservation and sharing of electronic evidence. Madam Chair, the group reiterates its support to you and we do look forward to a successful conclusion of the Convention. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you very much to South Africa and to the entire African group for your contribution. I will now give the floor to the International Chamber of Commerce. Three minutes.

ICC:
Thank you, Madam Chair, for the opportunity to share a few comments on behalf of the International Chamber of Commerce, the institutional representative of 45 million companies in over 100 countries. The establishment of this committee offered an opportunity to create a unified framework for collaboration among nations to confront the challenges posed by cybercrime, harmonize legal approaches and facilitate effective cross-border cooperation in combating this global menace. However, the Convention in its current form risks falling short of these ambitions. The global private sector remains concerned that the Convention continues to contain serious flaws allowing its provisions to be potentially misused to compromise cyber security, data privacy and fundamental rights and freedoms. We see these flaws in three main areas. First, as currently written, the Convention risks undermining human rights, particularly privacy and freedom of expression. It risks enabling intrusive cross-border data collection, infringing on individuals’ rights and preventing people from challenging arbitrary access to their data. Second, economic development relies heavily on a predictable and secure business environment. A flawed treaty may impose conflicting national rules leading to substantial legal and regulatory uncertainty, compliance costs, and hindering international cooperation. Additionally, the uncertainty created by expensive and vague legal definitions could discourage cybersecurity research and innovation essential for protecting digital ecosystems with which the global economy is intertwined and upon which it depends for growth. The convention in its current form could make it increasingly difficult for providers to challenge overbroad requests or resist extraterritorial requests for data from law enforcement. Under such unpredictable and uncertain circumstances, commercial activities may suffer, reducing the potential to invest and innovate in digital services, which is especially alarming at a time when socioeconomic development fueled by digitalization is a priority worldwide. Third, national security is intricately linked to cybersecurity. The proposed convention’s broad data collection powers without strong safeguards may weaken global cybersecurity, making institutions and individuals more vulnerable to cybercrime. The provision on compelled assistance in Article 28.4 could be interpreted to enable parties to the treaty to conscript people who have access to or otherwise possess the knowledge or skills necessary to break or circumvent security systems to help law enforcement access data on those networks. This must be removed, as it could even be interpreted to include compelled disclosure of previously unknown vulnerabilities, private encryption keys, or proprietary information like source code. To mitigate these risks, we refer you to our written input for specific recommendations. To conclude, the convention must strike a delicate balance to support international cooperation between law enforcement while protecting human rights, fostering economic development, and ensuring national security. Without significant revisions, the current draft risks undermining these critical areas. I thank you.

Microsoft:
Madam Chair, as always, we align ourselves with the statements made by the International Chamber of Commerce and the Tech Accord. Frankly, as I’ve said last time, the fact that you have industry and civil society aligned in our concerns to such an unprecedented degree should continue to give Member States pause. Madam Chair, I would like to recognize the work you, your team, and the Secretariat have invested into this negotiation, and I applaud you for your efforts to bring together such vastly different positions, especially in these geopolitically difficult times. That said, after nearly three years of negotiations, Microsoft remains gravely concerned that states have not yet reached consensus on some of the most fundamental issues, including the very purpose and scope of the Convention itself, and we are disappointed that so many of the concerns industry and civil society have raised over the past two-plus years have not been heard. Nothing of what I’m saying should be a surprise to anybody, so to once again be unmistakably clear, at its heart, this treaty still remains a data access, global surveillance treaty in the guise of a cybercrime treaty, without adequate safeguards to prevent government abuse of power, and in its current form, this treaty will erode data privacy, threaten digital sovereignty, and undermine online rights and freedoms globally. There isn’t much I can say in three minutes, so I will focus on three key areas. First, the draft Convention will undermine national security as it allows for unauthorized disclosure of sensitive data and classified information to third states. Through this treaty, specifically Article 28.4, malicious actors will have a UN instrument which can and will be abused to force individuals with knowledge of how a system functions to reveal proprietary or sensitive information. Handing over such information could expose the critical infrastructure of a state to cyberattacks or lead to the theft of state secrets, which would terrify us all. Secondly, the draft Convention will weaken global cybersecurity. The world greatly benefits from the work done by cybersecurity researchers, penetration testers, and ethical hackers, and we cannot emphasize enough that these professionals are critical to helping secure systems used by billions of people every day. As currently drafted, this convention will undermine global efforts to secure systems from cybercriminals. And thirdly, additional protocols open the door to further broadening of the scope. The new provision calling for protocols on additional cybercrimes appears to be, at best, an inadequate compromise on the scope of the convention itself. At worst, it proves that positions among member states are simply too far apart to reasonably deliver a useful new cybercrime treaty today. Madam Chair, Microsoft believes that a treaty focused on core cybercrime offenses with robust safeguards would be a useful outcome. However, in its current form, this draft is unfortunately still far from that. And without significant improvements, this treaty will have profound negative impacts on the digital ecosystem for years to come. And we could not recommend states sign or ratify a convention with such profound negative impacts on the digital ecosystem. That’s all the concern I can fit into three minutes.

Chair:
Bravo for being precise. That was three minutes on the dot. Cybersecurity Tech Accord.

Cybersecurity Tech Accord:
Thank you, Madam Chair. On behalf of the Cybersecurity Tech Accord and our 150 signatory companies globally, please accept our gratitude for your work and that of your team, including the Secretariat. As usual, we align ourselves with the statements of the International Chamber of Commerce and Microsoft, which you have just heard, as well as so much said by civil society. We also support the proposals for this session from both the OHCHR and Human Rights Watch. We have some further proposals which we would be pleased to share bilaterally, as well as those in our written statement on the AHC website. Madam Chair, distinguished delegates, we all confront several serious problems. We have an instrument that the preeminent guardian of international human rights law, the OHCHR, has clearly said is not congruent with that legal framework to which virtually every state in this room is bound. We have an instrument which will degrade global cybersecurity through the legal jeopardy of the professionals who are critical to protecting the systems relied on daily by billions of people. And not only them, journalists, whistleblowers and others too. We have an instrument which allows governments to engage in unlimited perpetual secret cooperation. Does anyone believe that won’t be abused? Without addressing obvious vectors for abuse, the text has clear risks to national security and undermines the meager human rights safeguards it contains. We have an instrument so broad in scope that nobody in or outside of this room even knows what acts it covers. And yet, and yet, there are demands to immediately negotiate a protocol, broadening the scope even further before the convention has even entered into force. Lastly, but definitely not least, we have a convention that facilitates charging children as criminals subject to international law enforcement cooperation for their selfies. Madam Chair, we are gratified to hear concerns from some states about this, including from Italy, Austria and Slovakia. Without significant improvements, this treaty will have profound negative impacts on the digital ecosystem. It will damage the credibility of the UN’s commitment to the values the UN Charter is founded upon. We know many states want increased cooperation on cybercrime. We entirely support this objective and many of our members actively participate in capacity building and technical assistance for exactly this reason. This text will not create the trust essential to cooperation. It will undermine it. Regrettably, without major amendments, this convention is not presently fit for purpose and we could not recommend states endorse or adopt it. Thank you for your attention.

Chair:
Thank you very much. Human Rights Watch.

Human Rights Watch:
Thank you, Madam Chair. I am delivering this statement on behalf of Human Rights Watch and the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Firstly, we would like to extend our sincere gratitude to you and your team for your tireless efforts. In our view, Rev. 3 remains fundamentally flawed with its broad scope and insufficient human rights safeguards. We are deeply concerned that the current draft would expand government surveillance and facilitate cross-border human rights abuses. On scope, the current title equates cybercrime with any crime involving ICTs, which governments may use to justify abusive domestic laws that use expansive definitions of cybercrime. Likewise, the proposed protocol to address additional crimes signals a clear intent to further expand the treaty’s reach. We recommend limiting Article 3 to specific criminal investigations and prosecutions of offenses established in accordance with Articles 7 through 17. If investigative and cooperation powers extend beyond Articles 7 through 17, Articles 23 and 35 should be limited to specific cases where there is reasonable suspicion to believe that a serious crime has been committed and that the offense is legitimately criminalized under international human rights law. We support OHCHR’s proposed amendments to the definition of serious crimes in Article 2H to limit the inclusion of conduct that is protected under international human rights law. On human rights safeguards, Article 6.2 is a welcome improvement to the text, and deleting it would clearly signal that states intend to use this treaty to suppress human rights. Article 24 should be amended to ensure that it incorporates international human rights principles, namely the standards of legality and necessity, and it should apply to the entire treaty. Article 35 urgently requires a dual criminality requirement, an explicit human rights safeguards provision, and a prohibition on mutual legal assistance in cases where there are credible reasons to believe that the request is politically motivated or arbitrary. The Convention’s approach to child sexual abuse material risks violating children’s rights. Article 14.4 would criminalize the consensual conduct between similarly aged children contrary to the guidance of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. Article 14.2 risks criminalizing material with evidentiary scientific or artistic value and puts at risk the work of human rights organizations that investigate children’s human rights abuses. In closing, we understand the desire among many states to reach consensus on the text. However, we remind delegates that there is no legal requirement to adopt a treaty. Rather, all states have a binding legal obligation under human rights law. We urge delegates not to compromise and adopt a treaty that is deeply problematic or flawed. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Chair:
Merci beaucoup. Thank you very much. Red de Defensa de los Derechos Digitales.

R3D:
Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to congratulate you for these three years of the Overgiver leadership in this process. I’m going to make my intervention in Spanish. We’re at a crossroads which will determine the future of the freedom of persons in cyberspace. And therefore, we need to be clear about our objectives and recall who we are really attempting to protect. Are we attempting to protect individuals whose lives have been affected by cybercrime, by human rights defenders, by journalists, by activists, or children? These are the people who are perhaps targeted and should be the subject of the text before us. Let me give you a few guidelines to orient our goals. Article 6, paragraph 2. for a treaty. We do not want to go back 20 years in the digital field in terms of human rights. We need to give the scope to this convention as outlined in Articles 4 and 5. Investigations need to be limited solely to crimes that are criminalized. In Article 28, paragraph 4, 29, 30, and 47, these actions are very intrusive and could cause irreparable damage to individuals. We recommend, therefore, that they be deleted completely. Similarly, the safeguards in Article 24 is a minimum standard, but it’s not sufficient when it comes to violations of human rights. The safeguards for independence are essential to ensure a democracy in the area of human rights, in particular in Latin America. This was recognized recently in the case by Columbia at the Inter-American Court with regard to interference in the freedom of human rights and abuses by authorities. It is urgent for delegations to correct these problems and those that my colleagues who spoke before me referred to in order to protect effectively our society so that this treaty can make a positive impact worldwide. Otherwise, we cannot recommend that states sign and ratify this convention. The process of ratification at the national level will be complicated, and this convention will not enjoy universality. Human rights organizations are fighting at all levels for a free, safe, and inclusive digital environment for all people, and this is just the beginning. Thank you. Thank you very much to Derechos Digitales. We have consistently emphasized the need to protect human rights to ensure the proposed cybercrime convention does not undermine gender equality. Thank you.

Chair:
Yes, now. Microphone for Derechos Digitales. Is it working now? Yes. Okay. Thank you. Don’t touch the… Why? Don’t touch it. Please, don’t touch. Okay. Yeah. Okay. Now it’s red. Okay. Thank you. Go ahead.

Derechos Digitales:
Thank you, Chair. Throughout this process, we have consistently emphasized the need to protect human rights to ensure that the proposed cybercrime convention does not undermine gender equality. It’s deeply concerning that even in this final session, there remains strong opposition to safeguarding these rights. As a result, the discussion seems to be around the bare minimum. The latest draft still contains overly broad provisions that could criminalize legitimate online expression, potentially leading to discriminatory impacts and deepening gender inequality. This is exacerbated by the possible additional protocol. We have provided evidence of how current local cybercrime legislations show that laws lacking a human rights and gender perspective, often characterized by broad and vague definitions, allow for arbitrary applications. This creates legal uncertainty and poses significant risk to fundamental rights, exacerbating their gender equalities. Human rights mechanisms have already identified a growing trend of these laws being used to surveil and punish activists. causing a chilling effect on advocacy and endangering the safety of human rights defenders. The lack of effective human rights safeguards and robust data protection principles within the Convention is particularly troubling. This deficiency risks legitimizing surveillance practices with differentiated impacts based on gender, further threatening privacy and other fundamental rights. We are not discussing potential risks, but concrete harms that are already being felt globally. The Convention must include strict limitations on procedural measures, ensuring that they are applied only to clearly defined cybercrimes, and must incorporate principles of legality, necessity and proportionality. The Inter-American Human Rights Court’s recent decision on the case Cajar v. Colombia recognized the right to defend human rights and data protection even in state intelligence tasks, granting individuals the right to control personal data held in public archives. The Court mandated prior judicial authorization for surveillance activities and stressed special protections for journalists and lawyers to safeguard their communications and sources. This decision is of utmost importance specifically for Latin American states. We urge state delegations to mainstream gender throughout the Convention, mandate Article 4, include gender equality in Article 6, narrow the scope to specifically define cyber-dependent crime, mandate criminal intent for offenses under Articles 7 and 11, ensure conditions and safeguards align with international law, and apply these safeguards to international cooperation measures, especially concerning personal data transfer and incorporate human rights-based data protection standards considering gender-related risks.

Chair:
Merci beaucoup. Thank you very much. Thank you. You have exceeded the time limit of three minutes. I apologize. Access now.

Acess Now:
Thank you Madam Chair. We appreciate the efforts made by you and by many participating delegates to the AHC over the last three years in trying to ensure that we have meaningful deliberations and a fit-for-purpose human rights respecting convention. Access Now supports interventions made by several other stakeholders, particularly my colleagues from Human Rights Watch, the Ricos Digitalis, R3D, as well as the input shared by the Cybersecurity Tech Accord, Microsoft and the International Chamber of Commerce. As an organization that has engaged in this process from the beginning, we want to speak with full candor. We should not be happy with where we are. We draw your attention to what we said in February this year. The UN should only put its name on a cybercrime convention that narrowly focuses on tackling cybercrime and which is not used as a tool to undermine human rights. Today in July, while recognizing the efforts made to improve the text, including the proposed Article 6 on human rights and other language, we unfortunately would repeat what we were forced to say earlier. This text should not be accepted as is by the United Nations. Despite what we might be sometimes tempted to think of, and we are enmeshed in the heat of these negotiations in these conference rooms, having a bad UN cybercrime treaty is not better than having no treaty. If this treaty is not further improved, the states are not further clear in how they protect human rights and ensure due process safeguards. If they do not provide protection to security researchers, then this convention, even if accepted, will be born into uncertainty and turbulence. States will not be able to sign and even fewer will be able to say with certainty that they can ratify. But even if states do not sign or do not ratify, the harm will be done. This AHC will change international law and put in place standards that will be referred to. It is in that spirit that we draw your attention to areas of language, supplementing what our colleagues have noted. Firstly, on security researchers and what sometimes people have referred to as good faith protections. We appreciate the recognition of this issue, but the language in the treaty is still insufficient, as we and society and even industry have said repeatedly. Security research is not done merely for service providers, nor is it pre-authorized in each instance. Therefore, the AHC should fix the language of Articles 7.2 and 11.2 in the criminalization chapter, and references to authorized with regards to security testing and penetration should be removed. And delegates should alter the preventative measures provision to improve the language of the new proposed Article 53E by removing reference that it makes to security research being only that benefits service providers. The U.N. Cybercrime Convention should not have a legacy that it makes us more cyber-insecure. Secondly, we call you to address calls to improve the issue of the intent language. We call for improvements to the Article 7.2.11 in the criminalization chapter, but we also want to draw attention to the current draft Article 18 that lacks clarity regarding the liability of online platforms for offenses committed by the users, specifically regarding the lack of requirement of intentional participation for offenses. This also contradicts Article 19. Thirdly, and most disappointingly, do not wind back the clock on human rights law with regards to Articles 24 and 35. The standard that should be referred to there is necessity, legality, and proportionality, as international human rights law and domestic law call for. A U.N. Cybercrime Convention should

Chair:
Thank you, Madam President.

League of Arab States:
I’m talking on behalf of the Secretary of the League of Arab States. The League commends the efforts of Her Excellency Ambassador Fauzia Boumaiza Mbarki, Chair of the Committee. I highly appreciate her professional leadership of the work of this Committee. We would like to thank the Secretariat for the effort made in the work of the Committee, and we hope to reach a consensual and common vision on the provisions of this Convention. The League of Arab States has actively participated in all sessions held by the Committee, whether in Vienna or New York. The Secretary General of the League of Arab States gave his clear instructions to add the item of a comprehensive international convention in countering the use of the ICT for organized criminal purposes in all meetings held at the League, and this to reach unified Arab vision. Madam Chair, you know full well that the League of Arab States was proactive in this domain. The Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology Offenses was adopted back in 2010 during the joint meeting between the Arab Justice Ministers’ Council and the Arab Interior Ministers’ Council meetings. We’re very proud that the current and ongoing efforts were taken into consideration, especially the text of the Arab Convention in line with GA Resolution 74-247 and Paragraph 2, which called for taking into full consideration existing international instruments and efforts at the national, regional, and international levels on combating the use of information and communication technology for criminal purposes. The League of Arab States reiterates its support to the positions of its member states in their national capacity today and yesterday. We will remain engaged in all discussions until we reach full consensus on all provisions of the convention. This has always been the case with the League of Arab States on international conventions, including the UN Convention Against Corruption. The League has participated in all meetings and committees until it was agreed upon by consensus. Later, the League encouraged the Arab countries to accede to such international conventions. All 21 Arab countries are parties to the convention, with the exception of one country that is in the process of submitting its ratification documents. As you all know, the accession to any international convention is a political decision by accession. And we, in the League of Arab States, would have full access to these decision-makers, and we will encourage accession and ratification of this convention, and wish you all the success in this meeting. Thank you, Madam Chairperson.

Chair:
Thank you very much, my dear sister, for your nice words.

DB Connect:
Thank you, Madam Chair, for your exceptional leadership throughout this convention. Your guidance has been invaluable as we work to address one of the most pressing challenges of our time. Cybercrime is evolving rapidly, presenting new and complex challenges that inflict severe economic and social damage, with costs projected to reach 10.5 trillion annually by 2025. A unified international response is more crucial than ever. With regard to Peru, Italy, Jamaica, to address this critical issue effectively, we must focus on three key areas. First, precise criminalisation. We must target specific cyber-dependent crimes with clear definitions to avoid limiting freedoms and ensure our laws are addressed genuinely. activities while protecting legitimate online use. Second, robust international cooperation, real-time information sharing and coordinated responses are essential for countering the evolving tactics of cyber adversaries. Establishing a 24-7 operational network is not a luxury, but a necessity to ensure timely and effective responses. Additionally, we must integrate strong human rights protections into our cooperation framework. This means carefully limiting investigative powers and allowing countries to refuse assistance when there is a risk of contributing to human rights abuses. Third, consideration of intent and protection for vulnerable groups. Our Convention should require proof of criminal intent for certain offences to prevent the criminalization of beneficial activities like security research. Explicit safeguards for children, particularly concerning self-generated content and non-consensual sharing of private images are crucial. By addressing these principles, we can develop a treaty that combats cyber crime effectively while upholding democratic values. This balanced approach will enhance our security and protect fundamental rights, ensuring that our response to cyber threats does not compromise core principles. Let us move forward thoughtfully addressing both the urgent threat of cyber crime and the need to preserve essential freedoms. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you very much. That was the last speakers from the multi-stakeholders from our civil society, academia, and business partners. Thank you very much. We have listened carefully to your views on the draft text that is in the process of being adopted. Thus concluding with our part dealing to the new amendments to the text. And I want to clarify something before we continue with our work. First of all, I want to repeat something because I believe not everyone understood. It is absolutely necessary that you are fully convinced that the chair does not have any personal position. The chair, myself, I won’t refer to myself in the third person, I have decided from the very outset to be as neutral as possible in order to ensure proper respect for each and everyone’s positions. Some statements have led me to believe that perhaps I’m not expressing myself clearly or I’ve made some procedural mistakes, but honestly, there should be no doubt as to my neutrality. The only thing that I’m interested in as the chair is that on 9th August, we can preferably by consensus adopt this text and that everyone is convinced of what it is that they are accepting, that there are no doubts that certain manipulations might have taken place, and so on. So what I ask for the time being from you is to focus on the points that you still find challenging to accept and to negotiate with those that oppose your proposals. At this stage of our work, as you know, this is a reconvened session. We were meant to complete our process in February. Back in February, the GA and I think the Secretary General and the presidents of the General Assembly above all, as well as all member states who have given us permission to have a reconvened session so that we can complete our work. We have eight days remaining. We are coming out to the end of the second day of our work, and unfortunately we have not moved forward one bit, and at this stage I must be very frank with you. Either you want to see this text, see the light, either everyone is convinced that we need a convention on cybercrime, on countering ICTs for criminal purposes, or we stop here. There is no need to waste the funding that has been allocated to us. Just as an aside, my country has spent a great deal of money in order to ensure that I can keep chairing this committee, and next time we will have to ask the United Nations to take the costs associated with the work of the chair and the Bureau upon itself because this is very thankless, tireless work. We must constantly be vigilant about how this or that word will be perceived, interpreted, etc. I am truly, truly concerned here because I see that eight days from when we are meant to finish, there are still attempts to go back to the starting point. We have no more time, no more room for… The kind of negotiations we had during the second, third, fourth session, a choice needs to be made. Can you still make certain compromises or not? Tomorrow you will have the final opportunity under the enlightened and friendly leadership of our Vice-Chair, Enrique Cerdas Sogosio, who has kindly accepted this very challenging responsibility and I thank him sincerely for that. It was not easy indeed, he has suffered alongside me and Elizabeth with other vice-chairs and others. It has not been easy, but at this stage you really need to think long and hard and consult with your capitals on whether you are in the position to accept certain compromises or not and if that is not the case then you need to be very frank and honest with the chair and simply say we cannot make these compromises and we will stop there. Honestly I am very concerned because methodology issues are still being raised even though things have already been adopted in that regard. There are questions about the utility of the interpretive notes as well and others. I understand your concerns and I share them fully, but we have a limited amount of time. As for the interpretive notes, I will send the explanation for what that is in writing. Even though as a diplomat, I address you as a diplomat and the diplomats among you know full well what that is. It is not the first time that they are interpretive notes in the process of elaborating an international Convention. As far as methodology is concerned, we’ve adopted methodology. There’s no point in asking why was that methodology adopted. It should have been opposed when we adopted it. On the one hand, we can’t adopt and accept methodology and then three weeks later, two days later, say, well, yeah, no, I can’t go along with that. I don’t agree with the methodology. And many other issues are in the same boat. So let’s be respectful of the financial commitments of our respective countries and the UN as well. And let’s get right to the point. We’ve all heard everyone’s concerns. What I’m asking you now is any of you, those of you who have any major concerns, to discuss those concerns with others who believe they can’t accept them and then come back to us tomorrow during our informal consultations and put forward a solution because we’re at the point where we need solutions. We need to move forward. Otherwise, I’m going to tell you quite frankly, I’m very comfortable with what I have done. I’ve submitted a draft text, a draft resolution. I’ve submitted interpretive notes. There will be the procedural report next Friday. And at that point in time, if no progress has been made, I will submit that documentation and then we’ll decide whether or not they can be adopted. That’s where we are. That’s what I wanted to tell you. Thank you very, very much because you’ve also, some of you have given me some good ideas and I hope that tomorrow we can make some progress. So you still have this evening. to negotiate with your other participants so that I hope tomorrow you’ll come to our informal consultations with solutions. Let’s now move on. We have very little time, less than an hour and a half. Criminal provisions, criminalization, jurisdiction, I invite my colleague, the Vice-Chair on behalf of Nigeria, Georgia, Malia Twendesva, to join me here. Let me tell you what we’re going to be doing in accordance with the methodology we adopted. We’re going to put up on the screen the text that we have, but these are not track changes. Don’t tell me I want this word here or there. It’s just so that we can have a look at the text. So if you agree with that, then we would adopt ADREF. If that’s not the case, then whoever is in disagreement, that individual has the responsibility to negotiate with other countries and to come back to us with a solution. George Maria? George Maria? He will join us later. He’ll join us later. So let’s resume consideration of Agenda Item 3, updated draft text of the Convention. Because of the time constraints, rather than opening up every provision, I’ll go over them one by one, and if there’s no objection by members of the Committee, I would ask the Secretariat to indicate that the given provision has been approved. If you disagree with approving the provision, then, as I said, you can ask for the floor. But do note that we will not be considering each provision in detail. Delegations are asked to explain briefly why a certain provision is unacceptable before we move on to the following provision. Any provision that cannot be found, cannot be adopted at referendum, then in informal consultations under the chairmanship of the Vice-Chair, or working on certain chapters, we’ll discuss them during those consultations. I’d like to thank Mr. George Maria here. Let’s go through the pending provisions of these three chapters one by one, except those that have already been assigned to informal discussions. Let us begin with the chapter on general provisions. In Article I, the Secretary of State, can you put that on the screen? In Article I, only Paragraph C is still pending. May I take it that the Ad Hoc Committee agrees with Article I, Paragraph C as contained in the updated draft? Please let us know if you do not agree, Russia.

Russian Federation:
Thank you, Madam Chair. I have one fairly important aspect to raise so that we don’t have to reiterate arguments that have already been expressed regarding the articles and provisions that you believe should be taken to bilateral or small group negotiations. I would ask you, so that all delegations are clear, what will be discussed in the small group bilateral format to indicate how you envision the provisions or the number of provisions that we should be discussing offline, so to speak, so that delegations don’t have to repeat themselves. Thank you.

Chair:
We’ll listen to everyone because I think there are questions around, please.

Iran:
Thank you, Madam Chair. First of all, I would like to extend my sympathy to your disappointment. I am disappointed also, unfortunately. And we do agree that if we want to reach a consensus on both sides, all delegations should be pragmatic, realistic, and sacrifice some dreams in this convention. So we cannot ask only one side to show flexibility. This text, as I mentioned previously, we are not happy with that because many of our proposals have been ignored and have not been inserted to the text, but many proposals from other sides inserted in the text. Firstly. Secondly, Madam Chair, on methodology, I agree with, I think this thing. English Delegation of Russian Federation. I have seen divergent views in the room, with whom I can negotiate to reach a consensus. Because, for example, on human rights, I can see it in a package, not Article 2 or 22. So maybe we need, if we want to reach a consensus, maybe we need, again, this is, we are in your hand, this is a suggestion, to establish different informal groups to reach a consensus. Because right now, I don’t know when we will discuss, for example, the preamble. So this is only for saving of the time and reaching a consensus. I think maybe we need to establish informal groups to reach a consensus. On this article, Madam Chair, from the first day, we proposed to put at three, transfer of technology. Because transfer of technology is different with capacity building and technical assistance. So it has been missed in this text, and we would like to add this after capacity building. I mean, technical assistance, comma, capacity building, and transfer of technology. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Chair:
Thank you very much for your question. Thank you. As far as your question on the informal groups, I just referred to tomorrow. Tomorrow, you’ll have the entire day for informal consultations on divergent views on issues where there’s no agreement. And we’ve just had the last two days on new additions. It’s not a question of re-drafting the convention. So you have the full day tomorrow to negotiate in informal sessions. I’ve said that several times now. Our chairman, Eric Sosia-Deseda, has kindly agreed to chair those informal consultations. So you’ll have the full day tomorrow for those informals. South Africa.

South Africa:
Thank you very much, Madam Chair. So Madam Chair, just during the last session, I spoke on behalf of the Africa Group and we requested the reinsertion of transfer of technology. So Madam Chair, if it’s possible that we could maintain consistency with the preamble so then the sentence would read, and capacity building, comma, including transfer of technology on mutually agreed terms. So it would maintain consistency with what is in the preamble. Thank you.

Chair:
Very well. I see there are proposals. We’ve already heard those proposals. Is the committee prepared to accept them? If not, we will set these proposals aside and then in informals we’ll see if we can make any progress. Très bien. Very well. United Kingdom.

United Kingdom:
Madam Chair, is the question whether or not we can accept the proposal that was made a moment ago by the Distinguished Delegate from South Africa? Sorry, is the question whether we can accept your text or whether we can accept the proposal that was made a moment ago by the Distinguished Delegate from South Africa?

Chair:
No, it’s the proposal of South Africa. I’m going to submit my text if there’s no progress on Friday the 9th, but for the time being we’re hearing the different proposals put forward by member states. These are proposals that have already been submitted. They’re not new proposals. These are ones that have already been submitted by different delegations. And of course, they want their proposals to be taken on board. That’s the case for all of the proposals during these negotiations.

United Kingdom:
On the proposal that’s been made again.

Chair:
South Africa, please, can you repeat your proposal?

South Africa:
As I indicated, I took the floor on behalf of the Africa group. And we requested that we add, after capacity building, we add comma, including the transfer of technology, comma, on mutually agreed terms. So this would maintain consistency with what is in the preamble. Thank you.

Chair:
Merci. Thank you.

United Kingdom:
Yes, my apologies. The proposal was clear in the first place, I just wasn’t clear whether I should repeat our views on this proposal, which we have expressed previously. So Madam Chair, we understand the importance that many delegations attach to technical assistance and capacity building. We are a strong supporter of those concepts. We feel that in this case, it is not appropriate to, in a high level, overarching statement of purpose, to single out a particular form of technical assistance. capacity building. We do not do that in subparagraph A. In subparagraph B, equally, we do not do that. We do not single out a particular form of international cooperation over one form over others. And therefore, we do not feel in this particular instance it is appropriate to do the same in subparagraph C. So for those reasons, as I say, there are other references to technology transfer in the convention, which we can support. But here, we feel that it’s not appropriate. Thank you.

Chair:
I see, then, that for the time being, there’s no possibility for retaining that proposal. There’s no opposition. That’s already something. So let’s move forward, as you know. Thank you, George Maria, for joining us. The vice chairs who carried out negotiations are going to be with me here while we go through the text. And every time there’s a need to consult further on the issue, then the vice chair in charge of those chapters will conduct coordination. They do not have to put forward solutions. It’s up to you to find solutions. Every member state with a proposal is responsible for finding a solution and contacting the vice chairman in charge of those chapters. So we’ve taken note of South Africa’s proposal, the African group. is insisting on the introduction of that wording in Article 1, Paragraph C, Russian Federation.

Russian Federation:
Thank you, Madam Chair. If you allow, I’d like to go back to my question. Before we continue working on the text of specific articles, it would be good to have an exhaustive understanding of which provisions you believe will be taken to informal discussions so that some delegations, including possibly Russian Federation, don’t appear to be those proposing deal-breakers if some provisions are to be discussed today or tomorrow. We need to understand that that might be discussed informally, to search for compromises so that we don’t necessarily need to say things we don’t need to say in this meeting. And second, I don’t understand if we’re going through the text from the very beginning why we haven’t started with the title of the Convention, the preamble, or part, and I ask for your clarification.

Chair:
Because in point of fact there was a strong divergence of views on the title and we’re just looking now at the items where we believe there might be some compromise, but where there was considerable opposition, we’ll look at those later. Let me ask you another question. Which questions are going to be looked at tomorrow during informal consultations? Yesterday I read that out, but perhaps I… misspoke or you didn’t understand me, but I read out the list of articles. Article 6, paragraph 2, on respect for human rights. Article 4, on offenses established in accordance with other UN conventions. Article 23, paragraph 4, on scope of application, conditions and safeguards, and interpretive notes on that subparagraph and article 24. There are also the two interpretive notes on article 35, on the general principles on international cooperation. Article 40, paragraph 22, on procedures relating to mutual legal assistance. Five of the draft text. So these are the issues that will be considered tomorrow in informals. I would ask the Secretariat to, as soon as this meeting is over, to please send that list to all the Member States so they have in writing the list of issues that will be considered during informals. Have I answered your question? Please go ahead. Thank you, Chair. I’m now convinced that we did not hear a mention of the provision that I think it would make sense to discuss informally. Yesterday and today you did not mention the title of the convention, but that is something that absolutely must be discussed further, including during informal consultations as well, it appears to me. My dear colleague, you’ve noted, as have I, and I think that everyone is witness to that. that the room is divided in two on the issue of the title and therefore, I think that to submit it to informal consultations yet again will not move anything forward because we’re simply going to repeat the same positions tomorrow and we’re going to waste time. So what I’m suggesting is that we resolve this question, this issue in plenary. Everyone will be present, everyone will participate and we’ll find a solution in plenary. But in the meantime, I’m inviting, and I said this yesterday, I’m inviting you to consult each other in an attempt to find some common ground. In my head, I have a solution but for the time being, I’m waiting until everyone is in a position to hear my solution. For the time being, I’d like to promote bilateral negotiations amongst yourselves. Perhaps you’ll come up with a solution and that would be perfect. So that’s what I’m proposing. We will look at the issue of the title here in plenary in a formal meeting. Yes, please go ahead.

Russian Federation:
Thank you, we’re intrigued now, of course, but I continue to proceed from the view that the issue around the title of the convention will be discussed during informal consultations as well, informals of various composition and various in one way or another. Thank you.

Chair:
Merci beaucoup. Thank you very much. On the list, I have Iran. Rwanda, Mali, and Mexico, Iran.

Iran:
Thank you, Madam Chair. Sorry to take floor again. On the list, I think this list of articles could be negotiated in informal mode are not complete, or it is – for example, we couldn’t see preamble, as distinguished delegation of Russian Federation said, title Article 57 and many. But I would like to ask, Madam Chair, to clarify, you mentioned Article 6, Paragraph 2, means that Paragraph 1 will not be discussed or negotiated or this is agreed. I thought it is – I think it is somehow kind of take it for granted, so which Iran cannot go along with even Paragraph 1. They are in your hand, but I couldn’t capture really – digest your methodology. Thank you very much.

Chair:
Excusez-moi. I think I’m putting – being put falsely on trial, Dina B. Yesterday I read almost an hour from the beginning of the meeting, I read through the methodology and I asked the question, do you agree with this methodology? And no one reacted. No one was opposed to it. If you had said, no, we can’t go along with it, then I would have stopped. I read out the same articles. I read them. You can check on the webcast. So in point of fact, I think you need to understand at this stage of our work, we’ve already heard everyone. So what our dear colleague from Brazil… will be doing is under his umbrella leadership all of the issues that I didn’t mention, the title, the preamble, and the resolution, because there is a resolution as well that needs to be negotiated. You may have forgotten it, but I haven’t. So all of these issues will be negotiated in plenary. There are questions which are disputed and they’ll be discussed tomorrow in informals in an attempt to make some progress, and at the same time we have the title, the preamble, the resolution, which also need to be finalized. Thank God we’ve already made a great deal of progress, and so I think that we are in a position where we can conclude our negotiations on those issues here in plenary, and you’ll have all the time you need, well, at least up until Friday the 9th of August. I’m being a bit silly, but let me repeat what I said yesterday about the text. The text of the convention must be finalized this Friday. We must give it to the interpretation, translation services, to editing, so that it can be published next Monday. John may correct me, but next Monday it needs to be published as an L document. So the text of the convention needs to be published, and that’s why I’m focusing most on these issues where there’s disagreement to be discussed in informal consultations tomorrow, and then we’ll continue our work in plenary as well, and then Friday everything needs to be done. The text needs to be finalized this Friday. the text of the convention and then we have the resolution to be negotiated Monday and Tuesday. The title and the preamble will be negotiated directly in plenary with the text put up on the screen. But it’s as if this is a new text we’ve been working on it for almost two and a half years. Unfortunately yesterday and today I’ve heard the same arguments put forward again and again so even though I asked you please tell me directly what you think about the changes and if you are not happy with them if you’re not satisfied then provide a solution. Nabeed, if you come and see me tomorrow and I’m sorry I’m speaking to you informally but if you come to me and you bring me the text of a convention which is finalized with a hundred and ninety countries in agreement with you then I’d submit it immediately. I don’t have a problem with that. I’m not personally opposed to anything. I repeat that and for two and a half years everyone has had a chance to speak. I’m not giving preference to one party or another that 99 requests for the floor plus 10 multi-stakeholders. I’ve counted. I don’t think I could be more inclusive than that. Have I answered your question, Iran?

Iran:
But really I have problems with those methodology but we are in your hand. On that yesterday because I think nobody does just that at that time including me. I didn’t listen to that list carefully. But it is on your – it is – depends on you how to manage the discussions. We are in your hand. And also I would like to emphasize that we should use any opportunity, not in this week. We have also – the next week to negotiate, we are diplomats. We have experienced – we have been in these situations and we should not be disappointed that if we couldn’t reach consensus on outstanding articles means – at the first week, there is no conventions on that. But we are in your hand, Madam Chair. Thank you. We respect you and I’m talking on behalf of not to accuse anybody, including Chair. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Rwanda.

Rwanda:
Thank you, Madam Chair, for your continued efforts and resilience to ensure the successful conclusion of this convention, hopefully by the 9th August. However, among the articles to be discussed, you have omitted the mention of Article 14, if I’m not mistaken, in its entirety, which was raised yesterday by Rwanda and by several other countries today, mainly Uganda, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, Oman, Morocco, among several other countries who are requesting if it could also be included among the articles. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Chair:
Yes. That article will first be discussed amongst you in informal consultations so that you can try to find solutions. And then please see the Vice Chair, the representative of Nigeria. to share the solution that you have found, so this is what we’re calling bilateral consultation. So you’ll see with your colleagues, those who are in agreement, that’s already good, so now you need to speak to those who disagree with regard to Article 14. That’s the dilemma right now. The Article 14 was proposed after a lengthy process, so it is now up to you to hold these discussions and consultations, but we’re at the point where you need to make the effort with other delegations to reach agreement to see if they agree to accept your proposals and then come to you, the vice chair, with the solution that you found. And then, of course, we will come back to it in plenary to discuss what is arrived at. We will, of course, still have Thursday, Friday, to go through the text in its entirety. That’s a given. So you have several days still to negotiate. Thank you. Mali has the floor. Do I have the microphone?

Mali:
Yes. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. My delegation would like to begin by thanking you for all the efforts that you and your team have made to arrive at this draft convention. We would like to express our solidarity in supporting the statement of the African Group regarding the transfer of technologies and capacity building as developing countries. And as far as we are concerned, everyone must have the same legal, technological and human resources means in order to effectively and uniformly fight these types of crimes. In addition, when it comes to your methodology, which involves skipping the title and preambular while adopting terminology that’s contained in the title is a cause for concern for my delegation. I believe that first we need to agree on the essentials, which is the title of the convention and the preambular part, before getting into the details because those details are inextricably linked to the title. Thank you very much.

Chair:
Thank you. Dear colleagues, can you take it upon yourselves to negotiate the title of the convention, perhaps with Iran and Russia, to see who agrees with the title? Perhaps we could make some progress in that way as well. Vous acceptez? Do you accept that proposal? Merci beaucoup. Thank you very much, dear colleague. So I’m putting you in charge of finding a solution for the title. Thank you. But I’m sure that he’ll be able to succeed in finding a solution. You may laugh, but I’m convinced he will. Mexico.

Mexico:
Thank you, Madam Chairman. Just for clarification purposes on your methodology, my delegation fully understands your approach, but I’m just taking advantage of your generosity in this Q&A session that we are having now. And I’m seeking a clarification from you. When would we be going in depth on the issue of ratifications? Today, yesterday, today, and yesterday, we had some divergent views on this issue. And I would recall that at the last session, we did not have an opportunity to address this issue in depth. So I’m turning to you for guidance. When can we take this issue up? Thank you.

Chair:
The ratification threshold is part of what we refer to as the final provision, so we will be looking at those in plenary. And I repeat to make sure that it’s clear, and I think that the Secretary will also send this to you in writing, so it’s really clear. Other than the questions that I listed and that I already listed yesterday, which will be considered during informal consultations tomorrow, led by our VAES chair, the representative of Brazil, all the other provisions will be considered here. What I proposed yesterday and read out yesterday was that we do an initial reading, article by article, of the points that I considered. And I’m surely wrong, but what seemed to me to be something that could be quickly adopted here in plenary with the presence of the vice chairs, the facilitators for certain parts of the text, and then we would review the text in its entirety after informal consultations are held tomorrow, we would go back here and go through the whole text from beginning to end, including the title, the preamble, and everything else in the documents. Because once again, we must conclude by Friday night. So I confirm that the ratification threshold is part of the final provisions, and that will be considered here in plenary. I want to reassure you, I did start with that, but I don’t seem to be succeeding in reassuring you. That’s terrible. you that we’re not going to leave any of these matters aside. We’re going to go through the convention article by article, paragraph by paragraph. We are going to look at, review everything, including the title. Of course we need a title. I’ve had 42 years in this career, and it seems that people think I just started yesterday. I’m well aware that we need to look at the title. We need a comprehensive, finalized text. So again, the matters I listed will be looked at during informal consultations. Everything else will be discussed in plenary. Is that clear now? Is everyone on the same page? Excellent. Very well. The Secretariat is indicating to me that the methodology has been published and has been available on the website since July 15th, so you have some time. You’ve already had some time to familiarize yourself with the methodology. Let’s not waste any more time. Pakistan, you have the floor.

Pakistan:
Thank you very much, Madam Chair, for giving the floor. Madam Chair, with regard to Article 1C, we recall that I presented this proposal in the fifth session, and then in the last session we correctly recalled that African – South Africa on behalf of African group also presented the inclusion of transfer of technology, so we would like to reiterate and add our name into that. And Madam Chair, agreeing with your methodology, the way you want to take us further, just one thing. You have highlighted several articles which is to be included for tomorrow in the informal negotiations. Madam Chair, two more articles, Article 14 and 16, although you have already indicated that this is to be discussed amongst them. But what we feel that those are also very divergent, have very divergent views from Member States. So we would like you to consider incorporating those articles also in the informal negotiation tomorrow. Reason being, we have some very key articles in the informal negotiation, and we feel that when we move back to plenary to further streamline, I agree, as you mentioned, paragraph by paragraph, those two articles should not hinder our moving forward or reaching consensus. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Chair:
Thank you. I’m not in your hands as usual, but I’m convinced that this will prevent informal consultations from moving forward. I do believe that these kind of issues are better to consider altogether here, because there are other delegations that don’t necessarily have enough delegates to be in both places at once to follow the progression of the text and various developments. So honestly, I ask you to trust what we decided on yesterday, namely that the issues I listed will be considered during informal consultations tomorrow, and then we’ll come back here in plenary format to look at everything that hasn’t been finalized at the informal level. I think with the experience that we’ve had since the start of the process, leaving these two articles or paragraphs to informals will not lead to any progress at all. Perhaps if we make more progress on other issues… there will be greater willingness to accept compromises in Article 14 and 16, unless everyone agrees to consider 14 and 16 tomorrow, in which case I wish you good luck. No, no. No, I see that’s not the case. Very well. Can we move on then? Article 2. Article 2, as you are aware, is use of terms. Perhaps we can give some more time to the facilitators, after having heard those of you who wish to take the floor. Russian Federation, I have Russia, Yemen, Vietnam.

Russian Federation:
Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, Madam Chair. You, in fact, anticipated my reaction on Article 2. We just proposed changing the definition of certain terms, namely supplier of services, and proposed bringing back paragraph 2. In addition, given that we don’t have a final solution regarding the title of the convention, given the importance of Article 1’s statement of Persian… And we would like to reserve the position of the Russian Federation regarding the term used there in all three paragraphs, namely cybercrime. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Russia Yemen.

Yemen:
Thank you, Madam Chair. We shared our observations this morning, and we have sent them in writing. And we have said the following regarding paragraph C in Article 2 on use of terms. We have said that the terms here contain both a legal aspect – they have a legal aspect and they have a technical aspect. But we need to be very precise and clear with the terminology that we adopt. For example, serious crimes or serious offenses. We have indicated that terminology can vary from one country to another, which is why at the end of the paragraph we need to add in accordance with the duration mentioned in national legislation, which is required to make the offense a serious offense.

Vietnam:
Thank you, Madam Chair. Regarding Article 2 in our statement yesterday, we mentioned a preference to have some amendment regarding to definition of service providers, and also the possibility of having subparagraph 2 back into the text. But we are happy to discuss with our colleagues in the informal context. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Chair:
Thank you very much. Rwanda, please.

Rwanda:
Thank you, Madam Chair. Regarding Article 2 on the definition of terms, serious crimes, given the nature of the Convention, we think the definition of the word serious crime has been given a wider threshold by defining it as serious crime shall mean conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty. So to us, giving it the minimum of four years, we find actually it’s not a serious crime. So we propose that if serious would be limited to international and transnational organized crimes or even go further to cross-border crimes, that would be sufficient. But four years, it means we are going to deal with all issues which would not be possible for an international Convention as this. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Chair:
Thank you, Rwanda. Iran.

Iran:
Thank you, Madam Chair. Of course, we have some views on the terms, but for sake of the compromise, I will not raise them, but three important issues. First, the definition of children moved to Article 14. I have read your explanations on this issue and the reasons, but I think the context of this Convention is different with the Convention on Protection of the Child and also the Protocol. We prefer to have the definition in the terms, but it’s not a big deal. It is our own definition of regional economic integration organization. We would like to ask to be removed. First, it is only defined one organization in the world. Secondly, only in the past practice, yes, we have in UNTUC, but here we’ll exclude many organizations. It’s not the definition of regional organization. If we want to have this definition, maybe we can only take out economic integration from the definition and also amend the whole text to take out economic integration from that terminology, because I think it is EU only. And on emergency, we have looked at the definitions of emergency in the UN documents. We would like to propose, it is coming from, I have forgotten the reference of that, to add at the end of this paragraph, or digital infrastructure of information system that requires urgent action. There are many examples we could raise on this issue, and also emergency should include infrastructure, digital infrastructure, as I read it. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Chair:
Merci beaucoup. Thank you. Paraguay, followed by Mauritania.

Paraguay:
Thank you, Madam Chairman. This is the first time I’m taking the floor today. I wanted to take advantage of that, and in 2011, today was declared by the General Assembly as the International Day of Friendship. So perhaps we can work in the friendly spirit of the day to arrive at a consensus. Having said that, I’d like to say that in our statements we have… made specific proposals and we said in point of fact that we agreed with the majority of the convention. We had a proposal in Article 2, the definition of service provider. Our suggestion would be, and I would emphasize suggestion, is that perhaps we would include individuals or natural persons because as the definition of service providers reads here, we’re referring to natural or physical persons when we say service provider and Article 27 makes that distinction. It makes the distinction between service providers and persons. So the service provider as it’s drafted in this article would not include physical persons and then I think that will leave us with a legal loophole. If you look at 23, 26, 29, if the service provider who in fact can be a physical person, then there’s a loophole. That’s why we emphasize that point in this article. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you. Thank you. That was indeed a very friendly, I thank you, Martina followed by Pakistan.

Mauritania:
Thank you, Madam Chair. I have a comment or observation regarding the definition of serious crime. Subparagraph H. This was copied over from the UNTUC convention on transnational organized crime. However, there was an addition made. which is not clear, which is a offense punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty. When we say maximum, the term maximum is not something that appears in the definition contained in the UNTOC convention. Rather, we should be referring to a minimum deprivation of liberty rather than maximum so that we can ensure harmony between these two definitions. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you, Mauritania, Pakistan.

Pakistan:
Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Madam Chair, yesterday we indicated that our preference to define children, whether it is given in Article 2 or if you would like to discuss it later in Article 14, should correspond to the definition which is mentioned in CRC. So we are flexible in that. If you do not wish to propose it over here, we can have it in Article 14. And there is no need to define emergency here when it is only used in Article 41 once in the entire text. Paragraph 3 and subparagraph D, which talks about sharing of electronic evidence to avoid any emergency. Now the definition of emergency is also restricted. But again, for the sake of compromise and to help you, we may live up with the definition of emergency if its scope is extended on the lines and the proposal made by a distinguished delegate of Iran. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Chair:
Thank you, Pakistan. I see that further negotiations are required, so I will ask our dear colleague, the Counselor for the South African Mission in Vienna, to accept continuing her good offices because it was her who facilitated negotiations on Article 2. Of course, discussions need to be have around paragraphs that are still outstanding. We won’t go back to anything that has been agreed ad ref. So Madam Counselor for the permanent mission of the South African Mission in Vienna, thank you for accepting to continue your good offices on Article 2 for paragraphs that are still outstanding. If there are no further statements regarding Article 2, then we can move on to Articles 7 through 13 regarding offenses against confidentiality, the integrity, and availability of an ICT system and or electronic data, and ICT system-related forgery, theft, or fraud. The offenses under Articles 7 to 13 have largely been retained. Also, the compromise to use the wording dishonest or criminal intent for the intent requirement of Articles 7, 8, and 12 of the Convention has also been retained. This language accommodates the specificities of domestic legal systems that employ different terms for search-specified intent requirements. Additionally, in the last sentence of Article 3 of the updated text of the Convention on ICT-related theft or fraud, the term criminal intent has not been included as expressed by some Member States during the concluding session amending the intent requirement of this provision with the expression criminal intent could risk an unintended expansion of the scope of the article, which by its very nature as a fraud provision inherently requires fraudulent or dishonest intent. Moreover, the scope of this provision, which is mandatory, has been considerably extended through the inclusion of paragraph C. I propose we continue with our consideration of each pending provision. Article 7, paragraph 2, Article 8, paragraph 2, Article 12, paragraph 2, and Article 13 where only the last sentence is pending as I just mentioned. Can we accept the text that is displayed on the screen? Are there any Can we accept this ad ref? At the very least, we can make some progress on one or two articles. That would be excellent. So we have the United States and Pakistan, United States. Microphone for the United States, please.

United States:
Yes, thank you very much, Madam Chair. With respect to the language in paragraph 2, we did hear the discussion from the last session about countries mentioning the need to include or criminal intent. But for us, our primary concern is that dishonest is also a type of criminal intent. We think there might be some punctuation that could be added, so minimal technical edits to make the language clearer that may help to address the issues of both the proponents and the opponents of the addition to the paragraph. And if Madam Chair would give me one moment to pull up the specific punctuation edits, I will propose that. Or I can send it up to the Secretary if that would be easier. If that’s your preference, Madam Chair, then I will send it up to the Secretary.

Chair:
No, it’s fine if you can read it out here as well so that everyone can hear it. I can also give you time to reflect on what you’re going to read out, because I see that you want to make certain that you read it out correctly. Le Pakistan. Pakistan.

Pakistan:
Thank you, Madam Chair. Madam Chair, with regard to paragraph 2, contrary to the previous speaker, we believe otherwise. We think that addition of the term or other dishonest is redundant, and at the same time we must call the criminal intent, and that is specifically mentioned in the text. So we would ideally like it to read with the intent of obtaining electronic data or criminal intent. That would be clear, otherwise we feel that it is also redundant because certain different types of terminology depicting the same meaning is added and it is repetitive. My colleague from U.S. also spoke about this, that they said that dishonest intent is also a criminal intent, so for the sake of having further clarity, and for the same reason, we prefer to keep criminal intent as it is reflected in the draft and remove all other dishonest as mentioned in paragraph 2. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Chair:
Thank you, the United States.

United States:
Thank you, Madam Chair, and I appreciate the additional time. So the punctuation would be, in paragraph, article 7, paragraph 2, a state party may require that the offense be committed by infringing security measures. semicolon, with the intent of obtaining electronic data, comma, or other dishonest or criminal intent, semicolon, and then the rest of the paragraph, or in relation to an information and communications technology system that is connected to another information and communications technology system. And with these technical edits, with the semicolons and the commas, as I just described, we think it would add clarity to the language, and also serve as a bridge to the proponents and the opponents of the addition of, or criminal intent.

Chair:
Très bien. Very well. Okay, so there are only comments on Article 7, Paragraph 2, then. Article 8, Paragraph 2. Article 12, Paragraph 2, and Article 13 at the end, those are all acceptable? Bien, alors. Very well. I see there’s no reaction. May we take it that Article 8, Paragraph 2, Article 12, Paragraph 2, and Article 13, with only the last sentences pending, are acceptable? U.S., please.

United States:
Thank you, Madam Chair. In fact, in Paragraph 8-2, we would just add, for the sake of clarity again, with dishonest or other criminal intent. As we’ve explained in this session and in the prior session, we believe dishonest is a type of criminal intent. So just for the clarification, and again, to address the concerns by those member states who have expressed that they may not have dishonest as a criminal intent in their systems, to acknowledge that difference and to bridge the gap, we would like to add dishonest or other criminal intent for the purpose of trying to reach consensus in paragraph 2 in Article 8.

Chair:
What does the Committee think about this proposal? Can we accept it? Article 8, paragraph 2, the Representative of the United States has just read out a clarification. U.S. Representative, can you re-read your proposal?

United States:
Yes, Madam Chair. For Article 8, paragraph 2, it would be to add, so it would start, a state party may require that the offense be committed with dishonest or other criminal intent. So the only proposal is to add the word other before criminal intent in paragraph 2.

Chair:
Looks good. I don’t see any reaction. Can we go along with the addition of this word? Very well. The word other. That’s wonderful. We’re making progress. Yemen. Yemen.

Yemen:
Thank you, Madam Chairperson. In this paragraph number 2 of Article 7, or paragraph 2 of Article 8, all are concerning the dishonest intent or criminal intent. intent. In the law, we’re only talking about the will. If there is a criminal intent, a real will to commit the crime, then there is no need to add others. Thank you.

Chair:
Yemen, could you please find a solution with the United States? We’ve heard the proposal from the U.S. representative, and you have another proposal, so perhaps you can get in touch with the U.S. and you will find a solution, and then you will bring it to us. Thank you.

Yemen:
No problem, Madam Chair, because we’re talking about a pure legal matter, and the criminal intent is related to the will.

Chair:
It’s the issue of the word other? Do you have any suggestions?

Yemen:
We don’t need the dishonest terminology. It’s enough to just say criminal intent in both Paragraph 2 of Article 7 and Paragraph 2 of Article 8. It’s enough to mention criminal intent because it carries all what is needed, dishonesty and a will. There is no problem whatsoever. It’s just an added terminology. It’s a repeated term.

Chair:
So for the time being, we’ll leave the paragraph as it stands. Pakistan.

Pakistan:
Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and apologies for taking the floor again. A moment back, what the distinguished delegate of Yemen mentioned, we were also, in fact, trying to say the same thing, that we are repeating terms and criminal intent is the actual verdict if this could be mentioned. This would also cover dishonest or other intent, which falls within the criminal intent. So for the sake of clarity, we propose to remove dishonest or other dishonest or dishonest and just leave the criminal intent. Thank you very much for that.

Chair:
Very well. Yemen and Pakistan, please discuss this matter with the U.S. representatives. You’ll find a solution. You’ll bring it back to us in the plenary. And if anyone else has anything else to add, you are entrusted with finding a solution and to bring it forward to us. Jamaica.

Jamaica:
Thank you, Madam Chair. Although you just indicated that we should have small group discussions, but my concern is if you remove dishonest intent and you leave criminal intent by itself in the subparagraph, it would be redundant, because if you look at the chapeau, it does speak to an intention, which is a criminal intent. And I think the import of paragraph two is that some delegations or some jurisdictions may want an added mens rea. And so I think by including dishonest there or criminal intent is useful. And if what the distinguished delegate of the United States of America has said would clarify that when you see dishonest intent, by putting other there or putting punctuations, you would clarify that dishonest is also a form of criminal intent, then I think it could improve on the text. I would just ask for us to be able to see it very clearly with the punctuations and then be able to give a further response. Thank you.

Chair:
I assure you it’s not a question of reopening negotiations when a country makes a specific proposal as the US has just done. It’s a question of asking those who have made comments to then work with the country that has made a proposal to seek a clarification to better understand why the word other in this case has been added. So when you come back to the plenary either we’re going to have the word other or there won’t be any other additions. We’re not going to reopen negotiations. That’s not what I’m asking you to do. I’m not asking you to debate yet again. It’s just a question of discussing with the proposing country and to ask for a clarification so that you can better understand why the proposal has been made and if the country comes back to us and says everyone’s in agreement to add the word other, fine, or there’s disagreement and then we’ll decide together. Do you understand? It’s just a way of moving forward. I wanted to make that quite clear. Every time I ask a country with comments to approach the author of the proposal it’s with the purpose of negotiating in small groups so as to determine whether or not the country with concerns has made a proposal that understands why a given word or a proposed change has been made. Otherwise we’ll be coming back here and we’re going to be reviewing the entire text section by section. We’re not going to come back to all of these paragraphs. We’re going to come back to the whole text on Thursday. I hope that’s clear. All right, let’s move on. Paragraph 2 of Article 12, can we accept that? Article 12, paragraph 2, that’s still pending. Very well, no reactions, fine. Secretary, please make a note of that. Agreed. Oh, sorry, Yemen.

Yemen:
It’s the same problem, Madam Chairperson. A state party may require an intent to defraud or a similar dishonest or criminal intent before criminal liability attaches. When we say a criminal intent before, so it’s a prior intent, is enough. The dishonest intent is an addition. It’s a repeated term. So we suggest that we remove dishonest intent because we are talking about a criminal intent and it’s a precondition to have a dishonest intent. So there is no need to add it. I hope this clarifies my idea. So delete or dishonest intent. If we keep it, it is not going to pose any problem. However, legally speaking, it’s more than enough to have criminal intent. Having a prior criminal intent is enough. The word dishonest is not needed. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan:
As the Article 12, the first paragraph mentions that intentionally, as it’s the same in Article 7 and 8, the word intentionally, then we don’t need the second paragraph, because we don’t need to disseminate the intent, dishonest or criminal, because it’s already mentioned intentionally in the first paragraph of the mentioned articles.

Chair:
What do you think of that? Let me remind you, this proposal to repeat comes from the Member States, so what does the Committee think? Can we move forward? Have you had time to digest this? I see no reaction, so I take it that the Committee is prepared to approve or agree Ad Ref Article 12, Paragraph 2, is that right? We’ll retain this redundancy, it’s all right? All right. Very well. Secretary, please, Pakistan.

Pakistan:
Thank you, Madam Chair. Madam Chair, with regard to this Paragraph 2, it has the same issue as the Distinguished Delegate of Yemen mentioned, so since you have tasked us to consult amongst ourselves a Distinguished Delegate of U.S., my delegation and Yemen, so I think one solution which could be found out after the discussion would apply to all these three articles and Paragraph 2. So with your indulgence, we request you to This paragraph could also be put within the domain of same discussion, and we can come back to you with the solution. Thank you very much.

Chair:
With great pleasure, and please take Azerbaijan along with you, Azerbaijan will join the small group. Azerbaijan, you’re going to join the small group for consulting purposes on the issue of dishonest. Angola, please. Very well. The United States is going to end up bringing along the entire committee. Vietnam, please.

Vietnam:
Thank you, Chair. We wanted to join this group, too, because we feel like it’s a different way that criminal law works in the civil system and the common law system. So we will hope to have clarities on this. Thank you, Chair.

Chair:
Very well. That’s great. Perfect. Since there’s no agreement yet, we’ll await the results of the small group consultations on that section. Let’s move on now to Article 14 and Article 16. But Article 14, 15, and 16, our dear Vice Chair is the one who carried out consultations on these issues. and has agreed to listen to your comments in an attempt to find a solution that everyone can go along with. We’re very close despite diverging views. I think that on these three articles, we’re very, very close to finding a solution. To be honest, what I felt is that there is great concern about the subject. So everyone wants to be absolutely certain, and that’s fully understandable. Everyone wants to be absolutely certain that we adopt the right wording because we’re speaking about children, and this is a matter of enormous concern, in particular when it comes to cybercrime. So my dear friend, George Maria, Articles 14, 15, and 16. You will carry out consultations, so you’ll approach the Vice-Chair, and together we’ll find a solution, hopefully, to all these three articles. Article 17. Secretary, can you put Article 17 on the screen, please? Laundering of proceeds of crime. And there are only lines A and B of paragraph 2 that are still suspended. The modification that was brought to line A in order to clarify its field of application by replacing included in the main violations by conferring the character of the main violation. I also remind you that there is another interpretation on Article 17 which specifies that within the framework of the Convention a violation cannot be considered as such. Apologies, apologies. It’s five to six, the meeting’s not over, interpreters. In passing, I’d like to thank you because we’re not easy to follow. So Article 17, laundering of proceeds of crime, there’s just subparagraphs A and B of paragraph 2 which are pending. And I was just explaining that the amendment made in subparagraph A to clarify its scope by replacing include at the end of the sentence include as predicate offense with establish as predicate offense. In addition, an interpretive note on Article 17 clarifies that in the framework of this Convention, an offense shall only be deemed an offense under Article 17 when the predicate offense is an offense established in accordance with Article 7 to 16 of the Convention. Is that clearer? I hope this amendment is clearer. May I take it that the committee agrees to paragraph 2 of Article 17 as contained in the updated draft? Please. Let’s accept just one, it will encourage us for tomorrow and the days to come. Otherwise, it’s too depressing. All right, is that good?