(2nd meeting) Reconvened concluding session of the Ad Hoc Committee to Elaborate a Comprehensive International Convention on Countering the Use of Information and Communications Technologies for Criminal Purposes

Member states debate key issues in proposed UN convention on cybercrime

During the session, Member States engaged in rigorous discussions on the draft text of the proposed United Nations Convention on Countering the Use of Information and Communication Technologies for Criminal Purposes. The Chair expressed appreciation for the collective efforts and the progress made, while acknowledging that some divergence remained on key issues.

Many delegations advocated for a succinct title, suggesting “United Nations Convention Against Cybercrime” for clarity and to avoid ambiguity in defining the scope of the convention. Concerns were raised about the implications and placement of Article 4, which addresses offences established in accordance with other international instruments.

There was robust support for maintaining strong protections within the Convention, with Article 6, particularly paragraph 2, being a focal point. Delegates emphasised the importance of human rights safeguards, with some proposing the removal of the listing of specific rights to achieve consensus.

The criminalisation chapter, particularly Articles 14 and 16, which focus on the abuse and sexual exploitation of children, was at the centre of the discussion. Delegates recognised the need to protect children while respecting cultural and legal differences.

Provisions covered in Articles 23, 35, and 40, which pertain to procedural measures, conditions, safeguards, and grounds for refusal of mutual legal assistance, were debated. Some delegations opposed the expansion of human rights as a ground for refusing cooperation, while others supported the inclusion of political offences as a ground for refusal.

The proposal to initiate immediate negotiations on additional protocols to the Convention was met with mixed reactions. Some Member States advocated for focusing on the ratification and implementation of the main instrument before embarking on new negotiations.

Mexico’s proposal to set the threshold for the Convention’s entry into force at 60 state parties garnered support from several delegations, who argued for a more inclusive process and a higher ratification threshold to reflect a broader consensus.

The session demonstrated a strong willingness among the Member States to work towards a consensus on the Convention. The Chair encouraged bilateral consultations to address the outstanding issues and proposed that discussions continue the following day, with the aim of finalising the text.

European Union:
We do not underestimate how difficult your task has been. Although this tax can still be improved, the EU and its Member States acknowledge that it implies significant concessions to be made by all sides to reach the appropriate balance between an ambitious scope for international cooperation, extensive procedural powers, and the human rights safeguards. The EU and its Member States continue firmly believing that this framework can only be truly effective and universal if it includes appropriate human rights and procedural safeguards. States will cooperate with other states if they can trust them because they have also committed, through this Convention, to respecting certain minimum safeguards. What is more, many states, such as the EU Member States, will only be able to cooperate at the international level if the Convention includes those safeguards. We believe your draft text strikes therefore a very delicate balance to secure consensus between the scope of the Convention and the safeguards it contains. Consequently, the EU and its Member States consider that any attempt to weaken the set of safeguards which have been included in the revised, updated draft will necessarily require reopening the discussion on the scope, notably for the exchange of electronic evidence. That would bring us back to a first stage of our negotiations and would risk making it impossible to successfully conclude this long journey on which we have all embarked two and a half years ago. More specifically, and also in response to some points made by some distinguished delegates, I would like to mention the following points which are, of course, without prejudice to further comment our reactions. First of all, regarding the title of the Convention, we need to ensure that it accurately captures the object and purpose of the future Convention. In this regard, as also stressed by several other delegations, we believe that the current formulation does not achieve yet this goal. Cybercrime is the globally accepted term to address the criminal conduct encompassed by the UN Convention, which has been widely used by the international community and practitioners for decades. On Article 6, Paragraph 2, Madam Chair, you have eloquently explained in your oral and written explanations why it is necessary and how it is directly connected with the ambitious scope of the current draft of the Convention regarding electronic evidence exchange. As you have rightly noted, Paragraph 2 contains a non-exhaustive list of rights considered to be particularly susceptible to violations by measures aimed at countering cybercrime. By listing them, Article 6, Paragraph 2 provides essential assurances to many, such as the EU and its member states. Consequently, the EU considers that its deletion from the draft would require restricting the scope of international cooperation and electronic evidence sharing much further. Regarding Articles 14 to 16, the EU and its member states are supportive of the draft text and urge for caution in reopening the text of these provisions, considering the significant amount of difficult discussions taking place during the negotiations. The exceptions in Article 14 are bare minimum requirements to avoid the over-criminalization of certain legitimate conduct involving children. There is absolutely no way for the EU and its member states to be able to join a convention by which they would have to criminalize behaviors which are considered as perfectly legitimate in our countries. A UN convention can only criminalize behaviors which are universally considered as criminal. Furthermore, the protection of children from over-criminalization is an objective which is well recognized also by UN bodies. On Article 24, Paragraph 2, which mentions in a non-exhaustive manner minimum procedural safeguards that are universally accepted, such as judicial or other independent review, and the right to an effective remedy. This right to an effective remedy is a universally recognized one by virtue of the Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly. It is therefore logical that a UN instrument to be adopted by the UN General Assembly explicitly mention this right which is inextricably linked to the application of criminal procedural powers. On Article 40, Paragraph 21, the EU and its member states can support the proposal from Costa Rica. Finally, regarding the relevant paragraph of the draft resolution dealing with the immediate negotiation of an additional protocol, we have noted and we can share the concerns expressed in this regard by other distinguished delegates from states such as Lebanon, Cote d’Ivoire, CARICOM, Ecuador, and Colombia, to name a few. Madam Chair, the EU and its member states will continue to negotiate constructively and in good faith to ensure a convention that creates an effective and universal framework for international cooperation to fight cybercrime. Thank you, Madam Chair.

India:
Thank you, Madam Chair. We would like to convey our deepest appreciation and gratitude to you and your team for your diligent efforts and persistence in leading this convention over the past two and a half years. We greatly appreciate the extensive consultations you have facilitated with all the member states, at the end of which you have come out with an updated draft text which is based on the discussions and the feedbacks that you received. Now, Madam Chair, we have carefully examined the revised draft and the written explanations. We believe that the revised draft incorporates several essential elements that enhance the convention’s effectiveness and countering the use of ICT for criminal purposes. However, we also believe that there is room for further strengthening international cooperation by facilitating practical operational aspects between the law enforcement agencies, promoting capacity-building measures, and minimizing challenges to the inter-agency cooperation. So, Madam Chair, to this end, we will reiterate some of the concerns that we have on the present draft. In Article 24, we believe Clause 2 includes certain phrases such as grounds justifying applications, independent review mechanisms that are quite ambiguous and are not very well understood and defined by the nation states. In Article 24, we also believe that Article 24 Clause 3 appears to have no relevance. In Article 35, we believe that the word prevention should be added in Para 1a before the word investigation, thus making Para 1a read as follows, the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of, and it follows them. Similarly, in Para 1c, the last sentence in force at the time of adoption of this convention, this may be deleted as it has no added value and the words, I quote, states are party to, unquote. This may be added to bring clarity. We still hold reservations on Para 22 of Article 40 as it intends to limit the scope of international cooperation through MLAT, which does not even exist in the present MLAT treaties. On Article 42, we believe that the deletion of Para 5 is important as the principles of dual criminality as per the legal conventions are generally used in cases of extradition only. However, we are concerned that this clause can be used to refuse even basic request of preservation and can act as a roadblock to achieve the objectives of this convention. Also, Para 6 mentions about Article 40, Para 22, which we have already objected to. On the issue of human rights, India has always supported human rights and its related provisions. We, however, believe that Article 6, Para 1 is sufficient to cater to the requirements of protections of human rights. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Chair:
Thank you, India. Mexico, por favor.

Mexico:
Thank you, Madam Chair. Since this is the first time that the Mexican delegation is taking the floor, allow us to express to you our thanks for your support and leadership as Chair of the Ad Hoc Committee. Our congratulations are also extended to your team and to the Secretariat. We’d like to take this opportunity to also extend greetings to delegations at this renewed session. Mexico expresses its general support for the text and we applaud its delicate balance, the result of long sessions of negotiation. My delegation believes that we are very close to finding a consensus, although we do recognize that there are still areas where we need to concentrate our efforts. Therefore, Mexico would like to make the following comments with regard to Article 6 relating to respect for human rights. Mexico believes it’s fundamental that this be included in the treaty without any changes or additional changes made to those that have previously been made. My delegation believes that this provision is a minimum compromise that is acceptable. Also, Mexico is open to adding to the safeguards for human rights, but we’re not open to any changes that would take us back. With regard to the possibility to prepare additional protocols in the agreed deadlines, Mexico continues to be concerned about this option because this represents a considerable risk that would create uncertainty and difficulties for the optimal entry into force and possible application of the instrument. Although additional protocols may be available in the future, this depends on the progressive development of law, and it should be recognized that the domestic internal proceedings of each country are different, and in some cases they are very complex. In this regard, my delegation believes it’s too early in the day to discuss this possibility at this time, given that there are differences of opinion as to the scope of the convention, which means that it will not be possible to have an additional text explaining the safeguards that would apply to the protocols. Also, Mexico does not agree with the limit for ratifications of 40 countries. There are some countries that would like to see a lower number and others that would like to increase the number. And we see that we have adopted the position of 40 ratifications. However, this does not currently reflect the willingness of the membership. Let us recall that at the last plenary session that we had a few months ago, 62 countries supported increasing the threshold to 60 ratifications, and only 7 countries requested it to be reduced to 30, whereas 35 countries tried to maintain it at 40. These numbers reveal that almost 50% more countries wanted to increase the threshold compared with those who are attempting to reduce it or maintain it. Therefore, we’d like to ask the room, Madam Chair, how can it be that we are still at this figure of 40? We need to seriously think about this. It’s important to highlight that these figures were decided in a context where, since it was not possible to reach agreement on central issues and we weren’t able to concentrate our efforts on other aspects of the Convention, we weren’t able to have an in-depth discussion about this particular issue. We are convinced that various countries that share our same concerns did not have the time necessary to express what their wishes were with regard to this very important matter. They didn’t have time to analyze the proposal carefully. We also believe that now that the conversation on additional protocols has become a central issue, and it’s possible that we will be discussing this, the proposal to increase the threshold is more relevant than ever before. If the Conference of States parties were to adopt these protocols that would expand our collective responsibilities and determine the path followed by the Convention, would it be sufficient that this decision be taken by only two-thirds of these 40 states, in other words, 26 states or approximately 13% of the membership? To isolate the majority of the membership in this way, ignoring the particular characteristics of each jurisdiction and the difficult task of harmonizing them with the new elements of this Convention, could also lead to the regionalization of the fight against cybercrime. Madam Chair, if this Convention is to be a genuine, universal and representative exercise, its entry into force must be more in line with that vision, particularly in the light of the complexity and the extent of its commitments, the sensitivity of the subjects that we have addressed and the unprecedented nature of a Convention related to cyberspace. In this regard, Mexico will be presenting an updated version of the arguments in favor of the proposal to increase the threshold of ratifications to 60 countries and will be posting this on the official website of the Committee for consideration by all delegations. For all of these reasons, Mexico does not believe that the contents of Operative Paragraph 5 of the draft resolution is viable, which establishes the deadline for negotiating protocols. To force a negotiating schedule for the protocols without previously having identified the areas of opportunity offered by the Convention will make it difficult to respond to future needs and it will also not adequately address the particular characteristics of each region. Thank you very much.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Mexico. Indonesia to be followed by Azerbaijan.

Indonesia:
Thank you, Madam Chair, for giving me the floor. First of all, let me extend my deepest gratitude to you, Madam Chair, for your dedication and tireless efforts in guiding the Committee through this complex negotiation. We hope this session will reach a consensus on establishing the first global Convention against cybercrime. Madam Chair, I would like to comment on some updated elements you have raised in the revised draft. On Article 6, my delegation remains convinced on the value human rights provision could add to our global efforts to counter cybercrime. However, we also think it’s important not to overburden Article 6, which outlines the primary objective of the future Convention in promoting, facilitating, and enhancing international cooperation in preventing and combating cybercrime. We believe that Article 6.1 in this regard sufficiently balances the need to combat cybercrime with the protection of human rights, rendering that Article 6.2 unnecessary. The same view also applies to the provision on the safeguards in Article 24. We would like to underline that safeguard provisions should not hinder international cooperation under this Convention. We also share India’s views that certain elements in Article 24 lack clarity and are not recognized in national law of some countries. For this reason, we look forward to engaging constructively with the renewed commitment to address such issues in a collaborative manner to reach a consensus. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Chair:
Thank you very much. Azerbaijan, to be followed by Czechia.

Azerbaijan:
Madam Chair and dear colleagues, finalizing the draft of the International Convention on Countering the Use of Information and Communication Technologies for Criminal Purposes is an important step forward in the collective and confident efforts to follow digital development. The road to this point wasn’t without difficulties. All the disagreements expressed over the past years regarding creating international legal standards are a wonderful manifestation of international democracy. The world community is awaiting the creation and entry into force of this Convention, which will cover a large part of social relations in modern era. The fundamental approach and provisions to the draft Convention have been analyzed through application in practice by Azerbaijani side, which utilize them in legislative reforms. We are especially grateful that all our suggestions have been considered during this period. Azerbaijan highly appreciates the tireless work and dedication of the Committee and all participating States and multi-stakeholders. One of the main issues of the Agenda is the possibility of using the traditional definitions of existing Conventions and introducing new definitions. It is desirable that the new Convention doesn’t create an obvious conflicts with existing international documents, but harmonizes with them. More than 70 Member States have ratified the Budapest Convention and incorporated its language, including definitions, into their national laws. On the other hand, in radically changing circumstances and conditions, the creation of necessary and modern international law shouldn’t be limited by rigid constraints. We consider complementary and development provisions that respond to the new challenges refined over the past periods to be completely reasonable. We consider revising the draft’s general principles of international cooperation provision. Limiting the scope norms on the international cooperation through special emphasis on serious crimes stipulated in other UN Conventions may pose considerable challenge in applying the legal possibilities provided by the Convention. In addition to considering the criminalization of cybercrimes as important and successful, it should also be noted that the absence of listing of the crimes committed through ICT in the Convention doesn’t hinder each country’s independent internal norm-making process in this regard. We are at the final stage where the current differences in approach are no longer rigid and do not prevent the finalization of the draft Convention. Let us take advantage of this remarkable opportunity that will become the cornerstone to collective security in cyberspace. Today cybercrime is a borderless threat. Serious hopes rest on the Convention to protect public and individual interests in the new era of constant digitization, demonstrating the high value and effectiveness of collective efforts, and not serving polarization, inequality, disinformation, and neocolonialization. Our shared commitment to creating a solid framework for a better, safer world and broad international cooperation remains unchanged. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you very much. I’ll read the list and you can then check whether you’re on it or not. Czechia, Nepal, South Africa, Panama, Algeria, Vanuatu, Liechtenstein, Bangladesh, Kazakhstan, Argentina, Japan, Malaysia, Kingdom of the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Russian Federation, Norway, Georgia, Egypt, Canada, Singapore, Nicaragua, Italy, Iceland, Australia, Angola, Armenia, Dominican Republic, Pakistan, and Dominican Republic, and Pakistan, but there’s no gold medal at the end of it. Czechia, please.

Czechia:
Thank you, Madam Chair, and I think there should be a gold medal which would go to you. Well, thank you. It is very nice to see you chairing again, and as you mentioned at the beginning, it is very nice to see all the people here again. It feels like a reunion of friends. So thank you for organizing this reconvene session and giving us the opportunity to meet again. However, we wanted to finish the negotiations in February already. The Czech Republic aligns itself with the statement of the EU and wishes to add the following in its national capacity. We would like to very much thank you, Madam Chair, as well as your team and the Secretariat for the hard work you have done on the text of the convention. We understand it is very difficult to accommodate the concerns of everyone, and at the same time, we know it is not possible to accommodate everyone 100 percent. So as you have been saying from the beginning, everyone should be equally unhappy, and we believe that the text we are having in front of us makes all of us equally happy and unhappy. For the sake of time, I will limit myself to just a few points now, and we will be ready to engage in discussions in more details later. So first, to start at the beginning, the title. We appreciate the efforts to find a compromise solution on the title, especially the efforts of Brazil working on the terminology as a whole, but we do not see the current title to be the right solution. Having one version of the title with another one next to it in brackets implies that one defines the other, that they basically mean the same, which is later on confirmed, actually, in paragraph four of the preamble. But we emphasize that this is a wrong definition, as already mentioned by Colombia and others. Cybercrime is not the same as crimes committed through the ICT systems. We don’t want to go into details now, we can do it later, but the letter, ICT crimes, is a much broader term and should not be understood as the same term as cybercrime. It is not the same, one cannot be defined by the other. So we therefore hope we will be able to come to a title and terms in the convention which do not cause this contradiction, and we are convinced that the right term is cybercrime. Still on terminology, we are unhappy to see throughout the text of the convention that although the terminology has not yet been agreed upon, one version of the terms, which is the ICT systems, has been inserted into the text, including into the Paris already agreed at referendum, which might imply that they are agreed at referendum with the inserted terminology, but that is not the case. There has not been an agreement on this term among all of us. And there has not been an agreement on many other terms in Article 2. Here we echo, for example, what was said by Paraguay on the definition of service providers and the need to include physical persons as well, that needs to be changed too. Another thing is the protocol. We understand that there are issues important for some countries which are not tackled by this convention, and we completely acknowledge that some countries feel the need to discuss these issues further. At the same time, we believe that now we should agree on the convention itself in order to have a basis for cooperation in matters of fighting cybercrime. We are convinced that after we adopt the convention now, and we are really positive it will be now this time, we should all focus on its ratification. For small countries like mine and many other in the room, as was mentioned, for example, by CARICOM, Cote d’Ivoire, Ecuador, and many others, it would be difficult to engage in the negotiations of a protocol immediately following the adoption of the convention by the General Assembly, while at the same time we will have to focus on the ratification process on national level. The same people would work on the ratification, which itself is quite demanding, and the same people would have to work on the protocol. Therefore, we urge to leave the negotiations of a protocol for the conference of parties, which will be established after the convention comes into force. Otherwise, we risk the protocol negotiations to be a rather non-inclusive process because many countries will not be able to participate fully for capacity reasons. The issue of the conference of parties is also linked to another aspect of inclusivity, which is that as many states as possible should be able to participate in the drafting of the rules of procedures, terms of reference, and other documents of the COSP. If such drafting takes place only when 40 countries ratify the convention, it definitely is not an inclusive process, and as much as we may want to ratify the convention quickly, in some countries such a process takes years, and they would be denied of the possibility to participate in drafting the documents. We can therefore support the proposal by Mexico to raise the thresholds of ratifications in Article 64. Speaking about inclusivity, we very much appreciate the way you, Madam Chair, have been making this process inclusive on the basis of current modalities. We are glad to see that all the states have been enabled to participate in the negotiation process, just as multistakeholders whose opinions we very much value, as they often bring fresh ideas to our deliberations. We must take into consideration that we are now dealing with a topic which has technical and legal aspects at the same time, and not all of us are experts on all such aspects. We therefore need the views and inputs from those who deal with it in their everyday work. Such inputs are very useful and practical. We take all their opinions very seriously and are thankful for them, and very much hope that the participation of multistakeholders will continue in this spirit, not only during this session, but also after the Conference of Parties is established. Finally, we would like to thank you, Madam Chair, for the balance you have managed to establish within the current text. We believe it provides a sufficient basis for international cooperation on fighting cybercrime, while adhering to the necessary safeguards which enable international cooperation. They definitely do not hinder it. As they currently stand, for us they are the core, the minimum, without which we would not be able to ratify the Convention. We would also be supportive of other proposals going in this direction, namely currently of the proposal made by Costa Rica, and also some ideas by New Zealand. Madam Chair, as much as we are happy to see all colleagues here again, we strongly believe that this session should finally be the final one, and we should adopt the Convention by consensus. We see the current text of the Convention as a good basis for cooperation in fighting cybercrime, and also for providing capacity building, which is equally important. Therefore, we should not use these two weeks to find more obstacles in our way, but rather focus on avenues how to reach compromise, and that when we meet again it will really be a reunion of friends, not a negotiation. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Nepal followed by South Africa.

Nepal:
Thank you, Madam Chair. We extend our deepest appreciation for your exceptional efforts in drafting this historic Convention, which is on the brink of a historic consensus. We find the draft to be well balanced, and would like to draw your attention to a few areas we wish to highlight, as all other Member States. Firstly, regarding the title, we propose it to be named the UN Convention on Cybercrime. The term cybercrime has already been approved by consensus in Resolution 74, slash 173 from 2019, and we believe it adequately reflects the scope of this Convention. Second, we firmly support the inclusion of robust safeguards, as emphasised in Article 6, specifically 6.2, as drafted. We believe it is crucial to strike a balance between crime prevention and protection. In relation to Article 40, we support the grounds for refusal based on political offences, as proposed by COASTER. Lastly, concerning the additional protocol, we don’t support its inclusion. To start negotiations after a year would strain resources and impose additional burdens on developing countries, as many others have stated. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Nepal. South Africa, please.

South Africa:
Thank you, Madam Chair. On behalf of South Africa, allow me to join others in expressing our appreciation to you and your team for your tireless efforts in producing this updated draft text. We are of the view that it serves as a good basis to continue discussions and help us reach consensus on some of the outstanding provisions. We reaffirm our commitment to working with you and all delegations in this regard in order to adopt the convention via consensus. As requested, we will now provide our brief comments on some of the provisions in the updated text. Madam Chair, South Africa supports the title reflecting the mandate of this committee as reflected in the respective resolutions that established this committee. After hearing the views of other delegations in the last session, South Africa expressed its flexibility to supporting an amalgamated title. We stand ready to continue working with other delegations to find a suitable solution that will address the concerns raised. We support Article 4 as drafted and its placement under general provisions. On Article 6, Madam Chair, South Africa fully respects the importance attached to the protection of human rights, and we are in support of the manner in which it has been captured under Article 6, Paragraph 1, which we understand to be applicable to the whole convention and therefore adequate. We have remained consistent in supporting a balanced approach and thus having the single overarching article addressing human rights. With regards to Article 6.2, South Africa notes the new addition of the phrase in accordance with applicable human rights law, and we appreciate the Chair’s efforts to address the concerns of several delegations, including our own, about the proposal’s limitations and imbalance. While South Africa maintains the position that a single overarching reference suffices, we will carefully consider CARICOM’s proposal of removing the listing under Article 6.2. Madam Chair, with regards to the draft resolution, South Africa fully supports OP5 as drafted. Taking into consideration the concerns and views expressed by delegations on this matter, South Africa sees the merit of having these discussions on a draft protocol, and we therefore appreciate the clear timeframe the Chair has provided in the draft. Lastly, Madam Chair, we remain committed to working together in a constructive manner, and we will continue to express our views on the other provisions as the meeting progresses.

Chair:
Thank you very much, South Africa, for your very constructive spirit. Panama, followed by Algeria.

Panama:
Thank you. The Panamanian delegation recognizes the great efforts and time that have been invested in order to produce this latest version of the Convention. In general terms, we support the text, but we just have a few comments to make along the lines of previous delegations that spoke before us. First of all, with regard to the name of this instrument, we feel that Convention Against Cybercrime covers the purposes and the spirit and objective of the Convention. With regard to human rights and safeguards for our country, it’s very important that these be robust, and therefore we support the text of Article 6 as it stands at the moment in the latest version, as well as the contents of Article 24. We’d also like to take this opportunity to support Costa Rica’s initiative to include a heading under Article 40, which would allow member states to deny assistance when that is requested with regard to a political crime. We feel, therefore, that the content of Article 14 is quite right, because it establishes a number of actions that can be punished with regard to offenses online, and we also agree with the contents of Article 16. Future protocols are important. However, we feel at this stage we should focus on the ratification of the text of this convention and provide for sufficient implementation of it in our countries, and that’s why we are fully prepared to reach consensus on this latest version. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you very much.

Algeria:
Thank you, Madam Chair. At the outset, as we meet once again under your wise presidency, to extend our greatest appreciation and our deep gratitude to you, Madam Chair, and to the Secretariat of the Committee. You have made great efforts since the beginning of our negotiations. We would also like to thank you for the updated draft text convention, which includes a number of elements and provisions that mainly aim to reach consensus in order to adopt this convention. My delegation also embarks upon this journey full of trust in your leadership of this committee. We trust your perfect approach that is built upon the principle of non-bias and inclusivity. We believe that this time we can increase our collective efforts in order to adopt this convention that we sorely need, and this is in order to enhance international cooperation, to prevent and combat crimes committed through the use of ICTs. In addition to enhancing states’ capacities, especially developing states, in combating these crimes. At the outset, we would like to make some remarks. With regards to Article 3 on implementation, we would like to join the delegations that were supportive of maintaining the original formulation of this article. As for Article 4 on criminalized actions, in accordance with other UN conventions and protocols, we also support its inclusion as drafted in the updated draft text convention. As for Article 6 on respecting human rights, we support the formulation suggested by the Chair. As for Articles 23 and 35, we also support their inclusion as drafted in the UDTC. As for Article 5 of the resolution to be proposed to the General Assembly on a protocol for the convention, we support its inclusion. We also express our full willingness to cooperate with other delegations in order to find a consensual formulation in order to discuss other provisions that are still controversial. We call upon all delegations to abide by the spirit of flexibility and consensus, which we believe is important in negotiations in order to reach harmonious solutions that enable achieving our collective goal, which is the final adoption of this draft text convention next week. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. We assure you that you will have our continuous support. Thank you.

Vanuatu:
Thank you, Madam Chair. Firstly, please allow me to join others to congratulate you, your team, and the Secretariat for your hard work behind the scenes. Your efforts have moved us closer to finding compromise, and you have my delegation’s gratitude and support. Please allow me to turn to a couple of issues in the UDTC that are important to Vanuatu. With regard to the title, Vanuatu aligns its support with the developing majority in this room, in shortening the title to UN Convention Against Cybercrime. Regarding human rights provisions, we have listened to the concerns raised by many states in this room, as well as stakeholders who have made valuable submissions to the process. We commend you, Chair, in trying to find a constructive way forward. As such, we support the existing language in Articles 6 and 24, and would not support the weakening of the provisions. We can, however, consider supporting proposals strengthening the language, but in the interest of finding consensus, we would echo the comments of the esteemed delegate from New Zealand and reconfirm that the inclusion of strong safeguards is necessary to accept the broad scope of the draft text. New Zealand also raised an important point regarding OP5 of the draft resolution. Like other Pacific brothers, Vanuatu is also concerned about the resource expectations written in the paragraph and will consider them closely. Madam Chair, Vanuatu, like many other small island developing states, has benefited greatly from international cooperation and capacity building to detect, investigate, and prosecute cybercrime. We consider supporting such international efforts as a core goal for this convention process. We also support CARICOM’s comments on the importance of Article 35. We look forward to the discussions over the next two weeks and wish us all strength for this last leg of this long journey. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Chair:
Thank you very much. Liechtenstein.

Liechtenstein:
Thank you so much, Madam Chair. First of all, I wish to thank once again, and hopefully for the last time, you, your team, and the Secretariat for Demand’s work that went into creating the updated draft text of the convention and for its timely distribution. Liechtenstein is convinced that we have taken another big step towards a consensual convention with this draft. We are still discontent with some parts of the draft, but we recognize the great effort that has been made to include all voices in the room. For Liechtenstein, there remain some key outstanding issues. We reaffirm our commitment to address these concerns in the spirit of consensus, but I wish to quickly highlight them. With regard to the title, Liechtenstein emphasizes that we were in favor of a simple, comprehensible title containing a singular term from the outset. That means that we should be able to capture the essence of the convention in one word. The current attempt to find a middle ground, unfortunately, in our opinion, does not help clearly define the subject matter of the convention, but rather leads to some uncertainties. Is the convention now about cybercrime, meaning the crimes defined in the criminalization chapter, or is it about crimes committed through the use of ICT systems? These two things are not the same. We therefore call for the deletion of the de-bracketed part of the title and keep it at United Nations Convention Against Cybercrime. Turning to Article 4, Liechtenstein is worried about potential future implications of the article. As the article is currently drafted, the scope is vague and it can lead to some problems. Upon ratification, states might need to update or amend their existing laws to encompass Article 4. Legal and technical resources would be required to implement these changes, as the incorporation could be complex. Furthermore, differing legal definitions and interpretations of the various implementations may create inconsistencies. We also cannot estimate the future impact of such an article, as it is impossible to predict what technical developments we will face in the coming years or decades. However, with this language, we would set a precedent for all future UN conventions. We are therefore not convinced that this article is the best solution. Turning to safeguards, Liechtenstein believes that we made some progress to implement at least the minimal standards of safeguards we need in this convention. And to keep it at these minimal standards, we have to support Article 6.2 as it stands. This is a key provision for us in order to maintain the delicate balance of this text. We also support the inclusion of Article 40.22, as is suggested in the draft text. However, some elements that we have repeatedly mentioned as being essential are not included in the updated draft convention. And in this regard, I would like to support the proposal that was made by Costa Rica for Article 40.21. The idea of refusing MLA requests when they pertain to political offenses is a concept that is known to all regions of the world and has been incorporated into international law. Including this addition thus aligns the UN Cybercrime Convention with international standards and norms. We also support to move Article 40.22 to Article 35, as was suggested by New Zealand, as we did repeatedly in the past. Turning to the entry into force of the convention, we are of the opinion that a lot of states call for a higher number of ratifications of the convention to enter into force. And we believe it’s worth discussing these issues further, and we would like to support the statement by Mexico in this regard. They made very convincing arguments, and we do also support a higher number of ratifications. And finally, Madam Chair, turning to the draft resolution and its OP5, we cannot support the direct continuation of the AHC. These negotiations on the convention are already close to the capacity limit for many small states. The direct continuation of the negotiations, moreover on a topic that was already extremely controversial at these negotiations, will be a heavy burden for many delegations. We fear that many of us will not be able to attend the suggested additional meetings on a protocol, and therefore we risk losing one of the distinguished features of this AHC, the incredible wide-ranging inclusivity. And this is particularly detrimental to small countries. In the coming years, a lot of our capacities will be tied with the implementation of this convention. We therefore believe that it makes more sense to focus on setting up the office, ratifying and implementing this convention, instead of further negotiations. Thank you very much.

Chair:
Thank you very much. Bangladesh, then Kazakhstan.

Bangladesh:
Madam Chair and distinguished colleagues, good afternoon. My delegation joins other delegates in appreciating you for your leadership in the Ad Hoc Committee of this convention. While Bangladesh expresses its commitment to the core idea of the draft convention, I would like to express a few comments on the updated text which my delegation would like to raise during the finalization process of this convention. We believe that Article 6.1 suffices the expected idea and does not need further elaboration, particularly zooming in on a few of the human rights aspects. The lesser the elaboration, the better it would be for many countries to avoid contradiction in explanation. We also respect the positions of many member states to retain the paragraph 2 of Article 6, and therefore we’d like to propose to bring the relevant text of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in the Article 6.2. We oppose the central idea of Article 14.4b, that children are capable of giving consent. We believe that it contradicts the value systems of many of the member states, and hence using it in a universal document like this may be avoided. We expect the international cooperation under this convention shall not be made conditional. We also reject the idea of expanding the scope of application of Article 24 to any chapters of this convention, including the unprecedented use of conditions and safeguards as grounds for refusal in the international cooperation chapter. Madam Chair, my delegation will continue to engage with other member states to finalization of this very important convention. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Chair:
Thank you very much. Bangladesh, Kazakhstan, then Argentina.

Kazakhstan:
Madam Chair, thank you for giving me the floor. I’ll be brief. We wish to express our gratitude and appreciation for the commendable efforts your Excellency and the Secretariat have exerted throughout this extensive process. Our delegation generally supports the draft convention proposed by you and your team, including the title of the convention. We recognize that the respect for human rights and the fundamental freedoms is an essential component of the espoused convention. We support the inclusion of reference to the protection of human rights as encapsulated in both Article 5 as well as Article 24. We believe that these articles contain sufficient measures to protect human rights. We wish to assure you once more of our full support and cooperation to conclude this convention during this session. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Chair:
Thank you very much. Argentina. The microphone for Argentina please. Technicians, sound engineers, I’ve seen that you’ve given the floor to Japan but it’s Argentina’s turn in fact. So microphone for Argentina please, unless Argentina is going to give its text to Japan for Japan to read out, but I’m guessing not.

Argentina:
Thank you very much for giving me the floor, Madam Chair. Firstly, we’d like to join in with delegations that took the floor before us by thanking you for the work of the chair of the committee and also thank the secretariat as we resume this closing session of the Ad Hoc Committee. And thank you for presenting a balanced text that reflects the sensitivities expressed by delegations throughout this negotiating process. And we also extend our thanks to the delegations who with their flexibility and constructive spirit have helped to work towards this goal. We’d like to state the express support of our delegation to the work of the chair and the trust that we have in your leadership. Well, like a lot of other delegations, we may have legitimate ideas about how the text can be improved under negotiation, but we understand that since this is a text of balance apart from unexceptional points, we do have to maintain the current language. And of course, for those situations that do need further specification, you can count on the flexibility of my delegation as we move forward with these individual negotiations. I’d like to clarify in this regard that there are various specific provisions of this draft which for my country are key and must be maintained in its current wording. For example, Articles 6 and Articles 14, 16, and 24 and 35, amongst others. To make progress in basic consensus in order to come up with a text that will satisfy all delegations is a complex but necessary task. My delegation is at the disposal of the chair to continue with this difficult task, bearing in mind both the overriding importance of addressing this given current times and for us to be able to fight these offenses and properly govern our societies. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Chair:
Thank you very much. Argentina, Japan, to be followed by Malaysia.

Japan:
Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and good afternoon to all delegates. Madam Chair, I would first like to express our appreciation to your and your team’s efforts in delivering the UDTC as we see it as well balanced, trying to take the middle way, bridging as many diverse views as possible. Japan firmly believes that sufficient level of human rights safeguards are essential for the Convention to be genuinely universal and indeed to promote international cooperation between diverse jurisdictions. In this light, notably, we support the current formulation of Article 6.2 as drafted. We also support Articles 14 and 16 as drafted in the UDTC. As already noted by several member states before me, the current language of Article 14 might not be perfect, but it has been incorporated into the text after the extensive discussions and contemplations in the past negotiations at AHC, and it also stands on a delicate balance between diverse views of a number of member states. Madam Chair, the current text of Article 14 should be maintained from the perspective of moving towards the adoption of the Convention by consensus. Madam Chair, Japan sees an added value in having interpretative notes on specific points of the notes, particularly the note 7 on Articles 23 and 35 with regard to the term investigation. We see the point noted here, and for the sake of clarification, we would like to propose adding of the crime on the third line of the note 7 between the investigation and leads to stopping. As regards to title, we prefer a short title, UN Convention Against Cybercrime, as suggested by many member states that took the floor before me, since we believe the title should reflect the exact contents of the Convention succinctly, rather than taking the risk of looking to define a cybercrime in the title. In relation to the GA, Madam Chair, Japan believes that considering the anticipated additional burden on member states, particularly those with limited capacity, the resource of member states should be first and foremost given to their work required for the conclusion of the Convention. Madam Chair, Japan commits itself to continue to work hard towards a consensus at this final session together with other member states under your able leadership. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Chair:
To Japan, Malaysia, please.

Malaysia:
Thank you, Madam Chair. First and foremost, Malaysia would like to congratulate you and your team for the outstanding effort in formulating the updated draft text of the Convention, or UDTC. We view the UDTC as an improvement over previous texts, which we hope will bring us a step closer to consensus. Malaysia is pleased to state that we are generally supportive of the draft text and will outline a few proposed amendments later in our statement. However, we believe some significant issues remain, particularly concerning the title of the Convention and also the protocol, as noted by several member states. Malaysia, like many other delegations such as the Czech Republic, cannot support attempts to define cybercrime in the title of the Convention, as the wordings in the parenthesis do not accurately describe the scope of the Convention, nor is it a widely accepted definition of the term. In this regard, Malaysia concurs with a distinguished delegate from the US that the title should not define cybercrime with open-ended reference to ICT, and that cybercrime is a globally accepted term. As we have mentioned in previous AHC sessions, we reiterate Malaysia’s preference for the title UN Convention Against Cybercrime, which offers greater clarity and broader understanding. Madam Chair, Malaysia notes that Article 2.2 has been removed from the UDTC and included in the interpretative notes on specific articles of the UDTC. Malaysia notes that the interpretative notes are expected to be considered and agreed upon by the Ad Hoc Committee for subsequent inclusion in the procedural report as an annex. In light of this, Malaysia would like to echo the statement made by Mauritania in seeking clarification on the legal status of the interpretative notes. Nonetheless, Malaysia believes that Article 2.2 should be reinstated in the UDTC as it is an integral part of the draft text. Its inclusion provides Member States with the necessary flexibility when incorporating the Convention into their domestic legislations. Malaysia can support Articles 14 and 16 of the UDTC. Regarding Article 6, Malaysia notes that it mandates state parties to adhere to and be consistent with all obligations under international human rights law, which primarily consists of treaties and customary international law. This may be construed as fulfilling obligations under the ratified treaties as well as customary international law, subject to any reservations under such treaties, and it is viewed that state parties may contend that certain rules of customary international law are not binding upon them as they have persistently objected to the application of such rules upon them. It is therefore imperative to acknowledge Malaysia’s appreciation for the importance of state parties’ adherence to all obligations under international human rights law, including treaties and customary international law. Malaysia respectfully proposes the substitution of the word law at the end of the first paragraph with treaties applicable to the state parties. With regard to Article 6.2, Malaysia supports the statements made by several delegations, namely India and Indonesia, in not supporting the inclusion of Article 6.2 in the UDTC. Be that as it may, alternatively, Malaysia can also support the proposal made by CARICOM to streamline Article 6.2 by removing the listing. We agree with CARICOM’s observation that since Article 6.1 does not include such listing and the preferred approach would be that both paragraphs follow a similar approach to human rights. Malaysia would also like to respectfully propose revising the end of the paragraph of Article 6.2 to read the obligations of the state parties under the applicable international human rights treaties and their respective domestic laws. With regard to the protocol, Malaysia also supports the views expressed by many states which do not support immediate protocol negotiations as the proposed methodology for their development is considered unconventional and would impose additional burden on the resources of states. I thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you.

Chair:
Malaysia Netherlands, please.

Netherlands:
Thank you, Madam Chair. The Kingdom of the Netherlands aligns itself with the statement made by the European Union. From our national perspective, we would like to make a couple of remarks and I will try to be brief. First, we would like to express our sincere gratitude to you and your team for your limitless energy and efforts in trying to guide us towards a compromise for two and a half years now. We believe you are getting very close towards achieving that goal, combining the views of different delegations and finding the delicate balance in the current draft. It is very much appreciated, and we would like to thank you for this. We agree with other delegations that this will become a comprehensive treaty, but for a very specific type of crime, namely cybercrime. The title of the treaty should therefore accurately reflect the content of the Convention, leaving behind any ambiguity about the scope of this binding instrument. As you stated this morning, this Convention is unprecedented in its powers and procedures compared to, for example, UNTOC and UNCOC. In order for this specific Convention to work, there is a recognition needed of the implication of these powers and the effects that they can have on our citizens. For the Netherlands, it is therefore self-explanatory that this treaty provides for the necessary human rights safeguards to ensure that the powers granted to States by virtue of this treaty are exercised in accordance with their human rights obligations. Without these safeguards, we would be unable to cooperate on the basis of this Convention. We therefore very warmly welcome your proposal to Article 6 as it is, and also welcome the safeguards that have been put in place concerning criminal procedures and international cooperation as a minimum standard. Finally, we remain apprehensive about negotiating a protocol on more criminalizations right after this session. We have to be aware about the consequences of this cybercrime Convention and the amount of work we are loading onto our legal systems and the practitioners that have to work with this every day. We need a starting point to build trust first in order to elaborate our cooperation in the future. If that means that if parties feel that more criminalizations are needed, the Conference of the State Parties could discuss this further. That is why we already have the possibility for proposing additional protocols built into this draft text in Article 61, and we do not need the stringent timeline proposed in OP5 of the draft resolution. On the basis of these points, we will look forward to continue the discussions with everyone in the room and look forward to come closer to a consensus. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Chair:
Thank you very much. Kingdom, please.

United Kingdom:
Thank you, Madam Chair. Good afternoon, colleagues. Like other states, Madam Chair, I would like to begin by thanking you, your team, and the Secretariat for all of your hard work on the UDTC. We too believe that it forms a good basis for our work over the coming session. However, we believe some areas require further clarity and consistency. I’d like to offer specific comments on three such areas – the Protocol, the Safeguards, and Article 4. So, firstly, on the Protocol. To be clear, we support the possibility of future protocols to our Convention, as is provided for by Article 61. That is a standard part of any UN Convention and, as was noted by the Distinguished Delegate from Brazil earlier, makes sense given the need to ensure the instrument remains relevant as time passes. However, we do not support the inclusion of OP5 in the resolution. We share the concerns of many others with this paragraph – the immediate timing of the proposed Ad Hoc Committee sessions, the focus on one specific area – that of additional criminal offences – and the predetermining of an outcome of the discussions. In addition, we have questions about the inclusivity of the process which is mapped out when we take OP5 together with Article 57.5g on the powers of the Conference of States Parties which is new language not found in UNTOC, and Article 64 on our Convention’s entry into force. As we understand it, once the two additional Ad Hoc Committee sessions provided for under OP5 have taken place, the discussions on the Protocol would then pass to the COP for consideration at its first session. As per Article 64, and as was explained earlier by the Distinguished Delegate from Mexico, that first COP could have as few as 40 States Parties, and as per Article 57.5g, it would have the power to elaborate and adopt a Protocol. Madam Chair, it is unprecedented for a COP which constitutes a fraction of the UN membership – and I believe Mexico gave a figure on that fraction, a very small one – to adopt a Protocol to a Convention which has been agreed by all UN Member States under the auspices of the General Assembly. Moreover, giving our COP this power would potentially put a small and non-representative group of early adopters in a position to modify and then adopt the Protocol as they see fit. That is not in the spirit of inclusivity which has guided our Ad Hoc Committee deliberations to date, which you outlined so clearly in your opening remarks, Madam Chair, and which the UK has been a strong supporter of. We therefore call for the deletion of OP5, and for clarity to be added to the Convention text to ensure that whenever and however we, as UN Member States, decide to supplement our Convention, it should be in a manner that is inclusive and open to all States. Secondly, on the safeguards. Madam Chair, we are pleased to note the strengthening of the safeguards in your new text. We support the addition of Article 6.2 as drafted. However, we remain concerned that overall the safeguards fall short of establishing an adequate minimum standard that would facilitate international cooperation. Our Convention will create a framework for international cooperation, but to ensure that framework is actually used, States parties will still need to have trust and confidence in each other. To be truly effective, therefore, our Convention must be clear and unambiguous, must be consistent with existing instruments, and must adequately provide for the protection of human rights. In this regard, we support the proposal made by Costa Rica on Article 40, Paragraph 21. Madam Chair, Article 23.4 helpfully clarifies that the Article 24 safeguards should apply equally when a State is using the Chapter 4 powers domestically or to render international cooperation. However, Madam Chair, there remains a gap regarding the application of the Article 24 safeguards when States are cooperating using the procedures in Chapter 5 which are not based on the Chapter 4 powers. We have a situation where, on the one hand, Chapter 5 offers States unprecedentedly broad cooperation, both in terms of the range of measures available and the wide scope of conduct they can be applied to. On the other hand, technology has evolved rapidly since UNTOC was negotiated in the late 1990s, resulting in a blurring of the lines between what is considered traditional evidence and evidence in electronic form. But unfortunately, the safeguards do not have the corresponding breadth and flexibility limited as they are to Chapter 4 and the procedural powers. In fact, in some instances, we are not even always applying the same standards to international cooperation as we do in UNTOC. For example, Article 18 on mutual legal assistance in UNTOC requires the requesting State party to have reasonable grounds to suspect. That requirement is not reflected in our Convention. We would like to see this gap filled by clarifying that the safeguards also apply to the wider Chapter 5 measures. This could be done either through additional language in 23.4, adding to what you have provided us with, Madam Chair, or by amending the text elsewhere, for example in Article 35. Thirdly, we have questions about the intent behind, placement of, and need for Article 4. We had understood the intent to be, as you say in your explanatory notes, Madam Chair, to ensure that all offline crimes established by United Nations Conventions and Protocols are also prohibited under their domestic law if committed online. That is a position the UK supports. However, we question whether it is necessary to have this provision in such a prominent place in our Convention. We also worry about the risk that it actually undermines the intention behind it by implying that a State which is signed up to a technology-neutral UN Convention may not have criminalised the offences that Convention establishes when they are committed through the use of an ICT system. More fundamentally, Madam Chair, we are concerned about both misinterpretations and deliberate attempts to use Article 4 for other intents. tense, including to apply the international cooperation measures established in our convention wholesale to other UN conventions and protocols. In light of these ambiguities, we believe that this article requires further clarification. Finally, I’d just like to say a brief few words on Articles 14 and 16, which we strongly support the inclusion of. We recognize the considerable efforts that have gone into finding a consensus on these articles. And given the widespread support the current language seems to enjoy, we can accept them as drafted. However, we must be clear, any further changes would make them unacceptable for us. We cannot and will not agree to a convention which criminalizes our children when they are lawfully, privately, and consensually exercising their rights. Madam Chair, we stand ready to work with all delegations to find a pathway to consensus. If we can resolve the key outstanding issues, the UK very much believes we will have a landmark universal convention which will make a meaningful impact in the fight against cybercrime. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Chair:
Thank you very much. Russian Federation.

Russian Federation:
Yes, thank you very much. Thank you, Madam Chair. Before handing over to the representative of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, I’d like to make a few comments. Distinguished colleagues, Madam Chair, in her opening remarks, and also many delegations speaking earlier today, spoke to the fact that we need to strive to achieve a consensus to adopt a constructive approach and to exhibit some flexibility in our stances. Against this backdrop, the passage we heard in the statement delivered by the distinguished representative of the EU was very much at odds with the rest of the statements. He basically set ultimatums, saying that certain provisions must remain in the convention. Otherwise, we’ll have to delete other provisions. And he also alluded to the fact that some countries might actually exit this entire process. Distinguished colleagues, I stand convinced that this forum, that this august meeting, is not the place for blackmail nor ultimatums regarding the ratification threshold, which the distinguished representative of Mexico spoke about. She proposed increasing the threshold to 60 countries, giving the following rationale. The convention needs to be universal. She pointed out the threat of regionalization if the ratification threshold is too low. But if we follow that logic, absolute universalization would stand at 192 ratifications. That would amount to universal ratification. But on a more serious note, and I think everyone wants, I’m convinced that everyone wants the convention to be adopted by consensus. If the convention is adopted by consensus, it follows that delegations present in the room and their governments endorse the convention text. And then all delegations go back to their capitals with the convention text, and then they would take that convention through various domestic procedures. Now, this takes some time. In some states, it’s up to the parliaments to consider the convention. But what’s most important to underline is that if the convention is adopted by consensus, then that implies that all states are prepared to participate in implementing the convention, to implement the convention. And then the issue is technical. I mean, it’s somewhat political, because the parliaments might be involved. But it’s just about technically, in technical terms, ratifying the participation of each and every country in the convention. So then why are we going to artificially hoist up the ratification threshold if there are obviously going to be certain states which will jump through all these hoops faster than others? Why should we artificially hamper the entry into force of the convention? And I’m convinced that the convention will be adopted by consensus. Why should we slow down its entry into force? And I’d like to refer to a very relevant document for this convention. The ratification threshold there was just five states. Even if we look at the original initial pool of states which could have become members to that convention, it was roughly 50. Well, five out of 50 do the math. It’s 10%. If we follow that logic, in fact, I cannot agree with the distinguished representative of Mexico. In her statement, she spoke about calculating, doing the math. But if we do that, the absolute criteria, if we count votes, I don’t want to go into this, but an absolute criterion, the absolute criterion would be a vote. But let’s revert back to focusing on the consensus, which we all want. So if we follow the logic of this document I’m referring to, then the ratification threshold for our universal convention, and that document I’m referring to also wants to be universal, then the universal threshold should be 20 countries, 2-0. That’s if we’re talking about proportions. And the last thing I wanted to say before I hand over to the representative of the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation, Costa Rica put forward a new proposal regarding political offenses. And in the room today, we had some member states speaking to these additions to the safeguards. And they, in fact, expressed their support for Costa Rica’s proposal. But let me say this. Is there a universal criterion for political offenses? A universally agreed, at the UN level, yardstick for figuring out what is a political offense? Obviously not. In different states, the very same actions might be construed as a political offense or a criminal offense. What’s more is, in one country, the law enforcement authorities might construe certain actions as a political, apologies, as a criminal offense, whereas NGOs might deem it to be a political offense in that same country. But let’s go back to the search for consensus. We already have a very difficult situation surrounding the articles on human rights. Why would we make our job harder? Thank you very much. So I’m going to hand over to the Prosecutor General. But before I do that, Madam Chair, Secretariat members, I would like to alert you to the fact that we will be taking the floor again, as our statements are, unfortunately, quite lengthy. Thank you very much. I will now hand over to the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation. Good afternoon, Madam Chair. Good afternoon, distinguished delegates. The Russian Federation will be speaking to one of the most contentious issues, the issue of criminalization, something we’ve flagged on numerous occasions since the very beginning. In the revised, the updated draft convention, we haven’t seen included what the Russian Federation has been proposing since the very beginning of the work of the AHC. It is the criminalization of the most serious crimes, crimes committed using ICTs. And in fact, the damages from those crimes and the threats of those crimes and the consequences of spreading, they’re particularly high. These are extremist crimes, illegal trafficking in arms and narcotic drugs, and also involving young people in very dangerous offenses. This is something we spoke to many times. We propose to include these kinds of offenses committed using ICTs and to cover that in a separate article in the criminalization chapter. This is a proposal that has not been taken into consideration. We understand that some states want to take an expansive approach to criminalization. And yet, those states which are scouring the establishment of a legal framework for cooperation on such crimes are also suffering the consequences of these offenses being committed. Many states have seen a significant uptick in crimes using ICTs and feeling the colossal damages being inflicted on national economies by the commission of such offenses. And this despite the measures law enforcement is taking at the national level. The worst damage being done to individuals, governments, and societies is being done by transnational organized groups. And the actions of such criminal groups often go unpunished. This, once again, attests to the fact that it’s insufficient to take steps to counter this within any single state. We need a consistent system for countering the use of ICTs for criminal purposes. Here at the open-ended ad hoc intergovernmental committee, rather in the other working group, the open-ended working group on the security of and the use of ICTs, they’re working on this issue. They’re looking at terrorists and criminal groups. They’ve noted the ongoing rise in cyber incidents, including incidents affecting critical infrastructure. Healthcare, aviation, and the energy sector are being hard hit. It’s unclear why this issue is being ignored here. So it would appear that at the Open Ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of ICTs, they’re encountering this problem, but here at the Ad Hoc Committee, we’re acting as if there is no problem. And yet in some states, they seem to be legal levers for addressing this issue, but that’s not actually the case, because terrorist attacks prepared very swiftly, because information now spreads at the speed of light. For instance, securing financial support is something that can be done very quickly. Well, the ramifications of that are very, very dire, both for states and societies, and examples abound. Terrorist acts, for instance, there was a terrorist act committed in the March of this year targeting ordinary people, including children. I’m referring to the terrorist act that hit Crocus City Hall, Concert Hall in the city of Moscow. I’m sure you all heard about that attack. How many more vile tragedies such as this one must happen before action is taken? Let me remind you that this terrorist act was prepared. It was put together using ICTs. There is no universal legal mechanism for cooperation so as to prevent the commission of such offences. For that reason, our delegation stands convinced that the negotiating mechanism of the AHC must confront all of these challenges. We should have an expansive approach as possible so as not to exclude the commission of any offences. We should involve all law enforcement authorities across all of the world’s states to prevent and suppress such offences. We continue to be in favour of an expansive approach to criminalisation in the Convention. The only alternative is drafting an additional protocol that would criminalise the offences I mentioned. This is something that should be reflected in the GA resolution. Let me remind you once again that at previous sessions, probably starting at the very beginning when we began to discuss criminalisation, some delegations said to us that traditional offences which use ICTs have no place in this Convention. They said such offences should be covered in a supplementary protocol, a separate document. This issue remains contentious to this day. A few words about Article 35. I wanted to draw the attention of delegates to Article 35. It limits cooperation by conventions and protocols which were already in force when this Convention enters into force. In other words, different agreements that are adopted subsequently after this Convention is adopted, including the protocols to this Convention, will not be considered in collecting, obtaining, preserving and sharing of evidence. So how are we going to confront new ICT challenges as well as new offences committed using ICTs? The limitations for international cooperation contained therein are patently obvious. The Russian delegation believes that it is necessary to delete from Paragraph 2 of Chapter 5, in force at the time of the adoption of this Convention, or perhaps we could add words we could say in force at the time of the adoption of the Convention as well as subsequently or something to the effect. In other words, when we adopt protocols to this Convention or if there are any other international instruments related to the illicit use of ICTs, if they’re adopted, they can be covered. They can be used when collecting electronic evidence, evidence in electronic form. One more comment about Costa Rica’s proposal, and there were a number of delegations who endorsed that proposal, the one on political offences. The head of our delegation already referred to this issue. I’d like to add that we do not agree with including another reason for refusing to engage in international cooperation, and the distinguished delegate of Costa Rica referred to the fact that in the laws on the books of some, many states, there is this concept of political offence. Perhaps in some states there is such an offence, but in other states there is no such notion. For example, in the legislation of the Russian Federation. Please take that into account. Thank you very much.

Chair:
Thank you very much. Norway to be followed by Georgia. Norway.

Norway:
Thank you, Madam Chair. Norway will also thank you, Madam Chair, and your team and the Secretariat for your hard work up to this session and for the updated draft of the Convention. You can always count on our effort and commitment to this process. And now turning to the edits in the UTDC. We strongly support your additions in Articles 6-2, 4022, 14-2, 14-4, and Article 16 as drafted. The updated draft Convention we have before us has a broad and in a UN context unprecedented scope for collecting and sharing of electronic evidence. We are also introducing very intrusive investigative measures like real-time collection of traffic data and interception of content data. Norway has been reluctant to both have such wide scope for electronic evidence and to introduce the intrusive procedural measure. We have, however, compromised on this for the sake of consensus. We do understand that some delegations would like to widen the scope of electronic evidence and keep the intrusive procedural measure. However, this necessitates stronger safeguards in this Convention. The UTDC provides a bare minimum of safeguards if we wish to keep its wide scope and intrusive procedural measure. Norway would therefore oppose any weakening of the language in this in Articles 6, 23, 24, and 4022. We agree to the UK’s concern regarding Article 23-4 and would prefer to have Article 4022 move to Article 35. Norway would emphasize that these safeguards create trust between states and will enhance international cooperation, not hamper it. Madam Chair, Norway supports the proposal by Costa Rica concerning the inclusion of a ground for refusal of political offense in Article 40-21. Regarding your question on Article 64, Madam Chair, we have supported a higher number of ratifications before the Convention enters into force before. We support the statement made by Mexico and their proposal to increase to 60 ratifications. In addition, we support a statement made by Costa Rica, Lebanon, and many other delegations regarding the title of the Convention. In our view, the title should be kept short and concise and not defining cybercrime. When it comes to the protocol language in the draft resolution, Norway shares the same concern that was raised by several delegations. We believe that such process would be too soon and would take the focus away from the ratification process of the main Convention and delay it. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you very much. So I’ll read the list of speakers. Georgia, Egypt, Canada, Singapore, Nicaragua, Iceland, Angola, Armenia, Dominican Republic, Pakistan, Australia, Qatar, Thailand, United Republic of Tanzania, Switzerland, Turkey, Peru, Venezuela, and Iraq, and Italy, Sweden, Namibia, United States. Syria, France, Uganda, Germany, Bulgaria, Republic of Korea. Georgia.

Georgia:
Good afternoon. Thank you, Madam Chair. My delegation greatly appreciates your and your team’s outstanding efforts, which we believe will bring us to success. We are generally supportive of the UDTC. As proposed, we believe it delicately strikes a balance between widely opposing wishes of the delegations. Georgia strongly supports the conditions and human rights safeguards included in Articles 6, 23, 4, 24, 37, and 40, or elsewhere in the text. The procedures and powers in this treaty seek to introduce are unprecedented in terms of the degree of intrusiveness. Therefore, appropriate safeguards against the abuse of such powers are essential from our national perspective. Georgia wishes to briefly comment on Articles 6, 2, and 40 in light of Costa Rica’s recent initiative on possible additions. We’d like to underscore that the rights listed in Article 6, 2 are among the most vulnerable in the cyber context. Furthermore, the broader scope of the convention beyond what my delegation and many others wished for raises additional concerns in this regard. We’d like to join Costa Rica’s initiative to reintroduce political offenses as ground for refusal for international cooperation. We agree with the distinguished delegate from Costa Rica that the political offense exception is widely recognized in many jurisdictions, including in those who expressed opposition to these provisions. And also, this ground for refusal can be found in regional and international treaties. What is of significance further on this point? It is a distinct concept from discrimination-motivated prosecutions already found in Paragraph 22 and can’t be used interchangeably. Turning to Article 14, we are supportive of Paragraph 4, which addresses the concerns raised by my and other delegations about over-criminalization. Regarding the protocol and the draft resolution, while this opportunity is foreseen by the commission, at this stage, we do not support opening negotiations immediately. We are concerned about the context that some delegations associate with the protocol negotiations, particularly the broadening of criminalization, which was unacceptable to many delegations during the negotiation process. Lastly, we would like to lend our support to the short title of the Convention Against Cybercrime, without including the definition text in the brackets. Concise naming is a common practice in international treaty making, and the term cybercrime is broadly known and used. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Chair:
Thank you very much. Egypt, please, then Canada.

Egypt:
Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Allow me to deliver this statement on behalf of the following states. Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Burkina Faso, Cuba, China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, Eritrea, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Namibia, Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Vietnam, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Madam Chair, at the outset, we wish to express our gratitude and appreciation for the commendable effort Your Excellency and the Secretariat have exerted throughout this extensive process. We’re confident that your wisdom and professionalism will pave the way towards reaching a consensual outcome that is satisfactory for all, and one which comprehensively addresses the needs and concerns of all states’ parties. We also wish to commend the progress made thus far in the process of the elaboration of the convention in which many states have worked constructively and made important concessions that have contributed positively to this process. We affirm our commitment to work closely with you to address existing concerns and to reach consensus on the outstanding issues. Madam Chair, while we’re keen that the envisaged convention achieves its object and purpose in endorsing international cooperation in combating these crimes, we are of the view that the extensive use of grounds of refusal across the text would dilute the obligatory nature of the convention, hinder international cooperation, and create unprecedented obstacles towards realizing its goals. The grounds for refusal in the current draft convention are extensively employed throughout the text, especially when compared to similar criminal justice international legal instruments relevant to the work of the UNODC. For instance, the chapter on international cooperation is highly caveated, and it includes proposals that provide states’ parties with the requisite liberty not to engage in international cooperation with other states, and to refuse to cooperate based on subjective and unjustifiable grounds. We’re of the view that this convention should be effective and capable of achieving its objectives and guarantee states’ respect for its binding nature, as is the case with ONTOC and ONCAC. Madam Chair, we recognize that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is an essential component of the Espouse Convention. This is why we have supported the inclusion of the references to the protection of human rights as encapsulated in both Article 6, Paragraph 1, which emphasizes states’ obligations to protect human rights while countering these crimes, as well as Article 24, which includes measures that solely relate to the sovereign decisions by states and their legal system. It is the conviction of all parties that Article 24 provides for measures to be adopted by states internally, with no foreign interference or supervision. Therefore, we reject any attempted expansion of the scope of application of Article 24 to any other chapters of this convention, including the unprecedented use of conditions and safeguards as grounds for refusal in the international cooperation chapter. Despite the fact that Article 6, Paragraph 1 and Article 24 provide for the protection of human rights in a manner that is adequate when compared to both existing regional and international legal instruments on the issue, it is worth mentioning that the current draft includes unprecedented proposals and repetitions with regards to this issue. We are not supportive of unnecessary redundancy in the text, and we are of the view that we should follow the lead of existing legal international instruments, such as ONTOC and ONCAC, which offer a model of how the imperativeness of human rights protection should be covered while implementing this convention. Madam Chair, protection of the child against sexual exploitation online is an integral component of this convention. We are of the view that the Convention on the Rights of the Child has sufficient grounds to achieve this goal. We’re concerned that some proposals in the current draft fall short of the parameters of protection provided for children under the CRC. This convention is not supposed to contradict or undermine existing international legal instruments on the protection of children. Madam Chair, we emphasize the importance of the provision of technical assistance, capacity building, including technology transfer to developing countries to prevent and combat cyber crimes as integral part of the envisaged convention. We, furthermore, while we acknowledge the important role of relevant stakeholders, including the private sector, in assisting states’ parties with regards to fulfilling relevant aspects of this convention, we emphasize that the engagement of the relevant stakeholders in supporting the states’ parties in implementing this convention shall be consistent with the well-established practices in both ONTOC and ONCAC. Madam Chair, we declare that the envisaged convention should be comprehensive in order to cover a wide range of criminal acts. Therefore, the ongoing negotiations shall enable the Ad Hoc Committee to continue its work to consider the elaboration of draft protocols supplementary to the convention, taking into consideration the current narrow scope and limited list of crimes. We wish to assure you once more of our full support and cooperation to conclude this convention during this session in a consensual manner that is satisfactory for all. This statement was on behalf of those countries. I would like now to take the floor as Egypt. If you allow me to do so, I will. If not, I can wait to the end of the list. All right, thank you very much, Madam Chair. At the outset, I’d like to express Egypt’s deep appreciation to your efforts in leading the work of this Ad Hoc Committee for more than two years. Your Excellency, your team, and the Secretariat have worked tirelessly to realize a common ground between member states to achieve consensus that enables the international community to effectively prevent and combat the use of information communication technologies for criminal purposes. Under your able leadership, we have managed to reach consensus on vast majority of the provisions of the envisaged convention. We know that some of the outstanding issues remain contentious. However, we’re confident that you will be able to drive this process forward to reach a common understanding and achieve a satisfactory conclusion to all, as was the case with the other UN ODC conventions. I think, Madam Chair, you’ve heard in the room many countries, including those whom I delivered the statement on their behalf, and other countries such as CARICOM, Iran, Cameroon, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, China, and many others who have talked about Article 6.2. This needs to be fixed. Article 6.2, as it stands, will not garner the consensus needed. But I also would like to speak about Article 23, Paragraph 4, and to take stock in how the process has developed, and where we came from, and how far did we reach. At the very beginning, Egypt objected to Article 24, based on the fact that it is taken verbatim from Budapest Convention, and it is based on European legal background and legal instruments. We have accepted Article 24 as part of our text because we endorse the protection of human rights and the protection of freedoms, and based on the fact that you will have an interpretive note that would explain that this article does not entail external supervision or international supervision. The inclusion in Article 23, Paragraph 4 of a reference to safeguards and conditions will extend Article 24 to international cooperation and to the legal procedures adopted by states. And this in itself contradicts your interpretive notes, which simply says that this article is exercised by the domestic authorities of each respective state and does not create a supervisory mechanism at the international level. If states are using Article 24 through Article 23, through the different chapters under Article 23, this entails international dealing with Article 24. And this is not even in Budapest Convention. So we see that as unprecedented. It extends the mandate of Article 24 beyond the interpretive note that you have already included and distributed to us. And it needs to be explained how come that it was moved to Article 23 from Article 35 because this proposal has never been delivered in the room. I don’t recall any state asking for this provision to be added into Article 23. On Article 40, Paragraph 22, Madam Chair, the question of having substantial ground that persecution might take place is a question that relates to certain texts, to certain conventions. So when we talk about extradition, yes, this is a condition when it comes to extradition, and you have already included it in Article 37. When we talk about return of refugees, yes, this is a condition because you usually return a person and you are afraid that he might be mistreated and there is well-founded fear of mistreating him. But when it comes to international cooperation, having such condition and giving a state free right to determine what is substantial grounds for persecution on its own and hold international cooperation hostage to that decision is unprecedented in any international context. I have been communicated by some of our colleagues saying that it’s in one of the protocols on terrorism. Terrorism is not part of our work here. It’s not part of this convention and we should not quote terrorism in this convention because we have agreed not to have terrorism as part of the list of crimes that we have. On the question of the child, Egypt fully supports in principle the retention of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 14 on offenses related to online child sexual abuse and child sexual exploitation material as they will enable international cooperation to prevent and combat the crimes and to protect our children while using the internet. We respect the positions of all partners but we also call upon them to respect our laws, principles and religious beliefs and not to impose on us their interpretation of other existing international legal instruments, namely the CRC because we have different interpretations and we do not insist on including them in the text. We are willing to continue deliberating these provisions in a manner that helps reach a consensus on them and that is satisfactory to all. Egypt fully supports the maximum protection of the child and believes that the realization of the best interest of the child and the full adherence to the letter and the spirit of the Convention on the Rights of the Child shall govern the criminalization of the child. Simultaneously, cultural diversity shall be fully respected. I thank you, Madam Chair, and we have other remarks on other parts of the text. We will come to it in due course. I thank you.

Chair:
Thank you. Canada, then Singapore.

Canada:
Thank you, Madam Chair. Good afternoon, colleagues. Madam Chair, thank you to you, your team, the Secretariat for all your work on a text that is bringing us closer to a final outcome. We agree very much with the comments that were made by our colleague from China this morning that we all need to come together in our collective wisdom as it was put and our collaboration to get this over the line in the short time that we have left. In that regard, Canada will keep our comments technical in nature, which is maybe a bit boring, but hopefully at least helpful for you. Firstly, on Article 6, we thank the Chair very much for listening to the very large group of states that advocated for and supported the concepts that this component contains. We agree with Brazil from this morning that a balance has been struck on this article as a whole. We also appreciate the flexibility that was shown by CARICOM on 6.2 specifically, and they’ve been valued partners throughout this process. Our view is that the listing of rights is important, as these are the rights that are most affected by the extension of the criminal law in the digital space, which I think was explained by yourself and others. Needless to say, in light of the very broad scope of elements of the treaty, 6.2 is an essential component of the Convention. We therefore join the many other delegations who support 6.2 in its current form in the text. On Articles 14 and 16, those that address the abuse and sexual exploitation of our children, I think we can all agree that these are incredibly important provisions and will go a long way to protecting children around the world. We are very close to finalizing these provisions, and we welcome the Chair’s innovative solution relating to the definition of a child, and in our view, a cybercrime convention must include these essential provisions. On Article 4, we still do not fully understand the objective of this article, I think as has been relayed by others. We share the concerns around what is captured by the language around existing UN conventions and protocols. It’s not exactly clear to us. We would encourage the supporters of the article and this language to clearly explain what it would do and why it is needed. On Article 40, we thank Costa Rica for their proposal with regard to political offenses, and we express our support for that proposal as well. On Article 64, we very much support the proposal made by Mexico, which was supported, as was pointed out, by a large group of countries to ensure that the number of ratifications is adequate to allow for a more inclusive treaty implementation process. On the title, we do understand what the Chair is trying to do in finding the balance on this wording, and I think we do agree with others that it doesn’t quite at present capture the nuance of what is in the text, and we would support others, including Costa Rica’s remarks, on how to potentially simplify the title, but we’re open to other ideas as well and know that you’re trying to find that balance in wording. On Operative Paragraph 5 of the resolution, we would support the comments made very clearly by Cote d’Ivoire, by Ecuador, and a long list of others, namely that we should keep the focus on the treaty negotiations and then the implementation of the treaty as negotiated, and not jump ahead into considering supplementing a treaty that hasn’t even had a chance to get off the ground yet. On the substance of that paragraph, we also have the same concerns that the UK outlined with the prescriptive nature in predetermining an outcome, as well as the scope of what is included in the discussions and the timing of those discussions and the timing of the outcome. So we have principled concerns with the paragraph as well as substantive concerns around that. And I think I’ll leave it there, Madam Chair. We’re making progress, as you said. You can count on our engagement fully for this final session. And thank you.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Singapore, to be followed by Nicaragua.

Singapore:
Madam Chair, thank you for giving me the floor. Please allow me to first join other delegations to express my appreciation to you and your team for the great effort you have taken in the preparation of the text and in bringing us closer to consensus. I’ll keep my remarks on a few specific issues quite short, just three issues, if you permit me, and I’ll reserve comments on the other issues of the text as we go into the more detailed negotiations. First, on the title of the Convention, Singapore appreciates that the current title is a proposal that aims to bridge the gap between the many differing views put forward over the past negotiations. And as articulated by many speakers before me, Singapore is also of the view that the inclusion of the term Crimes Committed Through the Use of an ICT System in the title would prejudge the definition of the term cybercrime. While we can exercise some flexibility, Singapore’s preference is therefore to have the title as succinct as possible, as some other jurisdictions have said, and therefore to keep it as the United Nations Convention Against Cybercrime. Moving on to Article 4, Paragraph 2 in particular, so we note that Paragraph 2 of Article 4 seeks to exclude offences established under other international agreements that are committed through the use of an ICT system, as well as to differentiate these offences from offences established under this Convention, which we understand to be Articles 7 through 17 of the UDTC, as articulated in the explanatory notes dated 15 July 2024. Furthermore, as explained in Madam Chair’s preface this morning at the beginning of the plenary session, the idea behind Article 4 as a whole is to keep the offences to be criminalised in this Convention well-defined and tightly scoped. Therefore, Singapore can go along with this article in the spirit of consensus. Finally, Madam Chair, on Article 6, Singapore remains of the view that this umbrella article on human rights is relevant and important to the Convention, and it’s quite a critical article to have. We also appreciate your efforts, Madam Chair, to bring together the different perspectives delegations have proposed at the last session. However, on Article 6, Paragraph 2, and taking into account the views from around the Chamber, we share the same view as our distinguished colleagues from CARICOM, that there is no need for the listing of the particular rights in Paragraph 2. For that reason, and bearing in mind that we are quite close to the end of the negotiations here, we see merit in CARICOM’s proposal to remove the listing of specific rights as a way to move forward and bring us closer to consensus. So thank you once again, Madam Chair. Please do rest assured that we will continue to support you and actively participate throughout the rest of the negotiations in order to bring us to conclusion. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Chair:
Thank you, Singapore. Nicaragua, then Iceland.

Nicaragua:
Thank you very much, Madam Chair. We endorse the statement delivered by Egypt on behalf of a group of countries. Madam Chair, allow us to express to you our thanks to you and to your team and the Secretariat for your extraordinary efforts throughout this negotiation process. We trust your wisdom that will enable us to arrive at a consensus that takes into account all of the concerns and needs of Member States. For Nicaragua, a small developing country, it is of vital importance that the Convention reflect international cooperation where developing countries are able to support each other in order to address the challenges posed by the use of ICTs for criminal purposes. In this regard, we reject that international cooperation should have conditions applied to it. That approach stands in the way of achieving the main goal of this Convention and prevents us together fighting the use of ICTs for criminal purposes. Madam Chair, unless there is financing for cooperation, this Convention won’t be able to be implemented because developed countries must provide developing countries with assistance so that they can implement what is agreed upon in this international instrument. Also, Nicaragua is part of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and we feel that this Convention, when it’s adopted next week, must rigorously reflect the parameters that are necessary to protect our children and in no way should it contradict or undermine international legal instruments that already exist with regard to the protection of these girls and boys. Thus, our delegation supports the inclusion of additional protocols. We think that that is a necessary and appropriate element. And finally, Nicaragua reiterates its full support to cooperate with you to arrive at a consensual solution acceptable to everyone. Thank you very much.

Chair:
Iceland, please, then Angola.

Iceland:
Thank you, Chair, and good afternoon, everyone. I will join others in starting by thanking you and congratulating you, your team, and the Secretariat for your work and commitment to this process. As the draft reflects, you have made impressive strides toward a text that has the potential to be standard-setting and a great achievement. On the point the Chair highlighted this morning, Iceland has the following comments. Regarding the title of the Convention, we support the shorter version of the title as was discussed in the statements from my colleagues from Liechtenstein and Singapore. On Article 4, we have both concerns on the placement and the content of the article. We in particular think that the ambiguity the article allows for, as it is worded now, is not appropriate in a criminal convention, as we are now discussing. I would refer to the statement from the UK on this point and support it. On safeguards, Iceland is a strong supporter, and we support Article 6 as it stands now. On Articles 14 to 16, Iceland recognizes the work and effort included in reaching the wording that we now have. It is of essence that we safeguard the rights of children, and Iceland, like other states, including Argentina, are of the opinion that the right balance has been struck regarding Article 14, and we should not make further changes to the text as it now stands. We have proposals that we think are important to Article 16, but in informal consultations that we have had with colleagues around this room, we think that we would not propose anything if the article would stand as it stands, and think that we are showing the flexibility and the positive attitude towards finding a solution by doing so. Regarding the issue of protocols, Iceland supports the UK proposal to delete this provision. As has already been addressed, small states like Iceland will have their hands full with the ratification and then the implementation of this convention. The resources the additional protocols would call for would create an imbalance between smaller and bigger states that have more manpower and resources. This is a situation that hardly fits with the spirit of the UN, where all countries should have the same opportunity to participate in such important standard-setting work. Finally, I would like to echo what my colleague from Vanuatu raised on the importance of effective international cooperation in the field of cybercrime. In this context, Iceland underlines that we all in this room are working towards a common goal of delivering a convention that improves the current situation by the end of next week. Iceland is committed to contributing and supporting the Chair in making this happen. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Iceland. Thank you very much, Iceland. Angola, followed by Armenia.

Angola:
Thank you, Chair, for giving us the floor, and thank you for leading us in this process. In general, Angola is supportive of the UDTC. However, we would like to address two technical aspects of the UDTC regarding human rights. Angola is of the view that respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms is already an achievement of humanity because it is based on the concept of human dignity, which is why its protection must occur both at the level of international and domestic legislation. Therefore, Angola strongly supports the wording of Article 6 of the UDTC. However, as it is a legal instrument, and taken into consideration, that Article 6 is included in General Provision Chapter, it is technically valid and applicable to the World Convention. Therefore, the reference to human rights in Article 24, Paragraph 1, 36, Paragraph 15, and 40, Paragraph 22, from our point of view, appears technically redundant. But, if the intention is to reinforce the idea of protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, Angola suggests that in the aforementioned Articles, as referred, should be made to Article 6. For example, in accordance with Article 6, respecting the terms of Article 6, or in accordance to Article 6. Madam Chair, on the relevance and the scope of application of Subparagraph F, Paragraph 2, Article 17. As agreed at referendum, this provision is very pertinent and it aims to respond a technical issue by the law enforcement authorities in dealing with specific case as it is very difficult to prove in court the subjective element of legal type of crime when it refers to intent, knowledge, and purpose. So, the wording of the provision has the merit of indicating that the subjective element is measured by effectual and objective circumstance of a specific case. However, in all Articles of criminalization chapter, reference is made to intent and in some cases to dishonest and criminal intent which will not benefit from the well-drafted provision of Subparagraph F, Paragraph 2 of Article 17 because technically it is only applied to the crime of laundering of proceeds of crime. With this view, Angola proposed that a Paragraph 2 to be included in Article 2 of the UDCTC inspired by Subparagraph F, Paragraph 2, Article 17 with the following wording. Intent, knowledge, and purpose required as an element of an offense set for Article 7 to 17 of this convention may be inferred from the objective factual circumstance just to cover all criminalization capital. Angola reiterates its full support of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee and will continue to participate in the negotiation with a constructive spirit and to reach consensus. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Chair:
Merci beaucoup, l’Angola. Thank you very much, Angola. Arminia, followed by the Dominican Republic.

Armenia:
Thank you, Madam Chair. Madam Chair, we would like to express our gratitude to you, the Bureau, and the Secretariat of the Ad Hoc Committee for the valuable work carried out over the recent years. Madam Chair, we share the position of the overwhelming majority of the delegations that work very close to find a consensus with the current draft despite some outstanding important questions that require further joint efforts and flexibility to successfully conclude these negotiations and have a UN convention that will enable us to cooperate on a global level against the scourge of cybercrimes. Having said that, Madam Chair, without proper human rights provisions, safeguards, we believe it will simply be impossible to reach a consensus as has been stated by many delegations before me. In this regard, we would like to reaffirm our staunch support to the relevant human rights safeguards, particularly Article 6 and 24 incorporated in the current draft. Moreover, Armenia will be in a position to consider supporting additional proposals that may strengthen the text in this regard. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Armenia. Thank you very much for being so succinct. Dominican Republic to be followed by Pakistan.

Dominican Republic:
Thank you, Madam Chair. Since it’s the first time we’re taking the floor, we’d once again like to express our thanks for the arduous work that you, your team and the Secretariat have done in preparing REV3 of the draft convention. We feel that this common effort is fundamental in order to move towards a consensus for an effective criminal justice instrument to fight cybercrime. In line with our priorities, we’d like to highlight the following points which we think are crucial. With regard to the title of the convention, we are of the view that it’s not simply a name, but it has current or future implications in terms of the scope of the convention. That’s why we would prefer a short and concise title, namely United Nations Convention Against Cybercrime. And this essentially for two reasons. The main reason being that our national legislation already uses this term cybercrime, as well as the national legislation of at least 75 states representing more than 40% of the UN membership. To introduce a different concept could have unexpected consequences in terms of adequate legislation for ratifying and implementing the convention arising from this process. Another reason would be that in our understanding, an alternative title might lead to confusion, defining cybercrime in an ambiguous and perhaps excessively broad manner, which could extend the scope of the convention beyond a criminal justice instrument based on consensus and focused on cybercrime, which is the spirit of our mandate. In order to accommodate the needs of states that so require it, in the spirit of consensus, we feel that the text currently in parenthesis could be included in Article 2 under the definitions for greater clarity. We are grateful for the inclusion of references to the transfer of technology by mutual agreement, both in the preamble as well as in Article 54. This is essential for developing countries such as the Dominican Republic in order to strengthen the technological capacities required for effective investigation of cybercrime. We’ve made progress in including the necessary guarantees to ensure that the largest possible number of states can cooperate with confidence. This treaty should not lead to, in any way, the suppression or limitation of human rights or fundamental freedoms, such as the freedom of expression. That’s why the Dominican Republic will always insist that we maintain the provisions in this regard in Article 6, paragraph 2. We support the current wording of Article 24 and paragraph 22 of Article 40. It’s fundamental that these articles are maintained without changes in order to guarantee the protection of human rights in the context of cybersecurity. We believe that beginning negotiations on an additional protocol a year after the adoption of the principal instrument is premature. It’s important that all countries, including our own, have the capacity to effectively implement the main instrument before we start embarking on new negotiations. Finally, we support Costa Rica’s proposal to include a paragraph that states will be able to deny assistance when requested if it is relating to a political crime, clearly distinguishing between persecution of political opinion and political crimes. Finally, we’d like to say that the number of ratifications for entry into force of the Convention should be 60, as proposed by Mexico. Less would be less than 30% of the members of the United Nations. In practical terms, we don’t think that this Convention should operate with only 20% of membership when this is all about international cooperation on cybercrime. We repeat the preparedness of the Dominican Republic to work towards an effective and efficient instrument to fight cybercrime and that this be brought about by consensus. Thank you.

Chair:
Thank you very much, Dominican Republic. Before giving the floor to Pakistan, I’d like to read out the speaker’s list. After Pakistan, there’s Australia, Qatar, Thailand, Tanzania, Switzerland, Turkey, Peru, Venezuela, Iraq, Italy, Sweden, Namibia, the United States of America, Syria, France, Uganda, Germany, Bulgaria, the Republic of Korea, and Poland. One more thing. The interpreters have informed us that delegations are reading their statements out very quickly and they’re running out of steam at this late hour, so when delivering your statements, kindly make an effort to read slower so that the interpreters can deliver your message properly. Thank you very much. Pakistan to be followed by Australia.

Pakistan:
Thank you, Madam Chair, for giving me the floor. First of all, I also extend my gratitude to you, like my other colleagues, for your exceptional leadership and tireless efforts in guiding us throughout the whole process. Our gratitude also goes to your team, to the Secretariat for their very commendable effort. As we reconvene for this concluding session, I’m hopeful that we will be able to finalize the convention consensually and continue our efforts by starting negotiations on the draft protocol on criminalization, thereby creating a comprehensive convention as mandated by UNGA Resolutions 74-247. I would like to address some of the cross-cutting issues reflected in your explanatory notes, in addition to those already highlighted by Distinguished Ambassador of Egypt in his joint statement which Pakistan has joined. These issues do not encompass all our concerns with the text, but for the sake of flexibility and to assist you, Madam Chair, in reaching consensus, we have limited our response to our key issues. Without prejudice to potential amendments or adjustments to our positions, during the next nine days, we highlight the following points. First, the title and scope of the Convention. The title and scope of the Convention are vital for the realization of Committee’s mandate. We maintain our long-standing position that the title should correspond to the base resolution. We highlight that cybercrime is not a globally accepted term. If it was, Pakistan would not single out itself from the global and universal recognition. Article 3 and 4 of the draft text provides the framework by focusing on serious crime and not establishing any new crimes, respectively. This clear distinction necessitates no further discussion on an already defined term, serious crime, including introduction of any conditions in application of an already defined term. With regard to preamble, we oppose the introduction of a non-exhaustive list of crimes. Should such a list be included, we recommend adding incitement to violence, desiccation of religion and its values among the list of crimes. Due to its varying degrees of interpretation and potential contention, we seek the replacement of gender perspective with elements of SDG 5, that is, gender perspective to be replaced with empowerment of all women and girls. The right to protection should extend beyond privacy and personal data to encompass broader human right consideration, and the exception accorded by introducing a separate paragraph on such right is also not supported by my delegation. Transfer of Technology Madam Chair, we cannot adequately and effectively prevent crimes committed through use of ICT unless we create an enabling environment that includes technical assistance, capacity building and, most importantly, the transfer of technology, all without hindrances. For us, this is a core component of the Convention. Without such measures, our efforts may fall short of achieving a society free from these crimes. We notice that Article 1C of the Convention does not include transfer of technology along with technical assistance and capacity building, and we once again call for its inclusion. Human Rights A broader scope of international human rights law is endorsed by the draft Convention, as reflected in paragraph 1 of Article 6. Selecting some rights over others, under the guise of ambiguous interpretation, suggesting that these rights may be more prone to violation, is not the right approach. We must uphold all human rights consistently and without prejudice. At the same time, any effort to rewrite international human rights law is unacceptable to us, particularly if it involves granting absolute personal freedoms without acknowledging that international human rights law inherently comes with certain responsibilities and limitations. For the chapter of criminalization, we advocate for correct establishment of mens rea, emphasizing intention and knowledge as the basis. The threshold for these should be criminal intent and unlawful acts, avoiding vague terms like without right, which do not clearly distinguish between lawful and unlawful actions. Regarding Article 14, we prefer the definition outlined in CRC, which provides flexibility for state parties to apply in their domestic law. Additionally, we raise concerns about the legal-marital relationship falling within the scope of child sexual abuse and exploitation materials, and this need to be addressed through a well-defined exemption and safeguard. We also seek clarity on whether the Convention excludes legal marriages involving persons under 18 from the scope of CSAM. The current proposal aims to establish a uniform age limit of 18 years for protection of children against CSAM offenses. However, there is a discrepancy between the definition of child pornographic material mentioned in Article 2 of OPSC, and the limitation sets out in Paragraph 3 of Article 14 of the revised draft. The draft restricts child pornographic material involving real children only, which creates significant loopholes. Full and adequate protection of children necessitates addressing these gaps. At the same time, freedom of expression should not be used as a guise for moral degradation. We question how children who require supervision can consent to generating sexual material even for their personal use. My delegation cannot accept the formulation which has such loopholes. Article 16, the shift in focus from privacy protection to social and cultural values, particularly concerning the element of consent for the dissemination of intimate image, lacks balance. In our view, the Article should harmonize privacy protection with public morals to uphold the highest standard of decency in a society. The issue at hand is not the intent of this Article, but the role of consent in establishing this crime. Even with consent, the dissemination of obscene material remains unacceptable to many within society. Fundamental freedoms always come with certain responsibilities, and we must respect the right of others to ensure that our actions should not violate the right of others. However, this is not the case with the current formulation of Article 16. The Convention must not deviate from established social, moral, and cultural values. The drafting of this Article must ensure that it does not inadvertently undermine these values while balancing privacy protection and public morals effectively. The addition of paragraph 4 to Article 23, which links domestic powers and procedures to international cooperation, introduces operational challenges and ambiguities. We find that the interpretive notes are different from the text provided in this paragraph and require further clarity. It is also important to note that this element could potentially introduce new standards for international cooperation, which, in our view, would jeopardize the effectiveness of this Convention. My delegation does not support the introduction of new standards in international cooperation. We believe that various factors could render international cooperation ineffective, including differing interpretations and implementation of this clause across jurisdiction, cross-border examination of domestic laws and procedures, and potential violations of sovereignty. Delay in achieving international cooperation due to limitations in domestic procedural measures could also arise, as these measures may remain elusive to the requesting State. We question whether in any international Convention procedural measures and safeguards are typically made part of or a subject matter of international cooperation. Additionally, elements such as ground-justifying applications are unacceptable to us, as they appear to provide grounds for international supervision. rather than enhancing practical cooperation. The introduction of the extradition clause in mutual legal assistance contradicts previous conventions and creates unnecessary hurdles in international cooperation. We oppose paragraph 22 of article 40 for this reason. Additionally, we do not support the introduction of new grounds for refusal, including political offenses. The definition of what constitutes a political offense is highly subjective and lacks clear boundaries, which poses a serious risk of misuse to block international cooperation. This ambiguity can also lead to significant delays and inefficiencies, undermining the effectiveness of our collective efforts. To ensure a smooth and effective international cooperation, grounds for refusal must align with existing and established international standards like that of UNCAC and UNTOC. Paragraph 8 of article 42. The previous 90-day preservation period of electronic evidence was a carefully considered balance between legal prudence and operational practicability. This period allows state parties sufficient time to execute thorough legal processes, including drafting requests for international cooperation and meeting domestic CODEL formalities. Reducing the preservation period to 60 days could compromise the ability of state parties to complete these tasks effectively and potentially leading to a higher risk of evidence loss or procedural error. Therefore, we suggest moving back to a 90-day preservation period rather than a 60-day timeline proposed in the UTDC. And finally, Madam Chair, on additional protocol. My delegation supports your proposal to initiate immediate negotiation on an additional protocol. We firmly believe that the list of crimes already reviewed by the Ad Hoc Committee along with the acts proposed by Member States in previous sessions should serve as a starting point. This approach will not only save our time and expedite the negotiation, but also promote a focused and efficient process. Regarding the concern expressed by some colleagues about immediate negotiations, we want to emphasize that it is not unusual to proceed with negotiation right after finalizing the draft text. Furthermore, the need for an additional protocol might have been avoided if the concerns of all Member States had been properly addressed and integrated in the UTDC. Our focus should be on engaging constructively rather than delaying negotiations. This proactive approach is essential for effective multilateral diplomacy. Although many of us, including Pakistan, face constraints due to limited resources, this does not absolve us from our responsibility to address and prevent crimes involving misuse of ICT devices and emerging threats that could impede global progress. Our commitment remains crucial in making the world safer and advancing our collective goal. This proposal does not preclude any delegation from introducing new crimes or objections. We are open to considering additional suggestions while ensuring that the negotiation process remains streamlined and effective. In conclusion, we would like to reiterate our support for you and your team. We are committed to the successful and consensual conclusion of the Convention and look forward to addressing all outstanding issues as we move forward. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Chair:
Thank you very much. In the rest of the minute, Australia will be followed by Qatar, then we will stop and I will give you some information. Thank you.

Australia:
Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Australia very much appreciates and expresses our appreciation for your efforts and also your teams to produce this new revised draft text. And I very much recognise your leadership and objectivity to strike a balance amid so many competing priorities and viewpoints, which really do reflect significant concessions from everyone in this room. To be very honest, there are articles in this new draft Convention that we like and there are articles that we do not, but we have heard that’s the case for everyone and I do think that this shows the extent to which we’ve all made compromises to get to this point. I’d like to turn to some of the specific provisions and the changes that you walked us through this morning. Firstly, on the title, Australia supports Lebanon, Vanuatu, Costa Rica, Malaysia, Ecuador, Colombia, Mauritania, Nepal and many, many others who have proposed that a short, sharp and clear title is best, that is Convention Against Cybercrime. Coming to Article 4, I note the change in the placement of this article and we would appreciate a little bit more explanation from those supporting this change to understand the effect of the reordering of the text. For Australia, Article 4 is inherently linked to the very long-running and ongoing discussions and questions we’ve had about the scope of the entire Convention, the draft resolution, the interpretive notes and because what is now Article 4 was created to provide a compromise when we were at that deadlock a year and a half ago on the very long, long list of crimes and criminal conduct that some states were proposing but which did not garner broad support for inclusion in the criminalisation chapter. So for Australia, paragraph 2 of Article 4 represents a very essential clarification of this provision’s application and is an essential part of that compromise and a question that we do have regarding the scope of criminalisation across Chapter 2, across Article 4 and through the application of procedural measures to all serious crimes in 23 and the application of international cooperation on e-evidence for all serious crimes in 35 inherently relates to the proposal to expand the criminalisation chapter through immediate protocol negotiations on additional crimes. We would like to understand what a small number of states have asked this AHC to continue its work, what exact issues would need to be elaborated by those additional protocols because we have not so far heard anyone identify crimes that would not be considered serious crimes or would not be covered by Article 4 that would require this committee’s immediate attention. And I would note that Australia would not consider the work of the first committee’s open-ended working group on cyber to be appropriate for additional protocols to our convention given that that open-ended working group focuses upon the behaviour of states in cyberspace and all UMM states have already agreed by consensus that international law, including our UN Charter, already applies. So we’ve got that one ticked off. And as such, Australia agrees that Lebanon, Ecuador, Colombia, Chile, Vanuatu, Malaysia, that really our focus should be on concluding and implementing the convention before us before we consider whether we should be turning our minds and the significant resources that would be required to begin another negotiation process immediately. Turning to Article 6, we would support the solutions that you have found here to balance the scope and safeguards within the convention text. As Australia has emphasised since the very beginning of our negotiations, we are open to talking about a very broad scope for cooperation, but this must be accompanied by commensurate guardrails that ensure the credibility and confidence in existing international law in the multilateral system, including its application to new issues such as cyber. So Article 6, Paragraph 1 and 2 provide for us some of these guardrails and we very much welcome the inclusion of such clear provisions in our convention as they are set out currently in the draft. Like many, we view these safeguards as set out as essential in Article 6 and any reduction or amendment to Article 6 would make us have to go back and reconsider the broad scope that we have come to agree to across the rest of the text to make sure that the powers remain balanced. I want to turn to Article 14 because we’ve heard several delegations raise some concerns or questions around Article 14, which we’ve worked very hard over the last two and a half years to bring to fruition. I won’t repeat all the reasons we’ve elaborated regarding how important it is to robustly criminalise online child abuse in our convention, only to very much agree with Brazil that this article is a must. We very much welcome and support the revised text as it is drafted and we think this effectively accounts for the needs of diverse cultural contexts and the very different legal systems that we all have in place. And while Australia is open to continuing discussions to improve this article, we really do encourage everyone to recognise the very considerable compromises that are already reflected in the drafting as it stands. I’d also note that Australia considers Paragraph 3 very helpful. Because we see that it makes clear that there are many forms of child abuse and exploitation material, some of them new, and some that depict real children and some that do not. And this paragraph draws unique attention for the first time to emerging forms of child abuse material, while it still also provides the discretion to states on whether all of this material must be considered criminalised and considered child abuse material in order to ratify the Convention. I think we should remember that we don’t yet have criminalisation of this specific behaviour set out in Article 14 in any other existing UN Convention. So this article would be strengthening the protection of children online, which I’ve heard every single one of us support, from a place of nothing to a place of something in the UN. And I would agree, Chair, with your assessment that providing clarity and discretion and permissiveness for cultural and legal differences in the article itself is preferred to creating the ability to allow states to make reservations from the article as a whole. Turning to Article 23, Paragraph 4, Australia very much welcomes the inclusion of this paragraph. And we agree with the questions from some delegations regarding its current placement. And we wonder whether this paragraph would not be more appropriate to be included in Article 35, so that it clearly applies to the full chapter of international cooperation. Turning to Article 35 itself, we support the proposal by New Zealand to move the non-discrimination clause into Article 35, so that it applies consistently across the entire international cooperation chapter. On Article 40, we strongly support the inclusion of Paragraph 22. And we agree with many countries who have supported Costa Rica’s proposal to provide grounds in Article 40 to refuse mutual legal assistance on the basis of political offences. Finally, I want to turn to Article 64 and the proposal from Mexico to set the number of ratifications from entry into force to 60 state parties. Because Australia identified quite strongly with the countries that were described as striving for consensus in this convention. And we agree that consensus and a consensus adopter convention will mean that we should all focus upon ratification and implementation as our next steps. And what a higher ratification threshold means to us is that there would need to be a more inclusive process before any amendments are being made to this consensus convention. We think that if the convention is adopted by consensus, that makes it actually even more important for any amendments or additions or changes to our convention to be considered and agreed through a very inclusive process, which could be a conference of parties coming into force after a larger number of states have ratified the convention. I agree with your assessment this morning, Chair, that while certain issues still need to be resolved, this draft is very, very close to our final version. And while we are still striving to find consensus on the substance of our text, I am very glad to hear so far today that I think we have consensus on finalising our work over the coming fortnight. And I am optimistic that we will get there either through our joint wisdom or perhaps with some wine and coffee. Thank you, Chair.

Chair:
Thank you very much. Qatar will be the last speaker for today.

Qatar:
Thank you, Madam Chair. And we thank you for the efforts made, especially towards arriving at a consensus. We thank your team as well. Madam Chair, the State of Qatar believes that there is no justification to refuse mutual or legal assistance for non-objective grounds. This would obstruct means to limit cybercrime and its cross-border nature. The State of Qatar, Madam Chair, supports what was stated in Chapter 4 on measures and applying the law. And we refuse expanding human rights as a justification to decline requests for cooperation. And we support sticking to what was stated in UNTAC and UNCAC in this matter. Madam Chair, the human rights agreements and instruments have enough foundations to guarantee the protection of children in all fields. And the text on the protection of children here might be considered a way to undermine what is stated in international instruments on the matter. We have agreed on discussing protocols for this agreement. And this would enhance consensus once this agreement and convention is adopted. Qatar supports the statement delivered by Egypt and associates itself with it. Our delegation, Madam Chair, supports you in your efforts to arrive at a consensus text. And I thank you.

Chair:
Thank you very much. So I’ll read out to you the list of speakers that are on the list and that we haven’t been able to listen to yet. Thailand, Tanzania, Switzerland, Turkey, Venezuela, Iraq, Italy, Sweden, Namibia, the United States of America, Syria, France, Uganda, Germany, Bulgaria, Republic of Korea, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Russia, Peru, Nigeria. So I make the following proposal. We’ll continue tomorrow to listen to everyone because it’s important that we do that. And I think I’ll also give the possibility to our multi-stakeholders, our partners, to also take the floor tomorrow and explain their positions and their opinions. Now, it’s clear, I think we’ve heard from a lot of countries, it’s clear that there are still some areas of divergence. And since I’m an optimist, I’ll begin with the good news. I took note that for everyone, this is a good, earnest basis for discussions and negotiations and that at the same time, you’ve all said that you are prepared to move towards consensus. And I hope that that will translate into negotiations over the next few days and that we’ll be able to understand each other. Those are the points that I noted then where there is a need to still have further discussion. There’s Article 6, Paragraph 2. Article 4 on offences established in accordance with other international instruments. There’s Article 23, Paragraph 4 on the scope of procedural measures and the application of conditions and safeguards, as well as the interpretative notes related to this paragraph and to Article 24. There are also the two interpretative notes on Article 35, on general principles of international cooperation. I also noted that there was concern about Article 40, Paragraph 22, on the refusal of mutual legal assistance on grounds of discrimination and finally, Operative Paragraph 5 of the draft resolution. Of course, there are other points as well that were raised by several delegations. That doesn’t mean that I’ve put them aside. It means that we’ll have the time in plenary or in other informals to discuss them. I therefore now encourage you to engage as early as this evening in bilateral negotiations so that Wednesday morning during our informal consultations that will be led by our Vice-Chair from Brazil, our friend Eric Sugo de la Serta. So that’s Wednesday all day. You’ll have the possibility to finalise these issues that I’ve just listed. So, I repeat, this evening you can begin bilateral consultations to try to achieve the maximum support or perhaps clarification. It may be just as an issue of clarifying certain points or explaining certain points so that Wednesday we can come to multilateral informals to finalise things and hopefully have consensus on the articles that I just listed. Tomorrow morning at 10 o’clock we’ll meet again here to continue to listen to the remaining countries as well as the multi-stakeholders. So, that’s it. And when I say that, I mean that bilateral consultations do not prevent the plenary being held and vice versa. We’ll continue in the plenary tomorrow. During that time, I warmly encourage you to continue to engage in bilateral consultations so that you can get the maximum amount of support for your proposals. For example, maybe I’m putting my foot in it here, but we’ve heard Costa Rica this morning proposing something and there were a lot of countries that supported that. But that’s not sufficient to reach consensus, so an effort needs to be made to win over the maximum number of countries. So, thank you very much. Have a pleasant evening and I wish you good courage because it’s not an easy task and we’ll meet together here tomorrow in this room to listen to everyone. Thank you.