(12th meeting) Reconvened concluding session of the Ad Hoc Committee to Elaborate a Comprehensive International Convention on Countering the Use of Information and Communications Technologies for Criminal Purposes
5 Aug 2024 15:00h - 18:00h
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Session report
Full session report
International committee grapples with cybercrime convention details amid human rights and cooperation debates
During an international committee meeting, the Chair addressed the delegates, acknowledging the slow progress from the morning’s discussions on the scope of safeguards. The Chair proposed that the afternoon session focus on all remaining pending issues, with the exception of Articles 14 and 16, which would be considered separately due to their distinct content. Delegates were encouraged to use the lunchtime break for further discussions, given the limited time available.
The debate centred on Article 6, Paragraph 2, which pertains to human rights safeguards within the convention. Delegates expressed divergent views, with some advocating for the retention of specific human rights within the article, while others called for a more general reference to human rights without an exhaustive list. A proposal to replace the term “suppression” with “restriction” was supported by India and several other delegations for its legal precision and clarity.
Discussions also focused on international cooperation, as outlined in Articles 23 and 24. Delegates debated the conditions and safeguards related to international cooperation, with some advocating for references to domestic laws and others expressing concerns over potential interference with sovereign rights.
The Chair’s proposal on the supplementary protocol and the process for its consideration was contentious. Concerns were raised about the immediate timing, the predetermined outcome, and the inclusivity of the process. Some delegates supported the Chair’s proposal as a balanced approach, while others suggested amendments to ensure that the timing and inclusivity of the protocol negotiations were manageable for all member states.
The number of ratifications required for the convention to enter into force was another topic of debate. Some delegations supported a higher threshold for ratification to ensure inclusivity and give states time for domestic legislative harmonisation. Others were satisfied with the Chair’s proposal of a lower threshold. The title of the convention was also debated, with some delegations preferring a shorter title that directly references cybercrime, while others were open to the Chair’s more comprehensive proposal.
Articles 14 and 16, likely related to child protection online, were indicated as contentious and had been the subject of frustration in negotiations. The Chair’s proposals were an attempt to reach a consensus, but further discussion and flexibility from all parties were necessary.
The Chair’s role was pivotal in guiding the discussions and attempting to balance the diverse interests and concerns of the delegates. The session highlighted the complexity of international negotiations, where language precision, legal implications, and the protection of human rights are critical factors in drafting a convention that aims to combat cybercrime effectively while upholding fundamental freedoms.
The committee is working towards drafting a convention that balances the fight against cybercrime with the protection of human rights, ensures effective international cooperation, and is inclusive of all member states’ concerns. The session is set to continue the following day, with further debate on the outstanding issues and specific articles. The Chair announced that the final text in English would be available the following afternoon, with translations into other languages provided as soon as possible, aiming for the adoption of the convention on Thursday.
Session transcript
Chair:
Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues, good afternoon. I hope you’ve been able to have some discussions amongst yourselves during the lunch break, given our slow debates this morning on the issue of the scope of safeguards. I propose that this afternoon, because there isn’t that much time left, we consider all remaining pending issues apart from Articles 14 and 16. Those two articles will be considered separately because they are not within the same area as the others, so I would prefer that we consider those separately. So we will resume the list of speakers, but this time you are, as it were, authorised to address the other pending articles apart from 14 and 16, please, because I would like us to consider those two issues separately, those two articles separately, and I would like us to focus on them separately. So, thank you very much, and without further ado, I have Mexico, the European Union, Chile, Singapore, Syria, the United Kingdom, Austria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Africa, Japan, Costa Rica, Georgia, Yemen. the Republic of Moldova, Nepal, Namibia, Angola, Vanuatu, Uganda, Armenia, Israel, Columbia, Dominican Republic, Sri Lanka, Russia on the list. That’s the list. So Mexico, and once again, Mexico and all the other speakers, please feel free to take the floor as well on the other pending issues apart from articles 14 and 16. Thank you very much, Mexico, please.
Mexico:
Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. My delegation would like to recognize your diligent efforts and the diligent efforts of your team and the secretariat throughout last week’s discussions and consultations over the weekend in order to provide us with the document we now have before us. While this document is still before my capital for review, I felt it necessary to take the floor to say that for my delegation, retaining article six and article 24 without any additional modifications or changes beyond those that have been provided previously is essential for the proper implementation of the future convention. And therefore, we prefer the drafting contained in draft revision three of the convention. We note with concern that the delicate balance that we had achieved stemming from lengthy prior negotiations is being lost with this new proposed text. And we therefore call on the membership to demonstrate flexibility in order to arrive at an agreement acceptable to everyone. And if you’ll allow me, Madam, we will reserve comments on the remainder of the document to a later stage. Thank you.
Chair:
Merci beaucoup. Thank you very much. European Union
European Union:
Thank you madam chair to speak on behalf of the EU on its 27 member states and I would like to to insist perhaps on this because some delegations have been making a number of references to the number of Delegations who have made statement For or against this article 6-2 on other points and I would like to remind that if optically in the room the EU has one voice and If the EU member states take the floor only occasionally the EU does represent 27 member states So now on on this Convention I would like really also on our behalf to To thank you for your efforts to to try to find a consensus among us. We know that it is difficult and We see that with this With these new proposals you have tried really to To bring us closer to to a consensus I’m not saying that I like all what I’ve seen but I have to To recognize that you you made significant efforts to take into account all The the concerns expressed by the delegations. So now on article 6 paragraph 2 This convention is about improving the fight against cybercrime by establishing common standards and powers That lead us ultimately to cooperating with each other the draft as it stands provides for broad scope for international cooperation that is unprecedented in human instruments It allows for electronic evidence sharing on serious crimes and not just those that the Convention establishes and provide for some very intrusive measures such as a real-time collection of traffic data and the interception of content data. In the area of criminal law, new powers are always accompanied by new safeguards to balance public interests, such as the fight against crime with individual rights. Therefore, an unprecedented scope must necessarily be accompanied by an unprecedented safeguard, such as the one of Article 6.2. This is an essential requirement for a significant number of delegations, including the EU and its 27 member states. Again, the alternative, as it has already been stressed by Australia, for instance, would be to revert to more traditional or limited forms of cooperation, such as sharing evidence only for the crimes codified in this Convention. So it is true that Paragraph 2 mentions some rights, but it does not pretend to be exhaustive. That’s what the terms including demonstrate. The rights currently listed in Paragraph 2 are those which are more at risk of being infringed in the fight against cybercrime. The stakeholders have confirmed it through their intervention also. This paragraph sends, therefore, a strong signal on our collective aim to apply this Convention in full respect of human rights that will help us all convincing the public of the merits of this Convention, and ultimately, therefore, contribute to its ratification by our respective parliaments. Some seem to consider it redundant, but still not contrary to their domestic law. We believe that the potential important benefits of this article, for many of us, could significantly outweigh the concerns of some over this provision being potentially redundant or unnecessary. On the other provision, Madam Chair, I will come back to you at a later stage. Je vous remercie, Madame President. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
Chair:
Thank you very much, Chile.
Chile:
Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. We’re very grateful to you for your efforts to arrive at a consensus and for the discussions, the paragraphs under discussion from this morning. On 6.2, this is the minimum that we could go along with, given the fact that we’re negotiating a text on serious crimes, and we therefore believe that recognizing individual human rights is essential. We do not support any of the proposals put forward this morning by other delegates. On OP5, as we expressed previously, we do not believe it’s necessary to include it in this draft revision. However, if I may, I’d like to make a proposal to the text. We suggest end necessary safeguards after additional crimes. Thank you very much, Madam.
Chair:
Thank you very much, Singapore.
Singapore:
Thank you, Madam Chair. Please allow me to express my appreciation for this paper that you have put forward for the consideration of the Committee. My delegation and I believe that this is a step forward, and we really thank you and your team for bringing us closer towards consensus. On Article 6.2, we have listened carefully to the discussions over this paragraph. We would like to recap that the original intent for Article 6 was to provide an overarching reference to human rights. and not to specify which of these rights are more pertinent to the Convention. While Singapore can see some merits put forward by delegations that wish to keep the listing of the paragraph, we remain convinced that its inclusion would not bring us closer to consensus at this point. For this reason, we would like to reiterate our position to delete the listing in paragraph 2, as well as to support CARICOM’s original proposal. We believe that this would be the best way forward for the Committee to come to a consensus on the paragraph. As for the other articles, we would like to reserve our comments at this point and to hear further discussion from the room. Thank you so much.
Chair:
Thank you very much, Syria.
Syria:
Thank you, Madam Chair. We are all depending on your patience and your management so that we can reach our desired goal. We have already talked about Article 6, Paragraph 2, and we suggested deleting Paragraph 2 or at least deleting the listing in it, because limiting the rights to a specific list will give preference to some rights over others. And this leads to discriminating or differentiating between different rights, even though we are convinced that human rights are one integral unit that cannot be devised. And this was affirmed in various treaties, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As a group of states or like-minded, we are trying to focus on some points that are linked to the formulation of the articles on human rights so that it is consistent with our contractual commitments as states. And the fact that we are stressing on some main points is an effort to reach a a formula that is acceptable to everyone. And our position is seen now as if we are opposing human rights. However, we reiterate through our international commitments and our legislation the need to give priority to human rights. Madam Chair, going into some partial details leads to challenges in reaching consensus. And as you know, the devil is in the details. Let our consensus be away from any partial details. Let it be in the interest of everyone and for it to lead towards approving this treaty. Many delegations have tried to submit proposals that meet their concerns. However, through a new formula that might be closer to one that can receive consensus, such as India, Egypt, Pakistan, Russia, and Iran, we support all these proposals and they are worthy of having a discussion about. And if there is a will to discuss them, and we are not talking about a battle where we might lose some rounds and compromise. We need to understand the nature of the convention and we need to have flexibility from everyone to reach consensus and to have a positive view through a constructive dialogue that leads us to succeed in this mission that we have been tasked to do by our states. The Indian proposal to use limiting instead of suppression is a correct one and does not change the purpose of the text. Limiting is the legal term that is used in international conventions and especially the ICCPR. Egypt, where he explained in detail the reasons for his proposal is something that we support if we retain the paragraph, the second paragraph of the Article 6, or we talk about other rights such as a list that includes also the right to development and the right to life. Returning to commitments is something that is in principle positive. We are open to this, even though our preference was to delete the second paragraph. Once again, Madam Chair, we are convinced of your ability through patience to make this difference. Thank you.
United Kingdom:
Thank you, Madam Chair. Good afternoon, colleagues. Madam Chair, we thank you, your team, and the Secretariat for your hard work over the weekend and for your proposal. We recognize that you have once again tried very hard to strike a balance between divergent positions. However, we believe that when taken together, the changes in your proposal would clearly make our Convention less balanced. We have three major concerns. Number one, the safeguards are more caveated and therefore weaker. Number two, the protocol remains immediate, prejudged, and non-inclusive. Number three, the proposal on Article 16 is unnecessary and adds unhelpful legal ambiguity to our Convention. I will give a little bit more detail on the safeguards now and then offer some further thoughts on the protocol later. On the safeguards… We join those delegations thanking you for your proposal on Article 6.2, Madam Chair, but we do see it as unnecessary to add a further caveat here. As Canada explained this morning, the article already has sufficient caveats. For the same reason, we cannot support the various proposals made this morning to add caveat upon caveat. Madam Chair, we cannot accept a further weakening of this vital safeguard because, as others have said, it is directly linked to the risks inherent in the unprecedented scope of international cooperation available under our Convention. The scope as envisaged in your Rev 3, Madam Chair, allows broad cooperation in relation to any and all serious crimes. Those crimes are defined entirely by domestic law. It is impossible for us to know now what those crimes could be. But online, the rights listed in Article 6.2 are those most likely to be infringed or engaged as a result of that broad scope of cooperation. Madam Chair, you asked us for proposals and, as we have discussed as a committee before, there are other ways to mitigate this risk that my delegation and others have talked about. One approach could be to qualify serious crime, as is the case in UNTOC. However, at this late stage in our negotiations, we would rather not go backwards. We did reserve on the definition of serious crime this morning, but we can accept it in relation to international cooperation. But we must be clear that that is only if the safeguards are adequate. We therefore strongly support retention of the REV3 text on 6.2. Turning now to Article 24, Paragraph 2, again we see the additional language here as unnecessary. Paragraph 1 of this article and Paragraph 2 in the bit that was already in REV3 already make clear that the reference in this article to judicial or other independent review is at the domestic level. We do not see the need to say it twice in the same article, let alone three times. On Article 24.4 we can accept the logic of moving this here from Article 23 as was proposed last week, however, as we have said many times before now, we believe the safeguards should apply to all international cooperation. Many countries already do this as a matter of course. It is not something new and we firmly believe that if we commit to a minimum level of safeguards when rendering international cooperation, it will help to give all states parties trust and confidence to use our Convention. On the protocol briefly, we continue to question whether the operative Paragraph 5 is needed and we have listened to delegations which have raised a wide range of concerns, including on timing, prejudging the outcome and inclusivity. We continue to have concerns but I will, in the spirit of being constructive, offer some more concrete views in due course. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chair:
Thank you. Austria.
Austria:
Madam Chair, we appreciate your as well as anyone’s efforts that was working over the weekend to come up with a proposal in order to find consensus. We align ourselves with the statement of the EU and would like to make the following additional remarks. Let me start out with a quote from former U.S. President Roosevelt in 1941. He said, in future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms. The first one is the freedom of speech and expression everywhere in the world. The second is the freedom of every person to worship God in his own way everywhere in the world. The third is the freedom from want everywhere in the world. And the fourth is the freedom from fear anywhere in the world. That is no vision of a distant millennium. It is a definite basis for a kind of world attainable in our time and generation. Even in the time of war, Roosevelt referred in particular to the right of freedom of speech and expression as well as religious belief. We can only speculate why that is the case. One reason for it might be that it all starts with suppression of the rights mentioned, which then leads to the violation of other human rights. And this is another example why the list of human rights is so important in Article 6.2. On a more general note, our view is that the proposal that you have put forward is leaning very much towards countries that want a broad scope on criminalization, a broad scope of investigative powers, and broad possibilities for international cooperation, but seem to have difficulties to accept that this needs to be balanced by adequate minimum safeguards. We have heard from these countries that they are still not satisfied with the proposal under discussion, although in our view, you are already asking more than we would be prepared to accept in the spirit of compromise. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Chair:
Thank you. The DRC has the floor.
Democratic Republic of the Congo:
Thank you very much, Madam Chair. The DRC welcomes everyone’s efforts, your efforts, your team’s efforts, and the Secretariat’s efforts in an attempt to find harmonized language for the Convention we are now considering. It is true that many provisions in this legal instrument that is now being drafted have already been approved and agreed at referendum by the plenary, but since you are encouraging initiative to come up with better… Consensus wording, my delegation, our delegation has carefully read through the document this weekend and that enabled us to submit some of our own considerations and views and to the committee as a whole, the sole objective is, as you have quite rightly said, to improve the writing, the content and the quality of this legal instrument, this international legal instrument. These few comments and observations are as follows. We’ll begin with the preamble. In the preamble we have two comments. Paragraph 11, the use of the concept of gender is inappropriate, we believe. We’ve discussed this with a number of delegations and they’ve expressed their views on this as well. We did not agree on the gender concept, quite rightly, because today this concept is much broader than it was several years ago and a number of states are uncomfortable with that because it runs counter to our practices in our societies and our cultural and religious practices in certain societies. During the electoral campaign of another country in 2023, a candidate to the presidential elections had submitted a vote sanctioned by the Congolese people for having used the concept of gender during the interview after submitting the candidacy. for the post of president. We cannot consider these societal values of states, not taking those into account here would be to violate the cultural rights of those states. And like Egypt, Russia, Iran, the DRC and many others, we hold this view. We believe that UN headquarters where we are presently is not the place either. This is not the appropriate place to address the violation of such a right which is part of human rights. And for that reason, my delegation is proposing replacing the concept of gender with the concept of equality which is not at all confusing. In paragraph 16, references made to the convention and to the treaty. Given the participation of wise diplomats here, we believe that the use of treaty and convention, these terms are synonymous. They are part of the two legal instruments, namely, the Vienna Conventions of 1969 and 1986. UN treaties, reference to UN treaties in paragraph 5, these two legal instruments do not draw any distinction between these two terms by which these international legal instruments are named. Our delegation is proposing, therefore, one of these terms so that we avoid any kind of redundancy and to clear up any misunderstanding. paragraph. Turning to Article 3 on the scope of application, Paragraph 1, a reference is made to crimes, and this is referred to in other paragraphs, Article 7, Paragraph 1, Article 8, Paragraph 1, Article 9, Paragraph 1, Article 10, Paragraph 1, Article 11, Paragraph 1, referring to criminal offenses. I’ll just mention those to save time. To the best of our knowledge, there are no civil offenses when referring to criminal offenses elsewhere. And we put this to the legal experts in the room. And for that reason, my delegation is proposing that we remove the word criminal in the various articles of the Convention to make the task of the Committee to which we ourselves belong easier, and we therefore would identify all of the provisions and we will submit them to the Secretariat so that the text can be harmonized if the plenary were to approve this. On Article 4, on offenses established in accordance with other UN conventions and protocols, Paragraph 1, the words conventions and protocols are written lowercase, but we believe that the first letters of these words should be capitalized in accordance with the practices here and for the proper presentation of the text. And so our delegation is proposing to the entire Committee to write UN conventions and protocols and used to capitalize the first letter throughout the text. In paragraph two, again under article four, we would like to see or to have a better understanding of this paragraph. We’re not certain we’ve understood it. We’re not sure we’ve understood it enough to explain it to our government, and we need to have a better understanding in preparing for ratification. On article seven, illegal access, under article three, criminal offenses, the comment we made there should be raised here as well, and we’ve already made a practical proposal, and we won’t make it again just to save time, but again, our paragraph one of article seven, we come back to what previous speakers have said about this paragraph when you refer to illegal access, referring back to the title of the article, our delegation is proposing to replace without right with not covered or not authorized under the law. It seems to us that the point, that is the point here in this paragraph, it’s a question of criminalizing unauthorized access and access not allowed under the law to any ICT system. And then the paragraph would be each state party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as. an offence, we don’t – we’d leave out criminal under its domestic law. When the unauthorised act or act unacceptable under the law, the access to the whole or any part of an information and communications technology system, of course, we’re prepared to submit that wording to the Secretariat in order to improve the writing of this provision. Madam Chairman, in conclusion, we withdraw your attention and the attention of other delegates to the need, the urgent need, to have this legal instrument for humanity. We need it now. Thank you. I haven’t finished, Madam. I think you’ll agree with us that we’re addressing paragraphs 1 of 64 on the entry into force of the Convention on Cybercrime, subject to our discussion on the title. We reiterate our proposal to support the reasonable ratification threshold at 40, and we call on states calling for a higher ratification threshold to show flexibility so that this convention can enter into force as soon as possible, because criminal cyber acts continue to be on the rise and affect millions of people throughout the world, in particular our country. I give as an example of the DRC. We pay the price every day. Just the day before yesterday, and I’d like to share this information with the committee and with the plenary, just the day before yesterday, the African airline planes CAA lost its signals at the Goma airport because the system was jammed, and we referred to that the last time we spoke. And today, if that plane had crashed, we would be in mourning in our country. Imagine if that crash had taken place on the 2nd of August. That would be a sad date that would go down in history. That’s actually the date of the Kisangi genocide. Ugandan-Rwandese people who fought on Congolese territory for economic reasons, they destroyed lives and broke the dreams of families. And we would close our comments here, madam, by asking you and other delegates to think about these victims. Thank you.
Chair:
Thank you very much, South Africa. And I’d like to remind you that we are looking at the chair’s paper on the pending issues. Thank you. Please limit yourselves to these issues, South Africa.
South Africa:
Thank you, madam chair. South Africa joins others in commending the chair and her team, as well as the vice chairs on the efforts made to address the main pending provisions of the UDTC. With a view to helping the committee move forward in its work, South Africa is hopeful that these amendments will bring us closer to consensus. As requested, madam chair, we will briefly provide our views on the document that we have before us. On Article 6, South Africa welcomes the retention of paragraph of one as originally drafted in the UDTC. However, Madam Chair, we still have concerns on listing specific rights in 6.2. We have heard delegations already providing additional rights to be covered, and we would not be in favor of an exhaustive list in this regard. We therefore support proposals that have been made without this list in accordance with applicable human rights law. Madam Chair, with regards to Articles 23 and 24, having heard the concerns raised on PARA 23.4, we have noted the changes made to address these, and we support the proposed amendments in Article 24. Madam Chair, SATAFCA welcomes the proposal to keep 40 state parties as the minimum threshold for the entry of force of the convention in Article 64. As the debate on the minimum threshold has been closely linked to the adoption of the supplementary protocol, SATAFCA can exercise its flexibility and welcome Article 61bis. We are of the view that the new article addresses member states’ concerns in a balanced manner with regard to speedy entry into force and inclusivity in the adoption of the supplementary protocol. SATAFCA is still evaluating PARA 2 under Article 61bis. Madam Chair, on OP5, SATAFCA supports the Chair’s proposal and the amendments, therefore. SATAFCA also supports the addition of at least before two sessions as proposed by the Chinese delegation in the last plenary meeting. Further to this, we support holding meetings. meetings in both Vienna and New York, and the proposal to accommodate those missions which do not have resident missions in Vienna. Finally, Madam Chair, South Africa adds its support to the proposal on the title combining the terms cybercrime and ICT systems. I thank you, Madam Chair.
Chair:
Thank you very much, South Africa. Japan.
Japan:
Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I would first like to join other delegations in thanking you for your dedication, your efforts, and work to bring us all closer to consensus. In this regard, I would like to stress that we strongly support your initiative and your work. Having received your paper, your proposals, we are now considering them and in consultation with the capital, so my interventions will be very brief and preliminary. We think that the Article 6.2 is essential. In this vein, we cannot support the proposals proposed by Egypt. As to your text, we prefer the text as reflected in the UDTC, but at the same time, we have been listening to other delegations’ interventions, including those from member states that haven’t been vocal to date. I will come back to the plenary at a later stage for further review, further views of ours. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Chair:
Thank you, Costa Rica.
Costa Rica:
Thank you, Madam Chair. Costa Rica would like to thank the Chair for the efforts that she has made to achieve a consensus text, however, I must express the great disappointment of my delegation because the entirety of the text that has been presented does not take into account Costa Rica’s proposal on the inclusion of political crimes, political offences, as a reason for not providing judicial assistance. Costa Rica made this proposal right back in the sixth session with enough time for delegations to be able to consider and analyze Costa Rica’s proposal. The proposal is also found in other international instruments, and many Member States are party to those instruments, including the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance for Criminal Offences, the Harare Plan for Mutual Legal Assistance for Criminal Issues Relating to the Commonwealth, and we can also find similar provisions in two international conventions on this subject, the Arab Convention on Combating Crime and the Budapest Convention. In other words, this is a provision that is not new, that is not innovative, and that goes for many delegations that are participating in the deliberations at the present time. It is part of the normative body of law that is applied around the world. What’s more, the proposal received considerable support in this room. For that reason, we regret deeply that Costa Rica’s proposal is not included in the document that we are studying, which does include a great deal of text. We would ask that Costa Rica’s proposal be noted in the report of this meeting, the fact that the proposal was made once again and that it enjoyed the support of a large number of delegations. Turning to Article 6, for Costa Rica, the version presented by the Chair is the absolute minimum that we could accept. It is far below what we were hoping to see in a document of this nature. Similarly, we cannot accept any change to the preamble as it relates to the protection of human rights and issues of gender, nor the proposals in paragraph 22 of Article 40. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chair:
Thank you, Costa Rica. Georgia. Thank you, Costa Rica. Georgia.
Georgia:
Thank you, Chair. Madam Chair, we acknowledge the profound difficulty of your role, given the current settings in the Committee, and we sincerely appreciate your and your team’s efforts. On Article 6.2, similarly to many delegations who spoke before me, Georgia is extremely reluctant to support any further weakening of the original language of the UDTC. Thus, we would like to express our strong preference for that text. It is the basic minimum to maintain balance between the broadened scope of the Commission and human rights. For the same reasons, we are unable to support the proposals made by Egypt, India, and Russia, among others, who sought to further downgrade Article 6.2. As to the relevance of the list of specific rights, Austria, UK, Canada and others have spoken eloquently on this point, and we find those arguments convincing. We cannot also support the addition to paragraph 2 of Article 24 as being unnecessary from our perspective. Furthermore, we regret that New Zealand’s proposal to have similar provisions contained in Article 40.22 to move it to Article 35 and include the political offence exception as a ground for refusal as proposed by COSTAR-ECAM has not been reflected in the recent package. We reserve our position for the remaining parts of the package. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chair:
Thank you very much. Yemen.
Yemen:
Thank you, Madam Chair. We reiterate our appreciation for your efforts and the efforts of the Secretariat. You have made tremendous efforts, and if it weren’t for these efforts, we would have agreed to many provisions ad ref. And the remaining parts of the text we need to show flexibility, and as we said on many occasions in more than one intervention, this should not run counter to national legislation. Hence we have flexibility with this one condition. I will comment on 6.2. In Article 6, when it comes to human rights, we said that there are laws and there are international conventions and international humanitarian law. Hence, this convention criminalizes certain offenses and cyber crimes or the crimes for the use of ICT systems. Hence, the human rights dimension in this crime and other crimes is governed by certain conditions and safeguards for inspection and there are safeguards for those accused that is set forth exclusively by the laws. And on the first glance, we had the reservation on the entire Article 6 and then afterwards we showed the flexibility and we said that Paragraph 1 of Article 6 is not problematic for us because it mentions what is not requiring any explanation, self-explanatory and there needs to be provisions within the law relevant to the procedural aspects. When we speak about cyber crimes, then we need to identify the human rights pertaining to such procedural matters and we mention them in an exclusive list. Here, Paragraph 2 of Article 6, as we are making comments on this paragraph in particular, there needs to be no list for those rights. Once we mention freedoms and human rights, they need to be mentioned in a general form and once we list them, we need to list all human rights. We agree with the colleagues who are saying when we say suppression and limiting, limiting is better than suppression and it is a legally accurate term, limiting instead of suppression and we need to refer to freedoms and human rights. human rights in general without referring to the freedom of expression or conscience because these are all human rights. Hence, we should not include an explanation or listing of any rights because this would limit human rights and fundamental freedoms to the list. And this needs to be interpreted in accordance with international humanitarian law and human rights law that is applicable I think.
Chair:
Thank you. Republic of Moldova.
Republic of Moldova:
Thank you Madam Chairperson. I would like to join previous speakers to thank you for all your efforts in steering the work of this committee and your team’s work in making smoother the process. At the beginning, I would like to join the Democratic Republic of Congo who said that we need this instrument for humanity. I fully agree with that. But we also need an instrument with human rights safeguards guaranteed now, tomorrow, and for the future generations. On Article 6, Paragraph 2, as previous delegations already mentioned, our position, we prefer the original text of the paragraph for the reasons already expressed by the European Union delegation, Canada, Chile, United Kingdom, and many others. As for the other articles, I will come back later. Thank you.
Nepal:
We reiterate our heartfelt appreciation for exceptional efforts in drafting this landmark convention which stands on a brink of historic consensus. The draft, particularly Article 6.2, reflects a well-balanced approach and we join other members in acknowledging the extensive work and numerous sessions that have gone into its formulation. We strongly support the inclusion of robust safeguards and the emphasis on human rights within this convention. We support Article 6.2 as drafted originally in Rev. 3. Although in the spirit of consensus, we can exercise flexibility and support India’s proposal to replace the term suppression with restriction. Overall, we find the draft commendable and well-constructed. Madam Chair, human rights are not just a principle but a way of life. In our country, we have witnessed remarkable transformations when our citizens are empowered and aware of their intrinsic power. This empowerment is critical for navigating and implementing this convention as well. Our Constitution, our nation’s supreme law, enshrines numerous human rights in Part 3, including the right to freedom of opinion and expression, the right to peaceful assembly, among others. These are fundamental liberties that we believe every nation values. We recognize that all member states present here agree on the paramount importance of human rights in ensuring the successful implementation of this convention. Therefore, we urge all member states to reach a swift consensus on Article 6.2. guided by our collective moral compass and commitment to these essential principles. Thank you.
Chair:
Merci beaucoup. Namibia. Thank you very much. Namibia.
Namibia:
Thank you, Madam Chair. The Namibian delegation wishes to express its sincere appreciation for the work you’ve done on these proposals. It is no easy feat, but all we can say is that more power to your elbow. Namibia, on Article 6.2, Namibia can support India’s proposal to replace the word suppression with restriction. However, we would like to propose a minor amendment to Article 6.2. The majority of the text remains the same. We would just like to add the phrase, after including, we would like to add, but not limited to. The rest of the paragraph remains the same, and then after the word association, we would like to insert the word except, so that it reads except in accordance and in a manner consistent with applicable international human rights law. Madam Chair, we believe that the addition of the phrase, but not limited to, aims to strike a delicate balance between specificity and inclusivity, and it also ensures that no rights is inadvertently omitted or perceived as less important. It also affirms that the protection extends beyond this current list to encompass all applicable human rights and fundamental freedoms. On Article 24, my delegation supports your proposal as drafted. For the rest of the text, we reserve our comments for a later stage. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chair:
Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Angola.
Angola:
Thank you, Madam Chair. Good afternoon, dear colleagues. Angola would like to recognize and thank you, Madam Chair, once again, for your commitment and your effort during this process. Madam Chair, regarding human rights safeguards, Angola is supportive of Article 6, both Paragraph 1 and 2, as it was drafted by you, Madam Chair, but for the sake of consensus, we can support the proposal made by our colleague from Namibia. For Angola, the perspective of human rights safeguards is to protect our citizens from eventual excess of the power of the state through investigative and prosecutorial powers. It is very common that criminal legal instruments should have such safeguards, so that the aim of fighting any kind of criminality should not be carried out by any means, including sacrifice of human rights and fundamental freedoms. From our perspective, the list in Paragraph 2 is exemplificative and reasonable, taking into consideration the intrusive procedural measures, including in UDTC. We think this is the rationale of Paragraph 2 of Article 6, and we support it. Madam Chair, Angola would like to support also the title of the Convention proposed by you, Madam Chair. At APSET, we thank you, Madam Chair.
Chair:
Thank you very much.
Vanuatu:
Thank you, Madam Chair, for giving us the floor. We join all other members to thank you for your great work over the weekend. We are starting the proposal, but would like to comment on Article 6. We would like to echo the comments made by the esteemed delegate from Australia, we support strong language on international cooperation to deter, detect, investigate and prosecute cybercrime. It is very clear that this kind of international cooperation, let alone any increase in cooperation, is only possible if appropriate safeguards are in place. It is a case of maintaining balance, a broader scope and stronger guardrails, or a narrower scope and fewer required safeguards. And while the language in the UDTC already represented significant compromises, we support the original language about the new proposal. We need to keep an eye on the ball. The aim is to strengthen international cooperation. For that reason, we do not think it’s appropriate to add yet another caveat to this paragraph, as also said by our Canadian colleagues. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Chair:
Thank you very much, Uganda. Thank you very much, Uganda.
Uganda:
Thank you, Madam Chair. On Article 6.2, Uganda believes that the proposed article is inclusive even without listing the individual rights, which listing is not existent as stated in the current text. Further, it is our considered opinion that the word suppression should be replaced with a word violation and the words human rights law replaced with international human rights instruments. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chair:
Thank you very much. Armenia.
Armenia:
Thank you, Madam Chair. At the outset, let me join the others expressing our gratitude for all your efforts with the objective of leading us towards consensus. Last week when we just started our negotiations, the overwhelming majority of the delegations expressed an opinion that we’re very close to find a consensus and my delegation added its voice to this optimism acknowledging that some outstanding important questions remain that would require further joint efforts and flexibility. Unfortunately during our concluding week we’re still expressing our divergent positions that don’t bring us any closer to consensus and consequently don’t live up to that initial optimism expressed by many states. Madam Chair but it was also evident from the very beginning that it will simply be impossible to reach a consensus without proper human rights provisions and safeguards. The rationale behind these safeguards has been plainly explained by many delegations and in this regard we would like to once again voice our support to article 6. With regard to your proposal we’re considering it and we’ll get back to it at a later stage. With regards of the proposals made by the Chair we will revert to them at a later stage as appropriate. Nonetheless Madam Chair as we have had an opportunity to state on our previous intervention we’re ready to show flexibility for the sake of having a consensual document given that all the parties will show their share of flexibility on different outstanding issues. We cannot reach a consensual document based on concessions on only part of the outstanding issues while ignoring the fact that the rest of them also require compromise. It’s clear that no one is going to be completely happy with the convention that we might potentially have but that is part of multilateralism. If you want to have a UN legal framework which will enable us to engage in effective cooperation against cyber crimes then each and every one of us should take a step back from their rigid positions and take some bold actions towards that objective. Thank you.
Chair:
Merci beaucoup. Thank you very much. The Chair would like to echo your statement. Israel.
Israel:
Thank you Madam Chair. I’d like to join many others and thank you. wholeheartedly and your team and the vice chairs, the Secretariat for leading us to this point. We cannot take it for granted. It’s been a very long two and a half or three years, and especially for the investment in time and tireless efforts during this weekend to try to bridge those divergences. If I may, I can use the example of building a construction of the game of Jenga, where you build a very high tower made out of bricks, wood bricks, and each brick is very, very delicate, and just touching it, let alone trying to remove it, can risk bringing the whole tower down and putting all the efforts put in this process from the beginning at risk. At this point, we understand the importance, the extreme importance of the safeguards that have been balancing this construction, and we support Article 6 as it is in the original Rev. 3. We can consider your amendments. We are still in negotiation with our capital about that, but we might show some flexibility if we can understand what is the importance of these and how do they make this different from the original text. But in general, we support the original text. Thank you.
Colombia:
Thank you, Madam Chairman. I’m pleased to report that, with your indulgence, I’m taking the floor on behalf of the following delegations. Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama. Dominican Republic, Uruguay, and my country, Colombia. On Article VI, we believe that this article as a whole is a necessary component for maintaining the delicate balance that we have in the text with regard to broadening the scope on cooperation and exchange of evidence. As we have said on a number of occasions, cooperation in the area of serious crimes, as reflected in the current drafting of Article XXXV, is an absolutely essential element for our delegations. It is therefore imperative to have the necessary safeguards reflected in the content of Paragraph VI. Similarly, for these delegations, safeguards in the area of human rights, which is currently in the text, reflect the minimum acceptable level for legal obligations in international law. Moreover, and related to the number of proposals put forward in our national capacity, my delegation would make the following statement on supplementary protocols. With regard to Article XXXI, we welcome its drafting. Operative Paragraph V, we note that this drafting is heading in the right direction, but we would say, for the reasons we have indicated in previous statements, that we would prefer the text to indicate that the two-year timeframe will begin once the resolution has entered into force. With regard to Paragraph VI, we believe that this is the current drafting of Paragraph V on the fact that the Ad Hoc Committee will finish its work mutatis mutandis in relation with GA Resolution 74-245 and 75-282, they also apply to this OP. With regard to further decides at the beginning of this OP-6, we go along with that. Thank you.
Chair:
Thank you very much, Dominican Republic.
Dominican Republic:
Thank you, Chairman, on point three of your proposal under 64 on the number of ratifications required for entry into force of the Convention. Last week, we listened to 75 delegations, including our own support to Mexico’s proposal, the threshold of 60 ratifications, for the very eloquent reasons expressed by many delegations. In view of the fact that many other states, including CARICOM, have supported the threshold of 40 ratifications and only a few have proposed that the threshold be 30, in the spirit of consensus the Dominican Republic would like to propose that the number be 50 ratifications so that we can bring both ends closer together. Thank you.
Chair:
Sri Lanka.
Sri Lanka:
Thank you, Madam Chair, for giving me the floor. Sri Lanka appreciates all your efforts in trying to achieve consensus among Member States on the pending provisions of this particular Convention. Sri Lanka supports the retention of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 6 as it provides for the bare minimum of human rights in the context of combating cybercrime under the Convention. Since the word including is used before the list of human rights in Article 6, Paragraph 2, such a list remains open-ended. Hence, there can be no requirement to add further human rights to the said list unless rights to be added are the most relevant. Sri Lanka remains flexible with the word suppression or retention in Article 6, Paragraph 2 of the Convention in the spirit of consensus. I thank you, Madam Chair.
Chair:
Thank you, Russia.
Russian Federation:
Thank you, Madam Chair. I’d like to express gratitude to you for the efforts that you’re making to find consensus. On Article 35, before I react to your proposal, I would like to draw attention of the distinguished members of the Ad Hoc Committee to C of Paragraph 1 of Article 35, where it talks about the collecting, obtaining, preserving and sharing of evidence in electronic form of any serious crime, including serious crimes established in accordance with other applicable United Nations Conventions and Protocols in force at the time of the adoption of this Convention. And I would like to turn to the Ad Hoc Committee with a proposal to once again consider Russia’s proposal after the words in force at the time to add the words and after the adoption of this Convention. And I’ll explain why. If we keep Paragraph 1C of Article 35 in its current form, then we are depriving it of any meaning. The protocol that I hope will be developed and around which we have already written so much and made so many efforts, because it would turn out that the collecting, obtaining, preserving and sharing of evidence in electronic form of any serious crime would not then be applicable, if the current wording is kept in C, it would not apply to the supplementary protocols. And another thing on Article 35 that I just wanted to draw your attention to, the Chair is proposing that we keep Article 35 and the two interpretative notes to it in the form that it was in, in the documents with which we began our discussions in the room last Monday. But I would like to point out that one of the interpretative notes, Russia made a proposal in that regard, that made the proposal of the Chair more concrete, and that relates to the interpretative note. And there were only objections to Russia’s proposal from one party. And for three days now, we have been actively, and I hope productively, been engaging in dialogue with that country. And so I hope that that dialogue will continue and that, as relates to the interpretative note to Article 35, we would be able to reach an understanding on new wording, more precise wording for that. Now, distinguished colleagues, upon the initiative of Russia, Russia proposed the inclusion in the Convention of Special Investigative Methods. And I recall that was at the third session when this subject, this subject had also. emerged before. Unfortunately, the subject of special investigative methods in our discussions dissolved. It seems to be dead and buried, although I am absolutely confident that the Convention would be even more effective if it did have those special investigative methods, particularly because those special methods of investigation are actively used nationally. In a number of countries, there are very precise provisions relating to those methods of investigation. If those methods of investigation were to be kept in a paragraph with precise provisions, well, that’s not possible, but we should nevertheless look at the possibility of stopping crimes of a form that I have repeatedly proposed to the Ad Hoc Committee at this session. In that regard, Russia, as I’ve already said, is proposing, inserting the word prevention and separation in Article 323, 35, 41 and 47. But we will pass our proposal on to the Secretariat and we would ask the Secretariat to put that proposal on the screen. This also relates to our proposal on Friday with a new PP and two OPs for the draft resolution. Now, I’m guessing that in response, I might hear things about methodology and the fact that there isn’t enough time, but this is a living process and Russia feels that it is important for the Ad Hoc Committee to assess its proposals on these issues, because ultimately, we’re not saying that if we can’t have one thing, then we We shouldn’t have another thing. We’re not saying that to any delegation. We’re simply asking the Ad Hoc Committee to consider Russia’s proposals, which will be put on the screen. Next. We appreciate the proposal from the chair regarding the level of ratification. Russia was in favor of 30 ratifications, but does believe it’s possible to agree to the chair’s proposal relating to the level of ratification of 40 states. However, the proposal relating to the modalities for work on the protocols gives rise to a number of doubts for us. As an initial reaction to the proposal by the distinguished representative of Brazil, we’ve been talking about the fact that this proposal of at least 60 states parties being enough for the development of any supplementary protocol, that’s essentially another way to get a ratification level of 60 countries. And in our view, in any case, if we continue dialogue on that proposal, we need to talk about states parties. Secondly, turning to paragraph two on the proposal for article 61bis relating to regional economic integration organizations. For the time being, we have one such organization that’s participating in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee and the discipline within that organization and its member states is enviable, but I don’t understand why the internal functions of this organization. need to be inserted into the text of the Convention. There are many other regional economic integration organisations which theoretically, and I hope, will participate in our Convention. Their distribution of competencies and authority between national and supranational levels may be different. So, why are we going to introduce provisions into this that, a priori, limit this new collective member of our Convention, collective party of our Convention, forces them to work in that way on the Supplementary Protocol? Relating to the Supplementary Protocol, paragraphs 5 and 6 in the resolution, the draft resolution, we appreciated the Chair’s proposal to include the verb to negotiate, although, of course, it would be better to leave it as it was in the initial version, to elaborate. But we continue to insist on the phrase, as appropriate, being removed from the text. And lastly, moving on to the Chair’s proposals on the name, the title of the Convention, and PP4 of the Preamble, unfortunately, this proposed title introduces even greater uncertainty when it comes to delineating the terms of cybercrime and crimes committed with the use of ICT systems. I think that in Russian it will be translated that way, but in other languages it will be translated in a different way, but a Convention Against Crimes Committed Against anyone or anything, but in any case, it needs to be against crimes committed X, Y or Z, but that’s really not the main issue. Currently, the title could interpret cybercrime as a broader concept than the use of ICT for criminal purposes, which isn’t right. We’re trying to change the place of the communal and the partial. Together with the preamble wording, we get two formulas really created. With the title, a cybercrime committed with the use of ICT systems is not equal to cybercrime. And so that creates the impression that there is the possibility of committing cybercrimes without ICT systems, without using ICT systems. And then there’s uncertainty in PP4 of the preamble. And it proposes that the text of the UDTC that we had last Monday is better. The new proposal narrows the words established in accordance with this convention, and it narrows the initial proposal from the chair. I’m confident that we need to be definite and consistent in order to rule out any risks when it comes to the carrying out of international cooperation. Such a unilateral approach will lead to preventing the need for the development of additional protocols on criminalization, because it will become evident that the convention will be devoted exclusively to cyber-dependent crimes, but to traditional crimes involving ICTs will fall out of the scope of the convention. In that regard, the Russian Federation believes it possible, Russia’s position is very clear and it has been stated repeatedly here in this room, that the name should correspond to the mandate, the title should correspond to the mandate. But in order to find a consensus, we do believe it possible to either go back to the title that was proposed by the chair in the UDTC. that we began our discussions with last Monday, or to consider the possibility of the following name, following title, UN Convention Against Crimes Committed Using ICT Systems, Including Cybercrime. And one more thing, going back to Article 6.2, I’d like to come back to the subject of human rights. The discussion this morning in this room demonstrated that a small group of countries are not willing to take into account the concerns and proposals for compromise from the global majority. We can see that our ideas are simply being blocked and they’re not even allowing proposals to be put on the screen with a reference to so-called methodology, and that is an approach that is only followed when it suits certain people. In the first week of the reconvened session, two joint statements were read out by a group of countries, firstly on human rights insertions into the text of the Convention that follow a single aim, to undermine the effectiveness of cooperation within the bounds of the Convention, and the second was on Articles 14 and 16 relating to the most important thing that we have, and that is our children. On one document, 38 countries have signed up and that number is continuing to go up, and on the second, there are more than 20 countries that have signed up to these statements. We don’t know why our positions are not being taken into account. We can’t see that on the screen, not for 6.2 or for Articles 14 and 16. It seems that those countries that are talking most of all about consensus, in fact, are hindering the amendments demanded by half of the world. Together with its like-minded countries, Russia has made many efforts and proposed optimal wording which is in line with the norms of international law and could be a way out of this deadlock, and I am prepared to read it out. and then send it on. If there’s no response from other countries, then I think that 6.2 will potentially have to be deleted. I’d individually like to address Article 14, subparagraph A. That wording allows for the possibility of creating pornographic materials, creating scenes of abuse and torture. D.2. As regarding 4.B, it essentially contains wording that allows for, from the territory of one state, to be moved at the same time, taking into account the proposed wording, bringing such a person that committed that crime, who would get those photos and videos in large numbers, is not possible. Moreover, given that we’re talking about ICT crimes and the use by malicious persons of the internet, we may never actually find out that correspondences between children, one of the parties may actually be an adult who is deceiving the child. This gives rise to the question of whose rights and interests we’re defending, particularly since the countries that are present and the parties to the Protocols of the Convention on the Rights of the Child have committed to protecting the young generation online. We will come back to this subject of 6.2 and 14 and 16 time and again until such time as our opinions are listened to. Lastly, given the statement by the delegation of Venezuela and Nicaragua, we must underscore our rejection of the practice of the Secretariat and the Chair to find consensus and compromise. Working behind the scenes is counterproductive when it works in circumvention of the interests of states, and it is unacceptable also when the Secretariat and the Chair criticize states. On the opposite, the Chair and the Secretariat must listen to the calls and proposals made by states. Thank you very much for your attention.
Chair:
I need to practice my Russian because I didn’t understand your explanation when it comes to the title. I need to practice my Russian because I really didn’t understand any of your explanation when it comes to the title. I’m laughing because I tried to help you by making sure that your proposal was taken into account and all of my efforts were aimed at covering to the best extent possible your concerns about the title because when we met you said to me that for you the title is very important. So I really did everything I possibly could to achieve that objective, the one that you said. So I hope to resume my Russian studies very soon. I’m signed up for Chinese at the Algiers University, but once I’ve got a handle on Chinese I’m going to get back to Russian because it’s been quite some time since I’ve spoken Russian. I’m sorry, I really didn’t understand your proposal. Perhaps it’s a question of interpretation. So I would like to see you after the meeting. I already have a meeting planned, but if you’re free at 7 p.m., I’d like to see you so that you can explain to me where the problem lies with the title that I’ve proposed. Thank you.
Uruguay:
Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. We are taking the floor in particular to thank you for all of your efforts and the efforts of the Secretary and your team in efforts to find consensus solutions on the pending areas of the draft. While we’ve been looking at the proposal that you’ve given to us, we would like to refer in particular to Article 6. As we’ve consistently said, we believe that the entire provision is a key component of the Convention. Your current drafting is the result of lengthy discussions and therefore the arguments to underscore the need to retain it have been clearly stated. While you have provided us with a compromise text in Rev. 3, which we support, and that is our strong preference, in a spirit of flexibility, in principle, we would not oppose favorably considering your suggestion made today, that is now on the screen, representing the minimum level which we need to have in our Convention that’s reflected in both these paragraphs.
Chair:
Thank you very much, Iran.
Iran:
Thank you, Madam Chair. First of all, I would like to kindly ask Madam Chair also to learn Farsi. It is the language of literature and poetry. So not only to learn Russian and Chinese, of course. Secondly, Madam Chair, I would like to, you mentioned this morning rightly that I fully agree that we are here to make impossible possible. Our mission would be fulfilled and make impossible possible if all delegations show flexibilities and for reaching a balanced text which is acceptable to all delegations. So Madam Chair, of course, I think we need a miracle. I don’t see that right now. Secondly, Madam Chair, once again I would like to reiterate that we are not against human rights law. Iran is a member of many international human rights instruments. In fact, we are obliged to implement those commitments and obligations. My delegations consistently reiterated that this is a criminal treaty, not a human rights treaty, and because of that in Vienna I said we should go to Geneva and to develop a human rights treaty on this issue. I think this place is not to develop a human rights treaty which many, many provisions, so-called safeguards and conditions inserted in this draft which I do believe that it is a ground for refusal of international cooperation. It is a big barrier. It will politicize the international cooperation in the future. And thirdly, Madam Chair, I agree with the distinguished delegation of the United Nations. the ambassador of Egypt, which mentioned today that all human rights are universal, indivisible, interrelated and interdependent and mutually reinforcing and all human rights must be treated in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing and with the same emphasis. Regardless the position of Iran on so-called human rights provisions, I think this is cherry-picking, which picks some elements, even I do believe that they are in contrary with the international human rights instruments, current international human rights instruments. So Madam Chair, therefore Iran first, we cannot go along with paragraph 4 article 23, which originally drafted and also the new drafting of article 24, all of elements we are not in favour of those elements. And also many delegations also emphasise that paragraph 22 of article 40 is a new precedent in mutual legal assistance and is not acceptable also for my delegations on this issue. On article 61B, again, of course I have no allergy on economic integration and my allergy is to fit a paragraph for only one regional organisation. So Iran could not go along with that. Paragraph 2 of Article 61. It is new precedent, of course, in this Convention. And on titles, I would like to support the statement made by the Distinguished Delegation of the Russian Federation on all elements, especially on titles. The mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee is clear. I will not repeat again that the mandate is to elaborate those and so on. So we are not here to rewrite the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. It is the mandate given to the Ad Hoc Committee by the General Assembly to elaborate this Convention with this title. So we would like to support also the Paragraph 1 of Article 61. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chair:
Thank you, Madam Chair. United States. Thank you very much.
United States:
Thank you, Madam Chair. We would like to make some comments on Article 24 as well as OP 5. On Article 24, we do appreciate and support the proposed Article 24.4, which confirms that there is no loophole for international cooperation while repeating that the relevant conditions and safeguards are applied at the domestic level. But we cannot support the revision to Paragraph 2. This revision, in our view, is interpretive guidance that should remain in an interpretive note. Similarly to our discussion in other articles, we should not be including basic interpretations of international law in the text of the Treaty. It creates questions about the implications of other commitments. in this text and in other treaties. One final comment on safeguards. We are, like many others in the room, disappointed that Costa Rica’s proposal on political offenses has not made it into this proposal. Costa Rica explained very well how this is a standard grounds for refusal across mutual legal assistance instruments and a particularly important protection given the broad scope of electronic evidence sharing proposed in this instrument. We certainly continue to encourage the inclusion of this proposal in the next draft. On protocols and entry into force. On protocols, I want to be very clear. The United States continues to be concerned about the accelerated consideration of protocols which we’ve heard many states across regions highlight as both unnecessary and burdensome. Our strong preference remains that we focus first on the entry into force and implementation of the main convention. As we look around the room, we see people, the very people, who will need to write new domestic laws, provide technical assistance, and ensure the effective prosecution and mutual legal assistance required under this treaty. We’ve got to give them time to do that work. No matter what we call it, a protocol is a new treaty, and we’re all extremely well aware of how much it takes to conclude a new treaty. If the AHC is to be eventually reconvened to discuss further protocols, we believe there is more work to be done to establish bounds for that process. First of all, we do not believe that the proposed protocol procedures in Article 61 BIS should be tied to Article 64, Entry into Force. The proposed 61 BIS does not address the issues of inclusivity raised by the Entry into Force for the main convention. We, therefore, continue to support Mexico’s proposal for 60 state parties for Entry into Force in Article 64. And I’m skipping two sentences because I don’t want to go on too long. We could set parameters for when the state parties may consider protocols through an article like 61 BIS. This seems to be a good path to address concerns about the protocols, but that’s not a substitute for an inclusive threshold for Entry into Force for this convention. Turning to the proposed language for a process for protocol considerations, we believe that the envisaged timeline is counterproductive. If the AHC is to continue its work along these lines, we believe that its first reconvened session should be no sooner than two years after the adoption of this convention by the General Assembly. We have to give everyone time to make the current instrument work before turning to another. We also believe it would be helpful for certainty and continuity if a committee were to meet consistently in a single location such as Vienna. Secondly, the change of the term from elaborate to negotiate does not address our concerns. If the AHC is to reconvene for the purpose of examining the need to address additional crimes, it certainly should have the flexibility to develop recommendations that are tailored to the assessed needs. and may not be in the form of a protocol. On specific solutions that you’ve asked us to propose, we would edit the text to say, quote, with a view to providing recommendations relating to the need for a draft protocol supplementary to this convention, unquote. The future AHC will face the same debate we have here. Some believe there’s a need for more, and some do not. We should not assume that the next iteration of this body will come to different conclusions than we have here. We also believe that if the need for additional crimes to be added is identified, the committee should also identify any necessary additional safeguards. As we discussed at length in this room, there have been substantial consensions on safeguards in the current instrument we are discussing. We’ve been able to get to where we are today. It’s not settled, because we know what kinds of crimes and assistance this treaty will cover. A new instrument establishing new offenses may need additional protections. Just as we cannot prejudge what a protocol covers, we cannot also prejudge what safeguards it will need to include. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chair:
Thank you very much, Ecuador.
Ecuador:
Thank you, Madam Chairman. As we stated last Monday, my delegation agreed with revision three. However, given the various views expressed in an attempt to arrive at consensus, we could go along with the text. you provided last night for Article 6, Paragraph 2. We could also support the proposal made by India to replace the word suppression with restriction. While this is an instrument on crime, we need to establish robust safeguards. It is difficult to understand, therefore, the opposition to human rights and fundamental freedoms, particularly if the proposal expressly states that these will be consistent with international law and international human rights law, the laws that are applicable. The reference to certain rights is understood in the provisions in the treaty and which could be applied arbitrarily. We’re not speaking about an exhaustive list here. We could further adjust the drafting then along those lines in order to arrive at consensus. Thank you, Madam.
Chair:
Thank you very much. Oman.
Oman:
Thank you, Madam Chair. First of all, we would like to thank you for your efforts to make this work a success. We know that this will lead to a positive outcome and consensus regarding our discussions, Madam Chair. We join the other delegations regarding their concerns for Article 6. Human rights are guaranteed and this is based on the human rights treaties and international human rights law. We demonstrated our reservation regarding the word suppression in Paragraph 1 of Article 6. We support the Indian proposal to change suppression to limiting, and we support the Egyptian proposal regarding Article 6, Paragraph 2. Discussion regarding this paragraph has happened by a lot of delegates. We agree with the delegates regarding Article 6, Paragraph 2, that it should be deleted and that we should retain only Paragraph 1 of Article 6. If the Secretary’s text is retained, then it should be based on the domestic laws of each state, and we again call on the deletion of this paragraph. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chair:
Merci beaucoup. Thank you very much. I don’t know if it’s exactly what the delegates said, but in French, it said that the text of the Secretariat, now it’s not the text of the Secretariat, please. Perhaps the text from the Secretariat would have been better, but the paper before us is that from the Chair. Thank you. Republic of Korea.
Republic of Korea:
Thank you, Madam Chair, for giving me the floor. We also join other delegations to appreciate you and your team’s tireless effort for our discussion, and this proposal definitely steps forward to our consensus. Our position is generally supportive for your proposal. We do address human rights clause and essentials for this Convention, considering a wide range of cooperation. In this regard, we support to retain Article 6, paragraph 2 as it is. However, we are carefully listening other delegations’ opinion. Regarding the protocol, we also think that it’s too soon to start the discussion to make additional protocols. But for our consensus, we are supportive of your approach differently between ratification and supplementary protocols. Thank you.
Chair:
Thank you very much. Peru. I apologize, Democratic Republic of the Congo first.
Democratic Republic of the Congo:
Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I know that you’re going to ask yourself whether I’m going to go on at length or be brief, but I can assure you that I will be brief. We’re taking the floor specifically on Article 6. At first reading, unless we’re making an error on our part, the spirit and the objective of Article 6 in paragraph 2 seems to be to provide safeguards for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Following the statements made by various delegations, we note that states agree as to the need to ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms are respected. They simply disagree over the current wording. The question that one may ask to reach a solution is whether the current wording is still corresponding to the objective and the spirit of the article as I mentioned it earlier. Now, rereading the paragraph, it is clear that the current wording does provide safeguards for human rights and fundamental freedoms, but it gives the impression that there is a risk that not all rights and freedoms will be included. That is why the Democratic Republic of the Congo proposes that we reword this, specifically Article 6, paragraph 2, as follows. The provisions of this convention apply while scrupulously respecting all existing human rights and fundamental freedoms conventions. Full stop.
Chair:
Thank you. Thank you very much, Peru.
Peru:
Thank you, Madam Chairman. Peru truly acknowledges your persistent efforts throughout all stages of the work as you have chaired our meetings to ensure consensus. Your most recent proposal and your clear explanation provided by this morning are proof of this. Turning to Article 6, paragraph 2, we agree with the changes that have been proposed, namely the additions. They are clear and we agree with the need to have this change in terminology, that is to change suppression for restriction so that the text is easier to understand. In any event, we do not see any incompatibility with a convention on legal criminal assistance cannot refer to human rights documents or, in point of fact, the safeguards under those other conventions. to the other proposals suggested by the chair. Peru also agrees with the number of the threshold for ratifications as proposed at 40 before the convention enters into force. We’ve heard the arguments in favor of that. There’s an urgent need for this convention to enter into force. We also agree with the view that it is difficult to arrive at a clear number, but we think that your most recent proposal sets us in the right direction.
Chair:
Thank you very much, Peru, Egypt.
Egypt:
Thank you, Madam Chair. We are pleased that the chair speaks Arabic fluently. And in this context, I would like to supplement our comment on the articles that are part of the chair’s proposal for discussing today. With regards to Article 6, Paragraph 2, I think many countries have already expressed and continue to express their reservations regarding the list of rights that have been referred to in Paragraph 2, and also the use of suppression instead of India’s proposal which is limiting, which is what we support. And as the representative of the Sultanate of Oman, has explained there is a lack of consensus on the current text in the President’s proposal and therefore the proposal is to delete this paragraph if it does not achieve consensus. As with regards to the proposal for articles 23, paragraph 4 and article 24, I think the Chair has taken into consideration the concerns of many states that have been referred to during the discussions that were held last week. In principle, we support the Chair’s proposal with regards to article 23 and article 24 and we suggest one amendment on paragraph 2 of article 24 so that we delete judicial or other independent, so that any review that is referred to in this paragraph and then we continue and we just delete judicial or other independent review so that it becomes more general and more comprehensive. As for article 40, paragraph 22, the Egyptian delegate continues to believe that this paragraph helps to establish selectivity in commitment to international cooperation, and we don’t consider it one of the reasons for rejection, but it is a reason for not committing to the Convention. We support the Chair’s proposal to retain Articles 3, Paragraph 1 and 2 and 3, and Article 4 and Article 35 with regards to additional protocols and linking that to Article 64. We see that we can go along with the Chair’s proposal regarding retaining Article 64 as is, but as for Article 61bis, we have already showed flexibility during the informal consultations regarding Paragraph 1 of this Article, and we are now considering the second paragraph, which has not been brought up in the past, and we will comment on this at a later time. Madam Chair, with regards to additional protocols and OP5, we believe it is very important to have a timeline for starting these negotiations. This is not the first time that we negotiate additional protocols while the original Convention is being gratified. Therefore, in principle, we support the Chair’s proposal and we show flexibility regarding the timeframes. related to that, taking into consideration the importance of achieving progress in negotiations and also how to consider the crimes that have the interest of many states and which have been brought up during previous sessions. As for the title, Madam Chair, we have already expressed our preference for a more comprehensive title but we are currently reviewing the text and we prefer the text, we prefer the title as is in the resolution establishing this committee. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chair:
Thank you very much. Mexico.
Mexico:
Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. As this is the last plenary meeting before submitting the text, Mexico would like to express its surprise at the fact that our proposal to raise to 60 the number of ratifications required for the entry into force in the Convention and that that has not been included. At the last plenary meeting when this issue was discussed, 75 countries supported raising the threshold to 60. That’s not an insignificant number and we had resounding support from the membership. It is important to point out that only three of the 75 delegations which spoke in favour expressed such flexibility to have the threshold set at 40. 61 BIS does not reflect the majority of concerns in our proposal. It is important to underscore the fact that Mexico proposed its initiative to raise the threshold of ratifications to 60 independent from our discussion on the protocols. That point takes account of inclusivity in a broader sense, including the important decisions to be taken at the first conference of the states parties and the importance of providing an appropriate space and of time so that the vast majority of member states can adequately meet the legislative harmonization requirements in order to accede to the treaty and in this way to allow for robust cooperation and reflect the universal nature of the convention we all hope to achieve. Given the advanced stage of our negotiations, we believe that the Dominican Republic proposal to raise the threshold to 50 is the most amount of flexibility we could show. The will of the membership to raise the threshold is clear and resounding and it is important to respect it and reflect that in the text of the convention. Thank you.
Chair:
Thank you very much. Canada.
Canada:
Thank you, Madam Chair. I’ll try and be brief, noting the time. So for us, we spoke on 6-2 this morning and I don’t want to belabor that point, but there’s been some comments on it this afternoon. So we just wanted to point out that Suppression is a term that appears already three times in this treaty and already has meaning in many other UN conventions as well. And so it’s not unprecedented and it’s not without legal certainty. So we would ask for it to be retained. Our understanding on suppression is that it’s the same term in French and Spanish. And if the French draft currently says repression or repression, that might be an error in the current translation. And if there needs to be adjustments in Arabic or other languages, these can be done by the UN experts on translation as is done in every negotiation. Let me now add a few comments on the other aspects of your broader proposal, Madam Chair. We share the concerns that were generally voiced on the balance of the proposal overall. We feel like it’s significantly shifting away from the priorities that we have previously raised, but I won’t review those again here. Instead, let me just touch on two aspects of the proposal. We would very much support the interventions of the UK and the US on Article 24. The revision to paragraph two is not appropriate for the text of this convention. And then on the protocol proposal that has been put forward, we echo the concerns raised by many others on this aspect of the US on concerns about the implementation of the convention itself. We would have a concern in the substantive text on the prescriptiveness of the direction to negotiate a protocol. We would again request that language be inserted to ensure that the discussion reflects the current diversity of views on the need for a protocol at all. We would ask also on the timelines that the term… The phrase no later than two years, in our opinion, means that it could be done any time after the adoption of the convention. So that could be a week after the adoption of the convention we’re in protocol discussions. And so we would like it to be clarified to express an appropriate amount of time before we would discuss anything on a protocol. And then just on entry into force, we echo, again, the points raised by the United States that while the proposal on the protocols to raise the threshold touches on one element, there’s a whole lot of work that the COSP does at the beginning. And we would be concerned about the inclusivity of that work. And so in that vein, we would very much support our Mexican colleagues in their proposal for entry into force. Thank you.
Chair:
Merci beaucoup. Thank you very much. India, please.
India:
Thank you, Madam Chair. So I would be restricting myself to certain comments on Para 23.4, which has now been taken to 24.4. Now, ma’am, as it was drafted 23.4, we were opposed to it. But now when we see the language, it has been put in 24.4. What we find is that our initial apprehension that this particular draft gives some kind of an interference into the domestic laws, that gets further reinforced because of a sentence that you put in here, which says that both for the purposes of domestic criminal investigations, that would imply that in case a state party were to do some domestic investigations, it would be bound down by this particular article. This particular phrase was not there when it was presented. in 23.4. We find it strange why this has been put in 24.4 besides the other phrase that continues to remain here. So we object to this language and in particular 24.4. Coming back, coming next to PP4, we think that the additional words established in accordance with this convention are not required and should be deleted from PP4. Again, Madam Chair, para 35 1a, we had requested for insertion of the word prevention. This appears to have not been found and we are disappointed with that. And para 40 22, the removal of which we had requested, that also appears to have not been favourably processed. I would again come back to Article 6.2. Since English is not my native language and not native language for many of other colleagues here, I just had a look at the Webster Dictionary meaning of restrict and suppression. Suppression it clearly says to put down by authority or force, whereas restriction it clearly says to confine within bounds. Now a state has the inherent power to confine within bounds of certain human rights. This is an acceptable thing. Here as the rights have been listed out, we have put in both the degradable and the non-degradable rights together. So when I say degradable rights, it would mean the right which cannot be bound down or restricted under any circumstances, whereas non-degradable rights would mean that there could be certain restrictions on it. it. So, if we were to club both the degradable and the non-degradable rights together here and then say states cannot suppress it, this somehow to our understanding does not make – it does not appear proper to us and therefore we had objected to the word suppression and clubbing of the degradable and non-degradable rights as has been listed here. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chair:
Thank you very much, India. Fiji.
Fiji:
Bula Vinaka, Chair, dear colleagues and distinguished dear friends. We echo the thanks of other delegations regarding your leadership, Chair, and the hard work of your team, the Secretariat, and the various delegations in moving towards a consensus. We’re also considering your proposal in its entirety given the different time zones, Chair, however below our preliminary views. With regards to the provisions related to the human rights safeguards, in Article 6 we welcome paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 as drafted in your Rev 3, Chair, and noting the amendment in paragraph 2, we’re closely reviewing this as well. On the supplementary protocol with regards to OP 5 and 6 in the resolution in your proposal, Chair, the current text – and this has also been raised by other delegations – as we have also interpreted it is that should the General Assembly adopt this treaty this year, the convening of the Ad Hoc Committee can take place immediately thereafter as long as it is no later than the end of 2026 as it currently is drafted. It also states that the second session of the Ad Hoc Committee will be meeting for the drafting of the protocol in the following calendar year, so it can also be as early as next year should the first session take place at the end of this year. Under OP6, the Ad Hoc Committee is also supposed to meet within one year of the adoption of the General Assembly to discuss the rules of procedure for the Conference of Parties. So Chair, these are just three sets of meetings which will require the participation of all members of the Ad Hoc Committee within two years based on the first meeting happening this year. This is in addition to the domestic procedures for ratification in our countries and other processes as also mentioned by many delegations last week and also today. Fiji notes that to ensure the meaningful participation of smaller states and to account for the unique contexts and challenges of smaller economies such as constrained resources that the OP5 be amended slightly to state that the first session to be held not earlier than two years after the date of adoption of the Convention and we also note that similar language has been proposed by the U.S. and supported by Canada. We need to ensure that all member states are able to meaningfully participate and contribute to the important areas to be discussed for the purposes of a protocol if need be. And Chair, we welcome OP6BIS as it will ensure the appropriate support to be given to all member states once all member states are in a position to attend and participate. With regard to the entry into force, Chair, we reiterate our support and preference for the proposal by Mexico as we had stated last Thursday in this plenary. With that being said and enjoying from the spirit to exercise flexibility and enriching consensus, we’re also positively and closely considering the proposal made by the Dominican Republic today with regards to the threshold being raised to 50. Thank you, Chair.
Chair:
Thank you very much. New Zealand.
New Zealand:
Thank you, Chair. I addressed Article 6 earlier, so now I turn to Article 7. and then the proposal for a fast-tracked protocol. On Article 24.2, in our previous statement, on this article, we raised concerns with the addition at the beginning of paragraph 24.2, that caveat which reads, in accordance with and pursuant to the domestic law of each state party. That concern is now further heightened as we see another addition at the end of paragraph 24.2, also referring to domestic law. If you did not know the history of this negotiation, or perhaps even if you do, the paragraph is somewhat incomprehensible. Is it about asserting the supremacy of domestic law, or is it about setting out a uniform and well understood standard on minimum safeguards? For clarity, we would again advocate for removing the beginning of the first sentence, that part that I read out before, in accordance with and pursuant to the domestic law of each state party, so that the sentence just begins, such conditions and safeguards shall. Likewise, we do not believe the additional text in red on the screen is necessary and can be removed. We also continue to support the concept of extending the application of these safeguards to the entire convention, rather than being limited to just this single chapter. On the protocol chair, our position has been opposed to the very concept of a fast track protocol. Over the week, we have heard the importance of this to others. We realize that these are genuinely held views. There is a genuinely held ambition to discuss further. Equally, we hope those advocating for the protocol can also understand our genuinely held concerns around inclusivity, timing, resources, and the necessity for such a fast track protocol. Specifically on your proposal chair, we would agree with the UK’s assessment that this version still has many of the same issues we raised earlier, namely it’s immediate, prejudged, and non-inclusive. For example, we do not see the change to negotiate to negotiate as a meaningful one. This is still predetermining or implying there will be a result. A more neutral wording would be something along the lines of to consider the necessity for a draft protocol, because currently we do not have consensus that such a protocol is needed. Further, the formulation of no later than two years, as others have pointed out, could result in an immediate or near immediate beginning of the negotiation. We support Fiji’s proposal in this regard and the explanation to ensure this timing is manageable. We do welcome the proposal for a 61-bis, but note that in our view it would not be a significant step toward inclusivity, especially given it could still be adopted by two-thirds of that 60, which would be 40 anyway, or even less given the present and voting stipulation. Further, 61-bis only seeks to address inclusivity in regard to the protocol. Our previous support for Mexico’s proposal to raise the threshold for ratification doesn’t relate only to the protocols, although that’s obviously a very important factor. As Tonga described in the statement made on behalf of the 14 members of the Pacific Islands Forum earlier, our priority should not just be speed, but rather the inclusivity, sustainability and purposefulness of the Convention. For these reasons, New Zealand continues to strongly support raising the ratification threshold. Thank you, Chair.
Chair:
Thank you, Liechtenstein. Thank you very much, Chair.
Liechtenstein:
Liechtenstein remains concerned regarding the language on the immediate continuation of the AHC in Paragraph 5 of the Resolution, and in our opinion the current changes are not sufficient. Calling for negotiations on draft protocols supplementing the Convention no later than two years means we basically could start a week after the adoption of the Convention. In addition, PARA-6 calls for the preparation of the rules on procedures one year after the adoption. We are looking at potential parallel negotiation processes within the AHC on key issues of the future Convention. So we are expected to simultaneously, one, implement the Convention, two, negotiate the rules of procedure, and three, negotiate the protocol. We therefore ask you to take into account the resources of small states. For small countries, meaningful participation under these circumstances, and I really apologize for using this word again, is practically impossible. In this regard, I wish to support the proposal by Fiji made just a little while ago. This seems a good step in the right direction. Madam Chair, we hear the great number of states calling for a higher number as the minimum threshold for the entry into force of the Convention. It is hard to understand why these voices have not been heard. The proposed Article 61 is only taking care of a fraction of our concerns. For example, the rules of procedures of the Conference and such critical issues as the review mechanism are not taken care of. It is essential that the voices of small states are heard on these issues as well. This can only be achieved by a higher number of state parties at the threshold for the entry into force. This increases the chances that at least a few small states will be at the table when these important decisions are made. And finally, Madam Chair, on the title, Liechtenstein still prefers the simple single-term cybercrime over a a longer and a complicated title. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Chair:
Thank you very much. EU.
European Union:
Merci, Madame la Présidente. I would like to express the position of the EU and its member states on some of the other proposals that you made and on which I didn’t have the opportunity to express myself. On Article 24, paragraph 2, we appreciate, again, your efforts to try to accommodate all sides, but at this last stage of the negotiation, we consider that the interpretative note that you propose for this article in the current version 3 should provide the assurances and clarification that some states need regarding the exclusive competence of national courts in supervising the application in specific cases by the authorities of their states of procedural power. We therefore object to the additional sentence in Article 24, paragraph 2, and we also support New Zealand’s proposal to delete the words at the beginning of paragraph 2, in accordance with and pursuant to the domestic law of each state parties, as they are redundant. On the title, here also we appreciate your efforts to trying to find a way forward, but we have noted that over the last days, a vast majority of states have favoured having a title that is short and simple, and that is the UN Convention Against Cybercrime. The main purpose of a title, regardless of the type of the document, is to express with the fewest words possible what a document is about. And we can all agree that this convention is about fighting cybercrime. Approximative redundancy can be helpful in some cases to reach a consensus, but we believe this is not the case when it comes to the title. On the Regional Economic Integration Organization paragraph, so the second paragraph of Article 61b, you would like to note that it is exactly the same as the one which was agreed at referendum in Article 65, paragraph 2, for the approval of amendments. This paragraph aims simply at clarifying that either the organization votes on behalf of its members or that its members vote individually, but that both cannot take place at the same time and we don’t understand why this would be an issue for the other members. Finally, on the protocols, the EU and its member states support the proposal made by the U.S. Distinguished Delegate to consider also the inclusion of possible additional safeguards together with the consideration of new crimes. Je vous remercie, Madame la Présidente.
Chair:
Thank you, Madame. Thank you. United Kingdom.
United Kingdom:
Thank you, Madame Chair. So, I took the floor earlier to speak on safeguards, but I wanted to add a few remarks on some of the other areas in your proposal, Madame Chair. So, first of all, on the scope, I wanted to do a couple of things. Firstly, to register our concerns regarding the proposal to reopen the interpretative note on investigations, as was drafted in the UDTC. That language, we believe, was already a somewhat delicate compromise, and we do not support the language proposed by the Russian Federation during the informals last week on proactive inquiries and disruption, which expands the interpretation of the term investigation in a way that is somewhat vague and overbroad. I would also note that we continue to have questions about the need for and unintended consequences of Article 4, as we explained previously. Regarding to protocols, as I said earlier, our concerns relate to the immediate timing, the prejudging of the outcome, and the inclusivity of the process. Like others, we recognize the importance some delegations attach to these discussions, and in order to address our concerns, we are open to a number of proposals we’ve heard from other delegations today and last week, which we believe could help to address our concerns. On timing, we support the need to focus on the implementation of the main Convention before diving into discussions on the protocol, and in that regard could support the proposal by Colombia to hold the first additional session of the Ad Hoc Committee at least two years after the entry into force of the Convention. On not prejudging, we could support CARICOM’s proposal, I believe it was a proposal made by CARICOM to add with a view to, in line two, with a view to, so after with a view to, to say consider, with a view to considering the elaboration of, and then on inclusivity, we continue to support Mexico’s proposal to set the entry into force threshold of the main convention at 60, but will consider the proposal made by the Dominican Republic to set it at 50. We are open to your proposal in Article 61bis, Madam Chair, as we agree that it would help to make adoption of the protocol more inclusive. That said, we believe it should actually be higher than 60, as was pointed out, I believe, a few moments ago by New Zealand, and according to the final sentence of Paragraph One, two-thirds of states’ parties are required for adoption. So if the protocol, which would, after all, be a new UN instrument, so we believe that should be supported by at least one-third of UN member states. So a threshold of 85 wouldn’t be mathematically correct, but it would help us to get up to a figure which would ensure that any decision to adopt a protocol would be taken by a larger, and by extension, more representative group of states’ parties. Finally, Madam Chair, on the title and preamble to Paragraph Four, we thank you for your new proposal. We will. consider it, we are considering it carefully. I think for the moment our preference remains to stick with the shorter title of the Convention Against Cybercrime. Um, and on, on PP4, uh, we’ve previously stated that we don’t believe we need to define cybercrime in our convention, um, and our concern that, that this language, uh, notably, where it says here and after cybercrime, uh, goes, well, is essentially a definition of cybercrime. Um, so we, we cannot support that at this stage. Uh, but Madam Chair, um, we, we recognize, recognizing, of course, the importance of, of having a title, um, to, uh, to finishing our work. Um, we, uh, stand ready to, or continue, uh, to stand ready to work with other delegations, uh, to find a, a, a solution we can all accept. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chair:
Thank you. Iceland.
Iceland:
Um, thank you, Madam Chair. Um, this is great. The battery in my computer just ran out. So, um, I had wonderful times, quarter to six. Uh, I’ll try to remember it. Thank you. Um, this is the first time we take the floor today. So thank you for your continued effort to, and, and well done to everyone who worked over the weekend. Um, uh, I will just be super, super brief. So on, uh, six two, uh, we support, uh, the version in rev three on, um, 23 and 24. We support what Liechtenstein and New Zealand have said on the importance of safeguards. Uh, we further support the addition, uh, the editorial, uh, proposals made by, uh, New Zealand. Um, and on the optional protocols, we would like to wholeheartedly support, uh, what our colleagues from Fiji have proposed, and we think it’s a very important issue. On the title, we prefer the short version. It’s a quarter to six, and I am not the only delegation that has consensus with Pakistan on the negotiations on Article 14 and 16, having been frustrating, I think, was the word that he used. So we have consensus on that. There is also the issue that we have not been able to address Articles 14 and 16, but there are still some delegations that have taken the floor here on the issue today, despite the chair’s guidance. So I just wanted to ask, before I yield the floor, if there will be an opportunity to address these Articles before there will be a draft of a REV4, or if I should also not follow the chair’s guide and express my views on those Articles. Thank you.
Chair:
My dear colleague, we have taken due note of your concern, your battery issue. It happens to all of us. So tomorrow morning, I will give you the floor so that you can express your views and make them as detailed as you’d like. So don’t worry about that. With your indulgence, I’m going to ask my dear colleague from Brazil, the vice chair of the committee, to take over the chair for a half an hour so that we can get through the list of speakers. And tomorrow morning, we’ll continue on Articles 14 and 16. You will receive the final text in English tomorrow afternoon and the translations of the text in the different languages will be given to you as soon as possible so that we can adopt the convention on Thursday. That’s the program. Thank you very much. See you tomorrow at 10 a.m. Thank you, Madam Chair. Glad to be of service to this committee. We’ll continue with the list. I hear we have up until 6.15 to continue this session. On the list, yes, on our list we have Australia, Kenya, Rwanda, China, Tanzania, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Tonga, Albania, Vanuatu, El Salvador and Paraguay. So let’s go on with the list. Next is Australia. You have the floor.
Australia:
Thank you very much, Vice Chair or Chair, maybe you are the Chair now. As you heard, we have spoken already this morning on Article 6, so I will constrain my remarks to the outstanding issues the Chair has asked us to talk about. In regards to Article 23 and 24, we’ve heard last week and in our previous sessions confusion around the interpretation of what was Article 23, Paragraph 4 in the UDCT and Australia has been open to ideas to provide clarification to this paragraph and its intention and implementation. The redrafted Paragraph 24, Paragraph 4, does add some clarification. Australia’s preference remains to include additional clarification that Article 24 applies to the whole convention, not just international cooperation, but we do see the rest of the redrafting of this paragraph 4 to be quite helpful. We are, however, considerably uncomfortable with the proposal to bring text from the interpretive note into Article 24, paragraph 3. We do find this addition, rather than adding clarity, increases the confusion, and it does add a lot of repetition, which we do find quite confusing. Coming to the proposals on the supplementary protocol, Australia has consistently expressed concerns about going straight into protocol negotiations, and we still haven’t received an answer to our question about what additional crimes require immediate negotiations that are not captured by Article 4 or the International Cooperation for Serious Crimes in our Convention. That being said, the Chair has asked for all of us to engage on the substance of her proposals, so in the interests of moving forward, I do have a couple of comments on the paper regarding timing, inclusivity, and prescriptiveness. We appreciate the efforts in the Chair’s text to add clarity around the timeframes for possible protocol negotiations. We very strongly support the proposal put forward by Fiji to provide more clarity on timings, and we would also suggest adding more clarity around the interaction between the work of the Ad Hoc Committee in paragraph OP6 and in paragraph OP5. We’d suggest that OP5 should be clear, that it’s the work, that the work of the Ad Hoc Committee set out in OP5, that is, around protocols, would take place after the conclusion of the work to develop the Conference of State Parties Rules of Procedure set out in OP6. This helps avoid the duplication of the Ad Hoc Committee’s work, potentially into multiple tracks and possibly compounding the resourcing issues set out by Fiji and other small states. On these paragraphs, we also support the proposal from Colombia that OP6 be very clear that the Ad Hoc Committee continues its work to prepare the rules of procedure for the Conference of State Parties, Mutatis Mutandis. Turning to the new proposed Article 61 BIS, we think that this is helpful to assist the inclusivity point that we’ve been discussing in relation to protocol negotiations. I am a little scared to ask the UK to show their arithmetic in relation to how they came up with that number but I trust them and so Australia can support increasing the number of state parties if that in fact it makes it a third of UN member states when the maths all works out. However we are still very disappointed to see no change to Article 64 after our considerable discussions last week and the many many states supporting the increased number of states required for entry into force. The proposal by Mexico remains we think the simplest way to address issues of inclusivity and the resource burdens that have been set out so clearly. Finally in relation to prescriptiveness we can support the proposal of the United States to include text on the work of the AHC to work with a view to making recommendations for a draft protocol, avoiding the prescriptiveness in relation to the outcomes of the OP5 AHC discussions. Very finally like the UK we think having a title for our convention is important. We want a title we are willing to continue discussions to find one that works for everyone. Thank you.
Chair:
Thank you Australia. Next Kenya to be followed by Rwanda. Kenya you have the floor.
Kenya:
Thank you chair. This delegation would like to thank you and your team for your tireless efforts in steering the work of this committee. We remain hopeful that we will reach a consensus in the document. We have listened carefully today and in the last week in discussions on the outstanding issues. Regarding Article 6, Paragraph 1, we support the retention of this paragraph as contained in the UDTC. However, regarding Paragraph 2, the proposal to have additional rights listed in the paragraph cannot receive our support as such lists will in no way be exhaustive. The reference in Paragraph 2 to the applicable international human rights laws in itself ensures all the necessary safeguards for human rights and fundamental freedoms. We therefore support the delegations that have called for the deletion of the list of rights. We further support the proposal by the Distinguished Delegate of India to delete the term suppression and replace it with the term restriction. Regarding the title of the Convention, our preference has been to keep it short. However, we are still considering the Chair’s proposal. And finally, we reserve our comment on the matter of the Supplementary Protocol and the prescribing of numbers required for the adoption of the same. Thank you.
Chair:
Thank you very much, Kenya. Next, Rwanda and then China. Rwanda, you have the floor.
Rwanda:
Thank you, Chair. We wish to reiterate our appreciation for your unceasing efforts as the Secretariat and wisdom to reach a consensus. In the spirit of consensus, in regard to the number of ratification for the Convention to enter into force, we support the threshold of 40 because it balances the wishes for those who wanted a lower threshold and for those who wanted a high threshold of 60. Chair, if you could allow us, as we talked about discussing Article 14 and 16 tomorrow, we saw the Chair’s proposal in regard to Article 14, but only Paragraph 4. The Delegation of Rwanda wishes… to bring back Article 14, Paragraph 1, where we wish to submit that, in the updated draft convention, the provision as it stands needs an adjustment. And we wish to bring that adjustment so that it can be considered for discussion tomorrow, if you allow us to proceed. The reason as to this adjustment is to protect children against offenses related to online child sexual abuse or child sexual exploitation material, and ensure compliancy with international law and civil human rights instruments, notably the CRC and other human rights conventions. When interpreting Article 14, we must weigh the child’s best interest against other considerations. Allow me just to read Paragraph 1, not the whole of Article 14, in the interest of time. If you look at the title, offenses related to online child sexual abuse or child sexual exploitation material, Paragraph 1 reads as follows. Each state party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offenses under its domestic law when committed intentionally and without right the following conduct. Just a, if I read just a, not up to d, producing, offering, selling, distributing, transmitting, broadcasting, displaying, publishing, or otherwise making available child sexual abuse or child sexual exploitation material through an information and communication technology system. Chair, the words without right in Paragraph 1 can be perceived as creating legal gaps for impunity since none of the words in Paragraph A up to D could in principle be done with right, and the exceptions for law enforcement necessities would be adequately covered by the term intentionally or by the general principles of domestic law. If Article 14 intends to prohibit offenses related to online child sexual abuse or child sexual exploitation material, we do not see how, at the same time, it permits such kind of exception. In our view, the purpose of this provision was to criminalize the conduct not giving right for probation. We would slightly understand that without rights could refer to actions taken without legal justification, permission or authority. It means that the conduct in question is performed without any legal entitlement to do so. While on one hand, this could mean that the phrase is used to specify that the criminal offenses being defined must be committed illegally or without lawful excuse. On the other hand, this has already been captured by the title of the article itself, which I already read. More than this, it is likely to better serve the interests of ill-intentioned persons or authorities. I wish to note that. That more than this, it is likely to better serve the interests of ill-intentioned persons or authorities. In other words, the provision is creating two categories of possible offenders. Those who have rights to commit offenses related to online child sexual abuse or child sexual exploitation material and those who do not have the right. Unfortunately, the article seems to give a fertile environment for online child sexual abuse by unknown or undefined group of persons within the UDTC. With your permission, Chair, allow us to conclude this discrepancy as follows from the voice of my colleague. Thank you, Chair. Sorry, it took a long time, but this is needed to be done. As a compromise, let us not retain an ambiguous wording of an undefined group to be eligible to abuse the said provision because the risk of those with rights has not been explicitly enumerated or defined by the UDTC. Although Rwanda agrees with the indispensable nature of Article 14, and the rationale behind its inclusion, which was to protect children against offenses related to online sexual abuse or child sexual exploitation material. We wish to highlight some of the problematic issue within Article 14, Paragraph 1, which may fall short to a compliance with international law and several human rights instruments. Thank you, Chair.
Chair:
Thank you very much, Rwanda. Indeed, we will take this issue up tomorrow, but I’m sure you have already said what you had to say on the issue. Maybe you don’t need to take the floor tomorrow on this. Thank you. So next, China to be followed by United Republic of Tanzania. China, you have the floor.
China:
I thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, the Chinese delegation would like to echo the statements made by previous representatives and thank you and Madam Chair for your important contribution and efforts to advance the negotiation of the convention regarding Article 6, Paragraph 2 of the UDTC. We’ve listened carefully to the statements made by previous speakers. As many colleagues have mentioned, many delegations have repeatedly reiterated their serious concerns about Article 6, which we need to take into careful consideration to finally reach a compromise. Just as many states have shown flexibility about the protocol, we call on states to show due flexibility regarding Article 6 as well. To that end, we support new proposal that could contribute to reaching consensus, such as adding except before in accordance with. About the negotiation of the protocol, we have repeatedly discussed OP5 of the UDTC in a spirit of compromise. And we believe the latest Proposed by the chair has fully heated the views of all parties and fully accommodated their concerns in terms of timing the content of the protocol and the arrangements for its adoption. As China has pointed out on many occasions before protocol is an important basis for advancing the negotiations on the convention and for striking a balance between the scope of the criminalization and human rights protection provisions. China is of the view that any further weakening of the relevant elements of the UDTC on protocol will upset the delicate balance that we have achieved and make it extremely difficult to reach a consensus. China has always participated in the negotiations on the convention in a constructive manner and in good faith. We urge all parties to demonstrate flexibility in the same way and show good faith. Finally, we still suggest that the reference to two meetings in OP5 to be replaced by at least two meetings. I thank you, Chair.
Chair:
Thank you, China. Next, Tanzania. You have the floor.
Tanzania:
Thank you, Vice Chair. Our delegation wishes to submit its position on the remaining articles. Vice Chair, on the newly proposed articles 23.3 and 24.4, my delegation supports the reformulated article 24.3 which seeks to clarify and underscore that the conditions and safeguards stipulated under article 24 shall apply within the context of each state party’s domestic law. However, we have noted the additional phrase which makes a reference to international legal instruments to which a state is a party. My delegation does not see merit in its addition. since such obligations under other international instruments to which a state is a party shall still apply to such a state notwithstanding. Vice-Chair, my delegation understands that ratification by any state or this instrument does not absolve such a state from its obligations under other international instruments, be it bilateral, regional, or multilateral. Therefore, we find the additional clause superfluous and redundant. However, if it serves the interest of some delegations with international obligations that subject procedural domestic laws to such instruments, we could be flexible and accept its inclusion. We also wish to underscore that we do not support any proposed amendments that seek to remove references to domestic laws under Article 24. Vice-Chair, in Article 24.4, my delegation reiterates its position that handling requests for international cooperation is a matter of domestic law. How Tanzania handles requests for international cooperation is our sovereign right. It is unprecedented for a UN Convention to dictate how Member States should handle requests for international cooperation. We wish to note once again that the existing international legal framework, which is also reflected in the UDTC, subjects the handling of requests for international cooperation to the domestic laws of Member States. Such a framework is reflected in Articles 40.17, Article 37.8, and in all forms of international cooperation stipulated under the UDTC. Vice-Chair, in all such provisions, UDTC contains caveats and references which subject all forms of international cooperation to the domestic laws of Member States, including grounds for refusal. Indeed, this formulation reflects… the existing international legal framework and international cooperation. Therefore, my delegation strongly opposes a reference to international cooperation in Article 24, Paragraph 4. As we have said numerous times, the inclusion of this paragraph alters the existing framework. The proposal interferes with and seeks to regulate the domestic laws of state parties. My delegation has accepted the inclusion of numerous provisions on conditions and safeguards, noting that the UDTC contains unprecedented intrusive measures. However, we could not accept proposals that may impair our sovereign right to hand requests for international cooperation. Vice-Chair, in Article 40, Paragraph 22, we reiterate that its inclusion is unprecedented in both UNTOC and UNCAC. My delegation was willing to exercise flexibility under the understanding that Article 6, Paragraph 2 is omitted for being unnecessary and redundant. Vice-Chair, regarding the supplementary protocol, my delegation understands that your proposal sought to address concerns raised by several delegations, such as resource constraints, as submitted by developing and small states. The proposal has also addressed the question of inclusivity, which opponents of the proposal raised. In our view, the revised text addresses such concerns, and we see no merit for any further objections to it. Therefore, my delegation supports your proposal, including the 60 ratification threshold as a condition precedent for the adoption of future protocols. My delegation also believes that a minor edit on the phrase I quote not later than two years could move the committee towards consensus. On the proposed title, my delegation is flexible with the proposed version, which accommodates proposals from both sides and reflects the mandate given to the committee by the UNHCR. the UN General Assembly. I thank you, Mr. Vice-Chair.
Chair:
Thank you, Tanzania. Next, Nigeria, and then Burkina Faso. Nigeria, you have the floor.
Nigeria:
Thank you very much. We are grateful to the chair for new proposals to address some of the pending paragraphs. We acknowledge the efforts and inclusive approach in finding that right balance. First, Mr. Chair, we fully support the new proposal on additional protocol. We believe it is a reflection of the discussions we had in this plenary only last Friday. As mentioned in Madam Chair’s remarks this morning, the new proposal in OP5 of the draft resolution and 61B’s paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 of the UDTC are clear initiatives and profound efforts to address the concerns of some delegations regarding inclusivity as well as reasonable time required for ratification of the new convention. To this end, we fully endorse the new proposals in OP5 and 61B’s. Mr. Chair, we would like to reiterate that a wording of the OP5 on the focus of the protocol is consistent with the understanding reached by this committee when we decided to suspend further consideration of important and serious cyber-enabled crimes which were to be reflected in the original Article 17 of the Zero Draft text of the convention. These additional crimes ought to have been negotiated simultaneously with this draft convention. This is why my delegation would like to reiterate that having a definite time frame for this process is the minimum that we can accept. We will not repeat the importance and urgency of addressing crimes not contained in the current draft and which electronic evidence envisaged in the scope of the UDTC may not cover. However, Mr. Chair, as a further compromise, our delegation could be flexible in accepting the proposal by the U.S. to amend the phrase in OP5. not later than two years, to substitute the word later with sooner, so we have no sooner than two years. To enable and reinforce the need to provide states the opportunity to sign or ratify the future convention before engaging in negotiating a new protocol. We agree with the proposal in Article 64 to maintain a threshold of 40 for entry into force as the concerns of inclusivity has been addressed in Article 61Bs. This is also a reflection of the generality of the delegations who took the floor on this issue last week. By the records of my delegation, a total number of 91 delegations took the floor and only 42, I repeat, only 42 supported the 60-state threshold for entry into force. That cannot be said to be the majority. Also, we cannot support the proposal of New Zealand and the UK to include the word consider in OP5 for being vague and ambiguous. Resolution 74-247 clearly empowered this committee to elaborate a convention. We are discussing another draft resolution to be considered by the UN General Assembly and we cannot afford not to be clear. We support the current wording and would also accept replacing negotiate with elaborate to ensure consistency. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Chair:
Thank you very much, Nigeria. Burkina Faso, we have two minutes for translation, so if you could be brief, you have the floor.
Burkina Faso:
Thank you, Mr. Chair. I will be brief in that case. My delegation aligns itself with the delegations that have thanked you for the efforts that you’ve made to present this document. On 6-2, we support the replacement of suppression with restriction. as has been supported by various delegations. We also note that the listing of some rights is not exhaustive and is a point of divergence and suppression would not harm the balance that we’re all seeking. On 34 on entry to force, we support what was proposed by the Chair regarding the title. We want to make sure of the translation in French and we’ll wait for that and we want to make sure that it covers the entire Convention and the spirit of Resolution 74-247. Thank you.
Chair:
Thank you very much, Burkina Faso. Thank you very much, interpreters, for your hard work and for bearing with us. We have a list for tomorrow, Tonga, Albania, Vanuatu, El Salvador, Paraguay, Norway, Switzerland and Kiribati. We’ll take up that list and taking up also Article 14 and 16 tomorrow. Have a good evening.
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