Securing Access to the Internet and Protecting Core Internet Resources in Contexts of Conflict and Crises

Summary

This discussion focused on the Internet Governance Forum’s Best Practice Forum on securing access to the Internet and protecting core Internet resources during conflicts and crises. The session was designed as the beginning of a year-long collaborative process to develop recommendations and best practices, with final outputs expected by November 2025. The forum presented a draft problem statement highlighting the need to clarify roles and responsibilities of the multistakeholder community in protecting Internet infrastructure during emergencies.

Several case studies illustrated different types of disruptions to Internet access during conflicts. Jalal Abukhater described the systematic destruction of Gaza’s telecommunications infrastructure, with 80% of the territory now in active combat zones and repeated deliberate blackouts affecting 2.2 million Palestinians. Marwa Fatafta discussed similar patterns in Sudan and Syria, where warring parties target Internet infrastructure as military objectives and restrict access to repair equipment and fuel. Pablo Hinojosa presented a different type of crisis through the AFRINIC case, where institutional governance failures rather than physical destruction threatened Internet stability across Africa.

The panel examined existing normative frameworks and their limitations. Dennis Broeders discussed the “public core of the Internet” concept, which focuses on protecting critical Internet protocols and infrastructure from unwarranted state interference. However, experts noted significant gaps between different legal frameworks, with international humanitarian law and human rights law offering different levels of protection. Chantal Joris highlighted how Internet infrastructure is often classified as “dual use,” making it potentially legitimate military targets under humanitarian law despite human rights protections.

The discussion revealed fundamental challenges in the current multistakeholder approach to Internet governance during crises. While the community responded effectively to Ukraine’s request to disconnect Russian address space, it has been largely unable to address physical infrastructure destruction in Gaza or institutional failures like AFRINIC. Participants emphasized the need for proactive protective measures, emergency connectivity mechanisms, and better integration of different legal frameworks to address these gaps in protecting Internet access during conflicts.

Keypoints

## Major Discussion Points:

– **Defining and protecting core Internet resources during conflicts**: The discussion centered on clarifying what constitutes “core Internet resources” and establishing roles and responsibilities for protecting them during crises. This includes physical infrastructure (cables, data centers), logical infrastructure (protocols), and organizational infrastructure (Internet governance institutions).

– **Real-world case studies of Internet disruption in conflict zones**: Participants examined specific examples including Gaza’s telecommunications destruction, Sudan’s ongoing connectivity issues, Syria’s sanctioned infrastructure, and the AFRINIC institutional crisis, demonstrating how Internet access becomes weaponized during conflicts.

– **Gaps in existing normative frameworks**: The panel identified significant limitations in current international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law, particularly around the protection of “dual-use” infrastructure and the challenge of applying proportionality principles to Internet shutdowns.

– **Multi-stakeholder community response capabilities**: A critical examination of whether and how the Internet governance community can effectively respond to crises, highlighting successes (Ukraine-Russia case) and failures (Gaza case) in protecting Internet availability during conflicts.

– **Need for proactive emergency mechanisms**: Discussion of concrete solutions including emergency connectivity protocols, multi-stakeholder crisis response mechanisms, funding for infrastructure repair, and alternative connectivity solutions like mesh networks and satellite access.

## Overall Purpose:

The discussion aimed to launch a Best Practice Forum focused on developing clearer guidelines, norms, and mechanisms for protecting Internet access and core Internet resources during conflicts and crises. The session served as a starting point for ongoing work that will continue through 2025, seeking to identify gaps in current frameworks and develop actionable recommendations for the multi-stakeholder Internet governance community.

## Overall Tone:

The discussion maintained a serious, academic tone throughout, befitting the gravity of the subject matter. The tone was collaborative and constructive, with participants building on each other’s expertise from legal, technical, and civil society perspectives. There was an underlying sense of urgency, particularly when discussing ongoing crises like Gaza and Sudan, but the conversation remained focused on practical solutions rather than becoming overly emotional. The tone became slightly more animated during the Q&A section when participants debated the risks and benefits of expanding protective measures for Internet institutions, but remained respectful and professionally engaged throughout.

Speakers

**Speakers from the provided list:**

– **Wim Degezelle** – Consultant with the IGF Secretariat supporting the best practice forum

– **Adedeji Ebo** – Director and Deputy of the High Representative Office of Disarmament Affairs of the UN (delivered video message on behalf of Ms. Izumina Kamitsu, Undersecretary General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs)

– **Anriette Esterhuysen** – Co-facilitator of the best practice forum, former commissioner of the Global Commission on Stability of Cyberspace

– **Dennis Broeders** – Dr. from Leiden University, developer of the concept of “public core of the Internet”

– **Madeline Carr** – University College London, cybersecurity expert, academic engaged in practice

– **Chantal Joris** – Article 19, expert in international law, international human rights law, international humanitarian law

– **Marwa Fatafta** – Access Now, leads Access Now’s work in the Middle East

– **Pablo Hinojosa** – Leader in the Internet tech community for 20+ years, works on institutional infrastructure for core Internet resources, associated with Marconi Society

– **Jalal Abukhater** – From Hamle organization working in Palestine/Israel, researcher on social media operations in conflict contexts

– **Milton Mueller** – Professor at Georgia Tech, Director of the Internet Governance Project

– **Audience** – Julian Sildenvanglo from Norway, private sector, ham radio operator and software engineer

**Additional speakers:**

None identified beyond the provided speakers names list.

# Internet Governance Forum Best Practice Forum: Securing Access to the Internet and Protecting Core Internet Resources During Conflicts and Crises

## Executive Summary

The Internet Governance Forum’s Best Practice Forum on securing access to the Internet and protecting core Internet resources during conflicts and crises convened as a main session to launch a collaborative process aimed at developing comprehensive recommendations and best practices. The session, designed as the beginning of ongoing work leading to a report by November 1st, brought together experts from legal, technical, civil society, and international organisation perspectives to examine the multistakeholder community’s role in protecting Internet infrastructure during emergencies.

The discussion revealed significant gaps between existing normative frameworks and real-world crisis responses, highlighting the urgent need for clearer definitions of core Internet resources, enhanced emergency response mechanisms, and better integration of international legal frameworks. Through examination of case studies from Gaza, Sudan, Syria, and the AFRINIC institutional crisis, participants identified fundamental limitations in current approaches whilst exploring potential solutions for protecting both physical and institutional Internet infrastructure during conflicts.

## Opening Framework and Problem Statement

Wim Degezelle, consultant with the IGF Secretariat, established the session’s purpose as launching a Best Practice Forum focused on clarifying roles and responsibilities of the multistakeholder community in securing core Internet resources during conflicts and crises. He explained that this year’s format is particularly advantageous because “usually people become interested after the IGF session ends, but this year we can involve everyone interested in the coming months.”

A problem statement has been published for public comment, with feedback already received raising concerns about the definition of “core Internet resources” and “multistakeholder.” Degezelle noted that the forum aims to develop actionable recommendations through continued collaboration, with a final report expected by November 1st.

## UN Framework and International Context

Adedeji Ebo, representing the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs, delivered a foundational message emphasising collective responsibility across stakeholders. He noted that whilst international law provides clear guidance on targeting civilian infrastructure, with states committed to not conducting ICT activities that damage critical infrastructure, responsibility extends beyond states alone. “We must work collectively as states, international organisations, civil society, and the private sector,” he emphasised, establishing the multistakeholder framework that would underpin the entire discussion.

Anriette Esterhuysen, co-facilitator of the Best Practice Forum, outlined the forum’s approach to exploring how existing frameworks can be strengthened through multistakeholder and legal mechanisms working together. She emphasised the importance of bringing together different communities that have been working on related issues separately.

## Case Studies: Real-World Internet Disruption

### Gaza: Digital Erasure as Weapon of War

Jalal Abukhater from Hamle provided a stark account of Gaza’s telecommunications collapse, describing how 80% of the territory is now classified as an active combat zone, leaving 2.2 million Palestinians digitally isolated. He characterised the situation not as technical failure but as “the use of connectivity as a weapon of war,” introducing the concept of “digital erasure.”

Abukhater detailed the systematic nature of the disruption: “We’ve seen deliberate blackouts that have lasted for days, sometimes weeks, affecting the entire population of Gaza.” He emphasised that this represents a fundamental shift from accidental or collateral damage to intentional targeting of civilian digital infrastructure as a military tactic.

### Sudan and Syria: Patterns of Infrastructure Targeting

Marwa Fatafta from Access Now expanded the geographical scope, describing similar patterns in Sudan and Syria where warring parties systematically target Internet infrastructure. In Sudan, the Rapid Support Forces have attacked data centres as collective punishment, causing complete communications blackouts. Syria’s 14-year conflict has left telecommunications infrastructure fragmented, with international sanctions complicating efforts to import repair equipment and fuel.

Fatafta noted that armed conflict has become the leading trigger of Internet shutdowns worldwide, with warring parties increasingly viewing civilian Internet infrastructure as legitimate military targets.

### AFRINIC: Institutional Governance Crisis

Pablo Hinojosa, representing the Internet technical community, presented a different type of crisis through the AFRINIC case, where institutional governance failures rather than physical destruction threatened Internet stability across Africa. AFRINIC has endured prolonged institutional uncertainty with legal proceedings and governance deadlock affecting global Internet stability.

Hinojosa emphasised that “protecting the core of the Internet also includes the protection of the institutions that make it work,” expanding the definition of what requires protection beyond physical and logical infrastructure to include the institutional layer. He referenced the Marconi Society work and mentioned the “139 keyword” in relation to protecting Internet institutions.

## Normative Frameworks and Legal Analysis

### The Public Core Concept

Dennis Broeders from Leiden University, who first developed the notion of the public core of the Internet, explained how this framework focuses on protecting critical Internet protocols and infrastructure as a global public good. He outlined a three-layer analysis: technical/physical, logical, and organizational levels of the public core.

Broeders noted the geopolitical pressures facing Internet governance, warning: “If anyone tells Donald Trump that he can turn off the Internet in Iran because he has ICANN, I’m not sure what he will do. I do not have deep faith in the gentlemanliness of the US administration at this moment.” He also mentioned the “Internet carve-out” by the EU and G7 regarding Ukraine as an example of how the public core concept has been applied.

### International Legal Framework Gaps

Chantal Joris from Article 19 provided critical analysis of existing legal frameworks, highlighting significant gaps between international humanitarian law and human rights law. She emphasised that international law is “in such a massive crisis that you really feel, okay, I can tell you about the rules, but, you know, compliance is totally nonexistent.”

Joris noted that Internet infrastructure is often classified as “dual-use,” making it potentially legitimate military targets under humanitarian law despite human rights protections, creating fundamental tensions in legal protection frameworks.

## Technical Solutions and Emergency Response

### Multistakeholder Response Capabilities

Madeline Carr from University College London noted differences in the multistakeholder community’s ability to respond to different types of crises, observing limitations when threats come through hardware destruction rather than logical infrastructure attacks.

Milton Mueller from Georgia Tech provided a cautionary perspective on expanding multistakeholder authority, arguing that physical infrastructure falls outside the scope of traditional Internet governance institutions and warning against seeking positive protection measures that could lead to state capture of Internet institutions.

### Emergency Connectivity Solutions

Fatafta proposed concrete solutions, calling for multistakeholder emergency mechanisms providing funding, political leverage, and technical solutions during crises. She emphasised the need to think beyond rapid emergency response, noting that armed conflict is cyclical and requires mechanisms for rebuilding resilient infrastructure.

Julian Sildenvanglo from the audience suggested that “emergency mesh technologies in phones could help maintain basic communication during disrupted situations,” highlighting potential technical approaches to maintaining connectivity when infrastructure is compromised.

## Future Directions and Next Steps

### Continuing the Forum’s Work

The Best Practice Forum will continue through online webinars, with the first scheduled for July. Organisers plan to invite other IGF workshops dealing with undersea cables, resilience, and conflict/human rights to join future discussions, consolidating feedback to develop a comprehensive agenda for continued work leading to the November 1st report.

### Open Participation

The forum maintains an open invitation for participation, with feedback mechanisms including a QR code for public comment on the problem statement. The collaborative approach emphasises bringing together different communities that have been working on related issues separately.

## Conclusion

The Best Practice Forum’s inaugural session successfully established the scope and urgency of challenges facing Internet access and core resource protection during conflicts and crises. The discussion demonstrated both strong consensus on the severity of the problem and significant disagreements about definitions, scope, and approaches.

The forum’s ongoing process faces the complex task of bridging fundamental tensions between technical and political approaches while establishing practical mechanisms that can respond effectively to crises. The path forward requires both immediate emergency response capabilities and longer-term institutional resilience, balancing the urgent needs of affected populations with the preservation of Internet governance principles.

As conflicts increasingly weaponise digital infrastructure, the multistakeholder community must evolve its approaches through continued collaboration, with the July webinar and broader IGF community engagement representing crucial next steps in this vital work.

Wim Degezelle: . Welcome to this main session of the best practice forum this year. This year we have a long title. It’s a best practice forum on securing access to the Internet and protecting core Internet resources in context of conflict and crisis. Briefly introduce myself. I’m Wim de Gezelle. I work as a consultant with the IGF Secretariat supporting this best practice forum. Why am I a consultant with the Secretariat? Why is the Secretariat supporting this work? Well, a best practice forum is one of the modalities of the intersessional activities. It means there are a couple of topics and this year there are four topics that the MAG, the multistakeholder advisory committee selects and say, well, it is important that we can work on this and we can have the discussions on this, but in a broader context, not only at the IGF, but also in the weeks before, ahead, after IGF. Typically, that means a best practice forum starts to work with online discussions ahead of the meeting to be able to present some outputs of the discussions at the IGF meeting. Of course, this year everything is different. And the fact is that IGF is way earlier. That means the best practice forum is really at its beginning. We have like one or two online I think it’s very important and a great opportunity this year because usually what happens is that we have the discussions with a team, with a core team, with people involved. At the IGF, we come to talk about it on stage and then afterwards a lot of people are interested to join, interested to participate. And then we usually have to say, sorry, but this is the end of the meeting, and then we have to say, sorry, but this is the end of the cycle. Well, this year, it is different. This year, we can start off and we can involve everybody that’s still interested in the coming months, because our final output we only intend to, or we only will present in the 1st of November. A couple of words about the topic and the title. The topic and the objectives of the session, this session immediately comes and follows a main session that was organized last year at the IGF in Riyadh, where a panel discussed what’s happening, what’s important with Internet access, what happens if there are conflicts, if there are crises, what it means to Internet access for civilians, what it also means to the stability of the Internet itself. One of the findings or outcomes of that session was exactly that there is a lot of talk, but not much is clearly defined about the topic. It is really important to have the discussion, pick up the discussion, identify roles, responsibilities, look at norms, existing norms, norms frameworks that might be applicable, and that is exactly where this best practice forum takes off. Thank you. and really wants to finalize. We published a problem statement, I will come back on later in the introduction, sorry, where we invite feedback to clarify the problem and then the panel will further discuss on this. This is also the objective of the session, is really have that input to continue to work on during the next months to clarify the problem statements, look, get pointers, get feedback, get input. And also part of the discussion is to discuss what can we as a best practice forum, what can we as a IGF community do in this field? What role can we play? Before I continue the introduction and go to the problem statement, I would like to invite you to listen to a video message from Mr. Abel, Director and Deputy of the High Representative Office of Disarmament Affairs of the UN. Can’t be here, but they say, can we at least provide a message via video? So please let us listen. Distinguished co-facilitators, dear participants,

Adedeji Ebo: I am honored to deliver this message on behalf of Ms. Izumina Kamitsu, Undersecretary General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs. For 20 years, the Internet Governance Forum has served as an essential platform for multi-stakeholder discussions on digital public policy. As we approach the 80th anniversary of the United Nations, we are reminded that our successes are underpinned by inclusive and coordinated. efforts. The IGF Best Practice Forums work precisely in that spirit, open bottom-up collective approaches to Internet policy matters. Allow me to now turn to the specific topic at hand. The importance of securing Internet access and protecting core Internet resources in contexts of conflict and crisis situations. Safeguarding Internet resources is essential for our shared digital future. These resources include what has become known as the public core of the Internet, which constitutes the critical digital components that ensure the general availability and integrity of the Internet across borders. Assets like fiber-optic cables, data centers, and satellite constellations. In peacetime, this critical infrastructure underpins digital transformation and enables sustainable development. We also see the vulnerability of these assets in conflict situations. Recent conflicts demonstrate the serious dangers posed to civilians by attacks, including through digital means, against infrastructure essential for public services and the functioning of society. We must ask ourselves, how can we mitigate the risks posed to critical infrastructure, including core internet resources, in light of rising threats. First, international law provides clear guidance on targeting of civilian infrastructure in the context of armed conflict. Deliberate attacks on civilian infrastructure are forbidden under international humanitarian law, including telecommunications and other infrastructure that help people to be informed and protected during times of war. We must always uphold these obligations and be guided by international law, including the UN Charter in the use of digital technologies. Second, states have agreed to be guided in their use of information and communications technologies by a set of norms, including three pertaining specifically to the protection of critical infrastructure. Fundamentally, states have committed not to conduct or knowingly support ICT activities that intentionally damages critical infrastructure or otherwise impairs the use and operation of such infrastructure providing services to the public. This includes the technical infrastructure essential to the general availability or integrity of the internet. But responsibility rests not only with states. We must work collectively as states, international organizations, civil society, and the private sector. Efforts such as joint norm implementation and exchanges of good practice could go a long way. We must ensure that our digital future is not only peaceful, but inclusive for the benefit of all. I thank you for your attention.

Wim Degezelle: Thank you. I think that was a statement that already has a lot of content, which the panel will definitely come back. But before handing over to the panel, I’m also going to listen to some case studies first. I already mentioned that the Best Practice Forum developed at its first call a problem statement that we sent out for public comment or input. Maybe I can have the slides on the screen. Most important part of the slide is of course the QR code, where you can still provide input on the statement. So this draft problem statement, which you can see behind me, is really the starting point for the discussions of the Best Practice Forum. It says that there is a clear and pressing need to clarify roles and responsibilities of the multistakeholder community and of institutions that are active within it in securing core Internet resources and in ensuring access to the Internet during conflicts and crises. Like I said, we discussed that already at the first online webinar we had of the Best Practice Forum. Then we published it. we have a lot of questions. We have a lot of questions on the statement itself, but also some additional questions on norms, framework, who should be involved, et cetera. Some of the initial feedback we received on the statement was the topic or the concept of core Internet resources. It is not clear for everyone. There are different opinions, different views on what it is, what it is not. So, we have a lot of questions on the statement, but also some additional comments on the framework. Be clear what is meant with it. Together and have discussions. It is important that you know what you talk about. Also, it was mentioned by one contribution that if there is ambiguity on what core Internet resources is, it is very difficult when you want to get to the core Internet. So, it is important to be clear what is meant by the term core Internet. Stakeholders, it is all clear or it is a term we are very familiar with within the IGF community. Stakeholders, multistakeholders, who they are. It is important to name them, to be very clear. Also, to understand that we might have a very clear idea of who stakeholders are. If you come to an IGF, but if we move to the core Internet, it is very important to have a clear understanding of what is meant by the term core Internet. With regard to roles and responsibilities, a comment came in. We should not only look at roles and responsibilities during crisis, during a conflict, but there is also an important role, important responsibilities on what happens before. Preparation for a crisis, prevention, and also what happens after it. So, it is not just this isn’t important, but something has to be fixed whose responsibility is it, and the last, there are areas where we are talking a lot about global direction and maybe of the global issues, the solution to solving these So I think that’s the main point that we have to make. And the second point that I want to mention is that it’s very easy to say it’s important to have access for civilians, but if you want to really have that discussion, it’s crucial that you agree on what scope you want for civilian access. Like I said, there is a QR code. And if you want to have access for civilian access, you have to have a QR code. So the best practice forum now has its main session at the IGF, but we continue to work and we expect to publish a report by the 1st of November. Thank you. I now would like to hand it over to Anirudh, who is a co-facilitator of the best practice forum and will lead the panel. So, Anirudh, thank you very much for being here. I would like to ask you to introduce yourself. And then we’ll have a discussion with the panel. Thank you all.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Thank you very much, Women. Thanks, everyone, for being here. Before I introduce my panel, I want to just really stress that everyone should know this session is fundamentally different from many other sessions you’ve been to in that best practice forums that have been held in the past. So, in fact, what this session gives us is an opportunity to set an agenda for the work of this best practice forum for the rest of this year, and potentially, should the MAG renew it, even for a further year or two. So don’t think just about what we can discuss today. Think also about what we can discuss, develop, and address going forward. So, I’ll leave it at that. So, to take us down to sort of the more nitty-gritty of this, so we can begin to look at this problem statement, look at the work, I mean, every moderator says that their panels are exceptional, but to my left, we have Dr. Dennis Bruders from Leiden University, who, in fact, is the person that first developed this notion of the public core of the Internet, and he’ll tell you more about that. And I don’t think he knew when he did that, that it would actually become an ongoing process and debate, and that we’re not leaving him alone as a result. And next to him is Madeleine Carr, University College London, also an academic, but these are not just your everyday academics, they’re academics that are actively engaged in practice and in this space, who is a cybersecurity expert, I would say. And then we have next to her Chantal Joris from Article 19, who understands and comes very much from the perspective of international law, international human rights law, international humanitarian law, which is really vital, as we also heard in the address from Adedeji earlier. And next to Chantal is Marwa Fatafta from Access Now, she leads Access Now’s work in the Middle East, and she will talk to us about some of the on-the-ground experiences and what the impact is when these resources and when access is not protected. And next to Marwa we have Pablo Hinojosa, a leader in the Internet tech community for the last 20 years, who will talk to us about the part that we often don’t think about, which is the institutional infrastructure that looks after the core Internet resources and what happens when they are in crisis. And next to Marwa is Jalal Abou-Katir, who is from Hamle, an organization working in Palestine, Israel, who does, I think, probably the most… and also, I think, the most detailed and validated research on how social media operates and how people use and abuse social media and how the institutions that provide social media platforms operate in context of conflict. So, to start us first, we’re going to first look at the experience. So, Jalal, really, it’s good to welcome you. I’m so sorry that because of conflict that you are not able to be with us. But please tell us a little bit more about how this destruction, disruption, non-availability of access has operated and impacted in the context of Gaza.

Jalal Abukhater: Thank you, Henriette. I’m very happy to be part of this panel. Thank you for, of course, organising this best practice forum. I’m hoping for an informed discussion. Of course, I’ll be presenting mainly on the experience that we’ve been documenting in terms of what’s happening in Gaza. We have been witnessing the collapse of the entire telecommunications system in real time. Since the start of the military campaign back in October 2023, the Gaza Strip has experienced repeated and deliberate blackouts, including right now. But what makes this current moment particularly alarming is the accumulated near-total destruction of Gaza’s internet and fixed-line infrastructure. As of this week, in June in 2025, we’re reporting daily on complete and partial internet and fixed-line blackouts across the entire Gaza Strip. The last remaining fibre route was repeatedly targeted and destroyed by Israeli forces over the past few weeks. All redundancy in the network has been lost. Mobile networks are barely holding on, and it may collapse entirely due to the lack of fuel, infrastructure and spare parts, of course. No repair missions are being permitted by Israeli authorities. 80% of Gaza is now classified as active combat zone, making technical intervention and repairs… Blackouts do have a catastrophic consequence, of course. Militarian organizations cannot coordinate aid, emergency services are unreachable, journalists are unable to report, and, of course, civilians are left in the dark without the ability to communicate or receive warnings. More than 2.2 million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip remain digitally isolated. Of course, this is not a technical failure only. This is the use of connectivity as a weapon of war, what we refer to as digital erasure. From a norms perspective, the destruction and obstruction of telecommunications infrastructure violates the principles of both international humanitarian law and human rights law. The Geneva Conventions protect civilian infrastructure, access to information is a recognized human right. Yet there is no accountability when core insurance services are digitally dismantled, as we see in Gaza. We, of course, ask for this forum to consider how existing normative frameworks fail to protect digital lifelines in occupied or besieged territory. What happens when a state actor with control over the spectrum and infrastructure uses that power to impose silence on a civilian population? We, of course, urge stakeholders in this space, governments, regulators, companies, multilateral bodies to treat telecom infrastructure the same way we treat water and electricity during humanitarian crisis. We need enforceable protections for core infrastructure under armed conflict, as well as emergency mechanisms for civil society and humanitarian actors to deploy alternatives, whether it’s by satellite, e-send, or portable cell networks. Lastly, I’d like to highlight that the campaign reconnects Gaza’s support by over 60 international organizations, including some present on this panel. Of course, we are reporting on this repeatedly. And of course, we are trying to urge international action through institutions like the ITU to ensure Gaza’s reconnection and future sovereignty is guaranteed. Lastly, I want to say a couple of facts and figures. the World Bank. The damages to Gaza’s ICT sector are estimated at $164 million, with $736 million in losses. Short-term reconstruction needs are estimated at $114 million, with total needs reaching $460 million. Without addressing these figures seriously, no humanitarian recovery plan may succeed. And thank you very much for the opportunity to speak. Thanks very much, Jalal. By the way, let’s not speak too quickly. We have to keep the captioners in mind as well, because they are transcribing what we are saying. I know time’s limited, but thanks very much for that, Jalal. Marwa, you have been working in Access Now works in other parts of the Middle East, including, I would like to highlight Sudan, a country which has been without internet access for years and years. So, what is the experience

Marwa Fatafta: and the impact there in the context? Yeah, absolutely. So, I want to follow up on what Jalal said and start by emphasizing on the fact that securing internet access or depriving civilian population of that is extremely different from the familiar kill switches that we know of, you know, where an authoritarian state would just simply shut down the internet in times of unrest. We’re talking about extremely complex situations, which makes our job as civil society trying to secure alternative connectivity difficult. So, the connectivity disruptions that we see time and time again, and that is unfortunately a trend on the rise. Access Now runs the global coalition of Keep It On, you know, 300 civil society organizations working to document and stop internet shutdowns around the world, and unfortunately, armed conflict has become the leading trigger of internet shutdowns worldwide. What we see is that in times of conflict, warring parties see civilian Internet infrastructure as a military target. So we see cell towers, fiber optic cables, switchboards, data centers, even ISP offices, headquarters and even their own maintenance crews and repair crews become a target. Gaza offers, sadly, a devastating example of that in action, as Jalal outlined. Sudan is another example. For instance, the rapid support forces, one of the warring parties in Sudan, they have attacked data centers in the opposite controlled part or in territories that are controlled by the opposite warring party as a way to inflict collective punishment of civilians. For example, last year in February, the RSF took over Internet service providers or data centers in Khartoum, which led to a complete communications blackout in the entire country. And we’ve seen the same pattern happening time and time again. Every time they attack data centers or seize data centers or telecommunications offices, they plunge the entire country into the dark. Another complicating factor, which I think is important for us to highlight, is we’re not only talking about the destruction and the damage of the infrastructure itself, but also the warring parties weaponize access, such as banning or restricting access to repair parts, spare parts or critical components of the infrastructure that is needed to repair it. Or sometimes things are as basic as fuel, as we also see again in the context of Gaza. And therefore, simply, if you don’t have electricity, you’re not able to provide the Internet to civilians. So the basic infrastructure maintenance becomes another political and logistical battlefield between the warring parties. And these challenges are magnified even further in sanctioned contexts, and here I want to take Syria as a case study or as an example to mention. Now the Syrian regime has thankfully fallen, but after 14 years of war, and that has left half of Syria’s infrastructure, including its telecommunications infrastructure, in shambles. What that meant is, for instance, it meant unreliable and slow internet, it meant fragmented internet, because every territory has become reliant on ISP providers, either provided by one of the controlling warring parties. For example, in northern Syria, people relied for a long time on telecommunications and internet services provided by the Turkish authorities, which meant that during the devastating earthquake that had hit Turkey and northern Syria, the Turkish authorities shut down the internet because they wanted to control the opposition, and the critical voices saying where is the government, what is it doing to help rescue people, but it also meant that people who were relying on these networks were also disconnected, and we’re talking about a moment of extreme humanitarian needs for populations. And the question here is that, okay, you have a, so Syria has been one of the most sanctioned countries on earth by the US, by the EU, that also included getting in repair equipment. It’s difficult for private companies, telecommunications companies, to bring in and import equipment that they need to repair and to maintain the running of this infrastructure, raising again questions about how can we secure internet access, the very topic of our discussion today, in such a context. around it as well. Next, I would suggest we also end the time for sharing of having questions in certain contexts, and I want to also say that, or actually, let me stop here, and I do want to raise the question of what we can do as

Anriette Esterhuysen: civil society but also, as part of the IGF knowledge stack up there in the ISOC, whenever that can be handled, of course. And we will go into any questions that you have. Pablo, you have a very different type of disruption to discuss. Pablo.

Pablo Hinojosa: Yes, but first I would like to advocate for the continuation of the work . Regardless of if the FGIS mandate is renewed or not. I think this is important work that needs to continue. I think we are all in agreement that we want to protect the public core of the internet. If not, you are really in the wrong forum. So I depart from that premise. And my argument here today is that protecting the core of the internet also includes the protection of the institutions that make it work. And I will come from the angle of resilience because internet resilience is not about networks but it’s also about people and organizations. And let me talk about a concrete example. It’s a striking example and this is the Afrinik case, the regional internet registry for Africa. For more than two years, Afrinik has endured a prolonged period of institutional uncertainty. Legal proceedings, governance deadlock, leadership gaps, they all have prevented it to function. And at the core it is the public T electricity industry. It was 20 years ago that we see the the basic services have continued. The absence of a CEO, the absence of a decision-making board has presented big, big challenges, and it is only thanks to the commitment of AFRINIC staff, its people, that the organization has continued to provide these basic services. For that commitment, which is usually not recognized or not recognized enough, we should all be, and the Internet should be, very grateful. A functional RIR is needed for Internet stability, because when institutions like AFRINIC struggle, it’s not a local issue on a single jurisdiction. If a registry cannot operate properly, it is harder to trust routing information, and it is easier for cyberattacks to happen. And that not only affects Africa, that affects the global Internet. So what we’ve seen in this example is that weakness doesn’t always come from infrastructure. It can also come from weak governance, legal pressures in specific jurisdictions, or the lack of multi-stakeholder community support, or enough support and pressure from the community. And I risk myself to say that when this happens, the multi-stakeholder model, the model that we have built for more than 20 years, it’s not only at the IGF, but also elsewhere, to protect the Internet may not be strong enough on its own. And that’s the premise that I would like to put forward. And this should be a wake-up call, not just for Africa, but for all of us who care about the resilience of the Internet. It challenges the long-held view that the best way to protect the Internet is through non-interference. Sometimes non-interference is not enough, and inaction, too, can cause harm. So, it’s definitely time to think about positive protective measures and I hope that the next part of the debate will talk about it and to help these institutions stay strong when they are under pressure. So my point is, if we want the Internet to stay open, stable and secure, if we want Internet resilience, we have to support the people and institutions that make that possible.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Thanks very much for that, Pablo. Now we are at the Internet Governance Forum and we do talk a lot here about norms and governance frameworks. So I’m now turning to our norms and governance experts. Just listening to this and listening to these different types of cases, some of them similar but also different dimensions. What is your view on existing normative frameworks, soft norms, hard norms, are they sufficient? Is it clear who they apply to or how compliance is measured and assessed? And maybe you don’t all have to comment on this, but those of you that have looked at the public core norm and the work around that, does it apply to this context? Let’s start with you, then we’ll go to Madeline and then we’ll go to you, Chantal.

Dennis Broeders: Thank you very much. So the cases are very, very different and the normative frameworks also differ. So I will focus on the most global ones and then there’s three major ones that I would like to flag, some really short because others will speak to it. So there’s the law of armed conflict, there’s human rights law and there’s the protection of critical information infrastructure in a global sense and that gets us to the public core. So international humanitarian law, there is always, surprises me how little protection there actually is for critical infrastructure when you really look at it, proportionality is extremely stretchy, right? So that’s one. Human rights law would be extremely relevant for the Gaza case, would be extremely relevant for the Syria case. But both of these will be addressed by Chantal, so I will leave those to the side. Third is the protection of critical internet resources and infrastructure. That’s the public core, and you’re right, when I wrote this more than 10 years ago under the beams in a think tank in The Hague, I did not think I would be 10 years later here still doing this, but fair enough. There has been a debate since 2015 on the idea of the public core of the internet, so the protection of core internet resources and infrastructure that should be exempted from unwarranted intervention by states. So in my original conceptions, I saw it as the core internet protocols and infrastructure are a global public good and should be treated as such. It is important to stretch, and Pablo already did that, the public core norm is a negative norm. It’s a thou shalt not norm, so they should not do it. That also means it’s a political commitment. Implementation is really hard when it comes to negative norms, and the whole framework about the implementation of norms is not necessarily helpful to the debate when it comes to negative norms. The focus is on large-scale and transnational disruption of the internet, like Pablo highlighted in the AFRINIC case. So for example, if you see how the debate developed, Gaza, for example, would not necessarily be the best fit. Human rights law would perhaps be a better way to look at it. The debate started in the Netherlands, it went to the Internet Society, to the Global Commission on Stability of Cyberspace, of which you were a commissioner. Multi-stakeholder instruments like the Paris goal, the EU, the UN, etc. A lot got translated, adapted, some things got lost in translation. That’s how it works. But the central idea still is how do we protect the integrity and the availability of the global internet? That’s how it’s formulated at the UN. Also in the draft report of the Open Ended Working Group, which came out last week, sometimes it’s policy in the EU, for example, but most it’s a framework. For this community, in the 2021 GGE report was the first recognition by diplomats and states that there is such a thing as transnational critical infrastructure. This is the group, GGE is a group of governmental experts of the first committee of the UN, so it’s a fairly strong instrument. Yeah, it’s the first committee, it’s the security diplomats that are doing this. The fact that the internet is a transnational infrastructure has a fairly high duh halter here, I presume, but for diplomats this was a big thing because critical infrastructure is a national prerogative, you decide what it is, right? When I look at the protection of the cultural core of the internet, I always look at three layers. So the technical, physical infrastructure, then the logical infrastructure and then the organizational level and that’s where I want to end up. So if we look at the technical level, so the physical infrastructure, that is increasingly being connected to the debate of the public core, right? We see it when we talk about cable infrastructure, satellite infrastructure, etc. That is increasingly coming together. Some of that is hype, right? We had a discussion here on Monday on day zero with some experts where they say, okay, intentional harm to these infrastructures is still fairly rare when it comes to cables, hasn’t changed that much. It’s real, it would have devastating consequences, it happens, but there’s a lot of hype. The other thing is, for politics, for diplomacy, also to a certain extent for academia, there is a bit of a Columbus fallacy, right? It’s new to us, it’s not necessarily new. Others have looked at this, right? There’s a lot of policy in place, they did not start yesterday just because the rest of the world discovered that this was a critical resource. So there is a lot in place already. At the logical level, you’ve heard ad nauseum how the protocols of the internet are not developed with security in mind, etc. That’s something we say to each other a lot. That makes it vulnerable, but already a lot of work has been done in the technical community also to try and fix these things. Lastly, the organizational level, and we haven’t talked too much about that, but I think it’s a really interesting one, and then I’ll stop. If we look at Ukraine, for example, there’s a lot of pressure on Internet governance organizations to take sides. We all know the Ukrainian request to ICANN, the RIPE NCC. They rejected that on the basis of neutrality, on the basis of, okay, we are caretakers of network continuity, basically. But it is also now outed as a possibility. The positive one on this front is that states, in the case of Ukraine, have said, okay, there’s a so-called Internet carve-out. The EU has said that, the G7 has said that, to not sanction these organizations in order to create continuity. But as other speakers here have already said, that does not, for example, apply to Syria, where it has happened. So, that’s different. The Afrinik case is also interesting, because one potential logical conclusion from what happens there is that, why don’t we move Afrinik from Mauritius to, say, Kenya, for example, right? That would make sense to a certain extent, but it would also mean that, for the first time, we will indicate to the world that these organizations that are responsible for the key resources of the Internet are a movable feast. You can put them here, you can put them there, it doesn’t really matter. That will open a debate that we haven’t seen yet. So, that’s also an interesting one. The last one that’s sort of connected to that, that also means that the fact that these organizations so far have been relatively unsanctioned, they have been not really weaponized yet, is based on a tacit gentleman’s agreement that is political in nature, right? So, let’s do a fictitious scenario. If anyone tells Donald Trump that he can turn off the Internet in Iran because he has ICANN, I’m not sure what he will do. I do not have a doubt. deep faith in the gentlemanliness

Anriette Esterhuysen: of the US administration at this moment. I’ll leave it at that. Thanks very much, Dennis. Madeline.

Madeline Carr: Yeah, okay, thanks. So over the course of the last year or so, we’ve been studying these cases, in particular the Russia-Ukraine case where Ukraine requested that the Russian address space be shut down. The Gaza case where the critical information infrastructure has been destroyed and there’s been no, they have not been allowed to repair it. And the Afrinet case where we saw this kind of ongoing legal, we could say, interference with that element, that organization of the public core. And we’ve been looking at how does the multi-stakeholder community cope with these situations of conflict and crisis. And I thought it was a very good point that Pablo made about considering these things, not just simply in a kind of technical or global institutional capacity, but thinking about the people and organizations that make up the maintenance of the public core. Because in fact, the reason that resonated with me is because that is a debate that happened in cybersecurity. Maybe 10 years ago, when we used to think of cybersecurity as a technical problem with technological solutions, and then we now realize that’s just simply not the case. So I think that’s a very good point to keep in mind when we consider these, because norms, of course, and international relations generally, are social processes. They’re about human beings and organizations. Of those three cases that we looked at, it was clear that there is a risk of interference to the public core from both state and non-state actors, and even private individuals. as demonstrated in the case of AFRINIC, but it also became clear to us that there are circumstances in which these relevant non-state actors, the multi-stakeholder community, really needs to be quite significantly more proactive in protecting the public core if the multi-stakeholder internet governance model that we have worked to develop over the last 20-30 years is to function as intended. And if it can’t function as intended, then we need to be honest about that and we need to talk about what can change, you know, and really through these three cases, there were two big things that became apparent to us. Well, three really, but in the Ukraine-Russia case and the Israel-Palestine case, they’re both confronting this very concrete scenario that the norm to protect the public core in many ways emerged from, and that was this concern of states taking steps to interfere with essential internet infrastructure to the detriment of another state or to, you know, undermine wider internet functionality. In those two cases, we saw different outcomes. So, in the context of the Ukraine-Russia case, where the challenge to the public core was predominantly focused on the software protocols and services, we could say that the multi-stakeholder community really performed quite well. There was a very, there was a public conversation about the request, the responses from ICANN and RIPE NCC were very articulate and they were publicly available, and I suppose we might say that they functioned as we would expect them to in such a situation. However, in the context of of Gaza when, in a way, the threat to the public core comes through the hardware. We haven’t seen any real response from the multi-stakeholder community. In a sense, that community seems kind of unable to respond to such a situation. And it appears to be completely unprepared to promote the protection of the public core in a context like that. Now, there’s another element to that, I think, that sometimes gets missed here, which is that prior to the destruction of the hardware in Gaza, the public core was already wholly dependent, or significantly dependent, on Israeli infrastructure. And despite agreements to the contrary, that had never been remedied by the multi-stakeholder community. So they were left in a very precarious position when this happened. And then secondly, Israel has been able to exert this kind of military force to destroy the physical telecommunications infrastructure to prevent the repair of it, and to prevent even the private sector, when Starlink made an offer, as they had done in Ukraine, to prevent that alternative solution from being implemented. So this leaves us then with this pretty central question that we really do need to discuss. In this context of crisis and conflict, is the multi-stakeholder community either willing and or able to respond to crises like this? If it is, and it can, then how? What should happen that hasn’t happened in such a context? And if it isn’t able to, then who is responsible in such a situation? Because these examples have really highlighted that there is quite. a significant gap here in in situations like this. Thanks very much Madeleine. Chantal, from the

Anriette Esterhuysen: perspective of international law, human rights law, humanitarian law, what is your view?

Chantal Joris: Yeah, thank you. Perhaps start by the fact I always, when we talk about these, you know, conflict situations coming in as an international lawyer, I do find it challenging these days because international law is in such a massive crisis that you really feel, okay, I can tell you about the rules, but, you know, compliance is totally in existence. So maybe also by starting, starting by saying, by protecting those institutions that protect international law, including the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, the United Nations, this is like a pre-requirement for being able to protect what we’re talking about today as well. And obviously, you know, questions around double standards also come up. I want to talk a bit first about international human rights law and then humanitarian law and where I see a bit of a gap. I will not go too much into questions around extraterritorial application of international human rights law, which obviously in international armed conflicts can become a topic. Also, we’ve heard, for example, RSF in Sudan, the question of non-state actors and also, again, their human rights obligations can be a bit of a tricky one. So I would just try to make a couple of concise points, but legally speaking, it’s always very complex when you have these overlapping frameworks and then you apply them to different type of actors. So under international human rights law, I would say it’s reasonably straightforward in principle any restriction on freedom of expression and the right to share and receive information, including internet-based restriction, need to be based on the test of legality, legitimacy, necessity and proportionality and the Human Rights Council and others have been quite clear that when we look at blanket shutdowns, the indiscriminate and widespread effect on the population is such that they basically can never be justified under international human rights law. And this has been also explicitly confirmed, for example, by the Freedom of Expression Mandate holders also in context of armed conflict. Now of course in armed conflict we also need to consider international humanitarian law which does not provide any explicit protection of internet access and it also does not contain any explicit prohibition on attacking internet infrastructure or restricting internet access. There are certain rules that are relevant depending on the situation, for example we have common article 1 of the Geneva Conventions which says parties need to respect international humanitarian law, so for example an internet shutdown specifically implemented to conceal violations of humanitarian law could be a violation of that provision, the protection of humanitarian organisations and hospitals which is also explicit under international humanitarian law is also contingent on them being able to access ICT infrastructure properly and operate properly, so in those aspects we have certain protections. I want to go, and Dennis touched upon this a little bit and it has been mentioned around these questions of the rules on attack, so humanitarian law says there is a prohibition on attacking civilian objects, the principle of distinction, and also where military objects are attacked the proportionality needs to be considered, so there can’t be excessive incidental harm to civilians or civilian objects as opposed to military objects. to the direct military advantage. Here the challenge is that ICC infrastructure is often considered as so-called dual use. I think, Marwa, you mentioned that they often consider military objectives and attacking. So if it’s used by both civilians and military, technically speaking, it does mean that attacking it can provide a military advantage. So under the principle of distinction, it could theoretically be allowed. What I see sometimes in commentary, particularly under international humanitarian law, what I find problematic is that it’s often considered a little bit the end of the discussion. We forget that there is also, again, the proportionality requirement. And we have two challenges. On the one hand, as has been mentioned, a human rights lawyer will do a very different proportionality assessment and consider civilian injury as opposed to military advantages than maybe someone working as a military advisor. So it’s a concept that can be stretched. It’s in the eye of the beholder, in a sense. So we have different assessments of that. The second challenge is, of course, really being able to assess the knock-on effect. What is really the impact of an internet shutdown? Who can’t call the hospital? What is the psychological impact? What are all the knock-on effects? The banking service is not being able to operate properly. Again, humanitarian organizations and so on. So that also makes that proportionality assessment a little bit more challenging. And here, I think as well, we need to work more to… So the problem is, in the end, you have a situation where, under human rights law, which is recognized to apply in armed conflicts, there’s basically quite a clear assessment. You can’t impose such a shutdown. And at the same time, under humanitarian law, you’re, well… you know, maybe we have very little to limit those attacks in a specific setting. So I think we need to be more conscious of that and work more towards really a systemic integration of these two legal frameworks and consider the human rights impacts as well in a proportionality analysis and within also a proper humanitarian law response. So I think that’s also something that the BPF could highlight, that there is a gap into understanding how these frameworks really interrelate.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Thanks very much, Chantal. And in fact, it’s so interesting to hear this because I think you have, amongst all of you, you’ve outlined both the potential and the limitations of, on the one hand, the multi-stakeholder commitment to an interoperable, available, free and open internet and also of international law. And maybe this is, you know, where the IGF and this best practice forum comes in, is to explore whether, in fact, by looking at both and working with both together, you could perhaps fill some of the gaps and strengthen some of the weaknesses that exist in each of these dimensions with the goal of ensuring availability, accessibility and protection. But we don’t have a lot of time left. We are going to come back and I’m going to ask all of you and you too, Jalal, to talk about what you would like this BPF to do, whether we should modify the problem statement. But now first I’m opening to participants. Wim, is there anyone online who has a question, who wants to make a comment? We have some people in the room. Please do participate. We really need your participation, not just today, but also remember this is an open and inclusive process. Every one of of you, online and in the room, can join this work and participate in it. Shall we start over there? Milton, please introduce yourself. Thank you.

Milton Mueller: My name is Milton Mueller. I’m a professor at Georgia Tech and director of the Internet Governance Project. So I want to take up something that Pablo said and something that Madeleine said, but I think part of the problem I have with the direction they went goes to Dennis’s bad definition of the public core, right? So I think he got some things right. If you’re talking about the IANA registries, you’re talking about the protocol level, you’re talking about layer three and above, then you’re talking about a global public core of Internet resources. When you talk about physical layer, most of the time it is neither public nor core, in the sense that all physical facilities, all cables, are local in some sense, territorial, and you can knock a cable out over here, it does not affect the global Internet. So that is, to my mind, the answer to Madeleine’s question, which is why did the multistakeholder community not deal with the destruction of physical infrastructure as opposed to the Ukraine situation? Well, it’s because the multistakeholder community, by which we, I hope, mean the Internet institutions, the non-state actor-based, they have no authority over the physical infrastructure. They have no authority over the ability of the Israeli military to destroy things, right? And I wish we did, but we ain’t going to get that authority anytime soon, whereas we do, and this is one of the reasons why I’m a big supporter of the Internet institutions, is that we do, we have removed the IANA registries from the control of nation-states. And so that gets me to Pablo, which is like, Pablo, be careful what you wish for. You asked for positive protection for the Internet institutions, like where is that going to come from? I can see, just to use a particular nation-state example, I can see the United States saying, you know, we’re going to protect the Internet institutions by taking them over and incorporating them into our jurisdiction, because otherwise they might be threatened. In fact, that was the argument that was made against the IANA transition, if you recall,

Pablo Hinojosa: the congressional debates of 2016. So we got it out. We got it in the work that Madeline, Dennis, and Andrea have been thinking, but I’m very much in agreement with better leadership and assertiveness and imagining solutions, and I think that is exactly the purpose of the discussion of positive measures. The solution, I don’t know, but I think we have the intellectual capital. We should have intellectual capital to say, in these cases, things have gone wrong, and what is it that we’re going to do as a multi-stakeholder community, and when institutions fail? Of course, you can say, do not open the Pandora box, and we have talked a lot about should we open the Pandora box, should we not open the Pandora box? Is this dangerous or not dangerous?

Dennis Broeders: And you’re right to say, well, keep it closed. I’m suggesting, let’s discuss. Let’s open it. Dennis. Maybe a few points. I mean, Milton is right in the sense that the protocols are the most pure in the sense of a pure public good, right? They’re not territorial in any sense. You wrote it in 2019, I wrote the same, so that’s where we agree. The other thing is, when you look at infrastructure, you’re right. All infrastructure, in the end, is somewhere within territorial sovereignty, right? That is absolutely a given. That is also why it is a norm. of restraint, right? That is the reason why you formulate this in a sense, okay, that infrastructure may be on the territory of a certain state. That does not necessarily mean that in a legal sense, yes, they have jurisdiction over all that infrastructure. But we have to take into consideration that because it is a joined up system, because it is a system of systems, if you do certain things, it will have transboundary effects, is it within every country’s legal remit to have to do things that have transboundary effects? Strictly speaking, yes. But there’s also due diligence obligations. I know Americans are not fond of due diligence obligations, but they are there. There’s also ideas of transboundary harm. There’s also ideas of do no harm principles. For example, I use the example more often, if you look at rivers, right, nobody disputes that the river Rhine goes through Germany and then comes to the Netherlands, et cetera, right? So, there is territorial jurisdiction. However, if you dump something in Germany, it’s going to end up in the Netherlands. So, there is an idea that, okay, maybe it’s not just within territorial sovereignty, there’s transboundary effects, and the internet sort of has a certain flow in that sense as well, right? So, that’s what I would like, and that’s one of the reasons why we talk about a norm of restraint. The last thing is to say, okay, if you move these things to a multilateral institution, you get a different governance. I totally agree. But they are already in a jurisdiction now, right? AFRINIC is in the jurisdiction of Mauritius. That has consequences. ICANN is in the jurisdiction of the United States. That has consequences. So, it’s not like they’re outside of jurisdiction at the organisational level. The protocols, yes, they are not territorial in any sense, but the organisations in the end are also within a jurisdiction. There’s no way around it. There will always be a jurisdiction.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Other questions from the floor or? I think then let’s now go back to our panel and if anybody in the room wants to make a suggestion. Oh, there is someone there. Please, we have a voice from Norway. I’m very happy to hear that. Go ahead, introduce yourself.

Audience: Hi, I’m Julian Sildenvanglo, Norwegian guy. I am in private sector and also a ham radio operator and a software engineer. So this is more of a technical thing than a policy thing, but I think what would help a lot in emergency situations and actively disrupted areas is if there was more policy towards enforcing mesh technologies into phones, like having phones be able to talk to each other and then if one of them has access to the internet. So low bandwidth information because you don’t really need in emergency situation much more than text. Like you need to be able to send to one person, hey, I’m healthy, I’m not, but just for emergency usage. Thanks very, very much for that.

Anriette Esterhuysen: So to the panel, to everyone and maybe we can start with Pablo and then we’ll go on to and end with you, Jalal. Listening to this and based on the problem statement, the feedback that we’ve had on the problem statement, what would you like to see? What do you think will be useful work for this best practice forum to do, to explore, to develop, to research, to bring people together around going forward? Pablo.

Pablo Hinojosa: Well, I think the current report triggered this discussion and this discussion has a lot of questions. to answer. So I’m in favor to continue to work on these questions. I’m also conscious about what Milton says. I mean, opening the Pandora’s box, particularly in an environment that, as our colleague said, is not very much in favor of rule-based or international cooperation or things like that. I mean, is this the right time? It’s not the right time. I’m conscious about it. But that doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t be worried. And that’s, I guess, the work that is happening, whether we can have some more imagination. And Pablo, just a quick follow-up question. You’ve been working with the Marconi Society on exploring Internet resilience as a concept and as a process. Do you see this work as being relevant to or overlapping in some way with the notion of Internet resilience? Entirely. And I really would love you to refer to the video of yesterday’s conversation, because it has a huge intersection in terms of what could go wrong and how can we take preventative measures and risk mitigation issues and who is responsible to fund and invest on those preventative issues that allow us to have a resilience mindset. And this is, again, not only in the infrastructure, which is privately owned and difficult to regulate, but still has a lot of interdependencies. And we have to cover for those interdependencies one way or another. And that’s kind of the work that we’re doing in the Marconi Society by triggering this discussion, as we did yesterday. 139 is the keyword. Just look for it.

Marwa Fatafta: and watch the video. Thanks, Pablo. Marwa, do you have suggestions? I do, and I want to bring the conversation back to the people, people on the ground who are impacted by shutdowns. And actually, as we speak, Palestinian telecommunications companies has warned that they are going to face yet another complete blackout because they are simply running out of fuel. So my question is here, and that’s the question that also communities ask us as civil society. How can we get connected to the internet? We need it. It’s a lifeline. It’s a life-saving tool. And here, unfortunately, of course, we can advocate, and we can issue public letters and statements that go into this wild universe. We don’t know even who’s reading them, saying this is a warning sign. We need to act together. We can, again, time and time again, highlight the detrimental impact of internet shutdowns and how they violate IHL, how they violate human rights. But we can, in some cases, also provide e-SIM cards, foreign SIM cards, cross-border connectivity, but those often are unsustainable solutions, and they tend to come to small pockets of individuals, such as journalists and human rights defenders. Engaging with the UN telecommunications or emergency telecommunications cluster, they do vital and important work, but their mission is restricted to providing connectivity to humanitarian actors and not to the wider population. So the question here is, and then again, in some cases, communities really find themselves, such as in the case of Sudan, having to rely on Starlink because they say, okay, we know it’s creating new private monopolistic dependencies, which expose already vulnerable populations to further vulnerabilities because, again, we are dependent on the whims of a one-tech billionaire who can, as in the case of Gaza, thank you, Madeleine, for sharing that, who said, I am not going to. provide styling to the population in Gaza because the Israeli Minister of Communications tweeted, don’t you dare. And he also threatened to withdraw a styling from Sudan, even though it wasn’t licensed then, and from Ukraine. So that’s also not an alternative solutions to us. What I think we really need right now is a multi-stakeholder mechanism where we can go to states, technical community, private actors, private telecommunications companies, and civil society to say, there is a crisis in X country. We need funding. We need political leverage, sometimes on political or on warring parties to let repair equipment in. And also, finally, I also totally agree with the point you raised, Pablo, and that’s something I have been thinking quite a lot about in the context of Gaza and Syria, is that we need to also think beyond this rapid response or emergency response, because armed conflict is very cyclical in nature. Armed conflicts are becoming increasingly, what’s the word? Intractable, thank you. And they’re having an open-ended nature, which means that when we’re talking about the collapse and disintegration of telecommunications at an infrastructural level, how can we ensure that such a mechanism can provide the rebuilding of resilient and independent infrastructure? In the context of Gaza, some telecommunications companies from previous rounds of war, I’m sorry, just to wrap up, said, okay, we’re gonna run out of fuel, so we will have emergency batteries. They never expected that there will be an unfolding genocide for a year and a half. So these are some examples where we can think at a technical level, how can we build resilient solutions to prevent and to help communities get connected once internet becomes a weapon of war?

Anriette Esterhuysen: Thanks, Marwa. And that’s an excellent, concrete, multi-stakeholder solution we can explore. I think we can start with you, Shantal. You have less than a minute each.

Chantal Joris: I will have 20 seconds. I think also again, establishing the missing link between the different communities. I have been talking about Internet chat towns for a long time. I have never been on the same panel as you who look at it from a very different perspective. I think it’s incomplete if we don’t have this conversation. I think we need to have a conversation.

Madeline Carr: I think we need to have a conversation. I think there is an extremely important element in all of this that should also be considered as we move forward and I will pass on. Thanks, Madeline. I will be super quick because I want to leave time for Jalal. I would just say my hopes for this in the future is that we can please, we can please continue to have difficult conversations. I think we need to be able to get together at places like this and talk about the things that are uncomfortable or confronting. Thanks, Madeline.

Dennis Broeders: I will try to be as quick as possible. Be careful what you wish for, but that also sort of supposes that the world hasn’t changed, and it has. It’s a different geopolitical world. It’s also a different world in terms of multi-stakeholder community. We now have more cables, more internet. We now have more redundancy, yay, but we have less companies that actually do the cables. What does that mean for multi-stakeholderism, right? If one of the companies, if one of those is gaining in power, companies wading into the Ukraine conflict without being asked, companies doing certain things or not doing certain things because they are asked by governments, it is a different world out there, and that has an impact on how we can look at these things and what we can and cannot do.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Thanks, Jalal, and Jalal, you are one of the people that I would like to hear more about, and I would like to hear more about what you would like us to talk about in the future.

Jalal Abukhater: Thanks, Jalal, and Jalal, you are with us, actually, almost not with us as a result of what we are talking about, so what would you like us to talk about? I want to stress on my colleagues and on the panel, the points made are points I support. Of course, there are gaps when we’re doing this proposal. Enforceable norms are lacking. There’s no emergency protocols for protecting the essential digital infrastructure. And of course, we’re seeing connectivity being weaponized, not just disrupted unintentionally. So there has to be consideration for how can we empower other actors, like local actors, civil society, technically and diplomatically, to respond to a blackout and explore emergency connectivity pathways, satellite or community networks, to see how they can be deployed in such situations when access is denied. And of course, the point of my fellow colleagues, I’m supporting them.

Anriette Esterhuysen: And thanks for the time. Thanks very much, Jalal. Our time is up. And I’m sorry we couldn’t give the floor to everyone. We will have an online webinar. I think, Wim, it will be in the first half of July where we are going to continue this discussion. We’ll invite other IGF workshops, because actually some dealt with undersea cables, some dealt with resilience, some dealt with conflict and human rights. We’ll bring them together. And we will then consolidate all the feedback and input and develop the agenda. So anyone who wants to join this BPF, Wim, just stand up so they can see you. Wim, who opened a session for us. I think Valeria is there as well from APC. Please just drop your email or find out how you can join. Thank you very much, everyone. I think it was extremely rich. I think we got a lot. Thanks. Thank you. So there.

Agreement points

Need for multi-stakeholder emergency response mechanisms

Speakers

– Marwa Fatafta
– Pablo Hinojosa
– Jalal Abukhater

Arguments

Need for multi-stakeholder emergency mechanism providing funding, political leverage, and technical solutions during crises

Need for positive protective measures when non-interference is insufficient, requiring community imagination for solutions

Communities need empowerment through emergency connectivity pathways including satellite and community networks

Summary

All three speakers agree that current approaches are insufficient and that coordinated multi-stakeholder mechanisms are needed to respond to crises, provide emergency connectivity, and support affected communities with both technical and political solutions.

Topics

Infrastructure | Development | Legal and regulatory

Armed conflict increasingly targets civilian Internet infrastructure

Speakers

– Jalal Abukhater
– Marwa Fatafta
– Adedeji Ebo

Arguments

Gaza has experienced deliberate blackouts and near-total destruction of internet infrastructure, with connectivity being used as a weapon of war

Armed conflict has become the leading trigger of internet shutdowns worldwide, with warring parties targeting civilian Internet infrastructure

International law provides clear guidance on targeting civilian infrastructure, with states committed to not conduct ICT activities that damage critical infrastructure

Summary

There is strong consensus that armed conflicts increasingly involve deliberate targeting of civilian Internet infrastructure as a weapon of war, violating international law and humanitarian principles.

Topics

Infrastructure | Human rights | Cybersecurity

Importance of protecting Internet governance institutions

Speakers

– Pablo Hinojosa
– Dennis Broeders
– Madeline Carr

Arguments

Protecting the public core includes protecting the institutions that make it work, as demonstrated by AFRINIC’s institutional uncertainty

Internet governance organizations face pressure to take sides in conflicts while maintaining neutrality for network continuity

Multi-stakeholder community needs to be more proactive in protecting the public core, as shown by different responses to Ukraine-Russia versus Gaza cases

Summary

All three speakers recognize that protecting the Internet requires protecting the institutions that govern it, acknowledging both their vulnerabilities and the need for more proactive community support.

Topics

Infrastructure | Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Gaps exist in current normative frameworks

Speakers

– Chantal Joris
– Dennis Broeders
– Adedeji Ebo

Arguments

International humanitarian law lacks explicit protection for internet access, creating gaps when combined with human rights law frameworks

The public core norm focuses on protecting core internet protocols and infrastructure as a global public good from unwarranted state intervention

International law provides clear guidance on targeting civilian infrastructure, with states committed to not conduct ICT activities that damage critical infrastructure

Summary

While international law and norms exist to protect infrastructure, there are significant gaps in their application to Internet resources, particularly in conflict situations where different legal frameworks may conflict.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Human rights | Cybersecurity

Similar viewpoints

Both speakers, working directly with affected communities, emphasize that current emergency connectivity solutions are inadequate and that communities need better technical and political support for sustainable connectivity during crises.

Speakers

– Marwa Fatafta
– Jalal Abukhater

Arguments

Emergency connectivity solutions like e-SIM cards and cross-border connectivity are often unsustainable and limited

Communities need empowerment through emergency connectivity pathways including satellite and community networks

Topics

Infrastructure | Development | Human rights

Both speakers acknowledge the changing geopolitical landscape and the need to consider new approaches to protecting Internet institutions, even if this involves risks and difficult conversations about intervention versus non-interference.

Speakers

– Pablo Hinojosa
– Dennis Broeders

Arguments

Opening discussions about positive protection measures despite risks of state takeover of Internet institutions

Geopolitical changes and corporate concentration affect multistakeholder governance capabilities

Topics

Infrastructure | Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Both speakers emphasize the importance of bringing together different communities and perspectives to have difficult but necessary conversations about protecting Internet access and resources.

Speakers

– Chantal Joris
– Anriette Esterhuysen

Arguments

Continue difficult conversations about uncomfortable topics while establishing links between different communities

IGF and Best Practice Forum can explore strengthening both multi-stakeholder and legal frameworks working together

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Human rights | Infrastructure

Unexpected consensus

Limitations of traditional multi-stakeholder non-interference approach

Speakers

– Pablo Hinojosa
– Milton Mueller
– Dennis Broeders

Arguments

Need for positive protective measures when non-interference is insufficient, requiring community imagination for solutions

Physical infrastructure is neither public nor core in the global sense, and multistakeholder institutions lack authority over physical destruction

Geopolitical changes and corporate concentration affect multistakeholder governance capabilities

Explanation

Unexpectedly, even strong advocates of the multi-stakeholder model acknowledge its limitations and the need to consider new approaches, despite the risks involved. This represents a significant shift from traditional non-interference principles.

Topics

Infrastructure | Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Recognition that technical solutions alone are insufficient

Speakers

– Marwa Fatafta
– Pablo Hinojosa
– Audience

Arguments

Develop mechanisms for rebuilding resilient and independent infrastructure beyond emergency response

Explore intersection with Internet resilience concepts including preventative measures and risk mitigation

Emergency mesh technologies in phones could help maintain basic communication during disrupted situations

Explanation

There is unexpected consensus across different perspectives that technical solutions must be combined with political, legal, and institutional approaches. Even technical experts acknowledge that technology alone cannot solve these complex problems.

Topics

Infrastructure | Development | Cybersecurity

Overall assessment

Summary

Strong consensus exists on the severity of the problem (Internet infrastructure being weaponized in conflicts), the inadequacy of current responses, and the need for new multi-stakeholder approaches. There is also agreement on the importance of protecting both physical infrastructure and governance institutions.

Consensus level

High level of consensus on problem identification and general direction for solutions, with constructive disagreement on specific approaches. This strong foundation suggests potential for effective collaborative work through the Best Practice Forum, though implementation challenges remain significant given the complex intersection of technical, legal, and political factors.

Different viewpoints

Definition and scope of public core of the Internet

Speakers

– Dennis Broeders
– Milton Mueller

Arguments

The public core norm focuses on protecting core internet protocols and infrastructure as a global public good from unwarranted state intervention

Physical infrastructure is neither public nor core in the global sense, and multistakeholder institutions lack authority over physical destruction

Summary

Dennis Broeders advocates for a broader definition of public core that includes physical infrastructure with transboundary effects requiring due diligence obligations, while Milton Mueller argues for a narrower definition limited to protocols and logical infrastructure, excluding physical infrastructure which he considers local and territorial.

Topics

Infrastructure | Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Approach to protecting Internet institutions under pressure

Speakers

– Pablo Hinojosa
– Milton Mueller

Arguments

Need for positive protective measures when non-interference is insufficient, requiring community imagination for solutions

Physical infrastructure is neither public nor core in the global sense, and multistakeholder institutions lack authority over physical destruction

Summary

Pablo advocates for positive protective measures and intervention when institutions face pressure, while Milton warns against this approach, concerned it could lead to state takeover of Internet institutions and emphasizing the success of removing IANA registries from state control.

Topics

Infrastructure | Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Legal framework adequacy for Internet protection in conflicts

Speakers

– Chantal Joris
– Adedeji Ebo

Arguments

International humanitarian law lacks explicit protection for internet access, creating gaps when combined with human rights law frameworks

International law provides clear guidance on targeting civilian infrastructure, with states committed to not conduct ICT activities that damage critical infrastructure

Summary

Chantal emphasizes the gaps and limitations in international humanitarian law regarding Internet protection, noting the crisis in international law compliance, while Adedeji presents a more optimistic view of existing international law frameworks providing clear guidance and state commitments.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Human rights | Cybersecurity

Unexpected differences

Scope of multi-stakeholder authority and responsibility

Speakers

– Madeline Carr
– Milton Mueller

Arguments

Multi-stakeholder community needs to be more proactive in protecting the public core, as shown by different responses to Ukraine-Russia versus Gaza cases

Physical infrastructure is neither public nor core in the global sense, and multistakeholder institutions lack authority over physical destruction

Explanation

This disagreement is unexpected because both speakers are generally supportive of multi-stakeholder governance, yet they have fundamentally different views on what the multi-stakeholder community should be expected to do. Madeline criticizes the community for not responding to physical infrastructure destruction in Gaza, while Milton argues this is outside their legitimate authority and capability.

Topics

Infrastructure | Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Optimism versus pessimism about international law effectiveness

Speakers

– Adedeji Ebo
– Chantal Joris

Arguments

International law provides clear guidance on targeting civilian infrastructure, with states committed to not conduct ICT activities that damage critical infrastructure

International law is in crisis with compliance issues, requiring protection of institutions like ICJ and ICC

Explanation

This disagreement is unexpected given both speakers represent international law perspectives, yet they have starkly different assessments of international law’s current effectiveness. Adedeji presents international law as providing clear guidance and effective commitments, while Chantal describes it as being in a ‘massive crisis’ with non-existent compliance.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Human rights

Overall assessment

Summary

The main areas of disagreement center on the definition and scope of core Internet resources, the appropriate level of intervention versus non-interference in protecting Internet institutions, the adequacy of existing legal frameworks, and the extent of multi-stakeholder community authority and responsibility in conflict situations.

Disagreement level

Moderate to high disagreement level with significant implications for the topic. The disagreements reveal fundamental tensions between different approaches to Internet governance – technical versus political, interventionist versus non-interventionist, optimistic versus pessimistic about existing frameworks. These disagreements could significantly impact the Best Practice Forum’s ability to develop consensus recommendations, as they reflect deeper philosophical differences about the nature of Internet governance, the role of different stakeholders, and the appropriate responses to crisis situations.

Partial agreements

Similar viewpoints

Both speakers, working directly with affected communities, emphasize that current emergency connectivity solutions are inadequate and that communities need better technical and political support for sustainable connectivity during crises.

Speakers

– Marwa Fatafta
– Jalal Abukhater

Arguments

Emergency connectivity solutions like e-SIM cards and cross-border connectivity are often unsustainable and limited

Communities need empowerment through emergency connectivity pathways including satellite and community networks

Topics

Infrastructure | Development | Human rights

Both speakers acknowledge the changing geopolitical landscape and the need to consider new approaches to protecting Internet institutions, even if this involves risks and difficult conversations about intervention versus non-interference.

Speakers

– Pablo Hinojosa
– Dennis Broeders

Arguments

Opening discussions about positive protection measures despite risks of state takeover of Internet institutions

Geopolitical changes and corporate concentration affect multistakeholder governance capabilities

Topics

Infrastructure | Legal and regulatory | Cybersecurity

Both speakers emphasize the importance of bringing together different communities and perspectives to have difficult but necessary conversations about protecting Internet access and resources.

Speakers

– Chantal Joris
– Anriette Esterhuysen

Arguments

Continue difficult conversations about uncomfortable topics while establishing links between different communities

IGF and Best Practice Forum can explore strengthening both multi-stakeholder and legal frameworks working together

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Human rights | Infrastructure

Key takeaways

The Best Practice Forum on securing Internet access and protecting core Internet resources in conflict and crisis is at its beginning stage, with final output expected by November 1st, allowing for continued participation throughout the year

There is a clear distinction between different types of Internet disruption: protocol-level attacks (like Ukraine-Russia case) where multistakeholder institutions can respond effectively, versus physical infrastructure destruction (like Gaza) where they have limited authority

International law frameworks have significant gaps – human rights law provides clear protections against Internet shutdowns, but international humanitarian law lacks explicit Internet protections, creating enforcement challenges

The public core norm focuses on protecting global Internet protocols and infrastructure as a public good, but is primarily a ‘negative norm’ (thou shalt not) with implementation challenges

Armed conflict has become the leading trigger of Internet shutdowns worldwide, with connectivity increasingly weaponized rather than just disrupted unintentionally

Physical Internet infrastructure exists within territorial sovereignty but has transboundary effects, requiring consideration of due diligence obligations and transboundary harm principles

The multistakeholder Internet governance model faces new challenges from geopolitical changes, corporate concentration, and the need for more proactive protection measures

Resolutions and action items

Continue the Best Practice Forum work through online webinars, with the first scheduled for the first half of July

Invite other IGF workshops dealing with undersea cables, resilience, and conflict/human rights to join future discussions

Consolidate feedback and input to develop a comprehensive agenda for the forum’s continued work

Develop a multi-stakeholder emergency mechanism that can provide funding, political leverage, and technical solutions during connectivity crises

Explore emergency connectivity pathways including satellite networks, community networks, and mesh technologies for crisis situations

Establish better links between different communities (legal, technical, policy) that have been working on related issues separately

Continue difficult conversations about uncomfortable topics to address gaps in current frameworks

Unresolved issues

The definition and scope of ‘core Internet resources’ remains unclear and contested among stakeholders

How to integrate international human rights law and international humanitarian law frameworks for comprehensive protection

Whether and how multistakeholder institutions should take more proactive protective measures without risking state takeover

How to address the authority gap where multistakeholder institutions can protect protocols but not physical infrastructure

How to ensure sustainable, long-term rebuilding of resilient infrastructure in conflict zones beyond emergency response

How to balance the need for positive protective measures with the risk of opening ‘Pandora’s box’ in current geopolitical climate

How to address the weaponization of connectivity by state and non-state actors when existing norms focus on restraint

How to ensure accountability and enforcement when core Internet resources are deliberately targeted or destroyed

Suggested compromises

Develop both negative norms (restraint-based) and positive protective measures to address different types of threats to Internet infrastructure

Create a systematic integration of human rights law and humanitarian law frameworks rather than treating them as separate systems

Focus on empowering local actors and civil society with both technical and diplomatic capabilities rather than relying solely on international institutions

Develop emergency protocols that can operate within existing territorial sovereignty while addressing transboundary effects

Create mechanisms that can provide both rapid emergency response and longer-term infrastructure rebuilding in conflict zones

Establish clearer definitions and scope for core Internet resources while maintaining flexibility for different contexts and stakeholder perspectives

We must ask ourselves, how can we mitigate the risks posed to critical infrastructure, including core internet resources, in light of rising threats… But responsibility rests not only with states. We must work collectively as states, international organizations, civil society, and the private sector.

Speaker

Adedeji Ebo

Reason

This opening statement from the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs established the multi-stakeholder framework and collective responsibility paradigm that became central to the entire discussion. It moved beyond traditional state-centric approaches to acknowledge that protecting internet infrastructure requires coordinated action across all stakeholder groups.

Impact

This comment set the foundational tone for the entire session, establishing that the discussion would not be limited to technical or legal frameworks alone, but would require examining roles across multiple stakeholder communities. It provided the conceptual framework that subsequent speakers built upon.

This is not a technical failure only. This is the use of connectivity as a weapon of war, what we refer to as digital erasure… We need enforceable protections for core infrastructure under armed conflict, as well as emergency mechanisms for civil society and humanitarian actors to deploy alternatives.

Speaker

Jalal Abukhater

Reason

This comment was particularly powerful because it reframed internet shutdowns from technical disruptions to deliberate weaponization, introducing the concept of ‘digital erasure.’ It challenged the panel to think beyond accidental or collateral damage to intentional targeting of civilian digital infrastructure as a military tactic.

Impact

This shifted the discussion from theoretical policy frameworks to urgent, real-world applications. It forced subsequent speakers to grapple with the inadequacy of existing norms when faced with deliberate weaponization of connectivity, and influenced later discussions about emergency response mechanisms.

Protecting the core of the internet also includes the protection of the institutions that make it work… internet resilience is not about networks but it’s also about people and organizations… Sometimes non-interference is not enough, and inaction, too, can cause harm.

Speaker

Pablo Hinojosa

Reason

This comment fundamentally expanded the definition of what needs protection beyond physical and logical infrastructure to include the institutional layer. The assertion that ‘non-interference is not enough’ challenged the traditional hands-off approach to internet governance and suggested that active protection measures might be necessary.

Impact

This comment introduced a paradigm shift that influenced the entire latter half of the discussion. It moved the conversation from passive protection norms to considering active, positive measures for protection, which became a recurring theme in subsequent speakers’ comments.

In the context of the Ukraine-Russia case and the Israel-Palestine case… we saw different outcomes… However, in the context of Gaza when… the threat to the public core comes through the hardware. We haven’t seen any real response from the multi-stakeholder community… it appears to be completely unprepared to promote the protection of the public core in a context like that.

Speaker

Madeline Carr

Reason

This comparative analysis exposed a critical gap in the multi-stakeholder system’s ability to respond to different types of threats. It revealed that while the system works well for protocol-level threats, it fails when physical infrastructure is targeted, highlighting fundamental limitations in current governance approaches.

Impact

This observation sparked intense debate about the scope and limitations of multi-stakeholder governance. It led to Milton Mueller’s response about jurisdictional limitations and Dennis Broeders’ discussion of territorial sovereignty, fundamentally challenging assumptions about what the multi-stakeholder community can and should address.

Pablo, be careful what you wish for. You asked for positive protection for the Internet institutions, like where is that going to come from? I can see… the United States saying, you know, we’re going to protect the Internet institutions by taking them over and incorporating them into our jurisdiction… So we got it out.

Speaker

Milton Mueller

Reason

This comment introduced a crucial cautionary perspective about the risks of seeking state protection for internet institutions. It highlighted the potential for ‘protection’ to become ‘capture’ and reminded the panel of hard-won victories in maintaining institutional independence from state control.

Impact

This comment created a significant tension in the discussion between the need for protection and the risk of state capture. It forced other panelists to grapple with this fundamental dilemma and led to more nuanced discussions about what types of positive measures might be acceptable without compromising institutional independence.

What I think we really need right now is a multi-stakeholder mechanism where we can go to states, technical community, private actors, private telecommunications companies, and civil society to say, there is a crisis in X country. We need funding. We need political leverage… And also… we need to also think beyond this rapid response or emergency response, because armed conflict is very cyclical in nature.

Speaker

Marwa Fatafta

Reason

This comment provided the most concrete, actionable proposal for addressing the gaps identified throughout the discussion. It moved beyond theoretical frameworks to propose specific institutional mechanisms while acknowledging the long-term, cyclical nature of conflicts that require sustained rather than just emergency responses.

Impact

This comment helped synthesize many of the earlier discussions into a practical proposal that other panelists could build upon. It provided a potential path forward that addressed both the immediate needs identified by Jalal and the institutional concerns raised by Pablo, while remaining sensitive to the sovereignty issues raised by Milton.

Overall assessment

These key comments fundamentally shaped the discussion by progressively expanding and deepening the scope of analysis. The conversation evolved from initial focus on technical and legal frameworks to a more complex understanding that encompasses institutional resilience, the weaponization of connectivity, and the limitations of existing governance models. The most impactful comments challenged fundamental assumptions – that internet governance is primarily technical, that non-interference is sufficient, and that existing multi-stakeholder mechanisms are adequate for crisis response. The tension between Milton Mueller’s warnings about state capture and Pablo Hinojosa’s call for positive protection measures created a productive dialectic that forced the panel to grapple with fundamental questions about the future of internet governance. Ultimately, these comments collectively moved the discussion from identifying problems to proposing concrete, multi-stakeholder solutions while maintaining awareness of the political and jurisdictional complexities involved.

What is the clear definition and scope of ‘core Internet resources’?

Speaker

Wim Degezelle (reporting feedback)

Explanation

There are different opinions and views on what core Internet resources are, and ambiguity makes it difficult to develop effective protection measures

Who are the specific stakeholders in the multistakeholder community and what are their clear roles?

Speaker

Wim Degezelle (reporting feedback)

Explanation

While the IGF community understands multistakeholder terminology, it’s important to clearly name and define stakeholders when moving beyond the IGF context

What are the roles and responsibilities before and after crises, not just during them?

Speaker

Wim Degezelle (reporting feedback)

Explanation

Prevention and post-crisis recovery responsibilities need to be clarified alongside crisis response roles

What is the agreed scope for civilian access to the Internet during conflicts?

Speaker

Wim Degezelle (reporting feedback)

Explanation

It’s crucial to define what level and type of civilian access should be maintained during conflicts and crises

How can existing normative frameworks be better integrated, particularly human rights law and international humanitarian law?

Speaker

Chantal Joris

Explanation

There are gaps in understanding how these frameworks interrelate, with different proportionality assessments between human rights and military perspectives

Is the multistakeholder community willing and able to respond to crises involving physical infrastructure destruction?

Speaker

Madeline Carr

Explanation

The community responded well to software/protocol threats (Ukraine case) but seems unable to address hardware destruction (Gaza case)

Who is responsible when the multistakeholder community cannot respond to infrastructure crises?

Speaker

Madeline Carr

Explanation

There’s a significant gap in responsibility when traditional multistakeholder mechanisms fail to protect core Internet resources

How can positive protective measures be developed for Internet institutions under pressure?

Speaker

Pablo Hinojosa

Explanation

Non-interference may not be sufficient; proactive measures are needed to support institutions like AFRINIC when they face governance or legal challenges

How can emergency connectivity mechanisms be established for civilian populations during conflicts?

Speaker

Marwa Fatafta

Explanation

Current solutions like e-SIM cards and UN emergency telecommunications are limited; a broader multistakeholder mechanism is needed for funding, political leverage, and technical solutions

How can resilient and independent infrastructure be rebuilt in post-conflict situations?

Speaker

Marwa Fatafta

Explanation

Armed conflicts are becoming more intractable and cyclical, requiring long-term infrastructure rebuilding strategies beyond emergency response

How can mesh technologies be better integrated into mobile devices for emergency communications?

Speaker

Julian Sildenvanglo (audience member)

Explanation

Technical solutions allowing phones to communicate with each other could provide low-bandwidth emergency connectivity when infrastructure is disrupted

How can local actors and civil society be empowered technically and diplomatically to respond to connectivity blackouts?

Speaker

Jalal Abukhater

Explanation

Emergency protocols and pathways for satellite or community networks need to be developed for deployment when access is deliberately denied

What are the implications of moving critical Internet institutions between jurisdictions?

Speaker

Dennis Broeders

Explanation

Moving institutions like AFRINIC could signal that Internet governance organizations are ‘movable feast,’ potentially opening dangerous precedents

How do we assess the full knock-on effects of Internet shutdowns for proportionality analysis?

Speaker

Chantal Joris

Explanation

Current proportionality assessments under international humanitarian law may not adequately consider the full civilian impact of connectivity disruptions