Day 0 Event #79 Wgig+20 Glancing Backward and Looking Forward

Summary

This discussion was a 20th anniversary reunion of the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG), celebrating the group’s contributions to the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) process and examining the current state of internet governance. The session was organized into three segments: the nature of internet governance, the relationship between multilateral and multistakeholder approaches, and the future of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF).

Participants emphasized that WGIG played a crucial role in legitimizing multistakeholder cooperation within the United Nations system, demonstrating that diverse stakeholders could work together effectively on complex technical and policy issues. The group developed a broad definition of internet governance that has stood the test of time, encompassing not just technical infrastructure but also the broader use of the internet and related policy issues. Several speakers shared anecdotes about how the process fostered unprecedented collaboration between stakeholders who had previously been antagonistic, such as government representatives, civil society, business, and technical communities.

The discussion revealed that the false dichotomy between multilateral and multistakeholder approaches has evolved, with recognition that both models must coexist and complement each other. Participants noted that while the IGF has successfully served as a global forum for dialogue and capacity building, it faces challenges including limited bottom-up participation, difficulty addressing controversial topics, and questions about its long-term sustainability and funding.

Looking forward, speakers identified the need for the IGF to mature in handling contentious issues, improve its methodology for generating meaningful outcomes, and potentially establish a new working group to address the relationship between internet governance, data governance, AI governance, and broader digital governance challenges. The discussion concluded with recognition that despite the passage of 20 years, the fundamental principles and collaborative spirit established by WGIG remain relevant and necessary for addressing contemporary digital governance challenges.

Keypoints

## Overall Purpose/Goal

This discussion was a 20th anniversary reunion of the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG), bringing together original members to reflect on their impact, assess the current state of internet governance, and discuss the future of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). The session aimed to evaluate whether the multi-stakeholder approach they pioneered has lived up to expectations and what changes might be needed going forward.

## Major Discussion Points

– **WGIG’s Historical Impact and Methodology**: Participants reflected on how WGIG successfully demonstrated multi-stakeholder cooperation within the UN system, created the first comprehensive definition of internet governance, and established innovative processes like public consultations and transparent documentation. The methodology of allowing diverse viewpoints while finding workable compromises was highlighted as a key achievement.

– **Multi-stakeholder vs. Multilateral Governance Models**: A central debate focused on whether these two approaches should be seen as competing or complementary. Speakers argued against treating this as a false dichotomy, emphasizing that both models need to coexist and work together, with the Tunis compromise representing a successful marriage of both approaches under the UN umbrella.

– **IGF’s Evolution and Current Challenges**: Discussion covered whether the IGF has fulfilled its original mandate as a forum for open dialogue. While praised for capacity building and providing a neutral space for discussion, concerns were raised about its limited decision-making power, funding sustainability, and whether it has become too insular or controlled from the top-down rather than truly bottom-up.

– **Contemporary Governance Challenges**: Participants grappled with how internet governance has evolved to encompass AI governance, data governance, and digital rights issues. There was debate about whether the IGF is mature enough to handle controversial topics and whether the original broad definition of internet governance remains relevant for today’s challenges.

– **Future Directions and Institutional Reform**: The conversation explored whether a new WGIG-style working group might be needed to address current governance gaps, how to better engage governments and decision-makers, and whether the IGF’s mandate needs updating to remain relevant in the current digital landscape.

## Overall Tone

The discussion began with a celebratory, nostalgic tone as participants shared anecdotes and reflected positively on their collaborative achievements 20 years ago. However, the tone gradually became more critical and forward-looking, with speakers raising challenging questions about current limitations and future needs. While maintaining collegiality and mutual respect, participants weren’t afraid to voice controversies and disagreements, particularly around issues of bottom-up governance, the role of governments, and whether current multi-stakeholder models are sufficient for today’s challenges. The session ended on a pragmatic note, acknowledging both successes and the need for continued evolution.

Speakers

**Speakers from the provided list:**

– **Markus Kummer** – Session moderator/chair, former diplomatic service of Switzerland, celebrating 20-year anniversary of Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG)

– **William J. Drake** – WGIG member, session organizer, edited books on WGIG in 2005 and 2015

– **Ayesha Hassan** – Former WGIG member representing ICC (International Chamber of Commerce)/global business community

– **Raul Echeberria** – Former WGIG member representing technical community

– **Wolfgang Kleinwachter** – Former WGIG member representing civil society and academic community

– **Avri Doria** – Former WGIG member, came in as a techie, past MAG member and MAG chair

– **Jovan Kurbalija** – Former WGIG member, Executive Director of the UN High-Level Panel, author of “Introduction to Internet Governance”

– **Alejandro Pisanty** – Former WGIG member, participating remotely from Mexico City

– **Carlos Afonso** – Former WGIG member, participating remotely from Rio

– **Baher Esmat** – Works for ICANN, participating remotely

– **Vittorio Bertola** – Former youngest member of WGIG, described as least diplomatic member

– **Charles Shaban** – Remote moderation coordinator, intellectual property practitioner

– **Bertrand de la Chapelle** – Executive Director of the Internet and Jurisdiction Policy Network

– **Ariette Esterhuisen** – Past MAG member and past MAG chair

– **Israel Rosas** – Internet Society representative

– **Jimson Olufuye** – Africa ICT Alliance

– **Hadi Alminyawi** –

Р**S̩bastien Bachelet** РIsaac Frantz and Uralo representative

– **Participant** – Government representative (specific identity not disclosed)

– **Audience** – Nandini from IT4Change India, part of Civil Society Coalition Global Digital Justice Forum

**Additional speakers:**

– **Shaima Akhtar** – Chairperson, Bangladesh Women IGF (participated via online question)

# 20th Anniversary Reunion of the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG): A Comprehensive Assessment of Past Achievements and Future Challenges

## Executive Summary

This discussion marked the 20th anniversary reunion of the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG), bringing together original members to reflect on their groundbreaking contributions to the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) process and examine the current state of internet governance. The session, moderated by Markus Kummer and organised by William J. Drake, opened with a lighthearted moment when Kummer shared that he had asked AI “does WGIG matter?” and received an affirmative response highlighting WGIG’s lasting contributions to multistakeholder governance.

Despite technical difficulties that set an informal, reunion-like atmosphere, the discussion evolved into a substantive examination of three key themes: the nature and enduring relevance of internet governance, the relationship between multilateral and multistakeholder approaches, and the future of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). The conversation balanced celebration of WGIG’s achievements with frank assessment of contemporary challenges, revealing both pride in past accomplishments and concern about current governance limitations.

## Historical Impact and Methodology of WGIG

### Foundational Achievements

William J. Drake outlined seven ways that WGIG made a lasting impact, which participants consistently endorsed throughout the discussion. These contributions included demonstrating that multistakeholder cooperation could work effectively within the UN system, helping facilitate WSIS negotiations by systematically mapping issues and positions, promoting broader public engagement through innovative consultation processes, demystifying internet governance by establishing that governance does not mean government control, developing a working definition of internet governance that has proven remarkably durable, proposing the creation of the IGF as a forum for continued dialogue without negotiation pressure, and creating methodological innovations for consensus-building.

Markus Kummer emphasised that the WGIG report found its way into the final WSIS outcome and significantly impacted the process. Raul Echeberria noted that WGIG strengthened the concept of multistakeholderism and consolidated the idea that participation from all stakeholders is crucial, sharing an anecdote about how discussions of root server A brought together diverse perspectives. Wolfgang Kleinwächter highlighted how WGIG created a unique culture of collaboration where every stakeholder brought different expertise to the table, transforming previously antagonistic relationships into productive cooperation.

### Methodological Innovation and the Role of Frank March

A particularly poignant aspect of the discussion focused on WGIG’s innovative methodology and the crucial role of Frank March, the secretary who has since passed away. Avri Doria provided detailed insights about March’s approach, describing how he would write while listening and incorporating real-time feedback from participants. She explained: “Frank March wrote while listening. And he would write and then he would read back what he wrote and people would say, no, that’s not what I meant. And he would change it. And he would read it back again.”

This methodological innovation proved particularly significant when contrasted with current governance processes. Jovan Kurbalija observed that contemporary processes often suffer from what he termed a “governance Bermuda Triangle” where stakeholder contributions disappear without clear traceability to final documents. This observation sparked broader reflection on how governance processes have evolved away from the transparent, participatory model that made WGIG successful.

## Evolution and Enduring Relevance of Internet Governance Definition

### Definitional Durability and Universal Applicability

There was remarkable consensus among participants that WGIG’s definition of internet governance has stood the test of time and remains applicable to contemporary challenges. Wolfgang Kleinwächter provided detailed analysis of the definition’s three key elements: multistakeholder approaches (involving all stakeholders in their respective roles), collaborative approaches (working together), and holistic approaches (covering all relevant issues). He argued that these elements make the definition universal and applicable to emerging governance challenges including AI governance.

Ayesha Hassan noted that the definition has adapted to new technologies, sharing an anecdote about how even Cuba and global business representatives found common ground in supporting the multistakeholder approach. Carlos Afonso reinforced the definition’s enduring relevance by noting that the WGIG report identified key public policy areas and fundamental issues that remain valid today.

### Contemporary Applications and Conceptual Clarity

The discussion revealed how internet governance has naturally expanded to encompass new technologies while maintaining its core framework. However, this expansion also raised questions about conceptual clarity. William J. Drake suggested the need for new work to address the relationship between internet governance, data governance, AI governance, and broader digital governance to reduce conceptual confusion and provide clearer guidance for policy-makers.

## Multistakeholder versus Multilateral Governance Models

### Moving Beyond False Dichotomies

One of the most significant areas of discussion concerned the relationship between multistakeholder and multilateral governance approaches. There was strong consensus that treating these as competing models represents a false dichotomy, with multiple speakers arguing that both approaches must coexist and complement each other.

Avri Doria emphasised that both models must work together rather than in opposition, while Markus Kummer noted that multilateralism protects smaller countries and should not exclude multistakeholderism. Jimson Olufuye added that multistakeholderism helps governments fulfil their responsibilities to citizens rather than taking over government work.

### Provocative Perspectives and Real-World Tensions

However, Alejandro Pisanty provided a more provocative view, arguing that all internet governance problems are better solved by multistakeholder mechanisms and suggesting that countries pushing for multilateral approaches are also pushing against internet freedom. He framed this as an “acid test” that challenged the diplomatic tendency to treat both approaches as equally valid.

Charles Shaban emphasised the need to find ways for multilateral and multistakeholder mechanisms to work together effectively, suggesting that the challenge lies not in choosing between models but in designing effective interfaces between them.

## Assessment of the Internet Governance Forum

### Achievements and Evolution

The discussion of the IGF revealed both appreciation for its achievements and frank acknowledgement of its limitations. Baher Esmat highlighted the IGF’s role as the primary global multistakeholder forum providing space for open discussion and capacity building, noting that it has continuously evolved in topics and outcomes while maintaining its non-decision-making nature as a strength.

Jovan Kurbalija praised the IGF’s value for capacity building and creating incremental development of new methodologies. Raul Echeberria noted the IGF’s evolution, mentioning how the 2013 IGF he organized addressed surveillance issues that became highly relevant. These positive assessments emphasised the IGF’s success in creating a neutral space for dialogue and its role in developing governance capacity globally.

### Critical Assessments and Uncomfortable Truths

However, the discussion also featured sharp critiques of the IGF’s performance and limitations. Vittorio Bertola, identified as the former youngest member of WGIG, provided perhaps the most damning assessment, arguing that the IGF failed to address economic and social questions due to lack of enforcement mechanisms against private sector actors. He observed: “the people that could make money out of breaking down the internet and turning it into walled gardens, they just went on and made money. And nobody could stop them because we had no stick.”

Most strikingly, Bertola cited a UK survey showing that half of young people believe they would be better off if the internet didn’t exist, serving as a devastating indictment of how far the internet has diverged from its original promise.

Avri Doria challenged one of the IGF’s core mythologies by stating bluntly: “Any notion we have that IGF has bottomed up is something that we should quit pretending. It is not. It hasn’t been.” This critique of the IGF’s democratic legitimacy sparked discussion about the gap between rhetoric and reality in multistakeholder governance.

### Capacity for Controversial Topics

A significant portion of the IGF discussion focused on its capacity to handle controversial topics. Jovan Kurbalija argued that enhanced cooperation should be brought as a track on the first day of IGF, questioning why such topics are avoided. Alejandro Pisanty contended that the IGF is mature enough to handle controversial issues but that some stakeholders are not ready for such discussions.

## Contemporary Challenges and Future Directions

### Institutional Reform Needs

The discussion revealed growing recognition that significant institutional reforms may be necessary to address contemporary digital governance challenges. William J. Drake suggested the need for new work to address the relationship between different forms of digital governance. Bertrand de la Chapelle proposed a new multistakeholder working group to address the IGF’s future after the WSIS+20 process.

Jovan Kurbalija presented three key questions for the IGF’s future: whether it should continue as a discussion forum or gain decision-making capacity, how to improve national and regional IGF processes, and how to ensure financial sustainability. He also suggested revisiting the Tunis compromise formula that balanced multistakeholder participation with the UN umbrella.

### Addressing Democratic Deficits and Inclusion

A recurring theme throughout the discussion was concern about democratic deficits in current governance processes. Nandini from IT4Change India raised concerns about digital governance issues being moved to closed-door trade negotiations, undermining democratic governance.

Charles Shaban emphasised the need for intersectional and rights-based approaches to digital governance centring marginalised communities, while Shaima Akhtar asked whether governance frameworks should evolve to be more inclusive of women, youth, and marginalised communities.

### Technical Innovation in Governance Processes

The discussion highlighted potential for innovation in governance processes themselves. Jovan Kurbalija noted that AI tools could now help trace contributions to final documents, though he emphasised that human approaches remain preferable. This observation highlighted how technological advances might support more transparent and participatory governance processes, potentially addressing the “governance Bermuda Triangle” problem he identified.

## Unresolved Tensions and Future Challenges

### Enforcement versus Dialogue

One of the most significant unresolved issues was how to balance multistakeholder governance with the need for enforcement mechanisms against powerful private sector actors. Bertola’s observation that governance without enforcement mechanisms allowed harmful actors to fragment the internet into commercial silos highlighted a fundamental challenge that remains unaddressed.

### Democratic Legitimacy and Genuine Participation

Despite broad agreement on many issues, the discussion revealed significant disagreements about the IGF’s democratic legitimacy and bottom-up nature. The tension between multistakeholder rhetoric and reality emerged as a critical concern requiring attention.

### Scope and Effectiveness

Participants disagreed about the IGF’s effectiveness in addressing broader internet governance issues beyond technical coordination. This disagreement reflected fundamental tensions about the appropriate scope and ambition of internet governance institutions, and whether dialogue-focused forums can be effective in addressing structural economic and social problems.

## Conclusion: Legacy and Future Prospects

The 20th anniversary reunion of WGIG demonstrated both the enduring relevance of the group’s achievements and the significant challenges facing contemporary internet governance. The informal, reunion-like atmosphere, punctuated by technical difficulties and fond memories of Frank March, provided an appropriate setting for both celebration and critical self-reflection.

The discussion revealed that WGIG’s core contributions—legitimising multistakeholder cooperation within the UN system, developing a durable and universal definition of internet governance, and creating innovative consensus-building methodologies—remain valuable and applicable to current challenges. The definition’s three elements of multistakeholder, collaborative, and holistic approaches have proven remarkably adaptable to new technologies and governance challenges.

However, the conversation also revealed significant tensions and unresolved issues. The gap between multistakeholder rhetoric and reality, the challenge of addressing economic and social problems without enforcement mechanisms, and questions about democratic legitimacy and genuine participation all emerged as critical concerns. Perhaps most sobering was the recognition that despite technical successes in internet governance, broader social outcomes may not have lived up to the original promise of the internet.

The frank and sometimes uncomfortable nature of the discussion—exemplified by Bertola’s harsh assessments and Doria’s challenge to IGF mythology—demonstrated the intellectual maturity of the internet governance community and its willingness to confront difficult truths. This honest assessment, balanced with recognition of genuine achievements, provides a solid foundation for addressing the significant challenges that lie ahead.

The session ultimately affirmed that while WGIG’s foundational work remains relevant, new approaches and potentially new institutions may be needed to address contemporary challenges effectively. The collaborative spirit and methodological innovations that made WGIG successful—particularly the transparent, participatory approach exemplified by Frank March’s real-time writing and feedback process—offer valuable lessons for future governance efforts in an increasingly complex and contested digital landscape.

Markus Kummer: I don’t understand, he gives me signs. Look at all those people, with that many people, they probably have enough time for a sentence each. Yeah, no, we can’t see that, we have to turn around. You guys are sitting in the right place, because those are too far away. I cannot touch the Zoom. Okay. Can you hear me? Yes. I can still hear music in my… Okay, good morning everyone. It’s all a bit complicated here, we have to put our headsets on, and we are on channel 4. 5. Oh, sorry, channel 5. Yes, we are in room 5. Anyway, welcome everyone. And to the technician, can you stop the background music, please? I don’t know what’s… Background music is on 4. Got it? Okay, I was on the wrong channel. Well, it’s very complicated, yes. And we’re not young people anymore, we’re celebrating the 20-year anniversary of the Working Group on Internet Governance. And whatever you say, you can hear it because the microphones are on permanently, so if you have any side conversations, we can hear it. Anyway, it’s a great pleasure to have you all here. So it’s a class reunion to celebrate the 20th anniversary. We’re all still walking, we’re not in a wheelchair yet. And as somebody said, maybe… We have to ask for a doctor to be in the room just in case. Be that as it may, I took the liberty of using my AI assistant I have on my phone to ask, does WGIG matter? And I say, it’s a difficult question, and the answers are yes and no. But in conclusion, it says that WGIG plays a role in the development and promotion of internet governance and may have less impact than some would have desired. This is sort of a kind of wishy-washy intelligence, I would have thought. We were part of the process. We actually thought we had a tremendous impact. It was a bit of a game changer in the WSIS process, which before was very much government only, and we really opened the doors to a multi-stakeholder participation. And we thought, OK, let’s look back a bit and also look forward a bit. And we decided to have it in three segments. And when I say we, it was mainly Bill who put it together. Have one segment on the nature of internet governance, one segment on multi-stakeholder and multilateral, which is seen by some as an antagonistic situation, and then the last segment, the IGF, looking forward to the future of the IGF. Does the IGF live up to expectation? What should change? What not? And with that, I hand over to Bill, who provides some framing of the session. Please, Bill.

William J. Drake: OK. Thank you very much, Marcus, and hello, everybody. I’m going to take my headphones off so I don’t hear myself. Well, I thank you all for coming, first of all, because there’s a lot going on at the same time. We’re here not because we think that the WGIG report that was put out was a source of Talmudic wisdom for the ages, that we solved all the problems of the universe or anything like that. It was a negotiated document under very intense conditions, et cetera. However, there was. a lot of impact, I think, on the process, and that it’s been lasting, and I think it’s worth taking note of that, since this is the 20th anniversary of the WSIS, how could we not talk about the 20th anniversary of the WGIG, which played an important role in bringing the WSIS to a successful conclusion. So that’s why I thought it would be useful to get the band back together again and do this. So I’m just going to make a few points about the impact of the WSIS, and that’s based in part on, we did two books together, aside from the reports that were put out, members of the group got together and contributed chapters to two books that I edited, one in 2005 and the other in 2015 on the 10th anniversary, and in those books I had chapters about why WGIG mattered, and I’m going to kind of just run through a couple of points to try to level set us to get everybody on the same page, because frankly at this point, I don’t know how many people even remember the WGIG. I talked to people at the party last night, and a lot of people were like, you know, I come to IGF, I don’t really know where the IGF came from, I don’t know what, you know, I mean a lot of this history has just gone dark as we’ve all gotten older and new people have cycled in, et cetera. So I think it’s good to try to level set us by getting us on the same page and say, what was this thing, et cetera. So I’m just going to make three points about the procedural and institutional contributions, and then a couple of points about the substantive contributions, and then we’ll go to inclusive discussion with all the people that are here as well as the ones who are online. So I would start by saying that the WGIG demonstrated the benefits of multistakeholder cooperation in the United Nations in a way that really hadn’t been seen before in the Internet governance space for those who are old and were around during the WSIS process. You may remember in the early stages of the process, stakeholders were being locked out of rooms, thrown out of rooms, told not to speak. The whole thing was a kind of a mess. For a long time, it took a while for the whole multistakeholder thing, ethos, to start to kick in. The WGIG contributed, I think, substantially to legitimating that and showing that, in fact, multistakeholder collaboration could be effective, problem-solving, and that indeed stakeholders could make real contributions to the kind of procedural and substantive learning that everybody was doing as we came together and groped towards some shared of things. Secondly, I’d say that the WCIS, the WGIG facilitated the WCIS negotiations. For those of you, again, who are around, you might remember that for the first couple of years in the Geneva cycle, people were saying the conversations all over the place, we don’t know what’s going on, it’s not cumulative, we’re going nowhere, etc., etc. The WGIG actually did a kind of systematic mapping and brought order to the discussion, worked through issues in a kind of structured and deliberate and methodical basis that kind of laid out the main issues at stake in a way that everybody could understand. The WGIG promoted public engagement. We did a lot of innovative things that now we take for granted, but back then were new in terms of having public comments, having open transparent processes, having everything on the web, having simultaneous translation in the sessions, etc., etc. All of that stuff that IGF now does, back then it was all new in the United Nations context. In terms of substantive contributions, the WGIG played a major role, I think, in demystifying the nature and scope of Internet governance. There was a lot of debate, you might remember back then, about is there such a thing as Internet governance, does the term even make sense, or else you had people who said, well, if there is Internet governance, it just meant what ICANN does, or it just means what intergovernmental agencies like the ITU should be doing, etc. And we were able to sort of work through this concept and sort of demonstrate that governance does not mean government, right? That we needed a holistic, broad approach to Internet governance that took into account not just the underlying infrastructure, but also the use of the Internet and the rule systems that apply to privacy, digital trade, intellectual property, and so on, on transactions going over the Internet, etc. We developed a working definition, which was drawn from the political science literature on international regimes as it happens, that set out who does Internet governance, what does Internet governance consist of, and where is it done, etc. All that was important. And we kind of took the attention off the whole debate that was going on at the time about how the ITU might take over ICANN and so on. In fact, we kind of de-centered the ITU and that controversy completely by taking this broad kind of approach, which I think was good. Fifth, we began the holistic analysis of a broad range of issues. In light of that broad definition, we mapped out all the different issues that are part of the Internet governance ecosystem and galaxy and clustered them and made them a little bit more tractable in terms of discussions. We had a process where colleagues put out different visions for oversight of Internet governance of critical Internet resources. This is the first chance for people to put forward alternatives to the ITU as an intergovernmental solution. Various government members came up with proposals for a global Internet council, an intergovernmental global Internet policy council, all kinds of new types of things. None of these were agreed as a group, but they were simply listed for people’s information and that helped shape the discussion going forward about enhanced cooperation and things like that. So that was, I think, probably useful in advancing the discussion. And of course, most importantly from the standpoint of this group, the WGIG proposed the creation of an Internet governance forum to continue the dialogue, to help to solve the deadlocks that were occurring around Internet governance to say, let’s have a permanent space attached to the United Nations where we can continue to have open discussion without the pressure of negotiating outcomes and so on. So those were seven ways in which the WGIG, I think, made a meaningful, impactful contribution to the conclusion of the WSIS process, but also helped laid the foundation for everything that’s gone on in the years subsequent. So that’s just a little background to refresh us for those who haven’t thought about the WGIG in 20 years. And now what we’re going to do is go through three forward-looking questions. I think it’s important to think about how we can do that. I think it’s important to think about how we can do that. I think it’s important to think about how we can do that. I’m also asking colleagues to think about how we think about some of the contemporary problems from the perspective of what we did together 20 years ago. So, thank you.

Markus Kummer: Thank you, Bill, and at a more basic level, I would say the WGIC report found its way into the final outcome of the WSIS, which was a very, very good report. I think it was a very good report, and I think a significant impact of the WGIC that we actually managed to feed into the process, and also, for those who attended the summits, there was a significant difference between the Geneva phase and the Tunis phase. The Tunis phase was by far more open in terms of procedure. The Tunis phase was more open in terms of procedure. The WGIC report was more open in terms of procedure. There was a discussion group and some government said, hey, this guy is not government. He needs to be taken out. Whereas, in Tunis, their ICANN community was present, the chair of ICANN was sometimes, or the CEO was sometimes asked for his comments or opinion on some of the items, and that was also an implementation of political science and the way in which those groups were discussed. And were we present. You will, and I have three members of the old WGIC group listed as contributors, but others feel free to chime in, and we will also open to the other participants to come in after the first segment, but we will invite Tita for us to come in after the cursor section has opened up a little bit. Here are three members of the old WGIC group listed as contributors, so to speak. You were a representative of ICC and people listened to what you had to say. Over to you, Aisha.

Ayesha Hassan: Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak to you. I think it has come a long way, but I think that the definition has stood the test of time. I think it’s still valid. I think that it has been nicely shaped so that it has adapted. In terms of the nature of Internet governance today, I think that it has expanded in the sense that many emerging countries are using the Internet as a means of communication. I think that it has also expanded in the sense that many of the issues that we are talking about now, in terms of Internet governance, whether it’s AI governance or other technologies, so I think that the discussion that we started 20 years ago is now at a place where we want to keep looking to having adaptable ways to address these issues, and one of the things that I think is really important is the idea of partnerships, and the idea of cooperating and discussing things across the stakeholder groups, which really didn’t exist before, and I just want to take a moment to share one little anecdote. At the time I was global business, and at one point our esteemed chairman, Nitin Desai, laughed and he said, oh my god, do I hear Cuba and global business agreeing? And here’s my comrade next to me today. Yes, we learned to talk to each other, and I think that that has lasted over the years and been fostered by the IGF itself, giving everybody an opportunity to talk with people that they may not have the chance to have a coffee and truly exchange with. And I purposely am emphasizing this because that is an asset, and I think that’s part of what the WGIG started and the IGF has continued to foster. So I’ll stop with that at this point.

Markus Kummer: Thank you, Aisha, for that, and I think anecdotes are always good to enliven the debate a bit or the discussion, and it’s great history. Raul, can you come in?

Raul Echeberria: Yes, thank you very much, Marcus. It’s very nice to be here with all of you today, 20 years later. I don’t know why the rest of the people look 20 years older, not myself. I don’t know what happened with the rest of the people. WGIG was a really innovative experience, an innovative way to address the difficulties that have presented during the first phase of the summit. As Marcus said, it was very different. The first and the second phases of the summit were very different. It was an achievement itself. The WGIG, as Aisha also pointed out, all of us learned about how to work better with other stakeholders. And it was very helpful to have an informal discussion in Tunis. I remember also… bringing an anecdote that there were a lot of discussions in the wiki about who managed the root server A and some of us were trying to explain to the rest of to other people that the root server A was not important. That’s so I said no because why you question what we are our positions. No, I’m not questioning your positions What we are saying here is that the problem is not root server A. The problem is more complex. So that’s the is the the discussion the level of discussion in 2005 was very different than 2003. I think that the one of the things that one of the important outcomes of the wiki was also that we strengthen the the concept of multi-holderism and this is when we look nowadays the the organizations and the forums that are involved in in different ways on in the governance of Internet. Not all of them are pure multi-stakeholder models, but they all of them or most of them are open to the participation of all stakeholders and this is important because we consolidated the idea that the participation of all stakeholders is crucial. It’s important and it’s a very important still today and though things that sometimes we take us for granted are not. And they all the with all the political changes that we are seeing around the world. That’s the things that that we assume that that were discussions of from the past probably will come back to the table in the in the in the near future and so it is important that we continue as reinforcing that idea that the participation of all stakeholders is crucial and that we need in a very changing world. We need to be more efficient in the development of digital policies to be more efficient, to have the right policies on time is we need the participation of everybody from the inception of the processes, from the origin of the discussions. So I think those lessons that we learned 20 years ago remain very important, valid. I wouldn’t say just valid, that’s crucial for the future of the digital governance in general. Thank you very much.

Markus Kummer: Thank you, Raul. And over to Wolfgang.

Wolfgang Kleinwachter: Thank you very much. I was a member of the WIKIG on behalf of civil society and the academic community and Juan was from the government, Aisha from the business and Raul from the technical community, as demonstrates already, that there was a unique culture of collaboration by trying to promote the understanding, because I also will start with an anecdote, because originally internet governance was not an issue for the WSIS in the mandate from the UN General Assembly in 2001. So in the process of the second PREP-COM, some people raised the issue of internet and then we had an inter-sessional meeting in Paris and this was in a night meeting in the cellar and it was unclear whether non-governmental people can join this Working Group 5. Now we are in the Workshop Room 5. So it was a new Working Group 5 because we had four different working groups and there was no control on the entrance, so that means a lot of non-state actors moved into the room and then a debate started and somebody talked about IP addresses and then the ambassador from a country, I will not name the country, said, what is this an IP address? Because there was only little knowledge about governments at this time and then Paul Wilson from APNIC stepped in and explained, you know, how how IP addresses and domain names are functioning. And then the ambassador, oh, this was very helpful. Thank you very much. And I think this was the start of the mutual recognition that every stakeholder can bring a different expertise to the table. But from Paris, it was in July 2003 to December 2003, to December 2003, the understanding of the complexity was still on a low level. So that means even people did not understand what we are talking about. That’s why the Wiki got the mandate to define what internet governance is. So it had not only the mandate to work on recommendations, but also to give a definition. And I think this definition is, the discussion around this definition is really crucial. And Bill mentioned that already. When we worked on the definition, we had two options at the end of the day. And narrow definition, just to concentrate on the critical internet resources, names and numbers, or a broad definition. And confronted with the complexity of the mandate also of the WSIS, we decided in favor of the broad definition. And this is what Bill said also on who and what and how. So, and these are the three elements which are defined in these three lines of the paragraph in the Tunis agenda, which says, okay, it has to be all stakeholder has to be involved in their respective roles. I was fighting until the very last moment to add on equal footing. But Anita said, okay, respective roles include in a certain way that everybody is equal in their respective role. So, but anyhow, this was the first element. all stakeholders has to be involved, the second was sharing, sharing on norms, principles and even decision-making procedures, that is the collaborative approach, and the third part was that we differentiated between the evolution and the use of the internet, so the technical and the political layer, and this was the holistic approach. And if I take these three basic elements of the definition, the multi-stakeholder approach, the collaborative approach and the holistic approach, then I think this definition is really universal and can be used for all governance aspects which we are discussing today, 20 years later, because 20 years ago internet governance was the term that covered all the things, but since that we have seen, you know, a lot of new language appearing around governance, we have digital governance, ICT governance, cyber governance, then governance of the internet of things, IoT governance, and now we are talking about AI governance, and I’m asking myself, you know, what is the difference between AI governance and internet and the broad definition of internet governance, if you just take these three approaches. So AI governance has to be multi-stakeholder, AI governance has to be collaborative, and, you know, without a holistic approach, you will fail to find any sustainable solutions for AI, that means you have to take into consideration also in AI governance the technical elements and the public policy implications, and in so far, you know, the confusion we had 20 years ago around internet governance sometimes reappear as confusion about AI governance, but it’s rather simple, go back to what we have produced 20 years ago. Thank you.

Markus Kummer: Thank you for that, Wolfgang, and yes, we also, the Tunis agenda has a whole chapter on internet governance with some explanatory paragraphs, and they make it clear that anything related to the use and abuse of the internet is part of internet governance, and also… these applications you mentioned, AI and whatever, they rely on the internet. Without the internet, digital without the internet, it’s not just about the standalone computer, it’s about connecting the computers. But I would like to invite other WGIC members, old WGIC members, if they would like to add anything, but also open the floor to other participants if you have comments or questions. Juan, you would like to come in, please?

Participant: Yes, well, good morning. I don’t want to, I’m not going to talk about the substantial achievements of the IGF, of the WGIC, because it was just mentioned, you know, the working definition and the rest of the mandate. I want to talk about some achievement of the methodology, because to ask a group of persons, intelligent group of persons, that have different viewpoints, to agree in a very contentious subject, it seems like being crazy, you know, because, well, if you have people that have similar opinions, that’s okay, but to have 30 people with different opinions to get to the results, it is a challenge. And it was done, and I’m going to share with you how methodology, it was done, because I think it’s useful for many discussions that are being carried out now, and also it has been applied in some other forums in which I participated. The first thing is that throughout the year that we were working, we had a lot of opinions. I think Bill mentioned all that opinions, and it was all collected in a very big document, and then at the end, because we had to have a report, we were placed into a… and they throw out the key, and you don’t get out until you have a report. But we have very, very large material that will be very impossible to collate. So the first decision is that we will have two reports. We will have a big report in which all the opinions will be collected. It necessarily is not a consensus report. It’s a sort of compendium, and it was mentioned that that was being very useful because many interesting ideas were there, and then people can take it out and materialize it later, and then to concentrate in the actual report. And, of course, then we have a lot of things in which we had consensus, and we put it there. We discussed the definition, as Wolfgang just said, with some tweaks there. But in the end, there were the recommendations of the arrangements for the government. There was no consensus in the final one. And so we decided that we would try to narrow down the different proposals to the bare basics, and we finally ended with four different ones. And I think this is a contribution of this report, and it’s a methodology that can be used in some discussions that we’re going to have now, for instance, in data governance and some other, that whenever we don’t get, we don’t have to get to one final consensus because maybe that’s impossible. But if we can narrow down and put the basic alternatives as part of the final report, that is a result, because otherwise you can say, okay, we don’t have consensus, so we don’t have result, and that’s zero. And so I think that this opens the way. to very contentious issues that it’s been discussed today to open the way to have results that could be actionable and that can really contribute. So I think Marcus and Bill and my colleagues, I think that that’s what’s one of the contribution that we made. And I think we had no choice because otherwise we’ll still be in the Chateau 20 years after trying to get the one only answer. Thank you.

Markus Kummer: Thank you. It was very good wine. Yeah. Yeah. Marcus. Marcus. OK, Jovan.

Jovan Kurbalija: Thank you. Just a quick note on this point, which I think Bill and Juan brought. At that time, you had a feeling that your input was taken care of. It was not accepted verbatim, but you had a feeling that it was provided. What is the major problem today is that we have so many processes which call you to have your say, make contribution. And your contribution disappears in some sort of a governance Bermuda Triangle. And you just come with some document and say, OK. It’s fine if somebody says, OK, we disagree. We cannot accept that. There is a consensus. But this is a huge problem. Some good news is, ideally, we should be locked in some sort of secluded place and negotiate, as Marcus did, really, as a big master of diplomacy. But nowadays, we have also AI that can help us. AI can trace our contribution to the final document. Is your contribution reflected in final document or completely ignored? It’s not ideal. I prefer human approach. But this is one great lesson, I would say, from WGIG and overall IGF process. When somebody asks you to have your say, to contribute, there is some sort of reflection. Roger, this. agree, agree, let’s discuss it, whatever. I’m afraid that this is missing now in global governance in general, and I would say also in AI and digital governance.

Markus Kummer: Thank you, Jovan, and I think in the interest of time we have to move on, and I encourage the next speakers to be as concise and compact as possible. So we go to the multilateral versus multistakeholder, and the first speaker is Alejandro Pisanti. He’s joining us remotely. Alejandro, are you on?

Alejandro Pisanty: Yes, I am on. Can you hear me?

Markus Kummer: Excellent. We can hear you. Welcome.

Alejandro Pisanty: Hi. It’s 3 a.m. in Mexico City. Cheers, everybody. Thanks for the invitation and for the first round. It’s very useful. One of the things that happens with, and it’s a bit of a paradox, as Jovan has said, we had the years of the governments and decision makers at the UN structurally because this was the outcome, and we was part of the process to produce an outcome for WSIS, the World Summit of Information Society, which had been agreed to take place by an agreement of the UN General Assembly. So that’s something that we’re not having as often now, and processes like the GDC seem to have been – Global Digital Compact – seem to have been designed in order to make it much harder for voices like who would have been the wiki to make even a dent on decisions that have already been made by the Secretary General and his adjuncts and a few influential governments. Multilateral versus multi-stakeholder, we have to – I’m confused. convinced that all problems of Internet governance and many others are much better solved by multi-stakeholder mechanisms. The weights of the stakeholders have to be different. Institutional and organizational design are key. We have to be able to, let’s say, involve governments decisively when things are involving law enforcement, for example. So even if the involvement is informal, it has to be very enabling, as happens in the anti-phishing working group or as it’s happening in the upcoming global anti-scam alliance. And in other places, the governments really have themselves decided to sit in the second row. That happened to us when we were doing the ICAN reform process around 2001, 2003. Governments were offered seats to study, at least seats at the table on the board, and they had very good reasons not to do that. One of them was legal, that they would have to join the liabilities of the corporation as governments, and the other ones that they would never come together to decide who were five representatives or even three representatives as one vote. What we have learned from these multi-stakeholder processes also is how different stakeholders perceive what is important, what is decisive, and what’s actually pretty standard. As you know, I have a scheme for translating things, like, for example, using identity, the mass scale of the internet, cross jurisdictions, lowering barriers, lowering friction, and managing memory and forgetting to understand what problems are actually not a problem created by the internet, but modified or disrupted if you want. And in some of these cases, you actually do need a more multilateral layer in the solution of a fully multi-stakeholder problem. Consequences of choosing multi-stakeholder or multilateral, well, it’s… the internet more free in the countries that propose multilateral? That’s probably the acid test of why we actually need to keep pushing for multi-stakeholder because every single country that pushes for more multilateral is also pushing against internet freedom. Thank you.

Markus Kummer: Thank you for that Alejandro and thank you for joining us at the ungodly hour in your country. That’s very much appreciated.

Alejandro Pisanty: Love you so much Mansoor.

Markus Kummer: And we have Avri as a speaker on these issues. Please Avri.

Avri Doria: Okay thank you. I actually very much like this subject of multi-stakeholder and multilateral as opposed to multi-stakeholder versus. I think at the moment in this point history they both have to coexist and in fact we’ve seen that. We see that with examples of like the ICAN example. We see that with examples like the the Sao Paulo guidelines which basically finally talk about how we can bring the two together. Now there was a wonderful part of WGIG where we were actually I think it’s the last time we actually participated as equals and that’s one of the things that I’ve looked for since then. WGIG truly was I was able to sit there and argue for hours against some of the roles and responsibilities as believed by governments and until Neaton got tired of it, it was allowed to go on and that is important. That is something that does not happen at the moment because even in our multi-stakeholder models even in something as vaunted as the IGF that grew out of WGIG, it’s a top down. There is an authority that we all answer to in some way. We all appeal to. We all have to go to. So the multi-stakeholder is there. I would never say that IGF isn’t multi-stakeholder. but not completely, not fully. It has a ways to develop. And Wigig does give an example, does sort of point a way of it can work. And we’ve seen other examples where it can work. It was an interesting example to me. I came in as a techie, knew nothing about internet governance, knew a little bit about philosophy, didn’t know what ICANN, I knew what ICANN was, but nothing about it. And I learned a lot through that process and found it really quite, quite valuable. And it obviously changed my life. One of the other things, and I wanna point out, and I’m not sure it even fits in this thing, but there was one feature of the working group on internet governance that we’ve lost. We had Frank March, our secretary, our main writer, sitting in the room with us while he was writing, talking to us, asking about this paragraph or that paragraph. That goes even further on the notion that now we sort of contribute our comments into a bucket somewhere and somebody may look at them, may not look at them, may include a word or two, but not. We actually sat there irritating this poor, lovely man, saying, no, no, no, no, you gotta change that word. No, I need this paragraph. No, and he actually bore with it. And so while we’re all talking about the wonder of Wigig, I really wanted to bring up the wonderful example of Frank. So I think that for the foreseeable future, we have to work on a way to combine the two because governments are not gonna give up their multilateral insofar as they can get beyond unilateral but they’re not gonna give it up in any time. And we can’t afford to give up a multi-stakeholder model so the two of them have to work either in contention, which is not that useful. or figure out how to operate together. And I think we’ve got some motion in that direction. I think WIEGIG started it. I think it’s always good to go back to reading, not only the report, but as several people said, the background report. There’s so much in there to play with. And I recommend it to any student. So hopefully that answered my part of the question.

Markus Kummer: Thank you for that, Avri, and also thank you for mentioning Frank. Frank March played a very important role. I think without him, we wouldn’t have been able to produce the report. I invite you to share a thought on him because he passed away, sadly, a couple of years back. That was very sad to learn. It was really an important help for us to produce the report. And the last speaker on this segment, and thank you also, Avri, for moving away from the dichotomy, multi-stakeholder versus multilateral. No, I think it was the Brazilians who always make the point there is no false dichotomy between the two. They have to work together. And thank you also for underlying that. Charles, you also put your name down for that. And can you also say if there’s anything to report on what’s happening in the Zoom room? Please, Charles.

Charles Shaban: Thank you. Thank you very much, Marcos. In fact, I think what I will say is I will start by saying that I was still young in the internet governance sphere, not in age, I’m still young in age. Anyway, so, but it was really a wonderful experience to sit, as my colleagues mentioned, with the different stakeholders. And to give an example, maybe different of what my colleague mentioned, I mean, a specific example. Let’s go to my current practice. The intellectual property was somehow problematic, you can say. I think we need to make sure that we have a policy that is not based on the UDRP, for example. I think without the multi-stakeholderism, we couldn’t have this uniform resolution policy on the Internet. Why? Because as everybody knows, it started with ICANN, WIPO, WIPO government, ICANN, different technical body, we can say, private sector, lawyers, and the civil society. So we need to make sure that we have a policy that is not based on the UDRP, for example, and we need to find these different solutions for the disputes on the Internet domain names in specific. So I would like to mention this to have some additional of what my colleagues already covered, I think, in general. So I agree, maybe the last sentence, I will say, I will not talk a lot, I will concentrate on remote moderation today. What Avery mentioned, I think multilateralism is a very important issue, and I think we need to find a way to work with the multilateralism, which is very important, bottom-up and so on, and to be able to find a way to work with the different multilateral mechanisms. Thank you.

Markus Kummer: Thank you very much. And I think there was a time when there was a real antagonism between multi-stakeholder, multilateral, and the technical community in particular said, oh, we need to work together, and as working for a small country for the diplomatic service of Switzerland, we always believe in multilateralism because it protects the smaller countries. Multilateralism is always better than unilateralism, and I think in this current global situation, we really all need to feel, we feel strengthened through multilateralism, which does not include unilateralism. And with that, can we move on to the last segment, which is essentially looking to the IGF. Has the IGF delivered what we had hoped for, and it really built very much on WGIG. We had, it was mentioned before, we had our closed session on the Chatham House rule, but we always opened up in between, and the day before, we had an open consultation, and we thought that could be the model also for the IGF, and the IGF very much built on that model. So has the IGF actually lived up to our expectations, and what should we do to move forward? And we have two remote speakers here, Baher Esmat, who works for ICANN, and Carlos, they’re all remotely, they’re both remotely, and then we have Jovan and Vittoria, who are here in the room. Can we move to Baher? Baher, are you online?

Baher Esmat: I am. I hope you can hear me.

Markus Kummer: We can hear you loud and clear. Excellent.

Baher Esmat: All right. Thank you, Marcus, and hello, everyone. I’m pleased to take part in this session and to contribute to the discussion. alongside my WGIG colleagues, the IGF, and today we’re almost 19 years into this global forum, and I think the IGF has been, you know, the primary global multi-stakeholder forum for discussing internet governance issues. It kind of, you know, filled a gap that was identified by the WGIG members 20 years ago. It provided a space for discussion, for open discussion among all stakeholders, from governments, private sector, civil society, technical community, and academia, all on equal footing. It has also contributed to a very important element, especially to those coming from the developing world, which is the capacity building aspect. And I think today, with the numerous, you know, regional, national IGFs and other similar platforms from, you know, school and internet governance and so forth, this, you know, shows the impact of the IGF over the years. Another point I’d like to point to very quickly, and I think some of the previous speakers have touched on, which is how the IGF has evolved over time. I think the IGF has been, you know, continuously evolving over the past years. We’ve seen this in many aspects from, you know, trying to improve its outcomes in the forms of, you know, whether messages or reports and so on, but also in the form of topics and issues being addressed during the meetings. And as someone noted earlier, you know, this debate between, you know, internet governance, digital governance, and those definitions, I think because of the way the WGIG approach the issue of defining internet governance. And, you know, we’ve seen the definition itself is broad enough to sort of encompass, you know, a lot of issues, most of which were not even foreseen, they did not exist 20 years ago. So the IJF over the years has evolved in its agenda. And we’ve seen many topics that were not in, you know, the WGIG radar in 2004-2005. AI is, you know, the most popular, but there are many, many others. And I think this evolution is one of the key characteristics of the IJF. The other characteristics that has been debated over the years is the non-decision making nature of the IJF. And while some, you know, have debated that this is one of the weaknesses of the IJF, personally, I believe it’s one of the strengths. And I think it was not a bug in the system. I think it was intentionally by design to be made as a, again, an open and non-decision making forum to allow everyone to contribute and to participate on equal footing. Now looking to the future, and this is my last point, I think, you know, as we continue to consider how to evolve the IJF, how to improve and strengthen the IJF, I believe that the financial stability and sustainability of the IGF is key. And for the IGF to continue to serve as the global internet governance forum, I think we need the minds of all the participants and the contributors to the IGF to come together and to consider more innovative ideas to sort of guarantee or at least offer or put forward a sustainable model for funding and supporting the IGF to continue its role at the global level. Thank you.

Markus Kummer: And the next speaker is Carlos Afonso. Are you joining us from Rio?

Carlos Afonso: Yes, I am joining from Rio. Let me turn the camera on. Yes, I am there.

Markus Kummer: It’s great to see you, Carlos.

Carlos Afonso: So I find it a bit complicated to find new things related to the report that we did in 2005. I already mentioned a very important thing that Frank Marsh did a beautiful work of patience, of listening to us and trying to synthesize everything. It was really great and the report is much, much more than the definition. I think we did a definition that was to stand the test of time, simple enough to stand the test of time, but it’s still very simple in relation to… to all the complex issues we are facing. But the report was so important because it identified four key public policy areas, which are still the main public policy areas, whatever the development of internet and, you know, and these four policy areas we managed to detail in 13, issues, fundamental issues, which are valid until today. So I think that more than the definition, or the report is a very good reference, which the report itself is studying the test of time. And this is great. I think this is what’s the main contribution we could do in that group at the time. Thank you.

Markus Kummer: Thank you very much, Carlos. Great to see you. Now back to the room and we have Jovan and Vittoria who also address this issue. Jovan first.

Jovan Kurbalija: Thank you, Markus. Well, it’s a party time in a way, and I don’t know if it is good to bring some controversies, but since we will have four days to chat in the corridors and during the coffee break, I will propose three points about the future of IGF, which may require the great contribution for all people in the room and the former members of the working. The first one, and thank you for parking it, is the false dichotomy, multi-stakeholder versus multilateral. If you look carefully in the Tunis compromise, you will see that IGF is masterpiece of compromise by putting the multi-stakeholder body under the UN umbrella. Both camps got something. Pro-governmental camp got for the first time IG issues in the UN context. Multi-stakeholder camp got multi-stakeholder participation. That formula, unfortunately, will have to be revisited, and that cannot stay as fixed in the stone. As Executive Director of the UN High-Level Panel, I try to argue for IGF Plus. And one point, and I will now open controversies, is that I argued that the famous, very controversial, big elephant in the room question of enhanced cooperation should be brought as one of the track on the first day of IGF together with governments, civil society, businesses discussing. We may not call it enhanced cooperation, we may call it enhanced coordination, just to have it smoother consumption, but I never understood why it wasn’t possible. I understand political positioning elements of it more diplomatic, but in its core it was very simple solution to put that last bit from the Tunis formula, bit of salt, which I think British diplomat on the 18th of November during the negotiation brought as a solution to find the package. That’s controversial and I’m sure there will be many questions. The second point is capacity building, and that was a great achievement. And here is a personal story. When I started doing IG, my friends asked me, what are you doing? And then when I told them what I was doing, they were calling me to fix their printer, to install their software and these things. I usually did it. It’s great to help people, but then it inspired me to write a book, Introduction to Internet Governance. And fast forward, few months ago, I wrote the last book eight years ago, and I said there is no need anymore, but people convinced me and I’m preparing eight edition, which will be presented on Wednesday. And the question was, should I call it Internet Governance? And you will see if you come to that discussion, there is a reason to keep it as Internet Governance. Issues are the same. They’re not asking me anymore to install their printer. They’re now asking me about where their knowledge is, who is basically monopolizing their knowledge. Discussion moved on. And that sort of dynamics, by me writing the book every year and now revisiting this book, is a great sort of diary of the Internet Governance Forum and its achievement. And third point, which Bill mentioned, is extremely important. It is modus operandi of the IGF. Sometimes. And. estimate that. And I’ll give you one point, again, personal story. 15 years ago, I went to the IGF, I think, well, you will find the date, but it was, and you know how it goes. You come the first day and you have a big ambitions, great speakers, great workshops, you want to follow it all. And after the first morning, you realize that you cannot do it and you end up in the cafeteria meeting friends, chatting. And there is always that feeling of the missed opportunities, or I missed something. This is how deep loss reporting started. First with humans, our former students, interns, and now it’s now help with the AI. And that incremental development of new methodologies, now when everything is now and here, we have AI, let’s install AI agents. But that incremental in all aspects of IGF work, capacity building, bringing consensus, involving other people from our side, this reporting, I think it’s a great legacy of the IGF. And on that legacy, we should build the future of IGF. There were three points. First, revisit Tunis formula. We need to do it. Second, continue capacity building. That’s one of the great achievements of IGF. And third one, talk more about the way of modus operandi of the IGF. It’s completely, I would say, we are too shy about it. And this is untold story of high relevance for the broader governance and other communities. Thank you.

Markus Kummer: Thank you, Jovan. And last speaker is Vittorio.

Vittorio Bertola: Thank you. So as the former youngest member of the WIG, again, the least diplomat, I think I will have to also start some controversy. But I think we’re really at the point in time where we need to think of the future of the IGF. So we need also to look at what worked and what didn’t work. I’d start from the first half of the problem, which is the practical way of working on the IGF. And I think in the overall, we like this event, so we continue coming. So I think everybody finds value in the IGF. I think it should continue. I think it could be better. I mean, especially this year, I only meet people that are disappointed because they’ve been trying to propose a panel or workshop for several years now, and they never get accepted even if they meet all the criteria, because there’s, I guess, a sheer lack of space. I mean, there’s a limit to how many you can have. But we have to find a better way of mobilizing these energies, because otherwise there’s people, especially outside of the existing, I mean, regular participants that come, try several years. They get disappointed. They go away and say, oh, the IGF is just a smoke, just for the insiders, just whatever. And the other thing is, I think that will also solve this problem, is a much better working of the national IGF specialists. I mean, our experience with the Italian IGF is terrible. I mean, six years ago, six, seven years ago, it was captured by the then government, and it was used by a politician for self-promotion. There were no meeting anymore. I mean, it didn’t even happen for several years. And then now it’s still in the hands of the government, and it’s a new government. You know, in six years, we have had like seven governments of multiple colors. But still, every government is keeping it, and now they’re organizing maybe one this year. Again, it’s multi-stakeholder in the sense that there’s multiple ministries involved. So I think that we need to address these kinds of things, because it could make the credibility, I mean, especially the bottom-up process much better. But then the other part of the question is about the role of the IGF, and I mean, the question in the program is, I mean, did it meet the purpose that we thought it will meet? And to be honest, I think that while the narrow part of the definition worked well, and I think that nobody’s really unhappy with the governance of the technical resources, that the broadest part of the definition didn’t work very well. So we are now at a state, I mean, 20 years ago, we believed the Internet would bring democracy and wealth, and it was an instrument for progress. And nowadays, I mean, I already quoted this. One month ago, there was a survey in the UK, and they asked the young people, I mean, would you live better off if the Internet didn’t exist? And half of them said yes. So half of them think that the world would be better without the Internet. And this is really, really terrible for us that, I mean, work to create it and make it. a mass instrument. And I think what failed is, I mean, we were naive. We thought that by putting everyone together, we would be able to address the economic and social questions, and this didn’t happen, just especially because of the private sector, I have to say, I mean, we’re part of the private sector. The people that could make money out of breaking down the internet and turning it into walled gardens, they just went on and made money. And nobody could stop them because we had no stick. We had carrots, I mean, to come in, but we had no stick to force them. And this is exactly what caused now the transition of countries and regions like the European Union that have always been in favor of multistakeholderism and open governance and whatever, to a new, I mean, like a hard jurisdiction, hard law approach. And this is why I think we were getting now also pressure from multilateralism. And to be honest, I don’t like the idea of more multilateralism, but I also don’t like the idea of continuing with a few very big companies that are doing whatever they want over the internet. And so maybe the national level will be more important. I don’t have an answer on how to build a new balance between all these stakeholders, but indeed there needs to be a reflection which I think includes the IGF as a continuing entity, but also takes into account that by now, I mean, governments really have the need to put some hard rules over global businesses and that this is the tension that is not going away. Thank you.

Markus Kummer: Well, thank you, Vittorio, and also thank you for asking tough questions. I see there are already reactions. Charles, do you have?

Charles Shaban: Maybe Aisha first, but there is a question online.

Markus Kummer: Well, why don’t you go ahead with the question?

Charles Shaban: Okay. In fact, there was some discussions and Bill already answered some of them, but I think one of the questions still online without a response maybe, from Shaima Akhtar, Chairperson, Bangladesh Women IGF. Given the rise of AI, surveillance technologies and the dominance of platform monopolies, should we now push for a more intersectional and right-based approach in defining digital governance? that generally center the live realities of women, youth, and marginalized communities.

Markus Kummer: Thank you. And there were hands up, Aisha and Avri, yes.

Ayesha Hassan: Just briefly, I wanted to build a bit on what has been said by other members here. I think that the IGF is a unique, Marcus, you’ve said this, a watering hole. And I really think that the way it is, it has evolved over 20 years. There are many ways in which each year it’s a different experience. And I think that the range of stakeholders has expanded in all of the different stakeholder groups. So as we look forward, I think it’s encouraging the topics that are important to people to be taken up here, whether in the workshops or in the main sessions. And I was very pleased this year to see resilience being there, because I believe that resilience is a challenge of the future. And it’s not just about how to survive one shock. It’s about how do you build the capacity across the layers, and how is this worked on across stakeholder groups to raise awareness about it. Now that, unfortunately, for the young people who wish that the internet didn’t exist, it does. And our economies, our political systems, social, everything, we depend on this wonderful thing called the internet. So I just wanted to say that now I think an issue for everyone to come around together on is also resilience. How do we keep this being as reliable and secure as possible? And lastly, a shout out to you, Jovan. I’m still waiting for the new edition of the puzzle. Do you remember your puzzle?

Jovan Kurbalija: It’s coming. It’s even more complicated.

Markus Kummer: Thank you, Aisha and Avri.

Avri Doria: Thanks. First of all, I want to thank the comment that came in. And one of the things I want to remind us all is there was a time in the IEGF where we couldn’t even mention the word or the number. notion of rights of people, that we had long, long battles about, my God, rights belongs to some other department within the UN. You can’t talk about rights. And fortunately, we’ve gotten, we’re not doing a lot of it. And so the questioner is right. When can we start talking about them more? Any notion we have that IGF has bottomed up is something that we should quit pretending. It is not. It hasn’t been. And I’d love to see it bottom up, but it isn’t. So and others, you don’t get to be bottom up by having an occasional consultation that you ignore. So that is, we are a tribe of groups. We come here, we come here in our tribes, and we argue for our points. But we’ve been told what points we’re going to be able to argue from by those who control it. So I love the IGF, I love to see it continue, and I’d really like to see it become bottom up.

Markus Kummer: Thank you. Charles?

Charles Shaban: Not from me. Alejandro, raise his hand.

Markus Kummer: Alejandro, want to come in?

Alejandro Pisanty: Yes. Thank you. Complementing what Avery has just said, we’ve been looking to the future of the IGF. Another type of feedback I get is that we must make sure that it doesn’t become like rights come winter. We have to make sure that we engage in these discussions substantively, the people that are decision makers and not only commercial representatives of businesses and higher level officials that don’t stay apart in their own corrals. But we really get to have this conversation substantively. It has to be bottom up, but it has to reach whoever else is in the geometry. I wouldn’t say they are on the top, but they are at the center in effective. political decision-making and we have to make sure that there’s an engagement with them, otherwise it’s too much corridor and too little really multi-stakeholder engagement. Thank you.

Markus Kummer: Thank you and I would also like to open the discussion to the floor. There are microphones on the side so the easiest way will be if those who have a comment or a question just align themselves behind one of the microphones. Yes, Raul, please. Okay, please. Okay, thank you.

Jimson Olufuye: Good morning, everybody. Can you hear me? Yes, we can hear you. Okay, first and foremost, my name is Jimson Olufuye, Africa ICT Alliance, been in the ecosystem for quite a while. I want to salute all our forerunners. Great job you’ve done and we are still at it. First and foremost, I want to talk about the last point made about bottom-up. Actually, we need to understand that it has always been top-down, always been top-down, so it’s going to take a while before it becomes a bottom-up, not as with ICANN. No, ICANN by design is bottom-up and so we need patience, we need perseverance, and we need to continuously engage and talk about it. And that brings me to the second point about multilateralism and multi-stakeholderism. I favor, I love multi-stakeholderism. I love it. It makes life easy. Everybody claims ownership, have ownership, you know, for the common issue for the society, so it’s the way to go. But I have an experience, too, that I will just share briefly. During the wicket that is working group on the arts corporation, a representative accused us in the private sector that we wanted to take over the work of government. So I had to make an explanation that indeed, no, we are helping the government to fulfill their objective. objective, the responsibility to the citizens. So, and after that explanation, I think the accusation stopped. I never heard about it anymore. So I think we need to continuously engage and explain clearly our intention. Our intention is a better society, information society where nobody’s left behind. And when we all work together, we will achieve together, and the government will achieve their purposes. Then thirdly, this is a question now, with regard to Yohan. Yohan made a very important, at least, comment about the issue of consensus. Look, I recall the conclusion of WGATE in 2018, 2018, January 2018. We could not have consensus because we’re expecting 100% consensus. But if what is said now is what we adopted, that is rough consensus, okay, or near consensus, 99% consensus, maybe we’ll have had a kind of firm report that says this is the outcome of this group. So the question is, if we had had that report based on what you have said, do you think the follow-up summit of the future will still have happened? Because by July, the Secretary General set up the high-level panel on digital cooperation, and that led us to this because the WGATE failed. Thank you.

Markus Kummer: Thank you. Shall we go to the microphone behind, and please introduce yourself?

Israel Rosas: Yeah, thank you. Israel Rosas with the Internet Society. Just a brief question, and Yohan hinted at it a little bit. If you were to give a single piece of advice to the WGATE facilitators on how to reach or generate consensus for this process, for the outcome document they are drafting, what would it be that you recommend to them? That’s the only question that I have.

Markus Kummer: Okay, that’s a short question, and I’ll take it back to our panellists. And now, Ariette.

Ariette Esterhuisen: Thanks, Markus. Ariette Esterhuisen, past MAG member and past MAG chair. Do you think the IGF is ready to actually handle controversial issues? I think we’ve spent so many times, I support what Yohan is saying, this fear of putting enhanced cooperation on the agenda. Surely the IGF is mature enough now to be able to do that? This fear of putting issues that are controversial, such as fair tax payment on the agenda by big tech companies, do you feel the IGF is mature enough to be able to do that? And I say that having worked, for example, as someone said, it took years before we could actually talk about human rights at the IGF. It took years. we could talk about LGBT issues at the IGF. Is the IGF finally mature enough to have a strategy which is including and facilitating debate on controversy as opposed to a strategy which is based on avoiding any kind of risk or controversial topic?

Markus Kummer: All important questions and again back to the second microphone, please, yes.

Audience: Hi, I’m Nandini. I’m from IT4Change India and part of the Civil Society Coalition Global Digital Justice Forum. So the panel made a lot of very insightful observations about how the relationship between multilateralism and multi-stakeholderism should not be seen as antagonistic when we want the democratic governance bottom line. My question is in recent years we have seen a lot of digital governance issues, data governance issues in particular, being taken out of a democratic space and into very closed-door multilateral spaces such as digital trade negotiations. So how does the panel think that, you know, we could use the digital cooperation mechanisms available to us to counter the view because even as the GDC processes for data governance are ongoing, we still see those issues and many new bottom lines being sealed in trade deals and sometimes even regional closed-door plurilateral deals. Thank you.

Markus Kummer: Thank you for the question and Bertrand, please.

Bertrand de la Chapelle: Good morning, my name is Bertrand de la Chapelle. I’m the Executive Director of the Internet and Jurisdiction Policy Network. Two comments. One, I’m very happy that both Juan and Jovan and others make a reference to the methodology and the way to work. What was striking from everything I understood from the working of the WGIG was this interaction between people, and Avri was mentioning it as well, and indeed the role of the Secretary had the capacity to make a summary and to present not only a one version that is watered down to get consensus, but something that says there are different options. That was extremely important. The methodology was important and it could be taken into account for the IGL. itself, because as Jordan Carter was saying in another session earlier, the IGF is not supposed to make decisions. It is, in my view, to help frame the issues, to bring the different actors around one topic so that instead of having different sessions addressing the different point of views on the same topic, the different actors can have the kind of interaction that you had within the WGIC. And second, a very quick question. The WGIC was a way out of some sort of roadblock at the end of the first phase of the WSIS. It created what all of you have said and what I believe is still today the most multi-stakeholder process that has taken place in 20 years. We are now stuck with the question of what is going to be the future of the IGF and I personally do not believe that the WSIS plus 20 process until December is going to solve the question of what are the next stages. So my question is, do you think that there would be a benefit in having a sort of new exercise of that sort, a new WGIC after December, or call it, as we were discussing yesterday, a CSTD working group, whatever multi-stakeholder discussion on revision of the mandate of the IGF after 20 years and institutionalization of this organization that now should become a mature organization with funding and processes?

Markus Kummer: Thank you. Food for thought. And I see there are various colleagues who put their hand up. I think Raul was first, then Jovan. Alejandro. Oh, sorry, Alejandro was already in the waiting room. Yes. Alejandro, please.

Alejandro Pisanty: Thank you. Quick replies to Israel. and to Andrea, and part of it has already been given by Bertrand. Consensus is not necessarily an objective of the IGF. It’s more like conveying of different views, reminding ourselves also that it has to be non-duplicative. So if there’s a forum, like satellites and the ITU or what have you, then it’s better to continue the discussion there, but after framing and bringing in new stakeholders that would be otherwise excluded. And to Andrea, and I think you’ll agree, the IGF is mature for lots of much more controversial issues. The ones that are not mature enough are some of the stakeholders. I would say particularly some governments that would prefer to continue power games in closed venues, or let’s say government-only venues where the politics is more like, you know, I’ll trade you some internal governance for some oil or some water rights. So we have to make sure that they are as mature as the forum. Thanks.

Markus Kummer: Thank you. Now we have Raul.

Raul Echeberria: Yes, thank you, Marcus. I cannot address all the points that were brought, so I will pick a couple of them. With regard to the maturity of IGF, I think that’s aligned with what Alejandro said. I think, yes, the IGF is mature enough, and I remember that in 2013 IGF was the first place in the world where we had an open discussion about surveillance after Snowden revelation, and it was a high-level panel, very, I think that it was very good. Yeah, and I organized it.

Jovan Kurbalija: It was one of the most difficult moderations. Yeah. I thought you were my friend.

Raul Echeberria: So the point is, I think that’s the the challenge is that it’s the commitment of the stakeholders to have those discussions. So I think that the tool is good and it’s mature enough, but I think that the point of failure is that it’s the commitment of stakeholders to come and engage and to be honest, and I think that’s all of us agree on this point, this is not the best moment for international cooperation. So I don’t think that we can be very optimistic, at least in the short term. With regard to the call that Israel asked about, what we would suggest to the facilitators, I’m not sure if you were talking about the work toward the December recommendations or the implementation or the recommendation themselves, but I think that the solution is exactly, the point is exactly the same and it’s what Bertram mentioned. I think with regard to the work toward the WSIS plus 20 evaluation, I think that the process has not been participative enough and it would have been good to have an exercise like WGIG to evaluate and make the recommendations, but we still have time to include that as part of the recommendation for the future. So I think that the idea could be the same. Thank you.

Markus Kummer: Thank you, and Wolfgang and Avri as well. I also. Okay, well let’s just take a round pan and start with Wolfgang.

Wolfgang Kleinwachter: Okay, yeah, the short answer to Bertram’s question is yes, certainly, because we will see in December a situation where there is no consensus. And always, you know, the best thing in such a situation, you know, delegate the open questions to a working group. So in Germany we say, if you’re not further informed, then start a working group. So that means if you are in a helpless situation, establish a working group and wait for the future, because this is not the time to reach an agreement. That’s my pessimistic preview for December. But I want to comment on another issue. When we discussed the IGF and the mandate, there was really the intention not to give the IGF a decision-making capacity. To give it only for discussion. Because this has opened the mind, opened the ears, opened the eyes for everybody. On equal footing, everybody can talk to everybody. But you need, at least in the multi-stakeholder context, four for a tango. And that means, if we didn’t want to have a governmental controlled internet, but we are also rejecting a business controlled internet. That’s why the academic, the civil society community, the technical community, was seen as an important part to bring all perspectives. What we see now is indeed that we are coming in a situation where we have either the tech oligarchs or the governments who want to manage this. When Mark Zuckerberg made the announcement in early January that he will stop content moderation, my first reaction was, Mark Zuckerberg should come to the IGF and to explain his decision to the pro-internet community. So I think this is what we need. We have to have the decision-makers on the table for discussions. And then they can go home and can make the decisions where they have a mandate in their own corporation. But it’s part of the accountability system also for the rulers of the internet of today. And this meets exactly what Vittorio has said. Thank you.

Markus Kummer: Thank you. We have one participant behind the microphone. Are you queuing behind the microphone? Two behind the microphone and then we go around here. But can you be very short? One minute?

Hadi Alminyawi: Yes, sure. This is Hadi Alminyawi. Following up with some of the controversial questions and following up and hearing this discussion, So the IGF, as been discussed, is a forum to discuss issues and, like, frame the issues in order to be discussed in a more formal way and come up with decisions and recommendations in the ITU. And that brings a question. So why would governments actually participate or take a role or be interested even in the discussions taking place in the Internet Governance Forum? And so I’ve heard others saying, well, governments would like to manage the IGF. Why would they be even interested in managing the IGF if all what we do here is, like, discussing the issues, framing them, and then moving them to the ITU in order to be discussed in a multilateral form? And there the decisions are made. So yeah, this is my question. Thank you.

Markus Kummer: Sébastien?

Sébastien Bachelet: Usually I come to a microphone and I speak in French, but it seems that it’s not possible here. Sébastien Bachelet, Isaac Frantz and Uralo. I just wanted to ask two questions. The first one, how many government representatives are in the room? Because they will learn a lot. The second question, do you want already that we book the castle for you for the next discussion? Thank you.

Markus Kummer: Thank you. French castle. Okay, now we go back to the panel. And we have five minutes left. So okay, we start with Avri.

Avri Doria: Thank you. Yeah, I have a couple of questions. I had actually, Sébastien, that same question. I was wondering, looking around, trying to figure out how many might be government and such. I won’t ask for a raise of hands, though I’d love to be able to ask for a raise of hands. But yeah, we have a couple at the table. But anyway, I wanted to also come back to people talking about the models. And I think one of the things that happened is with Working Group on Internet Governance, to get back to that, the whole discussion about multi-stakeholder and multi-stakeholderism and multi-stakeholder models really began in earnest. There were certainly examples of it before then, but the model discussion. And at this point, we’ve gotten where we really have to recognize that the model that we have at the IGF is really just one example of a way to do it. We now have many other models. We have to do more work. And it could even be a good thing to do at the IGF of understanding the pervasive number of models. The other thing we have to understand is one of the things that was talked about was IGF does not make a decision. There are multi-stakeholder models that do make decisions. For example, ICANN was brought up. But there you have a case of marrying sort of a multi-stakeholder, bottom-up policymaking with a top-down corporation doing its thing. And that marriage itself is really quite a fascinating thing that needs studying. So there are an immense number of models. And my last thing was on advice. It’s patient perseverance.

Markus Kummer: Thank you. Juan?

Participant: Yes. I didn’t want to talk, but I want to react to what you said, because maybe I’m the only government representative in the room. And I can say that why there’s no interest of government to come to IGF. And one of the things that we discuss in WGI, the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders, we need to define the roles and responsibilities of the processes that are surrounding WSIS. And that is not very well understood. I found out by experience, that the IGF is fantastic as an agenda setter, as framing the issues. And maybe I’m not agreeing with Avri, I think we have still, it can be improved the bottom up, but still there’s some bottom up because the workshops are proposed from the bottom, and also now we have the NRI, the National and Regional IGF. So the IGF is good to bring to the table problems and issues that may not be aware, not even by the governments of their own countries themselves, because of the candor in which it’s presented during the IGF, especially if you’ve been in the IGF that has been held in developing countries, the two where there were in Brazil, the one in Mexico, the one in Kenya. So I think that’s a good thing. So I think that what we need, Bertrand, after this process of the WSIS plus 20, is to really define what is the role of the IGF. The IGF has to be the agenda setter, that’s the role of the IGF, and the WSIS forum, the action, and that’s it.

Markus Kummer: Thank you. There may be others, a very last word.

Jovan Kurbalija: Maybe a quick comment from Jameson. Jameson, why governments are not coming? They are not finding answers to their questions. That’s it. 193 member states, easier than a few thousand members of the IGF. Now, we should not do government bashing. As Jameson said, we should explain why they can benefit. Bottom up, let’s use it with AI. This is now a crucial battle. Can we preserve our knowledge through bottom up AI? Not even Internet governance. This is a critical battle which is happening now and here. Are we ready to start these discussions?

Markus Kummer: Last 50 seconds.

Jovan Kurbalija: That’s it.

Markus Kummer: Bill?

William J. Drake: All right. Well, obviously, not enough time to say anything. On controversial questions, Henrietta. I would just say, remember how much time it took to talk about so-called critical Internet resources. The first couple of years of IGF, everybody was so stressed, we couldn’t even begin to have the conversation. One way to strengthen the ability of the IGF to actually take on these issues is to give us a permanent mandate. If we could, if everybody would stop worrying that somehow the mandate would be snatched back from us if we do anything wrong, then maybe we could get into things more. I also want to just say quickly, the woman who mentioned the trade questions, trade has been brought up in the IGF. It’s been very hard to talk about trade issues in the IGF because trade people don’t understand this space or care much about it, and often it’s hard for people in this space to get their head around how things work in trade. Last point on the new group thing. I think less than a new group to talk about the IGF’s future, narrowly, we need a group that thinks about the relationship between Internet governance, data governance, AI governance, and so on, digital governance. There’s a lot of confusion. There’s just an enormous amount of conceptual gunk out there, and this translates into proposals to do things like changing the name of the IGF and so on, and I think we need to get these issues sorted out and take into account what’s already been discussed and learned by people out there in the field who do these things professionally, among other things. By the way, I can’t think of one thing the ITU has done on Internet governance. I don’t see the IGF as just making inputs to the ITU.

Markus Kummer: Thank you. Well, thank you all for contributing, the participants and the panelists, and what you could see is that 20 years after, we still talk to each other and we’re still friends, so that is a lasting legacy. Please join me in giving all the panelists a big hand, and thank you all.

Agreement points

WGIG’s lasting impact and successful methodology

Speakers

– William J. Drake
– Markus Kummer
– Raul Echeberria
– Wolfgang Kleinwachter
– Participant
– Avri Doria
– Jovan Kurbalija

Arguments

WGIG demonstrated benefits of multistakeholder cooperation in UN context and legitimated this approach

WGIG facilitated WSIS negotiations by providing systematic mapping and structured discussion of issues

WGIG report found its way into final WSIS outcome and significantly impacted the process

WGIG strengthened concept of multistakeholderism and consolidated idea that all stakeholder participation is crucial

WGIG created unique culture of collaboration where every stakeholder brought different expertise to the table

WGIG’s methodology successfully brought together 30 people with different viewpoints to agree on contentious subjects

WGIG provided example of true participation as equals, which is missing in current governance models

Summary

Multiple speakers agree that WGIG was a groundbreaking success that legitimated multistakeholder cooperation in the UN context, created innovative methodology for consensus-building, and had lasting impact on internet governance processes.

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Internet governance definition’s enduring relevance and broad applicability

Speakers

– William J. Drake
– Ayesha Hassan
– Wolfgang Kleinwachter
– Carlos Afonso

Arguments

WGIG demystified internet governance by establishing that governance does not mean government

Internet governance definition has stood test of time and adapted to new technologies like AI governance

WGIG definition with multistakeholder, collaborative, and holistic approaches is universal and applicable to AI governance

WGIG report identified four key public policy areas and 13 fundamental issues that remain valid today

Summary

Speakers consistently agree that the WGIG definition of internet governance has proven durable and remains applicable to contemporary challenges including AI governance and other emerging technologies.

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Need for multistakeholder and multilateral approaches to coexist rather than compete

Speakers

– Markus Kummer
– Alejandro Pisanty
– Avri Doria
– Charles Shaban
– Jimson Olufuye

Arguments

Multilateralism protects smaller countries and should not exclude multistakeholderism

All internet governance problems are better solved by multistakeholder mechanisms with different stakeholder weights

Both multistakeholder and multilateral models must coexist and work together rather than in opposition

Multistakeholderism helps governments fulfill their responsibilities to citizens rather than taking over government work

Summary

There is strong consensus that the dichotomy between multistakeholder and multilateral approaches is false, and both models need to work together complementarily rather than in opposition.

Topics

Legal and regulatory

IGF’s value as discussion forum while acknowledging limitations

Speakers

– Baher Esmat
– Vittorio Bertola
– Participant
– Jovan Kurbalija

Arguments

IGF has been primary global multistakeholder forum providing space for open discussion and capacity building

IGF should continue but needs better mobilization of energies and improved national IGF processes

IGF serves as effective agenda setter and issue framer but needs clearer role definition

IGF has been valuable for capacity building and creating incremental development of new methodologies

Summary

Speakers agree that IGF provides valuable space for multistakeholder dialogue and capacity building, but acknowledge it needs improvements in process, participation, and role clarity.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Development

Similar viewpoints

These speakers share concern about the loss of transparent, participatory methodology that characterized WGIG, where contributions were clearly reflected and participants could see their input being incorporated in real-time.

Speakers

– Jovan Kurbalija
– Avri Doria
– Bertrand de la Chapelle

Arguments

Current processes lack transparency in how contributions are reflected in final documents

Frank March’s role as secretary who wrote while listening and incorporating real-time feedback was crucial innovation

WGIG’s methodology of presenting different options rather than watered-down consensus should be adopted by IGF

Topics

Legal and regulatory

These speakers believe IGF has the capacity to address controversial issues but is held back by stakeholder reluctance and lack of enforcement mechanisms, particularly regarding private sector accountability.

Speakers

– Alejandro Pisanty
– Ariette Esterhuizen
– Vittorio Bertola

Arguments

IGF is mature enough to handle controversial issues but some stakeholders are not ready for such discussions

IGF should facilitate debate on controversial topics like fair taxation of big tech companies

IGF failed to address economic and social questions due to lack of enforcement mechanisms against private sector

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Economic

These speakers emphasize IGF’s evolutionary capacity and its strength in building resilience and capacity across the internet governance ecosystem through continuous adaptation and learning.

Speakers

– Ayesha Hassan
– Baher Esmat
– Jovan Kurbalija

Arguments

Resilience across internet layers should be priority for future stakeholder collaboration

IGF has continuously evolved in topics and outcomes while maintaining non-decision making nature as strength

IGF has been valuable for capacity building and creating incremental development of new methodologies

Topics

Infrastructure | Development | Legal and regulatory

Unexpected consensus

Enhanced cooperation should be brought into IGF discussions

Speakers

– Jovan Kurbalija
– Ariette Esterhuizen

Arguments

Enhanced cooperation discussions should be brought into IGF as regular track rather than avoided

IGF should facilitate debate on controversial topics like fair taxation of big tech companies

Explanation

This represents unexpected consensus because enhanced cooperation has traditionally been seen as too controversial for IGF. The agreement that IGF should tackle this ‘elephant in the room’ issue directly challenges the forum’s historical avoidance of contentious topics.

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Need for new working group or process to address contemporary governance challenges

Speakers

– William J. Drake
– Bertrand de la Chapelle
– Wolfgang Kleinwachter

Arguments

New working group needed to address relationship between internet governance, data governance, and AI governance

Need for new multistakeholder working group to address IGF’s future after WSIS+20 process

Need to have the decision-makers on the table for discussions

Explanation

Unexpected because these speakers, who were part of the original WGIG success, are calling for essentially recreating that model to address current challenges, suggesting the original approach was so effective it should be replicated.

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Overall assessment

Summary

The discussion reveals strong consensus on WGIG’s historical importance and methodology, the enduring relevance of its internet governance definition, the need for multistakeholder-multilateral cooperation, and IGF’s value as a discussion forum. There is also agreement on the need for better transparency in governance processes and the importance of capacity building.

Consensus level

High level of consensus among speakers, particularly on foundational principles and historical assessment. The strong agreement suggests that WGIG’s core contributions remain relevant and that its methodology could inform current governance challenges. However, there are also shared concerns about current limitations and the need for evolution in internet governance processes.

Different viewpoints

IGF’s bottom-up nature and democratic participation

Speakers

– Avri Doria
– Participant
– Jimson Olufuye

Arguments

Any notion we have that IGF has bottomed up is something that we should quit pretending. It is not. It hasn’t been. And I’d love to see it bottom up, but it isn’t.

IGF serves as effective agenda setter and issue framer but needs clearer role definition

Need to understand that it has always been top-down, always been top-down, so it’s going to take a while before it becomes a bottom-up, not as with ICANN

Summary

Avri Doria argues that IGF is not truly bottom-up and never has been, while the government participant defends IGF as having some bottom-up elements through workshops and National/Regional IGFs. Jimson Olufuye acknowledges it’s always been top-down but argues for patience in the transition.

Topics

Legal and regulatory

IGF’s effectiveness in addressing broader internet governance issues

Speakers

– Vittorio Bertola
– Baher Esmat
– Ayesha Hassan

Arguments

IGF failed to address economic and social questions due to lack of enforcement mechanisms against private sector

IGF has continuously evolved in topics and outcomes while maintaining non-decision making nature as strength

Internet governance has expanded to include emerging countries and new technologies while maintaining core discussion framework

Summary

Bertola argues that IGF failed in its broader mandate because it lacked enforcement mechanisms against private sector actors who broke the internet into walled gardens. Esmat and Hassan view IGF’s evolution and non-decision making nature as strengths that have allowed it to adapt and remain relevant.

Topics

Economic | Legal and regulatory

Approach to handling controversial topics in IGF

Speakers

– Jovan Kurbalija
– Ariette Esterhuisen
– Alejandro Pisanty

Arguments

Enhanced cooperation discussions should be brought into IGF as regular track rather than avoided

IGF should facilitate debate on controversial topics like fair taxation of big tech companies

IGF is mature enough to handle controversial issues but some stakeholders are not ready for such discussions

Summary

While all agree IGF should handle controversial topics, they disagree on the approach. Kurbalija wants to directly address enhanced cooperation, Esterhuizen focuses on economic issues like taxation, and Pisanty blames stakeholder immaturity rather than IGF’s capacity.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Economic

Future governance structure needs

Speakers

– William J. Drake
– Bertrand de la Chapelle
– Jovan Kurbalija

Arguments

New working group needed to address relationship between internet governance, data governance, and AI governance

Need for new multistakeholder working group to address IGF’s future after WSIS+20 process

Need to revisit Tunis compromise formula that balanced multistakeholder participation with UN umbrella

Summary

Drake wants a conceptual working group to clarify relationships between different governance areas, de la Chapelle wants a group focused on IGF’s institutional future, while Kurbalija wants to fundamentally revisit the Tunis compromise that created IGF.

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Unexpected differences

Assessment of IGF’s success in fulfilling WGIG’s vision

Speakers

– Vittorio Bertola
– Baher Esmat
– Carlos Afonso

Arguments

IGF failed to address economic and social questions due to lack of enforcement mechanisms against private sector

IGF has been primary global multistakeholder forum providing space for open discussion and capacity building

WGIG report identified four key public policy areas and 13 fundamental issues that remain valid today

Explanation

This disagreement is unexpected because all speakers were involved in or supportive of WGIG’s work, yet they have fundamentally different assessments of whether IGF achieved WGIG’s goals. Bertola’s harsh critique contrasts sharply with Esmat’s positive assessment and Afonso’s emphasis on enduring relevance.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Economic

Role of Frank March and methodology importance

Speakers

– Avri Doria
– Jovan Kurbalija
– Bertrand de la Chapelle

Arguments

Frank March’s role as secretary who wrote while listening and incorporating real-time feedback was crucial innovation

Current processes lack transparency in how contributions are reflected in final documents

WGIG’s methodology of presenting different options rather than watered-down consensus should be adopted by IGF

Explanation

While all speakers praise WGIG’s methodology, they unexpectedly focus on different aspects as most important – Doria emphasizes the human element and real-time interaction, Kurbalija focuses on transparency and traceability, while de la Chapelle emphasizes the option-presentation approach. This suggests different understandings of what made WGIG successful.

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Overall assessment

Summary

The main areas of disagreement center on IGF’s democratic legitimacy and bottom-up nature, its effectiveness in addressing broader governance challenges beyond technical issues, approaches to handling controversial topics, and what type of institutional reforms are needed for the future.

Disagreement level

Moderate disagreement with significant implications. While speakers share common values about multistakeholder governance and IGF’s importance, they have fundamentally different assessments of IGF’s performance and different visions for its future. These disagreements reflect deeper tensions in internet governance between idealistic multistakeholder principles and practical governance challenges, particularly regarding enforcement mechanisms and democratic participation. The disagreements suggest the internet governance community faces critical decisions about IGF’s evolution and role in addressing contemporary digital governance challenges.

Partial agreements

Similar viewpoints

These speakers share concern about the loss of transparent, participatory methodology that characterized WGIG, where contributions were clearly reflected and participants could see their input being incorporated in real-time.

Speakers

– Jovan Kurbalija
– Avri Doria
– Bertrand de la Chapelle

Arguments

Current processes lack transparency in how contributions are reflected in final documents

Frank March’s role as secretary who wrote while listening and incorporating real-time feedback was crucial innovation

WGIG’s methodology of presenting different options rather than watered-down consensus should be adopted by IGF

Topics

Legal and regulatory

These speakers believe IGF has the capacity to address controversial issues but is held back by stakeholder reluctance and lack of enforcement mechanisms, particularly regarding private sector accountability.

Speakers

– Alejandro Pisanty
– Ariette Esterhuizen
– Vittorio Bertola

Arguments

IGF is mature enough to handle controversial issues but some stakeholders are not ready for such discussions

IGF should facilitate debate on controversial topics like fair taxation of big tech companies

IGF failed to address economic and social questions due to lack of enforcement mechanisms against private sector

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Economic

These speakers emphasize IGF’s evolutionary capacity and its strength in building resilience and capacity across the internet governance ecosystem through continuous adaptation and learning.

Speakers

– Ayesha Hassan
– Baher Esmat
– Jovan Kurbalija

Arguments

Resilience across internet layers should be priority for future stakeholder collaboration

IGF has continuously evolved in topics and outcomes while maintaining non-decision making nature as strength

IGF has been valuable for capacity building and creating incremental development of new methodologies

Topics

Infrastructure | Development | Legal and regulatory

Key takeaways

WGIG’s 20-year legacy demonstrates that multistakeholder cooperation in UN context can be effective and legitimating

The WGIG definition of internet governance has stood the test of time and remains applicable to emerging technologies like AI governance

Multistakeholder and multilateral governance models should coexist and complement each other rather than being viewed as antagonistic

The IGF has successfully served as a global forum for capacity building and agenda setting, but faces challenges in handling controversial topics and ensuring bottom-up participation

Current governance processes often lack transparency in how stakeholder contributions are reflected in final outcomes

The methodology used by WGIG – collecting all opinions while focusing on consensus areas and narrowing disagreements to basic alternatives – remains relevant for contemporary governance challenges

Financial sustainability and clearer role definition are critical for the IGF’s future effectiveness

There is growing tension between the need for multistakeholder governance and the reality of platform monopolies and government regulation

Resolutions and action items

Jovan Kurbalija will present the 8th edition of ‘Introduction to Internet Governance’ book on Wednesday

Suggestion to use AI tools to help trace stakeholder contributions to final governance documents

Proposal to include enhanced cooperation discussions as a regular track in IGF rather than avoiding the topic

Call for more innovative funding models to ensure IGF’s financial stability and sustainability

Unresolved issues

How to balance multistakeholder governance with the need for enforcement mechanisms against powerful private sector actors

Whether the IGF should transition from discussion-only forum to having some decision-making capacity

How to improve national and regional IGF processes that have been captured by governments or become ineffective

How to make governance processes truly bottom-up rather than top-down with occasional consultations

How to engage decision-makers and governments more effectively in IGF discussions

How to address digital governance issues being moved to closed-door trade negotiations

Whether a new working group is needed to address the relationship between internet governance, data governance, and AI governance

How to handle controversial topics like fair taxation of big tech companies and rights-based approaches to digital governance

Suggested compromises

Establishing a new multistakeholder working group after December 2024 to address IGF’s future mandate and institutionalization

Adopting ‘rough consensus’ or ‘near consensus’ (99%) rather than requiring 100% consensus in governance processes

Creating hybrid models that combine multistakeholder policy-making with multilateral implementation mechanisms

Using the IGF as an agenda-setter and issue-framer while allowing other forums to make formal decisions

Implementing the Sao Paulo guidelines approach to bring multistakeholder and multilateral mechanisms together

Allowing the IGF to handle controversial topics while maintaining its non-decision making nature

Developing clearer roles and responsibilities for different stakeholders in various governance processes

We had Frank March, our secretary, our main writer, sitting in the room with us while he was writing, talking to us, asking about this paragraph or that paragraph… What is the major problem today is that we have so many processes which call you to have your say, make contribution. And your contribution disappears in some sort of a governance Bermuda Triangle.

Speaker

Avri Doria and Jovan Kurbalija

Reason

This observation brilliantly captures a fundamental shift in governance processes from genuine collaborative writing to performative consultation. The metaphor of a ‘governance Bermuda Triangle’ where contributions vanish is particularly powerful in highlighting the erosion of meaningful participation.

Impact

This comment shifted the discussion from celebrating past achievements to critically examining current governance failures. It introduced the concept that procedural innovation (having the writer in the room) was as important as substantive outcomes, influencing later speakers to focus more on methodology and process design.

I’m convinced that all problems of Internet governance and many others are much better solved by multi-stakeholder mechanisms… every single country that pushes for more multilateral is also pushing against internet freedom. That’s probably the acid test.

Speaker

Alejandro Pisanty

Reason

This comment provides a provocative litmus test for evaluating governance approaches by linking multilateralism to internet freedom restrictions. It cuts through diplomatic niceties to suggest a clear correlation between governance preference and freedom outcomes.

Impact

This stark framing challenged the prevailing diplomatic tendency to treat multilateral and multistakeholder approaches as equally valid. It pushed subsequent speakers to move beyond the ‘false dichotomy’ language and grapple with real tensions between these approaches.

We thought that by putting everyone together, we would be able to address the economic and social questions, and this didn’t happen… we were naive… The people that could make money out of breaking down the internet and turning it into walled gardens, they just went on and made money. And nobody could stop them because we had no stick.

Speaker

Vittorio Bertola

Reason

This is a brutally honest assessment that challenges the fundamental assumptions underlying the WGIG’s approach. It acknowledges that multistakeholder governance failed to prevent the internet’s fragmentation into commercial silos, introducing the crucial concept that effective governance requires enforcement mechanisms (‘sticks’), not just dialogue.

Impact

This comment created the most significant turning point in the discussion, forcing participants to confront the limitations of their achievements. It shifted the conversation from celebration to critical self-reflection and sparked responses about the need for harder regulatory approaches and the tension between openness and control.

Any notion we have that IGF has bottomed up is something that we should quit pretending. It is not. It hasn’t been… So I love the IGF, I love to see it continue, and I’d really like to see it become bottom up.

Speaker

Avri Doria

Reason

This comment directly challenges one of the core mythologies of the IGF – that it represents genuine bottom-up governance. Coming from a WGIG veteran, this critique carries particular weight and forces honest examination of the gap between rhetoric and reality.

Impact

This blunt assessment validated concerns raised by other speakers and shifted the discussion toward more realistic appraisals of current governance structures. It influenced subsequent speakers to acknowledge the IGF’s limitations more openly and discuss concrete reforms rather than defensive justifications.

The famous, very controversial, big elephant in the room question of enhanced cooperation should be brought as one of the track on the first day of IGF… I never understood why it wasn’t possible.

Speaker

Jovan Kurbalija

Reason

This comment directly addresses the political taboos that have constrained IGF discussions. By naming the ‘elephant in the room’ and questioning why controversial topics are avoided, it challenges the forum’s risk-averse culture and suggests that maturity requires engaging with difficult issues.

Impact

This observation opened space for other participants to discuss controversial topics and the IGF’s capacity to handle them. It led to a broader conversation about whether the forum is mature enough to tackle divisive issues like taxation of big tech companies and enhanced cooperation.

One month ago, there was a survey in the UK, and they asked the young people… would you live better off if the Internet didn’t exist? And half of them said yes… this is really, really terrible for us that work to create it and make it a mass instrument.

Speaker

Vittorio Bertola

Reason

This statistic serves as a devastating indictment of how far the internet has diverged from its original promise. It provides concrete evidence that the internet governance community has failed in its broader mission, moving beyond technical governance to fundamental questions about the internet’s social value.

Impact

This shocking statistic reframed the entire discussion by introducing the perspective of those who feel harmed rather than helped by the internet. It forced participants to confront the possibility that their work, while technically successful, may have contributed to broader social problems.

Overall assessment

These key comments fundamentally transformed what began as a celebratory reunion into a critical examination of both achievements and failures. The discussion evolved through three distinct phases: initial celebration of WGIG’s procedural innovations and definitional work, honest acknowledgment of governance limitations and the gap between rhetoric and reality, and finally a sobering confrontation with the internet’s current social problems. The most impactful comments challenged core assumptions about multistakeholder governance effectiveness, forced recognition of enforcement gaps, and introduced uncomfortable evidence about the internet’s social impact. Rather than defensive responses, these provocative observations generally prompted deeper reflection and more nuanced analysis from other participants, demonstrating the intellectual maturity of this community even when confronting difficult truths about their life’s work.

Should we now push for a more intersectional and rights-based approach in defining digital governance that generally centers the lived realities of women, youth, and marginalized communities?

Speaker

Shaima Akhtar (via online question)

Explanation

This question addresses the need to evolve digital governance frameworks to be more inclusive and representative of marginalized groups, particularly given technological advances like AI and surveillance technologies.

If you were to give a single piece of advice to the WGATE facilitators on how to reach or generate consensus for this process, for the outcome document they are drafting, what would it be?

Speaker

Israel Rosas

Explanation

This seeks practical guidance from experienced WGIG members on consensus-building methodologies that could be applied to current digital governance processes.

Do you think the IGF is ready to actually handle controversial issues? Is the IGF mature enough now to be able to put enhanced cooperation, fair tax payment by big tech companies, and other controversial topics on the agenda?

Speaker

Ariette Esterhuisen

Explanation

This questions whether the IGF has evolved sufficiently to tackle difficult and politically sensitive topics rather than avoiding controversial discussions.

How could we use digital cooperation mechanisms available to us to counter the trend of digital governance issues being taken out of democratic spaces and into closed-door multilateral spaces such as digital trade negotiations?

Speaker

Nandini (IT4Change India)

Explanation

This addresses the challenge of maintaining democratic governance of digital issues when they are increasingly being decided in exclusive trade negotiation forums.

Do you think there would be a benefit in having a sort of new exercise like WGIG after December, or a CSTD working group on revision of the mandate of the IGF after 20 years?

Speaker

Bertrand de la Chapelle

Explanation

This proposes the need for a new structured multi-stakeholder process to address the future of the IGF and resolve current institutional challenges.

Why would governments actually participate or take a role in the IGF if all it does is discuss issues and frame them for decision-making in other forums like the ITU?

Speaker

Hadi Alminyawi

Explanation

This questions the value proposition of the IGF for government participation given its non-decision-making nature.

How many government representatives are in the room?

Speaker

Sébastien Bachelet

Explanation

This highlights the ongoing challenge of government engagement in IGF processes and the need to understand participation patterns.

Should we revisit the Tunis formula that established the IGF as a multi-stakeholder body under UN umbrella?

Speaker

Jovan Kurbalija

Explanation

This suggests that the foundational compromise that created the IGF may need to be reconsidered given current challenges and changing circumstances.

How can we better define the relationship between Internet governance, data governance, AI governance, and digital governance to reduce conceptual confusion?

Speaker

William J. Drake

Explanation

This addresses the need for conceptual clarity as new forms of governance emerge and overlap with traditional internet governance frameworks.

How can we improve the national and regional IGF processes to make them more effective and truly multi-stakeholder?

Speaker

Vittorio Bertola

Explanation

This addresses practical challenges in implementing the IGF model at national and regional levels, using the Italian IGF as a problematic example.

How can we ensure financial stability and sustainability of the IGF to guarantee its continued role at the global level?

Speaker

Baher Esmat

Explanation

This addresses a fundamental operational challenge that could affect the IGF’s ability to continue serving as the global internet governance forum.