Internet Governance in Times of Conflict | IGF 2023 Open Forum #152

Audience

The analysis examines a series of speeches discussing the issue of internet shutdowns and their implications. The speakers express grave concern over the seriousness of internet shutdowns and advocate for the imposition of sanctions on those responsible. They argue that internet shutdowns violate humanity and have far-reaching consequences on safety, health infrastructure, and access to information.

One speaker emphasises the need for better early crisis warnings and suggests integrating internet shutdown indicators into forecasting procedures for crisis surveillance. By recognising internet shutdowns as crisis indicators, governments and relevant authorities can respond more effectively to impending crises.

The importance of private sector governance in protecting the internet against political pressures is highlighted. The International Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which operates as a private corporation with multi-stakeholder representation, is praised for its ability to resist pressures to remove domain names or participate in political sanctions. This private sector governance is valued as a key characteristic in safeguarding the internet against subordination to military and political ends.

The analysis raises concerns about internet access and digital transformation in conflict areas. It highlights the negative impact of the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, where the digital transformation project funded by the World Bank was halted. Furthermore, the potential problem of the military owning internet service providers is mentioned, as it raises concerns about impartiality and the potential for censorship.

The role of social media networks and platforms in crisis management is discussed, with a call for better coordination with stakeholders and civil society. It is observed that people are more likely to rely on social media apps for reporting incidents or following news rather than traditional websites.

One speaker emphasises the need for clarity on how international humanitarian law should be applied in digital warfare situations where physical force is not involved. The use of cyberspace, spyware, and internet shutdowns in warfare creates challenges in interpreting and applying the rules of distinction, targeting, proportionality, and humanity.

In conclusion, the analysis highlights the gravity of the issue of internet shutdowns and advocates for sanctions as a means to address the problem. It calls for better early crisis warnings, the integration of internet shutdown indicators, and recognises the importance of private sector governance in protecting the internet. The challenges surrounding internet access and digital transformation in conflict areas, the potential concerns with military-owned internet service providers, and the pivotal role of social media networks in crisis management are also discussed. Finally, there is a need to clarify the application of international humanitarian law in the context of non-kinetic warfare involving cyberspace, spyware, and internet shutdowns.

Roman Jeet Singh Cheema

Access Now, a renowned digital security organization, receives daily requests for assistance in digital security issues. They prioritize global cybersecurity policy and advocate for the application of human rights law in Internet Governance. Access Now has observed an alarming increase in surveillance-related measures and spyware attacks targeting civil society, posing risks to individuals and communities.

One of Access Now’s key concerns is internet shutdowns. They strongly oppose decisions that lead to blacklisting the internet in specific regions, seeing it as a dangerous precedent. The organization actively works against internet shutdowns, recognizing the potential dangers they bring.

Access Now emphasizes the importance of reaching global consensus on various aspects of internet governance. They argue for the protection of cybersecurity incident response teams during times of conflict, asserting that emergency responders should not be targeted. They believe this principle should be extended to similar teams.

Regarding international governance conversations, Access Now supports the idea, advocating for stricter standards against cyber destructive activity. They express concern about separating and creating different internet standards, preferring a reduction in conflict over a permissive approach. They emphasize the need for preventive measures to address cyber conflict and establish stronger international governance norms.

Access Now highlights the universal unacceptability of internet shutdowns, noting that they are often used to hide impunity, violence, and targeting. They call for consequences for states that consistently perpetrate internet shutdowns and urge member states to demonstrate stronger commitment.

Lastly, Access Now advocates for active prevention of internet shutdowns through international media attention and domestic challenges. They believe the UN system, including organizations like the WHO, should play a more active role in addressing and preventing internet shutdowns.

In conclusion, Access Now, as a digital security organization, assists with digital security issues and pushes for global cybersecurity policy. They emphasize the application of human rights law in Internet Governance and oppose decisions that blacklist the internet. Their goal is to establish stricter standards against cyber destructive activity and prevent internet shutdowns through international governance conversations, media attention, and domestic challenges.

Mauro Vignati

During armed conflicts, the internet infrastructure often experiences disruptions, which have negative implications. The ICT infrastructure is frequently targeted or taken down, causing significant disruptions in communication and information flow. This poses challenges for civilians, as their ability to receive relief operations and maintain contact with their families is severely affected.

Furthermore, the absence of specific technologies in conflict zones hampers the work of international organizations. These organizations need to operate on both sides of a conflict to provide critical assistance and support. However, the disruption of technology makes it difficult for them to coordinate and execute relief operations effectively.

One of the underlying issues is the lack of distinction between civilian and military internet use. The internet architecture was not originally built to differentiate between these two categories. Consequently, during conflicts, civilian infrastructure often becomes disrupted, as it is not protected or prioritised. To address this, there is a need to establish clear guidelines and mechanisms to distinguish and protect civilian infrastructure from military targets.

Addressing this issue, it is recommended that the state takes measures to segment data and communication infrastructure used for military purposes from civilian ones. This segregation would help protect civilian infrastructure and ensure a more efficient and secure digital environment during conflicts. Additionally, tech companies should also consider implementing segmentation when providing services to military or civilian entities to prevent unintentional disruptions or compromise of civilian infrastructure.

Looking towards the future, it is vital to carefully consider how the digital infrastructure should be structured. As conflicts continue to evolve and technology advances, it is crucial to establish a robust and resilient digital framework that ensures the smooth operation of critical communication and information systems.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) plays a significant role in conflict management and humanitarian efforts. They work in more than 100 countries and are devoted to upholding International Humanitarian Law (IHL) during conflicts. This includes the protection of critical civilian infrastructure and refraining from targeting civilian objects.

The ICRC also advocates for the consideration of data protection within IHL. They aim to convince states to include data protection as an essential aspect of international humanitarian standards. Recognising the importance of data as an object to be protected aligns with the increasing reliance on digital infrastructure during conflicts and the need to safeguard sensitive information.

In conclusion, during armed conflicts, the internet infrastructure is often disrupted, impacting civilian access to vital services and hindering the work of international organizations. The differentiation between civilian and military internet use, along with the segmentation of data and communication infrastructure, is crucial to protect civilian infrastructure and ensure an efficient and secure digital environment. As conflicts continue to unfold, it is essential to consider the future of digital infrastructure and uphold International Humanitarian Law to safeguard civilian lives and maintain connectivity in conflict zones.

Moderator – Regine Grienberger

Global internet governance is facing significant challenges due to conflicts occurring between different groups and nations. These conflicts include the ongoing Ukraine war, terrorist attacks in Israel, and military coups in the Sahel region. The competition between authoritarian and liberal systems further exacerbates these conflicts, along with the global north-south divide concerning justice issues.

Regine Grienberger highlights the negative impact of these conflicts on global internet governance. This sentiment is supported by the fact that these conflicts impede the stability and functionality of the internet. In response, Grienberger emphasizes the importance of protecting the global, free, and open internet. Governments often intend to preserve internet freedom, but their actions can inadvertently undermine these efforts. Additionally, interfering with the architectural characteristics of the internet poses significant dangers.

Regarding potential solutions, it is noted that sanctions should not be the first response against internet shutdowns. Sanctions are viewed as a complex diplomatic instrument and not the primary course of action in addressing this issue. Instead, it is crucial to integrate internet shutdowns as a crisis indicator in early warning and forecasting procedures. By incorporating this information into crisis management protocols, social upheaval, riots, and civil wars can be prevented.

In the context of the digital divide, it is revealed that nearly 12 percent of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have regressed rather than progressed. Despite this, collaboration between countries through digital partnerships remains a viable solution. Estonia, for example, actively engages in digital cooperation with almost every country, including initiatives in Afghanistan. This showcases the potential of digital cooperation to address global challenges in an increasingly divided digital landscape.

In conclusion, conflicts between groups and nations pose a significant threat to global internet governance. The need to protect the free and open nature of the internet is emphasized, alongside urging governments to be mindful of unintentional interference. Furthermore, while sanctions should be approached cautiously, integrating internet shutdowns as crisis indicators and fostering digital cooperation contribute to mitigating the challenges presented by conflicts in the digital realm.

Nele Leosk

The analysis examines the role of cyberspace and technology in modern conflicts, focusing on the war in Ukraine. It highlights the negative impact of cyberattacks on Ukraine’s telecommunication infrastructure and their ripple effects on other countries. These attacks disrupted telecommunication services, and they often preceded physical attacks during the war. The analysis also emphasizes the importance of digital society and secure infrastructure in combating cyberattacks, citing Estonia’s secure digital identity system as an example. It stresses the need for collaboration between the private sector and governments to maintain data and services during conflicts. The analysis further addresses the increasing targeting of everyday services, like hospitals and schools, by cyberattacks and their detrimental effects on individuals. It highlights the significance of public goods and digital public infrastructure in democratizing and making states more accessible. Estonia’s collaboration with Finland and Iceland on digital solutions is also discussed, emphasizing the benefits of global collaboration. Overall, the analysis underscores the urgent need for robust cybersecurity measures in modern conflicts and advocates for cooperation and innovation to address these challenges effectively.

David Huberman

The functionality of the internet on a global scale is attributed to the adoption of common technical standards, which guarantee interoperability. These standards are developed by engineers around the world who contribute their expertise to ensure the quality and efficient operation of the internet. The internet’s infrastructure relies on a system of routing and domain name system (DNS), which everyone voluntarily adopts. This system enables the internet to work uniformly across different regions.

Another crucial component that supports the functioning of the internet is the root server system. This system ensures that all DNS queries work smoothly, allowing users to access websites and online services. Even during times of conflict, if regional root servers are taken down, it does not significantly impact internet users. This resilience is a testament to the robustness of the root server system and its ability to maintain the internet’s accessibility.

The governance model of the technical layer of the internet plays a pivotal role in keeping the internet online for everyone, even when individual systems go offline. This governance model is particularly effective during times of conflict, ensuring that the internet remains operational and accessible to users. It provides a framework for coordination and cooperation among various stakeholders to address challenges and maintain the internet’s functionality.

Building and securing the internet is no longer solely an engineering endeavor. It requires a collaborative effort involving multiple stakeholders, including civil society, government, academia, and engineering. The internet has become a matter of national security for countries, and the preservation of its public core must be achieved with neutrality. Recognizing the real-world implications, stakeholders from different sectors come together to ensure the security and stability of the internet.

Economies in transition or remote areas prioritize the construction and development of the internet to connect their people and share information with the rest of the world. Once initial construction is complete, securing the internet becomes a crucial focus to prevent vulnerabilities that may compromise the economy and infrastructure.

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is tasked with ensuring the security, stability, and resilience of a part of the internet through its multi-stakeholder model. This model has proven effective in maintaining the internet’s functionality during times of conflict, as acknowledged by David Huberman when appreciating Dr. Mueller’s explanation of its efficacy.

In conclusion, the internet’s functionality and continued accessibility are made possible by the adoption of common technical standards, the resilience of the root server system, and the effectiveness of the governance model of the technical layer. The collaboration of multiple stakeholders and the recognition of the internet’s security implications play a vital role in building and securing the internet globally.

Moderator – Regine Grienberger:
So welcome, everybody, to this session with the title Shaping Internet Governance in Times of Conflict. My name is Rekine Grimberger. I’m the German Cyber Ambassador, and I’m going to moderate this session. One of our panelists is still missing, so let’s see how we manage. But we will start with somebody else anyway. So when we look at what we have now, a global internet, the question that we are going to pose in this session is, just let me look up my notes. Where is it? So we live now in times of conflict, and this conflict is both imminent, sometimes even violent, a violent conflict, like the Ukraine war, like the terrorist attacks that we’ve seen in Israel these days, like the military coups in the Sahel. But there is also a strategic competition between authoritarian and liberal systems. And there is also, I would call it a redistribution conflict or a conflict over global justice issues between the global north and the global south, and also within societies. In these conflicts, people take sides. They are forced sometimes to take sides. They want to protect what they regard as theirs. And sometimes they lash out to push back others who are threatening their interests. Even institutions and conversations, sometimes also conversations that we have here at the IGF, are becoming increasingly politicized. You have seen or heard and remember, of course, that Ukraine, in March 2022, requested from Ike. can to block Russian internet domains. There are also requests from governments in a more general way to take back control of the internet to shield societies. Here he is, Roman. To shield societies, for example, from disinformation, from hate speech, from fake news. And sometimes governments do these even in good faith, unintentionally breaking what they actually want to protect, which is the global free and open internet. In this conversation that I’m going to have with my four partners here on the panel is we want to describe the pressure on internet governance in times of conflict and the dangers of fiddling with the architectural characteristics of the internet. But we would like to also highlight what keeps us together. What are the elements that help us to maintain this global internet? Which tools can we use to stabilize cyberspace in times of conflict? I would like to start to my right with David Huberman from ICANN. I would like to ask you to please introduce yourself first so that we know where you are from, your affiliation. And then perhaps share your experiences with what happens to internet governance in times of conflict from your point of view. What is the issue? What is the tissue that keeps us together? And what does ICANN do to protect this tissue? Thank you.

David Huberman:
Thank you, Dr. Greenberger. So good afternoon, everybody. My name is David Huberman. I work at ICANN. I am based in Washington, DC. And I have spent the last 25 years of my life, 24 years of my life, building internet and ensuring that people around the world and societies around the world, from the richest to the poorest to the newest and the oldest, have functioning internet. And what do I mean by that? Well, when you pick up your phone and you pick up your mobile device and you launch TikTok and you watch a video, to me, that’s not the internet. When you open up your laptop and you send an email, to me, that’s not the internet. What we are talking about is two very different layers. There is the layer where all these platforms exists, where your social media walled gardens exist, where your government ministries have their internets and their information and the information for the society exists, where your email and where your videos exist. But all of these run atop a different layer. And this is the technical layer that underpins the entire internet. You mentioned a global internet. And that’s very important because the entire world, the entire internet works because it uses common standards. Every time you do anything in an application, any time you do anything on your computer, underlying it is a system of routing and a system of the DNS, the domain name system. They’re a system of protocols that everybody in the world has chosen to voluntarily adopt. And they’ve adopted the same standards. And what that buys us is something called interoperability. Your internet in your country, in your home, works the same as my internet in my home and the same internet everywhere around the world because of common standards. A very smart person told me yesterday that it is this system that is designed to unify the world in times when conflict tries to divide us. And I want to give you a really interesting example of it. There is a system on the internet that pretty much none of you have ever heard of that is the most important system on the internet, or one of the most important things on the internet. You rely on it every time you do anything, and you don’t even know it. It’s called the root server system. And it is essentially what allows every DNS query to work. And even if you don’t know what it is, a DNS query is what allows you to get to every site you visit and allows your application to get to the places where it wants to deliver the data that you’re asking. And everybody in the world relies on this root server system to work 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, for the 40 years that it has existed. So here’s the thing. It’s in a time of conflict where if you think about a region, chaos has erupted. Violence has erupted. People are being killed. And you think, OK, between the bombs and the sabotage, we can take systems like this down, right? If the root server system here in Japan were to completely disappear, all of the different servers in the root server system in Japan disappeared, or in the Middle East right now, there’s a lot of chaos. There’s a lot of war. If all of the root servers in the Middle East were to go away, do you know what happened to all of the internet users still connected? Nothing. Nothing would happen. They wouldn’t notice it at all. And that’s because the governance system behind this technical layer has been designed, has evolved, and has been hardened to ensure that jurisdictional concerns, no. Application concerns, data concerns, no. It’s about the engineering, the interoperability, and the promotion of open standards that every developer can use to create whatever it is they want on the content layer, on the second layer. At the technical layer, the internet is not fragmented. The internet works because engineers. in China, and engineers in Japan, and engineers in South Africa, and engineers in Israel, and engineers in Palestine, and engineers in Ukraine, and engineers in Russia, all come together on mailing lists and sometimes at face-to-face meetings to create these standards upon which the internet is built. And they do so with an emphasis on quality engineering, openness, and interoperability. And so I’d like to close by remarking that in times of conflict, this is when the governance model of the technical layer actually shines, because the output of this governance model is what keeps the internet online for everybody, even as systems go off.

Moderator – Regine Grienberger:
Thank you, David. I would now turn to Roman from Access Now. Please first introduce yourself. And then what are your observations from your professional experiences with internet governance in times of conflict? And what do you do? What does your organization do to maintain this open, free, global internet that is an important means for the civil society?

Roman Jeet Singh Cheema:
Thank you so much, Ambassador. And I’m very happy to introduce myself partly, because I think it relates to this conversation and what the organization does. My name is Roman Jeet Singh Cheema. I am Senior International Counsel and Asia Pacific Policy Director at Access Now, where I also coordinate our work on global cybersecurity policy. Access Now is an international civil society organization that seeks to defend and extend the digital rights of individuals and communities at risk. And we are born from this basic understanding that tech can empower. Tech is critical to enabling human rights online and offline. But technology can also place people at risk. And that’s a very important reason why we believe this community needs to engage in this conversation and why we exist. Access Now was, in fact, born as a digital security organization. In 2009, Access Now’s co-founders during the Iranian Green Revolution protests and many other moments after that realized that technology was helping activists, mobilizers, this wide civil society sphere that many of us depend on in autocracies, democracies, and everywhere in between, that tech was enabling them but also putting them at risk. People’s devices were being attacked, compromised. People were being monitored. So that requires digital security assistance, but also public conversation around what is acceptable when it comes to recognizing how to prevent tech from doing harm. And what that means is today is we are a global digital security provider. We run a 24 by 7 digital security helpline that receives every day, as I speak, requests from civil society, journalists, and others, requests for assistance from basic things on what sort of device should I use to prevent myself from being attacked, or I believe I’m seeing something malicious here, or my friend who’s an activist or journalist has been detained, I’m worried about the information they may have on the device or in their online accounts, to many more complicated requests. Alongside that, we do public policy work and advocacy, and we also convene. I work in the advocacy arm that tracks and manages this. But why I mention this is that it’s therefore important to recognize that if tech empowers, and it also puts people at risk, how do we approach the question of the internet governance questions that we look at or the internet governance architecture? How does it address issues of contestation and times of conflict? And I think it’s very important to recognize that we specifically are so clearly aware that technology can be used to oppress and attack people, whether it’s in moments of general peacetime in terms of political contestation within countries, but also during moments of protest, of activism, but also conflict, whether it be internal armed conflict or cross-border situations. We particularly have been just interested in the rapid growth in the number of surveillance-related measures and spyware attacks that we have seen and this global hack-for-hire industry that exists, but also the more weaponized usage of cyber attacks more generally. And I know that some of my other panelists will go further into this in detail, but I did want to talk about this very briefly. It’s very important in the internet governance space as well to sometimes bridge it to the cybersecurity conversation, a conversation that you, Ambassador, and many others are at very often about what rules apply when it comes to human rights generally. And many of us are very intimately aware on how human rights law already applies to what governments and corporations and other actors do every day when it comes to technology and the importance of internet governance coming from a human rights framework. But also, how does humanitarian law apply during peacetime, internal armed conflict, and moments of general warfare? And why I mention this is that it leads to interesting moments. We’ve had such an interesting, robust conversation in the UN system when it comes to what sort of cyber norms should apply and the work of the UN Open-Ended Working Group on state-related ICT behavior. as well as other processes, but you still see those interesting moments pop up in the internet governance space, for example. I think it’s important to address the sort of conversation that came up in relation to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and then the conversation around the role of ICANN there, where many actors, including actors that we work with on digital security, actors directly involved in the situation, said it’s important for groups to take a stand. And it is our belief there, for example, that the internet governance ecosystem should not be making those sorts of decisions of taking entire entities out. And part of that comes from our own existing human rights work. We work on the issue of internet shutdowns, working together with the global community, the Keep It On Coalition, and we know the danger that happens when you decide to try to black out the internet. And if these decisions go into the technical administration of internet resources, we believe that was a very dangerous precedent that would cause problems. That does not mean that internet governance should not be accountable or should not be having conversations around who is in these spaces and what takes place. And I thought I would share this based on my experiences in the Asia-Pacific region, where society groups in countries which have gone through coups, which have gone through dramatic moments of transition, have asked which government bodies, for example, would ICANN recognize as legitimate or not? If officials are there who have sanctions or human rights measures applying or human rights claims against them, should they be allowed into meetings or not? And this is an important conversation that we think can happen further because conflict and human rights violations, unfortunately, are growing day by day. I just did want to end with noting this. It is very, very crucial for us to recognize that when it comes to these conversations, they are based on what is happening every day. So the ultimate reality is that we see a massive increase in the number of attacks targeting civil society when it comes to the use of cyber weapons and tools. And I know others may also speak to this. Why I mentioned this is that it’s therefore critical to recognize that there are certain areas that we should even more strongly say so. The work of cyber policy experts to say that the public core of the Internet, including the domain name function, should not be targeted is something that we must apply here. And I would end with noting this, that there are certain things we can agree upon further. Cyber security incident response teams within government, in civil society, or those who work in technical administration should not be targeted during times of conflict. That sort of idea that there are emergency response actors who should never be targeted, you don’t try to target the fire service, is something we need to understand more. And these basic understandings that are there between these different communities need to be synthesized further, which is why I’m very happy that we are having this conversation here. Thank you, Roman.

Moderator – Regine Grienberger:
I would like to turn now to Nele, my dear colleague from Estonia, Digital Ambassador. Please introduce yourself, and then I would like to ask you, because you are working closely with Ukraine, and Estonia has itself also experiences with attacks on the internet in cyberspace, I think it was in 2007. So that would be one aspect I would like to hear from you about. And then the other one is, you’re also looking at the bright side of digital technology, and all the possibilities and opportunities that governments with government applications can build on the internet, and the potential of digital cooperation also with your partners. So I would like to hear from you, what do you think should internet governance bring also as a contribution to this kind of overcoming of conflicts and providing for opportunities for, for example, achieving the sustainable development goals in the long run?

Nele Leosk:
Hello everybody, and thank you, Regina, for a nice introduction. So I’m a digital ambassador from Estonia, and indeed, when I started in my position, I thought I would only deal with the bright side of digital technologies, because we also have a cyber ambassador, whose task is to deal with all the dark sides of the internet and technologies. But over time, unfortunately, some of these grayer and darker issues have also, I would say, merged on my table, and increasingly so. So I would say that this has become also part of my everyday job to make sure that the technology is used for the good and for the bad, and there are several, I would say, global and multilateral and multi-stakeholder processes. One of them is why we are here, IGF. There are several others that are merging, so our task as tech ambassadors is to make sure that internet remains, as it was stated, open, free, interoperable, and accessible to everybody. But also that the technologies wouldn’t be misused. But before I go to the second part of Regina’s question, I would really perhaps point to some of the takeaways or something that we have seen in the current war in Ukraine and also beyond. And I guess we can conclude that actually both layers that you referred to, the technical layer and what is on top of it, is actually under attack, and is also very fragile. And we can see that clearly that digital or the cyberspace has become part of the war. The war in Ukraine did not start with physical missile attacks. It actually really started with cyberattacks at Viasat that really affected telecommunication in Ukraine and actually had a huge spillover effect to several other countries, including in the European Union. We also saw that data centers in Ukraine were attacked, and also the internet service provider Triolan was also attacked during the very first days of the war that started on the 24th of of February. So what has resulted, we of course also know that the connectivity has been vital and has been actually dependent on very few actors in Ukraine, if not to say currently mainly only one actor. And this brings in also other players in our, I would say, our diplomatic fora that perhaps used to be mainly focusing on the negotiations with states. Now the private sector and the big tech, of course, is a big part of it because they have an enormous power over both layers. But of course, we have also seen several good practices coming out from this unfortunate war. Both governments and private sector have actually also joined their forces to help Ukraine to keep the data, but also to keep the services running. But the other takeaway from the war in Ukraine is that when we, and this is what we have seen also in Estonia, when years back the cyber attacks were mainly targeted at critical infrastructure, government databases, perhaps government websites and services and so forth, this is changing. So increasingly, regular people’s services that they use every day are being under attack. Is it data attacks to hospitals, kindergarten, schools? And this means actually that the cyberspace is no longer actually about cyber security per se, but it’s also about how we digitalize our society. So for us in Estonia, it has been really useful that every single person in Estonia uses, for example, a secure digital identity, because it would be almost impossible to protect every single medical practice from these attacks if they were not using a secure digital identity. And I think this now finally comes to Regine’s second question about the importance actually around digital cooperation. So we have had indeed a long-term cooperation with Ukraine over the past 14 years, building their digital infrastructure, building data governance, data centers, helping to introduce a secure digital identity, helping it to be incompatible also with EU regulations and standards. And this has also very clearly helped Ukraine to provide services to people under very extreme circumstances. People in Ukraine can access their documents even if they live somewhere abroad and so forth. So this, I would say, long-term cooperation and really focusing on your digital society has become actually more crucial in times of conflicts than perhaps we would have thought before. I have some other comments, but I guess we can keep them for the second round.

Moderator – Regine Grienberger:
Thank you. And now to Mauro, here to my left. You’re from ICRC. I’d like to ask you also to introduce yourself. I wanted to have you on this panel because I wanted to highlight another element or another means that helps us to keep the world together and unified also in times of conflict. And in my understanding, that is also the role of international law and especially international humanitarian law, which are basically rules of the road for societies, for governments, to minimize harms to civilians in times of war and to perhaps also solve conflicts in peaceful ways. So please, could you explain a little bit where you stand, what you observe as threats to the global internet, and what can be done to prevent this harm or this damage done to the internet?

Mauro Vignati:
Thank you, Regina. My name is Mauro Vignatti. I’m a senior advisor on digital technologies and warfare at the International Committee of the Red Cross. I’m busy at the HQ in Geneva. I think there is no need to introduce the ICRC. So I would like to start with two remarks. First one, what you said, Regina, at the beginning. So we have armed conflicts from one side, and then we have political and economical tensions that are going to impact internet. So what we see logically is that the two are influencing each other. So we have armed conflicts that are increasing the polarization of political and economical tensions, and we have also the opposite situation. This is the first comment. The second one is about what David said in the introduction. So we should talk about internet governance, and we should talk about digital governance. So we should talk about what is the infrastructure and what is built on top. So referring to the infrastructure. So what we see at the beginning of each conflict, one of the first infrastructure that is disrupted is the ICT, Information Communication Technology infrastructure. So it could be antennas, it could be cables. So those are the first piece of the infrastructure that are taken down and disrupted. And here we have a first consideration. So internet has never been built with the idea to split what is to be used for military purposes and what is to be used for civilian purposes. So when we talk about that, we receive immediately a reaction. Say, hey, internet is like that. You want to modify internet. It’s not our goal to think of having two internets, but we have a consideration on that. So internet is not just a bubble. Internet is 77,000 autonomous systems that are connected to each other. So those are autonomous because they can work without interconnection to the other. If they want to connect to the other, OK, and then we create the internet. But just to be aware that we are talking about independent systems that are connected to each other, and with the fact that the military armed forces are using more and more civilian infrastructure, we have a situation where, logically, the civilian infrastructure will be taken down because it’s used by armed forces. So this is the first consideration in terms of international military law. There is a principle that is called the principle of distinction, that every time civilians and civilian objects must be distinguished to competence and military objectives. So in this case, we have an intermingling situation where the infrastructure is not clearly defined and split among competence and civilians. This is the first part for what we can call internet governance for the part of the digital. So what we see is that during armed conflict and even before the armed conflict are starting, we have a disruption of what we call the global digital supply chain. So this disruption of the global supply chain is done through sanctions, restrictions. Even we see lately self-exclusion of companies from territories that are in conflict. And this has a huge impact on civilians and also on the relief operations that are taking place. an international organization like ours is doing. So when we talk about self-exclusion, we see companies that are exiting specific territories and not providing any more services that civilians are used to use for several reasons. So for keeping contact with families, to be able to understand and receive information about relief operation that we deploy in the territory. And by them, they will be isolated in term of information. So they will not receive any more information coming from outside the territory of the conflict. So this is the first consideration about the disruption of global supply chain. So international organization like ours, we have to work on both side of the conflict. If the technologies that we are used to use in those territories are no more there, how we can operate in the two territories and being able to coordinate our relief operations if those technologies are no more available in those territories. And this increase the difficulties for NGOs or for international organization like the ICRC to operate in conflict zone.

Moderator – Regine Grienberger:
Thank you. I would like to put now a second round of questions to my panelists, but while I do this, please think about questions that you might want to raise. And my first question goes to David. You’ve heard about the roles that other players in the game take for themselves. So like governments, international law organizations, in civil society. What do you make of this burden sharing for maintaining the global internet? And perhaps you can also give us a little bit your take on the role of international law in this because we were having a conversation about that before and it was interesting what David said about that.

David Huberman:
Thank you, Regina. For 30, 40, 50 years, when we were building the internet in the 1960s and the 1970s, the 1980s and the 1990s, this was an engineering endeavor, okay? These were smart men and women from engineering backgrounds pursuing an engineering pursuit. But it’s 2023 and the internet is a matter of national security for countries. Just like you said, the intermingling of both military and civilian purposes over the same wires, over the same routers. My friend from Access Now talked very pointedly, very passionately about the public core of the internet and how we must maintain this neutrality, right? We can’t do this as an engineering endeavor anymore because there are the real world implications of what happens and how we build and how we evolve internet and internet standards. It’s too much part of our lives today. And so it’s never been more important that civil society, that government policy makers, that engineers work together to develop standards, to build internet. And today, equally important, more important, I’m not sure, harden the core of the internet to help prevent attacks from state actors, from bad actors, from terrorists, from whomever it is who wants to lower the quality of our lives by interrupting our digital lives. It is so important that we now start securing or better secure what we have built and what we are building. This is what ICANN does. The actual mission of ICANN is to increase the security, stability, and resilience of the part of the internet that we are in, the unique identifier system. And we do so through this multi-stakeholder model. And the multi-stakeholder model is only enriched through the spirit of collaboration, cooperation, and the shared expertise of governments, of civil society, of academia, and engineering to better build this internet that we all rely on. As for international law, she’s making me uncomfortable. uncomfortable on purpose. You can see her smiling. ICANN is an organization. It’s based in the United States. ICANN respects international law. The ICANN ecosystem is made from stakeholders all around the world. Of course, we hope they respect international law. But that’s really easy for us to say, because I’m an American, and you’re a German, and you’re an Estonian, and you are Swiss. And we live in this global north in very advanced societies where we believe in and want to progress our values that comport with what our idea of international law is. But the truth is, when I go into countries, economies in transition, many of which are in the global south, many of which are remote, many of which are found in remote corners in oceans, what we’re trying to do is build internet that works for their people so that they can connect and get information and share information with the rest of the world. And in these economies, the priority is on the initial construction, the initial development. And then the focus becomes on securing it. So these do not become vulnerable islands on the internet. And these discussions about international law, that’s not in the discussion. It’s not part of it, because we’re just trying to get connected, stay connected, and build connectivity that is secure. So it’s a very north-centric, it’s a very, very Western and European-centric type concept. And while ICANN strongly believes in these precepts, we have to understand that in the end, we are building this public core and trying to make it good for everybody.

Moderator – Regine Grienberger:
Thank you. And of course, Mauro has to respond to this.

Mauro Vignati:
Thank you. So the ICRC had during two years a so-called global advisory board of high-level person worldwide. And we’re going to publish in a week a report, the final report of the consultation we had with those persons. And one of the recommendations, so we have prepared a recommendation for combatants, for states, for tech companies, and for humanitarian organizations. So one of the recommendations that we have for states that the state should, to the maximum extent feasible, segment data and communication infrastructure used for military purpose from civilian ones. So I fully understand the argument that you are doing everything. The principal goal is the connectivity and guarantee the connectivity. But the connectivity is subjective. to a state on voluntary basis of the state. If the state decided to disrupt this connectivity, they can do it. So what we recommend to state here is to start to think about segmenting and segregating the communication systems and the data that they are providing on their territory. The same we ask to tech companies to start to think about it. When satellite companies, when cloud infrastructure are providing services to military or to civilians, they should start to think how to segment those. How we would like to have the internet in the future. How we would like the digital being structured in the future. Do we want to go on with the non-distinguishing what is a military from what is civilian or we would like to think now to evolve on a new level where data and infrastructure are separated between what is civilian and what is military.

Moderator – Regine Grienberger:
Thank you, Mauro. I saw Roman nodding and you were mentioning the cyber norms in your initial statement. So I would like to hear from you what role do you see for the international law in comparison to the other elements of the connective tissue that we have mentioned?

Roman Jeet Singh Cheema:
Thank you so much. I think it’s important when you go into this conversation to just recognize governance and law are linked but not the same topic. So for example, when you mentioned that many countries in the majority world may not want international law, I would dispute that some do, but many of them do want international governance conversations. In fact, the IGF in a sense exists because they brought up these conversations through the WSIS process and elsewhere. And why I mentioned that it’s very important to recognize where that imperative comes from. So that’s the first part. I just want to note that. So I think that’s what we also see in many of these cybersecurity conversations. We see many countries, sometimes countries that may not always be fully informed or maybe asking for something counterproductive to other elements of national strategy, but say we want it discussed in the UN system, we want more clarity. And I think it’s been useful that the cyber processes have been slow, very evolutionary, but have outlined certain things that there is an applicability of the UN Charter and international law to cyber behavior. It’s not a blank slate. There are elements there that are further clear and more clear than perhaps other parts are, including some of the conversation on the public call, which I acknowledge is not a fully recognized principle by every actor in the UN system, which is unfortunate. And perhaps we need more clarity there. But I think what’s really important there to recognize is that fundamentally, we do need to acknowledge that we need more evolution of this. I’m a bit cautious on the idea of saying that we need to separate and create different standards. Then I want to step back a moment to the conversation we see domestically in many countries are on internet shutdowns. When many countries have conducted internet shutdowns, and the position from Access Now and many of our colleagues in civil society is that internet shutdowns are never acceptable full stop. They are not legal, in our view, under international human rights law, and they ethically and principally in terms of efficacy are also ineffective. But the argument that some governments have taken is, look, we know that internet shutdowns disrupt public services, access to critical care. Maybe let’s create different layers. We’ll have government systems that are not shut down during the internet, and other systems that are shut down. And I was just thinking about it when we’re discussing this now in the context of conflict, and I recognize very importantly the principles that the ICRC is proposing here about careful targeting. But in a sense, the main principle we actually have is that this nature of cyber conflict, per se, is never acceptable. And just thinking about that, Regina, I know that that’s the tension we see in the UN processes itself. Many states, they are saying, we actually do not want cyber conflict to regularly take place. We do know that it’s already happening. And if we don’t acknowledge certain rules of the road, operators will go and conduct all sorts of problematic behavior. But this is why I was just thinking when it comes to this concept of internet governance and separating layers and doing other parts there. The basic principle is we want to reduce conflict rather than encourage more of it. I think we therefore need stronger standards saying that all sorts of cyber-destructive activity by states or by state-linked actors or non-state actors is problematic. I think one of our challenges as we apply traditional humanitarian law in this space is we are trying to make sure that when conflict takes place, it is very limited and targeted, but it’s also giving a permissive nature to certain actors. And I acknowledge that when states sometimes say this, they don’t always mean it. There are other political reasons why they’re saying this there. But this is the tension I see. Because, for example, I’ve seen so many actors within global South countries that say, we know shutdowns are problematic, but we can never stop doing them. So can you let us say that, OK, certain government systems will always be accessible. The rest will shut it down. So I just thought that parallel that came in. And I know it’s a crude parallel. It’s perhaps, in many ways, does not recognize the sophistication of many of the conversations. the RCRC and others have had. But I thought I’d just mention that as a sort of challenging reality check of how many governments may actually take these rules and apply them.

Moderator – Regine Grienberger:
Thank you, Man. I would like to touch briefly on something that Nelly mentioned before, and that is what is built on the internet is, you know, public infrastructure. And I would like to invite you to elaborate a little bit on digital public goods and digital public infrastructure, digital commons perhaps also, as elements that could also be seen as connective tissue

Nele Leosk:
on the basis of the internet. Thank you, Regina. Now you opened a very entirely new and big conversation. I don’t know how many of you are familiar with these terms that have merged over the past years, digital public goods and digital public infrastructure, and in the EU we use mainly the term digital commons. But I would perhaps summarize it from two different angles. One I would say is more philosophical, and the other is a little bit more practical. And actually the first one is really related to how we see the role of governments, but everybody, in building a digital society. And it started actually in Estonia really with rebuilding our state, with really democratizing our state, where we were in the understanding that whatever the government does, it does not do it first alone, and it does not do it for itself, or just serving certain stakeholders in a society. It started more with access to information. It moved then, I would say, to open data movement, reuse of data, but ultimately also to the technological sphere, to open standards, interoperability, and so forth. But the other part of this is actually very practical. We really realized, for example, in Estonia that the needs that governments have, but also civil society has, and the private sector has, are quite similar. For example, in digitalization, we would all need to authenticate ourselves virtually at some point, either to provide a service, either it’s a bank, it’s an electricity company, or it’s a Ministry of Interior. So what we did, we sort of combined our forces, and there are some aspects of this, I would say, digitalization that we really do together as a government, as a private sector, as every other participant in our society. And this, in a way, has also helped us first have a habit to work together and share what we have done and reuse what we have done. So ultimately, it comes back to actually to resources. But I think it is now maybe related also to creating a global good that the Internet allows us, but also digital technologies allow us to create and for everybody to use. So there are several examples from different countries around different solutions or products that have been made available for everybody for use. We have several of these products from Estonia that are used globally, also in Ukraine, that actually help us to save resources. And this is something that we would actually like to see perhaps more taking place. We have some systems created in Estonia, for example, we are working together with Finland and Iceland. There are some digital solutions that we develop together, we maintain them together. It allows us to save not only money, but increasingly actually human capital. It’s very challenging to find data architects or specialists, but surprisingly we don’t see that much yet. But we are starting to talk about it. I think the movement on DPI, the public goods, commons, is another push towards this. So I am a little bit positive to perhaps start sharing more of the good things we do.

Moderator – Regine Grienberger:
Thank you, Nelly. So now the floor is open for your questions. We have two microphones at both corners and also a hand mic here. And ask your questions. Who’s first at the mic? Okay, then it’s your question first. No, Milton, let the gentleman ask first and then you are.

Audience:
It’s your turn. Hi, thank you. My name is Gerald James and I have some questions just specifically on governance and actual action. I think there’s been an attempt to try and get some kind of discussion going on this, but I think there’s just a lot of fear around it. And I think that that’s kind of doing a disservice to those of us in the room who have lost family members or friends due to Internet shutdowns, which I’m not sure if there’s anyone else in here, but I have. And so I do think that there’s not a seriousness that’s taken to account with the idea of an Internet shutdown. And I think that they are often like an ancillary feature to society for a lot of different cultures. And it’s often something that we don’t actually necessarily give to everyone. It’s certain countries, like we mentioned Ukraine, we mentioned Iran, where we have interests from a global Western perspective, those people we drop internet to. We get them satellites and we make sure to take care of that. But I wonder where do we actually see governance action around sanctions on internet shutdowns? If you shut down the internet, why is that not a sanctionable offense? And especially if you are a UN member state or an IGF major stakeholder country, why would we endorse in any capacity your shutdown? And so I think that would be my first question and the bulk of my question. And then going forward, I guess the next part is how do we relate the actual damage that’s done to women’s safety, to family safety, to health infrastructure, and show the whole world that that is something that’s kept in place by the internet and by freedom of access to information. And when it’s turned off, people freely abandon their humanity. That is something that I’m very curious to hear about, and I don’t necessarily think that there’s a lot of parallels being drawn between the actual dangers to people and the way that the internet is used to ensure those dangers.

Moderator – Regine Grienberger:
Roman, would you like to talk about internet shutdowns once again? And I can then add something on sanctions.

Roman Jeet Singh Cheema:
So I just want to acknowledge firstly that I think I complete agreement on the fact that internet shutdowns are period not acceptable. I think the problem is we have outlined that international legal or human rights position. The follow through and application of that from member states in the international community is incredibly lacking. The purpose, for example, the Keep It On Coalition has to exist is not to track the number of internet shutdowns, it’s to prevent internet shutdowns from happening at any point of time. Because any internet shutdown is normally not just disproportionate, it is used, as you mentioned, as a cloak for impunity, for violence, for targeting, and very often in fact the claims made for internet shutdowns to prevent violence or for some other state purpose are actually exactly the opposite reason. They’re actually conducting problematic things. I think the challenge is that as we’ve discussed and recognize the shutdowns unacceptable from comments from the Freedom Online Coalition, from the UN Human Rights Council and elsewhere, we don’t see enough consequences. And being very honest here, I think we also say that even like-minded states, whether in the West or across Western alliances with colleagues in the majority world, there needs to be a much, much stronger position taken on this, which means that there should be consequences of discussions around digital public goods, around people’s participation in the internet governance ecosystem, if they are consistent perpetrators of internet shutdowns, not just in terms of numbers, but in terms of intense active effect. So it’s definitely a conversation where we’re seeing changes. But I’d say, in fact, sometimes the best prevention of shutdown has been international media attention, domestic challenges, not enough, of course, in, say, multilateral processes. And we do sometimes need to see more of that happen. In fact, I’m worried sometimes in a cyber context where people have said disinformation is a cybersecurity problem, because I can see that legal argument being constructed to say shutdowns are therefore a defense against disinformation, which they aren’t, by the way. And I’m happy to share more data on that. But we do now need to go from defensive conversation on shutdowns to actual action, literally a consistent, I hesitate to use program of action, because that means something very specific, but a clear political action plan from strong states taking positions on this. We say there will be consequences if you consistently shut down the internet, and it’s just not acceptable. And I do want to just note that the tracking of violence and impunity due to shutdowns, the initial steps being made, but there is much more that, in terms of political mandates or resources, could be given, even in the UN system, to the WHO and other actors to do more of that. They’re right now trying to do their best with a very limited set of resources and no actual mandate to track the effect of shutdowns.

Moderator – Regine Grienberger:
I would like to give you also an answer also from my government’s point of perspective. Sanctions, of course, are part of the diplomatic toolbox, but they are a rather complex instrument. And it’s certainly not the first thing that we are going to use. But for example, the German government is both part of the Freedom Online Coalition that Rahman mentioned, and also of the Declaration for the Future of the Internet, and both initiatives, alliances, contain this commitment to go against internet shutdowns in the diplomatic relationships with countries who use this instrument. And I can assure you that I do not, I’m not timid about speaking about that with partners, with my interlocutors about this issue. But what I wanted to add to this is that what we also have to understand is that there is a need to have an understanding as internet shutdowns, not as an isolated event. But we would like to integrate it in our early crisis warning in the forecasting procedures that we use to take information that we get from organizations like Freedom House, for example, on internet shutdowns as a crisis indicator for a specific country or region, so that we can step in earlier with the diplomatic measures, and not only after, you know, after the social upheaval, the riots, or civil war, or whatever has happened. So this is also something that I’m working on to kind of bring these informations to the people who should hear it. But now to here. Oh, I thought I was next. Let him be. Yeah, go ahead. Okay, Milton.

Audience:
So I do want to contribute something very important to the discussion, which I think has been overlooked. And it really relates to this business of why aren’t governments who shut down things sanctioned? And that is, to put it bluntly, there is no such thing as international law. There is international anarchy. Governments are sovereign, and there’s no world government that can impose sanctions upon them, although powerful governments try, such as the United States. And how is this relevant to ICANN and to the so-called public core of the Internet? Well, what we’ve done in order to get global governance of the public core, we have removed that whole governance problem from nation-states, and we’ve put it in the private sector. And that’s extremely important to understand. This is how we have internationalized governance of the domain name system. So David described ICANN as a multi-stakeholder organization, and everybody likes that term, so he’s probably trying to make ICANN look good. But the point is multi-stakeholderism is not the key characteristic of ICANN. The key characteristic is it is a private corporation that has multi-stakeholder representation and participation, and that gives it the ability to do things like say to Ukraine, sorry, we’re not going to remove .ru from the root, or we’re not going to participate in U.S. sanctions on countries that the U.S. doesn’t like, or we’re not going to make the Iranians, you know, succumb to their particular political agenda. So I think it’s really important to understand the role of private sector governance in this kind of protecting the Internet against subordination to military and political ends.

Moderator – Regine Grienberger:
Thank you. other question and then I’ll give you a possibility to answer yeah. Thank you my

Audience:
name is Farzana Badi, Digital Medusa. So I wanted to ask the panel about how do we how can we actually approach conflict so that we leave no one behind so we talk a lot about Ukraine but Afghanistan I have not heard a lot about Afghanistan and the situation that is going on there and Sudan is in conflict as well. In Afghanistan the digital transformation project that was funded by World Bank stopped after the Taliban took over. Taliban is a sanctioned entity and if they become government then there will be a lot of problems providing internet access to them. So how can we actually come up with an approach that we do we have a more inclusive approach that we do not leave anybody behind because they are struggling and they have nowhere to go to and then another thing that I just wanted to mention in a lot of the times in various countries the internet service providers are owned by the military so if you want to like divide this and kind of like maybe sanction the military later on then it will be a very very difficult task to do so I suggest thinking and also another point and that’s the last one using sanctions and I think we need to come up with better mechanisms for resolving conflicts especially when it comes to internet governance. Sanctions just cannot be so targeted on the internet and I have done some research on that especially at the infrastructure layer we need to have measures so that they can be they can function and they can

Moderator – Regine Grienberger:
operate. Thank you. Thank you. Let’s take the other two questions and then close and give the panelists an opportunity to answer. Please be brief. Yeah Dan Arnotto

Audience:
from the National Democratic Institute. I guess it’s kind of an extension on the private sector point you know just looking at the role of kind of social media networks and platforms I’d be curious to hear from the panel but you know we’ve developed guidance around crisis management a key component I think is actually working with different stakeholders civil society coordinating with say a meta or a X in terms of you know that aspect of dealing with critical situations and I mean for better or worse you know these platforms have become a component of the infrastructure people are going to the app they’re not going to a website anymore to report something or to follow the news or to communicate with someone about a critical issue so I think we have to consider the specific role of the platforms and those specific elements of the private sector in these considerations so I would be curious on your perspective there. My name is Chantal Joris, I’m with Article 19 Freedom of Expression organization and we’ve also been looking into into many of these issues and where the gaps are and one of the things I would be curious to hear your perspectives on is with international humanitarian law in terms of a gap in international law it still seems very much more clear when it comes to attacks in terms of involving kinetic force, involving physical force, but many of the methods of warfare now involve again the cyberspace, use of spyware, internet shutdowns, and there seems to be like much less clarity around whether the rules of distinction apply in the same way, the rules on targeting, or how proportionality and humanity principles can apply in this context. So perhaps also question to the representative of the ICRC on the process to further clarify also how these rules should be applied to also by digital companies and

Moderator – Regine Grienberger:
states. Thank you. We start with David and then you pick the questions you would

David Huberman:
like to answer. Thank you. Well I mean we’re just about out of time, so I really just I wanted to thank Dr. Mueller for very eloquently stating what I was trying to get across about how the governance model at ICANN really shines during these times of conflict.

Mauro Vignati:
Yeah, I want first to give a brief answer, the person that talked about other conflicts, so at least from the ICRC perspective, so we are working on more than 100 countries and working in so many conflicts that we take care of all the conflict where we are working in, we are not focusing specifically in one or the other conflict, so and this is something that we are working on. We opened a delegation for cyberspace in Luxembourg to research and develop and doing research and development exactly in this respect to understand if we are able as the ICRC to develop technologies and capabilities that can be deployed in conflict territories and provide connectivity to population that is no more able to have this connectivity or to safeguard the information that they are transferring because privacy is very important for for the beneficiaries of the ICRC, so this is something that we are working on. We started this R&D last year and about the sanction that are not the right method, I’m not saying that I agree or disagree, I mean we are neutral but what I say is that among the recommendations that we are delivering next week, one of the recommendation for the tech companies to understand that they have this major role in managing the infrastructure and and the digital solution on top of that and what we recommend to them is to understand if they are not under a sanction of a state and they want anyway to do their own decision to consider to keep up the fundamental functioning and maintenance of the network and the communication, so this is something that we strongly try to advocate with tech companies, so we reach out to them and we would like to stress the fact that we are working also with them in this regard. Apropos of the intervention of the representative of article 19, so I already consider some of the points that you raised in the way that even with the recommendation to follow IHL that we’re going to publish and re-stress next week, so for the states is to respect IHL. IHL already foreseeing the respect of critical infrastructure of civilian not taking down them, keeping up and not targeting civilian objects that are fundamental for the operation of the ICRC and for the civilians in this regard, so we think IHL is already covering these aspects even though there is not a common understanding about the data. If data is protected, we think it is in terms of international maintenance law. Some positions of other states do not go in this direction, so what we try to go is including data in this respect, so if data could be considered also by all the states as an object to be protected, we gonna reach out what we would like to have with in respect to shut down another another another new let’s say new topic that are not the classical cyber operation for disruption. But we think also an exfiltration information that can cause harm to civilians or accessing those kind of information. So the work that we are doing is that we try to convince states to recognize recognize

Moderator – Regine Grienberger:
data as an object to be protected. I just would like to respond and and maybe have a little bit positive note also at the end but still starting with negative it’s it does not only what you mentioned is not only of course the issue of a conflict zone we divide is increasing and not decreasing and and in 12 percent of SDGs we have gone backwards not not forward. But regardless of everything I do believe that digital is actually one of these areas where we can cooperate with almost every country because it brings so many similar issues but also similar solutions. So from Estonian side we do cooperate in digital with almost every country through different partnerships with UN, EU, different banks and and so forth and including actually also Afghanistan where we have some digitalization initiatives going on. So I end with a more positive note. Thank you. So time is out. We have to conclude this session. I thank you very much people on the panel for your contributions. It was very interesting and also for your questions some of which we will also take have to take home to think about it more thoroughly and I hope to see you again outside of this room. Thank you.