Elections and the Internet: free, fair and open? | IGF 2023 Town Hall #39

Felicia Anthonio

Internet shutdowns have become a widespread problem globally, with detrimental effects on lives and democratic processes. The Keep It On campaign, which aims to combat internet shutdowns, has recorded over 1,200 incidents of shutdowns in approximately 76 countries since 2016. These shutdowns are typically carried out by state actors during critical moments such as elections, protests, and conflicts.

One of the main concerns regarding internet shutdowns is their impact on democratic processes, particularly during elections. The internet plays a crucial role in enabling active participation and promoting transparency and fairness in electoral proceedings. However, when shutdowns occur, it becomes challenging to effectively monitor and ensure the integrity of electoral processes.

Governments often justify these shutdowns as a necessary national security measure to prevent the spread of misinformation. However, in practice, the opposite tends to occur. Shutdowns tend to benefit incumbent governments, as they can control the flow of information and stifle opposition voices. This, in turn, often sparks public outrage and protests. Incidents in countries like Uganda, Belarus, and the Republic of Congo serve as examples of how shutdowns have been used for political gains and to suppress dissent.

Addressing this issue requires the collaboration of various stakeholders, including businesses, big tech companies, and governments. The fight against internet shutdowns necessitates a multi-stakeholder approach, emphasizing the importance of secure, open, free, and inclusive internet access during critical moments such as elections.

Furthermore, it is crucial to highlight that internet shutdowns do not contribute to resolving crises. On the contrary, they tend to exacerbate the situations at hand. Shutdowns provide an opportunity for governments and perpetrators to commit crimes with impunity. Moreover, in conflict situations, shutting down the internet in response to flagged dangerous content ultimately escalates the crisis.

The Keep It On Coalition, a prominent advocate against shutdowns, strongly condemns all forms of internet shutdowns. In addition, they call upon big tech companies to exercise responsibility in promptly removing violent content to ensure people’s safety.

In conclusion, internet shutdowns are an escalating issue that negatively affects lives and democratic processes. The Keep It On campaign’s documentation of a significant number of shutdown incidents highlights the magnitude of the problem. The justifications used by governments for shutdowns often raise concerns about political motivations and human rights violations. Tackling this issue necessitates collaborative efforts between various stakeholders, and it is essential to prioritize secure, open, and inclusive internet access during critical moments. Additionally, internet shutdowns have been observed to worsen crises rather than resolve them, underlining the need for alternative approaches. The condemnation of shutdowns by organizations like the Kipiton Coalition further emphasizes the importance of combating this issue and ensuring the responsible conduct of big tech companies in safeguarding online spaces.

Audience

The speakers discussed several key aspects related to free and fair elections and the issue of internet shutdowns. They emphasised the importance of communication and the role it plays in ensuring fair elections. They highlighted the significance of the internet, GSM networks, and blockchain networks as essential tools for facilitating communication during election processes. Additionally, they emphasised the need for independent observers, journalists, and international organisations to monitor elections and ensure their fairness. These independent entities play a crucial role in preventing election fraud and promoting transparency.

Another critical aspect discussed was the use of blockchain technology in elections. The speakers highlighted the immutability of election results that can be achieved by leveraging blockchain technology. They stressed that this feature is essential in guaranteeing the credibility of election outcomes. Furthermore, they emphasised the role of cryptographic protection in ensuring the security and safety of the election process. Robust cryptographic measures can prevent tampering or manipulation of sensitive election data.

Scalability was identified as another crucial component of free and fair elections. The speakers pointed out that a scalable network is necessary to efficiently manage a large number of voters, such as a population of 300 million. This ensures that the election process can accommodate a significant number of participants without any disruptions or technical limitations.

While the discussion mainly focused on the positive aspects of communication, independent observers, blockchain technology, and scalability, there were also concerns raised regarding the resorting to internet shutdowns by governments. The speakers highlighted that governments sometimes lack alternative tools to address legitimate concerns and therefore turn to internet shutdowns as a means of control. This practice was seen as problematic as it limits citizens’ access to information and disrupts the democratic process.

The potential economic impact of internet shutdowns was also discussed. Lack of reliable connectivity was identified as a significant factor that creates a difficult investment climate. Internet shutdowns and restrictions on data flows were acknowledged as factors that negatively affect a country’s economy.

The Internet Society’s efforts in developing a tool called Pulse to track and provide information on internet shutdowns and data flows were applauded. This tool aims to support activists and democracy by providing digestible information that can help address concerns related to internet shutdowns.

The concerns about potential misuse and the legitimisation of internet shutdowns for specific cases were also raised. It was acknowledged that the legitimisation of internet shutdowns during religious ceremonies or events that might incite violence could encourage misuse of this strategy by other governments. This highlighted the need to explore solutions to address structural issues within governments that may lead to internet shutdowns.

Furthermore, the speakers identified the spread of disinformation as a significant challenge during elections. Disinformation was acknowledged as damaging to the image of political leaders and the democratic process as a whole. It was proposed that internet service providers should be held responsible for controlling the spread of disinformation, and artificial intelligence could be used as a tool to achieve this.

Lastly, the role of digital technology in promoting government accountability and responsiveness was emphasised. It was suggested that the use of digital technology can enhance the accountability of governments, making them more responsive to the needs and concerns of citizens.

Overall, the discussions highlighted the multifaceted nature of free and fair elections. It was concluded that a comprehensive approach involving governments, internet service providers, political parties, and citizens is necessary to ensure the integrity of electoral processes. The discussions also shed light on the challenges and potential solutions related to internet shutdowns, disinformation, and the use of digital technology in elections.

Ben Graham Jones

The discussion revolves around the detrimental effects of internet shutdowns and the importance of safeguarding online rights. The primary argument is that the rights people enjoy offline should not be diminished when they are online. This argument is supported by the agreement at the UN General Assembly that there should be equality between online and offline rights. It is emphasised that internet shutdowns have a negative impact on communication, as they silence the entire population by cutting off their access to the internet.

Another argument put forward is that internet shutdowns exacerbate the problem of disinformation. This is because during shutdowns, state TV or selective channels often remain functional, thereby monopolising the sources of information available to the public. This concentration of information sources leads to a limited pool of information and increases the likelihood of disinformation spreading. The inability to access fact-based information compromises people’s right to access accurate information and undermines the integrity of elections.

The discussions also highlight the need for cross-context learning to effectively counter disinformation. It is suggested that there is considerable overlap in the types of disinformation narratives spread across different electoral contexts. To address this challenge, there is a call for organisations working in vulnerable contexts to learn from other contexts and enhance their preparedness for countering disinformation. This entails shifting efforts from response to prevention and providing fact-based information at an earlier stage.

Furthermore, risk forecasting is deemed crucial in addressing potential internet shutdowns. The discussions stress that by the time an internet shutdown takes place, it is often too late to take substantial action. Therefore, organisations need to map out potential risks and adjust their plans accordingly to minimise the impact of such shutdowns.

Additionally, the analysis reveals that election technology, including blockchain, can become targets for disinformation. While the details and evidence supporting this argument are not provided, it is suggested that election technologies may be vulnerable to misinformation campaigns, potentially undermining the credibility and integrity of elections.

Overall, there is a strong positive stance that internet shutdowns should be fought against. The primary reason cited is that these shutdowns impede the ability of fact-checkers and journalists to perform their roles effectively, thereby undermining freedom of information. The importance of preserving online rights and resisting the negative consequences of internet shutdowns is emphasised throughout the discussions.

In conclusion, the expanded summary delves into the various arguments and evidence related to the negative consequences of internet shutdowns and the imperative to protect online rights. Additionally, the need for cross-context learning, risk forecasting, and the vulnerability of election technology are addressed. The overall message conveys the importance of combating internet shutdowns and their detrimental impact on freedom of information and the integrity of elections.

Kanbar Hossein-Bor

Internet shutdowns have a significant impact on the flow of information, freedom of expression, and human rights. These shutdowns not only hinder individuals’ ability to express themselves online but also threaten the exercise of human rights. It is important to consider internet shutdowns in the context of broader issues, such as media freedom and misinformation.

Recognizing the gravity of the situation, the Freedom Online Coalition issued a joint statement focusing on internet shutdowns and elections. The UK has taken a leading role in addressing this problem by leading a Task Force on Internet Shutdowns as part of the Freedom Online Coalition. This collaborative approach involves stakeholders such as the UK’s Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office, Access Now, and the Global Network Initiative. The Task Force, chaired by Kanbar Hossein-Bor, advocates for a multi-stakeholder approach to effectively tackle internet shutdowns and disruptions.

Internet shutdowns not only impact individual rights but also pose a threat to the wider democratic process. By restricting access to the internet, these shutdowns hinder the exercise of offline rights online. Additionally, the economic costs incurred by societies affected by internet shutdowns are substantial.

Despite the challenges, there is a strong desire to support policymakers who may lack the capacity, but not the intent, to address internet shutdowns. This recognizes the need for collaborative efforts between various actors to tackle this issue effectively.

In the face of those with ulterior motives, it is crucial to stand firm and uphold principles of open internet access and the protection of human rights. The comprehensive impact of internet shutdowns has been highlighted by the Oxford statement, and the launch of the FOC statement further emphasizes the urgency of addressing this issue.

In conclusion, internet shutdowns pose a grave threat to the free flow of information, freedom of expression, and human rights. Addressing this issue requires a collaborative, multi-stakeholder approach, as advocated by Kanbar Hossein-Bor and demonstrated through the Task Force on Internet Shutdowns led by the UK. Policymakers must prioritize efforts to combat internet shutdowns, even when capacity is limited, but there is a strong intent to address the issue. It is essential to remain steadfast in the face of those seeking to restrict access to information and suppress rights.

Andrea Ngombet

The analysis highlights several key points concerning internet shutdowns and information control in Congo. During the 2021 elections, the government not only blocked the internet but also telecommunications, justifying this action as a measure against foreign interference and misinformation. However, this move has been widely criticized as an attempt by the government to control the flow of information.

Furthermore, anti-terrorism and cyber-criminality laws have been used to suppress opposition in Congo. Activists were arrested based on their social media posts during the internet shutdowns, raising concerns about the government’s use of legal mechanisms to target dissent and stifle freedom of speech.

The government of Congo is seeking assistance from the Republic of China to acquire advanced tools for internet control, such as a firewall. However, this approach lacks technological sophistication, highlighting the need for aid in developing domestic technology and innovation.

One important argument made is that tech companies like META should play a role in preventing the spread of misinformation, particularly during elections. Through collaboration with META, Congo was able to establish the Congo Fact Check initiative, demonstrating the positive impact of cooperation between tech companies and local organizations.

Civil society organizations also have a crucial role in moderating hate speech and misinformation online. In Congo, META worked with civil society organizations to create a task force on elections, addressing hate speech and misinformation from both the opposition and government. The involvement of civil society organizations can serve as a middle ground, reducing the perceived need for the government to impose internet shutdowns.

Additionally, it is emphasized that big corporations should be encouraged to participate more actively in online moderation efforts. It is noted that these corporations often have a reactive approach to tackling online misinformation. By reaching out to them, local civil society organizations can facilitate their involvement in countering online misinformation and make their efforts more proactive.

In conclusion, the analysis reveals a concerning pattern of internet shutdowns and information control in Congo, which is seen as an attempt by the government to control the narrative during elections. There is a call for tech companies, civil society organizations, and big corporations to proactively work together to prevent the spread of misinformation and hate speech. By doing so, the likelihood of internet shutdowns can be reduced, ensuring the protection of freedom of speech and public access to information.

Nicole Streamlau

Internet shutdowns are increasingly seen as necessary measures to address concerns related to elections, such as interference, disinformation, and post-election violence. Research carried out in Africa has shown a growing acceptance of internet shutdowns as a means of controlling election-related issues. Historical practices like banning opinion polls and political campaigning near voting day have also contributed to this acceptance.

Governments in the global South express frustration with the perceived lack of response, engagement, and oversight from large social media companies. Internet shutdowns are viewed as a form of resistance and sovereignty against the dominance of these companies, which are often based in distant countries. This dynamic highlights the tensions between governments and technology companies in terms of information governance.

The decision to implement internet shutdowns is partly influenced by a lack of information literacy. Governments with limited experience and understanding of online content moderation may resort to internet shutdowns as a response. Oxford University has launched a training program aimed at increasing information literacy among policymakers and judges, promoting a better balance of competing rights and addressing information disorder within a human rights framework. The goal is to reduce reliance on internet shutdowns as a solution.

Policymakers in peripheral markets, such as Ethiopia and the Central African Republic, struggle to understand and engage with technology companies. This observation underscores the difficulties faced by policymakers in regions with limited presence and engagement, in contrast to countries like Germany, which have embassies in Silicon Valley. The complexities of the relationship between policymakers and technology companies contribute to the challenges of addressing issues like internet shutdowns.

In conflict-affected regions, internet shutdowns are becoming accepted by local populations as a means to combat online hate speech and incitement to violence. Research carried out in conflict-prone areas of Ethiopia shows that locals prefer internet shutdowns as a way to avoid exposure to harmful online content. The acceptance of internet shutdowns in these regions arises from a lack of effective alternatives to address widespread hate speech and incitement to violence online.

Overall, while internet shutdowns are increasingly seen as a response to election-related concerns, the lack of information literacy and strained relationships between governments and technology companies contribute to their implementation. However, efforts to enhance information literacy among policymakers and judges through training programs, such as the one initiated by Oxford University, offer a promising approach to reducing reliance on internet shutdowns. Finding effective and sustainable solutions beyond internet shutdowns requires striking a balance between addressing concerns and protecting rights within a human rights framework.

Sarah Moulton

Increased internet disruptions during elections have a detrimental impact on the work of ground observers and pose a serious threat to domestic observer networks. These networks play a crucial role in reporting on electoral processes and collecting vital data. The disruption of internet services hampers their operation, making it difficult to effectively monitor elections and gather accurate information.

Moreover, observers on the ground face higher risks, including the risk of being arrested. This underscores the urgent need to safeguard them and provide them with the necessary tools to measure and report data effectively. Without adequate protection and support, these observers may be deterred from carrying out their important work, compromising transparency and accountability in the electoral process.

The importance of political parties and policymakers engaging in the process is also highlighted. Attendees at the FIFA Africa event in Tanzania displayed interest in the issue, emphasising the need for their active involvement. It is crucial for political parties and policymakers to recognize the significance of internet disruptions during elections and take proactive measures to address this issue.

Early collaboration is essential, with a particular focus on data collection relating to the economic and social impacts of shutdowns. The repercussions of internet shutdowns extend beyond the electoral process and can have a significant negative impact on healthcare and various economic sectors within a country. Therefore, it is essential to gather comprehensive data on these impacts to understand the full extent of the problem and develop effective strategies to mitigate them. Training programs for politicians and political parties can also be instrumental in preparing them for potential shutdowns and equipping them with the necessary skills and knowledge to respond effectively.

Accurate data that reflects the specific local context is vital in reports related to internet shutdowns. It is crucial that policy decisions are based on accurate and contextually relevant information, as the impact of internet disruptions can vary greatly between different regions and countries. The work being done through the Summit for Democracy highlights the recognition of this need and the ongoing efforts to ensure that data used for policymaking accurately portrays the local realities and challenges associated with internet shutdowns.

Collaboration between various stakeholders, including policymakers, civil society, internet service providers, technology platforms, strategic litigators, and international organizations, is paramount. Given the complex and multifaceted nature of internet disruptions during elections, a collaborative approach is necessary to address the issue effectively. All these actors must come together and share their resources, expertise, and data to build a comprehensive case and develop robust strategies for combating internet shutdowns, particularly during election times.

Furthermore, the platform created by the Internet Society is highly valued and supports the measurement of the cost of internet shutdowns. This platform plays a crucial role in helping to quantify the economic impact of internet disruptions and provides valuable insights into the true costs of such disruptions. By highlighting the financial consequences, the Internet Society facilitates a deeper understanding of the gravity of the issue and advocates for necessary actions to prevent or mitigate internet shutdowns.

In conclusion, increased internet disruptions during elections pose serious challenges for ground observers and domestic observer networks. It is imperative to protect and support these observers, provide them with effective tools, and engage political parties and policymakers in addressing this issue. Early collaboration, accurate data collection, and collaboration between various stakeholders are all crucial aspects of combating internet shutdowns during elections. The platform created by the Internet Society is instrumental in measuring the cost of internet shutdowns and emphasizes the need for action.

Kanbar Hossein-Bor:
Hi. Good morning, everyone. I think we’ll just give it about another couple of seconds. I can see some people are still entering the room. And then hopefully we will start. And just a reminder that this is a session on elections and the Internet, free and fair and open. I hope that’s the session you’ve come for. If you haven’t, you’re very welcome to stay. Fantastic. Well, let’s make a start. Firstly, a good morning to everyone here. And I know we’ve got a lot of colleagues online as well. A good morning from Kyoto to them, wherever they may be joining us. It’s a real privilege for me to be moderating this session today. My name is Kambor Sainbor. I’m the head of the Democratic Governance and Media Freedom Department of the UK’s Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office. We have a wonderful panel here today with you. I’m going to ask them each to introduce themselves when I hand them over to the floor to engage in this session. I’ll start off with making a few introductory remarks to set the scene, as it were. From the UK’s perspective, it’s a real privilege for us for this year, as part of the Freedom Online Coalition, to be chairing one of the task forces of the Freedom Online Coalition. In this case, the Task Force on Internet Shutdowns. And true to the multi-stakeholder spirit of the IGF, we’re delighted to be chairing that with the FOC Advisory Network members, Access Now, and the Global Network Initiative. We are chairing this task force because We passionately believe that internet shutdowns pose a significant threat to the free flow of information. They are a significant threat to the ability of everyone to express themselves online. They are a major source of censorship. And as all of you know, in a world where we are increasingly exercising our offline rights online, they are a fundamental impediment to the ability of us to exercise our human rights. In that regard, we want to use our task force chairship to highlight the increasing prevalence and use of shutdowns and internet disruptions. And we passionately believe that the multi-stakeholder approach is the right one. But we also recognize that internet shutdowns need to be seen as part of a much broader set of issues, all of which are related. For example, we have the issue of media freedom, online violence against women, development, mis- and disinformation. All of them come together to pose a significant threat to the ability of all of us to exercise our rights and actually lead to the full exercise of the realization of development. So in that regard, I want to briefly, before I hand over to the panel, highlight for the benefit of all of you that there has been a joint statement on internet shutdowns and elections, which is actually going live today. So if you have a look at the screen. We have a quick snapshot of this statement, the first issued by the FOC. In that regard, I think it’s a great way to introduce the session today, a reminder of the determination of the FOC to take up the challenge that this issue poses. For all of you in the room, and I hope for all of you online, you can see the statement now. We will share a copy of that later. I’m very happy to discuss that as well during the Q&A. So insofar as today’s session is concerned, we’ve got, I think, five speakers. I’m gonna ask them each to come in. Firstly, with a few words of self-introduction, and then they’ll spend about three, five minutes reflecting on a particular point of this session. And then we will have, I hope, a good half an hour or so of discussion where we can answer questions or reflect on any points that you in the room or virtually are making. So without any further ado, I’m gonna ask Felicia Antonio to start off and give a reflection on the Keep It On campaign and what some of the initial recommendations the policy makers are. So over to you, Felicia. Hello, can you hear me okay?

Felicia Anthonio:
All right, I’m Felicia Antonio, Keep It On campaign manager at Access Now. And for those who don’t know what the Keep It On campaign is, it’s a global campaign that unites over 300 organizations around the world. And our objective is to fight internet shutdowns. And this campaign was launched in 2016 by Access Now and other stakeholders. And since then, we’ve monitored, documented, and advocated against shutdowns. I’m going to give a few highlights of what we’ve seen across the globe with regards to shutdowns in general, and then I’ll narrow my submission to election-related shutdowns and the impacts. So according to our data and monitoring that is accessed now in the Kipiton Coalition, Internet shutdowns are spreading, they are lasting longer, and they are also impacting lives. Since 2016, we’ve documented at least 1,200 incidents of shutdowns in about 76 countries worldwide. And these incidents of shutdowns are usually perpetrated by governments, state actors, warring parties, military juntas, or third parties, and they take place during very critical moments like elections, protests, and conflict situations. In relation to shutdowns documented around elections, we have seen at least 57 election-related shutdowns globally since 2016. Africa accounts for 44 percent of these shutdowns. That is about 25 of these shutdowns happened in Africa. We also have countries like Iran, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Iraq, Belarus, Turkmenistan, among others, that have weaponized shutdowns during elections. We all know and believe that the Internet and digital platforms continue to enable and enhance fundamental human rights of people to access information, to express themselves, and to also enjoy their rights to freedom of assembly. In times of elections, the Internet plays a critical role in promoting free, transparent, and fair electoral process by providing political candidates avenues. to reach their supporters or audience, as well as allow equal access to communication channels for both the incumbent and the opposition to debate and highlight their political manifestos and policies. And for voters, keeping the internet and essential platforms on during elections enable them to actively participate in democratic processes, scrutinize policies put forward by political candidates, and also provide opportunities for people to hold their governments to account. Elections, particularly in growing democracies, are a critical time of transition, and active participation in the process contributes significantly to a credible democratic outcome. Journalists, human rights defenders, election observers, and other key stakeholders also rely on the internet and digital communication tools to monitor the electoral process. And shutdowns make it extremely difficult for all these actors to effectively monitor the electoral processes across the globe. Some governments have attempted to justify these shutdowns as relevant to prevent the spread of misinformation or hateful content, or as a national security measure. However, the opposite is true. When you shut down the internet during elections, it results in chaos, in the sense that it blocks alternative sources of information verification channels and seeks to benefit only the incumbent governments. Imposing shutdowns during elections is likely to also agitate people to protest and, in that regard, it questions the national security bits of governments trying to justify shutdowns. And according to a study that was done in 2019 by the collaboration of ICT policy in East and Southern Africa. Shutdowns remain a go-to tool for governments who want to hold on to power. With examples in Uganda, Belarus, Republic of Congo and most recently we saw this happen in Gabon when the internet was shut down and then the incumbents was announced as a winner of the elections but there was a military coup which overthrew him and so if that hadn’t happened we would have the incumbents in power for the next term of elections. And then I think that although the number of elections around the world have reduced over the past few years with some authorities in countries like Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone among others making commitments to keep it on during elections I think it still remains a crucial priority for all actors working to advance democracy around the world and so next year we have or next year has been described as the year of elections with at least 50 or so elections, 50 or so countries scheduled to go to the polls and so given the direct interference of shutdowns on electoral processes and the outcomes of elections I think it’s important for all stakeholders including governments, regional and international bodies like the United Nations, the African Union, European Union, the Freedom Online Coalition among others to support the Keep It On Coalition and other stakeholders to ensure that governments do not normalize shutdowns during elections and we welcome the just published statements by the Freedom Online Coalition. denouncing election-related shutdowns. And my other recommendation also goes to the businesses and telecom companies, as well as big tech companies, to ensure that people have access to secure, open, free, inclusive internet access throughout electoral processes, as well as ensure that these platforms are safe for people to be able to express themselves, and to also avoid giving governments reasons to justify their actions by shutting down the internet. So in conclusion, I think that the fight against shutdowns requires a collaborative effort, as we’ve seen. And so this is not just something that civil society alone is working on. We’ve seen the just-released statement by the Freedom Online Coalition, as well as statements denouncing the use of shutdowns by several governments and other institutions, which we appreciate as the Kipiton Coalition. And we look forward to working with all of you to push back against shutdowns. Thank you.

Kanbar Hossein-Bor:
Thank you very much, Felicia, for that really great overview of the elections and shutdowns. I’m now very pleased to hand over to our colleague joining us on screen, Andrea Ngombe, who will reflect on the impact of shutdowns on the ground, especially as seen from the Republic of Congo. So over to Andrea. Hey. Can you hear us? Can you hear me? Yes, we can hear you. Yeah, I can hear you. Yeah, we can hear you. Please continue. Thank you. OK.

Andrea Ngombet:
Let me stop the video. OK, it’s OK. So thanks for having me. I’m Andrea Ngombe from Republic of Congo, leader of SASOP Collective, which is an organization based in Paris, but working on democracy and human rights in the Republic. of Congo. We started just for human rights and democracy, and then we extend in many topics as anti-skeptocracy, and we really work with KPI on campaigns since 2015. So what happened in the last election in 2021 in Congo was not just informative, but it followed up what Felicia said. The narrative first is about safety, the safety of the public against foreign interference, against misinformation coming from the opposition, but never about the misinformation coming from the government, of course. And by using this narrative of fighting the foreign influence into the electoral process, they are able to sell the internet shutdown as something as, oh, we are so weak. We are a weak democracy. We don’t have a tool to keep the internet on because we don’t have the necessary tool to block that misinformation. And during that election, it was surprising that this narrative was even effective in the public opinion, general public opinion of the Congolese. And it goes on for about one week without phone and internet because they just not block the internet, they also block the telecommunication directly in the country. And with that narrative, they extend it to the anti-terrorist activity. And my point here is to say that this internet shutdown is not just for the internet, it also has an impact directly on the people. Because of this new anti-terrorist and cyber-criminality law in Congo, they are able to arrest militants from the opposition because of social media posts. Even if the internet was blocked, if you post something earlier about the election process, they can go and arrest you. Three activists from the opposition were arrested and put in jail for about three or four months because of this internet shutdown and the information they spread. And on our side, Sophie, and this is what I was trying to make as a point, we work with people from META to say that during election time in Africa, because of the behavior of our government, they need to step up. I don’t ask for a full and permanent a task on election, but during election time, because of the spread of hate speech from the opposition and from the government, someone needs to be in the middle and like a referee for the competition on the free flow of information. And we were able to secure a tacit way to work with META and they put up something called Congo Fact Check to check on the information putting out during that special time. And they were able to block a very vast disinformation coming from government related Facebook account. And it was really shameful for government to come up with this idea of blocking misinformation by shutting down internet and being themselves broke because they use robot and bot to spread lies during election time. So this is what was happening. And because of that, I also think that the next move of this internet shutdown in Africa is not just about internet shutdown. It’s about control, control of the information coming in the country. So because they are not able to have the newest technology, they use the internet shutdown. But in the coming years, and in the perspective of Congo-Brazil, they are trying to have a set of tools coming from the Republic of China, people of the Republic of China, so they can have this kind of firewall and secure themselves from any kind of information coming from outside the world, inside the country. So this is what we need to be focused on, not just the regular internet shutdown, but this next step they are trying to make to block any kind of information coming from outside, inside the country. Thank you.

Kanbar Hossein-Bor:
Well, thank you very much, Andrea, for that really powerful reflection on the ground, especially some of those future challenges. Also, thank you for staying on time, and a special thanks for joining us. I think it’s one o’clock where you are in Paris, so we’re very grateful that you’ve dialed in, much obliged. I’m now going to hand over to Ben Graham-Jones to reflect on shutdowns and freedom of expression.

Ben Graham Jones:
Thanks ever so much, Kambar, and thank you, other colleagues. My name’s Ben Graham-Jones. I am an elections consultant, work on many elections every year, and an advisor to the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, a UK public body. Let me start by applauding the joint statement on internet shutdowns and elections by the online coalition. I think it really provides a sound basis for calling out the illegitimacy of internet shutdowns, wherever they may occur. I’m gonna make three brief points today, and really, the first is that I would like to, I’d like you to imagine, if you would, a situation where you have an election, and at some point during the election process, perhaps on election day, or perhaps as the results are being counted and tabulated, 10,000. Nearly 10,000 journalists are locked up by government authorities. How much condemnation and opprobrium this would attract from the international community and from domestic actors, and rightly so. And yet it strikes me that when the communications of an entire population is silenced for that period, there is not always the same level and the same degree of condemnation. And perhaps we need to think carefully about how we can equate those two events that the legitimacy of the rights that we enjoy offline are in no way diminished when they are online. And so this is the first point I wish to make. That equality between the rights we have offline as they are online, it’s been agreed at the UN General Assembly. It’s something which I think we need to underscore. And I applaud the work of Access Now, of NDI, of other partners here today, who do such an excellent job in really raising awareness of that fact. Of course, internet shutdowns are not just about the right to freedom of expression. And the second point I would like to make pertains to disinformation, the right to access information, and the right to credible elections, all of which depend on having that basis of fact-based information. And one of the things that I see as someone who specializes in counter disinformation is that when internet shutdowns occur, they amplify disinformation. How do they amplify disinformation? Because they concentrate the sources of information that people can access. Your state TV, for example, may remain on, or it may be that the channels that are closed down or the means which are throttled are selective. What that means for those of us working in counter disinformation is that we need to be thinking seriously about pre-bunking, about moving. our response efforts to prevention efforts, to mitigation efforts, about providing fact-based information at an earlier stage of the process where there is a risk of Internet shutdowns. I want to very briefly suggest four actions that can help in that regard. Number one, when we’re working in contexts which may be vulnerable to Internet shutdowns, we need to learn from other contexts. If you’re sat there in an election commission in Nigeria, let’s say, you may not be thinking about the recent election that took place in Kenya or France or Kazakhstan. Your previous points of reference is probably the previous elections that took place in Nigeria. But actually, what we need to be bearing in mind is that we see quite a lot of overlap in the types of disinformation narratives that are circulated across different electoral contexts. I see this. I work globally across lots of different elections each year. And so by looking at other contexts, we can bolster preparedness for counter disinformation in advance of any Internet shutdown and information monopoly being imposed. The second thing is to think about narrative forecasting. Our organizations, whether it’s election management bodies, civil society organizations, political parties, really making a plan for thinking about what types of narratives might be deployed at different points in the process, informed by that international best practice. And then thinking about what response might look like. Thirdly, overcoming selection bias. We know that people don’t seek out counter disinformation. We know people don’t look to check whether or not their pre-existing opinion is correct. There’s decades of psychological research on this. And so we need to find ways of bringing that fact-based information before shutdowns occur into the places where it needs to be. Because the very people who will otherwise seek out fact-based information are precisely the people who you need to reach least. And fourth, thinking about drafting that preemptive response early. If you can draft, well, if you can draft effective infographics and videos to counter some of these narratives early on, then when they do come up, it’s going to reduce your response times and cut the virality of disinformation before any shutdowns are imposed. The third point I’d like to very briefly make is on risk forecasting. And when we’re thinking about internet shutdowns, by the time it takes place, often it’s too late to do a lot of the actions that can have substantive consequence, whether that’s the publication of telecommunications licensing agreements, whether that’s putting concerted pressure, the sorts of things that keep it on, coalition does so effectively. And so we really need to be thinking about, on a sector-wide basis, but also within our individual organizations, mapping out risks. So for example, if you’re a body that sends election observation missions, you might be thinking about, okay, were there known risk factors of internet shutdowns present in particular contexts, and then prioritizing the deployment of your missions to those places so that you can serve as a counterweight to the monopolization of information. Likewise, if you are a civil society organization whose communications plan depends on releasing a statement around election day, but you realize that there is a chance of an internet shutdown, then maybe you need to think a little bit carefully about how to communicate your key messaging around the election if that’s not going to be possible. So three key points, remembering that the same rights online apply offline, thinking about farsighted disinformation response, and forecasting risk. Thanks ever so much.

Kanbar Hossein-Bor:
Thank you very much, Ben, especially for those pretty practical recommendations as well. We’re now going to go back online. We’ve got a colleague joining us, Nicole Stremlow, who will reflect on the research on government decisions around internet shutdowns, especially in Africa. Over to you, Nicole.

Nicole Streamlau:
Good morning, everyone. I hope you can hear me. We can. Please continue. Okay, thank you so much. So I just wanted to take a couple of minutes to reflect on some of the research we’ve been doing at Oxford around internet shutdowns, and particularly around elections and conflicts, primarily in Africa. So we’ve been conducting some research on government decision making, so basically asking why governments are choosing this relatively blunt tool of internet shutdowns, as compared with other forms of control, and specifically in Ethiopia, and I just returned from Ethiopia, we’ve also been looking at the impact and the perception of shutdown in violence affected communities. And actually, like Andrea, we found sort of a growing acceptance or acquiescence that this is actually an important tool. And in the process of our research, we’ve also sought to come up with a different reading of internet shutdowns. So to look beyond this framing this dichotomy of digital authoritarianism and ask whether or not it’s possible to identify these alternative logics and rules rather than the assumed motivations of what’s actually driving shutdowns. And I also have three points, like my previous colleague, and I would say, first of all, a somewhat obvious point is that we’re seeing a growing acceptance of shutdowns. So they’re becoming increasingly normalized as a tool to address very legitimate concerns around election interference, concerns about disinformation, concerns about incitement to violence post-elections, and they’re seen as a useful tool or a necessary trade-off to protect the integrity of the electoral process. And by this, I’m talking about a lot of reflections around the research we’ve been doing on the ground in Africa. So I think it’s also helpful to remember that there’s long been information controls around elections in different democracies. So the banning of public opinion polls within weeks of election is seen in Kenya, the prohibition of political advertising or campaign rallies close to voting day that might arise in particular contexts in accordance with historical experiences. And the challenge of social media is that it’s making it makes imposing these kinds of silences around elections increasingly difficult. So shutdowns are this blunt tool, this very crude tool for addressing some of these concerns in the context of having less precise tools or not knowing what else to do that might historically have been available for dealing with concerns around mass media, for example. And second, I think most importantly, we see shutdowns as a growing form of resistance, an expression of frustration to the overwhelming power of large social media companies that are typically based in the US or China. And we see this frustration with the failures and the inequalities of online content moderation. And I think to some degree, this has become well documented. People have been writing about this and doing research about this, particularly around the failure of online content moderation in local African languages and the lack of attention given to resource poor communities. So we see governments in these more marginal markets in the global South being frustrated with this inadequate response, the lack of engagement, the lack of product oversight from these large tech companies. And so shutdowns are seen by some, and it’s not always explicit, but as a way of expressing sovereignty, as a way of pushing back against what is often seen to be these arbitrary responses of incredibly rich companies deciding good and bad actors from a distance, and the frustration also with the rules that are being written in far off countries according to certain logics that local authorities feel powerless to engage or really to challenge. And so like Andrea, you know, I agree there’s a lot of discussion and debate about what more can these companies do, not necessarily in Kenya, but more in the Central African Republic, for example, or the failures of what’s been happening in Ethiopia. And third, I think we’ve also seen that the decision to implement shutdowns partly is an information literacy check. And I think to some degree, this has been overlooked, but our research has shown that governments often resort to shutdowns because of a lack of experience of how to actually engage these large tech companies, or a lack of understanding about alternative ways of addressing the very legitimate concerns about the failures of online content moderation, particularly around elections or in cases of extreme violence, and how to navigate this balance between the competing rights, such as the responsibility to protect in cases of extreme violence, as well as freedom of expression, or the right to information, as we’ve mentioned on this panel already. And if I can say a very tiny plug, we at Oxford, we were just awarded a European Media and Information Fund award to actually launch a new program to train policymakers and judges through a new executive program on information literacy. And we’re specifically going to be working on how to improve understanding among these key influencers, and how to address these really very real challenges that information disorder poses, particularly in the context of generative AI, but really how to do so through human rights, through a human rights framework ahead of elections in context of extreme violence, and hopefully reducing the need or the turn towards these blunt crude tools of censorship that internet shutdowns are. Thank you.

Kanbar Hossein-Bor:
Thank you so much, Nicole, really helpful there. And also grateful for you joining us. I know it’s a difficult time zone where you are as well. We’re now going to go to our last speaker. That’s Sarah Moulton. Before we open it up to you, the audience for Q&A, Sarah will be reflecting on the multi stakeholder coordination challenge. Over to you, Sarah.

Sarah Moulton:
Thanks. My name is Sarah Moulton. I’m from the National Democratic Institute. I’m the deputy director of our democracy and technology team. NDI is a nonprofit. partisan non-governmental organization based in the US but we work in about 50 countries around the world and we come at this from an implementation angle you know NDI works and supports democratic processes strengthening democratic institutions and provides a lot of on-the-ground election support for many of the elections that have been discussed already but in primarily we do a lot of work with domestic observation groups independent groups on the ground who are deployed in advance of an election to report back on you know what they’re seeing at the polling station and reporting on the process and the results and obviously for us from a practical standpoint it’s really important for the internet to be working so that they can transmit their findings and what they’re seeing throughout the day and then allowing the observer group to then report on make a statement about the process that they’re seeing and you know hopefully verify that it was indeed democratic and properly run that’s not always the case however you know what we’re seeing often these days is that these disruptions are making it more challenging for groups on the ground to do so there’s definitely been a lot more concern about what might be happening and trying to plan in advance for potential shutdowns and so one thing that we’ve really explored is how do we better utilize this network which can often include thousands you know maybe up to 2,000 in some cases observers deployed in all parts of a country and how do we take advantage of that distribution in order to collect better data on what we’re seeing across country in terms of whether there’s a shutdown whether there’s just a disruption or there’s throttling perhaps censorship of particular sites that can lead to better data collection in that process so how can we feed that data to the wider network of stakeholders that we’ve been talking about This is, you know, our topic here is multi-stakeholder collaboration and how do we share that data with those who can perhaps do that more direct advocacy with individuals maybe across on an international level but also even domestically. Our concern with that particular group, obviously there’s higher risks to observers these days. We’ve been seeing on a couple of recent examples Sierra Leone and perhaps Zimbabwe is the more difficult one to talk about but you know seeing observers arrested for simply the process they’re doing an independent analysis and verification sometimes in the middle of what they’re doing on Election Day in the case of Zimbabwe and so we have to look at you know how do we protect these groups who can collect this data but also enable them to to do so because there’s a lot of opportunity there’s a lot of tools out there now you know in order to take these measurements and then report them up. The other thing like sort of the other side of this angle is NDI also works with politicians and policymakers and I think that there’s a real opportunity for collaboration here but really needing to do so well in advance of an election we need to get this process started now yesterday you know especially with 2024 we’ve been talking about 2024 for years now but you know when are we you know we really have to actually start working towards it the statement is a great is a great start and a great recognition of that coming up and I know you know thanks to you know keep it on campaign really puts a lot of effort into planning and tracking which elections are going to be you know perhaps the most significant in potential for shutdowns but also reflecting having just come from the FIFA Africa event in Tanzania last week I think that you know there’s a lot of I think interest from policymakers to engage in this process but there’s also a lack of information at times there’s a lack of understanding of the environment and sometimes the approach from civil society might potentially be aggressive in this and they perceive it as that we are not being collaborative that we are coming at them as opposed to working together with them and frankly sometimes there’s a challenge in trying to get policymakers to care about the issue there’s you know the the prospect of freedom of expression may not really resonate especially when it came up the reference Felicia made to national security is often an argument made but I think really where we can make a difference here is really the impact of a shutdown beyond that it’s you know looking at the you know health care issues it’s looking at economic loss like has a huge impact on a country and really trying to you know collect that data use the data that we’re collecting in order to make that case in order to work earlier on with not only politicians or individuals but political parties generally because politicians during the time of an election are really concerned more about their election than they are about you know potentially a shutdown so how can you work with the wider you know political party ecosystem and I think there’s things we can do in preparation of that you know there is a desire for training programs for learning about these tools for working together with multi stakeholder approaches whether that’s civil society or others and I think for us if we can make better efforts to connect civil society with political parties as also international initiatives that we can go a long way towards kind of mitigating this potential damage is coming up so I’ll stop there

Kanbar Hossein-Bor:
thank you so much Sarah really really helpful we’re now going to open up for Q&A, really. I want to start with folks in the room first. If you can briefly introduce yourself and also briefly set out your comment or question, that would be great. I think the format is I see a mic in the middle. So maybe we’ve got a colleague already there. If you could, the gentleman in the white shirt, if you could start off.

Audience:
Yes, hello. My name is Eugene Morozov, and I represent devoteusa.com, a voting solution. I want to thank this panel for bringing up two very important components of free and fair elections. And one is availability of communication. You talk about internet, but there are, of course, other ways to communicate, like GSM networks or blockchain networks, which do not use TCP IP protocol at all. Then you talked about something also very important, and that is availability of independent observers and journalists and international organizations, very important. But there are three other critical components on free and fair elections, which this panel have not touched upon. So I just wanted to raise them. One of them is true immutability of election results. And that is achieved by, for example, using a blockchain, which is what we use. Then, of course, there is an issue of security and safety, and that is achieved by using a cryptographic protection. And you also need scalable networks to conduct elections with a country, let’s say, with 300 million voters. You must have a scalable network to conduct those. So my question is, are there any thoughts to those other components of free and fair election process that this panel is thinking about? And if not, of course, come talk to us. We can help. Thank you.

Kanbar Hossein-Bor:
Perfect. Thank You, Eugene. That’s some really powerful reflections there on the wider technological context of elections. I’m going to look to the panel in the room first to see if anyone wants to respond to Eugene. And Ben’s volunteered. Ben, over to you.

Ben Graham Jones:
Sure, thanks Eugene. I mean I don’t want to keep us close to the remit on internet shutdowns, but just to say that I think there’s probably two components to electoral legitimacy. There’s the actual process itself and how that pans out, and then there’s the perception of the process and election technology is a classic target for disinformation, in part because it’s very difficult to explain your blockchain or to explain. You can’t observe electrons as well. It makes it quite tricky sometimes because there are big tools for building confidence like this limiting audits like cryptographic methods as well. But I think that’s exactly why it’s so important that we fight internet shutdowns, is because when you’ve got that sort of disinformation that can be levied against election technologies in particular, then you can’t actually fight that if the fact-checkers and the journalists don’t have the ability to do so.

Kanbar Hossein-Bor:
Great, thank you. We have another speaker now. Over to you.

Audience:
Hi everyone, Nikki Muscati. I’m from the US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. I also serve as our focal point for the Freedom Online Coalition. Thank you so, so much for this panel. I was excitedly writing so many notes and I have so many follow-ups that I’d love to have with all of you. I have a question that was sparked by some of Nicole’s comments, but really just open it up to the whole panel. One of the things that I’ve also found is pretty consistent with the first finding that you noted about the acceptance, it seems, of this tool internationally, really due to the fact that so many governments feel that they really don’t have very many other tools to address what, again, are legitimate concerns. And, you know, when we’re going through the list that we see oftentimes, and access now keep it on reports of these are all the real reasons that an internet shutdown might be happening. I think one of the reasons that’s often cited as a I can’t believe that’s a reason is to prevent cheating and so I am a little bit curious just across the board you know what are some of the solutions that folks have been thinking about to address what is really just seen like as a institutional frameworks and sort of like structural issues within governments that lead them to be unable to address some of these again legitimate concerns that are happening within the country and then turning to the internet to then just bluntly just use that to to try to address everything and then creating so many other additional concerns that just build on top of the original legitimate concerns thank you

Kanbar Hossein-Bor:
thank you Nikki a really important point there about practical alternatives of policymakers if I may you implied you suggested Nikki Nicole had touched on some of these points I might ask Nicole online if you want to come in on Nikki’s question over to you

Nicole Streamlau:
Nicole sure no thanks for that Nikki well I think we see it at both levels and maybe Andrea wants to also come in with what he’s seeing in the Congo so I think we do see it with policymakers not understanding and I think it’s particularly in markets that are peripheral to the large tech companies so here you know I’m not speaking about Kenya I’m speaking about the Central African Republic I’m speaking to some degree about Ethiopia but you know that where they don’t have the same channels the same lines open they don’t have embassies in Silicon Valley like Germany does you know like it’s just a very different environment in relationship with these companies and so they’re also not sure how to engage with them and I think it’s not only the at the level of the companies but it’s also an understanding about technology it’s an understanding about what other tools they have have, how else they can deal with it, other than shutting down the Internet. And I think we also, and I think what is very concerning, and this is some research that as I mentioned, I just returned from Ethiopia, and we’ve been doing long standing research in Awassa and Shashamani, which are two conflict affected regions, looking at how communities there are engaging with Internet shutdowns and how they see the impact of Internet shutdowns. And we have seen there that there is an acceptance of these Internet shutdowns, because people are so fed up with the content that they’re receiving online, with the massive amounts of online hate speech, with the incitement to violence, and they’re also experiencing violence on the ground. So they’re just saying, and I’m putting it very crudely, our findings are more nuanced than this, but in the interest of like 10 seconds, they’re finding that there aren’t any other alternatives, so they’d rather not be exposed to this, what they see as inciting real world violence, and they’d rather just have it shut off.

Kanbar Hossein-Bor:
Great, thank you for that. I see some more hands up in the room, we’ve got two speakers, if the lady at the microphone could come in, and then afterwards, the gentleman here, if you could go after, we’ll take these two questions together in a bunch. So over to you.

Audience:
Wonderful, thank you. I’m Sally Wentworth, I’m from the Internet Society, and I want to thank you for this great panel, learned a lot, a lot of things to be concerned about. We at the Internet Society, we are a more technical organization, and we’ve thought hard about what role we can play to support the work that many of you are trying to do to support freedom and to support democracy and free flow of information, and where we stand is we like to look at it from what do we see in the Internet, and is there information that we can see on the Internet about shutdowns, about data flows, about cross-border connectivity, and make that information available in sort of digestible ways that you all can use in your advocacy and promotion of democracy and free elections. Sarah, I was particularly struck by your comment of putting this in a broader context of what is the impact, not just in the immediate term with respect to the election, but what does this do, you know, ongoing shutdowns, what does that do for a country’s economy, right? If we see governments saying we want to be, you know, an online economy, we want to be a digital marketplace, we want to have all these opportunities, but there’s no reliability of connectivity, that makes a very difficult investment climate. And so that’s some of what we’re trying to do. We have a tool called Pulse, a little bit of a shameless plug, but really what we’re trying to do is create resources that are useful for activists that are doing this kind of important work. So I want to thank you for that and express our support and willingness to be helpful in this.

Kanbar Hossein-Bor:
Thank you so much. I’ll take the two further questions in the room in a bunch, and then we’ve got a hand up in the virtual room as well, and then we’ll do one final round of reactions from the panel. But over to yourself.

Audience:
Hi, Jamil. I’m a barrister, but I’m also a policy counsel for many of the tech companies in Pakistan. And one of the things I found very effective was to actually run a timer, a clock that shows how money is being lost every time, you know. It worked really well with ministers and other policy folks as well. My question really is to Nicole. I completely understand there are certain things we’re also seeing in countries like Pakistan where there’s religious ceremonies or religious days where there could be violence, very serious violence. And so handling the internet in some ways becomes important. And if they don’t know what to do, they will shut it down. That’s what’s happening every single time. My concern is that while we legitimize that, and we said that’s a concern, from what I’m hearing constantly in this room has been this sort of an idea that, you know, there are actually good reasons. I’m concerned about certain governments. They might not be in Central Africa, for instance, but in other places who might actually take heed from this and say, wonderful, we have people who agree with us. So I’d just like to sort of make sure that we balance that out a little bit. Thank you so much.

Kanbar Hossein-Bor:
Thank you. A really good point there. And last but not least, over to you, sir. Thank you.

Audience:
Thank you. Let me introduce myself. This is Ganesh Pandey. I work for the government of Nepal in the prime minister office. While talking about the free and fair election and internet, right now we focus only on the internet shutdown and the something else, but we should not forget free and fair election needs comprehensive approach. There is a government, there is the internet service provider, there are political parties, and there are also the citizens. So sometimes government intentionally or purposefully controls the media and the internet to get some vested interest or hide the information. In that way how we can make the government accountable. Sometimes the public make the criticize of the some of the leader or the candidate of the elections. If that is disinformation, within one hour it is spread so fast that the image or the trust of that leader goes down immediately. And we don’t have the access to the internet service provider to control or to check or restrict that disinformation or the disclaim of that that is the false false information. So how the internet service providers we can make responsible through the use of AI or any tools so that such kind of disinformation should not be spread in the social media or something else. And the second thing is that how government can make, how we can make the government more accountable and responsive through the use of digital technology. This is also very important. Thank you very much.

Kanbar Hossein-Bor:
Thank you very much. Some really important reflections from a policymakers perspective. I’m going to ask the panel to come in. I’ll introduce you. and ask you to come in. But first to come in is I think we have André, one of our speakers online, who would like to come in. So André, did you want to come in on those points or another point?

Andrea Ngombet:
Yeah, thank you. So in the case of Congo, it was Sassoufi who reached out to META to have a kind of task force on the elections. And it’s not that we are trying to justify the reason of the government. We are identifying a pain. The pain is there is hate speech from opposition and government. There is misinformation from every side. So as a civil society organization, we need to be the referee in the middle ground. And if we can, as a takeaway for the group, have more civil society organizations reaching to those big corporations and doing this online moderation in the local level, because those companies won’t do it themselves, we need to push them. And by doing so, we will erase that argument of a government that internet means violence, because we will have these local civil society working against the hate speech, working against the incitement to violence. And if we are more of us doing that work, the government won’t have this legitimate argument to say, oh, nobody is doing that work, so we have to shut down the internet. This is our way to address that specific problem.

Kanbar Hossein-Bor:
Thank you, Andre. I think that addresses one of the points made just now about how to engage with internet providers and content platforms. But I think we had a question from the Internet Society around data and economy and making that argument. Maybe if I could ask Sarah to respond to that. And then we had a comment made from our colleague based in Pakistan about the dangers of potentially giving some arguments to those states. who don’t have, put bluntly, the best of intentions in this area and the unwitting power we might hand over to them. Maybe I can ask Felicia to respond to that. So, Sarah and then Felicia.

Sarah Moulton:
Yeah, all I would say is thank you to the Internet Society. I know that there’s been a lot of work being done lately, especially through the discussions from the Summit for Democracy. The platform that’s come out of that or that’s been strengthened through that and also the cost of Internet shutdown. Well, that’s a different title. But that tool, I think, is really critical. And it’s really getting it into more hands and how do we make sure that that data is accurate or reflects the local context, because that’s the other situation that we face. If we’re going in and speaking to a particular policymaker, they want to make sure that it reflects their situation and their context. And I think maybe, as I said, my main point is these conversations, this work, needs to start now, particularly for the elections coming up. How do we, you know, I think sitting down and collaborating and figuring out what data you have, what data you have, and that we have from on the ground and how do we, this is still my question is how can we, you know, have this collaboration point in advance to make sure that we’re all sharing the information that we’re collecting and working with the right, whether it’s policymakers, whether it’s civil society or ISPs or the tech platforms or strategic litigators, all of these components or international, you know, FOC is like, this is very critical for, you know, raising the alarm. And all of this data comes together to make the case. And so thank you for that. I’m not sure if I’m answering this particular question, but I just want to note that the importance of that platform and how much we value it.

Felicia Anthonio:
Thank you. Over to you, Felicia. Yes. Yeah, so for us, and I keep it on coalition campaign, we haven’t seen any evidence. of shutdowns contributing to resolving crises that governments tend to cite. When you shut down the internet during conflicts in response to dangerous content being flagged online, it only escalates the crisis. It endangers more people. It provides an opportunity for governments and perpetrators to actually commit heinous crimes against people with impunity. And so for us, we believe that what needs to be done is that, yes, there is violence content on platforms. Big tech companies need to be responsible in taking down violence content or hateful content or dangerous content in order to keep people safe. And so I just want to emphasize that the Kipiton Coalition denounces all forms of shutdowns. We haven’t seen shutdowns as a solution to any form of violence anywhere around the world. And if anything, what shutdowns do is that, as I said, it provides an opportunity for governments, warring parties, to perpetrate heinous crimes against people around the world. And so I just want to make this very clear on behalf of the Kipiton Coalition. Thank you.

Kanbar Hossein-Bor:
Thank you very much. We’re really reaching the end of it. I’ve got the unenviable task of trying to sum this up in about a minute or two. Three very quick points from me. Firstly, a big thanks to our speakers for coming in and setting out this very complicated issue for us. And also a big thank you to all of you, both online and in the room, for engaging in this. Secondly, I think for me, this is a reminder of the importance from a principles-based perspective. Namely, internet shutdowns pose a massive threat to not only the ability to exercise offline rights online, but they also pose a threat to the wider democratic process. fabric of society and also they pose significant economic costs to societies as well. Finally and the third more positive hope I want to end on is to say that there’s a lot of good intentions I’m hearing across this discussion about trying to support policymakers where they might not have the capacity but they have the intent to address these issues but also recognizing that we should stand firm in the face of those who actually don’t have the best of intentions here and next year we potentially have the fate of 2 billion people in about 50 or so elections to consider and the need to stand up for that on a norms-based basis. In that regard I really want to remind everyone of the FOC statement that we launched today. That’s a start about two weeks ago as part of the UNESCO International Day for Universal Access Information. There’s an Oxford statement also I like to bring your attention to I hope it will be on screen which highlights the comprehensive impact of these issues together and finally we hope through the FOC and the task force internet shutdowns we can through a multi-stakeholder approach bring all the expertise together the data together to come up with some practical measures to try and address the significant challenges that not only happening today but also will be facing collectively next year as well. So thanks again to all our speakers and to all of you for in this session. you You You