Networking Session #200 Cross Regional Connections for Information Resilience

Summary

This discussion focused on interregional connections for information integrity, examining how both authoritarian and democratic governments worldwide are adopting practices that restrict online freedom. The session brought together human rights advocates, researchers, and journalists from Latin America, Africa, Asia, and other regions to explore four key areas where digital authoritarian practices commonly appear: censorship, surveillance, online information integrity, and internet governance.

Participants shared concrete examples of censorship from their respective countries, with Abdullah Ahmadi describing how the Taliban in Afghanistan has imposed formal restrictions on independent media and blocked access to news websites, while also conducting informal intimidation of journalists and activists. Valentina Aguana from Venezuela detailed how internet blocks have become more pervasive, with 61 independent media outlets currently blocked and social media platforms like X (formerly Twitter) permanently restricted. She emphasized that censors are becoming more sophisticated but also more reckless, sometimes blocking critical internet infrastructure that affects millions of users globally.

The discussion on surveillance revealed similar patterns across regions, with Lillian Nalwoga from Uganda highlighting how African governments collectively spent a billion dollars on digital surveillance tools in 2023, often using legally embedded interception powers to monitor activists and journalists. Martha Roldós from Ecuador described how surveillance capabilities built during authoritarian periods continued to be used by subsequent governments, with information weaponized for character assassination campaigns.

Regarding information integrity, participants noted coordinated disinformation campaigns where governments use both bots and paid human networks to spread manipulated narratives, with countries like Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua helping amplify each other’s campaigns. The speakers emphasized that civil society organizations play a crucial role in resisting these authoritarian practices through coalition building, digital security training, and fact-checking initiatives, though they face significant sustainability challenges due to limited funding and geopolitical pressures.

Keypoints

## Major Discussion Points:

– **Censorship and Internet Blocking**: Participants discussed various forms of digital censorship, from formal government restrictions on media and websites to informal intimidation tactics. Key examples included Afghanistan’s post-Taliban restrictions on independent media and Venezuela’s blocking of 61 independent media outlets and social media platforms like X (Twitter), Reddit, and TikTok.

– **Digital Surveillance and Monitoring**: The conversation covered how governments use sophisticated surveillance tools including phone tapping, spyware like Pegasus, and internet interception to monitor and intimidate civil society, journalists, and activists. African countries were noted as collectively spending $1 billion on surveillance tools in 2023.

– **Information Manipulation and Disinformation**: Speakers addressed coordinated disinformation campaigns, particularly in Latin America, where governments use bot networks and paid human coordinators to spread manipulated narratives and conduct smear campaigns against opponents across multiple countries.

– **Internet Governance and Legal Frameworks**: Discussion of how different countries approach digital rights governance, contrasting the U.S. model (which relies heavily on platform self-regulation) with Brazil’s more comprehensive legal framework, and highlighting the lack of adequate legal protections in many regions.

– **Civil Society Sustainability Crisis**: A critical concern raised about the funding challenges facing digital rights organizations globally, particularly in the Global South, threatening the multi-stakeholder model of internet governance due to lack of resources for essential advocacy and protection work.

## Overall Purpose:

The discussion aimed to demonstrate cross-regional collaboration on information integrity issues by bringing together activists, researchers, and advocates from different continents to share experiences, identify common authoritarian digital practices, and explore resistance strategies. The session sought to build bridges between regions and stakeholders working to protect digital rights and civic space.

## Overall Tone:

The tone was serious and urgent throughout, reflecting the gravity of digital authoritarianism globally. While speakers shared concerning examples of repression and surveillance, the tone remained constructive and collaborative, emphasizing solidarity and shared solutions. The discussion maintained a professional, academic quality while being deeply personal as speakers shared experiences from their own countries. The moderator’s closing questions and positive responses from the audience suggested cautious optimism about the potential for continued collaboration despite the challenges discussed.

Speakers

– **Mariví Marín** – Venezuelan Human Rights Advocate, Director of PROVOX (a non-profit working on information integrity in Latin America), Session Moderator

– **Abdullah Ahmadi** – From Afghanistan, Human Rights Advocate focused on digital inclusion and civic space, Director of Afghanistan Democracy and Development Organization

– **Valentina Aguana** – From Venezuela, System Engineer and Researcher at Conexión Segura y Libre, works on internet censorship and digital rights

– **Lillian Nalwoga** – From Uganda, Program Manager at CIPESA, works on internet policy and digital rights in Africa

– **Martha Roldós** – From Ecuador, Investigative journalist, Director of Fundación Milojas

– **Sascha Hannig** – International relations analyst and academic, focused on authoritarian influence and the impact of science and technology on society (participated online)

– **Roberta Braga** – From Brazil and the U.S., Founder and Director of Digital Democracy Institute of the Americas (DDIA), focused on a healthier internet for Latinos across the U.S. and Latin America

– **Iria Puyosa** – From Venezuela and the U.S., Senior researcher/Senior fellow at the Atlantic Council on Tech Initiatives, expert on digital authoritarianism and governance

**Additional speakers:**

– **Participant** – Identified as speaking about disinformation patterns in Latin America, appears to be from PROVOX team (likely Estefania Da Silva based on context, though not explicitly confirmed in transcript)

# Interregional Connections for Information Integrity: Discussion Report

## Executive Summary

This session, moderated by Mariví Marín of PROVOX, brought together human rights advocates, researchers, and journalists from Latin America, Africa, and Asia to examine digital authoritarianism across four key areas: censorship, surveillance, online information integrity, and internet governance. Participants shared concrete examples from Afghanistan, Venezuela, Uganda, Ecuador, Brazil, and the United States, revealing common patterns of digital repression while exploring collaborative resistance strategies. The discussion highlighted the global nature of digital authoritarianism and the urgent need for sustained civil society collaboration to address these challenges.

## Session Structure and Participants

The session was organized around four thematic areas, with speakers presenting regional case studies followed by discussion. Participants included Abdullah Ahmadi (Afghanistan), Valentina Aguana (Venezuela), Lillian Nalwoga (Uganda/Africa), Martha Roldós (Ecuador), Estefania Da Silva (PROVOX), Sascha Hannig, Roberta Braga, and Iria Puyosa. The session concluded with audience interaction about authoritarian trends in participants’ countries.

## Censorship: Afghanistan and Venezuela

### Afghanistan Under the Taliban

Abdullah Ahmadi described Afghanistan’s comprehensive censorship system under Taliban rule, which operates through both formal restrictions and informal intimidation. The Taliban have implemented official media guidelines severely restricting independent journalism while conducting campaigns of intimidation targeting journalists and activists, with women journalists facing particularly severe restrictions.

The regime has systematically blocked access to independent news websites and imposed comprehensive restrictions on media operations. Beyond formal censorship, psychological pressure and threats create a climate of self-censorship among journalists and civil society activists, effectively dismantling Afghanistan’s previously vibrant independent media landscape.

Ahmadi emphasized technical resistance strategies including VPNs, encrypted messaging applications, and mirror sites, alongside social resistance through solidarity networks, diaspora media, and digital security training. However, he stressed these tactical responses are insufficient without broader systemic change and called for “the UN to work towards a legally binding convention on digital rights to protect freedoms like expression, privacy, access to information and encryption online.”

### Venezuela’s Evolving Censorship Tactics

Valentina Aguana reported that Venezuela has entered a new era of pervasive internet censorship, with 61 independent media outlets currently blocked and major social media platforms including X (formerly Twitter), TikTok, and Signal facing restrictions. She explained that internet blocks must be measurable, consistent, and intentional to be classified as censorship.

Aguana noted that censors are becoming both more sophisticated and reckless, moving beyond content blocking to infrastructure-level attacks. Venezuelan authorities have blocked critical internet infrastructure, including Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) like Amazon’s CloudFront and DNS servers, affecting not only Venezuelan users but potentially millions globally.

“We once thought that permanently blocking social media was a red line for censors, but unfortunately we know that that’s not the case anymore,” Aguana observed, reflecting the escalation in censorship tactics. She advocated for “censorship by design” solutions—applications built from the ground up with anti-censorship features, citing Vesinfiltro’s “Noticias Infiltra” app as an example.

## Surveillance: Uganda and Ecuador

### African Surveillance Infrastructure

Lillian Nalwoga presented striking data showing that African countries including Nigeria, Ghana, Morocco, Malawi, and Zambia collectively spent one billion US dollars in 2023 on digital surveillance tools, according to Institute of Development Studies research. These tools, supplied by the United States, United Kingdom, China, European Union nations, and Israel, include phone tapping capabilities, spyware such as Pegasus, and internet shutdown mechanisms.

Nalwoga explained that African governments have embedded legal interception powers within telecommunications frameworks, creating comprehensive surveillance ecosystems with minimal oversight. She noted that “over 21 shutdowns were documented” in 2020, with this infrastructure routinely used to monitor activists, journalists, and civil society organizations.

### Ecuador’s Weaponized Surveillance

Martha Roldós described Ecuador’s comprehensive surveillance system, including man-in-the-middle attacks, Pegasus spyware deployment, and new intelligence laws legalizing surveillance without adequate oversight. She highlighted a critical contradiction, asking “surveillance for what?” when crime has risen exponentially while surveillance mechanisms target journalists and civil society rather than criminal networks.

Roldós revealed that surveillance information has been weaponized for character assassination campaigns and compromised by non-state actors including narcotics trafficking organizations. She noted that the intelligence agency SENAIN was closed and replaced with CIES, but emphasized that surveillance systems persist across different governments, demonstrating the institutional momentum of such infrastructure.

## Information Integrity: Regional Challenges and Responses

### Latin American Disinformation Networks

Estefania Da Silva detailed sophisticated disinformation campaigns operating across Latin America, where governments employ coordinated networks of both automated bots and paid human operators. These campaigns demonstrate cross-border cooperation between countries including Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, with each nation helping amplify others’ disinformation efforts.

She explained that these hybrid networks combining technological and human resources are more difficult to detect and counter than purely automated systems. The cross-border nature means disinformation campaigns originating in one country can trend in others, creating regional echo chambers that amplify authoritarian messaging.

### Regional Response Gaps

Sascha Hannig observed that disinformation is not taken as seriously by decision makers in Latin America compared to the European Union. She emphasized the importance of context—disasters, uncertainty, and political unrest—in disinformation campaigns and noted that while the region is behind in counter-narrative operations, there is raising awareness of these issues.

## Internet Governance: Models and Sustainability

### Contrasting Governance Approaches

Roberta Braga analyzed different governance models, contrasting the United States’ decentralized approach with Brazil’s comprehensive legal framework. She noted that community-driven content moderation initiatives like Twitter’s Community Notes show mixed results, with significant delays averaging “14 days for a note to go from submission to publication on average,” limiting effectiveness in addressing real-time harms.

Braga mentioned that her team DDIA was “the first team to publish tweets in English and Spanish dated to 2021” with findings to be shared “July 9,” highlighting ongoing research into platform governance effectiveness.

### Civil Society Sustainability Crisis

Iria Puyosa raised critical concerns about the sustainability crisis facing civil society organizations working on digital rights, particularly in the Global South. She warned that “the survival of the Internet multi-stakeholder model of governance is tied to the survival or sustainability of civil society organisations working in this space.”

Puyosa explained that severe funding shortages threaten civil society’s ability to participate effectively in internet governance processes. This crisis is particularly acute for smaller organizations in developing countries, which lack access to major international funding sources and face additional geopolitical pressures and local restrictions.

## Resistance Strategies and Collaboration

### Technical and Social Resistance

Participants identified several resistance strategies currently employed across regions. Technical approaches include VPNs, encrypted messaging applications like Signal and Telegram, mirror sites for blocked content, and development of censorship-resistant applications with privacy built into their architecture.

Social resistance strategies encompass solidarity networks, coalition building, cross-regional collaboration, diaspora media, and digital security training programs. All participants emphasized the critical importance of these approaches in creating support systems for activists and journalists while building collective capacity to challenge authoritarian practices.

### Cross-Regional Learning

The discussion revealed remarkable similarities in digital repression patterns across different regions and contexts, suggesting that coordinated international responses are both possible and necessary. Participants demonstrated strong interest in continued collaboration and information sharing among civil society organizations.

## Conclusion and Audience Engagement

Mariví Marín concluded by asking the audience about authoritarian trends in their countries and key learnings from the session. The discussion demonstrated both the global scope of digital authoritarianism and the potential for effective cross-regional collaboration in addressing these challenges.

The conversation revealed that digital authoritarianism represents a global phenomenon with shared characteristics, tactics, and impacts across different political systems. However, significant challenges remain, particularly the funding crisis facing civil society organizations and the increasing sophistication of authoritarian tactics. Addressing these challenges will require sustained commitment and coordination among civil society organizations, with particular attention to supporting organizations in the Global South that face the greatest resource constraints.

Mariví Marín: Hello everyone Thank you very much for being here This session is called Interregional Connections for Information integrity Across the world, we’re seeing both AUTHORITARIAN governments and Democratic ones with increasingly alarming tendencies adopting practices that restrict freedom online These include laws designed to silence critical voices political motivated surveillance and coordinated online operations that disturb public opinion debate or spread hate At the same time, platforms still struggle to offer consistent responses and meaningful cooperation and with civil society remains weak The people pushing back against these threats are activists, journalists, researchers, civic tech groups and these are often those most affected by this But they are also operating in environments where sustainability is very difficult, especially now What we are doing today, live It’s a demonstration that cross-sector collaboration is possible not only between countries and regions but also across different branches of civil society Whether we come from activism, academia, journalism, or other, our shared work on information integrity connects us, and in many cases, protects the civic space. In this session, we will explore four key areas where digital authoritarian practices most often appear. The first one will be censorship, blocking or controlling access to online information. The second one will be surveillance, monitoring or intimidating people online. Three will be online information integrity, spreading false or hard-found narratives. And the last one will be internet governance, that basically is linked to the policies and systems that shape digital rights. With us, we will have me as a moderator, I’m Venezuelan, I’m a Human Rights Advocate, Director of PROVOX, a non-profit working on information integrity in Latin America. Maríonne Francesco from Costa Rica, she will be online, she’s a Digital Rights Researcher from PROVOX team. Valentina Aguana from Venezuela, she’s a System Engineer and Researcher at Conexión Segura y Libre, works on internet censorship and digital rights. Abdullah Ahmadi from Afghanistan, he’s a Human Rights Advocate focused on digital inclusion and civic space, he’s the Director of Afghanistan Democracy and Development Organization. Lilian Nalwonga from Uganda, she’s Program Manager at CIPESA and she works on internet policy and digital rights in Africa. Estefania Da Silva from Venezuela, she’s a Digital Research Specialist focused on information manipulation, part of PROVOX team. Sascha Hannig, online. She is an international relations analyst and academic, focused on authoritarian influence and the impact of science and technology on society. Iria Puyosa from Venezuela and the U.S. She is senior researcher, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council on Tech Initiatives. She is an expert on digital authoritarianism and governance. Roberta Braga from Brazil and the U.S. She is founder and director of Digital Democracy Institute of the Americas, DDIA, focused on a healthier internet for Latinos across the U.S. and Latin America. And Martha Roldós from Ecuador. She is an investigative journalist, director of Fundación Milojas. And with that, I will start with the first two questions regarding censorship and this will be the following ones. What recent examples of censorship, formal or informal, have affected your country and what resistant strategies, technical, legal, social, have been affected in countering your censorship? With that, I will leave the floor to Abdullah to his first question and then to Valentina. Abdullah, the floor is yours.

Abdullah Ahmadi: Hello, everyone, and thank you for the chance to speak about the situation in Afghanistan, where digital censorship has increased in recent years, and especially the civic space is closed in Afghanistan based according to the CIVICAS report. First, about the recent examples. Since the Taliban takeover in August 2021, Afghanistan has experienced both formal and informal censorship. Formally, the Taliban have restricted independent media by imposing new guidelines that ban critical reporting. Many TV channels and radio stations have been forced to close or deeply self-censor to avoid reprisals. Online, the Taliban have ordered internet service providers to block access to certain news websites and social media pages run by exiled Afghan journalists and human rights groups. They also monitor social media for dissenting voices. Informally, intermediation is widespread. Journalists, activists, and even ordinary citizens risk detention or treat if they share information that criticizes the regime, especially on Facebook and WhatsApp, which are widely used in Afghanistan. Women’s voices are especially targeted. Female journalists face not only censorship but harassment and bans from working abroad. This silencing has had a shocking effect on the flow of reliable information inside and outside Afghanistan. Second, about the resistance strategy, about your second question, despite the Afghan citizens and civil society groups have found a way to resist. Technically, many people rely on the VPNs to access blocked websites and social media platforms. Corrupted messaging applications like Signal and Telegram have become essential for activists and journalists to communicate securely and share information without immediate detection. Some exiled Afghan media outlets maintain mirror sites and distribute news through the WhatsApp broadcast list to reach people inside the country. Legally, while there are almost no functioning legal pathway for media freedom under the Taliban rule, regional and international organizations have stepped in. Exiled Afghan journalists collaborate with international human rights bodies to document press freedom violations, and some cases have been raised at the UN Human Rights Council and other forms of pressure to protect journalists at risk. Socially, one of the most powerful strategies that have been the Solidarity Network, Afghan journalists, especially those now in exile, continue to publish news about the country through their diaspora-run media podcasts and social media channels. Inside Afghanistan, people have access to this information. We also provide training on digital security and censorship escape. This is another strategy that we are using and organizing outside the country, helping local activists and journalists to protect themselves online and find a safe channel to speak out. In closing, censorship in Afghanistan is part of the broad attack on human rights, but despite fear and strict rules, Afghan people continue to resist using technology, solidarity and international support. I believe it is our responsibility as a global community to amplify their voices, share tools and knowledge, and stand with the Afghans defending their right to speak and behave. Finally, I call for the UN to work towards a legally binding convention on digital rights to protect freedoms like expression, privacy, access to information and corruption online with strong safeguard and inclusive governance. Thank you so much.

Mariví Marín: Thank you, Abdullah. Valentina?

Valentina Aguana: Thank you, Mariví. First, thank you. It is a pleasure and a privilege to be here and thank you, Abdullah. I think there is a lot of parallelisms that we can see in Afghanistan right now to what is happening in Venezuela. I’m going to specifically talk about internet blocks and how internet blocks are being used as a mechanism for censorship. I believe it’s important to also have a clear definition of what an internet block is, and we define it as an intentional technical measure for impeding access to a specific service, website or information on the internet. The block, for us, has to be technically measurable. It has to be consistent over time across different access points within the network, and it’s also not the result of a technical problem, therefore intentional. In Vesinfiltro, we have been documenting internet blocks for over 10 years, over a decade, and we have a pretty good understanding about how the internet landscape in Venezuela and the Latin American region has been changing over the years. Just last year in Venezuela, I believe that entered what I call a new era of internet censorship, one that is more pervasive and completely changes the way that Venezuela We have documented that at least 61 independent media sites or independent media outlets in Venezuela are currently blocked. But the raw number itself doesn’t really tell you anything. What we need to understand and we would need to know is that this represents practically the whole independent news media ecosystem in the country. So also civil society organizations have also been affected by these blocks. There are not only news media sites but fact-checking sites and civil society organizations, NGOs, etc. But apart from this, I think one of the more severe things that we’ve seen is that since last year, the Venezuelan government has implemented blocks against social media platforms like Reddit, TikTok, X, formerly Twitter, which by the way is currently still blocked in the country, and even messaging apps like Signal. We once thought that permanently blocking social media was a red line for censors, but unfortunately we know that that’s not the case anymore, not only in Venezuela but in different countries. And we have seen this spreading to other countries within the region, citing disinformation and public safety as an excuse for these internet blocks. Another very serious trend that we’ve seen is the blocking of critical internet infrastructure. We’re talking about public DNS servers like Google servers or CloudSource DNS servers, and also CDNs being blocked. We documented last year the block of CloudFront, that’s the Amazon Web Services CDN, and as we can imagine, this was a disaster. Millions of sites across the globe relied on CloudFront, and we believe that the intention was not to block the CDN itself, but actually a website. This is not only happens in Latin America, right here in Europe, several ISPs in Spain are currently blocking whole IP ranges from Cloudflare, Akamai, Vercel, among other companies, trying to tackle copyright infringements during soccer match, and you can imagine how crazy it is that half of the internet is down in certain ISPs in Spain when this is happening, when a soccer match is happening. So measures to block content or platforms on the internet, this is very important, must be exceptional, proportional, and the least dramatic as possible, only doing what is necessary, and of course, through a legal process. So in summary, the censors are getting more sophisticated with the blocks, but also more reckless on what they are trying to block, and just like Abdullah said, what is happening in Afghanistan, in Venezuela, there is not a clear legal path to challenge these blocks. However, multilateral and international organizations are there for a reason, and we need to keep pressuring these, because we know that the internet is a human right. So I think that this role is very important. Finally, I think that the work of civil society organization is key. We need to keep doing advocacy, we need to keep teaching about securitization techniques. However, this is not enough. I think that other traditional solutions are not enough to fight censorship, and I think the community, we need to invest time and effort and money in new solutions, privacy by design, but also censorship by design. For example, Noticias Infiltra is an app we created as a newsreader app that has a censorship by design approach, which I think this is what we need to do going forward in the future.

Mariví Marín: Thank you very much, Valentina and Abdullah. And with that, I will leave the floor with the second topic ahead, that will be censorship by design. surveillance. And the two questions will be for Martha and for Lillian. What forms of digital surveillance have been used to monitor, intimidate, or silence civil society, journalists, or communities? And how have been affected these groups responding and what protective practices or tools have emerged? With that, I will leave the floor to Lillian first and Martha as a second.

Lillian Nalwoga: Thank you, Mariví. Pleasure to be here. I’ll try to be brief because this is a conversational session. In terms of forms of digital surveillance, what has been used, I think we’ve heard from the previous speakers, it’s no different from whatever is happening in Africa. We are seeing various forms that are being used to monitor, intimidate, or silence civil society, journalists, and most famous, like everywhere, is phone tapping or internet interception, where governments and, of course, other actors for all the other reasons are using wiretapping, interception of calls, texts, and all that. And interestingly, this is well embedded in the legislation, where we have quite a number of countries that, including where I come from, Uganda, whether it’s Tanzania or Kenya, we have interception of communication nodes. And with that, governments are mandated to intercept calls wherever they think there is some sort of harm. Also, we’ve seen deployment of surveillance tools like spyware or malware on people who are targeted, whether it’s activists. And we’ve had reports or seen reports with Citizen Lab, releasing quite a lot of research on the use of Pegasus on opposition. If it was being done for good, and again I put good in quotes, would not be an issue. But what we are seeing is that, yes, governments may want to lawfully have legitimate concerns when it comes to surveillance. But in most cases, the laws and policies that are put in otherwise say something totally different, especially when it comes to undemocratic countries or countries that are really deep down in repression. So there’s a lack of oversight or limited oversight when it comes to how far they can go with this surveillance. And again, I think that is where the issue is. I just wanted to also maybe highlight the amount of money or resources that are being put in these surveillance tools. And in 2023, there was a research by the Institute of Development Studies that documented about, I can’t mention names because the research is there, countries like Nigeria, Ghana, Morocco, Malawi and Zambia collectively spent a billion US dollars in a year on digital surveillance tools. And these tools were being supplied by countries, US, UK, China, some countries in the EU and Israel. And I mean, when you look at this vast amount of money and that state of the countries. All surveillance also in Africa, we also look at surveillance as a censorship tool, especially when it comes to, you know, content filtering, the network disruptions that we are seeing. That is also one form of, you know, surveillance. And we’ve been known like other countries in Asia or in Asia mainly, where internet shutdowns have become a pandemic of its own. And in 2020, last year, over 21 shutdowns were documented. And now you can imagine, if you’re to connect to the internet, then it will kind of prompt how are you connecting, and then that could also, you know, get into that. So in conclusion on this question is, these tactics are usually, they combine technically sophisticated tools that we’ve already had, which have been, you know, legal or extra legal measures that are usually being used to suppress dissent. And it also makes detection very difficult for the targeted individuals, because at times, by the time you get to know you’re surveilled, it’s probably when you’re being arrested, you know, and the content that is showed to you, then that’s when you get to find out what is really happening. So this is a growing concern in Africa, and I think it’s also now becoming a very global concern when it comes to, you know, rights, especially the right to privacy and freedom of expression and access to information. How are the groups being affected? How are they responding and practices? I think what we are seeing is a lot of coalition movement building, you know, within the civic space. We have, for instance, for the shutdowns, we have the Keep It On campaign by Access Now. We have associations like Dictator Resilience Network, which comprises about 10 organizations that are coming around to, you know, say no, push against this kind of, you know, surveillance. And mainly in East Africa, where I’m coming from, we are seeing there’s an organization that I can mention, TATOA, which is in Swahili means solve, brings together organizations to build shared tools, conduct capacity building and all that. And last but not least is researching and documenting and being able to show where surveillance is happening for purposes of policymaking advocacy and other indicators, you know, have the information there so that we can always push against surveillance. Thank you.

Mariví Marín: Perfect. Thank you very much. With that, I’ll leave the floor to Martha. Martha, who is online.

Martha Roldós: Sorry, sorry. I’m connecting. Sorry. Okay. Now I’m ready. Sorry. I would like to say that we have had the same experience that the previous speakers have explained in all those matters. In the case of Ecuador, we have in the matter of surveillance, the questions are surveillance for what? Because we were presented with the idea that surveillance was a tool for security against crime in a country where crime has risen exponentially while the government was applying these mechanisms of surveillance to journalists, to social, to civil society, while the narcos were thriving. So surveillance for what? What is the form of sending to the public the idea of surveillance? I explain this because in our country, it has just been approved a new intelligence law that made surveillance actually legal in every aspect of it. If it is conducted by the government intelligence unit. So that’s a huge preoccupation right now. With the new law, we are not having any kind of register of the intelligence operations for history. They are going to be destroyed. And the intelligence unit is going to oversize themselves. So that’s a step for the worst in the country right now, in the matter of privacy and digital rights. Other aspects that I would like to highlight is that in the past, that’s not just now, we have had since Korea’s government and this implementation of new systems of surveillance, every type of digital surveillance. That also was part of a more broad scheme of surveillance in general, also in the real life. So we have had man-in-the-middle attacks. We have had a pack rat. We have had all our dealings with Pegasus and all these things that are like on trend. Everything that has been trending in the world for surveillance has been used in our country also. You know, hacking team, it’s like, it goes like waves. And also, almost always, mainly journalists, but also activists have been attacked by these instruments. That’s in the things that has been done in Ecuador. Not just while during the authoritarian regime from Rafael Correa, but also the governments that came after it. It was like a built capacity of surveillance that the next government, it was very difficult to restrain themselves from using. There was a brief moment of apparently clarity. The SENAIN, which was the intelligence office, was actually closed, but a new office was opened that was called CIES that had allegedly more controls from the state and from the control organisms. But it hasn’t worked like that, actually. And the problem with surveillance-

Mariví Marín: 30 seconds.

Martha Roldós: Hello? 30 seconds. 30 seconds. Well, that was the first question. In the second question, we have had the, what was the affectation? The affectation was that the people were, not just their privacy was exposed, but the problem was that it was weaponized. The information obtained through surveillance was weaponized by the state in the government from Correa’s regime to pieces for character assassination in the media. And in the following governments, the problem is that also it didn’t obey just to the state. Some non-state actors, like Narcos, had allies in the surveillance community.

Mariví Marín: Okay. Sorry to interrupt. We’re done with that point. Thank you very much. We see more similarities, although we are far away. We see the points of encounter. Now we’re going to the third point that will be information integrity. And with that, I will leave the floor to Estefania to talk about this.

Participant: Thank you Mariví. Well, at PROVOST we have seen several patterns of disinformation and narrative manipulation on social media in Latin America that have been repeating in several countries. For example, in the case of Venezuela, government entities and members of the cabinet spread manipulated information and launch smear campaigns against their opponents by activating not only bots but also networks of coordinated users, real people like you and me, that create several accounts and replicate the same content spread or promoted by the state with little to no modification. And to incentivize the participation in these activities, individuals are paid with state funds, which is a big issue, and given the country’s severe economic situation, this incentive, the creation of these networks, because people see this as a side job, so to speak. And the same pattern has been replicated in countries like Cuba and Nicaragua, where the government initiates a disinformation or a smear campaign and coordinated users replicate the content. And it even goes as far as Venezuelan campaigns trending in Cuba or Cuban campaigns trending in Venezuela. And this happens because these governments help each other to amplify these narratives and create the appearance of widespread support or bots around them. This type of behavior aims to divert the attention from the real events happening in the country, especially given that social media platforms are often used to access unbiased information and to protest against daily occurrences. In fact, the influence and the reach of these platforms are such that there have been cases of people being arrested for social media posts that are contradict the official state narrative. And regarding the second question about the responses that have worked or failed, digital activism has played a vital role in Venezuela. For example, the teachers union is highly organized in the protest to highlight the wage declines or the breaches of contract, and they combine the digital demonstration with protests on the streets. We can say that these much-needed actions have been met with repressive counter measures, such as the implementation of laws like the so-called hate law, which criminalizes the protest and is used to justify the arrest. Another thing that is very important, and with this I’ll be done, is the independent media outlets and the formation of coalitions with fact-checking teams and initiatives and organizations like robots that have become essential and pioneering because these actions aim to analyze the digital content, educate the citizens, and on how to identify disinformation or manipulated narratives, and also to promote digital security practices, as well as tools like the use of VPNs, for example, to avoid censorship. And this work at the end ensures that even though the traditional media is mainly controlled by the state, there remains access to verified and independent information that reflects the true reality of what’s happening in the country.

Mariví Marín: Thank you very much, Stefania. With that, Sascha Hannig, I will ask you to be brief, please.

Sascha Hannig: I’m gonna stick to my time. Thank you so much for your introduction. So when we talk about information integrity, the question is what information we can

Mariví Marín: trust, right? And when we ask ourselves what types of narratives of manipulation or disinformation

Sascha Hannig: are spread in the region, that is a question we actually want to know. And in that regard, I do agree with the previous… speakers on cooperation between actors on the situations in which these campaigns are spread. I only want to add a few points upon that. So the first is concerns over this formation and narrative manipulation not being taken as seriously as they should by decision makers, state actors. Maybe civil society to one extent does care about it, but we see again and again examples that when compared to other regions, such as the European Union, in Latin America in general, this information is not seen as a security issue. It’s seen seen as a distortion of information spreading. As a result, there are many ways in which information is spread. Some of these have already been mentioned. And I would only want to add to the first question, how important is the context? Because when we have disasters, when we have uncertainty, when we have political unrest, when we have domestic controversial issue, those are the areas in which these campaigns thrive. And these are the areas with not only state actors such as Russia or China or any other authoritarian actor or any other actor with an agenda thrives, but also untraceable independent disinformation spreaders. So regarding the second question, what responses from the civil society, media and academia or institutions have worked or failed in restoring narrative integrity? I think there is a lot of work being done by civil society in the region that is obvious, that is strong. The regions, as I mentioned, is a little bit behind in counter-narrative operation. and Marta Roldós. We don’t see a lot of information or disinformation responses, but we do see a raising awareness. And this raising awareness has created a door for discussion. Which in some cases has translated into actual responses. And I just want to mention one case with the 15 seconds I have left.

Mariví Marín: So I’m going to move forward with the last two questions. The first one will be for Roberta and the second one for Iria. Please do three minutes each and we will finish with that. Thank you very much, Roberta.

Roberta Braga: Thank you, Mariví. Good morning, everybody from D.C. So the two countries I can speak most closely to are the United States and Brazil, my two home countries. And here we’re talking about models of governance that the region has been implementing. And in the United States, there really are no central governance mechanisms for things like data privacy, Internet governance. And so by default, not only do the states sort of make a lot of the laws, which can really lead to some decentralization, some difficulties for businesses in adhering to this, some inadequate enforcement, and some diversity in approaches between states. But we also see that the United States prioritizes its core tenant, freedom of speech, which by default puts governance mechanisms almost entirely in the hands of social media platforms. In the U.S. this year, we’re seeing that a lot of the social media companies have moved toward a community-driven mode of content moderation, which I think has its pros and cons and has been really hotly debated here in Washington, D.C. and in California and other places. That model has been tried by other countries, but it’s not been implemented. And so we’re seeing that a lot of the states are trying to create a community-driven mode of content moderation, which by default puts governance mechanisms entirely in the hands of social media platforms. And so we’re seeing that a lot of the states are trying to And we are actually the first team at DDIA to publish tweets in English and Spanish dated to 2021. We will share findings on July 9 if you are interested. But that motto has not met a need for addressing online harms in real time. For example it takes 14 days for a note to go from submission to publication on average. And then Brazil, my other home country, has really taken a bit of a different approach. Brazil has the Marcos de Vila Internatio which is almost our digital civil bill of rights. And it really pushes for net neutrality and privacy and freedom of expression as well as data protection really at its core. It’s something that needs to be updated and is being discussed now. And then we have our general data protection law which I think really mirrors the European GDPR, emphasizes user privacy and data protection. But there is a lot more that needs to be done I think for us to really give these types of mechanisms the teeth they need to ensure our safety online. So Maribi, I will leave it at that.

Mariví Marín: That was fantastic. Thank you very much. I appreciate it. With that, Iria.

Iria Puyosa: Thank you very much for having me. I’m going to try to be very brief. One of the issues I’m concerned about at the moment is the pressures the civil society organizations, digital rights organizations and internet governance organizations are facing given the pressures from the current geopolitical dynamics and the pressures over the multi-stakeholder internet governance model due to the change on the global digital company I’m bringing up. I’m also particularly interested in the way these dynamics are playing on Latin America, Africa and Asia organizations who are also facing a shared economy. Client funding available for the kind of work they are doing, the kind of work my colleagues in the panel have been talking about, censorship, circumvention, disinformation, content disinformation, protecting data, personal data, content surveillance, all that very important roles as well as multi-stakeholder governance role the civil society organizations play, is in danger because of the lack of sustainability in the long term for this kind of organizations, particularly for the smaller organizations in the global south who are losing critical expertise due to the lack of funding. And I think this is a conversation we should be having in the Internet Governance Forum because even though it’s not related with the core resources of the Internet infrastructure, it’s core to the Internet Governance model. So if we want to have a multi-stakeholder model of governance, it requires the presence of civil society organizations, and civil society organizations, since it exists, it’s no way for us to defend the multi-stakeholder model, and it’s going to be a model run only by states and big corporations. So the survival of the Internet multi-stakeholder model of governance is tied to the survival or sustainability of civil society organizations working in this space. That is why my team in the Atlantic Council Democracy and Tech Initiative is aiming to have a systemic assessment of the support need of these kind of organizations working in digital rights and Internet governance, and we are exploring the way to partner with philanthropic donors and right-aligned states in order to identify mechanisms for channeling resources towards civil society organizations. This is part of the mission we are focused on in the coming year, trying to understand what is to support the needs of civil society organizations in Africa, Latin America, and South Asia, developing countries working in meaningful access to Internet connectivity. Digital Public Infrastructure and Internet and Data Governance. To end, very concrete recommendations for governments and funders. It’s important for them to strengthen capabilities for prioritizing partnerships with local civil society in the countries of the Global South, Latin America, Asia and Africa, particularly those organizations working in key areas like connectivity, meaningful connectivity, artificial intelligence, linking to the achievement of the sustainable development goals, which is very, very important for the Global South, particularly for African countries, or the issues of data governance at the Internet Governance Excel. For civil society organizations, initial recommendations is to try to work together, exploring the ways we can foster South-South collaboration in order for organizations from Latin America and Africa, or Africa and Asia, get projects, joint projects, because we are seeing in this conversation that the issues are similar in our regions, but small organizations were isolated, and having coalitions working together would be helpful in order to make the most for the scarce resources we have right now. So, we need to help this organization, this kind of partnership, to collectively navigate this geopolitical shift and this change on the global Internet governance brought by the Global Digital Compact new state of play. Thank you.

Mariví Marín: Thank you very much, Iria, and everyone online and in person. I will leave just two brief questions. Do you believe, for everyone in the audience, in person and online, that there is at least one authoritarian trend in your country? Say yes with the hand. Sure. I see all of us have some, and I see from the audience that there is two. And did you learn something about a tactic, idea, or alliance that you can use today for your own country, in my case, which I did. Some from the audience, too. I’m happy to see. Thank you everyone, thanks for the ones online and in person. By listening to each other, sharing concrete experiences, and reflecting across countries’ role and challenges, we have shown that cooperation to protect information integrity is not just possible, it’s already happening. And this session, this event in general, reminds us that resisting online authoritarian practices for a healthier and safer internet for all is not just about identifying the problems, but it’s also about building these bridges that we were talking about, bridges between regions, between diverse stakeholders, and between different areas of civil society that are the ones leading this fight every day. Let’s carry these ideas forward and keep this collaboration alive. Thank you very much.

Agreement points

Technical resistance strategies using VPNs, encrypted messaging, and circumvention tools

Speakers

– Abdullah Ahmadi
– Valentina Aguana

Arguments

Social resistance involves solidarity networks, diaspora media, digital security training, and coalition building across regions

Technical resistance includes VPNs, encrypted messaging apps, mirror sites, and censorship-resistant applications designed with privacy and anti-censorship features

Summary

Both speakers emphasize the critical role of technical tools like VPNs and encrypted messaging apps (Signal, Telegram) for circumventing censorship and enabling secure communication for activists and journalists

Topics

Cybersecurity | Human rights

Lack of legal pathways to challenge authoritarian digital practices

Speakers

– Abdullah Ahmadi
– Valentina Aguana
– Martha Roldós

Arguments

Taliban have imposed formal censorship through media guidelines and informal intimidation, especially targeting women journalists and activists

Venezuela has entered a new era of pervasive internet censorship, blocking 61 independent media outlets and major social media platforms like X, TikTok, and Signal

Ecuador has implemented comprehensive surveillance systems including man-in-the-middle attacks and Pegasus, with new intelligence laws making surveillance legal without oversight

Summary

All three speakers highlight the absence of effective legal mechanisms to challenge government censorship and surveillance, with legal systems either compromised or actively enabling authoritarian practices

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Human rights

Cross-border cooperation in authoritarian digital practices

Speakers

– Participant
– Abdullah Ahmadi

Arguments

Latin American governments use coordinated networks of real users and bots to spread disinformation, with cross-border cooperation between countries like Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua

Social resistance involves solidarity networks, diaspora media, digital security training, and coalition building across regions

Summary

Both speakers recognize that authoritarian practices and resistance efforts operate across national boundaries, with governments cooperating in disinformation campaigns while civil society builds international solidarity networks

Topics

Human rights | Development

Targeting of journalists and civil society as primary victims

Speakers

– Abdullah Ahmadi
– Valentina Aguana
– Martha Roldós
– Lillian Nalwoga

Arguments

Taliban have imposed formal censorship through media guidelines and informal intimidation, especially targeting women journalists and activists

Venezuela has entered a new era of pervasive internet censorship, blocking 61 independent media outlets and major social media platforms like X, TikTok, and Signal

Ecuador has implemented comprehensive surveillance systems including man-in-the-middle attacks and Pegasus, with new intelligence laws making surveillance legal without oversight

African governments collectively spent $1 billion on surveillance tools in 2023, using phone tapping, spyware like Pegasus, and internet shutdowns as control mechanisms

Summary

All speakers identify journalists, activists, and civil society organizations as the primary targets of digital authoritarianism across different regions and contexts

Topics

Human rights | Cybersecurity

Similar viewpoints

Both speakers describe comprehensive surveillance ecosystems using similar tools (Pegasus spyware, phone tapping) with inadequate legal oversight, showing how surveillance technologies and practices are globally distributed

Speakers

– Lillian Nalwoga
– Martha Roldós

Arguments

African governments collectively spent $1 billion on surveillance tools in 2023, using phone tapping, spyware like Pegasus, and internet shutdowns as control mechanisms

Ecuador has implemented comprehensive surveillance systems including man-in-the-middle attacks and Pegasus, with new intelligence laws making surveillance legal without oversight

Topics

Human rights | Cybersecurity

Both speakers focus on governance challenges and the need for more effective multi-stakeholder approaches, though from different angles – one examining national governance models and the other focusing on civil society sustainability

Speakers

– Roberta Braga
– Iria Puyosa

Arguments

The US lacks central governance mechanisms, relying on state-level laws and platform self-regulation, with community-driven content moderation showing mixed results

Civil society organizations face critical funding shortages that threaten the multi-stakeholder internet governance model, particularly affecting smaller organizations in the Global South

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Development

Both speakers address disinformation as a systematic problem in Latin America, with one highlighting the lack of adequate response and the other detailing the sophisticated nature of government-led disinformation campaigns

Speakers

– Sascha Hannig
– Participant

Arguments

Disinformation campaigns are not taken seriously enough as security issues in Latin America compared to other regions like the EU

Latin American governments use coordinated networks of real users and bots to spread disinformation, with cross-border cooperation between countries like Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua

Topics

Human rights | Legal and regulatory

Unexpected consensus

Infrastructure-level censorship as a new frontier of digital authoritarianism

Speakers

– Valentina Aguana
– Lillian Nalwoga

Arguments

Internet blocks are becoming more sophisticated but also more reckless, with censors blocking critical infrastructure like CDNs and DNS servers

African governments collectively spent $1 billion on surveillance tools in 2023, using phone tapping, spyware like Pegasus, and internet shutdowns as control mechanisms

Explanation

The consensus on infrastructure-level attacks (blocking CDNs, DNS servers, internet shutdowns) represents an unexpected escalation in censorship tactics that goes beyond traditional content blocking to attacking the fundamental infrastructure of the internet itself

Topics

Infrastructure | Cybersecurity

Economic incentivization of digital authoritarianism

Speakers

– Participant
– Lillian Nalwoga

Arguments

Latin American governments use coordinated networks of real users and bots to spread disinformation, with cross-border cooperation between countries like Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua

African governments collectively spent $1 billion on surveillance tools in 2023, using phone tapping, spyware like Pegasus, and internet shutdowns as control mechanisms

Explanation

Both speakers reveal the significant economic dimensions of digital authoritarianism – governments paying citizens to spread disinformation and spending billions on surveillance tools, showing how economic incentives drive both the supply and demand sides of authoritarian digital practices

Topics

Economic | Human rights

Overall assessment

Summary

Strong consensus exists on the systematic nature of digital authoritarianism globally, the targeting of civil society and journalists, the use of similar technical tools and tactics across regions, and the need for international cooperation in resistance efforts

Consensus level

High level of consensus with significant implications – the speakers demonstrate that digital authoritarianism is not isolated to specific regions but represents a global phenomenon with shared characteristics, tactics, and impacts. This consensus suggests the need for coordinated international responses and the sharing of resistance strategies across borders. The agreement also highlights the critical importance of sustaining civil society organizations as the primary defenders of digital rights and the multi-stakeholder governance model.

Different viewpoints

Governance approach – centralized vs decentralized regulation

Speakers

– Roberta Braga
– Iria Puyosa

Arguments

The US lacks central governance mechanisms, relying on state-level laws and platform self-regulation, with community-driven content moderation showing mixed results

Brazil has implemented comprehensive digital rights frameworks including Marco Civil da Internet and GDPR-style data protection laws

Summary

Roberta presents the US decentralized approach as problematic due to lack of central governance and reliance on platform self-regulation, while also highlighting Brazil’s more centralized comprehensive framework. This contrasts with Iria’s focus on strengthening multi-stakeholder governance through civil society support rather than state-led regulation.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Human rights

Priority focus for addressing digital authoritarianism

Speakers

– Sascha Hannig
– Iria Puyosa

Arguments

Disinformation campaigns are not taken seriously enough as security issues in Latin America compared to other regions like the EU

Civil society organizations face critical funding shortages that threaten the multi-stakeholder internet governance model, particularly affecting smaller organizations in the Global South

Summary

Sascha emphasizes the need for governments to treat disinformation as a security issue requiring state-level response, while Iria focuses on the fundamental need to sustain civil society organizations as the foundation for addressing all digital rights issues.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Human rights | Development

Unexpected differences

Role of international frameworks vs local solutions

Speakers

– Abdullah Ahmadi
– Valentina Aguana

Arguments

Social resistance involves solidarity networks, diaspora media, digital security training, and coalition building across regions

Technical resistance includes VPNs, encrypted messaging apps, mirror sites, and censorship-resistant applications designed with privacy and anti-censorship features

Explanation

While both speakers face similar censorship challenges, Abdullah calls for UN-led legally binding conventions on digital rights, while Valentina emphasizes that traditional solutions are not enough and advocates for building new technology solutions with censorship-resistance built in from the design phase. This represents a fundamental disagreement on whether to work within existing international legal frameworks or to build alternative technical infrastructure.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Infrastructure | Human rights

Overall assessment

Summary

The discussion shows remarkable consensus on the problems (censorship, surveillance, disinformation) but reveals subtle yet significant disagreements on solutions and priorities. Main disagreements center on governance approaches (centralized vs decentralized), the role of international frameworks vs technical solutions, and whether to prioritize state-level policy changes or civil society sustainability.

Disagreement level

Low to moderate disagreement level with high strategic implications. While speakers largely agree on the nature of threats, their different approaches to solutions could lead to fragmented efforts. The disagreements suggest a need for more coordination between those advocating for policy/legal solutions, those building technical solutions, and those focusing on civil society capacity building.

Partial agreements

Similar viewpoints

Both speakers describe comprehensive surveillance ecosystems using similar tools (Pegasus spyware, phone tapping) with inadequate legal oversight, showing how surveillance technologies and practices are globally distributed

Speakers

– Lillian Nalwoga
– Martha Roldós

Arguments

African governments collectively spent $1 billion on surveillance tools in 2023, using phone tapping, spyware like Pegasus, and internet shutdowns as control mechanisms

Ecuador has implemented comprehensive surveillance systems including man-in-the-middle attacks and Pegasus, with new intelligence laws making surveillance legal without oversight

Topics

Human rights | Cybersecurity

Both speakers focus on governance challenges and the need for more effective multi-stakeholder approaches, though from different angles – one examining national governance models and the other focusing on civil society sustainability

Speakers

– Roberta Braga
– Iria Puyosa

Arguments

The US lacks central governance mechanisms, relying on state-level laws and platform self-regulation, with community-driven content moderation showing mixed results

Civil society organizations face critical funding shortages that threaten the multi-stakeholder internet governance model, particularly affecting smaller organizations in the Global South

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Development

Both speakers address disinformation as a systematic problem in Latin America, with one highlighting the lack of adequate response and the other detailing the sophisticated nature of government-led disinformation campaigns

Speakers

– Sascha Hannig
– Participant

Arguments

Disinformation campaigns are not taken seriously enough as security issues in Latin America compared to other regions like the EU

Latin American governments use coordinated networks of real users and bots to spread disinformation, with cross-border cooperation between countries like Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua

Topics

Human rights | Legal and regulatory

Key takeaways

Digital authoritarianism is a global phenomenon affecting both authoritarian and democratic countries, with similar tactics being used across different regions including censorship, surveillance, disinformation, and restrictive internet governance

Cross-regional collaboration and information sharing among civil society organizations is not only possible but essential for combating digital authoritarian practices

Technical resistance strategies (VPNs, encrypted messaging, mirror sites) must be combined with legal advocacy and social solidarity networks to effectively counter digital repression

The sustainability crisis facing civil society organizations, particularly in the Global South, threatens the multi-stakeholder internet governance model and requires urgent attention from funders and governments

Censorship tactics are becoming more sophisticated and reckless, with governments blocking critical internet infrastructure and entire social media platforms rather than specific content

Surveillance has become a billion-dollar industry with governments weaponizing collected information for political purposes and character assassination

Disinformation campaigns often involve cross-border cooperation between authoritarian governments and are not being treated with sufficient seriousness as security threats in many regions

Resolutions and action items

Atlantic Council Democracy and Tech Initiative will conduct a systemic assessment of support needs for civil society organizations working in digital rights and internet governance

Explore partnerships with philanthropic donors and aligned states to channel resources toward civil society organizations in Africa, Latin America, and South Asia

Foster South-South collaboration between organizations from different Global South regions to work on joint projects and share scarce resources

Continue advocacy work through multilateral and international organizations to pressure governments on internet rights violations

Invest in developing new solutions with privacy-by-design and censorship-by-design approaches, following examples like the Noticias Infiltra app

Maintain documentation and research efforts to support policymaking and advocacy against surveillance and censorship

Unresolved issues

How to ensure long-term sustainable funding for civil society organizations working on digital rights in the Global South

How to effectively counter the increasing sophistication and recklessness of internet censorship tactics

How to address the lack of legal pathways to challenge surveillance and censorship in many countries

How to make policymakers take disinformation as seriously as other security threats

How to balance platform self-regulation with effective governance mechanisms for addressing online harms

How to prevent the erosion of the multi-stakeholder internet governance model due to civil society funding shortages

How to scale technical resistance solutions to match the growing sophistication of digital authoritarianism

Suggested compromises

Community-driven content moderation as an alternative to both government censorship and pure platform control, though this approach has shown mixed results

Combining technical circumvention tools with legal advocacy and social organizing rather than relying on any single approach

Balancing the need for updated governance frameworks (like Brazil’s Marco Civil da Internet) with protecting core principles like freedom of expression

Leveraging international pressure and documentation when domestic legal pathways are unavailable or ineffective

Abdullah’s call for ‘a legally binding convention on digital rights to protect freedoms like expression, privacy, access to information and corruption online with strong safeguard and inclusive governance’

Speaker

Abdullah Ahmadi

Reason

This comment elevated the discussion from tactical responses to systemic solutions, proposing a concrete international framework that could address the root causes of digital authoritarianism rather than just its symptoms. It demonstrated how extreme repression (Afghanistan under Taliban) can generate innovative thinking about global governance structures.

Impact

This comment established a framework that other speakers built upon throughout the session. It shifted the conversation from country-specific problems to the need for international coordination and legal frameworks, influencing later discussions about cross-regional collaboration and governance models.

Valentina’s observation that ‘We once thought that permanently blocking social media was a red line for censors, but unfortunately we know that that’s not the case anymore’ and her concept of ‘censorship by design’

Speaker

Valentina Aguana

Reason

This insight revealed how authoritarian tactics are evolving and becoming more sophisticated, challenging assumptions about what governments would or wouldn’t do. The ‘censorship by design’ concept introduced a proactive technical approach to resistance, moving beyond reactive measures to preventive solutions.

Impact

This comment fundamentally reframed how participants understood the evolution of censorship, moving the discussion from traditional blocking methods to more sophisticated infrastructure attacks. It influenced the technical direction of the conversation and highlighted the need for more innovative resistance strategies.

Martha’s question ‘surveillance for what?’ in discussing Ecuador’s experience where ‘surveillance was a tool for security against crime in a country where crime has risen exponentially while the government was applying these mechanisms of surveillance to journalists, to civil society, while the narcos were thriving’

Speaker

Martha Roldós

Reason

This comment exposed the fundamental contradiction in authoritarian surveillance – the gap between stated purposes (security) and actual targets (civil society). It revealed how surveillance becomes institutionalized and persists across different governments, challenging the narrative that these are temporary security measures.

Impact

This reframing influenced how other participants discussed surveillance, moving beyond technical aspects to examine the political motivations and effectiveness contradictions. It added a critical analytical layer that questioned government justifications for surveillance programs.

Iria’s warning that ‘the survival of the Internet multi-stakeholder model of governance is tied to the survival or sustainability of civil society organizations working in this space’

Speaker

Iria Puyosa

Reason

This comment connected the immediate funding crisis facing civil society organizations to the broader existential threat to internet governance models. It revealed how economic pressures and geopolitical shifts could fundamentally alter the structure of internet governance, moving from a multi-stakeholder to a state-corporate duopoly.

Impact

This observation shifted the final portion of the discussion toward systemic sustainability concerns, moving beyond tactical responses to authoritarian practices toward the meta-question of whether the current resistance infrastructure can survive. It reframed the entire conversation as not just about fighting authoritarianism, but about preserving the institutional capacity to fight it.

Lillian’s documentation that countries like ‘Nigeria, Ghana, Morocco, Malawi and Zambia collectively spent a billion US dollars in a year on digital surveillance tools’ supplied by ‘US, UK, China, some countries in the EU and Israel’

Speaker

Lillian Nalwoga

Reason

This comment revealed the global economic ecosystem that enables digital authoritarianism, showing how democratic countries profit from supplying surveillance tools to authoritarian regimes. It exposed the contradiction between stated democratic values and actual business practices, highlighting the international complicity in digital repression.

Impact

This data point added a crucial economic dimension to the discussion, showing that digital authoritarianism isn’t just about local government decisions but involves international supply chains and business relationships. It complicated the narrative of ‘democratic vs. authoritarian’ countries by showing how they’re economically interconnected in surveillance markets.

Overall assessment

These key comments transformed what could have been a series of isolated country reports into a sophisticated analysis of global digital authoritarianism. The discussion evolved through several phases: from documenting specific tactics (censorship, surveillance) to revealing systemic patterns (cross-border collaboration between authoritarian regimes, evolution of censorship techniques), to exposing structural contradictions (surveillance justified by security but targeting civil society), and finally to questioning the sustainability of resistance infrastructure itself. The most impactful comments were those that connected local experiences to global patterns, revealed contradictions in official narratives, or proposed systemic solutions. The conversation demonstrated remarkable convergence across different regions and contexts, with speakers building on each other’s insights to create a comprehensive picture of how digital authoritarianism operates as a global phenomenon requiring coordinated international responses.

Need for a legally binding UN convention on digital rights to protect freedoms like expression, privacy, access to information and encryption online with strong safeguards and inclusive governance

Speaker

Abdullah Ahmadi

Explanation

This represents a concrete policy recommendation that requires further development and international advocacy to establish global standards for digital rights protection

Investment in new solutions with privacy by design and censorship by design approaches, moving beyond traditional circumvention tools

Speaker

Valentina Aguana

Explanation

Current technical solutions are insufficient to combat sophisticated censorship, requiring research and development of new architectural approaches to internet infrastructure

Systemic assessment of support needs for civil society organizations working in digital rights and internet governance in the Global South

Speaker

Iria Puyosa

Explanation

The sustainability crisis of civil society organizations threatens the multi-stakeholder internet governance model, requiring comprehensive research to understand funding gaps and support mechanisms

Exploration of mechanisms for channeling resources towards civil society organizations in partnership with philanthropic donors and aligned states

Speaker

Iria Puyosa

Explanation

Addressing the funding crisis requires developing new partnership models and funding mechanisms specifically designed for digital rights organizations in developing countries

Foster South-South collaboration between organizations from Latin America, Africa, and Asia through joint projects

Speaker

Iria Puyosa

Explanation

Small organizations are isolated despite facing similar challenges, and collaborative approaches could maximize scarce resources and share expertise across regions

Research on community-driven content moderation models and their effectiveness in addressing online harms in real-time

Speaker

Roberta Braga

Explanation

Current community-driven approaches like Twitter’s Community Notes have limitations (14-day average for publication) that need to be studied and improved for better harm mitigation

Analysis of cross-border coordination in disinformation campaigns between authoritarian governments

Speaker

Estefania Da Silva

Explanation

The phenomenon of Venezuelan campaigns trending in Cuba and vice versa indicates systematic cooperation that requires deeper investigation to understand and counter

Documentation and measurement of the economic impact of internet shutdowns and infrastructure blocking

Speaker

Valentina Aguana and Lillian Nalwoga

Explanation

The blocking of critical infrastructure like CDNs affects millions globally, requiring comprehensive impact assessment to inform policy and advocacy efforts