Open Forum #78 Shaping the Future with Multistakeholder Foresight

Summary

This discussion focused on a strategic foresight project commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Digital Transformation, which developed scenarios for internet governance in 2040. The session featured Philipp Schulte from the German ministry, Julia Pohler who led the scenario development task force, and panelists Anriette Esterhuyse and Gbenga Sesan who were interviewed as part of the process.

Julia Pohler explained that strategic foresight is not about predicting exact futures but rather developing plausible scenarios to help stakeholders prepare for uncertainties and disruptions. The German project created four distinct scenarios exploring different trajectories for internet governance over the next 15 years, ranging from continued geopolitical competition to complete internet fragmentation to over-regulation to transformation toward public goods orientation. The process involved a 15-member German task force representing diverse stakeholder groups, supplemented by interviews with international experts to bring global perspectives.

A key finding was that geopolitics and the role of states emerged as the dominant driving forces across nearly all scenarios, with actions by major powers like the US, China, and Russia being central factors. Pohler noted that geopolitical developments have already moved faster than anticipated when the scenarios were written, suggesting the reality is outpacing their projections. Significantly, none of the scenarios except one showed a bright future for multi-stakeholder internet governance, with most depicting it as either hollowed out or institutionalized to the point of losing meaning.

The panelists found the interview process valuable and intellectually stimulating, though they noted some limitations including the abstract nature of the exercise and concerns about implementation. There was discussion about whether the report would be practically useful, with consensus that while the scenarios themselves might have limited direct application, the participatory process of developing them was extremely valuable for expanding thinking and preparing stakeholders for different possibilities.

The conversation highlighted broader challenges facing internet governance, including the tension between idealistic multi-stakeholder principles and geopolitical realities, the need for more concrete and courageous discussions about desired outcomes, and suggestions for making the IGF more interactive and willing to tackle difficult questions without seeking consensus on everything.

Keypoints

## Overall Purpose/Goal

This discussion centered on a strategic foresight project commissioned by the German Ministry for Digital Transformation, which developed four scenarios for internet governance in 2040. The session aimed to present the methodology, findings, and implications of this foresight exercise while exploring how such approaches could inform future policy-making and multi-stakeholder processes.

## Major Discussion Points

– **Strategic Foresight Methodology and Process**: The panelists explained how strategic foresight works – not to predict exact futures, but to develop plausible scenarios that help stakeholders prepare for uncertainties. The German project involved a 15-member task force representing diverse communities, supplemented by expert interviews and validation workshops to create four distinct scenarios for internet governance.

– **The Dominant Role of States in Future Scenarios**: A key finding was that geopolitical factors and state actions emerged as the primary drivers across most scenarios, rather than civil society or technical community initiatives. This represented a shift from earlier foresight exercises that might have emphasized corporate actors or civil society as main drivers.

– **Crisis of Multi-stakeholder Governance**: The scenarios revealed a troubling pattern where multi-stakeholder processes were either being hollowed out, undermined by state and corporate actors, or becoming so institutionalized that they lost their bottom-up character and meaningful impact. This finding prompted reflection on whether current multi-stakeholder models are living up to their promises.

– **Need for More Concrete and Courageous Approaches**: Panelists emphasized moving beyond abstract ideals to address specific challenges like fair taxation of big tech, data extractivism, and digital barriers created by platform monopolies. They called for “braver” multi-stakeholder forums willing to tackle difficult questions without consensus.

– **Practical Applications and Future Directions**: Discussion focused on how to make foresight exercises more useful through interactive formats like scenario games, better stakeholder engagement, and clearer pathways from analysis to policy implementation. Suggestions included redesigning IGF sessions to be more participatory and innovative.

## Overall Tone

The discussion maintained a constructive but increasingly critical tone. It began with technical explanations of the foresight methodology, but evolved into more pointed critiques of current multi-stakeholder governance limitations. While panelists expressed appreciation for the German government’s initiative, they became more direct about systemic problems and the need for fundamental changes. The tone remained collaborative throughout, with participants building on each other’s observations and offering concrete suggestions for improvement, though there was an underlying urgency about addressing the challenges identified in the scenarios.

Speakers

**Speakers from the provided list:**

– **Philipp Schulte** – Senior policy officer at the Federal Ministry for Digital Transformation and State Modernization in Germany

– **Julia Pohler** – Co-lead at the Berlin Social Center for a research group politics of digitalization, co-author of future scenarios on internet governance, task force lead for the strategic foresight project

– **Anriette Esterhuysen** – Senior advisor for global and regional Internet governance with the Association for Progress Communications, former MAG Chair, long-time IGF participant

– **Gbenga Sesan** – Executive Director of the Paradigm Initiative, IGF MAG leadership panel member

– **Audience** – Various audience members asking questions (roles/titles not specified for most)

**Additional speakers:**

– **Professor Roberta Haar** – Professor at Maastricht University, leading a horizon project called Remit Research, develops scenario testing workshops and games

– **Bertrand de la Chapelle** – Executive director of the Internet and Jurisdiction Policy Network

# Strategic Foresight for Internet Governance: Scenarios for 2040 – Discussion Report

## Introduction and Context

This discussion centered on a strategic foresight project commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Digital Transformation and State Modernization, which developed four scenarios for internet governance in 2040. The session brought together Philipp Schulte, a senior policy officer from the commissioning ministry; Julia Pohler, co-lead at the Berlin Social Center for a research group on politics of digitalization who participated in the scenario development; and experienced internet governance practitioners Anriette Esterhuysen (senior advisor for global and regional Internet governance with the Association for Progressive Communications) and Gbenga Sesan, both of whom were interviewed as experts during the research process.

## Strategic Foresight Methodology and Process

### Understanding Strategic Foresight

Julia Pohler explained that strategic foresight differs fundamentally from prediction or forecasting. Rather than attempting to determine what will happen, the methodology develops plausible scenarios to help stakeholders prepare for uncertainties and potential disruptions. As she noted, “We’re not trying to predict the future, but we’re trying to develop scenarios that are plausible and that help us to think about what could happen and how we can prepare for it.”

The German project employed a structured participatory methodology involving a 15-member task force representing diverse stakeholder groups from German civil society, academia, and technical communities. This core group was supplemented by interviews with international experts to ensure global perspectives were incorporated.

### The Four Scenarios

The task force developed four distinct scenarios for internet governance in 2040:

1. **Continuation of current trends** – Characterized by ongoing geoeconomic competition between major powers

2. **Complete systemic collapse** – Featuring internet fragmentation and breakdown of current governance structures

3. **Over-regulation** – Where everything becomes heavily controlled and regulated

4. **Transformation toward public goods orientation** – A shift toward treating internet infrastructure and governance as public goods

### Expert Perspectives on the Process

Anriette Esterhuysen found the interview process intellectually stimulating, noting that “foresight exercises are valuable for the participatory process itself, allowing creative thinking beyond current constraints.” However, she expressed some limitations with the individual interview format, preferring group dynamics for such discussions.

Gbenga Sesan appreciated the intellectual challenge, describing it as valuable for helping organizations adjust their strategies as reality unfolds. He emphasized that such exercises help stakeholders think beyond immediate concerns and consider longer-term implications of current trends.

## Key Finding: The Dominance of Geopolitical Factors

### States as Primary Drivers

One of the most significant findings was the unexpected prominence of geopolitical factors and state actions across nearly all scenarios. Julia Pohler observed that “the most important factor in almost all scenarios is actually the role of states and the role of governments,” which emerged more strongly than anticipated during the scenario development process.

This finding proved particularly prescient given subsequent developments. Pohler noted that “we wrote these scenarios before President Trump took office again. And before we kind of saw this increase of geopolitical tensions… So I think today we would have gone even further in emphasizing the role of geopolitics and geoeconomics… the reality is actually moving faster than we thought it would.”

### Reframing State Involvement

The prominence of state actors prompted important discussions about their role in internet governance. Philipp Schulte used a gardening metaphor to describe the state’s role: “The state should act as a gardener, ensuring that all stakeholder groups can perform their roles effectively.” This positioned governments not as threats to multi-stakeholder governance but as essential facilitators.

Anriette Esterhuysen challenged traditional assumptions, arguing that “states have always had profound impact on governance inclusivity and should not be seen as undermining multistakeholder ideals.” She provided concrete examples from WSIS processes where government positions significantly shaped outcomes.

## Challenges to Multi-Stakeholder Governance

### Sobering Scenario Outcomes

Perhaps the most concerning finding was what the scenarios revealed about the future of multi-stakeholder governance. Julia Pohler stated bluntly: “I think in all of these scenarios we ended up writing possible futures in where multi-stakeholder processes are either being hollowed out or kind of completely undermined by corporate actors and state actors… So I would say that in all of these scenarios, somehow multi-stakeholderism and governance has outlived its promises.”

Only one of the four scenarios showed a positive future for multi-stakeholder approaches, with the others depicting processes that had either lost meaning through over-institutionalization or been systematically undermined.

### Calls for More Direct Engagement

Anriette Esterhuysen argued for more concrete and courageous discussions in multi-stakeholder forums. She provided specific examples of topics often avoided: “I want fair tax payment by big tech so that countries who need revenue to actually build a fiber optic backbone… I want data flows that are not based on an extractive sort of colonial type model… but it’s almost impossible to say those things in the context of so many multi-stakeholder fora because you don’t want to offend the private sector.”

She criticized the tendency toward “watered down set of wedding vows” rather than meaningful policy discussions, calling for forums willing to tackle controversial issues without requiring universal agreement.

## Technology’s Complex Role

### Unfulfilled Promises

Anriette Esterhuysen reflected on technology’s role, noting that “early hopes that technology would be an equalizer between rich and poor have not fully materialized.” This observation highlighted how technological development interacts with existing power structures rather than automatically disrupting them.

### Corporate Fragmentation

Julia Pohler highlighted an often overlooked source of digital fragmentation: “Digital barriers created by big tech companies fragment online spaces as much as government regulation.” This expanded the discussion beyond traditional concerns about government restrictions to consider how platform business models contribute to digital division.

## Audience Engagement and Future Directions

### Collaborative Proposals

Professor Roberta Haar, leading a horizon project called Remit Research, proposed collaboration to develop scenario testing workshops and games based on the German project’s findings. She suggested moving beyond traditional report formats toward more interactive methodologies.

Bertrand de la Chapelle contributed observations about the limitations of multilateral systems and the upcoming discussions about the IGF’s future mandate in 2026, emphasizing the need for institutional evolution.

### Making Foresight More Interactive

Several speakers advocated for more engaging approaches to strategic foresight. Anriette Esterhuysen suggested that “the IGF needs renewal and redesign to tackle difficult questions without seeking consensus on everything,” proposing “more participative methodologies including scenario games rather than traditional panel formats.”

## Implementation Challenges and Next Steps

### Government Perspective

Philipp Schulte acknowledged the challenge of translating foresight exercises into policy action. He noted that Germany is currently in a government transition period, which affects the timeline for publishing the full report. The new ministry responsible for strategic foresight will handle publication once established.

### Process Improvements

Julia Pohler suggested that “future foresight processes should include government representatives directly in task forces for better implementation.” However, this raised questions about maintaining the independence and multi-stakeholder character of such exercises.

### Updating Scenarios

Given the rapid pace of geopolitical change, speakers acknowledged that the scenarios would benefit from updates reflecting current realities, potentially through addendums or annexes to maintain relevance.

## Practical Applications

### Beyond Traditional Formats

The discussion revealed strong interest in moving beyond conventional panel discussions toward more participatory approaches. The German scenarios could serve as the basis for interactive workshops, games, and simulation exercises that engage stakeholders more directly.

### Institutional Reform

The conversation included specific suggestions for reforming existing governance institutions, particularly the IGF. Speakers called for greater willingness to address controversial topics while maintaining inclusive character, and for adopting new methodologies that move beyond consensus-seeking on every issue.

## Conclusion

This discussion demonstrated the value of strategic foresight exercises both as planning tools and as catalysts for critical reflection on existing governance approaches. The sobering finding that multi-stakeholder governance faces significant challenges in most future scenarios prompted important conversations about reform and renewal.

The unexpected prominence of geopolitical factors across scenarios highlighted the need to better understand and engage with state actors as potential enablers rather than threats to inclusive governance. Similarly, the recognition that corporate actions contribute significantly to digital fragmentation suggested the need for more direct engagement with platform business models and big tech power.

The strong interest in more interactive and participatory methodologies, combined with calls for more courageous discussions of controversial topics, indicated potential pathways for more effective governance approaches. The challenge moving forward will be translating these insights into concrete actions while maintaining the inclusive character that defines multi-stakeholder approaches.

As Julia Pohler noted, the reality of geopolitical change is moving faster than anticipated, making such foresight exercises increasingly valuable for preparing stakeholders to navigate uncertain futures. The German project serves as both a methodological model and a wake-up call for the internet governance community to engage more seriously with the fundamental challenges facing current governance models.

Philipp Schulte: Hello, good morning, good afternoon everybody. Welcome to our open forum, Shaping the Future with Multi-Stakeholder Foresight. My name is Philipp Schulte, I’m a senior policy officer at the Federal Ministry for Digital Transformation and State Modernization in Germany, and I’m happy to see you all here on site and online and also on the panel and on our online panel. I will briefly explain what this session is about, that we have an online moderator with us, Lars. You can ask questions here on site and online after the first round of questions and you are very welcome to ask questions and I will also give you a lot of time for that, since I know some of the people here in the room have been involved in this exercise. I’m happy to discuss with you. So what is this session about? This session is about a project of our ministry which is called Strategic Foresight. Some of you might know that Germany has published last year the first strategy for international policy ever and there were several follow-up messages about this. There was funding for the IGF secretariat which we all really much welcome, but there was also a fellowship for international digital policy for young fellows which are also around here on the IGF and there was a process for strategic foresight we will dive into on this panel. And for that I’m very much excited to have you here on stage and online. We have here Anriett Esterhusen. I’m a senior advisor for global and regional Internet governance with the Association for Progress Communications and a former MAG Chair and around at the IGF since ever. I don’t know. Yes. Yeah, so and next to Anriette there’s Gbenga Sesan Executive Director of the Paradigm Initiative and also IGF MAG leadership panel member and Also, yeah, not new to the ecosystem here I can say and Online we have Julia Pohler. She’s co-lead at the Berlin Social Center for a research group politics of digitalization and co-author of the future scenarios we are discussing here on internet governance and in that role she has been a task force lead and developed the scenarios we we will discuss here. She’s online and hope can hear us Without further ado I will give the word to our panelists and starting with Julia online. Julia, you have been a task force lead in this experiment on strategic foresight with our ministry and Maybe you can explain to the audience which might not really be aware of this project or maybe doesn’t know what strategic foresight is it really is What was your role? What did you do with the task force members? Maybe you can say also word who was on the task force and what was the outcome?

Julia Pohler: Yes, thank you, can you hear me? Yeah, I can hear you well Perfect. Thank you very much. And I’m so sorry that I cannot be with you at the IGF But it’s my son’s birthday tomorrow, and I wouldn’t miss this not even for the IGF. I’m sorry So I’m happy to join online and I’ll be I’m happy to say a few words about the process and the methodology involved Not so much about the scenarios. We can discuss them later But maybe for those who are not familiar with strategic foresight I would like to make a few points of what strategic foresight is about and then Explain them on the example of our task force and what we did So I think what is important to keep in mind when we speak about strategic foresight in the field of Internet governance or elsewhere That strategic foresight is not about predicting the exact future and I think that’s something that we also struggle with in this process So it’s really strategic foresight is a process that helps us deal with Uncertainties by exploring kind of possible possible futures So it’s more about like thinking how we could prepare ourselves for different scenarios rather than trying to kind of guess What will actually happen in the future? So by using strategic foresight, and I think that’s the motivation also of the German Ministry to launch this process. Decision makers and stakeholders can better understand certain uncertainties that there are in the world and in which direction they might develop and then prepare for disruptions before they actually happen. That brings me to my second point. The first one is it’s not about predicting the future. The second one is it’s actually about developing future scenarios. Developing scenarios that are basically stories of plausible futures. That means that these futures that we develop in these scenarios, they don’t have to be realistic. It’s very likely that none of these stories that we develop will ever happen in that way, but they need to be plausible. So in some way they could happen if certain kind of circumstances come together. So these kind of stories that we develop or these scenarios that we develop are designed to highlight in different ways how the future might unfold and then help us understand how we can, with certain actions, kind of go in one direction or the other. So for instance, in the project that we’re discussing here, which was called Strategic Foresight Internet Governance in the year 2040 and was commissioned by the German Ministry for Digitalization and Transport. So before we actually changed the name of that ministry, we created four distinct scenarios for internet governance in the 15 years, in the next 15 years. And so these four scenarios were really kind of plausible stories in which we could explore a range of possible futures, which went from the continuation of trends that we see today, kind of growth and geoeconomic and geopolitical competition, and where this leads. And the second one was more about a complete and total systemic collapse and a fragmentation of the internet in two distinct networks. And the third one was about a regulation of the digital world to a degree that everything becomes controlled in some way. And the fourth one was about a complete transformation of the internet governance structures that we have today. in a turn away from economic competitive logic towards kind of a shared commitment in promoting public goods. So all of these four scenarios are possible futures and none of them will happen, but they helped us kind of understand what we see as trends and how we can deal with these trends. And also, I think what’s important to keep in mind that these scenarios do not exclude each other. Parts of them could coexist, so it could happen a part of one and a part of the other scenario, but it help us discuss what is desirable and what are risks that we want to avoid and where we kind of see opportunities and where we want to go. And for this very reason, I think strategic foresight has been a methodology that has been used by international organizations, also including a lot of UN agencies and by the European Commission, but also a lot by civil society organizations since the early 2000s to kind of inform decisions, inform actions and also inform policies. And I’m sure that Henriette and Brenna will tell us more about that because they probably have used a foresight in the past too. And that brings me to my third point, speaking about civil society and other actors. So the third part, so the first one, it’s not about predicting the future. The second one, it’s about writing possible future stories. And the third one, it’s to do this in a positive participatory way. So we followed a very structured method, but we reached this method through focused discussions with experts and stakeholders from very different backgrounds, which came together to gather insights and then kind of discuss different options and perspectives that we have on where we might go in the future with internet governance. And let me explain just in a few minutes what this meant concretely for our process. I will guide you a little bit through the process that we used to develop these scenarios for the German Ministry of Digitalization. So the entire process was mandated by the ministry, but it was coordinated by the German Agency for International Cooperation. the GESET, and they also provided the method experts who really kind of helped us through this process, all the task force members, and guided us methodologically through this discussion and how we develop the scenario. And for the task force, we were 15 members who were invited and were selected to represent the kind of diverse communities that we have in Germany, in internet governance, academia, business, civil society, and the technical community. And the goal was to develop these kind of four different scenarios for the next 15 years, basically, what will happen in the next 15 years in internet governance. So I was kind of the content lead, and that also meant that I helped drafting the scenarios, but it was really a joint process between all different members of the task force. So the task force members really contributed at every stage of the scenario creation, and we collected influential factors, we discussed what the impact of these factors may be, and then, based on the methodology, drafted these four possible futures, and also in the next step really critically accessed the possibility and constantly refined the writing of these scenarios. What’s also important is that because all members of this task force were from Germany, also they represented different stakeholder groups, still was a kind of very German or European centralized view that we had in this task force. So what we did is that I conducted interviews with specialists from various world regions and stakeholder groups to kind of validate these draft scenarios, bring in new ideas, and bring in also more global and diverse perspectives. So Henriette and Benna were interviewed by me for this process, so that’s also how they were involved in this. And finally, what we did after we had a good draft of the scenarios and they were validated, we had a network kind of workshop in which the different members of the task force, but also a different set of experts, were invited to participate in this workshop. So this was a kind of a virtual workshop, to discuss and also use a certain method to kind of develop ideas how these scenarios, what they mean for their own kind of actions and their own planning. And as far as I know, the scenarios are also now being used by the ministry to discuss potential options for actions in the field of Internet governance. And I leave it at that.

Philipp Schulte: Thank you, Julia. That was really helpful for us all on stage and also in the audience to better understand what you did and what the German government together with stakeholders here proposed. So one important point is that my panelists here on stage were interviewed for these scenarios. So let me turn to you, Anriette Bengar. How was it for you to be interviewed in this project? Was that something familiar to you? Was it completely new? What was your experience during the interview? What were you thinking when you were reading? I mean, we come maybe later to that. The scenarios and yeah, what was your impression?

Anriette Esterhuysen: You want me to start? I have used this methodology before and it was quite interesting a long, long time ago. It was actually in South Africa in around the late 1990s, just shortly after liberation, after the first democratic government was in place. And it was being used in the context of planning for development and inclusion and actually also participative governance. And at the time, I found it immensely frustrating. And I think I wasn’t a very productive participant at all because I found the abstraction very frustrating because I knew exactly, you know, I was much younger. I thought I knew exactly what we need to do, what the problems are. And approaching it in this kind of roundabout way seemed to me, and the facilitator was from the U.S., which frustrated me even more. And I really did not find it very helpful. But now I’m much older, much wiser, and Julia is a very, very good interviewer. And also I think, you know, having been around Internet governance for a long time, I think we have become very, what’s the word, quite boring is maybe the best word, but there are more sophisticated words. I don’t think we’re being creative or innovative enough. I don’t think we’re applying critical thinking enough in how we are evolving Internet governance. So I actually found it very exciting and very interesting and enjoyed the process. I think abstraction is still an issue, and maybe we can talk about that a little bit more later. Yes, I found it really, it was a sort of stream of consciousness approach, but guided by Julia to focus on the plausible, but also not trying to think of what will actually happen, and then playing with those trajectories, but of course with the knowledge of the world that we are living in and working in. So I found it very useful, and I was very impressed actually that Germany had done this. I think my only sort of one, I would have liked to be part of a focus group or a group at some point. I think I found it, I would have found it more interesting in some ways to have a group dynamic. And then I think my only other question about it as well is the way in which you treat multi-stakeholder in how you are approaching the future of Internet governance. And I think in that sense, the study itself, I think, perhaps did not unpack or deconstruct what multi-stakeholder means. I think I would have actually possibly found it more valuable if it was scenarios of governance effective, accountable, whatever governance. Somehow I felt that the focus on multi-stakeholder became a little bit one-dimensional. You know, civil society, business, government, technical, which I think is actually one of the weaknesses in our entire ecosystem.

Gbenga Sesan: Well, it wasn’t my first, but talking to Julia was also very interesting. I do interviews a lot, either from research interviews where people are hoping that you are supporting a thesis, or to media interviews where people are hoping they can pigeonhole you into a position. So this was very helpful that there was no target outcome you could think. And I think it was very helpful to be able to think on your feet, well, maybe on your seat, to think while you’re having the conversation. I’d done this in 2007, a while ago, as part of the Desmond Tutu Leadership Fellowship, and we’re trying to create scenarios for the future of Africa. It was an interesting process because for us at the time, it was like a compromise. There were people who felt things were going to go this way, and there were people who felt things were going to go the other way. The optimist, the pessimist, and maybe a small group in between. So doing futures, possible futures, was sort of a compromise. Like everybody felt heard, and everybody felt that they saw the future in this. And what I also found interesting in this, like Andrea said, it was good that it was a government. Typically, you would have this kind of project by civil society, thinking of the future. But it was good to know it was a government. And one of the things, I don’t know if Julia remembers this, but one of the things that I was very keen on was implementation. Whatever that asks you continue to implement, you’re able to look at the scenarios and adjust. Because one of the beautiful things about possible futures is that it won’t happen exactly the same way. But when something happens close to the scenario that you’ve discussed, then you have an opportunity to either align or to run away from certain things. And I’m glad to hear that that is happening now. So for me, it was fun. There was no exact destination. There was no eating agenda. So it was a better conversation to allow me to think and to speak to the issues as I saw them. and what I thought could happen. The other involvement I had with scenario planning, and I think that Anriette was also involved with this, was I think in 2008, was it Elon University? I don’t remember the name, talking about predicting the future. And I remember one of the things I said about the future at that time was that we will begin to find confusion between work and play. And so sometime during COVID, they sent me an email and said, oh, wow, what you said is what is happening now. And I was like, no, I did not predict the pandemic. I was just a bit scared that that was going to be something that would happen in the future. So I think it was very helpful because when that moment came, I felt prepared because you had thought about it. And I think this is one of the beautiful things about creating possible futures.

Philipp Schulte: Yeah, thank you so much. That was super rich already and it highlighted some of our ideas, but also some of the challenges within the process, but also in the outcomes or which the outcomes highlighted some of the challenges of the current environment, current community. And yeah, thank you so much for your thoughts here. Julia, do you want to react directly or otherwise I would ask you, what are your key takeaways or the defining event in describing these scenarios? What do you consider to be the defining characteristics of the multistakeholder governance of internet, the multistakeholder model of internet governance, which you had pointed out was a bit one dimensional. I think that’s what you said. And maybe actually it’s fun that you said that after reading the reports, because that’s what actually our finding was before starting this process. But so you might have now a better basis for discussion. That’s at least our hope, but I don’t know, you are heavily thinking about the multistakeholder process and having published. about it. What is your opinion?

Julia Pohler: Yeah, thanks. Well, I also really kind of enjoyed for me, as I usually, I’m a researcher, I work in academia, we don’t usually think about potential futures, right? We look at the past and the present. So for me, it was also a very interesting kind of exercise. And I’ve done this three times now, also in internet governance before in different contexts. And I thought it was very interesting. Also, I really enjoyed the interviews, because they really broadened my perspective. And I learned a lot from these interviews. But I think when kind of I we get to the stage where we really wrote the scenarios, and I looked at them with some distance after a while, I think what strikes me most is that the most important factor in almost all scenarios, maybe a little bit less the last one, which is about a complete transformation. But the first three one, the key driving factors is actually the role of states and the role of governments. So in each scenario, the kind of actions of states of in particular of important states, the US, China, but also Russia, then, of course, we are from the EU. So we kind of looked also at the EU, but the kind of the actions of particular states, including also emerging kind of powers, and the relationship between states and governance was really the key defining factor in each of the scenarios. So geopolitics, and so also geoeconomics, in some way, were the main drivers for transformations in these scenarios. And they’re all the main drivers of the future and the main kind of key factors for the future that we imagined. And we, that’s to say, we actually started writing them. And we wrote these scenarios before President Trump took office again. And before we kind of saw this increase of geopolitical tensions and economic competition that followed his taking office again. So I think Today we would have gone even further in emphasizing the role of geopolitics and geoeconomics in these scenarios and kind of written them even more around these kind of tensions that we see. In some way I would even say that the actual geopolitical developments have already overtaken the scenarios that we’ve written only six months ago or eight months ago. So the reality is actually moving faster than we thought it would. And it’s my assumption that actually 10 years ago had we written these scenarios 10 years ago we would have given a less much less prominent role to states and to governments and into the relationship between states. And I’m actually I don’t only think so I actually I’m sure we would have given this because I did such a process a foresight process in 2013, 14, 15 and there the key driver was actually the corporate actors and civil society. So it has changed and I think this is also kind of a finding that we see like on how we see the world as well that actually states and geopolitical and geoeconomic actions do have become more important again. As for multi-stakeholderism I kind of have to share also Anriette’s observation and I think what also with some distance looking back at these scenarios what is kind of striking and maybe even frightening that in none of these scenarios except maybe for the last one which is very different there is a bright future for multi-stakeholderism and internet governance. So I think in all of these scenarios we ended up writing possible futures in where multi-stakeholder processes are either being hollowed out or kind of completely undermined by corporate actors and state actors. To some degree basically the commitment of to multi-stakeholderism and internet governance remains at least at the discursive level but we wrote scenarios where this commitment is either only a lip service or where multi-stakeholder processes are being so institutionalized and professionalized and becoming so predictable that they actually lose their meaningness and they lose the kind of bottom-up character and the possibility to also include voices that might diverge from the mainstream kind of perspectives in these processes. So I would say that in all of these scenarios, somehow multi-stakeholderism and governance has outlived its promises. And I think that’s something that, since we ended up writing them, not really with that intention in mind, but this is how we kind of ended up seeing the future, I think that’s something that should give us some reflection on what we are doing and how we maybe can also transform our current model to make it more meaningful.

Philipp Schulte: See a lot of nodding here. Do you want to direct directly?

Gbenga Sesan: I mean, it’s, you know, I started nodding when you were talking about how fast the geopolitics have played out. And I think I remember part of our conversation at a time, we talked a bit about it, but I don’t think that anyone sort of could predict that things will move this fast. In fact, you know, by November, there were people who were doing scenarios, I mean, within organizations, we had to do some planning at Paradigm Initiative in November, you know, but there wasn’t that sense. And I think this is the relationship between insight and scenario planning. And this is why adjusting as you go is critical. So there are things that you sort of plan for and you dial them to a level seven and they get to a level nine and you have to tell yourself, listen, we can’t, I mean, it will be insanity for you to then take the actions you planned for level seven when you are at a level nine. I would say for multi-stakeholderism right now, not only is it not living up to some of the lofty, you know, definitions and branding it did, it’s also been threatened because of that reason, there are people who are then saying, yes, we’ve talked about the ideal multi-stakeholderism where everyone is an equal partner. Of course, we know not everyone is equal around the table. It hasn’t worked. So let’s try this other less perfect, but pragmatic model. And that itself is a challenge because I think, and two things to me, one is, yes, we must adjust, but we must also never lose that opportunity to dream of, to wish for a better scenario. It won’t be perfect. We have to adjust, we have to be realistic, but we shouldn’t move from optimism straight to pessimism. We should maintain a healthy dose of realism and say that some things may not be working now, but it is still possible to get things to become better.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Let me comment on what you said emerged about the role of states. I think absolutely, now that’s not a surprise to me. And in fact, what is a surprise to me is that there’s still reluctance to talk about enhanced cooperation in this space, which is, you know, one of the worst things not to be named. Words not to say. Because the reality is that how states engage or not engage with one another has profound impact on how inclusive governance is, how strong civil society can be, to what extent human rights are respected or democratic institutions are able to grow and play their role. So much as we like this, I don’t know, there’s this kind of fairytale notion of multi-stakeholder governance as this alternative dimension of perfect governance. I mean, I see it as a way, a way of arriving at more accountable, inclusive, effective governance. And states are a big part of that. I think what the multi-stakeholder approach gives us is a way of really putting on the table that states cannot do this on their own. And if they do it on their own, they’re probably not gonna do it very well. But that doesn’t mean that states do not still have quite a profound role. And I think the other thing that multi-stakeholder also gives us, or what I think the way in which the IGF and IG has evolved is the fact that it’s a diverse ecosystem. Internet governance has many. types of decision-making processes, types of development and standard-making processes. Some of them might be led by governments, some of them could be completely technical community-driven, and some might be more society-driven or private-sector-driven. I think what the multi-stakeholder approach gives us is the constant reminder that we need to connect these with one another and that they need to overlap and engage with one another. But it doesn’t mean that there’s this new sort of amorphous multi-stakeholder ideal which has to operate across the board. So I do think it’s interesting that the role of states is important and I don’t think we should feel that that undermines the ideals that we are striving for in this space, which is to have inclusive and participative governance that achieves good results, public interest results.

Philipp Schulte: Yeah, I guess I couldn’t agree more here since… I mean, to the world of the digital or to the internet, the state was maybe a foreign player for a long time. And now just… I mean, I share the observation here that the state, as also the ministries, show up more and more. They show up more to the IGF, but they show up more to ICANN, they show up more even to the IETF right now. And they get involved and I think that might be maybe a usual process since the state was reluctant to show up compared to other political areas or fields of politics. So that might be, I don’t know, it can be healing, because as you said, the state is still important and can play a role. And this also triggered a bit our thinking, what our role is and what a good role for us is. And I think, when I think about it, I think the responsibility of the state is more like… There’s a garden of multi-stakeholders and the state is… Maybe the responsibility of the state is to make sure that all floors, all the different stakeholder groups can perform in their role they want to perform and they perform best. And maybe these scenarios can help the different groups and that was one idea behind it. So this leads me to my next question. Is that… I mean, the report is not published yet, but it will be published at some time. Is that something you could use in your daily work?

Gbenga Sesan: Absolutely. Not just because I contributed to it, but one of the things I was very keen to see was how all the ideas would come together to define what the scenarios would be. I think, well, at the risk of giving you more work, I think it needs to be updated very quickly with some new realities, maybe like an addendum or an annex or something like that. And I believe that that’s something that we will do, most likely. Anyone who picks that report, who looks at the scenarios, will be able to situate those scenarios in our current reality. So some of the geopolitics that we talked about at the time, it wasn’t as deep as some of the experiences we have right now. So I can imagine that it will be at least a starter for conversations. But absolutely, I think this is something that will be useful, not just the content of it, but also the principle behind it. The principle of creating possible futures and adjusting your strategy as you continue to see what has emerged and how close they are to the possible futures that you predicted. One key role was the role of the state, but another key role is the role of technology. And so, Anayat, you worked a lot on connectivity and worked with a lot of technologies here also in this area.

Philipp Schulte: What’s your assessment of the role of technology in these reports or also in real life? And what can we learn from all the technologies, how they were implemented, how they were introduced for new technologies? And where do you see the dangers and opportunities?

Anriette Esterhuysen: You’re taking me away from scenarios now and foresight to reality, you know, in the present. I mean, I think that one of the things that we need to do and I think one of the strengths of the report is that it does allow us to think of technology in both as a force that has actually impact on its own, as well as a sector that interacts with geopolitical conflicts, with different forms of societal change and organization. I mean, I think… I mean, you were also going to ask me at one point when I was so actively involved in trying to build Internet connectivity in Africa in the sort of 80s, 90s, early 2000s, what our hopes were. And I think this is also a shift from WSIS and WSIS Plus 20. I think it was very much a belief, naive, obviously, that access to technology and particularly access to communications technology will be an equalizer. That it will be an equalizer between rich and poor, the center and the periphery, men, women, non-binary, that individuals… That it would be this set of tools and processes that creates engagement and cooperation. And of course, it didn’t quite pan out that way, but that is still part of what technology gives us. So I think, I mean, the hard part about foresight, but also the interesting part is to look at how this complex way in which individuals and societies engage with technology and are changed by technology, how that will play out in different scenarios. And maybe that’s also one of the reasons why the role of states emerged as important, because I think when faced with unpredictability, there is also, I guess, a tendency to look at who are the institutions in this context of unpredictability and insecurity that have the capacity and the responsibility to make sure things don’t go wrong. And I guess that’s also naive, because we also know that both corporations and states are unpredictable themselves. So I’m not giving you a good answer here, because I think that it is… So I’m going to actually answer the question you asked, Gbenga, which is, is this useful in my work? Not particularly, because I think it could. Is the report useful? I’m not sure if the report will be useful. I think the exercise is enormously useful. I think participatory processes like this are very valuable to the people that are part of them. So I think to make the report useful, you’d have to find a way of using it in a context where people are actually able to discuss and think about it and engage those scenarios. And then I think it could be very useful, because I think we do need to think more creatively. And I’m just going to give one example. We probably don’t have much time, but this year, for those of you who don’t know, but you’ve probably all heard so much about the World Summit on the Information Society, by the way, the action line on enabling environment, that’s what governments are supposed to do, create an enabling environment. But when the WSIS was reviewed by the Commission on Science for Technology, which is a UN body, it’s part of ECOSOC, it was shortly after the US government had taken a position on not wanting to support the sustainable development goals or use the concepts of developments and sustainability. It was also shortly after the US had pronounced that gender is biological and they are just too sexist. And so these featured in the negotiations around the WSIS, where people were talking about, have we got digital inclusion? Is there security? Are we achieving development goals? And it was really, I was there as a civil society participant, and to see the European states in particular, shell-shocked, because it was so difficult for them to operate in this context, when a long-time partner in the Internet governance and World Summit process, the US, was moving outside or taking on a different position. My first thought during that entire week was, I wish these governments had all done some foresight work. And maybe if they had, they’d actually be able to take advantage of this shift, be creative, form new alliances. And I think that’s why, certainly for diplomats, I think certainly for governments, anyone who is involved in negotiation in a geopolitical or even in a multi-stakeholder context, I think it’s a very, very useful technique to use.

Philipp Schulte: You gave us a lot of homework here. Speaking about time, we still have some time and I’m happy to take questions from the audience. So if you have prepared already a question, please line up here. We have a mic here. Otherwise, we are also able to take online questions and we are more than happy if you are in the discussion. Otherwise, I will pick up on another point you said that’s, I mean, level of abstract, like the reports are abstract. Oh, we have already. Yeah, please introduce yourself and…

Audience: Yes, good morning. My name is Professor Roberta Haar. I’m at Maastricht University. And I’m also leading, I was on a panel in day zero with my, I’m also leading a horizon project, Remit Research. I encourage you all to look at it. And I’m very excited about the work that you’re doing because we’re also, part of what we’re trying to develop is something called scenario testing workshops. And in those workshops, we’ve also developed games and we developed them with the joint research center at the EU Commission. They also have this scenario exploration system. You’re shaking your head, so I guess you’re aware of it. And so we have taken their system and used the data from our research and developed scenario games. And we’ve already played now the first one, which we had on military AI at Erasmus University in Rotterdam. And we had extremely good results. And we did exactly what Anriette said, as we took the data and we brought it to people to play and discuss. And we had four scenarios that we have developing with our different data. And we still have four workshops to go. And we will have one in Rome in April, in Helsinki in September, so April of next year, obviously. And then we’ll also have summit in Brussels. And I know Anriette is shaking your head because she’s on our supervisory board. She also pointed out for me to come today. So my question is, and my first question is, is the report accessible? And then you already answered that question. But then my next one is, can we sort of also adapt your data and maybe also have some collaborative in taking your data onto the next step into a game and so that we can integrate it and then indeed have policy ideas to invite policy stakeholders to our games and to play it? So I’m hoping that I’ve noted all your details out. I want to write to Julia and hoping that we can maybe have some collaborative work there. Is that something that you find interesting? So thank you.

Philipp Schulte: I guess I have to take the question first, but I’m happy to step in. So on the report, yes, it’s true. It’s not published yet. as you might know we are in a government transition period in Germany and we set up a new ministry but this new ministry will also be responsible for strategic foresight so that’s a lucky coincidence in this case and so we are really optimistic that we can proceed at some level with this report and also with the methodology for sure and also with our work we have done however one idea behind it was that this report is not only for the government but also for all stakeholders so happy to reach out to all involved in the program on the project and I know that some civil societies organization in Germany for example Wikimedia already taking the work and trying to to work with it with the reports and with the methodology so I’m happy

Julia Pohler: to connect you. Julia do you want to add anything? No you just mentioned what I would like to mention Julia I mean I know about the Remit project I went to one of your conferences last year discussing multilateralism, multi-stakeholderism and I would be happy to also be involved I think we have to go through the ministry if it will confirm this since they probably have some kind of control over the material we produce but I think it would be very helpful to kind of take this further and develop it into a game which would be fun and I think that also kind of connects to what I wanted to say about stakeholder engagement during this exercise maybe I can come to that later because it is also a challenge to keep people involved in these kind of exercises and I think making it into some bringing it to another format also could be very helpful in the learning process for us all and how we can do this differently as well to maybe make it more fun for everybody involved and make it more meaningful also the output and take the output to something that can then be kind of used elsewhere yeah Bertrand

Audience: good morning my name is Bertrand de la Chapelle I’m the executive director of the internet and of the German Jurisdiction Policy Network. Two things. One, first of all, congratulations to the German government for having undertaken this thing because I think it’s a perfect place and venue for discussing also the meta level of how our institutions are going. The tool of scenario or foresight is definitely a good one. I am extremely frustrated that you cannot present this because it would have been a perfect session to build the session around this. So I’m waiting impatiently for the release of the scenarios of the foresight report. The second thing is precisely about these kind of exercises. And they are extremely important. We know the limitations of those things. You know the benefit of engaging the people. It’s mostly the process of developing those things that is the most interesting because it allows people to express what they see as the trend, what they see as the drivers, pro or negatively. However, there are things that are always extremely difficult to anticipate in those environments. Call them the black swan or the unexpected events. For those of us who are old enough, we can remember that when the World Wide Web emerged, everybody was talking about America Online and the domination of America Online and how the future of electronic communications was going to be those mammoth companies or the telcos. And then something happened on the side. I want to keep faith in the fact that the multistakeholder spirit, not the model because there is no such thing as a multistakeholder model, but the multistakeholder spirit not only will be alive. but that it will ultimately permeate everything because the reality is today because of those geopolitical tensions we are seeing more than ever that the governments together cannot solve those problems. I want to highlight and I’ve said that in other sessions in 20 years since the WSIS there hasn’t been one single agreement among all governments on digital issues except a cybercrime convention sponsored by one of the countries that is the most present behind cybercrime. That’s the ultimate irony of the limits of the multilateral system which has to be preserved don’t get me wrong the states are absolutely fundamental but our inability so far to bring the different actors around the table in environments like the IGF and other venues is one of the reasons why we’re struggling to address those problems. At this juncture this exercise about scenarios we need to also think a little bit more about what we want not only what the trends are and to finish the WSIS plus 20 process at the moment is entirely focused on producing another resolution in December. There’s one thing that it should say and set the stage for which is what is going to be the future of the IGF. When do we discuss in 2026 and where the evolution of the mandate and the evolution of the structure of the IGF and as you’re discussing scenarios thinking about the institutional arrangements internationally is a core follow-up I think for what you’ve been trying to achieve.

Philipp Schulte: So I couldn’t track a real question here but provoking

Gbenga Sesan: Thanks a lot for that, and I underlined want here, when you were saying we should keep in mind what we want, and that’s something I was speaking to earlier when I said there is reality, there is history, there is data, but there is also the desire that we have, and we may be faced with challenges, but we need to come to the table with an ideal scenario that we want. What do we want? Because the challenge is, if you’re frustrated by history, historical data, if you’re frustrated by some scenarios that paint a bleak future, then there’s no point. We might as well just throw up our hands and say, let’s sit down and watch the TV, but if there is something that we want, what this brings to mind for me is if you’re running or sailing or flying against the wind, you could either submit to the direction of the wind, which then means you will go anywhere the wind takes you, or you could drive against the wind. My mathematics interest comes into play here. You think of the velocity to use, you think of the direct angle of inclination, so that worst-case scenario, you will not be pushed away and you will end up where you want to go. I think it’s really important that we know what we want, and knowing what we want has to come from everyone on the table. It cannot be what the government wants. It cannot be what only one stakeholder wants. Of course, we all come with what we want. We have conversations. In some cases, we’ll have consensus, and we will come together and agree on some things, but it is absolutely important, for the want of another phrase, to just keep dreaming.

Anriette Esterhuysen: Sometimes I’ve known Benga since he was very young, and sometimes he makes me feel very old and sometimes not, but today you make me feel very old, because I think that, of course, we have to dream, but it’s not just about dreaming. It’s about concrete things. What is the WSIS all about? It’s about a people-centered development, human rights-oriented information society, where people can use technology to improve their lives. To me, that’s more important than having an IGF, frankly, but I believe we need the IGF to get there, and I do agree with Batra that we have to renew the IGF, and I think that’s actually an interesting point about the foresight exercise as well. I think all of those scenarios, as Juli has said, they all depict a fairly not such a positive picture of multi-stakeholder, which I think we should interpret as a real indicator that we need the IGF, and we need forums like the IGF. I think for me, the important thing, though, is that it is an IGF which allows the wind in and doesn’t close all the windows so that we can sit in our sort of safe, comfortable, multi-stakeholder space, because I think, Benga, the reality is we don’t all want the same thing, and we’re not always going to have consensus. That doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t be in active, open conversation with one another, so for me, an IGF that actually allows us to tackle the big issues.

Julia Pohler: to do this kind of process or even take what we did now and move forward and see how why this matters also to the members who tasked with me who wrote this report and kind of show them the real kind of clear benefits. And I think one of the ideas on how to make this more meaningful would be to actually see what now for example the German government who mandated this process is doing with whatever ideas we developed and how these ideas actually kind of help people within the ministry, people within the government to figure out what they want as you just said it or figure out what they don’t want and how this impacts whatever the government should be doing and should not be doing. And I think that’s the kind of opaque part for us and this is also meant as a criticism on our task force itself because we had difficulties kind of picturing where we were going. It’s not meant as a criticism of the process itself because I also know that how it was organized we had a government change in between and whatever and the funding was also meant to engage stakeholders with each other. But I think what would be really helpful is to actually have people from the ministry in the task force next time you do this or when you take this to the next step because I think it would be extremely interesting to actually have people talking to each other about where this leads us and where would we want to go and I think it would also help the task force member better understand what their contributions are leading to and it will help the government who is mandating this process better understand where these ideas are coming from, what kind of competing visions are behind this, what kind of competing perspectives or even compatible perspectives are behind this. So I think this is one of the ways I would say take this forward or make it better in the next round.

Philipp Schulte: Yeah, that are valid points and it’s good to hear that because we were a bit reluctant to be on this task force because we don’t want it to have a government-steered process so writing our own scenarios by stakeholders and then use them as a lip service. So we really wanted not really to get into the scenarios. I mean and I agree that it was a lot of work and this was also a reason why the stakeholder group was mainly people from Germany or Europe because otherwise it would be even more. like harder to bring them all together to Berlin like two to three times and to work on a scenario. So there were some restrictions as I said, but our hope is that with the new government and with the new responsibilities in the ministry that we can learn from this process and take it to the next level. But coming back to my original question about like implementation and alternatives, what is your…

Gbenga Sesan: So I can go back to this word want and of course I agree with you on starting at times from what we don’t know what we don’t want. In fact in itself knowing what you don’t want is like knowing what you want. I want not to have what I don’t want. And we had this conversation on leadership panel, you know, we were inaugurated in August 2022 and we had a lot of conversations and it almost always ended with we don’t want this, we don’t want that. Many of you I hope have seen the internet we want paper that the leadership panel put out. That was the idea behind it. We have to at some point define certain things. There are certain things that we agree on. We don’t all agree on everything, but there are certain things that people will not feel too strongly against and we could start with that. The internet we want paper talks about certain things that I’m sure some people will read and say, hey, rights online. Maybe we don’t want that, but at least it is out there as something that certain stakeholders and majority of people desire, you know, to have. So I think it’s absolutely important. Yes, optimism, yes, dreaming, but also putting down in clear terms what we want. Because at times what that does is when you go into situations and you see reality, you can then say this is the reality, this is what I want and your task, your action is then creating a pathway. between where you are at and where you want to be. If I want to face reality, I definitely will resign from my job right now. I mean, I work on a continent to talk about digital rights and inclusion where every other conversation I have with governments in the region is about clampdowns or about explaining away, you know, clampdowns that they have, but it helps that we know that this is the desired destination. This is where we’re at and this is the tough work we have to do from point A, which is where we’re at, to point B, where we’d like to be.

Anriette Esterhuysen: You know, I think that, I think sometimes we say what we want and particularly when we try and say it in a multi-stakeholder way, you know, it sounds like some kind of sort of watered down set of wedding vows or whatever. I can’t think of a good analogy. I mean, I want fair tax payment by big tech so that countries who need revenue to actually build a fiber optic backbone so that there’s feasible, reasonable internet for institutions, for universities in a country to be able to have some access to resources. I, you know, I want data flows that are not based on an extractive sort of colonial type model, you know. I also want competition between the private sector and I want local private sector operators in developing countries. There are lots of things I want that I think will create an enabling open and inclusive internet, but it’s almost impossible to say those things in the context of so many multi-stakeholder fora because you don’t want to offend the private sector. You don’t want to offend governments that shut down the internet. You know, you don’t want to talk about the great firewall of this or that country. And I think we have to be able to be willing to use this sort of multi-stakeholder modality with a little bit more. I think it will help us get there, but I do have a concrete suggestion for the IGF, because I think this methodology is so powerful. I think one of the things that makes multi-stakeholder fora, or has the IGF, as it’s evolved, made it maybe also more difficult, is that it’s much more now not about individuals, but about institutions. I mean, if Philipp came to an IGF 15 years ago, he might have just been there as an individual, rather than as a representative of the German government. Now, there are pros and cons both ways, but I think if we could maybe collaborate, yourselves collaborate, with Roberta and her team, come up with a game that at the next IGF we play not in rooms like this, where we sit here and talk and you all sit there and listen, but actually engage with one another in an interactive way, and everyone participates in thinking about foresight and changes. And there’s no reason why you can’t do that in a room with 500 people, actually. There are methodologies that allow that. So, I’d like to see a redesigned IGF, a redesigned and a braver IGF, redesigned in terms of making it much more participative and innovative, in terms of the methodologies we use for our sessions, and a braver IGF, more willing to actually ask difficult questions around which there’s not going to be consensus.

Philipp Schulte: Absolutely. I think that’s a really good proposal to have not only workshop and lightning talks, but also games. That might be a really good new session format for the next IGF. Are there any other questions in the audience or online? I’m happy to take them now. Otherwise, I would invite my panelists for the final remarks. And partly you have answered them already, but you might summarize it and make it a bit more precise, so I can write that down. So, you articulated wishes for the IGF, but you might also articulate wishes for the German government or other governments when we now would get funding for another process. What are your three main wishes? What should be the outcome? And would you support us? Gbenga Sesan, you want me to start this time? Why don’t we let Julia start? As you want. You want me to start? Yes, please.

Julia Pohler: Okay. That’s a tough question when I have to think that the German government should be doing this. I was actually… thinking that what would I would like to have this kind of exercise on. But yeah, as Anriette just said, maybe we have to be a bit more courageous and in kind of tackling the elephants in the room. So I think what would be one of the things I would like to see a foresight exercise on is the practices of big technology companies in creating digital barriers and closed ecosystems. Because I think there’s a lot of talk recently about the potential fragmentation of our digital space due to governments and government regulation and digital sovereignty and a lot of fear related to this. Much of it is coming out of a particular idea that we need a certain kind of digital space that is even free from governments. I think we had this discussion right now. But I would like to see more attention being paid to how the dominant business models of our current platform economy fragment our online spaces and lead to many of the phenomenon that Anriette also just mentioned. So I think that would be one of the issues that should be tackled. Whether the German government is in a position to do this, I don’t know. But maybe we have to be courageous.

Anriette Esterhuysen: I think it would be interesting to to I support what Julia just said. I think because the role of states emerged as so important in the exercise. Maybe some activity to look at the role of states, but in a more creative way, not just look at, you know, digital services, digital market, you know, not just look at. I mean, often I feel governments feel that in their toolbox, there’s basically repression and regulation. In fact, governments have a huge toolbox that they can use. They can do so many good and engaging. And exactly. And as Philip is saying, this kind of thing, but maybe to use this in the IGF context, perhaps to work with other governments about, you know, what what is it really that governments can do to help us to enable this, what the multistakeholder ideal represents, which is inclusion, accountability and creativity. In other words, so instead of always, you know, governments being kind of the the silent partner or sometimes the problematic partner in this multistakeholder journey.

Agreement points

Strategic foresight methodology is valuable for participatory processes and creative thinking

Speakers

– Julia Pohler
– Anriette Esterhuysen
– Gbenga Sesan

Arguments

Strategic foresight creates plausible future scenarios rather than predictions to help prepare for uncertainties

Foresight exercises are valuable for the participatory process itself, allowing creative thinking beyond current constraints

The methodology helps organizations adjust strategies as reality unfolds compared to predicted scenarios

Summary

All speakers agree that strategic foresight is a valuable methodology that helps stakeholders think creatively about possible futures and prepare for uncertainties, with the process itself being as important as the outcomes

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Geopolitical developments and state actions are increasingly important drivers in internet governance

Speakers

– Julia Pohler
– Anriette Esterhuysen
– Gbenga Sesan

Arguments

Geopolitics and state actions emerged as the primary driving factors across most scenarios, more than anticipated

States have always had profound impact on governance inclusivity and should not be seen as undermining multistakeholder ideals

Current geopolitical developments are moving faster than the scenarios predicted, with increased state involvement

Summary

There is consensus that states and geopolitical factors have become more prominent in internet governance than previously anticipated, with this trend accelerating faster than expected

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Current multistakeholder governance faces significant challenges and needs renewal

Speakers

– Julia Pohler
– Anriette Esterhuysen
– Gbenga Sesan

Arguments

All scenarios except one showed a bleak future for multistakeholderism, with processes being hollowed out or institutionalized beyond meaning

The IGF needs renewal and redesign to tackle difficult questions without seeking consensus on everything

Multistakeholder governance faces threats from those seeking more pragmatic but less inclusive models

Summary

All speakers acknowledge that multistakeholder governance is facing serious challenges and requires significant reform to remain relevant and effective

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Future processes should be more interactive and participatory

Speakers

– Julia Pohler
– Anriette Esterhuysen
– Audience

Arguments

Future foresight processes should include government representatives directly in task forces for better implementation

The IGF should adopt more participative methodologies including scenario games rather than traditional panel formats

Reports should be made accessible and used in interactive formats like games for broader stakeholder engagement

Summary

There is agreement that future governance processes and forums should move beyond traditional formats to more interactive, participatory approaches that engage all stakeholders more meaningfully

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Similar viewpoints

Both speakers believe that future governance discussions need to be more courageous in addressing difficult topics, including the role of big tech companies and challenging existing assumptions about multistakeholder processes

Speakers

– Julia Pohler
– Anriette Esterhuysen

Arguments

Future exercises should examine big tech business models and government enabling roles more courageously

The IGF needs renewal and redesign to tackle difficult questions without seeking consensus on everything

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Economic

Both speakers acknowledge that early optimistic visions about technology’s impact haven’t fully materialized, but emphasize the importance of maintaining hope and clear goals while being realistic about current challenges

Speakers

– Anriette Esterhuysen
– Gbenga Sesan

Arguments

Early hopes that technology would be an equalizer between rich and poor have not fully materialized

Stakeholders must maintain optimism and define what they want while being realistic about challenges

Topics

Development | Human rights

Both speakers view the role of states and multistakeholder governance as facilitative and connecting, rather than controlling or replacing existing governance mechanisms

Speakers

– Anriette Esterhuysen
– Philipp Schulte

Arguments

The multistakeholder approach should focus on connecting diverse decision-making processes rather than creating uniform governance

States should act as enablers ensuring all stakeholder groups can perform their roles effectively

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Unexpected consensus

States playing a more prominent role in internet governance is not necessarily negative

Speakers

– Julia Pohler
– Anriette Esterhuysen
– Philipp Schulte

Arguments

Geopolitics and state actions emerged as the primary driving factors across most scenarios, more than anticipated

States have always had profound impact on governance inclusivity and should not be seen as undermining multistakeholder ideals

States should act as enablers ensuring all stakeholder groups can perform their roles effectively

Explanation

Despite the traditional internet governance community’s wariness of state involvement, there was unexpected consensus that increased state engagement could be positive if states act as enablers rather than controllers, and that their involvement was perhaps inevitable and necessary

Topics

Legal and regulatory

The need for more courageous and direct discussions in multistakeholder forums

Speakers

– Julia Pohler
– Anriette Esterhuysen
– Gbenga Sesan

Arguments

Future exercises should examine big tech business models and government enabling roles more courageously

The IGF needs renewal and redesign to tackle difficult questions without seeking consensus on everything

Stakeholders must maintain optimism and define what they want while being realistic about challenges

Explanation

There was unexpected consensus that the multistakeholder community needs to move away from seeking consensus on everything and instead engage in more direct, potentially confrontational discussions about difficult issues like big tech power and government overreach

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Economic

Overall assessment

Summary

The speakers demonstrated strong consensus on several key issues: the value of strategic foresight methodology, the increasing importance of geopolitical factors in internet governance, the need for multistakeholder governance reform, and the importance of more participatory processes. There was also unexpected agreement that increased state involvement isn’t necessarily negative if properly channeled, and that the community needs more courageous discussions about difficult topics.

Consensus level

High level of consensus with constructive disagreement mainly on implementation details rather than fundamental principles. This suggests the internet governance community is ready for significant reforms and new approaches, with broad agreement on the direction of needed changes. The consensus around the need for renewal and more direct engagement indicates potential for meaningful evolution of governance processes.

Different viewpoints

Level of abstraction in foresight methodology and its practical utility

Speakers

– Anriette Esterhuysen
– Julia Pohler

Arguments

Foresight exercises are valuable for the participatory process itself, allowing creative thinking beyond current constraints

Strategic foresight creates plausible future scenarios rather than predictions to help prepare for uncertainties

Summary

Anriette acknowledges that abstraction is still an issue with foresight methodology and questions whether the report itself will be particularly useful, emphasizing that the exercise process is more valuable than the output. Julia focuses more on the methodology’s value in creating plausible scenarios for preparation, suggesting the reports can be practically useful for decision-making.

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Approach to defining stakeholder goals – dreaming vs. concrete specificity

Speakers

– Gbenga Sesan
– Anriette Esterhuysen

Arguments

Stakeholders must maintain optimism and define what they want while being realistic about challenges

The IGF needs renewal and redesign to tackle difficult questions without seeking consensus on everything

Summary

Gbenga emphasizes the importance of maintaining optimism and ‘dreaming’ about desired outcomes even when facing challenges, while Anriette argues that it’s not just about dreaming but about concrete things, and criticizes that multistakeholder fora often produce watered-down statements to avoid offending stakeholders. She wants more specific, potentially controversial positions.

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Human rights

Government participation in foresight task forces

Speakers

– Julia Pohler
– Philipp Schulte

Arguments

Future foresight processes should include government representatives directly in task forces for better implementation

States should act as enablers ensuring all stakeholder groups can perform their roles effectively

Summary

Julia advocates for direct government participation in task forces to improve dialogue and implementation, while Philipp expresses reluctance about government involvement, stating they were hesitant to be on the task force to avoid having a government-steered process that would use stakeholder scenarios as lip service.

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Unexpected differences

Value and utility of the foresight report output versus process

Speakers

– Anriette Esterhuysen
– Julia Pohler
– Gbenga Sesan

Arguments

Foresight exercises are valuable for the participatory process itself, allowing creative thinking beyond current constraints

Strategic foresight creates plausible future scenarios rather than predictions to help prepare for uncertainties

The scenarios can serve as conversation starters but need updating with current geopolitical realities

Explanation

Unexpectedly, the panelists who participated in the foresight exercise disagreed on its practical utility. Anriette, despite finding the process valuable, questioned whether the report itself would be useful and emphasized that participatory processes like this are mainly valuable to participants. Gbenga was more optimistic about the report’s utility as conversation starters, while Julia focused on the methodology’s value. This disagreement is unexpected because all three were involved in the same process but came away with different assessments of its practical value.

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Overall assessment

Summary

The main areas of disagreement centered on methodological approaches to foresight exercises, the balance between idealism and pragmatism in multistakeholder governance, and the appropriate level of government involvement in stakeholder processes. Despite participating in the same foresight exercise, speakers had different views on its practical utility and implementation.

Disagreement level

The level of disagreement was moderate and constructive rather than fundamental. Speakers shared common concerns about the future of multistakeholder governance and the increasing role of states, but differed on approaches and solutions. The disagreements reflect different perspectives on how to strengthen and evolve internet governance rather than fundamental opposition to shared goals. This suggests a healthy debate within the community about methods and strategies rather than irreconcilable differences on core principles.

Partial agreements

Similar viewpoints

Both speakers believe that future governance discussions need to be more courageous in addressing difficult topics, including the role of big tech companies and challenging existing assumptions about multistakeholder processes

Speakers

– Julia Pohler
– Anriette Esterhuysen

Arguments

Future exercises should examine big tech business models and government enabling roles more courageously

The IGF needs renewal and redesign to tackle difficult questions without seeking consensus on everything

Topics

Legal and regulatory | Economic

Both speakers acknowledge that early optimistic visions about technology’s impact haven’t fully materialized, but emphasize the importance of maintaining hope and clear goals while being realistic about current challenges

Speakers

– Anriette Esterhuysen
– Gbenga Sesan

Arguments

Early hopes that technology would be an equalizer between rich and poor have not fully materialized

Stakeholders must maintain optimism and define what they want while being realistic about challenges

Topics

Development | Human rights

Both speakers view the role of states and multistakeholder governance as facilitative and connecting, rather than controlling or replacing existing governance mechanisms

Speakers

– Anriette Esterhuysen
– Philipp Schulte

Arguments

The multistakeholder approach should focus on connecting diverse decision-making processes rather than creating uniform governance

States should act as enablers ensuring all stakeholder groups can perform their roles effectively

Topics

Legal and regulatory

Key takeaways

Strategic foresight is a valuable methodology for exploring plausible futures rather than making predictions, helping stakeholders prepare for uncertainties and disruptions

Geopolitics and state actions have emerged as the primary driving factors in internet governance scenarios, with current developments moving faster than anticipated

All developed scenarios except one showed a bleak future for multistakeholder governance, with processes being either hollowed out or over-institutionalized

The multistakeholder approach should focus on connecting diverse decision-making processes rather than creating uniform governance structures

States play a crucial enabling role in internet governance and should not be viewed as undermining multistakeholder ideals

The participatory process of developing scenarios is often more valuable than the final report itself

Technology’s role as an equalizer has not materialized as hoped, and big tech business models create digital barriers that fragment online spaces

The IGF needs renewal and redesign to become more participative, innovative, and willing to tackle difficult questions without requiring consensus

Resolutions and action items

The German government will proceed with publishing the strategic foresight report under the new ministry responsible for strategic foresight

Collaboration proposed between the German foresight project and the Remit Research project to develop scenario testing workshops and games

Future foresight processes should include government representatives directly in task forces for better implementation and understanding

The IGF should consider adopting new session formats including scenario games rather than traditional panel discussions

The scenarios need updating with current geopolitical realities through addendums or annexes

Stakeholders should work together to define ‘what we want’ in concrete terms rather than abstract ideals

Unresolved issues

How to make foresight reports more accessible and useful for daily work beyond the participatory process

The challenge of maintaining stakeholder engagement throughout lengthy foresight exercises

How to balance the need for government involvement with maintaining genuine multistakeholder processes

The tension between being realistic about current challenges while maintaining optimism for desired outcomes

How to address the role of big technology companies in fragmenting digital spaces

The future mandate and structure of the IGF, particularly regarding the 2026 discussions

How to make multistakeholder forums more willing to tackle controversial issues without losing participants

Suggested compromises

Governments should act as enablers ensuring all stakeholder groups can perform their roles effectively, rather than dominating processes

Multistakeholder governance should embrace diverse decision-making processes that overlap and engage with each other rather than seeking uniform approaches

Future scenario exercises should balance German/European perspectives with global and diverse viewpoints through targeted interviews and validation

The IGF should become ‘braver’ in asking difficult questions while maintaining its inclusive character

Foresight exercises should examine both government regulation and big tech business models as sources of digital fragmentation

Strategic foresight should be used as an ongoing adjustment tool rather than a one-time prediction exercise

I think my only sort of one, I would have liked to be part of a focus group or a group at some point. I think I found it, I would have found it more interesting in some ways to have a group dynamic. And then I think my only other question about it as well is the way in which you treat multi-stakeholder in how you are approaching the future of Internet governance. And I think in that sense, the study itself, I think, perhaps did not unpack or deconstruct what multi-stakeholder means.

Speaker

Anriette Esterhuysen

Reason

This comment was insightful because it identified a fundamental methodological limitation and conceptual weakness in the foresight exercise. Esterhuysen pointed out that the study treated ‘multi-stakeholder’ as a one-dimensional concept without deconstructing its complexity, which is crucial given that multi-stakeholderism is central to internet governance discussions.

Impact

This critique shifted the conversation toward examining the limitations of current multi-stakeholder approaches and sparked deeper reflection on whether the focus should be on ‘multi-stakeholder governance’ or simply ‘effective, accountable governance.’ It also influenced Julia’s later admission that multi-stakeholderism appeared to have a bleak future in most scenarios.

So I think when kind of I we get to the stage where we really wrote the scenarios, and I looked at them with some distance after a while, I think what strikes me most is that the most important factor in almost all scenarios… is actually the role of states and the role of governments… And we wrote these scenarios before President Trump took office again. And before we kind of saw this increase of geopolitical tensions… So I think Today we would have gone even further in emphasizing the role of geopolitics and geoeconomics… the reality is actually moving faster than we thought it would.

Speaker

Julia Pohler

Reason

This observation was particularly thought-provoking because it revealed how rapidly geopolitical realities were outpacing even recent foresight exercises. It highlighted the dominance of state actors over other stakeholders in shaping internet governance futures, which challenges traditional multi-stakeholder ideals.

Impact

This comment fundamentally reframed the discussion around the central role of states in internet governance, leading other panelists to acknowledge this reality rather than resist it. It sparked a conversation about how to work with, rather than around, state power in multi-stakeholder processes.

I think in all of these scenarios we ended up writing possible futures in where multi-stakeholder processes are either being hollowed out or kind of completely undermined by corporate actors and state actors… So I would say that in all of these scenarios, somehow multi-stakeholderism and governance has outlived its promises.

Speaker

Julia Pohler

Reason

This was a stark and honest assessment that challenged the fundamental assumptions of the internet governance community. The admission that their scenarios showed multi-stakeholderism failing across different futures was a sobering reality check for the field.

Impact

This comment created a turning point in the discussion, moving from abstract scenario planning to concrete concerns about the viability of current governance models. It prompted other speakers to defend and redefine multi-stakeholderism, leading to more nuanced discussions about what effective governance actually means.

So much as we like this, I don’t know, there’s this kind of fairytale notion of multi-stakeholder governance as this alternative dimension of perfect governance. I mean, I see it as a way, a way of arriving at more accountable, inclusive, effective governance. And states are a big part of that.

Speaker

Anriette Esterhuysen

Reason

This comment was insightful because it reframed multi-stakeholder governance from an idealistic end goal to a pragmatic methodology. It challenged the community’s tendency to romanticize multi-stakeholderism while acknowledging the legitimate and necessary role of states.

Impact

This reframing helped move the conversation away from defending an idealized model toward discussing practical approaches to inclusive governance. It provided a more mature perspective that influenced subsequent discussions about how different stakeholders can work together effectively.

I think we do need to think more creatively. And I’m just going to give one example… to see the European states in particular, shell-shocked, because it was so difficult for them to operate in this context, when a long-time partner in the Internet governance and World Summit process, the US, was moving outside or taking on a different position. My first thought during that entire week was, I wish these governments had all done some foresight work.

Speaker

Anriette Esterhuysen

Reason

This concrete example powerfully illustrated the practical value of foresight exercises. By describing how unprepared governments were for geopolitical shifts, it demonstrated why scenario planning is essential for effective governance and diplomacy.

Impact

This example shifted the discussion from abstract methodology to concrete applications, helping participants understand the real-world value of foresight work. It reinforced the argument for more widespread adoption of these techniques in government and international relations.

I think sometimes we say what we want and particularly when we try and say it in a multi-stakeholder way, you know, it sounds like some kind of sort of watered down set of wedding vows… I want fair tax payment by big tech so that countries who need revenue to actually build a fiber optic backbone… I want data flows that are not based on an extractive sort of colonial type model… but it’s almost impossible to say those things in the context of so many multi-stakeholder fora because you don’t want to offend the private sector.

Speaker

Anriette Esterhuysen

Reason

This comment was particularly provocative because it exposed the tendency of multi-stakeholder processes to avoid difficult topics in favor of consensus-building, resulting in bland, ineffective outcomes. The specific examples made abstract governance discussions concrete and political.

Impact

This critique sparked a broader conversation about the need for ‘braver’ multi-stakeholder processes that can tackle controversial issues. It influenced the final recommendations about redesigning the IGF to be more participatory and willing to address difficult questions without requiring consensus.

Overall assessment

These key comments fundamentally shifted the discussion from a celebratory presentation of a foresight exercise to a critical examination of the current state and future viability of internet governance models. The conversation evolved through several phases: initial methodological critiques led to acknowledgment of the dominant role of states, which prompted honest assessment of multi-stakeholderism’s limitations, ultimately resulting in calls for more pragmatic, brave, and creative approaches to governance. The panelists’ willingness to challenge sacred assumptions about multi-stakeholder governance created space for more mature and realistic discussions about how to achieve effective, inclusive governance in a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape. The discussion demonstrated how foresight exercises can serve not just as planning tools, but as catalysts for fundamental reconsideration of existing approaches and assumptions.

How can the scenarios be updated to reflect rapidly changing geopolitical realities, particularly after recent political developments?

Speaker

Gbenga Sesan

Explanation

The scenarios were developed before recent geopolitical changes and may need updating as reality is moving faster than anticipated, requiring an addendum or annex to maintain relevance

How can multi-stakeholder processes be transformed to make them more meaningful and avoid being hollowed out or institutionalized to the point of losing their bottom-up character?

Speaker

Julia Pohler

Explanation

All scenarios except one showed a bleak future for multi-stakeholderism, suggesting current models may be outliving their promises and need transformation

How can strategic foresight exercises be made more participatory and engaging, potentially through gaming methodologies?

Speaker

Professor Roberta Haar

Explanation

There’s interest in adapting the scenario data into interactive games and collaborative workshops to make policy discussions more engaging and meaningful

What concrete actions should the German government take based on the scenarios developed, and how can this be made more transparent to stakeholders?

Speaker

Julia Pohler

Explanation

There’s a need for clearer understanding of how the scenarios will be implemented and what specific policy actions will result from the foresight exercise

How can government representatives be better integrated into future foresight task forces to improve mutual understanding?

Speaker

Julia Pohler

Explanation

Having government officials directly participate in scenario development could help both stakeholders understand the impact of their contributions and help governments understand different perspectives

What is the future mandate and structure of the IGF, and when will this be discussed?

Speaker

Bertrand de la Chapelle

Explanation

The evolution of IGF’s institutional arrangements needs to be addressed, particularly in the context of WSIS+20 discussions and the need for more effective multi-stakeholder governance

How can the IGF be redesigned to be more participative, innovative, and willing to tackle difficult questions without consensus?

Speaker

Anriette Esterhuyse

Explanation

Current IGF formats may be too institutionalized and risk-averse, requiring new methodologies and greater courage to address contentious issues effectively

What role should governments play in creating enabling environments for multi-stakeholder governance beyond just regulation and repression?

Speaker

Anriette Esterhuyse

Explanation

Governments have broader toolkits available and could be more creative partners in enabling inclusive, accountable, and creative governance processes

How do dominant technology companies’ business models fragment digital spaces and create barriers, and what are the implications for internet governance?

Speaker

Julia Pohler

Explanation

There’s insufficient attention to how platform economy business models contribute to digital fragmentation, compared to focus on government-driven fragmentation

How can foresight methodologies better account for ‘black swan’ events and unexpected developments that are difficult to anticipate?

Speaker

Bertrand de la Chapelle

Explanation

Historical examples show that major technological and social changes often come from unexpected directions, challenging the predictive capacity of scenario planning