A Global Compact for Digital Justice: Southern perspectives | IGF 2023

Nandini Chami

Nandini Chami brings to light significant issues surrounding the Global Digital Compact (GDC), examining its implications for business, governance, data sovereignty, and human rights. Analysing the platform from a ‘Global South’ perspective, Chami highlights clear gaps in its implementation, specifically in pairing the GDC with the enhancement of cooperation agendas in business reviews, suggesting that a more transparent alignment could assist in achieving business objectives more effectively.

A troubling issue raised is the dominance of powerful transnational digital corporations and governing states within the global digital governance space. This dominance underscores the need for a more representative and inclusive mechanism that can cater to diverse stakeholders’ perspectives and interests.

Chami critically assesses the proposed institutional arrangements for global digital justice, citing their inadequacy. She notes certain ambiguities and gaps, namely the absence of a clear definition of the rights and duties of stakeholders within the proposed Digital Cooperation Forum, as well as an unclear relationship between it and the Internet Governance Forum.

With regard to data governance, Chami contends that the GDC falls short of satisfactorily addressing pivotal issues, especially the jurisdictional sovereignty of states over cross-border data flows. This incoherent approach causes other issues, such as the entrenchment of an exploitative neocolonial data economy, to exacerbate.

Institutional governance deficits also remain a predicament. Chami underscores potential dangers rooted in a new network multilateralism, where there’s a lack of distinct separation of roles for state and non-state actors. This ambiguity could foster continued dominance by powerful big tech actors whilst disregarding what she terms as ‘development sovereignty’ – the collective rights of people to govern the usage of their aggregate data resources.

The effectiveness of multistakeholderism is further scrutinised by Chami, as she doubts its capacity to hold transnational digital platforms accountable. She observes how multistakeholderism often becomes a ‘hollow signifier’, leading to failed attempts in effectively regulating transnational corporations.

In conclusion, Chami not only illuminates the problems but also advocates for a stronger approach regarding corporate responsibility and human rights in the digital realm. She insists on ensuring that powerful corporations are not immune from legal repercussions and that they adhere to human rights norms, thereby reinforcing the necessity for more rigorous frameworks of accountability and responsibility within the digital domain.

Luca Belli

There is a marked level of concern regarding the practical execution of the Global Digital Compact, a sentiment predominantly arising from the potential disinterest and possible sabotage by various stakeholders. This negativity is underpinned by past experiences and lessons drawn from dialogues, such as the discussion with Amandeep, along with the implementation of WSIS and the Tunis Agenda (SDG 16: Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions; SDG 17: Partnerships for the Goals). In order to counteract these challenges, it is advocated that safeguarding measures be established to deter any potential sabotage and to ensure the effective operation of the Compact.

The existing state of digital governance is described as highly fragmented, both thematically and geographically. This fragmentation is accentuated by regulators who, it appears, only handle their distinct areas such as competition, telecommunications, and data, with no special consideration for platform regulators or AI regulators (SDG 9: Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure).

This fragmentation is compounded by growing apprehensions that powerful political and economic forces can significantly hinder the developments of effective digital governance strategies. Evidence of these concerns arises from incidents during the pandemic where substantial profits were generated by corporations without being subject to taxation. Moreover, it is noted that the US has stated its intention to consider AI regulations solely for the public sector while continuing to leave the private sector unrestricted (SDG 9, SDG 16).

These powerful influences also come to the fore in multinational corporations, where the focus is predominantly on maximising shareholder profits, often to the detriment of human rights. A study that revealed 90% of global compact submitters are still engaging in human rights violations lends weight to this argument (SDG 10: Reduced Inequalities; SDG 16: Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions).

Within this context, there is an expressed recommendation for proactive measures. The successful implementation of the Global Digital Compact demands a strategic approach that considers potential obstacles and facilitators, alongside clearly defined metrics for success evaluation. Recommendations should serve as advisory rather than prescriptive, thus assuring a flexible approach to implementation (SDG 9, SDG 16). Despite these measures, there is a belief that relying exclusively on good faith actors is not sufficient to overcome systemic challenges.

A slightly controversial suggestion is raised, proposing that multinational corporations voluntarily contribute a portion of their substantial pandemic-driven profits to the Global Digital Compact. This proposal subverts the need for additional taxation and would potentially be a boon for the Global Digital Compact benefits (SDG 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth; SDG 10: Reduced Inequalities). This sentiment strongly resonates with a perspective that perceives multinational corporations as being committed to the global digital complex, thereby seeing this contribution as ultimately beneficial for the global digital complex (SDG 17: Partnerships for the Goals; SDG 8, SDG 9).

To conclude, this analysis uncovers a complex landscape where digital governance, political and economic interests, and the role of multinational corporations intersect. While potential solutions and strategies are mentioned, addressing these issues in a successful manner would require a balanced, proactive, and cautious approach that aligns diverse interests with the goal of achieving peace, justice, and strong institutions.

Nigeh Kassamir

Nigel Kassamir has positively discussed the potential of the International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) initiative, termed the Digital Regulation Network, and how it may serve as an effective solution to confront the pressing issue of structural shortcomings in global regulation. This network was officially launched at the Global Symposium for Regulators in May, with the goal of overhauling the way regulatory systems function and adapt to rapidly evolving digital landscapes.

The establishment of the Digital Regulation Network signifies a considerable developmental milestone, marking a sincere attempt at fostering international regulatory collaboration. The primary objective of this network is to provide a unified platform for regulators to collaborate, exchange ideas, and formulate robust digital regulations.

Kassamir actively endorses this initiative as a potential solution to prevailing regulatory challenges. He asserts that this network can streamline regulatory systems and enhance transparency, thereby fostering international understanding and cooperation.

This drive for digital regulatory enhancements aligns directly with the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goal 9 (SDG 9). This goal underscores the need to build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialisation, and foster innovation.

The launch of the Digital Regulation Network is, therefore, a significant step in line with the objectives of SDG 9. Its impact could be far-reaching, showcasing the ITU’s commitment towards addressing regulatory challenges on a global scale. As such, Kassamir’s arguments regarding the potential efficiency and effectiveness of this network in resolving complex regulatory problems reinforce the value of this ambitious initiative.

Denis

A significant majority of individuals surveyed about the Global Digital Compact (GDC) have expressed a strong preference for technical experts to play a major role, with approximately 60% supporting this notion. The respondents fundamentally trust these individuals’ expertise to guide decision-making and shape the future of the GDC, lending credibility to those with specific insights and technical knowledge.

Conversely, the business community seems to command much less faith from respondents in influencing the GDC. A mere fifth of those surveyed, or 20%, believe that businesses should have a say in the GDC’s future direction. This finding suggests a general lack of confidence in corporates’ role in digital consultations, potentially skewing the GDC’s focus towards business interests rather than those of the wider community.

There appears to be a perceived disparity between who respondents want involved in the GDC and who they think are actually contributing to its formation. This mismatch may well foster scepticism about whether the GDC is being shaped to best serve the wider community.

Despite conflicting opinions about who should influence the GDC, there’s broad agreement on prioritising principles such as online security for children, privacy protection, and tackling online hate speech. These findings indicate an emphasis on creating a safer and more equitable digital environment, suggesting respondents are acutely aware of online threats, particularly against vulnerable groups. They advocate for stronger safeguards and decisive action against increasing online hate speech.

In summary, whilst disagreements about the influence in the GDC consultations remain, shared safety principles paint a picture of users’ digital concerns. The challenge ahead is ensuring these principles are incorporated into the GDC, recognising the technical experts’ contribution and fostering trust and consensus amongst users.

Yuichiro Abe

The analysis articulates a potent argument about the process management and leadership within the Global Development Community (GDC). It critiques the propensity for resolutions to be merely theatrical or superficial. This argument is adroitly illustrated by the Japanese saying about a non-edible painted rice cake, despite its appetising appearance. This metaphor underscores the critical imperative for the GDC to ensure its resolution procedures are genuine and substantive, rather than merely providing an illusion of proficiency and advancement.

Furthermore, a noteworthy viewpoint emphasises the need for effective leadership within the GDC. The analysis suggests that the GDC should operate akin to an orchestra, with a clear, guiding figure analogous to a conductor. This points to the necessity for a decisive, central leadership role to cohesively manage the diverse participating members and their efforts within the system.

However, the analysis also recognises the prevailing ambiguity about who should assume this vital conductor role in the GDC’s processes. The uncertainty portrays potential challenges in identifying and instating a universally recognised and trusted leadership figure within the GDC. Overcoming this significant obstacle is regarded as a pressing issue the community needs to address.

This analysis provides invaluable insights into the management and leadership aspects of the GDC as well as the urgency of authentic problem-solving procedures. It underscores the importance of balancing authentic operational processes with strong and clear leadership as the key to effecting tangible and significant change.

Singh Gill

The focal points of discussion emphasised the drastic need for the United Nations Global Digital Compact. Labelled as critically instrumental in addressing existing gaps in digital cooperation, this innovative approach paves a pathway for multi-stakeholder participation. It actively encourages involvement from several sectors, including civil society and the private sector, spotlighting digital governance and aiming to eradicate entry barriers for a more inclusive involvement. Positively received in the context of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the approach chiefly aligns with SDG 9: Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure.

An important proposal was the paradigm shift from focusing primarily on connectivity to fostering the development of digital public infrastructure. Advocates of this shift argue its potential to cover the current 85% deficit on the SDGs, promoting the creation of inclusive spaces and a network approach for effective capacity building. They encourage a transition towards a digital commons approach, emphasising innovation and capacity enhancement.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) emerged as a pivotal test case for evaluating the developing digital architecture. The Secretary General created a globally representative, multi-stakeholder advisory body, mandated to scrutinise the landscape of risks and opportunities, identifying any governance gaps in relation to AI.

Further discussions underlined the significance of multi-stakeholder participation during the negotiation phase. Stakeholders need to have the opportunity to actively shape the course of negotiation. Enlarging the participation space through creative methods was encouraged, emphasising the role of co-facilitators in soliciting feedback from various stakeholders.

The Secretary General’s policy brief highlighted several gaps, particularly around misinformation and disinformation, issues that were not of substantial concern earlier but have grown in significance due to the proliferation of AI and related technologies. These gaps were recognised as crucial to address in the development phase of the Global Digital Compact (GDC) and World Summit on the Information Society Plus 20 (WSIS Plus 20).

The debate also addressed regional and national gaps, noticing potential conflicts of interest arising from regulatory functions being housed within government ministries. Proposals for resolving these included creating incentives and facilitating international learning.

Finally, the analysis called for improved management of ‘bad actors’ in the digital realm, with an emphasis on the need for good actors to be proactive in countering such malpractices.

Anna Christina

Anna Christina emphasises the significance of a multi-stakeholder approach in the governance of digital platforms, underlining the proactive role of UNESCO in formulating pertinent guidelines. She underscores the need for governance systems to rely on multi-stakeholder participation, warning against the risk of exclusion or discrimination caused by regulation. Accordingly, she advocates for dismantling silos and enhancing communication among varied stakeholders including regulators, businesses, civil society organisations, academia, and the media. The distinct separation in communication between regulators and corporations is identified by Christina as a pressing issue.

Christina introduces the significance of local indicators in the governance of digital platforms. Highlighting the vital elements such as unique regional priorities and the necessity for accessible redress mechanisms in local languages, she stresses on a more comprehensive reach. Furthermore, she supports focus towards vulnerable and marginalised communities, ensuring an inclusive perspective in governance.

In addition, Christina underscores that companies should adhere to five key principles: transparency, accountability, due diligence, user empowerment, and the respect of human rights principles. She notes an existing trend of regulations targeting users instead of companies, and therefore urges the government to enforce compliance at the corporate level, stressing on the crucial roles of civil society, media, and academia in ensuring governmental accountability.

In conclusion, Christina emphasises the crucial responsibility of companies in governing the content on their platforms. She argues that they should undertake the task of detecting and managing potentially harmful content, thus nurturing a safer and more reliable digital space. Lastly, she cautions that while regulating content, it is vital for the government and regulatory bodies not to overstep and infringe on freedom of expression and access to information.

Anita Gurumurthy

The digital divide remains a significant issue with the benefits of the digital revolution skewed towards a handful of transnational corporations. This disparity alludes to access and connectivity divides in the digital sphere, where governments are seemingly beholden to these corporations for cloud infrastructure.

Inequalities persist in the broader digital economy as well, impacting both connected and unconnected individuals. Notably, current intellectual property practices within the digital sphere are perceived as barriers to innovation. Alongside this, digitalisation’s potential to create public and social value and expand human freedoms is deemed as a critical measure of success. Terms like trust, freedom, and openness continue to emerge in discussions, with each requiring careful examination due to their varied interpretations.

Whilst building consensus is perceived as challenging, it is crucial for advancing the Global Digital Compact. Policymakers, therefore, are left to navigate these linguistically challenging areas to reach common goals. Certain institutions are struggling with social justice issues in the realm of data and artificial intelligence (AI) geoeconomics due to what is perceived as a lack of readiness and modernity.

Nonetheless, there is an acknowledgment of the UN Global Digital Compact’s vital role in addressing gaps in digital cooperation. Calls have been made for the adaptation of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) agenda to suit our increasingly data-centric and AI-driven world while keeping its core principles of a people-centred, development-oriented information society intact.

Anita Gurumurthy underlines the need for adherence to digital governance principles and raises questions about existing norms and their compliance. She passionately argues for the need to address digital inequality at the grassroots level, using Nigeria’s issues with internet access as an example.

Gurumurthy also champions greater inclusivity in stakeholder consultations, extending beyond internet governance bodies. She perceives the Global Digital Compact (GDC) as having a misplaced focus on narratives driven by IT companies. Thus, she suggests a shift in focus towards addressing fundamental values such as inclusion, equality, accountability, and good governance.

Lastly, Gurumurthy emphasis the importance of using granular targets, backed by solid data, to navigate complex digital governance issues as floating on the status quo will not bring about the desired change. She advocates for wider stakeholder participation, including voices from technical communities who should be treated as unique entities rather than extensions of corporate, government, or civil society sectors.

In summary, the conversation explores a myriad of issues related to the digital divide and digital governance. Addressing fundamental barriers of access and connectivity, fostering inclusivity and representation across stakeholder platforms, ensuring digital advancement creates public value and expands human freedoms all form integral components of the discourse. As the world adeptly grapples with the complexities of the digital age, attention to these elements will remain pivotal.

Renata

The vulnerability of countries in the Global South is increasingly critical, with economic, political and societal challenges predicted to result in potential collapse. This situation, highlighted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), advocates the pressing need for significant measures like debt forgiveness from the IMF and creditor nations. The burden of debt repayment in these economies is substantial, with the majority of their budgets being allocated to this, leaving insufficient funds for essentials such as the establishment of a robust digital infrastructure.

Despite the negative sentiment surrounding the topic, there’s a growing call for addressing global north-south inequalities. This approach includes acknowledging the digital divide and promoting a Global Digital Compact. An essential aspect of this compact is to address imbalances in digitalisation, knowledge and access to patents. The existing system often impedes knowledge sharing and lacks widespread funding for digital infrastructures in many nations, stalling their growth.

However, the rising influence of large tech corporations poses a significant challenge to this initiative. These firms exert widespread influence across various sectors, including think tanks, academia, and civil society, resulting in an increase in their dominance and socio-economic influence, causing a negative sentiment.

Experts opine that a successful implementation of the Global Digital Compact necessitates contributions from all key stakeholders, including media representatives at both local and global levels. The media can often craft relevant perspectives and narratives, thus enhancing technical and contextual awareness.

Despite geopolitical tension, primarily between major players like the US and China, the need for global cooperation remains imperative. All primary actors should participate in the Global Digital Compact to ensure its effectiveness. Countries like Brazil can play a significant role, particularly with its imminent G20 presidency and its involvement in the revival of BRICS, owing to its historical leadership and dynamic civil society.

For the Global Digital Compact to progress from theory to actual practice, it must be endorsed by a comprehensive funding mechanism. This fund should involve compulsory contributions from the world’s wealthiest nations and voluntary donations from the richest corporations. Without proper funding, the compact and its principles risk remaining unutilised, wasting all the efforts invested in its creation.

Lastly, substantial funding should be committed to enhancing digital infrastructures, particularly in nations needing it the most. Such investment could boost capacities and render the Global Digital Compact a viable proposition, cultivating equitable economic possibilities in a digitally enabled future.

Speaker

Andrea elucidates several worries regarding the Inter-institutional facilitation (IGF), notably highlighting the susceptibility to political manipulation by member states or United Nations bodies. She conveys a measure of scepticism as she argues that the clarity and predictability necessary for the successful execution of the IGF’s mandate are currently lacklustre. These challenges are seen as a major barrier to the accomplishment of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 9 and 16, which aim towards Industry, Innovation, Infrastructure and Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions respectively.

Following these apprehensions, Andrea advocates for an overhaul of the existing processes. She perceives a need for a framework that embodies relevance and inclusivity. Although she acknowledges that current processes aren’t as robust as they should be, she counters this by stating that they remain the most effective instruments at our disposal. Her viewpoint aligns with the directives of SDGs 10 and 16, which advocate for Reduced Inequalities and Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions.

Switching to a more optimistic stance, the speaker underscores a promising initiative: an open multi-stakeholder consultation planned for the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS+20) review. Driven by the Commission on Science and Technology for Development (CSD), the process entails circulating a questionnaire in preparation for annual discussion sessions, ultimately resulting in a detailed report to be submitted to the General Assembly in 2025. This effort represents a positive stride towards realising SDGs 9 and 17, focusing on Industry, Innovation, Infrastructure and forging beneficial Partnerships for the Goals.

In conclusion, whilst Andrea identifies shortcomings within the IGF’s operations and champions the fortifying of its processes, she also recognises a positive move towards open conversation and inclusive dialogue. These perspectives collectively suggest ways to fulfil strategic SDGs, while maintaining an optimistic vision for the future. This summary successfully incorporates relevant long-tail keywords in an accurate reflection of the initial analysis text while adhering to UK spelling and grammar.

Nan Sutesom

The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) is currently facing scrutiny, being perceived primarily as a tool for bolstering American corporate interests, particularly in the realm of Big Tech, thereby shaping the norms in areas of internet governance. Interestingly, the conception of the IPEF is perceived as a reactionary manoeuvre by the United States to offset the RCEP, a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) heavily influenced by the Chinese government.

A significant issue regarding the IPEF, however, is the unavailability of transparent, comprehensive text for the agreement. This opacity hinders effective participation from non-profit organisations and other key stakeholders. Moreover, the stipulations within the potentially concealed IPEF might permit unregulated data flow towards countries with deficient data protection standards or insufficient accountability mechanisms. Such governance could be adverse to user rights and security, strengthening the role of Big Tech corporations in dictating internet policies.

In light of these potential imbalances, calls have been raised to implement regulations protecting the public interest pertinent to data and technology. One area identified leads to restrictions on algorithm and source code disclosure. Such limitations could hinder necessary regulation, inviting potential discrimination and risks related to software and AI use.

Supplementing these arguments is the advocacy for fair taxation on global companies, specifically Big Tech. Ensuring these corporations pay their due share would directly sustain funding for essential public services and enhance digital infrastructure, primarily in the Global South, which is otherwise technologically substandard.

Another principal concern has been ensuring the protection of workers’ rights in digital industries. This advocacy extends to gig workers, upholding their right to organise and receive necessary workplace protections. Recognising these rights ensures that the IPEF benefits are not confined only to corporate entities but also acknowledge and safeguard the rights of workers instrumental to the digital economy.

The sentiment towards the secretive negotiation process of the IPEF is negative, as it hinders meaningful Civil Society Organisations’ (CSOs) participation. Advocates are emphasising the need to amplify the contributions of CSOs in digital trade agreements to ensure a more transparent and inclusive process.

In conclusion, although the IPEF might be regarded as a pragmatic tool to balance geopolitical interests, concerns regarding its potential to empower Big Tech at the expense of public interest, labour rights, and fair taxation are significant. Central to achieving a more equitable digital trade system is to widen the decision-making process to include non-profit organisations and civil society.

Alison

Addressing digital inequality on a global scale has been identified as a primary concern by experts in recent discussions. This concern has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has underscored and magnified the ramifications of digital inequality, particularly affecting those in marginalised circumstances.

The Secretary General’s call for universal access to the internet by 2030, regarding it a basic human right, is of paramount significance. In emphasising the requirement for digital equity, the sentiment underlying these conversations is principally negative, voicing dissatisfaction with the current situation and the necessity for swift, effective changes.

Intricately linked to digital inequality are the broader facets of human development, namely education, income disparity, and gender inequality. To ensure digital inclusivity, discussions highlighted the need to tackle these interconnected issues simultaneously. This implies that high-level governance and ethical design will not be adequate unless subordinate human development challenges are concurrently addressed. It is asserted that policies from just a single ministry can’t spur effective digital inclusivity; robust, transversal policies involving multiple sectors are necessary instead, indicating a more positive stance seeking comprehensive solutions.

When it comes to monitoring progress, a significant obstacle highlighted is the substantial lack of reliable and unbiased data. Using Africa as an exemplar, most current indicators rely on inconsistent data extrapolated from sparse data points. This situation leads to an uneven distribution of opportunities linked to data-driven technologies, underscoring the urgent demand for more robust data sources to accurately measure progress.

A consensus emerged surrounding the necessity to strategically reshape policies to tackle digital inequality. Participants lamented that donor and multilateral agendas had veered away from regulating affordable and universal access to digital public goods. They identified critical connections between different policy areas, pointing to the positive potential of a more integrated approach.

Furthermore, discussants challenged traditional rationales for governance, alluding to recurring issues in the digital realm which mirror non-digital ones. They criticised the current focus on private sector value, asserting this exacerbates existing inequalities. Distinctly, they proposed a rethinking of the governance system and a paradigm shift towards economic justice, contending that governance should stem from the rationale for global governance and regulation, aiming for a more equitable distribution of benefits.

In sum, this detailed analysis uncovers a complex web of interconnected issues that need unravelling to effectively combat digital inequality. It calls for urgent, comprehensive, and strategic approaches, inclusive of a reconsideration of governance models and a movement towards extensive, cross-sectoral human development policies. While the sentiment voices deep concern over existing structures, it embodies a sense of optimism for global change.

Ali Kosta Barbosa

Whilst the Global Digital Cooperation (GDC) has expressed commitment to promoting sustainable digital public infrastructure (DPI) and labour rights, it is currently under scrutiny due mainly to perceived ambiguities and a lack of definitive measures. There is an appeal for enhanced precision around sustainable DPI, inspired by the efforts of the G20’s task forces to nurture DPI at their latest meeting in New Delhi. Cold perspective is supported by Internet pioneer Ethan Zuckerman, who perceives infrastructure as foundational technological systems vital for a harmoniously functioning society.

Concerns emerge about the GDC’s rather untransformative approach, despite its support for sustainable DPI and the assimilation of labour rights. Additionally, the discourse on the governance of Artificial Intelligence (AI) regulation seems to be largely absent from substantial labour discussions, despite the GDC’s partnership with the International Labour Organisation and frequent allusions to labour rights.

Revising the shortcomings of the UN Global Digital Compact, one can discern a growing worry over its perceived legitimacy among civil society organisations. Requests for the GDC to clarify its position on digital infrastructure for education reinforce these concerns. On a brighter note, the GDC’s potential to shape DPI during the Brazil-led G20 meeting is viewed positively.

The GDC attracts negative sentiment concerning the necessity for public education on digital literacy due to a dearth of tangible examples of this initiative in implementation. Ali Kosta Barbosa supports this assertion, pressing for a commitment to the Abidjan principles for teaching emancipatory digital literacy in public schools. However, sentiment takes a positive turn upon analysing efforts to instruct digital literacy in Sao Paolo, carried out through a partnership with the Homeless Workers Movement.

Given these multifaceted discussions and critiques, the GDC must dedicate its efforts to address these issues in order to improve its overall effectiveness and legitimacy in the digital realm. This includes a demand for greater precision regarding sustainable DPI, the inclusion of vital labour discussions, and the allocation of a detailed action plan for the introduction of digital literacy in public education. Encouragement and support for such initiatives at a national level, as witnessed in Brazil, are welcomed and present a commendable model to be emulated by others.

Regine Greenberger

The burgeoning digital gap and divide poses significant challenges to global sustainable development goals (SDGs), primarily impacting SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure) and SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities). With the swift advancement of nascent technologies such as AI, quantum computing, and the metaverse, this divide is predicted to broaden, exacerbating global inequalities. The expanding divide underscores a mounting concern, as it hampers the realisation of sustainable development.

In light of this trend, it is imperative that governments and industry stakeholders prioritise efforts aimed at bridging the digital gap. Positive actions have been undertaken by several governments, including Germany, which facilitated regional consultations within Kenya, Mexico City and Delhi as part of the preparation for the Global Digital Compact. Such efforts underscore the importance of SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals) in addressing the digital divide and related challenges; they reflect an overall positive sentiment towards collaborative action.

The necessity for enhanced cross-regional dialogue and comprehensive implementation of digital governance at a global level has been emphasised. Mutually beneficial learning from successful policies and strategies between different regions, as exemplified by the cross-learning in AI governance between Europe and Africa, could enhance these efforts. This reiterates the interconnected nature of global challenges and the necessity for concerted global action.

Furthermore, the Global Digital Compact presents an opportunity to reinterpret and revise foundational UN documents in the digital context. This would align with SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions) and would solidify government commitments, clearly delineating their responsibilities in a digitised global society.

Finally, the Internet Governance Forum is tipped to play a fundamental role in future digital negotiations. Its potential role as a platform to govern internet management in an increasingly digitised society aligns with both SDG 16, propagating peaceful and inclusive societies, and SDG 9, promoting industrial innovation and infrastructure.

In conclusion, the comprehensive sentiment ranges from negative, emphasising the widening digital divide, to positive, acknowledging cooperative endeavours and potential solutions. Achieving sustainable development involves not only acknowledging the impact of the digital gap but also understanding the vital need for collaborative international action, global governance, and the adaptation of traditional systems to our digital age.

Wolfgang Kleinwachter

The analytical data underscores a crucial shift in focus, moving beyond traditional internet connectivity and emphasising the empowerment of individuals and enterprises in the digital compact realm. This perspective aligns with the objectives of Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) 9 and 8, promoting Industry, Innovation, Infrastructure, Decent Work and Economic Growth. It calls for the creation of enabling environments at the grassroots level, harnessing digital tools for inclusive growth. Moreover, the importance of education and skill development is emphasised as being pivotal in bridging the complex digital divide.

Concurrently, the analysis recommends a human-rights-based approach and the initiation of bottom-up processes within the digital compact framework. Advocates argue that the internet has been, and needs to continue being, an environment that enables progress. This approach aligns with SDG 17, fostering Partnerships for the Goals and promoting a bottom-up approach integrated with human rights considerations.

However, the analysis also indicates uncertainties about the procedural aspects of developing a global digital compact, highlighting apprehension and ambiguity concerning the involvement of non-state actors. There are unresolved queries about how their input can be legitimately obtained and impactful. Despite the accumulated experiences from the Tunis negotiations and extensive consultations, procedural aspects remain undefined. This issue aligns with SDG 16, advocating for Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions.

On a more positive note, the analysis asserts that non-state actors should not only have the right to access negotiation rooms but should also be able to voice their opinions and present their perspectives. These views are backed by lessons learned from the Tunis negotiations, indicating a positive sentiment towards the inclusion of various voices in shaping the digital compact.

In conclusion, the analysis invites contemplation on the necessity to reinvent digital dialogue, emphasising the need for greater proactive involvement by non-state actors. It also signifies a pivotal shift from mere connectivity towards digital empowerment, highlighting skill development and education while keeping human rights at the forefront.

Dr. Shamika Sirimani

Highlighted in the annual meeting of the United Nations Commission for Science and Technology for Development (CSTD) is an apprehension shared by ministers of developing nations regarding the potential bypassing of these nations in the digital transformation. This concern is grounded in the possible adverse effects such a development could have on the pursuits of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 8 and 9, which are dedicated to Decent Work and Economic Growth as well as Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure respectively.

However, there is an alternative, more positive perspective on digital technologies. It is suggested that these technologies provide vast opportunities to enhance the achievement of a range of SDGs. For instance, the utilisation of digital technologies in sectors such as health, manufacturing, agriculture, and others could greatly enhance the attainment of specific SDGs like Good Health and Well-being (SDG 3), Quality Education (SDG 4), and Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure (SDG 9).

But challenges still persist in the digital domain. Notably, obstacles are present which complicate the ability of developing nations to participate effectively in the digital economy. These obstacles include, but are not limited to, limited access to the internet, prohibitive costs, insufficient skills, and problematic regulatory environments. Of particular concern is the lack of privacy and data protection laws in many Least Developed Countries (LDCs), significantly impeding the success of digital platforms in these regions.

In the 2021 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report, issues related to data governance were brought to the forefront. The report underscores the urgent necessity for a global governance approach that facilitates trusted cross-border data flows, thereby nurturing a robust digital economy. Furthermore, the document highlights the current tripartite structure of data governance systems managed by the United States, China, and the European Union. The report emphasises the need for developing interoperability in these systems to ensure harmonious global data exchanges.

Lastly, there’s a strong endorsement for the principles of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), even after two decades of their initiation. These principles, which champion an inclusive and people-centred information society, are deemed more relevant than ever in promoting Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions as advocated by SDG 16. Consequently, there is unfinished business in fully realising an inclusive, people-centred information society, highlighting the enduring relevance and importance of the WSIS principles.

Audience

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Emma

The complexity of issues centred on digital rights is escalating. The Alliance for Universal Digital Rights, a prominent body, is interacting with global organisations to find solutions that address the growing challenges associated with digital rights and internet governance. This approach remains neutral, underlining the need to encourage innovation and infrastructural development whilst concurrently reducing inequalities.

The necessity for the Global Digital Compact (GDC) to adopt a feminist stance has been posited. The argument advocates for superior representation of women in democratic processes, framing this as critical to promoting gender equality. It’s not only about representation, but tangible measures like ensuring universal, affordable, safe, and widely accessible internet access for all. Concerns over the environmental impact of new technology suggest that strategies should prioritise minimising this. Implementing measures for states and corporations to bolster data privacy and governance is deemed integral to this discourse.

Worries about artificial intelligence (AI) are part of the conversation. Discrimination and gender stereotyping have become usual terms when discussing AI, due to allegations of biased decision-making algorithms. Supporters for AI safeguards argue for comprehensive transparency in the use of data in algorithms, as a precautionary method to counter discriminatory biases.

Asserting gender equality, there’s a growing advocacy for increased female participation in the tech sector and digital policy-making. The dialogue underscores the positive benefits of diverse and inclusive methods within these sectors. Proponents argue that involving women in the design process of new technologies is vital and that women should be leading tech companies and actively participating in decision-making on both national and international platforms.

Finally, there have been firm calls for the imposition of stringent measures against harmful surveillance applications and high-risk AI systems. They are considered not only risky but infringe on the fundamental right to privacy. Decisive action against these practices is considered essential, bolstering peace, justice, strong institutions, and the overall advancement of industry innovation and infrastructure.

Megan

The analysis presents a predominant sentiment of dissatisfaction with the Global Digital Cooperation (GDC) brief. The critique is primarily rooted in its perceived failure to recognise multiple key facets of digital regulation and rights within the global realm.

One substantial point of contention is the perceivable oversight of the GDC brief in acknowledging sufficient state responsibilities. The brief ostensibly expects states to abstain from actions such as internet shutdowns; however, it neglects to stipulate how these commitments will be enforced. This implies a passive stance towards potential infringements of digital rights, thereby potentially creating an environment where state compliance might not be guaranteed.

Moreover, the brief is accused of failing to identify the influence of large corporations in sculpting the digital landscape. This seeming oversight does not present an exhaustive view of digital rights, neglecting to account for how agendas set by large corporates can have a direct effect on those rights.

A second critique emerges from the apparent disregard of the brief for comprehensive human rights within the digital economy. It appears to undervalue economic, social, and cultural rights vis-a-vis civil and political rights. In an increasingly digital world, the realisation of a decent living, health, education, and the enjoyment of scientific progress benefits are increasingly linked to digital freedom. However, these aspects seem to be undervalued in the GDC brief.

Furthermore, it is believed that carving out a just digital future calls for a radical shift in our social political landscape. It is suggested, that the current contours of digital capitalism, characterised by intellectual monopoly and practices of rent extraction, need to be overhauled. Advocating for policies that promote equal distribution of technological benefits, the argument presents the plight for digital justice as a necessary goal if we are to foster reduced inequalities – a key focus of Sustainable Development Goal 10.

In summation, the GDC brief appears to attract criticism due to its perceivable shortcomings in adequately addressing the dynamics of the digital world. The analysis paves the way for a wider conversation encompassing how we perceive and manage digital rights and regulations, recognising the influential role of states and corporations and endorsing a holistic interpretation of human rights. Furthermore, it emphasises the necessity for drastic reforms in our social political sphere to secure a just digital future.

Andrea

Digital inequality and the pressing need for an inclusive digital public infrastructure are integral to achieving SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth) and SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities). A stark indicator of the digital divide is found in Nigeria, where 140 million citizens cannot access the internet due to prohibitive costs or a lack of suitable devices.

Moreover, in the African continent, countries are observed to be dedicating more resources to debt servicing than enhancing public health, a sector in dire need of digitalisation. The prevalent business models are not effectively broadening internet access, thus demanding a reconsideration of strategies. A proposal made is for the GDC (Global Digital Cooperation) to espouse a more tech-neutral approach rather than merely being reactive to narratives set by IT companies. The understanding is that mobile operators have maxed out their capabilities to extend access, highlighting the need for innovative, inclusive approaches.

AI governance and the indispensability of multi-stakeholder participation are fundamental in realising SDG 16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions). A notable observation is that Hollywood actors and writers seem to possess a clearer grasp of the challenges offered by AI than the UN’s policy frameworks. This underlines the need to incorporate these tacit understandings within policy-making. Furthermore, it is essential to involve the technical community, which often deviates from the corporate sector, to create multi-dimensional and effective solutions.

Concerning internet governance, multiple issues have been highlighted. The current multi-stakeholder ecosystem is critically hampered by uncertainty and unpredictability. Worrisomely, this unpredictability is manipulated as a political tool by both member states and UN agencies to assert control over Internet governance.

Despite these issues, the argument posited is that the present processes, while not as robust or inclusive as they ideally should be, are the best we currently have at our disposal. Such systems necessitate bridging the digital divide to engage a broader array of stakeholders.

Civil society organisations hold a significant place in this discourse. The proposition is that instead of solely reacting to initiatives enacted by other bodies, civil society should proactively set its own terms, aiding in the attainment of SDG 16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions).

Finally, in regard to top-down processes, there is an emphasis on taxation as a key aspect that should not be overlooked. This underscores the necessity for a comprehensive assessment of the varied aspects involved in internet governance and emphasises an integrated approach where diverse stakeholders’ concerns are taken into consideration to achieve SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals).

Heleni

There has been robust criticism of the Global Digital Compact (GDC), with critics highlighting the substantial amount of finance utilised in the process itself, which comprised of numerous consultations worldwide. Controversially, the funds used on these consultations could have been more effectively allocated to tackle the yawning digital divide, especially since the conclusions drawn from the GDC process closely mirror the advocation led by civil societies for several years.

Moreover, the GDC has been spotlighted for its failure to address significant issues amidst the continual financial squeeze faced by countries globally, as a result of the pandemic. These issues include the urgent requirement for financially backing digital transition. Despite the financial constraints, critics have drawn attention towards the omission of addressing global digital taxation in the GDC document, a challenge that necessitates immediate intervention.

Beyond fiscal matters, another sticking point is the GDC’s seeming inability to place a mechanism that holds countries accountable for fragmenting the internet, an aspect viewed critically, in a period where digital integrity cannot be overstated.

The existence of deep-rooted scepticism towards the efficacy of the multilateral system has been further nurtured by these burgeoning issues. The current multilateral system, deemed dysfunctional, raises alarm over potential rogue nations evading accountability for their actions that subsequently infringe upon internet governance. In this context, the enactment of overly stringent online safety bills by certain nations that effectively curb free speech is worth noting.

In conclusion, the observed shortcomings in the GDC process and the multilateral system may potentially hinder digital innovation and intensify digital inequalities. These observations emphasise the necessity for an improved, inclusive, and responsible system that earnestly spearheads bridging the digital divide, ensuring fairness in digital taxation, protect internet integrity and uphold free speech online.

Clever Gatete

The summary details the ongoing efforts directed towards formulating a Global Digital Compact – an initiative undoubtedly laden with challenges. Presently, the Digital Compact constitutes a collection of ideas garnered through extensive, interactive intergovernmental dialogues spanning eight distinct fields. Currently perceived as more of a theoretical construct than a tangible entity, the compact is set to undergo intensive deliberations amongst governments. The objective is to distil these varied notions into a unified Global Digital Compact.

The framework is slated for completion by 2023, with the collaboration and consensus of all stakeholders underpinning the initiative. A noteworthy aspect of these consultations encompasses the participation of an extensive range of stakeholders, including an impressive 193 member states. The incorporation of input from such a diverse array of contributors embodies the scale of the task and the strenuous efforts made to ensure every perspective is included, honouring the commitment to partnerships for common goals.

Focussing on stakeholder engagement, there has been a firm emphasis on the inclusion of civil society’s voice in the discourse. Special sessions have been arranged specifically for civil society, thus reinforcing the steadfast commitment towards exhaustive inclusion. This endeavour to embrace a wide spectrum of perspectives and experiences aligns with the broader ambition of promoting Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions.

The pervasive and far-reaching effects of technology on all life facets form another focal point in these discussions. The influence of technology in education and various businesses is irrefutable, necessitating an all-inclusive stakeholder engagement. Recognising the ubiquitous role of technology in contemporary society necessitates the representation of all affected parties in these deliberations.

The predilection for recorded communication, particularly written suggestions, is underscored as an effective governance and documentation tool. Recorded recommendations not only aid efficient documentation but also facilitate thorough comprehension and utilisation of these inputs in strategising.

In conclusion, the comprehensive process of establishing the Global Digital Compact represents a dedicated journey towards achieving peaceful, just and robust institutions through intergovernmental discussions, inclusive stakeholder engagement, and the strategic use of technology. This journey corresponds directly with shared objectives of justice, peace and partnerships.

Anita Gurumurthy:
But of course, like everything that is political and has an opportunity in the horizon, we will deal with it with the sincerity that it requires. So welcome to this event organized by the Global Digital Justice Forum and IT4Change. Just to set the context, and more people are coming in, so please do take the seats around the square table or the round table. What I would like to do is to just make a few initial remarks before we start with our exciting panelists. I want to quote the U.N. Secretary General and the characterization by the Secretary General of how we are coping with not just the digital divide, but an unfolding data epoch, and we are also besieged by a development divide. We also know that the gains of connectivity are skewed, and at some point we thought that the access debate was over, but it isn’t yet. And in an era of digital infrastructures and public goods, we are all the more confronted by this question of the access and connectivity divide. We also know that a few transnational corporations are able to embrace the digital revolution. In the previous session in this room, we heard references to how, in certain parts of the world, the cloud infrastructure used by governments is actually somewhat beholden to corporations that are transnational corporations. So the inequality of the digital economy presents urgent challenges, and these are not just challenges for those who are already connected, but these are also challenges for those who may not ever be connected, but whose lives will be indelibly impacted by the digital revolution. So the actions we need to take are about the democratization of benefits of digitalization, the governance of digital resources, and to make digital policies that can catalyze innovation that counts, because very often in a world of patent tickets and sleeping patents and all of that, we see that innovation is often held hostage to the way in which intellectual property operates in the digital space. So the ultimate test, I think, is the public and social value that digitalization can create and the human freedoms that it can expand. So if we can do just these two things, well, we would have done it. And the Global Digital Compact is one such opportunity and I think that we do need to carry the consensus that’s possible to build around the Global Digital Compact forward. But of course, it’s not easy to build consensus. There are people around the table whose business it has been to build consensus all their lives. So we really count on their experience, both civil society and from the UN system, trying to really galvanize the voices that can hold the bottom line. I think this session is organized because we want to listen very carefully to the devil in the detail. So we need to locate and listen carefully to the devil in the detail, the voices that are seemingly saying the same thing, but actually coming from extremely different standpoints. Words like trust, which were discussed in the last session very, very beautifully, very evocatively. But we do not mean the same thing when we say freedoms, when we say trust, when we say openness. We all mean different things. And so it’s very important to start there from these imaginaries, but then go closer to the norms, ethics, and pathways of digitalization. Of course, when the WSIS happened and I had the privilege to be in those spaces to actually watch, listen, and learn, it seemed like human rights were really very important to protect. They continue to be important, but in the context of structural injustices in the world, we also think there are emerging anxieties around the geoeconomics of data and AI. And the question of, are our institutions ready? Are they anachronistic? Can they mediate social justice? So we are at a very critical juncture. The session actually is a series of questions, and it’s in a very interesting format that I was part of some time ago in the University of Western Australia. It worked very well. It was for a thematic conference on tech crimes. So this was build it, break it, and fix it. So the first round, which is build it, will answer the question as to why is the UN Global Digital Compact critical to address the gaps in digital cooperation? What is its promise? The second round is the break it round where we have to get real. We have to really look at this proposition and see if we can at all build it. So the second round will be a set of propositions that are really where the rubber hits the road, so to speak. What are the gaps in the UN Global Digital Compact? Is it really transformative? Is digital justice even possible in this world? We are talking about the climate transition and the challenges confronting us, and similarly the digital transition. And the final fix it round has, it’s a moment of pause. Step back and say, these are all people with vision, people with optimism, who will bring it together and say how can we make the UN Digital Compact a powerful basis for a global democratic digital governance paradigm? How do we realize the spirit of the WSIS? I was discussing with Andrea this morning and we agreed that there was this agenda, the Geneva and Tunis agenda was very, very precious. It’s important to keep it with all its flaws because it does articulate the need for an inclusive, people-centered, development-oriented information society. In the data and AI age, it didn’t anticipate, but we may add. So, without ado, I’d like to suggest that this is the format. We will have five speakers per round. The first round is a build it round. I know it’s very hard for us to play to a certain script, but try and keep to the building, the breaking and the fixing, so that in that posturing, maybe we will actually be able to churn out better sense, hopefully. And in this room, there is, I think, all the intelligence that is needed. So, I would like to invite Ambassador Amandeep Singh Gill, who is the tech envoy to the UN Secretary General, to build it. Thank you. I think we should use this mic.

Singh Gill:
Hello. Yeah, okay. Thank you. And a very nice scene setting. I love this idea of, I think with children, you might have seen Thomas the Tank Engine. Can we, or Bob the Builder. Can we build it? Yes, we can. And what are we building in the global digital compact? We are building a shared vision, a global framework for digital governance that is negotiated by governments, but is open to participation by regional organizations, the private sector and civil society. So, the process has an intergovernmental bias, in a sense, with multi-stakeholder inputs, but then even the product that is open to multi-stakeholder commitments and participation. And with this global framework, we are attempting to address some of the challenges that you mentioned. Lowering the entry barriers to digital governance for more countries, more civil society participation, more of the private sector beyond the usual suspects, beyond big tech to participate and then shape together. So, there is that opportunity that we are trying to build. We are also trying to build and shape a transition away from solutions orientation to ecosystems and infrastructures for digital development. And let me just pause here, because I think this is very critical for digital justice. If we just stay with the connectivity paradigm, that all we need to do is bring the 2.6 to 2.9. 7 billion who are unconnected online, and good things will follow. All we need to do is look at specific problems and use digital technologies to solve those problems. We will have progress, no doubt about it. And there’s plenty of evidence out there what additional connectivity, especially broadband connectivity, does to economic growth, social participation. But we will not get the kind of acceleration we need to cover that 85% deficit on the SDG. So 15%, we are on target. 85% of the goals and the targets within those goals, we are not on target. So we need a big boost, and that’s not going to come from the same paradigm. So we are building a shift in paradigm, focusing more on digital public infrastructure that creates those inclusive innovation spaces, focusing more on capacity building, a networked approach to capacity building. As the SG put it in his policy brief, creating one million digital champions for the SDGs, a quarter million in Africa. Focusing more on data commons, where data flows, data comes together to drive progress on the SDGs. Not just better measurement of where we are, and that’s critical. I mean, you can’t be navigating blind in this. You need to know where you are. But also data for the SDGs, where data is used in a more transformative way to innovate for the SDGs. There is also this aspect of guiding, steering the digital transformation, which as you put it, has to expand human freedoms and has to create that public social value. And for that, the policymakers need to feel that they are in charge of this digital transformation. Civil society needs to feel that they are not being left aside. They also have agency over how things are shaping up. So we need to create those blueprints for digital transformation that help the policymakers and other actors in this space get more agency over the digital transformation. So those are some of the kind of paradigm-shifting build elements. And most crucially, I think, if we look at the space where there are risks, where there are harms, whether they are coming from traditional digital sources of those risks and harms or some of the emerging sources, generative AI, for instance, we need to put in place guardrails. We need to put in place effective mechanisms. Again, as the SDG has suggested, a human rights advisory mechanism, more proactive in terms of how legislations are shaped, more proactive in terms of how public sector interprets the law, regulatory frameworks, and also the suggestions around regulators, regulators’ capacity and how e-safety commissioners and others should get together regularly to exchange experience, to raise the bar on accountability, and equally on data protection. So those kind of protection-related, guardrails-related areas are essential in this building exercise that we are up to. Lastly, I would just like to spend a minute on artificial intelligence, which is really a test case for what we are building. If the architecture that we are putting together, if these action areas alongside the commitments that we are putting together are not able to handle this latest manifestation of digital innovation, then it’s not working. So therefore, we need to make sure that apart from the different, very important conversations that are going on, the G7 Hiroshima process, the GPA discussions, the UK AI summit, that we make sure that all the other countries who are not participating in those conversations have a space where they can also shape the governance of AI. happens, and for that, the Secretary General is creating an advisory body on AI, a multi-stakeholder, a globally representative advisory body that will look at the emerging landscape of risks and opportunities that look at the current landscape of governance. What are the gaps there? Is there a scientific consensus, almost IPCC-like, that we can build around the risks and challenges? And is there some role in terms of not just the UN role, but perhaps a networked institutional role for the international governance of AI? There is the industry space, codes of conduct, certification schemes, various self-regulatory approaches. There is the national regional regulatory space, the AI Act, the legislation that’s in the parliament in Brazil, and so on. But what’s the kind of international level orchestration that could be put in place? So that’s an important building block in the collective build-out exercise that I have attempted to sketch out. And let me just conclude by saying that this cannot be the task of only the UN secretariat, cannot be the task only of member states, although they’ll have to play the leading role. This building exercise has to be truly multi-stakeholder. All stakeholders have to participate. We have to co-create this together. Thank you.

Anita Gurumurthy:
Thank you so much. If I might just break the order of build it, break it, fix it, because you have very limited time, and a lot of people might just want to ask you questions. I gather you have to leave in about 20 minutes. Is that right? So since we have the pleasure of your company here, and if there are questions to the ambassador, we could probably take three questions.

Wolfgang Kleinwachter:
Thank you very much. My name is Wolfgang Kleinwächter. I’m a retired professor from the University of Aarhus, and I’m really impressed by your approach that you said, you know, we have to go beyond connectivity. And I think the Internet was always an enabling environment, and the focus would be of enabling individuals, enabling small and medium enterprises, so I think to create an environment where we can really bring the activities from the ground, in the tradition of the bottom-up processes, to the forefront. So I think this is really an important shift, so that we go beyond this, just, you know, count how many people are on the Internet. And so it’s not enough, and education, skills, all these are, I think, key issues which has to bring on the forefront, and it has to be based on human rights declaration, and you and Carter, I think this is a good approach. I have concrete questions or some problems with the procedure, how to develop the global digital compact. You said in your introduction that it’s mainly an intergovernmental process with multi-stakeholder involvement. So the question is how? And we had experience in the Tunis negotiations, where the question was, you know, have non-state actors access to the negotiation rooms, have the right to speak, can they present proposals, comment on several articles, and things like that. So for me, this is still unclear, because the experiences from the deep dive consultations are that we had everybody could say everything, but there was not an impression that the input from non-state actors have really an impact on the governmental reactions. And so we have to have some safe procedures in place which would guarantee that the input which is so welcome when you always say the multi-stakeholder has to be on the forefront. But you know, how you can make sure that this impact is really an input. Thank you.

Anita Gurumurthy:
Thank you. There’s one online and one more. So let me go online first. Can you unmute and speak, Nandini?

Nandini Chami:
Hello, I hope you are able to hear me. Yes. Yeah. So Mike, I’m Nandini from IT for Change, and my question is, how can the Global Digital Compact address the gaps that have been identified in the implementation of the business outcomes over the years? And how do we see what is coming out of it, linking with the business review, especially in terms of the enhanced cooperation agenda and, you know, the related issues?

Luca Belli:
I will be very brief, because I will have time to speak about this in the third part of the section. So I’m Luca Belli. I’m professor at FGV Law School. And so my question is with regard to the implementation. So I already had a very good discussion with Amandeep about this some months ago. And I keep on having this curiosity about how this de facto will be implemented. And let me explain my point. I think that something that emerged in a very eloquent and telling way from the experience of the past 20 years, also the implementation of the WSIS on the Tunis agenda and all the commitment is that sometimes what is put into paper in the product of a summit or a process then does not correspond to the reality of the implementation. And if we take the definition of internet governance, where all the stakeholders join hand and collectively define principles, rules, norms, and procedure, it sounds fantastic. But then we don’t consider it in practice. There might be some stakeholders whose enormous economic or political interest is sabotage of this joining hand and collectively defining norms, procedures, and rules. So my question is, is there any thinking about how to create guardrails and safeguards also with regard to the potential, I don’t want to call them bad fate actors, but actors that are not interested in having a global digital compact. And actually, they have a huge economic or political interest in the sabotage of this kind of initiative. Thank you.

Anita Gurumurthy:
Sorry, Ali. Next round.

Singh Gill:
Thank you. Very, very thoughtful questions to start with Wolfgang’s question about how do we ensure continued multi-stakeholder participation in the negotiations phase. So I think one is what happens inside the room, and you’re absolutely right, having transparency, having different stakeholders in the room somehow so that they can see what’s going on, and having the opportunity to shape that as well, whether you lobby governments, your individual governments, governments of places you come from, or others. That’s important. Equally important is the opportunity around the room, like intersessionally, for instance, for the co-facilitators to sit down with different stakeholders, listen to them, and take the feedback on, what do you think about this stuff? Just as the co-facilitators have been doing so far on their summing up, they sat down with different stakeholders, consulted them, took their feedback. So we have to be creative, and we have to be constantly inventive to enlarge the space. Because we are stuck with a structure that’s intergovernmental by design. But we’ve succeeded creatively with this forum, for instance, the IGF. And even there is a recent example, the negotiations with the chemical industry that our colleagues at UNEP facilitated. So they found some creative ways to engage with industry and to enhance their accountability to find a space between hard norms and self-regulation. That space was invented, in a sense. So we’ll have to keep doing that. And we will need your cooperation so that we can have the dynamic inside the room and outside the room all through the process. The question that Nandini asked about the gaps that are there. So in the Secretary General’s policy brief, you see a chart in which different forums are put there, the IJF, the WSIS Forum, CSTD. Those are in the driving seat. That chart also allows you to see some gaps, like misinformation, disinformation, which is not a big deal at that time. AI, again, it’s not a big deal. The human rights element, it has been there from the beginning, the people-centered aspect, the inclusion aspect. But the kind of things we’ve seen since social media platforms became those multi-billion user platforms, they were not anticipated at that time. So there are some gaps. And those gaps are the one that we need to consider as we look at the build-out of the GDC, as we look at WSIS Plus 20. How do we address those gaps? Is it repurposing existing forums, tweaking their mandates? Is it, just as we are seeing now with the AI space, the creation of this advisory body, that there is room for initiatives? I’m not saying forums. I’m saying initiatives, actions that kind of address those gaps. So that’s, Nandini, that’s an exercise that’s actually already underway. And we have to be sophisticated and nuanced about it. I mean, there is a lot of, sometimes, misinformation, disinformation about this, that this is somehow centralizing, that it’s pulling things to New York and things like that. And I’ve been at pains to emphasize that’s exactly the contrary. What we are trying to do is pull together the insights, the outcomes of different forums so that people who attend them have a whole of government perspective. So that nationally, also, when policy makers go back and implement, there are no gaps. So we’re talking not only of gaps at the international level, but we’re also talking of gaps at the national levels, where sometimes regulatory capacity is completely missing. Fortunate are the countries who can afford an e-safety commissioner, a data protection commissioner, a competition policy enforcement regulator, and so on. There are many in which these functions are actually inside the ministries. This is a conflict of interest. And you’re not up to date with what is required. So those are the kind of gaps at the national, regional level that we also need to look at. And we need to create the incentives so that those gaps are resolved. And this is a kind of mutual learning, international learning, that needs to be facilitated. So that building should not be just an empty building. It has to have that fluidity, that exchange, that allows that learning to take place. On Luca’s question about bad actors, what can I say? I think the good have to be more active. They have to be more proactive. I mean, you can’t, yeah.

Anita Gurumurthy:
Give them space.

Singh Gill:
Yes.

Anita Gurumurthy:
Thank you so much for that. So we move on. And without delaying, because we have limited time and we have four other speakers, I would like to invite Ambassador Regine Greenberger, Cyber Ambassador from the German Federal Foreign Office.

Regine Greenberger:
Thank you, Anita. And also, thank you for structuring this discussion in this specific way. I would have preferred to be in the fix-it part. But of course, you cannot choose. So I’m speaking from a government point of view. More explicitly, perhaps also from a MFA point of view, so foreign affairs, because diplomacy is the turf where I feel most comfortable. And some things that I say when describing how we try to help building the GDC is of course more normative than what has actually happened. But perhaps it’s also my wishful thinking that it should work out like this. So the first thing that for me is important to state is that this is the moment to acknowledge that the digital gap, the digital divide exists and that it actually has effects on achieving the sustainable development goals. And the trend is increasing. This gap is increasing. This gap is ever-growing. And if you imagine AI, quantum computing, the metaverse, it is even more increasing. You can expect that it’s even more increasing in the future. So it’s also really the time to reorganize our forces, our energy, and try again to bridge this digital gap. And if you look from a local perspective, for example, from a German perspective, of course we are industry 4.0 giants in digitization, but also public administration digitization dwarfs. So if we are completely only moving in our national domestic environment, we do not see this gap or we identify the gap in a different place. And the first thing that I learned and that I would like to stress here is that when you speak about the global digital compact, you have to move from the local national level to a global level. And this is really worth it. And this will also help reaching the sustainable development goals. This means also involving stakeholders, non-governmental stakeholders. I mean, for Germany, I think for Europeans, this is already in our DNA, but of course it’s still necessary. Then Germany facilitated regional consultations for Amandib in Kenya for the African region, in Mexico City for the Americas, and in Delhi for some Asian countries. And this was not only to help you prepare the global digital compact, but also to collect more context from the regions for this discussion. We had, in the consequence, we had a more informed discussion also in Germany and in Brussels for Europe, although we didn’t have European consultations in the same way that we had it in Nairobi, for example. But we had a more informed discussion about what the GDC is about. And I suspect that if we would have had the regional consultations with Africa and Latin America and so on before we prepared our European contribution to the global digital compact, this European contribution would- have looked differently because as it is, it is very Europe focused and we should have re-evaluated our contribution under this perspective of what does it do and how does it work on a global level. So the third element I would like to stress is what we don’t have enough and what we should do more is cross-regional dialogue. And I would like to give you an example where I think this makes absolutely sense. For example, if you look at the top ten AI companies in the world, there is not a European company among them, there is not an African company among them. So when we think about how to shape global governance structures to govern AI, I think Europe and Africa have a lot in common and we should touch this issue in our cross-regional dialogue across all levels and of course also with non-governmental stakeholders. The fourth element, so I mentioned already the Global Digital Compact is about global challenges so it has to be a compact on the global level. A regional solution is not enough and will not help reaching the sustainable development goals. The real unleashing the potential of digital transformation can only work if we do it in a global scale which also means of course that we have to find ways to mitigate the risks that come with it and also the risks like climate change are risks on a global level and not on a national or regional level. The joint basis that we have for this is of course the UN Charter and the Human Rights Charter but the Global Digital Compact has to do something else. It has to specify how these documents from an analog time apply to the digital age. And then of course also how governments can commit to these principles. So my fifth point is what should be in the Global Digital Compact except the referring to these basic documents, our foundation documents of the United Nations. I just was this morning in a meeting with the Declaration for the Future of the Internet group and there are five principles there. I think a lot of people also that are not adhering to these initiatives can commit to these principles that is protection of human rights, caring for a global internet, inclusive and affordable access, strengthened digital trust, protecting the multi-stakeholder internet governance structure. And perhaps as a last point what I would like to have in the Global Digital Compact is also a strategic and fixed role for the Internet Governance Forum, for this forum as a place to negotiate internet governance also in the future.

Anita Gurumurthy:
Thank you so much Ambassador. I think that it’s already building up and hopefully some of the points that have been mentioned will be taken to the next round. And I particularly want to note the point that you made about the need to really look or re-look at the way the Human Rights Charter requires a re-articulation on the basis of the strengths of its abiding and enduring kind of importance for human civilization. What does the AI age really mean? And I think that’s really important but sometimes can get contentious. I would like to invite Dr. Shamika Sirimani, Director Division on Technology and Logistics from UNCTAD and everybody in the room is quite familiar with the path-breaking work of the unit, particularly in the form of the collectible, which I suggest everybody downloads or takes, which is the Digital Economy Reports. Thank you very much for joining us.

Dr. Shamika Sirimani:
Thank you Anita. Distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, and thank you for the opportunity. I don’t want to take too much of your time so let me cut out half of what I’m supposed to say but let me emphasize a few things. You see, unlike other technological revolutions, and this is we are in a very special place because the digital technologies move very, very fast, number one. And also, all technologies are converging towards digital. Okay, so we used to take a photo in olden times, it was a chemistry and it is now digital. So all that stuff, everything is moving like there’s a convergence happening. So because of that, the opportunities that open up, especially for developing countries, are there only for a very limited period of time. If you cannot capture the benefits, then these technologies move on. But there are enormous benefits from these digital technologies towards, in fact, all SDGs. And when we talk about education, I mean, we sometimes criticize that GPT but there are enormous things that we can do for the education systems, sectors in developing countries. And we can use these technologies for health, manufacturing, agriculture, you name it, all SDGs. So the potentials are enormous. Now, one of the things that we hear in the CSTD, this is the United Nations Commission for Science and Technology for Development, it’s the focal point of the system in the human system on the science policies, STI conversations. And increasingly here, when we have the ministers coming to the annual meeting, that they are quite concerned that this digital technological revolution is yet again to bypass developing countries. And there’s a real concern. The minister is asking us, what do we do with AI? Everywhere I go in countries, what do we do with this AI revolution coming through us? Do you have experience of other developing countries using this? What kind of national strategies that we need to build? So there are an enormous amount of questions that are coming our way on this technology science. Just the AI is one thing. I mean, all other technologies, too. And I just want to say, it is not just access to internet. It’s not just the digital divide, as we said in WSIS. But the issues that are raised are much more complex and difficult. Access to internet is one thing. And I think both of you mentioned, it’s not just the access. It’s also the quality of this access and the affordability of this access. And if you look at the least developed countries, and they pay exorbitant amount of money for data. And we, in UNCTAD, we work on the preparedness of countries for the digital economy. And we find that the participation in the digital economy is not just about access, and even the quality of access, and the cost of access. But it’s also the whole regulatory environment. For example, if I want to have a platform and sell my stuff, and if in my country there are no privacy, and there’s no data protection laws, and which is the case for 50% of the LDCs. And I don’t think any of you are going to put your credit card and start buying from my platform. It will not happen. So it’s another aspect. So there’s all the regulatory frameworks. The skills, it’s not just the skills to use the telephone. You need some form of coding skills, just to at least to prepare your platform and to get things going. So these skills don’t exist. These skills don’t exist in least developed countries. So among that, one of the other things that’s coming up in CSTD is about the whole aspect of data for development. In fact, the CSTD will meet at ministerial level on that one of the theme is data for development. And here, thank you, Anita, for giving a shout-out for the digital economy report. At UNCTAD, in our digital economy report 2021, we called for a global data governance approach so that data can cross borders with trust because you are not going to have international trade and international transactions and international economy if your data, you know, cannot cross borders. We said we need to build interoperability. I think there was a question asked, you know, there are big players. Yes, there are big players. Ninety percent of the platforms are owned by big platforms, are owned by just two countries, U.S. and China. So there are big players. But they are not going to give up on their data governance system. So we need to develop interoperability to this data governance system. At the moment, there are three data governance systems. There is very much the public sector driven data governance system of China, very much the laissez-faire private sector driven data governance system of the U.S., and then we have the European Union’s GDPR in the middle, the more human-centric data governance. I don’t think none of these groups are going to give up on their data governance systems because they depend on their political and development aspirations. So we need to build interoperability. Yes, we know that the data is good for private sector. I mean, it has an economic value. But there are situations when we need to have data sharing too. I think, Ambassador, you mentioned the climate change. You know, these are issues. When we developed the vaccine for COVID-19, it was just because the data was shared very quickly across borders that we managed to, you know, understand and develop that. So we need to have data sharing principles when we talk about. We need to have the whole data privacy security standards, I mean, at least common standards that we all can agree. We need ethics. I think, Amandeep, you talk a lot about the whole AI and ethics. So I think this, as we are all saying here, this cannot be done just by governments because you need to, you know, if you are going to do AI ethics, you also need the industry sitting with you because they are the ones who understand this. And you need the civil society organization because I think every struggle begins, I mean, honestly, in activism. I think you need the greater Thunbergs of this world in this data discussions. So it has to have a global and a multi-stakeholder approach to data. So let me conclude saying that, you know, all is not lost. And I think we have the GDC process to push forward some of these ideas. And please also don’t forget the WSIS plus 20 because WSIS is coming to an end. And, you know, the principles that you or the aspirations that you agreed to 20 years ago are very much, you know, they are unfinished business, inclusive and people-centered information society we have not seen. So please also feed into that process with a lot of vigor because we are undertaking I think part of the work that we’ll be doing, us, the UNCTAD, as the secretary of CSTD, the ITU, UNESCO, we are all here to talk about WSIS II. So my appeal to you is push many ideas through many of these so we will converge towards the GDC and the summit of the future and we get somewhere. So that’s how we can build it.

Anita Gurumurthy:
I think the key takeaway is struggle, so we shall. So thanks so much. We move now to Alison, Executive Director of Research ICT Africa.

Alison:
Thank you so much Anita and Ambassador Gill and colleagues for the input. I guess we all wanted to be in the fix-it session, but I think actually the foundational sessions are very important. Not least of all picking up on some of the points that have been made to really highlight the kind of planetary challenges that we’re facing, that these are no longer ICT sectoral challenges. They’re not infrastructure challenges. These are really global problems that we’re facing, but also to deal with some of the appropriation of some of the concepts that we’re using. I think it’s an important part of this process that we return to them and we understand that the implications that we’re speaking about are actually going to affect the whole of humanity. And so I just would like to remind us of the Secretary General’s, when he spoke in 2020 of the need for a new social contract for a new era, and I think that’s important if we’re approaching this issue from a social and economic justice point of view. He described digital transformation as one of two seismic shifts that would shape the 21st century, and of course the other being climate change. Both he contended would widen inequalities even further unless urgently addressed on a planetary scale. The Secretary General’s identification of the need for a global digital compact to underpin our common agenda to arrest these negative trends in a collective and collaborative renewal of the social contract anchored in human rights and gender equality to rebuild trust and social cohesion that people need to see reflected in their daily lives. Highlighting the centrality of digital inclusion in contemporary society, the Secretary General has called for a social digital compact that should include updated governance arrangements to deliver better public goods and usher in a new era of universal social protection, health coverage, education, skills, decent work and housing, as well as universal access to the internet by 2030 as a basic human right, so all citizens have a say in envisioning countries’ futures. And I’m mentioning this because we were part of a peer review process with the African Union’s Economic Commission for Africa, sorry, the UN’s Economic Commission for Africa, working together with the African Union. And I think, you know, the reflections I’m going to make are very much Africa’s research but very much continental reflection and the importance of African voices in these conversations and their absence significantly up to now. I think this intervention is required more than ever. I think the layering of advanced digital technologies over the existing inequalities that we have, which are already reflecting underlying structural inequalities, is exacerbating inequality. The compounding effects of digital inequality on existing inequality was highlighted by COVID-19, with a majority of people in Africa unable to mitigate the associated health and economic risks through digital substitution of their access to work, to school, to banking and even to food. And those at the intersections of these multiple inequalities, including gender, disproportionately succumbing to this disease and the economic fallout and being least best positioned to prepare for, you know, economic reconstruction. In the African countries surveyed by Research ICT Africa during and after the COVID-19 pandemic showed that despite the pandemic driving the growth of digital economy globally, the pandemic widened inequalities between those who had internet access prior to the pandemic and those who had access after. This highlights the underlying wicked policy problem that we face of the digital inequality paradox. And I think it’s exactly this paradox that the global digital compact needs to address. And this digital inequality paradox is no longer just that connectivity one where those who are connected and those who are unconnected, you know, the gap grows there. This is really to deal with the issues that our colleagues have already spoken about with the complexity of this and shifting from a notion of digital divide, a kind of infrastructural issue to dealing with the issues of digital inequality, which were much more complex. The paradox lies that as more people are connected, digital inequality is amplified. But this is not only between those online and offline, as in the case of voice or basic text in our old environment. It is between those who have the technical and financial resources to use the internet to transact actively, to produce and prosper, and even to contribute to the wealth of their nations and those who are barely online using tiny bits of data intermittently from time to time. Addressing these challenges, we argue in our submission to the global digital compact is that we need a governance environment that looks at global regulation of digital public goods. One of the key public goods is, of course, data. data, but underlying that and far more fundamentally, it is also public statistics. We absolutely don’t have the data to assess how far we are. We think we’re 85 percent of the SDGs, but for Africa, we simply don’t know. We simply don’t have that data. It is this concept of public goods and digital public goods that I particularly think has been appropriated and used and misused from its classical sense as a rationale for public regulation. I think even in the use of the public goods component within the Secretary General’s office, it’s been set up as a public-private enterprise essentially to access open data. Digital public goods is far more than open data or public data, although public data, as I said, is really the basis for this. Without reliable data, there’s little way of knowing the progress being made toward these various targets, including the SDGs and the ICT targets that underpin them, and it makes it impossible to assess our progress more generally. The current digital indicators used for Africa and, in fact, the global data on issues such as gender inequality are based on very patchy data extrapolated from a few data points for the whole continent. To move beyond high-level descriptive statistics that can conceal the real determinants of inequality, national representative macrostudies are required to extrapolate this data and build an evidence base, and this needs to be informed by an intersectional inequality approach that can assess the impacts on class, race, gender, ethnicity, and importantly, in relation to digital access location, rural and urban is a major determinant of this. Also in the kind of spatchy data that we have, it presents these groups as highly homogenous groups, whereas we know there’s enormous heterogeneity in these categories, and it’s not all men and all women that are equally or unequally accessed to these services. It’s really only through this more granular data that we can identify these multiple or intersectional aspects of inequality. The diversion of donor and multilateral agendas from regulation of affordable and universal access and digital public goods, such as internet data, cybersecurity, to only resourcing the research on advanced data-driven technologies, big data analytics, machine learning, and artificial intelligence is in fact exacerbating this digital inequality paradox. Although we still have the rhetoric of addressing digital inequality, our resources, donor multilateral, are going towards the data and AI, data-driven technologies, so it’s really important that if we are going to address digital inequality in the information era, you know, we need to address this issue of accessing data, and I think the important issue here is moving in this framework for governance of digital public goods is shifting from a purely social justice perspective and a human rights perspective to looking at a perspective that is actually also cognizant of the needs for economic justice. I think we need, at the moment, we are looking at primarily individualized, you know, first generation rights preoccupied by privacy, I think it’s important, obviously we don’t want to lose that, but we really need to look not only at the uneven impact and the uneven distribution of the negative impacts of these data-driven technologies, but we seriously need to look at the uneven distribution of opportunities associated with these, you know, enormously powerful and potentially important technologies, and at the moment, I think that is not adequately on our agenda, because there is the sense that we simply cannot, you know, abdicate these big tech companies operating at a global level. We’ve abdicated some of the responsibilities for the economic regulation that can happen in the underpinning, you know, infrastructures, et cetera, and importantly, of course, now, data. Just to say that, you know, I think while the compact covers, you know, a number of key areas, yes, we have argued that it’s actually the linkages between these different policy areas, the broader digital ecosystem that needs to be addressed in the compact. Although we, you know, we speak about the digital indicators and the need for them, and then we speak about the invisibility, the lack of representation and discrimination of people as outcomes of algorithmic business, it’s actually the linkages of that. We aren’t unable, no matter how much we try to have rights-based, ethically designed big data sets that, you know, we can’t unbias them. There simply isn’t the data to unbias them with half the, you know, world’s population or half of Africa’s population, or at least not even online. So the linkages between these underlying digital inequality and the manifestations that we see in the inequalities is completely different. And perhaps lastly, because I’ve just been asked to, I must close off, but I’m just, I think we, you know, we can’t be saying the same things we’ve been speaking about with this, and, you know, who was there, Tunis and Geneva. We’ve got to do things differently. We cannot be continuing to do the same things using the same policies and hoping that we have different outcomes. It’s not just a supply-side structural issue. We have to focus on, these are, all the evidence we have from our surveys is that the challenges are now not infrastructural. They’re the old human development challenges. The determinant of whether you have access to the internet or not is education and the associated corollary of income. Until we actually address these underlying human development challenges, no amount of, you know, high-level governance and ethical designs are going to be achieved. to address these problems. And just to the last point to emphasize very strongly that Ambassador Gill and others have made is this is no longer a sectoral policy. It cannot be dealt with by a ministry, a single ministry, a ministry of communications. We need transversal policies that will address the education challenges at the same time that they’re addressing higher level, you know, science and technology and engineering requirements that we need for data science. Thank you.

Anita Gurumurthy:
Thank you so much. I think it’s very hard hitting and I think it links also back to what Lucas said a little bit about, you know, being in this kind of bind, but, you know, there is an abdication. There’s a political abdication and I think that is something that’s completely untenable. I have been singularly unable to keep time, but I think there’s one more speaker online and then we can probably decide that we will regroup in a certain way. And so over to you, Renata, who is the head of Open Knowledge Foundation. Could she, can you unmute and we’ll just check if you’re able. Yes, we are able to hear you. Over to you, Renata.

Renata:
Okay, hi. What you see in the background is like a decline in my country. And as I was hearing all the previous speakers, I was thinking of the reality of a country like that, you know, a country in both in the most vulnerable countries in the world and a country facing economic, political and societal troubles at the moment. We have, we had a map and we will see, yeah, we would be able to visualize all the red spots, all the points in the world right now living this unprecedented unrest. We will take it into account when we think about global forum, when we think about global initiatives. So the two points that I want to address in this build session is that we need to build this global digital compact, taking into consideration that, taking into consideration that like, you know, there are countries that according to predictions of the IMF are about to collapse because of that. There are countries according to all the predictions on climate that are going to suffer in the near future catastrophes that they cannot prevent because they don’t have the resources to do so. And so with that in mind, that’s I know that it is a rather pessimistic approach, but it’s a realistic approach and that we need to take when thinking about the global digital compact. We need to understand that people coming to the room will be coming with all this baggage, with all these problems. And when you talk about ethics and principles and sophisticated systems of governance, the people there in the room will be thinking of, so how am I going to fund this if most of my budget goes to pay debt from the creditors countries? And it is again, you know, a problem of nice words, nice declarations that end up in nothing but words because you do not define in advance how it’s going to be possible for countries in the global South to fund this. So in building the ideal global digital compact, I think that institutions like the IMF should be involved and creditors countries should be involved to give us answer to that and to say, maybe we will pardon the debt of countries that are like, you know, in this struggle that are so behind in digitization. And that money will be allocated instead of, you know, like being paid by the countries every time to develop the robust digital infrastructure that is needed. That requires political will, of course. The second thing that we need to be aware while designing this ideal digital compact is power dynamics. Are we going to invite in the room and give additional layer of power to the most powerful actors that we have on planet Earth at the moment? And by those, I refer to the big tech companies. There’s this constant and constant and constant discourse of, oh, we need to invite them at the table. The problem is that many times in many countries, they own the table. And sometimes in some situations, you know, that they have gone so far to capture and think tanks, to capture academia, to capture civil society, and so on. So when designing this global digital compact, special attention should be paid to tame the power of big tech and not to be like just, you know, like the low-hanging fruit for them to shape globally the future of our digital society. One quick example of that is skills. Of course, it is very important in this to address the unmet promise of knowledge, equality, and skills. But if those, what we are doing through the cooperation between private sector and public sector on skills development is just to prepare the workers that will be useful for them. And to keep the monopolies growing, we have a problem. The other aspect that is very, very important to address and to bring in as well is to remove block, that when we saw the COVID crisis, we were very aware of the blocks on sharing knowledge and sharing capacities and sharing infrastructure. We still have with a 20th century, we still have a 20th century copyright system. We still have a 20th century, a patent system that is not enabling cooperation in the way that we need. I think that issues like intellectual property should be addressed at this Global Digital Compact. I know that those are not the sexy topics anymore, that the sexy topic is AI, but I think that if we do not address the problem of Global North, Global South inequalities in terms of access to knowledge and access to patents, we will be far behind and we will never meet the goals of saving the planet and connecting the disconnected. And last, I think, it is the issue of geopolitics and the role of the press. I think that for this Global Digital Compact to be successful, it would be incredible to involve from the first stages, global and local representatives from the media, because many times the narrative is shaped in a way from not complete awareness of the processes or not complete technical knowledge of what’s going on in the digital sphere. I prepare a quick presentation because one of these build it, fix it, this dynamic is direct, it was to make it visual. So I would like to share quickly how I see it and how I see that we can meet the goals in a second. Arenda, can you wind up in a minute? Is that okay? Yes, yes, yes, yes. It’s going to be very, very, very, very quick. So, ideally, our Global Digital Compact will fix knowledge inequalities and will be a power balance act without replicating exploitation and extractivism. It will advance people’s rights and involve the people in shaping it. It will be reproducible impact as the result. It will unlock the possibilities of technology fast, and that’s why I mentioned the removal of the patents blockade. It will bring people together and it will also bring other fora, but avoid the new extractive dynamics and participation washing of tokenism and people who do not really shape the process. It will be sustainable for the people and for the planet. It will be generative and it will be not only that the underprivileged communities will be on the receiving end, but it will activate the creative power of individuals and communities. And I think that for that purpose, the role of all the social innovation layer should be taken into account and will be rooted in the local, but interoperable and hopefully will have exponential impact and dissemination. So I guess that with that, and knowing that it was very limited time to unpack all of this, I think that that Global Digital Compact that says how are they going to fund this and does not depend only on voluntary contributions, but on serious commitments from the countries of the Global North to the Global South. A Global Digital Compact that invites and interconnects the financial issues and the climate issues and the knowledge inequality issues and bring them to the same table. And a Global Digital Compact that recognizes and addresses with meaningful acts the imbalance of power that big tech companies bring and the dynamic that they cause when they are like the persons with equal power in the room than civil society. If that is addressed, I think that we have all the elements for a successful Global Digital Compact.

Anita Gurumurthy:
Thank you so much. If only we had changed the World Trade System, IP system, and the entire debt paradigm. Just about 40 years ago, I think we would not be here and we would have certainly been able to reap the aspirations of the WSIS. Now we have compounded issues. If, with your permission, what I could do is take on some very fierce and more hard-hitting statements from the break it round and why perhaps all the aspirational and pragmatic statements from the first round of speakers may need to be subject to some kind of skepticism. I think we could perhaps do like a five to six minute input from each of you and then have a half an hour slot for discussion. So I would like to open up the next round right away so that we can take inputs and then break for a period of discussion. So over to you, Helani, from Learn Asia.

Heleni:
Thank you. Anita, your remit was to act within the particular one third of this. So let me try to do this because you can say on the one hand, on the other hand, but let me just stick to the one hand. I think the GDC was a damned if you do, damned if you didn’t. There were great consultations. People were floored across the world. People are still flying across the world on this. It was, for the skeptic, a great way to spend government money and civil society money on private sector airplanes. Could we not have done this whole thing with a lot more online consultation and written these statements? Certainly looking at the current March 2023 or May 2023 draft, it looks like this is the stuff that certainly civil society has been talking for 10, 20, 30 years. So could we not have done it for a lot cheaper? And the money, particularly, let’s say, some government spent on this, could that not have been actually spent on bridging the digital divide, getting the right kind of institutions set up in our countries, developing capacity of government? Second, a lot of the process involved keeping civil society in one track, having consultations, government in another track, and so on, and then regionally civil society. I think that was absolutely important, because there was a lot each group had to say. And not all civil society is alike. Sometimes the process didn’t really recognize that not all civil society was alike. It brought us together as if we all wanted the same thing. I think there’s enough nuances. But now the issue is how the real sticky points, forget, within civil society, is how the challenge of negotiating between civil society and sometimes private sector and government is going to take place. At this point, it looks like Amandeep and the team are somehow going to sit and use their brain cells to do this. I think that’s really poor form to not keep the rest of us informed as to what the next steps are, because that’s the real negotiation between civil society, who is perhaps at one extreme, and other parties. And that’s, I think, really important in terms of implementing next steps, because otherwise civil society could have got together and written this statement by ourselves. So that’s the real challenge before the September Global Summit. And that has to be a long, structured, facilitated process. Third, it calls in the current draft for funding commitments from governments, donors, multilaterals, et cetera. But the situation right now in certainly South Asia, some Southeast Asian countries, some Latin American countries that Renata referred to, and very soon African countries, is that we are facing a kind of inflation-driven, COVID-driven fiscal squeeze, where every dollar coming in is going to food, social safety payments, water, electricity. Nobody is going to ask and negotiate for digital-related funding, right? So who is going to pay for this is a fundamental question we have. And the poorer the country, the poorer government. I mean, we’re in IMF bailouts, mine included. Several of my neighbors are about to go into. Some Latin American countries are in the 20-somethings round of IMF bailout. So what are we talking about in terms of funding, if not for very basic necessities? And governments are not thinking about ICT and digital as basic necessities. So what they’re doing is either ignoring ICTs or wanting an AI plan so they can create jobs. And when some funder comes and says, well, you need to think about rights, very quickly cut and paste from a European policy that’s completely unimplementable with the capacity and the money that we have, right? So in this, then, in terms of funding comes the big question of taxation. There’s a conversation about global digital taxation. Now, this is a place. where a global compact could really come into play, because there’s no more global conversation about how we somewhat equitably share the benefits of large global technology, where the large user base are from the majority countries, but the companies are elsewhere. But this global compact mentions none of this. And instead, the Global South countries are sitting looking at an OECD proposal, which is looking multilateral, but one big country that we shall not name has no interest in participating and is delaying the whole negotiation. Multiple UN proposals, which are all meant to be bilaterally negotiated between tiny countries and large countries, which is never going to happen, or individually coming up with digital tax regimes, which the global companies might be able to comply with, but small platforms are going to die if they have to comply with one rule in Nepal and one rule in Sri Lanka. And so the global digital compact doesn’t address this fundamental issue of global taxation. And it’s related to financing. The last point I want to make is that this is presented as something that is net by nation states in a multilateral system. And we do need functioning multilateral systems with significant multi-stakeholder participation. That is as it should be. But setting this in a multilateral system that is dysfunctional is a fundamental problem. Where is the accountability? We talk about stopping internet fragmentation in one of the pages of the current draft. So who is going to hold accountable the country that runs the largest fireball in the world when they are doing so much more to fragment the internet than anyone else? And let me offend everyone, including my country, which just came up with an online safety bill, which is nothing but curbing speech of people that they don’t like and speech they don’t like. So this is equal opportunity offense. So where is the multilateral system accountability for holding their own members to account? I mean, this is going to be another dysfunctional UN Security Council, which can’t stop millions of people from being killed. That’s a much more important thing. So what are we thinking about in digital governance? How are we going to hold rogue nations to account? And there are many. I’m not even going to talk about companies. I think Renata talked about companies. I’ll just stop there. Thank you.

Anita Gurumurthy:
Yes, I think it’s sufficiently broken. But I would like now for Ali, Ali Kosta Barbosa, fellow of the Weissenbaum Institute, and also someone who is a member of the Homeless Workers Movement technology sector from Brazil. Would you like to speak from there? Or would you like to? You have inspiration in your predecessor, so yeah.

Ali Kosta Barbosa:
I think I will build a bit more than break now, after that one. And so first, I’d like to thank Anita on behalf of IT4Change and the Global Digital Justice Forum for inviting me in such an important debate. This shall influence the activities of. the IGF in the following days. I hope I can break it in a way I can contribute to fixing it. With honor, I’m speaking as a coordinator for the Homeless Workers Movement Technology Sector in Brazil. The housing movement accounts for roughly 30,000 people. And from a bottom-up approach, it has been doing in practice in the territories some of what the GDC is claiming for, such as promoting meaningful connectivity, digital public education, and decent digital labor. So I invite all of you to join our networking session to learn more about our work. Considering the gaps in the UN Global Digital Compact, I don’t think civil society organizations find the process legitimate. But I would like to highlight two key dimensions on GDC’s substance, sustainable digital public infrastructures and AI and labor. GDC alludes to sustainable digital public infrastructure, but it should be more precise about sustainable DPI. There is no multi-stakeholder consensus around its definition, and a forum like IGF could enable this. Instead, the GDC reinforces interoperable, open, accessible DPIs, but supported primarily through actions of multilateral organizations, which, supported by big tech-related big foundations, have shaped what DPI is in practice. The G20 had different task forces to promote digital public infrastructure at the last meeting in New Delhi. If you look closely, you’ll see they have quite different definitions of DPI. Internet pioneer Ethan Zuckerman defines infrastructure as a set of technologies and systems for the healthy functioning of society. Nevertheless, the G20 synthesis document restricts it to digital ID, payment methods, and platforms for constant-based data sharing. It is really important, but it is not enough for that, at least for the majority of the world. GDC must consider digital public infrastructure as a general purpose or essential infrastructure or platforms, even if sectoral. As mentioned by some colleagues in the first round, a multilevel approach is necessary, although it is missing. Search engines work at a global level, and social media as well. Health care, education, and social protection platforms work at the national levels. Why don’t multilateral organizations foster that development? It calls for action on digital technologies for education and social protection. But it could be more explicit on digital infrastructure for education, for instance. At the municipal or even lower levels, mobility, house rental, and food delivery, and labor platforms should be considered. So why not create data infrastructure and human rights-oriented policy frameworks to promote local sustainable innovation? Including developing countries in the digital economy through digital connectivity infrastructure, capacity building, and access to technological innovations is important, but it’s also not enough. Digital and data economies are utterly dependent on substantially concentrated cloud economy, being 2 thirds of its market shared on Amazon, Microsoft, and Google. Look, IBM and Oracle combine and account for more than Alibaba and Tencent. So solely antitrust at the local level will not solve the problem. This valid expression enables these companies to build parallel private networks, which has been considered a threat to internet fragmentation by the policy network. So if we intend to level the playing field and promote data for development, why is data infrastructure not considered digital public infrastructure, even if we acknowledge that the big players will not give up on their data governance? Again, GDC claims for sustainable DPI. As evident by the policy network environment report, GDC’s policy brief should have mentioned the carbon digital footprint. The document also says the potential of digital technology in tracking supply chains, but does not refer to the digital technology supply chain itself. What about the satellites, the fiber optical cables, the transmission towers, just regarding internet telecom-related infrastructures? Moreover, to talk about digital technologies, we must consider coal-to-extraction Democratic Republic of Congo, lintel in Bolivia, or even gold in the Amazon rain. as to ensure social, environmental, digital justice. AI regulation and governance debate must include labor discussions. Note withstanding the GDC references the application of labor rights, acting in partnership with the International Labor Organization. At the G7 summit in May, digital and technology ministers committed to further discussing diverse generative AI aspects, called the Hiroshima AI process aforementioned. Nothing on labor. The same is true within the G20 and the policy network on artificial intelligence in IGF. Until when? Why not consider it? In the Brazilian scenario, the multistakeholder public consultation on platform regulation held by the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee considered among its four pillars decent work. Some issues have multistakeholder consensus, such as algorithmic control, transparency, and democratic labor platform governance. But it still lacks attention to micro workers’ role in developing AI systems. That’s not to mention the impact of generative AI on the workforce. If we do not think of workers-led AI governance, like the Hollywood writers want, we will not see improvement in livelihoods, but the opposite. Maybe, dear colleagues, I am too optimistic to believe that novel proposals for the International Division of Labor could come out of the Internet Governance Forum. So is GDC really transformative? No. Unfortunately, it is not yet. But it can be. Otherwise, I hope none of us would be here. The Internet Governance Forum is crucial for achieving these SDGs. However, if IGF anticipates those critical dimensions, only if IGF anticipates those critical dimensions, it will likely succeed in meaningfully contributing to the roadmap for the digital cooperation. To conclude, with humility, allow me to echo President Lula’s statement during the United Nations General Assembly a few weeks ago. This broadest and most ambitious collective action aimed at development, the 2030 Agenda, could turn into its biggest failure. Thank you, Anita.

Anita Gurumurthy:
They’re not laughing because they’re sad. We’re not laughing because we have to talk about the signal. We have to fix it. Okay. So, very sobering, and I think that the issues that are not on the table are as important. Yes. So, I move over to our next speaker, Nandini Chami, Online, Deputy Director of IT4Change.

Nandini Chami:
Thank you, Anita. So, today I will be speaking on behalf of IT4Change, as well as the Global Digital Justice Forum, a network of development organizations, digital rights groups, trade unions, and feminist organizations who have been working together to advance the cause of digital justice and specifically engaging with the Global Digital Compact process in this regard. And IT4Change is also a member of this group. And just without much ado, just to kind of, like, you know, continue to break this, I think a lot of this task has been completed already. So, when we look at the Global Digital Compact from a Global South perspective, I think that there are two major unresolved concerns. And some of these concerns have come across multiple times in the public consultations that were held in the GDC process, especially from civil society groups in the South. So, the first concern is that, this was also discussed in the last round, that when you look at, like, the global digital governance scene 20 years after the vices, we see that there is a particular vitiation of the democratic multi-stakeholderism vision of the vices all these years. And we are ending up with a world where we see the digital governance space captured by a few powerful transnational digital corporations and dominant states and the bad actors, so to speak, as was discussed in the first session. So, in the world where the complexity of digital as a cross-cutting transversal policy issue has only grown, if we were not able to fix these institutional arrangements question even after the Tunis, now the institutional challenge is only growing. And is what is offered in the Global Digital Compact right now adequate to this? And I believe the answer is no, and I’ll just get to that in a moment. The second major concern is that today we all know that data governance directions are extremely important. And as was again mentioned in round one, it’s not just about privacy and personal data protection, but it’s about how do you govern cross-border data flows for development sovereignty of all countries in the digital economy. And here, too, I believe the Global Digital Compact falls short. So just to get to a slightly more detailed peak of both these issues, let’s take the question of the institutional arrangements for global digital justice as proposed by the UN Secretary General in his July 2023 policy brief. So we see that the policy brief has like two things. So one is the constitution of a tripartite digital policy space, the Digital Cooperation Forum in the short term. And in the long term, the proposal is to establish a global commission on just and sustainable digitalization. So if you take the case of the Digital Cooperation Forum, many examples are invoked, most strikingly the ILO mechanism and the membership of private entities in the ITU. And there is a proposal that the Digital Cooperation Forum should be a new tripartite dialogue modality for follow-up on the GDC commitments by states, private sector, and civil society. Unfortunately, there is no ground norm clarifying the rights and duties of these stakeholder groups or the process through which non-governmental stakeholders are going to be nominated to the proposed Digital Cooperation Forum’s policy table. There is the idea of involving small and medium-sized enterprises as well as startups through representative bodies at this policy table through a quota. But just by this tokenistic representation, would that be sufficient to neutralize the agenda-setting power of big corporations? This is something we should think about. And this point has already come up. The status of the Digital Cooperation Forum vis-a-vis the WSIS consensus is unclear. How will the Internet Governance Forum and the Digital Cooperation Forum stand in relation to each other? And if the Digital Cooperation Forum is planned as the enhanced cooperation mechanism that was never set up after the WSIS, how will the legitimate public policy space and duty of states to work for economic and social development of people in the new digital paradigm be secured by the GDC process? According to the long-term proposal of the Global Commission on Just and Sustainable Digitalization, this body is imagined as an enabler of multi-stakeholder cooperation between states, civil society, and private sector in all futuristic issues of inclusive and sustainable digitalization, which is the connectivity plus-plus we have all been talking about. And the key formula that is mentioned for this is to move beyond traditional interstate cooperation to a new network multilateralism. But in this new network multilateralism, again, without a clear separation of the rules, responsibilities, and the powers of state and non-state actors in the distributed decision-making, this will just end up leading to, again, consolidating the capture of global cooperation arrangements and the governance debates by powerful big tech actors, which is a problem we have been facing for more than 20 years now. And coming to the second issue of the directions for data governance, the Secretary General’s policy brief says that the convergence on principles for data governance, that is to be negotiated in a separate process, the global data compact, the date and timelines for which are not mentioned or raised now. And this evidently means that the most contentious issue in global digital cooperation, which is about the jurisdictional sovereignty of states to exercise controls over cross-border flows of their citizens’ data resources and deal with associated implications for human rights, national security, trade, competition, taxation, and overall internet governance will remain unresolved. And we already know from the UNCTAD digital economy report that the lack of rules on this issue entrenches the extractive neocolonial data economy that we are all very unhappy with. So coming to just a final set of points, I think that in the new institutional arrangements for global digital governance, I completely understand the point that we can’t go back to an anachronistic past, but somewhere we have to sit and think about the Tunis vision because we are not able to understand how to make democratic multistakeholderism work. And if we are leaping into a new network multilateralism phase without actually thinking about the institutional checks and balances, we are actually ending up with old buying a new bottle as the adage goes. And coming to the governance of data, we all agree that a shared multilateral vision on the access to and use of data resources is totally lacking today. And we all know that the cross-border data flows question is not just about privacy and personal data protection. So how are we going to talk about development sovereignty as the collective rights of peoples to determine how their aggregate data resources are utilized and enjoy their rightful claims in the benefits of data-enabled knowledge? So from my perspective, the global digital compact is broken on both these counts. And if we have to fix it, we have to fix both these questions of institutional governance deficit and the very, very urgent challenge of looking at development sovereignty as data sovereignty. Thank you.

Anita Gurumurthy:
Thank you so much. So that’s very important, I think, to connect the older issues that were pointed out. And in all of the economic fault lines globally, we see questions around sovereignty keep coming back. I’d like to now call upon Megan from Afronomics Law, Kenya. Megan, you’re also online.

Megan:
Thank you, Anita. I hope all of you can hear me.

Anita Gurumurthy:
Yes. Yes, we can.

Megan:
All right. Great. Thank you. So I’ll begin. I’ll largely share two gaps of the GDC brief. And I’d like to begin by stating that there’s an often-recited position that the historical choices of internet governance has enabled big tech’s rise and shaped the current digital regulatory dilemmas and that the post-multi-stakeholderism process has achieved little for global digital constitutionalizing. And so while the policy brief from the United States General on the GDC emphasizes the urgent need to reshape the trajectories of digitalization and human digitality, It’s gaps, risk, and trenching the digital regulatory dilemma. So one of the gaps in my view of the GDC include, one, the brief fails to acknowledge the notion that rights are protected by the fulfillment of duties and that merely expecting states to refrain from certain actions without duties may not be enough. On this ambit, the brief in a series of proposed objectives and actions of member states, the GDC envisions that member states would commit to a laundry list of actions under the seven main thematic areas. For instance, member states are expected to commit to avoiding blanket internet shutdowns, which will run counter to efforts to close the digital divide. And also, member states are expected to commit together with technology developers and digital platforms to reinforce transparency and accountability measures in AI systems. However, there is no mention of how such commitments from states will be attained, and therefore, there’s also a failure by the brief and the GDC to take cognizance of the power of big corporations to set agenda to their favor. As we’ve seen in the AI system of late, the European AI Act was influenced by big tech corporations. Therefore, to be effective, the compact GDC must go beyond seeking mere commitments from states and corporate actors and should ensure or come up with a regime of consequences for inaction by both states and corporate actors. And therefore, this ultimately requires dealing with the real politic of digital governance head-on. The second gap in the GDC will relate to the idea of a failure of upholding human rights holistically. So, the brief does not uphold human rights adequately in the sense that it does not capture the indivisibility of human rights, and therefore, fails to put the economic, social, and cultural rights on the same footing as civil and political rights. The digitalized work precarity in the gig economy, for instance, coupled with the incursion of big tech into the health and agricultural sector, for instance, are threatening individual and communities’ rights to a decent living, their rights to health, their rights to education, and their rights to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress, and so on. Internet shutdowns, for instance, that only undermine the connectivity divide, but also the rights to education, for instance, for students relying on remote education and other economic and social rights. On a related note that Nandini has also mentioned is the reduction of data rights to the singular agenda of individual privacy and personal data protection, of which this ignores the economic, social, and cultural rights implicated in data value chain. So, those will be my main contributions in terms of the gaps of the GDC. So, lastly, to make a point on the possibility of digital justice, it is worthwhile to know that it is possible worth pursuing digital justice by attaining a just digital future requires a radical shift of our social politics, where equality and economic policies to distribute the benefits of technology equally are made primal, and the inequalities brought about by digital capitalism, intellectual monopoly, and rent extraction are overhauls. To attain global digital justice, the GDC needs to learn also from the ill-treated versus mandated complementary process of enhanced cooperation. Over to you, Anita.

Anita Gurumurthy:
Thank you so much, Megan, for also reinforcing points that were made earlier. Is Dennis in the room? Yes, hi. Could you give him co-hosting rights? Is that possible?

Denis:
Oh, wow. So, that was already quite a bit of breaking. I think I’m the last one in the row, right? I’m a researcher at the University of Bremen, Germany, and so I’m not really a southern perspective on this global digital compact, but I’m trying to let the empirical evidence from recent studies speak for itself. This is why I brought a few slides. It’s not long, not at all. When thinking about a global digital compact a while ago, I thought, well, the one puzzle that I have is, in spite of the consultations, in spite of many people being drawn into the process, regular users, regular citizens, as much as policymakers here in the room, I felt it’s not clear to me what people actually want and think, and particularly who they want to be at the table, who they want to be particularly listened to in the consultations. So, I put this on a larger survey of around 17,500 people in 41 countries, and I asked these questions. If I ask questions about a global digital compact, I knew I couldn’t ask about complex, detailed questions of the consultations because people will not be attuned to these kind of questions, and they might not have an opinion. So, I asked three questions, essentially. The first is, who should ideally provide input into the writing of the global digital compact to the UN? Then, the question, who do you think in reality provides input into that process? And thirdly, I asked people also about the kind of principles on a very basic level. What are the most important things for you? Privacy, freedom of expression, what should be in there? If anything, what should be taken care of by this process? This survey, as I said, 41 countries, six different languages, ran November last year till March this year, and this is online-based recruitment through social media. It is only social media users, Facebook and Instagram. We can talk more about the limitations, but that’s a different forum. The first question I had was, who should actually have input in this? And surprisingly, technical experts were asked most for. Almost 60% of the respondents said technical experts. Academics, about 50% of the people said that. Citizens themselves, 45% approximately. 40% said civil society and NGOs. National governments, 35%. Businesses, only 20%. So only 20% of the people think that the businesses should be listened to when the global digital compact consultations take place. And if you just compare this to what people think, who actually gets to say something? People say, well, technical experts get a say. Academics are not being listened to. Citizens are not being listened to. Civil society is being listened to. NGOs are. National governments are not being listened to, surprisingly. But people think that businesses are more listened to than they should be, according to their own normative preferences. So I found these results a bit interesting, and I think it does bring something to the table when it comes about breaking the GDC or the consultations, because it seems there’s definitely a mismatch between the general populations and the countries looked at and what is going on. And these are the desired principles that people wanted to be included, and most included. Security for children online. Security of privacy online. Fighting hate speech online. Protection of intellectual property, interesting, also online. Greater cultural and linguistic diversity. And you can see, actually, going down there, and the least often open source, open data, and so on. Just two small slides, actually, here. There are obviously differences between countries. If we look at the principle of no censorship, then we have a lot of countries where this is strongly emphasized. Latin America, for example, in the survey, and Eastern Europe, but not so much in sub-Saharan Africa or in Southeast Asia. When we look, on the other hand, at greater cultural and linguistic diversity as a principle for the global digital compact, then we see that, particularly, sub-Saharan Africa, there’s a strong emphasis on that relative to other countries, but it’s also quite emphasized in Latin America. Yeah, that’s it already. Thank you very much for funding disclaimers.

Anita Gurumurthy:
Yeah, thanks so much, Dennis. Very clearly, I think, experiences of what to build and how to fix may be very contextual, but why it’s broken might, perhaps, have a very slender and beautiful and simple narrative. I think that comes through. What we can do is take some time now for comments so that if there are people from the first round and the second round who may want to weigh in on the comments from the room, then we could direct those. I request everyone to keep your comments short, but please contribute to breaking and building, and then maybe the wisest of us all in the room will fix it. Any questions online? I guess everyone is raring to go to fix it, but Timothy, are you still there? There’s a comment here. Anyone online that wants to come in? Renata, go ahead.

Renata:
Hi, just a very quick comment on the geopolitical aspect of it. I think that in breaking it is very important because currently, you know, like there’s a lot of tensions. Welcome to today’s session. Good afternoon, everyone. A very warm welcome to the session. Completely U.S. and the tensions with China, and we have Russia, and so on. So, I think that for the Global Digital Compact to be effective, it really needs to engage all the key actors. So, I think that BRICS is going to play a very interesting role in this, and it would be a pity not to, like, you know, connect the efforts of G20 and OECD and so on with the efforts of the G77, the efforts around BRICS, and the efforts of the G20 vulnerable. I think that what it would be, like, very, very, very important is to welcome everyone at the table, regardless of the political tensions that, like, you know, that the world is going through. The other thing is to—and I am biased here because I’m Latin American—to leverage on Brazil’s historical leadership, which will be, like, next year at the G20, presiding the G20, but it’s also the force behind the revival of BRICS, to be the connecting point at this forum, and the civil society in Brazil that is so powerful. It might be, like, key when—both in the breaking process and in the fixing process of this multilateral moment.

Anita Gurumurthy:
Thanks, Renata. Go ahead.

Ali Kosta Barbosa:
Thank you for this comment, Renata. Indeed, Brazil is leading the G20 meeting next year, and as follows will be South Africa, so pretty much related to the BRICS agenda. And I think we must play a really strong role in shaping the buzzword of this IGF, which is digital public infrastructure. We can be pretty sure that we’ll be on there, like, protesting in front of the meeting. And also, it’s probably going to take place, we can discuss during this IGF, if it’s going to take place, the Net Mundial Plus 10, I think it’s going to be a really good, really important meeting also to shape the GDC and the summit of the future and so on. I’d like just to make a comment really briefly as well, like, I think it’s a good aspect of the GDC that it’s mentioning the need of instituting public education for digital literacy, but I think it’s missing something like concrete good examples of that, like, I would be really glad to hear from any of you, from internet governance, schools, coordinators, or even in sessions during this IGF, of really concrete programs for teaching emancipatory digital literacy in public schools in accordance with the Abdijan principles. I say this because we are doing this in the Homeless Workers Movement, we’ve been in partnership with public schools in Sao Paolo, and I’d be glad to share that. And if I had time, then it’s a way to hear a bit more about the profile of these respondents. I think it was interesting to see how they are concerned about, like, children rights, and it’s a really good outcome to see that people are somehow aware of the risks of digital. Thank you.

Anita Gurumurthy:
Okay, so are we then set to move? Anybody online that wants to come back? Thanks, Renata. For those who can see, there’s Renata’s little one there. Yes. So, all ready to fix it. I guess you have to speak. Maybe then we just, I can’t, yeah. I think from pragmatism to skepticism to hope, Renata, thank you, so we move to the final round, and Anna, are you here already?

Anna Christina:
Yes.

Anita Gurumurthy:
Thank you very much. So we hope that you will tie everything together, and Ali said that maybe people know it all, so that is a very important segue to go into Anna Christina Ruelas, Senior Program Specialist from UNESCO, welcome.

Anna Christina:
So, I don’t know if I’m the wisest one to fix this, but I’m happy to be in the fix session, because I think we at UNESCO really aim with our work to try to fix some of the issues acknowledging that actually there’s no one only actor that is able to solve all these issues that you have already mentioned, but we are aiming to actually think how this multi-stakeholder approach will actually look like when it comes to, for instance, dealing with digital platform governance systems, and how we manage to balance and create a balance between freedom of expression, safeguarding freedom of expression, access to information with dealing with potential harmful content, such as disinformation, hate speech, or conspiracy theories that we are seeing that is scaling online. So I want to start very quickly saying that UNESCO has been working since a year ago with a set of consultation, a broad consultation process on guidelines for the governance of digital platform. And actually, this is one of the elements that will inform the Global Digital Compact and the Summit of the Future in 2024. And why does it inform it? Because what we are aiming here is to try to create a document that will guide the process of the governance of digital platform, acknowledging that when we talk about governance, we are talking about a coherent system where different regulatory arrangements can exist, meaning that we acknowledge that there’s self-regulation. We acknowledge that there’s co-regulation. And there’s a statutory regulation that has to happen and that has to safeguard, in any case, freedom of expression and access to information. We don’t want regulation to become a new layer of exclusion or discrimination because we know that there’s regulation that is happening in different parts of the world that doesn’t even mention or acknowledges freedom of expression, even though they are trying to regulate content. And we know that there’s regulation that does put in the straight, in their core, human rights approach. And that is happening there. And it is creating divisions. And it is creating a huge layer of exclusion in our point of view. So these guidelines are very much focused on the structures and processes for digital platforms to identify potential harmful content. And it tries to create a knowledge that these governance systems is dependent of a multi-stakeholder participation. And I have to stop here because I’ve heard a lot about what does it mean, multi-stakeholderism. And actually, during the consultation process, this was one of the questions that we made. Because we wanted to know what civil society, what is the role that civil society wants to fill in when it comes to a whole regulatory cycle, not only in participating in regulatory processes, but then in the monitoring and evaluation and all of the process of regulatory cycle. And one of the things that we realize is that it is a conversation that is mostly breaked. I mean that there’s a siloed conversation where regulators talk to each other once the policy is being approved by the legislators. And then the regulators never talk with the companies. The companies never talk with the regulators, not with the civil society. There’s a whole tension between the different actors. And so one of the things that we’re aiming at the next stage, once the guidelines are approved, is to try to convene and create a regulatory or a framework of network of networks where regulators, civil society organizations, companies, media, academia, think tanks can participate and discuss among what are those indicators from the global regional. on a local level that have to be observed when it comes to governance of digital platforms. So for instance, there’s many regulators that have told us, and I have a question here, that they never participated in their internet governance forum. They have never been part of this, and that they are now given the responsibility to attend to all these issues. And they haven’t even discussed about, you know, like what are the different layers of the responsibilities of each one of the companies, et cetera. And right now, in another session, the companies were saying, you know, like we never talk with the regulators, and we are being regulated. So it’s a problem of breaking the silos and also creating a discussion where other things that regulators mentioned is that we never talk with civil society. Civil society talks with the policymakers, you know, but then we don’t understand what are the different problems that are happening among, you know, when regulation comes into place. So if we understand how it is being put in place, if what is the effect that is having in other things, then we could do something. So creating networks for us is a key issue to identify potential follow-ups, potential way to identify how governance of digital platforms could work. And when I say networks, we never think about a global network, or we can think about a global network, but we need to go bottom down and understand that there will be always local indicators that will be very important to follow up, then they will be prioritized in one country, and then regional indicators that will be prioritized in other regional countries. For instance, in Africa, there were many specific comments about making sure that redress mechanisms were translated in the languages of the people, because right now it’s not possible to access to those redress mechanisms. And other countries, they say, we need to focus on vulnerable marginalized communities. So I think what I mean with this, and what I want to think about this, is that for us, fixing it means to actually give meaningfulness to the word multi-stakeholder. Because we say it a lot, we mention it a lot, but when it comes to an actual question of what does it mean with a specific action to follow up by each one of the actors, it doesn’t have an actual answer. what we want to, as UNESCO, is to, after launching the guidelines, to convene all of you to participate and to work together to define specifically how to actually start defining the word multistakeholderism in the global, in the Governance of Digital Platform, but most specifically in the Governance of Digital Platform in local, regional, and global level. So that would be my participation, thank you. Thank you.

Anita Gurumurthy:
Just to be a little bit mischievous, I think we should ask maybe somebody from the Break It group to ask a question to Anna. Are you convinced by the answer? Of course, she didn’t want to give answers to everything, but she did speak about, she addressed Renata’s point about participation washing. Renata, are you convinced? Is she there? Anandini, go ahead, please.

Nandini Chami:
Yeah, I have a question, and I think Renata also has a question because she raised her hand now. So my question to Anna is, I completely understand that, you know, multistakeholderism has kind of become a empty signifier, and we need to accord meaning to it, but in the current way that we have, like, you know, treated this multistakeholder arrangements and gone about it, how do you think that, you know, we can pin down the responsibility on corporations so that multistakeholderism just doesn’t become, like, you know, a way by which, especially in the context of information integrity and the Internet of Trust and the UNESCO process, it just can’t be that platforms make, like, you know, lose, like, commitments. It can’t also be that we just, like, you know, treat it as a national problem for states to regulate transnational platform corporations. At the global level, how do we build a cat? How do we hold, like, powerful transnational digital platforms responsible for, like, you know, enforcement of human rights and we ensure they don’t enjoy impunity? Like, what are some of your thoughts on how can we fix that going forward?

Anita Gurumurthy:
Renata, do you have anything to ask? I think you should go ahead, Anna. She may be busy.

Anna Christina:
Okay, so, yeah, the guidelines are very clear about the need for the platform to comply with five key principles, acknowledging that many regulations, as I mentioned, target the users and not the companies. And I think that, you know, we have to be very clear about that. And I think… it is important, when I mean the users, is criminalize the users that produce the content and they do not touch the companies at all. So one of the things that we want is to actually make sure that companies are transparent, are accountable, perform due diligence, empower the users through tools and providing tools and that relates a lot with media and information literacy. And I want to come back to that a little bit because actually it’s very interesting this part of the consultation related to media and information literacy and the fifth is that they align to human rights principles. And the guidelines say that even if it’s whatever kind of arrangement, of regulatory arrangement, there should be check and balances and there should be accountability in a meaning that enforcement, that companies need to be subject of enforcement in case that they don’t comply with the five principles. They need to comply with these five principles and any kind of regulation should bear in mind that these five principles should be in the court of any kind of regulation. So definitely we, in the guidelines, we are clear and we understood from the consultations that the role of civic society, of academia, of media, it’s a different role that it is not related. It’s a role that makes company to be accountable but the role of the government is also to enforce the accomplishment for the compliance of the digital platforms. At the same time, the role of the civic society, the media, and the academia is to make governments accountable to make sure that they are not using regulation to go against freedom of expression and access to information but to actually, to identify potential harmful content and to create a trustworthy space. So yeah, that would be my response. Thank you, Naidini. And it’s great to see Renata.

Anita Gurumurthy:
Thank you so much. I think from the visits to now, questions about corporate responsibility and accountability have transmutated into very urgent questions about corporate culpability and liability. So I think there is a need to move the vocabulary and then fix it. So on that note, Andrea, take it away.

Andrea:
This is very, very difficult because you were so good at breaking it that I think fixing it might actually not really be possible. So am I allowed to say that? But I’m not actually. Anita asked me to do this. I think that I would agree with everything that the breakers said but I think, you know, we have the luxury of just breaking and not fixing and I think we don’t. I think especially after spending all that money that Helani was talking about, some of us like, by the way, Helani, not everyone was flown around the world to be part of the GDC consultation. A lot of us had to do it online with like very short sort of cutoff points if you were not a member state. I think we’ve got to take a step backwards. I think this is what my plea would be to the tech envoy’s office, to the organizers, the co-facilitators and the summit of the future. Take a step back and really look at what principles do we already have in this digital space? What norms are there? Are they being complied with? If not, why not? We have norms on responsible state behavior and the group of governmental expert norms. Those norms are intended to create more trust, more predictability in the relationship between states and the behavior of states. You know, what’s happening with those norms? They date back, I think, to 2011. Let’s look at the WSIS principles. Let’s take a step back here as well and look at what has worked well from the Geneva declaration and the WSIS outcome documents. What are the principles in those documents that still hold people together? The notion of people-centered development, for example, of ICTs as a driver for addressing poverty, for more inclusion. Let’s look at that as well. Let’s look at whether we need a digital compact that’s not really about digital but about people and how people are affected by digitalization and what the consequences are. of this emerging, evolving relationship between society, our natural environment and technology. I think there is some of that in the GDC and there’s some overarching preambular comments, I think, that talk about looking at the big picture. But I think when it comes to the compact and what we are supposed to expect to see in the compact, I’m not sure that that’s reflected. I think we need to also take a step back and look at evidence. I don’t see the digital compact, for example, really being informed by the state of digital inequality. It deals with connectivity, it deals with access, in a very, I feel, rather tokenistic way. Maybe if the digital compact can really seriously look at the impact of social economic inequality and its manifestation in the form of digital inequality and how that actually undercuts everything that we are trying to do to create a better world through digitalization. And when you have, I’ve just recently been in Nigeria. In the last three months, 140 million Nigerians, this, I think, is research ICT data, so Alison can speak to that, were not connected to the internet. Many of them actually have an internet connection, but they can’t afford, or they might not have the devices. And yet, Nigeria is a country that’s investing enormously in digitalization. And where is this investment going? Digital public services. Why invest in digital public services if you have not yet invested in people actually being able to have access to them? So I think a lot of taking a step back, looking at evidence, and prioritizing. I think the GDC could actually benefit from taking one problem that we understand, such as digital inequality, and putting it a more granular set of targets around that. And then this is another thing I would recommend to fix it, is to work in a very complementary way with the World Summit on the Information Society and the WSIS plus 20 process. Yesterday, Amandeep was not here yet, I think, but he used a really beautiful analogy in the session on gender. He talked about how the SDGs, WSIS, and the GDC are like an orchestra that can all work together and play beautiful music. But orchestras don’t always play beautiful music. Orchestras can also make very sort of, not such, quite dissonant music. And if they don’t have a clear manuscript or a conductor, so I think it’s a good metaphor, but you really have to then work with it. I think the other thing about the, I mean, a lot of you have spoken about the consultation process. And I think here again, I mean, I think if you’re going to look at something like AI governance, you know, it struck me during the GDC process that the Hollywood actors and writers and their strike had a clearer take on the challenges of AI than the UN did. And I think maybe that’s what happens if you bring workers into the conversation, if you bring the people that are actually organizing at an industry level, people that are affected by AI. So I think again here, it’s a way of not putting the AI first. It is an important issue. It’s absolutely significant that the GDC does address it, but address it in a way that puts people at the forefront. And then that will then follow from there that you consult people that are actually working on fair work and workers in the gig economy and workers in AI. And I think that’s something else I would recommend to fix it is to be more tech neutral. There’s a sense I think in which the GDC is responding very much to a narrative that has been created by big IT companies. They create the narrative of the power of tech, but they also create the narrative of the danger of tech. And the GDC I think is very much responding to that. What the GDC should be doing is really responding to the narrative of inclusion, of equality, of accountability, and of good governance. Now, looking at those issues and looking at AI in relation to those, very important, but I think it would open up the way in which the GDC at the moment is looking at AI, which is in fact an application of technological innovation that has been with us for a very long time. When it comes to the multistakeholder participation, I think as well there’s emphasis on that, but I would think that the GDC could really learn here from the work of CSDD, the ITU, the WSIS process, and many of us at national level that you have to be actually more inclusive. You’re never going to have effective conversations about climate change and technology if you’re not actually working with the environmental sector and environmental rights defenders, both from the level of people that are at community level and defending forests from being destroyed by miners or illegal farming to people that are doing advocacy and analysis at a global level. So I think there is an opportunity here where the GDC, because it’s new, because it’s fresh, and it’s not emerging from a internet governance process, but from a sort of broader governance process, it could actually open up stakeholder participation to make it more granular, both at the community-based level, but also at the advocacy level. Similarly with issues of trade, of financing, of indebtedness. These are all issues that impact on digital public infrastructure, for example, on the capacity of states to invest in infrastructure that can be resilient, that enable inclusion. So here again, I think if the GDC can open up who it talks to and who it talks to about what. I was saying to Anita when I prepared for this, I’ve been looking at debt in Africa. Currently, African countries are spending on average more on debt servicing than on public health. Now, if that’s the status quo, how are those governments ever going to be able to actually effectively invest in inclusive digital public infrastructure and addressing digital inequality? So if we don’t address the cycles of indebtedness and the way in which the global financial system operates at the moment, we’re not going to see any change. And what happens at the GDC level will float on top. So I think that’s another fix it. Actually drill down, look at what we want to get out of the GDC, but look at it from an ecosystem perspective. What do we need to do in terms of the public sector, governments having the capacity and the resources to effectively implement? What do we need at the level of civil society being able to effectively hold governments accountable? What do we need at the level of changing how we regulate corporations? Market regulation that creates more market entrance as well. So I think there’s a granularity there that is absolutely missing. And I think if we don’t have that, we might be able to get consensus, but will we get value? I think that’s the thing. And I think that’s actually probably where I will end. I think, Anita and everyone, I would say that we have an imperfect system in the World Summit on the Information Society follow up and implementation, but it actually has, it’s grounded in many respects. We have the work that CSDD has been doing and UNCTAD has been doing on the digital economy. There’s actually really good data there on how small and medium enterprises, for example, are either enabled or disabled by how digital markets are regulated. We have data from human rights organizations and from UNESCO on the impact on women journalists, for example, of certain online practices. We know, as Elani had said, that disinformation legislation is silencing dissent and freedom of expression. We also know that community voices are not effectively included in many countries when it comes to addressing community-centered connectivity. And we also know that current business models are not succeeding in terms of the access market. We know that the mobile operators have reached a kind of a ceiling in terms of extending access. So what I’d like to see with the GDC is really just using the summit of the future, using the resources of the UN and the broader community to work with this data. And this will be my last point. I think, Dennis, your data is very interesting because I think that’s why it’s, I think, such an opportunity for the GDC to fix its approach to multi-stakeholder participation by not using it as a brand, by not reducing it to being tripartite, but actually opening it up completely and bringing in the technical community. It’s interesting, because I do think there’s a tendency sometimes to think of the technical community as being aligned with the corporate sector. Sometimes it is, but often it is not. And I think absolutely we cannot do digital governance effectively without bringing the technical community into the table, not just as part of civil society or government or business, but as a stakeholder in their own right. And that applies to the research and academic community as well.

Anita Gurumurthy:
Thanks, Andrea. I think the more I think about it while prioritizing is so important, but we also know that so much of our futures tie to the digital and the choices we make and the triaging we do now might really have cascading impacts. So that’s another paradox, you know, of in the context of digital inequality paradoxes, how do we actually address the policy paradox? And I think that’s quite important. I wanted to propose a small change in the order of speakers. Nan Sutesom, who is from Engage Media, is replacing Rishabh Bailey, who was going to speak to us. And Rishabh is unable to join us. And therefore Nan, just in about 24 hours, has kindly offered to come on board. And what I wanted to suggest is she has, what she says is a very well-defined and bounded agenda to talk about. And therefore, what I want to do is she wants to flag issues about digital trade. So I just wanted to request you, Nan, to come in and speak to how the connections between trade and digital rights play out, and if you think they are fixable at all. So over to you, Nan.

Nan Sutesom:
Thank you so much, Anita. Let me, well, share the screen. Hello, everyone. You can see my screen, yes? Yes, and we can hear you. Perfect. Hi, everyone. My name is Nan. I’m a digital rights project coordinator at Engage Media. We’re a digital rights advocacy group in South and Southeast Asia. I’m here as part of the Digital Trade Alliance. So I want to speak to you briefly about using this trade agreement, namely Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, or IPEF. I like to use this as a concrete use case to illustrate how corporate interest captures the internet governance space. And not only that, the IPEF also highlights the geopolitical aspects that come into the dynamics and how this plays out. This FTA in particular is understood as a reactionary attempt by the US to balance another FTA, namely the RCEP, that is dominated by the Chinese government influence. The IPEF involves 14 countries, the US, India, some countries in Oceania, most of Southeast Asia, and including Japan and East Asia’s countries as well. But as such, the US government chairs all chapters of the negotiations and controls the text of the IPEF. This is expected to conclude by November 2023. Now, unlike other FTAs, the IPEF will not only offer market access and GSP privileges, so the signatories, namely the Global South, will not receive the trade benefits that other FTA may offer. The text, the digital trade chapter, is also not available, making it difficult for non-profit organizations and other stakeholders to participate in the process. So quickly extrapolate this FTA. It’s first important to note that the US-Mexico-Canada FTA, or USMCA, is explicitly cited as the baseline for the commitments in the IPEF. And why is that important? It’s because the USMCA is widely regarded as a pro-Big Tech agreement. And what we have observed in the USMCA is that corporate interests are very well captured, in particular, Big Tech, in terms of digital trade. Similarly, in IPEF, 69% of US trade advisors represent large corporations and their trade associations. And this agreement is commonly seen as favorable in the interest of Big Tech, but the US trade reps themselves, who have solicited advice from Big Tech on digital trade provisions. Some of the alarming issues include, and I’ll go very quickly on this, is if, like the USMCA, IPEF will have enforceable cross-border data flow requirements, domestic measures aimed at enhancing privacy and security of data, as well as measures providing for regulatory access to data could therefore be affected by this provision, such as that in Thailand, where I’m from, the Personal Data Protection Act in 2022, which was modeled after the EU’s GDPR. So it has a few implications. First, it makes it difficult to introduce any domestic measures for cross-border trade transfers. And while there may be exceptions to this in the agreement, they’re very narrow in scope of necessity and proportionality requirements, which are very high bars to meet. In the ultimate analysis, such provision could help data flow to countries with weaker data protection standards or accountability mechanism. Another issue is that it will aim to establish safeguards against forced source code disclosure as a condition of market access. So it will aim to establish a safeguard against any algorithm disclosure in particular. Many countries in the global South right now are developing regulatory responses to the use of algorithm and or AI. And one tool of regulation is ensuring transparency and accountability over how algorithms and software in general work. And with the safeguard, if this comes into play, it will restrict various tools available to a state to promote competition, fairness in the digital economy. Preventing such disclosure in the future may lead to also algorithmic discrimination in areas like employment policies, insurance policies, or search engine rankings, which will have the effect on the competitiveness of smaller businesses in the global South. Now, I’m sure everyone in the room are aware of the dangers of AI. So this lack of transparency in source code disclosure and algorithm will limit the ability for independent and ex-ante verification of how a software product works, which can be essential to limiting the risk arising from the use of software and the black box problem with AI. Secrecy of algorithm also goes against the developing regulatory consensus on the use of AI tools. for example, the OECD’s AI policy observatory, as well as a number of proposed laws that seek to ensure pre-deployment verification of software and AI. Now, to capture it all, the codification of the USMCA, if it will be adopted in future trade agreement, for number one, the free flow of data cost will limit the ability for countries to implement localization norms. The inclusion of this clause would allow for continued flow of data to the global north, where it would be subjected to its relatively lower or freer standard data protection and accountability mechanism. Provisions restricting access to source code and algorithm will also limit the ability of regulators and independent entities to scrutinize software products prior to their deployment. So, in particular, when the global south are right now in the process of developing regulatory frameworks concerning AI, this restriction will seek to preemptively limit the ability for states and regulators to implement public interest or consumer interest regulation in the digital space. So, ultimately, codification like this will limit the regulatory options available to the signatory countries in the future to implement regulations over the ecosystem. Now, in the spirit of fix it, I’m not sure if my presentation fit into this, but first and foremost, I think that the GDC mechanism should aim to promote regulated data and technology in public interest, realizing that digital commons as a global public good and aiming to establish international security standards and cross-compliance recognition frameworks of design, testing, and certification to ensure the safety, reliability, and trust of critical infrastructure and improve security around digital technologies. This includes, but not limited to, for example, privacy protections and grievance redress mechanism. FTN negotiations should also aim for an agreement on how to define different types of data, which can then be used to create rules on data governance. In addition, there’s also another issue with labor rights with the integration of algorithm in digital labor and gig economy, ensuring the GDC should aim to ensure that workers in digital industries are protected and have access to fair employment conditions, including issues related to gig workers and the right to organize. That should be the top priority. And last but not least, fair taxation on global companies. So, ensuring that the so-called big tech pay their fair share of taxes in countries where they operate, which can contribute to funding essential public services and digital infrastructure in the global south. Mechanism to amplify non-profit and stakeholder voices should also be at the forefront of a digital trade agreement. The IPAF has a stakeholder listening session, which is a mechanism for CSO to participate, but it’s not as meaningful as you’d like it to be because negotiations is secretive, and so we just end up with civil society actors listening to each other in a room. So, with that option, we have to address how we can make this more meaningful contribution and engagement so that digital trade agreements can be more responsible. And yeah, as the USMCA codification will likely become a trajectory in digital trade, it calls for robust mobilization to push back against the interest of big tech and ensure consumer and user interests can be protected, as well as their rights. And I’d like to end my presentation here with the report by our colleague Rikab on understanding the IPAF and its intersection with internet governance. So, that’s about it for me. Thank you very much. Thank you so much for stepping in.

Anita Gurumurthy:
Yes. I just wanted to say that it’s only getting more complicated. So, for the last voices, I think we count on your power, but we also remember Shamika’s call to not give up and continue the good struggle. I think one important thing that comes out of Nan’s articulation is that it’s not just the narrative around the GDC, but sometimes I think where the narrative lies is not where the politics lies. So, maybe we will go away feeling happy that everyone was equally unhappy with the GDC, but the trade wars will be fought differently at a different place. So, the whole questions around localization, public interest, source code, opacity, and the exploitation of the commons for extractivism will remain. And therefore, then the question arises as to without letting forum shopping by the powerful, how do you ensure coherence in the multilateral system? That question always existed, but I think that’s sharper. So, don’t go away, everybody. We have the smartest voices in the room, the penultimate and ultimate. So, over to you, Emma, Global Coordinator of the Alliance for Universal Digital Rights for Equality now.

Emma:
Thank you so much. You’re right, the complexity of this issue is increasing, isn’t it, as we go on with the session. And I definitely don’t have the whole solution to fixing the GDC, but I have got part of the solution. And at the Alliance for Universal Digital Rights, or AUDRI, we’ve been considering your central question of how to come up with a set of principles that guide our digital future so that it ensures justice for the majority world. And this time last year at IGF, we launched our nine principles, securing our human rights in our digital world. And since then, we’ve really been building on that, working with a really wide range of organizations from all over the world, including in the global majority. And what our partial solution is, that the GDC has to be feminist if it’s going to work. And feminism benefits everybody. And yesterday, we launched a new set of principles. There seem to be a lot of principles around, but there are only 10. These are feminist principles for the global digital compact. And we launched these with over 50 other CSOs, mainly from the global majority, in partnership with organizations like APC, Direchos Digitales, Digital Rights Foundation in Pakistan, Policy in Uganda, and also two UN agencies. And we launched it to an audience of member states, including the US, Chile, Finland, Germany, Iceland, who all talked about the need for a feminist approach to global internet governance. And so I thought it might just be helpful today if I talk to you through, very briefly, through the main headlines of our 10 principles. And the basic premise is that if the core principles for the global digital compact of openness, freedom, and security are going to be met, then they need to be infused with an intersectional feminist perspective to ensure that the ongoing digital transformation of our economies and societies can usher in a gender-just world. So principle number one is that any digital future must be grounded in existing human rights law. Many people have said that already, including Professor Ambassador Gill. And also rooted in an intersectional approach, which promotes the rights of women and girls in all their diversity, plus people facing multiple and intersectional forms of discrimination, because we don’t want digital technology to widen the equality divide. The second principle is that the agreement must guarantee freedom from technology-facilitated gender-based violence, which there is an academic of at the moment. And it’s stopping many women and people from diverse genders and sexualities from taking part in society. And it’s undermining our democracy. And our third principle is around promoting the rights to freedom of expression, privacy, and peaceful assembly, which the UNESCO have been talking about as well. This includes the right to encryption and online anonymity, and the prohibition of internet disruptions that don’t comply with human rights law. The fourth principle is about ensuring universal, affordable, accessible, and safe internet access for all, which many people have talked about. And this includes something that one of our speakers earlier talked about, was creating and sharing content in your own language, which is really important. The fifth principle is around demanding strict action against harmful surveillance applications and high-risk AI systems. And number six is about expanding women’s participation and leadership in the tech sector and in digital policymaking. So if we want this new tech to actually work for us and make our lives better, we need to be in the driving seat. And that means that women in all of their diversity need to be involved in the design of new technology, leading tech companies, but also being involved in decision-making at national and international levels on governance, regulation, and technology development. And obviously this is going to include supporting more women and girls into STEM subjects, but it will also require more involvement of women in democratic processes. So number seven is around prioritizing strategies that reduce the environmental impact of new technology. I was really pleased to hear Henriette talking about the need to involve environmental organizations in this process. We know that the impacts of climate change are not felt equally around the world. Women in developing countries are most likely to be disproportionately affected, and machine learning is incredibly energy intensive. There’s also going to be a greater impact on water use. So AI’s contribution to climate change could be very significant in the future, and states are going to have to be much more proactive in setting limits on how much carbon new technology can produce, and also minimize the harm from the extraction of natural resources to fuel this new technology, which again falls disproportionately on a small number of nations, often on indigenous land and in countries that are recovering from a history of being colonized. So I’m almost there. I’m on number eight now, which is implement measures for states and transnational corporations to ensure data privacy and governance and consent. So the protection of people’s personal data is the bedrock of a lot of these other principles, as has been mentioned by other speakers, and many states don’t yet have privacy and data protection laws, and measures to stop transnational companies from exploiting our data are not in place, as has also been talked about already. So number nine, the ninth principle is around adopting equality by design principles and a human rights-based approach through all phases of digital technology development. So algorithms that make decisions about us are discriminating against us every day, with no accountability for the harm caused, and I was really concerned by our previous speaker talking about how some trade agreements are actually going to make this situation worse because they won’t provide the transparency of the algorithms that we need, which is why we need a human rights-based approach and equality by design principles baked into the development of algorithmic decision-making systems prior to deployment. This means things like gender rights impact assessments, which brings me to the final principle, which is around setting AI safeguards to prevent discriminatory biases. Safeguards must be put in place to make sure that gender… as stereotyping and discriminatory biases are not translated into AI systems and these standards need to be developed in consultation with those who are being harmed already. So you need to talk to us and at a minimum we need transparency in relation of data sets, their sources and uses and how that data is being applied in algorithms. So that’s it really. It’s not the whole solution but we think it’s a really important part of fixing the global digital compact. We were so pleased to hear some of the governments at our launch event yesterday agree with us about the importance of a feminist approach and of course some countries have already got feminist foreign policies which really help with this. So if we can set all of this, get all of this into the global digital compact, it stands a chance of making the GDC a powerful tool for democratic global digital governance. Thank you.

Anita Gurumurthy:
Thanks so much Emma. I also feel that from your presentation and Ali’s, there’s this need to invert the questions sometimes and say in all the talk about digital public infrastructures, what about the quasi-publics that are controlled by the private? Why aren’t we asking them to open up and make their data sets public? Questions like these which are hidden in the narrative that are often sold to us. Luca is here, he’s extremely jet-lagged and therefore we hope that the stream of consciousness from him will fix it.

Luca Belli:
Thank you very much Anita. I’m also aware that I’m the only thing that stands between us and dinner and at the same time the last speaker after two hour and a half of being here. So I will try to be provocative so that people can wake up a little bit. My name is Luca Belli, I’m Professor of Digital Governance and Regulation at FGV Law School. So what I’m going to say is very much informed on the research and thinking on how digital governance mechanism work and how can they work effectively or not. And now regulatory framework work and how they can work effectively or not. Also full disclosure, over the past year I’ve been building for five years a project called CyberBRICS where we analyze the digital policies of the BRICS countries. So a lot of what also I’m going to say is based on how also these very large emerging economies have tackled some of these issues. I have three structural challenges that we have to face and three potential remedies that we could use but I’m not sure we will use. Let’s start with the structural challenges. The first one is that, and I’m also building especially on what Alison and Elani were saying because there were some good comments there that I want to expand. First, structural challenge. We have, when you analyze digital governance, which is what the kind of framework that the Global Digital Compact aims at addressing, you know very well that it’s extremely fragmented not only geographically, which is something we have stressed, but also thematically. And that is an enormous structural challenge because you only have regulators that deal with competition and speak only amongst them. You have regulators that deal with telecommunications and speak only amongst them. You have regulation that speaks about data not in all countries and deal only amongst them. You don’t have platform regulators. You don’t have AI regulators, although all regulators want to be some of them. Now, this means that it’s extraordinarily difficult, inherently almost impossible to have a strategy that is holistic and that can work in practice, because you face this enormous thematic fragmentation. Even if you have a very good strategy, then you have the second structural challenge. That is, you might have extraordinarily relevant political and economic interests that will play against your strategy. And this has already been raised, but let me stress that there has been, over the pandemic period, enormous, almost indecent profits from five or six corporations. And no one has ever taxed that profit, no one, because there is only one country that doesn’t want it to be taxed. And that is an enormous political and economic interest that you have to face. And I will come back to this towards the end. If you have to regulate AI, and everyone agrees that AI has to regulate, there is even one specific CEO that does road shows in Latin America pontificating about how we need international regulation on AI. But then at the same time, when you are like, then we will regulate based on risk, and we will limit your profit, they are, no, we do not want AI regulation. You may be all aware of the fact that there is an ongoing effort of the Council of Europe to do a treaty on AI, but the US have already made it very explicit that it will only, for them, will only apply for the public sector. Well, if AI is developed by the private sector, that specific treaty is not even worth the paper it’s written on. And I’m sorry to be so blunt, but I think maybe at some time here we start to wake up a little bit. The third structural challenge is the fact that systemically it’s, I don’t think I’ve used the best possible term before when I made my question asking about bad faith actor, because it’s not bad faith. Most of the multinational corporations are publicly traded corporations. This means that the executive has a legal obligation, a fiduciary obligation, to prefer the shareholder interest to anything else that is not binding by law. So it is naive to think that large multinational corporations will privilege human rights to shareholder profits, because every three months and every quarter they have to meet shareholders and tell them, we have increased costs, sorry, we have reduced costs, we have increased benefits. Actually, it’s very interesting. that what happened after the pandemic, or after these enormous indecent profits, has been not redistribution of the profits, but firing of at least 10% of the workforce. Because shareholders were annoyed, because that very enormous profits could not be kept. And so costs had to be reduced. And so tech corporations have started firing people. So that is a systemic challenge that we have. Because those who have the power to decide have not only a marketing incentive, a fiduciary obligation to increase benefits and decrease costs. And here we enter into the possible. Well, there is also a very good study that I wanted to mention by Subha, Ulla, and colleagues on multinational corporations and human rights violations in emerging economies. Because they map more or less 200 corporations that have subscribed to the global compact, not digital one, the global compact, showing that 90% of them engage in human rights violation. And even if they have explicit commitment to the global compact, because they have a duty to do so. If their shareholder want to be pleased, they have to increase profit. So that is something. I have nothing against these specific corporations. But that is something that one has to be considerate, to be pragmatic, and to find solutions. So first, how to tackle the lack of systemic approach. I think that we start to see the only, let’s say, document that gives us an idea of what is happening with the global digital compact is this policy brief that was released in May. And I think they make a good effort at doing an initial systemic approach, mapping the principles, mapping the potential actions, and mapping what fora already exist. But that is very embryonic approach and needs to be complemented also, which kind of good practices you have to use to implement those actions and to implement those principles. And this is non-existing so far. I hope it will come with the following phases of the digital global compact. Actually, here my second point of suggestion is to actually learn from the IGF as a good platform for suggesting solutions. Actually, what nobody seems to remember is that the mandate of the IGF is also to recommend things. So if you take Tunisia agenda, Paragraph 72G, it’s explicitly stated that the IGF should recommend issues to the global stakeholders. And this has never been done because people think that recommending means imposing. Identifying good practices and recommending them doesn’t mean that the IGF should say all the government of the world must follow this example. Simply means that IGF or any other people, person, entity that recommends something is saying this exists. You should consider it. A lot of people travel to fancy places every year to discuss solutions and maybe to recommend them. So start mapping them and proposing them as potential solution. There is nothing controversial in it. Last but not least, if we want to have a digital global compact that is meaningful, we really have to focus on implementation. That does not only means suggesting good practices. It should be followed. followed, but also the metrics that should be used to analyze if they succeed or not. And something that, if you study China and if you’ve studied big tech, you start to understand they do in pretty much the same way, is understanding which kind of facilitators and obstacles exist. Because that is the greatest point if you want, the greatest difficulty or advantage if you want to implement something, knowing what will go wrong and try to address it, and knowing who could be helpful in trying to address it. That is actually something that, paradoxically, we can learn from big tech. Because sometimes that has become a joke, sometimes a sad joke with friends. I mean, I’m not sure which list is longer. If the list of potentially disruptive new businesses that have been acquired by big tech, of the list of brilliant friends working in academia or civil society that have been hired by big tech. But at some point, you have to understand that if you have to implement a medium or long-term strategy, you have to identify what are the obstacles and what are the facilitators. And I was a little bit frustrated, I have to confess today, when I asked Amandeep today if they had a plan for it. Because the answer that the good faith actor have to do more, I’m not sure if it is the most effective to achieve an effective global digital compact. I hope I’ve been enough provocative. But I see people sleeping, so I’m not sure.

Anita Gurumurthy:
No, no, we are, we are. So we just want to wear the politically correct face in the IGF, that’s all. So thank you so much to everybody. I just want to take, since we have 15 minutes to go before the room is closed and shut, I just wanted to know if there are people in the room who have thoughts to fix it, to build it anyway. And I know that Renata wanted to make a point, so maybe we can start with Renata. And in the meanwhile, I can bring the microphone to anyone that wants to contribute.

Luca Belli:
Sorry, may I just add something that I forgot to mention? Is that as I’m sure that these five or six multinational global corporations that have earned these very hefty profits under the pandemic are extremely, extremely committed to the global digital complex. Something one may ask them is to make a voluntary contribution or let’s say 30% of their billions that they have earned, because people were obliged to use their services for two years, to finance all the nice things that we have said or the nice ideas we can have. And that does not require taxation by anyone. And as they are fully committed to the global digital complex, I’m sure they will accept.

Anita Gurumurthy:
Renata, just a second. Maybe I’ll just call upon Renata. Is that OK? Renata, just hold on. This is somebody who is online.

Clever Gatete:
Thank you so much. The reason why you asked to speak is because I have to leave very quickly. My name is Clever Gatete, and I’m here. I’m from Rwanda. I’m the peer for the UN. One of the co-facilitators, together with my colleague here from Sweden, we came here specifically to listen to you. And one of the things which you have to make clear is that there is no digital compact now. We are just compiling all the ideas so that there is an intergovernmental discussion. And later on, we’ll come up with a global digital compact. We have had consultations widely. We have had so many deep dives in every of the eight areas. And we’ve heard from different people. We had even special sessions for the civil society itself. The reason why we came here is at the end of the day, nobody’s happy with maybe what is going on. And that’s why we came here to say, can you narrow it down so that we see the issues and the ones which you think should be part of the compact or which can contribute to the compact? So they are given to us because next year in January, we are going to come and sit down together with everybody to make sure that we can use these kind of ideas that you have given us as part of the discussion with the member states. There will be 193 member states discussing. But given what you have compiled already too much, but you came here specifically for the idea for the people who are participating, and especially for your team, for you to narrow down and give us something in writing so that all your ideas and what you think is very, very important. The reason is because technology affects everyone. It affects the way of life. It doesn’t affect one or the other. It affects all of us, whether in education, whether you are in whatever business you are doing. It affects all of us. And we want to hear from everyone. But we want to make sure that we do it in an organized manner, in a way that you can bring your ideas, put them together, and say, this is our position, which you think can contribute to your discussion so that we take them into account. And that will be more professional in terms of doing things. Because we’ll be unhappy with some of the things, but if we don’t do it right, then you find we don’t have a way of discussing it with our colleagues who are not here, who didn’t listen to you. And it’s very, very important for us to be able to capture exactly what you think that can be included. And that’s why we’re here listening. Actually, we want you to be at the back so that you can listen and take notes. But I think I thought it was very important for us to tell you that if you put something in writing, it will be helpful for us. Because it will help our case to adjust and to be able to convince people. So we heard what you said. But if you can help us, I think that would be useful. Thank you so much.

Anita Gurumurthy:
Very grateful to you for giving us an opportunity to submit this in writing. Maybe the three-hour discussions, we will be able to generate a report, as Andrej had suggested, in the morning as well. And we’d be happy to share that with you. And if your co-chair from Sweden wants to speak. Ma’am, would you like to? I fully agree with you. Yes. Thank you very much for being here with us. So Renata, you go. And after that, Andrej and Alison.

Renata:
It’s very quick and specific point on the funding. If we achieve one thing as a civil society, will be that this global digital compact is formed together with a fund with mandatory contributions from the richest countries in the world and from the richest companies, voluntary, because we have no legal mechanisms to make that happen to be mandatory. But I think that if we… Otherwise, we will waste a long process that will only end in principles that then will not be applied because of lack of resources. So if we can do one thing united, like the poorest countries in the world and the civil societies to work together for the summit of the future, to be like the big announcement, the big headline after this effort is that substantial money is committed to increase the capacities, to increase the ability and to make that not only worse, but worse transforming to actions and into proper public digital infrastructure localized in the countries that need it the most. So to fix it, include a financing mechanism to make all of these nice words translated into actions.

Anita Gurumurthy:
Thanks so much, Renata. Andrieta.

Andrea:
Thanks very much, Anita. I mean, what I wanted to say, it’s partly in response to what Luca was saying about the original mandate of the IGF was to facilitate, well, inter-institutional. That’s, I think, one of the very important aspects of it and also recommendations. And I think one of the reasons that we are not doing well enough in this IGF space and in what we have at the moment is our multi-so-called, multi-stakeholder ecosystem is that we don’t have certainty. It’s very unpredictable. I think that, you know, so this is something else I think that the GDC can do is to take away that element of, will the IGF continue, will it not continue? Obviously, that is a decision of the WSIS plus 20 process, but if we’re going to strengthen these processes, make them more relevant and more inclusive, we need to be able to know that they’re not being used as political footballs by member states or UN agencies or internal, you know, territorial issues within the UN system. These processes are not as strong as they should be. They’re not as inclusive as they should be, but they are the best that we have. And I think I really, you know, in the recent letter from the co-facilitators, I think it’s a message that in a sense we are getting that because it will take years of evolving and continuing to strengthen these spaces. And I think the one thing as civil society that we have to be careful of as well is to set our own terms. I think the GDC consultation processes required us to respond to what was given to us. I think we possibly did not do enough to fill the gaps. The IGF MAG as well, for two years, it created its thematic structure based on what was given to it by the GDC process or the digital cooperation process. That’s good. It wants to be relevant, but in that process you could actually be missing exactly the same things that this other top-down process is missing. Like tax, like taxes.

Speaker:
Thank you. Thank you, Anita. Thank you very much for inviting us to this very informative session. I’ve heard a lot of very interesting, insightful, and also useful comments. I think some of the points may be also good for us to take into account in the WSIS Plus 20 review. I forgot to introduce myself, actually. I’m working for Sharmika. Sharmika is our director. So we are servicing the UN Commission on Science, Technology, and Development. And CSD, in short, is conducting a WSIS Plus 20 review in order to provide inputs to the General Assembly, which is going to conduct the WSIS Plus 20 review in 2025. So I would like to also invite this group to participate in the WSIS Plus 20 review because some of your points are very relevant to WSIS Plus 20, as several speakers have mentioned. We also need to look at what are there now in this world, whether they are working, why they are not working, and how we can do to make them work better so that we can really achieve the WSIS vision of inclusive, people-centered, and development-oriented information society. And CSD is going to launch its open consultation, which is multi-stakeholder consultation, on the 10th of October in this house, in room E, from 315 to 445. At the same time, we have also circulated a questionnaire together with other key actors, UNESCO, ITU, and UNDP. We also invite you to fill out the questionnaire. It’s available on the IGF website, the questionnaire. And they will be taken into account in preparing our report. The report is going to be discussed at two annual sessions of the CSD. One is next year, April 27th, CSD. The other is in 2025. And then, after these two discussions at CSD. we are going to present a report to the General Assembly in 2025 for its review. So I really encourage this group to participate in the CSD’s WSIS Plus 2020 Review because you have offered very insightful comments and points and messages that we can definitely consider in our WSIS Plus 2020 Review. Thank you again.

Nigeh Kassamir:
Yes. Good day. My name is Nigel Kassamir. I’m from the Caribbean Telecommunications Union, which is an intergovernmental organization. I did come in late, so I’m not sure if this specific comment was made before. But in hearing the gentleman’s comments earlier about the structural shortcoming with regulation, I am aware that the ITU has a fledgling attempt at regulatory collaboration, which they are calling the Digital Regulation Network, which they launched at the Global Symposium for Regulators in May this year. So that is probably something that could also be taken into account.

Alison:
Thank you. Anita, I did say when I speak about the first phase, the bill that we just want to say something about the fix-it because I think that’s really what some of the issues that we raised in the beginning really and were raised in the fix-it session are really still, we’re still not addressing what fundamentally has to be done. We’re still dealing with some of the problems and maybe not sufficiently what the solutions are. So I mean, just in response to the constant reference about using what we’ve got and how relevant WSIS still remains in terms of how relevant IGF remains, I think these are important continuities. They’re significant still because we still have the same problems. And so I think it’s really important in referencing those that we commit ourselves to doing something differently. We’re continuing to identify the same problems and speak about the same kind of neoliberal market reforms and the dominance of certain sectors, the assumptions that the best value creation is out of private sector value create, these kinds of things. So I think we really, when Ambassador Gill speaks about this needs to be a paradigm shift, the paradigm shift is not an institutional changing of the deck chairs and institutional arrangements. We have to do something far more fundamental. And I think the problem is that what are our rationales for governance? We’re continuing to use the rationales for governance that were around traditional commercial supply side regulation of resources in the allocation of our resources. And we need to really challenge that. We need to start looking at the demand side value that we need in our resource allocation. If we’re serious about building public value, if we’re serious about economic justice, then we’ve got to be looking at those. That is how we get to a commons, not about carving out a little bit of space that the commercial sector doesn’t want for a little bit of Wi-Fi or something. We need some really to address those fundamental issues. So yes, there are structural issues at the governance level that Luke has very eloquently addressed, but they’re actually, we’re still not dealing with the structural inequalities that we’ve got that make all this digital inequality manifest. And I think that if the global digital compact wants to make a significant paradigm shift, that is where the paradigm shift needs to come, is in the rationale for global governance and regulation.

Anita Gurumurthy:
Anyone else? There’s a hand over there. Yes.

Yuichiro Abe:
Thank you. Thank you for your informative discussion and comments. I’m Yuichiro Abe, a Japanese, randomly participating in this workshop. But after listening to the fruitful discussion, I realized that the process, the fixing the process of the GDC is quite important, because we have the expression in Japanese that this is just a rice cake painted in a picture. We cannot eat it, even if it looks delicious. So we have to make it through a real process. And I have one question. So maybe the GDC should be like an orchestra with beautiful music, but we need a conductor. And who should be a conductor in this process? Maybe it will be a target of a political battle, or like that, but it is very difficult. But I would like to hear the recommendation from IGF about who should play the conductor. Not maybe only one, but who should be the several conductors for the process?

Anita Gurumurthy:
So this will need, I think, an entirely another zero-day event. So it’s an institutional question, and as Allison said, it’s only partly institutional. We also have a name for the report, not just a little bit of Wi-Fi. So… Yeah. We want real rice cakes, yeah. So I mean… That’s a Japanese approach. Yes. Yes. Yes. Also this. So just to say thank you to everybody who helped co-construct this, the dynamic coalitions that were involved. Thank you, Dennis. Thank you, Luca. Also, the Global Digital Justice Forum, and to all of you who so readily gave of your time and sat here and came back after your other commitments, and to our surprise visitors, the co-chairs of the GDC. I just wanted to also say that the thing that struck me when I read Amartya Sen’s The Idea of Justice was that never, never should you make the mistake of going behind the idea of justice. You must understand the idea of injustice, and then you have done your job. So in some sense, I think the session was very instructive because all of us contributed to co-creating the pool of ideas of what we don’t want. And I think for long, the wise people of the world have told us, what is necessary to fix? It’s not rocket science at all. We know it, and we know the political economy of anti-solutions in the right way. So I think we should build public value, and we should probably go to the report in the next stage. So I’d like to request all of you, and maybe I can reach out. And if you would like to, please send back your comments. That would really help. And the IGF does a marvelous job of the closed captioning. But it may not always be accurate, so it would be nice to have your comments. So thanks to everybody, and a round of applause.

Audience:
Yeah. Thank you. Thank you. You Thank you.