WSIS+20 in Action: Implementation, Cooperation and Review – Part II

Deniz Susar highlights that there are now many related UN processes on digital cooperation, including the WSIS Forum, IGF, Global Digital Compact, STI Forum, and UN Group on Information Society, as well as new AI-specific processes. This proliferation raises the question of how to bring everything together rather than creating yet another process. The key challenge is how C11 can help improve coherence and avoid duplication as member states repeatedly request.

Susar listed numerous existing UN digital processes including the WSIS Forum, IGF, Global Digital Compact, STI Forum, and UN Group on Information Society , and noted new AI-related processes such as the global dialogue on AI governance and the independent international scientific panel on AI . She illustrated the duplication problem with a personal anecdote: while conducting a capacity-building workshop on AI in public administration in a Middle Eastern country, she discovered another UN agency was running a similar workshop in the same building, organised by the same ministry .

Susar explains that the 82nd UN General Assembly session, beginning in September 2027, will include a review of the Global Digital Compact, which will be particularly significant given the transition to a new Secretary-General. This review will allow member states to assess what has worked and to consider which arrangements should continue, evolve, or be restructured. The AI governance processes created under the GDC will also be subject to this assessment.

Susar noted that the 82nd UN General Assembly session will begin in September 2027 and will include a GDC review starting with a report from the Secretary-General, coinciding with a new Secretary-General taking office . She stated that the GDC review will give member states an opportunity to assess AI governance arrangements, including their added value, duration, relationship with existing WSIS and UN processes, and how AI-related cooperation should be taken forward .

Philipp Schulte argues that WSIS, and specifically C11, represents the overarching mandate for UN agencies to work on digital cooperation, making it the natural framework within which newer processes such as the GDC should be situated. He notes that during the WSIS Plus 20 review build-up, it became apparent that this steering role had been somewhat overlooked. The roadmaps are seen as a key mechanism to reassert and clarify this overarching role.

Schulte described WSIS as 'one of the oldest and certainly the most comprehensive mandate for the UN to work on digital' and characterised C11 as 'the overarching mandate for the UN agencies to work on digital cooperation' . He noted that member states and UN agencies had recognised during the WSIS Plus 20 review that the original WSIS mandate's steering role had been 'a bit overlooked' and was 'not really clear' .

Schulte argues that the roadmaps are not an extra burden but a genuine opportunity for UN agencies to recalibrate how they work on digital issues, clarify their priorities, and align with newer mandates including the GDC and various ECOSOC and ITU resolutions. The roadmaps serve as a communication vehicle both internally within agencies and externally to member states and the public. This process of recalibration is seen as essential for demonstrating relevance and coherence.

Schulte explained that the WSIS mandate is 'super broad' and 'tech neutral', giving agencies room to decide what to work on, but that this should not mean agencies can do whatever they want . He described the roadmaps as 'a chance to streamline a bit the work and also to take into account newer mandates such as from the Global Digital Compact' and other resolutions from the second committee, ECOSOC, and ITU .

Schulte argues that while mappings and metrics are useful, the roadmap's real value lies in helping agencies identify and communicate specific, concrete priorities that vary by region and context. Rather than generic statements, the roadmap should contain actionable targets that member states can understand and hold agencies accountable for. He uses the example of setting a specific target for increasing Internet Exchange Points in Eastern Africa within two years as the kind of concrete deliverable that would resonate with member states.

Schulte gave the concrete example of infrastructure priorities, noting that the situation in East Africa differs from Eastern Europe or South America, and suggested the roadmap could specify a target such as increasing the number of Internet Exchange Points in Eastern Africa by a specific number within two years . He argued that such concrete items are 'something you can bring back to the member states, and I think they would love to see that' .

Schulte observes that WSIS was historically placed in a box and never well connected to the broader UN development agenda, which may have made sense in 2003–2005 but is no longer appropriate. He sees the GDC as one result of this disconnection and argues that the roadmaps offer a window of opportunity until 2030 to integrate WSIS more fully into overall UN processes. He also believes that WSIS and post-2030 policy outputs will need to be integrated rather than kept separate.

Schulte stated that WSIS 'was pretty much put in a box for several reasons and was never well connected to the broader UN agenda on development' and that this is 'not possible anymore', citing the GDC as one result . He argued there is 'a window of opportunity until 2030' and that the roadmaps are 'a chance for the agencies to prepare also for 2030' and to consider what comes after .

Schulte argues that member states expect UN agencies to demonstrate delivery on UNAT (UN system-wide coherence and reform) commitments within the digital cooperation space, and the roadmaps are a vehicle for this. He notes that the UN80 process, though little discussed in WSIS circles, is a relevant opportunity for agencies to show how their work aligns with broader UN reform. This framing positions the roadmaps as tools for accountability as well as planning.

Schulte stated that 'as member states we expect the agencies also to deliver in the realm of digital cooperation on WISIS on UNAT' and described the roadmaps as 'a good opportunity' rather than an extra task . He specifically mentioned the UN80 process as 'little discussed in WISIS' but as a relevant context for the roadmaps .

Paulina Ibarra argues that digital threats, particularly those affecting elections and democratic processes, operate across borders using cross-border digital infrastructure, making isolated national policies ineffective. She positions Action Line C11 on regional cooperation not merely as a policy line but as a matter of democratic resilience. This framing elevates the urgency and political significance of regional digital cooperation.

Ibarra cited the example of her NGO's work in Latin America focusing on dangerous trends, particularly those affecting female candidates during elections, as an illustration of cross-border digital threats . She noted that 'because these operations use cross-border digital infrastructure, isolated national policies simply don't work, unlike the EU', concluding that 'Action C11 on regional cooperation is a matter of democratic resilience and not just a policy line' .

Ibarra proposes three concrete actions for the C11 roadmap: first, enforcing mandatory human rights due diligence and algorithmic transparency for tech platforms across all markets; second, creating a direct formal line from national and regional IGFs into GDC and CSTD review mechanisms; and third, establishing traceable feedback loops within UN DESA so that regional stakeholder input visibly influences international policy priorities. These proposals aim to move from rhetorical commitments to operational accountability.

Ibarra called for regional frameworks under C11 to 'push for mandatory human rights due diligence and security across the entire technology lifecycle' and for tech platforms to 'face the same regulatory rigor and algorithm transparency in local non-English speaking markets as they do in the global' . She argued that the C11 architecture needs 'a direct line from national and regional IGFs straight into a formal review mechanism of the GDC and the CSCD' and that UN DESA should maintain 'a visible record showing exactly how that information impacts international policy priorities or platform oversight' .

Ibarra argues that local civil society organisations are the first responders when it comes to digital harms, but their insights rarely translate into changes in global compliance or policy. She calls for the C11 architecture to create a structural connection between national and regional IGFs and the formal review mechanisms of the GDC and CSTD. This would ensure that ground-level knowledge informs global governance rather than remaining siloed at the local level.

Ibarra stated that 'local civil society organizations are actually the first responders when it comes to digital harms but their insights rarely change global compliance' and that the 'C11 architecture needs to be built and needs to incorporate a direct line from national and regional IGFs straight into a formal review mechanism of the GDC and the CSCD' .

Dr. Xiao Zhang argues that the IGF, with its evolving mandate, is the appropriate platform to build connections between different UN agencies rather than establishing a new single advisory body. She emphasises that the UN system has different agencies with different policies and actions, and the IGF's multi-stakeholder character makes it uniquely suited to bridge these. Strengthening the IGF's connections with various agencies would be more effective than creating new structures.

Zhang stated that 'we should build the agents' connections with different agencies because this really stands for modistic holder group' and that the IGF's mandate is evolving, making it suitable for this bridging role . She noted that the UN system has 'different agencies, different policies, different actions, different decisions' but does not need 'a single modistic advisor group' .

Dr. Zhang argues that amid diverse priorities, the C11 roadmap should identify the minimum shared infrastructure principles that all parties can agree on, particularly maintaining a single, interconnected, non-fragmented Internet and ensuring interoperability. She frames these as foundational prerequisites for all other digital cooperation. Capacity building, especially in the AI age where the digital divide risks widening, is also highlighted as a critical priority.

Zhang stated that 'we should work on the one Internet that means aware the fragmentation of the infrastructure, we should remain interconnected well-connected, and it's something minimal' . She also emphasised that 'interoperability is very important' as it 'helps the business become easier' , and noted that 'in the AI age, our digital divide could be wider, because we have no access', making capacity building 'a very important issue' .

Dr. Zhang argues that the IGF's mandate should not be limited to Internet governance in the narrow sense but should evolve to cover digitalisation governance more broadly, reflecting the comprehensive nature of digital transformation. She sees WSIS as a great success precisely because it is comprehensive and covers the whole of society. The mandate must keep pace with the expanding scope of digital issues.

Zhang argued that 'the mandate is evolving, like the Internet Governance Forum, we should not just focus on the Internet governance, but it should be the digitalization governance the digital governance' . She described WSIS as 'very comprehensive' with 'so many action lines' covering 'a whole society' .

Dr. Zhang cautions against over-relying on a single group of scientists for digital governance decisions, arguing that digitalisation is fundamentally about human involvement and the acceptance of technology, encompassing economic and social factors beyond the purely technical. She implies that a more pluralistic approach to evidence and expertise is needed. This serves as a counterpoint to the suggestion that digital governance should simply 'listen to the science' as climate governance does.

Zhang stated that 'we should be very careful if we want to build a, if we just listen to a scientist or a scientist group, because it's very, very complicated' and that 'digitalization is about the involvement of human and how human could accept technology' involving 'a lot of economic and social factors' beyond just 'the technology factor' .

Sophia Longwe highlights that AI governance is particularly fragmented, with multiple dialogues occurring at different levels including exclusive forums such as the G7, G20, and OECD where many member states cannot participate and civil society is largely absent. These mechanisms coexist but do not relate to each other despite having overlapping mandates. This fragmentation is both exclusive and inefficient.

Longwe noted that 'the eye governments, Warren and Sandscape, is just genuinely really fragmented' with 'so many different dialogues going on at so many different levels, also very exclusive for like the G7, like the G20, like the OECD, where certain member states can't participate, and also civil society is not really involved there' . She observed that 'those mechanisms somehow coexist, but don't really relate to each other, but they do have overlapping mandates, obviously' .

Longwe argues that civil society is systematically marginalised in digital governance processes, relegated to side events and parallel tracks rather than being included in main decision-making spaces. She characterises this as both exclusive and genuinely inefficient, as it requires significant resources from already underfunded organisations. The performative nature of such inclusion undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of governance processes.

Longwe stated that 'from a civil society perspective, we are basically placed at those processes kind of like at the outskirts, at like separate side events, and it somehow feels often very performative, because we're not really involved in the main decision-making spaces' . She noted that civil society is 'obviously really always mostly underfunded' and that 'most of us work on a volunteer basis', making the resource burden of multiple processes particularly acute .

Longwe argues that the C11 roadmap should place civic participation at the centre of governance rather than treating it as an add-on to disconnected forums. She draws on Wikimedia's experience as a community-led, multilingual movement operating in nearly 350 knowledge versions as a model of how participatory, collaborative, and open governance can function at a global scale. Digital public goods such as Wikipedia and Wikidata, recognised under the GDC, demonstrate this model in practice.

Longwe argued that 'C11 is an opportunity for stakeholder engagement and for stakeholders to participate more meaningfully in processes that are already existing instead of just like, yeah, starting new ones' and that 'through this roadmap, we could really move civic participation to the center' . She cited Wikimedia's experience as a 'community-led' movement that is 'multilingual' and 'exist[s] in almost 350 different knowledge versions', with digital public goods like Wikipedia and Wikidata 'recognised as digital public goods, also linked to the Global Digital Compact' as a demonstration of participatory global governance .

Longwe presents three main priorities for the C11 roadmap: institutional coherence through alignment of WSIS action lines with the GDC, SDGs, and AI-related processes; meaningful participation that genuinely integrates marginalised communities into decision-making rather than symbolic consultations; and implementation capacity by strengthening existing institutions like the IGF and national and regional initiatives. She also calls for adapting IGF modalities to make it more future-ready and securing more funding for it.

Longwe outlined three takeaways: first, 'institutional coherence' to 'align the WSIS action lines avoid duplication and really link them to the GDC to the SDGs to UNHC and to also all of the other related AI processes' ; second, 'meaningful participation' to 'ensure that marginalized communities are integrated into decision making and not just confined to some parallel tracks and some like symbolic consultations or photo opportunities' ; and third, 'implementation capacity' to 'strengthen existing institutions that have worked for a long time, like the IGF, like national and regional initiatives' .

Anriette Esterhuysen argues that simple proxy indicators like the number of National and Regional Initiatives (NRIs) do not capture the actual impact of WSIS implementation. What matters is whether NRIs are contributing to more inclusive policymaking at the national level and facilitating collaborative WSIS implementation in country or region. She draws an analogy with donor accountability frameworks to illustrate why outcome-oriented indicators are necessary.

Esterhuysen stated that she is 'not convinced that [number of NRIs] is particularly useful' and that 'what we want to see is, are those NRIs contributing to more inclusive policymaking at national level? And are they facilitating collaborative WSIS implementation in country or in region?' . She used the analogy of a donor relationship, noting that if she gave a donor 'an indicator like number of NRIs, they would send me back to my log frame and ask me to redo it, because they want outcome-oriented indicators' .

Esterhuysen proposes that rather than developing indicators in isolation, UN DESA should work collaboratively with NRIs and other stakeholders to develop more meaningful, outcome-oriented measurement. This collaborative approach would both improve the quality of indicators and build ownership among those being measured. She suggests that NRIs themselves could contribute to more substantive measurement of their own impact.

Esterhuysen suggested that Susar should 'do it collaboratively' and that 'if you can count the number of NRIs, ask the NRIs to do some more outcome-oriented measurement' .

Esterhuysen proposes that rather than producing matrices of matrices, each action line roadmap should be structured around the rich thematic headings already present in the WSIS outcome document, such as information and communications for development, closing digital divides, the digital economy, and environmental impacts. This would create a more conceptual and substantive framework that speaks to human beings rather than being a mechanical tick-box exercise. It would also allow cross-cutting issues like data governance to be tracked across all action lines.

Esterhuysen proposed asking 'each action line roadmap to include these [thematic headings] and then some reflections on priorities and activities under those', noting that for C11 this would allow DESA to map which processes deal with data governance or environmental impacts and how stakeholders can engage with them . She expressed concern that current roadmaps and integration matrices 'end up with matrices, matrices of matrices, and they don't speak to human beings' and are 'mechanical tick box things' .

Robert Lisinge argues that the C11 roadmap must prioritise capacity building for member states, particularly in Africa, as well as alignment with existing frameworks including the GDC, SDGs, and the African Union's Agenda 2063. He also calls for a unified set of reporting indicators to reduce the burden on member states who currently face an enormous number of duplicating reporting requirements from different frameworks. The ECA's experience of clustering WSIS Plus 20 outcomes into nine thematic pillars with 15 priority indicators is offered as a model.

Lisinge described ECA's development of an indicative roadmap for Africa that clusters WSIS Plus 20 outcomes into nine thematic pillars with a minimum of 15 priority indicators, ensuring alignment between WSIS, GDC objectives, African Union Agenda 2063, and the SDGs . He stated that 'capacity building should be one of the things that we need to be reflected in the action plan for international cooperation' and called for 'a unified set of reporting lines' to address the problem of member states facing 'an enormous number of indicators and reporting requirements from each of different duplicating or replicating frameworks' .

Lisinge argues that the current proliferation of reporting requirements from multiple overlapping frameworks places an unsustainable burden on member states, particularly in Africa. He proposes developing a minimum set of priority indicators that are mapped across WSIS, GDC, SDGs, and regional agendas such as the African Union's Agenda 2063. The ECA's approach of identifying 15 priority indicators across nine thematic pillars is presented as a practical model for this.

Lisinge noted that 'most of our member states face some challenges in terms of an enormous number of indicators and reporting requirements from each of different duplicating or replicating frameworks from different countries' . He described ECA's approach of clustering WSIS Plus 20 outcomes into nine thematic pillars and identifying 'a minimum of 15 indicators where countries can report on priority', with alignment mapped across GDC objectives, African Union Agenda 2063, and the SDGs .

Lisinge identifies the translation of global commitments into national actions as the critical missing link in WSIS implementation. He describes ECA's work in developing an indicative roadmap for Africa that helps countries operationalise WSIS Plus 20 outcomes at the national level, developed in partnership with regional and international organisations. This regional-to-national bridge is presented as essential for making global commitments meaningful.

Lisinge stated that 'the global commitments into national actions is what is missing. Implementation is missing. So countries need that one' . He described ECA's development of 'an indicative roadmap, which helps countries to use it for their national implementation' of the WSIS Plus 20 outcome, done 'in partnership with regional and international organizations and development partners' .

The audience speaker from the Geneva Graduate Institute argues that rather than focusing on overly quantitative indicators, the primary measurable outcome should be coherence across the digital governance system. If coherence is achieved by the time of any given review, this would satisfy both member states and the multi-stakeholder community by enabling structured engagement for all. This reframes measurement around systemic outcomes rather than activity counts.

The speaker argued that 'if we have coherence across the digital governance system but by the time of whichever review you want to take, I think that will make member states very happy and that will make I hope the multi-stakeholder community very happy because as we said civil society will be able to have a structured engagement industry will have structured engagement' . He also noted this could be put into indicators .

The audience speaker from the Geneva Graduate Institute argues that the principle of 'listening to the science', well established in climate change governance, should be applied to digital governance, particularly regarding social media regulation where scientific evidence has not been adequately heeded. Rather than inventing new terminology or frameworks for digital governance, existing approaches from climate discussions could be adapted. This would ground digital governance in evidence rather than political negotiation alone.

The speaker stated that 'listen to the science should also be something that we do digitally' and that 'we haven't listened to the science with regard to social media regulation we haven't listened to the science in many matters', suggesting that applying this principle would mean 'we don't need to come up with a new fancy term for digital we can use what we already had in the climate discussions' .

The audience speaker proposes a specific type of quantitative indicator that tracks the journey of issues from the NRI level through regional to global discussion and measures whether concrete outcomes were achieved. This approach would capture the effectiveness of the multi-level governance architecture rather than simply counting inputs or activities. He acknowledges this merits further reflection in the roadmap.

The speaker suggested that 'you can say how many issues, for example, how many issues have been raised at NRI level that have then been discussed at regional level and then been discussed on a global level and we've come to a concrete outcome' and noted that 'you can even quantify that perhaps' .

The audience speaker challenges the tendency towards overly quantitative indicators, arguing that coherence across the digital governance system is a more meaningful primary outcome to measure. He suggests this approach would be more satisfying to both member states and the multi-stakeholder community than counting activities or outputs. This aligns with broader calls in the discussion for outcome-oriented rather than input-oriented measurement.

The speaker stated he wanted 'to challenge perhaps as well the the notion of overly quantitative indicators' and argued that measuring coherence across the digital governance system would 'make member states very happy' and the multi-stakeholder community happy as well .

The audience speaker (Paulina Ibarra responding to the floor discussion) emphasises that civil society organisations face severe resource constraints and are forced to spread themselves very thinly across multiple governance processes, reducing their effectiveness. She argues that clearer priorities and consolidated mechanisms are needed so that civil society can focus its limited resources where they matter most. Without visible priorities, civil society cannot engage effectively.

The speaker noted that 'the resources that civil society has to allocate to follow up every single one of these different mechanisms, it's tremendous. And the resources are very limited' . She called for 'real existing priorities that we can see and say, okay, here is where we need to put our effort, instead of just trying to spread out very thin and very ineffectively to cover it' .

The audience speaker from the Wikimedia movement argues that one practical response to the proliferation of parallel processes is to create a consolidated, accessible knowledge base that documents resolutions and decisions from all relevant processes in one place. This would reduce complexity not only for civil society but also for government representatives who cannot follow all tracks. She notes that the DESA website is a good start in this direction.

The speaker proposed that 'we still try to document and to combine the resolutions and the decisions that are there in the different processes in one place' so that it would be 'less complicated for civil society' and also easier for governmental institutions where 'not every member in a government is able to follow all tracks' . She acknowledged that 'your website is a good start' .

The audience speaker (Jimson Olufuye) highlights that WSIS awareness has been poor in many developing countries over the past 20 years, representing a significant implementation gap. He calls for the roadmap to prioritise creating greater awareness and encouraging member states to implement WSIS commitments this time around. He specifically recommends using the Sao Paulo multi-stakeholder guidelines to bring all stakeholders together not only at the national level but also at subnational levels.

The speaker stated that 'WSIS awareness has been poor in many developing countries over the past 20 years' and called for 'a need to create more awareness and encourage member states to really implement this time around and using the South Polo multistakeholder guidelines to bring all stakeholders together not only at the national level, even at the subnational levels' .