This session explored how to align institutional roles between the WSIS+20 review outcomes and the Global Digital Compact (GDC), with a focus on identifying concrete milestones for implementation . It was co-organised by multiple Internet Society chapters, including the UK, Switzerland, Belgrade, and Germany. Paul Gaskell (UK government) described the WSIS+20 outcome as a genuine success, highlighting the permanent mandate for the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), the reaffirmation of the 2005 Tunis Principles, and the IGF's recognition as the primary forum for internet governance dialogue . He identified increased participation from G77 countries, small and medium-sized enterprises, women, and young people as a key measurable milestone, noting that the upcoming IGF in Kenya presents an important opportunity in this regard .
Matthew Shears cautioned against reverting to siloed approaches, pointing to Article 68 of the GDC as an explicit expectation that the IGF and WSIS will be core components of GDC implementation . Markus Kummer emphasised the IGF's role as 'the glue' holding processes together , while also raising concerns about the legal and structural fragility of voluntary intersessional bodies such as dynamic coalitions and national and regional initiatives . Valeria Betancourt highlighted the lack of serious funding commitments as a critical gap, calling for a demand-driven, recipient-centred approach from the GDC's newly mandated interagency task force on financing .
Charles Noir (CIRA) welcomed the recognition of the technical community as a distinct stakeholder , and stressed the importance of bringing practical expertise into policy discussions early enough to enable implementation at the infrastructure level . Dr Yik Chan Chin noted the proliferation of new AI governance mechanisms emerging from the GDC and the Global AI Dialogue , urging the IGF to work more closely with the UN Office for Digital and Emerging Technology to monitor GDC implementation .
Overall, participants agreed that the WSIS+20 outcome represents a significant but not guaranteed achievement , and that the primary challenge ahead lies in translating multistakeholder commitments into coherent, accountable, and adequately funded implementation, with the IGF positioned as the central coordinating mechanism .
Overall Purpose
- The discussion aimed to explore how the outcomes of the WSIS Plus 20 review and the Global Digital Compact (GDC) can be aligned in practice, identify concrete implementation milestones, and clarify the institutional roles of various stakeholders in advancing the process.
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Major Discussion Points
- The WSIS+20 review produced significant, hard-won achievements, particularly the permanent mandate for the IGF. Speakers highlighted that the outcome was not guaranteed, noting the reaffirmation of the 2005 Tunis Principles and the IGF's designation as the primary forum for internet governance dialogue as key wins. The permanent mandate was seen as especially transformative, freeing the IGF from the recurring pressure of mandate renewal and enabling it to be bolder in its work. - Aligning the WSIS framework, the GDC, and emerging AI governance structures is a critical challenge requiring effort to avoid fragmentation and duplication. Matthew Shears warned that stakeholders risk reverting to isolated, siloed approaches rather than seizing the opportunity for coherent coordination. The GDC's Article 68 explicitly positions the IGF and WSIS as core components of GDC implementation, but this must be actively realised. Dr. Yik Chan Chin further noted the proliferation of new AI governance mechanisms emerging from the Global AI Dialogue, raising questions about synergies with existing structures. - Funding gaps and the lack of viable financial mechanisms represent a major accountability and implementation challenge, particularly for civil society and developing countries. Valeria Betancourt emphasised that meaningful connectivity remains out of reach for a significant portion of the global population, and that civil society's role in implementation is chronically underfunded. The newly mandated interagency task force on financing was identified as a crucial opportunity, provided it is informed by the perspectives of recipients rather than development agencies alone. Dr Jimson Olufuye reinforced this by calling for blended financial mechanisms and better national statistical capacity to measure meaningful access. - The IGF ecosystem requires internal consolidation to fulfil its expanded role as the connective tissue between global digital governance processes. Markus Kummer noted that while the IGF has evolved into a vibrant ecosystem of intersessional work, national and regional initiatives, and dynamic coalitions, these structures lack legal personality, making contractual arrangements and sustainable funding difficult. He called for consolidation that preserves the bottom-up, voluntary nature of the IGF while making it more structurally stable. The UNGIS interagency coordination mechanism and a new multistakeholder addition to it were identified as important connective tools. - Translating global commitments into concrete, measurable national-level implementation, especially in developing countries, is an urgent priority. Paul Gaskell identified increased participation from G77 countries, small and medium-sized enterprises, women, and young people as a key milestone, with the upcoming IGF in Kenya seen as a prime opportunity. Charles Noir stressed the technical community's role in bringing practical expertise into policy discussions early enough to ensure implementable outcomes. The Internet Society's non-paper was highlighted as a tool to foster accountability through clear roadmaps for action line implementation. ---
Overall Tone
- The overall tone of the discussion was constructive, collaborative, and cautiously optimistic. Speakers opened with a sense of genuine support at the WSIS+20 outcomes, particularly the permanent IGF mandate, which set a positive and energised atmosphere.
- As the conversation progressed, the tone became more measured and pragmatic, with speakers acknowledging significant structural challenges - fragmentation, underfunding, legal gaps in the IGF ecosystem, and the risk of reverting to siloed approaches. However, these concerns were consistently framed as opportunities rather than obstacles, maintaining a forward-looking spirit throughout.
- By the closing remarks, the tone had settled into a rallying, action-oriented register, with speakers urging stakeholders to act as 'WSIS champions' , exercise mutual accountability , and collectively 'roll up their sleeves' to build the implementation roadmap . There was no significant conflict or discord; the dominant mood was one of shared purpose across stakeholder groups.
Expanded Summary: Aligning Institutional Roles for WSIS Plus 20 and Global Digital Compact Implementation
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Session Overview and Purpose
This session was co-organised by the Internet Society chapters of the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Belgrade (Serbia), and Germany , and brought together an exceptional set of experts representing governments, the private sector, the technical community, civil society, and academia . Co-moderated by Desiree Miloshevic Evans and Olivier Crépin-Leblond, who managed online participation , the session aimed to explore the opportunities and challenges of aligning institutional roles across the WSIS Plus 20 review outcomes and the Global Digital Compact (GDC), with a particular focus on identifying concrete milestones for implementation . Speakers were asked first to reflect on what had been achieved through the WSIS Plus 20 process and then to project forward, identifying first steps in what was acknowledged to be a substantial task .
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Achievements of the WSIS Plus 20 Review
Paul Gaskell, Deputy Director for Digital Trade, Internet Governance and Digital Standards at the UK's Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, opened by describing the WSIS Plus 20 outcome as "a really important success", explicitly noting that the result was not guaranteed and that other, less favourable outcomes had been foreseeable at an earlier stage . He highlighted two dimensions of this success: the quality of the process itself and the substance of the outcome. On process, Gaskell praised the genuine multi-stakeholder approach adopted by the co-facilitators, including the informal multi-stakeholder sounding board, as having run "really well" . On substance, he identified three key wins: the permanent mandate for the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), the reaffirmation of the 2005 Tunis Principles, and the clear designation of the IGF as the primary forum for internet governance dialogue .
Markus Kummer, who served as the IGF's first secretariat head for its first five years and later as chair of the Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG), built on Gaskell's assessment by highlighting an additional achievement: the recognition that the IGF is "no longer a standalone annual meeting but is at the centre of a vibrant ecosystem" encompassing intersessional work, national and regional initiatives, policy networks, best practice forums, and dynamic coalitions . He described this as a significant recognition of the work that had been done over many years . Matthew Shears, a board member of the Internet Society's UK chapter joining remotely, added that the GDC had lent new credibility to the multi-stakeholder model, noting that it had "achieved a level of standing in international policy circles related to the internet and development" . Valeria Betancourt of the Association for Progressive Communications (APC) acknowledged these wins, including the integrated approach to WSIS-GDC implementation, while also noting significant regrets - in particular, the lack of meaningful gender integration into the process, which she identified as a systemic failure of the WSIS Plus 20 review rather than a mere oversight . Charles Noir, Vice President for Community Investment, Policy and Advocacy at CIRA, welcomed the recognition of the technical community as a unique stakeholder distinct from the traditional tri-party model, describing this as something the 45-member technical community coalition had actively argued for and was "very pleased" to see in the final document .
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The Permanent Mandate: Opportunity and Responsibility
Kummer identified the permanent mandate as perhaps the most transformative achievement of the WSIS Plus 20 review. Before its adoption, the IGF had always operated under the pressure of mandate renewal, which shaped its behaviour and constrained its ambitions . With a permanent mandate, Kummer argued, the IGF "can be much freer and also, I would hope, bolder in what it's doing" . However, he was careful to note that this freedom also brings new responsibilities, particularly the need for internal consolidation of the IGF's many intersessional structures . Gaskell echoed this sentiment in his closing remarks, expressing a desire to see the IGF develop "more focused, practical, and concrete outcomes", beginning with the upcoming meeting in Kenya . Shears similarly acknowledged that the permanent mandate creates an "institutional coordination challenge" within the UN system that could become "overwhelming" if not actively managed , and that the IGF must balance its growing UN-system role with maintaining the continued importance of national IGFs and local inputs .
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The Risk of Fragmentation Across Governance Processes
Shears introduced what became one of the session's central analytical themes: the risk of treating the WSIS framework, the GDC, and emerging AI governance structures as separate, unlinked processes. He warned that stakeholders risk "reverting back into our somewhat isolated tracks, which is an easy and all too often common way of approaching these kinds of policy issues" , and identified the biggest problem as the tendency to "continue to see these as processes that are not linked, that these are processes that will go on in their own ways" and "will not be sufficiently aligned at the senior level" . At the same time, he pointed to Article 68 of the GDC as an explicit expectation that the IGF and WSIS will be core components of GDC implementation, describing this as "a great opportunity" that "can be easily thwarted if we think about these things in the ways we have in the past" .
Kummer explicitly shared Shears's concern about fragmentation and positioned the IGF as "the glue holding the processes together" . He argued that AI should not be treated as a separate governance domain, noting that the existing broad definition of internet governance - agreed by UN member states and confirmed in multiple General Assembly resolutions - already encompasses AI, covering three distinct layers: physical infrastructure (such as cables), logical infrastructure (names and addresses), and the use and abuse of the internet . He urged participants not to "make a dichotomy between the various processes" but to recognise that they all fall under the broad heading of internet governance . Noir agreed on the need to "really think about duplication" and "how many organisations are involved" across overlapping governance spaces . Dr Yik Chan Chin, project lead on AI at the United Nations University in Macau, described the empirical reality of institutional proliferation, noting that the GDC had created new mechanisms including the Global AI Dialogue, the Office for Digital and Emerging Technology (ODET), and the UN Inter-Agency Working Group on AI coordinated by ITU and UNESCO . She further reported that the Global AI Dialogue had reportedly produced additional initiatives - including an AI Governance for Humanity initiative, an AI for Good Global Commission, a UN AI Resource Hub, and a global network of centres for AI capacity building - raising urgent questions about synergies with existing structures .
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The IGF Ecosystem: Consolidation and Structural Challenges
Kummer raised a practical and often overlooked structural challenge facing the IGF ecosystem: while its intersessional bodies - dynamic coalitions, national and regional IGF initiatives (NRIs) - have grown in number and ambition, they lack legal personality . This means they cannot easily enter into contractual arrangements or manage funding independently, and must instead rely on existing entities such as Internet Society chapters or government agencies to provide a legal home . The same challenge applies to dynamic coalitions, which face significant difficulties if they wish to embark on more ambitious projects involving financial commitments . Kummer called for consolidation of these processes to make them "more stable going the way forward", while insisting that any consolidation must preserve the "bottom-up voluntary nature of the IGF" and avoid "top-down taking control" .
Chin, who drew on sixteen years of IGF involvement to support her recommendations, reinforced this point, arguing that the IGF needs to "consolidate IGF resource" and develop "more effective mechanism, including the effective governance structure and leadership" , and that it must find more effective ways to connect with and reach out to other AI governance actors . An audience member, Wout Nathans van der Borg, working with a dynamic coalition focused on internet standards, raised the question of whether the MAG requires a different mandate or formal liaison arrangements to better connect internal IGF work with external governance processes . He referenced Wolfgang Kleinwacht's longstanding suggestion of having MAG liaisons to other organisations as a possible structural solution, concluding that "the theme is reorganisation" . Kummer responded by pointing to the UN Group on the Information Society (UNGIS) as an existing interagency coordination mechanism in which the IGF secretariat is already involved, and noted that a new multi-stakeholder addition to UNGIS would be important for connecting the IGF to other processes . He expressed confidence that the current MAG, "full of dynamism", would find pragmatic solutions, while acknowledging that this remains "work in progress" .
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Financing: The Critical and Underaddressed Gap
Betancourt delivered the session's most pointed critique, identifying the lack of serious commitment to funding as "one of the main gaps and challenges" ahead . She noted that despite progress in various areas, approximately one third of the world remains unconnected, and that the number of people not benefiting from digital technology continues to grow . Progress on financing advocacy, including initiatives led by civil society and the technical community, had been made in "very tiny steps" . She argued that there is a widespread but incorrect assumption that the necessary funds already exist, stating plainly that "the financing is there and is not there" , and that civil society - which plays a crucial role in WSIS and GDC implementation, particularly in contexts where the state is weak - simply lacks the funding to engage meaningfully .
Betancourt identified the newly mandated interagency task force on financing as a crucial opportunity, provided it is approached correctly . She argued that the task force must be informed by the perspectives of recipients rather than development agencies, including not only developing countries but also small actors and small implementers . She called for a comprehensive financial ecosystem drawing on public, private, and community-based sources, describing this as "essentially non-negotiable" for the implementation of WSIS action lines and GDC objectives . Dr Jimson Olufuye, CEO of a private sector company in Nigeria with extensive experience in translating global commitments into national strategies, reinforced this by calling for blended financial mechanisms to help developing countries implement result-oriented projects . He also highlighted the need to empower national statistical organisations with both financial and technical support to produce granular data on meaningful connectivity, beyond simple coverage statistics . Gaskell, in his closing remarks, acknowledged that the IGF secretariat is "underpowered" and put forward the personal view that "multi-stakeholder organisation funding should also be multi-stakeholder" .
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Implementation Priorities: From Principles to Practice
Gaskell identified increased meaningful participation from G77 countries, small and medium-sized enterprises, women, and young people as "one of the real milestones" for demonstrating that WSIS Plus 20 implementation is on track . He described the upcoming IGF in Kenya as "an excellent opportunity to demonstrate that and to see greater G77 participation" . Olufuye, speaking from the perspective of a private sector actor in a developing country, stressed that developing countries are looking forward to the "full implementation" of the WSIS Plus 20 outcome document, including the Sao Paulo multi-stakeholder guidelines and the recognition of power asymmetries . He called for better-resourced actors to bring other stakeholders on board, and for developing countries to adopt multi-stakeholder approaches in their regulatory processes, including sandbox approaches to achieve "smart regulation" across sectors such as finance, telecoms, health, and agriculture - an approach he argued would create "a sense of ownership" among stakeholders and contribute directly to achieving the SDGs . He highlighted Nigeria's national payment stack as a success story with the potential to be replicated across Africa's approximately 54 countries .
Chin reported that the Global AI Dialogue had reached several important conclusions: that the dialogue is not intended to replace existing mechanisms but to foster mutual learning and complementary narratives; that the focus should shift "from the abstract to operational government structures"; and that inclusive, multi-stakeholder participation is crucial for effective global governance . She noted that what is expected from stakeholders is "concrete, named, supported, and result-oriented commitment" for the second UN Global AI Dialogue in May 2027 - a timeline of less than two years . She urged the IGF to work more closely with ODET and the UN Inter-Agency Working Group to monitor GDC implementation .
An Internet Society representative in the audience made a strong case for the development of clear roadmaps for WSIS action line implementation, arguing that the action lines are "the part of the WSIS process that we see in grave need of further work" . The non-paper put forward was described as having been built substantially on input from the Internet Society's community. The representative argued that roadmaps are essential not only for focusing conversations and setting clear targets, but also for providing "a bit of accountability for these commitments", warning that without them "there's a risk that we simply don't progress as much as we should" . Gaskell explicitly agreed in his closing remarks, describing the WSIS action lines and the roadmap as "a bit of WSIS that is underappreciated" . Betancourt concurred, noting that roadmaps for implementation at national levels "will come with a layer of accountability" .
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The Role of the Technical Community
Noir emphasised the technical community's distinctive contribution to the governance process: the ability to bring "practical expertise into the policy discussion" early enough to ensure that when outcomes are produced, they can actually be implemented . He described CIRA's role as that of a "fairly neutral operator" that can engage in policy conversations at an early stage, and stressed the importance of implementing "at the infrastructure layer the necessary conditions, the technologies that deliver on hopefully all of what we're trying to do" across the WSIS and GDC frameworks . He highlighted the existing multi-stakeholder model's strength in already including strong technical organisations such as ICANN and ISOC, whose expertise should be represented in policy discussions . In his closing remarks, Noir argued that "co-accountability is important" within the multi-stakeholder governance system, and that participants must "be brave enough to bring those issues to the table when we meet in forums like this" .
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Accountability: Values, Power, and Institutional Coordination
A question submitted online by Pari Esfandiari, read by Crépin-Leblond, introduced a philosophically sharp challenge to the session's direction: if the emphasis is shifting from abstract principles to operational governance, "what mechanisms will ensure that implementation remains accountable to the values those principles were intended to protect rather than simply becoming an exercise in institutional coordination?" . This question catalysed the most substantive closing exchanges of the session.
Betancourt responded directly, arguing that "a pragmatic application of the multi-stakeholder model is needed, acknowledging that it is not serving the interests of all the stakeholders similarly" . She called for "a critical approach to understand what are the real dynamics of power that are permeating an effective and more meaningful application of the multi-stakeholder model" , arguing that this critical examination would itself increase accountability. She also insisted that a viable financial ecosystem is "a very important element of public accountability" and that implementation without financial mechanisms is "non-negotiable" . Noir framed accountability in terms of mutual responsibility within the multi-stakeholder system, arguing that participants must exercise "co-accountability" and be willing to raise difficult issues in forums such as the IGF . Shears, in his closing remarks, noted that the institutional coordination challenge of sitting within the UN system could be "overwhelming" and must be actively managed, while also emphasising the opportunity for the IGF to "extol its multi-stakeholder credentials within the UN system" .
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Closing Reflections and Call to Action
The session closed with a series of brief but substantive reflections from all speakers. Olufuye called on all participants to "consider themselves as WSIS champions" and act as "evangelists ensuring that the agreed principles are implemented, especially the Sao Paulo multi-stakeholder guidelines" . Chin reiterated that the IGF is "the only multi-stakeholder mechanism in the UN system" and that its resources must be used "conservatively and effectively to hold the AI governance process accountable" . Noir called for the exercise of co-accountability as a defining feature of the multi-stakeholder governance system . Gaskell expressed a desire for the IGF to have "more focused, practical, and concrete outcomes" beginning in Kenya, acknowledged the underpowered secretariat, and put forward the principle that multi-stakeholder funding should itself be multi-stakeholder . Shears described the opportunity for the IGF as "significant" but acknowledged that it "is going to take a lot of work", urging a balance between the IGF's UN-system role and its local and national dimensions . Kummer concluded that "there is a huge opportunity for the IGF to fill this space and to really connect the dots in the various initiatives" .
Miloshevic Evans closed the session by expressing hope that the discussion was not the end but the beginning of a broader collaborative effort, calling on all participants - through their chapters, coalitions, and communities across all regions - to "roll up our sleeves and help paint that implementation roadmap together" . The overall tone throughout was constructive and cautiously optimistic: a genuine sense of relief at the WSIS Plus 20 outcomes was tempered by clear-eyed recognition of the structural, financial, and institutional challenges that lie ahead, and by a shared commitment to addressing them through coordinated, accountable, and inclusive multi-stakeholder action.
Genuine multi-stakeholder process ran well, including the informal multi-stakeholder sounding board
Arg. 1Paul Gaskell highlighted that the WSIS Plus 20 review process was conducted in a genuinely multi-stakeholder manner, which he considered a notable achievement. He specifically praised the co-facilitators and the informal multi-stakeholder sounding board process as examples of this working well.
Gaskell noted that not all UN processes run smoothly, but that the informal multi-stakeholder sounding board process ran really well as a piece of the process .
on: The multi-stakeholder model has gained new credibility and must be preserved and strengthened going forward
on: The primary gap in WSIS Plus 20 outcomes: funding versus gender integration versus process quality
Permanent mandate for the IGF and reaffirmation of the 2005 Tunis Principles are significant wins
Arg. 2Gaskell emphasised that securing a permanent mandate for the IGF and reaffirming the 2005 Tunis Principles were major achievements of the WSIS Plus 20 review. He stressed that these outcomes were not guaranteed and should be appreciated accordingly.
He pointed to the permanent mandate for the Internet Governance Forum, the reaffirmation of the 2005 Tunis Principles, and the clear statement that the IGF is the primary forum for Internet Governance Dialogue as really good results, noting they were not automatic outcomes .
on: The WSIS Plus 20 review produced better-than-expected outcomes, particularly the permanent IGF mandate and reaffirmation of the Tunis Principles
Increasing meaningful stakeholder participation, particularly from G77 countries, women, and young people, is a key measurable milestone
Arg. 3Gaskell argued that one of the most important measurable milestones for the next phase of WSIS implementation is genuinely increasing wider stakeholder participation. He specifically highlighted the need to include G77 countries, small and medium-sized enterprises, younger people, and women.
He identified increasing wider stakeholder participation, particularly from G77 countries and by small and medium-sized enterprises, including increased diversity, younger people, and women, as a real milestone .
on: Whether the multi-stakeholder model adequately serves all stakeholders or requires critical reassessment of power dynamics
The IGF in Kenya represents an excellent opportunity to demonstrate greater G77 participation
Arg. 4Gaskell pointed to the upcoming IGF in Kenya as a concrete opportunity to demonstrate progress on broadening participation, particularly from the Global South. He considered the choice of Kenya as a host to be an excellent development for this purpose.
He stated that the next IGF being held in Kenya is an excellent opportunity to demonstrate greater G77 participation, and that they were extremely fortunate to have it there .
The IGF should produce more focused, practical, and concrete outcomes, beginning with the Kenya meeting
Arg. 5Gaskell argued that now the IGF has a permanent mandate, it should shift towards delivering more focused and practical outcomes rather than broad discussions. He suggested the Kenya IGF should be the starting point for this new approach.
He expressed a desire to see the IGF have more focused, practical, and concrete outcomes, and indicated that this should begin with the Kenya meeting .
on: Implementation must shift from abstract principles to concrete, practical, and measurable outcomes
Funding for the IGF secretariat is insufficient and multi-stakeholder organisations should be funded in a multi-stakeholder manner
Arg. 6Gaskell acknowledged that the IGF secretariat is underpowered in terms of resources and that this needs to be addressed. He also put forward the view that funding for multi-stakeholder organisations should itself reflect multi-stakeholder principles.
He noted that there is a recognition that the secretariat is underpowered and that this would be beneficial to address, and added his personal view that multi-stakeholder organisation funding should also be multi-stakeholder .
on: Funding and financial mechanisms represent a critical gap that must be urgently addressed for WSIS and GDC implementation
The GDC explicitly expects IGF and WSIS to be core components of its implementation, representing a new level of credibility for multi-stakeholder processes
Arg. 1Shears argued that the GDC contains an explicit expectation that the IGF and WSIS will be central to its implementation, which represents a significant recognition of the multi-stakeholder model. He cautioned, however, that this opportunity must be actively pursued rather than taken for granted.
He pointed to Article 68 of the GDC, which contains an explicit ask and expectation that the IGF and the WSIS will be core components of implementing the GDC, and stressed this cannot be taken lightly or for granted . He also noted that the multi-stakeholder process has achieved a level of standing in international policy circles related to the internet and development .
on: The multi-stakeholder model has gained new credibility and must be preserved and strengthened going forward
Continuing to treat WSIS, GDC, and AI governance as separate, unlinked processes is the biggest risk going forward
Arg. 2Shears identified the tendency to treat these governance processes as isolated tracks as the primary risk of fragmentation. He warned that if stakeholders revert to their traditional siloed modes of operating, the opportunities presented by the GDC will not be realised.
He described the biggest problem as continuing to see these as processes that are not linked, that will go on in their own ways, and will not be sufficiently aligned at the senior level, meaning the opportunities for the IGF and its multi-stakeholder processes will not be realised .
on: Fragmentation and duplication across WSIS, GDC, and AI governance processes represent the primary risk going forward
Balancing the IGF's growing role within the UN system with the continued importance of national IGFs and local inputs is essential
Arg. 3Shears argued that while the IGF must strengthen its institutional coordination within the UN system, it must not lose sight of the importance of national IGFs and local-level inputs. He presented this balance as both a challenge and an opportunity.
He stated that the IGF has an opportunity to extol its multi-stakeholder credentials within the UN system, but that this means it cannot lose sight of the local importance, the national IGFs, and the inputs that they have .
on: The IGF should serve as the central coordinating mechanism connecting the various governance processes
Institutional coordination within the UN system poses an overwhelming challenge that must be actively managed to preserve the IGF's multi-stakeholder credentials
Arg. 4Shears acknowledged that the IGF's growing embeddedness within the UN system creates a significant institutional coordination challenge. He suggested this must be carefully managed to ensure the IGF's multi-stakeholder identity is not compromised.
He noted that there is an institutional coordination challenge, which can be something that can be overwhelming in terms of sitting within the UN system, and that this is something that has to be worked at .
on: Implementation must shift from abstract principles to concrete, practical, and measurable outcomes
on: Whether the IGF is working well enough or requires significant reform
IGF is now recognised as the centre of a vibrant ecosystem, not just a standalone annual meeting
Arg. 1Kummer highlighted that the WSIS Plus 20 review formally recognised the IGF as the hub of a broader ecosystem that includes intersessional work, national and regional initiatives, policy networks, best practice forums, and dynamic coalitions. He considered this a significant achievement.
He noted the recognition in the WSIS Plus 20 review that the IGF is no longer a standalone annual meeting but is at the centre of a vibrant ecosystem with intersessional work, and the recognition of national and regional initiatives, policy networks, best practice forums, and dynamic coalitions .
on: The WSIS Plus 20 review produced better-than-expected outcomes, particularly the permanent IGF mandate and reaffirmation of the Tunis Principles
The IGF should serve as the glue holding the various processes together rather than allowing parallel tracks to develop
Arg. 2Kummer argued that the IGF is uniquely positioned to connect and integrate the various governance processes, including WSIS, GDC, and AI governance. He framed this as the IGF's central role in preventing fragmentation.
He stated that he sees the IGF very much as the glue holding the processes together, and raised the question of what internet governance means in practice, arguing that AI falls under the broad definition of internet governance agreed by UN member states .
on: The IGF should serve as the central coordinating mechanism connecting the various governance processes
on: Whether AI governance should be integrated into the existing WSIS/IGF framework or whether new mechanisms are inevitable and necessary
The IGF needs to connect to broader UN agency processes, with UNGIS and a new multi-stakeholder addition serving as a coordination mechanism
Arg. 3Kummer pointed to the existing UNGIS mechanism as the primary vehicle for connecting the IGF to other UN processes. He also noted that a new multi-stakeholder addition to UNGIS would be important for this coordination.
He referenced UNGIS, the UN Interagency Coordination body, noting that the IGF secretariat is involved there and that there will be a new multi-stakeholder addition to UNGIS, which is important for the IGF to connect to other processes .
The permanent mandate removes the pressure of renewal and allows the IGF to be bolder and more ambitious
Arg. 4Kummer argued that the permanent mandate is transformative because it frees the IGF from the constant need to justify its existence and secure renewals. This creates space for the IGF to be more ambitious and take on a broader role.
He noted that before the permanent mandate, there was always a struggle for renewal of the mandate and pressure around what needed to be done to ensure it was renewed, but that this pressure is now off, meaning the IGF can be much freer and bolder .
Intersessional processes such as dynamic coalitions and NRIs face legal and structural challenges due to lack of legal personality
Arg. 5Kummer identified a significant structural challenge facing the IGF ecosystem: many of its intersessional bodies, including dynamic coalitions and national and regional initiatives, lack legal personality. This makes it difficult for them to enter into contracts or manage funds.
He explained that intersessional processes are built on voluntary collaboration but lack legal personality, making it difficult for NRIs to enter into contractual arrangements, and that they often have to bank on an existing entity such as an Internet Society chapter or government agency . He noted the same challenge applies to dynamic coalitions when they want to embark on more ambitious projects involving money .
on: Consolidation of existing IGF structures and processes is needed rather than creation of new parallel mechanisms
on: Whether the IGF is working well enough or requires significant reform
Clear wins include the integrated approach to WSIS-GDC implementation, but significant regrets remain such as lack of gender integration
Arg. 1Betancourt acknowledged the positive outcomes of the WSIS Plus 20 review, including the IGF mandate and the integrated approach to implementation, but also pointed to important shortcomings. She specifically highlighted the failure to adequately integrate gender considerations as a significant regret.
She mentioned the mandate for the IGF and the integrated approach to WSIS-GDC implementation as clear wins, but also noted very significant regrets, including the gender integration into the process .
on: The WSIS Plus 20 review produced better-than-expected outcomes, particularly the permanent IGF mandate and reaffirmation of the Tunis Principles
on: The primary gap in WSIS Plus 20 outcomes: funding versus gender integration versus process quality
The lack of serious commitment to funding is one of the most significant gaps from the WSIS Plus 20 review
Arg. 2Betancourt argued that the failure to make serious commitments on funding represents one of the most critical gaps in the WSIS Plus 20 outcome. She framed this as a central challenge for the APC and other civil society actors going forward.
She identified the lack of serious commitment with the funding situation and the achievement of the WSIS vision and the implementation of the action lines in tandem with the Global Digital Compact as one of the main gaps and challenges ahead .
on: Funding and financial mechanisms represent a critical gap that must be urgently addressed for WSIS and GDC implementation
on: The primary gap in WSIS Plus 20 outcomes: funding versus gender integration versus process quality
The interagency task force on financing should be informed by the perspective of recipients, not just development agencies
Arg. 3Betancourt argued that the newly created interagency task force on financing must approach its work from the perspective of those receiving support, rather than from the perspective of development agencies. She emphasised that this includes not only developing countries but also small actors and implementers.
She stated that the task force should not approach the financing of the WSIS and the GDC from the point of view of the development agencies, but rather from the point of view of the recipients, including not only developing countries but also small actors and small implementers . She also suggested the task force could map approaches working in other fields, look at gaps in existing financial arrangements, and identify the most effective mechanisms for funding to flow .
on: How to approach the financing of WSIS and GDC implementation: development agency perspective versus recipient perspective
Civil society plays a huge role in WSIS and GDC implementation, particularly where the state is weak, but lacks the necessary funding to engage meaningfully
Arg. 4Betancourt highlighted that civil society is a critical implementer of WSIS and GDC commitments, especially in contexts where state capacity is limited. However, she argued that civil society cannot fulfil this role without adequate funding, which is currently absent.
She noted that there is a lack of understanding of the huge role that civil society plays in the implementation of the WSIS and the GDC, particularly in contexts where the state is weak, and that for civil society to meaningfully engage with implementation, funding has to be there and is simply not there .
A critical approach to power dynamics within the multi-stakeholder model is needed to ensure it serves all stakeholders equally
Arg. 5Betancourt argued that the multi-stakeholder model, while valuable, does not serve all stakeholders equally and that a critical examination of power dynamics is necessary. She suggested this is essential for increasing accountability within the model.
She called for a pragmatic application of the multi-stakeholder model, acknowledging that it is not serving the interests of all stakeholders similarly, and argued that a critical approach to understanding the real dynamics of power permeating an effective and more meaningful application of the model is needed .
on: The multi-stakeholder model has gained new credibility and must be preserved and strengthened going forward
on: Whether the multi-stakeholder model adequately serves all stakeholders or requires critical reassessment of power dynamics
A viable financial ecosystem must include public, private, and community-based sources and is non-negotiable for WSIS and GDC implementation
Arg. 6Betancourt argued that implementing the WSIS action lines and GDC objectives is impossible without a comprehensive and sustainable financial ecosystem. She described this ecosystem as needing to draw on public, private, and community-based sources at all levels.
She stressed the urgent need for financial ecosystems at all levels that are viable, innovative, and demand-driven, drawing on public, private, and community-based sources . She described the need to enable all necessary conditions to build a more sustainable ecosystem ensuring availability of investment, public sector support, direct private sector financing, and funding for startups , and concluded that implementation of the WSIS action lines and GDC objectives without financial mechanisms is non-negotiable .
Recognition of the technical community as a unique stakeholder, distinct from the traditional tri-party model
Arg. 1Noir highlighted that the final WSIS Plus 20 document recognised the technical community as a distinct stakeholder group, separate from the traditional government-private sector-civil society tri-party model. He noted this was something the technical community coalition had actively advocated for.
He noted that the recognition of the technical community as a unique stakeholder was something the technical community coalition on multi-stakeholderism, comprising 45 technical operators, had argued for, and that CIRA was very pleased to see this progress make it into the document .
on: The WSIS Plus 20 review produced better-than-expected outcomes, particularly the permanent IGF mandate and reaffirmation of the Tunis Principles
There is a need to avoid duplication and consider how many organisations are involved across overlapping governance spaces
Arg. 2Noir echoed concerns about duplication across governance processes and the proliferation of organisations involved in overlapping spaces. He argued that this needs to be carefully considered as part of the implementation process.
He stated that there is a need to really think about duplication and to really think about how many organisations are involved across the many topics being spanned .
on: Consolidation of existing IGF structures and processes is needed rather than creation of new parallel mechanisms
The technical community can bring practical, relatively neutral expertise into policy discussions early enough to ensure implementable outcomes
Arg. 3Noir argued that the technical community's primary contribution is bringing practical expertise into policy discussions at an early enough stage to ensure that outcomes can actually be implemented. He described CIRA's role as providing relatively neutral advice to governments and other stakeholders.
He described CIRA as working closely with their government and other governments to provide practical expertise, seeing themselves as fairly neutral operators that can get into the policy conversation early enough so that when outcomes are produced, they can implement some of that .
Technical operators can implement necessary conditions at the infrastructure layer to deliver on WSIS and SDG objectives
Arg. 4Noir argued that technical operators like CIRA have a specific and important role in implementing the infrastructure-level conditions necessary to deliver on the broader goals of WSIS and the SDGs. He framed this as the technical community's unique contribution to the implementation process.
He stated that as a technical operator, CIRA sees itself as being able to implement at the infrastructure layer the necessary conditions and technologies that deliver on the goals of WSIS and the political momentum gained with the GDC .
The existing multi-stakeholder model already includes strong technical organisations whose expertise should be represented in policy discussions
Arg. 5Noir pointed to the existing multi-stakeholder model as already containing strong technical organisations with deep expertise in particular areas. He argued that this expertise needs to be effectively represented in policy discussions to ensure sound outcomes.
He referenced the incredible structure already developed in the multi-stakeholder model, including technical organisations like ICANN and ISOC, noting that these organisations understand particular areas very well and that their expertise should be represented in policy discussions so that outcomes can eventually be implemented at a technical level .
Co-accountability within the multi-stakeholder governance system requires participants to be brave enough to raise difficult issues in forums
Arg. 6Noir argued that one of the strengths of the multi-stakeholder governance system is the ability to hold each other accountable, but that this requires participants to be willing to raise difficult issues. He described this as an important part of what makes the system work.
He stated that part of what the multi-stakeholder governance system does well is that there is an opportunity to keep each other co-accountable, and that participants have to be brave enough to bring those issues to the table when meeting in forums .
on: The multi-stakeholder model has gained new credibility and must be preserved and strengthened going forward
on: Whether the multi-stakeholder model adequately serves all stakeholders or requires critical reassessment of power dynamics
Full implementation of the WSIS Plus 20 outcome document, including the Sao Paulo multi-stakeholder guidelines, is the priority for developing countries
Arg. 1Olufuye argued that for developing countries, the most urgent priority is the full implementation of the WSIS Plus 20 outcome document, with particular emphasis on the multi-stakeholder approach. He highlighted the recognition of the Sao Paulo multi-stakeholder guidelines and the acknowledgement of power asymmetries as especially important.
He stated that developing countries will be looking forward to full implementation of the WSIS Plus 20 outcome document, and noted that the document recognised the Sao Paulo multi-stakeholder guidelines and power asymmetry, with the expectation that those better resourced will bring other stakeholders on board .
on: The IGF should serve as the central coordinating mechanism connecting the various governance processes
on: Whether the multi-stakeholder model adequately serves all stakeholders or requires critical reassessment of power dynamics
Sharing success stories, such as Nigeria's national payment stack, can help other developing countries replicate effective models
Arg. 2Olufuye argued that sharing concrete success stories from developing countries is an important mechanism for spreading effective implementation models. He used Nigeria's national payment stack as an example of a successful initiative that could be replicated across Africa.
He cited Nigeria's launch of its national payment stack, which brought all payments from fintechs, traditional banks, microfinance, and payment infrastructure under one single gateway enabling instant payment across all sectors and boosting inclusivity, as a success story that could be projected to other developing countries, noting that about 54 countries in Africa need to get that success story across .
Blended financial mechanisms should be developed to help developing countries implement result-oriented projects
Arg. 3Olufuye argued that the ITU-mandated task force on financial mechanisms should help developing countries develop blended finance approaches. He emphasised the importance of ensuring that financial mechanisms lead to result-oriented projects rather than funds that remain unused.
He suggested that the ITU, mandated to come up with the task force and best financial mechanisms, can really help developing countries fine-tune their financial processes and develop blended finance so they can implement projects that will be result-oriented, not ones that may be left hanging .
on: Funding and financial mechanisms represent a critical gap that must be urgently addressed for WSIS and GDC implementation
on: How to approach the financing of WSIS and GDC implementation: development agency perspective versus recipient perspective
All participants should consider themselves WSIS champions and act as evangelists for the agreed principles, especially the Sao Paulo multi-stakeholder guidelines
Arg. 4Olufuye called on all participants to take personal responsibility for advancing WSIS implementation by acting as champions and evangelists for the agreed principles. He specifically highlighted the Sao Paulo multi-stakeholder guidelines as a key set of principles to promote.
He urged all participants to consider themselves as WSIS champions and as champions to go ahead and be the evangelists ensuring that the agreed principles are implemented, especially the Sao Paulo multi-stakeholder guidelines .
on: The multi-stakeholder model has gained new credibility and must be preserved and strengthened going forward
New mechanisms created by the GDC, alongside existing UN structures, risk creating competing governance structures for AI
Arg. 1Chin highlighted that the GDC has created several new mechanisms for AI governance, including the Global AI Dialogue and the Office for Digital and Emerging Technology, while existing mechanisms such as the UN Inter-Agency Working Group on AI also remain active. She noted that new initiatives continued to emerge even during the Global AI Dialogue itself, raising concerns about proliferation.
She noted that the GDC created the Global AI Dialogue and the independent panel, as well as the Office for Digital and Emerging Technology, and that there is already a UN Inter-Agency Working Group on AI coordinated by ITU and UNESCO . She also described new initiatives emerging from the Global AI Dialogue, including the AI Governance for Humanity initiative, the AI for Good Global Commission, the UN AI Resource Hub, and the Global Network of Centres for Exchange and Collaboration in AI Capacity Building .
on: Fragmentation and duplication across WSIS, GDC, and AI governance processes represent the primary risk going forward
on: Whether AI governance should be integrated into the existing WSIS/IGF framework or whether new mechanisms are inevitable and necessary
The IGF is the only multi-stakeholder mechanism in the UN system and its resources must be used effectively to hold AI governance accountable
Arg. 2Chin argued that the IGF's unique status as the only multi-stakeholder mechanism in the UN system gives it a special responsibility in relation to AI governance. She called for the IGF's resources to be used conservatively and effectively to fulfil this accountability function.
She stated that the IGF is the only multi-stakeholder mechanism in the UN system and that its resources need to be utilised conservatively and effectively to hold the AI governance process accountable .
on: Consolidation of existing IGF structures and processes is needed rather than creation of new parallel mechanisms
on: Whether the IGF is working well enough or requires significant reform
The shift from abstract principles to operational governance structures, with concrete and result-oriented commitments, is the direction set by the Global AI Dialogue
Arg. 3Chin reported that the Global AI Dialogue had set a clear direction away from abstract principle commitments towards operational governance structures and concrete, named, and result-oriented commitments. She noted that stakeholders are expected to prepare such commitments for the second Global AI Dialogue in 2027.
She outlined conclusions from the Global AI Dialogue, including that the focus will shift from abstract principle commitments to operational governance structures , and that what is wanted is concrete, named, supported, and result-oriented commitments for the second UN Global AI Dialogue in May 2027 in New York .
on: Implementation must shift from abstract principles to concrete, practical, and measurable outcomes
The IGF should work more closely with ODET and the UN Inter-Agency Working Group to monitor GDC implementation
Arg. 4Chin argued that the IGF needs to strengthen its working relationship with the Office for Digital and Emerging Technology and the UN Inter-Agency Working Group in order to effectively monitor GDC implementation. She framed this as an important part of the IGF fulfilling its mandate.
She urged that the IGF can work more closely with ODET or the UN Inter-Agency Working Group to monitor the implementation of the GDC, noting that the monitoring duties and responsibilities are part of the IGF's mandate and that it needs to function in this role by working with these bodies .
Developing clear roadmaps for action line implementation is essential to foster accountability and ensure year-on-year progress
Arg. 1The Internet Society representative argued that the WSIS action lines are the part of the WSIS process most in need of further work, and that developing clear roadmaps is the key tool for addressing this. They emphasised that roadmaps are important not just for focus but also for creating accountability.
The speaker noted that in the Internet Society's view, the IGF is working quite well but the implementation of the action lines is in grave need of further work . They recommended focusing efforts on developing good roadmaps as an important tool to foster focus, ensure clear targets, and importantly provide accountability for commitments, warning that without roadmaps there is a risk of not progressing as much as needed .
on: Implementation must shift from abstract principles to concrete, practical, and measurable outcomes
on: Whether the IGF is working well enough or requires significant reform
The MAG may need a different mandate or liaison arrangements to better connect internal IGF work with external governance processes
Arg. 2The audience member raised the question of whether the IGF's Multi-stakeholder Advisory Group needs to be restructured or given a different mandate to better bridge internal IGF work with external governance processes. They referenced the idea of having MAG liaisons to other organisations as one possible approach.
The speaker asked whether the MAG needs to have a different sort of mandate, or whether liaisons from the MAG to other organisations are needed, referencing Wolfgang Kleinwacht's suggestion about having liaisons representing these communities . They concluded that the theme is reorganisation .
on: Consolidation of existing IGF structures and processes is needed rather than creation of new parallel mechanisms
The shift to operational governance must remain accountable to the values that underpinning principles were intended to protect
Arg. 1Crépin-Leblond relayed an online question asking how the shift from abstract principles to operational governance structures can be kept accountable to the values those principles were designed to protect. The concern is that institutional coordination could become an end in itself rather than a means to uphold core values.
He read out a question from Perry Esfandiari asking what mechanisms will ensure that implementation remains accountable to the values those principles were intended to protect, rather than simply becoming an exercise in institutional coordination .
The session aims to explore opportunities, challenges, and priorities for aligning institutional roles across WSIS and GDC processes and strengthening coordination
Arg. 1Miloshevic Evans framed the session's purpose as exploring how institutional roles can be aligned across the various governance processes, including WSIS and the GDC, and how coordination can be strengthened. She emphasised that the goal is to move beyond discussion towards agreeing on concrete milestones for an implementation roadmap.
She stated that the session would explore the opportunities, challenges, and primarily the priorities for aligning institutional roles across these processes and strengthening coordination, and that the hope was to agree on milestones that will help with the implementation roadmap currently being built .
The WSIS Plus 20 review has reaffirmed long-standing commitments, but implementation requires clear milestones and a defined starting point
Arg. 2Miloshevic Evans acknowledged that the WSIS Plus 20 process has reaffirmed existing commitments to working together, but stressed that turning these commitments into reality requires clear, measurable milestones. She framed this as the central challenge for the next phase of implementation.
She noted that WSIS Plus 20 has reaffirmed long-standing commitments through which everyone is working together, but that implementation needs clear milestones and a clear starting point, and asked what the most important measurable milestones from the UK government's point of view would be for the next 12 months to demonstrate that WSIS Plus 20 implementation is going to be implemented .
Coherent implementation requires aligning the GDC, global AI dialogue, WSIS framework with action lines, and the IGF ecosystem
Arg. 3Miloshevic Evans raised the question of how coherent implementation can be achieved across the multiple overlapping governance frameworks, including the GDC, the global AI dialogue, the WSIS action lines, and the IGF ecosystem. She framed this as a key challenge for moving forward effectively.
She asked how coherent implementation would take place between the Global Digital Compact, the global AI dialogue, the WSIS process with its action lines, and the IGF ecosystem, and sought initial thoughts on how to align all these processes for the benefit of moving forward .
The IGF ecosystem's evolution should be assessed and key successes projected over the next five years
Arg. 4Miloshevic Evans invited reflection on the evolution of the IGF ecosystem and asked what the key successes should be over the next five years. She framed this as an opportunity to both take stock of progress and set a forward-looking agenda for the IGF.
She asked what should be, in the next five years, the key successes for the IGF ecosystem to evolve, inviting the speaker to first reflect upon the evolution and then project forward .
Civil society's accountability gaps and priorities must be addressed as part of the WSIS and GDC implementation process
Arg. 5Miloshevic Evans highlighted the importance of identifying and addressing accountability gaps from a civil society perspective as part of the broader implementation effort. She framed this as a necessary step towards achieving meaningful milestones.
She asked what the priorities or major accountability gaps are from the civil society point of view that need to be overcome in order to get to some milestone or further processes .
The technical community has an role to play in speeding up implementation beyond government and civil society
Arg. 6Miloshevic Evans raised the question of what role the technical community can play in contributing to and accelerating the next phase of WSIS and GDC implementation. She framed this as an important dimension of the broader multi-stakeholder effort.
She asked what the role for the technical community would be to contribute and have an role in the next phase to speed up implementation, and invited the speaker to mention milestones as well .
Translating WSIS and GDC commitments into national implementation strategies is the most urgent priority for developing countries
Arg. 7Miloshevic Evans highlighted the importance of translating global commitments into concrete national strategies, particularly for developing countries. She framed this as a key challenge for private sector actors in the developing world.
She asked what would be the most urgent national implementation of the WSIS and GDC commitments that need to be translated, bringing the perspective of a private sector company in a developing world .
AI governance must be integrated into the WSIS framework without creating parallel tracks or competing governance structures
Arg. 8Miloshevic Evans raised the question of how AI governance can be meaningfully integrated into the existing WSIS framework without generating additional fragmentation or competing governance structures. She framed this as a key challenge for the AI governance agenda.
She asked how AI governance can be more integrated into the WSIS framework without creating parallel tracks or competing governance structures .
on: Fragmentation and duplication across WSIS, GDC, and AI governance processes represent the primary risk going forward
on: Whether AI governance should be integrated into the existing WSIS/IGF framework or whether new mechanisms are inevitable and necessary
Good data and statistics are essential prerequisites for setting and tracking meaningful implementation milestones
Arg. 9Miloshevic Evans acknowledged the importance of good data as a foundation for developing and tracking implementation milestones. She highlighted this as a key insight from the discussion on national implementation.
She thanked the speaker for mentioning good data in order to work on milestones, signalling her agreement that data and statistics are essential for meaningful implementation tracking .
The session should result in a collaborative effort to paint an implementation roadmap, with all stakeholders rolling up their sleeves
Arg. 10Miloshevic Evans concluded the session by calling on all participants to take an role in building the implementation roadmap together. She emphasised that the discussion should not end with the session but should continue through engagement across chapters, coalitions, and communities.
She stated that she hopes the session is not the end of the discussion, that chapters are in all places and many coalitions of the technical community and civil society are active, and that everyone needs to roll up their sleeves and help paint that implementation roadmap together .
Session Knowledge Graph
Speakers · Topics · Arguments · Relationships
Gaskell described the WSIS Plus 20 outcome as 'a really important success', highlighting the permanent IGF mandate, reaffirmation of the 2005 Tunis Principles, and the IGF's status as the primary forum for Internet Governance Dialogue as 'really good results' that 'were not automatic' . Shears noted that the multi-stakeholder process has 'achieved a level of standing in international policy circles' . Kummer highlighted the recognition that the IGF is 'no longer a standalone annual meeting but is at the centre of a vibrant ecosystem' . Betancourt acknowledged 'clear wins' including the IGF mandate and integrated approach to WSIS-GDC implementation . Noir was 'very pleased' to see the technical community recognised as a unique stakeholder in the final document .
Permanent mandate for the IGF and reaffirmation of the 2005 Tunis Principles are significant wins
The GDC explicitly expects IGF and WSIS to be core components of its implementation, representing a new level of credibility for multi-stakeholder processes
IGF is now recognised as the centre of a vibrant ecosystem, not just a standalone annual meeting
Clear wins include the integrated approach to WSIS-GDC implementation, but significant regrets remain such as lack of gender integration
Recognition of the technical community as a unique stakeholder, distinct from the traditional tri-party model
Shears identified the biggest problem as 'continuing to see these as processes that are not linked, that these are processes that will go on in their own ways' and 'will not be sufficiently aligned at the senior level' . Kummer shared 'Matthew's concern about the potential of fragmentation of the different processes' and saw the IGF 'very much as the glue holding the processes together' . Noir agreed there is a need to 'really think about duplication' and 'how many organisations are involved' . Chin highlighted the proliferation of new AI governance mechanisms emerging from the GDC alongside existing structures . Miloshevic Evans framed the challenge as how to achieve 'coherent implementation' across the GDC, global AI dialogue, WSIS framework, and IGF ecosystem .
Continuing to treat WSIS, GDC, and AI governance as separate, unlinked processes is the biggest risk going forward
The IGF should serve as the glue holding the various processes together rather than allowing parallel tracks to develop
There is a need to avoid duplication and consider how many organisations are involved across overlapping governance spaces
New mechanisms created by the GDC, alongside existing UN structures, risk creating competing governance structures for AI
AI governance must be integrated into the WSIS framework without creating parallel tracks or competing governance structures
Kummer described the IGF as 'the glue holding the processes together' and argued that AI falls under the broad definition of internet governance agreed by UN member states . Shears argued the IGF has 'an opportunity to extol its multi-stakeholder credentials within the UN system' while not losing sight of national IGFs . Chin stated that 'the IGF is the only multi-stakeholder mechanism in the UN system' and its resources must be used 'conservatively and effectively to hold the AI governance process accountable' . Olufuye noted that 'IGF has been that rallying point' for developing countries to discuss these issues .
The IGF should serve as the glue holding the various processes together rather than allowing parallel tracks to develop
Balancing the IGF's growing role within the UN system with the continued importance of national IGFs and local inputs is essential
The IGF is the only multi-stakeholder mechanism in the UN system and its resources must be used effectively to hold AI governance accountable
Full implementation of the WSIS Plus 20 outcome document, including the Sao Paulo multi-stakeholder guidelines, is the priority for developing countries
Shears noted that 'the multi-stakeholder process is something now that has credibility in the eyes of many' and 'has achieved a level of standing in international policy circles' . Gaskell praised the 'genuine multi-stakeholder process for the review' and the informal multi-stakeholder sounding board as running 'really well' . Noir argued that 'part of what we do in the multi-stakeholder governance system so well is we have an opportunity to keep each other co-accountable' . Betancourt called for 'a pragmatic application of the multi-stakeholder model', acknowledging it is 'not serving the interests of all the stakeholders similarly' and calling for a critical approach to power dynamics . Olufuye urged all participants to 'consider themselves as WSIS champions' and evangelists for agreed principles including the Sao Paulo multi-stakeholder guidelines .
The GDC explicitly expects IGF and WSIS to be core components of its implementation, representing a new level of credibility for multi-stakeholder processes
Genuine multi-stakeholder process ran well, including the informal multi-stakeholder sounding board
Co-accountability within the multi-stakeholder governance system requires participants to be brave enough to raise difficult issues in forums
A critical approach to power dynamics within the multi-stakeholder model is needed to ensure it serves all stakeholders equally
All participants should consider themselves WSIS champions and act as evangelists for the agreed principles, especially the Sao Paulo multi-stakeholder guidelines
Betancourt identified 'the lack of serious commitment with the funding situation' as 'one of the main gaps and challenges' ahead , and argued that 'implementation of the WSIS action lines and the GDC objectives without financial mechanisms is non-negotiable' . Gaskell acknowledged that 'the secretariat is underpowered' and put forward the personal view that 'multi-stakeholder organisation funding should also be multi-stakeholder' . Olufuye suggested the ITU-mandated task force can 'help developing countries fine-tune their financial processes and develop blended finance so they can implement projects that will be result-oriented' .
The lack of serious commitment to funding is one of the most significant gaps from the WSIS Plus 20 review
Funding for the IGF secretariat is insufficient and multi-stakeholder organisations should be funded in a multi-stakeholder manner
Blended financial mechanisms should be developed to help developing countries implement result-oriented projects
Gaskell expressed a desire to see the IGF have 'more focused, practical, and concrete outcomes' beginning with the Kenya meeting . Chin reported that the Global AI Dialogue concluded the focus should 'shift from the abstract to operational government structures' and that what is wanted is 'concrete, named, supported, and result-oriented commitment' for the second Global AI Dialogue in 2027 . The Internet Society audience representative argued that 'developing good roadmaps' is 'an important tool to foster both sort of focus of the conversations, make sure that we have clear targets' and provide 'accountability for these commitments' . Shears noted the 'institutional coordination challenge' of sitting within the UN system must be actively worked at .
The IGF should produce more focused, practical, and concrete outcomes, beginning with the Kenya meeting
The shift from abstract principles to operational governance structures, with concrete and result-oriented commitments, is the direction set by the Global AI Dialogue
Developing clear roadmaps for action line implementation is essential to foster accountability and ensure year-on-year progress
Institutional coordination within the UN system poses an overwhelming challenge that must be actively managed to preserve the IGF's multi-stakeholder credentials
Kummer called for 'consolidation of what we have and make it more stable going the way forward', noting that intersessional processes lack legal personality and face structural challenges . Chin stressed the need to 'consolidate IGF resource' and have 'more effective mechanism, including the effective governance structure and leadership' . Noir agreed there is a need to 'really think about duplication' and 'how many organisations are involved' . The audience member raised whether the MAG needs 'a different sort of mandate' or liaison arrangements, concluding that 'the theme is reorganisation' .
Intersessional processes such as dynamic coalitions and NRIs face legal and structural challenges due to lack of legal personality
The IGF is the only multi-stakeholder mechanism in the UN system and its resources must be used effectively to hold AI governance accountable
There is a need to avoid duplication and consider how many organisations are involved across overlapping governance spaces
The MAG may need a different mandate or liaison arrangements to better connect internal IGF work with external governance processes
Both Shears and Kummer expressed strong concern about fragmentation and the tendency to treat governance processes as isolated tracks. Shears warned that 'the biggest problem is that we continue to see these as processes that are not linked' , while Kummer explicitly stated he shares 'Matthew's concern about the potential of fragmentation of the different processes' and sees 'the IGF very much as the glue holding the processes together' . Both agreed that the IGF's broad definition of internet governance, which encompasses AI, should be the unifying framework . Both Betancourt and Olufuye emphasised the critical importance of financial mechanisms for implementation, particularly from the perspective of developing countries and civil society. Betancourt stressed that 'for civil society to be able to meaningfully engage with implementation, funding has to be there and is simply not there' , while Olufuye argued that the ITU-mandated task force can help developing countries 'fine-tune their financial processes and develop blended finance so they can implement projects that will be result-oriented' . Both saw the interagency task force on financing as a key milestone . Both Gaskell and Olufuye highlighted the importance of broadening participation, particularly from the Global South. Gaskell identified 'genuinely increasing wider stakeholder participation, particularly from G77 countries' as 'one of the real milestones' , while Olufuye stressed that developing countries need the multi-stakeholder approach to be implemented in practice, with 'those better resourced' bringing 'on board other stakeholders' . Both pointed to the IGF in Kenya as a concrete opportunity to demonstrate this . Kummer, Shears, and Chin all addressed the IGF's evolving institutional role within the UN system. Kummer noted the permanent mandate means the IGF 'can be much freer and also bolder' , while Shears argued the IGF has 'an opportunity to extol its multi-stakeholder credentials within the UN system' but must not lose sight of national IGFs . Chin urged the IGF to 'work more closely with ODET or the UN Inter-Agency Working Group to monitor the implementation of GDC' . All three saw this institutional evolution as both an opportunity and a challenge requiring careful management. Noir, Betancourt, and Crépin-Leblond (relaying an online question) all converged on the theme of accountability within the multi-stakeholder model. Noir argued participants must 'be brave enough to bring those issues to the table' and that 'co-accountability is important' . Betancourt called for 'a critical approach to understand what are the real dynamics of power that are permeating an effective and more meaningful application of the multi-stakeholder model' . Crépin-Leblond relayed the question of 'what mechanisms will ensure that implementation remains accountable to the values those principles were intended to protect rather than simply becoming an exercise in institutional coordination' . The Internet Society audience representative, Gaskell, and Betancourt all agreed that the WSIS action lines are underappreciated and need more focused attention. The audience representative noted that 'the part of the WSIS process that we see in grave need of further work is really the implementation of the action lines' and recommended 'developing good roadmaps' . Gaskell 'totally agreed' with this point about the WSIS action lines and the roadmap being 'a bit of WSIS that is underappreciated' . Betancourt concurred with ISOC's position and noted the roadmaps for implementation at national levels 'will come with a layer of accountability' .
While it might be expected that the technical community representative (Noir) would advocate for recognition of the technical community as a distinct stakeholder, the broader consensus across speakers from government (Gaskell) and the IGF ecosystem (Kummer) on the value of this recognition was notable. Noir highlighted that the recognition of the technical community as a unique stakeholder was something the 45-member technical community coalition had 'argued for' and was 'very pleased' to see in the document . This was not challenged by any other speaker, and Kummer's broader point about the IGF ecosystem encompassing diverse intersessional bodies implicitly supported this expanded stakeholder recognition.
There was unexpected consensus that the permanent mandate, while celebrated as a win, brings with it new pressures and responsibilities. Rather than simply celebrating the mandate, speakers from different stakeholder groups converged on the view that it raises the bar for the IGF's performance. Kummer noted the mandate means the IGF 'can be much freer and also bolder' but also 'needs consolidation' . Shears acknowledged the 'institutional coordination challenge' of sitting within the UN system could be 'overwhelming' . Gaskell argued the IGF should now deliver 'more focused, practical, and concrete outcomes' . This nuanced, cautiously optimistic consensus across government, civil society, and IGF veterans was more sophisticated than a simple celebration of the mandate.
It was somewhat unexpected that a government representative (Gaskell) aligned closely with civil society (Betancourt) and private sector from the developing world (Olufuye) on the issue of underfunding of civil society and multi-stakeholder organisations. Betancourt argued that 'there is a lack of understanding of the huge role that civil society plays in the implementation of the WSIS and the GDC' and that 'funding has to be there and is simply not there' . Gaskell, from a government perspective, acknowledged the secretariat is 'underpowered' and put forward the view that 'multi-stakeholder organisation funding should also be multi-stakeholder' . Olufuye's call for the Sao Paulo multi-stakeholder guidelines to be implemented, with better-resourced actors bringing others on board , reinforced this cross-stakeholder consensus on funding gaps.
While the push for operational governance was broadly welcomed, there was an unexpected convergence across speakers from very different backgrounds on the need to ensure this shift does not hollow out the values underpinning the principles. Chin reported the Global AI Dialogue's conclusion that the focus should shift 'from the abstract to operational government structures' , but this was immediately contextualised by Betancourt's call for a 'critical approach to understand what are the real dynamics of power' , Noir's call for 'co-accountability' , and the online question relayed by Crépin-Leblond asking 'what mechanisms will ensure that implementation remains accountable to the values those principles were intended to protect rather than simply becoming an exercise in institutional coordination' . This cross-stakeholder concern about values being lost in operationalisation was a notable area of convergence.
The discussion revealed a remarkably high level of consensus across all stakeholder groups - government, civil society, technical community, private sector, and academia - on several core issues. There was broad agreement that: (1) the WSIS Plus 20 review produced better-than-expected outcomes, particularly the permanent IGF mandate ; (2) fragmentation and duplication across WSIS, GDC, and AI governance processes represent the primary risk going forward ; (3) the IGF should serve as the central coordinating mechanism ; (4) the multi-stakeholder model has gained new credibility and must be preserved ; (5) funding gaps are critical and must be urgently addressed ; (6) implementation must shift from abstract principles to concrete, measurable outcomes ; and (7) consolidation of existing structures is preferable to creating new parallel mechanisms . Areas of nuance rather than disagreement included the degree to which the multi-stakeholder model serves all stakeholders equally and the specific mechanisms for ensuring accountability in the shift to operational governance .
The Internet Society audience representative argued that the IGF is working quite well and that the action lines are the part most in need of further work , implying the IGF itself does not require fundamental reform. By contrast, Kummer identified structural legal challenges facing intersessional bodies such as dynamic coalitions and NRIs that lack legal personality and cannot easily enter contractual arrangements , suggesting deeper institutional reform is needed. Chin argued the IGF must use its resources conservatively and effectively , implying resource constraints are a pressing concern. Shears warned that institutional coordination within the UN system could become overwhelming , suggesting the challenge is more systemic than the audience representative acknowledged.
Developing clear roadmaps for action line implementation is essential to foster accountability and ensure year-on-year progress
Intersessional processes such as dynamic coalitions and NRIs face legal and structural challenges due to lack of legal personality
The IGF is the only multi-stakeholder mechanism in the UN system and its resources must be used effectively to hold AI governance accountable
Institutional coordination within the UN system poses an overwhelming challenge that must be actively managed to preserve the IGF's multi-stakeholder credentials
Betancourt identified the lack of serious commitment to funding as the most critical gap from the WSIS Plus 20 review , and also noted gender integration as a significant regret . Gaskell, by contrast, emphasised the process as having run well and focused on the positive outcomes such as the permanent IGF mandate and reaffirmation of the Tunis Principles , without foregrounding funding or gender as primary gaps. Shears similarly emphasised the opportunity presented by the GDC's recognition of the multi-stakeholder model , rather than dwelling on gaps. This reflects a divergence between a civil society perspective focused on structural deficits and a government/process perspective focused on institutional achievements.
The lack of serious commitment to funding is one of the most significant gaps from the WSIS Plus 20 review
Clear wins include the integrated approach to WSIS-GDC implementation, but significant regrets remain such as lack of gender integration
Genuine multi-stakeholder process ran well, including the informal multi-stakeholder sounding board
Betancourt explicitly argued that the multi-stakeholder model is not serving the interests of all stakeholders similarly and called for a critical approach to understanding real dynamics of power . Noir, while acknowledging the need for co-accountability, framed the multi-stakeholder system as something that works well and simply needs participants to be brave enough to raise issues , without questioning the model's structural fairness. Gaskell focused on broadening participation as the key milestone , treating the model as sound but needing wider inclusion. Olufuye highlighted the Sao Paulo multi-stakeholder guidelines and power asymmetry recognition as important, but framed this as a matter of implementation rather than structural critique of the model itself.
A critical approach to power dynamics within the multi-stakeholder model is needed to ensure it serves all stakeholders equally
Co-accountability within the multi-stakeholder governance system requires participants to be brave enough to raise difficult issues in forums
Increasing meaningful stakeholder participation, particularly from G77 countries, women, and young people, is a key measurable milestone
Full implementation of the WSIS Plus 20 outcome document, including the Sao Paulo multi-stakeholder guidelines, is the priority for developing countries
Betancourt argued strongly that the interagency task force on financing must approach its work from the perspective of recipients rather than development agencies, and that this includes not only developing countries but also small actors and implementers . She also stressed that the assumption that funds are already available is incorrect . Olufuye, while also focused on developing countries, framed the ITU-mandated task force more positively as a mechanism that can help developing countries fine-tune blended finance approaches , without explicitly challenging the development agency perspective or questioning whether funds exist. This reflects a subtle but meaningful difference in how each speaker frames the financing problem and who bears responsibility for solving it.
The interagency task force on financing should be informed by the perspective of recipients, not just development agencies
Blended financial mechanisms should be developed to help developing countries implement result-oriented projects
Miloshevic Evans framed the question as how AI governance can be integrated into the WSIS framework without creating parallel tracks , implying this is a desirable and achievable goal. Kummer argued that AI falls under the existing broad definition of internet governance and that the IGF should serve as the glue holding processes together , suggesting integration is both possible and preferable. Chin, however, described the proliferation of new AI governance mechanisms emerging from the GDC - including the Global AI Dialogue, the Office for Digital and Emerging Technology, the AI for Good Global Commission, and others - as an empirical reality, and focused on how the IGF should work with these new bodies rather than replace them . This reflects a tension between an integrationist ideal and the practical reality of institutional proliferation.
New mechanisms created by the GDC, alongside existing UN structures, risk creating competing governance structures for AI
The IGF should serve as the glue holding the various processes together rather than allowing parallel tracks to develop
AI governance must be integrated into the WSIS framework without creating parallel tracks or competing governance structures
In a session largely devoted to celebrating the multi-stakeholder model and its achievements, Betancourt introduced an unexpected critical note by arguing that the model does not serve all stakeholders similarly and that a critical approach to understanding real dynamics of power is needed . This was unexpected because the session's framing and most other speakers treated the multi-stakeholder model as a shared success to be built upon. Noir's response - that co-accountability requires participants to be brave enough to raise issues - implicitly reframed Betancourt's structural critique as a matter of individual courage rather than systemic power imbalance. Gaskell's focus on broadening participation similarly treated the issue as one of inclusion rather than structural power. The divergence between a structural critique and an inclusionary/procedural response was not anticipated by the session's framing.
Betancourt made the unexpected and pointed observation that there is an assumption that funds are there and the financing is there, but it is simply not there , directly challenging a premise that other speakers appeared to take for granted. Olufuye discussed blended finance mechanisms and Gaskell discussed the IGF secretariat being underpowered , both of which implicitly accept that some funding exists but is misallocated or insufficient. Neither directly engaged with Betancourt's more fundamental claim that the financing simply does not exist. This disagreement about the basic empirical premise of the financing discussion was unexpected in a session focused on implementation roadmaps.
While both Kummer and Chin agreed on the risk of fragmentation, an unexpected divergence emerged in their implicit prescriptions. Kummer argued that AI falls under the existing broad definition of internet governance and that the IGF should be the glue holding processes together , suggesting the IGF should be the primary integrating body. Chin, however, described the proliferation of new AI governance mechanisms as an empirical reality already underway and focused on how the IGF should work with ODET and the UN Inter-Agency Working Group , implying accommodation of new structures rather than integration under the IGF umbrella. This was unexpected because both speakers are experienced IGF insiders who might have been expected to share a common institutional vision, yet they implicitly diverged on whether the IGF should lead or collaborate in the AI governance space.
The session exhibited a high degree of surface-level consensus around the value of the multi-stakeholder model, the importance of the IGF's permanent mandate, and the need to avoid fragmentation across WSIS, GDC, and AI governance processes. However, beneath this consensus lay meaningful disagreements about: (1) the adequacy of the multi-stakeholder model's structural fairness versus its procedural sufficiency ; (2) the primary gaps in the WSIS Plus 20 outcomes, with civil society emphasising funding and gender while government and process-focused speakers emphasised institutional wins ; (3) the approach to financing, with Betancourt challenging the assumption that funds exist while others focused on better allocation mechanisms ; (4) the IGF's role vis-Ã -vis new AI governance mechanisms, with Kummer advocating for the IGF as integrating glue and Chin describing a more accommodating relationship with new bodies ; and (5) the depth of IGF reform needed, with the Internet Society audience representative suggesting the IGF is working well while Kummer , Chin , and Shears identified more fundamental structural challenges.
All speakers agreed that the WSIS Plus 20 review produced important positive outcomes, particularly the permanent mandate for the IGF and the recognition of the multi-stakeholder model's credibility . However, they diverged significantly on what the most important achievement was and what the most pressing gaps are. Gaskell emphasised the process quality and institutional wins , Kummer highlighted the ecosystem recognition , Shears focused on the GDC's explicit recognition of the IGF and WSIS , Betancourt acknowledged wins but foregrounded regrets including gender and funding , Noir celebrated the recognition of the technical community as a unique stakeholder , Olufuye prioritised the Sao Paulo guidelines and power asymmetry recognition , and Chin noted the IGF's unique multi-stakeholder status . The shared goal of affirming the WSIS Plus 20 outcomes masked significant differences in emphasis and priority.
Permanent mandate for the IGF and reaffirmation of the 2005 Tunis Principles are significant wins IGF is now recognised as the centre of a vibrant ecosystem, not just a standalone annual meeting The GDC explicitly expects IGF and WSIS to be core components of its implementation, representing a new level of credibility for multi-stakeholder processes Clear wins include the integrated approach to WSIS-GDC implementation, but significant regrets remain such as lack of gender integration Recognition of the technical community as a unique stakeholder, distinct from the traditional tri-party model Full implementation of the WSIS Plus 20 outcome document, including the Sao Paulo multi-stakeholder guidelines, is the priority for developing countries The IGF is the only multi-stakeholder mechanism in the UN system and its resources must be used effectively to hold AI governance accountable
All four speakers agreed that fragmentation and duplication across governance processes is a serious risk . However, they differed on the solution. Shears argued that stakeholders must resist reverting to isolated tracks and actively grasp the opportunity for alignment . Kummer proposed the IGF as the integrating glue and pointed to UNGIS as the coordination mechanism . Noir focused on the need to think carefully about how many organisations are involved without specifying a structural solution. Chin described the proliferation of new mechanisms as already underway and focused on how the IGF should work with ODET and the UN Inter-Agency Working Group rather than replace them , implying a more accommodating approach to new structures than Kummer's integrationist vision.
Continuing to treat WSIS, GDC, and AI governance as separate, unlinked processes is the biggest risk going forward The IGF should serve as the glue holding the various processes together rather than allowing parallel tracks to develop There is a need to avoid duplication and consider how many organisations are involved across overlapping governance spaces New mechanisms created by the GDC, alongside existing UN structures, risk creating competing governance structures for AI
All four speakers agreed that funding is a significant challenge for WSIS and GDC implementation. However, they framed the problem and solution differently. Betancourt argued that the assumption that funds exist is wrong and that the task force must approach financing from the recipient perspective , calling for a comprehensive financial ecosystem drawing on public, private, and community-based sources . Gaskell focused more narrowly on the IGF secretariat being underpowered and argued that multi-stakeholder organisations should be funded in a multi-stakeholder manner . Olufuye focused on blended finance mechanisms to help developing countries implement result-oriented projects . The Internet Society audience representative focused on roadmaps as a tool for accountability rather than directly addressing funding , suggesting a different prioritisation of the problem.
A viable financial ecosystem must include public, private, and community-based sources and is non-negotiable for WSIS and GDC implementation Funding for the IGF secretariat is insufficient and multi-stakeholder organisations should be funded in a multi-stakeholder manner Blended financial mechanisms should be developed to help developing countries implement result-oriented projects Developing clear roadmaps for action line implementation is essential to foster accountability and ensure year-on-year progress
All three speakers agreed that the IGF needs to strengthen its institutional structures and connections to fulfil its expanded role. However, they emphasised different dimensions of this challenge. Kummer focused on the internal structural challenge of intersessional bodies lacking legal personality and the need for consolidation while preserving the bottom-up nature . Chin focused on the external coordination challenge, urging the IGF to work more closely with ODET and the UN Inter-Agency Working Group and to consolidate its resources . Shears focused on the balance between the IGF's growing UN system role and the continued importance of national IGFs and local inputs , warning that institutional coordination could become overwhelming . These represent complementary but distinct diagnoses of the IGF's structural challenges.
Intersessional processes such as dynamic coalitions and NRIs face legal and structural challenges due to lack of legal personality The IGF should work more closely with ODET and the UN Inter-Agency Working Group to monitor GDC implementation Balancing the IGF's growing role within the UN system with the continued importance of national IGFs and local inputs is essential
- The WSIS Plus 20 review produced better-than-expected outcomes, including a permanent mandate for the IGF, reaffirmation of the 2005 Tunis Principles, and recognition of the IGF as the primary forum for internet governance dialogue.
- The GDC explicitly identifies the IGF and WSIS as core components of its implementation, lending new credibility to the multi-stakeholder model at the international level.
- The greatest risk going forward is treating WSIS, GDC, and AI governance as separate, unlinked processes, leading to fragmentation and duplication across governance structures.
- The IGF should serve as the connective tissue holding multiple governance processes together, leveraging its unique status as the only multi-stakeholder mechanism within the UN system.
- The permanent mandate frees the IGF from renewal pressures, enabling it to be bolder and more focused on producing practical, concrete outcomes.
- Intersessional IGF structures such as dynamic coalitions and national and regional initiatives face significant legal and structural challenges due to their lack of legal personality, requiring consolidation.
- Financing remains one of the most critical and underaddressed gaps; a viable financial ecosystem drawing on public, private, and community-based sources is considered non-negotiable for WSIS and GDC implementation.
- Civil society plays a substantial role in WSIS and GDC implementation, particularly where state capacity is weak, but lacks the funding necessary to engage meaningfully.
- The technical community contributes practical, relatively neutral expertise that should be integrated into policy discussions early enough to ensure implementable outcomes at the infrastructure layer.
- Increasing meaningful participation from G77 countries, women, and young people is a key measurable milestone, with the Kenya IGF representing a significant opportunity.
- The Global AI Dialogue has signalled a shift from abstract principles to operational governance structures, with concrete and result-oriented commitments expected by the second UN Global AI Dialogue in May 2027.
- Accountability within the multi-stakeholder model requires a critical examination of power dynamics to ensure the model genuinely serves all stakeholders, not just the better-resourced ones.
- Clear roadmaps for action line implementation are essential to foster accountability and ensure year-on-year progress, as the action lines remain an underappreciated and underdeveloped part of the WSIS framework.
“The biggest problem is that we continue to see these as processes that are not linked, that these are processes that will go on in their own ways. They will not be sufficiently aligned at the senior level. And the opportunities for the IGF and its multi-stakeholder processes will not be realized.”
“The IGF is no longer a standalone annual meeting but is at the centre of a vibrant ecosystem with intersessional work and the recognition also of national and regional initiatives... But they are built on voluntary collaboration of a bunch of volunteers, but they don't have some legal personality, and that is also a challenge.”
“The task force should not approach the financing of the WSIS and the GDC from the point of view of the development agencies, but rather from the point of view of the recipients. And this includes not only developing countries, but also the small actors, the small implementers.”
“If the emphasis is shifting from abstract principles to operational governance, what mechanisms will ensure that implementation remains accountable to the values those principles were intended to protect rather than simply becoming an exercise in institutional coordination?”
“The IGF is the only multi-stakeholder mechanism in the UN system, so we need to utilise our resource conservatively and effectively to hold the AI governance process accountable.”
“Multi-stakeholder organisation funding should also be multi-stakeholder.”
“Unless we have these roadmaps, unless we have a shared understanding of what needs to be done on a year-to-year basis almost, there's a risk that we simply don't progress as much as we should.”
How can the WSIS outcome document and the Global Digital Compact be aligned in practice, and what concrete milestones should be set for the next 12 months?
This is a central question of the session that was only partially addressed. Establishing concrete, measurable milestones is critical to ensuring that the political momentum from WSIS Plus 20 translates into tangible implementation progress rather than remaining aspirational.
How can wider stakeholder participation, particularly from G77 countries, small and medium-sized enterprises, women, and young people, be genuinely increased in IGF and WSIS processes?
Inclusive participation is a key measure of success for the WSIS Plus 20 implementation. Without meaningful representation from underrepresented groups, the legitimacy and effectiveness of multi-stakeholder governance processes are undermined.
How can the IGF and WSIS framework avoid fragmentation and duplication with the Global Digital Compact processes, and what mechanisms will ensure these are treated as linked rather than separate processes?
The risk of institutional fragmentation is a recurring concern throughout the discussion. If these processes operate in silos, the opportunity to leverage the multi-stakeholder model's credibility and the synergies between GDC and WSIS will be lost.
How can the IGF encourage future meetings to address issue sets outlined in the GDC that have not typically been addressed by the IGF in the past?
The GDC contains thematic areas that fall outside the IGF's traditional scope. Identifying how the IGF can expand its agenda to cover these areas without losing focus is important for maximising the opportunity presented by the GDC's explicit reference to the IGF.
How can the legal and institutional status of IGF intersessional processes, such as dynamic coalitions and national and regional IGF initiatives, be consolidated to allow them to enter contractual arrangements and manage funding more effectively?
Many IGF intersessional bodies lack legal personality, which prevents them from entering contracts or managing funds independently. Resolving this structural challenge is essential for the long-term sustainability and ambition of the IGF ecosystem.
What are the most effective financial mechanisms for implementing the WSIS action lines and GDC objectives, particularly for developing countries and small civil society actors?
Funding gaps remain one of the most significant barriers to WSIS and GDC implementation. Understanding which financial models work, for whom, and under what conditions is critical to ensuring that commitments translate into real-world outcomes, especially in contexts where state capacity is weak.
How should the interagency task force on financing approach its mandate, and how can it be informed by the perspectives of recipients rather than development agencies?
The task force represents a unique opportunity to redesign financing approaches, but its effectiveness depends on whose perspectives shape its recommendations. Ensuring it is demand-driven rather than supply-driven is a critical design question that requires further research and advocacy.
What is the huge role that civil society plays in implementing WSIS and GDC commitments, particularly in contexts where the state is weak, and how can this be better recognised and resourced?
Civil society's implementation role is often invisible in formal governance discussions. Documenting and quantifying this role is necessary to make the case for dedicated funding and to ensure accountability frameworks reflect the full range of actors involved in delivery.
How can the technical community bring practical expertise into policy discussions early enough to ensure that policy outcomes are technically implementable?
There is a persistent gap between policy commitments and technical feasibility. Identifying mechanisms for early and meaningful technical community engagement in policy processes is essential to avoid commitments that cannot be operationalised at the infrastructure layer.
How can national statistical organisations in developing countries be empowered to collect granular data on meaningful connectivity, beyond simple coverage statistics?
Reliable, disaggregated data is a prerequisite for evidence-based policy and for measuring progress towards WSIS and SDG targets. Without improved national statistical capacity, it is impossible to know whether interventions are reaching those most in need.
How can AI governance be integrated into the WSIS framework without creating parallel or competing governance structures?
The proliferation of new AI governance initiatives risks duplicating existing structures and fragmenting global digital governance. Identifying how AI governance fits within the existing WSIS and IGF ecosystem is urgent given the pace of AI development and the short timeline to the next UN Global AI Dialogue in 2027.
What are the synergies between the GDC's new mechanisms, such as the Global AI Dialogue and the Office for Digital and Emerging Technology, and existing structures like the UN Inter-Agency Working Group on AI coordinated by ITU and UNESCO?
Multiple new and existing mechanisms now operate in the AI governance space. Mapping their relationships and identifying complementarities versus overlaps is necessary to avoid duplication and to ensure coherent global governance of AI.
How can the IGF work more closely with the Office for Digital and Emerging Technology and the UN Inter-Agency Working Group to monitor the implementation of the GDC?
The IGF has a potential monitoring role in GDC implementation, but this requires formal coordination with UN interagency bodies. Clarifying the IGF's mandate and mechanisms for this role is an open and urgent question.
If the emphasis is shifting from abstract principles to operational governance, what mechanisms will ensure that implementation remains accountable to the values those principles were intended to protect, rather than simply becoming an exercise in institutional coordination?
This question addresses a fundamental tension in governance reform: the risk that operationalisation becomes an end in itself, losing sight of the normative commitments that motivated the process. It was raised as an explicit question during the session and was not fully answered.
Does the MAG need a different mandate or structure, such as formal liaisons to other organisations, to ensure that external processes are brought into the IGF's work and that IGF outputs are relevant to the broader UN ecosystem?
The question of whether the IGF's internal governance structures are fit for purpose in a more complex multi-process environment is a practical and urgent one. Reorganisation of the MAG's role and external relationships could be a key enabler of the IGF's expanded mandate.
How can the WSIS action lines be better implemented through clear roadmaps that provide focus, shared targets, and accountability on a year-to-year basis?
The WSIS action lines have historically been underimplemented. Developing structured roadmaps is identified as a critical tool for accountability and progress tracking, and the absence of such roadmaps is seen as a significant gap in the current implementation architecture.
How should multi-stakeholder organisations be funded, and should funding itself be multi-stakeholder in nature?
The question of who funds multi-stakeholder governance bodies has implications for their independence, legitimacy, and accountability. This is an underexplored area that has direct bearing on the sustainability and credibility of the IGF and related processes.
How can the IGF balance its growing role within the UN system with maintaining the importance of national IGFs and local inputs?
As the IGF takes on a more prominent role in the UN system, there is a risk that its local and national dimensions are overshadowed. Ensuring that bottom-up inputs from national IGFs continue to feed into global processes is a structural challenge that requires deliberate design.
How can the UNGIS mechanism and its new multi-stakeholder addition be used effectively to connect the IGF to other UN processes and initiatives?
The UNGIS is identified as an existing coordination mechanism that could help the IGF connect to broader UN processes, but how this will work in practice remains unclear. Further work is needed to define the IGF's role within this structure.
How can the multi-stakeholder model be critically examined to address power asymmetries and ensure it serves the interests of all stakeholders, not just the better-resourced ones?
The multi-stakeholder model is widely endorsed but its practical application is uneven. Understanding and addressing the power dynamics that limit meaningful participation by less-resourced actors is essential for the model's legitimacy and effectiveness.
How can success stories from developing countries, such as Nigeria's national payment stack, be systematically shared and replicated across other developing nations to accelerate WSIS and GDC implementation?
Peer learning and knowledge transfer between developing countries is an underutilised mechanism for accelerating implementation. Identifying how to systematically capture, disseminate, and adapt successful national initiatives is an important area for further research and programme design.
How can the IGF develop more effective governance structures, leadership, and resource consolidation to better connect with and hold accountable the growing number of AI governance actors?
The IGF's internal effectiveness is a prerequisite for its external influence. Without stronger governance structures and adequate resources, the IGF will struggle to fulfil its potential role as the primary multi-stakeholder forum in an increasingly complex digital governance landscape.
