WSIS Action Line C9: Media - Towards Resilient Information Ecosystems in Times of Crisis: Rethinking ‘Preparedness’ in Digital Governance
This discussion was held as part of the WSIS Action Line C9 review process and focused on the challenges of maintaining trustworthy information ecosystems and media resilience during crisis situations, including armed conflict, natural disasters, and pandemics . The moderator, Guilherme Canela de Souza Godoi, framed the session by pointing out that the digital transformation has not brought greater plurality of voices, but also intensified threats to information integrity, with independent journalism being more important than ever. .
Professor Ingrid Volkmer presented findings from a survey of 200 regulatory experts worldwide, revealing significant governance gaps: 61% of respondents said their regulatory frameworks did not include provisions for crisis situations , a majority reported not addressing transnational digital infrastructures such as cloud computing and satellites in crisis communication planning , and 71% indicated no privacy protections were in place for citizens using digital data sources during crises . She argued that digital regulation in crisis constitutes an entirely new regulatory space requiring fresh tools and approaches .
Giulio Coppi highlighted how the humanitarian space has been transformed by the digitisation of aid delivery, the militarisation of civilian digital systems, and the explosion of disinformation, warning that AI acts as 'an accelerator in an explosive mix' . He called for rejecting claims of the dual-use nature of ICT systems and for reclaiming the protected status of civilian digital infrastructure and the individuals who maintain it .
Dr Charles Lewis, speaking from South Africa, emphasised the need for regulators to act as 'custodians of information resilience' , stressing that crisis communication must be multi-channel, location-based, and delivered in indigenous languages . Maksym Dvorovyi described Ukraine's experience, noting that while some preparatory legislative steps were taken between 2014 and 2022 , cooperation with major tech platforms had largely collapsed by 2025, with platforms such as Telegram never responding even during the full-scale invasion .
Participants broadly agreed that existing national and international legal frameworks are insufficient, and that a global framework for platform governance - centred on enhanced due diligence obligations and specific crisis governance provisions - is increasingly necessary . Audience contributions further underscored the importance of protecting local journalists during crises and preserving crisis communications for post-event accountability , reinforcing the session's conclusion that protecting information ecosystems in times of crisis requires urgent, coordinated, and rights-based action across all stakeholders.
Overall Purpose
- The discussion is a structured panel session focused on the challenges of maintaining trustworthy information ecosystems, media integrity, and crisis communication in the digital age. Specifically, it examines how the principles of the WSIS Action Line C9 (media and access to information) apply under crisis conditions - including armed conflict, natural disasters, and pandemics - and what regulatory, humanitarian, and governance frameworks are needed to address these challenges.
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Major Discussion Points
- The evolution of information ecosystems and the concept of 'information integrity': The moderator contextualised the session by noting that the media landscape has changed dramatically since the WSIS process began 20 years ago, shifting from legacy media governance to a complex digital ecosystem. The UN has introduced the concept of 'information integrity' to connect the protection of information producers, media literacy, platform governance, and digital infrastructure into a coherent framework.
- Regulatory gaps in crisis communication: Prof. Ingrid Volkmer presented findings from a survey of 200 regulatory experts worldwide, revealing significant governance deficiencies. A majority of respondents (61%) reported that new regulatory approaches do not include provisions for times of crisis, a majority said transnational infrastructures such as cloud computing and satellites are not addressed in crisis communication debates, and 71% reported no provisions to protect privacy rights during crises. Prof. Volkmer pointed out that these findings point to a systemic absence of data governance infrastructure capable of supporting crisis response. - The humanitarian dimension of digital crisis communication: Giulio Coppi outlined how the digital communication layer now hosts not only information but also life-saving services and rights-enabling functionalities, fundamentally transforming the humanitarian space. Key trends include shrinking humanitarian access, the digitisation of aid delivery, dependence on big tech cloud providers, the militarisation of civilian digital systems, and the spread of disinformation accelerated by AI. He argued that journalists and local digital rights activists are currently filling critical protection gaps at great personal cost. - The accountability deficit of private digital platforms in conflict zones: Maksym Dvorovyi described Ukraine's experience, noting that while some preparatory legislative steps were taken between 2014 and 2022 to restrict Russian-linked media and platforms, cooperation with major private tech platforms has deteriorated significantly. By 2025-2026, platforms show little willingness to engage with Ukrainian authorities, applying general policies rather than tailoring responses to crisis contexts. Telegram, in particular, was singled out as a platform that never responded even during the acute phase of the full-scale invasion. This led to a call for a global framework on platform governance with enhanced due diligence obligations and specific crisis governance provisions. - The need for structured, multi-channel, and locally adapted early warning systems: Dr. Charles Lewis emphasised that regulators must see themselves as "custodians of information resilience" and that effective crisis response requires preparedness, forecasting, community-level communication, and readiness to respond. He stressed that communications must be location-based, delivered in indigenous languages, and transmitted across multiple channels, including SMS, mobile networks, and WhatsApp. The key priority for South Africa is translating existing international guidance into properly institutionalised national structures. ---
Overall Tone
- The overall tone of the discussion is serious, urgent, and constructive, with occasional moments of levity. The opening remarks establish a tone of informed concern, acknowledging both positive developments in digital access and the mounting threats to information integrity. As the panel progresses, the tone becomes increasingly sober and at times candid, particularly in Dvorovyi's testimony about Ukraine's deteriorating relationship with private platforms and Coppi's warning that the private sector will effectively become the arbiter of crisis communication if normative frameworks are not established. The audience contributions towards the end introduce a more critical and grassroots perspective, with a freelance journalist questioning whether government crisis communication has anything to do with journalism at all , and a participant from Iran highlighting the threat to media pluralism under crisis conditions. The closing remarks return to a forward-looking, collaborative tone, with the moderator pointing towards future work and a potential follow-up event in Nairobi.
Expanded Summary: WSIS Action Line C9 - Information Integrity and Crisis Communication in the Digital Age
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Session Context and Framing
This panel session was convened as part of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) Action Line C9 review process, which concerns media and access to information. The moderator, Guilherme Canela de Souza Godoi of UNESCO, introduced the session as part of the WSIS Action Line C9 review process and set the scene by reflecting on how dramatically the media and information ecosystem has changed since the WSIS process began twenty years ago . At that time, governance discussions were largely focused on what is now called legacy media; today, the conversation encompasses a vastly more complex digital environment involving platforms, artificial intelligence, satellite infrastructure, and cross-border information flows . To manage time, the moderator introduced a light-hearted football card system - a yellow card signalling one minute remaining and a red card requiring the speaker to stop - a device that proved both effective and occasionally contested .
The moderator framed the session's central concern as the concept of "information integrity", which the United Nations introduced during the WSIS twenty-year review process running alongside the Global Digital Compact . This concept connects multiple previously siloed domains: the protection of those who produce information (journalists, scientists, artists), media and information literacy, the governance of digital platforms and AI, and the management of digital infrastructure and archives . The moderator observed that while there are genuine positive developments in digital access and the plurality of voices online , these gains are offset by mounting threats to trustworthy information, spanning vaccines, elections, climate change, and financial matters . He captured the structural paradox at the heart of the session with a striking observation: independent investigative journalism is "more important than ever and has less money than ever" , a situation he described as tragically ironic and not limited to journalists alone .
A particularly memorable framing device was the moderator's observation that information integrity may be the only issue on which "bad guys and good guys agree" - the former seeking to attack it, the latter to protect it - underscoring that its strategic importance is universally acknowledged even by adversaries . The session deliberately chose not to take stock of all developments across the action line, but instead to zoom in on one specific and underexplored dimension: the particular challenges of maintaining information integrity in crisis scenarios, whether armed conflict, natural disaster, or pandemic .
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The Transformation of Crisis Communication: An Ecosystem Perspective
Professor Ingrid Volkmer of the University of Melbourne opened the substantive discussion by challenging the assumption that crisis communication is primarily about governments delivering national narratives to citizens. She argued that crisis communication now operates across digital and data ecosystems in which technologies take a central geopolitical role and can be weaponised, as can platforms . This means that governance can no longer be approached through siloed structures - regulating AI separately, addressing disinformation separately - but must treat the entire digital and data ecosystem as an integrated whole that is specifically activated and stressed during crises . She also drew attention to the emerging role of low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellites such as Starlink, noting that while they are new to this sphere, greater awareness of their role in specific crises is urgently needed . These data ecosystems, she argued, must be accountable and should not be treated as mere technical add-ons to crisis governance; they are, in fact, crucial for building crisis resilience in countries . Volkmer concluded that digital regulation in crisis constitutes an entirely new regulatory space, requiring new tools and approaches developed collaboratively by practitioners and academics .
Giulio Coppi, Senior Humanitarian Officer for AccessNow, extended this analysis by reframing the stakes of the conversation. He argued that the same technological communication layer now hosts not only information but also life-saving services, essential assets, and rights-enabling functionalities, representing a fundamentally transformed humanitarian space with multiple actors responding to different priorities and sometimes different ethical frameworks . He identified five key trends reshaping this space: increasing humanitarian needs combined with shrinking physical and digital access and funding, leading to greater isolation of local actors and dependence on remote communication tools ; the digitalisation of aid delivery, creating increasingly mediated relationships between aid organisations and communities ; the explosion of cloud computing, which entrenches dependence on big tech providers and worsens the extractive nature of aid data gathering ; the militarisation of commercial and civilian digital systems, enhancing vulnerability to cyber attacks, shutdowns, spyware, and surveillance ; and slow progress on protection standard development, resulting in insufficient data and evidence-based analysis to support digital-adapted protection strategies .
Coppi further highlighted a dimension that had received little attention in mainstream governance discussions: the risk to communities displaced by climate change or conflict who have turned to digital tools to preserve their culture, heritage, memory, and demographic documentation . If traditional humanitarian protection mandate holders do not recognise these as essential civilian assets worth protecting, digital transformation may paradoxically make such communities more vulnerable rather than ensuring their preservation . He also warned that the explosion of disinformation, misinformation, and hate speech in crisis situations - compounded by the normalised recourse to blanket internet shutdowns - corrals vulnerable people into untrusted information bubbles, and that AI, while not radically changing this dynamic, acts as "an accelerator in an explosive mix" . Coppi noted that signals of hope in humanitarian crisis communication come not from humanitarians - a self-critical acknowledgement - but from journalists and local digital rights activists filling the gap at great personal and professional cost with very limited support . His call to "reclaim the protected nature of our digital, civilian digital information and digital ecosystem, and of those individuals that are working to make it accessible, reliable, and safe for everyone in times of crisis" was one of the session's most direct normative statements.
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Empirical Evidence: Regulatory Gaps Revealed by Survey Data
Professor Volkmer presented findings from a survey conducted in cooperation with UNESCO among two hundred regulatory experts across the world, designed to understand how governments manage crisis communication and what their perceptions of their own capacities are . The results were striking in their consistency. When asked whether new regulatory approaches include provisions for times of crisis, a majority of sixty-one per cent said no or did not know, a finding Volkmer described as reflecting a deeper absence of data governance infrastructure capable of supporting crisis response . A second question asked whether regulators address transnational infrastructures such as cloud computing services and satellites in crisis communication debates; again, a majority said no or did not know, underscoring a significant gap in attention to critical infrastructures . A third question on whether initiatives exist to protect privacy rights when citizens use digital data sources during crises found that seventy-one per cent reported no or did not know, representing what Volkmer called another urgent governance gap .
Beyond these specific findings, Volkmer reported that survey respondents expressed a broader uncertainty about technological roles, reflecting capacity gaps, organisational silos, unclear legal frameworks, and a lack of pre-existing partnerships with platforms and infrastructure providers . This points to a systemic rather than merely technical problem: the architecture of national governance itself may be inadequate for managing cross-border digital crises.
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The Regulatory Perspective: South Africa's Experience
Dr Charles Lewis, Counsellor at the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA), speaking online, offered a practitioner's perspective on the role of ICT regulators in crisis preparedness and response. He described South Africa's experience with a range of emergencies - floods, civil disturbances, fires, and COVID-19 - all of which resulted in loss of life, damage to infrastructure, and disruption of services . He outlined the international frameworks being developed in response, including ITU work in 2023, a SADC national emergency telecommunications plan published in 2024, and South Africa's own incipient Early Warning for All initiative .
Lewis argued that effective crisis communication requires attention to four pillars: preparedness (identifying and analysing risks, setting up structures and processes in advance) ; forecasting and monitoring (detecting and tracking emerging threats) ; communication and warning (reaching communities and individuals when disaster strikes) ; and readiness to respond, including testing systems before they are needed . He emphasised the importance of proper testing, noting that poorly managed tests - such as instances where citizens were woken in the middle of the night by alerts that were not intended to be sent - illustrate the risks of inadequate preparation. He emphasised that regulators must see themselves as "custodians of information resilience", needing to be flexible and capable of reacting and recovering quickly . Critically, he stressed that crisis communication must be people-focused, reaching communities in the languages they speak - a particular challenge in South Africa with eleven official languages - and must use a multiplicity of channels including SMS, mobile networks, and WhatsApp . His key priority for South Africa was translating existing theory and international guidance into properly institutionalised national structures, with clear roles and responsibilities established before the next disaster strikes .
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Ukraine's Experience: Platform Accountability in Wartime
Maksym Dvorovyi, Senior Legal Counsel at the Digital Security Lab in Ukraine, provided the session's most direct testimony from an crisis context. He described how, in the eight years between 2014 and 2022, Ukraine undertook preparatory legislative steps to address Russian information threats, including restricting Russian-linked legacy media and blocking key Russian platforms such as VKontakte, Odnoklassniki, Mail.ru, and Yandex . He argued that these steps had a measurable positive effect: when parts of Ukraine were occupied following the full-scale invasion in 2022, people in cities such as Kherson and Zaporizhia came out to protest the occupation, suggesting that Russian media influence had been at least partially limited . Ukraine also undertook a broader review of legislation aligned with EU accession processes, adding specific provisions to combat what it termed "aggressor states" .
However, Dvorovyi was candid about the limitations of these preparations, particularly regarding cooperation with private technology platforms. While many platforms initially coordinated with Ukrainian authorities in 2022 - banning accounts of prominent propaganda spreaders and taking actions that later influenced EU-level decisions - Dvorovyi acknowledged that while these EU-level actions were "quite questionable in the EU context", they were nonetheless helpful for the Ukrainian population. This cooperation gradually declined to almost nothing . By the time of the session, there was no significant willingness on the part of private companies to engage in dialogue with Ukrainian legislators, with platforms applying general global policies rather than tailoring them to crisis contexts . Telegram was singled out as a particularly problematic case: it possesses the largest news influence in Ukraine, allows anonymous sources to flourish, and never responded even during the acute phase of the full-scale invasion . Dvorovyi concluded that some platforms had simply chosen to be irresponsible, and that Ukraine currently has no mechanisms to hold them to any form of accountability .
The moderator drew a lesson from this testimony, recalling that when UNESCO began developing guidelines for platform governance, advocates of self-regulation had argued for keeping governance discussions focused on voluntary compliance - and the Ukrainian experience demonstrated the consequences when governance relies solely on goodwill . This framing reinforced the broader session argument that voluntary compliance frameworks are structurally insufficient in crisis contexts.
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Platform Accountability, Digital Sovereignty, and the Case for Global Governance Frameworks
The question of platform accountability emerged as one of the session's central themes, with multiple speakers converging on the view that existing frameworks - national, regional, and voluntary - have proven inadequate. Coppi warned that without normative frameworks and regulatory intervention to embed humanitarian communication channels into policy discussions, the private sector will by default decide when communication is useful and when it is not, when it is a priority and when it is not, resulting in what he called "policy by third party" . He called for rights to be placed back at the centre of the communication environment and for systems to be protected through redundancy and rights-protected normative frameworks that will survive the first crisis .
In his closing remarks, Coppi introduced a conceptual challenge to the widely used but often vaguely defined concept of "digital sovereignty". He argued that digital sovereignty comes with responsibilities, and that any serious discussion of it must include a frank examination of what it means in terms of protecting people's rights in the digital space, particularly in times of crisis . This encompasses the right to connectivity, to receive and transmit news, to maintain contact with loved ones, to preserve cultural memory, and to keep civilian data flowing . He observed that much of the existing discussion has become stuck on the tension between the rights of individuals and the capacity of governments to shut down information flows, and that without a frank resolution of this tension through normative frameworks, the private sector will fill the vacuum .
This argument connected directly to the moderator's earlier observation that the cross-border nature of digital information ecosystems makes purely national governance approaches very difficult, in a way that was not the case when governance of broadcasting was the primary concern . Both the overall digital information environment and the human beings operating within it now function in a transnational space that national jurisdictions cannot adequately govern alone .
Dvorovyi, drawing on Ukraine's lived experience, called for a renewal of discussions about a global framework on platform governance focused on enhanced due diligence obligations and including specific sections on crisis governance . He acknowledged the complexity of this position, noting the potential for abuse by certain governments of any such regulation, but argued that this is the direction in which the international community must move, as all national approaches have not worked well . He also noted that generative AI must be included in this framework, as it is itself effectively becoming a platform . This call for a global framework was notable for coming from a practitioner in an war zone who had previously witnessed the failure of both national legislation and the EU's Digital Services Act to provide adequate protection for countries outside the EU's single market .
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Audience Contributions: Local Journalism, Media Pluralism, and Post-Crisis Accountability
The session's closing minutes included a series of brief audience interventions that introduced important dimensions not fully addressed by the panel. A participant from Iran raised the concern that AI appears to be reducing media pluralism globally, a problem compounded in crisis contexts where information environments are already under severe pressure . The moderator connected this to the related issue of internet shutdowns during crises, which directly impact media pluralism and communities' access to diverse information sources .
An audience member called for local communicators and journalists not to be forgotten in crisis communication frameworks, noting that they are typically the first to stop working in crises due to lack of funds, threats, and censorship from both governments and foreign actors . This reinforced Coppi's earlier observation that signals of hope in humanitarian crisis communication come not from humanitarians but from journalists and local digital rights activists filling the gap at great personal and professional cost with very limited support .
Stephen Wyburn of the International Federation of Library Associations raised the largely overlooked dimension of preserving crisis communications for post-crisis learning and accountability, referencing the difficulty of COVID-19 inquiries in reconstructing what occurred . This intervention implicitly challenged the panel's focus on real-time crisis response and pointed to the need for data governance frameworks that also address archival preservation and institutional memory.
A freelance journalist in the audience offered a more critical perspective, arguing that crisis communication from government has nothing to do with journalism, that journalists are not supposed to replace official communication channels, and that governments and administrations consistently fail to develop worst-case scenario planning - citing the tsunami and COVID as examples . He also stated a preference for citizen journalism over what he termed "quality media" for understanding what is happening in crisis zones . While this challenged some of the panel's framing, it nonetheless reinforced the shared concern about the structural vulnerability of independent journalism and the inadequacy of official crisis communication systems.
An audience member also highlighted the Internet Governance Forum Policy Network working on norms, roles, and responsibilities in crisis communication within a multi-stakeholder framework as an workstream .
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Conclusions and Forward-Looking Priorities
In the session's closing round, each speaker identified a key priority for future action. Professor Volkmer called for crisis protocols to pre-integrate all communication technologies - cloud, satellite, and AI - as core components of building national crisis resilience, and for early partnerships with platforms and infrastructure providers to be established before crises occur rather than negotiated during them . She implicitly connected this to Dvorovyi's testimony about Ukraine, suggesting that had such arrangements been in place in advance, the post-crisis scramble to establish cooperation might have been avoided. She also emphasised the need for international cooperation, given that national regulatory structures may no longer be sufficient when dealing with crisis .
Coppi reiterated his call for digital sovereignty to be accompanied by clear rights responsibilities, and for normative frameworks to be developed that embed humanitarian communication channels into policy discussions, protect systems through redundancy, and ensure that rights-based approaches survive the first crisis . Lewis called for South Africa to translate existing international guidance into properly institutionalised national structures, with clear roles and responsibilities housed within the South Africa Regulators Forum, and for systems to be tested before they are needed . Dvorovyi called for the design of legal frameworks that will make platforms significantly more accountable, arguing that all national approaches have not worked well and that a global framework with enhanced due diligence obligations and crisis governance provisions is the necessary direction of travel .
The moderator closed by pointing towards two concrete next steps: the forthcoming launch of the UNESCO-commissioned report based on Professor Volkmer's survey, which participants were encouraged to engage with as a basis for continued work ; and a follow-up event being organised in Nairobi, with the moderator noting that the IGF format might allow for deeper engagement on these issues of norms, roles, and responsibilities in crisis communication within a multi-stakeholder framework . The session concluded with a broad consensus that the diagnosis of the problem is well-established - inadequate regulatory frameworks, platform unaccountability, under-resourced local journalists, and the absence of rights-based normative frameworks for crisis communication - but that the international community faces significant and unresolved questions about the appropriate mechanisms for addressing it, particularly regarding the design of global platform governance frameworks that balance accountability with safeguards against governmental overreach.
The media ecosystem has transformed dramatically over 20 years, moving beyond legacy media to a complex digital environment where information integrity requires connecting multiple dots including protection of journalists, media literacy, platform governance, and digital infrastructure - Overview of information integrity framework
Arg. 1The moderator argues that the media and information ecosystem has changed fundamentally since the WSIS process began 20 years ago, when discussions centred on legacy media. Today, information integrity requires a holistic approach that connects the protection of information producers, media literacy, platform governance, AI, digital infrastructure, and archiving into a single interconnected framework rather than treating them as separate silos.
He noted that 20 years ago the discussion was very much about what we today call legacy media, and that the ecosystem was very different from what it is today . The United Nations introduced the concept of information integrity during the WSIS review process, connecting dots from the protection of journalists, scientists, and artists, to media literacy, platform governance, AI, and digital infrastructure . He emphasised that what was once seen as different silos is now impossible to treat separately .
on: Local journalists and communicators are critically important in crisis contexts but are severely under-resourced, under threat, and insufficiently supported
Internet shutdowns in crisis situations directly impact media pluralism and the ability of communities to access diverse information sources - Shutdowns and media pluralism
Arg. 2The moderator highlights that internet shutdowns, which are often deployed during crises, directly undermine media pluralism by cutting off communities from diverse information sources. This compounds the already severe pressure on information environments during emergencies.
The moderator connected the audience member's concern about AI and media pluralism to the broader issue of internet shutdowns in crisis contexts, noting their direct impact on media pluralism .
The reliance on self-regulation and goodwill of platforms without actual governance mechanisms leads to situations where platforms act only when they choose to, demonstrating the failure of voluntary approaches - Failure of platform self-regulation
Arg. 3The moderator argues that the experience of Ukraine demonstrates the fundamental inadequacy of relying on voluntary self-regulation by digital platforms. When platforms are not bound by enforceable governance mechanisms, they engage only when it suits them and withdraw cooperation at will, leaving crisis-affected populations without protection.
He recalled that when discussions about platform governance began, several players advocated for self-regulation, and the Ukrainian experience shows what happens when governance relies only on goodwill - platforms cooperate when they want to and stop when they do not .
on: Digital platforms lack adequate accountability mechanisms in crisis contexts, and voluntary self-regulation has proven insufficient
Crisis communication is no longer about delivering national narratives to citizens; it now operates across digital and data ecosystems where technologies and platforms take centre stage in geopolitical issues and can be weaponised - Ecosystem-wide crisis communication
Arg. 1Professor Volkmer argues that the nature of crisis communication has fundamentally shifted from a state-centric model of delivering national narratives to citizens, to a complex, cross-ecosystem phenomenon. Technologies and platforms now play a central geopolitical role in crises and can be weaponised, meaning they must be understood as part of an integrated digital and data ecosystem rather than as isolated technical components.
She stated that in crisis situations it is no longer about delivering national narratives to citizens alone, but that there are many other dimensions operating across digital and data ecosystems . She noted that technologies take a centre-stage role in geopolitical issues and can be weaponised, as can platforms . She also highlighted that LEO satellites such as Starlink are new actors in this sphere requiring greater awareness .
on: Crisis communication has fundamentally transformed beyond national narrative delivery into a complex cross-ecosystem phenomenon requiring integrated governance
A survey of 200 regulatory experts found that 61% said their regulatory frameworks do not include provisions for times of crisis, reflecting a deep absence of data governance infrastructure capable of supporting crisis response - Regulatory frameworks lack crisis provisions
Arg. 2A major empirical finding from Professor Volkmer's survey is that the overwhelming majority of regulatory frameworks around the world have not been designed to address crisis scenarios. This gap reflects a systemic absence of data governance infrastructure that would be needed to support effective crisis response.
The survey of 200 regulatory experts conducted in cooperation with UNESCO asked whether new regulatory approaches include provisions for times of crisis, and a majority of 61% said no or did not know . This was described as reflecting a deeper absence of data governance infrastructure capable of supporting crisis response .
on: Existing regulatory and governance frameworks are fundamentally inadequate for managing digital crisis communication, with significant gaps across multiple dimensions
A majority of regulators surveyed said they do not address transnational infrastructures such as cloud computing and satellites in crisis communication regulatory debates, underscoring a significant gap in attention to critical infrastructures - Gap in transnational infrastructure regulation
Arg. 3The survey revealed that most national regulators fail to incorporate transnational digital infrastructures — such as cloud computing services and satellites — into their crisis communication regulatory frameworks. This represents a critical blind spot given the increasing dependence of crisis response on these cross-border systems.
Regulators were asked whether they address transnational infrastructures such as cloud computing and satellites in regulatory debates on crisis communication, and again a majority said no or did not know . This was described as underscoring a significant gap in attention to critical infrastructures .
on: Existing regulatory and governance frameworks are fundamentally inadequate for managing digital crisis communication, with significant gaps across multiple dimensions
71% of regulators reported no initiatives to ensure protection of privacy rights when citizens use digital data sources during crises, representing an urgent governance gap - Privacy protection gap in crisis
Arg. 4The survey found that nearly three-quarters of regulators have no measures in place to protect citizens' privacy rights when they use digital data sources during crises. This represents an urgent and largely unaddressed governance gap that leaves citizens particularly vulnerable at the moments when they are most reliant on digital systems.
When asked whether there are initiatives to ensure protection of privacy rights when citizens use digital data sources in crisis times, 71% of respondents reported no or did not know, which was described as representing another urgent governance gap .
Regulators feel their national structures may no longer be relevant and that international cooperation is needed, reflecting capacity gaps, organisational silos, and unclear legal frameworks - National regulatory structures insufficient
Arg. 5Beyond specific regulatory gaps, the survey revealed a broader crisis of confidence among regulators themselves, who feel that their existing national structures and inter-ministerial cooperation models may no longer be adequate for managing digital crises. This points to the need for international cooperation and new regulatory tools.
Survey respondents indicated that their national regulatory structures might no longer be relevant and that the way ministries cooperate might no longer be sufficient when dealing with crisis, reflecting capacity gaps, organisational silos, and unclear legal frameworks . Respondents also felt that international cooperation is needed .
Crisis protocols need to pre-integrate all communication technologies including cloud, satellite, and AI as core components of building national crisis resilience, with early partnerships with platforms and infrastructure providers established before crises occur - Pre-integrated crisis protocols needed
Arg. 6Professor Volkmer argues that the most urgent action needed is to redesign crisis protocols so that all relevant communication technologies — cloud, satellite, and AI — are built in as core components from the outset, rather than being treated as technical add-ons. Establishing partnerships with platforms and infrastructure providers before crises occur is essential to avoid the reactive and ineffective coordination seen in current crisis responses.
She stated that crisis protocols need to consider all sorts of communication technologies - cloud, satellite, and AI - as core pre-integrated components of building national crisis resilience, and that starting this thinking process is very urgent . She also noted that if early arrangements with platforms were in place, situations where post-crisis coordination has to happen might be avoided, referencing the Ukrainian experience as an example .
on: Pre-crisis preparedness, including early partnerships and integrated frameworks, is essential and more effective than reactive post-crisis responses
The same tech communication layer now hosts not only information but also life-saving services, essential assets, and rights-enabling functionalities, representing a transformed humanitarian space - Transformed humanitarian communication space
Arg. 1Giulio Coppi argues that the digital communication layer has become far more than an information channel — it now simultaneously hosts life-saving services, essential assets, and rights-enabling functionalities. This transformation has created a complex humanitarian space with multiple actors operating under different priorities and ethical frameworks.
He stated that today the same tech communication layer hosts not only information but also life-saving services, essential assets, and rights-enabling functionalities, representing a transformed humanitarian space with multiple different actors responding to different priorities and sometimes different ethical frameworks .
on: Crisis communication has fundamentally transformed beyond national narrative delivery into a complex cross-ecosystem phenomenon requiring integrated governance
Increasing humanitarian needs combined with shrinking physical and digital access and funding result in increased isolation of local actors and greater dependence on remote communication tools for aid coordination and delivery - Shrinking humanitarian access
Arg. 2Coppi identifies a structural tension in the humanitarian sector where growing needs are met with diminishing resources and access, both physical and digital. This forces humanitarian actors to rely increasingly on remote communication tools, which themselves carry risks and dependencies.
He described increasing needs and shrinking humanitarian access - both physical and digital - and funding, which result in increased isolation of local actors and the need for remote communication tools for aid coordination and delivery .
The explosion of cloud computing entrenches dependence of humanitarian actors on big tech providers and worsens the extractive nature of aid data gathering processes - Cloud computing dependency risks
Arg. 3The rapid expansion of cloud computing in humanitarian operations has created a structural dependency on a small number of large technology companies. This dependency also exacerbates pre-existing problems with the extractive nature of data collection in aid contexts, where data about vulnerable populations is gathered in ways that may not serve their interests.
He noted that the explosion of cloud computing further entrenches the dependence of humanitarian actors on big tech providers and on local or private infrastructure, and makes worse the extractive nature of aid data gathering and collection processes, which was pre-existent but gets worse .
The militarisation of commercial and civilian digital systems enhances the vulnerability of humanitarian programming to cyber attacks, shutdowns, spyware, and surveillance - Militarisation of civilian digital systems
Arg. 4Coppi highlights that the increasing use of commercial and civilian digital systems for military purposes creates serious risks for humanitarian operations. When civilian digital infrastructure is militarised, humanitarian actors using the same systems become exposed to cyber attacks, shutdowns, spyware, and various forms of surveillance.
He described the militarisation of commercial and civilian digital systems and data as enhancing the vulnerability of humanitarian programming to digital-related threats, including cyber attacks, shutdowns, spyware, and all sorts of surveillance methods .
Crisis-related migration communities turning to digital to preserve culture, heritage, and memory are made more vulnerable if traditional protection mandate holders do not recognise these as essential civilian assets worth protecting - Digital cultural preservation at risk
Arg. 5Coppi argues that a largely overlooked dimension of digital vulnerability in crisis is the risk to cultural heritage and community memory. When displaced communities use digital platforms to preserve their culture and identity, and protection agencies fail to recognise these digital assets as worth protecting, the digital transformation paradoxically increases their vulnerability rather than ensuring preservation.
He gave the example of crisis-related migration communities turning to digital to preserve their culture, heritage, memory, and demographic documentation, noting that if traditional protection mandate holders do not recognise these as essential civilian assets worth protecting, digital transformation processes might actually make them more vulnerable instead of ensuring their preservation .
Journalists and local digital rights activists are currently filling the humanitarian communication gap at great personal and professional cost with very limited support - Local actors filling humanitarian gaps
Arg. 6Coppi observes that in the absence of adequate humanitarian frameworks for digital crisis communication, it is journalists and local digital rights activists who are stepping in to fill the gap. They do so at significant personal and professional risk, and with very little institutional or financial support.
He stated that signals for hope from a humanitarian perspective come not from humanitarians but from journalists and local digital rights activists who are currently filling that gap at great personal and professional cost with very limited support .
on: Local journalists and communicators are critically important in crisis contexts but are severely under-resourced, under threat, and insufficiently supported
Digital sovereignty must come with responsibilities, including protecting people's rights in the digital space, particularly in times of crisis, covering connectivity, news flow, cultural memory preservation, and civilian data protection - Digital sovereignty and rights responsibilities
Arg. 7Coppi argues that the concept of digital sovereignty, which has gained prominence in policy discussions, cannot be separated from the responsibilities it entails towards people's rights. In times of crisis, this means ensuring connectivity, the flow of news, the preservation of cultural memory, and the protection of civilian data.
He stated that digital sovereignty comes with responsibilities, including protecting people's rights in the digital space, and posed a series of questions about what this means in times of crisis: connectivity, getting news in and out, keeping in touch with loved ones, preserving cultural memory, and keeping civilian data flowing .
on: A human rights-based approach must be central to crisis communication governance, with rights protection embedded in normative frameworks
Without normative frameworks and regulatory intervention to embed humanitarian communication channels into policy discussions, the private sector will decide when communication is a priority, resulting in policy by third party - Risk of private sector control over crisis communication
Arg. 8Coppi warns that if regulators and the international community do not establish normative frameworks that embed humanitarian communication channels into policy, the private sector will by default become the arbiter of when and how communication flows in crisis situations. This would result in what he calls 'policy by third party', where commercial interests rather than rights determine communication priorities.
He argued that if regulators do not step in and the international community does not find a way to embed humanitarian communication channels into the discussion, the private sector will take over and decide when communication is useful and when it is not, resulting in policy by third party . He called for putting rights back in the middle of the communication environment and protecting systems through redundancy and rights-protected normative frameworks .
on: A human rights-based approach must be central to crisis communication governance, with rights protection embedded in normative frameworks
Regulators must see themselves as custodians of information resilience, needing to be flexible and able to react and recover quickly, with coordinated collaboration that is properly structured and planned - Regulators as custodians of information resilience
Arg. 1Dr Lewis argues that ICT sector regulators need to reconceptualise their role in crisis situations, seeing themselves not merely as technical overseers but as custodians of information resilience. This requires flexibility, rapid reaction capacity, and properly structured collaborative frameworks involving multiple players.
He stated that as regulators and ICT sector regulators, it is important to see themselves as custodians of information resilience, needing to be flexible and able to react and recover very quickly, and that any response is a coordinated collaboration that needs to be properly structured and planned . He referenced South Africa's response to COVID-19 as an example of effective regulatory action .
Crisis communication must be people-focused, using multiple channels, location-based, in mother-tongue languages, and simple enough to be usable across diverse communities - People-focused multi-channel communication
Arg. 2Dr Lewis emphasises that effective crisis communication must be designed around the needs of communities rather than the convenience of institutions. This means using multiple communication channels, ensuring messages are location-based, delivered in people's mother tongues, and simple enough to be understood and acted upon across diverse populations.
He stated that the approach needs to be people-focused, reaching out to communities with information that is usable, simple, and inalienable, and that mother-tongue communication is particularly important in a country like South Africa with 11 official languages . He also noted the need for location-based communication using a multiplicity of channels including SMS, mobile networks, and WhatsApp .
The critical need is to translate theory into practice by properly institutionalising early warning frameworks, clarifying roles and responsibilities, and ensuring structures are in place before the next disaster strikes - Translating theory into practice
Arg. 3Dr Lewis argues that the most pressing challenge for South Africa and similar countries is not the absence of guidance or frameworks — these exist from bodies such as the ITU and SADC — but the failure to translate them into operational reality. Proper institutionalisation, clear role assignment, and pre-established structures are essential.
He noted that South Africa has guidance from the ITU, SADC, and an incipient early warning systems for all structure, but that these need to be properly institutionalised with absolutely clear roles for various participants, including through South Africa's regulators forum . He gave the concrete example of needing structured systems in place so that when floods hit KwaZulu-Natal or the Eastern Cape, someone will stand up and issue warnings in indigenous languages before floods sweep homes away .
on: Existing regulatory and governance frameworks are fundamentally inadequate for managing digital crisis communication, with significant gaps across multiple dimensions
Key steps for regulators include legislating for structures, identifying roles and responsibilities, planning, communicating, and critically testing the systems put in place - Regulatory steps for crisis preparedness
Arg. 4Dr Lewis outlines a practical sequence of steps that regulators must take to build effective crisis preparedness: legislating for the necessary structures, clearly identifying roles and responsibilities, planning, communicating, and — critically — testing the systems before they are needed in a real emergency.
He summarised the steps as: legislate for the structures to be put in place, regulate and identify roles and responsibilities, plan, communicate, and critically test the systems put in place . He noted that testing is important but can go wrong, referencing an example of a test in Florida or California where people were woken at 3am by an unintended alert .
on: Pre-crisis preparedness, including early partnerships and integrated frameworks, is essential and more effective than reactive post-crisis responses
Ukraine's pre-invasion legislative steps to restrict Russian legacy media and block key Russian platforms had a measurable positive effect in limiting Russian media influence in occupied territories - Pre-crisis legislative preparedness in Ukraine
Arg. 1Dvorovyi argues that Ukraine's legislative actions between 2014 and 2022 — restricting Russian-financed media and blocking key Russian platforms — provided meaningful protection against Russian information influence. The fact that citizens in newly occupied territories came out to protest the occupation suggests that Russian media's effect had been limited by these preparatory measures.
He described how over the period 2014-2022, Ukrainian legislators identified key actors, threats, and platforms containing harmful content, and restricted Russian-financed media and direct Russian media . Key Russian platforms including Vkontakte, Odnoklassniki, Mail.ru, and Yandex were blocked . He noted that when regions of Kherson and Zaporizhia became occupied, people came out to protest, suggesting Russian media influence had been limited .
on: Pre-crisis preparedness, including early partnerships and integrated frameworks, is essential and more effective than reactive post-crisis responses
Initial cooperation between Ukrainian authorities and big tech platforms in 2022 gradually declined to almost nothing, with platforms applying general policies rather than tailoring them to crisis contexts - Decline of platform cooperation in crisis
Arg. 2Dvorovyi documents how the initial willingness of major technology platforms to cooperate with Ukrainian authorities in the acute phase of the 2022 invasion progressively eroded. By 2025–2026, platforms were applying generic global policies rather than adapting their approaches to the specific crisis context of a country at war.
He described how in the beginning of the full-scale invasion in 2022, many platforms were readily coordinating with Ukrainian authorities, with accounts of prominent war propaganda spreaders being banned . However, this cooperation gradually declined to almost nothing, and by 2025-2026 there was no significant willingness from private companies to engage in dialogue with the Ukrainian legislator . He attributed this partly to Ukraine not being a large enough market for platforms to tailor their policies .
on: Digital platforms lack adequate accountability mechanisms in crisis contexts, and voluntary self-regulation has proven insufficient
Platforms such as Telegram, which have the largest news influence in Ukraine, never responded even during the acute crisis phase, leaving no mechanisms to hold them accountable - Unaccountable platforms in wartime
Arg. 3Dvorovyi highlights Telegram as a particularly problematic case, given its dominant role in Ukraine's information environment. Despite its enormous influence and the proliferation of anonymous sources on the platform, Telegram never engaged with Ukrainian authorities even at the height of the crisis, and there are no effective mechanisms to compel accountability.
He noted that special regard is paid to Telegram because it possesses the largest news influence in Ukraine but allows anonymous sources to flourish, and it never responded even in 2022 . He stated that some platforms are willingly choosing not to respond, becoming irresponsible, and that there are no mechanisms to put them into any form of accountability .
on: Digital platforms lack adequate accountability mechanisms in crisis contexts, and voluntary self-regulation has proven insufficient
There is a necessity to develop a global framework on platform governance focused on enhanced due diligence obligations, including sections on crisis governance, while guarding against potential government abuse of such regulation - Need for global platform governance framework
Arg. 4Dvorovyi concludes that national approaches to platform governance have failed and that a global framework is now necessary. This framework should centre on enhanced due diligence obligations for platforms and include specific provisions for crisis governance, while also building in safeguards against the risk that governments might abuse such regulatory powers.
He argued that current legal frameworks, including the Digital Services Act, do not really work for countries like Ukraine that are not yet in the EU digital single market . He called for renewing discussions about a global framework on platform governance focused on enhanced due diligence obligations with sections on crisis governance, while taking into account the potential for abuse by certain governments . He stated that national approaches have not worked well and that platforms need to be made much more accountable .
on: A human rights-based approach must be central to crisis communication governance, with rights protection embedded in normative frameworks
AI appears to reduce media pluralism globally, and this concern is compounded in crisis contexts where information environments are already under severe pressure - AI reducing media pluralism
Arg. 1An audience member from Iran raises the concern that AI is contributing to a reduction in media pluralism worldwide, and asks how this intersects with crisis communication. The concern is particularly acute in contexts where information environments are already constrained by political or crisis-related pressures.
The audience member, identifying as being from Iran and therefore familiar with crisis communication in restrictive environments, asked what happens to media pluralism in crisis and stated that AI seems to reduce media pluralism all over the world .
Local communicators and journalists are the first to stop working in crises due to lack of funds, threats, and censorship from both governments and foreign actors, and must not be forgotten in crisis communication frameworks - Protecting local journalists in crisis
Arg. 2An audience member emphasises that local journalists and communicators are among the most vulnerable actors in crisis situations, facing simultaneous threats from lack of funding, physical danger, and censorship from multiple directions. They argue that crisis communication frameworks must explicitly account for and protect these essential actors.
The audience member called for not forgetting local communicators and journalists and how to keep local media working during crises, noting they are the first to stop working because they lack not only the ability to communicate but also funds, and face threats and censorship from governments and foreign actors .
on: Local journalists and communicators are critically important in crisis contexts but are severely under-resourced, under threat, and insufficiently supported
Government crisis communication and journalism serve distinct functions; governments must be credible both politically and technically for crisis communication to work, and journalists should not be expected to replace official communication channels - Distinction between official communication and journalism
Arg. 3A freelance journalist in the audience argues that there is an important conceptual distinction between government crisis communication and journalism that should not be conflated. Effective official crisis communication depends on governmental credibility, and journalists should not be positioned as substitutes for official channels.
The freelance journalist stated that crisis communication from government has nothing to do with journalism, and that if governments and administrations are credible both politically and technically, it works, but that journalists and media are not supposed to replace official communication .
Preserving the record of crisis communications is essential for post-crisis learning and accountability, as demonstrated by ongoing COVID inquiries attempting to reconstruct what occurred - Preserving crisis communication records
Arg. 4An audience member from the International Federation of Library Associations raises the often-overlooked issue of preserving crisis communications for future learning and accountability. The ongoing COVID-19 inquiries demonstrate the difficulty of reconstructing what happened when records have not been systematically preserved.
The audience member from the International Federation of Library Associations asked how equipped we are to preserve the communication that goes on during crises so that we can understand what happened afterwards, referencing the multiple COVID inquiries currently trying to understand what occurred .
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