WSIS Action Line C5 Building confidence and security in the use of ICTs

Dr. Pace argues that space systems present unique cybersecurity challenges because satellites cannot be physically accessed once launched, may operate for 10–15 years without hardware upgrades, and exist in a hostile radiation environment that can cause memory corruption indistinguishable from a malicious attack. Each segment — space, ground, and link — has its own distinct attack surface, and the complexity of these systems creates multiple potential entry points for adversaries.

Dr. Pace noted that satellites, once launched, cannot be physically touched for repairs or replacements , that there may be long gaps in communication with satellites unlike terrestrial systems , and that the space environment can cause radiation-induced memory upsets that are difficult to distinguish from malicious interference . He also highlighted that the more complex a system becomes, the more attack routes exist .

Dr. Pace contends that while terrestrial cybersecurity lessons are valuable and applicable, they cannot simply be transplanted into the space domain. The physical inaccessibility of satellites, their long operational lifespans, specialised supply chains, and severe size, weight, and power constraints mean that space cybersecurity requires adapted and additional measures beyond standard ground-based practices.

Dr. Pace stated that terrestrial good practices are not really good enough for space , citing physical inaccessibility, long cycle times of up to 15 years , a very small global supply base for radiation-hardened parts , and severe size, weight, and power limitations alongside specialised protocols .

Dr. Pace identifies a deep cultural divide between the space and cybersecurity communities as a major obstacle to improving space cybersecurity. Space professionals tend to resist being told how to manage their systems, while cyber professionals may apply terrestrial rules without understanding the unique constraints of space operations.

Dr. Pace described himself as 'a space guy, not a cyber guy' and noted there is 'a giant cultural chasm between those communities,' with space people resisting being told what to do with their satellites and cyber people insisting on certain practices . He also noted that many satellite operators still transmit telemetry in clear text, suggesting a lack of basic cyber awareness in the space community .

Dr. Pace emphasises that cyber threats to space systems are not hypothetical but have already been demonstrated in practice. The threat landscape spans a wide spectrum of sophistication, from amateur actors seeking to cause mischief to highly capable nation-state adversaries.

Dr. Pace noted that threats range from subtle actions like inserting malicious code to blunt methods like jamming and RF interference seen in the GPS domain and over conflict zones , and that perpetrators range from hobbyists to sophisticated nation-state actors . He stressed that these threats are not hypothetical .

Dr. Pace highlights that a surprisingly large number of satellite systems transmit their telemetry, tracking, and control data in unencrypted clear text, representing one of the most basic and easily exploitable security failures in the space sector. This reflects a broader culture of security through obscurity that pervades parts of the space industry.

Dr. Pace expressed amazement at the number of satellite systems that still transmit in clear text, using the vivid analogy that 'it's raining data, go out and get a bowl, and here it is' . He also noted that many space operators still rely on security through obscurity, assuming no one will pay attention to them .

Dr. Pace outlines a set of foundational technical recommendations for improving space cybersecurity, beginning with basic measures such as encrypting telemetry data and progressing to more sophisticated approaches like hardware-anchored secure boot and network segmentation. These measures form the baseline from which more advanced resilience strategies can be built.

Dr. Pace recommended strong cryptography on telemetry, tracking, and control , hardware-anchored secure boot processes , multi-factor authentication , and network segmentation to prevent unrestricted lateral movement across systems .

Because satellites are far from Earth and only intermittently in contact with ground stations, they cannot rely on external monitoring for security. Dr. Pace argues that satellites must therefore be equipped with autonomous intrusion detection capabilities that allow them to assess their own operational state and identify potentially malicious commands.

Dr. Pace explained that because satellites are far from Earth and have intermittent contact, an autonomous intrusion detection system becomes important . He gave the example that if a satellite receives a command to perform a re-entry burn when it should be cruising to Mars, it should be able to recognise that something is wrong .

Dr. Pace advocates for a shift in how cybersecurity success is measured in the space domain, moving away from the goal of preventing all intrusions towards measuring how quickly a system can detect, respond to, and recover from an attack. This zero-trust approach assumes that breaches will occur and focuses on minimising their impact and duration.

Dr. Pace stated that the measure of goodness is not the time between attacks but rather the time it takes to resolve an attack and restore the system . He referenced zero-trust architectures as an approach that assumes penetration will occur .

Dr. Pace identifies post-quantum cryptography migration as a particularly complex challenge for space systems, compounded by the difficulty of distributing cryptographic keys to satellites. There is a tension between implementing strong cryptographic systems and the risk that radiation-induced memory corruption could render a satellite permanently inoperable if it cannot be physically accessed for recovery.

Dr. Pace noted that key distribution in space is far more difficult than on the ground , and that if a strong cryptographic system is in place and radiation corrupts memory or storage, the satellite could become a 'brick' with no means of recovery since it cannot be physically accessed . He described this as a design challenge requiring careful balancing of agility and resilience .

Dr. Pace observes that there is no comprehensive international treaty or binding legal framework specifically addressing space cybersecurity. In the absence of such instruments, governments must rely on national licensing regimes, regulatory requirements, and procurement standards to drive improved security practices among satellite operators.

Dr. Pace stated that at the international level, treaty law is 'pretty silent' on space cybersecurity , and identified national licensing, regulation, and procurement as the primary tools available . He also noted the European Union's proposed Space Act as an example of regional regulatory effort, albeit a controversial one .

Dr. Pace describes a diverse ecosystem of standards organisations working on space cybersecurity, ranging from highly technical engineering bodies like IEEE to intergovernmental organisations like ITU. Each body brings different stakeholder interests and operates with different levels of authority, creating a complex but evolving standards landscape.

Dr. Pace described IEEE as very technically focused with engineers solving problems , ISO as incorporating national inputs and priorities , and ITU as having a voting structure with national representation . He noted that standards range from non-binding norms to detailed technical standards .

Drawing on his experience in ITU spectrum negotiations, Dr. Pace argues that there is a natural alignment of interests between countries that operate space systems and developing nations that depend on those systems for their infrastructure. This shared interest can serve as a basis for building international cooperation on space cybersecurity.

Dr. Pace recounted his experience working on ITU spectrum issues, where developing countries supported space system interests because their own infrastructure depended on systems like GPS and satellite communications . He drew a parallel to cybersecurity, arguing that both space-capable and space-dependent nations share a common interest in securing these systems .

Dr. Pace recommends that governments treat space cybersecurity as an integral component of their broader national cybersecurity strategies rather than a niche concern for the space sector alone. He also advocates for using the practical tools of procurement requirements and licensing conditions to incentivise better security practices across the industry.

Among his recommendations for governments, Dr. Pace listed integrating space into national cyber strategies rather than keeping it separate, and using licensing and procurement as levers for inducing better security behaviour . He also recommended international consultations through mechanisms including ITU and investing in the workforce .

Dr. Pace argues that one of the most important and underappreciated roles in space cybersecurity policymaking is that of the translator — someone who can bridge the communication gaps between technical engineers, lawyers, and financial professionals. Each community operates with its own assumptions and vocabulary, and misunderstandings between them impede effective policy development.

Dr. Pace told his students that 'a lot of what policymaking is is a translation function,' explaining things across technical, legal, and financial communities that all believe they are speaking the same language but are not . He also noted the cultural divide between space and cyber communities as a specific example of this broader challenge .

Dr. Pace explains that because 3GPP governs the standards for billions of mobile devices, its non-terrestrial network standards are becoming the de facto security baseline for satellite-mobile convergence. These standards are now being extended to cover new direct-to-device and LEO satellite systems, creating both opportunities and challenges for the space cybersecurity community.

Dr. Pace confirmed that de facto security standards are being driven by 3GPP through its non-terrestrial network standards, given the scale of billions of devices governed by these standards . He noted that these standards are being extended to integrate direct-to-device and LEO systems .

Dr. Pace identifies a three-way architectural challenge in the convergence of satellite and mobile networks: reconciling the 3GPP non-trusted network model with the large installed base of proprietary satellite systems, while also preparing for future delay-tolerant networking architectures designed for deep space communications. Navigating these three layers simultaneously is a significant technical and governance challenge.

Dr. Pace described the challenge of moving from the 3GPP non-trusted network reality, through existing proprietary installed systems in LEO and geostationary orbit, to future delay-tolerant networking using bundle protocols, which he described as an overlay network . He also mentioned the possibility of a separate lecture on solar system internet as an illustration of the complexity involved .

Dr. Pace points to the upcoming World Radiocommunication Conference 2027 as a critical juncture for the future of security protocols in converged satellite-mobile environments. The decisions made there around direct-to-device communications will have downstream implications for what security measures can practically be implemented.

Dr. Pace advised the audience to look for developments at WRC-27 as direct-to-device discussions occur, because these will affect the environment for security protocols that are going to be implementable .

Alexandre Vallet argues that because satellite communications were historically a niche market, they did not attract significant attention from cybersecurity specialists. This has led to a tendency to simply replicate terrestrial cybersecurity approaches when addressing space cybersecurity, which he considers a mistake given the fundamental differences of the space domain.

Vallet noted that historically, space cybersecurity was not attractive for cybersecurity specialists because satellite communications were a niche market , and that there is now a tendency to replicate terrestrial cybersecurity approaches too much, which he characterised as a mistake .

Vallet identifies the primary role of research institutions in space cybersecurity as bringing clarity to the concepts being discussed and establishing a common language that can underpin policy conversations. Without this conceptual foundation, he argues, policy discussions risk being built on misunderstandings or misaligned assumptions.

Vallet stated that the most important and urgent role of research institutes is to bring clarity to the concepts being discussed , and that a common language and framework are needed to address the specificities of space cybersecurity in policy conversations . He cited Dr. Pace's presentation as an excellent example of this .

Vallet highlights that the space industry's long-standing preference for proprietary, bespoke solutions creates a cultural barrier to the adoption of common cybersecurity standards. He argues that the research and academic community has an important role to play in shifting this culture towards standardised approaches.

Vallet noted that the space industry has historically been very keen on proprietary solutions, and that adopting common standards on space cybersecurity will be a cultural challenge . He argued that researchers and academics can help change this culture and move the industry towards standardised cybersecurity protocols .

Hunter argues that the standard cybersecurity approach of black-boxing a capability to ensure confidentiality and protection is not viable for space assets, which are national security assets with specific operational requirements. This necessitates a unique collaboration between cybersecurity experts and space experts that goes beyond conventional cybersecurity practice.

Hunter stated that cybersecurity will always black-box a capability to ensure it is confidential and protected, but that this is not viable for space assets given their national security status . She argued that this is where the marriage between cybersecurity experts and space experts needs to come together .

Hunter identifies the ground segment and user segment as the most practically vulnerable parts of the space system architecture. The ground segment's high degree of interconnection creates broad exposure, while the user segment is compromised by human error and poor cybersecurity hygiene.

Hunter described the ground segment as highly interconnected with the greatest risk of attack surface exposure , and the user segment as most at risk because humans are fallible and configure end-user capabilities poorly, with the greatest degree of poor hygiene .

Hunter highlights communication links as a distinct and particularly vulnerable attack surface within the space system architecture, susceptible to both interception of data and disruption of the communications themselves.

Hunter stated that the communications links segment is 'obviously very vulnerable to interception and disruption' .

Hunter characterises space cybersecurity as building upon standard cybersecurity fundamentals rather than replacing them, describing it as 'basics plus plus.' The additional layers required for space include redundancy in communications paths, clear agreements with providers, defined roles and responsibilities, and regular risk and vulnerability assessments.

Hunter agreed with Dr. Pace that space cybersecurity cannot be exactly the same as terrestrial cybersecurity, describing it as 'basics plus plus in space' . She listed recommendations including redundancy and communications path planning, clear agreements with providers, incident response and business continuity plans, clear role definition, and regular risk and vulnerability assessments .

Hunter recommends that international negotiations on space cybersecurity governance should prioritise the development of shared expectations and non-binding norms rather than attempting to create new binding legal instruments. She argues that the flexibility and inclusivity of non-binding norms are better suited to the rapidly evolving nature of the space cybersecurity domain.

Hunter recommended that negotiations continue not to create new legal instruments but to focus on shared expectations and non-binding norms, noting that these offer more flexibility and inclusivity given the fast-moving nature of the domain .

Hunter highlights Australia's decision to formally designate the space sector as critical national infrastructure as a concrete example of how governments can embed space cybersecurity into their national frameworks. This designation brings additional legal protections and obligations that apply to space capabilities.

Hunter stated that under Australia's eleven sectors of critical national infrastructure, the space sector and space capabilities have been designated, giving them additional protections and obligations from a national perspective . She also noted that some of Dr. Pace's recommendations are already embedded in Australia's systems of national significance .

Hunter identifies three distinct diplomatic risks arising from the cross-border nature of space infrastructure: the risk of misunderstanding whether an incident is a cyber attack or a physical accident, the risk of escalation due to differing interpretations, and the risk of delays in detecting, resolving, and recovering from incidents. These risks have real-world implications for international relations.

Hunter described the risk of misunderstanding - whether an incident is a cyber attack or a physical accident - as a key diplomatic risk , noting that this can lead to escalation or different government responses . She referenced the Viasat incident as an example of different interpretations of standards, norms, and law playing out . She also identified the risk of delay in detection, resolution, and resilience-building as a third diplomatic risk .

Hunter argues that the cybersecurity community already has well-established coordination mechanisms for sharing information and responding to incidents, but that these need to be connected to the space community. The challenge is not creating new mechanisms but rather integrating existing ones with the space sector.

Hunter noted that at the global level, computer emergency response teams understand tactical and operational information sharing during incidents , the International Watch and Warning Network can identify risks , and there is a range of points of contact under global mechanisms . She identified the challenge as 'the glue of how we plug that into the broader space community' .

Hunter emphasises that effective national cybersecurity responses to space-related threats cannot be confined to the space sector alone. The energy and telecommunications sectors are deeply intertwined with space capabilities, and meaningful cybersecurity responses require collaboration across all three sectors.

Hunter stated that the partnership between government and industry is incredibly important and that in Australia it has to be cross-sectoral, bringing together not just the space sector but also the energy and telco sectors when addressing the cybersecurity component .

AlHassan argues that space cybersecurity is distinctive because it intersects with four of the five dimensions that shape cyberspace: geopolitics, economics, social issues, and technical matters. A cyber incident affecting space infrastructure therefore has implications that extend far beyond any single nation, affecting global supply chains, economies, and societies.

AlHassan stated that space cuts across four of the five dimensions shaping cyberspace - geopolitics, economics, social, and technical . He noted that a cyber incident in orbit is not a one-nation issue but an issue of many nations , and that a satellite issue is not just about the satellite but has wider implications for the global economy through supply chains . He also cited connectivity, navigation, and disaster response as social dimensions of space .

AlHassan presents the collaboration between GCF, George Washington University's Space Policy Institute, and ITU as a model for the kind of multi-stakeholder partnership needed to address space cybersecurity effectively. He argues that this partnership bridges the gap between research, policy, and operational expertise.

AlHassan described GCF's partnership with the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University as distinctive because it brings together established space powers and new operators, characterising this bridge-building as a serious response to the challenge . He also outlined GCF's three working methods - strategic initiatives, research, and convening global leaders - as the basis for this collaboration .

AlHassan explains that GCF's mandate spans five dimensions of cyberspace, and that space cybersecurity is relevant to four of them, making it a natural and strategically important area of focus for the organisation. This breadth of relevance justifies GCF's investment in space cybersecurity research and collaboration.

AlHassan stated that GCF's work spans five dimensions - geopolitics, economics, social and behavioural, and technical - and that space cuts across four of these . He elaborated on each dimension: geopolitical because space spans borders , economic because of supply chain implications , social because of connectivity and disaster response , and technical because systems must be secure by design and software persists for decades .

The unnamed ITU speaker emphasises that ITU's engagement with the space cybersecurity research initiative is not confined to a single bureau or department but represents a genuinely organisation-wide effort. This breadth of institutional involvement underscores the importance ITU places on this work.

The speaker noted that within ITU, the work is truly collaborative, involving the Radio Communications Bureau headed by Alexandre Vallet, colleagues from the Development Bureau, the Standardisation Bureau, and the Secretary General's office . The speaker described it as 'truly an ITU-wide effort' in supporting the work of George Washington University and GCF .

An audience member raises the question of whether there are concrete examples of cooperation between satellite operators and mobile operators specifically on cybersecurity, in the context of the growing convergence between non-terrestrial networks and mobile systems. This reflects a practical interest in understanding how the industry is operationalising the theoretical frameworks discussed.

The audience member noted the increasing cooperation between satellite operators and mobile operators in the context of NTN and mobile convergence, and asked whether there are any concrete examples of such cooperation specifically in the area of security and cybersecurity .

Bueermann opens the session by noting that space infrastructure is deeply embedded in daily life, but that the regulatory and governance frameworks designed to protect it predate the sophisticated cyber threats we face today. This gap between the age of the frameworks and the current threat landscape is a central motivation for the session.

Bueermann stated that space-based infrastructure underpins far more of daily life than people realise , and that the frameworks governing space communications and technology were written long before the international community had to contend with today's cyber adversaries .

Bueermann observes that there is a growing recognition among international actors of the need to coordinate and communicate about cyber resilience as it applies to space technology. This emerging coordination represents a positive development, though it is still in its early stages.

Bueermann noted that the international community is starting to think about how to coordinate and communicate about what it means to be cyber resilient and cyber secure when it comes to space technology .

Bueermann argues that space-based technologies should be classified and treated as critical infrastructure, a label that is increasingly appropriate given how much other critical sectors depend on space systems. This framing is important for driving appropriate levels of protection and governance attention.

Bueermann introduced the panellists working on cyber resilience for critical infrastructure and stated that space-based technologies are rapidly demanding that label .

Bueermann highlights the collaborative research initiative as an example of the kind of partnership needed to tackle complex, cross-cutting issues like space cybersecurity. The initiative brings together expertise from international organisations, academia, and civil society to examine threats and resilience measures.

Bueermann explained that the foundational questions for the session came from a joint research initiative between GCF, George Washington University's Space Policy Institute, and ITU, working to examine the main cyber threats to space systems and measures to improve their resilience and safety . She expressed gratitude to GCF for supporting the initiative and to Dr. Pace for leading the work .

Bueermann emphasises that addressing space cybersecurity requires a genuinely diverse set of perspectives and expertise, spanning the space sector, the cybersecurity community, and the diplomatic sphere. The composition of the panel itself is presented as a deliberate reflection of this need for diversity.

Bueermann noted the diversity of views represented on the panel, including those approaching the issue from the space perspective, those working on cyber resilience for critical infrastructure, and those engaged in national cybersecurity diplomacy . She framed the session as an attempt to tackle these issues through this diversity of expertise .