High Level Dialogue: Strengthening the Resilience of Telecommunication Submarine Cables

Mr. Lamanauskas emphasised that submarine cables are a critical infrastructure underpinning modern life, carrying the vast majority of international internet traffic. He stressed that economies, societies, and financial systems are deeply dependent on this infrastructure, and that disruptions are felt acutely when cables break.

He noted that submarine cables carry around 99% of international internet traffic , that economies and financial infrastructure depend on them , and that in 2025 alone there were around 180 cable breaks, with simultaneous multiple breaks being particularly impactful .

Mr. Lamanauskas outlined the scale and ambition of the International Advisory Board on Submarine Cable Resilience, which brought together a large number of members and experts over two years. He described the resulting 200-page report as a rich resource that he expects will serve as a definitive handbook for the field.

He explained that the IAB had 42 members (40 plus two co-chairs) and that working groups involved 175 experts from around the world . The working groups examined repair and deployment practices, risk monitoring and identification, and connecting the unconnected . He described the final output as a 200-page report that he believes will become a handbook for the area .

Mr. Lamanauskas used a physical prop — a piece of submarine cable — to illustrate the contrast between the enormous reliance placed on submarine cables and their physical fragility. He argued that this vulnerability makes their protection all the more urgent.

He referenced the physical piece of CWI-3 lightweight cable brought by Mr. Wrottesley, noting that despite the enormous dependence of economies and societies on submarine cables, they are physically quite thin and therefore do not take much to break .

In response to an audience question about whether an international legal approach should be pursued, Mr. Lamanauskas noted that the current focus has been on implementing existing frameworks and sharing best practices. He acknowledged that the question of whether legal frameworks need strengthening is ultimately one for member states and legal professionals to consider.

He noted that the UN Department of the Law of the Sea is an observer to the IAB , and that results have been presented to bodies such as the International Seabed Authority and the IMO . He also referenced a 19th-century treaty on telegraph cable protection that some countries still apply , while clarifying that the IAB report's direct focus was on implementation and best practice rather than legal reform .

Dr. Tijani argued that in an increasingly networked world, systems must not merely withstand stress but learn from it — a concept he described as anti-fragility. He contended that as reliance on connectivity and intelligent systems deepens, the responsibility to ensure cable resilience becomes ever more critical.

He invoked the concept of anti-fragility, arguing that fragile systems give way under stress and that the world must instead learn from disruptions . He warned that the more the world becomes connected and dependent on intelligent systems, the greater the consequences of a major cable cut .

Dr. Tijani expressed strong personal enthusiasm for the IAB report, describing it as a stellar piece of work that will shape how countries think about connectivity. He also noted that the advisory body's approach could serve as a broader model for resilience thinking beyond submarine cables.

He stated that he personally believes the IAB will become a model for resilience generally , and referenced ITU's related report with Science Pool on 'when digital fails', noting that many countries are not ready for digital system failures . He described the report as a masterpiece that every country should use to create action .

Dr. Tijani drew on his personal experience during the West Africa cable cuts of March 2024 to illustrate the lack of governmental preparedness. He admitted that as a minister he was largely clueless about what to do and that existing frameworks left the response largely to cable owners, without adequate government coordination.

He described the cable cut on 14 March 2024 affecting several cables including the Main One cable , and admitted that as a minister he was 'totally clueless' on what to do to support the response . He noted that cables were often treated as private property, leaving government without a clear role, even though the economic impact extended far beyond cable owners .

Dr. Tijani highlighted that in Nigeria, cable landing previously required clearance from multiple agencies, creating significant delays and costs. He argued that streamlined, government-coordinated processes are essential to reducing these barriers.

He recounted that for a recent cable landing in Nigeria, companies had to approach multiple agencies for different clearances, but because they came to his ministry first, a presidential directive was obtained that aligned all agencies, enabling the fastest cable landing in the country's history . He noted that every additional day spent in the process represents a cost to the companies .

Dr. Tijani used Nigeria's experience with a recent cable landing as a concrete example of how effective government coordination can dramatically accelerate processes. He argued that this demonstrates the critical enabling role that government can play when it acts proactively.

He described how, when a cable company came to his ministry first, he was able to secure a presidential directive that aligned all relevant agencies, resulting in the fastest cable landing in Nigeria's history . He contrasted this with the previous situation where companies had to navigate multiple agencies independently .

Dr. Tijani argued that ITU has a vital role in supporting governments to develop the right enabling environment and protocols for submarine cable resilience. He contended that when governments act clearly and decisively, it attracts private investment and benefits both businesses and society.

He cited Nigeria's declaration of telecommunications infrastructure as critical national infrastructure, which he said led to over one billion dollars of private investment within six months . He argued that ITU should support governments to take the right action and put the right protocols in place, enabling nations to attract investment .

Dr. Tijani argued that governments must move beyond passive observation and take an active, clearly defined role in submarine cable resilience. He stressed that this is not about controlling business but about creating the enabling environment that allows businesses and society to thrive.

He argued that government's role is to put the right enabling environment in place, not to control businesses , and that every nation should have a clear plan on the role of government . He warned that if government is soft about its role, it is businesses and society that will suffer .

Prof. Maximiano emphasised that submarine cables must be understood as infrastructure with implications far beyond telecommunications, encompassing economic, security, and development dimensions. She argued that protecting them requires action across multiple fronts.

She stated that as infrastructure carrying more than 99% of international data traffic, submarine cables are fundamental to digital economies and societies , and that protecting them is an economic, security, and development priority . She outlined the need for greater diversity and redundancy, sustained investment, streamlined regulatory procedures, and best practices for risk prevention .

Prof. Maximiano described the IAB's work as a journey from awareness to action, emphasising that the focus must now shift to transforming recommendations into operational preparedness. She stressed that this means establishing clear responsibilities, improving coordination, and ensuring countries can respond, repair, and recover quickly.

She described the IAB's work as a transition 'from awareness to action' and 'from paper to practice' , noting that the board identified challenges, exchanged global experience, and developed practical recommendations . She emphasised that shared responsibility now lies in transforming those recommendations into operational preparedness, including clear responsibilities and improved coordination .

Prof. Maximiano argued that resilience is inherently a multi-stakeholder challenge and that no single actor can achieve it alone. She stressed that governments, regulators, industry, international organisations, the technical community, and academia all have essential roles to play.

She stated that perhaps the most important lesson from the advisory body is that resilience cannot be achieved by a single stakeholder acting alone , and that governments, regulators, industry, international organisations, the technical community, and academia all have a role to play .

Prof. Maximiano drew on Portugal's experience as an Atlantic gateway to illustrate that geographic advantage comes with significant responsibility. She argued that resilience must be designed into infrastructure from the outset and that cooperation among stakeholders must be established before incidents occur.

She noted that around 25% of submarine cables pass through Portugal's exclusive economic zone, positioning the country as a technological hub but also giving it greater responsibility . She cited the Atlantic Cam cable connecting Portugal with Madeira and Azores as an example of resilience built by design through a ring topology . She also highlighted national exercises involving regulators, operators, the Navy, and other public authorities as an example of cooperation before incidents occur .

Prof. Maximiano argued that the most critical next step is implementation — moving beyond documentation to concrete action. She identified investment, capacity building, better governance, and regulatory certainty as the key pillars of this transition.

She called for investment not only in deploying more cables and repair capacity, but also in capacity building to have the right people in the right places . She stressed the need for better governance and greater regulatory certainty, explaining that effective regulation provides clarity, predictability, and cooperation throughout the lifecycle of submarine cable systems . She also called for more harmonised protocols and regulatory harmonisation across jurisdictions .

Mr. Wrottesley, representing the ICPC as ITU's partner in the IAB work, expressed strong endorsement of the collaborative process and the resulting report. He emphasised the importance of moving towards implementation and recommended that all stakeholders engage carefully with the report.

He stated that from the ICPC's perspective, the collaboration to produce the report and work with all stakeholders involved was fantastic . Unlike Mr. Lamanauskas, he noted that he had read every word of the report several times , and strongly recommended that everybody take note of it and look towards implementation .

Mr. Chin explained that Singapore's unique geographic situation as a small island nation in a region of 700 million people makes submarine cable connectivity existentially important. He argued that this context drives Singapore's proactive and comprehensive approach to cable resilience.

He described Singapore as a small island in Southeast Asia, fundamentally sea-locked, where the surrounding waters are largely part of neighbouring countries' waters . He noted that Singapore put out a digital connectivity blueprint in 2023 with an ambition to double the number of cables from 26 within 10 years, and that they are currently just over 30 cables .

Mr. Chin outlined Singapore's comprehensive policy and regulatory approach to submarine cable resilience, which combines fit-for-purpose legislation, spatial planning, and streamlined administrative processes. He highlighted the importance of a whole-of-government approach with a single coordinating body.

He described how Singapore ensures individual laws such as the Telecommunications Act, Maritime and Port Authority Act, and Merchant Shipping Act contain sufficient provisions for subsea cables, including requirements for cables to be buried to 4 to 12 metres depth . He noted that IMDA acts as a single point of contact for cable deployment applications , and that the Maritime Port Authority commits to responding to cable repair applications within three to five working days, reduced from one week .

Mr. Chin argued that effective cable resilience management requires governments to coordinate internally and present a unified interface to industry. He emphasised that applicants should not have to navigate multiple agencies and that back-end coordination is the government's responsibility.

He explained that IMDA acts as the single point of contact in the Singapore government for cable deployment applications, coordinating with all other relevant agencies at the back end , so that cable owners and operators only need to reach out to one body . He also noted that the Maritime Port Authority serves as the single point of contact for cable repair applications .

Mr. Chin identified three distinct but equally important roles for international organisations in advancing submarine cable resilience: building awareness, advocating for the issues, and convening the right people for productive dialogue. He argued that the IAB report itself demonstrates these roles in action.

He stated that international organisations can play key roles in awareness building, advocacy, and bringing their convening power to bear - getting the right people into the right room to have the right conversations . He cited the International Advisory Board and its report as a demonstration of these roles .

Mr. Chin argued that the most important immediate step for governments is to achieve internal coordination before engaging with external partners. He stressed that from the perspective of citizens and businesses, government must appear and act as a unified entity.

He argued that when working with partners outside government - whether citizens or businesses - they do not see individual regulators or ministries but the government as a whole . He therefore argued it is incumbent on governments to be as coordinated as possible internally and to bring that coordination to their interactions with the private sector .

Mr. Chin argued that industry's most important contribution is to do what it does best — innovate and bring new solutions — while also developing capability in partner organisations. He highlighted repair capacity and technology as particularly important areas for industry focus.

He stated that the most important thing for industry is to continue to innovate, bring new solutions and technologies to bear that can enhance submarine cable resilience , and to develop capability in partners, for example in terms of repair capacity, repair capability, and technology in repair vessels .

Mr. Kim used the example of Tonga's 2022 volcanic eruption and subsequent cable damage to illustrate the disproportionate impact that cable failures can have on small island economies. He argued that advancing resilience and inclusion in submarine cable infrastructure is crucial for all, but especially for small economies.

He cited the 2022 volcanic eruption in Tonga, where damage to a single cable resulted in near-total digital isolation for 61 days and affected $182 million in GDP, representing 39% of Tonga's total GDP .

Mr. Kim described the World Bank's participation in the IAB, particularly in leading Working Group 3 on fostering connectivity and geographic diversity. He argued that this work identified critical gaps and market failures that need to be addressed through concrete measures.

He noted that the World Bank led Working Group 3 on fostering connectivity and geographic diversity , and that the group found advancing resilience and inclusion in submarine cable infrastructure for small economies to be crucial . He identified market failure and gaps as a starting point for concrete measures .

Mr. Kim presented stark statistics on the scale of the cable outage problem and the inadequacy of the current repair fleet. He argued that the situation is deteriorating, with repair times more than doubling as the fleet ages and demand increases.

He stated that between 150 to 200 outages occur every year globally, with 80% caused by human maritime activities . He noted that there are only roughly 70 repair vessels, of which only 20 to 25 are dedicated long-term repair vessels, and a significant share of the fleet is over 30 years old . As a result, average repair time has increased from around 20 days to more than 50 days .

Mr. Kim argued that governments have a specific and important role in establishing the strategic and regulatory frameworks that enable resilient submarine cable infrastructure. He emphasised the importance of geographic diversity, multiple landing points, and pro-competition policies.

He stated that from the government perspective, adopting clear national and regional strategies and implementation plans is really important, which requires geographic diversity consideration, multiple landing points, open access policy, and pro-competition regimes .

Mr. Kim argued that submarine cable infrastructure must be understood as a public good, with the implication that its resilience cannot be left to any single actor. He called for greater public investment and collective international action to address the challenges.

He stated that submarine cable infrastructure must be seen as a public good and public infrastructure, and that no single country, individual, or private sector actor can fix it alone . He called for more attention and public investment for resilience and measures to quickly fix affected facilities and cables .

Mr. Kim argued that resilience must be embedded in the commercial models of private operators from the very beginning of project design. He stressed that development finance institutions and other stakeholders must push back on models that do not adequately account for resilience.

He stated that integrating resilience into commercial models is really important for private operators, and that if they cannot fully embrace safe and resilient measures from the beginning, stakeholders must keep pushing back and telling the private sector that it is not the right model . He also noted the importance of bringing stakeholders to the table early at the design stage to unlock resilient and inclusive project scope .

Mr. Kim outlined the World Bank's concrete commitments to advancing submarine cable resilience, including increased investment, de-risking mechanisms, and support for country-level vulnerability assessments. He emphasised the importance of designing resilience into projects from the outset.

He stated that the World Bank will invest more and consider more resilient approaches for submarine cables, including in Africa and West Africa through the West African integration programme . He described plans to bring de-risking mechanisms such as guarantee platforms or public grants to enable private sector investment , and to support country-level vulnerability diagnosis and bankable, resilient project design from the beginning .

Ms. Jun Xian explained that the industry has developed targeted risk mitigation strategies in route planning, proactively steering clear of high-risk areas. She highlighted the development of alternative routes, particularly to bypass the geopolitically sensitive Red Sea.

She noted that in route planning, developers proactively avoid high-risk zones including fishing grounds, anchorage areas, shipping lanes, seismic belts, and congested choke points such as the Strait of Malacca and the Red Sea . She cited new Eurasia cable systems that have adopted alternative Middle Eastern routes passing through Saudi Arabia or Oman via terrestrial routes to bypass the Red Sea .

Ms. Jun Xian identified geopolitical risks and congested maritime choke points as significant sources of vulnerability for submarine cable routes. She argued that these risks are driving the development of alternative routing strategies.

She cited the Red Sea and the Strait of Malacca as examples of congested choke points with significant geopolitical risks , and noted that new Eurasia cable systems have been developed with alternative routes to bypass the Red Sea for geopolitical reasons .

Ms. Jun Xian described how the industry designs new submarine cable systems with built-in resilience through multiple landing stations, diversified deployment, and network redundancy. She argued that this approach effectively mitigates the risk of single-point failures disrupting international services.

She explained that each submarine cable system is designed with multiple landing stations, each interconnecting with various independent cable systems, and that cross-border circuits and customer services are evenly distributed across diverse cable systems . She also noted that landing stations have dedicated backup resources reserved for service restoration in the event of a cable outage , and that by embracing diversified deployment and network redundancy, operators can effectively mitigate disruptions caused by single-point failures .

Ms. Jun Xian commended the IAB's work in producing a comprehensive set of measures and policy guidelines that reflect the collective aspirations of governments, industry, and international organisations. She argued that these guidelines provide a strong foundation for building a safer and more inclusive global submarine cable network.

She stated that the IAB's hard work has brought together expertise from government, industrial stakeholders, and international organisations, and has developed a full set of measures and policy guidelines reflecting the shared aspiration of all parties to jointly build a safe, reliable, and inclusive global submarine cable network .

Ms. Jun Xian argued that the top priority for the next five years must be the adoption and full implementation of the IAB's recommendations by all governments and industry enterprises. She contended that only through concrete implementation and deep cooperation can the key pain points in submarine cable resilience be resolved.

She stated that from the carrier and industry point of view, the top priority must be to encourage all governments and industrial enterprises worldwide to actively adopt and fully implement all the guiding recommendations put forward by the IAB . She argued that only through concrete implementation and deep pragmatic cooperation between government and industry can barriers such as lengthy approval timelines, insufficient geographic diversity, and imbalanced regional resources be resolved .

Mr. Mills emphasised the United States' deep reliance on undersea cables for economic, security, and digital purposes. He argued that cables are critical infrastructure that require the attention and care of both governments and industry.

He stated that the United States relies on undersea cables for economic growth, security, national security, and its digital future . He noted that the world is increasingly aware that undersea cables are how citizens connect, how trillions of dollars in transactions are performed daily, and how the internet empowers future innovators .

Mr. Mills argued that governments have a distinct and important role in communicating their priorities to industry, ensuring legal accountability for cable breaks, and creating a secure environment in which industry can operate and innovate. He stressed that industry and government have different but complementary priorities.

He argued that industry knows the operational details of cable maintenance better than government, but that government must communicate back what its priorities are, since industry may not fully understand them . He also noted that governments are more concerned about cause and legal accountability for cable breaks, and that these should be investigated through transparent processes with due process .

Mr. Mills argued that industry possesses superior operational knowledge about cable maintenance and continuity, and that governments should focus on enabling industry to act rather than trying to replicate that knowledge. He stressed the importance of creating a trusted environment in which industry can innovate freely.

He stated that industry probably knows the details better than government because it is their job to maintain continuity of operations and to know when cables break and how to repair them as quickly as possible . He argued that industry must be unleashed to innovate and make money, while government creates the secure and trusted environment .

Mr. Mills identified information sharing and legal accountability as the two most important contributions governments can make to submarine cable resilience. He argued that these complement industry's operational expertise and create the conditions for a secure and trusted environment.

He stated that a lot of what government can do better involves information sharing and communication of priorities , and that governments are more concerned about cause and legal accountability for cable breaks, which should be investigated through transparent processes with due process .

An audience member raised the question of whether the IAB report and ITU's work should lead to a more formal international legal approach to submarine cable protection. Drawing an analogy with the IPCC's role in generating an advisory opinion on climate change, the speaker asked whether a similar mechanism could be pursued for submarine cables.

The audience member asked whether the report suggests an international constructive legal approach, referencing discussions in New York the previous month about hotspot areas . They drew an analogy with the IPCC, which gave a strong recommendation that resulted in an advisory opinion by the ICJ and ITLOS on climate change, and asked whether ITU is planning to seek a similar advisory opinion .