Building Trust and Protection for Essential Digital Services: From Standards to Deployment

The first Geneva Convention of 1864 established specific protections for medical services in armed conflict, and it was recognised from the outset that a visible emblem was necessary to identify protected entities in complex security environments. This led to the creation of the Red Cross emblem, which later evolved to include the Red Crescent and Red Crystal. These emblems signal to warring parties that the bearer has a medical or humanitarian function and is therefore not a legitimate military target.

Samit D'Cunha traced the origin of the emblem system to the signing of the first Geneva Convention in 1864, which created specific protections for medical services and established the need for a means of identification in armed conflict . He noted that the emblem evolved from a Red Cross on a white armband to use on vehicles and hospital rooftops as conflict and medical services developed .

By the 1970s, it was recognised that visual confirmation of an emblem was no longer sufficient, prompting the development of electromagnetic and light frequency signals standardised through the ITU and the International Civil Aviation Organization. These technical standards were directly incorporated into international humanitarian law through Annex I of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. This precedent demonstrates that technical standards bodies have historically played a role in shaping IHL identification mechanisms.

Samit D'Cunha explained that in the 1970s, working through the ITU and ICAO, electromagnetic radio frequencies and light frequencies were standardised as the Distinctive Signal for identifying specific protections in armed conflict . He confirmed that these standards were incorporated directly into Annex I of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, making them part of international humanitarian law .

Medical services and humanitarian organisations such as the ICRC now depend heavily on digital infrastructure, yet there is no established mechanism to signal their legal protection when that infrastructure is targeted through cyber operations. This creates a significant gap between the existing legal protections under IHL and the practical ability to identify and enforce those protections in the digital domain. The Digital Emblem Project was conceived to address this gap.

Samit D'Cunha noted that cyber operations are a reality of armed conflict and that medical and humanitarian operations depend on digital infrastructure, but that no means currently exists to identify that protection in the digital domain .

While states hold divergent views on many aspects of how IHL applies to cyberspace — such as the definition of 'attack' or whether data constitutes an 'object' — there is clear and broad agreement that the obligation to respect and protect medical services extends to cyber activities. This consensus is reflected in individual state positions, the common European Union and African positions, and most significantly in Resolution 2 adopted at the 2024 International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. The resolution, adopted by 196 states party to the Geneva Conventions, explicitly affirms that this obligation applies to the use of ICTs.

Samit D'Cunha cited over a dozen individual state positions that affirm the obligation to respect and protect medical services in cyberspace , as well as the common EU and African positions . He highlighted Resolution 2 adopted at the 2024 International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, attended by 196 states party to the Geneva Conventions, which in Operative Paragraphs 6 and 7 explicitly states that the obligation to respect and protect applies to the use of ICTs with respect to medical services and humanitarian personnel respectively .

The existing obligation under IHL to respect and protect medical services is broad and unqualified, meaning it applies regardless of the domain — physical, aerial, maritime, outer space, or cyberspace. There is therefore no need to create new legal protections; the challenge is solely one of identification and signalling. The digital emblem is the mechanism by which those pre-existing protections are made visible in the digital domain.

Samit D'Cunha stated that the protection already exists and is broad and unqualified, meaning a party to a conflict cannot unduly interfere with a hospital whether through physical, cyber, or any other means .

The Digital Emblem Project recognises that legal and technical capacity varies significantly across states, and that capacity building is an essential component of ensuring the emblem can be universally implemented. Resolution 2 of the 2024 International Conference explicitly calls on states to provide capacity building to those that need it. National Red Cross and Red Crescent societies are identified as key partners in this process, given their established role in supporting national IHL implementation.

Samit D'Cunha referenced Paragraph 12 of Resolution 2 from the 2024 International Conference, which encourages the ICRC's work on the digital emblem and calls on states to provide capacity building to states that need it, as well as to national societies . He also noted that national societies have historically been essential in building state capacity to implement IHL .

While the British Red Cross and Australian Red Cross have been the first to implement the ADEM prototype on their infrastructure, Samit D'Cunha stressed that the testing group must be broadened to reflect the full diversity of national societies globally. This is essential to ensure that the digital emblem functions effectively in a wide range of technical and operational environments, not just those of well-resourced societies. He noted that the current testing group already includes societies from Asia, Africa, Europe, and South America.

Samit D'Cunha noted that eight national societies are currently part of the testing group, with the British Red Cross and Australian Red Cross being the first to implement the emblem on their infrastructure . He emphasised the need to ensure that testing represents the diversity of national societies across all regions, including Asia, Africa, and South America, and that early adopters should become champions to help others .

Rather than developing entirely new technologies, the digital emblem leverages existing, widely adopted internet technologies such as WebPKI and the Domain Name System (DNS). DNS was selected as the first protocol for serving the emblem because it is already universally used for everyday internet activities such as email and web browsing. This approach ensures compatibility with existing infrastructure and reduces the complexity of deployment.

Mauro Vignati explained that the digital emblem reuses technologies already widely adopted on the internet, specifically mentioning WebPKI and DNS . He noted that DNS was chosen as the first protocol for serving the emblem because it is the protocol used daily for retrieving emails and surfing the web .

Standardisation of the digital emblem's underlying technology is essential because all parties — regardless of region or country — must be able to communicate using the same technological language. Without a common standard, the emblem cannot function reliably across different systems and jurisdictions. Mauro Vignati emphasised that while some of the component technologies are already standardised, they must be packaged and agreed upon in a specific way for the digital emblem.

Mauro Vignati stated that standardisation is very important because everyone must talk the same technological language to enable consistent interaction from different regions and countries . He noted that existing standardised technologies must be packaged in specific ways and that agreement must be reached on exactly which technology supports the digital emblem .

The ADEM prototype, developed in collaboration with ETH Zurich, represents the current state of the digital emblem project and is publicly available for inspection and use. It is being tested with national societies, with the British Red Cross and Australian Red Cross having already deployed it on their domains. A public verification tool is also available online, allowing anyone to test the presence and correct display of the emblem on those domains.

Mauro Vignati confirmed that the ADEM prototype was developed with ETH Zurich and is hosted on a public GitHub repository where anyone can download, inspect, and use the code . He noted that the British Red Cross and Australian Red Cross have already deployed the emblem on their domains, and that a public verification tool is available online to test the presence of the emblem .

Mauro Vignati proposed that the deployment of the digital emblem can be scaled through a cascading model, whereby major national societies that implement the emblem first assist others in doing so. This approach is intended to spread technical knowledge and capability progressively across the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement and beyond. The model relies on early adopters acting as hubs of expertise and support.

Mauro Vignati described how the British and Australian Red Cross were helped to implement and deploy the emblem, and expressed hope that in the future major actors will help others in a cascading effect, spreading knowledge and capability on how to deploy the solution .

The next phase of the Digital Emblem Project involves completing the standardisation process at the ITU and IETF, building on the ADEM prototype that has already been submitted to both bodies. Once a common technological agreement is reached, the emblem will be deployed to entities that are authorised to display it under IHL. The prototype and its code are already publicly available to support transparency and community engagement during this process.

Mauro Vignati outlined that the project is currently in the process of standardising the technology at the ITU and IETF, with the ADEM prototype already submitted to both bodies . He stated that the next steps are to finalise standardisation, reach common agreement on the technology, and then deploy the emblem to authorised entities .

Tommy Jensen argued that the need to signal the existence of IHL protections on a digital asset is perhaps the clearest example of a requirement for interoperability he has encountered. Without standardised protocols, parties on different sides of a conflict would need to manually invent or negotiate bespoke signalling arrangements, which is practically unworkable even if legally required. Standards bodies such as the IETF exist precisely to solve this kind of problem by enabling computers to communicate across the internet without each party having to invent its own solution.

Tommy Jensen noted that the Tallinn Manual requires parties to negotiate signalling arrangements, but observed that in practice this is far more difficult than simply stating it as a requirement . He referenced the role of organisations like the IETF in standardising protocols that allow computers to communicate across the internet, without which the modern web and email would not exist .

Open standardisation through bodies such as the IETF brings together experts from diverse fields who can scrutinise the digital emblem's design and identify vulnerabilities before it is deployed at scale. This peer review process strengthens the security and reliability of the standard in ways that cannot be fully predicted in advance. Tommy Jensen argued that this expert refinement will benefit the emblem for the decades it needs to function.

Tommy Jensen stated that when a standard is brought to the IETF, experts across fields can tear it apart and find flaws before deployment, allowing the standard to be refined . He argued that having experts across areas refine the prototype will make it even better in ways that cannot be predicted, benefiting everyone for the decades to come .

Tommy Jensen argued that solving the digital emblem problem as a purely technical or academic exercise is insufficient if the resulting system cannot be operationally used by non-technical personnel. If medical staff are required to become computer networking experts in order to, for example, remove an emblem from an asset as territory changes hands, the problem has not been practically solved. The role of industry is to productise the standard — creating out-of-the-box solutions that make deployment and management accessible to those who need it.

Tommy Jensen gave the example of medical personnel needing to remove an emblem from an asset as ground is surrendered to an incoming force, arguing that if this requires expertise in computer networking, the problem has not been operationally solved . He identified the role of industry as making the emblem easy to deploy through out-of-the-box solutions that do not require users to be technical experts .

Tommy Jensen stressed that the digital emblem must be designed to function in severely constrained networking environments, including areas with only 2G cellular connectivity. Designing for better connectivity and thereby excluding parties in conflict zones with poor infrastructure is not acceptable, as it would undermine the universality of the protection. The requirement for the emblem to perform in very poor networking conditions must therefore be built into the technical design from the outset.

Tommy Jensen referenced a research group presentation at the IETF where a presenter noted that within Palestine, infrastructure was at one point limited to 2G cellular connectivity . He argued that modern protocol design cannot take for granted better network connectivity, as doing so would exclude parties, which is a non-starter, and that the emblem must be readily deployable anywhere by anyone .

The Blue Shield emblem was established under the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, providing a parallel framework to the Red Cross system for protecting cultural property. Like the Red Cross emblem, the Blue Shield faces the challenge of extending its protective function to the digital domain, where significant cultural heritage now exists. Emma Cunliffe described the Blue Shield's engagement with the ICRC's Digital Emblem Project as an opportunity to address this shared challenge.

Emma Cunliffe explained that the 1954 Hague Convention and its two protocols specify a blue and white shield to be placed on cultural items of great importance to signal their protection during conflicts . She noted that cultural information, archives, and museum collections are now stored digitally, and that some cultural heritage - such as records of destroyed sites like Palmyra or the Berlin Wall - exists only in digital form .

Emma Cunliffe argued that digital cultural heritage — including digitised archives, museum collections, and records of sites that no longer physically exist — deserves the same IHL protections as physical cultural property. The cultural sector has advanced significantly in its use of digital technologies, and the records of a people's history and identity held in digital form are as important as any physical monument. The digital emblem offers a means of signalling this protection in the digital domain.

Emma Cunliffe cited the examples of digital records of destroyed sites such as Palmyra and the Berlin Wall, which no longer exist physically and are preserved only in digital form, as examples of digital cultural heritage deserving protection . She argued that a museum holding the history and identity of a people has records that are protected and deserve the same protections as more physical heritage .

Despite the Hague Convention having been signed by nearly 140 states, the Blue Shield emblem suffers from very low public awareness and inconsistent implementation. Many people do not recognise the emblem or understand its significance. Spot checks of national legislation found fewer than 10 countries that have formally legislated the emblem, and the number of Blue Shields placed on monuments varies enormously across signatory states.

Emma Cunliffe noted that many people still do not know what the Blue Shield is when they see it . She reported that of the 140 states that have signed the Hague Convention, only about 40 to 50 actually place Blue Shields on monuments, with numbers ranging from five to about 40,000, and that spot checks found fewer than 10 countries that legislate the emblem .

A significant policy milestone was achieved when UNESCO member states approved guidelines for the Blue Shield that include recommendations for the use and implementation of the digital emblem. This governmental endorsement represents an important step in building the legitimacy and political support needed to advance the digital emblem for cultural heritage protection. Emma Cunliffe described this as an enormously important step forward.

Emma Cunliffe reported that the UNESCO team supporting the Hague Convention presented guidelines to member states, which were approved and include recommendations for the use and implementation of the digital emblem .

Emma Cunliffe argued that national legislation is a critical step in advancing the Blue Shield's protective function, both for physical and digital heritage. Legislation is needed to define what constitutes digital heritage, to formally recognise the emblem and the places where it is applied, and to establish systems for reporting and managing misuse. Without such legislation, the emblem lacks the legal grounding needed to build trust and prevent abuse.

Emma Cunliffe stated that Blue Shield emblems are not legislated in most countries and that this needs to change to prevent misuse, contrasting this with the Red Cross which is legislated in almost every country . She noted that countries need to identify what they class as digital heritage and that civil society and government institutions are moving faster than government policy and legislation in this area . She also referenced cases of misuse found in Blue Shield's study, noting the need for better systems to manage and support compliance .

Emma Cunliffe highlighted that the cultural heritage sector is fundamentally under-resourced, running largely on passion rather than adequate funding, and that its digital infrastructure is often outdated. Technical know-how is very low outside major institutions, making it unrealistic to expect heritage organisations to implement complex technical solutions without significant support. She therefore welcomed the prospect of standardised, out-of-the-box solutions and emphasised the need for a multi-partner approach involving civil society, governments, international agencies, and funders.

Emma Cunliffe described the heritage sector as one that really runs on love and interest, with technology that is often very old and technical know-how that is very low outside major institutions . She expressed enthusiasm for out-of-the-box standardised solutions that can help people who would not otherwise understand how to apply technical protections . She also described the need for a multi-partner approach involving civil society, NGOs, governments, UNESCO, and funders as the only way to make this work .

Emma Cunliffe argued that deploying the digital emblem for cultural heritage protection at the necessary scale requires a genuinely multi-stakeholder approach, bringing together civil society, NGOs, governments, international agencies such as UNESCO, and major funding bodies. No single actor has the reach, resources, or authority to achieve this alone. She expressed optimism that the level of interest and desire across these communities makes such collaboration achievable.

Emma Cunliffe described a vision in which major funding bodies that fund heritage preservation in crisis areas - which already do significant digitisation work - could become key advocates for the digital emblem and help connect heritage organisations with their governments . She concluded that a multi-partner approach of civil society, NGOs, governments, UNESCO, and funders is the only way to make this work, but expressed hope given the strong interest and desire she observed .

Joelle Rizk provided the framing context for the session, explaining that the Digital Emblem Project has progressed from Phase 1 — which involved discussions around formulation, elaboration, and development — to Phase 2, which involves prototype testing and demonstration. A significant milestone was the demo held at CERN the day before the session, attended by ICRC colleagues, industry stakeholders, and others. This transition marks a concrete step towards translating IHL protections into the digital domain.

Joelle Rizk described attending the CERN event the previous day to launch Phase 2 of the digital emblem project, which involved a prototype demonstration . She explained that Phase 2 represents a move from discussions around formulation and elaboration to actual testing and demonstration of technical solutions .

Joelle Rizk closed the session by emphasising the real-world stakes of the Digital Emblem Project, noting that cyberattacks on medical services during armed conflict can have life-or-death consequences for civilians. Similarly, attacks on humanitarian databases can obstruct the delivery of protection services, including the tracing of missing persons. These consequences underscore the urgency and importance of developing a reliable digital emblem.

Joelle Rizk stated that an attack against a medical service in cyberspace during armed conflict could mean life and death to civilians . She also noted that an attack against a humanitarian organisation's database could hinder the delivery of protection services, including finding people who have gone missing .

Joelle Rizk summarised the Digital Emblem Project's core purpose as making existing IHL protections visible, detectable, and verifiable in the context of cyber operations during armed conflict. While the project is technically and legally complex — requiring the combination of legal norms with technical standards — its fundamental aim is straightforward. She characterised it as an ambitious yet complex project with a simple underlying purpose.

Joelle Rizk stated that the project's purpose is to make international humanitarian law protections visible, detectable, and verifiable in cyber operations during armed conflict . She described it as a very ambitious yet very complex project that combines legal norms and technical standards .

The audience member raised a concern about the unequal capacity of different countries to implement the digital emblem, noting that even in developed countries the technical capacity to implement such solutions is not uniform. The situation is considerably worse in developing countries and in countries currently experiencing armed conflict, where the need for protection is most acute. She questioned how the project addresses these disparities from both a legal and technical perspective.

The audience member noted that while health infrastructure is legally protected in many countries, this has not translated into digital protection in most of them . She observed that even in developed countries, the capacity to implement the proposed solutions is not uniform, and that the impact is even worse in developing countries and conflict zones .