9th meeting - Plenary Session

The Philippines argues that capacity building is not merely one pillar among equals but rather the foundational enabler that makes all other pillars of the UN framework functional. Without it, states cannot effectively implement international law, operationalise voluntary norms, develop confidence-building measures, or participate in institutional dialogue.

The Philippines explicitly stated that capacity building 'is not a stand-alone pillar, but an enabler of all five pillars, strengthening the ability of states to implement international law, operationalize the voluntary norms, develop confidence-building measures, and participate effectively in regular institutional dialogue' .

The Philippines contends that effective capacity building must be grounded in the specific needs and priorities of recipient states, rather than being imposed from outside or delivered as isolated interventions. The goal should be to build enduring institutional, legal, technical, operational, and policy capabilities.

The Philippines stated that effective capacity building 'is most impactful when it is demand-driven, nationally owned, sustainable, and responsive to nationally identified priorities' and should 'empower states to develop enduring institutional, legal, technical, operational, and policy capabilities rather than provide one-time assistance' .

The Philippines highlights its national efforts to build a robust cybersecurity ecosystem through multiple investment streams and international partnerships. It specifically recognises UNIDIR's contributions through workshops and technical engagements that have strengthened national expertise.

The Philippines noted it 'continues to strengthen its cybersecurity ecosystem through investments in institutional development, workforce capacity, the protection of critical information infrastructure, and international cooperation' , and recognised 'the valuable contributions of UNIDIR, whose workshops and technical engagements have strengthened national expertise and supported the Philippines' effective participation in international discussions on ICT security' .

The Philippines highlights a concrete example of gender-inclusive capacity building through the ITU Academy's HERS CyberTrack programme, which is enabling Filipino women professionals to strengthen their expertise in cyber policy and diplomacy. This initiative is presented as contributing to both national technical capacity and broader participation in international cyber policy discussions.

The Philippines noted that 'through the ITU Academy's HERS CyberTrack program, three Filipino women cybersecurity policy professionals representing three government agencies are participating in the cyber policy and diplomacy track, strengthening national technical expertise and supporting sustainable capacity development while broadening participation in international cyber policy discussions' .

The Philippines argues that regional organisations play a vital complementary role in the global capacity building architecture by contextualising global commitments to regional realities and enabling peer learning. This positions regional bodies as essential intermediaries between global frameworks and national implementation.

The Philippines stated that 'regional organizations can make valuable contributions by identifying regional priorities, coordinating technical cooperation, and facilitating peer learning among member states' .

The Philippines acknowledges the valuable role that non-state actors can play in supplementing national capacity building efforts, while emphasising that such contributions must remain consistent with the intergovernmental nature of the UN mechanism. This reflects a balanced approach to multi-stakeholder engagement.

The Philippines noted that 'the expertise of the private sector, industry, academia, and the technical community can complement national efforts by contributing operational knowledge and practical experience, consistent with the agreed modalities of the UN' mechanism 'and while fully respecting its state-led nature' .

Indonesia asserts that capacity building is not peripheral but central to the entire global mechanism, arguing that without adequate capacity, none of the other pillars can be effectively implemented. This reflects the view that technical and institutional readiness is a prerequisite for meaningful participation in global cyber governance.

Indonesia stated that it 'reaffirms that capacity building is a cornerstone of global cyber stability and a priority for the global mechanisms' and that 'without adequate capacity, implementations of all pillars of the global mechanisms would be difficult to achieve' .

Indonesia emphasises that capacity building must adhere to core principles that protect the sovereignty and agency of recipient states, particularly developing countries. The explicit rejection of political conditionalities reflects concern that capacity building should not be used as a tool of geopolitical influence.

Indonesia underscored 'that capacity building must be demand-driven, sustainable, inclusive, and free from political conditionalities in order to bridge digital divides and ensure that all states can safely and securely seize the benefits of digital technologies' .

Indonesia points to ASEAN's regional cybersecurity strategy as a concrete example of how tailored, long-term regional programmes can effectively build both national and collective resilience. This is presented as a model that respects national priorities while fostering sustained regional cooperation.

Indonesia noted that 'ASEAN's capacity-building ecosystems, as reflected in ASEAN's Cybersecurity Cooperation Strategy for 2026-2030, demonstrate how tailored long-term programs can strengthen national and regional resilience' and highlight 'the importance of partnerships that respect national priorities and build capabilities that endure' .

Indonesia envisions the global mechanism and its dedicated thematic groups as a central coordination platform that can efficiently connect states' capacity building needs with available resources. This hub model would help avoid duplication and ensure equitable access to assistance.

Indonesia stated that it 'believes that the global mechanisms, including through DTGs, could serve as a hub for coordinating capacity-building efforts, matching needs with resources, and ensuring that existence is accessible to all member states' , and identified specific priority areas including 'critical information infrastructure protections, cyber crisis management, and strengthening the capacity of CERT and C-CERT' .

Indonesia proposes specific thematic priorities for the dedicated thematic group on capacity building, focusing on practical operational areas that directly affect states' ability to protect their digital infrastructure and respond to cyber incidents. These priorities reflect Indonesia's view of the most urgent capacity gaps.

Indonesia identified 'capacity-building areas that are important to consider, including critical information infrastructure protections, cyber crisis management, and strengthening the capacity of CERT and C-CERT' as priorities for the DTGs .

The African Union Commission frames capacity building not merely as a technical activity but as a strategic investment that serves both digital development and broader peace and security objectives. This framing connects cybersecurity capacity to the AU's continental initiative to silence the guns in Africa.

The African Union Commission stated that 'capacity building is a strategic investment in digital development' and 'represents an essential lever for consolidating international peace and security in cyberspace in accordance with the objectives of the Continental Initiative aiming to silence the guns in Africa' .

The African Union Commission argues that capacity building must go beyond short-term technical assistance to become a sustainable investment that builds lasting institutional resilience. It specifically emphasises the dual imperatives of gender equality and youth empowerment as integral to this vision.

The African Union Commission stated that 'capacity building must be conceived as a sustainable investment, an investment in resilient institutions, this while promoting gender equality and while giving young Africans the knowledge and skills that they need to become innovative actors and to work in cybersecurity' and to 'ensure the digital transformation of the continent in accordance with the aspirations of Agenda 2063' .

The African Union Commission specifically highlights gender equality and youth empowerment as central pillars of its approach to cybersecurity capacity building. This reflects the AU's broader development agenda under Agenda 2063, which envisions an inclusive digital transformation of the continent.

The African Union Commission emphasised that capacity building must promote 'gender equality and while giving young Africans the knowledge and skills that they need to become innovative actors and to work in cybersecurity' and to ensure 'the digital transformation of the continent in accordance with the aspirations of Agenda 2063' .

Kuwait frames capacity building as the practical mechanism through which the principle of sovereign equality can be realised in the context of the global mechanism. Without adequate capacity, smaller or less technically advanced states cannot participate on equal terms with more developed nations.

Kuwait stated that it 'attaches particular importance to capacity building as a practical mean of enabling all states to participate meaningfully on an equal footing in the work of the global mechanism' and that 'capacity building cuts across all pillars of our work requires a holistic approach and must be accelerated in light of rapid development in the digital landscape' .

Kuwait proposes a concrete addition to the global ICT security portal in the form of a voluntary scenario-based module that would help states develop common understanding of how international law applies to ICT activities. This tool would organise voluntary state views on legal questions without determining correct interpretations or replacing intergovernmental negotiations.

Kuwait welcomed 'India's important commitment to supporting the establishment and operationalization of the global portal' and proposed 'the development of a voluntary scenario-based capacity building module on international law and the use of ICT within the global portal' , noting that the tool 'could not determine whether interpretation is correct, rank national position, or replace intergovernmental negotiations' but would 'organize voluntary views, clarify the reasoning behind different approaches' .

Thailand asserts that capacity building is not optional but indispensable for addressing malicious cyber activities and building resilience across all states, particularly developing countries. It should be central to collective efforts and aligned with the OEWG's principles of sustainability, inclusivity, and neutrality.

Thailand stated that it 'recognizes that capacity building is indispensable in mitigating malicious cyber activities and strengthening cyber resilience' and that 'capacity building should remain a central pillar of our collective efforts, enabling all states, particularly developing countries, to address the challenges and opportunities presented by emerging technologies' .

Thailand emphasises that capacity building efforts must be customised to the specific needs and circumstances of each state rather than applying a uniform approach. This principle of tailoring is linked to respect for national sovereignty and the recognition that different states have different starting points and priorities.

Thailand stated that 'while strengthening cyber resilience to be effective, such efforts must be need-based, tailored to national priorities and responsive to national capacities' , and supported 'the operationalization of the capacity building principle to ensure a sustainable, inclusive, and neutral approach to capacity building that respects national security and national sovereignty' .

Thailand highlights its engagement in regional and bilateral capacity building initiatives, positioning the ASEAN-Japan Cybersecurity Capacity Building Centre as a key regional platform. It also notes its diverse partnerships with international organisations and civil society.

Thailand stated that it 'places great importance to the ASEAN-Japan Cybersecurity Capacity Building Center as a key platform for strengthening regional cyber capacity' , noting the centre co-works with partners including 'the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, as well as civil society organizations' . Thailand also noted working with 'UNIDER, Canada, the European Union, Plinkendale Institute, the Simpson Center, and the ICT for Peace Foundation' .

Thailand highlights two specific programmes that promote women's participation in cybersecurity: an international fellowship and a national competition. These initiatives are presented as practical tools for closing the gender gap and developing a new generation of skilled cybersecurity professionals.

Thailand recognised 'the importance of gender-responsive capacity-building programs which have enabled the more meaningful and inclusive participation of women in relevant meetings and processes', citing 'the Women in International Security and Cyberspace Fellowship and the Women Thailand Cyber Top Talent Competition, which aims to enhance women's practical cybersecurity skills, reach the gender gap, and cultivate a new generation of highly skilled cybersecurity professionals' .

Thailand proposes specific thematic priorities for the dedicated thematic group on capacity building, focusing on emerging and advanced technological threats as well as foundational governance frameworks. This reflects Thailand's view that capacity building must keep pace with the rapidly evolving threat landscape.

Thailand proposed that 'the DTG-2 on capacity building prioritize discussions' on 'addressing advanced cyber threats including AI and security, quantum readiness, post-quantum cryptography, and operational technology security' and 'providing assistance with national legal and policy frameworks' .

Suriname argues that capacity building must be understood in its full breadth as an investment that touches on multiple dimensions of national life, including resilience, institutions, economy, and public trust. This framing elevates capacity building beyond a purely technical domain into a matter of national development.

Suriname stated that 'for Suriname, capacity building is not simply a technical exercise. It is an investment in national resilience, institutional development, economic stability, and public trust' , requiring 'sustained investment in skilled professionals, effective national institutions such as the CSIRT, strong legal and policy frameworks, secure digital infrastructure, and meaningful regional and international cooperation' .

Suriname emphasises that capacity building must be adapted to the specific circumstances of each country, particularly smaller developing nations with limited resources. The call for practical and sustainable approaches reflects the reality that many countries face difficult trade-offs in allocating limited resources.

Suriname stated that 'capacity building is an investment in disability and prosperity of all. It must be practical, sustainable, and tailored to national circumstances' , noting that 'limited financial and human resources often require difficult choices, yet the cost of insufficient investment is far greater, exposing countries to disruption of essential services, economic losses, and weakened public confidence' .

Suriname highlights the difficult resource constraints faced by small developing nations and argues that the cost of underinvesting in cybersecurity capacity far outweighs the cost of investment. The emergence of an offshore oil and gas sector adds urgency to protecting critical infrastructure.

Suriname noted that 'limited financial and human resources often require difficult choices, yet the cost of insufficient investment is far greater, exposing countries to disruption of essential services, economic losses, and weakened public confidence' . It also highlighted that 'an emergent offshore oil and gas sector creates new opportunities for sustainable economic growth, while also expanding the need to protect critical infrastructure against evolving cyber threats' .

FIRST argues that effective capacity building cannot be achieved through brief, isolated interventions but requires sustained, locally grounded engagement over time. This principle is presented as essential to achieving meaningful and lasting improvements in national cyber capabilities.

FIRST stated that 'effective capacity building cannot be achieved through short-term interventions. It must be locally driven, responsive to national priorities and sustained over a longer period of time' , and noted that 'experience from regions such as the Western Balkans and Africa demonstrate that greatest impact is achieved when international organizations work closely with local stakeholders and the international community' .

FIRST argues that no single actor can bear the full responsibility for capacity building and that effective outcomes require genuine collaboration across all stakeholder groups. This includes ensuring that donors and implementers work in coordinated rather than fragmented ways.

FIRST stated that 'capacity-building is a shared responsibility. It calls for stronger partnerships among states, private sectors, civil society, and the technical community with donors and implementers working together effectively in public-private partnerships' .

FIRST identifies a structural problem in the funding landscape for capacity building: the mismatch between short-term funding cycles and the long-term nature of meaningful capacity development. Complex and fragmented reporting requirements further compound this challenge.

FIRST noted that 'funding is often limited to short-term project cycles, while reporting requirements are increasingly complex and fragmented across donors. These constraints undermine the long-term investments that meaningfully advance capacity-building requirements' .

The Netherlands argues that the global mechanism should not be a one-directional transfer of knowledge but a genuine multilateral platform where ideas, needs, experiences, and resources converge. DTG2 is identified as pivotal to realising this vision of collaborative capacity building.

The Netherlands stated that 'the UN Global Mechanism should therefore not be a one- or two-way street, but rather should act as a place where ideas, needs, experiences, innovations and resources all come together' and 'should function as a platform where all stakeholders can learn from each other and jointly shape solutions', with 'the role of DTG2 in this sense will be pivotal for the global mechanism's success' .

The Netherlands highlights its concrete contributions to global cybersecurity capacity building through partnerships with the EU, UNIDIR, and the Talent Mechanism. These efforts span multiple dimensions of cybersecurity governance, from strategy development to technical incident response.

The Netherlands stated that it 'works closely with international partners, including the EU, UNIDER and through the Talent Mechanism, to improve cybersecurity and foster sustainable capacity building' and has 'supported development and implementation of national cybersecurity strategies, incident response capabilities and policies for vulnerability disclosure' , as well as working 'to strengthen SEARCH and C-SEARCH and other relevant national agencies worldwide' .

The Netherlands highlights its financial support for the Women in Cyber Fellowship and calls on other delegations to contribute to this initiative. The appeal is grounded in the recognition that women remain underrepresented in the digital and cybersecurity workforce and that policies must be gender responsive.

The Netherlands expressed 'special appreciation of the Women in Cyber Fellowship, coordinated by UNIDER, to which the Kingdom of the Netherlands is a proud donor' , noting that the Fellowship 'has strengthened the participation of women in UN cyber processes' and encouraging 'all delegations in a position to do so to contribute to the work of the Fellowship and broader to ensure that we bridge the gender divide' .

The Netherlands argues that the multi-stakeholder community must be able to participate fully and without obstruction in the capacity building work of the global mechanism. This participation is presented as a prerequisite for effective, pragmatic, and responsive implementation.

The Netherlands stated that 'the meaningful and unimpeded participation of multi-stakeholder community is imperative to this aim' of ensuring 'that capacity building is implemented in an effective, pragmatic and responsive manner' .

Yemen frames capacity building as a practical mechanism for strengthening national security rather than merely an agenda item, emphasising the need for concrete results. This perspective is grounded in Yemen's own experience as a post-conflict country working to build national cybersecurity institutions.

Yemen stated that 'capacity building is not only an agenda item, it's a mechanism to strengthen national security and to deliver concrete results' , and noted its national efforts including 'a law against cybercrime and on the protection of data' and 'setting up a national center, the Center for Cybersecurity, which identifies threats and cyber incidents' .

Yemen calls for practical, targeted support for the most vulnerable countries, including least developed countries and those emerging from conflict. The emphasis is on building foundational infrastructure and sustainable training rather than one-off assistance.

Yemen stated that 'developing countries, in particular LDCs and post-conflict countries, need support, practical support' to 'bolster their infrastructure of control and surveillance' and 'national centers to respond to cyber threats' , and called for 'sustainable training initiatives' including '12-month long-term training programs' that 'build capacity of staff in this area' .

Yemen articulates an interdependence argument: that cybersecurity is a collective good where the weakest link determines the strength of the whole system. This framing makes capacity building for developing countries a matter of global, not just national, security.

Yemen stated that 'you cannot create a safe cyber system when there's a gap among countries in this area. Because a weakness in one link means the entire chain falls apart' .

Interpol draws on its operational experience to argue that capacity building is most effective when it is customised to the specific roles and responsibilities of different national actors, such as law enforcement. A one-size-fits-all approach fails to account for the specialised needs of different professional communities.

Interpol stated that 'capacity building results in sustainable operational capabilities and measurable outcomes when it is nationally owned, driven by identified needs, and crucially tailored to the distinct responsibility of relevant national actors', using the football metaphor that 'different types of players, goalkeepers, defenders, or strikers, may need different specialized forms of training' .

Interpol presents a concrete operational example of how capacity building embedded within real operations produces measurable results. The operation demonstrates that training followed by coordinated joint action can yield significant law enforcement outcomes.

Interpol described that 'ahead of the operational phase, 13 countries from the Middle East and North Africa received specialized training, taking part in tabletop exercises focused on technical threats' and that 'Interpol then coordinated the participating countries in a joint operation against fishing and malware. Together, they arrested over 200 suspects, who had been linked to 3,867 identified victims' .

Australia highlights the Women in Cyber Fellowship as a concrete mechanism for expanding women's participation in UN cybersecurity processes, particularly from underrepresented and developing states. The statistic that women delivered over 50% of statements during the plenary is presented as evidence of meaningful progress.

Australia noted that 'through our ongoing support of the Women in Cyber Fellowship, Australia and partner countries, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, are helping expand opportunities for women from underrepresented and developing states to participate in UN cybersecurity processes' , and that 'women delivered just over 50% of the statements during this plenary session', continuing 'the trend of gender parity that we have seen over the last final sessions of the OEWG' .

The Dominican Republic presents itself as a regional hub for cybersecurity capacity building in Latin America and the Caribbean, highlighting the LAC4 centre and its EU-supported programmes. The training of over 900 criminal justice professionals demonstrates the scale and practical impact of these initiatives.

The Dominican Republic noted that 'the Cyber Capacity Centre for Latin America and the Caribbean, LAC4, with its centre in Santo Domingo has provided technical diplomatic assistance directly to states' , and that as 'a regional hub of the Glazi E and Glazi Plus of the EU', it has 'trained more than 900 police officers, judges and prosecutors' , with some becoming instructors who train professionals in other countries of the region .

The Dominican Republic draws on its experience as a regional capacity building hub to argue that sustained mentorship combined with peer networks produces better outcomes than isolated workshops. This lesson is offered as a concrete recommendation for the dedicated thematic group.

The Dominican Republic stated that 'capacity-building programs work better when they combine sustained mentorship with networks of peer-peer cooperation, not just independent freestanding workshops' , and offered this as 'a key recommendation' to the dedicated thematic group .

The Dominican Republic argues that the global portal should serve a coordination function by mapping existing capacity building activities to prevent duplication and fragmentation. It also calls for accountability mechanisms in the form of measurable metrics for any voluntary fund.

The Dominican Republic stated that 'instead of duplicating the functions across other areas, the overall portal should help us map activities to avoid fragmentation of international efforts' , and that it supports 'the idea that any voluntary fund for capacity-building should include metrics so that we can measure results' .

Paraguay presents its new National Security Strategy as an example of successful international collaboration in capacity building, developed jointly with the OAS. It also highlights the C-CERT Americas network as an effective regional mechanism for cyber incident response.

Paraguay noted that 'the new National Security Strategy was built in collaboration with the Organization of American States and the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology of Paraguay, and that was launched last year' , and highlighted 'the importance of the C-Cert America's network for the response and prevention of cyber incidents' .

Paraguay argues that cybersecurity gaps are inseparable from broader digital economic inequalities, and that addressing one requires addressing the other. It highlights the specific disadvantage faced by landlocked countries that lack direct access to the maritime infrastructure that carries most internet traffic.

Paraguay stated that 'asymmetries generate insecurity. Sustainable growth in cybersecurity will not be possible without the sustainable growth of a digital economy' , noting that 'countries that do not have direct access to the maritime backbones of the Internet, 95% of the information on the web still passes through this' face particular challenges .

The OSCE describes its extensive portfolio of capacity building activities that have evolved from general awareness-raising to more specific, practical workshops on selected confidence-building measures. These activities span multiple regions and cover both technical and diplomatic dimensions of cybersecurity.

The OSCE described workshops on 'how closer cooperation between governments and private operators can improve information sharing, resilience, and incident responses in critical information sectors' , on 'translating critical information infrastructure protection concepts into practical action' , and its 'fourth annual training on international cyber diplomacy, gathering 18 participants from Eastern and Southeastern Europe, Central Asia, South Caucasus and Mongolia' .

Zimbabwe frames capacity building as the essential mechanism for closing the gap between states with different levels of technical and institutional development, enabling all to participate in implementing the agreed UN framework. This reflects the view that the framework's effectiveness depends on universal participation.

Zimbabwe stated that 'capacity building is essential to narrowing the digital divide, strengthening national resilience, and ensuring that all states, regardless of their size or technical capacity, can implement the agreed framework effectively' .

Zimbabwe articulates a comprehensive set of principles that should govern capacity building, emphasising national ownership and the absence of conditionalities as particularly important. These principles are presented as essential to ensuring that capacity building empowers rather than creates dependency.

Zimbabwe stated that capacity building 'should be nationally owned, demand-driven, needs-based, sustainable, transparent, and free from conditionalities' and 'should respond to nationally identified priorities, strengthen domestic institutions and capabilities, and empower states to build lasting resilience rather than create technological dependence' .

Zimbabwe highlights the Global Points of Contact Directory as a tangible and practical outcome of the OEWG process that facilitates communication and cooperation between states. It calls for broader participation in simulations to strengthen both diplomatic and technical national points of contact.

Zimbabwe stated that it 'considers the Global Points of Contact Directory to be one of the most practical achievements of the open-ended working group' and encouraged 'wider participation in future simulations and continued efforts to strengthen both diplomatic and technical national points of contact' .

Zimbabwe calls for improved coordination among the many existing capacity building initiatives to ensure they complement rather than duplicate each other. This coordination is presented as essential to maximising the impact of available resources and better serving national needs.

Zimbabwe stated that it 'encourages greater coordination among existing capacity-building initiatives to maximize their impact, avoid duplication, and better respond to national needs' .

Tuvalu argues that capacity building is particularly fundamental for small island developing states, which face unique constraints that make it difficult to implement cyber norms and participate in international processes without targeted support. This framing highlights the specific vulnerabilities of SIDS in the cyber domain.

Tuvalu stated that 'capacity building is the fundamental foundation for small island developing states such as my own country, Tuvalu, to effectively implement cyber norms, strengthen our national preparedness, and engage meaningfully in EU and cyber processes' .

Tuvalu emphasises that capacity building must be grounded in the specific priorities and needs of recipient states, with state-led assessments ensuring that external support is genuinely tailored rather than generic. This principle protects national ownership of the capacity building process.

Tuvalu stated that 'capacity building must be country-owned and needs-driven' with 'national priorities focused on strengthening cybersecurity governance, enhancing incident response capabilities, and advancing the cyber pillar of our national security policy', and strongly encouraged 'the adoption of state-led assessments' to ensure 'support is tailored and practical' .

Tuvalu specifically recognises the Women in Cyber Fellowship as having made a tangible difference to its ability to participate in UN cyber processes and build national capacity. This testimony from a small island developing state underscores the fellowship's impact on the most resource-constrained participants.

Tuvalu 'acknowledges the invaluable support of UNDA and partners women in cyber fellowship, which has been instrumental in enhancing our participation in this vital discussion and strengthen our national capacity in ICT security' .

Tuvalu articulates the specific structural disadvantages faced by small island developing states in building cybersecurity capacity, including geographic isolation and high connectivity costs. It calls for international support that is adapted to these realities through flexible delivery modalities.

Tuvalu noted that 'our states often face significant constraints including limited resources, geographic isolation, and high connectivity costs' and that 'to be effective, international support is encouraged and must be predictable, sustainable, and delivered through diverse channels, including remote and hybrid training, the use of micro-modules, and sustained mentorship program' .

Saudi Arabia presents a comprehensive portfolio of global capacity building initiatives that it has established or co-launched, covering multiple dimensions of cybersecurity from child protection to women's empowerment. The establishment of a dedicated UNITAR office in Riyadh represents a significant institutional commitment.

Saudi Arabia described the establishment of 'the Global Cybersecurity Forum, GCF' , the launch of 'the Global Initiative for Child Protection in Cyberspace, and the Global Initiative for Women's Empowerment in Cybersecurity' , the 'Global Initiative for International Capacity Building in Cyberspace in partnership with the United Nations' , and 'in partnership with the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, UNITAR launched a UNITAR office dedicated to cybersecurity headquartered in Riyadh' .

Saudi Arabia highlights a concrete programme specifically designed to prepare women for leadership roles in cybersecurity, with a significant international reach spanning over 67 countries. This programme is presented as part of Saudi Arabia's broader commitment to gender inclusion in cybersecurity.

Saudi Arabia stated that it 'is also implementing a specialized program to train women in cybersecurity so they can take up leadership positions. To date, representatives from more than 67 countries have graduated from this program' .

The Secretariat provides an update on the status of the global ICT security portal, confirming that India's financial pledge is enabling its development at a time when the UN faces significant budgetary and liquidity constraints. This represents a critical enabling contribution to a key mechanism of the global framework.

The Secretariat expressed 'deep appreciation to the delegation of India for its pledge to support with financial resources the technical establishment of the portal and its maintenance', noting that 'we are deeply grateful to India for its support, which is enabling us to develop the portal in the current budgetary and liquidity constraints of the United Nations Secretariat' .

The Chair highlights the achievement of gender parity in statement delivery during the first substantive session of the global mechanism as a significant milestone. This statistic is presented as evidence that the mechanism is beginning its work with a strong foundation of inclusive participation.

The Chair stated that 'of the 324 statements made this week, 162 were delivered by women, and that is indeed 50%' and that 'this first page in the history of the mechanism proudly bears the hallmark of these women' .

The Chair outlines the next steps for the mechanism, including the circulation of a preliminary proposal for the DTGs' organisation by the end of August. She explicitly calls for flexibility from delegations, acknowledging that the DTGs have no prior template and that consensus cannot become an obstacle to progress.

The Chair stated that she hopes 'to circulate the preliminary proposal toward the end of August' and asked delegations 'to receive that proposal we will circulate in August as a serious, balanced, good faith basis on which to begin building without delay' , noting that 'the DTGs have no prior template to build on. We must define the topics, the structure, and orientation of the work' .

Future Earth Systems proposes that enterprise architecture practices, specifically capability maps and models, offer practical frameworks for structuring and prioritising capacity building efforts. These tools can help states identify gaps, measure maturity, and plan systematically across government and the broader economy.

Future Earth Systems explained that 'capability maps can help to clarify which capabilities are needed across different parts of government and the broad economy for implementing the norms and participating positively in the CBMs' , and that 'capability models on the other hand provide greater insights into each capability' including 'how you can measure your current state of capability maturity against best practice and targeted maturity frameworks' .

The Kenya ICT Action Network argues that non-state actors bring irreplaceable localised knowledge and expertise that should be formally integrated into capacity building design and delivery, not merely consulted. This systematic integration is presented as essential for accountability and measurable impact.

The Kenya ICT Action Network stated that 'civil society organizations, academia, and technical communities do possess deep localized expertise and local threat temerity' and that 'the global mechanism will need to systematically integrate non-state actors as co-designers, co-creators, trainers, and evaluators of capacity-building programs to ensure accountability and measurable impact' .

The Kenya ICT Action Network argues that effective capacity building requires co-design with local institutions to ensure it is genuinely responsive to specific regional contexts, including language and human rights considerations. State resources alone are insufficient to achieve the depth and breadth of capacity building needed.

The Kenya ICT Action Network stated that 'capacity building must not be a top-down, copy-paste exercise. Programs will need to be co-designed, co-created with local institutions to address specific regional threat landscapes, local language realities, and human rights impacts, including protecting civil society and vulnerable populations from the technology-facilitated abuse' , and that 'cyber resilience cannot be built in silos' and 'cannot be achieved through state resources alone' .

Russia uses its right of reply to contest what it characterises as one-sided accusations from Italy regarding attacks on civilian infrastructure, arguing that Ukraine's attacks on Russian infrastructure were ignored. Russia frames this as an example of the politicisation that undermines the global mechanism's work.

Russia stated that it 'heard outrageous anti-Russian attacks from the delegate of Italy' who 'mentioned some attacks on civilian infrastructure of Ukraine but for some reason they failed to mention the regular and fully real attacks by Ukraine on the civilian infrastructure of Russia' , and condemned 'the ceaseless attempts to politicize discussions around the global mechanism', arguing that 'such baseless accusations have been heard' and that 'such an approach undermines the work of the global mechanism' .

Ukraine responds to Russia's right of reply by reaffirming the legal basis for its actions under the UN Charter's right of self-defence. It also defends the practice of public attribution and restrictive measures as legitimate tools for signalling collective opposition to malicious cyber behaviour.

Ukraine stated that it wishes 'to remind everyone that Ukraine remains under Russia's aggression and is conducting the defense under the Article 51 of the UN Charter' , and that 'public attribution and restrictive measures are applied for a reason. And the reason is to manifest a joint protest against malicious behavior that undermines security in the use of the ICTs and on the global scale' .