Quel équilibre entre règlementation et innovation ?
The forum focused on digital governance and artificial intelligence in the Francophone space, presented as a multistakeholder dialogue platform for developing common positions on these issues.Henri Monceau highlighted the initiative’s strong momentum, with twice as many in-person registrants and more than 900 registrations overall, and placed the meeting on the eve of the United Nations’ first global dialogue on AI, in a context of strong global concentration of computing capacity, especially in the United States and China.
He stressed the Francophonie’s particular responsibility to defend governance that is inclusive, global, and attentive to linguistic and cultural diversity.Doreen Bogdan-Martin presented this forum as an opportunity to inform the imminent international debates on the balance between innovation and regulation, access to knowledge, and sustainable infrastructure, while recalling the ITU’s role in standards, capacity building, and the AI for Good initiative.
In his video message, Amandeep Singh Gill warned that AI is trained on a limited portion of human experience, which marginalizes many languages and traditions and creates a “civilizational” risk.He praised the Francophonie for its defense of linguistic diversity in the digital sphere and called on it to become a “living laboratory” based on open corpora, shared data, and multilingual models.The speakers broadly agreed in rejecting the idea of a simple opposition between regulation and innovation. Henri Verdier, Léna Dargham, Lacina Konaté, and Anne-Marie Jean argued that well-designed regulation, supported by standards, can build trust, foster interoperability, and support sustainable innovation rather than hinder it.
Janis Karklins extended this idea by defending the multistakeholder approach as the foundation of the success of Internet governance and as a method still necessary in the face of the growing complexity of digital challenges.Several speakers also emphasized digital sovereignty, participation in standard-setting bodies, and access in French to technical documents as conditions for preventing market rules from being defined elsewhere.
Another major theme was linguistic and cultural diversity in AI systems. Henri Verdier explained that the dominance of English-language training data affects not only access to knowledge, but also the way models interpret questions and the implicit values they incorporate.Anne-Marie Jean illustrated a policy response with the example of Quebec, where Law 109 aims not to regulate content itself, but the conditions of its discoverability on platforms and connected devices, in order to prevent cultural erasure in the digital environment.She also called for structured Francophone data and for coordinated Francophone action in international forums.
Finally, Lacina Konaté stressed that, for Africa, the central challenge is to build proactive governance of data, infrastructure, and computing capacity, within a transformation logic centered on citizens rather than simple administrative digitization.
From this perspective, participants mentioned as indicators of future success greater digital sovereignty, a stronger Francophone presence in international standards, AI models designed as a common good, and better citizen education on AI.
The session concluded with the signing of a partnership between AFNIC and Smart Africa to strengthen DNS infrastructure, skills, and digital sovereignty on the African continent, reflecting a desire to translate the debates into concrete cooperation.
- The forum aims to consolidate a Francophone space for dialogue and common positions on digital and AI governance by bringing together states, regulators, academics, technical actors, and civil society. This ambition is presented as a response to strong demand and as a Francophone contribution to more inclusive global governance.
- Several speakers underscored the strong global concentration of AI capabilities - particularly in computing, data, and infrastructure - mainly benefiting the United States and China, which creates technological, economic, linguistic, and geopolitical imbalances. The Francophonie is therefore called upon to defend linguistic and cultural diversity to avoid an AI built on too narrow a slice of human experience.
- A central theme of the debate is that the issue is not simply regulation versus innovation: the real challenge is to build trust through smart, proportionate, and effective frameworks. The panelists argued that good regulation, also supported by technical standards, can promote innovation, sustainable investment, interoperability, and the protection of citizens.
- Digital sovereignty - or strategic autonomy - recurred as a concrete priority, particularly for Africa and countries of the Global South: it depends on control over data, infrastructure, computing capacity, skills, and public policies centered on citizens rather than on simple administrative digitization. Several exchanges stressed that Africa can become a major player if it governs its data better and develops its own capabilities.
- Linguistic and cultural diversity is presented as a structural issue for AI, not merely a symbolic one. This is reflected in calls to develop open corpora, multilingual models, and a stronger Francophone presence in standard-setting bodies, but also in the Quebec example of policies on the discoverability of Francophone cultural content on digital platforms.
- Overall objective of the discussion:
- The purpose of this discussion is to open the second Francophone forum on digital governance and artificial intelligence, to prepare the exchanges in view of upcoming multilateral meetings, and above all to define a common Francophone vision of AI governance: inclusive, multilingual, based on cooperation, balanced regulation, standardization, and the strengthening of digital sovereignty.
- Overall tone of the discussion:
- The tone is initially institutional, solemn, and mobilizing during the opening statements, with a strong emphasis on multilateralism and collective responsibility. It then becomes more analytical and strategic during the roundtable, with concrete exchanges on regulation, standards, infrastructure, and sovereignty. At times, the tone becomes more alarmed or critical in the face of the risks of concentration of technological power, cultural homogenization, and weakening of the multilateral framework, before becoming constructive and action-oriented again, particularly around partnerships, Francophone solutions, and avenues for future cooperation.
The second Francophone Forum on Digital and Artificial Intelligence Governance opens with the observation of a clear rise in the initiative’s momentum and the assertion of a more structured political ambition. Henri Monceau emphasizes that in-person participation has doubled and that more than 900 registrations were recorded, three times more than the previous year. He sees this not only as interest in AI, but also as the expression of a broader need for a Francophone space for dialogue, reflection, and proposals on digital governance. He presents this forum as a place where states, parliamentarians, local authorities, regulators, academics, standardization bodies, data protection authorities, technical actors, and civil society can jointly develop common positions. He also makes clear that the initiative is not intended to speak on behalf of the world, but to contribute to a more inclusive, legitimate, and genuinely multilingual global governance of AI.
This opening is situated within a broader international sequence. Monceau notes that the forum is being held on the eve of the first United Nations global dialogue on artificial intelligence, created in the wake of the Global Digital Compact, and shortly after the publication of the preliminary report of the independent scientific panel on AI. From this context, he draws a twofold diagnosis: never has a technology spread so quickly, but never have the capabilities that make it possible been so concentrated. In this regard, he cites the global distribution of computing power dedicated to AI, 75% of which is located in the United States and 15% in China, leaving only a residual share for the rest of the world. In his view, this concentration is at once technological, economic, cultural, linguistic, and geopolitical, hence the particular responsibility of the Francophonie in defending an innovation that does not result in uniformity. Monceau then structures the day around three major themes: the balance between innovation and regulation, the effects of AI on knowledge, languages, content, and access to knowledge, and then the question of infrastructure, its sustainability, and digital sovereignty. He specifies that no definitive answer will be found in a single day, but that each of these questions calls for collective responses. The opening tone is both solemn and mobilizing: at this stage, the issue is no longer whether AI will transform societies, but who will actually take part in that transformation. Doreen Bogdan-Martin, Secretary-General of the ITU, extends this framing by explicitly placing the forum within the immediate multilateral agenda. She recalls having followed with interest the conclusions of the first forum, focused on innovation, cooperation, inclusion, youth, and culture, and sees this second edition as an opportunity to inform the following week’s discussions on global AI governance. She takes up the major themes announced - the balance between regulation and innovation, access to knowledge, sustainable and sovereign infrastructures - and invites participants to join the first United Nations global dialogue on AI governance, co-organized by the ITU, UNESCO, and the UN. She also presents the ITU’s role as a technical and standard-setting support organization, acting through capacity-building, the development of tools, standards, and technical publications, as well as through the AI for Good initiative, conceived as a platform linking the private sector, the United Nations, NGOs, administrations, start-ups, and researchers. Finally, she places the WSIS Forum within the same dynamic, emphasizing that AI must be discussed there not only as a technological innovation, but also from a development perspective. Henri Monceau then explains that Amandeep Singh Gill, who had initially been expected in person, was unable to arrive on time due to a transport problem and recorded a video message from Rome that was played during the session. In this address, the United Nations Secretary-General’s Envoy on Technology describes AI as the century’s “cognitive infrastructure,” capable of translating, summarizing, advising, and deciding, but he raises the crucial question: in what language does it think, and with what memory of the world? He states that the major models are currently trained on only a fraction of human experience, leaving thousands of languages, as well as entire legal, philosophical, medical, and poetic traditions, outside the frame or at the margins. From this, he concludes that the risk is not merely technical, but civilizational: that of an intelligence that would mistake one part of humanity for all of humanity. He draws from this a demanding conception of universality: a truly global AI is not measured first by its computing power, but by its ability to embrace the plurality of ways of speaking, knowing, and being. Cultural diversity is therefore not, in his view, a moral add-on, but a condition of the universality of digital governance. He praises the Francophonie for having understood that language itself constitutes an infrastructure, and that defending a language means defending a way of understanding the world. In the immediate wake of this message, Henri Monceau relays a compelling call to make the Francophone space a “living laboratory” based on open corpora, shared data, multilingual models, and talent trained across five continents. He argues that diversity should not be seen as an obstacle to innovation, but as its accelerator, and suggests that what the Francophonie succeeds in doing could then be taken up by other linguistic communities.
Omar Zniber, President of the Group of Francophone Ambassadors in Geneva, in turn places the forum back within the context of international Geneva. He points out that the meeting coincides with a week marked by several major events - the global dialogue on AI governance, the World Summit on the Information Society Forum, and the AI for Good Summit - which situates the forum within a particularly dense diplomatic week in Geneva and reinforces its role as a platform for exchanges, experience-sharing, and concrete recommendations. He then recalls that digital technology and artificial intelligence are profoundly reshaping economies, administrations, education, health, and production systems, while also being able to accelerate the Sustainable Development Goals, improve public services, and boost competitiveness. He nevertheless stresses that these promises come with major challenges: protection of personal data, reduction of the digital divide, ethics, and digital sovereignty. He also mentions the uses of AI in disarmament, security, and humanitarian issues, to underscore that the human dimension must remain central. In his view, the Francophone space has strengths that can help build a safer, more sovereign, and more inclusive digital ecosystem through the sharing of knowledge and good practices. He finally insists on the importance of using AI to entrench linguistic diversity in international bodies and to enrich the capacity to “understand one another together.” Janis Karklins then adds a conceptual complement by returning to Internet governance. He defends the multistakeholder approach as one of the main reasons for the success of the Internet since WSIS, recalling that no single actor alone possesses all the necessary expertise, authority, or responsibility. Governments, the private sector, civil society, academia, the technical community, and international organizations must therefore continue to contribute complementary perspectives, because decisions on the Internet are more robust when they are grounded in the experience of those who develop it, use it, and depend on it. Karklins also recalls that ICANN coordinates the Internet’s system of unique identifiers according to a multistakeholder approach, which contributes to the security, stability, and interoperability of the global domain name system. This point establishes continuity between the historical governance of the Internet and the new debates on AI: the multistakeholder model, reaffirmed in the context of the WSIS+20 review, remains essential as the challenges become more complex. The first roundtable addresses precisely the balance between regulation and innovation, with Henri Verdier, Léna Dargham, Lacina Konaté, and Anne-Marie Jean. From the outset, Henri Monceau formulates the classic tension: some argue that regulation hinders innovation, while others believe that in the absence of rules there can be neither trust, nor sustainable investment, nor responsible innovation. The discussion will, however, quickly dismantle this overly simple opposition. Henri Verdier opens with a deliberately provocative and vivid answer: he recalls that French gastronomy is one of the most regulated sectors in the world, yet that has not prevented it from being excellent. He adds that bad regulation can obviously hinder innovation, but that there are also many examples where regulation has supported it. His most developed illustration is aviation: Europe, he says, was able to enter a market dominated by Boeing by relying on higher safety standards, which were turned into a competitive advantage. Above all, he concludes that the real question is not only whether regulation hampers innovation, but recognizing that not every innovation is synonymous with progress. Without political intervention, democracy, and collective decision-making, digital innovation can also serve dystopian projects. Léna Dargham then shifts the center of gravity of the debate toward trust and standardization. She believes that the essential point is not to oppose regulation and innovation, but to find the balance that makes it possible to create trust. To do so, it must be possible to demonstrate the reliability, interoperability, and connection of solutions to international markets. She describes standardization as an “invisible pillar” that allows innovations precisely to be recognized as reliable and interoperable, and to create a common language among innovators, investors, regulators, and markets. Her remarks broaden the notion of governance beyond the law toward technical and commercial mechanisms that are often less visible, but decisive. Lacina Konaté moves in the same general direction, while reframing the priorities from an African perspective. In his view, the debate is not about choosing between regulation and innovation, but about creating the conditions of trust that allow innovation to thrive while protecting citizens. He states that no lasting technological transformation has ever developed without trust and that, for Francophone countries, the priority should not be to pile up ever more rules, but to build smart, proportionate regulatory frameworks that are conducive to innovation. He also insists on an idea he will develop later: AI governance does not begin with the algorithm, but with infrastructure, data, skills, and trust. Anne-Marie Jean, for her part, brings in the example of Quebec’s cultural sector to illustrate that a highly regulated environment does not prevent innovation. She recalls that culture in Quebec is structured by copyright laws, associations, unions, and support mechanisms, without this preventing Quebec creators from gaining international visibility. Her argument is that this regulatory environment protects fairness and creates the conditions in which artists and creators can innovate sustainably. The discussion then shifts to the question of the real priority for African countries: access, regulation, infrastructure, or capacity. Lacina Konaté answers bluntly that, for the population, the priority may be access to the Internet, but that, for governments, the priority must be regulation. He places this position within a historical and demographic reading: Africa would not truly have participated in any previous technological revolution and is now facing population growth on an unprecedented scale, which requires different responses. But his notion of regulation is itself distinctive. Konaté believes it must be proactive and citizen-centered, whereas the last thirty years would instead have produced regulations centered on technologies. Here he develops one of the most striking distinctions of the session: digital transformation is not simple digitization. Putting forms or paperwork online does not transform the state if services remain designed in a fragmented way and if the citizen remains the one who personally carries their data from one administration to another. True transformation instead requires organizing around the citizen and making coherent use of data. Prompted again on the risk that those who control infrastructure and content will also dominate the making of the rules, Konaté broadens the debate further to the geoeconomics of AI. He argues that Africa currently accounts for only a very small share of the data mobilized in AI infrastructures, a situation he contrasts with much stronger concentration in other regions of the world. He concludes that African states must urgently govern their data, because AI feeds on this resource and the future is already being decided there. He goes further by arguing that Africa also has underestimated material assets, particularly in renewable energy. He states that the continent has around 3,000 hours of sunshine per year and suggests that this resource could support the establishment of computing centers and AI servers. In this perspective, he reverses the usual narrative of delay: in his view, Africa is not a peripheral “Global South,” but a potential “new center,” provided that data, energy, and computational infrastructure are understood as strategic issues in their own right. Digital sovereignty then emerges as a structuring theme, though with different emphases depending on the speakers. When Monceau asks Léna Dargham about the role of standards in this sovereignty - which he prefers to call strategic autonomy - she replies that the standard is “the language of the market” and the technical foundation of regulation. Those who draft standards therefore, in practice, write the rules of the market. Consequently, the low participation of Francophone countries, especially developing countries, in international standard-setting work constitutes, in her view, a major strategic handicap. Dargham identifies several causes for this under-participation, but particularly stresses the lack of access to standardization documents in French. Many Francophone countries, especially African ones, are not truly bilingual, which prevents their experts from participating usefully in consultations, votes, and drafting. She recalls that at the international level, one country counts for one vote, so not participating amounts to ceding the decision to others. She then presents a concrete response: the Réseau Normalisation et Francophonie is developing a machine-translation platform for draft standards, notably from ISO and IEC, in order to enable its members to review, discuss, and actively contribute to the texts. The linguistic and cultural dimension of AI is then explored further through the Quebec example presented by Anne-Marie Jean. She begins by recalling that the defense and promotion of French lie at the heart of Quebec’s political identity, but explains that the shift of cultural practices toward digital platforms and connected devices has made a new issue central: no longer only the production of content, but its discoverability. In her view, major platforms now play a decisive role in what citizens do or do not see, and one can observe a very worrying decline in certain cultural practices in French, especially among young people. She then presents Quebec’s Bill 109 as a strong policy response. Anne-Marie Jean states that this law was passed by the National Assembly of Quebec in December 2025. It is not intended to regulate content directly, but rather the conditions of its discoverability. The goal is for original French-language cultural content to be found, suggested, and chosen by citizens. Concretely, it imposes requirements on digital platforms and manufacturers of connected devices, with the aim that national platforms and original French-language cultural content be more easily visible and accessible. For Jean, the issue is to prevent digital transformation from taking place at the cost of cultural erasure. She then explicitly links this policy to AI. Since AI feeds on data, it is necessary to ensure that Francophone data are present, structured, and usable within systems so that content can be found and promoted. She also mentions a project led by Bibliothèque et Archives nationales du Québec to build, in compliance with copyright, a database capable of feeding AIs that respect diversity, promote Francophone and Indigenous content, and strengthen sovereignty as well as data traceability. Henri Verdier then takes up the linguistic issue again at a more philosophical, technical, and geopolitical level. Responding to a question about the change in scale or nature of regulation, he clearly states that it is a change in nature. He recalls that 92% of training data are said to be in English and argues that the problem lies not only in reduced access to non-English knowledge. More profoundly, models trained in one language also internalize representations of the world specific to that language. Using the literary example of “solitude” and “soledad,” he shows that apparently equivalent words in fact open onto different imaginaries; consequently, an AI educated mainly in English not only understands certain forms of knowledge less well, it also “does not hear the same question.” Verdier reinforces this point by linking it to different legal and political conceptions. He refers, for example, to the constitutional protection of freedom of expression granted to legal persons in the United States, to suggest that models trained in that linguistic and institutional universe implicitly incorporate visions of law different from those prevailing in French, where the Constitution protects humans first. His argument is therefore that the language of training structures mental categories, hierarchies of values, and responses. This gives the question of linguistic diversity a much broader significance than that of a simple translation policy. The same speaker then highlights two other major transformations linked to AI. Henri Verdier emphasizes that, unlike the Internet revolution centered on relationships between people, AI penetrates the sphere of intimacy, to the point of transforming personal practices such as writing love letters or breakup letters. He also notes that the Internet was born in an academic world structured by open standards, digital commons, transparency, and cooperation, whereas the AI revolution is emerging at the heart of private companies worth a trillion dollars. Consequently, the contemporary challenge is to “impose the commons” on something that was not born as a common good. This difference in origin explains, in his view, the intensification of power dynamics and geopolitical tensions around AI. From this perspective, Verdier formulates one of the strongest theses of the morning: regulation will not happen if creation does not happen as well. For him, good governance is not limited to legal regulation; it also requires open standards, public infrastructure, voluntary norms, codes of conduct, common resources, and real scientific and economic power. He explicitly links this regulatory capacity to the production of commons: open standards, public infrastructure, shared resources, and foundation models designed as commons or global public goods. Writing good texts without having infrastructure, open databases, computing centers, and innovation capacities amounts to producing standards with no real grip on the world.
When Henri Monceau then asks the panelists which indicators would make it possible to know, in five years, whether the Francophonie has taken the right direction, the answers outline a shared but non-homogeneous strategic agenda. Anne-Marie Jean first hopes for strong Francophone convergence in international forums, particularly around UNESCO’s work on an additional protocol to the 2005 Convention on the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. She also mentions the recent announcement of a special envoy on the discoverability of Francophone cultural content, who should mobilize states around the infrastructure needed for their cultural and digital sovereignty. Lacina Konaté responds in terms of continental and national AI sovereignty in Africa. He hopes to see, within a five-year horizon, homegrown African computing capacities emerge, local servers, adapted sectoral uses - agriculture, critical infrastructure, fintech, administration - and cross-border mechanisms for shared access to computing power. In this context, he mentions Smart Africa’s work on a “Compute Embassy Law,” intended to democratize access to computing capacity and promote more sovereign AI at the African scale. Léna Dargham, for her part, proposes as indicators Francophone leadership in the development of international standards, not only through participation in drafting, but also by taking on responsibilities in the governance of technical committees. She also stresses the accessibility of standardization documents in French and their national adoption by companies, innovators, and private-sector actors, because certification and compliance with standards condition access to international markets. Henri Verdier finally formulates a triptych of success: making foundation models a common good of humanity, accessible without permission and genuinely multilingual; encouraging a great diversity of innovators so that solutions adapted to local contexts can emerge; and treating AI literacy as a priority as fundamental as basic literacy. He rejects the idea of a humanity reduced to passively consuming automated systems designed elsewhere, and calls for mass education in the reasoned and dignified use of AI. The sequence of exchanges with the audience confirms and complicates these main lines. A first speaker emphasizes the negative spirals that AI could produce, particularly around mining extraction, conflict, pollution, and the growing distance between decision-making models and lived reality. This intervention is a reminder that AI governance must also integrate the material and environmental externalities of technological infrastructures. Oumar Ndiaye then reframes the morning’s central issue in terms of legitimacy: who regulates, for whom, and for what purpose? He warns against the tendency to copy external frameworks, such as the GDPR, without sufficient reflection on specific contexts, and defends the idea of regulation oriented toward the common good. Other interventions refer to the scientific and infrastructural capacities existing in Europe, cooperation among Swiss, Finnish, and African researchers around computing for AI, the possible value of regulatory “sandboxes,” the transferability of Bill 109, the role of universities in adapting curricula, and the possibility of a genuine “win-win” model between high-income Francophone countries and middle- or low-income countries.
In response to these interventions, Henri Verdier refocuses the debate on the effectiveness of regulations in a more conflictual international context. He states that the multilateral order based on the rule of law is now weakened, which means that it is not enough to write good texts: it is also necessary to create the conditions that allow them to exist. In his view, those conditions depend on infrastructure, open databases, computing centers, standards, and industrial policies. He speaks of “gently imposing” the desired regulations, that is, not through coercion alone, but through the construction of resources and ecosystems that make possible an AI grounded in law and reason. Léna Dargham then takes up the question of regulatory harmonization and suggests that the OIF take stock of existing regulations in the Francophone space in order to explore the relevant levels of harmonization - national, regional, international - on the basis of good practices, rather than through simple copy-and-paste. Lacina Konaté, for his part, returns to African demographic and institutional issues. He emphasizes the urgency of providing health, banking, and administrative services to a rapidly growing population, which requires thinking in terms of services rather than physical institutions: he says, in substance, that populations need health services or banking services more than the simple institutional reproduction of the hospital or the bank. He links this approach to the issue of public digital infrastructure, particularly unique digital identity, payments, and data sharing. He also mentions electronic signatures and PKI, to show that the obstacles do not primarily stem from the absence of technology, but from an insufficient understanding of the issues. He finally states that the digital economy and transformation do not constitute one vertical sector among others, but rather a cross-cutting dimension that affects all public action and university education. Anne-Marie Jean complements these responses by recalling that, within the Francophonie, Ministers of Culture have already asked the Parliamentary Assembly of the Francophonie to develop a shared legislative corpus. She also indicates that Quebec and Côte d’Ivoire have jointly developed a framework identifying the legislative, regulatory, and support elements needed for a discoverability ecosystem. In her view, these tools should help each state diagnose its situation and plan its implementation, particularly with a view to the next meeting of Ministers of Culture in Yerevan. Henri Monceau concludes this part by responding to a question about the role of the OIF Resource Centre for digital and AI governance. He explains that this center, launched at Switzerland’s initiative during the Djerba Summit, is intended to support Francophone states, in particular through AI-based tools capable of querying regulatory and standardization texts in a precise way. He also announces a workshop in Alexandria on native language models, which directly extends the morning’s debates on the need for corpora, data, and models rooted in Francophone languages and contexts. The session finally closes with an act of concrete cooperation: the signing of a memorandum of understanding between AFNIC and Smart Africa. Pierre Bonis explains that the objective is to pool the networks of African national registries, in particular through a college bringing together around twenty top-level domain name registries, and to connect them with Smart Africa’s actions. He presents these registries as building blocks of sovereign infrastructure, concentrating expertise, autonomy, and technical dialogue with governments. Lacina Konaté presents this signing as the formalization of a partnership already long underway. He stresses that issues of Internet governance remain fundamental, because there can be no viable AI without good Internet governance and without preserving essential technical resources. The practical conclusion of the morning is therefore consistent with all the exchanges: beyond principles, digital sovereignty also requires institutional and technical partnerships on the Internet’s critical infrastructures. Overall, this opening sequence and first roundtable reveal several clear convergences, despite differences in emphasis on action priorities. First, the Francophonie is seeking to establish itself as a space for structured dialogue, connected to global arenas, in order to weigh collectively on digital and AI governance. Second, linguistic and cultural diversity is conceived here as a condition of the universality of AI, not as a peripheral issue. Third, the opposition between regulation and innovation is largely rejected in favor of an approach based on trust, standardization, and proportionate frameworks. Finally, the debates show that the main line of discussion does not concern the abstract alternative of whether or not to regulate, but rather the levers to prioritize: rules, infrastructure, participation in standardization, digital commons, computational sovereignty, data governance, or training.
The morning’s implicit conclusion is that none of these dimensions can suffice on its own. The speakers converge on the idea that credible Francophone governance of AI will have to combine regulation, standardization, production of linguistic resources, computing infrastructure, data governance, technical cooperation, mass training, and a stronger presence in international bodies. In this sense, the forum does not merely open a reflection: it seeks to sketch out a Francophone action agenda that is at once normative, technical, cultural, and geopolitical, aligned with the major international debates on the concentration of digital power, unequal access, multilingual inclusion, and development.
La base confirme que le Pacte numérique mondial constitue bien un processus multilatéral structurant pour la gouvernance numérique à l’ONU, avec des consultations multipartites et un lien avec le Sommet de l’avenir [S33].
La base apporte un contexte utile en montrant que les processus de gouvernance numérique et d’IA sont pensés de manière multipartite, notamment dans le cadre du Pacte numérique mondial et des discussions internationales sur l’IA [S33] et [S51].
Cette orientation est cohérente avec la base, qui insiste sur le besoin d’une représentation plus large dans les discussions scientifiques sur l’IA et sur l’inclusion de perspectives diverses au-delà du seul noyau technicien [S51]. La base souligne aussi l’importance de solutions locales et culturellement adaptées [S37].
La base ne confirme pas les chiffres cités sur la puissance de calcul, mais elle renforce le diagnostic général sur les déséquilibres culturels et technologiques en soulignant la nécessité de modèles souverains adaptés aux contextes linguistiques et culturels, ainsi que les risques de dépendance vis-à-vis des grands acteurs technologiques [S37].
La base confirme que cette tension est centrale dans les débats actuels sur l’IA : elle évoque explicitement la critique des approches réglementaires existantes et l’idée que la réglementation devrait être un catalyseur d’innovation plutôt qu’un frein [S37].
La base ajoute un éclairage important sur la souveraineté numérique en insistant sur le besoin de modèles d’IA souverains, d’appropriation locale des technologies et de réduction des dépendances technologiques, en particulier pour les régions moins dotées [S37].
La base situe ce besoin dans une évolution plus large de la diplomatie numérique, marquée par l’essor des réunions hybrides, de nouveaux outils numériques et une intégration croissante des enjeux technologiques dans les organisations internationales [S35].
The forum meets a need for a French-speaking space for dialogue to build common positions among States, regulators, technical experts, and civil society (Henri Monceau)
Arg. 1Henri Monceau presents the forum as a response to a real expectation within the French-speaking world: to have a structured venue for debating digital and AI governance. In his view, this space should enable a wide range of stakeholders to jointly develop common positions within a multilateral and inclusive framework.
He highlights the sharp growth in participation, with twice as many in-person registrants and more than 900 registrations overall, compared with three times fewer the previous year, demonstrating the existence of a concrete need . He also specifies that this venue must bring together States, parliamentarians, local authorities, regulators, academics, standard-setting bodies, data protection authorities, technical actors, and civil society in order to jointly develop common positions .
on: The need for French-speaking, multilateral, and inclusive governance of digital technology and AI
The Francophonie must become a model laboratory for digital diversity, with open corpora, shared data, multilingual models, and talent trained across several continents (Henri Monceau)
Arg. 2Henri Monceau takes up Amandeep Singh Gill's message and turns it into a concrete direction for the French-speaking world. He calls on the Francophonie to prove by example that linguistic diversity can be a driver of innovation, through open resources, pooled data, and human capacities distributed worldwide.
He argues that the French-speaking world must become a "living laboratory" with open corpora, shared data, multilingual models, and talent trained across all five continents . He adds that diversity is not an obstacle but an accelerator of innovation, and that what the Francophonie succeeds in doing can be taken up by other linguistic communities .
on: Linguistic and cultural diversity is a condition for truly universal AI
The global concentration of computing power and AI capabilities in a handful of countries creates a strategic, economic, cultural, and geopolitical imbalance; the key question becomes whether everyone can truly participate in the transformation now underway (Henri Monceau)
Arg. 3Henri Monceau explains that AI is spreading very rapidly even as the means to produce it remain overwhelmingly concentrated. For him, the central issue is no longer whether AI will transform societies, but who will truly be able to participate in that transformation.
He draws on the independent scientific report on AI to say that no technology has ever spread so quickly, while also noting that 75% of the world's AI-dedicated computing power is located in the United States and 15% in China, leaving only a residual share for the rest of the world . He adds that this concentration is at once technological, economic, cultural, linguistic, and geopolitical, turning the issue into one of effective participation in the ongoing transformation .
on: Digital sovereignty depends on infrastructure, data, computing capacity, and effective participation in AI value chains
on: The immediate priority for African and French-speaking countries: regulation first, or infrastructure/innovation and capacity-building in parallel
The OIF resource center must help States engage with normative and regulatory texts using AI-based tools, in order to strengthen their governance capacities (Henri Monceau)
Arg. 4Henri Monceau describes the OIF resource center as a practical support instrument for French-speaking States. The aim is to give them tools for analysis and engagement with normative and regulatory corpora in order to strengthen their decision-making autonomy and governance capacities.
He explains that the resource center was developed to support French-speaking States on these issues and that an AI-based tool is currently being built with a laboratory based in Dakar . He specifies that this tool must enable governments and digital stakeholders to query regulatory and normative texts in a precise and tailored way so as to engage with this collective intelligence .
on: Francophone participation in standardization and the harmonization of frameworks is a strategic issue
The ITU sees this forum as a direct contribution to the upcoming global debates on AI governance and advocates international cooperation geared toward an inclusive digital future (Doreen Bogdan-Martin)
Arg. 1Doreen Bogdan-Martin presents the forum as a useful opportunity to inform the upcoming international discussions on AI governance. She emphasizes cooperation among international institutions and the collective building of an inclusive digital future that benefits everyone.
She explicitly links the forum’s themes to the discussions scheduled a few days later during the first United Nations global dialogue on AI governance, co-organized by the ITU, UNESCO, and the United Nations . She concludes by stating that it is together that stakeholders will build a more inclusive digital future that benefits everyone .
on: The need for Francophone, multilateral, and inclusive governance of digital technology and AI
The forum’s discussions should feed into broader platforms such as WSIS and AI for Good, in particular by placing AI back within a development perspective (Doreen Bogdan-Martin)
Arg. 2For Doreen Bogdan-Martin, the forum’s discussions must not remain isolated but should feed into the major international processes already underway. She explicitly places AI within a development framework, in connection with AI for Good and the WSIS Forum.
She presents AI for Good as a key ITU initiative mobilizing tools, technical expertise, and global multistakeholder networks . She adds that the annual WSIS Forum, organized in parallel, will make it possible to discuss AI in a development context, and hopes that the day’s exchanges will inspire the summit discussions the following week .
on: Digital transformation must be centered on citizens, uses, and skills, rather than on the mere digitization of procedures
The French-speaking world has unique strengths to advance digital governance that is safer, more sovereign, and more inclusive, contributing to the debates of International Geneva (Omar Zniber)
Arg. 1Omar Zniber argues that the Francophonie provides a relevant framework for addressing the challenges of digital technology and AI. He sees the forum as a platform for exchanges capable of concretely informing the debates taking place in Geneva on digital governance.
He recalls that digital technology and AI are profoundly transforming economies, administrations, education, and healthcare, while also offering an opportunity to advance the sustainable development goals, improve public services, and enhance competitiveness . He adds that data protection, the digital divide, ethics, and digital sovereignty are major challenges, and asserts that the French-speaking world has the necessary strengths to build an ecosystem that is safer, more sovereign, and more inclusive, whose conclusions can inform future debates in International Geneva .
on: Digital transformation must be centered on citizens, uses, and skills, rather than on the mere digitization of procedures
Linguistic diversity must be ensured within international bodies and in the uses of AI in order to enrich dialogue and the ability to live together (Omar Zniber)
Arg. 2Omar Zniber insists that linguistic diversity is not a secondary issue but a governance imperative. In his view, AI must be mobilized to strengthen this diversity, particularly in international organizations, in order to reinforce dialogue among societies.
He concludes by stressing the need to harness everything AI has to offer to ensure and uphold linguistic diversity within international bodies . He directly links this objective to enriching dialogue and to the ability to live and understand one another together .
on: Linguistic and cultural diversity is a condition for truly universal AI
The multistakeholder model has been the key to the success of Internet governance and must remain the foundation of effective governance in the face of the growing complexity of the digital sphere (Janis Karklins)
Arg. 1Janis Karklins argues that Internet governance has worked because it is based on a diversity of stakeholders, each bringing specific expertise. He believes this approach must remain central to addressing increasingly complex digital issues.
He explains that, since the World Summit on the Information Society, the multistakeholder approach has enabled the Internet to become an open, stable, secure, resilient, and interoperable global ecosystem . He stresses that no single actor alone has all the necessary expertise or authority, and that decisions are more robust when they draw on governments, the private sector, civil society, academia, the technical community, and international organizations . He adds that the WSIS+20 review reaffirmed the multistakeholder model as the foundation of effective governance .
on: Technical cooperation and concrete partnerships are necessary to strengthen digital autonomy
Good governance is not limited to legal regulation: it also requires infrastructure, standards, shared resources, and an indigenous capacity for innovation (Henri Verdier)
Arg. 1Henri Verdier argues that effective AI governance cannot rely solely on legal texts. It also requires a material and institutional foundation: infrastructure, open standards, shared resources, and the innovation capacity of those seeking to regulate.
In his final response, he argues that it is not enough to write good regulations if the conditions for implementing them do not exist, especially in a context where the rule-based multilateral order is under strain . He specifies that it is necessary to build the infrastructure, open databases, computing centers, and industrial policies that will make possible an AI grounded in law and reason . Earlier, he had also indicated that good governance includes regulation, but also open standards, public infrastructure, voluntary norms, and codes of conduct .
on: Digital sovereignty depends on infrastructure, data, computing capacity, and effective participation in AI value chains
on: The immediate priority for African and Francophone countries: regulation first, or infrastructure/innovation and capacity-building in parallel
The massive underrepresentation of Francophone data in AI models creates not only a knowledge deficit, but also a bias in the very way questions are understood and framed (Henri Verdier)
Arg. 2Henri Verdier explains that the problem is not only quantitative—that is, the lack of Francophone content—but also cognitive. Models trained predominantly in English carry implicit representations that shape the very understanding of questions and concepts.
He notes that the vast majority of training data is Anglophone, then explains that models calculate probabilities from linguistic corpora that convey deep-seated representations . To illustrate this bias, he uses the literary example of the difference between “solitude” in French and “soledad” in Spanish: the same question can be interpreted differently depending on the linguistic universe in which the model was trained . He also adds the example of American constitutional conceptions of corporate personhood, which can permeate Anglophone models .
on: Linguistic and cultural diversity is a condition for truly universal AI
The opposition between regulation and innovation is misleading: good regulation can support innovation, while bad regulation can hinder it; the political challenge is to steer innovation toward social progress rather than dystopian uses (Henri Verdier)
Arg. 3Henri Verdier rejects the idea of an automatic antagonism between regulation and innovation. On the contrary, he advocates an approach in which the quality of regulation matters, and in which the central issue becomes the political direction of innovation toward democratic and socially desirable ends.
He gives the example of French gastronomy, which is highly regulated yet successful, to show that regulation and excellence can coexist . He then cites European aeronautics, explaining that higher safety standards enabled Europe to gain market share against Boeing . Finally, he argues that innovation is not always synonymous with progress and can also serve dystopian projects, hence the need for political intervention, democracy, and collective decision-making .
on: The opposition between regulation and innovation is misleading; the real issue is finding a balance of trust
A key indicator of success would be the emergence of foundation models designed as a common good, combined with a diversity of innovators and strong AI literacy across societies (Henri Verdier)
Arg. 4Henri Verdier proposes three medium-term success criteria: accessible foundation models as a common good, genuine diversity among innovators to address varied needs, and the widespread expansion of AI literacy. In his view, these three dimensions are inseparable if we want to avoid passive dependence on a handful of dominant solutions.
He first argues that foundation models should become a common good of humanity, accessible without permission and inherently multilingual . He then contends that a wide diversity of solutions tailored to varied contexts is needed-for example, for tropical agriculture or different health systems-which in turn requires a diversity of innovators . Finally, he believes that AI literacy must become as important as basic literacy in order to avoid creating a humanity of passive consumers .
on: Approaches to digital sovereignty: strategic autonomy through standards, sovereignty through data and local computing, or global commons
AI literacy must become as essential as basic literacy if we want to avoid creating a humanity of passive consumers of automated systems (Henri Verdier)
Arg. 5Henri Verdier considers the educational dimension to be central to AI governance. It is not just a matter of learning how to use tools, but of enabling individuals to remain autonomous, critical, and dignified in the face of automation.
In his vision of the three victories to be achieved, he states that AI literacy must be regarded as being as important as basic literacy . He justifies this by explaining that we must not create a humanity of passive consumers of technological solutions, but rather people capable of using AI in a thoughtful and dignified way .
on: Digital transformation must be centered on citizens, uses, and skills, rather than on the mere digitization of procedures.
The central risk is that of an AI trained on only a limited fraction of human experience, marginalizing entire languages and traditions; cultural diversity is therefore a condition for the universality of AI (Amandeep Singh Gill)
Arg. 1Amandeep Singh Gill argues that today’s AI is built on an incomplete vision of humanity, because its large models are trained on overly limited corpora. He concludes that cultural and linguistic diversity is not a moral add-on, but an essential condition for AI to be truly universal.
He explains that large models are trained on only a fraction of human experience, while thousands of languages and legal, philosophical, medical, and poetic traditions remain absent from or marginalized in the corpora . He describes this risk as “civilizational,” warning that an intelligence could mistake part of humanity for humanity as a whole . He adds that a global AI should be judged by its capacity to embrace the plurality of ways of speaking, knowing, and being, and that cultural diversity is the very condition of its universality .
on: Linguistic and cultural diversity is a condition for truly universal AI
Protecting the French language and the discoverability of cultural content are major policy issues; regulation must impose conditions to make Francophone content visible on platforms and connected devices (Anne-Marie Jean)
Arg. 1Anne-Marie Jean argues that cultural and linguistic diversity requires strong public intervention in the digital environment. In her view, the issue is not censoring content, but regulating the conditions of its visibility so that Francophone content remains accessible and is genuinely chosen.
She explains that cultural practices are shifting to digital platforms, whose algorithms increasingly determine what citizens do or do not see, while original cultural content in French is declining sharply, especially among young people . She then presents Quebec’s Bill 109, adopted in December 2025, which aims to protect the discoverability of Francophone cultural content by imposing requirements on platforms and connected-device manufacturers so that national platforms and content produced in Quebec are visible and accessible . She finally links this objective to AI by explaining that well-structured Francophone data is also needed in these systems .
on: Linguistic and cultural diversity is a condition for truly universal AI
The example of Quebec’s cultural sector shows that a highly regulated environment can, on the contrary, enable creation, equity, and innovation (Anne-Marie Jean)
Arg. 2Anne-Marie Jean uses the example of Quebec’s cultural sector to challenge the idea that regulation necessarily harms innovation. She argues that a structured framework can, on the contrary, protect creators, ensure equity, and promote international outreach.
She describes Quebec’s cultural sector as highly regulated, with copyright laws, associations, and unions, while emphasizing that this has never prevented Quebec creators from innovating and achieving international reach . She concludes that this regulatory environment is precisely what enables artists and creators to develop their projects in a fair and equitable way .
on: The opposition between regulation and innovation is misleading; the real issue is striking a balance of trust
The real balance to be sought is the one that creates trust; technical standards serve to demonstrate reliability, interoperability, and market access by connecting innovators, investors, and regulators (Léna Dargham)
Arg. 1Léna Dargham believes that the real debate is not about setting regulation against innovation, but about finding the balance that inspires trust. She presents standardization as a discreet but essential technical mechanism for making solutions credible, interoperable, and commercially viable.
She explains that the decisive question is how to create trust and demonstrate that solutions are reliable, interoperable, and connectable to international markets . She adds that standards create a common language between the innovator, the investor, the international market, and regulators, and that regulation supported by harmonized standards can make this balance concrete and effective .
on: The opposition between regulation and innovation is misleading; the real issue is a balance of trust
Standards are also instruments of sovereignty, because those who draft them are, in practice, writing the rules of the market; the absence of Francophone countries from these bodies condemns them to applying standards designed elsewhere (Léna Dargham)
Arg. 2Léna Dargham shows that standardization is not merely technical: it concretely structures economic exchanges and therefore relations of sovereignty. If Francophone countries do not participate in developing standards, they lose influence and are then compelled to comply with rules defined by others.
She states that the standard is the language of the market and the technical foundation of regulation, so that the countries that draft standards are in fact drafting the rules of the market . She also notes that a participation barometer showed a major deficit among Francophone countries, particularly developing ones, in the development of international standards, which means they effectively leave the decision to other countries .
on: Digital sovereignty depends on infrastructure, data, computing capacity, and effective participation in AI value chains
on: Ways of approaching digital sovereignty: strategic autonomy through standards, sovereignty through data and local computing, or global commons
The main obstacle to the participation of Francophone countries in international standard-setting work is the lack of access to technical documents in French, which weakens their influence over global rules (Léna Dargham)
Arg. 3Léna Dargham identifies a major linguistic and capacity-related obstacle to the participation of Francophone countries in international standardization. Without access to technical documents in French, many national experts can neither follow nor meaningfully influence the work.
She explains that the network observed a huge lack of participation by developing Francophone countries in international standard-setting work . She specifies that this deficit is due in particular to a lack of national expertise, but above all to the absence of access to technical documentation in French, which prevents many experts, especially African ones, from participating in voting and in the development of standards .
on: Francophone participation in standardization and the harmonization of frameworks is a strategic issue
The Francophone standardization network is developing a machine translation platform for draft standards in order to strengthen members’ participation in voting and drafting (Léna Dargham)
Arg. 4To address the participation deficit, Léna Dargham presents an operational solution led by the French-speaking standardization network. The idea is to reduce the language barrier and enable more member involvement in international processes.
She announces the development of a machine translation platform for draft standardization documents produced notably by ISO and IEC . She explains that this tool should enable members to circulate these texts at the national level, consult stakeholders, and participate actively rather than passively in voting and drafting .
on: Francophone participation in standardization and the harmonization of frameworks is a strategic issue
In the long term, success will be measured by Francophone leadership in international technical committees and by stronger national uptake of standards by innovators and businesses (Léna Dargham)
Arg. 5Léna Dargham proposes success indicators focused on influence and ownership. In her view, real progress would mean that Francophone countries no longer merely follow international standards, but help lead them and effectively implement them within their national ecosystems.
She states that, within five years, there should be Francophone leadership in the development of international standards, with an presence in drafting and in the governance of technical committees . She adds that another important indicator would be the accessibility of standardization documents in French and their national uptake by entrepreneurs and innovators, including through certification and access to international markets .
It would be useful to map existing regulations across the Francophone sphere and explore forms of harmonization that avoid simply copying and pasting external models (Léna Dargham)
Arg. 6Léna Dargham suggests a collective approach to regulatory harmonization within the Francophonie. She is not advocating automatic uniformity, but rather structured work on best practices to avoid the mechanical importation of external frameworks.
She invites reflection on the appropriate level of harmonization among national, regional, and international regulations . She cites examples of harmonized regulations in other fields and proposes that the OIF map existing regulations in member countries in order to work toward potential harmonization that avoids random copy-pasting .
on: Francophone participation in standardization and the harmonization of frameworks is a strategic issue
on: The appropriate level of standard-setting action: building primarily national/proactive rules, or moving toward Francophone/international harmonization of regulations
The issue is not choosing between regulation and innovation, but building smart, proportionate regulatory frameworks that support innovation while protecting citizens (Lacina Konaté)
Arg. 1Lacina Konaté rejects a binary view that pits regulation against innovation. He argues that the goal is to build frameworks that are protective enough to inspire trust and protect citizens, without stifling technological development.
He argues that the real debate is not about choosing between regulation and innovation, but about creating conditions of trust that allow innovation to thrive while protecting citizens . He adds that insufficient regulation creates risks, while excessive regulation hampers innovation, hence the need for smart, proportionate frameworks .
on: The opposition between regulation and innovation is misleading; the real issue is a balance of trust
For African countries, the state's priority must be proactive regulation centered on citizens and data governance, so as not to undergo another technological revolution without taking part in it (Lacina Konaté)
Arg. 2Lacina Konaté believes that Africa must not repeat past experiences in which it underwent technological revolutions without being able to shape them. He advocates proactive regulation based on citizens' needs and well-managed data governance.
He recalls that Africa did not truly take part in previous industrial revolutions and highlights the scale of its demographic growth, which creates absorption challenges for schools, hospitals, and services . He argues that regulation has too often been designed around technologies rather than citizens, creating confusion between digitization and transformation . He concludes that the priority for African states is to seize this revolution proactively, with appropriate data governance .
on: Digital sovereignty depends on infrastructure, data, computing capacity, and effective participation in AI value chains
on: The relevant level of normative action: building primarily national/proactive rules or moving toward Francophone/international harmonization of regulations
Africa has real material assets, particularly in energy, that can underpin computational sovereignty and attract AI infrastructure closer to the data and the needs it serves (Lacina Konaté)
Arg. 3Lacina Konaté argues that Africa does not lack the structural assets needed to host AI capacity, particularly in terms of energy. In doing so, he overturns the narrative of dependence by presenting Africa as a potentially central location for the deployment of computing infrastructure.
He notes that only 2% of the data controlled on AI servers comes from Africa, which shows the gap that remains to be closed in data governance . But he adds that Africa receives about 3,000 hours of sunshine per year and cites estimates of energy capacity capable of powering thousands of AI servers . He then questions the logic of keeping infrastructure far from energy sources and data, especially as the United States faces an energy deficit and the geopolitics of energy becomes increasingly central .
on: How to approach digital sovereignty: strategic autonomy through regulation, sovereignty through data and local computing, or global commons
Digital transformation is not the same as simply digitizing procedures; putting forms online without redesigning services around citizens does not amount to genuine transformation (Lacina Konaté)
Arg. 4Lacina Konaté draws a clear distinction between administrative digitization and the genuine transformation of public services. In his view, digitizing existing procedures without rethinking their underlying logic merely moves paperwork online without improving citizens’ lives.
He explains that, in many countries, ministries are said to be digitalized when in fact they have only put existing paperwork online . He adds that citizens still have to carry their data from one administration to another, which shows that systems are not designed around their needs .
on: Digital transformation must be centered on citizens, uses, and skills, rather than on the mere digitization of procedures
Africa's challenges require a deep understanding of demographic, social, and economic needs; digital technology must be conceived as a cross-cutting response to access to essential services, not as a standalone sector (Lacina Konaté)
Arg. 5Lacina Konaté argues that digital technology must be understood as a systemic response to large-scale challenges, not as just another technical field. He stresses the urgency created by demographic growth and the need to think in terms of essential services that must be made accessible.
He explains that, given the rapid growth of Africa’s population, the issue is not simply to have hospitals or banks, but to provide health, banking, and administrative services at scale . He argues that the digital economy and transformation are not a vertical sector but a cross-cutting one, and that real issues must first be understood before invoking political will alone .
on: Digital transformation must be centered on citizens, uses, and skills, rather than on the mere digitization of procedures
Universities and training systems must adapt, because the AI revolution affects every field and requires a rethinking of the skills being taught (Lacina Konaté)
Arg. 6Lacina Konaté considers that the current revolution requires a profound adaptation of higher education and curricula. In his view, training inherited from the past is no longer sufficient to prepare societies for the cross-cutting transformations driven by AI and digital technologies.
In response to a question about universities, he states that this revolution affects all fields and does not concern technology alone . He cites the example of China, which is said to have eliminated 12,000 university degrees, to illustrate the idea of a deep reform of curricula and the skills being taught .
Sound Internet governance is a prerequisite for AI development; preserving fundamental technical resources is therefore strategic for Africa (Lacina Konaté)
Arg. 7Lacina Konaté emphasizes that AI cannot develop sustainably without a well-governed internet technical foundation. He thus links AI issues to the more fundamental ones of Internet governance and the preservation of critical technical resources.
During the signing of the partnership with AFNIC, he recalls that the technical community has made a major contribution to understanding Internet governance issues in Africa . He states explicitly that there is no artificial intelligence without good Internet governance, and that these foundational resources must be preserved for Africa .
on: Technical cooperation and concrete partnerships are necessary to strengthen digital autonomy
The central issue of regulation is also political: we need to know who regulates, for whom, and in service of what collective purpose (L’auditoire)
Arg. 1A participant from the audience refocuses the debate on the political legitimacy of regulation. In his view, the real challenge is not merely to produce rules, but to determine which actors write them, for whose benefit, and in pursuit of what collective interest.
The speaker explicitly asks, “who is going to regulate?”, “for whom are we regulating?”, and “for what purpose?”, warning that rules are often written by actors with a direct stake in the issue . He draws on the examples of French gastronomy, the pharmaceutical industry, and the GDPR to show that regulatory frameworks often reflect situated interests, whereas AI should be conceived of as a common good .
on: The opposition between regulation and innovation is misleading; the real issue is finding a balance of trust
on: The relevant level for normative action: primarily building national/proactive rules or moving toward Francophone/international harmonization of regulations
Practical cooperation already exists among technical actors, researchers, and institutions from different regions, showing that it is possible to build shared capacities despite asymmetries in capital (L’auditoire)
Arg. 2Another participant from the audience emphasizes that useful international collaborations already exist, showing that capacity-building is possible beyond the major centers of economic power alone. His remarks are meant to introduce a note of optimism and to remind us that scientific and technical cooperation is already producing tangible results.
He cites the contribution of European scientists, particularly from ETH Zurich, to recent generations of Nvidia chips to show that expertise is not concentrated solely in large companies . He also mentions the Alps computing center in Switzerland and the ICANN/International Compute for AI Network developed with Finland and Data Science Africa in Kenya, where African researchers are working on issues linked to the Sustainable Development Goals despite limited access to infrastructure and data .
on: Technical cooperation and practical partnerships are necessary to strengthen digital autonomy
Naming infrastructures and national registries are building blocks of sovereignty; their cooperation with Smart Africa seeks to strengthen skills, autonomy, and dialogue between the technical community and African governments (Pierre Bonis)
Arg. 1Pierre Bonis presents the partnership with Smart Africa as a concrete driver for strengthening Africa’s digital autonomy. He emphasizes the strategic role of national domain name registries as elements of sovereign infrastructure, carrying technical expertise and enabling dialogue with public authorities.
He explains that the memorandum aims to bring together the networks of African national registries, in particular a network bringing together around twenty top-level domain name registries, with Smart Africa’s initiatives . He specifies that these registries are building blocks of sovereign infrastructure, concentrate expertise and drivers of autonomy, and that cooperation should promote south-south skills transfer as well as constructive dialogue between the technical community and governments .
on: Technical cooperation and concrete partnerships are necessary to strengthen digital autonomy
Session Knowledge Graph
Speakers · Topics · Arguments · Relationships
Several speakers converge on the idea that a structured French-speaking space, connected to international forums, is needed to develop common positions on digital and AI governance. Henri Monceau presents the forum as a multistakeholder dialogue space where states, regulators, technical experts, and civil society jointly build common positions . Doreen Bogdan-Martin explicitly links this forum to the upcoming global discussions on AI governance and calls for building an inclusive digital future together . Omar Zniber stresses the specific strengths of the French-speaking world in feeding International Geneva with concrete exchanges and recommendations . Lastly, Janis Karklins argues for the multistakeholder model as the proven foundation of effective Internet governance, still essential in the face of the digital world’s growing complexity .
The forum responds to the need for a French-speaking space for dialogue to build common positions among states, regulators, technical experts, and civil society (Henri Monceau)
The ITU sees this forum as a direct contribution to the upcoming global debates on AI governance and advocates international cooperation geared toward an inclusive digital future (Doreen Bogdan-Martin)
The French-speaking world has particular strengths to advance safer, more sovereign, and more inclusive digital governance, contributing meaningfully to debates in International Geneva (Omar Zniber)
The multistakeholder model has underpinned the success of Internet governance and must remain the foundation of effective governance in the face of the growing complexity of the digital world (Janis Karklins)
This point is reinforced by work on African digital diplomacy, which underscores that global digital prosperity requires Africa’s participation and the joint mobilization of states, businesses, technical communities, and civil society [S40]. It also echoes the call to reassess and strengthen multistakeholder dialogue after twenty years of Internet governance [S46].
There is strong agreement that global AI can be neither legitimate nor relevant if it marginalizes non-dominant languages, cultures, and corpora. Amandeep Singh Gill warns that large models are trained on only a limited fraction of human experience and that cultural diversity is a condition for the universality of AI . Henri Monceau follows the same logic in calling for La Francophonie to become a laboratory for open corpora, shared data, and multilingual models . Omar Zniber highlights the need to use AI to ensure linguistic diversity within international bodies and enrich dialogue . Henri Verdier adds that the dominance of English-language corpora also produces cognitive biases in the very understanding of questions . Anne-Marie Jean links this requirement to the discoverability of French-language content and the structuring of French-language data in AI .
La Francophonie must become a model laboratory for digital diversity, with open corpora, shared data, multilingual models, and talent trained across several continents (Henri Monceau)
The central risk is that AI trained on only a limited fraction of human experience will marginalize entire languages and traditions; cultural diversity is therefore a condition for the universality of AI (Amandeep Singh Gill)
Linguistic diversity must be ensured within international bodies and in AI uses in order to enrich dialogue and the capacity to live together (Omar Zniber)
The massive underrepresentation of French-language data in AI models creates not only a knowledge deficit, but also a bias in the very way questions are understood and framed (Henri Verdier)
Protecting French and ensuring the discoverability of cultural content are major political issues; regulation must impose conditions to make French-language content visible on platforms and connected devices (Anne-Marie Jean)
This idea is directly supported by the discussions on cultural and linguistic diversity in AI: the dominance of English-language training data is described as a “cognitive injustice” and an “imperialism of knowledge,” hence the need for ecosystems that enable interaction in local African languages [S44].
The speakers largely reject the idea of an automatic antagonism between regulation and innovation. Henri Verdier explains that poor regulation can hinder innovation, but that good regulation can also support it and steer it toward social progress . Léna Dargham argues that the essential thing is to create trust by demonstrating the reliability and interoperability of solutions through standards . Lacina Konaté advocates smart, proportionate regulatory frameworks that protect citizens without stifling innovation . Anne-Marie Jean cites the example of Quebec’s cultural sector, which is highly regulated yet innovative and internationalized . L’auditoire adds that regulation must also be examined politically in terms of its authors, beneficiaries, and collective purpose .
The opposition between regulation and innovation is misleading: good regulation can support innovation, while bad regulation can hinder it; the political challenge is to steer innovation toward social progress rather than dystopian uses (Henri Verdier)
The real balance to be struck is the one that creates trust; technical standards help demonstrate reliability, interoperability, and market access, connecting innovators, investors, and regulators (Léna Dargham)
The issue is not to choose between rules and innovation, but to build smart, proportionate, innovation-friendly regulatory frameworks while protecting citizens (Lacina Konaté)
The example of Quebec’s cultural sector shows that a highly regulated environment can, on the contrary, enable creativity, fairness, and innovation (Anne-Marie Jean)
The central question of regulation is also political: it is necessary to ask who regulates, for whom, and in the service of what collective purpose (L’auditoire)
This framing is consistent with the analysis that standards and regulation must be aligned with digital transformation: standards can complement rules that often lag behind innovation and can serve as de facto governance tools to ensure quality, safety, and security [S39].
There is broad agreement that digital sovereignty cannot be reduced to abstract principles and requires a material and institutional foundation. Henri Monceau starts from the observation of a massive concentration of computing power in the United States and China, raising the question of the rest of the world’s real participation in the transformation under way . Lacina Konaté stresses proactive data governance, the need not to passively endure another technological revolution, and Africa’s energy and structural advantages for hosting AI infrastructure . Léna Dargham reminds us that sovereignty is also at stake in the drafting of standards that become the rules of the market . Henri Verdier argues that infrastructure, standards, open databases, and indigenous capabilities are needed to make regulation effective . Pierre Bonis adds that national registries and naming infrastructures are concrete building blocks of sovereignty and autonomy .
The global concentration of computing power and AI capabilities in a handful of countries creates a strategic, economic, cultural, and geopolitical imbalance; the key question becomes that of everyone’s real participation in the transformation now underway (Henri Monceau)
For African countries, the state’s priority must be proactive regulation centered on citizens and data governance, so as not to undergo yet another technological revolution without taking part in it (Lacina Konaté)
Standards are also instruments of sovereignty, because those who draft them are effectively writing the rules of the market; the absence of French-speaking countries from these bodies condemns them to applying standards designed elsewhere (Léna Dargham)
Good governance is not limited to legal regulation: it also requires infrastructure, standards, shared resources, and independent innovation capacity (Henri Verdier)
Naming infrastructures and national registries are building blocks of sovereignty; their cooperation with Smart Africa aims to strengthen skills, autonomy, and dialogue between the technical community and African governments (Pierre Bonis)
The sources recall that digital sovereignty cannot be purely legal: it also depends on infrastructure and technical capabilities, in a context of strong interdependence and material vulnerabilities such as cables and networks [S43]. African broadband policies also show that competitiveness and participation in digital markets require robust infrastructure, financing, and integration into regional and international dynamics [S42].
The discussions show agreement on the importance of increasing the French-speaking world’s capacity to participate actively in shaping standards and to better harmonize regulatory frameworks. Léna Dargham explains that the lack of access to technical documents in French severely limits the participation of French-speaking countries in voting and standard-setting work, and presents a machine translation platform to address this . Henri Monceau indicates that the OIF resource center is developing an AI tool to help states query and understand standards and regulatory texts . Anne-Marie Jean highlights legislative cooperation tools and shared frameworks among French-speaking states to foster ownership and implementation of common frameworks around discoverability . Léna Dargham also proposes an inventory of existing regulations in order to explore a reasoned harmonization within La Francophonie .
The main obstacle to the participation of French-speaking countries in international standard-setting work is the lack of access to technical documents in French, which weakens their influence over global rules (Léna Dargham)
The French-speaking standardization network is developing a machine translation platform for draft standards in order to strengthen members’ participation in voting and drafting (Léna Dargham)
The OIF resource center must help states engage with standards and regulatory texts using AI-based tools, in order to strengthen their governance capacities (Henri Monceau)
It would be useful to map existing regulations across the French-speaking world and explore forms of harmonization that avoid simple copy-pasting of external models (Léna Dargham)
This point is strongly supported by analyses of digital governance: international standardization is presented as a central lever when regulation struggles to keep pace with innovation, and can become a de facto governance tool [S39]. The role of technical standards as an instrument of voluntary regulation and international interoperability is also explicitly emphasized, notably through the ITU [S46].
Another point of convergence is the idea that digital transformation must be assessed on the basis of the services delivered, social needs, and human capabilities. Lacina Konaté clearly distinguishes transformation from simple administrative digitization and stresses services designed around citizens in areas such as health, banking, education, and public administration . Henri Verdier complements this point by arguing that AI literacy must become as central as basic literacy in order to avoid technological passivity . Doreen Bogdan-Martin places the debates on AI within a development perspective through AI for Good and WSIS . Omar Zniber likewise highlights the effects of digital technology and AI on the economy, public administration, education, and health, as well as their potential for the Sustainable Development Goals and the improvement of public services .
Digital transformation is not the same as simply digitizing procedures; putting forms online without redesigning services around citizens does not constitute real transformation (Lacina Konaté)
African challenges require a deep understanding of demographic, social, and economic needs; digital technology must be conceived as a cross-cutting response to access to essential services, not as an isolated sector (Lacina Konaté)
AI literacy must become as essential as basic literacy if we are to avoid creating a humanity of passive consumers of automated systems (Henri Verdier)
The forum’s discussions must feed into broader spaces such as WSIS and AI for Good, notably by placing AI back within a development perspective (Doreen Bogdan-Martin)
The French-speaking world has particular strengths to advance safer, more sovereign, and more inclusive digital governance, contributing meaningfully to debates in International Geneva (Omar Zniber)
This orientation aligns with the notion of “meaningful connectivity,” defined beyond the mere presence of networks as the real capacity for daily use with adequate devices, bandwidth, and data [S42]. It is also consistent with the emphasis on adapting curricula, training, and digital skills as conditions for effective inclusion [S46].
Participants also agreed on the importance of concrete alliances among technical stakeholders, public institutions, and international networks. Pierre Bonis presented the partnership between AFNIC and Smart Africa as a way to pool registry networks, strengthen skills, and consolidate infrastructure autonomy . Lacina Konaté stated that there can be no sustainable AI without good Internet governance and without preserving core technical resources . The audience highlighted the existence of already operational cooperation among computing centers, researchers, and transnational networks, particularly between Switzerland, Finland, and African researchers . Janis Karklins provided the shared conceptual framework by recalling that multistakeholder cooperation is precisely what has enabled the reliable and interoperable functioning of the Internet .
Naming infrastructures and national registries are building blocks of sovereignty; their cooperation with Smart Africa aims to strengthen skills, autonomy, and dialogue between the technical community and African governments (Pierre Bonis)
Good Internet governance is a prerequisite for the development of AI; preserving fundamental technical resources is therefore strategic for Africa (Lacina Konaté)
Concrete cooperation already exists among technical actors, researchers, and institutions from different regions, showing that it is possible to build shared capacities despite asymmetries in capital (L’auditoire)
The multistakeholder model has underpinned the success of Internet governance and must remain the foundation of effective governance in the face of the growing complexity of the digital world (Janis Karklins)
African digital infrastructure policies show a frequent dependence on external co-financing and partnerships, while also emphasizing the importance of strengthening public-sector capacities to attract funding and coordinate initiatives at the regional level [S42]. Concrete examples of co-financing and a systemic approach to digital projects are also put forward [S45].
These speakers all advocate governance grounded in multilateral or multistakeholder dialogue, rooted in the Francophone sphere but aimed at influencing global forums. Monceau emphasizes building common positions among stakeholders , Doreen Bogdan-Martin links this work to UN processes and WSIS , Zniber highlights the forum’s ability to feed into International Geneva , and Karklins recalls that a plurality of actors is the key to effective digital governance . All of them regard the language issue as structural, not marginal, in AI governance. Amandeep Singh Gill speaks of a civilizational risk if entire languages and traditions remain absent from corpora . Monceau translates this idea into a call to make the Francophonie a multilingual laboratory . Verdier shows that linguistic bias also affects the mental categories of models . Anne-Marie Jean and Omar Zniber extend this observation toward policy responses, respectively through the discoverability of content and the defense of linguistic diversity in international organizations . These speakers share the view that well-designed regulation can generate trust, fairness, and innovative capacity. Verdier illustrates this with gastronomy and aeronautics , Dargham with the role of standards in demonstrating reliability and interoperability , Konaté with the call for smart and proportionate frameworks , and Jean with the example of Quebec’s highly regulated yet creative cultural sector . They share the same material vision of digital sovereignty: it requires locally governed data, computing capacity, technical infrastructure, a presence in standard-setting, and concrete partnerships. Monceau highlights the concentration of compute , Konaté stresses data, energy, and the need for African computational sovereignty , Verdier argues that dedicated infrastructure and standards are needed to regulate effectively , Dargham ties sovereignty to the ability to write standards , and Bonis underscores domain name registries as building blocks of autonomy . These speakers see digital technology and AI above all as instruments of development, services, and human capabilities. Konaté emphasizes citizen-centered services rather than simply putting procedures online . Verdier asserts the need for mass training in the responsible use of AI . Doreen Bogdan-Martin links AI to the development framework and the SDGs through AI for Good and WSIS . Zniber also highlights the potential of digital technology for economies, education, health, and public services .
It is noteworthy that speakers from culture, standardization, Internet governance, and public strategy all arrive at the same conclusion: cultural diversity cannot be defended without concrete technical levers. Anne-Marie Jean speaks about content discoverability and the structuring of Francophone data . Léna Dargham shows that standards write the rules of the market . Verdier connects this to infrastructure, standards, and common resources . Bonis and Konaté anchor this logic in the technical layers of the Internet, particularly registries and core resources .
The debate could have pitted a legal approach against a capacity-building approach, but an unexpected consensus emerged around their complementarity. Monceau starts from the global imbalance in capacities . Konaté insists on the need for proactive regulation, but one grounded in data, infrastructure, and an understanding of the issues . Verdier states explicitly that regulation will not work unless creation also takes place . The audience reinforces this point by giving examples of scientific and technical cooperation already in place to build that capacity .
This consensus is particularly strong because it does not come only from Francophone actors attached to the language, but also from leaders in global governance. Amandeep Singh Gill frames the problem in civilizational terms . Verdier recasts it in technical and cognitive terms . Monceau turns it into a political strategy for the Francophonie . Zniber situates it within diplomacy and the functioning of international organizations .
There is broad consensus on several structuring priorities: the need for inclusive Francophone governance connected to global forums; the central importance of linguistic and cultural diversity in AI; rejection of the simplistic opposition between regulation and innovation; the decisive importance of infrastructure, data, standards, and domestic capabilities; and the need for a citizen- and use-centered digital transformation .
Lacina Konaté states explicitly that, for African governments, “the priority” must be regulation, even if access remains the population’s priority; he advocates proactive regulation to frame data use and avoid merely undergoing the ongoing revolution . Henri Verdier argues, by contrast, that regulation alone is not enough and that no effective regulation is possible without infrastructure, open databases, computing centers, standards, and independent innovation capacity; in his words, “we will not regulate if we do not also create” . Without taking such a direct position, Henri Monceau also steers the debate toward the concrete conditions of sovereignty-infrastructure, sustainability, and the capacity of States to be actors rather than mere users-thereby shifting the focus beyond regulation alone .
For African countries, the State’s priority must be proactive, citizen-centered regulation focused on data governance, so as not to be subjected to a new technological revolution without taking part in it (Lacina Konaté)
Good governance is not limited to legal regulation: it also requires infrastructure, standards, shared resources, and homegrown innovation capacity (Henri Verdier)
The global concentration of computing power and AI capabilities in a handful of countries creates a strategic, economic, cultural, and geopolitical imbalance; the key question therefore becomes whether everyone can truly participate in the transformation now underway (Henri Monceau)
The disagreement is clarified by two complementary frameworks: on the one hand, standards and regulations are seen as necessary to govern rapidly evolving technologies [S39]; on the other, African policy approaches stress that without infrastructure, connectivity, and institutional capacity, digital transformation remains incomplete [S42].
Lacina Konaté emphasizes a response rooted first and foremost in the specific needs of African States, centered on citizens, their data, and their demographic and social urgencies; his approach is one of proactive regulation tailored to each context . Léna Dargham, for her part, calls for reflection on the appropriate level of harmonization across national, regional, and international scales, and proposes that the OIF map existing regulations in order to work toward possible harmonization . A participant from L’auditoire adds a political caveat: even before harmonizing, it is necessary to clarify who writes the rules, for whom, and in whose interest, warning against frameworks copied without reflection, such as the GDPR or certain constitutions . The disagreement, then, concerns less the need for rules than the legitimate scale and the method by which those rules are made.
For African countries, the State’s priority must be proactive, citizen-centered regulation focused on data governance, so as not to be subjected to a new technological revolution without taking part in it (Lacina Konaté)
It would be useful to map the regulations already in place across the Francophone space and explore forms of harmonization that avoid simply copying and pasting external models (Léna Dargham)
The central issue of regulation is also political: we need to know who regulates, for whom, and in the service of what collective purpose (L’auditoire)
This tension reflects a well-documented debate between national regulatory sovereignty and regional or international harmonization. The sources highlight both the importance of national frameworks aligned with ITU decisions and the value of regional coordination of policies and standards [S42]. They also stress that international standards can overcome multilateral deadlock by becoming de facto governance tools [S39].
For Léna Dargham, sovereignty begins with participation in drafting standards, because standards are “the language of the market” and the technical foundation of regulation; not having a seat in these bodies means letting others write the rules . For Lacina Konaté, sovereignty must also be material and computational: governance of African data, deployment of servers, use of African energy resources, and cross-border access to computing power . Henri Verdier emphasizes a third path: making foundation models a common good of humanity, accessible without permission, with a diversity of innovators and widespread literacy . All three advocate a form of autonomy, but they differ on the main lever: standards, sovereign infrastructure, or the global commons.
Standards are also instruments of sovereignty, because those who draft them effectively write the rules of the market; the absence of Francophone countries from these bodies condemns them to applying standards designed elsewhere (Léna Dargham)
Africa has real material assets, especially in energy, that can underpin computational sovereignty and attract AI infrastructure as close as possible to the data and the needs (Lacina Konaté)
A key indicator of success would be the emergence of foundation models conceived as a common good, combined with a diversity of innovators and strong AI literacy across societies (Henri Verdier)
The sources provide a direct framing of this divergence: digital sovereignty is described as plural, encompassing legal and technical approaches as well as approaches centered on the self-determination of citizens and communities [S43]. They also recall the dilemma between national storage of critical data and cross-border data flows in the service of development and the public good [S39].
It is striking that, in a roundtable framed as “regulation versus innovation,” no major speaker argues for the absence of regulation; the real point of friction becomes the actual capacity to enforce the rules. Henri Verdier argues that drafting good texts is not enough and that regulations will remain unenforced without infrastructure, open databases, computing capacity, and homegrown innovation . Lacina Konaté nevertheless gives priority to proactive regulation for African States in order to regain control over data and avoid merely undergoing a new technological revolution . Léna Dargham shifts the ground again by arguing that regulatory sovereignty begins with writing international technical standards . The unexpected disagreement, then, is less “should we regulate?” than “what must we possess for regulation to have an effect?”
While the term sovereignty might appear unifying, the interventions reveal an unexpected divergence over its meaning. Henri Verdier proposes that foundation models should become a global common good, which relativizes a strictly sovereigntist logic . Lacina Konaté, by contrast, speaks of continental and national sovereignty, with servers, energy, and computing capacity located in Africa . Léna Dargham defines sovereignty above all through presence in standard-setting bodies that write the rules of the market . The gap is significant because all three use similar language, but with very different underlying strategies.
The main disagreements concern pathways to action more than end goals: whether to prioritize proactive regulation or the simultaneous building of infrastructure and capacity; the national scale or Francophone/international harmonization; normative sovereignty or computational sovereignty; global commons or the territorial anchoring of resources .
The speakers largely converge on the idea that regulation and innovation are not incompatible: Henri Verdier argues that bad regulation can hamper innovation, but good regulation can instead support it ; Lacina Konaté speaks of smart and proportionate frameworks, neither insufficient nor excessive ; Léna Dargham reframes the debate around trust, reliability, and interoperability as demonstrated by standards ; Anne-Marie Jean draws on the example of Quebec’s cultural sector to show that a highly regulated environment can remain innovative and creative . The disagreement is therefore not about the goal, but about the priority instruments for achieving this balance: law, technical standards, sectoral policies, or data governance.
The opposition between regulation and innovation is misleading: good regulation can support innovation, while bad regulation can hinder it; the political challenge is to steer innovation toward social progress rather than dystopian uses (Henri Verdier) The challenge is not to choose between rules and innovation, but to build smart, proportionate, innovation-friendly regulatory frameworks while protecting citizens (Lacina Konaté) The real balance to seek is the one that creates trust; technical standards help demonstrate reliability, interoperability, and market access by connecting innovators, investors, and regulators (Léna Dargham) The example of Quebec’s cultural sector shows that a highly regulated environment can, on the contrary, enable creation, fairness, and innovation (Anne-Marie Jean)
All agree that linguistic and cultural diversity is essential to legitimate and universal AI: Amandeep Singh Gill stresses that large models cover only a fraction of human experience and that cultural diversity is a condition of universality ; Henri Monceau calls for a Francophone laboratory based on open corpora, shared data, and multilingual models ; Henri Verdier explains that the absence of Francophone data also produces cognitive biases in the very understanding of questions ; Anne-Marie Jean advocates regulation of the discoverability of Francophone content ; Omar Zniber emphasizes linguistic diversity in international bodies and in AI uses . There is strong agreement on the objective, but the means differ: opening corpora, data governance, platform regulation, reform of international bodies, or development of multilingual models.
The central risk is that of an AI trained on only a limited fraction of human experience, marginalizing entire languages and traditions; cultural diversity is therefore a condition for the universality of AI (Amandeep Singh Gill) La Francophonie must become a model laboratory for digital diversity, with open corpora, shared data, multilingual models, and talent trained across several continents (Henri Monceau) The massive underrepresentation of Francophone data in AI models produces not only a knowledge deficit, but also a bias in the very way questions are understood and framed (Henri Verdier) Protecting French and ensuring the discoverability of cultural content are major political issues; regulation must impose conditions to make Francophone content visible on platforms and connected devices (Anne-Marie Jean) Linguistic diversity must be ensured within international bodies and in the uses of AI in order to enrich dialogue and the ability to live together (Omar Zniber)
The speakers share the objective of inclusive, multilateral, and multistakeholder governance: Henri Monceau presents the forum as a place to build common positions among states, regulators, technical experts, and civil society ; Janis Karklins defends the multistakeholder model as the foundation of the Internet’s success and a necessary basis for the future ; Doreen Bogdan-Martin links this forum to the UN’s global dialogue and to international cooperation for an inclusive digital future ; Omar Zniber sees the Francophone space as a useful platform for informing debates in Geneva . The nuance lies in the preferred scale of action: Francophone forum, UN arenas, the global technical community, or Geneva diplomacy.
The forum meets a need for a Francophone space for dialogue to build common positions among States, regulators, technical experts, and civil society (Henri Monceau) The multistakeholder model has made Internet governance successful and must remain the foundation of effective governance in the face of the growing complexity of the digital sphere (Janis Karklins) The ITU sees this forum as a direct contribution to the upcoming global debates on AI governance and advocates international cooperation geared toward an inclusive digital future (Doreen Bogdan-Martin) The Francophone space has particular strengths to advance safer, more sovereign, and more inclusive digital governance, contributing meaningfully to debates in International Geneva (Omar Zniber)
- The forum confirms a growing need for a Francophone space for dialogue on digital and AI governance, capable of bringing together States, regulators, technical experts, parliamentarians, civil society, and academic stakeholders to develop common positions.
- AI governance must be global, inclusive, and multistakeholder; several speakers stressed that the multistakeholder model, already central to Internet governance, remains the most robust foundation for addressing today’s digital complexity.
- Linguistic and cultural diversity was presented as a condition for the universality of AI, not as a secondary issue: models trained primarily in English risk excluding entire bodies of knowledge, traditions, and ways of thinking.
- La Francophonie is being called upon to become a model laboratory for digital diversity, grounded in open corpora, shared data, multilingual models, and the training of talent across several continents.
- The opposition between regulation and innovation was largely rejected: the dominant consensus is that well-designed regulation can support innovation, build trust, protect citizens, and foster sustainable investment.
- Trust was identified as the central objective of a good balance between innovation and regulation; technical standards play a key role here in ensuring reliability, interoperability, market access, and a common language among innovators, investors, and regulators.
- The issue is not only legal: good governance also requires infrastructure, standards, shared resources, governed data, and independent innovation and computing capacity.
- The global concentration of computing power, data, and AI capabilities in a very limited number of actors and countries was presented as a major strategic imbalance, with economic, cultural, and geopolitical implications.
- For Africa and other Francophone countries of the Global South, the challenge is not to catch up with an external model but to build their own proactive trajectory centered on citizens, essential services, data, and infrastructure.
- Digital transformation was distinguished from simple digitization: putting procedures online is not enough; public services must be redesigned based on citizens’ needs and the actual use of data.
- International standards were described as instruments of sovereignty, because those who draft them effectively write the rules of the market; the limited participation of Francophone countries in these processes therefore constitutes a strategic handicap.
- The lack of access to technical and standards documents in French was identified as a concrete obstacle to Francophone participation in international standardization bodies.
- The protection and discoverability of Francophone cultural content were presented as top-tier political issues; the example of Quebec showed that public intervention can target not the content itself, but the conditions of its visibility on platforms and connected devices.
- AI literacy, large-scale training, and the adaptation of universities and skills were described as essential conditions for avoiding passive dependence on systems designed elsewhere.
- Concrete technical cooperation, particularly around naming infrastructures, national registries, computing centers, and shared tools, was seen as an immediate lever for strengthening the digital autonomy and sovereignty of Francophone States.
“"Artificial intelligence is becoming the cognitive infrastructure of our century (...) In what language does it think, and with what memory of the world? (...) The risk is not only technical, it is civilizational."”
“"Make the Francophone world a living laboratory, with open corpora, shared data, multilingual models, and talent trained across five continents. Show that diversity is not an obstacle to innovation, but its accelerator."”
“"The question is not only whether innovation is being hindered by regulation (...) innovation is not always progress (...) without political action, without democracy, and without collective decision-making, we are on the wrong track."”
“"How do we create trust? (...) standardization [is] that invisible pillar that helps innovations (...) demonstrate their reliability and interoperability."”
“"The governance of artificial intelligence does not begin with the algorithm at all. It begins with infrastructure, data, skills, and trust."”
“"Transformation is not digitalization (...) in our countries, citizens have become the state's courier."”
“"Why sit in Ireland or Massachusetts waiting for data instead of going where the energy is? (...) Africa is the new center."”
“"A standard is the language of the market (...) the countries that participate in drafting these standards participate in drafting the rules of the market."”
“"The issue (...) was the discoverability of original French-language cultural content (...) the objective is to ensure that this digital transformation does not come at the cost of cultural erasure."”
“"It is not only that it does not have access to all knowledge, it is that it does not hear the same question."”
“"The AI revolution is emerging in companies worth 1 trillion dollars (...) for 40 years, we tried to protect the commons. Now, we will have to impose the commons on something that is not common by nature."”
“"If we want only to regulate, without any scientific power, without any economic power, without being among those who innovate, we have no chance."”
“"Who is going to regulate? And for whom are we regulating?"”
“"The multilateral order based on the rule of law is somewhat under threat (...) it is not enough to write perfect regulations; they will not be implemented."”
How can an effective balance be built between regulation and innovation in AI and digital technology?
This is the guiding thread of the roundtable. The question is important because insufficient regulation creates risks, while excessive regulation can hinder innovation, investment, and trust.
What concrete conditions make it possible to create trust in AI solutions and digital innovations?
Trust was presented as the central condition for sustainable innovation. This implies a better understanding of the role of reliability, interoperability, standards, and proportionate regulatory frameworks.
How can we prevent the actors who control infrastructure, data, and content from occupying a disproportionate place in shaping the rules?
AI governance is global, but capabilities are highly concentrated. This question is essential to ensure inclusive regulation and to prevent less well-resourced countries from being subjected to standards developed elsewhere.
How can the participation of Francophone countries, particularly developing countries, be strengthened in the drafting of international standards?
Low francophone participation in standard-setting bodies reduces their influence over market rules and the technical standards that shape innovation and digital sovereignty.
What impact does the lack of technical documentation in French have on the ability of Francophone experts to participate in standardization work?
Linguistic access to standards documents was identified as a concrete obstacle to participation. It is a key issue for inclusion, capacity-building, and the normative influence of the francophone sphere.
How can the Francophone world be turned into a laboratory for open corpora, shared data, multilingual models, and talent development?
This avenue aims to turn linguistic diversity into a driver of innovation. It is important for reducing the exclusion of underrepresented languages and traditions in large models.
In what language does AI "think," and how can the plurality of languages, knowledge systems, and worldviews truly be integrated into large models?
The discussion showed that language is not merely a channel for conveying content, but shapes understanding, implicit representations, and access to knowledge. It is therefore a fundamental issue of cultural diversity and universality.
What indicators would make it possible, five years from now, to know whether Francophone AI governance has taken the right direction?
This issue opens up an agenda for monitoring and evaluation. The responses point to several avenues: francophone presence in forums, compute sovereignty, normative leadership, shared multilingual models, diversity among innovators, and AI literacy.
How can continental and national sovereignty in AI be ensured in Africa, particularly with regard to computing, data, and sector-specific uses?
This issue is strategic for avoiding structural dependency. It concerns access to servers, cross-border harmonization, and uses in agriculture, health, fintech, and public administration.
Why are AI infrastructures not developing more in places where renewable energy and certain raw materials are available, particularly in Africa?
The issue involves the geopolitics of energy, the location of computing centers, and global industrial choices. It prompts reflection on the economic, political, and regulatory reasons for this asymmetry.
How can a data governance strategy be developed in African and French-speaking countries before their data is captured elsewhere?
Data was described as the resource that fuels AI. This issue is important for sovereignty, the protection of citizens, and the future capacity for local innovation.
How can digital transformation be concretely distinguished from the mere digitization of procedures?
The discussion showed that an administration can be digitized without being truly transformed. Clarifying this distinction is important for designing public policies centered on citizens rather than merely putting existing processes online.
What role should universities play in striking a balance between regulation, innovation, and digital transformation, particularly in Africa?
This issue is crucial for skills development, curriculum adaptation, and the production of knowledge that is useful for regulation, innovation, and understanding the challenges at stake.
How should university programs and degrees be adapted to the changes brought about by AI?
The issue was raised through the idea of deep curriculum reform. It is important to avoid a mismatch between education systems and the real needs of societies and economies.
Who should regulate AI, for whom is it being regulated, and for what purpose?
This question relates to legitimacy, the interests at stake, and the purpose of the law. It is central to avoiding regulations captured by certain actors or simply copied without contextualization.
At what level should AI and digital regulations be harmonized: national, regional, Francophone, or international?
Harmonization was presented as a practical challenge to avoid disorderly copy-pasting and to build coherent, compatible frameworks tailored to different contexts.
Should existing regulations in Francophone states be identified and compared in order to pinpoint good practices and avenues for harmonization?
This initiative would make it possible to pool the experience of States, support parliamentarians and regulators, and accelerate collective learning across the francophone sphere.
How can essential building blocks such as electronic signatures and digital identity be made legally operational in certain states?
The gap between technical availability and legal recognition is slowing the dematerialization of public services. The issue is important for rapid access to rights and administrative procedures.
How can alignment between regulation and people’s concrete needs in terms of digital public services be accelerated?
The challenge is to ensure that the law does not lag behind essential uses, particularly for civil status records, administrative procedures, and the inclusion of rapidly growing populations.
How can Quebec’s law on the discoverability of Francophone cultural content inspire other Francophone states?
This issue is important because it opens the possibility of transferring or adapting public policy instruments to protect cultural diversity in digital and algorithmic environments.
What are the legislative, regulatory, technical, and institutional prerequisites for implementing discoverability strategies in Francophone countries?
Discoverability was identified as a strategic issue for access to original cultural content in French. Understanding the prerequisites would help support concrete implementation in several countries.
How can platforms and connected devices be made to reinvest funding locally and give visibility to national platforms and content?
This avenue touches on cultural and economic sovereignty. It is important to avoid the erasure of local productions in interfaces dominated by major international platforms.
How can databases that respect copyright be built to support AI systems that promote Francophone and Indigenous content?
The issue is decisive for developing AI systems aligned with cultural diversity, data traceability, and respect for creators.
What role can the OIF Resource Centre play in the field of digital and AI regulation?
The question concerns the tools, capacities, and services that this center could offer francophone States to help them better understand, compare, and apply regulatory and normative texts.
Should Francophone regulatory “sandboxes” be created to experiment with regulatory solutions?
Sandboxes are mentioned as a possible tool for testing regulatory approaches without stifling innovation. This would make it possible to learn through experimentation within a controlled framework.
How can European and Francophone scientific and infrastructure capacities in AI be better leveraged, and what should be required in return when their researchers contribute to major technology companies?
This issue concerns research strategy, value-sharing, and technological sovereignty. It calls for examining the conditions for collaboration between public research and major private platforms.
How can a truly “win-win” model be achieved within the Francophonie between high-income countries and middle- or low-income countries?
Francophone cooperation can only be credible if its benefits are shared. This issue is important to avoid reproducing asymmetries between centers of power and peripheries.
How can regulation be pursued in a context where the rule-based multilateral order is weakened and powerful actors do not necessarily comply with the rules?
This question shifts the debate from drafting standards to the conditions of their effectiveness. It is essential for thinking about the actual implementation of regulations in a conflict-ridden geopolitical context.
How can regulations grounded in law and reason be enforced through non-coercive means, via infrastructure, standards, databases, and industrial policies?
The discussion suggests that writing good texts is not enough. We need to examine the material and institutional levers that make regulation enforceable and credible.
How can foundation models be made a common good of humanity, accessible without permission, multilingual, and open?
This issue opens up a major research and governance agenda around digital commons, open source, and equitable access to the foundational building blocks of AI.
How can a diversity of innovators and AI solutions suited to local contexts be fostered, for example in tropical agriculture or health?
Useful and inclusive AI requires diverse solutions that are closely aligned with actual uses and local realities. This is a matter of development, technological relevance, and cognitive justice.
How can AI literacy be made as important a goal as basic literacy?
The challenge is to avoid reducing humanity to passive consumers of opaque systems. We need a better understanding of the minimum skills required for autonomous, critical, and dignified use of AI.
What systemic risks and self-reinforcing spirals can AI generate in relation to mining, conflict, pollution, and detachment from reality?
This intervention highlights a need for research on the cumulative externalities of AI and on how certain uses may exacerbate the very crises they claim to address.
How can we prevent governance models and decisions from drifting further and further away from the real world they claim to represent?
The issue is important for the quality of public decision-making, the robustness of models, and the prevention of systemic errors amplified by automation.
How can we develop native language models grounded in the languages, data, and contexts specific to Francophone regions?
This avenue was explicitly linked to a future workshop. It is important for reducing dependence on English-dominated models and for grounding AI in diverse linguistic and cultural realities.